Command Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN
Nimitz “Graybook”
7 December 1941 – 31 August 1945

Volume 1 of 8

Running Estimate and Summary
maintained by Captain James M. Steele, USN,
CINCPAC staff at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
covering the period 7 December 1941 to 31 August 1942

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contains the CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet) staff’s “running
estimate of the situation” and summary of command decisions, as well as key dispatches
received or originated by CINCPAC headquarters.

The 8 volumes are paginated as follows:

**Volume 1** (7 December 1941 to 31 August 1942): pages 1 - 861
**Volume 2** (1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942): pages 862 – 1262
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**Volume 8** (Selected dispatches concerning the period 30 December 1941 – 30 April 1942
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United States Naval War College, Newport, RI
2013
WAR PLANS
CINCPAC FILES

SECRET

SUBJECT: Captain Steele's "RUNNING ESTIMATE and SUMMARY", covering the period 7 December 1941, to 31 August, 1942.

FILE

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ: DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION

December 7 - The war opened with the attack of Japanese aircraft on Oahu. When the first Japanese aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor about 0750 LCT, forces were distributed as follows:

Task Force Three- INDIANAPOLIS, 5 DMS - at Johnston Island.

Task Force Twelve (composed of units usually part of Task Force Three) - LEXINGTON, Crudiv Four less LOUISVILLE, 5 DD - about 500 miles southeast of Midway, enroute to fly off VMSE-231 to Midway.

Task Force Eight (comprising usual Task Force Two less 3 battleships and one desron) - ENTERPRISE, Crudiv Five less PENSACOLA, 9 DD - returning from transfer of VMF-221 to Wake - about 200 miles west of Pearl.

MINNEAPOLIS and 3 DMS in operating area south of Oahu.

PENSACOLA (Task Group 15.5) in south Pacific, escorting convoy to Far East.

LOUISVILLE (Task Group 15.1) in south Pacific, returning from Far East with two Army transports.

AT MIDWAY
1 VPron; 2 SS

AT WAKE
1 VMFron; 2 SS

AT JOHNSTON
2 PBY-1 of utility squadron

IN NAVY YARD
COLORADO at Bremerton; 5 DD, 1 ODD, 5 SS at Mare Island; 2 CL, 2 CA, 2 SS, 4 DM at Nyd Pearl Harbor.

AT MANILA
BOISE
Enroute Pearl

PELIAS; 4 SS
At SAN DIEGO

SARATOGA, 3 ODD, 6 OSS

At PEARL HARBOR

8 BB (PENN in drydock), 2 CL, 2 OCL, 17 DD, OGLALA, 4 DM, tenders and auxiliaries, 5 SS, 69 VP, 18 VMSB, 32 VJ. (7 of the VP were in the air - 4 at Lahaina, 3 south of Oahu).

On MAUI

7 VJ aircraft

This summary will be chiefly concerned with the situation as to major forces. The enemy air attack, destroyed or immobilized all long range aircraft, with a few exceptions which were able to take off within a few hours. The resulting aircraft search was so thin, that no enemy carrier was sighted.

All battleships had been damaged, at least two irreparable; HELENA, PHOENIX and RALEIGH had received hits; and three destroyers were wrecked in drydock. Other damage was chiefly in auxiliary types.

Three light cruisers and about 20 destroyer types left Pearl Harbor during the raid and shortly after the raid, and were ordered to assemble under Comdesbatfor and join Task Force Eight.

The indications as to enemy position were equally divided between north and south of the island. As a result of contacts with enemy aircraft, a despatch was sent to Task Forces 8, 12 and 3 at 0942 LCT as follows:

"Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching x Some indication enemy force northwest Oahu x Addressees operate as directed ComTaskForce 8 to intercept and attack enemy x Composition enemy force unknown".

Lexington directed not to land marine aircraft at Midway

Then followed on the warning net a false report of two carriers southwest of Barbers Point. On intercepting this report the MINNEAPOLIS sent a despatch which said "two" (instead of "no", as was intended) carriers in sight.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

Comtaskfor 8 acted on these last reports and turned eastward. Radio bearings on radio transmissions identified as being the AKAGI were bi-lateral, both north and south. As a result of mounting indications of a southward position, Comtaskfor 8 was informed at 1046 LCT that the AKAGI bore 178°. A further step in the unfortunate chain of events was that an ENTERPRISE aircraft reported to Comtaskfor 8 that ships to the eastward of him (probably the DETROIT and ships approaching him from Pearl Harbor) were hostile. As a result, a bombing and torpedo flight was put off by Task Force Eight and a light force search and attack was organized for that night.

The view was held for some time that carriers were both north and south of the island. As a result, Task Force Twelve, soon joined by Comscofor in the INDIANAPOLIS, was directed to operate to intercept the supposed southern group, assuming it was proceeding toward Jaluit. A special, distant, VP search, in addition to an all-around search, based on the same assumption, was arranged for the morning of the 8th.

Reports were received of the first air attack on Wake and Guam and of a bombardment at Midway by light craft.

December 8.

No enemy was sighted by the special search to the southwestward and, by the afternoon of the 8th, it appeared from radio intelligence that all of the enemy striking force had been to the northward and had retired northwestward to about 750 miles. Of course they might soon return.

Before Task Force Twelve left the vicinity of Johnston Island, the situation was confused by a report from a patrol plane that it had sighted and attacked an enemy carrier accompanied by one destroyer. Task Force Twelve had turned toward Pearl Harbor in response to an order to that effect. Although reasonably sure that the contact was in error, this Task Force turned to search for this carrier and to support Johnston Island. The final explanation was that the patrol plane had bombed and missed, the PORTLAND, which was separated from the remainder of Task Force 12. In the meantime, the return of that force toward Pearl Harbor had been considerably delayed.

Task Force Eight operations made no contacts, and ENTERPRISE with the units which had been with her on the trip to Wake entered Pearl for fuel. The units which had left Pearl on the 7th operated to the northward of Oahu under the command of Comdesbatfor.

SARATOGA left San Diego for Pearl on the 8th.
Commander Task Force Eight was strongly of the opinion that all carriers should be employed in ferrying air reinforcements to Oahu. This view was agreed to with reservations by CinCPac and urgent request for aircraft was submitted to Opnav (See 090253).

December 9.

Task Force Eight's stay in Pearl Harbor was made as short as possible and it departed early on the 9th and took up patrol in the area to the northward of Oahu, in combination with Comdesbatfor's force. This disposition was considered favorable for action against the enemy striking group should it return for another attack.

Task Force Twelve continued toward Pearl Harbor, and plans were made to send an oiler out to fuel it at sea so that the carrier would not be exposed to air attack in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, Opnav's despatch 091812, quoted in the following summary, should be noted.

Communication with Guam was lost on this date.

See Opnav despatch 090139 which modified the War Plan to exclude all offensive tasks except "Raid enemy sea communications and positions", and to limit defense to territory to east of the 160th meridian.

Enemy was reported to have occupied Makin in the Gilberts, and landing at Tarawa. Land offensive was started against Malaya; bombing against Cavite. PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE were sunk.

December 10.

The only change made in disposition this date was that Task Force Twelve was ordered to make Westings in order to expedite action in case plans, which were being considered for increased protection of Midway and Wake, were adopted. This force was attempting to fuel but was being delayed on account of rough weather.

It was beginning to be seen that all carriers could not be employed in transporting aircraft from the Coast.

Wake had received three bombings, and on this date repulsed what appeared to be a landing attack by cruisers, destroyers and transports.

Landings were reported on Luzon.

At this time the Estimate, dated December 10th, which follows, was prepared. The tentative plans which are a part of the Estimate are marked with notes as to the action which was taken in regard to them.
SECNAV TO CINCPAC

08 0450

Despite security measures in effect surprise attack by Japanese bombing planes damaged all battleships except Maryland. Moderate damage to Tennessee and Pennsylvania. Arizona total wreck. West Virginia resting on bottom still burning. Oklahoma capsized. California resting on bottom. Nevada moderate damage. Beached x Utah and Oglala capsized x Honolulu. Helena and Raleigh damaged and unfit for sea. Vestal damaged and beached x Curtiss moderate damage x Destroyers Shaw Cassin Downes in drydock complete wrecks x As result of attack Army airplane losses severe x There remain 13 B17 nine B18 and about 30 pursuit planes x Approximately 10 patrol planes remain available x Oahu x 1 Patrol plane squadron at Midway. Recommend all available Army bombers be sent to Oahu x Fire opened promptly by all ships and a number of enemy aircraft destroyed x 1 Enemy submarine sunk possibly 2 more x 2 carriers 7 heavy cruisers 3 squadrons destroyers and all available planes searching for enemy x Personnel behavior magnificent in face of furious surprise attack x Personnel casualties believed to be heavy in Oklahoma and Arizona.

OPNAV TO CINCPAC

08 1700

As soon as possible assemble BatDiv 3, Yorktown and one squadron modern destroyers at Norfolk, prepare them immediately for transfer to Pacific Fleet. Desire Yorktown have full plane complement plus appropriate spares except reduce torpedo planes to 12 and replace the six torpedo planes transferred by six dive bombers. Transfer three squadrons patrol bombers to Pacific Fleet immediately x Separate dispatch directs you reinforce Canal Zone x You are authorized withdraw all capital ships and carriers from Iceland if you desire x
OPNAV TO CINCPAC, CINCAF

MAKE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO WPL 46 EFFECTIVE ON RECEIPT:
PAR 3211 (Task Forces) DELETE TEXT SUBPAR C (Guam) AND ADD "HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES" X ADD SUBPAR D "NAVAL DEFENSE FORCES, WAKE, WHICH CAN BE REASSIGNED TO NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IF DESIRES" X PAR 3212 (Tasks) DELETE SUBPARS A (Divert by denial and captures of Marshalls), B (Prepare to capture Marshalls and Carolines), D (Support British south of equator between 155° E and 180°), F (Defend Guam, Category F) X MAKE SUBPAR G (Protect communications) NEW SUBPAR A X ADD NEW SUBPAR B AS FOLLOWS "SUPPORT THE ARMY IN THE DEFENSE OF THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORY OF DEFENSE D" X ADD NEW SUBPAR DOG AS FOLLOWS: "RAID ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS" X CHANGE SUBPAR EASY TO READ "DEFEND SAMOA, MIDWAY, JOHNSTON AND PALMYRA ISLANDS CATEGORY OF DEFENSE D" X ADD NEW SUBPAR F AS FOLLOWS "DEFEND WAKE CATEGORY OF DEFENSE C" X ADD TO SUBPAR H (Protect territory) "EAST OF 180TH MERIDIAN" AFTER WORDS "PACIFIC AREA" AND RELETTER AS SUBPAR G" X ADD TO SUBPAR I (Cover Coastal Frontier Forces) "AND THE CANADIAN LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES" AND RELETTER AS SUBPAR H X RELETTER SUBPARS J AND K AS SUBPARS I AND J RESPECTIVELY X

CINCPAC TO OPNAV

09 0253

Imperative additional Army bombers and pursuits be sent here with utmost dispatch X Propose use high speed carrier transportation for pursuits as soon as pursuits available X While carrier transporting pursuits base air group here to augment island force X Advise

OPNAV TO CINCPAC, INFOR TO NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS

09 1812

MY 090139 PLACES COMMANDER HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FULLY UNDER YOUR COMMAND FOR ALL PURPOSES X

YOUR 090253 WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS ARE BENDING EVERY EFFORT TO REINFORCE THE PACIFIC FLEET AND THE ARMY HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, WITH SHIPS, AIRPLANES, TROOPS, AND ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS X YOU WILL BE PROMPTLY INFORMED AS TO PLANS X IN VIEW OF RAID ON WEST COAST IT IS NECESSARY ALSO TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR THAT REGION, ALASKA, AND THE CANAL ZONE X

FOR THIS SAME REASON YOUR COVERING OPERATIONS ASSUME ESPECIAL IMPORTANCE AND IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ESCORTS FOR CONVOYS BETWEEN HAWAII AND WEST COAST X

WHEN CARRIERS ARE USED FOR TRANSPORTING PLANES TO OAHU THEIR OWN COMPLEMENT MAY REINFORCE ARMY AIR DEFENSE OAHU BUT SHOULD BE WELL DISPERSED AMONG DIFFERENT FIeldS AND EFFECTIVELY CAMOUFLAGED X (New par cont'd next page)
BECAUSE OF THE GREAT SUCCESS OF THE JAPANESE RAID ON THE SEVENTH IT IS EXPECTED TO BE PROMPTLY FOLLOWED UP BY ADDITIONAL ATTACKS IN ORDER RENDER HAWAII UNTENABLE AS NAVAL AND AIR BASES, IN WHICH EVENTUALITY IT IS BELIEVED JAPANESE HAVE SUITABLE FORCES FOR INITIAL OCCUPATION OF ISLANDS OTHER THAN OAHU INCLUDING MIDWAY MAUI AND HAWAII.

UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS QUESTIONABLE THAT MIDWAY CAN BE RETAINED BUT IT IS HOPED THAT JOHNSTON PALMYRA AND SAMOA MAY BE.

IN EXPECTATION OF FURTHER AIR RAIDS AND INADEQUACY OF DEFENSES OAHU CNO CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT WOUNDED VESSELS ABLE TO PROCEED UNDER OWN POWER SHOULD BE SENT TO WEST COAST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DUE REGARD TO SAFETY FROM CURRENT RAIDING FORCES AND VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE COUNTER ATTACKS ON THESE RAIDERS BY YOU.

UNTIL DEFENSES ARE INCREASED IT IS DOUBTFUL IF PEARL SHOULD BE USED AS A BASE FOR ANY EXCEPT PATROL CRAFT NAVAL AIRCRAFT SUBMARINES OR FOR SHORT PERIODS WHEN IT IS REASONABLY CERTAIN JAPANESE ATTACKS WILL NOT BE MADE.

CONSIDER IT SPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT SUBMARINES AND TENDERS NOT SUFFER LOSSES SUGGEST WIDE DISPERsal THROUGH THE VARIOUS LOCHS AND PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE CAMOUFLAGE MEASURES.

09 2358 SECNAV TO ALNAV

PLACE IN EFFECT IMMEDIATELY "INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING MARITIME AND AERIAL WARFARE, MAY 1941" EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED FROM TIME TO TIME.

10 2042 CINCPAC TO OPNAV

Since appearance enemy in this area all tactical efforts with all available forces have been vigorously prosecuted toward locating and destroying enemy forces primarily carriers. Our heavy losses have not seriously depleted our fast striking forces nor reduced morale and determination. Pearl must be used for essential supply and overhaul facilities and must be provided with additional aircraft both Army and Navy also relief pilots and maintenance personnel. Pearl channels clear. Industrial establishment intact and doing excellent work. Otherwise your suggestions being carried out.

(Among the foregoing are the directives received prior to the preparation of the Estimate of December 10th which follows.)
BRIEFED ESTIMATE AS OF 10 DECEMBER.

I. OUR MISSION

1. With the losses we have sustained, it is necessary to revise completely our strategy of a Pacific War. The loss of battleships commits us to the strategic defensive until our forces can again be built up. However, a very powerful striking force of carriers, cruisers and destroyers survive. These forces must be operated boldly and vigorously on the tactical offensive in order to retrieve our initial disaster. The Chief of Naval Operations has furnished us with a brief estimate of the present situation as it is known to him and has modified our basic War Plan to agree with this new estimate. The important tasks assigned the Pacific Fleet in this revised plan are briefed below:

(a) Protect sea communication of Associated Powers.
(b) Support the Army in the defense of Hawaii, Samoa, Midway, Johnson and Palmyra in category "D".
(c) Raid enemy sea communications.
(d) Defend Wake in category "C".
(e) Protect territory of Associated Powers in the Pacific Area East of 180° Longitude and prevent extension of enemy power into Western Hemisphere.
(f) Cover Coastal Frontier Forces.

2; In order to approach the general problem and arrive at a general plan of operations, we may condense the above assigned tasks into one broad mission as follows:
WHILE PROTECTING THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS EAST OF 180° BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND
WHILE ENSURING ALLIED SEA COMMUNICATION IN THE PACIFIC BY
COVERING AND ESCORTING, TO DEFEND THE HAWAIIAN AND OUTLYING
ISLAND BASES IN ORDER TO RETAIN A SECURE BASE FOR FURTHER
EXTENSION OF OUR NAVAL CONTROL.

3. This mission is the immediate mission. It is
strategically defensive but an appreciation of the general
world situation clearly demands that the action and disposit-
tions required to carry it out must be boldly offensive.

II. SURVEY OF OPPOSING STRENGTHS

4. POLITICAL FACTORS

Japan is under more or less unified military control.

Our government is more cumbersome for purposes of
making war. The citizenry is probably well unified in support
of the government in this war, but our preparations were de-
layed because we did not have a "full emergency" situation.

Japan's connection with the Axis is useful as a means
of diverting our strength.

Our Associated Powers in the Pacific are woefully
weak, and much weaker today through having lost two capital
ships.

5. ECONOMIC FACTORS. Our national economy is much
stronger than Japan's. It probably was her desperate economic
status which led her to attack us. Each success in the Malay
area will improve her over-all status provided she can make use of the economic accretions in time. Oil is the most critical supply for her. Her island possessions are of course very dependent on the Homeland and other sources for supplies.

6. Our weaknesses are the losses of strategic materials from the area into which the Japs are advancing, and a financial status which may well cause trouble. The lack of resources of Hawaii and other island areas we must defend is also a weakness.

7. PSYCHOLOGIC FACTORS. Japan probably started the war with a will to win based on desperation. Her initial successes at Pearl Harbor, off Malaya, etc., will undoubtedly make her morale very high.

8. Conversely, our losses, occasioned through not being the aggressor, will put a strain on morale, particularly as we probably will not be able to strike back very effectively for a long time. We are on the defensive; Japan has the strategic initiative; - that is hard for us to take. However, our personnel and population can take it when the occasion demands, and they probably will now.

9. The Japanese have proved themselves daring (we underestimated how daring); they have been training hard for years; and they have had much experience at war, including many amphibious operations in recent years. They are probably not as good operators of material as we, but they have proved themselves to be careful and skillful planners.
10. We should show a superiority along these lines, but we must not again under-estimate the Japanese.

11. **ARMED FORCES.** Involvements elsewhere and logistic considerations will strongly influence the nature and strength of forces Japanese send into the Pacific Fleet theater. The forces that attacked Oahu last Sunday included at least two carriers, possibly three or four. Radio intelligence and questioning of prisoners indicates this force may have included two battleships and six carriers. Since no contact was made the strength of the escort, number of auxiliaries used en route, if any, and nature of Covering Force, if any, remain indeterminate.

12. A number of submarines have been sighted in the Hawaiian area. Three to five were sighted today over 100 miles northeastward of Oahu, headed eastward at fifteen knots; indicating they were moving to our Pacific Coast.

13. Light forces and transports, presumably from the Marshalls, have attacked Wake. Cruisers have bombarded Midway. Air and surface craft captured Guam. Some sort of armed expedition gained positions in the Gilberts.

14. Japanese forces sank two British capital ships near Singapore. Other naval forces are operating against the Philippines.

15. It would appear, then, that very strong forces can be sent to the Hawaiian area or even to the Pacific Coast. Early destruction of nearly all opposing battleships will permit the Japanese to employ their own battleships without fear of an opponent stronger in capital ships. Logistic re-
requirements and limitations on numbers of accompanying light forces and aircraft, however, will be a strong deterrent toward their movement as far east as Hawaii. The possibility of such movement must not be lost sight of, particularly as regards ex-battle cruisers. In fact, analysis of captured papers gives some indication that they may have accompanied the 7 December raid on Oahu.

16. Our own available ships in the Hawaiian area are ready about 13-17 December, and COLORADO ready 1 February.

3 CV including SARATOGA arriving 12 December.

3 BB ready about 13-17 December, and COLORADO ready 1 February.

6 CA exclusive of PENSACOLA enroute Suva to Brisbane, LOUISVILLE enroute Samoa to Honolulu, NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO at yard about to proceed to coast for completion of repairs.

2 CL exclusive of BOISE in Asiatic and HONOLULU which is soon to finish repairs.

1 OCL

38 DD four more complete repairs Mare Island 17 December.

4 ODD in 14th Naval District.

4 DM

13 DM3

3 Coast Guard

SS

12 PTB

Various Auxiliaries.
17. Additionally assigned by the Department are 3 BB, 1 CV, 1 Desron, but time of arrival is not yet known.

18. The status of Army and Navy aircraft on Cahu (exclusive of those in ships) is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Heavy bombers</td>
<td>27 more due to arrive on Thursday, Saturday and Sunday (9 each day).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Pursuits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Medium bombers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>Maximum of 6 or 8 more due to be in flying condition within the next 10 days. 3 12-plane squadrons due very soon from west coast, no definite dates yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Scout bombers</td>
<td>Marine planes at Ewa Field, arrived today from LEXINGTON. Of scout bombers at Ewa Field during the raid, 13 can, after a long time, be got back in commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>Marine fighters. These are due Thursday in SARATOGA. 2 VF, of those at Ewa Field during the raid, will soon be back in commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Scout Observa.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>VJ (large)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>VJ (small)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. Three additional patrol squadrons and planes from the First Marine Aircraft Wing have been ordered but have not reported. Additional reinforcements air and otherwise are to be furnished the Army but details are not available.

20. **LOGISTIC SUPPORT.** The Japanese could readily supply Wake, if it should fall into their hands, via the Marshalls. They would have more difficulty as to Midway, but the drain would not be a heavy one.

21. Even in peace time there has been considerable difficulty in our meeting the logistic requirements of outlying bases. It will be much more so now, but it is possible.

22. Deficiencies in the available supplies here are manifold. No exhaustive discussion of that aspect is necessary. Repeated strong representations in the past have only been partially heeded but stronger support may now be expected. As a glaring example, all .50 calibre ammunition from the N.A.D. is exhausted. It is hoped to salvage some from damaged ships. Meeting the logistic needs of the Hawaiian Islands from the mainland, and supplying our outlying bases will impose heavy demands on this fleet for convoy work.

23. **ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION**

23. In considering enemy courses of action it must be remembered that while Japan has a great superiority at present she has also many commitments, especially in troops. Without more definite information of how things actually are in the Far East, it is difficult to estimate just how much of her
force will be tied to that theater and how much will be free
to act against us. The factor of size of expeditions required
and distance militates against an attempted landing on Oahu
or any well defended part of our territory. In the presence
of a strong striking force, a landing on any of the other
Hawaiian Islands is unlikely. Landings on outlying islands,
for purposes of occupation, are unlikely except for Wake and
possibly Samoa. The possibility of a landing attempt against
Midway is not to be discarded. It will be influenced by the
results at Wake. Landings for demolition are possible at
Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.

24. It is believed that the great success of the initial
surprise raid was not anticipated. Otherwise it would have
been followed up immediately. It may still be, but by the
same or other group of carriers from the homeland and with con-
sequent delay. The original raiding force is now believed
homeward bound but we may expect vigorous and daring operations
by fast striking forces, raiders and submarines.

25. From the Japanese viewpoint, and that is the point
of view we must adopt as considering her course of action, it
is believed that her most probable operations will be along
following lines:

(a) Raids by fast striking groups of carriers,
cruisers and destroyers on Oahu, Midway and possibly the
Aleutians, the crescendo rising or falling with the opposition
met and losses incurred.
(b) Raids on Wake from shore bases with possible minor landing attempts.

c) Concentrated groups of submarines on focal points of communication between Oahu and mainland, particularly Pearl and West Coast loading ports. A few widely scattered submarines may operate on other routes.

d) Raids on fairly heavy scale on Pearl - West Coast communications. May use fast BB for this occasionally, but cruisers and heavily armed merchant raiders will be the rule.

e) Covering or supporting groups of heavy forces including battleships must be anticipated when seeking or pursuing enemy forces outside the range of our shore based aircraft.
OWN COURSES OF ACTION

23. The general considerations guiding our course of action must be the purpose of our mission - to retain a secure base for further operations and extension of our control. To do this, we must both prevent further raids on Oahu, while building up its means of defense against aircraft. This latter is an Army responsibility, but we must further it by insuring arrival of reinforcements, particularly aircraft and AA defense. At the same time, our deployment must be governed by necessity for covering our territory and allied communications as well as for the interception and damaging of enemy raiding forces. If we damage the raiding forces every time they enter the area, preferably before, but certainly after an attack, the raids will become smaller and fewer and eventually cease. We can then project operations of our own from a secure base.

24. We cannot intercept raids or contribute to defense of Oahu from the West Coast, therefore we must maintain striking forces in the area, accepting the existing weakness of Pearl Harbor AA defense, but overcoming it by keeping our forces at sea. Carriers, cruisers and destroyers must, therefore, replenish and get what relaxation they can, at Pearl with a possibility of periodic return to Coast as reinforcements are received. As security of Pearl is increased it will be possible to afford further rest and upkeep periods there.
25. Since attacks must come from the westward, and so long as we hold the Midway, Johnston, Palmyra line probably from the area north of the Hawaiian chain, they should usually be disposed north and west of Oahu. In such area they not only cover Oahu but are in a favorable position for supporting Midway, can be promptly moved toward the Aleutians, or to intercept a force moving toward or away from our West Coast.

26. Protection of sea communications; defense of outlying bases, particularly Wake and Samoa, and protection of far flung territory requires a wide dispersal of forces. Defense of Oahu requires concentration sufficient to detect and overcome the force sent against it. The two requirements are diametrically opposed in their distribution. Our forces are limited. We must so distribute and dispose them as to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, while minimizing our own losses.

27. Forces basing on Pearl not immediately essential for combat work must be reduced to a minimum. This is particularly true as to battleships, which should be returned to the Coast.

28. With the above as a premise, the following general plan of operations appears feasible and consistent with our assigned tasks:

(a) Employ searching and striking groups of carriers, cruisers and destroyers, replenishing at Pearl, but primarily at sea, in position to intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces and to afford support to menaced bases. The purpose
of these groups is to protect our bases and territory and to cover operations of escort and coastal forces.

(b) Employ battleships with A/S groups composed of suitable DMs, DMSs and DDs, but latter reduced to minimum, in escort between Oahu and Coast.

(c) Depend on Local Defense Forces for escort of coastal convoys on our own West Coast.

(d) Utilize striking groups of (a) above to support defense of outlying island bases. Replenish, reenforce and relieve as personnel and material available and circumstances dictate.

(e) Employ submarines offensively in Japanese waters.

(f) Employ VP primarily in search and security operations. Continue use of Army long range bombers, and own VJ planes to assist.

(g) Give every assistance to Army and insist upon rapid augmentation of their air and AA strength.

DECISION

23. (a) Organize three task forces, each consisting of one CV, 2 or 3 CA, and 6 to 9 DD. Operate one (with 3 CA if practicable) in vicinity of Midway and one to northward of Oahu, the third being either enroute or replenishing at Pearl. This deployment best meets the conditions of supporting defense of our bases, covering our coasts (including Alaska and Canada),
and affording means of replenishing, reenforcing, and relieving
outlying islands by direct and close support during progress
of a specific operation; as British now do with Malta.

(b) On arrival of YORKTOWN organize an additional
similar task force. Maintain one task force at each of the
foregoing stations, while one is enroute to and from or replen-
ishing at Pearl or in support position, and one to the Coast for
essential rest of personnel and upkeep of machinery. See
typical scheme in attached table.

(c) Organize an escort force between West Coast and
Hawaii, consisting of battleship and suitable A/S vessels.
Light craft to work from Pearl and from West Coast, battleship
to work from West Coast only and make round trip. The general
scheme will be have convoy leave coast with a BB and 4 - 6 DDs
or A/S vessels to about 200 - 500 miles off coast when all but
BB escort and two DDs return to Coast. BBs and 2 DD continue
to about 200 miles from Pearl, when convoy is met by additional
A/S craft, BBs meet coast bound convoy and return to coast.
2 DDs continue to Pearl and 2 from there go to coast, other
escorts return Pearl when released about 500 miles out. In
this connection send battleships to coast with destroyer escort
as soon as ready.

(d) Keep shipping to Australian theater to minimum
and adjust sailings to escorts which can be made available.

(e) Maintain maximum submarine patrols in Japanese
waters, as previously planned, at same time continuing those at Midway and Wake.

(f) Organize VPs into an offshore security and searching force, covering maximum areas and depths. As soon as possible, divide into three groups, one on search, one stand-by as striking or control group and one upkeep and relaxation. Main striking group will be Army bombers and main defense group will be Army pursuit. VJ planes will augment search.

(g) 1st Marine Air Group when available to augment outlying island defenses, or assist Army from Oahu as developments dictate.

(h) Depend on Army and ships in port for AA defense of Pearl.

As a vital necessity to any plan, land based pursuit and bombardment aviation must be built up most rapidly. AA defenses, particularly against dive bombers, is equally necessary. Radar, both ship and shore, must be supplied in great quantity.
1. Information.

(a) The campaign for which this is the plan comprises the operations which will be undertaken until this Fleet is strong enough to conduct strategically offensive operations.

(b) Motivating Considerations.

The basic Rainbow Five Plan has been modified to take account of the present reduced strength of the Pacific Fleet. The only strategically offensive task remaining in Plan is "to raid Japanese positions and communications". This will be carried out only by submarines until the Fleet is reinforced, unless Japan attempts to reestablish a communication line to South or Central America. The remaining assigned tasks require protection of the territory and communications of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area. (The definition of the Pacific Area remains the same as in the original Rainbow Five Plan). WAKE is to be defended in category "C"; all other territory in the general HAWAIIAN Area, in category "D". It is considered by the Commander-in-Chief that the OAHU group of islands must be made secure at all costs. He expects great quantities of men and material to augment the present defending forces, and will prosecute a vigorous offensive against any threatening forces. The line of communications to the West Coast is of course vital. That of SAMOA and beyond to AUSTRALIA must be kept open; our outlying islands must be protected and supplied.

(c) Probable Enemy Action.

Japanese initial actions are well known. Because of the successes obtained we can expect further air raids on OAHU. Just how soon is problematical, but the next will probably occur within two or three weeks or sooner. Submarines have already appeared in this area, and on the route to the West Coast. Sufficient numbers will probably
reach the Coast to create demands for coastal convoys. Strong surface raids will probably be made on the same route. WAKE has received five air attacks and on this date was being subjected to a landing attack in which our forces had already sunk one cruiser and one destroyer. If this attack fails, a stronger one may be considered a certainty. MIDWAY has been bombared, and was bombed today. General Japanese successes may lead to an early landing attack against this island, even though it may not have been included in the original plan.

(d) Own Forces.

Our forces available are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediately Available</th>
<th>Eventually Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 BB repaired in the near future.</td>
<td>3 BB from Atlantic Fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BB from PUGET SOUND about February 1st.</td>
<td>1 BB indefinite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CA on escort duty.</td>
<td>3 CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CA under overhaul.</td>
<td>2 CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CA under repair (available with three shafts).</td>
<td>1 CL in Far East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CL under repair, date completion indefinite.</td>
<td>1 OCL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 OCL indefinite.</td>
<td>3 CV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CV from Atlantic Fleet.</td>
<td>4 DL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 DL under overhaul, MARE ISLAND.</td>
<td>33 DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 DD under overhaul, MARE ISLAND.</td>
<td>9 DD from Atlantic Fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 DMS</td>
<td>4 DM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 DM under overhaul.</td>
<td>16 SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 SS under overhaul.</td>
<td>2 SS sound school.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. General Task.

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, -

(a) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers east of Longitude one hundred eighty degrees.

(b) Assist in the strengthening of the OAHU base.
(c) Sever Japanese communications east of Longitude one hundred eighty degrees.

(d) Defend WAKE as may be practicable.

(e) Raid, with submarines, enemy forces and communications near the Japanese Homeland.

3. Tasks.

(a) Task.
Cover OAHU, MIDWAY and when practicable, WAKE; destroying or inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces which come within reach.

Forces.
Three (four when YORKTOWN joins) striking groups each composed of one carrier, at least two heavy cruisers and six destroyers. Submarines when available for defensive purposes.

Method of Operation.
Maintain two groups at sea: one off MIDWAY; one north of OAHU; two en route to, en route from, or at Pearl, or on West Coast (first in-port period for groups to be at PEARL HARBOR). See tentative schedule, Annex A.

(b) Task.
Escort convoys between West Coast and HAWAII.

Forces.
Three (four when COLORADO joins) escort groups composed of one battleship and two to six destroyers.

Method of Operation.
Battleships and eight to ten destroyers base on Coast; eight to ten destroyers base at PEARL HARBOR.

Four to six destroyers in the escort when within five hundred miles of a terminal; destroyers reduced to two along remainder of route; battleship in the escort between Coast and two hundred mile circle from PEARL.

Use SAN PEDRO and SAN DIEGO as well as SAN FRANCISCO.

Run convoy about once a week; convoys limited to eight to ten ships; unload at both HONOLULU and PEARL.
Campaign Plan (Cont'd)
No. 2-R5

(c) Task.
Escort ships to and from outlying islands and SAMOA, and to point of transfer to British protection and return.

Forces.
Cruisers and destroyers when they can be spared from more urgent duties.

(d) Task.
Escort Hawaiian inter-island shipping.

Forces.
Destroyers, other types with anti-submarine installations, local defense forces.

(e) Task.
Support the Army in the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

Forces.
Fourteenth District forces and fleet forces present or within supporting distance of the area.

(f) Task.
Destroy enemy commerce and raiders in the Pacific Area.

Forces.
Forces available and within striking distance.

(g) Task.
Raid enemy forces and communications near Japanese Homeland.

Forces.
Submarines in greatest strength practicable.

(h) Task.
Obtain information of enemy approaching, or in, the Hawaiian Area. Attack enemy under suitable conditions.

Forces.
Patrol planes.

(i) Task.
Reenforce JOHNSTON ISLAND and PALMYRA.

Forces.
Marine forces; escort by destroyers.
Campaign Plan (Cont'd)

No. 2-R5

(j) **Task.**

Reinforce MIDWAY and WAKE if practicable.

**Forces.**

Marine forces; escort by striking force.

4. **Logistics.**

Base Force furnish necessary logistic support, assisted as necessary by District and Naval Transportation forces.

5. **Commander-in-Chief at PEARL HARBOR.**

H. H. KIMMEL,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

**Annex:**

A - Initial schedule for striking forces.

**DISTRIBUTION:**

P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary.
### ANNEX A

**to**

**CAMPAIGN PLAN No. 2-R5**

**INITIAL SCHEDULE FOR STRIKING FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MIDWAY</th>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>PEARL</th>
<th>COAST</th>
<th>SAILS</th>
<th>RETURN</th>
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<tr>
<td>LEXINGTON</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td>DEC 21</td>
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<tr>
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<td>DEC 31</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>YORKTOWN</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JAN 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEXINGTON</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JAN 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. E. KIMMEL,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, PEARL HARBOR

1400, 10 December, 1941.

Operation Plan
No. 3-R5

TASK ORGANIZATION

(Modified from day to day as availability of ships and demands require. See Operations Officer’s daily sheet for details).

(a) Task Force Eight - ComAirbatfor

ENTERPRISE (F)

2 - 3 CA

½ to 1 Desron

(b) Task Force Twelve - Comsofor

LEXINGTON

2 - 3 CA (INDIANAPOLIS (F))

½ to 1 Desron

(c) Task Force Three, Task Force Sixteen - Comcardiv One

(Composition changed, and designation changed on arrival PEARL 12/13 December).

SARATOGA (F)

2 - 3 CA

½ to 1 Desron

(d) Task Force - Com

(To be organized after arrival carrier from East Coast).

YORKTOWN

2 - 3 CA

½ to 1 Desron
(e) **Task Force Fifteen, Combat for**

BB, CA, CL, DD, DMS

as assigned to escort duty from time to time.

(f) **Task Force One - Comdesbatfor**

(Temporary Force)

1 OCL

Assigned DD

Destroyer tenders

(g) **Task Force Nine - Compatwing Two**

Shore based aircraft

Aircraft tenders

(h) **Task Force Seven - Comsubsofor**

Submarines

Submarine tenders

(i) **Task Force Six - Combat for**

Auxiliaries

(j) **Task Force Four - Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier**

Local Defense Forces

Coast Guard

DD, DM, DMS, Auxiliaries

and other fleet craft as assigned

(k) **Task Force Five - Commander Pacific Southern Coastal Frontier**

Coastal and Local Defense Forces
(1) **Task Force Ten** - Commander Pacific Northern Coastal Frontier 
Coastal and Local Defense Forces.

1. Information as furnished in daily and special bulletins.

2. This fleet will intercept and destroy enemy forces 
approaching the Hawaiian area, or that come or can 
be brought within range by conducting appropriate 
searches and attacking vigorously in order to safeguard 
own and allied territory and communications.

3. (a) **Task Force Eight** (ENTERPRISE).
(b) **Task Force Twelve** (LEXINGTON).
(c) **Task Force Sixteen** (SARATOGA).
(d) **Task Force** (YORKTOWN).

(1) These task forces, which constitute the major 
striking forces, will search their respective 
operating areas for enemy raiders or other enemy 
forces and in cooperation with one another and with 
Army aircraft annihilate those discovered.

(2) Schedule of expected times and locations of 
operations is as shown in Annex A to Campaign 
Plan 2-R5. Specific directions will be issued as 
necessary for relieving stations, reservicing, 
visiting coast, etc.
(3) For the immediate present in carrying out sub-
paragraph one above Task Force Sixteen will continue
to PEARL for discharging surplus planes and reservicing.
Task Force Eight will continue operations to
northward of OAHU. Task Force Twelve will refuel
in accordance with current instructions, then inter-
cept WM. WARD BURROWS and when joined by ships pro-
ceeding from PEARL HARBOR proceed with reenforcements
to WAKE. Cover discharge of cargo and evacuation of
laborers, and wounded. More complete instructions
will be issued separately.

(e) Task Force Fifteen (Escort Force). Protect UNITED
STATES and ALLIED shipping by escorting with vessels
provided. Maintain close liaison with Commanders of
Naval Coastal Frontiers in connection therewith. Conduct
operations in accordance with current methods, those laid
down in Campaign Plan 2-R5 and special instructions that
may be issued.

(f) Task Force One (a temporary force). Assign vessels
and carry out special tasks and instructions as ordered.

(g) Task Force Nine (Patrol planes). (1) Operate patrol
planes and other shore based aircraft including Army
bombers made available so as to gain the earliest possible
information of advancing enemy forces. Use patrol planes
offensively only when other types of our own are not
within striking distance, or the risk of damage to our own planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

(2) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

(3) At present base all planes available on OAHU, but be prepared on short notice to transfer units to outlying bases.

(4) Maintain close liaison with Army Air Force for all aviation activities particularly as to information, identity of aircraft, etc.

(5) Maintain maximum practicable dispersion of planes when at base.

(h) Task Force Seven (Submarines). (1) Conduct unrestricted warfare against Axis powers.

(2) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(3) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating condition.

Unless otherwise directed give stations the following priority:

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU
(4) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing mines and torpedoes and in appropriate, gunfire.

(5) Report important enemy movements by radio if attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

(6) Keep units in port widely dispersed.

(i) Task Force Six (Base Force Vessels). Commander Base Force continue to provide logistic and salvage services to the fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases. Continue liaison with Coastal Frontier Commanders with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, loading of vessels, routing and protection of shipping, etc.

(j) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and units concerned.

(2) Task Force Commander continue duties as Base Defense Officer.

(3) Continue work on outlying subsidiary bases at MIDWAY, JOHNSTON, PALMYRA and WAKE in so far as practicable and circumstances permit.

(4) Defend the foregoing bases. In close cooperation with the Commander-in-Chief and other designated commanders provide for their support; reinforcement;
and evacuation of civilians, sick or wounded personnel, or others as circumstances require. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed in connection with requirements for the foregoing.

(5) Make the facilities of those bases available for fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities of those bases. Annex IV of WPPac-46 is effective.

(6) Escort inter-island shipping as available forces, and circumstances permit.

(k) **Task Force Five** (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) **Task Force Ten** (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

Conduct such search, patrols and escorts in vicinity of own areas as is practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(x) (1) Maintain all units in maximum degree of material readiness.

(2) Continue such training activities as operations and other circumstances permit.

(3) Maintain internal and external security at all times cooperating with Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers.

(4) This plan effective on receipt.
4. Logistic replenishments at PEARL HARBOR and on the West Coast; and as may be specially provided for.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U.S.F. Seventy, as modified by Annex III, WPPac-46.

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.

(c) Commander-in-Chief at Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR.

H. E. KIMMEL,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

DISTRIBUTION:

P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary.
ANNEX A

TO

CINGPAC OPERATION PLAN 3-R5

INITIAL ASSIGNMENTS AND SCHEDULE FOR ESCORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>West Coast Escort Group</th>
<th>PEARL Escort Group</th>
<th>En Route Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batdiv A - TENNESSEE ready / Desron Five MARYLAND &quot; 13th PENNSYLVANIA &quot; 14th COLORADO 1 Feb.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Desdiv 10 (reach S.F. 15 Dec.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NEW ORLEANS
ST. LOUIS
Desron Three

Special Escort Group

LOUISVILLE
PENSACOLA
BOISE
PHOENIX

Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEST COAST - PEARL</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ESCORT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 knot</td>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>NEW ORLEANS Desdiv 10</td>
<td>Must depart from PH 15 Dec. Escort whole route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_ knot</td>
<td>_ Dec</td>
<td>ST. LOUIS PORTER Desron 3</td>
<td>or MARYLAND and PENNSYLVANIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

Operation Plan
No. 4-R5

TASK ORGANIZATION:

(a) Task Force Fifteen

West Coast Escort Group - Rear Admiral Bagley.

Batdiv A - TENNESSEE
MARYLAND
PENNNSYLVANIA (COLORADO)

PEARL Escort Group

One Desron (initial assignment in Annex A) 9 DD

En Route Escort Group

Combatant ships which may be making passage between West Coast and Hawaii.

Special Escort Group

Cruisers and DD as assigned.

(b) Task Force Five - Commander Pacific Southern Coastal Frontier.

Coastal and local defense forces.

(c) Task Force Four

Local defense forces.
Operation Plan
No. 4-R5

1. **Information.** As in CincPac Campaign Plan No. 2-R5, and information bulletins to be issued from time to time by the Commander-in-Chief. CincPac Operation Plan No. 3-R5 assigns the task for this force.

2. This force will protect designated United States and Allied shipping by escorting.

3. (a) **Task Force Fifteen.**

   West Coast Escort Group,
   PEARL Escort Group,
   En Route Escort Group.

   Escort convoys of all Allied shipping between the West Coast of the UNITED STATES and HAWAII. Not less than four destroyers are to be in the escort when within five hundred miles of terminals; not less than two on the remainder of the route. West Coast Escort Group will base in general on West Coast and battleships will not approach closer than two hundred miles to PEARL HARBOR. Pearl Escort Group base in general at PEARL HARBOR. See Annex A for initial availability. En Route Escort Group relieve regular escorts whenever practicable.

   **Special Escort Group** escort convoys and ships between
OAHU and outlying islands and on overseas routes as may be directed.

(b) **Task Force Five** augment escorts in coastal area when practicable. Route convoys except in Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. **XENH** Routes are to avoid, when possible, known and probable area of enemy operations. Utilize SAN PEDRO and SAN DIEGO as well as SAN FRANCISCO for loading points. Shipping between Northwest UNITED STATES and HAWAII proceed via SAN FRANCISCO.

(c) **Task Force Four** escort and route inter-island shipping. Route convoys in Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to avoid known and probable areas of enemy operations. Utilize both HONOLULU and PEARL for berthing and shipping.

(x) This **plan** effective on receipt. Special assignments and schedules, will be in accordance with Annex A and future special directives.

4. **Logistic support on West Coast and at PEARL.** Utilize West Coast supplies wherever practicable. Combasefor Subordinate Command utilize SAN PEDRO and SAN DIEGO as well as SAN FRANCISCO for loading points.
5. As in Operation Plan 2-R5.

H. E. KIMMEL,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.
December 10, 1941.

Operation Order
No. 2

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) Task Force Twelve - Vice Admiral Brown.

LEXINGTON
INDIANAPOLIS
CHICAGO
PORTLAND
DESRON 1

(b) Task Group 12.7

TANGIER
Wm. W. BURROWS
2 DD

(c) Task Group 12.8

WRIGHT
2 DD

(d) Task Group 12.9

THORNTON

1. Garrisons at outlying islands require reinforcement, and at WAKE and MIDWAY wounded need to be evacuated. A part of the civilian workmen require evacuation.

2. Designated ships will transport reinforcements to outlying island bases and evacuate personnel therefrom as indicated in paragraph three.
3. (a) **Task Force Twelve** on completion of fueling rendezvous with **Task Group 12.7** at a time and place to be designated by despatch by Commander-in-Chief. Thence proceed to rendezvous with Wm. W. BURROWS at a time and place to be designated by despatch, thence proceed to vicinity of WAKE. Cover unloading and loading of TANGIER and Wm. W. BURROWS as may be found expedient. BURROWS as may be found expedient without undue exposure of this force.

When ships mentioned have completed duties at WAKE direct **Task Group 12.7** to return to PEARL. This task force then rendezvous with **Task Group 12.8** at time and place to be designated by despatch and proceed to MIDWAY. Cover unloading and loading of WRIGHT as may be found expedient without undue exposure of this force. After WRIGHT has completed duties at MIDWAY direct **Task Group 12.8** to return to PEARL, and thereafter **Task Force Twelve** operate in area to northward of MIDWAY against any enemy that may approach.

If enemy contact is made during any of foregoing operations take offensive action against them and give such instructions to vessels being covered as your judgment dictates.
(b) Task Group 12.7 less Wm. W. BURROWS load such personnel and supplies for WAKE as Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, directs and depart on twelve December for designated rendezvous with Task Force Twelve. Wm. W. BURROWS join Task Force Twelve at designated rendezvous. At JOHNSTON, MIDWAY and WAKE discharge cargo and personnel and embark other personnel as directed by Commanding Officers of requisite Air Stations giving precedence to wounded. Upon being released by Commander Task Force Twelve return to PEARL.

(c) Task Group 12.8 load such personnel and supplies for JOHNSTON and MIDWAY as Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, directs and depart on or about twelve December for MIDWAY via JOHNSTON, thence to designated rendezvous with Task Force Twelve. On arrival MIDWAY discharge cargo and personnel and embark other personnel as directed by Commanding Officer Naval Air Station giving precedence to wounded. Upon being released by Commander Task Force Twelve return to PEARL.

(d) Task Group 12.9 load such personnel and supplies for PALMYRA as Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, directs and depart on twelve December for PALMYRA. On arrival discharge cargo and personnel and embark other personnel as directed by Commanding Officer Naval Air Station.
Upon completion return to PEARL.

(x) Upon departing outlying bases report to Commander-in-Chief and Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, expected time of arrival at PEARL. When four hours away report exact time of expected entrance.

4. Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, is requested, by copy of this order to take necessary steps as to loading the outgoing vessels, and to issue necessary instructions regarding personnel to be evacuated.

5. Communications normal.
Maintain radio silence enroute except for enemy contact or matter of extreme urgency.
Use Greenwich Civil Time.
Commander-in-Chief at PEARL HARBOR.

H. E. KIMMEL,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Normal)
Running Summary of Situation (Cont'd)

December 11.

Task Force Twelve (LEXINGTON Group) continued its attempts to fuel during this day - still about 230 miles to the southwest of Oahu.

Task Force Eight remained to the northward.

SARATOGA continued en route to Pearl, and MINNEAPOLIS and 4 DD were sent to form her escort.

Two submarines started for patrol off the Japanese Homeland; one more following on the 12th.

The Secretary of the Navy arrived at Pearl Harbor.

Plans for the reenforcement of Wake were still under consideration but not yet crystallized.

For despatches received on 10th and 11th see attached summary.

No significant information of the enemy was received except that his activity in the Gilberts was verified. The landing at Tarawa had apparently been for demolition only.

The LAHAINA was shelled and sunk by a submarine about 700 miles northeast of Oahu.

December 12.

The Secretary of the Navy departed for the West Coast.

Task Force Twelve was still unable to fuel at sea and it was decided to bring the LEXINGTON group into Pearl Harbor to accomplish this.

It was intended to use this group in connection with the reenforcement of Wake, and to have the approaching SARATOGA fly off a squadron of Marine fighters which she was transporting, and send them to Wake on the LEXINGTON.

Task Force Eight remained to the northward.

The SARATOGA was being delayed by the effect of rough weather on her escort of three 1200-ton destroyers.

No important despatches were received.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

There had been several reports during the preceding few days of enemy aircraft on the West Coast. These were never verified.

Enemy submarines have been operating in Hawaiian Area since the 7th, one having sunk the CYNTHIA OLSON miles to the eastward early on that day. Few attacks had been made on combatant ships and none had been successful.

Wake was continuing to be bombed almost daily.

December 13.

Task Force Twelve entered Pearl. It was decided to send it to raid Jaluit, (See Operation Order 40-41 of 13 December) changing its designation to Task Force Eleven.

At the same time it was decided to form Task Force Fourteen with SARATOGA and send it to cover a reinforcement of Wake. The loading of the TANGIER for this purpose was commenced.

The arrival of the SARATOGA was still further delayed by weather.

Task Force Eight remained north of Oahu.

It was beginning to be even more evident that carriers would not be readily available for transporting aircraft, and CinCPac's 132101 (following) was sent. Opnav's reply 140237 is also shown.

Land offensives of the enemy in the Far East were progressing unfavorably for us.

December 14.

Task Force Eleven departed for Jaluit operation, after which the SARATOGA entered Pearl.

Preparations for the reinforcement of Wake proceeded and Operation Order No. 39-41 for Task Force Fourteen, covering this operation was in preparation. No personnel reinforcements except replacements were being sent to Wake, but ammunition, radar and many other supplies were loaded on the TANGIER, including the ground crew and equipment of VMF-221. She was also to take off about two-thirds of the 1500 civilian employees from Wake. The SARATOGA was to transport the planes of the VMF squadron.
Task Force Eight continued operating to the northward.

Convoys were being organized between the West Coast and Hawaii, the first westbound being due to sail on the 17th.

Received Opnav's 142346 (following) which suggested a large reinforcement for Samoa.

No significant information of the enemy was received, except that the Hoegh (Norwegian ship of which no information had been received) was sunk 29 miles northeast of Oahu at about 0300. No submarine or torpedo was sighted.

December 15.

Operation Order 39-41 was issued.

The TANGIER and oiler of Task Force Fourteen sailed - remainder of force delayed until the next day because of the time necessary to fuel SARATOGA.

Task Force Eight was returning to Pearl.

CinCPac in 152302 reported to Opnav concerning the Wake and Jaluit expeditions. Opnav replied "Concur heartily" (See following Opnav 160050).

Johnston Island was shelled by light surface forces just after dark this date, and Kahului, Maui, was shelled by a submarine. Wake continued to receive almost daily bombings from two-engine bombers and four-engine seaplanes.

On this date the Secretary of the Navy announced a considerable percentage of the losses which had been suffered on the 7th - ARIZONA lost, OKLAHOMA capsized, UTAH, OGLALA, three destroyers wrecked, and other ships damaged.

December 16.


LOUISVILLE and her convoy arrived from Australia.

Some reinforcement of B-17's had been received by this time. Three large Matson boats with supplies and reinforcements sailed from San Francisco this date under escort.
10 2033 OPNAV TO CINCPAC

Second Marine Defense Battalion leaves Parris Island via train about 12-14 December for San Diego your command. CNO believes best stationed Samoa, however, can be stationed in Hawaii.

10 2209 OPNAV TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, ALL NAVAL DISTRICTS AND COAST FRONTIERS

Desire assist Army aircraft warning service by providing suitable small vessels stationed 50 or more miles off shore to report approaching enemy aircraft and enemy surface craft and submarines. Such vessels to be equipped with radio for transmitting voice or telegraph as required for reception by Army warning net ashore. Crews to be furnished by Navy personnel if available otherwise by undoubtedly loyal civilians. Action addressees acquire or charter by usual procedure adequate number available vessels for this service in addition to those already being acquired under WPL 46 if Naval and Coast Guard craft are insufficient in numbers. Naval Coastal Frontier Force Commanders will give highest priority to cooperation with Army Air Force Commanders for this purpose.

11 1451 SECNAV TO ALNAV

EXECUTE WPL 46 AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY IN ADDITION TO JAPAN NAVAL ATTACHES ADVISE NAVAL AUTHORITIES

13 2101 CINCPAC TO OPNAV INFO COMAIRBATFOR

When will carrier be needed West Coast for transportation Army pursuit planes here X Same question regarding Marine Aircraft Wing 1 with composition this wing.

14 0237 OPNAV TO CINCPAC INFO PACFLT

Your 132101 Marine Aircraft Wing 1 should reach San Diego by Friday 19th X Consists of 5 squadrons with approximately 37 F4F-3's, 23 SB2U-3's, 19 SBD-1's and 11 SBD-4's X 30 Army pilots and 69 P-40 airplanes should reach San Diego by Tuesday 16 Dec X Army planes now in crates X Army authorities have been informed that it might not be possible to accommodate all their planes available in 1 carrier
YORKTOWN and four DD are due about 29 December at San Diego from the Atlantic.

Estimates of enemy distribution of forces were received from Opnav, Com 16 and the British. All were in agreement that the main strength of BBs and CVs were unlocated. Their most probable location was in the Saipan-Bonin area.
WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO MY 091812 CNO ESTIMATES JAPANESE INTENTION ULTIMATELY TO CAPTURE ALL OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS. IF THIS VIEW IS CORRECT, THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING SAMOA AND PALMYRA IS APPARENT.

OWING TO THE DISTANCE OF SAMOA FROM HAWAII, THE GARRISON OUGHT TO BE IN SUCH STRENGTH AS TO BE ABLE TO HOLD OUT AGAINST A CONSIDERABLE EFFORT UNTIL YOU CAN TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE ATTACKING FORCES. AT PRESENT THE JAPANESE EFFORT IN THAT DIRECTION SEEMS TO BE MINOR AND TO CONSIST OF A FEW CRUISERS, DESTROYERS, SUBMARINES, AIRCRAFT AND TROOPS.

WITH DUE REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH PACIFIC, CNO PROPOSES FOLLOWING PLAN:— TRANSFER SECOND MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION AND EIGHTH MARINE REGIMENT REINFORCED TO 3700 MEN TO SAMOA WITH SUPPLIES FOR 3 MONTHS BUILDING UP TO 6 MONTHS. YORKTOWN AND 4 DD WILL LEAVE NORFOLK DECEMBER 17, PROPOSE TO ATTACH CRUDIV THREE AT PANAMA, PROCEED SAN DIEGO THERE DIRECT TO SAMOA WITH TROOP CONVOY.

IT WOULD ALSO BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE STATION 1 MARINE VF AND ONE VBS SQUADRON IN SAMOA IF YOU CAN SPARE THEM.

CNO WILL Endeavor TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION AND SMALL NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE.

ULTIMATELY CRUDIV 3 WILL RETURN PANAMA.

ALSO SUGGEST ADDITION OF SMALL INFANTRY DETACHMENT TO PALMYRA. REQUEST YOUR EARLY CONSIDERATION AND ADVICE.

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED AT YOUR DISCRETION TO REINFORCE WAKE AND MIDWAY, TO RE STOCK THEM WITH AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES AND TO REMOVE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.

Wake must be:— One, supplied with ammunition and reinforced with fighter planes;

Two, evacuated or;

Three, abandon the garrison and defense workers totaling about 1400 men. To unload ammunition and stores and embark a portion of defense workers will take at least 2 days. Embarking all personnel for evacuation should be accomplished in less than 1 day. With unfavorable weather these times will be indefinitely increased. Ammunition
that can be supplied will be sufficient for about 1 month at present rate of expenditure. Have planned to reinforce Wake and evacuate about 700 defense workers and am despatching 1 CV 3 CA and a DD squadron escorting Tangier with ammunition and supplies departing today. Also plan a diversional attack on Eastern Marshalls with 1 CV 3 CA and a squadron of destroyers who sailed yesterday.

16 0050 OPNAV TO CINCPAC

OPERATIONS REPORTED IN YOUR 152302 ARE HEARTILY CONCURRED IN.

16 1900 OPNAV TO CONTINENTAL NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS. INFO: CINCPAC

In Coastal Frontiers of continental United States operate under category of defense Cast instead of Baker. Chief of Staff, USA will issue similar orders to Army.

16 2200 OPNAV TO CINCPAC

AT YOUR CONVENIENCE REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE AS TO DATE ON WHICH AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER FROM YOUR FLEET MAY BE AVAILABLE SAN DIEGO TRANSPORTING ASSEMBLED MARINE AND ARMY AIRCRAFT FROM SAN DIEGO TO HAWAIIAN AREA AND NUMBER OF HER OWN AIRCRAFT TO BE RETAINED FOR DEFENSE ENROUTE. YOUR 132101. FOR YOUR INFORMATION USS KITTYHAWK AND HAMMONDSPORT CONVERTED SEA TRAINS WILL ARRIVE SAN DIEGO ABOUT 1 JANUARY TO LOAD ASSEMBLED AIRCRAFT FOR HAWAII OR FOR DELIVERY FAR EAST VIA AUSTRALIA IN ACCORDANCE FOR DECISION TO BE MADE LATER. THESE SHIPS CAN EACH CARRY EITHER ABOUT 48 PURSUIT AIRPLANES ASSEMBLED OR ABOUT 100 CRATED.
MEMORANDUM TO: Captain A. C. Davis, Staff, CINCPAC

Subject: Tafuna Airport, Samoa

1. Confirming Lt. Comdr. L. J. Watson’s statements to you, the completion of the first runway at Tafuna to 500 ft. by 3000 ft. is not possible before 1 March with the equipment now there, and how much time after 1 March will be required remains to be determined. An estimate is expected from Samoa within a day or two (in response to our request).

2. The estimate will be based on equipment now on the job plus the assumption that the job may be assured that continuous operation will not be interrupted because of lack of commercial gasoline, diesel oil and provisions. It is estimated that the present gasoline supply will last only to 1 January and that the diesel oil supply will last until about 1 February, after which respective dates the requirements will be 25 fifty gallon drums of gasoline and 15 fifty gallon drums of diesel oil per day. Provisions for Contractors’ personnel (about 120 Mainlanders and 1300 Samoans) have been made available principally through the Naval Station. It is presumed that the Governor-Commandant is informing the Navy of all provision requirements.

3. The date of “usable completion” of this runway was given as March 1942 before the present emergency. This date was predicated upon the then scheduled arrival in Samoa of certain very important equipment that is now held up at San Francisco Bay points.

4. The new tank farm (two 55,000 bbl. fuel oil tanks, two 10,000 bbl. diesel oil tanks and two 2,500 bbl. gasoline tanks) will be ready to receive a tanker 25 December if the tanker takes with it certain fittings and hose of which Comtrainron 8 has been informed.

H. T. Brune
Officer-in-Charge
Contract No. 4173
SECRET

Reference: Opnav 142346 re Samoa.

1. Proposes 2nd Def. Bn. plus 8th Marine Regiment reinforced to 3700 men be sent Samoa.

2. If 2nd Def. Bn. is full strength, it would have about 900 men with:

   6 - 5" or 155 mm.
   12 - 3"
   30 - .50 cal AA mgs.
   30 - .30 cal mgs.
   6 - Searchlights.
   1 - SCR 270 (radar)
   3 - SCR 268 (radar)

3. The composition of the 8th Regiment reinforced to 3700 is not stated but is assumed to be approximately as follows:

   8th Regiment (Infantry)  2324
   Artillery Battalion       577
   Medical                  150
   Service and Transport    170
   Tank Company             146
   Special Weapons (AA, AB, AT)  155
   Signal                   113
   Headquarters             65
   3700

   NOTE: Engineers may be substituted for Tanks and/or special weapons.

4. There is now in Samoa:

   4 - 6" Naval guns.
   6 - 3" AA naval guns without director.
   12 - .50 cal AA mgs.
   12 - .30 cal mgs.
   427 - Personnel.
   500 - Native reserves - authorized but not completely formed. This has always been considered only a defense against raids.
5. Comdt. Samoa has recommended increased defenses and the ROinC based estimates on an assumed defense scheme. Major Pefley made a study of the defenses on the ground. I have been preparing a study of defense requirements based on a Category "C" (minor attack) and Category "D" (may be subjected to major attack). All earlier studies were considered and also the landing field construction and the increased strategic importance of Samoa. My studies indicated need for the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Category &quot;D&quot;</th>
<th>Increase Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seacoast Defense:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;, 6&quot; or 7&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antiaircraft:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot;</td>
<td>6 (Navy 22 fixed)</td>
<td>16 (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 mm. AA:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 cal. AA:</td>
<td>16 (4 Navy) 56</td>
<td>40 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1:** 37 mm. AA fire units (2 guns) may be substituted for about 50% of the .50 cal AA fire units and figures given adjusted accordingly.

**Beach and Ground Defense Forces:**

6. The need for infantry on this relatively large island has always been realized. For a category "C" defense, one infantry battalion was desired. The study in progress had made no estimate of the infantry force for a category D defense. However, in view of the size of the island, the great possibility of attack as set forth by Opnav, and the need for its landing field, I am of the
opinion that a reinforced regiment is not too large a mobilized defense force for the situation contemplated.

7. In summary, it may be stated that there is quite close agreement between the forces independently estimated here as necessary for the defense of Samoa and what Opnav now offers. Concurrence with Opnav plan as to sending 2d Defense Battalion and 8th Regiment to Samoa indicated, insofar as strength is concerned. This plan must, however, be tested for logistics.

(a) Tonnage for the initial movement will be provided by Opnav and is of no concern in this estimate. From experience in the Hawaiian area, about 300 tons of fuel, gasoline, clothing, food, and automatic supplies is required to maintain one defense battalion for one month. Ammunition is in addition, but replenishment depends upon expenditures. On the basis of the foregoing, the average tonnage required monthly by the 2d Defense Battalion, the 8th Regiment, and the present defense force will be not less than 1800 tons exclusive of ammunition. An average of 200 tons a month would be required for this. On the basis of maintaining a 6 months supply, but never falling below 3 months, one 6000 ton shipment would be required every three months by the Marines.

(b) The support of the Marines, however, is not the only shipping item for Samoa. There is the naval station, naval air station, the maintenance of an adequate level of fuel oil, diesel, and gasoline, and food for the natives who, with
increased income, are becoming ever more dependent on imported food. Some shipping will have to visit Samoa for maintaining the foregoing, if we retain it. There will have to be tankers, cargo ships, and refrigerated space used for Samoa, regardless of the increased defense force. The question of escort will arise whether or not the defenses are increased as contemplated, and, therefore, is not particularly involved in the increase. In view of all the foregoing, I believe the increased logistic demands of the larger defense force are not a controlling factor in the decision as to whether they should be sent to Samoa. It is a question of capacity of ships used in this service, rather than the number of ships, sailings, or escorts. For these reasons, if we want to hold Samoa, the shipping and escort demands for the increased force may be rejected as a controlling factor as to the feasibility of Opnav's plan.

(c) Housing will be a serious problem. The present defense forces have lived in tents for almost a year but will shortly move into barracks. The 2d Defense Battalion and the 8th Regiment will have to live in tents for a considerable time. Much clearing of ground will have to be done to find a suitable camp site for the infantry. If arable patches are used, it may reduce island food supply. The dispersion of troops of the defense battalion to be near their batteries and positions will be necessary. There is only 1,000,000 feet of contractor's lumber on the island, not sufficient for required tent decks. All this could be eventually taken care of, if ships, material and time were available. There will be many difficulties in
housing but they are not insuperable and troops can live under field conditions for an extended period.

(d) There is abundant water in Samoa, the chief problem being to get it to the place where needed. Suggested that about 10,000' of 3" or 4" pipe be taken along for this purpose.

(e) The terrain is rugged, heavily wooded in places, and roads and trails are few and generally poor. Motor transportation is limited largely to the south coast. The emplacement of coast defense batteries is an engineering problem of no mean proportions. About 3 - 50 horsepower gasoline or diesel double drum hoists, shears, and cables for skidways used in hoisting heavy equipment should be provided. The emplacement of some gun batteries would require a long time.

(f) The capacity of Pago Pago harbor is insufficient to accommodate the convoy - at least 4 transports, an oiler and 1 or 2 cargo ships and probably an escort of cruisers, one carrier and 4 destroyers. Seven cruiser type vessels can be accommodated in the harbor but one must anchor between the points at the entrance almost in the open sea where it would be subjected to torpedo and gunfire attack.

(g) There is one pier in Pago Pago. Unloading by one vessel can be done over this pier but simultaneous loading would have to be done by ships' boats. With the pier occupied by one vessel, the landing of troops and supplies from other vessels could hardly be accomplished over the same pier. The
removal of troops and equipment from the harbor area to clear it for landing other troops would present a further problem. The conclusion as to unloading is that it would require an extended period during which vessels would be exposed to torpedo attack and require the constant presence and vigilance of the escort vessels.

**AIRCRAFT:**

8. Opnav considers it would be highly desirable to station 1 VMFron and 1 VMSBron in Samoa, if they can be spared. Present there is only 1 VMSBron available at Pearl and due to go to Midway on 17 Dec. The 1st Marairwing is now at San Diego awaiting transfer to Pearl. It consists of 37 VF, and 53 VSB. On January 1, 1942 it will have 7 additional VF. In my opinion, immediate commitments for this wing should be as follows: Wake: some VF and 1 VSBron; Midway: some VF. Johnston and Palmyra should have aircraft but their fields are not ready. In view of the foregoing, 18 VF and 18 VSB are available for Samoa.

9. The readiness of the landing field at Samoa, is, however, the controlling factor. In this connection, see the attached memorandum of the District Public Works Officer. March 1st appears to be the earliest date on which land planes can be supported in Samoa, and landplanes require no further consideration here. It is recommended, however, that 1 squadron of VSO seaplanes be sent to Samoa until landplanes can be used.
10. The possibility as to fuel shows that the capacity on Dec. 28 will be 110,000 bbls fuel oil, 20,000 bbls diesel oil, and 5000 bbls gasoline. The tanks should be filled at the earliest opportunity.

11. The chief delay in preparing the landing field is equipment that was awaiting shipment from San Francisco in the Hawaiian Merchant. No knowledge of this vessel's movements are known locally, but it has a speed of about 16.5 knots. It should proceed Samoa immediately with needed equipment or accompany the contemplated convoy, if early use of the landing field is to be obtained.

STRATEGIC FEATURES:

12. O:nav estimates it to be Japanese intention ultimately to capture all of the South Pacific Islands; that, owing to the distance of Samoa from Hawaii the garrison ought to be in such strength as to be able to hold out against a considerable effort until Cincpac can take action against the attacking forces; and that at present the Japanese effort in that direction seems to be minor and consists of a few cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. There is complete agreement with the foregoing estimate. The most important questions in connection therewith is how much strength Japan can bring against Samoa, and when. Our problem is to get sufficient forces at Samoa in time to defeat Japanese efforts against it.

13. The general strategic situation in the Pacific is
that Japan is making a major effort in Malaya. Her crying need is oil which she hopes to get in Borneo, rather than Burma. If Japan is successful in Malaya, it appears that her next major effort will be in Borneo. Some time must elapse before she can exert this major effort in Borneo with the same sea, land, and air forces, because some consolidation of gains and reorganization of forces would be necessary in Malaya. There is, however, the possibility that Japan already has forces available for a major effort in Borneo and that such effort may begin before Malaya is completely subdued. The Japanese are meticulous planners and organizers and will undertake no major effort until they are completely ready.

14. Initial success of Japan has been due to surprise, efficient execution of a preconceived plan, and unexpected damage, at least by us, to allied major sea forces. The weakness of the Japanese plan is her widely spread forces which, if they are unsuccessful in their first thrust, are without reserves to continue the effort. Information, which we have no reason to doubt, indicates they contemplated the seizure of Wake. The loss of a CL and a DD resulted in withdrawal. Success, on the other hand, was easy in the Gilberts. The foregoing analysis applies particularly to the availability for landings. The greater flexibility and mobility of naval and air forces permits a rapid change in their theater of action.

15. Although it is believed that Japan will execute any new major effort in Borneo or in that area, she is undoubtedly...
capable now of exerting minor efforts in other areas. It is entirely feasible that she can furnish several thousand troops, and transports for one or more of such expeditions. The furnishing of adequate air and naval support at great distance from present bases is not so feasible, as long as the Asiatic occupation continues. It is hardly probable that modern cruisers, battleships, and large carriers will be risked in a minor operation far from present bases, which will require their exposure during a period of days while a landing against opposition is being made.

16. The immediate situation in the Samoa area is that the Japanese have established air operations from Makin. This move appears to have been more for the immediate purpose of covering the southern flank of the Marshalls rather than for gaining a takeoff for continued advance toward Samoa. Evidence of this is the occupation and subsequent evacuation of Tarawa later information indicates 4th Air Group at Wotif. However, from the Marshalls, Jaluit, it is 1710 miles to Samoa and from Hawaii to Samoa it is 2276 miles.

17. In view of the foregoing, it is indicated that Japan will not make a major attack against Samoa until our airfield is completed there. Such an attack would be made in the near future only if forces based on Samoa or if facilities there jeopardized Japanese operations in another more important area. A bombardment raid is entirely possible at any time but infantry can not combat such attack.

18. One further consideration should be mentioned.
The defensive strength of Samoa against landing attack lies in surf conditions on the windward (south) side and the fact that the rugged terrain and vegetation prevents advance from the north (most favorable for landing) to the vital area, except for a few precipitous trails. The use of mechanized equipment by the attacker after gaining a beachhead is improbable. And, lastly, the Japanese have always avoided landing against a defended point, if this was at all possible. There is no maneuver space on shore for either attacker or defender. The strength of the defender lies in the defiles (beaches and trails) which will prevent extension of the front and furnish a concentrated target.

19. If the conclusions of this estimate are accepted, it is recommended that the following despatch be sent to Opnav:

"YOUR 142316 THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH OPNAVS ESTIMATE RE SAMOA AND THAT REENFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY X LANDING FIELD WILL NOT BE USABLE PRIOR TO MARCH FIRST AND THEN ONLY IF VITALLY ESSENTIAL CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT SCHEDULED TO DEPART SANFRANCISCO IN HAWAIIAN MERCHANT ARRIVES WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY X AIRCRAFT CAN BE SPARED FOR SAMOA WHEN FIELD IS READY X CONSIDER MAJOR ATTACK SAMOA UNLIKELY PRIOR TO COMPLETION FIELD X CAPACITY OF HARBOR INADEQUATE FOR CONVOY AND ESCORT CONTEMPLATED AND WILL EXPOSE AND DELAY VESSELS X UNLOADING PROTECTION STORES HOUSING FOR COMPLETE DEFENSE BATTALION AND REINFORCED REGIMENT PRESENTS MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM BUT THIS CAN BE SOLVED X LIMITED AREA AVAILABLE FOR CAMP AND POSSIBLE CLEARING NECESSARY TO ACCOMMODATE ENTIRE FORCE AT ONE TIME X RECOMMEND SECOND
DEFENSE BATTALION COMMA ONE BATTALION INFANTRY REINFORCED WITH ANTI-BOAT WEAPONS BE SENT SAMOA NOW X REMAINDER REINFORCED INFANTRY REGIMENT SHOULD BE HELD SANDIEGO OR SENT HAWAII FOR TRANSPORTATION SAMOA WHEN LANDING FIELD IS COMPLETED X CONSIDER EXECUTION PLAN RECOMMENDED WILL FURNISH ADEQUATE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENSES BY INCREMENTS WILL SIMPLIFY LOCAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT UNDULY INCREASING ESCORT REQUIREMENTS X EXPECT OPNAV TO FURNISH TRANSPORTATION FOR INITIAL MOVEMENT X REINFORCEMENT BOTH JOHNSTON AND PALMYRA UNDER CONSIDERATION X ADVISE X

See 220301 of December which was actually sent.
SAMOA REENFORCEMENT

I. SITUATION

1. See attached study by 86 which gives details of Samoan reinforcement suggested in Opnav despatch 142346. This same despatch contemplates:

   (a) Sending the total of about 4600 men and their equipment in one convoy direct from San Diego to Samoa. Three months' supplies to accompany; six months' supplies to be built up.

   (b) Composing the escort of the YORKTOWN, 4 DD and Crudiv 3 - all reinforcements to this fleet, due at San Diego about 29 December.

   (c) CNO endeavoring to provide transportation for the troops and equipment.

   (d) Possibly stationing 1 VMF and 1 VMBS Squadron at Samoa.

   Since Opnav's despatch H.Q. Marine Corps has organized the above forces (including defense battalions) into the 2nd Marine Brigade ready to sail in early January (202103).

2. Although it has not been transmitted to Opnav, our tentative decision (see attached study) is:

   (a) To send, initially, only the Second Defense Battalion and one battalion of infantry reinforced by anti-boat weapons.

   (b) To hold remainder of Eighth Regiment at San Diego (or Hawaii) until the landing field at Samoa is completed (1 March or later).

   (c) To transfer one VMFron and one VMSBron to Samoa when the airfield is ready.

3. (a) Second Marine Battalion reported for duty on 20 December (47 officers, 814 men plus 84 men required for Samoa).

   (b) Battalion Commander will inform very shortly as to needs for cargo space.

   (c) First Marine Air Wing will be assembled at San Diego (37 VF, 53 VSB), about 21 December.
4. (a) Distances involved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Days at 15 kts</th>
<th>Days at 12 kt.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samoa - San Diego</td>
<td>4180</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearl - San Diego</td>
<td>2280</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearl - Samoa</td>
<td>2280</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego-Samoa-Pearl</td>
<td>6460</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa - Makin</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa - Jaluit</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) War radii of ships involved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15 kts</th>
<th>12 kts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YORKTOWN</td>
<td>14546</td>
<td>16623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crudiv 3</td>
<td>8120</td>
<td>9750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desron 2</td>
<td>5850</td>
<td>6550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average transport</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Number of cruiser or transport berths at Pago

Pago - 6 plus one in harbor entrance. This leaves one buoy for four destroyers.

(d) Net defenses - none. That intended for Rabaul has been made available but is still in San Francisco.

(e) Mine field - Ordered by CNO to be laid in accordance with plan now laid out on chart. Will probably be laid by the time reinforcements reach there. Consists of two single lines of mines, giving some but very little protection inside the harbor and also some in areas outside where depths are about 40-45 fathoms. Mines are 100 yards apart.

5. Other considerations:

(a) Surface raiding activities of the Japanese apparently have so far been by the small cruisers and destroyers of the Fourth Fleet. Our OCL's are more than a match for them.

(b) Only seaplanes can be based at present at Makin.

6. Transports available. CNO has said that he will endeavor to furnish transportation. 86 estimates that four transports and 1 or 2 cargo ships will be necessary for the whole movement. For our initial reenforcement, two transports and one cargo ship should be sufficient. (Only one Base for transport, HARRIS, is available and it arrives in Hawaii 23 December).
7. **Fuel.** There is little hope of the fuel storage being ready and filled in time to be of assistance for this expedition. An oiler will therefore be necessary. It should be sent from the coast to either precede or accompany the convoy, depending on the speeds involved. Such employment of a fleet oiler will put even more strain on our fuel replenishment at Pearl.

8. **Discussion.**

Having reduced the size and consequent importance of the first convoy, we would be justified in not sending a carrier with the convoy, particularly as the YORKTOWN is needed for ferrying aircraft to Hawaii and for offensive and defensive purposes in that area. If two CCL's and 4 destroyers are not considered sufficient for the reduced convoy, a heavy cruiser may be sent to join it at some such point as where it crosses the longitude of Pearl Harbor. The destroyers should not be reduced, as they will be particularly needed because of the lack of submarine protection in Pago Pago Harbor.

Rather than anchor the whole force in Pago Pago harbor at one time, it would be better to have the transports go to the dock one at a time, where they could unload and the oiler could fuel them simultaneously. The destroyers could first fuel at sea or in the harbor one at a time, while the two remain with the convoy and one patrols the entrance.

The cruiser aircraft should maintain an inner air patrol over the entrance.

Cruisers could be fueled at sea, or one at a time in the harbor.

**Covering.** If we are going to raid the Marshalls in the near future, it would be well to time the raid with the approach of this convoy to Samoa. If no raid takes place, a covering movement of one of our task forces toward the Gilbert area should be made.
December 17.

No change in the situation as to major task forces. It was decided to send the WRIGHT to supply Midway and to partially evacuate civilians. The PORTER (Comdesron 5) was assigned as escort.

It was decided to send available submarines to observe in the Marshalls.

Submarine patrol at Midway and Wake was reduced to one each.

A study on the Samoan reinforcement was completed and is appended.

Vice Admiral Pye relieved Admiral Kimmel of command of the Fleet this date. Admiral Nimitz will take command later.

Enemy submarine activity was very light - still no successful attack on a combatant ship. (Only three attacks have been reported during the war).

Radio intelligence connected Crudiv 8 and Cardiv 2 of the enemy fleet with Airon 24, of the Fourth (Mandate) Fleet.

Received Opnav's 17O115 giving appreciation of tasks of Pacific Fleet (See following).

December 18.

Army forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier were placed under the CinCPac this date under the principle of unit of command (Opnavs 2355 following).

No change of operations for major Task Forces was initiated.

COOLIDGE and SCOTT were being loaded with wounded and evacuees and will constitute the first convoy from Honolulu tomorrow (aside from the local A/S protection which has been consistently furnished).

The enemy announced with considerable accuracy our losses on the 7th.

Land offensives in the Far East continued to advance. However, most of our naval forces had cleared the Philippines safely.

Enemy Cardiv 2 and Crudiv 8 continued to be associated with the Fourth Fleet in communications. Also Cardiv 5 was associated in one message with local defense units in the Eastern Marshalls.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

December 19.

Task Forces Eleven and Seventeen proceeding as before.


Received word that facilities at Cavite had been completely demolished.

CinC in his 191037 (following) replied to Opnav's 170115.

December 20.

Orders for Task Forces Eleven, Fourteen and Eight were changed by CinC's 210157 (See Vice Admiral Pye's Estimate and CinCPac's 210147 following). The Substance was that the Jaluit raid was called off, Task Force Fourteen's area of operations was restricted, and Task Forces Eleven and Eight were assigned areas from which to support Task Force Fourteen.

PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND and TENNESSEE departed for the West Coast where repairs are to be completed.

Wake received a dive bombing attack from carrier planes this date. TRITON was recalled from there due to materiel trouble - leaving no submarine on patrol there.

December 21.

All forces proceeding as before. The Matson ship convoy arrived Honolulu.

Wake received another raid from dive bombers as well as horizontal bombers. On one occasion previously the daily raid (about noon) was made by 41 two-engined bombers.

Radio intelligence indicated little of a definite character except that the SORYU appeared to be in the general vicinity of Wake.

Submarines appeared on the West Coast and sank two ships.

A recommendation to Opnav was made to effect the Samoan reinforcement in two increments and employ the YORKTOWN for a ferry trip to Hawaii (See CinCPac 220301 following)
RILLING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

December 22

Wake's report of a landing attack arrived at 0520 (HST). Troops were reported on the island and several ships including destroyers and a transport were mentioned. Nothing was heard after 0830 (HST). The Commander-in-Chief decided to recall Task Force Fourteen which was due to arrive off Wake on the 23rd (HST). The considerations affecting this decision are appended. The Radio Intelligence report for the day previous linked Crudiv 8 (2 CA), Cardiv Two (2 CV) and Batdiv 3 (2 BB). During the deliberations as to this move Opnav's despatch 221706 (appended) was received. The decision was reported to Opnav in CinCPac's 222256 (also appended).

Task Forces Eleven and Fourteen were ordered to return to Pearl and Task Force Eight to cover the WRIGHT at Midway.

December 23

Task Force 14 was ordered to send the TANGIER to Midway to land any of her supplies which might be required. Also the SARATOGA will fly off VMF-221 to Midway.

Opnav in 231546 commented upon CinCPac's 191037 regarding defenses at Hawaii. CinCPac replied in 240507.

Johnston was shelled by a submarine on the night of 22nd and Palmyra this night.

December 24

Task forces proceeding as before. WRIGHT and PORTER arrived at Midway.

Plans were made to send supplies and reinforcements to Johnston, Palmyra and Christmas Islands (Op. Order 45-41) and Palmyra and Christmas groups departed.

Second convoy from the Coast arrived.

PENSACOLA at Brisbane was ordered by Opnav to accompany her convoy to Torres Strait, then rejoin Fleet. BOISE was being retained in the Asiatic Fleet.

Reports of continued activity of the enemy in the Gilberts was received.

Leave and liberty over Christmas were cancelled.

Enemy offensives in the Far East were still progressing.

The Estimate of the Situation which follows was prepared by the War Plans Section.
CHANGE TASK OF SUB-PARAGRAPH DOG MY 090139 TO READ:

"RAID ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND FORCES" - IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THE WORD FORCES INCLUDES POSITIONS AND INSTALLATIONS OF ALL CHARACTER.

YOUR ESTIMATE OF SITUATION ACCORDS IN GENERAL WITH IDEAS OF CNO. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME FEATURES WHICH YOU ARE HEREBY REQUESTED CAREFULLY TO RECONSIDER:

FIRST, KNOX IS NOT YET SATISFIED THAT HAWAIIAN ISLANDS ARE SAFE FROM CAPTURE. CNO CONSIDERS IT POSSIBLE FOR JAPANESE CARRIERS AGAIN TO DESTROY A LARGE PART OF THE SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT AND IF THIS OCCURS A SECOND TIME THEY CANNOT BE REPLACED EXCEPT AFTER A LONG PERIOD. JAPANESE CARRIER STRENGTH IS SUCH THAT YOU CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT LANDINGS BY JAPANESE TROOPS WILL NOT BE MADE ON UNDEFENDED ISLANDS OF THE HAWAIIAN GROUP AND SEIZURE OF AIRFIELDS OR DESTRUCTION OF PLANES ARE STILL POSSIBLE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. THE ENTIRE DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS IS UNDER REVIEW BY THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS. CNO HAS RECOMMENDED STATIONING TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT ON ALL THE LARGER ISLANDS IN ORDER TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY AIR TO CREATE A LARGER BASE AREA WITH MUTUALLY SELF SUPPORTING FORCES;

SECOND, UNTIL OAHU DEFENSES ARE BUILT UP TO SATISFACTORY STATUS PEARL HARBOR SHOULD BE USED BY YOUR VESSELS ONLY FOR SHORT PERIODS AND WHEN SUCH USE IS ESSENTIAL. NO REGULAR OVERHAULS SHOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR THE NAVY YARD BUT ALL ITS ACTIVITIES DEVOTED TO SUPPLY AND TO EMERGENCY REPAIR PURPOSES AND ALTERATIONS THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY. UPKEEP PERIODS SHOULD BE SHORTENED AND SHIPS KEPT AT SEA AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT REGARD AT THIS TIME TO RELAXATION PERIODS FOR PERSONNEL. EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS SHOULD BE DEvised AND EXECUTED WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO SECURITY AGAINST AIRCRAFT OR TORPEDO OR GUN ATTACK OF SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND SHORE FACILITIES;

THIRD, THE MARSHALL ISLAND BASES CONSTITUTE A CONTINUOUS THREAT TO YOUR FORCES AND SHIPPING TO HAWAII AND THE FAR EAST AS WELL AS THREAT TO WAKE AND MIDWAY. CONSIDER THAT THESE JAPANESE BASES SHOULD BE RAIDED AND DESTROYED WHEN PRACTICABLE AND UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THESE THREATS BUT AS SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR WAKE AND MIDWAY AND FOR THE GREAT MORAL VALUE WHICH SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL HAVE FOR THE ARMY, NAVY AND PEOPLE OF UNITED STATES AS YOU NOW PLAN.
CNO recognizes need for utmost secrecy but desires to be informed in advance of special operations when practicable;

Fourth, while your proposed deployment is considered sound, CNO invites attention to the danger of employing the same type of deployment or conducting operations along fixed lines over extended periods. In this, as in all other operations, deception and surprise are essential;

Fifth, while trans-Pacific shipping to Australia and beyond may eventually be reduced it will increase over the next several weeks in order to provide support for Army and Navy forces in the Far East area and later (upper or lower?) Australia.

It also may become necessary at times to escort shipping between West Coast and the Canal.

Desire your comment after due consideration of foregoing.

17 0235 OPNAV TO CINCPAC

Southeast Pacific Force hereby placed temporarily under CINCPAC for escort of Yorktown ultimately will return to present duty. CINCPAC issue movement order from Canal Zone where Carrier and 4 DD expected arrive about 21 December. Company NC F and CompacSou NC F cooperate with COMSEPACFOR in escort and cover with patrol planes as practicable while vessels are in respective coastal zones. This movement must be kept as secret as possible.

17 2355 OPNAV TO CINCPAC

In separate dispatch to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff all Army forces in the Hawaiian coastal frontier have been placed under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Obtain from Commanding General a certified copy of dispatch referred to without paraphrase.

663 17th War Department to Comdg.Gen. Hawaiian Department

All Army forces in the Hawaiian coastal frontier are placed under the command of the Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet, under the principle of unity of command as prescribed in Chapter Two, Paragraphs 9(b)(2) and (10), joint action of the Army and the NavyComma nineteen hundred and thirty five stop you will deliver exact copy of this message to Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and advise War Department of date and hour unity of command becomes effective X Stark and Marshall
In view disclosed weakness of Army defense Hawaiian Islands and reduced battleship strength consider maintenance of most of present fleet strength essential to insure defense of islands. Also in view indicated increased air activity Marshalls with assurance one and possibly two carrier groups and evidence of extensive offshore lookout and patrol now consider surprise attack improbable. I have reluctantly abandoned proposed carrier attack on Marshalls. Wake bombed by Carrier planes today. Operations relief of Wake continue but carrier not to approach closer than two hundred miles x Task Force previously assigned attack mission being moved to northward in support task force enroute vicinity Wake.

Your 210147 and 152302 general considerations and recent developments emphasize that Wake is now and will continue to be a liability. You are authorized to evacuate Wake with appropriate demolition. Efforts to strengthen and hold Midway should continue. King concurs.

Wake cannot be evacuated. It was under coordinated heavy bomber and carrier plane attack at 0210 GCT 22d. It is under landing attack today by several cruisers, destroyers and transports with possibility covering force in vicinity. Last report at 1952 GCT 22d is enemy on island, several ships plus transport moving in. Issue in doubt. Gallant defense Wake has been of utmost value but hereafter Wake is a liability. In view present extensive operations I am forced to conclude that risk of one task force to attack enemy vicinity of Wake is not justifiable. Have ordered retirement of two western task forces. Third task force has been ordered to cover Wright now enroute Midway.
CINCPAC TO OPNAV, infor Comdt Samoa, CO2JtTrainFor, BaseforSubOrdCom, CPSNCF.

22 0301

Your 142346 CinC in general agreement your estimate reference Samoa and that reinforcements are necessary. However, problem complicated by following factors:-

One, landing field will not be usable prior March and then only if vitally essential construction equipment now scheduled depart San Francisco in Hawaiian Merchant arrives without delay and if operations not interrupted by lack gasoline, diesel oil and provisions;

Two, current supply contractor's gasoline exhausted by one January and diesel by one February;

Three, Navy quantities any petroleum products negligible and storage not complete;

Four, tanker of which fleet critically short required fuel escort and Samoa shore establishment;

Five, small harbor and lack of A/S protection limits size convoy that can be expeditiously handled without undue risk and delay;

Six, protection stores and providing camp site and tent floors serious problem.

In view foregoing recommend increase Samoan garrison by increments first increment to consist of second defense battalion and one battalion infantry reinforce with anti-tank platoon and engineer company to sail San Diego when transportation mentioned your 142346 and one oiler also furnished by you is available. Remainder reinforced regiment should be held San Diego for later transportation. Local Defense vessels should accompany first increment if possible.

If this plan adopted propose escort first increment Crud-dive 3 and 2 DD of YORKTOWN group, leaving YORKTOWN free for other employment. Will require early advice composition of convoy and estimated date of sailing. Sent separately to Samoa. Com-11 deliver for info to Comdg. Gen, Second Joint Training Force. Com-12 deliver to CombaseforSubCom.
DEC. GCT.

23 0145  OPNAV TO MULTIPLE ADDRESS

While Chief of Naval Operations assumes that events of December 7 have caused all naval forces to assume a state of readiness against surprise attack it should be noted that Japanese and German psychology make Sundays, Christmas and other holidays likely dates for attack.

23 1546  OPNAV TO CINCPAC

REVIEW OF YOUR 191037 IN CONSULTATION WITH ARMY AIR STAFF INDICATES DESIRABILITY RECONSIDERATION PROPOSED ACTION RELATIVE OUTLYING FIELDS AND AIRCRAFT STATUS AT NIGHT. VALUE OF DISPERsal OF AIRCRAFT FOR REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY FITS IN WITH CREATION OF LARGER BASE AREA (3 OR MORE ISLANDS) WITH MUTUALLY SUPPORTING FORCES AND INDICATES NEED TO RETAIN UTILIZE AND DEFEND OUTLYING FIELDS. VALUE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AT NIGHT IN GOOD WEATHER WARRANTS RETENTION OF SOME IN ALERT STATUS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. KING CONCURS.

24 0507  CINCPAC TO OPNAV

No fields being made unusable that are suitable for regular Army Navy use except by temporary removable blocking and in some cases preparing to demolish by mines. Possible demolition by enemy bombs is being insured against. No demolition charges being placed until field is properly defended against sabotage. One squadron Army pursuit on alert during darkness but pursuit planes in air from one hour before sunrise to sunset except when carrier and other important fleet units are in port is being reduced to conserve material. Additional radars have been installed and with more experienced personnel the efficiency has been greatly increased. Daily search through 360 degrees by patrol planes to 700 miles and Army bombers to 300 miles. Your 231546.
WAKE

There are nearly 1500 people on Wake.

By completely destroying or abandoning everything on the island, including personal belongings, the personnel could be taken on the Tangier very rapidly.

She would be crowded to an extreme degree, but I believe it could be done.

Now as to protecting her.

She should not go until air protection is available.

My conclusion then is that if Wake is to be evacuated, and I strongly recommend against that, then the promptest measure is to send

TANGIER to join LEXINGTON group, and have her and DD do the job while LEX planes cover the operation.

C. H. McMorris.

NOTE: SARATOGA force was one sent with the TANGIER.
Estimate by Admiral Pye on 20 December.

(A)  (1) There is evidence of increasing air activity in Marshalls, both land based and carrier based.
     (2) Intercepted traffic indicates increased activity in patrol operations in vicinity of Marshall Islands.
     (3) Indications that seaplanes are based at Taritari.
     (4) Our positive information re situation in Marshall Islands is non-existent.

(B) From the above it appears that the element of surprise in the attack of Task Force 11 will probably be missing in which case serious losses might be sustained without compensating damage to enemy. Such a loss would have a seriously depressing morale effect on the fleet and country and jeopardize the Hawaiian Islands.

(C) That long delay in initiating the plan caused by the inability of the LEXINGTON to fuel has made it possible for the enemy to estimate the situation and to increase the defense of the Islands. This in itself is an advantage, as it has caused reduction in air strength in other areas.

(D) Task Force 14 will be at its nearest point about 750 miles from any enemy air base - such position is not dangerous from air attack. There is a possibility that an enemy force may take the offensive against this force if its mission is suspected but such chance must be taken any time.

(E) If Task Force 11 moves to the northward it will be in a positions to support Task Force 14.

(F) Enemy carrier groups full of fuel will be able to overtake either of our Task Forces in long run to Pearl. We have no support other than Task Force 8.
Estimate by Admiral Pye as to Action re enemy investing Wake - 0700 - December 22, 1941.

1. Relief of Wake on present expedition now impossible. Tangier should be diverted to eastward.

2. Relief mission having been abandoned, only two courses remain, (a) To attack enemy forces in vicinity of Wake; or (b) Withdraw all forces to eastward.

3. The time of enemy attacks by carrier planes the last two days followed by landing operations today indicates enemy has estimated closely the time at which our relief expedition might arrive, and may if the general location of our carrier groups is estimated be waiting in force.

4. There is a possibility of doing extensive damage to the enemy if the presence in the vicinity of our carrier groups is not suspected.

5. Our naval forces have not yet been exposed to action.

6. The danger to damaged ships at 2000 miles from base must not be under-estimated. A loss of a large part of our forces would make possible a major operation against the Hawaiian Islands. We cannot afford such losses at present.

7. The decision therefore appears to lie between two courses of action -

   (a) Direct Task Force 14 to attack enemy forces, Task Forces 8 and 14 to become involved only in covering the retirement of Task Force 14, or,
   (b) Retiring all forces without any attempt to attack enemy concentrated near Wake.

8. Discussion of course (a):

   There is good reason to believe that if our carrier attack is successful, extensive damage may be done to enemy forces near Wake. It is not probable, though possible, that enemy carrier will be closer than 100 miles from Wake. One or more others may be reserved for any forces seeking to come to Wake's relief. The use of our carrier planes will show definitely the presence of one carrier in the vicinity. If it is pursued the pursuing enemy carriers may be engaged with Task Force 11 and 8 and cause the enemy serious losses.
The proposed attack even by one group may involve the loss of the entire group. Such a loss if the enemy can be seriously damaged and some offensive spirit shown by our Navy may be worth the sacrifice in view of YORKTOWN joining within two weeks. The SARATOGA in Task Force 14 will have the use of the Marine planes which were to go to Wake, but these are not suited to carrier landings and can be used only in an emergency.

9. OPNAV despatch just received states Wake will continue to be a liability and authorizes evacuation. Evacuation is impossible; it will eventually be forced to capitulate. The real question at issue is, shall we take the chance of the loss of a carrier group to attempt to attack the enemy forces in the vicinity of Wake.

10. The exact positions of Task Forces 11 and 3 are unknown, but since the modification of instructions have had adequate time to reach assigned operating areas. The distances between Task Forces is therefore greater than had been anticipated for tomorrow.

   Relief or evacuation of Wake now impossible.

   Task Forces 14, 11, and 3 retire to northeastward, then to Pearl. Report position when within 600 miles of Pearl.

   Relief or evacuation of Wake now impossible. Task Force 14 make one air attack on enemy forces, then retire to northeastward. Task Forces 11 and 3 retire to northeastward not becoming involved in action in support of Task Force 14 except under favorable circumstances.
Estimate of Captain McMorris as to action regarding enemy investing Wake 0800 Dec. 22

1. Wake reported being under gunfire by surface forces about 0300 local time today, and that a landing attack was indicated.

Two days ago carrier dive bombers and shore based horizontal bombers attacked independently.

Yesterday they attacked together.

A dawn landing attack with air support is indicated.

2. Enemy force present is uncertain. Only one carrier is known to be present. Others may be. If there be additional carriers they may not participate in the attack but be disposed to prevent interference with the landing and to attack any of our own forces going to relief of Wake. No real evidence of this.

On December 17 a single message was partially decrypted that contained Cardiv 5 (probably) as a joint addressee with various Marshall stations believed to be offshore patrols and observations stations.

Numerous other messages of the past few days have concerned 4th Fleet - Cardiv Two (HORYU and SIRYU) and Crudiv 8 (ZCA) Horyu and Siryu small CV.

RDF cut Pearl-Samoa-Dutch Harbor indicated Crudiv 8 vicinity Saipan. No direct evidence of more than 1 CV in vicinity.

3. Information is too vague and limited to draw definite conclusions but some indications of most mid-Pacific carriers nearing Japan.

4. In existing circumstances relief or abandonment of Wake at this time assumes secondary importance even though there continues to be strong reasons for relieving that place at an early date. The point is there is an enemy force (possibly weaker) that we can get at.
5. Our own forces are scattered but converging.

The exact situation as to fuel is not known but there are strong reasons for feeling that the cruisers and DD of T.F. 11 and 14 have recently fueled and that the CVs of those two forces still have 2/3 or more of their capacity. T.F. 8 has thus far steamed only about 1500 miles. The carrier of that force is a long range one. The DDs of T.F. 8 are probably the units least well off in fuel and they can steam a long way at high speed.

6. Relief of Wake must be delayed or abandoned; the question of evacuation must also await determination until the present situation clears. Best way to clear it is to get at the enemy.

Own Courses of Action

7. (a) Withdraw all forces toward Pearl without further effort.

(b) Attack forces threatening Wake as soon as possible with T.F. 14 while T.F. 8 and 11 close to support.

(c) Search wide areas with the three T.F. for enemy units that might be covering Wake operations and delaying any decision as to final action until afterwards when results of search are known.

(d) Concentrate the three T.F. and drive off forces threatening Wake (unless it has already fallen and surface forces withdrawn).

8. Course (a) - withdrawal - is unduly cautious. It is easily possible (not to say somewhat probable) that the enemy force is weaker than T.F. 14 alone. It would tend to destroy service and public confidence.

9. Course (b) offers the greatest chance of damaging the enemy. He does not know the location of our task forces and whether or not they are concentrated even if he knows they are at sea.
The enemy cannot have superior forces in all directions. We know where part of them are. There may be no others except in the general vicinity of Wake. The one carrier known to be there is probably the SORYU of 10,000 tons carrying 40 to 50 aircraft.

T.F. 14 can conduct a limited patrol for her own safety while attacking. The SARATOGA has two squadrons of fighters (including the VMF squadron for Wake) to guard T.F. 14. Odds are strongly in her favor.

Such an attack might expose T.F. 14 to attack by other enemy forces while SARATOGA's aircraft are operating against enemy forces off Wake, or while landing after return. This is improbable.

Such is a possibility, but the enemy would first have to search for and locate T.F. 14 and the odds are against rather than in favor of this.

Even though the enemy launch such attack its success is by no manner of means assured. Japanese attacks on the English capital ships in Gulf of Siam were not heavy coordinated attacks but successive attacks by relatively small groups. Reports from Far East as well as from Oahu and from Wake indicate the enemy aircraft are very vulnerable to fighter attack.

This course offers great chance of success against enemy forces off Wake and added possibility of damaging or destroying the enemy forces piecemeal if they are in the vicinity. Even though the enemy be encountered in superior strength the chances of falling back without serious loss are excellent. It is an opportunity unlikely to come again soon.

We are in great need of a victory. Success in this effort would strengthen defenses of Oahu tremendously.

Course (c). This course temporizes and merely postpones the vital decision. In playing for complete safety we would stand to lose a golden opportunity through wasted time.

Course (d). Necessitates delay. Probably removes the advantage of surprise, for it gives the enemy further chance to learn as much of you as you do of him.

It increases the opportunity for him to withdraw if inferior or if his objective at Wake is accomplished.

If he be superior it adds to his chances of damaging all carriers, but such indications as we have indicate no overwhelming superiority and our carrier people are good themselves.

Decision - adopt course (b).
Decision by Admiral Draemel as to action regarding enemy investing Wake.
0700 - 22 December.

Can the forces at sea, in fact, relieve Wake?

Even if the Tangier lands everything - the best that can be said - is - it affords a temporary relief. Further operations must be conducted - a series of them to hold Wake. If this prove impossible Wake eventually must capitulate. Wake was very weak prior to this attack.

Is the condition of Wake after this attack, such - that the aid on the Tangier will be - can be landed? We must not overlook the fact that this effort of the Japs - may be successful. Marine planes must have information before taking off.

Wake - now - becomes of secondary importance. The important issue now - is - action with Jap forces attacking Wake.

If Japan is unaware of, or has not deduced that our forces at sea; may attempt to relieve Wake - he may have inferior forces.

On the other hand - if he knows or estimates our strength at sea - and deduces - their mission as a relief of Wake - he may be fully prepared and set for action. If so - his forces are undoubtedly - strong - or what he considers strong enough to do the job.

Task Forces 11-14 - Evidently plan to fuel enroute returning - in event of an action - such fueling may not be possible. This is a definite weakness.

In event an engagement with Jap forces is accepted - as attempting to support Wake - the possibility of the action developing into a major engagement can not be overlooked. We are willing to accept a major engagement - at this distance from our base - with an uncertainty in the fuel situation?

There are no reserves - all our forces are in the area of possible operations.

The General Situation - dictates caution - extreme caution.

We must decide - either

(1) To abandon Wake - or (2) accept the risk of a major engagement.
Admiral Pye - 24 December.

General Plan for Task Forces.

1. LEXINGTON group retires 1st. Should take minimum time to refuel and proceed to coast, remaining there one week, for overhaul, etc. Carry to coast 9 VF and 29 dive bombers. Obtain maximum number of planes consistent with operating efficiency. Number of fighters to be assigned to carriers should be increased if it is possible to handle them even if boxed, and additional pilots should be carried.

2. SARATOGA Group enters day after LEXINGTON departs. Previous to LEXINGTON departure should operate about 700-800 miles to southward of Oahu in support of Johnston and Palmyra-Christmas line. Should refuel and put to sea with 2 CA and 5 DD as early as possible.

3. ENTERPRISE Group should if necessary refuel DDs at sea and remain in Midway area until SARATOGA leaves - arriving Pearl 2 days after SARATOGA sortie.

4. YORKTOWN should proceed from San Diego to Pearl, as soon as possible, bringing as many planes as can be carried and retain operating efficiency. She should be scheduled to arrive 3 days after arrival of ENTERPRISE?
Movements of Army troops overseas prescribed by paragraph 3511 WPL 46 have been suspended and will not be undertaken except by special arrangements to be provided for by a separate directive for each movement which will be issued when the situation demands and circumstances permit.

It is essential that joint operations centers be established in all Coastal Frontiers Sectors and sub-sectors in which joint operations are being or likely to be carried on. Request funds by despatch if required. Immediate action directed. A similar directive is being issued by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Consult Army authorities.

After conference with Commanding General regarding points Opnav 170115;

First, Concur Hawaiian Islands not yet safe from capture by major operation;

Second, concur possibility enemy carriers may again raid Oahu but question probability of destroying large percentage of planes on ground. Commanding General convinced Radar warning net effective. I am not so convinced. Have issued instructions one third interceptor command be in air from one half hour before sunrise until 0800 and from one hour before sunset until one half hour after sunset. At other periods during daylight one sixth interceptor command be in air. Planes employed in search take off fifteen minutes before sunrise. All other planes manned and ready during the morning and evening danger periods. At night planes dispersed one quarter one hours notice three quarters four hours notice to permit overhaul.

Third, concur danger of enemy using outlying army emergency landing fields. These are being made unusable. Maui air-field being prepared for instant domolition.
19 1037 Fourth, concur necessary station troops establish Radar (Cont'd) and later construct airfield on other islands.

Fifth, all nets and target rafts now employed guard ships and drydock caissons against torpedoes.

Sixth, concur Pearl should be used by vessels minimum consistent with maintaining operating efficiency.

Further consideration other points later.
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

December 24, 1941.

I - MISSION

SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION

1. The War, having been opened by Japan’s surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor has existed for 17 days. This attack reduced our battleship strength for the time being to almost nothing, laid up two light cruisers for a long period and destroyed two destroyers. Our ally, Great Britain, has lost two of the five heavy ships she planned to station at Singapore. Japan’s losses in battleships are uncertain. She may have lost one but, it is more probable that one or two are damaged and not sunk. In all, her losses have been comparatively small. They will be enumerated, as known, in a detailed comparison to be made later. It is sufficient to say here that Japan has: twice as many battleships as we have available, even counting our reinforcement (3 BB) from the East Coast; over twice as many carriers, counting our reinforcement of one. In the other types, the comparison is not so unfavorable if we include our Asiatic Fleet and allies in the Western Pacific. Also, it is probable that uncertainty as to Russia’s actions is keeping some of the Japanese light forces on guard in the Japan Sea against attack by the similar forces Russia is supposed to have at Vladivostok.
2. Enemy Action to date:

(a) Pacific Area.

(1) Raid on Oahu on 7 December - probable striking force of six carriers, two heavy cruisers, two converted battle cruisers and one destroyer squadron. This was apparently followed by a retirement, possible to the Bonin area.

(2) Surface ship raids on Midway and Johnston on 7 and 15 December respectively, apparently by Fourth Fleet units.

(3) Almost daily air raids on Wake including two recent ones from carrier aircraft; one abortive landing attack on in which the enemy lost 1 CL, 2 DD (and 1 ?) (enemy losing December 10); and probably its capture on December 22. In the latter operation, apparently some striking force units were present.

(4) Occupation of Makin Island and a demolition landing at Tarawa - also apparently by Fourth Fleet units.

(5) Air raids against Ocean Island and Nauru.

(6) Apparent reinforcement of aircraft in the Marshall area, and reinforcement of Fourth Fleet possibly with Crudiv 8 and Cardiv 2.

(7) Considerable air activity around Kapingamarangi and coast of Rabaul between there and Nissan Island (New Guinea).

(8) Possible, on one occasion, air reconnaissance of Samoa.

(9) Operation of submarines in the Hawaiian area, along the route to the West Coast, and on the West Coast.

(10) Probable covering operations in the Saipan - Bonin area with battleship strength (First Fleet).
(b) **Far East Area.**

1. Landings in the Philippines, Malaya, Hongkong, and, recently, in North Borneo.

2. Heavy support to the above with air, both land and carrier based, either 3 or 4 carriers having been employed in the Far East Area.

3. Support to these landings with the Second (minus about 6 CA) Third and Southern Expeditionary Fleets, probably reenforced by two battleships, which may have been damaged.

The above land offensives are being particularly successful in Malaya and Hongkong, and apparently the one in the Philippines is now gathering momentum. Hongkong capitulated about Dec. 26th. Situation in Philippines on 29th very critical. There is no report whether oil wells and facilities in North Borneo were demolished prior to capture.

3. **Own Action to date:**

   (a) **Pacific Area.**

   1. Reenforcement and improvement of the defenses of Oahu and nearby large islands.

   2. Covering the Hawaiian area and outlying islands by the employment of carrier groups containing a single carrier, three CA and a destroyer squadron.

   3. Escorting important ships in convoys between West Coast and Oahu, - with the all available cruisers and destroyers not otherwise employed.

   4. Intensive A/S operations, air and surface in the vicinity of Oahu. (No submarine damage to combatant ships to date).
(5) Air search to maximum practicable distance from Oahu, twice-a-day using Army as well as Navy aircraft. Same aircraft to take the offensive if objective is found.

(6) Replenishment and reenforcement of outlying islands (did not reach Wake before capture).

(7) Repair and return of battleships to West Coast. (3 arriving about 20 Dec.

(8) Employment of submarines to defend Wake (new withdrawn) and Midway, and for offensive operations off Japanese Homeland, Wake and in Marshalls (offensive submarines still enroute).

(9) A planned air raid on Jaluit which was abandoned when the task force was in the area eastward of the Marshalls.

(b) **Far East Area.**

(1) Resistance wherever practicable and retirement of surface forces to the Soerabaya area.

(2) Air attacks with patrol planes, probably damaging one battleship. (Patrol planes have retired to N.E.I. also).

(3) Offensive and defensive action by submarines, remaining based at Manila as long as practicable.

(4) In accordance with present directives from CNO to CinCAGF will provide for eventual retirement to Northwest Australia and the pushing of all possible Army reinforcements into Luzon. In the meantime the U.S. forces at Java have undertaken to hold the Malay Barrier east and north of Lombok Strait.
(5) Dutch. The Dutch have made a tentative agreement to hold the Malay Barrier east of Lombok Strait. Their aircraft and submarines have been attacking Japanese transports and cruisers, and some results have been claimed. Their two cruisers are presumably at Singapore.

(6) British. It is not clear what the British Navy is doing, and whether the three other heavy units of the five originally planned will be brought to Singapore. Admiral Phillips, the CinC, Eastern Fleet was lost in the Prince of Wales, shortly after he and CinCAf had conferred and came to some agreement as to coordinated action. The British have had a tendency to use their ships for escorting in the Indian Ocean rather than for such a task as "hold the Malay Barrier."

(7) Australia, New Zealand. These slim forces are occupied wholly in commerce protection in the vicinity of Australia. One bombing attack has been made on Kapingamarangi.

FORMULATION OF MISSION.

The effective War Plan (Rainbow Five) as revised, assigned the following tasks to the Pacific Fleet in the Pacific Area:

(1) Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers.
(2) Support the Army in the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Category D. (May receive major attack)
(3) Destroy Axis sea communications.

-5-
(4) Raid enemy sea communications and forces.
(5) Defend Samoa, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra in Category D.
(6) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers east of 180°.
(7) Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier forces and the Canadian Naval Local Defense Forces.

In (4) "forces" is to be taken as including positions, installations, etc.

Other communications from the CNO indicate concern over the safety of the Oahu base, and the belief that additional attacks will be made to render it untenable. In one despatch the view is held that the retention of Midway is doubtful. The holding of Samoa, Palmyra and Johnston and of the large islands of the group, is stressed. The use of Pearl Harbor until the defenses have been increased is discouraged. Escorts between Hawaii and the Coast are to be provided, and effective counter attacks against raiders are to be made.

The Mission is formulated as follows:

"While protecting the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers east of 180° and raiding enemy communications and forces, to reenforce and defend the Oahu and outlying bases; in order to retain, and make secure, a fleet base for further operations. When the fleet is strong enough to take the strategic offensive,"

-6-
II - SURVEY OF OPPOSING STRENGTHS

1. Economic Factors.

Japan must have access to raw materials and markets in order to survive. The supply of her expanding possessions will be an ever increasing problem.

We must supply our remaining outlying possessions. Our access to the strategic materials of the N.E.I. and Malaya is most important. Supplies must go to the Philippines in the Far East as long as they remain in our hands. Over all our economic position is much better than Japan's.

2. Psychologic Factors.

(a) Morale - The morale of the Japanese fighting forces, flushed with initial success, should be high.

(b) Our morale has received a great blow, but it has great capacity for "come back". That of the country is probably of the same calibre but questioning eyes are undoubtedly being turned on the Pacific Fleet.

(c) Training. From experience so far had with the enemy, his performance has been good. His submarines have not distinguished themselves, but the mechanical excellence and resolution of his flyers have been proved beyond doubt particularly in aerial torpedo technique. His planning has also appeared to be very good.

We, however, should be able to demonstrate superiority in most departments when we actually make contact.
3. **Relative Positions.**

With the loss of Guam and Wake our most exposed position is Samoa.

The following distances are pertinent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>PEARL</th>
<th>TRUK</th>
<th>JALUIT</th>
<th>WAKE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAMOA</td>
<td>2276</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>1710</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALMYRA</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>2780</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JOHNSTON</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>2334</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDWAY</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>2155</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>1080</td>
</tr>
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</table>

4. **Information.**

The Japanese continue to have many advantages over us when it comes to information already obtained and to means of obtaining it in the vicinity of bases. Secret agent radios may still be in existence on Oahu.
5. Armed Forces (Corrected to 13 January)
(a) Navy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OWN</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
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<tr>
<td>PACFLT</td>
<td>ASIAFLT</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(1) Includes COLORADO, under overhaul; excludes, NEVADA, CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA, OKLAHOMA and ARIZONA.
(2) Damaged.
(3) Japanese ships reported sunk have been subtracted from the total. Those shown damaged are in accordance
with reports received. No attempt has been made to estimate losses of enemy submarines. He has admitted the loss of 5 midget submarines.

At Vladivostok Russia is reported to have 16 destroyers of various sizes and 93 submarines.

The disposition of enemy forces, so far as we know, has been given in the "Situation".

(b) Army.

The number of troops available to the enemy for operations in the Central Pacific is difficult to estimate. In spite of his involvement with China, and his guard against Russia, he apparently had sufficient available to execute simultaneous attacks against the Philippines, Malaya and Hongkong, and is sending some against British Borneo. More impressive, these were mobile forces in transports. It is believed that the two largest offensives, Luzon and Malaya will absorb practically all of his mobile forces until these attacks have been pushed to a successful conclusion. There were apparently sufficient such forces in the Mandates to act successfully against the Gilberts and Wake.

(c) Air Forces.

XXX No complete estimate of air forces will be attempted here but the following details are recorded.

(1) Japanese carriers average less capacity than do ours.
(2) Aircraft in the Marshalls at the outbreak of war were variously estimated from 150 by the Fleet Intelligence Section down to 29 by the British Intelligence. One indication of the number present was that Wake was bombed by 27 twin-motored planes on December 7th and a few days later one of the almost daily attacks contained 41. As many as eight four-motored sea planes attacked on another occasion. On December 9th a seaplane unit and tender moved into Makin.

(3) The Japanese have several sea plane carriers. These and the interlocking chains of bases give great mobility to their air forces. A few submarines may be fitted with aircraft.

(4) While the above air activity was going on, the various land offensives in the Far East appeared to have adequate air support, and Cavite, in particular, was severely bombed.

(d) Material.

No inferior material was noted in the planes shot down on the seventh. However, they were not armoured and were not fast. One outstanding material feature is the Japanese aerial torpedo which takes its depth so quickly that it can be dropped in shallower water and closer to the target than can ours, at present.
(e) **Bases.**

Japanese bases in the Mandates and other islands are, in general, admirably placed for mutual support, and to form successive lines of resistance against any advance of ours. They also help to extend the range of his offensive operations, particularly those of submarines and aircraft. Just how well developed any of them are for surface ships is uncertain. Truk probably has considerable facilities, and also Port Lloyd. It is doubtful if any of the Marshalls are fitted, say, to fuel a sizeable force, but many of them offer anchorages where fueling could readily be conducted from oilers.

In Pearl Harbor we have a fleet base good in many respects, but it is the only one in a large area. This is a great disadvantage - all our eggs are in one basket; enemy submarines can concentrate; and the general effect on our operations is as though each force had a string tied to it, the other end of which is sure to be secured at Pearl Harbor. Our outlying bases are well situated as outposts, but are weak, and cannot support surface craft. Samoa is excellently placed for our southwest communication lines. It, however, is far from Pearl Harbor and the Marshalls and Gilberts somewhat flank the route to it.
(f) Logistics.

A strain will undoubtedly be placed upon Japan to keep up the far-flung system of positions she has reenforced and expanded. Of her needs, aviation gasoline will probably be the most critical.

Our logistic problem is difficult chiefly because of the lack of bottoms. Submarine sinkings have already started and escorts will be difficult to furnish.

Drydocks may be a bottleneck for us, but they will be the same for the enemy, particularly if he exposes himself in the Eastern Pacific.
III - ENEMY COURSES

1. Mission.

(a) Japan's broad mission is believed to have been, at the beginning of the war:

"TO DESTROY THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH JAPANESE HEGEMONY OVER THAT AREA."

Just how far this may have been extended by his initial success against our fleet is problematical. There has been much talk of ruling the world among certain elements of the enemy, but there are so many things they must accomplish before they can consider working up to a major effort, even outside of the Western Pacific, that such a broad extension of his mission is discarded from consideration.

The formulation of the Mission as given is considered as far as it goes sound. The enemy has already attacked most of the territory of the Associated Powers north of the Malay Barrier, and it is considered that the islands comprising this Barrier are vital to him.

The question at present is, will he undertake to extend control to the Mid Pacific? To do so of course, he must capture Oahu.

(b) The considerations which may lead him to such an effort are:

(1) He may desire such control in order to be able to launch an offensive against the United States in the Eastern Pacific.
(2) He may desire to deny Oahu to us so that we surely cannot interfere with his extension and consolidation in the Far East.

The latter is considered to be his most likely motivation. It is in line with his attack on December 7th, - a preventive measure.

(c) The considerations against such an attack are that:

(1) He will subject his naval strength to attrition losses which would place them in an unfavorable situation for carrying out, against increasing associated forces, the remainder of the program he may have laid out.

(2) He may have, and probably has, another commitment in mind - the conquest of Australia. This is considered probable because:

(i) He undoubtedly is anxious to incorporate it in his Empire because of its resources, its space for colonization and because its bases would therefore be denied to the Associated Powers as foot-holds to renew pressure on Japan in the Far East.

(ii) Such advance could probably be undertaken at no great cost in the way of losses to his Fleet.

(iii) It is a natural extension from the system of bases he will have if successful in capturing the Malay Barrier.

(3) Because of present commitments he may not be able to prepare for such an attack in time. The time element enters very strongly into the situation for him because:
(1) He must at least surmise that reinforcements such as Batdiv Three, the Yorktown, and possibly the North Carolina and Washington, will be brought to the Pacific.

(ii) More of our battleships will be repaired in a few months.

(iii) The longer he delays, the stronger Hawaii can be made.

(iv) We already have a tremendous war effort program which is only beginning to produce.

(v) The events in Russia may presage the beginning of a fold-up for Germany. If such should be the case Great Britain and the United States would eventually be free to turn full strength upon Japan.

(4) He may not be able to undertake the responsibility of support and supply of Hawaii.

From the foregoing it appears that the enemy mission already quoted is the most probable one, and that the most probable change in it would be that he would seek extension of control to the Mid Pacific in order to deny it to us.
2. **Courses of Action.**

The following four courses are set down as being evident from the enemy's present actions and as being necessary to complete the execution of his probable mission.

0-1 - To capture and consolidate the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, including the Malay Barrier.

0-2 - To capture and consolidate Australia - New Zealand.

0-3 - To prevent interference with operations in the Far East by the Associated Powers.

0-4 - To hold the status quo with China and Russia while completing 0-1 and 0-2.

His course to accomplish his next most probable mission is:

0-5 - To capture, and deny to us, Oahu and its outlying positions.

In carrying out 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3, it is visualized that he will:

6-1 - Capture, by landing operations and land offensives, bases or sites suitable for aircraft to support naval and land forces, and for naval forces to control the sea areas and support further land offensives.

6-2 - Mop-up remaining territory by supported landing operations.

6-3 - Employ naval and air units in the Western Pacific to render support as indicated above and to cover the
operations in that area.

6-4 - Employ naval and air units otherwise to:

(a) Protect the homeland and outlying islands in coordination with land forces;
(b) Protect lines of communication in the Western Pacific and to outlying positions in the mid-Pacific;
(c) Divert our forces and inflict damage by raids on our communications, forces, and positions, including demolition raids;  
inferior
(d) Cut off and destroy/forces as opportunity offers.

6-5 - Capture Samoa and British outlying positions in the South Pacific.

This course is considered probable because it will assist in his campaign against Australia and will facilitate attacks on our lines of communication and, because, due to the exposed position and present weak defenses, it can be accomplished without great loss to the enemy.

Less probable:

6-6 - Capture Oahu and other main islands of the Hawaiian Group.

This is considered less probable because of our deduced enemy mission, but the adoption of this course by the enemy must of course be guarded against.
3. **Operations.**

To carry out the courses of action enumerated above it is visualized that the enemy will:

(a) Occupy an air base or bases in the Ellice Islands.

(b) Make supported landing attack against Samoa as soon as he can muster sufficient troops and transports.

(c) Continue submarine raids on our forces and communications and an occasional submarine shelling of our outlying islands.

(d) Continue submarine observations of our movements, and, if it continues practicable, the employment of secret agents to obtain and transmit information.

(e) Employ cruisers and converted merchantmen for raids on our lines of communication in the South Pacific, and cruisers against our Hawaii - outlying base communications. Less probable, employ cruisers, and perhaps raids-in-force, against our Hawaii-Mainland communications.

(f) Make surface bombardment and air raids against out outlying bases. Less likely but still to be guarded against are air raids against Oahu, West Coast ports, and the Canal.

(g) Make landing attacks for demolition against our outlying bases and stations, including the Aleutian Islands.

(h) Conduct sweeps in force through the areas in the mid-Pacific in which inferior forces of ours may be operating.
(i) Less probable, make landing attacks for capture on outlying bases of the Hawaiian area, outlying islands of the main group, and Oahu (It is not believed outlying bases will be attacked for capture except as part of the operations for the capture of Oahu).

(j) Establish air patrols and surface warning nets off Japanese territory. It is believed that the enemy is particularly apprehensive against a carrier raid against the Homeland.

(k) Repel attacks against territory with aircraft striking groups, submarines and other torpedo craft, and with land defenses.

(l) Cover territory and communications against attack, and Far East operations against interference with main fleet units.
4. An estimate as to enemy action in the mid-Pacific in the immediate future is as follows:

(a) Continue raids and harassment with submarines.
(b) Attack communications to Australia with cruisers, auxiliary cruisers and long range patrol planes.
(c) Seize an air base in the Ellice Islands.
(d) Make a strong carrier raid (not less than two CV) against one of our outlying bases — priority as follows: Midway, Palmyra, Johnston.
(e) Make a cruiser bombardment, and perhaps a demolition raid against Canton.
(f) Land for demolition purposes at outlying Aleutian positions.
(g) If it can be organized before our reinforcement, send an expedition to capture Samoa, and probably later, Suva.
(h) Employ remaining forces to protect own territory, communications and Far Eastern operations.

5. Possible but not considered probable at this time are:
(a) Cruiser raids against communications to the West Coast.
(b) Sweeps in force including fast battleships along the West Coast communication line.
(c) Carrier raid against Oahu.
(d) Carrier raid against Pacific Northwest.
III. OWN COURSES

1. The mission is repeated:

While protecting the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers east of 180° and raiding enemy communications and forces, to reenforce and defend Oahu and outlying bases; in order to retain, and make secure, a fleet base for further operations when the fleet is strong enough to take the strategic offensive.

2. This mission is the guide for our actions until our fleet base is considered strong enough to defend itself, and our Fleet is strong enough to undertake distant operations. It is a strategically defensive mission but we must bear in mind that when highly mobile forces are at hand a passive defense is by no means indicated.

2. Courses of Action.

Some courses of action are evident and are already being carried out. Under the broad course of action -

B-1. Strengthen the defenses of the Oahu base to the maximum practicable extent. We have the following supporting courses:

b-1. Increase the Army defenses of Oahu in pursuit aircraft, bombers, AA artillery, troops, heavy artillery, radar equipment, to the maximum extent practicable.

b-2. Increase the naval local defense forces to provide sufficient anti-submarine patrols, surface air-warning
net, mine defense, harbor patrols, etc.

b-3. Improve passive defense by means of nets and obstructions; bomb or splinter proof construction; dispersal; camouflage; better operating centers and communications.

b-4. Increase to the limit that can be supported troops, arms, radar, ammunition and other supplies at outlying bases.

Other evident courses follow:

B-2. Cover the Oahu base and the West Coast by the operations of task forces at sea.

"Cover" is a broad term and its application in this case will be discussed later.

B-3. Cover the outlying bases by the operations of task forces at sea and, in some cases, with submarines.

This also requires discussion. It is apparent that Samoa, for instance, could be covered in this way only occasionally; the Aleutians rarely ever.

B-4. Protect sea communications by escorting, patrolling, routing, covering and by destroying enemy raiders.

This course of action has already been taken and its execution is shaping up as follows:

b-5. Provide anti-submarine and anti-surface raider escort between Hawaii and the West Coast for important shipping; diverse routing for ordinary freighters, with local A/S escort near terminals. Provide cover for the operation
of task forces in the mid-Pacific.

b-6. Provide anti-submarine escort and cover between Hawaii and outlying islands.

b-7. Provide anti-raider escort for extremely important shipping along the most exposed portion of the route to the New Zealand - Australia area; diverse and roundabout routing for other traffic.

For that part of the mission which requires raids on enemy sea communications and forces, it is evident that a large percentage of our submarines should be so employed, hence:

B-5. Raid enemy sea communications and forces with submarines.

It is other raids with surface and air forces which require careful consideration.

We have forces available - carriers and cruisers - well suited for this work -, and a judicious choice of objectives and timing will do much to make our defensive effective and should help to improve our relative strength. We cannot afford to accept losses on a ship for ship basis, but will have to take some risks in order to strike the enemy a blow from time to time. The morale of the Fleet and of the nation demands it, and it is only in this way that we can keep some of the enemy diverted to the defensive instead of permitting him to take offensive measures against us at will. Aside from raids on positions we should make sweeps in force (not less
than two carrier groups) in areas where inferior enemy forces and supply ships are likely to be. As our battleships become available they can be advanced as supporting "strong points" on which the fast groups could retire.

Each operation must be meticulously planned in accordance with the conditions existing, and forces available at the time. The general courses are:

B-6. Raid outlying enemy bases with carrier - heavy cruiser groups.

B-7. Sweep exposed enemy areas and communications with strong, fast forces.

B-8. Support raiding and sweeping operations from intermediate advanced positions with battleships.
I. SITUATION (Dec. 25, 1941)

1. Forces.

The three principal task forces at sea are nearing the end of their fuel and are now scheduled to return to Pearl to remain as indicated below:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Comp.</th>
<th>Comdr.</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.F. 11</td>
<td>LEXINGTON</td>
<td>Vice Ad. Brown</td>
<td>27-29</td>
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<tr>
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<td>R. Ad. Fletcher</td>
<td>29-31</td>
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<td>DESRON 6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. Previous Employment

Task Force 11 left Pearl on 14 December with orders to conduct bombing raid on Jaluit on 22 December (10:30). On 20 December its orders were changed to render support to Task Force 14 from a position to the eastward of Wake. On 22 December, before it had taken up this position, it was recalled to Pearl.
Task Force 14 departed Pearl on 16 December with orders to reenforce and supply Wake with men and materials carried in the TANGIER, beginning 23 December. On 22 December, after Wake was captured by the enemy, this force was recalled.

Task Force 8 departed Pearl 19 December with orders to support the other two task forces from a position to the westward of Johnston Island. On 22 December it was ordered to cover the reenforcement of Wake by Task Force 17 (WRIGHT, PORTER), an operation ending 26 December.

3. Motivating Considerations.

The effective war plan requires protection of our territory and sea communications, but also raiding of enemy sea communications and forces. Recent directives from CNO have expressed concern over the inadequacy of the present defenses of the Oahu base, but have also pointed out the necessity for vigorous raiding of the enemy's outlying positions.

The defenses of Oahu have been considerably improved since 7 December; defense organization has been ironed out; and air searches are extending to 700-800 miles. Task forces are not so greatly needed to assist in a close defense.

Aside from any directive received, it is most apparent that to buoy morale and to create some diversion of the enemy, an offensive blow must be struck, and soon.

4. Objective.

The outlying island objectives for an air raid present themselves as follows:
(a) **Wake** - captured from us on 22 December.

(b) **Eniwetok** - westernmost island in northern chain; probably considerable development; an important link in the air route through the Marshalls; probable base of aircraft which raided Wake almost daily.

(c) **Rongelap** - in northern chain; another possible base of the aircraft which raided Wake, but any considerable development if there, has been a well-guarded secret.

(d) **Wotje - Maloelap** - on northeast corner of the Marshalls; considerable development reported.

(e) **Majuro - Arno** - in eastern chain of Marshalls; comparatively good base sites, but not much development reported.

(f) **Mille** - southeast corner of the Marshalls; little development reported but it includes a base detachment and, in an enemy despatch of about 11 December, a Mille detachment was referred to.

(g) **Jaluit** - in western chain of islands; is seat of government of the Marshalls; the center of defenses and apparently the most developed.

(h) **Makin** - northernmost Gilbert Island; was captured by the Japanese on 10 December; is being developed as an air base; had present recently a portion of Airon 24, probably a tender and some four-motored sea planes.

(i) **Tarawa - Abaiang** - Gilbert Islands south of Makin; have been attacked by the enemy, but it is doubtful if they are being developed now.
Some of the considerations which lead to a choice of objectives:

(1) Due to our present reduced forces, chance of damage to our carrier should be kept as small as is compatible with the inflicting of an appreciable amount of damage on the enemy. We can’t afford to trade ship for ship much less ship for some minor shore installations. This consideration eliminates Eniwetok, Rongelap and Jaluit for the present. It points to Makin where defenses are not organized and which can be approached with little risk of detection and bombing from the stronger islands. Wotje-Maloelap, Majuro-Arno, and Mille, being in the eastern chain can also be approached under favorable conditions, but Wotje-Maloelap are probably fairly well guarded.

(2) Damage inflicted should be worth the risk and the wear and tear of the operation. This is a difficult problem. It is improbable to get something for nothing, and valuable objectives are usually well defended.

(3) Not knowing the status of our personnel now in Japanese hands on Wake, bombing that island would not do.

(4) The operation might be considered in its relation to other of our operations and problems. CNO considers that the action of the Japanese in the Gilberts indicates a threat to Samoa, and we concur in the idea that the enemy must have designs on that place. A large reinforcement to Samoa will probably be en route in early
January. An operation against Makin would have a covering effect, and the wiping out the present development might set back any plans the enemy might have against Samoa. Makin is therefore selected as an objective. As the development there will probably not warrant the employment of a complete carrier group, is there any other objective which could be struck simultaneously? Mille suggests itself at once. It probably has little development, but it is an outpost for Jaluit, and cleaning it out would assist a later operation against that place. A simultaneous air raid against Makin and Mille is therefore decided upon. At Makin, as there is a British settlement, the bombing objectives must be very carefully selected.

5. All three of the task forces have been operating almost continuously for a considerable period - order in length of operating period 8, 11, 14. For any raid against the enemy islands, fuel will be a consideration, and the ENTERPRISE has about twice the radius of the LEXINGTON class. However, waiting for the ENTERPRISE would delay the operation considerably, and this carrier has had the longest continuous operation. Therefore we chose the first force to return - 11 with the LEXINGTON.

(As of 31 December such an attack had not been decided upon. Samoa Reenforcement is now due to be en route from San Diego from 6 to 20 January.)
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

December 25

No change in orders for task forces. VMF-221 landed at Midway.

December 26

No change for task forces. WRIGHT departed Midway and TANGIER arrived there.

Johnston group departed from Pearl.

No significant enemy information received except reports of minor activity in the Gilberts.

Opnav put decision as to Samoan reinforcement up to CinCPac, but advised sending full reinforcement and carrier escort.

December 27

Task Force 14 entered.

In accordance with decision to reduce the strength of the main task forces, one cruiser and three DD were detached and assigned to escort duty under Combasefor (Task Force 15). Decision was made to employ Task Force Eleven in covering the Hawaiian area instead of raiding the Eastern Marshalls or Gilberts. The deciding factor was that we cannot at this time afford to subject our forces to losses from shore based air and superior carrier strength, particularly while 2000 miles from base. (See Op. Order 46-41).

Opnav directed more detailed reports as to operations of task forces, and particularly of the considerations that led to the abandonment of the tasks in connection Jaluit and Wake. (Opnav 271808 and 271810).

December 28

No change for task forces.

Rescue of survivors developed that S.S. PRUSA was torpedoed on 18 December, and S.S. MANINI on 17 December - both south of the Hawaiian group.

Decision was made to send the full reinforcement to Samoa (CinCPac 281631). The YORKTOWN group will escort it as Task Force 17.

CinCAF is moving from Manila to Sourabaya, probably by submarine.
December 29

Task Force Fourteen entered Pearl this date. Other two major task forces (Eight and Eleven) patrolling in general Hawaiian area.

The battleships arrived at West Coast ports - PENNSYLVANIA at San Francisco; MARYLAND and TENNESSEE at Puget Sound.

A raider report near West Coast was received but the identity of this ship was never established.

Radio Intelligence offered nothing significant. Enemy carriers are linked in some way with Homeland air stations - possibly receiving relief air groups.

Opnav in 291431 pointed out threat against Samoa and Suva constituted by the enemy activities in the Gilberts. Directed consideration of this in planning "covering or diversion operations" in connection with the Samoan reenforcement.

December 30

CHICAGO, in Task Force Eleven, was recalled that Rear Admiral Newton might turn over command Cruisers, Scouting Force to Rear Admiral Fletcher. It has been decided to send the latter officer to San Diego to embark in the YORKTOWN and take command of Task Force Seventeen. All task force commanders of carrier groups are to be embarked in the carriers and arrangements are being made for a rear admiral to command the cruisers of each of these forces.

YORKTOWN group arrived at San Diego.

No significant information of the enemy was received.

Admiral King took command of the U.S. Fleet from Washington and sent his appreciation of the principle tasks for the Pacific Fleet in his 301740. His plans for exercising command are given in 301701.

December 31

Op. Order No. 48-41 was issued to Task Force Seventeen.

Rear Admiral Fletcher flew to San Diego to take command of this force. The LOUISVILLE and ST. LOUIS were assigned to this force instead RICHMOND and TRENTON (Southeast Pacific Force).

Task Force Fourteen sailed to cover the Midway area in accordance with Op. Order 47-41. Rear Admiral Leary was placed in command.

Task Force Eight entered Pearl.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

December 31 (Cont'd)

Received orders from Cominich to transfer one patrol squadron to CinCAF. Eighteen VP reinforcements have now arrived in this area and the last six are awaiting good weather.

The maintenance of a daily all-around search to 700 miles from Oahu has not been found possible with the long range aircraft available, and certain sectors to the eastward each day are searched to only 200-300 miles.

As result of RDF bearings of 5 enemy ships passing through Johnston Island, Comtaskfor 11 was ordered to give special coverage to that place.

Admiral Nimitz took command of the Pacific Fleet this date.

Cominich (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet) informed CinCAF concerning the tasks of the Asiatic Fleet (Cominich 312300).

January 1

Tasks forces operating as before. It was decided that Task Force Eight would operate in the Hawaiian Area for a few days beginning January 3rd and would then return to prepare for an operation in coordination with Task Force Seventeen.

Enemy submarines in the Hawaiian Area had apparently withdrawn to greater distances from Oahu, with several along the routes to the outlying islands.

S.S. MALAMA, 600 miles south of Tahiti was stopped apparently by an aircraft from a raider.

January 2

No developments as to own forces. War Plans Section's Estimate of the Situation as to employment of main task forces in January is appended. Offensive employment for Task Forces 11 and 17 during their next period at sea was recommended.

No significant radio intelligence of the enemy was received. No association of carriers with the Mandate Fleet had been noted for some time.

Cominich in 021718 urged serious consideration of offensive action against the Gilbergets, particularly in connection with the Samoan reinforcement.
INFORMATION RECEIVED AS TO YOUR OPERATIONS HAS BEEN INADEQUATE FOR ESSENTIAL COMPREHENSION OF YOUR CURRENT ACTIVITIES. REPORT DAILY:

(A) MAJOR TASKS WHICH ARE ACTIVE.
(B) CORRESPONDING TASK FORCES AND GROUPS.
(C) APPROXIMATE LOCATION THEREOF.
(D) APPROPRIATE COMMENT AS TO PROGRESS OF THE SEVERAL ACTIVE TASKS.

ON 27 December organization and operations Pacific Fleet your 27 1808:

(A) Task Force Eleven. Lexington with grounded main rotor 3 CA 9 DD in Pearl refueling after return Jaluit area (see my 28.0417). This force less 1 CA and 3 DD departs 29 December to cover Johnston-Falmyra line. LEXINGTON can now make 30 knots. On return about 4 January repairs must be undertaken Pearl if practicable otherwise CV must return mainland for rotor repairs.

(B) Task Force Fourteen. Saratoga with 3 CA, 9 DD, 1 AO retiring from Wake (see my 280417) to refuel 29-31 December thence proceed Midway area.

(C) Task Force Eight. Enterprise with same support force as Fourteen completing covering reenforcement Midway by 12 VMF additional ammunition and radar is returning Pearl enter 31 Dec. depart 3 Jan., probable use covering Oahu or own advance bases against enemy raids.

(D) Task Force Nine. Patwings covering daily 700 mile circle around Oahu assisted by Army Bl7s. Two planes each at Johnston, Palmyra, plus striking force at Oahu.

(E) Task Force Seven. Submarines. One Midway, one Wake. Two enroute Marshalls, three in Orange waters.

(F) Task Force Fifteen. Escort force of 7 cruisers plus 10 DD on mainland and trans-Pacific escort duty plus covering reenforcements to Johnston-Falmyra and Xmas.

(G) Task Force Sixteen. Three BB and DD escort returning mainland yard overhaul.

(H) Available DM5 and DM under Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for local escort and anti-submarine patrol.
to insure channel kept open.

(I) No forces in contact with enemy except several attacks by planes and destroyers against suspected submarines.

**OPNAV TO CINCPAC**

ESSENTIAL FOR UNDERSTANDING REQUIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY THAT YOU FURNISH ME WITH FURTHER INFORMATION AS TO CONSIDERATIONS WHICH GOVERNED RETIREMENT OF TWO WESTERN TASK FORCES AS REPORTED IN YOUR TWENTY TWO TWENTY FIFTY SIX

**CINCPAC TO OPNAV**

Considerations changed situation due to:

(A)(1) Enemy landing at Wake made relief or evacuation impossible.

(2) Navy Department's expressed opinions
    (A) Wake a liability;
    (B) Concern for holding Midway;
    (C) Belief Hawaiian Islands not secure which was concurred in by C.G;
    (D) Opinion raid on Pearl may soon be repeated;
    (E) Concern over route to Australia.

(3) Radio intelligence indicating probability two carrier groups and a fast battleship division in Mandate area.

(4) The probability that a definitely organized landing expedition at Wake would have strong supporting forces.

(B) Question then became should TF 14 be directed to attack enemy forces at Wake? If TF 14 became involved should Task Force 11 be ordered to support? My conclusion was that if action developed against any but unimportant naval forces at Wake it would be on enemy's terms in range of shore-based bombers with our forces 2000 miles from nearest base with inadequate fuel for more than 2 days high speed, with probable loss of any damaged ships, and might involve two task forces

(C) I had been strongest advocate of offensive action for relief of Wake but with Wake under landing attack I became convinced that the general situation took precedence and required conservation of our forces. With extreme regret I ordered a retirement Opnav 271810.
CINCPAC TO OPNAV

Your 26 1908 I plan to transport entire reinforcement less aviation in Matson Line ships escorting with force mentioned your 142346. One Fleet AO will accompany expedition. In addition commercial AK with essential contractor's material may proceed with or independent this convoy. Covering or diversion operations under consideration will be determined upon later. Recommend you make the three Matson ships available San Diego by 3 January.

OPNAV TO CINCPAC

STRONG INDICATIONS JAPANESE BASING MAKin ISL IN NORTH GILBERTS THUS DEVELOPING THREAT TOWARDS FIJI AND SAMOA AND SO TO COMMUNICATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA. INCLUDE THIS FACTOR IN YOUR CONSIDERATION OF "COVERING OR DIVERSION OPERATIONS" OF YOUR 281631 KING CONCURS.

ALNAV

FUNCTIONS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. FLEET (COMINCH):
(1) Evaluation of information and intelligence.
(2) Preparation and execution of plans for current war operations.
(3) Operational duties.
(4) Essential communications for war operations.
(5) Training. (Opnav prepares War Plans from long-range point of view).

COMINCH TO PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATES

ALNAV 166 CURRENT OPERATING PLANS ALLOCATIONS AND DISPOSITIONS CONTINUE IN EFFECT UNLESS AND UNTIL DUTY MODIFIED AS TO ALL COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AFFECTING FLEETS NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS AND ARMY COMMANDS X ADDRESS TO ME ALL OPERATING DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE BUT CONTINUE TO ADDRESS OPNAV ON ALL OTHER MATTERS. IT IS MY INTENTION THAT COMMAND SHALL BE EXERCISED BY THE ISSUE OF GENERAL OPERATING PLANS AND OR DIRECTIVES AND THAT PERTINENT DISCRETION AND RESPONSIBILITY SHALL BEvested in appropriate principal subordinates in chain of command. CARRY ON. OPNAV INFORMED.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

CONSIDER TASKS ASSIGNED YOU SUMMARIZE INTO TWO PRIMARY TASKS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY FIRST COVERING AND HOLDING LINE HAWAII MIDWAY AND MAINTAINING ITS COMMUNICATIONS WITH WEST COAST SECOND AND ONLY IN SMALL DEGREE LESS IMPORTANT MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATION WEST COAST AUSTRALIA CHIEFLY BY COVERING SECURING AND HOLDING LINE HAWAII SAMOA WHICH SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE FIJI AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE SEE OPNAV 291431 IN THIS CONNECTION.
DEC. GCT

30 1840 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

TRANSFER FROM HAWAIIAN AREA TO CINC ASIATIC FOR DUTY ONE 12 PLANE PATROL SQUADRON READY FOR SERVICE X DESIGNATION OF SQUADRON CHOICE OF ROUTE LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS AT DISCRETION CINCPAC X THIS MOVEMENT MUST BE EXPEDITED.

31 2300 COMINCH TO CINCAF, INFO CINCPAC

THE GENERAL STRATEGIC POLICY FOR OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EASTERN THEATER WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY THE US AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF IS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) TO HOLD THE MALAY BARRIER (DEFINED AS THE LINE MALAY PENINSULA SUMATRA JAVA AND NORTH AUSTRALIA) AS THE BASIC DEFENSIVE POSITION IN THAT THEATER AND TO OPERATE SEA LAND AND AIR FORCES IN AS GREAT DEPTH AS POSSIBLE FORWARD OF THE BARRIER IN ORDER TO OPPOSE ANY JAPANESE SOUTHWARD ADVANCE.

(B) TO HOLD BURMA AND AUSTRALIA AS ESSENTIAL SUPPORTING POSITIONS FOR THE THEATER AND BURMA AS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUPPORT OF CHINA AND TO THE DEFENSE OF INDIA.

(C) TO REESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH THE DUTCH EAST INDIES WITH LUZON AND TO SUPPORT THE PHILIPPINES GARRISONS

(D) TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE THEATER IN DISPOSING OF THE REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVING IN THAT THEATER YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE ABOVE POLICY AND CONSIDER THE NEED OF THE THEATER AS A WHOLE X TO THIS END CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG THE BRITISH DUTCH AND UNITED STATES COMMANDERS IS ESSENTIAL AND YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONCERT MEASURES ACCORDINGLY BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF FAR EAST WILL INFORM THE DUTCH AND REQUEST THEIR COOPERATION.

JAN GCT

02 1718 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

URGE YOUR THOROUGH CONSIDERATION OF EXPEDITION OF RAID IN CHARACTER AGAINST ENEMY BASES IN GILBERT ISLANDS PROBABLY MAKIN AND OR IN ELLICE AND PHOENIX GROUPS EITHER AS SEPARATE OPERATION OR PREFERABLY COORDINATED WITH SAMOA REINFORCEMENT EXPEDITION IN ORDER TO FIRST COVER LATTER SECOND CHECK INCREASING ENEMY THREAT TO SAMOA DASH FIJI AREA THMD UNDERTAKE SOME AGGRESSIVE ACTION FOR EFFECT ON GENERAL MORALE.

02 2235 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

OPERATIONS PROPOSED YOUR 021718 CONTEMPLATED AND UNDER consideration.
EMPLOYMENT OF CARRIER TASK FORCES IN JANUARY

I. SITUATION

1. The general situation has been given in the Estimate prepared December 24 and corrected as of December 28. A general comparison of forces is included in the same Estimate.

2. The pertinent features of the situation facing us are as follows:

   (a) Enemy Situation.

       From the best intelligence that we have, it appears that:

       (1) The Far East offensives are occupying practically all of the amphibious forces of the enemy plus 3 or 4 carriers, 2 BB's, about 13 cruisers, about one-third of his destroyers, some submarines and many auxiliary types. How long these forces will be needed in the Far East is problematical but it is believed that the end of January will see them still there.

       (2) Since the raid on the 7th, all First Fleet units and carriers have apparently remained west of the Eastern Marshalls.

       (3) Carrier air groups are being refitted or exchanged.
(4) There are about fifteen submarines at sea from the Hawaiian area to the West Coast.

(5) The enemy is consolidating an air base at Makin and is extending his air activities to New Guinea and, at one time, to the Ellice Islands. He has bombed Ocean Island several times and Nauru at least once.

(6) There are increasing indications of converted raiders and tenders being at large.

Known enemy action since the raid on Oahu has been -

(7) The sustained bombing and capture of Wake - with at least one carrier supporting.

(8) Surface ship shelling of Midway and Johnston, and submarine shelling of Johnston, Palmyra, and outlying main islands of Hawaiian group.

(9) Sinking of three cargo ships in this general area and three or four on the West Coast.

(b) Own Situation.

(1) Battleships - PENNSYLVANIA ready in mid-January, MARYLAND about 20 January, TENNESSEE about 5 February, COLORADO 1 February, Batdiv Three probably by the end of the month. Thus no battleship will be available during greater part of this month.
### (2) Carrier Task Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.F. 11 - LEXINGTON</td>
<td>LEXINGTON</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>Departed P.H. 29 Dec</td>
<td>covering Johnston-Palmyra line; returning 3 January.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIANAPOLIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHICAGO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(at Pearl today)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One DL, 5 DD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.F. 14 - SARATOGA</td>
<td>SARATOGA</td>
<td>Leary</td>
<td>Departed P.H. 31 Dec</td>
<td>covering Midway area; returning 15 Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASTORIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINNEAPOLIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One DL, 5 DD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.F. 8 - ENTERPRISE</td>
<td>ENTERPRISE</td>
<td>Halsey</td>
<td></td>
<td>In Pearl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHAMPTON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT LAKE CITY</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHESTER</td>
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<td>Desron Six</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.F. 8 will probably be reduced by one CA and 3 DD before departing on 3 January. It will probably remain at sea in the vicinity of Oahu from 3-7 January.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.F. 17 - YORHTOWN</td>
<td>YORHTOWN</td>
<td>Fletcher</td>
<td>At or en route San Diego.</td>
<td>Departing S.D. for Samoa about 6 January escorting 3 AP, 1 AK, 1 AE, 1 AO. Should arrive 20 Jan. Some covering operation has been tentatively planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUISVILLE</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST LOUIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four DD</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Pacific Force are engaged in escort, and local anti-submarine operations; submarines - on defensive patrol, 3 to the Marshalls, 3 off Japan; patrol planes engaged in patrols from Oahu.

Some units must soon receive upkeep and others engage in some training.

Our Asiatic Naval Forces have retired to the Malay Barrier and are preparing to move to Darwin if necessary.
(3) From the directives issued to the Pacific Fleet, the mission is taken to be:

"TO SAFEGUARD OUR TERRITORY AND COMMUNICATIONS LINES".

This has been stressed by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (who took command yesterday) giving first priority to Midway-Hawaii and Hawaii-Mainland lines, and only slightly less to Hawaii-Samoa, extending to Suva as soon as practicable.

CNO and the Secretary of the Navy have been concerned over the safety of the Oahu base, and only in one despatch did CNO point out the need for offensive operations to prevent enemy use of Marshall bases and to benefit national and service morale.

In connection with our tentative plan for covering by offensive operation or otherwise, CNO also pointed out the activities of the enemy in the Gilberts. Cominch concurred in this suggestion and on 2 January urged its adoption.
II. ENEMY INTENTIONS

3. In other estimates the enemy's intentions in general order of priority have been deduced as follows:
   (a) The prosecution of the offensives in the Far East until all of Malaysia, Philippines and N.E.I. have been captured. In this will probably be included Rangoon.
   (b) Consolidation of this territory.
   (c) Advance upon Australia.

   While these are going on:
   (d) Continued submarine raids on our forces and communications, minor attacks against outlying islands and Alaska.
   (e) Cruiser raids against the routes to Australia, and possibly to the Mainland.
   (f) Capture Samoa.
   (g) Capture Canton.
   (i) Capture Suva.
   (j) Attack with strong forces including carriers for demolition Johnston, Palmyra, Midway.
   (k) Sweeps in force along our communications to outlying islands; along our route to Mainland.
   (l) Carrier raids on West Coast.
   (m) Attacks for capture of Wake, Palmyra; main Hawaiian Islands; Oahu.
III. OWN COURSES OF ACTION

4. During the next month it may be assumed that there will be no release of the forces now engaged in escort duty, or of those operating in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. In other words we are committed to that escorting and patrolling.

5. The program for the submarines and patrol planes for the next month may be considered fairly well settled. The only change that might be made is for some submarine protection of Samoa.

6. It is also assumed that during January there will be no renewal of navy yard overhauls and extended upkeep, or diversion of forces to a strictly training program during January.

7. As Task Force 17 is committed to the Samoan expedition, our problem reduces to the employment of the units now comprising Task Forces Eight, Eleven, and Fourteen. The way the employment of these task forces has been shaped up so far, it appears that we are committed to covering to the westward with T.F. 14 until the 13th and that that force will not be available for another operation until about the 17th. T.F. 11 will be available about the 7th. T.F. 8 the 11th. Thus Oahu will be covered until the 17th and Midway until about the 10th.
The following courses of action suggest themselves:

(a) To cover Oahu closely.
(b) To cover Midway.
(c) To cover Johnston and Palmyra.
(d) To cover Canton and Samoa.
(e) To operate carrier groups in above covering operations: (1) separately; (2) within ready supporting distances of each other; (3) in combination.
(f) To attack enemy communications with: (1) cruisers; (2) one carrier group; (3) two or more carrier groups separately, or in combination.
(g) To attack enemy positions with one or more carrier groups. For objectives, it is considered that the only ones at all practicable at this time are Wake, the Marshalls and the Gilberts.

The considerations favoring the adoption of covering operations alone are:

(a) Oahu may require more than its own defenses in case of attack.
(b) The outlying islands undoubtedly do require more than their own defenses to defeat even a moderate scale attack.
(c) Such operations should keep own available forces undamaged until an enemy attack comes (ignoring possibility of damage by submarines). They would therefore be intact for a close-in defense of the territory being covered.
(d) Limiting our covering operations to the islands of the Hawaiian system would preserve the forces for the defense of Oahu, which is paramount.
(e) Considerable training could be accomplished while covering is in progress.

10. Considerations leading to adoption of offensive courses:
   (a) Damage to the enemy, disproportionate if practicable. At the shore objectives sufficient facilities might be destroyed to prevent, or at least hinder, the use of these bases by the enemy.
   (b) Tendency to divert enemy forces for defense. He might try to cover his territory with forces which he would intend to be stronger than our attacking forces.
   (c) Boost to morale of the fleet.
   (d) Boost to morale of the nation.
   (e) In general, the advantages which go with the initiative.

11. One of the basic questions facing us is:
   Is the close cover of Oahu necessary at this time?
   Taking in combination the present state of its defenses and our deductions as to enemy intentions the answer is "no".

12. Of outlying positions, which is in most need of cover?
   Samoa, Canton, Midway, Palmyra and Johnston in that order.
Of course, while covering Midway and Johnston we would be furnishing some cover to Oahu, and while on attack missions to the westward certain cover will be afforded. Samoa will require much less coverage after the reenforcement arrives and is organized, but until this has been accomplished (about the end of January) Samoa is a special case, and we are practically committed to covering in that area or conducting a diversionary operation.

13. The questions now are:

(a) Shall the operation coordinated with the Samoan reenforcement be a covering or an offensive operation? If offensive, where strike and when? T.F. 8 seems to be the choice for this operation.

(b) Shall T.F. 11 (ready on 7th):

(1) Cover in the Hawaiian area?
(2) Cover in the Samoan area in conjunction with T.F.8?
(3) Conduct an offensive operation?

If (3) when? where?

(c) Shall T.F. 14 (ready on 17th) continue to cover in the Hawaiian area or conduct an offensive operation? If the latter, where?
14. T.F. 8:
(a) In view of the strong considerations for an offensive move, viz:
   (1) Diversion of enemy from offensive moves or advances;
   (2) Damage - particularly of means which facilitate enemy advances;
   (3) Morale.
   
   The defensive covering of the Samoan expedition is not considered sufficient. The CinC, U.S. Fleet is evidently in full agreement with this view.
(b) The Gilberts and any other extensions of Japanese bases in the same direction, are considered to be the best objectives, because:
   (1) Such extension toward communication lines and territory should be repulsed.
   (2) The force attacking them is in a good covering position for Samoa and T.F. 17.
   (3) The Japanese can hardly have had time to install strong defenses in the Gilberts. Cominich concurs that the Gilbert bases are favorable objectives.

15. When? If it is too far ahead of the arrival of T.F. 17 at Samoa, T.F. 8 might have to retire and the enemy would have time to make good some of his losses, and investigate as to what is going on.
If we endeavor to have the attack on the day of the arrival of T.F. 17, we may have missed an enemy expedition which would be arriving at Samoa at about the same time.

If the attack on the Gilberts were timed to be about three days ahead of the arrival of T.F. 17, the above objectives would be met and T.F. 8 might encounter the enemy expedition. If "soft" conditions were found at enemy bases, repeated attacks could be made - the longer the better for our purposes.

16. T.F. 11 (ready on 7th). Offensive moves by task forces against communications are not considered practicable at this time. The enemy's communications are all protected by his outlying positions. T.F. 14 will be covering the Midway area until the 10th and is tied to the Oahu area from about 13th to 18th. The alternatives for T.F. 11 are considered to be:

(a) Cover the Midway area;
(b) Cover the southwestern area;
(c) Attack on Wake;
(d) Attack on northeastern Marshalls;
(e) Attack on southeastern Marshalls.

17. Perhaps more enemy information will be received in the next few days to guide us (via submarines, B-17 or enemy activity). Failing this, the best course for T.F. 11 is believed to be an air raid on Wotje-Maloelap. This has the following advantages:
(a) Starts our offensive moves earlier;
(b) Approach to these islands is not flanked by any enemy positions, and they are not believed too strong for such an attack;
(c) It will divert the enemy in connection with our later operations in the southwest.
(d) The force will be furnishing some measure of cover to Johnston and Palmyra.
(e) T.F's 11 and 8 will be within mutual support during part of the operation.

18. This attack could take place about the 13th or 14th. T.F. 8, by leaving on the 10th should be able to attack the Gilberts on the 17th.

19. T.F. 14 after departing Pearl on the 17th should be held in a central supporting position. T.F. 11 would return to the Oahu area about the 20th; T.F. 8 about the 25th. After they return, more effective upkeep, and some system for training, should be initiated.

20. Summary.
(a) T.F. 11 depart 7th and attack Wotje-Maloelap on 13th or 14th. Return to arrive Pearl about 20th.
(b) T.F. 8 depart 10th. Attack Gilberts on the 17th if practicable (delay if departure of T.F. 17 is delayed). Return to Pearl about 25th.
(c) T.F. 14 continue present covering operation, and on departure from Pearl about 17th cover from a central position to the westward.

January 24.

Final decisions by CinCPac as to the employment of the carrier task forces was as follows:

Task Force Eleven sailed on 7 January to cover the Johnston - Midway line; returned on 16th; sailed again on 19th to cover Christmas - Palmyra line; was on 21 January ordered to attack Wake; then, when NECHES was sunk, was ordered to return to Pearl.

Task Force Fourteen carrier, SARATOGA was hit by one torpedo; returned on 13th; out of action for several months.

Task Force Eight sailed on 11th to cover Samoa; then to make an attack on the Marshall - Gilberts after the unloading was completed.

Task Force Seventeen was to make an attack in conjunction with Task Force Eight.

Final order was to depart Samoa for this attack just as soon as troops were disembarked. This will make the attacks (Jaluit, Millie, Makin) about January 31.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

January 3

Task Force 8 departed and Task Force 11 entered Pearl. AA and surface target practice was arranged for Task Force 8 on its first two days at sea - a resumption of this type of training. Besides covering Oahu, Task Force 8 was to assist in protection of a very slow convoy of 17 ships which was approaching from the Coast.

Complying with directive of the War Department, the Army was trying out the route for heavy bombers to Australia.

First division of Patron 22 departed for the Asiatic Fleet. This Fleet had largely assembled at Port Darwin.

One Army B-17 reported on a reconnaissance of Wake made on the 2nd. Little activity was seen except two seaplanes and three small craft. This was substantiated by photographs and the report of the POMPANO. This submarine was ordered from Wake to the Marshalls, leaving none at Wake. The need for information of the Marshalls motivated this change.

January 4

Task Forces operating as before.

GRAYLING departed to make the fifth submarine in the Marshall-Gilberts.

In 050547 CinCPac pointed out Cominch the danger of detaching air units when we need as many as 288 VP for maintenance of effective search.

What information of the enemy could be obtained indicated that reinforcements were moving to support the land offensives. However, Rabaul aerodromes were bombed this date.

The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was informed by the War Department that he would be in command of a pursuit squadron, arriving Fiji the end of January, which would operate under strategic direction of New Zealand. It is not clear what relationship this force would have to the CinCPac in his exercise of unity of command.

January 5.

Task Force Eleven is in Pearl; to depart the 7th. Task Force Fourteen is patrolling Midway area until 13th; Task Force Eight covering to the northward of Oahu, to enter the 7th.

Cominch in 051747 in connection with detachment of VP's, assured that paramount importance of the Hawaiian Area was realized, and inquired whether Midway was sufficiently strong to be held against a strong attack. See Cincpacs reply, 070245.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

January 5 (Cont'd)

In 052154 (following) Cominich informed of the agreement concerning the Far East between Australia, Netherlands, United Kingdom and the U.S.

January 6

Task Forces assigned as before. Task Force 17 sailed from San Diego for Samoa, date of arrival, 20th.

The large, slow convoy (DETROIT) had been joined by the PORTLAND and two DD from Pearl.

War Department informed Commanding General that the U.S. participation in the construction of the air field at Noumea is his responsibility. Australia should defend New Caledonia, but U.S. may have to contribute.

Deliberation continued as to character of the operation to be conducted by Task Force Eight in connection with the Samoan reinforcement.

January 7

Main task forces operating as planned. Task Force One was established, composed of BBs, HELENA and 5 DD.

PENSACOLA departed Brisbane for Pearl.

Cominich informed of expedition from East Coast to Borabora (see 070015 following). The status of the army garrison was not defined. Same despatch informed of Army reinforcements to Australia, Canton, Christmas and Hawaii.

No significant information of enemy was received except a trend toward reenforcement of the land offensives in Philippines, Malaya, and Borneo.

January 8

All battleships at Puget Sound were given a completion date of February 5; PENNSYLVANIA January 22.

It was decided that the operation of Task Force Eight would be to cover Samoa from a northward position. See Vice Admiral Pye's estimate appended, and Op. Order 3-42.

Offensive operations are planned for Task Forces Eight and Seventeen after the unloading at Samoa is completed. See Op. Plan 4-42.
January 8 (Cont'd)

Received Cominich's 081856 asking date of Samoan reinforcement. Replied with 090445 giving outline of plans.

SWAN departed for Pago Pago to act as tender for VOS planes being sent there via Taskfor 17.

First report from a submarine indicated little activity at Rongelap and Binini, and considerable at Kwajalein.

Report of attacks on 6th and 7th against Rabaul aerodrome was received.

Organization of Asiatic Fleet was received. A report indicated very few U.S. aircraft had escaped from the Philippines.

Australia is sending some cruiser strength toward Suva.
Withdrawals of Army bombers and Navy patrol planes from this theater even though temporary for other projects leave us dangerously weak against aircraft carrier and other forms of attack. Retention of Oahu is by no means assured with present available forces. Navy patrol wings should be increased to 144 planes composed of both seaplane and landplane types for maintenance effective search. Carrier squadrons should be filled and kept filled to full allowance of spares to insure maximum effective sea-borne striking force. To maintain even present daily search imposes greater load on material and personnel than can be much longer continued. See my 041001. See Comdg General Hawaiian Departments despatch of even date to War Department with which CinCPac strongly concurs.
WITHDRAWALS OF PATROL PLANES FROM YOUR THEATER ARE NOT CONTEMPLATED OTHER THAN ONE SQUADRON TO FAR EAST ALREADY ENROUTE X YOUR 050547 X MEASURES NOW IN HAND (1st) TO INCREASE YOUR PATROL PLANE STRENGTH (BUT AT LEAST TOKEN FORCES MUST BE CONTINUED ALONG WEST COAST WHILE EAST COAST IS CURRENTLY DENUDED) (2) FOR KEEPING CARRIER SQUADRONS AT STRENGTH AND TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENT SQUADRONS, BE ASSURED THAT PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF HAWAIIAN AREA IS REALIZED X DO YOU CONSIDER MIDWAY NOW ADEQUATELY STRONG TO BE HELD AGAINST STRONG ATTACK X

Following is brief of draft agreement between Australia, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States known as ABDA Powers. Will inform you when ratified. ABDA Area established to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma, Malaya, Netherlands, East Indies and the Philippines. The boundaries are similar to those defined for the Far East Area but including Torres Strait and North coast of Australia from Cape York to Northwest Cape. Supreme Command set up under one commander of all land and sea and air forces of the ABDA governments which are in the ABDA area or located in Australian territory when such forces allotted for service in or in support of the ABDA area. Basic strategic concept for the conduct of war is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest moment through employment of concentrated air power. General strategic employment of concentrated air policy is that stated in my 312300. Supreme Command will coordinate strategic operations all armed forces assign strategic missions and objectives and where desirable arrange for formation of Task Forces for the execution of specific operations appointing any officer irrespective of seniority or nationality to command such task forces. Supreme Command will have no responsibility in respect to internal administration of forces. He will make no alteration in the basic tactical organization of such forces and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and not be subdivided into small units for attachment to other national components except in cases of urgent necessity. Commanders of all land and air forces will be informed by respective governments that from a date to be notified all orders and instructions issued by the supreme commander will be considered as emanating from their respective governments. Staff of supreme commander will include
officers of each of the ABDA powers. The supreme headquarters initially in Java. Wavell will be supreme commander, Brett deputy, Hart CinC all naval forces ABDA area. Obtain full text of agreement from Wavell.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

NAVY WILL ESTABLISH A FUEL DEPOT CAPACITY 200,000 GALLONS FUEL OIL 50,000 GALLONS DIESEL 50,000 GALLONS GASOLINE IN BORABORA SOCIETY ISLANDS CODE NAME BOBCAT, REPEAT BOBCAT WITH EXPEDITION SAILING FROM EAST COAST LATTER PART OF JANUARY X NAVY WILL MAN FUEL DEPOT RADIO STATION SEAPLANES NETS AND HARBOR FACILITIES 6 VOS WITH FACILITIES FOR 12 VPB X ARMY GARRISON ABOUT 3,800 WILL MAN/NAVY 7" GUNS AND AA EIGHT EQUIVALENT OF MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION AND PROVIDE MOBILE DEFENSE X PROPOSE ESCORT REPEAT ESCORT WITH SEAPACFOR TO REMAIN DESTINATION UNTIL FIXED DEFENSES INSTALLED AND ARE OPERATING X COMPAOPINF INFORM COMSEAPACFOR ON ARRIVAL FROM SAN DIEGO AND CINCPAC ON DEPARTURE CONVOY FROM CANAL ZONE Z ARMY PLANS SENDING LAST OF JANUARY FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO AUSTRALIA CODE NAME XRAY 15 KNOT CONVOY WITH 11,000 TROOPS AND ABOUT SAME TIME GARRISON 1,400 MEN TO CANTON AND 1,900 TO CHRISTMAS X APPROVED ARMY PLANS TOTAL REENFORCEMENTS HAWAII CODE NAME COPPER WILL BE ABOUT 30,000 MEN POSSIBLY 50,000 IN ADDITION TO THOSE NOW ENROUTE X MOVEMENT TO XRAY CANTON CHRISTMAS WILL INCREASE YOUR ESCORT LOAD AND RETARD MOVEMENT TO COPPER SO THAT ONLY 1500 ADDITIONAL WILL GO IN JANUARY 20,000 IN FEBRUARY REMAINDER MARCH X REQUEST COMMENT AND STATEMENT AS TO WHEN YOU CAN PROVIDE ESCORTS X

CINCPAC TO COMINCH

YOUR 051747 Personnel and equipment Midway given my serial 0128W of 1 January. 14 VMF and 17 VMS now based there. My serial 102W of 3 January ordered 2 Companies infantry transferred from 2d Marine Division at San Diego to Midway. They will not be there before end this month. 1 submarine on patrol there. 1 Major Task Force operates intermittently that vicinity. Addition of 2 patrol plane squadrons 1 or more fighter squadrons and small surface units for local defense would greatly strengthen the defensive capabilities of Midway and should be provided at earliest opportunity but under existing circumstances such forces are not available to Cincpac for assignment. Consider Midway as now held can repel moderate attack and with additions mentioned above will be able to withstand any except major attack.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC
08 1856
WHAT IS ESTIMATED DATE OF REINFORCEMENT EXPEDITION MENTIONED MY 021713 YOUR 022235?

CINCPAC TO COMINCH
09 0445
YOUR 081856 Date arrival reenforcement Samoa 20 January. Taskfor 8 departing Pearl 11 January to operate in coordination with Task Force 17 to cover arrival and unloading x. Upon completion plan both forces make simultaneous air attacks Gilberts and Eastern Marshalls. Estimate date these attacks first week of February. Offensive operations deferred until after establishment Samoan Reenforcements in order to more positively insure success that expedition and to avoid serious situation that would arise if one carrier were damaged 2,000 miles from base while operating without other carrier support.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS re SAMOA REENFORCEMENT OPERATION

Prepared by Vice Admiral Eye.

What means of interfering with Samoa Expedition are available to enemy?

(1) Seaplane bombers.
(2) Land based bombers.
(3) Submarines.
(4) Combination of cruiser-carrier task group.

General Considerations.

Enemy must be assumed to know of the composition and date of departure of SAMOA reenforcement expedition, by means of agents communicating via Mexico. For such an expedition there could be assumed only four probable destinations -

(a) Midway,
(b) Hawaiian Islands,
(c) Samoa,
(d) Fiji Islands.

If the enemy information service is as efficient in the United States as it is in Hawaiian Islands, the large amount of contractor's materials destined for SAMOA will be known to be in the AK, and that the true destination may be assumed to be known to the enemy.

The assumption, that the enemy will be advised of the composition of the force, its true departure, and destination will be known to the enemy, is not only reasonable but should be considered as a fact and our plans should be made on that assumption.

The enemy will have at least two weeks in which to organize and move forces to attack the SAMOA detachment. We know that there were at least 41 land bombers which made an attack on Wake, probably from Eniwetok or Rongelap. To the best of our knowledge there are in the Marshalls a comparatively few long range seaplanes. There were and may still be two carrier groups, several CA's and possibly a fast battleship division in the Mandate area. Jaluit appears to be the center of enemy submarine activity and in all probability has both seaplane and landplane operating facilities. The number of submarines actually available at Jaluit is unknown but with the number known to be operating in Hawaiian waters and in waters between Hawaii and the West Coast, the probable number of submarines available in Jaluit, is not large.

In the Marshall Islands on the eastern fringe Wotje is probably the best developed. Recent information indicates enemy activity at Mili, the southernmost island.
In the Gilbert Islands (British) information indicates the possible establishment of an enemy seaplane base at Makin, and the demolition by landing forces of the radio station and other facilities at Tarawa. Of the other Gilbert Islands although most of them are sparsely inhabited none seem to offer good sites for seaplane operating bases.

Of the Ellice Islands Funafuti is apparently suitable as a seaplane base. It is an extensive atoll with a large lagoon, into which there are two entrances for ships probably 18' - 20' draft. This lagoon has been used by seaplanes. This island is the most suitable for development by the enemy for a seaplane base. Enemy planes have been reported flying over this island at various times but as yet it is presumed that no attack by the enemy has been made as presumably communication between Funafuti and the Australian Government still is intact; and no report of any attack has been made.

Consideration of attack on Samoan Detachment by seaplane bombers.

At present any known seaplane operating base in use by enemy seaplanes is outside of effective range from Samoa. Even Funafuti is over 700 miles from Samoa.

A few long range seaplane bombers were seen over Wake, but the number was too small to cause much concern. The total number of this type of plane possessed by the Japanese Navy is not believed to be large, and to date there are no indications of the development of a base from which such type could be effective in the area of Samoa.

Conclusion: An effective attack against the Samoan expedition by seaplane bombers does not appear to constitute a serious threat.

Consideration of Attack on Samoan Detachment by landbased bombers.

Landbased bombers to a number of more than 40 appeared over Wake on several occasions. The bases from which they operated are not definitely known, but are presumed to be Eniwetok, Rongelap, and possibly Wotje. The radius of action of these planes is over 500 miles with bombs, and possibly as much as 700 miles. It must always be kept in mind that if a favorable target is presented we may expect these planes to fly to at least 900 miles in a suicide attack.

So far as is known there exist no land fields for the operation of landbased planes south or east of Jaluit, which island is about 1700 miles from Pago Pago.
Conclusion: Until further fields for the operation of landbased planes are known to exist, interference with the Samoan Detachment by landbased bombers does not appear to constitute a serious menace as long as Canton remains in our hands.

Consideration of Attack by submarines on Samoan Detachment.

Assuming as we should do, that the enemy will make a correct decision as to the destination of the Samoan Detachment submarines from Jaluit could arrive in the vicinity of Pago Pago before the arrival of our detachment.

The number of ships in this detachment which are required to enter port is not less than five. The YORKTOWN may have to enter to unload the seaplanes she is carrying. The only net protection is an anti-torpedo net. The harbour is deep and a submarine could pass the net when submerged. Two-man submarines would be effective if they could be brought to the vicinity.

There are two single lines of mines off the entrance. Such minefields are not very effective and in fact may complicate the operation of destroyers against submarines. These fields have been placed and there is no possibility of changing or removing them.

If as we must believe the enemy is anticipating extending his operations to Samoan and Fiji Islands, the maximum possible interference with the Samoan Expedition must be anticipated by us. A concentration of enemy submarines in the vicinity of Pago Pago would constitute a serious menace both to ships at sea and in port. Whether or not the enemy will so employ them is probably merely a question of their availability and the precedence assigned to this operation as compared to operations in the vicinity of Pearl and on our West Coast.

Conclusion: Under the circumstances we should assume that enemy submarines will be made available for such operation against the Samoan Detachment and should plan accordingly.

Consideration of a combination Carrier-Cruiser enemy Task Force to interfere with Samoan Expedition.

There was ample radio intelligence indicating the presence in the Mandate Area as late as 20 December, of 2 carrier divisions, 1 heavy cruiser division, and possibly 1 fast battleship division. The indication of the locations of these units has not been so definite recently. They may or may not have returned to their home bases.
We should assume, however, that the general composition of our Task Forces are known to the enemy, and it is reasonable to suppose that within the Mandate Area there exists an enemy Task Force of superior strength to any one of ours.

It is not believed that Jaluit is capable of handling such a force, but Truk may be. Truk is about 2600 miles from Samoa. Such a force operating from Truk would of necessity require fuel at sea, but we have evidence of the enemy being efficient in such operations.

Conclusion: We must consider that the formation of a Task Force superior in strength to our normal Task Force organization, with instructions to intercept and destroy our Samoan Detachment is a probability which can not be overlooked.

Summarizing the conclusions reached above:

An attack upon our Samoan Detachment by -

(a) Long range seaplanes is improbable;

(b) Long range landbased bombers is improbable so long as Canton remains in our hands, and Suva in the hands of our Allies.

(c) A concentration of submarines in the vicinity of Pago Pago is probable.

(d) An enemy Task Force of carriers and surface ships of a strength superior to one of our normal Task Force organizations is probable.

To counter these enemy measures -

(a) We must provide adequate anti-submarine defense in the immediate vicinity of Pago Pago during the approach, unloading and departure of the ships of Task Force 17.

(b) Increase the protection of Task Force 17 by an additional Task Force, support Task Force 17 by an additional Task Force within striking distance; or attempt by attacking enemy positions in the Gilberts by our second Task Force to divert enemy efforts away from the Samoan Expedition.

Anti-submarine defense.

The anti-submarine defense of Task Force 17 consists of 4 destroyers and air patrols from a carrier and 2 cruisers. In the open sea this anti-submarine defense during daylight is
probably adequate but in port, or while entering or sortieing such defense appears inadequate. It is also inadequate at night to prevent enemy submarines entering the bay and passing under the anti-torpedo net.

This force will be in port from 6 - 8 days and four destroyers is inadequate to maintain the required night patrol for such a long period.

Conclusions: Task Force 17 should be augmented by 4 destroyers. The destroyers of Task Force 8 should not be depleted in order to furnish these ships, unless four destroyers can be made available from no other source.

Anti-carrier-cruiser defense.

Task Force 17 will consist of - LOUISVILLE, ST LOUIS, YORKTOWN and 4 destroyers and on the last day at sea and while in port, of 4 additional destroyers from Pearl.

Task Force 8 will consist of - NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, ENTERPRISE and 9 destroyers (or 5 destroyers in case 4 must be sent from this force to Task Force 17).

It is possible but not probable that any enemy cruiser-carrier task force will be much if any, superior to this combined force.

These two forces can effect a junction the day before Task Force 17 arrive at Pago Pago if desirable; or,

Task Force 8 could attack Mili and Makin as a diversion at any time from 2 days before to several days after the arrival of Task Force 17; or,

Task Force 8 could operate within supporting distance and in advance of Task Force 17 during its approach, and to the westward of Pago Pago during the unloading.

Consideration of a diversion attack on Mili and Makin.

The conclusion has been reached that the Samoan Detachment is not threatened seriously by long range seaplane bombers or by landbased bombers so long as Canton is in our hands, but that it is threatened by submarines and a carrier-cruiser task force.

A diversion attack as such, could be of assistance to the Samoan Expedition only in case it caused enemy submarines or the enemy carrier-cruiser task force to be diverted from Samoa.
Such a diversion attack certainly would divert no enemy submarine from Samoa.

That it would divert an enemy carrier-cruiser task group is very doubtful. In the first place it is doubtful if such enemy task force would be sufficiently close to consider that there was a possibility of overtaking our task force; and in the second place if the enemy has information of the Samoan Expedition which we should assume that he has, he would at once place the attack on Mili and Makin in the class of a diversion.

Should such an attack result in any loss and fail as a diversion it would have been a costly experiment.

Even if such attack were made early and no loss sustained the situation in relation to the Samoan Detachment would remain unchanged. If this attack were made about the time of or after the arrival of Task Force 17, the distance separating our two task forces would be so great that for several days they could afford each other no mutual support.

This course of action offers no advantages except the possibility of damage to Mili and Makin at the possible sacrifice of Samoa. After the Samoan Expedition is landed and the ships are clear, attack and reconnaissance by Task Force 8 and Task Force/less auxiliaries will be practicable should the situation then warrant.

Consideration of joining our two task forces the day before arrival at Samoa.

The two task forces so joined probably will be equal or superior to any enemy carrier-cruiser attack group, but if not, it will have to fight it out. There are several advantages in having these two task forces concentrated.

(1) reduces air activity for anti-submarine patrol and for fighting plane patrol;

(2) concentrates a large number of destroyers for anti-submarine defense;

(3) has all ships within tactical control in case an enemy force is located and an action or chase ensues.

(4) permits more effective cooperation of air attack activities.

There are, however, several disadvantages:--

(1) a chance sighting of this force unknown to it, by a submarine or plane, might permit the enemy to launch a daylight attack finding both carriers together and subject to the same attack.
(2) limits the area that can be searched to the radius from one position although it increases the arc which can be searched.

(3) decreases flexibility for maneuvering.

Conclusion on this course of action is reserved.

Consideration of operating our two task forces within tactical air support but not in the same formation.

If Task Force 8 operates 200-300 miles in advance of Task Force 17 during day before arrival, and to westward of Samoa during the period of unloading the area covered by planes of the two carriers will be much greater than if they operate together and consequently give a greater chance of locating the enemy. It is recognized that this requires more flying with consequent wear and tear but due to importance of this expedition getting ashore this disadvantage should be accepted.

There is the further disadvantage that if either of our Task Forces is encountered alone, it may be weaker than the enemy Task Force; and under certain conditions might not be able to assist by air support in time. And further, the operation of two carriers in the immediate vicinity of Pago Pago increases the chance of loss of one by submarine attack.

Conclusions: The advantages and disadvantage of operating our Task Forces together or separated by 200-300 miles are just about the same, but I should be inclined to favor operating them separately but within tactical air support.

Additional measures.

Canton Island 690 miles north of Tutuila has at present a land air field 5000 feet long and suitable for B-17 operation. It can also accommodate VP planes.

During the Samoan relief expedition a force of 6 VP's and 6 B-17's operating from Canton Island might be of great value as a scouting and attack group.

If Canton is still in our hands on 19 January a force of 6 VP's and 6 B-17's should arrive at Canton Island that day.
OPERATIONS AFTER REENFORCEMENT OF SAMOA IS COMPLETED

Task Force 8 and 17 should fuel from tankers just previous to arrival of Task Force 17 in Samoan area (within 500 miles of destination), and again during latter stages of unloading period. They should be prepared for additional operations.

A question immediately arises in regard to the procedure in reference to the transports and auxiliaries. These ships will be light on their return trip and can make good speed. It is probable that there will be many evacuees from Samoa on at least one of the Matson line vessels.

Were it not for these evacuees it would probably be desirable to permit each transport and auxiliary to proceed independently, but to permit a vessel loaded with women and children to proceed without escort is a different matter. If as has been recommended, 4 destroyers are sent from the Hawaiian area in addition to Task Force 8 and 17 - it appears desirable for at least 2 of these to return to the West Coast with the ship carrying the evacuees, and if this is done it appears desirable for the three Matson line ships to proceed in company. The distance to San Diego is 4200 miles and destroyers can not make this distance at high speed without refueling. This situation may be met by 2 destroyers leaving Samoa a day or two before the convoy making contact with the late tanker from the coast, refueling and relieving the 2 destroyers then with the convoy, the latter 2 proceeding to Pearl, refueling from the tanker if necessary.

The AK and AO should proceed independently.

RECONNAISSANCE.

Our information in relation to the islands of the Union, Ellice, Gilbert and Marshall groups is not adequate. The Phoenix Islands have been reconnoitered and the decision reached that Canton is the most suitable site for an air base.

The Army has constructed a base at Canton suitable so far as landing operations are concerned, for the largest landplanes and seaplanes. It is poorly defended and there is no channel for ships hence all gear must be landed by barges. There is no natural water supply. Distillers are necessary. At present the garrison is 78 men of an engineer company. Certain minor reenforcement is underway. There are at present no planes at Canton, and no radar or RDF. This island is an important link in the line of air communications with Suva and the Far East.

The recent flight of a B-17 from Midway to Wake and back for purposes of reconnaissance indicates that Canton had a radar for homing planes, it might be possible for a B-17 to reconnoiter
Makin and Mili from Canton. The appearance of a B-17 over either of these places would cause the enemy to make additional efforts against Canton. This possibility in the present undefended state of Canton should be recognized as a disadvantage to the conduct of reconnaissance from that island at present.

**UNION GROUP**

So far as our information indicates there are no islands of this group suitable for extensive use as air bases. It is noted, however, that any of them might be used as emergency seaplane landing areas. There may be enemy observers and radio stations on these islands but so far there is believed to be no other activity. It is questionable that reconnaissance of these islands would produce any information of value but if VP planes are sent to Canton during this operation they might be directed to reconnoiter these islands before returning to Pearl.

**ELLICE ISLANDS.**

Our own VP planes last year landed at Funafuti. The VP tender entered the lagoon and anchored there. This island has possibilities for development as a seaplane base and probably will be occupied and used by the enemy in the future. At present, although enemy planes have been reported flying over the islands, it is assumed to be in Allied hands as no report of hostile activity has been received. If no report of enemy activity in this area is received before Jan. 27, it appears that air reconnaissance would add little to our present information. If however, enemy activity is reported it will constitute a definite threat to Samoa and Fiji Islands and should be made an attack objective of Task Force 8 or 17.

**GILBERT ISLANDS**

Reported enemy activity in the Gilberts to date, has been limited to the probable occupation of Makin as a seaplane operating base, and a demolition landing at Tarawa. Enemy planes have been sighted over Ocean Island about 400 miles to the westward.

Our information of this group is not very good but Tarawa seems to have the greatest possibilities for development. Makin appears to be the next most suitable and possibly its location makes it the most desirable to the enemy.

It appears desirable that each of these islands should be reconnoitered and any enemy shipping, planes, or fuel tanks or other air base facilities, be attacked. They constitute a definite step in the direction toward Samoa and Suva and must be interfered with as much as possible.
It must be recognized that the Gilbert Islands are British possessions and that indiscriminate bombing can not be done. Planes and ships of belligerent character, however, are legitimate objects of attack even though such an attack would damage allied areas.

Tarawa and Makin should be reconnoitered and any enemy planes, ships, or aviation facilities destroyed.

MARSHALL ISLANDS

There can be no question that the enemy has strong air bases in the Marshall Islands. It is improbable that there are landplane bases south of Jaluit. It is probable that there is a comparatively strong seaplane base at Mili though its development appears to have started only recently. An attack on Mili probably could be countered only by seaplanes and by landplanes from Jaluit which would have to fly at least 400 miles in order to attack the carrier (assuming that they did not take off previous to our planes arriving in the vicinity of Mili).

It is most desirable that the Pacific Fleet take some offensive action but an attack by ship based aircraft against shore-based aircraft bases except when the element of surprise is present, partakes of the nature of an attack on shore fortifications with long range guns and may result in serious losses.

The Commander-in-Chief has suggested such an attack as having a possible bearing on the Samoan reinforcement expedition. Such an attack previous to the Samoan expedition's completion of landing operations appears to me to be unsound as concluded above. This attack if made should be made upon the return trip of Task Forces from Samoa to Pearl. It should be made if at all, only with a complete understanding of the risk involved in attacking with a carrier within 500 miles of a possible land-based bomber group at Jaluit.

General Discussion of Attack Procedure.

Should it be decided to attack Mili, and Makin and Tarawa, the most advantageous procedure would be to attack Mili with one carrier group and Makin and Tarawa with the other carrier group, the attacks to be conducted simultaneously and Mili being attacked by the carrier having the strongest cruiser and destroyer protection.

Attack points on a bearing from Mili and Makin of 120° will place the carrier groups about 190 miles apart at the time of launching. The carrier to attack Makin would be approximately equally distant from Tarawa. A retirement of the northern carrier on course 110° would give the greatest distance from Jaluit and almost the maximum from Mili.
If planes were launched in time to attack about 15 minutes before sunrise launching would be completed about 1 hour 45 minutes before sunrise - at this period the moon will rise about and there will be no moonlight during the operation. The carriers should be consulted as to the feasibility of this plan.

If this plan be practicable the carrier would run in about 10 hours at 25 knots before launching - she would be about 450 miles from Mili and 575 miles from Jaluit at sunset the night before. Should the carrier unbeknownst to her be discovered during daylight the day before the attack her position would be serious. Special observation for planes and small boats should be made during such period.

After the attacks the Task Groups should retire within supporting distance of each other until clear of shore-based aircraft, and then proceed toward Pearl.

If P-3's and B-17's are operating from CANTON as proposed herein, they can be profitably used in precedeing in rear of the retiring carriers on the day after the attacks and in attacking any enemy surface ships which may be in pursuit.
January 9

Task Forces as before.

Australian Naval Board reported estimate that enemy was concentrating in Carolines and Marshalls and would move against Fiji. Asked as to what we are doing (See ACNB 091206). It was thought, for security purposes that full information of the Samoan operation should not be sent at this time (CinCPac 100605 was the reply).

January 10

Task Forces as before.

Opnav informed of list of 21 tankers which were being chartered for the Pacific Fleet. Two of these are for gasoline; one more will be required.

In response to an order from Cominch, the TROUT is being prepared to carry 3" AA ammunition to Corregidor, departing 12th.

Cominch provided for systematizing the dissemination of enemy information. CinCPac is directing Com-14 to collect and disseminate to all concerned, including task forces and Australian Naval Board.

Opnav reopened question of balloon barrage for Pearl Harbor.

Cominch directed that Samoan mine-laying facilities be used for laying 300 mines at Suva arriving about January 29th.

A complete report of aerial reconnaissance of Truk was received from Australia. Twenty-four ships, mostly DD's and no capital ships were reported.

January 11

Task Force Eight departed for planned operations.

NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI departed from Canal Zone for West Coast.

Cominch reported New Zealand authorities willing to have defenses installed in British Samoa in connection defense Tutuila. As only air field site would take months to prepare, it is not the present intention to install any defenses on these islands.

Naval Station, Samoa was shelled by a submarine at about 0230 Samoan time.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

January 11 (Cont'd)

Nuku Nono in Union Group reported sighting a single engine plane at 0130 (GCT) the 10th. Afterwards it was reported as seaplane.

Enemy planes reported reconnoitering Bismarch Archipelago and Solomon Islands.

January 12

Task Forces proceeding as before, but SARATOGA received a torpedo hit at 1915 last night - about 350 miles southwest of Oahu.

Australian - Suva convoy left San Francisco, convoyed by PHOENIX.

RAMAPO left San Francisco for Borabora to act as fueling depot.

Naval Attache Melbourne reports concentration of transports in eastern Marshall Islands. Our submarines were ordered to report on their observations.

January 13

Task Force Fourteen entered Pearl and SARATOGA was prepared to dock in the new drydock.

It was decided to send 6 VP and 6 B-17 to operate between Canton and Suva to cover the Samoan operations. See Op. Plan 6-42.

SUMNER departed for Borabora to survey and mark the harbor.

Submarines reported on Marshalls - considerable activity at Kwajalein and Wotje but not anywhere else observed including Jaluit, Eniwetok and Maloelap were not examined.

January 14

Task forces proceeding as before except Task Force Eleven was ordered back to fuel.

Two DD were sent to support Canton during VP-B-17 operations.

Australia reports: large movement in Marshalls, probably including 2 CV; runway at Rabaul demolished on 11th; enemy observation of Gilbert and Ellice Islands continue; and strange plane was seen in New Hebrides.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

January 15

SARATOGA entered drydock.

Main task forces as before.

POLLACK returning from YOKOHAMA patrol reports sinking three merchantmen.

A summary of the demands on Pacific Fleet for escorting was sent to Cominch with request for more destroyers.

January 16

Task Force Eleven entered Pearl. Decision was made to reinforce it with units from Task Force Fourteen and send it on 19 January to a supporting position off Christmas Island.

PROCYON departed San Francisco with further supplies for Samoa, and HAMMONDSPORT (AKV) departed for Australia.

Brigadier General Larsen, U.S.M.C., Commanding the troops for Samoa, was appointed Military Governor of American Samoa by the President. Present Governor, Captain Wild, to continue to execute duties as subordinate of Brigadier General Larsen.

Admiral Hart assumed command of the Allied Naval Forces in ABDA Area (see 052154 preceding). Address "ABD Afloat Batavia". Admiral Hart's position is subordinate to General Wavell the Supreme Commander in the ABDA area.

ComPacSoNavCoastFront is having considerable difficulty in supplying escorts for coastal convoys. The results on the distribution of petroleum products are particularly serious. Desdiv 50 is being relieved by other sound-equipped craft and will perform escort duty for the Coast Frontiers.

January 17

All active operations are, as before, in connection with the Samoan reinforcement. The B-17's, less one damaged at Palmyra, arrived at Canton to join the VP's which arrived the day before. They reported sighting 3 submarines within 100 miles of Canton.

The SARATOGA damage develops as being rather severe, and she will be given final repairs and probably some alteration on the West Coast.

There are 7 cruisers and 15 destroyers now assigned to escort duty.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

January 17 (Cont'd)

Due to the manner in which supplies to Oahu have been handled to date, CinCPac recommended better coordination (180401 to Opnav, following).

Efforts are continuing to solve the questions of supplies, transportation and escort of supplies, and defenses of the outlying islands. Pressure is being placed on Com-14 to better coordinate these matters and to line up the Army authorities in connection with Canton and Christmas which are being developed by them. The Army authorities are using Inter-Island ships chartered by them in this supply and are showing their inexperience in these matters.

Australia and New Zealand Boards were informed of the operations in connection with the Samoan reinforcement but the reinforcement itself was not mentioned.

January 18

No important developments this date.

Patrol plane sighted a submarine south of Canton.

Received more information from Cominch concerning Borabora (Cominch 182110). A reinforcement to Noumea is included.

Radio intelligence for several days has indicated a concentration in the Truk area.

January 19

Task Force Eleven, reinforced, departed for Christmas area.

Cominch in 191815 (following) gave further information on plans for the South Pacific, and suggested air base at Funafuti and permanent force in Samoa - Fiji area.

Heavy raid including carrier aircraft was received by Rabaul (2 CV indicated.)

January 20

Relief for two destroyers at Canton departed escorting Army supply ship.

Found that Army had misinformed concerning gasoline at Canton, and that supply was very low. Decided to continue operations of aircraft a few days - then review situation.
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd)

January 20 (Cont'd)

Consideration was being given to the operations of the escort required from Borabora to Australia the middle of February.

Cominich in 202150 (following) directed a speed-up in the offensive operations of Task Forces Eight and Seventeen and suggested a raid on Wake in addition.

In 210309 (following) CinCPac pointed out pertinent logistic information to Cominich and asked for certain other similar information concerning Australia and South Pacific.

DOLPHIN reported after an inspection of Jaluit, a suspicious lack of activity. Three large auxiliaries, possibly total of six, were sighted on two different days.

GUDGEON reported no naval activity of Bungo Channel; sank one freighter.

Task Force Seventeen was supposed to reach Samoa today. No report was received except an arrival report for two aircraft which indicated that the convoy might have been delayed one day.

January 21.

Consideration and discussion continued concerning the operations proposed by Cominich. There was general concurrence that speeding up the attacks on the Gilbert-Marshall area was desirable. Some doubt was expressed as to the advisability of making Wake an additional objective for another task force. This would create a period thereafter when all three of the task forces would be unavailable for distant operations. The morale factor as to Wake and the indicated desires of Cominich led to the decision to divert Task Force Eleven to make the suggested attack on Wake. The NECHES will be sent to join it about 600 miles west of Johnston and two of its extra destroyers will be returned to Pearl for escort duty. CinCPac 212217.

Task Force Eight and Seventeen were ordered to leave Samoa as soon as all troops are disembarked, and to carry out the planned attacks. One cruiser and three destroyers will be left at Pago Pago, and these will later be used as part of the escort of the convoy from Borabora to Australia. CinCPac 220055.

The IDAHO and two DD from the Atlantic departed Balboa for San Francisco.
January 21 (Cont'd)

It was decided to employ the MISSISSIPPI and NEW MEXICO (due at San Francisco tomorrow) immediately as escorts of Hawaii-bound convoys thus releasing cruisers for the southwestern convoys.

Heavy air attacks in the vicinity of Rabaul continued; a group of nine ships were sighted approaching that port; and Japanese landings took place at Mussau Island and Rapsu, New Ireland. At least two carriers were indicated in that area.

Enemy submarines have apparently been clear of the Hawaiian area for three days, and from the Eastern Pacific for much longer.

Received directive from Cominch regarding exchange of information with the British (Cominch 201730).

January 22

Operations going forward as previously decided. No direct report was received as to unloading at Samoa, but it was apparently progressing.

Our submarine patrols are being extended by sending one to Truk and one to Saipan, reducing accordingly the number in the Marshalls.

Lt-Comdr. Beasley, Intelligence Officer of the New Zealand Naval Board arrived for conference. An appreciation as to the general situation, and of the situation at Suva, were delivered by him and are attached herein.

The Warspite left Puget Sound for Sydney.

A report was received giving clear indication that Rabaul had been captured.

There are further indications that there are two enemy carriers operating off New Ireland and the Solomons.

NZNB reports that the enemy reconnaissance, with large seaplanes based on Makin, daily in the Gilberts and about every third day in the Ellice Islands.
APPRECIATION — DEFENCE OF FIJI — 3th JANUARY, 1942.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Fiji provides the best equipped and protected deep water harbour together with air facilities on the route between the U.S. — Honolulu and Panama on the one hand, and New Zealand — Australia and the Malay Barrier on the other. There are other possible harbours such asPago Pago, Apia, Noumea, but for strategical and geographical and physical reasons they compare unfavourably with Fiji.

2. Occupation of Fiji would be of great importance to the enemy for the following reasons:

(a) Deprives British, Dutch, U.S. shipping of a very important intermediate fuelling base.

(b) Cuts the aircraft reinforcing route between U.S. and Malay Barrier.

(c) Greatly simplifies enemy action against Allied Pacific trade.

(d) A most valuable advanced base for a future attack on New Zealand or possibly Australia.

(e) The loss of Fiji would greatly reduce the threat of Allied action against Japanese bases in the Marshalls.

OUR OBJECT

3. Our object is therefore to keep Fiji for our own use.

GENERAL STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4. The available Allied Naval forces in the area are heavily committed in the protection of trade and the escorting of essential troop movements. This involves considerable dispersal of force. A striking force of one 8-inch cruiser and two modern 6-inch cruisers is available under F.O.C.A.S. in the Tasman-FiJi-Port Horebshy Area. Small air reconnaissance and striking forces are available at Fiji and Rabaul. The aerodrome at Fiji will not be fit for U.S. Flying Fortresses until mid-January, after which U.S. air reinforcements can be expected, but nothing is yet known as to where they will be destined. The Japanese are therefore able at present to concentrate overwhelming air and naval superiority on Fiji, unless this movement can be interfered with by combined British and U.S. Naval Forces and carrier-borne aircraft.

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE

5. The distance from Fiji to Jaluit, the nearest Japanese Base, is 1520 miles. The Japanese have already occupied Makin Island, 1300 miles from Fiji and are probably developing it as an advanced seaplane base. The U.S. Fleet Base at Honolulu is 2730 miles from Fiji and about 2460 miles from the nearest point on the line Jaluit-Fiji. Fiji is about 700 miles from Pago Pago, 1160 from Auckland, 750 from Noumea and 1140 from Brisbane. The distance from Jaluit to Rabaul, the nearest Australian air base, is 1160 miles.

Intelligence regarding the Enemy

6. The whereabouts of the Japanese Combined Fleet is obscure, but a number of heavy units is undoubtedly in the Mandated Area. Japanese Naval Forces in the Mandated Islands are thought to consist of:

4 Aircraft carriers with 192 aircraft at unspecified number of seaplanes
10 Heavy cruisers of which one 8" cruiser on 10/4.
Light cruisers
14 Destroyers at Truk on 10/1
9 Submarines
2 Seaplane carriers at Truk on 10/1

On 9/1 W/T and D/F placed more than 20 Naval Units in the Marshalls and the 4th Fleet in the Mandates.

Japanese Bases in the Marshalls

7.- Jaluit

A portion of the South China Fleet was here on 13/12. It is known to be a submarine base and has recently been heard operating submarines.

Air craft at Jaluit are probably –

12 fighters
8 fighter-bombers.

Wotje

The main air base in the Marshall’s probably mostly flying-boats. Other aircraft are –

6 fighters
8 fighter-bombers

The Yokohama and Chitose Flying-boat squadrons are thought to be at Wotje, and four-engined flying-boats have been reported almost daily over the Gilberts, presumably from Wotje.

Makin Island, Gilberts

Four warships and possibly a seaplane carrier were reported at various times. There were indications that a seaplane base was being developed, but only two flying boats, probable Type 97, were present at Makin on 14/1.

At least 46 aircraft are estimated in the Mandated Islands bases.

6 or 9 Heavy Bombers
3 4 engine flying-boats

2 4 engine flying-boats were sighted at Truk on 10/1, also some fighters.

Intelligence Regarding Own Forces

8.- (a) Naval

1 minesweeper based on Suva

"LEANDER" - 6" cruiser at Suva on 14/1

"HOTchkiss" - A.M.O. due Suva 16/1.

"AUSTRALIA" - 8" cruiser

"BEGEM" - 6" cruisers

"CANBERRA" - 8" Cruiser

"HOBART" - 6" cruiser

"ADELAI D" - old 6" - Escorting Convoy Wellington to Sydney due 16/1.

Two 3rd U.S. Cruisers and two 6" U.S. Cruisers with destroyers and submarines are in the Port Moresby - Sourabaya Area together with Dutch Forces.

These are, however, heavily committed and are unlikely to be available in the Fiji Area at present.

The U.S.6" Cruiser "Penscola" on passage Sydney-Honolulu, due 20/1
Honolulu

Task Force 3 is understood to be operating from Honolulu and consists of:

3 aircraft carriers
8 or 9 8" cruisers

Apart from destroyers and submarines the remaining effective heavy units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet have been withdrawn to the U.S.

American Samoa

The aircraft carrier "Yorktown" with cruisers "Louisville", "St. Louis" and 4 destroyers is escorting a convoy to Pago Pago due 21/1 or 22/1.

(b) Air

At Fiji

"Hudsons" ... ... 9
Singapore Flying-boats ... 4
"Vincent" ... ... 6
"H.M.S 86" ... ... 1
"H.M. 89" ... ... 2

At Rabaul

R.A.A.F. Hudsons ... 7

One U.S. convoy is due Fiji 30/1 with 25 fighter aircraft and a quantity of A.A. and anti-tank guns and other equipment.

(c) Army

There are two Brigade Groups at Fiji consisting of 7695 all ranks. This includes a small number of A.A. guns for the defence of Mandi Aerodrome. Fixed gun defences of Fiji consist of two 6" guns and two 4.7" guns at Suva and 2 6" guns at Mandi.

Courses of Action Open to the Japanese

9.- As regards Fiji the Japanese have two main courses of action:

(a) To deny its use to us.
(b) To take it for themselves.

As regards (a) this could be carried out by the following means:

(i) Intensive mining.
(ii) Submarine attack.
(iii) Possession of nearby bases for surface warships and aircraft which would make Fiji untenable for our shipping and aircraft.

As regards (b) this would involve a major naval and air and military operation.
JAPANESE MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION

10. - In view of the great value which possession of Fiji would mean to the Japanese, and considering the audacity of Japanese strategy so far, it seems wise to assume that they will go all out to seize the island. It is also pointed out that our counter measures to guard against (b) would also automatically guard against (a). It is therefore assumed that the Japanese will probably try to take Fiji for themselves.

Japanese Expedition to Seize Fiji

11. - The scale of attack may be as much as one division supported by four aircraft carriers and other heavy naval units. In the absence of advanced fuelling bases in the Ellice Islands a Japanese convoy would have to cover 1,500 miles from Jaluit before arrival at the scene of operations. Destroyers and other small craft would be seriously short of fuel and would need to refuel. Transports might need shelter. It therefore seems clear that the Japanese would need a nearby advanced base for resupplying and other requirements.

12. - The first necessity is therefore to obtain an advanced base, either -

(a) in the neighbouring island of Vana Levu, or
(b) one of the Ellice Island group or neighbouring groups.

As regards (a) Vana Levu is in easy bombing distance of Viti Levu and the first move must therefore be to destroy the aerodrome at Nandi. Since there is only one major aerodrome there (Nandi) and in view of the heavy air attack which could be made from four aircraft carriers, it is not thought that this would present much difficulty unless powerful A.A. defence and adequate fighter strength can be provided at Nandi.

As regards (b) the following islands are possible:

- Nukufetau Ellice Islands C. anchorage
- Funafuti Ellice Islands D. anchorage
- Wallis Island C. anchorage.

All these islands would, however, involve sea distances of 200 to 500 miles between them and the main objective at Fiji. Funafuti is six hundred miles from Fiji. In spite of the fact that it is only classed as a D. anchorage it is capable of easy improvement, and is a good flying boat base, for which purpose it was successfully used by the U.S. authorities for their survey recently. Funafuti is therefore considered most likely as regards (b) above.

13. - Japanese alternatives may therefore be summarised as follows:

either

(a) make straight for Fiji from the Marshalls. Knock out Nandi aerodrome and establish an advanced base from which to attack Viti Levu,

or

(b) establish an advanced base or bases somewhere in the island between the Gilberts and Fiji possibly at Funafuti,

or

(c) carry out (a) and (b) simultaneously.

5
14.- (a) would have the advantage of surprise, but would present considerable risk to communications threatened by the U.S. Pacific Fleet and British Cruiser Squadron Force.

(b) would be safer, but would give the game away and would involve some delay which might give us time to organise a counter-stroke.

(c) obtains surprise at the main objective of Fiji and also fuelling and aircraft reconnaissance bases in the direction of Honolulu.

(c) is therefore considered most probable Japanese course of action.


(a) The Japanese first necessity is to destroy the aerodrome and aircraft.

(b) A secondary objective would almost certainly be to deny the use of the harbour and fuelling facilities at Suva and Nadi to us. This could most easily be achieved by early mining attacks by air or surface craft or submarine, probably simultaneously with the first air attack on the aerodrome.

(c) Another consideration is the necessity for advanced bases. It is idle to speculate what they might do, but the seizure of Funafuti and Vava'u Leva immediately prior to the main attack seems a likely course of action.

OUR POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION TO OBTAIN OUR OBJECT

16.- (a) to attack the Japanese concentration before it leaves the Marshall-,

(b) To intercept the expedition en route.

(c) To concentrate on defensive measures at Fiji.

(d) to carry out a combination of the above.

17.- As regards (a) the depleted state of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and the meagreness of our own Naval Forces together with the known danger of placing surface ships within range of shore based aircraft, combine to make this a most hazardous enterprise. Moreover it will be most difficult without forego the possibility of surprise to ascertain whether the expedition is there to be attacked.

As regards (b), the Japanese expedition may be expected to have heavy naval support and considerable carrier-born aircraft. It will be most difficult to obtain news of the departure of the expedition and the timing of an interception will be very problematical, especially for Forces based on Honolulu. This course, therefore, depends on obtaining intelligence of the expedition's departure. Successful interception would, however, at least greatly disorganise the intended attack on Fiji.

As regards (c), it is felt that the arrival of the expedition at Fiji will be its most vulnerable movement for the following reasons:--

(i) Its exact position will be known.

(ii) The transports will be tied down temporarily.
(iii) The expedition will be at its maximum distance from its base.

(iv) We would have the support of our own shore based aircraft.

(v) Our bases will be close at hand.

As regards (a), it is felt that a combination of (b) and (c) present the best possibility of inflicting damage on the enemy. However, for (b) the co-operation of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and particularly the U.S. aircraft carriers is essential. To attack such an expedition escorted by a powerful carrier force whilst our own Naval Forces are unsupported by aircraft is to court disaster unless the position of the expedition is so accurately known that it can be attacked by night with adequate time for withdrawal before daylight. Under the circumstances such an attack would be highly problematical and hazardous. Submarine attack on such a concentration of shipping which would probably be short of A/B craft, due to the distance it has got to come, presents a possibility of inflicting casualties which should be given weight. Air attack could be expected to produce good results.

OUR PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION

16. - (i) To concentrate on defensive measures at Fiji and particularly on fighter and A.A. defences.

(ii) To endeavour to obtain U.S. co-operation, specially the U.S. aircraft carriers in order to attack the expedition, either

(a) on route if its position is accurately known, and the U.S. aircraft carriers can get within striking distance, or

(b) on arrival at Fiji.

(iii) To carry out a night attack on the expedition using a cruiser striking force after arrival of the expedition at Fiji, and in co-operation with the U.S. naval forces.

(iv) To lay minefields at strategic points under cover of shore defences.

(v) To obtain if possible the use of a flotilla or half a flotilla of U.S. submarines to be based on Suva.

(vi) To obtain U.S. flying boat or seaplane reinforcements at Suva for reconnaissance and striking force purposes.

(vii) To endeavour to keep open the ports of Suva and Nandi for the use of our own units for which adequate A/B and A/B forces are necessary.

17. - For the successful execution of the above courses of action it is of the utmost importance to obtain prior information of the impending attack or at least of the fact that the expedition has started.

CONCLUSIONS

18. - It is thought very probable that the first definite indication of an impending major attack on Fiji will take the form of a heavy bombing attack on Nandi aerodrome. Mines (air-, surface or submarine) will probably be laid simultaneously in the approaches to Suva and Nandi to deny the use of these bases to our own forces. In the absence of adequate heavy naval forces such as might be provided by a reconstituted U.S. Pacific Fleet, the defence of Fiji hinges on the following considerations:
(a) adequate military forces
(b) adequate fighter and A.A. defences
(c) the denial of a base at Vava'u by S.
(d) defensive minefields.
(e) provision of a submarine force based on Suva.
(f) surface and air attack after the arrival of the expedition.
(g) possible interception of the expedition en route providing strong U.S. naval and aircraft carrier support can be obtained.
(h) adequate M/A and A/S forces to keep Suva and Momi free from mines and submarines.
(i) U.S. submarines or Australian and U.S. air reconnaissance of the Marshall Islands required to obtain information of the movement of the expedition.

GENERAL CONCLUSION.

21. The co-operation of the U.S. naval authorities is of paramount importance in any scheme for the defence of Fiji. Fighter reinforcements must be obtained and other air reinforcement is of vital importance. Submarine support would be a major factor for successful defence. Adequate minefields must be laid. Every effort should be made to ascertain the time of departure of the expedition from the Marshall Islands. The minesweeping forces and A/S forces at Fiji are inadequate at present.

(Written) Wallis Island

May be obs port for

Vichy France + possibly Japan.
Waller Island

May be other port for

Nelly frame or

Marilyn
APPRECIATION OF THE PACIFIC SITUATION
AS AT 15th JANUARY, 1942.

GENERAL REMARKS

The underlying strategy of the war in the Pacific is quite simple, namely, to defeat the Japanese at sea. Once we can cut the Japanese sea communications and regain command of the Western Pacific, our victory is certain.

2. Unfortunately, the Japanese have a twenty years start on us. Since the Washington Conference in 1922, when for political reasons the British Empire and the United States of America guaranteed not to develop bases in the "status quo" area of the Pacific, Japan was assured of command of the sea in her own waters and, generally speaking, the north-western part of the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese have made full use of the advantages conferred by this Treaty. The following successive moves have all consolidated and extended the area over which they have complete control:

(a) the formation of naval and air bases in Formosa and the Pescadores;
(b) the seizure of Manchuria;
(c) the Chinese "incident" and formation of further naval and air bases on the China coast;
(d) the development of bases in the mandated islands;
(e) the seizure of French Indo China and yet further naval and air bases.

They have also learnt the importance of shore-based air forces and have retained those which will operate over the sea under naval control. The first three weeks of the war have again strengthened and extended the area over which they have complete control.

3. It will be no easy task to reduce their commanding position. It can only be achieved by defeating them at sea, which demands strong air forces as well as naval forces, and by economic pressure.

OBJECT

4. Our object, therefore, is to regain command of the sea in the Western Pacific.

INTELLIGENCE

5. Since the war broke out, the situation has altered radically to our disadvantage, thanks mainly to the following circumstances:

(a) the crippling of the U.S. Pacific Fleet;
(b) the sinking of the "PRINCE OF WALES" and "REPULSE" and consequent delay in forming the British Eastern Fleet;
(c) the realisation that the Japanese know how to exploit the advantages of sea power and of modern tactics by sea, land and air.
The Pacific Fleet has lost 2 battleships sunk, and 3 badly damaged and out of action for some months at least. Three 6" cruisers are also damaged.

This leaves the following ships capable of conducting operations in the Pacific:

4 battleships,
4 aircraft carriers (including U.S.S. "YORKTOWN" which has just arrived from the Atlantic),
11 8" cruisers (including 4 temporarily detached),
4 6" cruisers (including 3 temporarily detached),
36 destroyers,
17 submarines.

In addition, we know that 3 battleships and 9 destroyers are joining the Pacific Fleet from the Atlantic about the end of January.

The battleships and two of the 8" cruisers have retired to the Western Pacific Coast of America, leaving only 3 aircraft carriers and seven 8" cruisers with attendant destroyers, in the Honolulu Area. The reason for the move of the battleships and cruisers is not yet known.

In a recent telegram, Mr. Winston Churchill said that the naval situation in the Pacific should be restored in a month's time. The meaning of this remark was not specified, but it can only refer to the reformation of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The premature movement to Singapore of the "PRINCE OF WALES" and "REFUSE", with only 4 destroyers as escort, was obviously dictated by political strategy and has been a disastrous failure. The intentions of Admiral Phillips were to collect as many cruisers and destroyers as he could from British, Dutch and American forces in the Eastern Theatre. He had reached full agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet (Admiral Hart) on the following dispositions.

A cruiser striking force, consisting of the 3 American cruisers from the Asiatic Fleet and possibly one or two British ones, commanded by an American Admiral, was to be based in the Sourabaya-Darwin area, to deal with enemy forces detected by aircraft and submarines patrols to the Northward. The battle fleet, with its cruisers and destroyers, was to be based on Singapore and would be responsible for preventing a Southward move of Japanese forces along the Java-Sumatra line. It was intended that 2 Dutch cruisers, together with one from New Zealand and one or two from the East Indies, should be attached to the battle fleet. In addition, 6 Dutch destroyers and at least 4 American destroyers would join the 4 modern destroyers which came out with the "PRINCE OF WALES", and a 10,000-ton old 8" class destroyers from Singapore and Hong Kong, in order to form a very heterogeneous screen for the battle fleet. The date of arrival of the 4 "R" class battleships was not known.

The present intention is to reform a strong Eastern Fleet to be based on Singapore. If Singapore is not available, other bases have been, or are being, prepared in the Indian Ocean and in Australian waters. It is obviously a question of months before this Fleet can become effective.
11.- In the meantime, every effort will be made to hold Singapore; and land and air reinforcements are being sent as quickly as possible. As the Japanese have almost complete command of the air now over Malaya, their arrival is problematical unless strong air escorts are made available.

Japanese Methods of Warfare.

12.- The opening Japanese moves have shown how successfully the Japanese have adapted themselves to the lessons of World War II. No doubt this is largely due to their German advisers. Examples of this are given in the following paragraphs.

13.- Their use of their command of the sea has certainly been masterly. They have not hesitated to move large land and air forces over the seas which they command, in spite of probable opposition from our own naval and air forces. Their success shows that the risks they took were really not very great.

14.- Their combined operations have been very well organised and uniformly successful. They must have suffered considerable losses, but in every case they have succeeded in getting large masses of troops and equipment ashore at the place and time they had selected. In Malaya this was attained by infiltration tactics. Although they were repulsed on certain beaches, they got ashore at others and immediately threw in large masses of troops where they had obtained a footing.

15.- Similarly, in their operations ashore they have certainly adopted the very latest methods of land warfare. Their personal equipment is light but efficient. They have landed tanks and mechanised transport. They have inflatable rubber boats for crossing creeks and rivers. They are evidently past masters of infiltration tactics, and so far in Malaya we have not succeeded in holding them.

16.- Finally, their very successful torpedo attack with shore-based aircraft on our two unfortunate heavy ships shows a degree of organisation which we have only achieved in our carrier-borne torpedo aircraft squadrons. We can certainly assume that their naval efficiency is as good as ours, even though perhaps we hope it is not.

Naval Forces Available.

Enemy

17.- The Japanese have at least 9 battleships available, assuming that 2 have been damaged by American aircraft. They also have 10 aircraft-carriers, 12 8" cruisers, 23 6" cruisers and large numbers of small craft.

18.- The whereabouts of their main fleet is not known; but wireless traffic indicates a strong concentration, including at least 4 aircraft-carriers, in the Marshall and Carolines area. Cruisers are operating off the Hawaiian Islands and the West Coast of the U.S.A. The Japanese have also seized an advanced base for northern advance at Butaritari in the Gilbert group, but reports on January show that flying boats only are operating from here at present.

Allied - Pacific Area

9.- The disposition of the U.S. Fleet is given in paragraphs 6-7 above. A force consisting of 3 carriers and 8 8" cruisers (one which is on passage to the Pacific coast) known as Task Force 3 is thought to be operating near Honolulu.
The only British forces in the Pacific are those in Australia and New Zealand, consisting of 2 8" cruisers, 3 modern 6" and 1 old 6" cruisers.

**Allied - Darwin-Sourabaya Area**

The American Task Force 5 (consisting of 2 8" cruisers, 2 6" cruisers and 13 destroyers) and 25 submarines, are retiring to this area. It is also intended to base one Australian 6" cruiser here ("HOBART").

**West Java Sea**

Dutch forces are operating in this area, consisting of 1 modern 6" cruiser, 2 old 6" cruisers, 1 modern flotilla leader, 6 destroyers and 5 submarines.

**Singapore Area**

Two of the three old 6" cruisers based here recently were at Batavia on 6th January with C.in C., E.F. The third is in the Sourabaya area. Subsequent allocation of these cruisers is unknown. 7 destroyers are at Singapore together with 2 U.S. and 4 Dutch Submarines.

**Indian Ocean**

British forces consisting of one "R" class battleship, 2 8" cruisers, 2 modern 6" cruisers, and 7 old 6" cruisers and one aircraft carrier are widely dispersed for trade protection.

**DEDUCTION**

At the present time the enemy has superior forces in all respects. The Allied forces have the additional disadvantage of being widely dispersed in the defence of trade. In addition, in these areas occupied by the enemy there are strong shore-based naval air forces.

He can therefore launch attacks in any direction in which he wishes to move. So far, he has only done so over seas under his full control, i.e., towards the Philippines and Malaya. Expeditions further afield are attended by greater risks; but at the present time the risks are not very great until the U.S. Pacific Fleet is reformed.

The only possible brake on his further expansion is his preoccupation with his present commitments.

The inference is that he could move against the Dutch East Indies or in the direction of the Tasman at any time he likes. As soon as he has occupied the Philippines the probability of attack will be greatly increased.

**NEXT JAPANESE MOVE**

The following are possible alternatives:

(a) Attack on Allied trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans by submarine and surface forces. The submarines have already started this attack, but have not yet appeared in Australian and New Zealand waters. Their arrival there is only a matter of time. Surface attack by raiders, and possibly surface warships, may be expected at any time. Larger forces will need an advanced base to become effective.
(b) Attack on the Netherlands East Indies, in order to obtain oil and other tropical products, and to obtain control over the passages into the Indian Ocean. This attack will certainly be made if and when Singapore has fallen, and probably sooner.

(c) Seizure of advanced bases for attack on trade, and eventually for invasion of Australia and/or New Zealand.

28.- Of the above moves, (a) and (b) are certain to take place. (c) may possibly be delayed until he has completed his earlier commitments, but we have been warned by both the United Kingdom and American Chiefs of Staff that a Southward move may take place at any time.

**ALLIED COUNTER MEASURES**

29.- The first and most important is the reformation of the United States Pacific Fleet. At the present time we are completely in the dark about this. The whole situation regarding intelligence of American movements in the Pacific is highly unsatisfactory.

30.- The next most important is the reformation of the British Eastern Fleet. During the last few days the Admiralty have been making preparations, including requests to Australia to prepare certain ports as bases. The present intention is that the British Eastern Fleet should operate quite independently of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Both Australia and New Zealand have protested strongly against this, pointing out that unity of command, if not a combined fleet, is essential.

31.- In the meantime, we must make use of what few forces we have available. It is generally agreed that, in face of the scale of probable attack, as many cruisers as possible must remain concentrated. This is the reason for forming a cruiser striking force (Task Force 5) in the Java Sea, and the Anzac Squadron in the Tasman.

32.- It is also essential to keep trade moving in spite of risk of losses. The main protection will be given by wide dispersion, and by keeping Pacific shipping as far south as possible in order to take advantage of bad weather and low visibility. Important troop and supply convoys must be escorted by the strongest force available.

**SITUATION IN THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC**

33.- The strong concentration of naval forces in the Marshall Islands, and the seizure of the advanced seaplane base at Butaritari are indications that the enemy is contemplating a southward move.

34.- The most likely objective is the Fiji Group. This would not only cut the bomber reinforcing route across the Pacific, but also give him a good naval advanced base at Suva, or one of the other anchorages in the Group, and 2 aerodromes.

35.- The next most attractive bait is New Caledonia, where he will have good harbours and resources, aerodromes and valuable minerals he cannot get elsewhere. It is quite possible that he will attack both.
36. - New Zealand itself is a possible ulterior objective. The Military Adviser to the New Zealand Government (General Sir Guy Williams) suggested in September, 1941, that invasion could not take place until Singapore had fallen, the British and American fleets had been defeated, and the Japanese had captured an advanced base. Although none of these contingencies has yet occurred, it must be admitted that Singapore is in danger of capture, the two fleets have suffered serious reverses and Fiji is threatened with attack.

37. - Although actual invasion can still be ruled out at the present time, nuisance raids are quite possible. New Zealand is still sending appreciable numbers of men overseas for the Navy and Air Force. Reinforcements for the Middle East are not urgently needed at the moment and have been temporarily suspended, mainly owing to lack of escorts. A successful nuisance raid would have considerable psychological effect and might well result in complete suspension of all troop movements overseas.

Counter Measures for these Moves.

38. - The present forces in Fiji are insufficient for an attack, which may be made by a Division, accompanied by 4 aircraft-carryers. New Zealand has reinforced Fiji, where there are now two Brigade groups and certain other troops, organised as a Division. The United States of America also realises the importance of Fiji and is sending equipment, aircraft and air personnel, and possibly land forces. The reinforcements contemplated would have a good chance of holding the island of Viti Levu.

39. - The situation in New Caledonia, which is an Australian commitment, is not too good. The French forces, though considerable, are not reliable. So far, the Australians have only been able to send a small force of their own.

40. - The main defence for these islands is naturally by naval forces. The Anzac Squadron is obviously not strong enough to prevent such an attack, though if well handled it should be able to interfere seriously with it. Its main weakness is the absence of carrier-borne aircraft.

41. - The British position in the South West Pacific must therefore depend on the reformation of the United States Pacific Fleet. This has been pressed for in personal telegrams from the Prime Minister, New Zealand, to Mr. Winston Churchill in Washington.

42. - In view of the potential threat to New Zealand itself, the Government has decided to take certain anti-invasion measures, including mobilisation of the Territorial Army, which needs at least three months' training before it can be considered efficient. The Military Adviser appreciated that the most likely points for invasion are the North Auckland Peninsula, probably through the Bay of Islands, and the Marlborough Sounds, in that order. Guns are being mounted and mobile forces disposed for the defence of these two areas.

43. - Civil emergency schemes to deal with damage caused by embarkation or air raids are also being accelerated in the principal towns. The E.P.S. and blackout organisations are already well advanced.

COMMAND

44. - The Washington conversations between Mr. Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt have resulted in an agreement for unified command of sea, land and air forces in the ADBA area. This command
is to be under a British General, who will be known as the Supreme Commander, and he will have an American General as his deputy. An American Admiral will command the naval forces in this area, under the Supreme Commander.

45.- No attempt has been made for a unified command of the naval forces, i.e., of the United States Pacific Fleet, the British Eastern Fleet and other naval forces in the area. This has been pointed out by both Australia and New Zealand, in urgent telegrams to Mr. Winston Churchill. Australia has put forward proposals for a combined fleet. New Zealand has pressed for unified command over the two fleets, possibly by an American Admiral working in close co-operation with the Supreme Commander.

CONCLUSIONS

46.- (i) Japan must first be defeated at sea.

(ii) This demands unified direction of British and United States forces and the formation of a balanced fleet strong enough to defeat the Japanese.

(iii) Until such a fleet is formed, the Allied position is precarious and depends on holding our bases, particularly Singapore.

(iv) In the South West Pacific the British position depends primarily on the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

(v) A Japanese attack on Fiji and/or New Caledonia may be expected at any time.

(vi) Our naval forces in this area are inferior to the possible scale of attack. They can only be used effectively if they are concentrated.

(vii) Invasion of New Zealand is improbable at the moment, but the possibility will become greater if the Japanese have further successes.

(viii) Attack on trade by surface and submarine raiders must be expected. This is best met by wide dispersion of shipping and the strongest possible protection of troop convoys.

(ix) The next few months will be most critical.
ACNB TO CINCPAC AND NZNB

09 1206

Australia and NZ intelligence confirmed concentration of naval forces and auxiliaries in Caroline Island and Marshalls. It is considered that an attack on islands which form parts of USA bombers reenforcing route across Pacific may be impending. New Zealand considers Fiji the most probable objective. The establishment of Japs in this area besides cutting the ferry route will also seriously threaten the shipping routes. Such an operation by Japs will give an opportunity for counter issue by USA and British naval forces. Our forces available in this area consist HMAS AUSTRALIA, HMAS PERTH, HMS ACHILLES, and HMNZS LEANDER. Request if no objection be informed of searches completed re this matter so that we may cooperate in any action you propose to take.

CINCPAC TO ACNB

10 0605

Your 1206Z/9 under advisement. Exact information of enemy forces in Marshalls limited except observed at Kwajalein, four large auxiliaries anchored and landplanes both bombers and fighters present. Other commitments preclude operations suggested in immediate future but possible later. Request be kept advised of any new development.
COORDINATION AND DISSEMINATION OF ENEMY ACTIVITIES AT SEA WILL BE HANDLED IN ATLANTIC AREA DIRECTLY BY COMINCH X IN PACIFIC AREA BY COM 14 X AS AT PRESENT UNTIL NOON GCT JAN 20 AND THEREAFTER COM PSNCF ADDRESSING COMINCH APPROPRIATE US COMDRS IN PACIFIC NOIC ESQUEIMALT NEW ZEALAND NAVY BOARD WELLINGTON NSHQ OTTAWA BNLO SAN FRANCISCO AND CINC EASTERN FLEET X PARA INFO ADDRESSEES INCLUDE COM PSNCF IN REPORTS OF ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN PACIFIC

CANCEL MY 102250 CINCPAC 120435 CINCPAC MAKE OWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISSUING PACIFIC BULLETIN INCLUDING IN ADDRESS BRITISH COMMANDS SPECIFIED IN MY REFERENCE DISPATCH

IN COMPLIANCE WITH REQUEST NEW ZEALAND GOVT 300 MARK 6 MINES COMPLETE LEAVING SAN FRANCISCO FOR SUVA ABOUT 12 JAN X ARRANGE FOR PLANTING THEM THERE PREFERABLY WITH PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT SAMOA AFTER PLANTING MINES NOW ENROUTE LATTER PLACE X UPON COMPLETION PLANTING RETURN SAMOA X

NEW ZEALAND CONSENTS AMERICAN FORCES MAKE INSTALLATIONS ON BRITISH SAMOA AND TAKE SUCH OTHER MEASURES THERE AS MAY CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE OF AMERICAN SAMOA X NEW ZEALAND AUTHORITIES APIA WILLFULLY COOPERATE X NECESSARY ACTION ACCORDANCE YOUR JUDGEMENT IN AGREEMENT WITH THEM X
Recommendations: 070015 x Current and foreseen requirements are:

(1) Samoan expedition convoy 1005 escort Task Force 17.

(2) Bobcat expedition latter part January escort South-East Pacific Force.

(3) Xray first contingent convoy 2013 escort PHOENIX.

(4) Xray second contingent late January. Honolulu now enroute east with convoy 4036 tentatively assigned.


(6) Noumea project reference War Department message number 880 of 5 January. Assume can be handled in Xray convoys.

(7) Copper reinforcements transports not assigned but assumed generally in 14 knot class. Between 40 and 50 slow cargo ships and tankers per month continuing indefinitely. Escort by battleships and destroyers necessary between mainland and within 500 miles Copper both directions. Inside 500 miles escort by destroyers based Copper with air coverage.

(8) Believe continuing supply of outlying bases and protection of inter-island shipping can generally be handled by Coastal Frontier Forces as now reinforced by Minrons 1 and 2 at the rate of 1 convoy to each base per month. However Minrons 1 and 2 must be relieved by subchasers and patrol craft at earliest practicable date to make minecraft available for their primary employment. Due short cruising radius intend retain DETROIT this area to support these movements as necessary after battleships are available for ocean escort.

(9) Barring effects enemy action requirements outlined above can be met at times indicated. For continuing requirements on Bobcat-Xray line 4 light cruisers can handle 1 convoy per month in each direction. ST LOUIS and HELENA will be added this run completion Samoan expedition and Navy Yard repairs respectively. Any other cruiser requirements will necessitate removing some heavies from major task forces.
For continuing requirements of Copper can handle approximately 5 convoys per month. West Coast shipments for Christmas and Canton can be cut out of these convoys at Ocean meeting point by local escorts. Urgent need exists for additional destroyers. Under program described above not more than 2 destroyers can be assigned to each battleship escort unit and the light cruisers will have none from Pacific Coastal Frontier until junction with Far East Forces. Urgently recommend transfer at least 1 and preferably 2 Desrons to this Fleet. Particularly desire remaining leaders of Desron 9.
CINCPAC TO OPNAV

Control, allocation and loading of shipping in Pacific requires coordination in order make most effective use available shipping and escorts. Essential provide for needs Army, Navy, and Civilians and that coordinated schedules be established earliest practicable date. Control by centralized NTS agency in Pacsoncf as contemplated by joint agreements and war plans believed essential. All shipping in Pacific including supply of personnel and material Xray, Bobcat, Samoa, Suva, Xmas, Canton, Noumea must be included. Reinforcements and developments above places plus Hawaiian Dept must be predicated on availability shipping and escort to support them. Impossible Cincpac make long range plans either escort or other operations until comprehensive picture shipping requirements known. X Opnav deliver Cominch also for action X

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

BOBCAT CONVOY BC 100 OF 6 SHIPS WITH 4,500 TROOPS AND XRAY CONVOY BT 200 OF 8 TRANSPORTS WITH 20,000 TROOPS ARRIVE CANAL ZONE ABOUT 28 JANUARY THENCE AFTER FUELING WILL PROCEED IN COMPANY TO BOBCAT ESCORTED BY SOUTHEAST PACFOR COMPOSED OF 2 CL 2 DD ETA 16 FEBRUARY SPEED OF ADVANCE 14 X SE PACFOR REMAIN BOBCAT UNTIL BOBCAT CONVOY READY RETURN VIA CANAL BY WHICH TIME HALF FIXED DEFENSES AND VOS OPERATIONS SHOULD BE READY X TRANSPORT BARRY OF BT 200 WILL REQUIRE FUEL BOBCAT X CINCPAC PROVIDE ESCORT FOR BT 200 SPEED 16 FROM BOBCAT TO BRISBANE ADJUSTING FLEET PLANS IF NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THIS HIGHLY IMPORTANT EXPEDITION X PARA CINCPAC 160615 ITEM TWO SEE ABOVE X ITEM 5 CONVOY WILL CONSIST TWO SHIPS FOR CHRISTMAS ISLAND TWO FOR CANTON READY SAN FRANCISCO 29 JANUARY X ITEM SIX NOUMEA INCLUDED IN BT 200 X ITEM NINE FURTHER TRANSFERS DESTROYERS UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT THERE ARE SERIOUS SHORTAGES EVERYWHERE X OTHER ITEMS NO COMMENT X

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

MY 182110 GIVES STATUS OF BOBCAT EXPEDITION X REENFORCMENT OF SAMOA BY US AND OF FIJI BY NEW ZEALAND NOW IN HAND X WE NOW CONTEMPLATE OCCUPATION OF FUNAPUTI IN ELICIE ISLANDS AS OUTPOST FOR SAMOA AND FIJI AND AS LINKAGE POST TOWARDS SOLOMON ISLANDS PARA GOING FACTORS COMBINE TO MAKE ADVISABLE EARLY CONSIDERATION OF KEEPING SUITABLE AND AVAILABLE FORCE CONSTANTLY IN AREA EMBRACING CANTON FUNAPUTI SAMOA FIJI BOBCAT X
HAVE AGREED WITH BRITISH THAT INFORMATION CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR OTHERS TO KNOW, INCLUDING INTENDED MOVEMENTS WHEN APPROPRIATE, MAY, SUBJECT TO WHATEVER CONTROL COMMANDERS IN CHIEF MAY CHOOSE TO EXERCISE, BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN COMMANDERS OF APPROXIMATELY EQUIVALENT ECHELONS OPERATING IN ADJACENT AREAS. ON NO ACCOUNT IS THIS TO INCLUDE ANY MATTER THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS AN ORDER WHEREVER ARRANGEMENTS MAY RESULT FROM THIS AGREEMENT. THE KEY IDEA IS TO USE THAT COMMUNICATION NETWORK WHICH WILL RESULT IN QUICKEST EXCHANGE OF ESSENTIAL INFORMATION BETWEEN THOSE WHO NEED TO KNOW.

 PARA 3AB1 OF YOUR OPPLAN 4-42 WILL NOT BE SO INTERPRETED AS TO DELAY DEPARTURE OF TASK FORCE EIGHT BEYOND TIME ESSENTIAL FOR FUELING AS ADVANCE OF TASK FORCES TO NORTHWEST WILL AFFORD ADEQUATE COVER AND TIME FACTOR APPEARS PARAMOUNT.

 GIVE CONSIDERATION TO PRACTICABILITY OF RAIDING WAKE WITH ADDITIONAL TASK FORCE TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTER ATTACKS ON GILBERTS OR MARSHALLS AT WHICH TIME ENEMY ENDUKAVERS TO OPPOSE HALSEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO HAVE REDUCED COVERAGE ON WAKE, AND WHEN ALSO INDICATIONS OF LARGE NAVAL MOVEMENT FROM MANDATES TOWARD SOUTHWEST MAY FURTHER HAVE REDUCED WAKE SUPPORT.

Your 182210 and 191815 every operation including escort duties in areas indicated must be predicated on availability fuel for combatant and noncombatant ships. Following information significant total naval and commercial fuel oil stocks in thousands of tons 12 January Brisbane 21, Sydney 8, Melbourne 8. The foregoing remaining after reductions since 22 Dec. of 10, 7, and 13 respectively. At Port Moresby none, no exact information as to current situation Suva and Noumea. Par.

Request information as to probable future availability and plans for maintaining supply at Bobcat, Samoa and places mentioned above. Diversion tankers available to fleet or in prospect to supply Australia or New Zealand will jeopardize supply of Pearl Harbor.

In order make definite logistic estimates and provisions for fuel at Bobcat up to and including departure BT 200 for Xray and BC100 for Canal request estimate total fuel requirements. Both convoys at Bobcat. Data available here for estimating needs.
21 0309 both escorts. Assume BT 200 and escort can obtain fuel at Xray. In view recent difficulties docking Republic at Brisbane and lack knowledge composition convoy invite attention to controlling depths that harbor.

21 2217 CINCPAC TO TASK FORCE COMMANDERS

Task Force 11 for action. Cancel my OpOrder 7-42. Direct BAGLEY, MUGFORD and JARVIS return to Pearl. NECHES will depart on 22nd to join you at rendezvous Mike. Task Force 11 conduct air raid on Wake followed by bombardment if practicable. Proceed to meet NECHES at Point Mike lat 20 North longitude 179-50 West at 2000 GCT January 27. Fuel at discretion and conduct raid after which return toward Pearl. Latest information objective will be furnished as received. Delivered for info to Comcardiv 1 Domdesbatfor and NECHES.

22 0055 CINCPAC TO TASK FORCE COMMANDERS

Essential execution my Operation Plan 4-42 be expedited. Duration of close coverage Samoan unloading reduced accordingly. As soon as troops disembarked carry out plan except detach 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers to cover remainder unloading and to await further orders designating this detachment Task Group 13.4. Direct its commander report to Cincpac via Samoa the composition this command

Raiding objectives extended to include Ralik Chain at discretion CTF 8. Latest information Marshalls will be furnished as becomes available.

23 1940 COMINCH TO CINCAP, CINCPAC

DEVELOPE ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF MARINES AND NAVAL UNITS OF "COMMANDO" TYPE FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH EXPEDITIONS OF RAID CHARACTER FOR DEMOLITION AND OTHER DESTRUCTION OF SHORE INSTALLATIONS IN ENEMY HELD ISLANDS AND BASES X EMPLOYMENT OF SOME SMALL UNITS EMBARKED IN SUBMARINES APPEAR PRACTICABLE BY USE OF RUBBER BOATS.
Item five convoy will probably be organized in two sections proceeding in company from San Francisco. 1st section 6 - 17 knot vessels, 2d section 8 - 14 knot ships. Composition may be changed by allocations from Admiral Land's board to be available here today. Irrespective of composition large convoy will be ready to sail on or about Jan. 30. Escort recommended 1 cruiser with 3 or 4 destroyers reinforced when nearing point of separation of sections. Timely decision escorts 2018 and 2019 essential.

Cominch 182210 was interpreted to mean that convoy BT 200 would take the place of movement of 11,000 Army to Xray from San Francisco late January mentioned in his 070015. This inference apparently confirmed by your 202358 which requested Honolulu previously earmarked for Xray trip as escort for convoy 2018. Urdis 212004 now indicates this interpretation incorrect and that you are sailing the 11,000 Army for Xray as well as contingents for Christmas and Canton since you state there will be 14 ships in item 5 convoy whereas Cominch specified only 2 ships each for Canton Christmas. Expedite reply giving sufficient detailed information to clarify whole situation.

Your 220121 status present information in connection formation convoys in Clipper mail but owing weather Clipper delivery not made. This information will clarify situation as to present and future movements of convoys. Hereafter each day this report will be forwarded by Clipper. Large troop and freight movement by Army to Xray and Copper is in formative stage. Approximately 14 ships will be ready to sail around Jan. 30. This convoy will include 2 ships to Xmas Island and 1 or 2 to Canton Island, remainder to Xray. Above independent and separate from Panama Canal movements or convoys scheduled for 23 Jan and 25 Jan. Further information as soon as obtained.
CINCPAC TO CINCAF, INFO COMINCH

WPL-46 Appendix L Section 516 A2 and B4. Desire you release to me area north of latitude 26 in order provide submarines with entrance East China Sea. Would it aid you to release to me area east of Long. 132 East and North of Equator.

CINCAF TO CINCPAC, INFO COMINCH

Afirm to your 210331 as regards the extension south to latitude 26. Not now advisable release to you westward to longitude 132 east.
January 23

The NECHES was sunk at 0319 (local). She was proceeding to her rendezvous with Task Force 11 and was 135 miles west of Oahu. The night was extremely dark. She had no escort with her due to the non-availability of DD’s but was meeting the JARVIS from Task Force 11 at 0800.

As no other tanker was available except the NEOSHO which was due at Pearl on the 26th, CinCPac decided that the factor of safety for the Wake expedition was too small, and ordered Task Force 11 to return to Pearl to be fueled and held in readiness for eventualities.

RDF positions placed three enemy SS in the immediate vicinity of Midway. As no other Sub except the NECHES attacker was heard or seen in the Eastern Pacific, this indicated a particular interest by the enemy in Midway.

Comtaskfor 17 reported that all troops were disembarked at Samoa and recommended that the Task Force’s depart Samoa on 25th, GCT.

The GRIDLEY and FANNING of Task Force Seventeen collided and damaged both bows. After emergency repairs at Pago Pago they will return to Pearl.

Task Force 8 gave his plan of attack. F-Day is 25th. Attack will be made on 31st on Jaluit, Mili and Makin. VP’s and B-17’s discontinue shuttle to Suva on 27th and make search to westward on the 28th.

Subs in the Marshalls were ordered to reconnoiter Maloelap and Uterik, then retire to northward during the raid of Task Force 8 and 17. The CACHALOT had been ordered away from Midway to proceed westward but developed engine trouble. All submarines are now going to be employed for offensive patrols.

Due to presence of the enemy at Rabaul, CinCAF advises that all merchant ships entering the ABDA Area should be convoyed and that Torres Strait be used only under special arrangement.

Cominich directed the training of Commando units for surreptitious landings on enemy coasts. (Cominich 231946)

It was learned that there would be a large convoy of troops for Australia from the West Coast about January 29th as well as the 20,000 which were coming from the East Coast, and proceeding via Borabora.
January 24 - Operations of Task Forces Eight and Seventeen progressing as planned. Eight starts to the northwest tomorrow; Seventeen will follow 150 miles astern. No further information as to unloading at Samoa.

Commanding General, Second Marine Brigade, estimates that a 2500 foot runway could be made ready in one month. Requested aircraft as soon as possible.

Another E-17 dropped out at Suva so that Suva-Canton Flight yesterday was by only two planes.

Task Force 11 will enter Pearl tomorrow. It will be fueled and held in reserve for the present.

Cominch (in 24 1740 attached) informed of the proposal to constitute the Anzac Naval Area in which an allied naval force would operate under a U.S. flag officer. Vice Admiral Fye was suggested for the command and will probably accept. The reply is under study.

Report was received of a British launch from Apia being fired upon by an aircraft which answered the description of a U.S. observation plane.

Enemy offensives are advancing in the Far East and in the New Britain Area. At least two carriers are operating in the latter. Tarakan and northern Celebes have been in enemy hands for several days and Amboina has been bombed several times. A convoy advancing south through Makassar Straits was roughly used by Dutch aircraft yesterday and two U.S. destroyers last night. The DD’s escaped with negligible damage. However, the S-36 is a total loss through grounding and the BOISE damaged her bottom in Sapeh Strait.

A submarine was sighted off Midway, and one south of Oahu.

Cincaf released the area between 26° and 30° so that Pacific Fleet submarines can operate in the North China Sea (Cincpac 210331 and Cincaf 230329).
FOLLOWING FROM OPNAV "CINCPAC 219309. AS INDICATED OPNAV 102250 IT WAS ASSUMED WITH TOTAL 19 LARGE AND 2 SMALL CHARTERED TANKERS THE NEEDS OF PEARL AND BOBCAT MIGHT BE MET X FURTHER ASSUMPTION THAT REQUIREMENTS LATTER WOULD BE REPLENISHED BY DIVERSION SOME OF CHARTERED TANKERS AS YOU DIRECTED X SAMOA NOT ESTIMATED IN FOREGOING NOR AUSTRALASIA FOR WHICH FOLLOWING INFO FURNISHED X ANTICIPATING SITUATION LIKELY DEVELOP THAT AREA BRITISH THROUGH SPNAVCO SUGGESTED ABOUT 20 DECEMBER THEIR READINESS MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS FAR EAST AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC WITH TANKER TONNAGE THEIR CONTROL AND REQUESTED ESTIMATES OF FUEL TO BE LAID DOWN X ACCORDINGLY ADVISE THEM CINCAF WOULD NEED AT DARWIN IN THOUSANDS OF TONS MONTHLY 29 BUNKER 6 DIESEL and 1 AVGAS X ALSO REQUESTED FOR PROSPECTIVE CONVOYS X EITHER BRISBANE OR SYDNEY FOLLOW NO AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS OF TONS JANUARY 10 X FEBRUARY 15 X MARCH 16 X APRIL 20 X THERE SHOULDN'T THEREFORE BE FUEL AT THESE POINTS DURING PERIODS MENTIONED OVER AND ABOVE NORMAL NEEDS AUSTRALASIA X INTEND KEEP LONDON ADVISED OF REQUIREMENTS AS CHANGING X EXCLUSIVE OF ESCORTS ESTIMATES FOR CONVOYS BC100 AND BT200 AT BOBCAT ARE X FUEL OIL 5,100 TONS X DIESEL 460 TONS X BOTH GROUPS SHOULD RESTRICT WITHDRAWALS FROM RAMAPCO TO MINIMUM X ARMY ACQUAINTED DISADVANTAGES UNLOADING BRISBANE BUT PREPARED ACCEPT DELAYS INCIDENT BARGING FROM OUTER ANCHORAGE

COMINCH TO CINCPAC, INFO CINCAF

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE ABOUT TO RECOMMEND THAT ANZAC NAVAL AREA BE ESTABLISHED ALONG FOLLOWING GENERAL LINE X (1) WITH BOUNDARIES BEGINNING AT MERIDIAN 141 DEGREES EAST ALONG EQUATOR TO MERIDIAN 170 DEGREES EAST THENCE SOUTH EASTERLY TO PARALLEL 20 DEGREES SOUTH MERIDIAN 175 DEGREES WEST THENCE DUE SOUTH ALSO FROM POINT OF BEGINNING SOUTH ALONG MERIDIAN 141 DEGREES EAST TO SOUTH COAST OF NEW GUINEA THENCE EASTWARD ALONG THAT COAST TO MERIDIAN 143 DEGREES EAST THENCE DUE SOUTH IN SEA AREAS ONLY X (2) SAID AREA WILL BE UNDER US DIRECTION WITH US FLAG OFFICER IN COMMAND AND WILL BE EITHER DIRECTLY UNDER COMINCH OR ELSE UNDER CINCPAC WHO MAY NOT CHANGE ALLOCATION OF SHIPS THERETO X (3) TENTATIVE INITIAL ALLOCATION OF SHIPS BRITISH 1 CARRIER U S AT LEAST 1 HEAVY OR LIGHT CRUISER POSSIBLY ONE DESDIV NEW ZEALAND 2 LIGHT CRUISERS AUSTRALIA APPROXIMATELY TWO THIRDS OF SEAGOING SHIPS (REMAINDER TO ABDU COMMAND) X (4) TASKS: ONE, COVER EAST AND NORTHEAST APPROACHES TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: TWO, ESCORT AND COVER CONVOYS IN ANZAC AREA: THREE, SUPPORT DEFENSE OF ISLANDS IN SAID AREA PARTICULARLY KEY POINTS ALSO ATTACK ADJACENT ENEMY KEY POINTS: FOUR, CORRELATE OPERATIONS WITH FORCES IN ABDU AREA AND WITH PACIFIC FLEET X (5) REQUEST COMMENT PARTICULARLY AS TO PATA (2) ABOVE X (6) CINCPAC NOMINATE FLAG OFFICER FOR THIS COMMAND FOR WHICH COMINCH WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE OFFICER NUMBER 20 IF ACCEPTABLE TO YOU AND TO HIM
January 25

Task Forces Eight and Seventeen departed from Samoan area to the northwest.

Matsonia departed Samoa for the Coast.

Task Force Eleven entered Pearl. Plan is still to hold this force in reserve, at the same time accomplishing minor upkeep and inter-change of carrier fighter aircraft.

Triton and Tuna departed for patrol areas off Japan.

Asiatic Forces continued to clash with the enemy in Makassar Strait, Sturgeon reporting that she sank a CA or CV.

The activity of the enemy along the New Ireland - Solomon front leads to one estimate that he will soon extend his bases to Noumea to cut the bomber route and operate against the communication line to Australia. If he advances on Port Moresby, as he probably will, he will control Torres Strait.

Further reports by our submarines gave the following:

Shore installations, anti-sub patrols and one large steamer at Maloelap. Two seaplanes at Wotje. Nothing at Uterik.

January 26

Task Forces 8 and 17 still maintaining schedule, will fuel on 28th; attack on 31st. Still being afforded partial cover by the operations of the VF B-17 unit, which will make its last search to westward on 28th and then return Pearl.

Monterey departed Samoa.

Task Force 11 will be held for eventualities in connection with the attacks of the other two forces.

Plans have been made for the escorts which must accompany Australian reinforcement convoys mentioned in earlier despatches - one from West Coast and one from East Coast via Borabora. See Op. Orders 8-42 and 9-42.

The earlier three-ship convoy is about south of Suva today. One ship is going to Suva and the other two are now being directed to Melbourne with the idea that one will eventually proceed to the NEI. A request that the Phoenix proceed beyond Melbourne was denied because of our shortage of cruisers.
January 29. Task Forces Eight and Seventeen were apparently proceeding as planned.

Deliberations continued as to the employment of Task Force Eleven but decision was withheld until after conference with the Task Force Commander.

Although the MISSISSIPPI is now escorting a convoy, that duty for the NEW MEXICO has been cancelled for the present. This employment for the battleships requires extra destroyers which are not available at present.

None of the three cargo ships have left Samoa yet. The unloading is being guarded by the SAN FRANCISCO and three destroyers.

The reinforcement (pursuit squadron) for Suva arrived in the President MONROE. This force has been placed under the Commanding General Hawaiian Department but its tactical direction is by the New Zealand command.

RAMAPO arrived Borabora, and a report on that place was received from the SUMNER.

In 291430 Cominch informed that S.S. QUEEN ELIZABETH would fuel at Nuku Hiva and asked if destroyer would be available to cover this. Reply was made in negative.

A patrol plane inspection of Baker and Howland found that they had each been raided by the enemy. This probably occurred about January when a garbled radio report was received but not traced. Any of the weather observers remaining will be taken off by the HELM in the next few days.

Cominch was informed that the Army wished to send A.A. ammunition and medical supplies to Manila via a submarine and that one is available. He replied in the negative because of the inadequate number of submarines for combatant work.

The Australians have made several raids on Rabaul where a considerable concentration of shipping continues. Enemy is now using Katfeng as a base.

Air raids along the coast of New Guinea continue.
January 30.

The operations of Task Forces Eight and Eleven are proceeding as planned, but Vice Admiral Halsey reported in his 302000 that unless fuel on his return trip was assured, his attack could not extend for more than one day. This led to the decision to send Task Force Eleven with the NEOSHO tomorrow to a rendezvous with Task Force Eight (see Operation Order No. 10-42). After this duty is completed, this task force is to cover Canton. That place is to be reinforced about 12 February as provided in Op. Order No. 8-42.

Information of this movement was sent out in 310137. Considerable concern over the fuel situation was felt, and KASKASKIA enroute Samoa to San Pedro was ordered to proceed to Pearl.

Four out six B-17's and five out six VP's of Task Group 8.9 returned from the Canton-Suva search they had been conducting.

Cominch's 292110 provided for our contribution to the Anzac Force. Admiral Leary and staff will proceed by plane to Wellington on the 1st; CHICAGO and PIRKINS will depart for that place on the 2nd; and the LAMSON will proceed from SAMOA on the same date. See Operation Order No. 11-42.

Cominch in 292220 (a disc - secret file) informed that decision had been made to establish an outpost at Funafuti and asked again for comment on the necessity for basing a force of considerable strength in the Suva-Samoa-Canton-Bobcat area. CincPac replied with despatch 30-A which follows. Nukufetau was recommended in place of Funafuti.

Received orders to transfer the PHOENIX to the Asiatic Fleet vice the damaged BOISE.

Three APD's are being transferred from the Atlantic to this command.

The IDADO and 2 DD arrived San Francisco.
January 31.

Attacks by Task Forces 8 and 17 were successfully carried out today except that heavy rain decreased the effectiveness of that against Jaluit.

Results:

By T.F. 17

Makin - 1 auxiliary badly damaged, two seaplanes destroyed.
Jaluit - 1 out of two auxiliaries badly damaged; no aircraft present.
Mili - Nothing present.
(Seven of our aircraft lost).
T.F. 17 retiring for fuel.

By T.F. 8

Kwajalein - many auxiliaries and aircraft destroyed, some shore installations attacked.
Wotje - Many auxiliaries destroyed, shore installations bombed and bombarded.
Maloelap - Installations bombed and bombarded.
(Six of our aircraft lost, CHESTER hit by bomb amidships, ENTERPRISE some damage from near misses. CHESTER can still make thirty knots).

T.F. 8 retiring toward Pearl in urgent need of fuel. T.F. 11 will meet him north of Johnston Island. T.F. 11 departed this morning.

HELM received attack at Baker Island from large seaplane - received no damage but probably damaged plane. Completed evacuation of Baker and Howland.

KASKASKIA was told to resume voyage because PLATTE was nearing Pearl. A Standard Oil tanker was being prepared for fueling at sea.

Cominch in 31/606 directed that CinCPac control routing of Convoys 2030 and BT200, and also cover them with a carrier group operating in the South Pacific east of 180°. Convoy 2030 sailed from S.F. today for Canton, Christmas and Xray.

The enemy continues to advance in his offensive. He is installed at Balikpapan and in southeast Celebes. He has reached.
January 26 (Cont'd)

The loading of all the convoys mentioned has been directed by authorities on the continent. We have only the following information:

- S.F. - Australia: 12,000 troops
- East Coast - Australia: 20,900 troops
- East Coast - Eorabora: 3,500 troops
- S.F. - Canton: 1,600 troops
- S.F. - Christmas: 2,100 troops
- President Monroe to Suva: 660 troops - pursuit squadron and air warning company.
- Coolidge and Mariposa to Australia - NEI: Unknown

Enemy air attacks and observation along the Solomons, New Guinea and the line west of New Guinea continue.

An enemy submarine shelled Midway at dark last night. No damage ashore; possibility of a hit on the submarine.

The radio intelligence and other indications lead to the belief that there could hardly be much strength in the Marshalls.

In his 251630 Cominich directed that no further withdrawals be made from the First Marine Air Wing. This will make it difficult to supply the aircraft which Cincpac has been directed to furnish, and which are an urgent need, at Samoa.

Preparations of plans for a balloon barrage in certain sectors of Pearl Harbor are going forward. Previous objection was a result chiefly of the danger of such an installation to our own aircraft based in the Pearl Harbor area. This objection is now being met by careful choice of locations and by placing balloons in sectors which offer the least hazard to our own operations.

January 27 - In view of the growing conviction that most of the Japanese strength is engaged in the southwest, full consideration was given to expanding the offensive operations of Task Forces 8 and 17. Vice-Admiral Halsey’s plan included attacks on Makin, Mili and Jaluit. Since he prepared this plan the submarine reports on Maloelap and Wotje and intelligence of enemy operations in the Rabaul area have been received. During deliveries as to what form the directive to Vice Admiral Halsey should take a despatch along the same lines from Cominch (271945) was received. As a result Cincpac’s 280311 (following) was sent to Comtaskfor 8.

T.F. 11 was permitted to disable machinery until Jan. 30.
A dispatch (262007) was received from Cominch with regard to the possibility of dispensing with escorts for ships between here and the West Coast, and adopting diversive routing in place thereof. This matter is under consideration.

Cominch in 261721 directed that one large cruiser and two DD be prepared for the Anzac area.

In regard to that area Cincpac nominated Vice Admiral Pye as the Commander and made certain other recommendations at contained in 270103. For political reasons, etc., it was thought that the Anzac force should operate directly under Cominch though for strictly naval reasons a status under the Commander-in-Chief was considered to have been better.

Vice Admiral Pye has been acting as adviser to Cincpac since Admiral Nimitz relieved him. It will have been noted that several of his estimates of the situation are contained herein.

It has been decided to recommend that the Battle Force and Scouting Force grouping be abandoned and that the administration organization be composed of types directly under the Commander-in-Chief.

A task organization and broad tasks are being formulated to be issued in the form of a general plan, and also more specific plans which will include the Army forces placed under Cincpac on the principle of unity of command.

Enemy activity continued in the Solomon area, chiefly air raids and air observation, but Rabaul and Kavieng appear to be definitely captured, as well as a few of the unprotected small islands in the vicinity.

Submarines are again making their presence known in the Oahu area and again one shelled Midway at dark. However, during yesterday forenoon the GUDGEON returning from Japan sank a submarine of the I-68 class on the surface 200 miles west of Midway.
IT IS DESIRED THAT NO FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF AIRCRAFT FROM FIRST MARINE AIR WING BE MADE WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM ME. MY INTENTION IS TO MAINTAIN THESE SQUADRONS IN COMPLETE STATE READINESS AS COMBAT LOSS REPLACEMENTS FOR CARRIERS IF REQUIRED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS NAVAL SQUADRONS ARE READY FOR THIS PURPOSE.

PREPARE TO ALLOCATE TO ANZAC AREA ONE HEAVY OR ONE NEW LIGHT CRUISER FITTED AS FLAGSHIP ALSO AT LEAST TWO MODERN DESTROYERS PARA PRESSURE IS INCREASING FOR ALLOCATION MORE SHIPS TO ABDA COMMAND.

DESIRE RECOMMENDATION AS TO PRACTICABILITY AND SECURITY OF DESPATCHING CARGO VESSEL REGARDLESS OF SPEED INDEPENDENTLY BY DIVERSIFIED ROUTING BETWEEN WEST COAST PORTS AND HAWAIIAN AREA AND SURFACE COVERAGE TO BE FOR AT LEAST 200 MILES FROM PORTS OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION.

OFFICER NUMBER 20 NOMINATED IN PRESENT RANK OF VICE ADMIRAL X APPOINTMENT ACCEPTABLE TO HIM X REFERENCE PARA 2 COMINCH 241740 X BECAUSE OF LARGE NUMBER OF ANZAC SHIPS COMMA LOCATION OF AREA AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS RECOMMEND AREA COMMANDER OPERATE UNDER COMINCH DIRECT X AREA ASSIGNMENT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS RESTRICTING OPERATIONS OF TASK FORCES WITHIN SUCH LIMITS AFTER DUE NOTICE X RECOMMEND LIMITING POINT IN LAT 20 DEGREES SOUTH BE LONGITUDE 172 WEST IN ORDER TO INCREASE DISTANCE TO LIMITING LINE FROM SUVA AND TONGATABU X PROSPECTIVE AREA COMMANDER REQUESTS OFFICER NUMBER 45 BE ASSIGNED TO HIS FORCE IN WHICH CINCPAC CONCURS X BECAUSE OF HAVING GREATER STAFF ACCOMMODATIONS AND RADAR RECOMMEND ONE CA BE INCLUDED IN US CONTRIBUTION
ASSUME YOU ARE AWARE OF SERIOUS ENEMY THREAT TO COMMUNICATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA CREATED BY CURRENT ENEMY OCCUPATION OF POINTS ESPECIALLY RABAUL IN BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO AND HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT WHILE IT IS INADVISABLE TO DIVERT PART OF HALSEY EXPEDITION IN THAT DIRECTION IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT PLANNED ATTACK IN MARSHALLS BE DRIVEN HOME.

FOR ACTION COMTASKFOR 8 X ESTIMATE ENEMY FORCES MARSHALLS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY REDUCED IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS TO SOUTHWESTWARD X NOW IS OPPORTUNITY TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS GILBERTS MARSHALLS AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ATTACKS BE DRIVEN HOME X EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION BY EXPANDING OPERATIONS UTILIZING BOTH TASK FORCES IN SUCH REPEATED AIR ATTACKS AND SHIP BOMBARDMENTS AS DEVELOPMENTS AND LOGISTICS MAKE FEASIBLE X IF PRACTICABLE EXTEND OFFENSIVE ACTION BEYOND 1 DAY.
January 28. Task Forces Eight and Seventeen scheduled to
fuel today.

Deliberations as to employment of Task Force Eleven
were in progress. Despatch 270956 had been received from Australia
indicating much anxiety as to enemy occupation of Noumea. The
only information previously received as to a reinforcement at that
place was contained in Cominch's 182110 (January) and earlier
reference from the War Department to the Commanding General
Hawaiian Department which said that Australia was being urged to
reinforce that place but that the U.S. might have to undertake it.

Vice admiral Pye urges that one of Vice Admiral
Halsey's carrier groups be sent to Suva after the presently
planned attack on the Marshalls and that Task Force Eleven be
sent to a position west of Samoa; these two forces to oppose
further extension of the enemy to Noumea. The view of the War
Plans Section is: that this move is too eccentric for our primary
task of protecting Hawaii and the Mainland; that it would be con-
siderably weaker than the force the enemy is employing in that
area; and that the logistic situation of our forces would be most
precarius. The War Plans Section inclines to the view that a
follow-up in the Marshalls or a raid on Wake would be the best
employment for Task Force Eleven in order to further destroy
facilities in that area and to divert some enemy forces from
his offense. No decision was made today. It will probably be
decided after Vice Admiral Halsey's attack has been completed.

An enemy submarine torpedoes the small Army trans-
port R.T. FRANK this morning between Maui and Hawaii. An inten-
sive search resulted in some good sound contacts and good indi-
cation that the submarine had been sunk.

Our submarine observation of Taongi revealed no
development although radio intelligence has for a long time
placed a radio station there.

In 272333 Cominch informed that Vice Admiral Pye
would not command the Anzac Force.

Cincpac in 282117 urged reconsideration of the fore-
going and nominated Rear Admiral Leary to be assisted by Rear
Admiral Smith.

In his 290047 Cincpac recommended to Cominch that
all ships between the West Coast and Hawaii continue to be con-
voyed.
Johore Strait in Malaya. He may have landed at Salamoa, New Guinea and he is believed to be reconnoitering the New Hebrides.

Made detailed despatch report to Cominch as to composition and employment of task forces.
The occupation of Rabaul increases threat to Port Moresby and New Caledonia. (2) Port Moresby has garrison of 5,500 and requests for submarines to add to its defenses has been made. Its capture would close Torres Straits. (3) New Caledonia is practically undefended and its capture would give Japan a base from which she could cut the sea and air ferry route between United States and Australia besides providing access chrome and nickel. (4) It is understood that U.S. troops are now enroute Australia from U.S. East Coast to form a garrison for defense of New Caledonia and will arrive in Australia in about 21 days when transports have to be restowed. Time factor suggests Japan, with so rich a prize in view constitutes acting 1st, in which case the only immediate defense is a strong naval concentration in this area (5) On assumption U.S. Flag Officer will now assume command in Anzac area and that one 8" and 2 6" British cruisers will be available to join him, request plans be be concerted so that a sufficiently strong force may be concentrated in this area to deal with force similar to that employed in capture of Rabaul. It is believed that approximately 1 carrier was used in this operation, escort being 2 8" - 2 6" cruisers and 2 aircraft carriers.
SECRET
JAN. 2333

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

YOUR 270103 REGRET THAT OFFICER PROPOSAL CONTAINED MY 241740 NOT APPROVED LOCALLY AND REQUEST NOMINATE ONE OR MORE OTHERS X ANZAC AREA TO BE INITIALLY DIRECTED UNDER COMINCH X CHANGES IN ANZAC BOUNDARIES NOT PRACTICABLE AT PRESENT AS PROPOSAL WOULD FURTHER DELAY ACTION WHICH IS ALREADY OVERDUE

2117 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Urgently request reconsideration your 272333 X Considered most capable and suitable officer available X If reconsideration not acceptable recommend officer whose signal number is 45 to be assisted by officer whose signal number is 205

0047 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Consider most economical air coverage and surface escort can be provided in convoys composed of ships of equal speed but that careful coordinated control under one responsible command essential - mydis 180401 Compacsoncf 191804 urdis 262007 X Routing ships independently will complicate rather than simplify air and surface coverage X While at present no Japanese raiders or submarines believed to be east of longitude 150 West - this situation subject to sudden change X With between 20 and 40 slow freighters at sea enemy action would probably result in excessive losses x Navy auxiliaries and new cargo ships capable 15 knots or better considered reasonably safe unescorted but these ships able to travel with 14 knot transports which must be escorted regardless X Naval auxiliaries add materially to gun power of such convoys and obtain in return some antisubmarine protection X Recommend against sailing slow ships unescorted and further consideration my dis referenced above.

1430 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

My 261800 about February 15 SS Queen Elizabeth passage Auckland to San Francisco will fuel from British Bishopdale at Nuku Hiva Marquesas x Do your present plans make practicable assignment one DD to investigate and select best fueling site February 13 or 14th and cover ships involved during fueling X If reply negative ConsepacFor arrange one Dog Love with Baker Tare 200 carry out above assignment.

2200 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

AIDAC (PETLOCK and Mobile Force)
Operation Plan
No. R5-1

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) Covering Force (Task Force One), Rear Admiral Anderson.
   All battleships
   Cruisers as assigned
   Destroyers as assigned.

(b) Striking Forces (Task Force numbers as assigned in orders for specific operations)
   Carriers, cruisers and destroyers organized into task forces suitable for the specific task or tasks assigned.

(c) Submarine Force (Task Force Seven), Rear Admiral Withers.
   Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

(d) Patrol Plane Force (Task Force Nine), Rear Admiral Bellinger.
   Patwings ONE and TWO.

(e) Escort Force (Task Force Fifteen), Rear Admiral Calhoun.
   Forces exclusive of Task Force One assigned.

(f) Base Force (Task Force Six), Rear Admiral Calhoun.
   Trainron TWO, FOUR, SIX, and EIGHT.
   Base Force Subordinate Command, San Francisco.

(g) Marine Force, Major General Vogel.
   Marines assigned to Pacific Fleet.

(h) Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Task Force Four) Rear Admiral Bloch
   Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
   Fleet Forces which may be assigned.

(i) Naval Station Samoa (Task Force Five), Brigadier General Larsen.
   Local Defense Forces, Samoa.
   Fleet forces which may be assigned.
Operation Plan

No. R5-1

1. Information.
   (a) This plan is issued under U. S. Pacific Fleet Campaign Plan 2-R5 to promulgate a task organization of the Pacific Fleet and to assign general tasks to the task forces. More detailed tasks will be assigned in the orders or plans for specific operations. The Pacific Northern and Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontiers are not included in the Task Organization at this time as there are no tasks to be assigned to them other than those assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations.

   The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and Naval Station, SAMOA are made task forces of the Pacific Fleet by the effective Basic Navy War Plan (WPL-46), as revised.

   (b) Information of the enemy is in Fleet Intelligence Bulletins and in the daily broadcasts by Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

2. This fleet will:
   (a) Raid enemy communications and forces.
   (b) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers east of Longitude 180° by covering, by destroying enemy forces, and by continuing through offensive operations.
   (c) Escort shipping, and cover and patrol lines of communication as circumstances require.
3. (a) **Covering Force (Task Force One)**

   (1) Cover operations of other forces as may be directed.

   (2) Escort, with appropriate strength, convoys between the West Coast and the five hundred mile circle from Oahu.

   (3) Base at San Francisco at present.

   (4) Conduct intensive training as conditions permit.

(b) **Striking Forces**

   (1) Raid enemy communications, positions and forces as directed in specific plans and orders.

   (2) Cover own territory, forces, and communications as directed in specific orders and as can be accomplished incidental to other operations.

   (3) Base at Pearl Harbor.

(c) **Submarine Force (Task Force Seven)**

   (1) Raid enemy communications and forces off Japan and in the Japanese Mandates, in accordance with specific directives as issued.

   (2) Observe enemy areas as may be specifically directed, and as may be accomplished incidental to offensive task.

   (3) Maintain defensive patrols as may be orders.

   (4) Base Pearl Harbor. Utilize facilities of MIDWAY as may be expedient.
(d) **Patrol Plane Force (Task Force Nine)**

1. Conduct aerial patrols from Oahu in conjunction with the Army as specifically ordered.
2. When directed, operate aircraft from advance bases to support operations of other forces; and to increase general security of the Oahu Base, and of the bases concerned.
3. Assist **Task Force Four** with transportation of supplies to the outlying islands.

(e) **Escort Force (Task Force Fifteen)**

1. Escort convoys to the Anzac Area and the southwestern bases as circumstances require and the forces available permit.
2. Make forces available to Task Force One as directed.
3. Assist in escorting convoys to MIDWAY, JOHNSTON, PALMYRA, CANTON, CHRISTMAS and other outlying bases.

(f) **Base Force (Task Force Six)**

1. Provide logistic service to the Fleet, maintaining for this purpose close liaison through the Base Force Subordinate Command with Commander Pacific Southern Coastal Frontier and with the Naval Transportation Service.
2. Assist **Task Force Four** as may be practicable with transportation of supplies to the outlying islands.
3. Prepare, by training and by liaison with the agencies supplying material, to establish advance bases.
4. Train transports for amphibious expeditions in conjunction with **Second Marine Division**.
(g) Second Marine Division.

(1) Organize and train for landing operations, including those of the "Commando" type.

(2) Cooperate and assist Army units in training for landing operations as may be required by specific directives.

(3) Be prepared to move advance units to base on OAHU, or at advanced bases.

(h) Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Task Force Four)

(1) Carry out tasks assigned in CinCPac Fleet's Campaign Plan 2-R5.

(i) Naval Station Samoa (Task Force Five).

(1) Defend American SAMOA.

(2) When assigned forces permit, assist in the protection of Allied maritime communications in the vicinity of SAMOA.

(3) Assist in the protection and supply of Fleet units present.

(x) (1) This plan effective on receipt.

4. Logistics. General logistic support will be supplied by the Base Forces as prescribed in paragraph 3(f).

(a) Communications. In accordance with PAC-SEVENTY.

6. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet will disseminate information as to his location.

C. W. NIMITZ
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC

29 2110

GCT PARA AFIRM X FOR OFFICER WHOSE SIGNAL NUMBER IS 45 (RADM LEARY) YOU WILL BE ASSIGNED BY SEPARATE SECNAV DESPATCH TO COMMAND QUOTE ANZAC FORCE UNQUOTE CONCERNING WHICH THERE IS GIVEN HEREWITH FULL TEST OF DESPATCH AGREED TO BY ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED QUOTE THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMEND THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE QUOTE ANZAC AREA UNQUOTE AND OF THE CORRESPONDING QUOTE ANZAC FORCE UNQUOTE PARA ONE BOUNDARIES COLON BEGINNING AT LONGITUDE 141 DEG EAST AT THE EQUATOR EASTWARD ALONG THE EQUATOR TO LONGITUDE 170 DEG EAST THERESEASTERNLY TO POINT IN LATITUDE 20 DEG SOUTH LONGITUDE 175 DEG WEST THENCE DUE SOUTH; FROM POINT OF BEGINNING SOUTH ALONG MERIDIAN 141 DEGREES EAST TO SOUTH COAST OF NEW GUINEA THENCE EASTWARD ALONG SAID COAST TO MERIDIAN 143 DEGREES EAST THERESE DUE SOUTH IN SEA AREAS ONLY X PARA 2 X ANZAC FORCE TO BE UNDER STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE UNITED STATES EXERCISED BY COMMANDER IN CHIEF U S FLEET THROUGH ONE OR MORE U S FLAG OFFICERS ASSISTED BY ONE OR MORE FLAG OFFICERS NAMED BY AUSTRALIA AND SLANT OR NEW ZEALAND X PARA 3 X ALL PRACTICABLE USE WILL BE MADE OF NAVAL SUPPLY COMMUNICATION AND REPAIR FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND X PARA 4 X INITIAL ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPS TO ANZAC FORCES BRITISH 1 CARRIER UNITED STATES ONE HEAVY OR ONE LIGHT CRUISER AND TWO DESTROYERS NEW ZEALAND TWO LIGHT CRUISERS ONE AUXILIARY CRUISER AUSTRALIA TWO HEAVY CRUISERS ONE LIGHT CRUISER THREE AUXILIARY CRUISERS TWO DESTROYERS TWO ANTISUBMARINE PATROL VESSELS SIX 600 TON ANTISUBMARINE VESSELS PAREN REMAINDER OF AUSTRALIA SEAGOING FORCES NAMELY TWO LIGHT CRUISERS TWO DESTROYERS THREE SLOOPS TO BE ASSIGNED TO ABDA COMMAND PAREN PERIOD ALL OTHER AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND NAVAL UNITS TO REMAIN AT DISPOSAL OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS FOR LOCAL DEFENSE X THE DISPOSAL OF ADDITIONS TO DOMINION NAVAL FORCES WILL BE DECIDED BY AGREEMENT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

SUMNER TO CINCPAC

29 2335

200 foot 9 fathom channel developed and buoyed X Not difficult improving by blasting X Seaplanes can land and takeoff in main harbor X Believe Motu Mute Island could be developed for land plane base X East of Tahiti for seaplane base X Old chart of inner harbor nearly correct X No water supply above native needs X Could be developed X Ready to receive ships X Ramapo arrived today A M

30 2000

CONTASK FOR EIGHT TO CINCPAC

Unless assured of fuel meeting me on return route to Pearl anticipate necessity Task Force 8 withdrawal after 1 day
This message to Comtaskforce 8 for action X TaskForce 11 with only available tanker NEOSHO departing Pearl 2030 GCT January 31 for point 100 miles south Task Force 8 Fox plus 8 day rendezvous Comtaskforce 8 221625 X Withdraw after first day at Halseys discretion.

YOUR 302139 SEA FRONTIER IS NEW TERM FOR NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER WHICH IS GENERAL CHARACTER OF ORGANIZATION IN THAT COMANZAC SHOULD SET UP TO INCLUDE PROTECTION OF COASTWISE SHIPPING.

CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Your 292220 Compatwing Two serial 0425 of 11 July furnished Hydrographer contains report reconnaissance Ellice Islands last June which indicates Nukufetau is somewhat better seaplane operating area than Funafuti X Chart study shows former more easily defended X Unless landing field is to be built suggest occupying that place instead of Funafuti X Request information contemplated developments whether Army or Marine personnel and estimated date X Para X Primary mission mobile fleet force mentioned your 191815 not entirely clear X At present and in foreseeable future considerable number cruisers and destroyers engaged covering or escort duties Canton Christmas Bobcat Samoa Fiji Anzac area X A mobile striking or covering force to remain constantly in the area superimposed on prospective escort obligations seems likely to result in principal employment of fleet being defense distant communication lines and relatively weak shore positions X This would result in considerable expenditure of resources with no commensurate return X Presence of a covering force in that large area would not relieve necessity for cruiser escorts to guard transports or other important ships against single raiders X Recommend against proposal as a guiding directive X CinCPac proposes operate Task Forces that area from time to time as situation or enemy intelligence may indicate X If still considered advisable to make permanent assignment that area loss of one CA two DD to anzac force change of Phoenix for Boise attendant logistic difficulties and weakening of operations elsewhere suggest two cruisers and four DD which would be available to CinCPac for escort as circumstances required.
PLOT OF PROBABLE TRACKS OF CONVOYS BAKER TARE 200 BAKER CAST 100 AND 2030 INDICATES HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF VALUABLE SHIPPING WILL BE SOUTH OF EQUATOR AND WEST OF LONGITUDE 150 WEST FROM ABOUT 7 TO 23 FEBRUARY X SUGGEST YOU COVER THE MOVEMENTS OF THESE CONVOYS USING AIRCRAFT IN GENERAL ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR OPPLAN 6-42 BETWEEN HAWAII AND NEW CALEDONIA X SUPPORT THIS AIR PATROL BY ONE OF YOUR STRIKING GROUPS EAST OF LONGITUDE 180 X I WILL ARRANGE FOR COVER AND SUPPORT BY ANZAC NAVAL AND AIR FORCES REMAINDER OF VOYAGE X CINCPAC CONTROL ROUTING OF CONVOYS 2030 BEYOND XMAS AND BAKER TARE 200 BEYOND BOBCAT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF COVER XX WHAT ESCORT WILL YOU PROVIDE FOR BAKER TARE 200 BEYOND BOBCAT
February 1.

Task Forces Eight and Seventeen continued their retirement.

Task Force Eight approaching Task Force Eleven. The number of patrol planes at Johnston Island was increased to six to assist in covering these forces. Later, Vice Admiral Halsey reported that his force had sufficient fuel to reach Pearl. Apparently CHESTER and two DD are separated from ENTERPRISE and must conduct fueling of the DD. Admiral Halsey also reported that the enemy operates two-engined bombers 600 miles from Taroa Island, Maloaap.

The Navy Department announced the news of the attack, and a boost in morale all around is evident.

The employment for Task Force Eleven must now be decided upon. The directive from Cominch to operate a carrier group in the South Pacific bears very heavily upon the situation.

Convoy BT-200 departed from the Canal Zone today. Task Force Thirteen (Op.Ord. 9-42) will take it over near Bobcat where the BARRY (AP) must refuel.

The TAUTOG, which is about 300 miles ahead of Task Force Eight, reported two biplanes. These are thought to be from submarines.

Rear Admiral Leary departed by plane for Wellington. He will assume the rank of Vice Admiral upon arrival Auckland, and take command of the Anzac Force.

First reenforcements for Australia (COOLIDGE, MARIPOSA) arrived Melbourne. The COOLIDGE may be sent on to Java.

CinCIN reported that condition of BOISE makes it necessary to send her to Colombo for two months repairs. Pacific Fleet has now detached two CLs leaving three; one CA leaving eleven; and two DD, leaving 49. Three of Destroy 50 are now assigned to the West Coast Coastal Frontiers leaving division commander in the RATHBURN to operate the sound school, to which has been assigned several patrol types which work with two 8-type submarines.

Suva reported bearings of enemy forces to the southeast, moving eastward. These were fixed by our radio intelligence to be northwest of Suva, west of the Gilberts.

Radio communication with Salamoa was established again, but air attacks by Japs in that area continue.
February 1 (Cont'd)

Replied to Cominch 292220 that if still considered advisable to make permanent assignment of a force to the Samoan area, two cruisers and four DD should be the maximum and should be available for escort in that area (Aidac file 010407). In same message recommended that Nukufetau be substituted for Funafuti because it has a clearer lagoon and can be more easily defended. Only disadvantage is that it has not as much space for land aircraft.

February 2.

Task Forces Eight and Seventeen continued toward Pearl; Task Force Eight will enter on the 5th, and Seventeen on the 6th. Both have been at sea for extremely long periods and need rest and upkeep. The hazard of having three carriers in port together for several days will be accepted. The SARATOGA will be ready to leave for the Coast for permanent repairs about the 10th.

Task Force Eleven turned south to carry out the remainder of its orders (10-42) to cover Canton. Plans are in the making to employ this force in carrying out Cominch 311606 (covering convoys).

GRIDLEY and FANNING (damaged) started from Pago Pago for Pearl.

Six submarines are enroute to stations in the west including one in the East China Sea.

In the Asiatic, Sourabaya and other points in Java were attacked by carrier planes. Other enemy pressure continued in the southwest. He bombed Tulagi and New Guinea including Moresby. British attacked shipping at Rabaul with 4 VP.

February 3.

Task Forces at sea proceeding as before.

The Bobcat convoy departed Panama, due to arrive February 18.

Supply of outlying islands is continuing, - RAIL, WASMUTH and SS HAWAII returned from Johnston; TANEY and BARBARA OLSEN are at Canton; GREBE and YO-43 are return/return from Palmyra.
February 3 (Continued)

Cominch in 031600 (Aidac) informed that Funafuti would be selected as the outpost for Samoa and that the Samoan Force of 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers would be kept continuously in the area.

The MOFFETT of the BT-200 escort will guard fueling of the SS QUEEN ELIZABETH at Nukuhiva.

Radio intelligence indicated that an extensive operation, "MA" covering period 5-10 February will be undertaken by the enemy - probably attacks all along the Malay Barrier - New Guinea line.

Amboina is being attacked. Air raids continue on Java, but Malacca is still in Dutch hands.

Nine U.S. B-17's attacked enemy ships at Balikpapan. Results indeterminate.

February 4.

No change for Task Forces.

Op. Order 11-42 was issued to Task Force 11. It provides for that force to cover Convoys 2030, BT-200 and BC-100 and reinforces it with PLATTE, being sent to Samoa, and CURTISS and six VP being sent to Suva.


CASE and O'BRIEN collided off the Farallones in fog. They returned to San Francisco but complete damage report has not been received.

All enemy forces are fairly well accounted for in the southwest by radio intelligence, except seven BB and Cardiv Four.

Enemy ships were reported off Efate.
February 5.

Task Force Eight entered. Damage to CHESTER was by a small instantaneous bomb; that to ENTERPRISE was from fragments. A most successful raid was indicated - destroyed about fifteen ships including cruiser, tenders, gunboats, two submarines, a 17,000 ton merchantman, and 35 planes for sure. Well developed airfields were found at Taroa and Roi Islands and much damage to shore installations was inflicted. Five of our fighters engaged fifteen enemy fighters and shot down three with no losses. Our chief loss was at Roi where fighters got 4 VSB. The raid was apparently a complete surprise to the enemy. ENTERPRISE remained in sight of Wotje for five hours - was attacked by seven twin engined bombers.

Because of number of carriers in port and the Emperor's birthday, overnight leave and liberty was cancelled until further orders.

CURTISS, PLATTE, WORDEN of Task Force 11; PORTER of Task Force 12; PENSACOLA and 4 DD of Task Force 13; departed.

Asiatic Fleet was redesignated U.S. Naval Forces Southwest Pacific, Vice Admiral Glassford in command. Admiral Hart in command of Combined Naval Forces ABDA area (Secnav 042030).

Received from Cominch a request for views as to whether the PacFlt should relieve the pressure of the enemy in the southwest by reenforcing the ABDA and/or Anzac area or by aggressive operations in the Pacific Area, including use of battleships (051555 Aidac).

Enemy action in Far East continues. Submarine activity in the Eastern Pacific is nil.

February 6.

Task Force 17 entered. Little to add to previous report. No air opposition encountered except two flying boats. No air at Jaluit. Weather caused loss of six out of the eight planes lost.

Cominch informed that CONCORD is in SEPac Force and not in PacFlt.

Received attached despatches 061513 and 062352 from Cominch estimating that enemy would soon strike all along the Southwest line including Noumea and the New Hebrides. They also might well raid Midway, Oahu, West Coast and Canal Zone. Sends Task Force 11 to Anzac Area (established this date) and reenforces with two cruisers and six destroyers from Task Forces 12 and 13.
February 6 (continued)

Despatch orders were issued making these changes. HONOLULU and two DD will combine convoys 2030 and BT-200 at Bobcat.

Secnav despatch 061445 (attached) changed "Naval Coastal Frontiers" to "Sea Frontiers".

Enemy showed no signs of turning aside from his southwest objectives.

February 7.

ComTaskForce 11 gave his plans in 070615. He will operate in the area between Fiji and New Caledonia. Comanzac reports that he is leaving for Melbourne Feb 10. He diverted the CHICAGO and PERKINS into Suva where it will join the Anzac Squadron.

Six VP left for Suva in accordance with original orders except that they will make no search from Canton.

Replied to Cominch 051555, 061513 and 062352 in CinCPac 080239 (Aidac). Pointed out that there were insufficient forces to conduct any offensive operations except hit and run raids which probably would not release pressure in southwest. Battleships would not fit in such operations and there are insufficient light forces to raid, and also screen them. Contemplate that one task force will next cover in the Samoan area and one will be held in reserve. It was decided not to conduct further raids at this time because the probable results do not balance the probable risks.

In response to a request from C.O., Bobcat for a tug, the TERN is being sent there.

Governor Samoa reports airfield will be ready on March 1 for fighters on May 5 for bombers. It is not yet evident how this aircraft will be provided.

A large convoy is making up in San Francisco for Australia. Many of the AK's will be sent alone on dispersed routes.

Cominch in 071940 informs that Marine units being removed from Iceland will be sent to the Pacific Fleet. He speaks of the need for amphibious troops here being obvious.

Ten S-class submarines are being sent to the Far East.
February 7 (continued)

Activity in the Bismarck area appears reduced. The enemy main attack forces are in the Molucca Area. Singapore continues to be hammered, and artillery is working against the Bataan Peninsula.

February 8.

Shifts in forces are proceeding as directed for the "offensive" in the New Caledonia Area.

Through a dispatch from the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, it was learned that Cominch desired 12 B-17's sent to support Task Force 11. Arrangements are being made to send them and a plan of operations is being drawn up. The TANGIER will be sent to Fiji to carry necessary personnel and material there.

Comanzac gave further directions for the concentration of the Anzac Squadron off Fiji.

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, informed the ABDA Command that plans for the following ferrying of aircraft was planned in February and March:

- 22 B-17
- 114 B-26 (must be set up and trained in Hawaii)
- 8 B-25

Except for more bombing of Java the offense in that area does not seem to be getting underway.

A submarine bombarded Midway with 3 shells tonight, then escaped.

February 9.

Task Force 11 and reinforcements proceeding as previously ordered.

During the afternoon, Cominch 09245 (Aidac) was received. Disagrees throughout with CinCPac 080239. Briefly, it informs that present employment of battleships is unsatisfactory and points out that attempts to relieve pressure in the southwest must be continued by offensive operations in the Mid-Pacific, mentioning Wake and the northern Marshalls. This makes the situation particularly difficult, as through orders of Cominch in 061513 and 062352, Task Force 11, extra light forces, and tankers are being tied up in the Suva Area. Full deliberations were held but no satisfactory solution of the problem could be reached. Further conference with
February 9 (continued)

Vice Admiral Halsey will be held tomorrow. The War Plans Section Briefed Estimate is quite pertinent and is bound herewith.

In response to a request of CinCPac, Vice Admiral Pye, was ordered to Washington for conference with Cominich, and left by clipper today.

The SARATOGA left for Puget Sound today for permanent repairs and major alterations.

The activity in the New Guinea area is still slack. The offensive against Java is holding off, but pressure against Singapore and Bataan is severe. The Japs have landed on Singapore Island.

February 10 -

No change made today in plan of operations. Further discussion was held as to employment of Task Forces Eight and Seventeen and the battleships, but final decision was not reached. As pointed out in the briefed estimate, it is very difficult to select an objective within reach of the Fleet (extended by oiling at sea) which would result in any considerable diversion of enemy force from the southwest. One proposal was to send Task Force Eight to make a sweep with Task Force Eleven as far as Rabaul, while holding Task Force Seventeen in reserve or having him attack Wake. Task Force Eight would of course be operating outside of the Pacific Area which is the responsibility of the Pacific Fleet.

Another proposal was to raid Tokyo. This would be precarious due to bad weather for fueling.

Comanzac has established himself at Melbourne. He is forming an Anzac Squadron under Rear Admiral Grace (R.N.) composed of 2 CA, 2 CL and 2 DD. This will cooperate with Task Force Eleven between Fiji and New Caledonia.

Task Unit 11.1.2 (6 VP) arrived Suva.

An enemy sub bombarded Midway again this evening. Two rounds, no damage; was attacked by two aircraft.

Events are moving fast at Singapore and slowly in the Solomons area. Off Java and Timor strong preparations by the enemy are still indicated.
February 10 (continued)

The Australians air attacked Gasmata, New Britain, which has just been occupied by the enemy. Only slight damage claimed.

February 11

Decision was reached to employ Task Forces Eight and Seventeen combined into one Task Force to make a coordinated raid on Wake and Eniwetok or other objective such as Marcus if Eniwetok develops as undesirable. It is feared that this will not divert much strength from the southwest but it is as strong an aggressive operation as can be undertaken at this time. The combined Task Force is designated as thirteen.

Vice Admiral Halsey will depart on 13 February with Task Group 13.1 and Rear Admiral Fletcher on 15 February with Task Group 15.2. Each will hold target practice enroute.

Cominich was informed in 120459 (Aidac).

Patrol Squadron 91 will reenforce the Pacific Fleet on March 1.

Singapore is being over-run and will probably fall in a day or two.

Some enemy activity in New Guinea continues and the R.A.A.F. bombed ships at Gasmata again.

CHICAGO and PERKINS of Anzac Force arrived Suva.

Admiral Hart has given up his position in command of the ABDA due to ill health. The Dutch Vice Admiral Helfrich relieves him.
February 12.

Prior to issue of Operation Order 15-42 to Vice Admiral Halsey, deference was paid to possible superstitious persons by changing the task force number to Sixteen. Then, in order to make sure connections between Admiral Fletcher's force and the GUADALUPE which must accompany him, and is not scheduled to arrive at Pearl until the fifteenth, the dates of departure of Task Groups 16.1 and 16.2 were changed to 14 February and 16 February respectively.

A report was received from the CACHALOT which indicated little activity at Wake and none visible at Eniwetok. This is considered rather puzzling in regard to the latter for radio intelligence before the war indicated the probability of an air field, and the air attacks on Wake were believed to have been launched from there or Rongalap, which also showed no activity during an earlier submarine reconnaissance. Eniwetok appears to be even less of an OPTIMUM objective for attack than had been believed before.

The NEVADA was refloated today. She will be placed in drydock in the near future.

Cominch in 122200 (Aidac) directed that Admiral Leary who had expected to establish a command center at Melbourne, to rejoin his flagship, and conduct an offensive operation with the Anzac Force and T.F. 11 against the enemy in the Solomons-Bismarck area. CinCPac was directed to furnish logistic support for the whole operation including ammunition. Three large tankers had already been assigned; the British have two at Suva; TANGIER and CURTISS have bombs and air torpedoes. Other forms of ammunition must be sent.

Task Force Eleven's VP's (6) started search to westward from Suva, but sighted nothing.

Singapore island is still holding out. No more enemy landings were made yesterday at any point.

One submarine was reported by a B-17 northeast of Canton. This may mean difficulty for the PORTER in protecting the President TAYLOR while she is unloading.

February 13.

Plans for Task Force 16 are still in effect. All movements of escorts, and reinforcements for Task Force 11 are proceeding according to schedule. Task Groups 12.1 and 12.5 (HONOLULU and 2 DD) arrived at Bobcat with Convoy 2036. PENSACOLA and 2 DD arrive Pago Pago, fueled from PLATTE and departed to join Task Force 11. PORTER and PRES. TAYLOR arrived Canton; MORRIS ELLET and PRES. JOHNSTON arrived Christmas the tenth. Twelve B-17's are at Nandi.
February 13 (Continued)

In connection with Cominch 122200 (Aidac) Com T.F. 11 in 140022 (Aidac) recommended to ComAnzac that the two forces conduct a sweep to bomb Rabaul. ComAnzac's receipt of Cominch 122200 was much delayed because it was sent in a code which ComAnzac did not have available in Melbourne. When he received the despatch by means of a reencoding by CinCPac, he replied in 140336-140344 (attached) in which he asked for reconsideration as to embarking in his flagship in order that he would have access to the intelligence and communication channels of the ACNB. He also in 140538 asked Task Force 11 to comply with Cominch 122200. In the meantime the Anzac Squadron, under Rear Admiral Grace departed to cover the Noumea-Suva line after he had conferred with the staff aviator of Task Force 11.

Army B-24's will start reinforcing Oahu at a rate of four per week.

Singapore still holds out. No other land offensives have started, but Dutch are apparently giving up Malacca.

Some enemy forces are reported at both Rabaul and Gasmata and enemy VP's were reported 90 miles southeast of Rossel islands on 12th.

February 14.

Task Group 16.1 departed as scheduled.

No reports have been received from HONOLULU with convoys 2030 and BT-200 so it is presumed they left on schedule from Bobcat. BT-200 now goes to Melbourne. There, some of it will be reloaded and taken to Noumea. Final destination of 2030 is not yet determined.

The PRESIDENT TAYLOR at Canton went aground, probably due to losing her anchor which slipped off the anchorage shelf. The PORTER is with her; TANEY and SEMINOLE are being sent to her assistance. Disembarkation has been extremely slow due to the necessity for remaining outside the lagoon and the scarcity of shallow draft equipment for unloading. The defense of Canton which is being garrisoned by the Army (TAYLOR'S loading was entirely directed on the mainland) is going to be most difficult.

With the departure of the carrier of Task Group 16.1, the special alert was relaxed on Oahu.

THRESHER returning from Saipan said that she had sighted six freighters and sunk one.

Cominch informed that a training carrier would arrive in the Pacific the latter part of April.
February 14 (Continued)

Comanzac accepted the proposal of Com T.F. 11's 140022 (Aidac)(raid on Rabaul) and enlarged upon it in his 150244 (attached).

The Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) the Australian squadron, Rear Admiral Grace, reported logistic arrangements and other matters to Com T.F. 11 in his 142112 (attached).

Enemy forces in the New Britain-Solomons area were 1 CV, 3 cruisers and 11 AP at Rabaul and a small force at Gasmata. Tulagi was lightly bombed.

Singapore still holds out.

February 15.

About noon received despatch 151830 (Aidac) from Cominich, which indicated that occasional raids in the Mandates are considered sufficient, and that forces should be disposed more to meet suspected threats of enemy forces. Suggested sending either Halsey or Fletcher to the Canton Area. As a result Rear Admiral Fletcher will go to this area, his Task Force redesignated Seventeen (See CinCPac 160301 with operation orders). Vice Admiral Halsey's Force remains Sixteen; objective changed to Wake because of lack of activity reported at Eniwetok.

Received Wake aerial photographs taken by an Army B-17 yesterday. No great activity is shown. No ships or aircraft visible. This was confirmed by a report from the NARWHAL. This planned raid will be chiefly of morale value.

Cominich apparently accedes to Comanzac remaining ashore and in 141835 (Aidac) directed Vice Admiral Brown (T.F.-11) to take charge of offensive operations in the Bismarck-Solomons Area. Brown in his 152225 (Aidac) gives his plan for raiding Rabaul on Feb 21st (local) Feb 20th here.

The PRESIDENT TAYLOR is firmly aground. Diverting the TANGIER to assist her was considered but was discarded because of her unsuitability, and the urgency of her war mission to support the B-17 bombers in the Anzac Area. Lt-Comdr. Curtiss (U.S.N.R.F. and salvage expert) is being flown down.

The CURTISS, PLATTE and WORDEN remained one or two days extra at Samoa because of a garble in their orders. They finally proceeded to Suva today. The CURTISS must get to Noumea to tend the six VP which Brown is shifting there from Suva.

Admiral Brown has made the TANGIER available to Suva to transport Army personnel to Townsville where the B-17's will base during the Rabaul operation. In CinCPac 160329 (Aidac)
February 15 (Continued)

Admiral Brown was informed that we want the CURTISS returned for a ferry trip to the mainland as soon as possible.

The troop convoy which arrived today reported a midnight submarine attack on Friday night which was unsuccessful. Otherwise the route between here and the mainland has been quiet for several weeks.

SARATOGA arrived Puget Sound.

Singapore fell today and Palembang is being attacked.

February 16

Task Force Seventeen sailed as scheduled. Task Force Sixteen enroute Wake.

Task Force Eleven proceeding toward Rabaul to bomb it on the 20th (our date). Intelligence continues to locate several ships in the harbor there and the Hosho in that vicinity. The Australian Squadron is in support of Task Force 11.

The KINGFISHER is being sent from Samoa to lay the 300 mines recently landed by the Monroe at Suva.

The TROUT has commenced her return voyage from East China Sea, and reports sinking a 5,000 ton freighter. This is the submarine which carried AA ammunition to Corregidor. She is now loaded with gold and securities from Manila.

Cominch in 161635 (attached) informed that serious consideration must be given to establishing an intermediate base at Suva and a main base at Auckland.

The supply of ammunition to the forces in the Anzac Area is still being studied. No ship is readily available.

The enemy operations in Sumatra have been immediately successful, but the Dutch apparently burned the oil facilities before capture.

February 17

Task Forces proceeding as planned.

It was decided to employ the DOBBIN to carry ammunition to the Anzac Area.

Due to a collapse in the marine railway, the PLUNGER fell on its side. No serious damage resulted.
February 17 (Continued)

GRAMPUS reported that there is small activity at Wotje but a considerable number of ships at Kwajalein.

President Taylor is apparently not badly damaged but will require 3,000 tons lightening. The Japara is already enroute with more material for Canton from San Francisco. Undue congestion there may result.

Comininch informed that Convoy 2030 (now combined with BT-200) must go to Brisbane. BT-200 is going to Melbourne. Convoy 2033 composed of 7 ships left San Francisco for Australia on the 12th and a fast convoy of three troopships will leave on the 18th.

Consideration is being given to Comininch's despatch about Auckland and Suva. It is evident that CinCPac has no means with which to establish a base. It is also not clear whether the strength of the fleet is to be employed to defend Anzac or Hawaii.

A despatch from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department urging immediate sending of reinforcements already requested was given full concurrence by CinCPac. (This was finally sent the 19th and is attached).

Enemy concentrations are making up against Timor and Batavia. A considerable convoy has just moved from Australia to Koepang in Timor.

February 18.

Task Forces proceeding as planned.

TANGIER, carrying supporting material and personnel for the B-17's of Task Force 11 arrived and departed Samoa for Suva. CURTISS, tender for VP's of Task Force 11 left Suva presumably for Noumea, where VP's will operate and search to the northward.

The Australian Squadron is supporting Task Force 11 from the rear and is guarding the PLATTE. KASKASKIA is enroute Suva and will arrive about the 27th. Other logistic support is planned - DOBBIN with ammunition; chartered tanker Schofield to unload into tanks at Pago Pago.

Convoy BC-100, SEPULGA and TERN presumably arrived at Bobcat today.

NEVADA entered drydock successfully today.

The Australian estimate locates 12 fighters, 12 torpedo bombers, 24 heavy bombers and eight vessels at Rabaul. These forces are very evidently on the increase. Task Force 11's D-day is the 20th.
01 0407 CINCPAC TO COMINCH
AIDAC
Reply to Aidac 292220

03 1600 COMINCH TO CINCPAC
AIDAC
FETLOCK WILL BE ESTABLISHED

04 2030 SECNAV TO ALNAV
042030
FOLLOWING NEW NAVAL COMMANDS ESTABLISHED X FORCES
FORMERLY CONSTITUTING ASIATIC FLEET ARE NOW KNOWN
AS QUOTE US NAVAL FORCES SOUTHWEST PACIFIC UNQUOTE X
VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD COMMANDS THIS FORCE X ADMIRAL
HART IS COMMANDER COMBINED NAVAL FORCES ABDA AREA X
COMBINED NAVAL FORCES AUSTRALIA DASH NEW ZEALAND
AREA HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH VICE ADMIRAL LEARY
U S NAVY IN COMMAND TITLE COMMANDER ANZAC FORCES

05 1555 COMINCH TO CINCPAC
AIDAC
REENFORCEMENT AND AGGRESSIVE ACTION
Executive order number 8984 of December 18, 1941 reading in part quote The Commander in Chief United States Fleet shall have supreme command of the operating forces of the Naval Coastal Frontier Commands unquote is interpreted and supplemented as hereinafter set forth para Designation Naval Coastal Frontier is hereby changed to Sea Frontier and Naval Coastal Force is changed to Sea Frontier Force Para Names of former Naval Coastal Frontiers changed to sea Frontiers as follows Colon North Atlantic to Eastern X Southern to Gulf X Caribbean to Caribbean X Panama to Panama X Hawaiian to Hawaiian X Pacific Northern to Northwest X Pacific Southern to Western Para A Sea Frontier to Commander Paren Formerly Naval Coastal Frontier Command- er paren commands two forces Afirm Sea Frontier Force comprising ships and aircraft duly allocated by Cominch Baker Local Defense Forces comprising ships and aircraft duly allocated to the Component Naval Districts by Chief Naval Operations para As Commander of a Sea Frontier Force the Commander of a Sea Frontier is under Cominch and in turn may have under him as Task Force Commanders the Commandants of component Naval Districts X As Commander of the Local Defense Forces he is under the Chief Naval Operations and in turn shall have under him as Task Force Commanders the Commandants of the component Naval Districts Para Pertinent existing regulations orders and plans are modified accordingly

GIVE THIS DESPATCH IMMEDIATELY TO ADDRESSES IN PERSON X THERE ARE DEFINITE SIGNS OF A WIDESPREAD AND COORDINATED JAPANESE OFFENSIVE IN ABDA AND ANZAC AREAS WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS WHICH MAY WELL BE ACCOMPANIED BY STRONG RAIDS AGAINST MIDWAY OAHU NEW HEBRIDES NE AUSTRALIA AND POSSIBLY WEST COAST OR CANAL X EXPEDITE DISPOSITIONS AND OPERATIONS OF YOUR FORCES TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR MAKING DETACHED ENEMY VENTURES COSTLY FOR THEM X CONTASKFOR 11 PACFLT CONTINUE TOWARD ANZAC AREA FOR COOPERATION WITH COMANZAC FOR HIM X INFORM ARMY AND AUSTRALIANS X MORE TO FOLLOW
COMINCH TO CINCPAC COMANZAC FORCES

SITUATION IN NORTHERN ANZAC AREA REQUIRES PROMPT ACTION TO CHECK ENEMY ADVANCE AND OCCUPATION X ESTIMATE ENEMY GARRISON AND STRONG SHORE BASE AIR WILL BE ESTABLISHED RABaul NEXT FEW DAYS AND THEN ENEMY STRIKING FORCE OF AT LEAST 2 CARRIERS SEVERAL CRUISERS DESTROYERS POSSIBLY BATTLESHIPS AND AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE TO STRIKE NEW CALEDONIA NEW HEBRIDES OR OTHER POSITIONS ON OUR LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS XX COMANZAC FORCE CONCENTRATION NAVAL FORCES FIJI - NEW CALEDONIA AREA ALSO PRESS AND ARRANGE FOR FULL COOPERATION AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE INCLUDING 1 GROUP US ARMY PURSUIT RECENTLY ALLOCATED XX CINCPAC ARRANGE FOR AND DIRECT TASK FORCE 11 AUGMENTED BY SAN FRANCISCO 2 DD AND ALL PRACTICABLE NAVY PATROL AND ARMY BOMBER PLANES FROM HAWAII TO PROCEED AT ONCE TO ANZAC AREA AND COOPERATE WITH COMANZAC FORCE UNDER DIRECTION OF LATTER X EXPEDITE PENSACOLA AND 2 DD JOINING UP BUT DO NOT DELAY OPERATION AWAITING THEIR ARRIVAL X THIS ACTION CONSIDERED GOOD PROTECTION CONVOYS 2030 AND BAKER TARE 200 WHICH SHOULD BE COMBINED NEAR BORA BORA THENCE PROCEED AUSTRALIA UNDER REDUCED ESCORT HONOLULU AND 1 DD SUGGESTED XX CINCPAC PROVIDE THESE FORCES WITH ALL POSSIBLE INFORMATION OF ENEMY

07 0615 COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC

After fueling present intention originator proceed on seven February from position 150 miles east Hypo to position about 800 miles bearing 320 from Tare arriving 0200 GCT February 13 Neosho in company X will operate in 300 miles square whose center is latter position until about 15 Feb when necessary refuel with all remaining fuel in tanker in order reach Affirm X This based on 15 knots x Request you inform Comanzac X Army X Australians and direct San Francisco join in position 520 miles bearing two eight nine from Easy at 0000 Zed 11 Feb X Complying Cominch 061513
FEB GCT

07 1940 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

MARINE UNITS NOW BEING BROUGHT OUT OF ICELAND WILL BE ASSIGNED YOUR AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AS WILL 3 APD'S AND CORRESPONDING TROOPS XX OBVIOUSLY YOU HAVE URGENT NEED FOR AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATIONS NOW IN SIGHT THEREFORE URGE THAT YOU REQUIRE ALL POSSIBLE TRAINING ESPECIALLY SHIP TO SHORE OF ALL MARINE AND ARMY TROOPS COMPRISING YOUR AMPHIBIOUS FORCE EVEN THOUGH SUCH TRAINING HAS TO BE CARRIED OUT PIECEMEAL WITH SUCH AP'S AS YOU CAN MAKE AVAILABLE X

08 0239 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Aidac
Reply to Cominch 051555, 061513, 062352.

09 2245 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Aidac
CONTINUOUS EFFORT TO DAMAGE ENEMY SHIPS AND BASES

12 0459 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Aidac
Reply to Cominch 092245. Proposed operations.

12 2200 COMINCH TO COMANZAC

Aidac
Return to flagship and conduct offensive in Solomon-Bismarcks.

222
14 0022
tf. 11 to comanzac

Aidac
recommends Rabaul raid.

14 0336
comanzac to cominch

Part 1 of my 0344Z 14th. Your 122200 total ships available my command one Australian 8 inch cruiser, 2 New Zealand 6 inch cruisers, USS CHICAGO, and 2 U.S. destroyers. Rear Admiral Commanding Australian Squadron is in command and is cooperating with Brown. By leaving Melbourne I will cut myself off from all direct contact with RAAF and the very complete communications, intelligence and operational facilities of navy organization here which I cannot duplicate. I have to work everything through naval boards of 2 dominions and it is my considered judgement that command of Anzac Force can best be exercised from here. By embarking in my flagship I frequently must break radio silence for proper and efficient execution of numerous tasks assigned me.

14 0338
comanzac to cominch

Part 2 of my 0344Z/14 x After several conferences with both Australian and New Zealand naval boards, US Army General, and US Naval Attache Melbourne there is general agreement that US ordered commander must base ashore to coordinate many activities and problems constantly arising this area x I had arranged to utilize my aviation operations drafting officers and intelligence staff jointly with those of Vice Admiral Royle, Chief of Australian Naval Staff and work in same building with the Chief of Air Staff who also uses same intelligence and communication facilities x All these advantages will be denied me by trying to operate from cruiser x No immediate addition to my force in sight and as my task includes responsibility for protection shipping I will be unable to have any information on which to base decision as how best to employ the very few vessels available.
14 0340 COMANZAC to COMINCH

Part 3 of my 0344Z 14th x Refer your 1222000 in order conduct offensive operations we must accumulate additional aircraft in northeast Australia see my 0758Z 13th x I can only arrange for this and for shifting location of few heavy bombers now in Suva by remaining here x All United States aircraft available in Australia are being sent NEf or Darwin and RAAF is inadequate for present assignments x I request to be informed what additional aircraft will be sent me besides the 12 B-17’s now enroute Suva x Present operations were initiated to afford protection to convoy proceeding Xray as per your 062353 x I now understand you authorize operations as far to westward as Brown and I deem possible x In order carry out your instructions I consider it essential to operate from location where maximum communications and information are available to me in order that I may keep Brown fully informed x Part 4 follows x

14 0344 COMANZAC to COMINCH

Part 4 and final of my 0344Z/14 x I repeat that my considered judgement with which VAdm Royle and Commodore Parry completely agree is that operational command can only be exercised from Melbourne where complete facilities for communications and intelligence exist x I request reconsideration x Can depart Sydney 19th Feb on an armed merchant cruiser HMNZS Monowai which vessel now enroute here with all my codes staff equipment and personnel this will permit me to join Chicago at Suva about 25th Feb at which time must detach 2 six inch cruisers to escort important convoy to Xray leaving me only 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers with Australian Flag Officer second in command x Request reply in this system

14 0538 COMANZAC TO COMTASKFORCE 11

Please comply Cominch 122200
COMINCH to CINCPAC and COMANZAC for COM T.F. 11

Aidac
Vice Admiral Brown take charge of operations in northern Anzac area.

FOC AUSTRALIAN SQD to COMTASKFOR 11

Your 0247/14 not to NOC Fiji number 140033 not received Para x 25000 tons fuel now at Suva x Naval tanker FALKEFJELL with 10,400 tons due Suva today 15th and tanker British Colony due 18th or 19th Feb to replenish Suva tanks to capacity 7250 tons x Para x 3 x FALKEFJELL fitted for fueling warships at sea but loaded speed only 9 knots. Para 4 x Assuming ships to be fueled to stowage capacity, and allowing for (a) cruising speed 20 knots, (b) steam for full speed at 30 minutes notice, (c) 12 hours at full speed, (d) 10% effective fuel remaining, (e) destroyers are completed with fuel from 8" cruisers after 70 hours steaming at 20 knots, then maximum operational endurance is 2750 miles x This distance is endurance of 6" cruisers which would not be refueled at sea from 8" cruisers x Para 5 x At 2300/14 February Squadron will be short of fuel to the equivalent of 400 miles at 20 knots x Para 6 x Should you wish to make NEOSHO or PLATTE available to fuel Anzac squadron at sea, FALKEFJELL is available to replenish them as directed by you x Para 7 x I suggest it would be advantageous for me to meet you at sea and come on board LEXINGTON for discussion x I now intend to be in position 18 Deg 20 min south 173 Deg 00 min east at 0001/16 Feb and will continue towards Point Peach at 15 knots until 0500/16 when course of Anzac Squadron will be reversed x

COMANZAC to COMTASKFOR 11

(1) Concur in Rabaul operation outlined your 0022Z/14 x

(2) Send all B-17 bombers to Townsville for operation under and with all available Australian Air Forces for coordination attacks x Australian Air Force will conduct daily search of Rabaul dash Port Moresby dash Tulagi area which will require all Australian Catalinas x

(3) My (word apparently left out) indicates that PBY's should not be utilized for daylight attacks in view of fighter opposition but operations have been conducted successfully at night x Necessary your PBY's base Noumea and take over reconnaissance Noumea dash Tulagi area now being conducted by Australian Catalinas or search as you desire x

(Cont'd next page)
(4) Use Anzac Squadron as you desire x

(5) Australian Air Force will coordinate attack of all available planes from continent on date and at hour set by you x

15 1830 COMINCH to CINCPAC

Aidac

CHANGE IN PLAN FOR FLETCHER.

16 0329 CINCPAC to T.F. ll

Aidac

Instructions for AV's x

16 1635 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, COMANZAC

SERIOUS CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN AT ONCE TO THE PREPARATION OF SUVA AS AN ADVANCE OR INTERMEDIATE OPERATING BASE AND OF AUCKLAND AS A MAIN OPERATING BASE IN SOUTH PACIFIC BOTH BECAUSE OF STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION FREMISED ON PROBABLE PRESSURE OF EVENTS.
BRIEFED ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
5 February, 1942.

1. The Japanese are being successful in all of their advances from Malaya to New Ireland. Singapore will probably fall very shortly - reinforcements, even if underway, could not be of the types and in the quantities to save it. The Batan Peninsula will probably hold out for some time, but reinforcement for it is most unlikely. Enemy air raids, including carrier planes, have started against Java, and enemy bases are being established at Balikpapan and Kendari to which Amboina will soon be added. Java, Flores and Timor are very evident objectives for future landing attack. The enemy is operating from Rabaul, and Kavieng and has reconnoitred and air raided extensively in eastern New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. He has also observed the New Hebrides frequently. His first air raids against Port Moresby have just been made. Radio intelligence indicates much activity at the Pelew Base and some at Truk. A large attack force has been organized in a plan designated "MA".

This is believed to be against Java, and also against New Guinea and possibly New Caledonia, for the British report eleven transports or auxiliaries at Rabaul, which might indicate further landing attacks are impending in that area. Moresby and Noumea would be tempting objectives.
2. The disposition of the enemy's important naval forces is believed to be somewhat as follows:

BB's
- 2 damaged
- 2 operating as support for carriers.
- 6 or 7 in a covering force operating between the Homeland and the Pelews, probably spending a considerable time at anchor to save fuel.
- Truk or Ulithi may be used as a fueling point occasionally.

CV's
- Cardiv One - south of Truk, engaged in the attacks on and near Rabaul.
- Cardiv 2 - probably making the attacks on Java.
- Cardiv 3 - RYUJO off Malaya;
  - HOSHO enroute Truk from Yokosuka.
- Cardiv 4 - unlocated.
- Cardiv 5 - Shokaku near Truk, ZUIKAKA near homeland.

Even the Fourth Fleet cruisers and destroyers have apparently not been in the Marshalls for some time, but have been based on Truk and working against the Solomon Area.

Actual observation of the Eastern Marshalls discovered only one cruiser.

3. Our own operation in the Marshalls has apparently diverted some air forces from other points, but little else. The Australians are continuing to conduct weak bombing attacks.
against enemy shipping at Rabaul, and a few remaining air forces in Java are inflicting some damage on enemy transports and light forces in that area, but little impedance has resulted to the enemy's progress. Asiatic submarines have obtained unexpectedly small results. Our Asiatic destroyers made one successful night attack but the surface forces available at Java can easily be overpowered by the forces Japan has available.

4. Except for the recent raid, our fleet has been engaged in covering territories and communications with carriers (of which three are now available) and light forces. We have four BB available at San Francisco now, and can have two available in four days and one on the 21st. The Anzac Force is being formed but is weak and the time of arrival of its one carrier is uncertain.

5. Any hope that the enemy may be extending himself beyond his means of supply seems to be in vain. He gets along with simple equipment, minimum food, and is also living off the land to a large extent. Aircraft and aviation gasoline are critical supplies but he is still delivering them where they do him the most good.

6. From the foregoing it is apparent that we must examine exhaustively how the Pacific Fleet can best contribute to the retardation and eventual stopping of the enemy advance.
MISSION

7. In line with our own conclusion Cominch has asked for comment in regard to the methods of relieving pressure in the Southwest Pacific. He advances the idea that this may be done by reinforcing the Anzac and/or ABDA forces, or by vigorous offensive action in the Pacific Fleet Area including the employment of battleships. He points out that such vigorous action would incidentally reduce the necessity for escorts in Eastern the/Pacific.

Our mission is taken to be:
"To so employ the U.S. Pacific Fleet as to best relieve the enemy's pressure against ABDA and Anzac forces and territory in the Southwest Pacific."

ENEMY COURSES

8. The enemy's action for the past month and a half has verified the estimate made on 24 December that he would prosecute and consolidate his offensives in the Far East to and including Australia before he would make a strong move in the Mid-Pacific. He has not made even minor raids, except by submarines, in our area and has removed some forces from the Marshalls. It is therefore again stated that his course of action continues to be:

To employ all the forces that can be made available to capture and consolidate all land areas in the Far East.
In so doing he will continue to employ his naval forces to support the land attacks and air attacks, and to cover the attack forces and their communications. It is probable that his battleship strength plus one or two of the carriers which are unlocated are employed in the covering task.

**OWN COURSES**

9. The success of any course that we adopt depends somewhat on how the enemy reacts to it. Predictions as to psychological reactions, particularly of the Japanese, are difficult. Any raids against the enemy's territory and communications may cause him to divert some of his forces from the southwest. They would not be sure to do so unless they were sustained enough to inflict appreciable damage on installations, forces or shipping which is directly supporting his present offensives. For instance, he probably will not divert forces to fully replace his losses in the Marshalls, arguing that even if we capture some of them, we could not, for some time to come, bring sustained effort against his present operations. Thus if we adopt the proposed vigorous action we must make it against objectives which will hurt, and make it as sustained as possible. Our decision as to adopting this course depends very much upon its feasibility. Fuel and bases and relative strengths are the considerations. Before examining these further, a comparison between the two proposed courses will be made:
ADVANTAGES

Reenforcement of Anzac and/or ABDA.
(1) Some though limited bases are near the areas of active operations.
(2) More chance of coming to grips with important enemy forces.
(3) Possibility of finding troop convoys enroute, or forces in the midst of a landing attack.
(4) Covers our line of communication to Australia where it is most in danger.

Aggressive Action in Pacific Area.
(1) Has covering effect for our territory and important lines of communication.
(2) Base, though distant from vital enemy areas, is complete and well protected.
(3) Concentrated forces can be used in areas which the enemy may be guarding lightly due to the commitments of his offensives.
(4) Nearer the U.S. Mainland which must furnish much of the logistic support to any area of operations in the Pacific Basin.

DISADVANTAGES

(1) Bases are most inadequate, particularly for carriers. Those in the ABDA area, except Darwin, are already under heavy air attack.
(2) Disperses our forces to such an extent, that if we provide a reinforcement which would be strong enough to meet the forces already used in that
(1) Either seizing of a fueling base, or fueling at sea, must be undertaken in order to reach vital enemy areas.
(2) Without a nearby base, the action cannot be sustained nature. We have no troops ready to seize an advanced base.
area, we would denude the Pacific Area.

(3) Although action may be slightly more sustained than the operations which could be undertaken in the Pacific Area, they have the disadvantages of frontal attack as opposed to a flank attack against communications.

(4) Even including the shore fuel storages, the logistic situation is precarious, and will suffer from making in haste such a tremendous shift of base.

The basic question is one the answer of which is out of our hands:

(1) Are we going to gamble all upon securing Australia as a base of future operations against the enemy, and leave our Pacific Area open to attack, or

(2) Are we going to protect our own vital territory and communications while doing what we can in bold operations against the enemy's flank?

It is believed that the second course of action is preferable if we decide that we can execute the bold operations against objectives which, if damaged, would really hamper the
SECRET

Japanese effort to the southward.

Possible objectives and the feasibility of attacking them will therefore be examined.

II. Objectives - Japanese Homeland

Truk
Saipan
Bonins
Eastern Marshalls - Wake
Eniwetok - Ponape

None of the above objectives can be operated against safely without fueling at sea, and against none can really sustained pressure be maintained. Each is considered separately as follows:

**Homeland - Advantages**

(1) No outposts guarding east coast.
(2) Strong psychological effect - particularly in U.S.
(3) Some damage to enemy war effort.
(4) Best intelligence to date indicates that, if our available battleships were at hand, we would not encounter forces which were superior.

**Disadvantages**

(1) Weather along route is almost universally unfavorable for fueling. Employing an Aleutian harbor might
help, but weather is also bad there and some units would still have to be fueled at sea.

(2) Due to dispersion and multiplicity of objectives, it would be difficult to cause large and effective military damage.

(3) Psychological effect on Japanese may be overrated due to their regimentation and control of public information. This would be particularly true if the damage created was less than they have pictured in their apprehension over our carriers.

(4) Because we could not make repeated attacks, the Japanese high command might refuse to divert any forces from their present offensives. (This of course might apply to any of the listed objectives).

(5) Though enemy air forces might not be great in number, the multiplicity of fields in the vicinity would make it impossible to immobilize a large percentage of them by surprise attack on the ground.

(6) Distance involved would require about 40% more fueling than a raid on the Marshalls.
Truk - Advantages

(1) It is an important advanced based which is being used extensively in the attacks in the New Guinea area. Australian reconnaissance has shown many ships in the anchorage, congested airfields, a floating dry dock and considerable building. A strong attack against this concentrated objective, particularly if many ships, either naval or supply and transport types, would definitely interfere with the Japanese advance - both by the destruction of logistic support to his advance forces and by the necessary replacement and probable increase in the defending forces against another attack.

(2) There are directions of approach clear of outposts.

(3) Weather should give reasonable chance of successful fueling.

(4) There is a chance that our battleship group, if employed in the operation might encounter important enemy forces in inferior numbers.

Disadvantages

(1) The northeast approaches, while fairly clear, can be covered by aircraft from Wake, Eniwetok, Marcus and Hall Islands. Thus the hazard of discovery during approach is considerable. For the same reason there is good chance of being intercepted by land-based bombers.
(2) The distance involved requires about 50% more fueling than a raid on the Marshalls.
(3) The defenses are probably stronger than the Marshalls and include larger guns to oppose bombardment.

**Bonin-Saipan - Advantages**

(1) Being nearer the Homeland than the other island objectives there would be more psychological effect. Saipan is an important administrative center.
(2) Approach is free from outposts except Marcus.
(3) Air opposition at Port Lloyd should not be very strong. Saipan is believed to be a well equipped staging point but would not necessarily have large number of aircraft present.

**Disadvantages**

(1) These bases will probably offer little shipping and few facilities which, if damaged, would appreciably hamper the enemy's present war effort. Port Lloyd is a small harbor and Saipan has one only for small craft.
(2) Bad weather is probable off Port Lloyd but better than in the Homeland area.
(3) The distance is practically as great as to the Homeland.
Marshalls-Wake - Advantages

(1) Closest to Hawaii.
(2) Weather favorable for fueling.
(3) Less danger from shore defenses, particularly where we attacked last.
(4) Wake has some psychological advantages in connection with U.S. sentiment.

Disadvantages

(1) Offer least chance of diverting forces from the southwest.
(2) May offer suitable objectives to damage - no important mobile forces liable to be found there.

Eniwetok-Ponape - Advantages

(1) Being deeper in the enemy territory than the Eastern Marshalls, an attack against them might retract more enemy forces.
(2) Eniwetok has only Wake as an outpost to the northward.
(3) Weather favorable for fueling.
(4) Distance less than Truk-Homeland line.

Disadvantages

(1) No good information as to activities at these places. (This may rectified at Eniwetok by expected submarine report).
(2) Little shipping would be found at Ponape as no good harbor exists.
(3) Advance and retirement would be roundabout to avoid Marshalls.
Decisions

12. (a) The weather is believed to preclude a raid on the Homeland in winter. Whereas in summer the nights are short for visibility.

(b) The lack of probable objectives at present in the Eastern Marshalls, Eniwetok and Ponape and the lack of drawing power prevents them from being the best choice.

(c) It is considered that, if we can employ four or more battleships as a support force, a raid should be made on Truk; if battleships are not used a raid should be made on Port Lloyd or Saipan or both.

(NOTE: Having been ordered to send a considerable force to the Anzac Area, there are not enough light forces remaining to permit employment of battleships. Therefore our second choice, if we make another raid, is forced upon us, - namely "To raid the Bonin-Saipan Area with two carriers".)
February 19

Task Force Eleven when it was spotted at 1137 (local) by two four-engined scouts 400 miles east of Rabaul decided to turn back for fuel because surprise would be absent the next day and the fuel situation would preclude any delay. These two planes were shot down but five hours later the force was attacked by about 12 to 20 were shot down without damage to our ships. Commander Task Force 11 is continuing his retirement for fuel (see despatches 200237 and 200753 attached). Comanzac in his 200734 stated that attack on Rabaul should be made soon to prevent enemy attack on Port Moresby. The number of ships sighted by reconnaissance at Rabaul was 18.

It was decided to include the BRIDGE in the logistic support for the southern forces, and to escort the three ships (SCHOFIELD, DOBBIN are the other two) with two light minelayers which can lay mines at Samoa.

The TAYLOR is still fast aground, and weather unfavorable. the SONOMA has been despatched to assist.

Received by despatch from the MILWAUKEE which had left Bobcat on the 16th, that Convoy BT-200 was turned over to Task Force 12 (HONOLULU, 2 DD) on schedule on the 14th. MILWAUKEE and MOFFETT are Atlantic Fleet forces returning thereto. One CL and one DL of the SE Pacific Force will return immediately to pick up a new convoy, and the others will remain at Bobcat until the defenses, which were supposed to arrive yesterday, are established.

The SUMNER in a separate despatch reports preparation and survey of the harbor well underway, and that large ships negotiate the channel readily.

Bad news comes from Port Darwin. Two air raids totalling ninety-five planes did much damage including sinking the PEARY and six cargo ships. These were part of the convoy which was going to Koopang, but had turned back after an air attack at sea. Most disturbing, 10 P-40's were shot out of the air and only 5 enemy planes were shot down.

ComSouWestPac Force reports a battle off Bali in which U.S. destroyers and Dutch cruisers attacked a landing expedition. Results indeterminate but cruiser JAVA badly damaged.

Radio Intelligence was checked by the GRAYLING which sighted the HOSHO off Truk.
February 20.

There is no further news of Task Force 11. Radio Intelligence indicates that the enemy was stirred up by the contacts and is probably conducting urgent operations in connection with the location and interception of this force. RDF indicates that the Hosho, formerly thought to be near New Britain, is northwest of Ponape.

The Tangier will remain at Suva until further orders. She, however, moved to Nandi on the same island.

Other Task Forces proceeding as planned, though date of Vice Admiral Halsey's attack is not known - Feb. 22nd, Hawaiian date, is a reasonable guess.

Operation Order No. 16-42 was issued to Task Force 19, the logistic force, due to depart for Samoa tomorrow.

In Cominch 201830 the transfer of the Hornet, Vincennes, Nashville, one modern DD division and one large tanker to Pacific Fleet was directed. They will leave the East Coast about March 1.

In Cominch 201940 (attached) he directed the forming of an amphibious force under a flag officer.

All signs point to continued concentration of the enemy on the job at hand, namely the conquest of the Malay Barrier (now Java, as he is on Sumatra, Bali and Timor). The great question is whether he will continue after Australia and New Zealand or will he first consolidate the N.E.I. It is the estimate of the War Plans section that he will soon try to capture Port Darwin and Port Moresby at least.

February 21

Still no news from the task forces, but there was intercepted a despatch from Comanzac to Comtaskfor 11 informing him that Army and Australian planes from Australia would attack Rabaul on Feb. 23rd, local.

The departure of Task Force 19 was delayed until tomorrow.

A large evacuation convoy including the Lurline and the Aquitania left this afternoon.
February 21 (Cont'd)

No information was received of the salvage operations on the Taylor. The Porter can remain three days more and the Taney seven. The former was ordered to proceed to Palmyra when necessary and await orders.

Plans are being made to send about 20,000 troops from the Mainland to the other large islands of the Hawaiian Group, about 17,000 arriving in one convoy early in March. It will be noted from the Commanding General's despatch of the 19th that he has again requested a second division for these islands.

Other messages concerning bases in the south Pacific were received, Comanzac's 210450, 210435, and 210516 and Cominch's 211600 (all appended). In this connection a personal letter from CNO was recently received asking if the Hawaiian Islands were strongly enough protected by the Army and district forces to permit the Fleet to be "footfree." The CinC's reply was in the negative and the general's despatch was referred to. Reference was also made to the frequent requests by the Commandant for adequate forces.

A discussion was held as to what was probably making up in regard to the employment of large fleet forces in the Australian-New Zealand Area. The consensus of opinion seemed to be that such employment was basically unsound because of the difficulties of supply and repair (no drydock for carrier or battleship) and because of the resulting exposure of U.S. territory to attack. However, that area is the one in which our forces will meet advancing enemy forces, and we may be forced to make the move due to political or "desperation strategic" considerations.

Radio Intelligence continued to indicate an alerted Wake-Mandate-Rabaul area, but no indications of any change in distribution of surface forces.

Apparently the Dutch and U.S. forces inflicted considerable damage on the enemy landing force at Bali, but did not prevent a landing in considerable force.

February 22

Still no news of the progress of the three active Task Forces. Task Force Eleven presumably finished fueling today. Task Force Sixteen should have attacked Wake today. Task Force Seventeen is presumably in his area WSW of Canton.

Army and Australian bombers presumably raided Rabaul today but reports of result have not yet been received.
February 22 (Continued)

Task Force Nineteen (logistic support) got away for Suva today.

The situation at Canton remains bad. The weather has been such that neither salvage nor unloading of the President Taylor has been proceeded with. The Japara will arrive there in a few days. Extra barges are being sent down but they will not arrive for about two weeks.

Cominch in 222200 directed that Tongatabu (code name "Bleacher") be prepared as an intermediate operating base suitable for sheltering a carrier. The Sumner is being ordered there from Bobcat to conduct a survey and make other preparations within her capabilities. Cominch based this selection on the promise that Suva cannot be developed as such a base.

Another directive from Cominch was received, concerning the offensive employment of submarines (221729 attached). This directive is already being complied with in that all patrol stations now occupied are in the Western Pacific - including Truk, Saipan and Port Lloyd. The Trout, enroute here, sank a small patrol vessel north of the Bonins.

The enemy has definitely landed on Timor and Bali, but not yet on Java.

Radio intelligence indicated that twenty-five heavy bombers were moving from either the Pelews or Truk to Rabaul.

Commandant 14th Naval District has recommended to Secnav the deportation of all Japanese males under 50 who are aliens or who have been educated or trained in Japan.

February 23

Comtaskfor 11 in 232214 (Aidac) reported that, due to the impossibility of effecting surprise, he would withhold attack on Rabaul until he has another carrier to assist him. In 232146 and 232156 he reported further on the encounter with enemy aircraft on the 19th. Our VF's and VSB's shot down 16 or 17 out of the 18 Jap planes which attacked, and their bombing was ineffectual. Apparently Task Force 11 has not been able to fuel from the PLATTE as yet.
February 23 (Cont'd)

Enemy urgent radio activity began at Wake at 0730 (Wake time) and continued all day. This indicates an attack by Task Force Sixteen but nothing has been heard from that force. The enemy was apparently ordering submarines to intercept and RDF showed one or two in the vicinity of Wake.

The unloading of the President Johnson at Christmas was completed today and it, with MORRIS and ELLET, is enroute Honolulu.

Received word that the fuel situation on the east coast of Australia is critical and also the supply of aviation gasoline at Suva. The latter can be remedied from some of our supply ships in the area. The former situation is difficult of solution. It was visualized in Cincpac's 21 0309 of January.

Opnav (231417), contrary to recommendation by Cincpac, directed that a flag officer under supervision of Combasefor be charged with the maintenance of battleships, carriers and cruisers. Cincpac's recommendation was to permit the shore-based administrative offices of Type Commanders to continue the function.

No great changes were noted in the activities of the enemy. Apparently allied successes off Bali are holding up the attack on Java. There were several despatches which indicated some interception and possible decrypting of our call system.

February 24

Still no word from Task Force Sixteen though the enemy at Wake continues sending an occasional urgent message, and a concentration of submarines was making up in that area. Task Force Seventeen also unheard, and, due to bad weather is probably having trouble in refueling at sea.

Two despatches (232158 and 232203) were received from ComTaskFor 11 on the subject of logistics. These were replied to by Cincpac in 250125 and 250427. Also two despatches were received from Comanzac on the subject of the Rabaul attack. (250100 and 250430 attached). Cincpac, in his 251209 (Aidac) to Cominch, acceded to the idea that it was desirable to have Task Force 17 join Task Force 11 for an attack on Rabaul. Included were recommendations (1) that the command relationships be clarified and (2) that, due to logistic difficulties, at least one force should retire from the area after the attack. The air attack by Army bombers, etc., on the 22d was somewhat abortive
February 24 (Cont'd)

due to weather. Two reached objectives - results unknown, and one landed in a swamp.

The Japara arrived for unloading at Canton. The weather is still bad and the Taylor is still unloaded. Either one or both of her engines is damaged so that she will probably require towing after she is refloated. The Robin was sent with one large and three small lighters which will assist with future unloading.

Five more commercial tankers have been made available to this Fleet and four more are promised for March.

No new moves by the enemy are evident, and our small forces in Java continue to hammer at enemy convoys. Moresby received a rather heavy raid.

An enemy submarine bombarded the California coast yesterday and there were two air alarms in the Los Angeles area during the night.

February 25

No news from any of the three major task forces except that a despatch (260458) from Vice Admiral Brown (T.F.11) informed that he does not now consider an attack on Rabaul, even with two carriers, advisable. Also no reply was made by Cominich to the proposal by Comanzac for a two-carrier attack.

Received suggestion from Cominich as to possible use of Puget Sound and Gulf of California as training areas (261530).

The TANGIER will go to Vila (Efate) to tend the six patrol planes which are operating with Task Force 11.

A decoded enemy report indicated that a special air search may have been conducted for Vice Admiral Halsey's force on the 23rd (the day he is assumed to have attacked).

Convoy plans are being made for the movement of the 27th Army Division to the outlying large islands of the Hawaiian Group. Also for further movements of U.S. troops to Australia. The plans for the garrisoning of New Caledonia have been received recently. Troops (eventually totalling 20,000) of the BT-200 convoy will return there from Melbourne departing about March 15th.

Further enemy traffic regarding our call system mentioned papers captured at AA (almost surely Wake).
SECRET

February 25 (Cont'd)

A large enemy convoy has been spotted north of Java and Comsouwest Pacific has ordered five cruisers and nine destroyers to attack it until destroyed.

A Japanese message to Berlin mentioned that Japan will be unable to sustain losses at the present rate.

February 26

Still no news from Task Force 16, and Task Force 17 is still quiet. Also nothing was received during the day from Task Force 11.

A long despatch (261630) came from Cominch. This did not materially clarify the command relationships in the northern Anazac area and contains no assurance that an attack against Rabaul will be made. The great difficulties in connection with the operations in that area are logistics and the lack of bases. It appears that the LEXINGTON cannot enter any harbor except Sidney. The fuel situation has been discussed before. It is precarious indeed. The NEOSHO will depart for that area again on Saturday; and the KASKASKIA is arriving Suva today. Task Force Nineteen (logistic Group) will arrive Samoa on 3 March.

Deliberations as to what Cincpac must do, and how, will be held tomorrow.

Vice Admiral Pye returned from Washington today. The chief and most disturbing report was that no over-all plan has been adopted. We don't know how "all-out" our help is to be to Australia.

No new enemy moves were reported yesterday. The Burma Road has been cut and Rangoon is about to fall. Incidentally the PHOENIX is escorting from Freemantle a convoy for Rangoon which will probably be diverted to Colombo. The BOISE is undergoing repairs at the latter place.

Of interest is a directive to Comsouwestfor from Cominch to have one submarine always available to General McArthur and to send munitions by subs on this duty.
The only despatch received from the task forces today was Comtaskfor 11's 270542 which stated necessity for provisions prior 15 March and that Sydney was the only harbor that the carrier (LEXINGTON) could enter.

Comanzac in 270845 assured Cominch that Anzac Force was not being controlled by the ACNB.

The deliberations, as to Cincpac's action as a result of Cominch 261630 were completed, and despatches 280417 and 280559 were sent out. In general they provide for TF 17 joining TF 11 as soon as possible so that an attack on Rabaul could be made. In any case TF-11 is to depart for Pearl about the middle of the month, obtaining provisions from the BRIDGE at Pago Pago as necessary.

The CURTISS reported that Vila (Efate) was dangerous for the operation of patrol planes (262100) and Comanzac therefore ordered (272355) the TANGIER to proceed to Noumea and the patrol planes of Task Force 11 continue operations from there. This is of interest because Vice Admiral Pye learned in Washington that Vila is intended by Cominch to be the first outlying base established in that area instead of Funafuti. Both of the foregoing messages were relayed to Cominch.

Arrangements have been made to have the HONOLULU and JARVIS escort the reinforcement from Melbourne to Noumea, where it is expected to arrive about 13 March.

The Australians continue to bomb Rabaul at night with one or two PBY, - apparently with good results. Our B-17's, only nine operative, are being held for possible coordination with Task Force 11.

A report recently came from Noumea that the Free French High Commissioner there was indignant because he had not been informed of the establishment of the Bobcat base. A check did not verify this and showed that General deGaulle had consented to this project.

Things at Canton are going very slowly due to heavy swells. A tropical storm is making up south of Canton, moving southwest. This may hinder TF-11 considerably.

No report was received as to the attack on the convoy in the Java Sea.

The signs of a major Japanese effort toward India are on the increase.
February 28.

Task Force 17 presumably proceeding to join Task Force 11. The latter force reports emptying the PLATTE on the 24th (Hawaiian Date) and recommends two small tankers be used instead of one large one. Still no word from Task Force 16 though Tokyo has reported the attack as occurring last Monday (Hawaiian time); admits minor damage and loss of one patrol boat; claims damage to heavy cruiser and three destroyers.

In 280511 provided for escort of Noumea reinforcement.

The sea is still rough at Canton and the TAYLOR has suffered more damage. Effort to pull her off will be made on the 2nd.

Cominch in 282121 suggested to Comanzac that, as long as Vila was found unsuitable for patrol planes, Havannah Harbor at the same island (Efate) be tested.

Cominch also, in 282035, requested comment as to distribution of submarines in the Pacific.

The name of the Base Force has been changed to Service Force.

Consideration of the base detachment designed for Tongatabu is continuing. The ANTARES and RIGEL with an AF and an AO would be suitable.

The RAMAPO left Borabora several days ago. ComsoueasPac Force reported unloading going slowly there (010247) - six weeks before half the guns will be installed.

The attack against Java has started with three landings. A heavy attack was made against Port Moresby yesterday in which three PBY's were destroyed.

Another (or the same) submarine showed up off San Francisco. There have been no contacts in the Hawaiian Area for about a week.
GEN EMMONS TO ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

The Fall of Singapore and the employment of considerable part of the Pacific Fleet in Anzac and perhaps other distant areas requires new estimate of Pacific situation based on following factors:

First, Japanese know great value of Pearl Harbor as base of our defensive and offensive operations in Pacific.

Second, they know present strengths of Army, Navy and Air units on Oahu and outlying islands.

Third, they know these islands are to be reinforced.

Fourth, Japanese are opportunists and their operations have proved they are capable of carefully weighing our situation here and making sound plans for the capture of Oahu.

Fifth, it will soon be within their capabilities to launch attack on these islands and still carry on their campaign in the southwest Pacific.

Sixth, they would first seize one or more of the outlying islands of this group as base for operations against Oahu.

Seventh, with land based aviation on such island as Hawaii or Kauai facilities of Pearl Harbor could be demolished and security of Oahu menaced.

It is realized that War Department knows our situation and is taking steps to strengthen our defenses. However, decisions made in December to limit reinforcements for outlying islands to one square division, and to limit air forces to two bombardment groups plus one bombardment squadron and three pursuit groups should now be reviewed in light of current situation. In considering our needs it should be remembered that this department combines theater of operations with communication zone and has a special anti-sabotage problem in Honolulu and outlying islands. Again recommend 2 reinforced square divisions for outlying islands, air strength as recommended in my radio 1273 December 20, full T/O strength for units on Oahu and one armored regiment requested in my radio 1677 January 13 or 2 medium tank battalions in lieu thereof. Reinforcements and fillers for Hawaii should now have top priority on transport in Pacific.
CONTINUED

Only by thus adequately guarding the naval and air bases in Hawaii can the security of the Pacific Coast and the sea and air routes therefrom be guaranteed. Irrespective of what happens in the Far East the Hawaiian Islands should be made genuinely impregnable. Cincpac has seen this radio and fully concurs.

COMTASKFOR 11 to CINCPAC

Shot down 2 4-engine enemy scouts 400 miles east Rabaul. Believe harbor of Rabaul will be clear of shipping by morning and general air alerted. In view acute fuel shortage which permits no delay in original schedule will not attack 21 Feb., but will withdraw to refuel in readiness for further offensive action. Will reconnoiter Solomons enroute and attack enemy found there. Recommend cancel scheduled attack by Army and Australian bombers. Cincpac transmit to Comanzac.

COMANZAC to COMTASKFOR 11

Attack scheduled by shore based bombers cancelled. Your 200237. In view of threat to Port Moresby consider attack should be rescheduled as soon as fuel situation permits.

COMTASKFOR 11 to CHICAGO, CINCPAC

Have been heavily attacked by approximately 30 heavy bombers. No damage to ships this force. About 12 to 20 enemy planes destroyed. Own plane losses slight. Am returning to rendezvous with Platte arriving there 1200 February 22nd. Cincpac transmit to Commander Australian Force and Comanzac.

COMINCH to CINCLANT

Make ready group for transfer to Pacific leaving from East Coast about 1 March consisting of Hornet, Vincennes, Nashville, one modern Desdiv, one tanker of Cimarron class.

COMINCH to CINCLANT, CINCPAC

EACH FLEET SHALL INCLUDE AN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE WITH FLAG OFFICER AS FORCE COMMANDER TO COMPREHEND THREE GROUPS NAMELY FIRST COVERING FORCES AS ASSIGNED SECOND TRANSPORT X COMBAT AND OTHER UNDER NAVAL OFFICER THIRD AMPHIBIOUS CORPS UNDER GENERAL OFFICER PREFERABLY MARINE
Part one of two. Immediately upon my arrival requested steps be taken develop Suva Nandi area as operating base. Your 1635/16. Drag survey channel and four mile square anchorage Nandi Roads has been arranged with New Zealand Naval Board. Suva Harbor difficult for very large vessels. Increased fuel and cold storage facilities have been requested but great difficulty obtaining material. New Zealand Naval Board also been requested increase protection. This will require installation submarine indicator loops and nets Nandi and Suva material for which not available Australia or New Zealand and additional mines required even after Kingfisher lays 300 mines now on hand. End first part.

Part. 2. Additional landplane facilities and more anti-aircraft protection for fields also necessary. Both places vulnerable submarine attack at present from examination of facilities available Auckland (small dry dock and limited shop facilities) and of area available for possible expansion thereof also considering maximum depth water available I consider Sydney Harbor only really suitable location for main fleet operating base this area.
Request every effort be made to develop Suva Nandi area as operating base for Pacific Fleet as well as Anzac Force. Refer my 0742Z/16. Steps should be taken to increase protection of anchorage by installation indicator loop nets and additional mines. Increased fuel tanks and cold storage should be made earliest practicable date. Airforce and anti-aircraft protection should be increased as soon as practicable. Please keep Comanzac informed of steps taken along these lines.

COMINCH TO COMANZAC

Your 210435 indicates misunderstanding of intent of my 161635 which may have been inadequately expressed but Auckland will be main operating base in south Pacific because of paramount strategical considerations which take precedence over major overhaul and drydock facilities.

OPNAV TO COMINCH TO CINCPAC

IT IS MY BELIEF THAT ENEMY SHIPPING IS ONE OF THE MOST VULNERABLE FUNCTIONS INVOLVED IN CONTINUANCE OF HIS OPERATIONS AND THAT EVERY SUBMARINE THAT CAN BE SPARED FROM INDISPENSIBLE OPERATIONS IN MANDATES SHOULD BE SENT TO ATTACK ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN WESTERN PACIFIC WHERE THEY LEAVE JAPAN AT FOCAL OR OTHER PREFERABLE POINTS ENROUTE SOUTHWARD, OR ELSEWHERE AS YOUR AVAILABLE INFORMATION MAKES ADVISABLE.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC COMANZAC

REFERENCE INTERMEDIATE OPERATING BASE MENTIONED IN MY 161635 X CONSIDER SAMOA AND SUVA INADEQUATE FOR PURPOSE PROPOSE DEVELOP TONGATABU TO WHICH CINCPAC REQUESTED SEND SUMNER FOR SURVEY AND ESTABLISH AIDS TO NAVIGATION ALSO IMPROVEMENT OF CHANNEL PREFERABLY EGERIA COMANZAC FOR ENLIST ALL PRACTICABLE AID FROM NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA LOOKING TO MAKING TONGATABU SECURE PRIOR TO AND AFTER ARRIVAL US NAVAL ARMY AIR UNITS CINCPAC MAKE READY APPROPRIATE BASE FORCE DETACHMENT (INCLUDING ALL PRACTICAL SECURITY MEASURES) TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL OPERATING SERVICES - FUEL PROVISIONS STORES REPAIRS - FOR FORCES WHICH WILL BE WORKING CONTINUOUSLY IN AREA NORTH NORTHWEST AND WEST OF "BLEACHER" WHICH IS CODE NAME AND SHORT TITLE FOR TONGATABU.
My 200753 revised and final count shows force attacked February 20 by 18 heavy bombers in two groups of nine each. One other group at time thought to be enemy turned out to be own planes returning from search. First attack occurred at 1650 LCT when force was on southwesterly course 346 miles bearing 071 degrees from Rabaul. Second attack one half hour later. 16 enemy planes known to have been destroyed and possibly a 17th. 2 planes previously damaged by fighters finally brought down by short range antiaircraft fire. Remainder brought down by repeated attacks by fighters and scout bombers. Lieut Edward H. O'Hare chiefly responsible for destruction of 6 planes. Own losses 2 VF and one pilot Ensign John Woodrow Wilson USNR. Inform other interested commands. Part 2 follows.

Carrier target of both attacks. Bombing wild in first attack due to intense fighter attack which early damaged leader's plane. Only three planes this group reached approximate release point. Radical maneuver by carrier contributed to large error. Leader plane after damage appeared to attempt crash landing carrier deck but was shot down by antiaircraft fire from carrier one hundred yards from ship. Second attack five planes reached release point. Salvo landed astern carrier on port quarter nearest 100 feet some fragments landing on ship. Both groups circled formation and made final approach up wind from astern in tight vee formation. Release point at about 11 to 12000 feet altitude. Planes camouflaged mottled green and gray color type 97. Anti-aircraft fire inaccurate in fuse range probably due to change of altitude during first part of final approach. This is part 2 of Comtaskfor 11 dispatch 232146.

Aidac
Need for support by another carrier.
COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC

Expect to empty KASKASKIA about 2 March. Request information whether KASKASKIA can refill Suva for Taskfor 11 or whether another tanker same capacity will be provided in Suva area by 8 March. In view increased force will require thereafter 80,000 bbls. every six days. Plan return PLATTE to Pearl after fueling this force about 25 February.

COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC

Further extended operations this area will require early delivery following replacements. Planes in crates for carrier and cruisers as early as practicable three F4F-3 for replacements and three for spares, total six. One SBD-3 for replacements and six for spares. One SOC-2 for replacement. Ammunition 4000 rounds each 5 inch 25 and 5 inch 38. 500 catapult charges. 20,000 1.1. Total 500000 50 caliber AP and tracer. 200 depth charges. 8 inch replacements for possible future expenditures. Information requested from BuOrd whether carrier 8 inch suitable for use heavy cruiser guns by reduction weight of charge.

COMANZAC FOR TO CINCPAC

In view latest intelligence suggest consideration be given early attack Rabaul area by Task Forces 11 and 17.

COMANZAC TO CINCPAC

Concur Brown's remarks regarding further attacks Rabaul outlined in his 232214. See my 250100. Latest information indicates U.S. Army expedition New Caledonia probably ready proceed about 15 March with possibility some units anticipate that date slightly. Anzac Squadron will be required escort that movement. Cincpac pass this to Cominch and Comtaskfor 11.

CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 11

Ammunition shipped in DOBBIN for you, Army and Anzac Force. 5 inch /38 4,000 AA common. 1,000 common. 5 inch /25 3100 AA. 3"/50 200 AA. Catapult charges 450 full load 50 no load. 1.1 50,000. Caliber 50 450,000. Caliber 30 200,000. 20 MM 40,000. Depth charges 300 pound with arbors 50. 600 pound 100. Bombs 1000 pound 100, 500 pound 500, 100 pound 500. Incendiary 200. Mk. 17 depth bombs 50. Miscellaneous details included with above. Also shipped in CHICAGO 600 pound depth charges 48. 300 pound 24 plus capacity load in own
FEB 25 (Cont'd)

25 0125 Calibers. DOBBIN should arrive Samoa 4 March. Aircraft replacements and conversion LEXINGTON 8 inch will be covered in separate despatches.

25 0427 CINCPAC TO TASKFOR COMMANDERS, COMANZAC

Comtaskforce 11 232158 consider fuel requirements indicated are excessive and greatly beyond previous reports. Comanzac expected supply fuel his squadron. Leary advise Brown and CINCPAC feasibility refilling KASKASKIA Suva after Task Force 11 fueling on 2 March. NEOSHO expected return Suva about 8 March local date.

25 1209 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Aidac

Recommendations concerning employment two task forces against Rabaul.

26 0458 COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC

Comanzac 250100 my 232214 not intended to recommend two carrier attack on Rabaul. I do not recommend it under present conditions.

26 1530 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

CONTINUOUS USE OF CHEASAPEAKE BAY AS SECURE TRAINING AREA PROMPTS SUGGESTION THAT PUGET SOUND AND AREA NORTHWARD BE USED FOR SIMILAR PURPOSE PARA USE OF GULF OF MEXICO FOR SHAKEDOWN OF LARGE SHIPS ALSO SUGGESTS SIMILAR USE OF GULF OF CALIFORNIA AS AFFORDING CORRESPONDING DEGREE SECURITY.

26 1630 COMINCH TO CTF 11, 17, COMANZAC. INFO CINCPAC

FOLLOWING DECISION ON COMMAND AND MY GENERAL COMMENTS ON CTF 11 232214 COMANZACFOR 250100 AND 250900 CINCPAC 250847 AND 251209 X

(A) WHILE LEARY REMAINS ON SHORE SENIOR PACFLT OFFICER AFLOAT IN ANZAC HEREAFTER EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND OF PACFLT FORCES AND ANZAC FORCES ASSIGNED TO COMMON TASKS BUT LEARY COORDINATE SUPPORTING OPERATIONS OF US AND AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCES BASED AUSTRALIA AND MORESBY X CANNOT APPROVE WITHHOLDING ANZAC FORCE FROM ACTIVE OPERATIONS MERELY TO FORM A RESERVE X THIS IDEA IS PASSIVE AND APPEARS LIKELY TO BE PREMISED ON AFIRM CAST NEGAT BAKER VIEWS

(B) AGREE THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF USING A SINGLE CARRIER IN AN IMPORTANT OFFENSIVE TASK WITHOUT SUITABLE COVERAGE BY SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT X EITHER TF-11 OR 17 PREFERABLY BOTH SHOULD REMAIN
ANZAC UNTIL NEW CALEDONIA IS GARRISONED BUT THIS DEPENDS ON LOGISTICS AND MUST BE DECIDED BY CINCPAC X ADVISE

(C) OPERATIONS IN FORWARD AREAS SUCH AS "OFFENSIVE SWEEPS" ARE Seldom JUSTIFIED IN THE ABSENCE OF INDICATIONS OF ENEMY PRESENCE SINCE SUCH OPERATIONS MAY DISCLOSE OWN PRESENCE AND INTENTION AND ELIMINATE ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE

(D) OUR CURRENT TASKS ARE NOT MERELY PROTECTIVE BUT ALSO OFFENSIVE WHERE PRACTICABLE AS BEST WAY TO PROTECT IS BY REDUCING ENEMY OFFENSIVE POWER THROUGH DESTRUCTION OF HIS MOBILE FORCES PARTICULARLY CARRIERS, CRUISERS, LOADED TRANSPORTS AND LONG RANGE BOMBERS X WHILE ENEMY SHORE POSITIONS MAY BE LOOKED ON AS LOCATIONS WHERE ENEMY NAVAL FORCES MAY BE STRUCK, RAIDS WHICH MERELY PUT AIR FIELDS AND FIXED INSTALLATIONS OUT OF COMMISSION TEMPORARILY MAY NOT IN THEMSELVES BE PARTICULARLY PROFITABLE X

(E) NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY IN BISMARCK SOLOMONS AREA CAN PROBABLY BE BETTER COVERED BY RECONNAISSANCE BY PATROL PLANES AND BOMBERS BASED NORTHEAST AUSTRALIA USING MORESBY FOR REFUELING X RECOMMEND LEARY MAKE EFFORT TO HAVE US ARMY FIGHTERS SENT TO MORESBY TO PROTECT THIS VERY IMPORTANT AIR FIELD

(F) WILL TRANSMIT IN SEPARATE DESPATCH MY ANALYSIS PRESENT ENEMY SITUATION AND INTENTION ANZAC CTG 11.1 to COMANZAC, CINCPAC, CTF 11, CTF 9

Survey by squadron commander discloses operation PBY's from Vila impracticable. RAAF has already seriously damaged similar types attempting to operate there. Limited area in harbor requires takeoff in Meli Bay which has heavy swells due to shoaling. Consider operation from Noumea with cooperation RAAF to northward will assure effective search. Flight 41 has been operating away from base since February 7 on basis 3 weeks of such employment. Spares aboard Curtiss insufficient to make necessary repairs and replacements particularly engine and spark plugs for protracted operations. Continuance of flight operations after this week most doubtful unless spark plugs already requested are received.

270542 COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC

It will be absolutely necessary reprovision repeat reprovision this force not later than 15 March. Unless it is intended we return Pearl it will be necessary proceed Sydney after refueling from Kaskaskia about 5 March. No other harbor this area for carrier.
SECRET
FEB GCT

27 0845 COMANZAC TO COMINCH

Your 261630 regarding comment Afirm Anzac Forces are operating actively with Brown except when necessary to withdraw certain units for important escort duties. Decisions are made and operations ordered without any reference to ACNB. US and Australian shore based aircraft operate from northeast Australia refueling at Moresby or Horn Island and our patrol planes operate from Noumea or Vila to afford coverage of entire area Moresby to Efate.

US Army preparing pursuit squadrons for service and will provide protection NE coast soon as possible. 12 planes now available Townsville Horn Island and next squadron goes Darwin.

27 2355 COMANZAC TO CURTISS, TANGIER

My 250935x Cancel operations from Vila. Tangier proceed Noumea and relieve Curtiss. Continue daily air patrols from Noumea with 3 planes to 700 miles on median line 342 degrees from Noumea. Curtiss when relieved by Tangier proceed Suva and carry out previous orders.

28 0417 CINCPAC TO TF COMMANDERS

Task Force 17 join Comtaskfor 11 now assumed to be in area westward of New Hebrides. To minimize necessity for use radio rendezvous tentatively set three hundred miles north of Noumea at 0100 GCT 6 March subject to change by Brown or Fletcher's inability to meet.

28 0559 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Interpret your 261630 Afirm that SOPA PacFlt in Anzac Area operates directly under Cominch. Fletcher being ordered join Brown. Location and fuel status both uncertain but estimate they can join and both fuel to capacity from accompanying tankers west of New Hebrides by local six March unless currently predicted unfavorable weather interferes.

If offensive action is then initiated promptly toward New Britain can supply tankers Noumea and Suva to replenish after withdrawal. Can thereafter furnish logistic support one task force except for aircraft or large quantities ammunition. Brown undergo continuously since 31 January should be withdrawn after Fletcher arrives unless he remain for an offensive operation and in any case must leave by mid-March taking sufficient provisions in Tutuila from Bridge to reach Pearl

Estimate New Caledonia garrison will not arrive Noumea prior 13 March. Advise.
28 0511 CINCPAC TO COMANZAC

Urdis 270640 X Orders for Task Groups 12.1 and 12.2 in mydis 262315 hereby cancelled. Direct HONOLULU JARVIS as Task Group 12.1 escort army convoy departing Xray seven March for Noumea. Completion this duty proceed Pearl via Samoa for fuel. Direct NEW ORLEANS due Brisbane four March and MUGFORD as Task Group 12.2 depart Brisbane in time arrive Bobcat by 22 March report there to Comseapacfor escort convoy Baker Tare two hundred one from Bobcat to junction with escort from Anzac Force thence to Pago Pago for orders. CO NEW ORLEANS designated Comtaskfor 12 effective five March. Units stopping Samoa report time of departure route and speed to Pearl via shore radio.

28 2025 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, COMANZAC, COMSWPACFOR

EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS AS TO MOST PROFITABLE DISPOSITION OF SUBMARINES AND THEIR TENDERS NOW IN PACIFIC FLEET AND FAR EAST PLUS TEN SAIL CLASS AND TWO TENDERS NOW ENROUTE.

28 2121 COMINCH TO COMANZAC, infor CINCPAC

CONCERNING COMTASKGROUP 11.1 262100 SUGGEST POSSIBILITIES OF HAVANNAH HARBOR FOR PATROL PLANE OPERATIONS BE INVESTIGATED.

28 2120 COMINCH TO COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG

REPORT RELATIVE PRACTICABILITY ESTABLISHING AIRFIELD SEAPLANE BASE AND GARRISON ON UPOLU OR SAVAI'I X INTENTION DEVELOP 1 ISLAND ONLY X SAVAI'I PREFERRED TACTICALLY
March 1

Task Force 11 (LEXINGTON, 4 CA, 9 DD under Vice Admiral Brown) is presumably in the area north of Noumea, with an Anzac Force of 2 CA's, 2 CL's and 2 DD's operating in coordination with it. The KASKASKIA arrived in Suva on the 17th, the NEOSHO is enroute to that place and the TIPPECANOE and SS GULFWAX leave today for that area. Arriving at Samoa tomorrow are the DOBBIN, BRIDGE and SS SCOFIELD. The last named will proceed to Suva after it deposits 20,000 bbls. of fuel at Samoa.

Task Force 17 (YORKTOWN, 2 CA, 6 DD under Rear Admiral Fletcher) is proceeding from the Canton area to join Task Force 11 300 miles north of Noumea at 0000 Z on 6 March. The GUADALUPE is in company with this Force.

Task Force 16 (ENTERPRISE, 2 CA, 7 DD under Vice Admiral Halsey) raided Wake on 23 February (Hawaiian date) and may be about to attack Marcus. The SABINE is attached to this force.

No report from any of these forces was received today.

The Commanding General, Second Marine Brigade at Samoa replied to Cominch's 282120 in his 021037 which chooses Upolu Island as the outpost of Tutuila.

Enemy radio was intercepted which showed that some of our aviators had been made prisoners at Wake, and that they had told a good many truths about Pearl Harbor.

Other intercepts indicated that the Marshalls are being reinforced and that a shift of seventeen planes was being made from one base in the Marshalls to another until certain "offensive" operations are completed.

Enemy Cardiv Five has been so suspiciously active on the radio in the Bonin-Homeland Area that radio deception is indicated.

The enemy offensive against Java continues, three beach heads having been established.
SECRET

March 2.

Task Forces were silent again today.

Cominch in 021615 (Aidac) directed that Comtaskfor 11 use his combined forces to make an attack in the New Britain - Solomon Area about March 10th. Task Force 11 would then return to Pearl if directed by Cincpac.

To obtain full use of fuel available Cincpac sent despatches 030935 and 031007 (filed with orders).

The situation at Canton was unreported today. An attempt to float the TAYLOR was supposed to have been made.

The CACHALOT returning from Truk had only one attack with indeterminate results to report. The lack of success of submarines in general has been quite disappointing.

No particular change in enemy activities were indicated in any way today. Attack on Java continues and light air activity in the Solomons - New Guinea area continues.

There have been no further intercepts mentioning an offensive, and Cardiv Five appears to be really in home waters.

March 3.

Still no reports from the active task forces. The Noumea area is having hurricane weather which may interfere seriously with refueling.

A report received via the Army said the TAYLOR was still pounding and had flooded some of the engine and fire room spaces. Indications are that she will be a total loss.

Cominch in 031505 directed that the service detachment required by his 222200 plus appropriate troops and aircraft be sent to Bleacher (Iongatabu). These are to "fill in" to make it an intermediate operating base until the expedition for its establishment can be sent from the West Coast.

It appeared from the Sailing Directions that this harbor could not be entered by a carrier or a loaded tanker. As the SUMNER had just reported her arrival, she was asked in Cincpac 040201 as to the capabilities of the channels, and replied favorably in 040530 (attached).
March 3 (Cont'd)

It is the opinion of the War Plans Section that Nandi offers the best site for a carrier anchorage in the area, as: it is believed to require only some sweeping; it has a large airfield; and there are considerable defenses, with a pursuit squadron already installed.

A despatch to this effect may be sent to Cominich but, in the meantime, the Army is being asked for troops and planes, a Marine defense battalion is being assembled; and several auxiliaries to form the service detachment are being readied.

Cincpac replied in 040337 as to disposition of submarines.

The MARYLAND, COLORADO and TENNESSEE arrived San Francisco today.

The TROUT (carrying Manila bullion, etc) returned from patrol.

Cominch in 031525 told Comsouwespacfor in what way to carry on.

A detailed report of surviving American forces in the Asiatic was received (031335 attached). Apparently the Marblehead, Pecos and LANGLEY have been sunk. Fate of Houston uncertain. It will be noted nearly all forces are retiring to Fremantle.

Cominch in 031630 asked Comwseaffrontier as to suitability of Kodiak for surface forces. In 030730 the NAS Dutch Harbor told of a rough patrol of the S-18.

Radio intelligence indicates some kind of an offensive against the Hawaiian area, possibly tomorrow, employing large seaplanes and submarines based in the Marshalls. An alert was sent to all forces.

The enemy's Java offensive was not over-running the Dutch.

However, fighter planes raided Derby and Broome in northeast Australia, Moresby received another raid, and the concentration at Rabaul is increasing.

Submarines were reported off the Galapagos by the Moffett, and off the coast of Lower California by the Naval Attache in Mexico.
March 4.

Task Forces 11 and 17 were unheard today. Bad weather still persists in Noumea area.

Comin in 042227 called attention to a possible enemy offensive in which the Hawaiian area would be an objective.

The alert sent out yesterday was justified, for one or two large enemy planes raided Oahu last night. They were picked up by the Kauai radar and were tracked in from the northwest and out to the southwest showing up for about three hours except when they were over this island. The night was moonlit but there was a low ceiling with some rain here. The four pursuits put in the air were ineffective, and gun fire was not opened because the searchlights could not pick up the enemy. Four bombs were dropped at 0215 local and landed above Honolulu without damage. Five patrol planes took off with torpedoes to search for a supporting ship. The present estimate is that the plane was fueled by a submarine at some such anchorage as French Frigate Shoal. An AVD was sent to watch that atoll.

Due to warning by Comin and other information it was decided to inform Comtask for 16 and tell him that the CUYAMA could be sent to fuel his force (CinCPac 050251).

Vice Admiral Halsey has not yet informed CinCPac of what he has been doing. However, an English broadcast from Tokyo reported a raid by 30 planes against the Marianas.

Considerable deliberation has been held as to the establishment of Bleacher. CinCPac's 050509 and 050553 were sent to Comin on this subject. In general, further enlightenment as to ultimate plans for Bleacher was requested and the higher priority of Nandi Roads as a carrier anchorage was recommended. The Army here was unable to furnish a garrison for Bleacher, and the aircraft supply is practically nil. A marine defense battalion is being prepared although transfer of its weapons will leave quite a hole in the defenses of Pearl Harbor. The CRESCENT CITY (AP) and CASTOR (AKS) are being prepared to transport the troops and equipment. The SOLACE may be sent. The RIGEL and ANTARES are not immediately ready.

Comin in 041725 requested comment as to the proper subdivision of the Pacific Areas in which the U.S. will be responsible for the operations.

Comtaskfor One commented in his 050215 as to possible cruise to the Gulf of Lower California to train battleships.

Com-13 in his 050127 replied to Comin's question as to Kodiak.
March 4 (continued).

The enemy is continuing to concentrate on Java and is succeeding. New raids were made against both Moresby and Darwin.

At least two submarines continue to operate between here and Midway. Other small raids may be received here from large seaplanes, but radio intelligence gives no indication that carriers have started this way yet.

March 5.

As a result of announcement by Tokyo and one urgent message sent out by Marcus, it appears that Task Force Sixteen attacked the latter place on Wednesday, March 3 (Hawaiian date). This was nine days after the probable date of the attack on Wake. Vice Admiral Halsey replied to Cincpac’s 050251 by setting a rendezvous for the CUYAMA 720 miles west of Oahu at 1800Z March 8. He informed that his force was undamaged but gave no other information. Due to an increasing number of submarines in the French Frigate-Midway area and south thereof, the rendezvous is not very well placed.

No news from Task Forces 11 and 17 but TANGIER has reported hurricane weather for the last two days, which does not augur well for an operation which will not wait. Aside from the fuel situation the concentration at Rabaul is becoming greater and is probably about to move. As regards fuel, the S.S. SCOFIELD completed discharge of some of her cargo at Samoa and is on her way to Suva.

No enemy aircraft reached Oahu last night though at least one submarine is indicated still near French Frigate Shoal. Radio intelligence still indicates a close tie-up between submarines in this area and aircraft in the eastern Marshalls. However there are no indications of an imminent carrier attack here.

The latest report from the TAYLOR at Canton is that it may not be fatally damaged, but three weeks will be required to prepare her for refloating, and then she must be towed to a dry-dock for major repairs. The JAPARA unloading is going extremely slowly, but the ROBIN delivered barges there today.

No reply has been received from Cominch in regard to further plans as to Bleacher. Plans to send defense battalion and as much equipment as possible is proceeding.

The enemy is spreading successfully on Java. Batavia fell tonight.
March 6.

In view of the continued concentration of submarines near the designated rendezvous for the CUYAMA and Task Force 16, that force was told to return to Pearl for fuel, and CUYAMA was recalled. Still no amplifying reports from the Task Force Commander, but enemy announcements make the raid on Marcus a certainty.

Task Forces 11 and 17 were unheard again today. The center of the hurricane passed Noumea with negligible damage to our forces, and patrol plane search was made from there yesterday. Some movement has already taken place from Rabaul, as reconnaissance shows fewer ships there.

ComTaskfor ONE in his 060103 told of plans for training battleships.

Plans concerning Bleacher are still underway. The SUMNER reported that housing there was available for 5000 troops and that more huts could be built. Still no amplification as to that base received from Cominch, except for 041453 which shifted attention from the northwest to the northern channel. This was replied to in 060225.

The radio activity between submarines west of here and aircraft in the Marshalls continues, but no further activity either here or at French Frigate Shoal has been noted. A patrol plane as well as the AVD observed the latter place.

A reply (070451) was sent to Cominich in regard to his suggested subdivision of the Pacific Area. Cominich and ComSouwestPacfor replied in 060507.

Enemy successes continue in Java. One carrier was reported in the Indian Ocean. In New Guinea, his air activity indicates further landings.

March 7

Task Force 16 still silent and returning Pearl.

Task Force 17 has presumably joined Task Force Eleven. From the latter an Aidac (080013) was received giving his plans for his attack against New Britain bases on the 10th (9th Hawaiian date). Apparently close figuring on fuel, and bad weather, have not prevented plans from going through. As Japanese landings at Salamoa, Loe and other points in New Guinea have been made, this attack is a little late for maximum effectiveness.

Another aidac was received from Cominich (071820) directing that Task Force Eleven, before departing from the Anzac Area, should fill up Task Force Seventeen with spares and stores.
March 7 (Cont'd)

The SUMNER in 072345 reported further encouraging news as to Bleacher. The loading of the Crescent City and Castor is underway and the Solace will probably accompany them. The expedition will be slightly delayed due to the shortage of escorts and the 14th has been tentatively set as the sailing date.

A false alarm as to aircraft and bombarding submarines occurred this morning. The radar plot of the aircraft was quite convincing, but there does not seem to have been much justification for the report that five submarines were bombarding the west coast of Oahu. Radio intelligence and the continued presence of submarines near French Frigate indicate that other raids by large seaplanes may be attempted. A carrier raid does not appear to be imminent.

In 080135 the Commanding General, 2d Marine Brigade at Samoa reported further upon his misgivings as to Western Samoa being undefended. He is receiving 1200 troops which he may use to garrison Upolu Island.

The enemy continues his success in Java, and, as already mentioned, he landed in some strength in New Guinea.

March 9.

Task Force 16 was sighted today 600 miles to the west southwestward. It should arrive Pearl on the 10th.

Task Forces 11 and 17 combined should be approaching New Britain and were apparently not discovered today.

Efate reported that possibly a carrier and two other vessels passed there at about 2100 last night (Hawaiian time) heading northeastward.

The convoy for Noumea was scheduled to depart from Australia yesterday, escorted by two cruisers and two destroyers, all U.S.

ComSouWestPac's reply 090612 was received to Cominch's despatch suggests operating area subdivision.

The enemy situation continues much the same.
March 9

No indication of the operations of Task Forces 11 and 17 plus Anzac Force was received until about 1600 when a contact report was made by the enemy Gunboat Division EIGHT in the Rabaul area. Also no report of the results of the raid by the B-17s on the northeast coast of New Guinea (Comanzac 091300) was received.

The VPs at Noumea and the British planes at Suva made a special search for an enemy carrier in that general area without result. Suva had been alerted by what was thought to be a carrier plane last night.

Task Force 16 will enter tomorrow.

Unloading at Bobcat is going very slowly, and one-half of the 7" guns will not be emplaced for about a month more. Opnav therefore ordered the remaining ships of the Southeast Pacific Force to return to their station. Their departure was reported in ComSePacfor 100254.

Opnav in 081905 provided for the garrisoning of EFATE by two companies of the Noumea detachment.

Tokyo was again interested in Hawaiian weather so a warning against seaplane attacks was disseminated.

Dutch resistance in Java has collapsed and Rangoon has fallen. Enemy submarines and probably one carrier are working in the Indian Ocean. Air attacks on Moresby continue, but it is still usable.

TRITON in 100915 reported sinking four ships during her patrol in the East China Sea.

In 091630 Cominch requested comment as to advisability of doing away with Battle Force and Scouting Force as task organization.

March 10

Task Force 16 entered. The results of its attacks are contained in Cincpac's 110321, attached. Little permanent damage was done, but the enemy was harassed with very small loss to us except wear and tear.

The results of Vice Admiral Brown's activities are not yet apparent, though enemy contact reports in the Rabaul area continued today. The raid of the B-17's scheduled for yesterday was still unreported. The enemy landings on the northeast coast of New Guinea were continuing.
March 10 (Cont'd)

Due to a spell of good weather at Canton some progress has been made in unloading the Taylor and the Japara. The latter should be completed about the 15th and the former may be ready for a pull shortly after that date.

Plans for the Bleacher expedition are continuing. It was decided today to add the CUYAMA to provide transportation for excess vehicles and to deposit some more oil in the area. The SUMNER reported delay due to bad weather, in marking the channel, but that the anchorage is ready.

The supply of the Anzac Area is going according to schedule. The Scofield has delivered her oil to the KASKASKIA and is returning to the West Coast. The BRIDGE and DGBEIN are at Suva. The NEOSHO is enroute to Suva and the Gulfwax has almost reached Samoa. The GUADALUPE delivered her remnant of fuel at Suva and after depositing some gasoline on the north shore of Viti Levu will return to Pearl. The PLATTE is receiving a much needed week's overhaul. The SABINE, which has been with Task Force Sixteen, will be held as the "ready" tanker.

The code name of Efate is apparently "Roses" and Opnav sent the attached query (101828) in regard to its characteristics. Opnav also asked about barges at Bleacher, probably in connection with the expedition it is making up in connection with the permanent garrisoning of that place.

The situation at Noumea is indicated by the TANGIER's despatches 100605 and 102350 attached. The convoy from Australia is expected to arrive there day after tomorrow.

There were no new moves of the enemy apparent today. His present intentions appear to be against both Australia and India.

March 11

Finally heard from Vice Admiral Brown - his report 102201 is attached. He did not approach New Britain at all, but went to a position south of NEW GUINEA and sent aircraft across the peninsula to LAE and SALAMOA where they found a considerable number of targets. Even with the damage inflicted, it is doubtful if the enemy will be greatly retarded.

A despatch 120335 was sent to ComTaskfor 11 to comply with Cominch's order to fill up TaskFor 17, and to direct the latter force to continue operations in the ANZAC area.

Another despatch 120259 was sent to inform Cominch of the BLEACHER plans.
March 11 (Continued)

The SUMNER reported in 120235 that the main channel is ready at BLEACHER. Some doubt as to SUMNER's optimistic reply regarding fresh water there was raised by SUVA.

COMANZAC in 110432 answered Opnav's query as to "Roses" (EPATE).

Received 111620 (AIDAC) from Cominch which warned as to possible attacks in this area.

HORNET, NASHVILLE, VINCENNES, CIMARRON, DesDiv 22 have reported for duty.

A very significant change in enemy disposition has been indicated. The Screening Force (BBs, CAs, DDs plus some carriers) is apparently assembling in the BONIN area and Cardiv FIVE received urgent orders which apparently turned at least one of its carriers back from on a passage to STARING BAY. This looks suspiciously like an offensive move because it is difficult to believe that our operations have made the enemy so fearful of an attack against his Homeland.

March 12

No word from Task Forces 11 and 17 today. Comanzac reported that five B-17s attacked LAE and SALAMOA and shipping off those places on the day after the attack by Vice Admiral Brown's forces. They did some damage to these places and reported several enemy surface units were still present. In fact some of these sounded suspiciously like the same units that the carrier aircraft thought they had sunk.

Nothing was received from Cominch today.

Three despatches (130307, 130339, 130545) were sent in order to provide ComTaskfor 17 and the auxiliaries in the South PACIFIC with full information as to their directives. In this connection Comanzac sent his 130025.

To Cominoh was sent another request (122129) for Army heavy bombers. This was particularly timely due to the warning recently received from Cominch.

Preparations are being made to form another Task Force with the HORNET as the carrier.

There still continued indications that the enemy is forming a strong concentration in the BONIN area. Cardiv FIVE is still involved and may be moving eastward.
March 12 (Continued)

The enemy also evinces strong interest in the Bay of Bengal.

A considerable number of his ships were reported to have been recently at Buka passage.

Com-14 sent his 130121 to Cominch in regard to information bulletins based on radio intelligence.

March 13.

No report received today from Task Forces 11 and 17. They should be about to commence fueling.

Task Force 16 is still at Pearl and will probably remain until the 20th or 21st. The ships of this Task Force are receiving much needed upkeep and are being brought up-to-date on the various projects for improvement of fighting efficiency. The general question of upkeep is giving some concern. T.F.-11 has been at sea for 1½ months and T.F.-17 will probably be longer.

Cominch in 131535 told ComT.F.-17 to carry on in the Anzac Area.

Operation Plan No. 17-42 was issued to Task Force 13, the Bleacher expedition. In 132037 and 132100 Opnav indicated that the permanent garrison might arrive just about the time Task Force 13 has gotten established, and that the Marine Defense Battalion in T.F. 13 (No.4) would have to move on to another base. This is a most undesirable situation.

Another despatch concerning water at Bleacher was received from the SUMMER (122305). Also further information as to Roses (Efate) was furnished by the TANGIER (140530). This ship and six patrol planes are being left in the Anzac area for the time being. The planes are just now being relieved by six fresh units. The B-17's which were sent in connection with T.F.-11 operations will continue to operate from Townsville under ComAnzac. Only five out of the original twelve figured in the last attack.

CinCPac today signed Hawaiian Defense Plan No. 1-42. This assigns defensive tasks to the Army and the Sea Frontier, and to Fleet Forces present in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. It supplants the old joint plan which has been in effect for the Army and the Sea Frontier and is issued under the principle of unity of command. It has been under consideration for many weeks in an endeavor to solve some of the knotty problems as to its form and substance.

Sent 130339 to ComTaskFor 17 giving him information as to facilities at his disposal.
March 13 (Continued)

Cominch in 121250 suggested a reorganization of the Sea Frontier Command. CinCPac recommended against this in 140353 as did also Com 14 in 132358.

Further radio intelligence indicates that the enemy is really alarmed as to an attack near his Homeland, and that the powerful force that he is assembling is at present for defensive purposes. However, the alerted state of the forces in the Hawaiian Area has not been relaxed.

March 14

No reports were received from Task Forces 11 or 17 today.

Task Force 13 is delayed by loading difficulties until tomorrow.

Received 131430 from Cominch, as to reorganization of Task Force 16. This dispatch is not entirely understood and 142155 was sent in reply.

Received another question in Cominch 131955 as to doing away with Scouting Force and Battle Force as task forces.

In 131305 Cominch continues his emphasis upon the Amphibious Force. However many demands on the transports are still being made to send garrisons to Pacific bases. The training of the troops was of course greatly retarded by the detachment of the Iceland garrison last year, and the moving of 5,000 men to Samoa in January.

A false air alarm this morning was the result of failure to identify friendly planes to the southward. A garbled report of a carrier was also made by an Army plane.

Canton was not heard from today though a launching attempt was supposed to be made on the TAYLOR yesterday.

The enemy Screening Force is still screening in the Bonin-Marcus Area. The remainder of his re-deployment is not clear, though some units are undoubtedly going to the Indian Ocean and some are reinforcing the Marshalls and Rabaul.

March 15

Received 160821 (Aidac) from Vice Admiral Brown giving his views as to how the enemy can be held in the New Guinea, northeastern Australia area - he considers enemy too strong on land to permit a raid against his bases - particularly Rabaul.
March 15 (Continued)

In Cominch 141825 the duty of promulgating enemy intelligence bulletins was assigned to CinCPac. It is intended that the Com 14 unit will continue to supply the data for these bulletins.

In 150137 CinCPac replied to Opnav's inquiries about mines at Bleacher.

Admiral Brown also in his 151520 and 151525 gave further details of the attack of his and the Army aircraft on the 10th, indicating that the damage inflicted really was great.

Comdesron 5 (PORTER) reported that he is enroute to Pearl with the JAPARA and that the refloating attempt on the TAYLOR was unsuccessful. This matter is being studied further by the salvage personnel now at Canton.

The destroyer watch on French Frigate Shoal is being continued.

In response to orders issued by Comsubpac on the 13th, three submarines are taking up patrol stations northwest of the Bonins to attack any of the enemy concentration believed to be forming there. One sub is being sent into the Anzac area to patrol near Rabaul.

The enemy continues to search intensively north of Marcus, but Cardiv Five is now slated to carry planes from Yokosuka to Staring Bay. A considerable enemy concentration has continued to use Kessa Harbor (Duka Channel), northwest Solomons. Bombing of Moresby continues and Horn Island (Torres Strait) has received its first air attack.

March 16

Task Force 17 was heard from in his 132141 in which he endeavored to arrange for the train vessels at Samoa to move to Noumea or Suva. In 160217 Cinopac ordered that these ships be moved from Samoa only in emergency.

Further word from Cominch was received as to the conference concerning Task Force 16's employment (162043). Orders for this force will therefore have to wait for the results of the conference.

In 170545 replied to Opnav's 151526 concerning water at Bleacher.

The small force sent from Noumea to Efate is due to arrive today.
March 16 (Con't)

The special alert placed in effect on Oahu on March 3 was relaxed today.

High Commissioner Sayre of the Philippines passed through by plane enroute to the U.S.

Cominch in 161642 directed transfer of 4 DD and 5 OSS from Southwest pacfor to Anzac Force. Also the GRIFFIN and 5 OSS are now enroute from Panama to the Anzac Area.

No offensive move of the enemy has been detected as being actually underway but the indications are that he will move against northern Australia and India and possibly New Caledonia. Our garrison is now ashore at the last place but unloading has not been completed.

The enemy also is apparently continuing to activate his screening and mainland defense forces. The KAGA is definitely enroute to Yokosuka, perhaps with some torpedo damage. Our submarines may get a shot at her.

March 17.

No news of any task force was received today.

Recent reports from submarines have been quite discouraging as they have not sighted much traffic off Port Lloyd, Bungo Channel, or even the eastern part of the East China Sea. No indication of the result of our submarines concentrating northwest of the Bonins has been noted. They should, however, be at present in the path of the KAGA which is known to be en route to Yokosuka.

Several more or less administrative matters are being forced upon the Commander-in-Chief because of unsatisfactory conditions. The fuel supply of Hawaii is one, and in fact the general supply and shipping are in the same condition. No action was taken on CinCPac dispatch 180401 of January and no real naval transportation service, as was visualized by the War Plan, has ever been created. There is therefore no coordinating or directing agency on the West Coast to systematize the shipments.

The allocation of space for evacuees has just been put in the hands of the CinCPac by Opnav.
March 17 (Cont'd)

In reply to a question from Cominch concerning the aircraft slated for Bleacher, 172029 was sent. Contained therein is the implied suggestion that, as long as the Army garrison will arrive there soon, it would be better not to send the Marine aircraft. Also in 170545, Cincpac replied to Opnav's question about well-digging equipment in Task Force Thirteen.

Some of the troops for Hawaii, Maui and Kauai arrived on the 15th in the Lurline and Aquitania. There has been no great increase in aircraft here recently - about 30 B-17's and about 133 pursuits constitute the Army's air force. A few B-24's have started through to Australia and the first B-26's, which are being set up here have begun to fly to the same destination.

The situation at Noumea is indicated by Tangier's 170145.

The press announced General MacArthur's presence in Australia, and that he would be in supreme command there. In connection with this Cominch's 171640 was received telling of prospective area alignments.

There were no new developments in enemy activities today.
ANY OR ALL US MEN OF WAR TO CINCPAC

To CINCPAC for info who is requested pass to Cominch for action and also to Comanzac and Opnav for info. President Tyler will depart 28 Feb for Papeete for water than to San Francisco via route 30 miles west of normal Great Circle Lane. Other vessels unloading slowly. Ostrom estimates 6 weeks before one-half of 7" guns will be installed. Transports and store ships will require water. Request convoy vessels returning from Anzac ports deliver 1000 tons if practicable. Deemed undesirable send vessels to Papeete for water except in emergency.

CG 2MARBRIG SAMOA TO COMINCH

Ref Urdis 282120. Opolu is only practicable choice for establishment airfield seaplane base and garrison. Tactical advantage in location of Island of Savaii recognized but it offers no natural advantages for immediate developments. Estimate Savaii would involve enormous construction project requiring many months for development of port, roads, field and seaplane runways. Estimate runway on Opolu adjoining existing seaplane runway could be prepared in 30 days after arrival personnel and equipment. Foregoing based on recent staff reconnaissance and study of both islands.

COMINCH TO COMTASKFOR 11

Aidac

Combined offensive about 10 March.

COMSOUWESPAC TO COMINCH

Following ships Fremantle. Holland, Snapper, Sturgeon, Sculpin, George B. Henry, Island Mail. 7 submarines operating Java Sea and approaches 2 south of Java, Permit enroute disposition General McArthur, remainder enroute Fremantle. Houston and Perth sailed Batavia March 1 probably in action Sunda Strait no information since sailing. Pope with badly damaged Exeter and Encounter bound Sunda Strait from Surabaya. Last heard from Java Sea being shadowed by plane. Remainder Desron 29 enroute Fremantle. Lt. Clark and 4 men ordered to destroy Stewart Make best way to Tjilatjap. Action and present whereabouts unknown.
Childs in Exmouth Gulf, Preston, Heron minus one propeller blade, Lark, Whipporwill, Tulsa, Ashville, Isabel, Lanakai enroute Fremantle. Andam sailed 1 March counsel general Foote on-board, destination unknown. Mount Vernon nearing Fremantle. Phoenix and Otus enroute. 7 hospital cases Houston and Marblehead in charge Lt. Comdr. Waskel, MCR, USN, remain Tjilatjap. Whipple has 200 Langley and Pecos survivors no information remaining 500 or so.

03 1505 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

SEND SERVICE FORCE DETACHMENT MY 222200 TO BLEACHER AUGMENTED BY SUITABLE DETACHMENT OF TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT FOR LOCAL DEFENSE PENDING ARRIVAL DEFENSE FORCE NOW BEING MADE UP FOR DEPARTURE FROM WEST COAST WHEN SHIPPING IS AVAILABLE PARA OPNAV HAS IN HAND ROUTING OF SHIP SUPPLIES OF ALL KINDS DIRECT TO BLEACHER.

03 1525 COMINCH TO COMSOUWESPATCFOR

CONTINUE ACTIVE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN ABDA AREA PARA ATTACK ENEMY VESSELS WITHIN AREA AND EXITING FROM PASSES COMMA OPPOSE ENEMY ADVANCE TOWARDS AUSTRALIA AND MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH PHILIPPINES PARA MAKE USE OF AIR AUGMENTED BY OWN ARMY AIR AND AUSTRALIAN AIR AS ARRANGED FOR BY COMANZAC FOR SUPPORT OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AND ATTACK ON ENEMY AIR BASES PARA REPORT BY RETURN DESPATCH WHAT SURFACE FORCES REMAIN INCLUDING AUXILIARIES AND WHICH OF THEM YOU FEEL YOU CAN ACTIVELY EMPLOY AGAINST THE ENEMY WHILE CONTINUING TO OPERATE IN THE ABDA AREA PARA MAKE SIMILAR REPORT AS TO AUSTRALIAN NAVAL UNITS ALLOCATED TO ABDA AREA.

03 16360 COMINCH TO COMNWSEAFRON

TO WHAT EXTENT DOES KODIAK ENTER INTO YOUR PLANS AS AN OPERATING BASE FOR SURFACE FORCES AS WELL AS AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES PARA REVIEW ADEQUACY OF FACILITIES AND DEFENSES OF KODIAK ON FOREGOING PREMISE

04 0201 CINCPAC TO SUMNER

Earliest possible information desired as to feasibility use Nukualofa anchorage by CV. What is estimated time for determining suitability Lahi Passage by deferring work Egeria Channel. Is Narrows considered difficult to negotiate by heavy cruisers and larger ships.
Your 282035 believe there should be retained in Souwestpacfor maximum number submarines which can be supported within reasonable range of the NEI and lines which Japan may develop in Bay of Bengal area. Additional tender should be assigned if required. Of submarines which cannot be maintained by the Souwestpacfor all Sail class should be assigned to Anzac Area and large type with appropriate tenders shifted to Pearl which is considered satisfactory as base for patrols in the Western Pacific. Pearl based units should take over Pelew and other Asiatic areas when Comsouwestpac is ready to release them also Solomon-Rabaul Area. 10 S-type enroute should be assigned Anzac less Solomon-Rabaul area with tender or tenders as necessary. Comasubpac considers 1500 miles their maximum practicable operating range. Present sound school and assignment to Dutch Harbor with appropriate rotation should be continued.

Nukualofa now available as anchorage. Narrows not difficult for types specified. Slow low powered ships use during slack water. Experienced local pilot available. Lahi Passage considered safe but will be dragged and marked in four days.

YOUR VIEWS REQUESTED ON CONVENIENCE AND ADVISABILITY OF DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL AREAS IN PACIFIC WHICH IS ABOUT TO BECOME WHOLLY UNIT SAIL (US) SPHERE OF RESPONSIBILITY.

CONSIDER AFIRM CONTINUATION OF ABDA AREA MODIFIED TO EXCLUDE MALAYA AND SUMATRA WITH NORTHERN BOUNDARY 20 DEGREES NORTHEAST BOUNDARY 130 DEGREES EAST TO EQUATOR THENCE AS NOW. BAKER ANZAC AREA TO INCLUDE AUSTRALIA EXCEPT ABDA AREA OTHERWISE AS NOW BUT WITH EAST BOUNDARY RUNNING SOUTHEAST FROM EQUATOR AT 160 DEGREES EAST TO POINT 30 DEGREES SOUTH 175 DEGREES WEST THENCE SOUTH CAST SOUTH PACIFIC AREA SOUTH OF EQUATOR AND EAST TO 110 DEGREES WEST DOG CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA NORTH OF EQUATOR AND EAST OF ABDA AREA TO 42 DEGREES EASY NORTH PACIFIC AREA NORTH OF 42 DEGREES FOX SOUTHEAST PACIFIC AREA AS NOW.

OPERATIONS IN AREAS AFIRM BAKER FOX INITIALLY TO BE UNDER COMINCH, THOSE IN CAST EASY UNDER CINCPAC.

MAIN OPERATION AND SUPPLY BASES X AREA AFIRM TO BE DETERMINED X BAKER AUCKLAND X CAST TONGATABU X DOG PEARL HARBOR EASY KODIAK X FOX PANAMA.
COMINCH to CINCPAC

SHOW IMMEDIATELY TO CINCPAC IN PERSON X COPEKS FROM COM 14 AND COM 16 AND OTHER RADIO INTELLIGENCE SINCE ABOUT FEBRUARY 15 INDICATE ENEMY PLANS RAID WITH CAR- DIV 5 PLUS NITTA MARU AND LARGE SEAPLANES AGAINST US POSITIONS AND FORCES PROBABLY OAHU POSSIBLY PALMYRA JOHNSTON MIDWAY X IN SPITE OF SUGGESTIONS OF DECEPTION COMINCH ANALYSIS HAS HERETOFORE TENTATIVELY PLACED DATE OF RAID ABOUT MARCH 11 TO 13 X HOWEVER THE IMPLICATIONS IN COM 14 040919 AND COM 16 041228 THAT THE ATTACK WILL OCCUR MARCH 5TH EITHER TOKYO OR OAHU DATE HAVE SOME FOUNDATION AND CANNOT BE IGNORED.

COMNOWESSEAFRON to COMINCH

See Com 13 endorsement on district report to shore station development board 18 October last recommending drydock for Kodiak for ships up to 3,000 tons ur 031630 consider Kodiak should be used as base of operations for at least squadron of destroyers and no less than 6 submarines in addition to 48 patrol planes and 72 land planes latter on emergency basis x In view current shortage in all of preceding categories current plans are predicated on employing Kodiak as principal base of operations of force available in Alaska. Comalsec has shore administrative headquarters there at present x No net or mine defenses so far provided but Army garrison of about 6,000 considered adequate defense against surface raiders x Protection against air attack is inadequate due to lack of fighting planes x Army endeavoring remedy this condition has 13 B17's and 25 P40's at present.

COMBATSHIPS to CINCPAC

Puget Sound and area to northward lacks protective nets and compares unfavorably with Chesapeake Bay in security and in expanse of clear water and percentage of good visibility for training purposes but has some value for limited elementary training particularly for shaking down after protracted visit navy yard provided for security reasons this use is sporadic and irregular x Consider desirable net Port Townsend anchorage x Enemy submarines have visited Gulf of Mexico but apparently not Gulf of California x Relative security for training in such an area must be sought in not too frequent nor regular use x Believe strongly in plenty of cruising for battleships adequately screened but consider desirable they customarily be behind nets x Do not recommend more than 4 battleships cruise with 5 destroyer screen x Believe suggested 3 weeks cruise practicable.
CINCPAC to COMINCH

Part 1 of 2 parts x Your 222200 and 031505 Marine Defense Battalion preparing depart x Marine fighting planes Ewa can be used Bleacher instead of Johnston and Palmyra but if Army will ultimately man station recommend use pursuit planes from Hawaii replacing with others from mainland x Essential necessities for accommodation planes will be provided prior to their arrival x

If more than protected anchorage contemplated base should have at least minimum accommodations for carrier group also storage facilities for fuel oil gasoline ammunition stores and preferably some repair and other facilities x Consider these should be provided x Does your concept include such development and to what extent x It will materially assist if your ideas could be communicated to me more fully x Second part to follow.

CINCPAC to COMINCH

2nd and last part x Para x Shore installations and personnel should be provided by department meaning of quote Opnav has in hand routing of ships supplies of all kinds direct to Bleacher unquote not clear x

Size force supported by base and service detachment definitely limited by supplies that can regularly be received from mainland which in turn depends upon availability adequate shipping x In view exposure anchorage propose use it to minimum extent until defenses including aircraft are established x Fourteen service ships consisting of 1 AF 7 AO 1 ADR 2 DM 1 AM and 2 AV already in area and others being prepared x

Comanzac 210430 and 0742Z/16 February indicate availability Nandi Roads by middle April x Believe date could be considerably advanced if SUMNER sent there from Bleacher to assist sweeping x Recently advised additional air fields being constructed Viti Levu that will soon permit use by carrier group x Other facilities and defenses including presence Army pursuit squadron and mining preparations point to certain advantages that place which while closer to bases for enemy bombers is also closer to probable operating areas x Believe protected base can be developed earlier there than at Bleacher x

Request your reactions as to Nandi Roads also as to use Army pursuit planes from Oahu at Bleacher and information as to whether or not Department will provide shore installations and shore personnel including those for construction both places.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMANZAC

My 222200 your 230403 February. Request SUMNER give priority to Lahi Passage for deep draft ships reporting by despatch preliminary estimates of suitability estimated time required to check survey and install navigation aids. Anchorage area off Nukualofa should be surveyed to provide for 4 deep 4 medium and 8 light draft vessels initially and then extended for twice this number of ships.

CINCPAC TO ALL TASK FORCE COMMANDERS

For Task Force 16. Following extracts from Cominich:
"Intelligence indicates enemy plans raid with carriers and large seaplanes against U.S. positions and forces probably Oahu possibly Palmyra, Johnston, Midway. In spite of suggestions of deception Cominich has heretofore tentatively placed date of raid about 11 to 13 March. Implications that attack will occur at an earlier date cannot be ignored". Troop movements are enroute Hawaiian Area ETA 11 to 14 March. Desire Task Force 16 be prepared for counter action. If you require fuel will send CUYAMA to rendezvous to be designated by you. CUYAMA speed 12 with 40,000 barrels now on four hours notice.

COMBATSHIPS TO CINCPAC INFO COMBATFOR

Propose following schedule of training and firing at sea for battleships screened by 3 destroyers now assigned Task Force ONE. March 9-14 Batdiv 3 provided one additional destroyer which has been requested from ComWest-SeaFron is available. Otherwise Batdiv 3 less NEW MEXICO. March 19-23 Batdiv 2. March 27-31 Batdiv 4. Consider above time at sea inadequate but maximum which can be provided until additional destroyers are available. Propose continue similar operations to limit of available destroyers.

CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Your 041453 on 3 March in response my inquiry SUMNER preliminary report estimates Lahi Passage safe. Time to drag and mark 4 days. Narrows feasible at slack water. Action being initiated regarding serious water problem indicated Naval Officer in Charge Fiji despatch 0345Z/5 to NZ Air Liaison Officer here. Assume diplomatic arrangements with NZ and Tonga governments made.
Regarding areas proposed urdis 051725 consider: (a) ABDA area should be extended southward to include western coast of Australia and southwestern coast to Longitude 118 degrees east. This will place Fremantle in ABDA area as operating base. (b) Eastern boundary ANZAC area should be changed to read "Running southeast from Equator at 160 degrees east to point 18 degrees south 176 degrees west thence south". This will keep Fiji in ANZAC area as Fiji tied very tightly with New Zealand. Believe that for strategic economic and political reasons Fiji should not be outside ANZAC area. Fiji is garrisoned by and is main outlying base for New Zealand. (c) Strongly recommend designation of Sydney as additional operating and as main repair base.

Consider operational areas should be analogous to sea frontiers with unity command all forces assigned thereto. Cominch 041725. The Commanders should support but not command other Fleet forces operating in their area. Size force required for effective results in attacking enemy positions or meeting enemy attack as well as complicated logistic problems clearly indicated forces must not be dispersed unduly by definite assignment to areas. Proposed areas satisfactory except AFIRM should include all western Australia. Recommend BAKER CAST DOG under Cincpac to facilitate operations. Others under Cominch.
07 1820 FROM COMINCH TO CINCPAC

AIDAC
FILL TASK FORCE SEVENTEEN WITH STORES AND SPARES

07 2345 FROM SUMNER TO CINCPAC

Plenty of drinking water available. Local jetty will take vessels to 5,000 gross tons. Reef to (either westward or eastward) of town dry in places at low tide. Top of reef level enough for vehicles. Edge of reef steep in deep water facilitating landing by boats, pontoons and tank lighter. One deep water channel through reef to shore wide enough for tank lighters. First class road along waterfront and to large grass surfaced landing field and various other places on the island. No cranes available. Sumner originator of this. Colonel in command of island forces starting immediately on causeways for use in landing when reef is awash. Also other arrangements for reception of troops. Has 700 men available for work as necessary. Ready to receive troops and equipment at any time.

08 0013 FROM TASK FORCE 11 TO COMANZAC

Aidac originated 052300.

Plans for attack.

08 0135 CG 2ND MARBRIG TO CINCPAC

Personal visit to Western Samoa yesterday convinces me defenseless condition rich island simply waiting seizure by enemy. Without our superiority at sea and in the air this area present status and Savaii imperils security this base. Whole group Samoan Islands forms tactical entity. Administrator has instructions to give us whatever we want on those islands. Rumor current that negotiations underway for release mandate these islands to the United States and it appears reaction would be favorable in official circles. Upolu and Savaii feasible for occupation by enemy but only Upolu capable of hasty development as base. Enemy occupation and development Upolu could prevent our primary employment Tutuila Base without even his seizure of Tutuila. Enemy occupation Upolu would require major operation to dislodge him.
09 0912 COMSWESPAC to COMINCH

Your 041725 for operational purposes including basing proposed area satisfactory.

08 1905 OPNAV to COMTASKGROUP 12.1

On joining with deliver the following from General Marshall to Commanding General POPPY quote dispatch to EPATE at earliest possible date a detachment consisting of 1 heavy weapons company, one rifle company, and necessary services with 60 days supplies and 10 units of fire. This is a temporary measure pending the establishment of permanent garrison. This force will remain under your command. A representative of Comanzac Force will meet you at Noumea. Acknowledge unquote Comanzac deliver to Brett.

09 1300 COMANZACFOR to COMTASKFOR 17, 11, CHICAGO

8 B-17s leaving HORN ISLAND about 0900 local time 10th will attack enemy forces SALAMAUA LAE area about 1200 local time 10th priority of targets (1) aircraft carrier or seaplane tender (2) transports (3) warships.

09 1630 COMINCH to CINCPAC INFO OPNAV BUNAV

YOUR 030323 FEB APPROVED BY MY 041920 OF FEB MENTIONS QUOTE REORGANIZATION WHICH WILL BE SUBMITTED NEAR FUTURE UNQUOTE AND NOT YET RECEIVED PARA WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ABOUT DISCONTINUANCE OF BATTLE FORCE AND SCOUTING FORCE AS PERMANENT TASK FORCES ESPECIALLY SINCE BUNAV STATES NO REASON WHY FLAG AND OTHER OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BE ORDERED AS COMMANDER TASK FORCE OR TASK GROUP OR TASK UNIT

10 0254 COMSEPACFOR to COMINCH

Originator ComSepacfor in TRENTON plus SAMPSON departed Bobcat for Canal Zone by direct route 1600 9th. Desire mail be held at Balboa. SEPULGA now SOPA Bobcat. Request interested activities including Army be notified route radio radio traffic via that vessel. Request mail for all vessels BC 200 be forwarded to and held San Francisco.

10 0915 TRITON to COMTASKFOR 7

Cleared area 2 March. 3 freighters and 1 cargo passenger vessel torpedoed. Some rerouting traffic. May pass around north of SAISHUTO. Area patrolled by large seaplanes. No men-of-war sighted.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIGH COMMISSIONER PROGRESSING SATISFACTORYLY. HE STRONGLY DESIRES TO COMMAND ALL MILITARY FORCES. HAVE INFORMED HIM SUCH IS AND WILL BE MY TASK. ALREADY COMMANDER AUSTRALIAN FORCE HERE COOPERATING SPLENDIDLY UNDER ME. ANTICIPATE NO FURTHER TROUBLES RE QUESTION OF COMMAND. 12 OFFICERS OF POPPY FORCE ARRIVED YESTERDAY BY PLANE. CONTRARY TO WAR DEPARTMENT INFORMATION EMMONS REPRESENTATIVE HERE HAS BEEN AND IS DOING SUPERIOR WORK. HE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE REMOVED. THIS FROM GENERAL PATCH FOR TRANSMISSION TO WAR DEPARTMENT.

REQUEST INFORMATION IF ANY FOLLOWING FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT ROSES HOUSING IN NIPA SHACKS OR OTHERWISE WEIGHT HANDLING DOCKS LIGHTERAGE FRESH WATER FUEL OR GAS STORAGE.

DELIVER TO GENERAL R.W. CRAWFORD, WAR PLANS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. WAR DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS NOT INFORM HIGH COMMISSIONER OUR DEFENSE PLANS FOR POPPY HAVE BEEN STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH BY ME. HOWEVER YESTERDAY AUSTRALIAN NAVAL LIAISON HERE (TO CRAWFORD FROM PATCH) INFORMED ME HE HAD DISCLOSED DATE, STRENGTH AND ALL OTHER DATA TO HIGH COMMISSIONER IN ACCORDANCE WITH ORDERS FROM HIS SUPERIOR NAVY AUTHORITY IN AUSTRALIA. THIS LATTER FACT I HAVE CONFIRMED. OTHERWISE PREPARATORY RECONNAISSANCES PROCEEDING SATISFACTORYLY. THIS FROM GENERAL PATCH.

HALSEY IN THIS MORNING. WELL EXECUTED ATTACKS AGAINST WAKE 24TH MARCUS 4TH LOCAL DATES FOUND NO SHIPPING AND FEW AIRCRAFT PRESENT. AT WAKE THREE LARGE SEAPLANES ONE PATROL BOAT ALL DESTROYED FOUR PRISONERS TAKEN FROM LATTER. SHORE INSTALLATIONS INCLUDING LANDING FIELD DAMAGED BY 37 FIVE HUNDRED POUND BOMBS, 182 ONE HUNDREDS, HEAVY STRAFING AND BY BOMBARDMENT NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, BALCH AND MARY. OUR LOSS ONE VSIB CREW APPARENTLY CAPTURED. AT MARCUS TWO DIVE BOMBER SQUADRONS ATTACKED DAWN. NO ENEMY AIRCRAFT PRESENT. FIELD IS ONLY PARTIALLY DEVELOPED BUT USABLE. CONSIDERABLE BUILDINGS INCLUDING PIER ON
south side. Damage difficult to determine as heavy type machine gun fire was accurate. 32 five hundreds and 64 one hundreds dropped on buildings, tanks, AA guns and runway. One VSB shot down but crew seen in rubber boat ten miles from island.

Unless enemy action prevents will keep force sixteen at Pearl at least ten days to accomplish necessary upkeep and urgent alterations to increase combat effectiveness.

No report from Brown but enemy radio indicates contacts beginning 0030Z on tenth. TRITON returning from area north of Formosa reports sinking three freighters and one passenger cargo ship. Midway reports contact with enemy planes at 2340Z tenth. Further details when received.

On forenoon 10 March 105 planes launched from 2 carriers in Gulf of Papua from point 125 miles from Salamoa and carried out surprise attack on enemy forces that port and Lae. No enemy air opposition encountered except 1 scout type seaplane and antiaircraft batteries from shore and ships. Following damage inflicted 3 transports at Lae 2 sunk 1 about 15000 tons with many men aboard other beached. 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers 1 auxiliary believed to be minelayer in Lae-Salamoa Roads damaged as follows: One cruiser hit by 6 500 pound bombs and 1 100 bomb left burning. Other cruiser hit by one 1000 pound bomb blew up probably sunk. One destroyer hit by 500 pound bomb stern blown off and sunk. Other destroyer hit by 100 pound bombs afire and stopped. Minelayer left burning. At Salamoa 2 transports about 10000 tons at anchor. 1 sunk other left burning. 1 scout type seaplane shot down by fighter. 1 LEXINGTON scout bomber pilot Ensign Joseph Philip Johnson USNR and James Wuford Jewell ARM 3rd service number 287 39 74 USN shot down by direct hit AA fire near shore at Lae. Survival uncertain. No other casualties this force. No enemy planes sighted by our ships. US Army bombers followed our attack results unknown. Air field hangars and WSMI houses believed unserviceable mostly from previous bombing. Greatly appreciate excellent reconnaissance information obtained by Royal Australian fliers under difficult and hazardous conditions. Combined task forces withdrawing to fuel rendezvous. Taskfor 11 proceeding PEARL after fueling about 16th unless otherwise directed.
COMANZAC to OPNAV INFO CINCPAC, TANGIER, SUMNER

Your 101828. Facilities ROSES: (a) Estimate housing accommodation for 2000 men available wooden construction buildings and about 1000 in Nipa shacks. (b) Jetties suitable ships boats only 2 length 240' width 8' and 4 length 100' depth water alongside 6 to 8 feet. (c) Lightering nil. (d) Very limited drinking water supply catchwater only. Drinking and boiler water for local steamers at Port Havannah from small stream using ships boats. No water barge. (e) Small supply Diesel oil for Inter-island steamer and Avgas approx 45000 gallons 90 octane and 1500 gallons aero oil available 3rd March for RAAF use. All in drums. No tank storage. (f) TANGIER being requested obtain more detailed information.

SUMNER to CINCPAC


CINCPAC to CTF 11, CTF 17 INFO COMINCH

Task Force 11 comply Cominch 171820 except direct PENSACOLA join Fletcher. Taskforce 17 continue operations ANZAC area. Well Done.

CINCPAC to COMINCH INFO CINCPAC

Your 031505 Fourth Defense Battalion and advance detachment of personnel from Marine Fighting Squadron Ewa expected depart PEARL about 14th. Initial movement to BLEACHER will be CRESCENT CITY, CASTOR, CUYAMA, SOLACE and 2 DD. All except SOLACE returning after discharge. Expect plant mines carried in CASTOR by DMs now in SAMOA. As no reply received my 050509 and 050533 equipment and ground personnel Marine Fighting Squadron being sent to prepare for receiving planes to follow when transportation available here about 1 April. Please advise as to diplomatic arrangements with TONGA and NEW ZEALAND governments.
IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD COMMANDS WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ABOUT SUBSTITUTING TERM NAVAL BASE FOR NAVY YARD TO INCLUDE ADJACENT ACTIVITIES OF BASE CHARACTER AND TO EMPLOY TERM NAVAL DOCKYARD TO INCLUDE INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENT AND ACTIVITIES SERVING OR OTHERWISE DIRECTLY RELATED THERE-TO PARA IN HAWAII A LINE OFFICER WOULD HAVE TRIPLE FUNCTIONS AS TO SEAFPONTIER DISTRICT AND NAVAL BASE WHILE AN ENGINEERING DUTY ONLY OFFICER WOULD COMMAND NAVAL DOCKYARD.

COMINCH to CINCPAC

REFER MY 161635 AND 222200 X PLAN DISPATCH FROM EAST COAST ABOUT 6 APRIL NAVAL X ARMY AND AIR UNITS AND SERVICES FOR BLEACHER X PERSONNEL ABOUT 6000 ARMY X 500 NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION X 500 NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE UNIT X FORCE MENTIONED YOUR 120259 WILL BE USED FIJI-AUSTRALIAN AREA AT A PLACE TO BE DESIGNATED LATER AFTER BEING RELIEVED AT BLEACHER BY ARMY.

SUMNER TO CINCPAC

Local colonel in command made careful survey water. Your 122149. Sumner replying. Reports present wells and storage adequate for number troops specified. Additional machinery and tanks will add to convenience by locating wells where desired. Storage tank and cisterns generally used in town. Mostly open wells located at various other places of the island. Water reported good.
Maximum number Army heavy bombers available daily here for striking force is 18. This due to limited total number and essential demands maintenance and repair. Your 111620. Request every effort expedite air increases previously recommended for this area particularly heavy bombers.

Anzac squadron under Focas will operate as desired by Fletcher in connection further operations against enemy. Army bomber and RAAF cooperation will be arranged by me as may be requested. PBY patrol and search continues but is subject to modification as desired. Comanzac will continue daily intelligence. CHICAGO pass this (by visual) to Focas for action.

With reference to Daily Bulletins of Japanese activity and after consultation Cincpac submit following for consideration by Cominch (a) in order prevent possible leakage information obtained by CI and consequent loss of source of this information delete from all bulletins direct references this type of information. (b) avoid repeating information previously issued by Mid Pacific Units. This will obviate possibility of apparent contradiction of locations enemy units due to time lag between issuance various bulletins. (c) in order preserve general security reduce number of addressees to those actually concerned.

On completion fueling both Task Forces around sixteen March assume Task Force 17 full and Task Force 11 sufficient fuel for return PEARL. Further assume KASKASKIA NEOSHO practically empty and TIPPECANOE at SUVA with 65,000 barrels. Based on above TIPPECANOE remain to serve Fletcher. PLATTE expected arrive SUVA same purpose around 26 March. KASKASKIA and NEOSHO return PEARL as directed by Brown discharging remnants to SUVA if space available and remnants large enough to warrant it. Advise if foregoing not feasible or satisfactory.
13 0339  CINCPAC to COMTASKFOR 17 INFO COMINCH, COMANZAC

CinCPac 120335 your operations directly under Cominich. In absence other orders be guided by principles given Cominich 261630 and 021615. BRIDGE with food and DOBBIN with some ammunition replacements of all kinds and minor repair facilities are in Pago Pago available for your logistic support. SOLACE departing Pearl 14th for Samoa. You are authorized to order any one of those ships elsewhere in emergency to supply your forces keeping CinCPac informed. Fuel supply covered in separate despatch. Service Force detachment with defense battalion and mines arrives Tongatabu code name Bleacher about 26th to establish advance base. Lahi Passage has been swept to 40 feet and buoyed by SUMNER. Anchorage available off Nukualofa.

13 0545  CINCPAC to BRIDGE, DOBBIN, SOLACE

ComTaskForce 17 has been authorized to order any of addressees to proceed as services for his forces may require.

13 1305  COMINCH to CINCPAC, CINCLANT INFO CG AMPHIBFOR PAC & LANT

Effort will be made to keep 1 full division combat loaded transports available each coast for training which must be expedited even though piecemeal. Para.

Demands for shipping may necessitate that transport training division include ships under overhaul.

13 1535  COMINCH to COMANZAC, COMTASKFOR 17 INFO CINCPAC

CINCPAC 130339 EXPEDITE READINESS TASKFOR 17 AND ANZAC SQUADRON TO CONTINUE OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ENEMY ACTIVITIES NEW GUINEA AREA AND EASTWARD PREMISED ON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY CINCPAC AND COMANZAC FORCE WITH LATTER ARRANGING FOR AIR COOPERATION WHICH WAS SO EFFECTIVE ON MARCH 10TH PARA ENEMY ACTIVITIES AGAINST PORT MORESBY AND/OR TO SECURE BASE SITES IN SOLOMON ISLANDS ARE INDICATED AS OBJECTIVES BUT YOU ARE FREE TO STRIKE AS YOU SEE FIT TO CRIPPLE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES.

13 2037  OPNAV to CINCPAC

Your 130339 request information number mines type cable plummets and antenna being sent Bleacher in order correlate mining projects. 600 contact mines being prepared for shipment to Bleacher and 270 to Roses repeat Roses from Yorktown and West Coast early April.
13 1430 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

YOUR 122059 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS INDICATE ADVISABILITY OF ATTACKING BASIC SHIPS NAMED TO YOUR TASK FORCE 16 DULY STREAMLINED BUT TO INCLUDE SISTER SHIP PARA STAND BY TO SEND COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN TO WEST COAST FOR CONFERENCE ABOUT TIME BASIC SHIP ARRIVES THERE

13 1955 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

YOUR 030323 FEBRUARY WAS APPROVED BY MY 041920 FEBRUARY PARA NOW WISH YOUR VIEWS AS TO CONTINUATION OF TERMS "BATTLE FORCE AND SCOUTING FORCE" AS PERMANENT TASK FORCES X NOTE THAT THESE TERMS ARE NOT IN USE IN ATLANTIC PARA BNAV STATES THAT OFFICERS CAN BE ORDERED TO SEA DUTY AS "COMMANDER TASK FORCE TASK GROUP OR TASK UNIT" WITHOUT NUMERICAL DESIGNATION

14 2155 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Task Force 16 ready to depart about 21st. Your 131430. Task Force 18 due arrive San Diego about same date. Task Force 17 should leave Anzac Area about 5 April for return Pearl. Proposed conference would require delay depart 16 or assignment of relief task force commander.

15 1520 COMTASKFOR 11 to COMINCH INFO COMANZAC CINCPAC CTF-17

This my 102201 and Comanzac 120155 during Navy attack Salamaua-Lae area additional ships were sighted 25 miles off coast and attacked by part of YORKTOWN planes which arrived in area one half hour after LEXINGTON planes. An officer flown to Townsville with despatches following day was informed by Major Carmichael USA that Army bombers attacked ships at sea and not ships in ports of either Salamaua or Lae already sinking or badly damaged by Navy. It is therefore probable that total damage inflicted on 10 March by combined United States-Australian forces is: By Navy 1 CA MOGAMI class sunk 1 CA KINUGASA class sunk 1 CL NATORO or TENRYU class badly damaged and believed sunk. 1 DD probably sunk 2 badly damaged possibly sunk. 5 APs or AKs all either sunk or completely destroyed by fire and beached. 1 AM burning and probably sunk. 1 AV seriously damaged. 2 PG damaged 1 burning possibly sunk.
OPNAV to CINCPAC info CONANZAC

13 2100

Our mining plans assume same ships will lay mines in succession at Fantan Bleacher and Roses using some assembly personnel now enroute Fantan. Advise whether correct or what additional mine facilities desired.

COM-14 to COMINCH info CINCPAC

13 2358

Believe current designations and organization simple effective and well understood your 121250. Line Flag Officer for Comdt Navy Yard of great value on account military and professional qualifications as he has important military duties relating security navy yard and adjacent land areas as well as being charged security waters Pearl together with entrance sortie berthing piloting and supply tugs to fleet. In addition he affords trained line relief for District Comdt in case sickness or casualty. Doubt exists as to whether change title would not cause loss statutory and fiscal authority now possessed by Comdts Navy Yard. Recommend no change.

CINCPAC to COMINCH info COM-14

14 0353

Recommend against changes Naval District dash Navy Yard setup offered for comment your 121250. New setup does not offer advantages that would outweigh confusion that might result from changes in organization at a time when utmost stability is required. Concur in Com-14 despatch 132358.

TANGIER to COMANZAC, CINCPAC

14 0530

Your 030500 suitable for flight operations, it is believed, under all wind directions. The greatest difficulty will be experienced finding suitable plane and tender moorings since deep water cones abruptly up to coral reef skirting harbor. Chart depth of water is below figures furnished by French authorities here. Before basing at Havanna submarine protection across two passages should be provided. Above result of roncom landing and air reconnaissance information contained your 110432 checks except that there is possibilities few lighters at Roses though not seen in harbor today. Pass to Comanzac for action.
13 2141 COMTASKFOR 17 to COMANZAC INFO CINCPAC

Necessary BRIDGE DCBBIN SOLACE base closer to probable scene of operations this Task Force. In view my lack of knowledge harbor conditions and necessity radio silence request Comanzac take charge those ships and order them to Noumea or Suva preferable the former. BRIDGE especially required for early provisioning. BRIDGE should leave 10 days provisions at Samoa for San Francisco and Bagley.

141825 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COM 14 INFO VARIOUS COMMANDS

Com 14 130121 recommendation:
(A) Approved.
(B) Cominch and Com 14 discontinue bulletins. CinCPac issue daily bulletin.
(C) Addressees as per present Com 14 bulletin plus SPENAVO. Continue distribution RI and COPEKS as at present.

15 0137 CINCPAC TO COMINCH, OPNAV

Opnav 132037 sending to Bleacher 430 mark 6 mines completely assembled and adjusted for depth. Following data give in order number mines depth casing feet depth antennae float feet limitations depth water fathoms Afirm 80. 45. 10. 10-157, Baker 80. 45. 10. 10-74, Cast 20.25. 10. 6-57, Dog 175. 25. 7. 6-57, Easy 125. 22. 7. 5-57.

Tentative mining plan supplied Commander Task Force 13 subject to modification after arrival Bleacher about 26th and conferring with local authorities and Sumner now surveying there.

Opnav 132100. Kingfisher now laying fields Suva understand additional mines being sent there from mainland. Gamble and Ramsay planting mines Samoa estimated complete 27 March. Mines arrived those places missing essential parts which have been supplied from Pearl. Plan use Gamble, Ramsay at Bleacher. No information regarding Roses.

Bumed 132041 assume orders for base hospital 3 issued by Opnav or Cominch. Request location Strawstack estimated time arrival and any other pertinent information.

Insofar as possible recommend Cincpac be kept fully advised as to plans for south sea bases with advance information where practicable in order to provide more effective planning cooperation and coordination here.
15 1525 COMTASKFOR 11 TO COMINCH INFO COMANZAC

Numerous small craft and landing boats attempting rescue of personnel from AP beached and sunk. 2 seaplanes Lae definitely shot down in flames other seen falling out of control. Antiaircraft guns on beach at Lae and on cruisers strafed and silenced. By Army and Australian forces: 1 near miss on cruiser. 1 near miss on large destroyer. 1 direct hit on each of 2 APs. 1 AP surrounded by 6 bombs and left burning. 1 near miss on each of 2 other AP seen to have caused damage. 1 near miss on 1 other AP. All bombs used by Army and Australian forces were either of 500 or 600 pound type. Total 104 carrier planes polish Hudsons and 8 Army bombers participated in attack. Report of Navy damages is result of careful check and analysis of reports submitted by LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN squadrons commanders and pilots and from interpretation of photographs made during engagement.

15 1526 OPNAV TO CINCPAC

If well boring outfits are enroute Bleacher in CRESCENT CITY or other vessel request wells be drilled to accommodate about 7000 Army, Navy permanent garrison due Bleacher in May. Will any distillation and purification units be required? Reference Summer to Cincpac 122305.

16 0217 CINCPAC TO CTF 17, COMANZAC

CTF 17 132141 do not desire ships mentioned base in as advanced places as Noumea and Suva. They may be ordered there for services in accordance my 130339 on completion of which they should be promptly returned Samoa. Contemplate use Bleacher when advanced base established there.

16 0821 COMTASKFOR 11 TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC, COMANZAC

Aidac

Recommendation as to future operations in north Anzac Area.

16 1642 COMINCH TO COMSWPACFOR, COMSUBRON 5

COMSWPACFOR TRANSFER 4 DD 5 OSS AT ONCE TO COMANZAC FORCE FOR DUTY. HAVE AS ACCOMPANY CSS LAND SPARES AND STORES AS DIRECTED BY COMANZACFOR THEN RETURN NORMAL STATION. ON DEPARTURE BOBCAT COMSUBRON 5 IN GRIFFIN SUEDIV 53 REPORT COMANZAC FOR DUTY.
MAR GCT

16 2043 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

MY REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING PEARL MOST RAPID MEANS FOR CONFERENCE WITH YOU AND COMTASKFOR 16. SHOULD ARRIVE 20TH THIS REFERS TO SUBJECT MY 131430 YOUR 142155 AND TAKES PLACE OF CONFERENCE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED

17 0241 CINCPAC TO OPNAV

Your 141828. Cincpac now controlling evacuation allocations and giving consideration to civilian needs. Allocations are based on priorities and proportioned to numbers various categories to be evacuated as agreed to in conference with representatives ComGen Hawaiian Dept.

17 0345 CINCPAC TO OPNAV

No well boring equipment in CRESCENT CITY. SUMNER reports water situation satisfactory. Your 151526 in view comments SUMNER 122305 and considering variation in Bleacher rainfall recommend permanent garrison provide well boring outfits and purification units and for emergency use distillation equipment.

17 0145 TANGIER to CINCPAC

General Patch to General Marshall War Dept Washington D C. Situation as follows colon except for unloading details comma all troops ashore and dispersed. 50% present ship supplies ashore. Limited unloading facilities and equipment slows time of debarkation of supplies and equipment. 85% motor equipment yet to arrive. Ground reconnaissance shows terrain and road net exceptionally severe comma hence additional quarter ton 4 by 4 vehicles urgently needed here. Requisition for them follows. Force directed to be dispatched to Efate by your radio have sailed under escort comma General Rose in command. My previous request for 3000 additional 30 caliber rifles and attendant ammunition to organize comma train and have available a force of 3000 additional native troops unanswered. Emphasize the importance of this request semicolon request confirmation or denial. Destroying air field at Koumac because adequate defense thereof would cause excessive troop dispersion. Have received written agreement from high commissioner here to exercise command over allied forces in Poppy. From General Patch.
FOR INFORMATION ONLY. IT IS LIKELY THAT SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA UNDER UNITED STATES CONTROL WILL SOON BE SET UP TO INCLUDE AUSTRALIA THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES LESS SUMATRA PLUS PHILIPPINES NEW GUINEA BISMARCS AND SOLOMONS. IN SUCH CASE NAVAL FORCES WILL BE UNITED IN ONE COMMAND PROBABLY UNDER LEARY COMPRISING AUSTRALIAN NAVY AND CURRENT UNITED SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCE. ALL AIR FORCES OTHER THAN NAVAL WILL PROBABLY ALSO BE COMBINED UNDER A SINGLE SUBORDINATE COMMAND. OVERALL COMMAND WILL BE SIMILAR TO THAT OF ABDA AREA PROBABLY UNDER UNITED STATES ARMY OR AIR CORPS OFFICER. SOUTH PACIFIC AREA ALSO CONTEMPLATED TO INCLUDE ALL EAST OF ABOVE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AND UNDER UNITED STATES NAVY.

YOUR 161847 MY 120259 ADVANCE DETACHMENT OF 1 OFFICER 151 MEN WITH 1 J2F DUE BLEACHER IN CRESCENT CITY 27 MARCH TO PREPARE FOR RECEIVING PLANES. EXPECT SEND 21 P2A AND 1 J2F FROM HERE WHEN TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE ABOUT 1 APRIL. IN VIEW LIMITED UNLOADING FACILITIES BLEACHER AND DISTANCE FIELD FROM PORT PROBABLY PLANES MUST BE LANDED AND REASSEMBLED SUVA AND FLOWN TO BLEACHER. TRANSPORTATION AND READINESS FOR SERVICE WILL BE EXPEDITED AS MUCH AS THE VARIOUS COMPLICATED FACTORS PERMIT BUT IT NOW APPEARS IM- PROBABLE THAT READINESS WILL BE APPRECIABLE BEFORE ARRIVAL FORCE MENTIONED YOUR 122010. IF ASSIGNMENT THESE PLANES ELSEWHERE IN SOUTH SEAS CONTEMPLATED FURTHER COMPLICATIONS AND DELAYS IN MOVING FROM BLEACHER WILL BE ENTAILED. IF ANY CANCELLATION ASSIGNMENT THIS SQUADRON IS UNDER CONSIDERATION REQUEST EARLY ADVICE IN ORDER IT MAY BE SENT PALMYRA WHERE STATIONING OF PLANES URGENTLY DESIRED.
March 18.

There was still no word from Task Forces 11 and 17. Some indication is expected from ComTF-17 as to his intentions. TF-11 is returning to Pearl but date of arrival is unknown.

TF-13 is en route Tongatabu (Bleacher) expected to arrive on the 27th. Orders (182055) were issued to the GAMBLE and RAMSAY to proceed to Bleacher on the 27th to lay mines.

TF-18 (HORNET Group) is expected to arrive San Diego on the 20th.

The refloating attempt on the TAYLOR was unsuccessful and prospects are most unfavorable.

Received 192350 from Com.Gen 2nd Marine Brigade concerning Western Samoa.

The enemy seems to be occupied in reorganizing, though he continues to bomb Moresby and is advancing on that place through the jungle of the Papuan peninsula.

Tulagi was also bombed by 5 four-engined bombers.

The Army commander at Canton reported five ships proceeding by Canton. The MAHAN was unable to verify this report. Also Christmas Island sighted a mysterious single engined plane.

March 19.

No information from Task Forces at sea but from report of KASKASKIA, it is estimated TF-11 will arrive here March 25th.

Sent 191929 to Cominch concerning Marine shore battery at Bleacher.

Com-12 sent 190710 to Opnav asking for information on the new South Pacific bases.

A squadron of patrol planes will be sent to Australia, to be replaced by one from the West Coast. Efforts are being made to provide Fremantle with air defenses. (Cominch 191920).

Information was received that Rear Admiral's Rockwell and Purnell would serve under Vice Admiral Leary and Vice Admiral Glassford would go to other duty. Admiral Hart arrived on the East Coast a few days ago. The MARBLEHEAD was badly damaged and is at Columbus with the BOISE. The HOUSTON has been given up for lost.
March 19 (Continued)

The enemy bombed Beru (Gilberts) yesterday. Indications continue to point to a move against India - other moves not yet defined.

Received from Cominch 191905 concerning possible use of battleships to relieve pressure in the Indian Ocean.

Captain Duncan, the aviation officer of Cominch's Staff, arrived for conference.

March 20.

Task forces proceeding as before.

Received Cominch's 191400, 191401, 191402 in which plans were made known for bases at Tongatabu, Efate and a Samoan system of bases. These expeditions from East and West Coasts will total 13 transports and 15 cargo ships. The Samoan group will continue to be Marine-garrisoned; the others, Army. It will be seen that this requires Task Force 13 to be diverted to Efate (Roses). (CinCPac 210533). Also mining at Bleacher will be delayed.

Some convoys continue to go to Australia there being one en route from San Francisco and one from the East Coast. There are also large numbers of cargo ships proceeding singly by circuitous routes. The items in the press emphasize the help that is being given to Australia. General McArthur has announced that we will launch an offensive from Australia and relieve the Philippines.

Our B-17's from Townsville continue to bomb the enemy at his New Guinea and New Britain bases, though only four have been used recently.

Sent 210111 to Samoa in regard to initial movements to Western Samoa. Received Cominch's 192055 concerning local defense forces for Samoa - apparently to be supplied from HawSeaFront.

Comanzac's 202256 indicates some of the questions the Department is now asking about Roses.

The enemy still maintains the Screening Force in the Homeland-Bonins Area, and a good many units are returning to home yards for refits. In general he seems to be reorganizing and making plans for his next moves.
March 21

Task Force 11 still returning. The SAN FRANCISCO and one destroyer found it necessary to stop at Pago Pago for provisions from the BRIDGE.

Task Force 17 has not yet informed of his intentions.

Task Force 16 is being held in port until the HORNET gets out to the Hawaiian area.

The reports of the NARWHAL and TUNA with about two ships apiece (East China Sea and Bungo Channel respectively) are more encouraging than was at first thought.

A conference was held by the Admiral as to the possible use of the battleships to divert forces from the Indian Ocean. It was decided that we would be forced to hold them on the West Coast for almost another month. They are operating at sea, including target practice, as much as the size of their destroyer escort permits. They have only 3 DD now but will soon have five.

No considerable change in the enemy dispositions has been noted. Some movement of units to the Homeland continues. The mutual air attacks between enemy and allied forces in the New Guinea area continues.

The Vichy radio has been broadcasting apparently Axis inspired reports that large expeditionary forces (Jap) were enroute Western Australia and Fiji.

March 22.

Task Forces as before. VINCENNES is being given a short availability at Mare Island to correct her most glaring deficiencies.

The salvage units have been ordered back from Canton. Further attempts to float the President Taylor will be discussed after their return.

Allied aircraft had considerable success in destroying
enemy aircraft at Lae. This was the first indication that fighters have been stationed at Moresby. There are 15. Also received information that there is a squadron of fighters at Fremantle. Koepang was reconnoitred and attacked by the Australians.

March 23.

Task Forces as before except received report that Task Force 11 will arrive the 26th instead of the 25th; also received ComTaskFor's 210833 as to his intentions. He does not intend to attack any enemy base.

Captain Duncan left by air for Washington today. He carried a mailgram (232130 - not attached) to Comin-ch concerning future plans. Cincpac 240147 was sent on the same subject.

In 231255 Comin-ch again pointed out to Comanzac that Bleacher and Auckland are the bases having priority.

Received 210502 from CHICAGO concerning lack of underwater defenses at Noumea.

SOLACE arrived at Pago Pago. He reports sighting a submarine just north of there during the night. The R.D.F. has indicated a submarine in that vicinity for some time. SOLACE is observing Geneva Convention concerning hospital ships.

The Commander-in-Chief held a conference to discuss an Estimate of the Situation by Rear Admiral Theobald. The gist of this was that the Japs would probably not tackle either Australia or India - therefore the present is a likely time for an attack against Hawaii. Therefore he recommends holding strong forces within a day and a half of Oahu until the enemy commits himself. The consensus of opinion at the conference was that there is increased chance of such attack but it is not imminent. It is not practicable at this time to operate strong forces as he suggests.

Received Comdg. General 2d Marine Brigade's 232026 and 232039 giving terms of agreement regarding Western Samoa.

The third part of this agreement (232051) was also received.
March 23 (Cont'd)

A patrol plane has been surveying the Society and Cook Group with a view to building other Army air fields.

Mutual air attacks continue in area along North Australia. One enemy attack went to Katherine, 150 miles inland of Darwin on the one land route which leads to that place from the south.

March 24.

No change in operations of task forces today.

A letter giving the proposed task organization of the Fleet was sent to CominCh via Capt. Duncan. By this, the Scouting Force and Battle Force are done away with. Vice Admiral Brown will command the Amphibious Force; Vice Admiral Pye the Covering Force (BB's and accompany ships of other types).

The CALIFORNIA was floated today. The NEVADA is out of dock and is expected to be ready to proceed to the West Coast about April 18th.

Received 240300 from NZNB relative to features of Roses.

The LEXINGTON has a stripped turbine, but the present idea is that she will have to run on it for awhile. However T.F.-11 will be given about two weeks in port if practicable.

The state of the defenses of Canton is giving concern. The expedition was planned in Washington, and the personnel establishing themselves there are inexperienced in any such work. It has been entirely an Army project, but CinCPac is responsible and the place is of great strategic value to us. Investigation of means to improve the situation is underway.

No new moves by the enemy were evident today, although he has or is about to occupy the Andaman Islands in eastern Bay of Bengal.

March 25.

No change in operations of task forces.

Received training schedule for BB's of Task Force One. Due to small number of destroyers available, the divisions are operating at sea from San Francisco one at a time.

The situation as to aircraft in the Hawaiian area is attached herewith.
March 25 (Cont'd)

Plans are complete to mine French Frigate Shoal and mine-laying will commence about the 29th.

Received from Opnav 251410 regarding mining at Efate and 251650 regarding fuel requirements for the April convoys to the South Pacific and Australia.

The situation known of the enemy remains the same. A flurry by our submarines in the Bonins area was apparently caused for the enemy Screening Force and related forces. A definite submarine contact was reported between Brisbane and Noumea.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander-in-Chief.

Following is the latest status of Army and Navy aircraft based on Oahu:

**ARMY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Heavy bombers</td>
<td>Of these, one at Palmyra is still awaiting repair. No news of any increases. Of 114 B-26's for Australia, 61 have arrived here. Of these, 41 have departed for Australia, 5 are in flying condition, and 14 are being assembled. Hereafter, B-26's for Australia will be flown, rather than shipped, here from the coast. No more B-25's will be flown through here, the Dutch contract having been cancelled. Two B-25's are hung up here by the cancellation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>No information as to more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>No information as to more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Medium bombers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Observation</td>
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**NAVY**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>Of these 84, 6 are basing at Noumea and 12 are leaving soon for Australia. 41 are due from the coast and 11 are due to be returned to the coast. The net result will be 102 planes, of which 96 will be here and 6 at Noumea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>SARATOGA squadron (15) and Marine squadron (20).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Scout Bombers</td>
<td>SARATOGA squadron (18) and Marine squadron (18).</td>
</tr>
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</table>
**Subject:** Status of Army and Navy Aircraft based on Oahu.

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<td>15</td>
<td>VO/VS</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>VJ (Large)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>VJ (Small)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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A. C. Davis

**Copy to:**
Chief of Staff
Operations
War Plans
Capt. McCormick
March 26.

Task Force 11 entered today. On the whole, they had stood the 54 days at sea very well. The fueling at sea was accomplished repeatedly but it takes up a large percentage of time and puts the force involved in a very vulnerable status. There is not a great deal to add to Vice Admiral Brown's despatch reports which have been included earlier in this summary. The two carriers and the four cruisers went into the Gulf of Papua on the 10th and flew aircraft across the mountains during the favorable part of the day. The LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN air groups attacked separate groups of ships, and including the B-17 attack which followed, a total of 23 ships sunk or damaged are claimed. During the advance of the carriers, four cruisers, including the Anzac squadron, conducted air patrols southeast of New Guinea to guard against surprise from that direction.

ComTF-11's directive was to attack the enemy in New Britain and the Solomons, but he apparently decided that better targets offered and more effective attacks could be made where he went.

TF-11 will remain in port about two weeks for upkeep, alterations and repairs. The turrets are being removed from the LEXINGTON in accordance with approved alteration.

The GRIFFIN and 6 S-boats have arrived Bobcat en route Anzac Area. Also convoy BT-201 (From East Coast) has just passed Bobcat en route Australia.

Written directives for the movements to Bleacher, Roses and the Straw bases have been received. The despatch description of these plans has already been included in this summary.

Hdgrs. U.S.N.C. 252030 directs that arrangements be made to receive the 3rd Marine Brigade on Upolu (Strawhat).

Received Cominch 261655 concerning offshore boundaries of sea frontiers.

No new moves on the part of the enemy are evident.

March 27.

Task forces are employed as before. Task Force 17 is presumably at the farthest west point of his sweep in the Coral Sea.

Received 272000 (Aidac) from Cominch in reply to Cincpac 232130 concerning future operations.

Sent 280215 in reply to 272000 which referred to overhaul for Fletcher's force.
March 27 (Cont'd)

Received Cominch 271340 concerning employment of SUMNER at Nandi.

The enemy, from his radio traffic, is undergoing a period of quiet, but some kind of offensive is expected to start on March 30th.

March 28

Task forces operating as before, except Task Force 16 completed target practice yesterday and today.

Received 281645 (Aidac) from Cominch concerning special mission for submarine. The DRUM has been designated in Cincpac 290159 (Aidac) to perform this duty.

Plans have been made to send the WRIGHT to Freemantle to carry personnel and gear for patrol squadron 21 which is enroute Freemantle. WRIGHT will stop at Samoa, Suva, Noumea and Melbourne enroute Freemantle.

Four DMs left for French Frigate to lay the mine field at French Frigate Shoal to deny it to enemy ships, especially submarines.

Received intelligence report from Comanzac which reported 30 transports at Rabaul. In response to an inquiry this was explained to be 30 ships total, including 17 merchant type.

At the same time this report was received, 281635 was received from Cominch asking for the situation with respect to Task Force 17 and the enemy.

Received from Comanzac 290230 regarding state of survey at Nandi, and 280731 concerning the use of some of the Bleacher mines at Nandi.

No other enemy movements or concentrations were noted.

March 29

Task Force 17 is the only major task force at sea. A report from Comanzac stated that our air patrol had sighted Task Force 17 only 280 miles southeast of Rabaul. This was surprising as it was so far within the air search range of enemy bases. However, enemy forces had also been sighted south of Bougainville and it appeared that Task Force 17 was in excellent
position to strike them.

Six B-17s are scheduled to strike Rabaul today.

Vice Admiral Halsey flew to the Coast to make arrangements with Task Force 18 (HORNET) for future operations.

The supply of the outlying islands of this Sea Frontier occupies the full time services of several ships. The CURTISS with escort is at Midway; the BLUE SONOCO, O.OLSEN and THORNTON have just supplied Palmyra.

Cominch in 291440 directed Vice Admiral Leary to take command of the Southwest Pacific forces. This merges them, to all intents and purposes, with the Anzac forces.

In 291015 from Air Department, Wellington, a report was received as to progress in New Caledonia.

The enemy is apparently still preparing for his drives. The Malay-to-the-westward move is the most evident, but a large concentration of ships is at Rabaul.

March 30

Comtaskfor 17 in 292346 gave his real position which was much to the southward of that reported yesterday. In response to the above message, Cominch sent 301930 to Comtaskfor 17 questioning any apparent retirement from the enemy. Further reports of enemy detachments at or near Buka and Bougainville Islands were received, and Shortland Harbor was bombarded and probably occupied late this afternoon. The raid by our B-17s did not bomb Rabaul on account of clouds, but dropped their loads on Lae.

By 310243 Cincpac organized the Amphibious Force with Vice Admiral Brown in command. He is leaving Pearl 3 April to conduct training at San Diego.

Cincpac sent 302231 asking for information as to the agency which will provide for supply of outlying bases once they are established; and 310047 making recommendation that the Wallis Island development be reduced.

In regard to the employment of SUMNER at Nandi as suggested by Cominch, if the full development of Wallis is persisted in, there will be much more profitable use for her there. The SUMNER has reported she will complete survey of Bleacher about 6 April.
March 30 (Continued)

The mine fields at Samoa are completed. Cincpac sent 292359 to Comindiv 2 in regard to laying the Bleacher mines at Roses and Fiji.

Asker SEPULGA in 302325 when fuel tanks at Bobcat would be ready.

Cincpac was informed of a special task of blockade running which has been assigned to the Army.

Indications of enemy advances continue. Besides the westward and eastward moves already mentioned an expansion along the New Guinea North Coast is indicated.

March 31

Comtaskfor 17 explained his plans to Cominch 29 2346. After he provisions and fuels at Noumea he will proceed to the northwestward again to oppose enemy advances. In 311455 Cominch informed T.F. 17 that he should use Bleacher during replenishment after present operations.

In 010033 Cincpac amplified his previous message concerning the Amphibious Force by giving the composition of the Amphibious Corps.

A merchant ship is being prepared for a special mission by placing Navy officers and crew on board.

Taskfor 16 is again carrying on target practice.

The BOISE, completing repairs in a few days, will return to the Pacific Fleet.

Received 312125 from Cominch in regard to plans for the raider battalion to be stationed on Upolu. In 010557 ComGen Second Marine Brigade reported arrival of the first contingent of the garrison for that island.

In 301940 Cominch requested the British to reduce the degree of dissemination of shipping.

Opnav in 301345 told of inability of Australia to supply oil. This was no surprise.

Although there were again several reports of enemy ships in the vicinity of, and south of, Bougainville, nothing definite has developed in that area, nor have the first steps of the other enemy advances been reported.
March 31 (continued)

The bombing of Moresby continues but the fields there are still operable.

In 010435 the RICHMOND reported upon the development of Bobcat. This report and letter from SE Pacific indicate that unloading troubles were added to by poor loading.

April 1.

Task Force 17 presumably completed provisioning at Noumea today and is proceeding to the northwest again. Its tanker, the PLATTE, has been given a point to the northward to which it is to return each day. Small enemy forces are being reported around Bougainville Island and T.F.-17 may find some worthwhile objectives. It is not certain whether Shortland Harbor (South of Bougainville) has been occupied.

Comtaskfor 13 (CRESSENT CITY) reported a surprising speed in unloading at Roses, and in preparing a field for fighters and dive bombers (Comanzac 011359). As a result 020411 was sent to provide for the future movement of the units of that force.

Received 311830 from SecNav providing for the reorganization of the Pacific Fleet. Also from Cominch 010910 learned that the ATLANTA and probably all of Crudiv 11 would reenforce this Fleet.

Received 011040 from SUMNER describing facilities at Bleacher for a carrier group.

At a conference with salvage officer it was decided to organize an expedition to renew attempts to float the TAYLOR at Canton.

No particularly significant moves were made by the enemy today, but he continues to reenforce Rabaul with aircraft. Submarines remain clear of the Central and Eastern Pacific and some have been noted changing base to the Sea of Japan. This and other recent moves of forces in the same direction may mean something in connection with Russia.

April 2.

Task Force 18 departed from the West Coast today. Vice Admiral Halsey is still held up on the coast by weather. The plans for the employment of Task Force Sixteen are awaiting completion until his return.

In 011600 Cominch replied to Admiral Layton concerning exchange of information.
At an informal conference held by the Commander-in-Chief today the future employment of Task Force 11 was discussed. Although it had been planned to have this force operate with Task Force One, chiefly in training exercises, it now appears that it would be more profitable for it to join Task Force Seventeen to oppose the enemy in his advance in the New Guinea-Solomon area. Contrary to previous decision the LEXINGTON is having her turbine repaired until about the 15th. The chief motive in having the battleships (Task Force One) put to sea for a considerable period is to exert a diverting or holding effect on enemy forces which might otherwise support the offensive in the Indian Ocean.

Rear Admiral Bloch was detached as Comhawseafront.

The WRIGHT and TUCKER departed today in accordance with CinCPac 290241 (not attached). The KASKASKIA was added to this expedition to provide for fuel needs in the Anzac or Solomon Area. The chief cargo of the WRIGHT is material for the patrol plane squadron which has just been transferred to Fremantle but she is also carrying miscellaneous items to other bases.

There was received from Cominchr 311840 which reversed the previous interpretation of Secnav that CinCPac is the "Military Commander" required to coordinate intelligence activities in Hawaii. In reply 020247 was sent.

The expedition for the salvage of the TAYLOR was ordered by CinCPac 030125.

The POLLACK which patrolled in the East China Sea reports sinking one freighter. The "bag" by submarines continues to be small but is causing the enemy concern and is diverting his forces for escorts.

No new trends were noted in enemy action. There is still doubt as whether he has occupied Shortland Harbor, but a reliable report was received that about 500 troops had landed at Buka Passage where there is a small airfield.

April 3.

Received Comtaskfor 17 plan for his next operation 020250 (Aidac). Comtaskfor 17 has also issued orders for the Service Force detachment to meet him at Bleacher on 1 May.

Vice Admiral Halsey has not yet returned, so that plans are still being held up.
CINCPAC to SAMOA

Deliver following to CO RAMSAV Quote on 27 March RAMSAV GAMBLE designated TG 13.9 proceed Tongatabu report CTF 13 and lay mine fields as directed by him. Information as in my OpPlan 17-42 in mail via SOLACE. Report expected date completion mining when determined Unquote. Any unfinished mining Samoa will be completed later.

COMGEN 2D MARBRIG to CINCPAC

The following radio to Admor Apia from his government has been furnished the military governor of officer messenger Quote Americans can have full and free use of all land and other facilities for all war purposes and every possible assistance. Cannot answer in detail your inquiry regarding tenure of land but suggest Governor be informed matter will be dealt with as soon as possible and that in meantime he should proceed on the understanding that any question that may arise now or after the war will be dealt with on agreement and on the principle that our object is to meet American wishes in every respect. A senior military officer from New Zealand will arrive in Apia by air at a very early date for discussions with American authorities. Prime Minister Unquote. A message received from Admor states he Col Hunt New Zealand military representative is arriving Apia today or tomorrow and on his arrival will advise military governor when he will be available for discussion. Admor has been advised that we will send a plane to escort Colonel Hunt Pago Pago at such time as he may be ready. It is apparent that Colonel Hunt is prepared to discuss details of American garrison and air installations in Western Samoa. Request instructions as to how far the military governor is authorized to go in such discussions.

COM-12 to OPNAV info CINCPAC, etc.

Definite information required for intelligent planning to assemble cargo assign loading berths and make loading plans for the proposed Roses Bleachers Straw movements. Information should include rates vessels involved troops whether Army Navy or Marines with number and where and when they will arrive complete data regarding cargo where and how it will be delivered. With amounts weights cubic and heavy lifts.
Following is Admiralty message 294A passed by Cominch to you for info: The following arrangements of command in area covered by East Indies station are promulgated for information and necessary action:

(a) The Eastern Fleet consists of all His Majesty's Ships and vessels at present of the East Indies station (except local defense vessels) and of such additions as may be made by Admiralty from time to time.

(b) The Eastern Fleet is commanded and administered by CinC Eastern Fleet who is also responsible for the conduct of naval strategy in area covered by East Indies station and for the provision of naval forces for all operations on the station, including convoy escort other than those provided out of local defence forces.

(c) CinC East Indies remains in command of East Indies station and is responsible for all routine duty on the station. The command and administration of all local defence forces and shore establishments, including Fleet Base (except those situated in Australia which remain under Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, Melbourne) and for the routing of convoys and shipping.

(d) CinC East Indies is also deputy CinC of Eastern Fleet and will act for the Eastern Fleet when latter proceeds afloat so long as CinC Eastern Fleet's headquarters are in Ceylon.

(e) The responsible naval advice to and cooperation with Government of India and other adjacent authorities rests with CinC East Indies and Deputy CinC Eastern Fleet who is responsible for referring any matter of a major strategic nature to CinC Eastern Fleet.

(f) The headquarters of CinC East Indies will remain ashore at Colombo as at present. The CinC Eastern Fleet will be provided with shore accommodation for himself and his Staff at Colombo in order that he may be either ashore or afloat as circumstances require.

(g) Signals and correspondence dealing with matter which falls within province of CinC East Indies as defined above should be addressed CinC East Indies with copy to CinC Eastern Fleet. Signals and correspondence dealing with matter in province of CinC Eastern Fleet should be addressed CinC Eastern Fleet with copy to CinC East Indies as Deputy to CinC Eastern Fleet.
COMINCH to CINCPAC

19 1400

MY 122010 IN ADDITION TO FORCES FOR BLEACHER I PLAN TO SEND FROM SAN FRANCISCO ABOUT 12 APRIL NAVAL AND ARMY UNITS AND SERVICES TO ROSES. MARINE CORPS REENFORCEMENTS FOR STRAW WILL BE LOADED IN TRANSPORTS TO ACCOMPANY WITH BLEACHER AND ROSES CONVOYS WHICH WILL BE ROUTED TO VICINITY OF BOBCAT AND THEN PROCEED GENERALLY IN COMPANY TO DESTINATIONS. ARRANGE FOR PROTECTION FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO BOBCAT AND THENCE TO DESTINATIONS REQUESTING COM ANZAC FOR SUPPORT. COM SOUTHEAST PACFOR WILL BE DIRECTED BY ME TO PROVIDE ESCORTS FROM PANAMA TO BOBCAT. ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL BOBCAT 29 APRIL. BLEACHER CONVOY WILL CONSIST OF 5 TRANSPORTS AND 7 CARGO VESSELS ROSES CONVOY 3 TRANSPORTS AND 3 CARGO VESSELS STRAW CONVOY LOADING NORFOLK 3 TRANSPORTS AND 4 CARGO VESSELS LOADING SAN DIEGO 2 TRANSPORTS AND 1 CARGO VESSEL. ARRANGE FOR REFUELING TRANSPORTS AND CARGO VESSELS AT BOBCAT AND BLEACHER. PART 2 FOLLOWS.

19 1401

COMINCH to CINCPAC

PART 2 OF MY 191400. ROSES PERSONNEL CONSISTS OF ABOUT 5,000 ARMY BUT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT INCLUDE AA OR COMPLETE COAST DEFENSE UNITS ALSO INCLUDES 500 NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION AND 500 NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE AND HOSPITAL UNITS. BASED ON INFO LATELY RECEIVED REGARDING NEW ZEALAND DEFENSES IN PLACE AT BLEACHER AND BECAUSE OF EXPOSED POSITION OF ROSES WHERE 450 ARMY TROOPS ARE DUE TO LAND 18 MARCH FROM POPPY I DESIRE YOU SEND 4TH DEFENSE BATTALION AND ADVANCE DETACHMENTS OF PERSONNEL FROM MARINE FIGHTING SQUADRON IN TASK FORCE 13 TO ROSES. MARINE FIGHTING SQUADRON PLANES AND REMAINDER OF PERSONNEL TO BE DISPATCHED BY YOU TO ARRIVE ROSES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER FIELD COMPLETED. MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION AND VF SQUADRON MUST REMAIN ROSES UNTIL RELIEVED LATER BY ARMY. ARRANGE LOCAL COMMAND RELATIONS ROSES WITH GENERAL PATCH ASSIGNING UNITY OF COMMAND LOCALLY TO SENIOR TROOP COMMANDER PRESENT. NEW ZEALAND KNOWS OF INTENDED MOVEMENT TO BLEACHER. NECESSARY DIPLOMATIC ARRANGEMENTS ROSES WILL BE MADE HERE. DIRECTIVES FOR BLEACHER ROSES AND STRAW MOVEMENTS BEING FORWARDED BY COURIER. PART 3 NOT TO COMANZAC FOLLOWS.
COMINCH to CINCPAC

THIS IS PART 3 OF MY 191400. PARTS 1 AND 2 ARE NOT TO INFO ADDRESSEES. SAMOA CODE NAME STRAW REENFORCEMENTS WILL ARRIVE ABOUT 2 MAY CONSIST ABOUT 6000 MARINES OF 1ST DIVISION 19 VO-VJ AND 1450 NAVY INCLUDING NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION. PLAN TO DEVELOP AREA AS FOLLOWS.

TUTUILLA CODE NAME STRAWSTACK PRESENT DEFENSES PLUS FORCE HEADQUARTERS BASE DEPORT RAIDER BATTALION BARRAGE BALLOON SQUADRON MOBILE BASE HOSPITAL. UPOLU CODE NAME STRAWHALE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS REENFORCED REGIMENT LESS BATTALION 8AA GUNS 8 155MM TWO THIRDS MG GROUP AIRFIELD SEAPLANE BASE. SAVAI CODE NAME STRAWMAN INFANTRY COMPANY FOR OBSERVATION. WALLIS ISLAND CODE NAME STRAWBOARD REENFORCED BATTALION 8 AA GUNS 8 155 MM TWO THIRDS MG GROUP AIRFIELD SEAPLANE BASE. REFERENCE COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG 190045 CINCPAC ISSUE DIRECTIVE RELATIVE ADVANCE PROTECTION AND PREPARATIONS UPOLU. DELAY RECONNAISSANCE PREPARATIONS WALLIS UNTIL JUST PRIOR ARRIVAL GARRISON AS IT MAY BE THAT FORCIBLE OCCUPATION MAYBE INVOLVED.

IN ORDER MEET INSO FAR AS PRACTICABLE REQUIREMENTS COMSOWESPAC 140310 WITHOUT REDUCING PATROL PLANE STRENGTH HAWAIIAN AREA TRANSFER TO PEARL ONE SQUADRON FROM PATWING 4 AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER ARRIVAL THESE REPLACEMENTS TRANSFER TO COMSOWESPAC FOR OPERATION IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA ONE SQUADRON OF 12 PATROL PLANES FROM TASKFORCE 9. ARRANGE WITH COMSOWESPAC FOR SUPPLY OF ONLY SUCH EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL AS IS NECESSARY. REDISTRIBUTION OF PLANES AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED AT YOUR DISCRETION TO EFFECTUATE ABOVE. OPMNAV AND BUREAUS INFORMED.

CINCPAC to COMINCH

Your 192010 urge six 155 MM M-1 tractor drawn high speed mounts with ammunition be provided Fourth Defense Battalion for use after relief Bleacher. Present five inch guns and ammunition this battalion to remain in defense Bleacher. Approval will speed permanent defense Bleacher and increase suitability Fourth Defense Battalion for mobile use with offensive forces.
COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG, SAMOA

Following Higgins boats were shipped to SAMOA. Four picket boats serial numbers C5934, 5935, 5936, 5940, and two converted landing boats numbers C3618 and 3622 total six Higgins type intended for antisubmarine use. Equipment included depth charge racks installed radio and portable hydrophone sets furnished. Navsta Tutuila 130644. Four additional landing boats serial numbers C3564, 3568, 3573 and 3591 were also shipped by local authorities. Assignment of tuna boats and local defense vessels may be made by Cincpac from those assigned HawSeaFron.

COMANZAC to --- INFO CINCPAC

Following contents Comanzac 1433Z/10 passed to Australian Naval Liaison Officer OBJO REP at Vila for action and NZNB for info. Please pass following message to Commanding Officer U.S. Army Detachment at Vila. Quote require three dispersed landing plane fields. Inform what areas are suitable and give approximate estimate amount earth movement required to grade. Report on available water supply from existing source and prospect supply new wells and from stream within five miles of Vila. Requirements are for about 6,000 men. Unquote above message was received from Washington.

CINCPAC to COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG INFO COMINCH, ETC.

Refer Hqrs USMC 132123. General plan contained Cominch 191402. UR 130045. Establish advance protection at Upolu and Savaii. Authorized employ GARFIELD for initial movement with least practicable delay. Prepare in every possible way for arrival of permanent defenses and facilities Upolu and Savaii. UR 182350 in discussions with Col Hunt authorized to discuss our plan for defense of Samoan group and to arrange for land, services, assistance required by military necessity.

COMTASKFOR 17 TO COMANZAC

Your 200733 This force will fuel from TIPPECANOE 22-23 March north of New Caledonia. Then proceed west into Coral Sea to approximately Long. 153 East. If favorable opportunity can be found to attack enemy surface concentrations will give you as much advance information as possible. Necessary to return vicinity of Noumea by April 1st for provisioning. Your 190015 Please keep me informed.
Make following changes to my operation plan number 17-42. Add new paragraph 1J: On 18th March U S Army advance detachment composed one heavy weapons company one infantry company services commanded by BrigGen Rose 60 days supplies 10 units fire landed at EFATE, New Hebrides code name ROSES. Due exposed position this detachment Cominch has directed Cincpac to divert Marine 4th Defense Battalion and advance detachments personnel from Marine Fighting Squadron now embarked in Taskfor 13 to ROSES. Planes and remainder personnel fighting squadron to follow as soon as possible after airfield is completed. Defense battalion and fighter squadron to remain ROSES until later relieved by Army. Under General Patch at Noumea local unity of command vested in Senior Troop Commander present. Necessary diplomatic arrangements regarding ROSES being made in Washington. Cancel paragraph 2. New mission derived from information above. Cancel subparagraphs 3 a firm 2 to 5 inclusive substitute operate with U S Army in defense of ROSES until relieved. In paragraph 3 baker l change destination to ROSES. Add completion discharge marines and equipment at ROSES proceed BLEACHER and discharge material destined for that base. Modify paragraph 3 Xray proceed ROSES via route points Maine 11-45 South 171-00 West and Vermont 17-00 South 175-00 East to arrive FILA HARBOR 1900Z/28 March if practicable. If delayed advise Gen. Patch via TANGIER. Use direct route from ROSES to BLEACHER advising SUMNER and Comdt. SAMOA expected time arrival. CRESCENT CITY depart BLEACHER in advance of CASTOR if return to west coast will thereby be expedited. CTF 13 deliver copy to CO 4th Marine Defense Battalion for action. TANGIER deliver copy to Gen. Patch. Comanzac requested to cover movement Taskforce 13 from point Vermont to ROSES and during discharging. Comdt. SAMOA direct minelayers to BLEACHER on receipt date Taskfor 13 arrival there.
CINCPAC TO COMINCH

In view special character of some of the considerations involved reply to your 191905 is being transmitted by your representative leaving Pearl today Monday.

CHICAGO TO COMANZAC

Further observation Noumea on relatively clear dark nights no moonlight leads conclusion port and Great Roads peculiarly susceptible to submarine attack surface awash or submerged. Precipitous shore line contour and profile stand out clearly against dark background and depth of water close to shore offers simple problem of navigation and attack to determined submarine commander of average ability. Military value of ships present which may be determined by air reconnaissance would justify loss any reasonable number of submarines. Penetration barrier reef possible with relative impunity several passes. Attack could be delivered later after charting and close observation. On clear moonlight or partial moonlight night problem even simpler for submarines handled with average skill. Suggest ultimate protection should be positive with anti-submarine net at frequently used passes such as Bulari with effective mine labyrinths at all other passes and torpedo and light indicator nets across port and Great Road entrances. Such means necessary for security and to reduce tension which might otherwise exist through baseless alarms. This is a continuation of my 160132. In meantime anti-submarine patrol air and surface desirable at Bulari and at Port and Great Roads entrances day and night. Danger submarine attack progressively increases.

COMINCH TO COMANZAC

HAVE JUST SEEN ACNB DISPATCH TO BAD WASHINGTON FROM WHICH IT APPEARS THAT YOU DO NOT YET APPRECIATE THAT BLEACHER AND AUCKLAND HAVE BEEN SET BY ME AS PRINCIPAL OPERATING BASES IN SOUTH PACIFIC

TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO CURB REQUESTS WHICH CANNOT HAVE PRIORITY UNTIL BLEACHER AND AUCKLAND HAVE BEEN TAKEN CARE OF
Cancel my 220750. This part one of three parts. Originator Com.Gen. 2nd MarBrig. Following summary agreement signed by Brig. Gen. Larsen in capacity Military Governor and Lieutenant Colonel F L Hunt representing the New Zealand Government signed 20 March becomes operative immediately and subject to ratification by the Governments of United States and New Zealand:

United States have full and free use of the areas and facilities required now or for future development for the period of the war. And such further periods as may be required by the commander of the American forces in Samoa to clear up the situation.

Tactical dispositions will be considered of primary importance and will be given highest priority in any arrangements to be concluded.

The full and free use of existing facilities will be granted to the United States authorities including ports. Land area to be selected by the Commander United States Force in Samoa. Roads. Communications. Seaplane base, etc. In event future development created either by United States authorities or British use of such facilities may be granted to either nation at the discretion of the commander of such military installation.

Samoan Group shall be considered tactical entity and in consideration of the garrisoning or occupation of Western Samoa by United States forces the latter islands (Western Samoa) shall be under the same military status as American Samoa.

Under principle unity of command Governor American Samoa shall exercise same authority in Western Samoa. Part 2 follows.

This is part 2 of 3 parts. The functions of civil government in Western Samoa shall continue exercise through the administrator of Western Samoa but in any and all matters affecting the military situation or forces or the security
of the islands the orders and actions of the civil government insofar as they affect Western Samoa shall be subject to the approval of the Military Governor. Authority over the civil population will be exercised through the civil administration and authority over the military forces will be exercised by the military commander. Local detachment New Zealand troops will act as patrols and military police in relation to civilians in insuring security of Western Samoa in cooperation with United States forces and may be assigned missions in general scheme of defense also guard duty government property and in charge of internment camps. Camps. Airfields and similar areas placed at the disposal of U.S. forces shall pass to the exclusive jurisdiction of such U.S. forces. All discipline over members of U.S. forces or U.S. Nationals employed defense projects remain hands appropriate U.S. authorities. Arrests, trial, punishment Samoan civilians carried out per local law by ordinary civil agencies. New Zealand Government agrees to provide U.S. forces with necessary land and water areas and their unrestricted use free of all incumbrances, taxes, or other expenses during the period of this agreement. Such land to be cleared of civilian or other occupants and their activities.

COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG to CINC PAC

Part 3. New Zealand Government agrees to grant United States forces necessary harbor and other facilities without port or other government charges or taxes on any requirements of or for United States forces during period of the occupation. Area under consideration at present estimated 5,000 acres including water front along buoyed seaplane runway at Satapuala and inland sufficient meet requirements size shape location determined by survey United States authorities. This includes seaplane runway and such other area required for occupation training and defense of Western Samoa. Colonel Hunt directed to not discuss financial considerations. His directive stated such matters will be dealt with by the New Zealand government direct with the United States authorities if they arise. End of agreement. Copies of agreement being mailed Cincpac, Opnav. Marcorps. In view of inseparable destiny all islands Samoan Group and the intimate relationship these islands to our security in South Pacific recommend consideration United States assumption mandate Western Samoa. My opinion this can be accomplished now. End of three parts.
Following has been received by NZNB. "Following for Comanzac repeated Cincpac. New Zealand and Consular agent Noumea from Commanding Officer US Army Detachment Vila. Begin. 3 desirable landing stretch sites available within a radius of 5 miles Vila. Grading and clearing no serious problem with equipment. No existing water supply Vila. Rain water storage in tanks no wells in area. Local inhabitants advise water to be found at 40 feet. No equipment available for quick survey. 3 good streams within area considered adequate supply. In same part of this area examined and selected for separate aerodromes, large aerodrome by Colonel Sverdrup US and valued by Lieutenant Melbourne of Australian Airboard. Part 2 follows.

25 1410 OPNAV TO CINCPAC

Your 220141 Suggest leaving 100 Bleacher mines roses. 80 with 940 foot and 20 with 340 foot cables to close Havannah Harbor and South Bay. Remaining 380 Bleacher mines to Fan Tan if practicable for field between Lovuka and Malalo Lailai recommended Comanzac. Recommendation establishing Bleacher reserve my 201900 withdrawen.

25 1650 OPNAV TO CINCPAC

Your 242345 to Cominch. Fuel requirements in thousands of barrels as follows. First figure each group fuel oil, second diesel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bleacher</th>
<th>Straw</th>
<th>Roses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>18 and 8.5</td>
<td>16 and 6.5</td>
<td>10 and 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
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Total all three movements 44 and 15.

260400 NAVOBS WELLING TO CINCPAC

This is part two of my 240300. All after large aerodrome by Colonel Scerdrup US, and Flight Lt. Livingstone (note correction) of Australian Air Board. Flight Lt. Sand, RAAF, now stationed here inspected area today and considers area suitable for all types. End of message. DNI Melbourne pass to Comanzac DNI Wellington pass to Cincpac NLO Noumea pass to Consular Agent Noumea.
25 2030

HDQS USMC WASH to COMGEN 2nd MARBRIG info CINCPAC

Mydis 212115 request you make all arrangements practicable for arrival and installation of Third Brigade at Strawhat. From examination map cast george 3rd Brigade estimates that bulk of supplies and about 1000 personnel including most of defense battalion and construction company will eventually be located in vicinity proposed aviation fields near Toloa Point. He tentatively proposes to have remaining personnel operate with Toloa Point as main base and Apia as secondary base. Pending movement to airfield site supplies will have to be stored near Apia preferably in western part of village. Storage requirements approximately the same as for 2nd Brigade. Comments and suggestions as result of reconnaissance on ground requested.

26 1655

COMINCH to COMFRONTIERS info CINCPAC, etc.

RECOMMEND TO ME OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES SEA FRONTIERS FOR PURPOSE OF FIXING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ROUTING OF SHIPPING TO IMPLEMENT BRITISH DASH USA MERCHANT SHIP ROUTING AGREEMENT. OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES US ATLANTIC COAST AS ESTABLISHED BY CINCLANT SECRET SERIAL 00266 NOVEMBER 81941 ARE BEING USED AT PRESENT BUT NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT SIMILAR BOUNDARIES ON PACIFIC COAST. INCLUDE HAWAIIAN SEA FRONTIER ALSO BOTH CANADIAN COASTS AS TO OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES AND BOUNDARY BETWEEN US AND CANADIAN ZONES IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WILL BE FURTHER REFERRED BY COMINCH TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AS NECESSARY. BOUNDARIES RECOMMENDED WILL NOT LIMIT OPERATING AREAS SEAPHON FORCES BUT WILL BE USED CONNECTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIVERSION FOR SHIPPING. OPNAV INFORMED.

27 1340

COMINCH to CINCPAC

COMPLETION SUMNER AT BLEACHER DIRECT HER PROCEED NANDI IF SERVICES CAN EXPEDITE SWEEPING NANDI ROADS X THEREAFTER SHIP AVAILABLE TO YOU X COMINCH WILL NOT ACT REFERENCE: NAVOBS WELLINGTON 250345 BUT IS OF OPINION INVESTIGATION UNNECESSARY.

27 2000

COMINCH to CINCPAC

Aidac

Comment on future operations.
27 2245  CTF 12 TO SUMNER

NEW ORLEANS and MUGFORD expect arrive Bleacher forenoon April 2nd and will depart same day for Samoa. Cincpac pass to Comanzac for and Navsta Samoa for info.

280215  CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Your 272000 as units for setting up initial defenses Bleacher were diverted to Roses and since New Zealand defenses former place are negligible no service units except SUMNER have been sent there. TIPPECANOE and PLATTE now operating under Fletcher's orders. BRIDGE due Noumea 1 April to provision his force. SOLACE and DOBBIN being held Samoa. Cincpac will arrange to assemble aforementioned units to service Task Force 17 at Bleacher or Auckland as soon as you advise which place will be used and when.

28 0731  COMANZAC to CINCPAC INFO OPNAV, KINGFISHER

Suggest KINGFISHER use remaining 380 BLEACHER mines to complete mining Nandi waters as follows: Opnav 251410. Three rows 80 yards between mines on line 020 degrees from northeast tip Malololailai to reef; also 085 degrees from reef to Kandauu Island. Total distance about four miles. Above lines recommended by KINGFISHER reference Opnav 201900. KINGFISHER reports use two additional minelayers desirable to expedite completion of operation.

28 1635  COMINCH to COMANZAC INFO CINCPAC

COMTASKFOR 17 DISPATCH 210833 REPORT CURRENT SITUATION AS YOU KNOW IT

28 1645  COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Aidac
Special mission for submarine.

29 0159  CINCPAC to COMINCH

Aidac
Reply to 281645.
COMANZAC to CINCPAC INFO COMINCH, ALSNOB WELLINGTON

Following from officer commanding survey party Nandi:
"Preliminary survey Nandi and sweeping completed except final sweep. No navigational dangers other than immediate vicinity Curacoo Rock not yet examined. Consider anchorage suitable any type ship. Anticipate complete Nandi survey 31st March. Preliminary work commenced extension survey to Lautoka proposed by NZNB requiring additional 7 days". Reference Cominch 271340 urgently recommend SUMNER proceed Nandi to expedite establishment necessary beacons, navigational marks, and check survey.

AIR DEPT WELLINGTON to NZALO HONOLULU

For NZALO HONOLULU from Air Department Wellington. X36392 A473 20/3 From CAS. You are probably aware that General Tinker was unable to make his intended inspection in New Caledonia. Group Captain Hewlett whom the General met in Fiji left Noumea 27 March and reports as follows: American Army and works units arrived about 12 March with full equipment and are attempting to straighten out general civil disorganization. Worst features are civil administration and chaotic communications internal and external. RAAF wireless station is the only W/T link in working order and is hampered by routing through Townsville. Departure signals from ferry aircraft are frequently unrecognizable and are seldom if ever received until after the aircraft arrive. First aircraft tested 27/3. Tontouta runways serviceable. Plaine Des Gaies progress reported good. Americans at Tontouta eagerly awaiting arrival of General Tinker as they require much assistance from him and his Staff. Reports end. You should enquire whether this report would be of value to General Tinker.

COMINCH TO COMSOWESPACEFOR, COMANZAC INFO CINCPAC

IN ORDER TO FACILITATE IMPENDING CHANGES INDICATED IN MY 171640 VICE ADMIRAL LEARY HEREBY DIRECTED ASSUME COMMAND NAVAL FORCES SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AS ADDITIONAL DUTY PARA APPROPRIATE ORDERS TO LEARY WILL BE ISSUED BY BUNAV AS WILL ORDERS DETACHING GLASSFORD TO US AND TO PURNELL AND ROCKWELL TO REPORT TO LEARY PARA UPON ASSUMING DUAL COMMAND LEARY PLACE HIMSELF AND BOTH FORCES AT DISPOSAL OF GENERAL MACARTHUR FOR COORDINATION OF EFFORT PENDING FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPREME COMMAND IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
COMTASKFOR 17 to COMANZAC INFO COMINCH, CINCPAC, ETC.

Comanzac 291325 at 0340 GCT March 29 Taskfor 17 in Lat 16 South Long 157 East enroute Noumea to arrive April 1st for provisions. Request verification report. If force reported is enemy heading south I will proceed at once to operate until further orders vicinity Lat 15 South Long 160 East.

CINCPAC to NAVSTA TUTUILA INFO COMINCH, OPNAV, COMANZAC, ETC.

Deliver to Comindiv 2. CASTOR with Taskforce 13 at Efate code name Roses has 480 completely assembled mines originally destined Tongatabu code name Bleacher. Opnav has proposed 80 mines be left Roses for mining Havannah Harbor and South Bay and remainder brought Fiji for planting additional fields there. Comindiv 2 with GAMELE and RAMSAY taking any Army stores for Fiji now in DOBBIN proceed Suva. After conferring with KINGFISHER and local authorities Suva proceed to Roses. After arrival and consultation with Commanding General recommend to Comanzac info Cincpac Opnav and Cominch as to mining there. As Comanzac directs either plant the fields or stow mines until suitable time for planting. Completion duty Roses load mines from CASTOR, return Fiji and plant fields there as agreed upon. Make arrangements with Commander Task Force 13 for obtaining remainder mines either through repeated trips your command to Roses or CASTOR stopping Fiji to deliver them. Your mining operations Anzac Area subject to orders Comanzac. Keep him and Cincpac informed of plans and progress. Use shore radio stations maximum practicable extent for communications.

COMINCH to COMTASKFOR 17 INFO CINCPAC, COMANZAC.

YOUR 292346 NOT UNDERSTOOD IF IT MEANS YOU ARE RETIRING FROM ENEMY VICINITY IN ORDER TO PROVISION

CINCPAC to COMINCH, OPNAV

Request information as to what agency will plan for and provide shipping supplies material and personnel for Navy and Marine units at Bobcat, Straw, Bleacher, Roses, etc., after the initial movement.

CINCPAC to SEPULGA

What is best estimate first availability shore fuel oil tanks sufficient take your remaining fuel second completion shore installations. Include other information deemed pertinent.
CINCPAC to OPNAV, COMINCH

Cominch 191402 and his serial 00191 also Comdt. MarCorps serial 003A7842 have you any Hydrographic information besides that on H.O. Chart 2019 and in H.O. 166 on Strawboard. Careful consideration of available information causes grave doubts as to practicability operations proposed. Use of passes and and waters there by any of vessels mentioned in references has great probability of resulting in disaster. Small vessels for ferrying material from Strawstack are not available and such method is impracticable for much of the heavy equipment involved. Suggest consideration be given to sending only special weapons company to and not developing that island, at least until other Straw developments are completed.

What diplomatic arrangements have been made or are in prospect. Is your 191402 to be interpreted that initial reconnaissance will have authority to make any necessary local arrangements and be prepared to use such force as may be required to obtain agreements.

OPNAV TO ALUSNA MELBOURNE

Alusna Melbourne deliver to ACNB and NZNB for info. British authorities advise their inability meet United States fuel requirements Australia after May 1. Accordingly have arranged with WSA to allocate sufficient tonnage meet our needs over and above those Comanzac which already programmed with McKay and Catawba. Estimate about 11 tankers required. First 2 nominated are E.J. Henry and Pan American due arrive Sydney about 30 April and 2 May respectively with full loads Navy grade special fuel oil totalling 30,000 tons. Remaining ships should arrive various dates throughout May. Initial cargoes each tanker being obtained Gulf of Aruba. Thereafter will load San Pedro. U.S. deliveries are on basis of requirements cargo ships and transports to arrive Australia monthly plus units Sowespacfor. Important Opnav know where cargoes should be discharged best meet available storage space and prospective offtakes. Further desirable route tankers to exact ports of delivery prior leaving Canal or California in order minimize diversion orders enroute. Desire you consult necessary authorities and advise Opnav destination ports as appropriate. Under plan outlined supplies laid down monthly will approximate 67,000 tons fuel oil and 12,000 diesel. Although requirements Sowespacfor are also included therein it is not contemplated tankers will discharge at ports other than east coast including Melbourne. In other words it is hoped British can continue meet needs that force in view delivery equivalent fuel eastern Australia by United States.
COMINCH TO SPENAVO LONDON

30 1940

Please convey to First Sea Lord in person my growing concern over volume and variety of information concerning ships and shipping now being exchanged not only in Atlantic but in Pacific.

Some of it appears only to be of general information nature but superfluous curiosity on part of plotters. Much of it seems based on an attempt to identify ships and ship's officers by their exact location rather than by effective recognition signals. Much of it facilitates essential cooperation. All of it tends to overload communication channels.

I request his cooperation to restrict volume and variety of information exchanged first by limiting it to those who need to know, second by improving recognition signals, third mutual confidence that affairs are being conducted in manner as effective as means in hand allow.

COMINCH TO CTF 17.

31 1455

Upon completion current operations proceed Bleacher there replenish fuel and supplies and otherwise make ready for further operations to northwestward as the situation in the area where you are now operating requires constant activity of a task force like yours to keep the enemy occupied.

Requirements for use of other task forces like yours make it necessary to continue your active operations south of Equator until your force can be relieved.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

31 2125

THINK IT ADVISABLE THAT YOU HAVE COLONEL CARLSON COMMANDER RAIDER BATTALION VISIT HAWAII FOR CONFERENCE REGARDING EMPLOYMENT OF THAT BATTALION IN COMMANDO TYPE OPERATIONS

CINCPAC TO PACFLT, C.G. AMPHCORPAC

My 100041 February and 310243 March. Former Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet consisting 2nd MarDiv and 3rd Army Div less air and other units on detached duty becomes Amphibious Corps Pacific Fleet zero hours Zed 15 April.
Your 302325 following information from Naval Station

"Construction not started on fuel depot. 1st question estimate July 1. 2nd question rough estimate November 1. 2 gun emplacements about June 1. Temporary facilities for operation VS 2D14 installed 0 shore facilities installed for operation VPB. Naval Radio Station completed."

If desired empty SEPULGA RAMAPO can take 9600 barrels fuel no diesel. HAMUL (ready to depart April 3) can take 4800 barrels. MERCURY (ready to depart about April 10) can take 3000 barrels. Both vessels have sufficient fuel on board now to reach destination. Suggest transfer avgas to Naval Station and lubricating oil to RAMAPO. No storage for 3000 barrels diesel and 1400 barrels bunker remaining in SEPULGA.

Advance party arrived Strawhat 24 March and main body completed disembarkation 1700 30 March. Total force 550 officers and men. GARFIELD returned here today.

This is Alnav sixty-two. Following changes in organization of Pacific Fleet are effective as of 10 April. Battle Force and Scouting Force are abolished. Fleet Type Commands established are battle ships, carriers, cruisers and destroyers. Other fleet type commands now in existence namely Service force, Amphibious force, Submarines and Patrol Wings are to be continued as such. Units heretofore comprising battle and scouting forces are thereby assigned to appropriate fleet type commands for administrative purposes. Orders to officers being issued incident to this reorganization will not involve any changes in rank of flag officers.

TERM MILITARY COMMANDER FOR PURPOSES OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE YOUR 250145 IS INTERPRETED TO MEAN THE ARMY COMMANDER. YOUR HAWAIIAN DEPENSE PLAN 1-42 COMMANDER HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOW BE COORDINATING AGENCY FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE WITHIN SCOPE DELIMITATION AGREEMENT REVISED FEBRUARY 9. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF INFORMED.
01 0910  COMINCH to CINCLANT info CINCPAC etc.

DIRECT ATLANTA PROCEED CANAL ZONE AND UPON ARRIVAL REPORT CINCPAC FOR DUTY IN NEW CRUDIV 11. ATLANTA AVAILABLE ESCORT DUTY ENROUTE PANAMA.

01 1040  SUMNER to CINCPAC

Large grass surfaced air field in good condition 14 miles from Nukualofa available for use. Local commander arranging housing at airfield for 250 men or more if necessary in Nipa shacks. If notified will have food available for 24 or 48 hours. Little shop facilities. Transportation between dock and field will be available.

01 1600  COMINCH to ALUSNOB COLOMBO info CINCPAC etc.

ADVISE ADMIRAL LAYTON THAT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION OF THE SCOPE INDICATED IN YOUR 311605 30 MARCH IS UNNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE FOR FOLLOWING REASONS (A) INDIAN OCEAN AND PACIFIC THEATERS ARE ENTIRELY SEPARATE STRATEGIC ENTITIES. GRAND STRATEGY OF ANY ACTION INVOLVING COMBINED OPERATIONS OF NAVAL FORCES IN BOTH THEATERS CAN BE COORDINATED ONLY BY COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF OR BY COMINCH AND ADMIRALTIES WHO WILL THEN ISSUE APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMANDERS CONCERNED. CODES JOINTLY HELD BY SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS LISTED IN SIGHTED DESPATCH UNSUITABLE FOR SUCH USE. (B) PENDING FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPREME COMMANDER IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA CINC EASTERN FLEET AND COMSOUTH-PACFOR SHOULD EXCHANGE SUCH INFORMATION AS THEY DEEM NECESSARY TO THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THEIR ADJACENT AREA ISSUING MEANS ALREADY AVAILABLE. OTHER ARRANGEMENTS PREMATURE (C) DETAILED PLANS ORGANIZATIONS OR REPORTS OF MINOR OPERATIONS IN ONE THEATER ON A LESSER SCALE THAN THOSE OF PARA (A) NEED NOT BE KNOWN BY COMMANDER OF OTHER THEATER AS THEY DO NOT AFFECT THIS OPERATION. ADMIRALTIES AT THEIR REQUEST ALREADY INFORMED OF GENERAL NATURE OF PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE OPERATIONS OF NAVAL FORCES IN PACIFIC THEATER. THIS IS SECRET.

03 0125  CINCPAC to COMSERTFORPAC

Take charge of and conduct salvage operations Pres. Taylor at Canton. CTF 4 and 1 ship Task Group 4.5 or TANEY available to accompany expedition. Inform Cincpac of plans and keep him advised of progress of salvage work.
01 1359 COMANZAC TO CINCPAC

Following received from Vila. Action Cincpac infor Comanzac, Tangier, Focas, Comindiv 2. Crescent City and Cuyama expected to complete unloading 3 April Castor 5 April. Request instructions originator Comtaskfor 13. Comtaskgroup 13.1 estimates landing field will be ready for use of fighters and dive bombers by 12 April. Do not recommend landing of mines Roses due lack of handling facilities on shore. If not urgently required Bleacher recommend 5 buoys be left by Cuyama for marking shoals this harbor. This is my 010456. Tangier pass to Gen. Patch unquote. Cuyama pass all above to Comtaskfor 13.

02 0247 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Cominch 311840 is at variance with interpretation term military commander in Secnav 252030 in reply to Cincpac 0145 same date. Acting on the earlier decision the duty of coordinating intelligence coverage has been delegated to army commander in letter, your copy of which is in the mail.

03 0411 CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 13.

Retention 5 buoys at Roses approved urdis 010456. Mydis 010323 modified as follows. Completion unloading Cuyama at Roses transfer to her material in Castor and Crescent City intended for Bleacher. Direct Cuyama proceed with one destroyer escort to Noumea there deliver all remaining avgas to Tangier and fuel that vessel to capacity. Thence proceed to Tutuila complete discharge of liquid cargo to shore tanks. Completion proceed to San Pedro and there await orders. Destroyer in company escort Cuyama until clear of Samoan waters then return to Tutuila to await orders.

Direct Crescent City, Castor when discharged Roses proceed with remaining destroyer to Suva. Castor deliver mines to Mindiv 2 utilizing shore storage if own departure can thereby be expedited. Completion proceed to west coast Crescent City to San Diego Castor to San Francisco. Destroyer in company escort clear of Samoa area then return to Tutuila to await orders.

Gamble, Ramsay lay Fiji mines then take 100 mines to Roses and lay or stow them as directed by Comanzac in accordance with directive in mydis 292359.
PART 1

COMINCH 031905 X 4 PARTS IN ALL X

PARA ONE BY AGREEMENT AMONG GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA NEW
ZEALAND UNITED KINGDOM NETHERLANDS AND UNITED STATES THE
PACIFIC OCEAN AREA COMPRISING NORTH CENTRAL AND SOUTH
PACIFIC AREAS HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED WITH BOUNDARIES AS
LATER DEFINED HEREIN

PARA TWO BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT WITH CONCURRENCE
OF ABOVE GOVERNMENTS YOU ARE HEREBY DESIGNATED AS COMMANDER
IN CHIEF OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA AND OF ALL ARMED FORCES
WHICH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE ASSIGNED OR MAY ASSIGN TO
THIS AREA

PARA THREE YOU WILL APPOINT A COMMANDER OF SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
WHO ACTING UNDER YOUR AUTHORITY AND GENERAL DIRECTION WILL
EXERCISE COMMAND OF COMBINED ARMED FORCES WHICH MAY AT ANY
TIME BE ASSIGNED TO AREA X YOU WILL EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND
OF COMBINED ARMED FORCES IN NORTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

PARA FOUR IN CONSONANCE WITH BASIC STRATEGIC POLICY OF
GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED YOUR ASSIGNED TASKS ARE TO ENSURE
ISLAND POSITIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
AREA NECESSARY FOR SECURITY OF LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
THOSE REGIONS AND FOR SUPPORTING NAVAL AIR AND AMPHIBIOUS
OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPANESE ENSURE SUPPORT OPERATIONS OF FORCES
IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA CAST CONTAIN JAPANESE FORCES WITHIN
PACIFIC THEATER DO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE OF THE CONTINENT OF
NORTH AMERICA ENSURE PROTECT ESSENTIAL SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS
FOR PREPARE FOR EXECUTION OF MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS OFFENSIVES
AGAINST POSITIONS HELD BY JAPAN INITIALLY TO BE LAUNCHED
FROM SOUTHERN PACIFIC AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA XX MORE FOLLOWS

PARA 5 YOU WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF RESPECTIVE FORCES UNDER YOUR
COMMAND X YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DIRECT AND COORDINATE CREATION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE FACILITIES AND BROAD
ALLOCATION OF WAR MATERIAL PARA

PARA 6 AUTHORIZED TO CONTROL ISSUE OF ALL COMMUNIQUÉS CON-
CERNING FORCES UNDER YOUR COMMAND

PARA 7 WHEN TASK FORCES OF YOUR COMMAND OPERATE OUTSIDE
PACIFIC OCEAN AREA COOPERATION WITH FORCES IN AREA IN WHICH
OPERATING WILL BE EFFECTED BY JOINT OR COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF AS APPROPRIATE
Para 8 Commanders of all armed forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that from a date to be notified all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

Para 9 Your staff will include officers assigned by governments concerned based upon requests made directly to national commanders of various forces in your area.

Para 10 Governments concerned will exercise direction of operations in Pacific Ocean area as follows: the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and over such related factors as are necessary for proper implementation including allocation of forces and war material. Baker Joint US.

03 2017 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Part 3 COMINCH 031905 X Chiefs of staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy. X COMINCH will act as executive agency for them X. All instructions to you will be issued by or through COMINCH CAST. New Zealand Chiefs of staff will be responsible for land defense of New Zealand subject to such strategic decisions affecting this responsibility as you may make for the conduct of naval operations in Pacific Ocean area X. Boundaries X. Between Indian theater and Pacific theater X. From Cape Kami Luibienow Peninsula around coast of Tonkin Gulf Indo China, Thailand and Malaya to Singapore thence south to North coast of Sumatra around East coast Sumatra (Leaving Sunda Strait to eastward of line) to point on coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 East thence south to latitude 08 South thence southeasterly toward Onslow to longitude 110 East thence South X. Pacific theater extends eastward of this line to continents of North and South America X. Of Southwest Pacific area X. Westerly boundary is that of Pacific theater X. North and east as follows: X. From Cape Kami south to latitude 20 North thence east to 130 East longitude thence South to equator along equator to longitude 165 East thence South to latitude 10 South then southwesterly to latitude 17 South longitude 160 East thence South X. Of Southeast Pacific area X. From Mexico-Guatemala western boundary to latitude 11 North longitude 110 West thence South X. Of Pacific Ocean area X. Hunk 4 coming up.
03 1922  COMINCH TO CINCPAC

PART 4 THIS AREA INCLUDES ALL OF PACIFIC THEATER NOT INCLUDED IN SOUTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST PACIFIC AREAS SUBDIVIDED INTO (A) NORTH PACIFIC AREA NORTH OF LATITUDE 42 NORTH (B) CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA BETWEEN EQUATOR AND LATITUDE 42 NORTH (C) SOUTH PACIFIC AREA SOUTH OF EQUATOR X PARA

APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVE SENT TO GENERAL MAC ARTHUR AS SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA ASSIGNS HIM TASKS AS FOLLOWS (A) HOLD THE KEY MILITARY REGIONS OF AUSTRALIA AS BASES FOR FUTURE OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN AND IN ORDER TO CHECK JAPANESE CONQUEST IN THIS AREA (B) CHECK ENEMY ADVANCE TOWARD AUSTRALIA AND ITS ESSENTIAL LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS BY DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY COMBATANT TROOP AND SUPPLY SHIPS AIRCRAFT AND BASES IN EASTERN MALAYSIA AND NEW GUINEA BISMARCK SOLOMON ISLANDS REGION (C) EXERT ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON ENEMY BY DESTRUCTION OF SHIPPING TRANSPORTING MATERIALS TO JAPAN (D) MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN PHILIPPINES (E) PROTECT COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AND ITS CLOSE APPROACHES (F) ROUTE SHIPPING IN THAT AREA (G) SUPPORT OPERATIONS OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN PACIFIC OCEAN AREA AND INDIAN THEATER (H) PREPARE TO TAKE OFFENSIVE X COPIES OF BOTH DIRECTIVES BY AIR MAIL X PARA 4 ABOVE SHALL BE CONSIDERED SUPPLEMENTARY TO BASIC DIRECTIVE IN MY 301740 DECEMBER.

04 0650  COMTASKFOR 17 TO COMANZAC

My 012250 Attack delayed until I have definite location enemy. Remaining vicinity 15 south 160 East.

04 1310  COMINCH TO COMSOWESPAC, COMANZAC

My 291440 March and my 031905. Vice Admiral Leary report to General MacArthur with forces under his command.

Arrange with MacArthur an appropriate designation and corresponding short title for naval forces in southwest Pacific Area and for detachments thereof.

New Zealand naval forces now in Anzac Force will be directed to join South Pacific Force at an early repeat early date. Cnapav, Chief of Staff Army and Australian New Zealand Naval Delegation informed.
04 1850  COMINCH TO CINCPAC

NOMINATE FLAG OFFICER NOT NECESSARILY NOW UNDER YOUR COMMAND AS COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC AREA AND TO COMMAND "SOUTH PACIFIC NAVAL FORCE" X SEE MY 031905 X

ASIDE FROM CERTAIN MINOR NAVAL AND AIR UNITS IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO HAVE PACIFIC FLEET UNITS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE BUT OF COURSE UNITS DULY ASSIGNED TO YOU WILL PASS TO OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE WHILE IN THAT AREA.

05 1849  CINCPAC TO COMINCH

April 3 (Continued)

The Navy chartered ship THOMAS JEFFERSON left today.

Vice Admiral Brown and Staff left for San Diego to take command of Task Force Three, the Amphibious Force. Rear Admiral Fitch is now in command of Task Force 11.

Orders were issued to keep the TANGOR clear of the area south of Rabaul in which she might contact Task Force Seventeen.

The loss of tankers on the East Coast is making itself felt in that the reinforcement of the Pacific Fleet by four tankers has been held up.

Received a change in decision as to intelligence. Secnav reversed his interpretation to agree with CominCh's that the Army Commander is the "Military Commander" responsible for coordinating intelligence activities.

No new trends or action by the enemy today.

April 4.

Operations are proceeding as previously reported. Orders for Task Force 16 are still being held up awaiting Vice Admiral Halsey.

Received a most important directive from CominCh contained in 031905, 031922, 032017 and 032123. This informed of the agreement with our allies as to delineation of areas, and command relationships. It also restates the tasks of the Armed Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area, under Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and in the Southwest Pacific Area under General MacArthur. A special commander for the South Pacific Area is required (CominCh 041850) and Vice Admiral Pye has been nominated (CincPac 051849).

The new delineation places New Zealand, Noumea and Fiji under CincPac. However, the area of active operations (New Guinea-Solomons) is in the Southwest Pacific Area, so that some command relationships will need to be clarified.

Vice Admiral Pye assumed command of Task Force One today, and Rear Admiral Bagley has reported to take over the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. Rear Admiral Furlong continues as Commandant of the Navy Yard.

In 041310 CominCh ordered Vice Admiral Leary to report to General MacArthur, and stated that the New Zealand Naval forces would be assigned to the South Pacific Force.

The condition of readiness against aircraft attack of ships at Pearl Harbor has been relaxed to Condition II from ½ hour before sunrise to 0930; Condition IV from 0930 to sunset; Condition III from sunset to ½ hour before sunrise. The improvement in the defenses and in the warning system is considered to
permit this change. The Aquitania on the 3d brought more troops for the outlying islands - the total in the Coastal Frontier is now about 80,000. As additional planes report the increased number will be utilized at first to accomplish more training.

The Grenadier returned and reported sinking a 7000 ton tanker and a 5000 ton cargo ship south of Truk.

No new enemy moves were noted today. Preparation in the Indian Ocean, and strengthening of Rabaul and the Marshalls continues.

April 5.

In 040650 Comtaskfor 17 reported that he would not proceed into the Solomon Area until he had more definite information as to suitable objectives.

One B-17 attacked the Rabaul airdrome and six B-26 (first appearance) bombed the shipping in that harbor with fair success.

The unloading at Roses has been completed and the ships are proceeding as directed in 030411 already referred to.

The Gudgeon reports sinking one large passenger-freighter and a 5000 ton freighter south of Tsushima.

A small set-back in the salvage of the California was received today when a gasoline explosion stopped the pumps so that she settled again.

Enemy trends remain the same. It seems fairly well established that small landings have been made at Kessa, Buka Passage, Faisi (Shortland) and Kieta.
April 6.

The Army reported a submarine off Christmas Island - doubtful, as not confirmed any source.

The DRUM left for a patrol to westward.

The directive from Cominich received on the 4th was slightly modified. In the modification, reference was made to Annex 1 (defining areas); and the "Pacific Theatre is designated an area of United States strategic responsibility." This modification merely states "You are designated as CinC of the Pacific Ocean Area" - leaving out "By direction of the President with the concurrence of above governments."

A shore radio station has been established at Roses.

Cominich ordered Comanzac to start the setup for an intelligence group for the South Pacific Force. This will deal initially with the islands in the area 0°-20° S, 150° E - 170° W.

Cincpac expressed to the Fleet his satisfaction on the endurance, ability, etc., of the Fleet and called attention to the fine work of Task Force 11 which has been at sea 75 out of 85 days.

Major General C.F.B. Price reported as prospective C.G. Samoa Islands.

Compatwing 2 is to establish a liaison officer group at Noumea.

Task Force 16 was ordered to prepare to sail on the 7th - but was delayed and placed on 2 hour notice.

Cominich ordered Cincpac to relieve the New Zealand detachment at Fanning with U.S. Army troops.

B-25's bombed Gasmata aerdrome and 2 Hudsons bombed 14 flying boats at Koepang. Size of attacks and results minor.

Moresby again bombed - no casualties. Darwin raided on 5th by 7 heavy bombers - damage slight. Japs are managing to destroy considerable allied avgas at Darwin.

There is increasing evidence that at present the Japs (1) are committed to a seaborne offensive in the Bay of Bengal area, (2) reinforcing air in the New Guinea and Mandate area, (3) expect to defend their eastern flank mainly by air for the present.

Increased activity vicinity of Cebu is indicated.

The Jap occupation of Faisi is confirmed.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC

FANNING ISLAND NOW GARRISONED BY NEW ZEALAND DETACHMENT GUARDING CABLE STATION IS SO FAR REMOVED FROM HOMELAND THAT REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE FOR REPLACEMENT OF GARRISON BY U.S.

DETACHMENT THERE NOW COMPRISSES FIVE OFFICERS 108 MEN 2 HEAVY MACHINE GUNS 8 MACHINE GUNS 1 3" MORTAR 250 GRENADES 145,000 ROUNDS SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 1 6" GUN WITH 150 ROUNDS.

TAKE IMMEDIATE AND APPROPRIATE STEPS REPLACE GARRISON PREFERABLY WITH U.S. ARMY TROOPS LINKED WITH CHRISTMAS ISLAND

MUNITIONS EQUIPMENT THAT WE CAN USE WILL BE LEFT

ALSO ARRANGE FOR TRANSFER OF GARRISON TO HOMELAND IN DUE COURSE X OPNAV AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFORMED.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

HERE IS A MESSAGE FROM COMINCH ACTION CINCPAC INFO COMANZACFOR COMSOUWESTPACFOR COM 16 X CHANGE FIRST 2 PARAGRAPHS OF DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC OCEAN AREA MYSER 00254 OF APRIL 3RD TO READ, "PARA 1 BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND THE UNITED KINGDOM THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES THE PACIFIC THEATER (SEE ANNEX 1) IS DESIGNATED AN AREA OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY PARA 2 THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA COMPRISING THE NORTH CENTRAL AND SOUTH PACIFIC AREAS HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED AS DEFINED IN ANNEX 1 X YOU ARE DESIGNATED AS THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA AND OF ALL ARMED FORCES WHICH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE ASSIGNED OR MAY ASSIGN TO THIS AREA " X MAKE SIMILAR CHANGE IN MACARTHURS DIRECTIVE X CORRECTED COPIES BY MAIL.

COMINCH TO COMANZAC

Request following intelligence action in anticipation establishment base for Southern Pacific Force in New Zealand or in islands generally to northward (A) Form nucleus intelligence group for contemplated intelligence center at above base using available personnel including intelligence personnel evacuated from NEI and those recently sent out after providing for needs Australian area (B) Obtain list of individuals available in Australia and Polynesia having local knowledge islands between Equator and 20 south and 150 east to 170 west (C) as initial.
task direct base intelligence group to collect all available data concerning above islands supplementing where practicable by consulting individuals cited. Request advice regarding constitution intelligence group.
April 7.

The SUMNER completed a survey of Tongatabu.

Shore Radio was established at Efate.

The ARGONNE and BREESE departed for Canton to salvage the PRES. TAYLOR. The NAVAJO will follow about the 15th to tow the TAYLOR to Pearl. Estimate the salvage job will be completed April 20 and ETA Pearl May 4th.

TF-16 is on 2 hours' notice. Vice Admiral Halsey returned to Pearl from West Coast.

2 own SS are on western patrol stations; 3 own SS enroute west; 3 SS enroute Pearl from west; 13 SS at Pearl; 1 SS enroute Pearl from west coast; 3 SS at NYMI.

Minor air attacks continue at Koepang, Lae, and Gasmata. Port Moresby and Darwin under minor air attack from Japs.

Enemy trends remain the same.

Unidentified submarines were sighted (1) Lat 9-42 S, Long 176-18 W, (2) Lat 58-11 N, Long 147-48 W.

There may be 5 Jap BB's in the Bay of Bengal area.

April 8.

TF-16 departed at noon.

The first report of our Pacific Fleet submarines using gunfire against enemy was received today when the POLLACK returned from a China Sea patrol. She shelled (ineffectively) one freighter, sank one sampan with her deck gun, and sank one sampan with .50 cal. MG. Comsubs Pacific has directed more of this kind of work be done. The work accomplished by our submarines to date is not too impressive.

Cominch (072135) gives CinCPac the task of directing the occupation and development of Island Bases in southern part of area. This despatch refers particularly to the Straw project, and says that Strawboard will be developed as a land-plane and seaplane base. CinCPac will send a light force (125 men) to Strawboard in the next few days.

The C.G. 2nd Marine Brigade in his 080223 gives preliminary plans for the reception of forces at Straw.
April 8 (cont'd).

The convoys with reinforcements to Bleacher and Straw will sail from the East Coast April 9 and West Coast April 12.

TF-1 reports readiness for sea the afternoon of April 10.

All of the above points to more than passive defense.

The Japs are landing at Lorengau (Manus Is). There seems to be a good target at Rabaul, but the attack by our B-26's today only got a near miss on one AP and destroyed 8 VB on the ground. Minor air attacks by both sides continued. The major operations of the Japs are in the Bengal Bay area.
COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG TO CINCPAC

08 0245

THIS IS PART 3 OF 3 PARTS X ESTIMATED SCOPE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE DEFENSE X STRAWSTACK: PREVENT RAIDS MINOR LANDINGS AND PREVENT OR DELAY ENEMY USE OF AIRFIELD OR HARBOR X STRAWHAT: PREVENT RAIDS MINOR LANDINGS AIRFIELD AND HARBOR AND PREVENT OR DELAY UNRESTRICTED DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAND AS BASE OF OPERATIONS X STRAWMAN: OBSERVATION PROTECTION WARNING INSTALLATIONS AND FUEL CACHE EMERGENCY SEAPLANE OPERATIONS X STRAWBOARD: BLOCK ALL BUT MAJOR LANDING EXTEND WARNING NET TO WEST PROJECT AIRFIELD AND SEAPLANE BASE X STRAW: WARNING NET STRAW GROUP ORGANIZED ONE SYSTEM CENTRALIZED AT STRAWHAT X ALL AIR DETACHMENTS AND LOCAL NAVAL DEFENSE FORCES ORGANIZED FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMGENAMPHIBCORPSpac

YOUR 310047 EARLY DEVELOPMENT STRAWBOARD DESIRED AS LANDPLANE SEAPLANE BASE X METHOD OF OCCUPATION AND DEVELOPMENT ARE LEFT TO YOUR DISCRETION REFER PARAGRAPH 3H MY SERIAL 00190 X OPNAV 041939 TO COM 14 MAKES LUMBER SCHOONERS OLIVER OLSEN AND EL CAPITAN AVAILABLE AS YOU DESIRE X YOU ALREADY HAVE USS KAULA AND SS TYLEE X ABOUT 7 DAYS PRIOR YOUR FIRST LANDING NOTIFY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WHO WILL THEN MAKE ARRANGEMENTS RELATIVE AGREEMENT FREE FRENCH AUTHORITIES X YOUR INITIAL LANDING PARTY SHOULD MAKE NECESSARY LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS AND BE PREPARED TO EMPLOY NECESSARY FORCE X NO ADDITIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE EXCEPT BRITISH PUBLICATION PORTS AND HARBORS WHICH STATES ANCHORAGE SHOULD BE CHECKED BEFORE USING BY LARGE SHIPS X ASSUME YOU HAVE 1941 EDITION HO CHART 2019 X COMGEN AMPHIECORPS PAC DELIVER COPY TO MAJ GEN PRICE

COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG TO CINCPAC

PART 1 OF 3 X REFERENCE CINCPAC SERIAL 054W PART 1 X PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR RECEPTION FORCES STRAW X PREPARATIONS FOR RECEPTION AND PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF STRAWSTACK, STRAWHAT AND STRAWMAN FOR SQDN VS 1-D14 TO COVER SHIP MOVEMENTS TO STRAWHAT AND STRAWBOARD X IF LOADING PLAN PERMITS PROPOSE DESPATCH KIT CARSON DIRECT TO APIA ON ARRIVAL STRAW X AREA COVERED BY AIR X DETACH 1 dd to STRAWSTACK from STRAW CONVOY ON 28 APRIL TO COVER KIT CARSON AT STRAWHAT X UNLOAD AP HAVING STRAWSTACK TROOPS ON ARRIVAL CONVOY 28 APRIL X AIR RECONNAISSANCE STRAWBOARD 1 MAY.

COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG TO CINCPAC

PART 2 OF 3 X ON . MAY EMBARK ADVANCE PARTY ON THE DD AND DEPART SAME DAY FOR STRAWBOARD X AIR COVERAGE X LOAD EMPTY AP AT STRAWSTACK WITH 8TH DEFENSE BATTALION PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL X ON ARRIVAL EAST COAST CONTINGENT STRAW AREA SHIPS TO PROCEED TO PORTS EMBARKED PERSONNEL ARE TO GARRISON WITHIN CAPACITY UNLOADING FACILITIES AND COMMENCE UNLOADING X DD LANDS ADVANCE PARTY ON STRAWBOARD AT DAYLIGHT 2 MAY X AP WITH INFRANTRY GARRISON FOR STRAWBOARD DEPARTS STRAWSTACK 1 OR 2 MAY X KIT CARSON AND AP WITH 8TH DEFENSE BATTALION TO PROCEED TO STRAWBOARD DIRECTED BY COM GEN AREA X FOREGOING PLAN BASED ON DIRECTIVE DELAYING RECONNAISSANCE OR ADVANCE PARTY UNTIL IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING MAIN LANDING X HOWEVER IF DIRECTED AND TRANSPORTATION MADE AVAILABLE AM PREPARING TO SEND ADVANCE PARTY OF 125 LIGHTLY ARMED PLUS COMMUNICATION AND ENGINEER PERSONNEL ON DD OR APD FROM FORCES NOW HERE DESTINED FOR STRAWBOARD X PART 3 FOLLOWS
April 9

The CALIFORNIA was placed in drydock.

The press reports the fall of Bataan defenders, but Corregidor still holds. Thus any relief to that area from here cannot be undertaken.

Vice Admiral Glassford is enroute Pearl from Sydney by air.

Scattered submarine contacts in the Pacific Ocean area are not confirmed by any source.

Rabaul was bombed again by the Army/RAAF. Considerable opposition met with but we had no losses. The enemy lost 8 VB, 1 VF, others damaged, and large fires started.

The main Jap effort today is in the Indian area. They got two Red cruisers by air attack.

Signs point to an offensive in the New Guinea area the latter part of the month.

April 10

Orders were issued for TF 1 and 11 to conduct training to westward of Palmyra Christmas line ending about May 4, when BBs will enter Pearl.

The Greyback returned from a patrol in Empire waters - results one 7,000 Maru sunk, one 250 ton subchaser sunk, one 4,000 ton freighter hit.

The type organization for the Pacific Fleet was placed in effect today.

There was a long conference today during which the Admiral made several decisions, a long dispatch was sent to Cominch setting forth the position of the Cinc Pac and requesting further amplification and clarification of Cominch 4 part directive dated April 3rd. When a reply is received Cinc Pac should be able to set up his organization requirements and comply with the directive. It should be noted that the directive of April 3rd raised many points of doubt here. Without complete background it is almost impossible to understand the details such a broad directive. It was further confused when Cominch said, on the 3rd, you will appoint a Commander of the South Pacific Area "and on the 4th" nominate" such a Commander.
April 10 (continued)

The directive was sent on the 3rd. It was still not clear today. Could time have been saved (1) by a full explanation from Cominch by airmail (2) sending a representative to Pearl from Washington who could have answered questions (3) the two Admirals meet in San Francisco.

Comanzac estimates that the offensive in Eastern New Guinea will start about April 21.

There is evidence that the air reinforcements to the Mandates and the New Guinea areas continue and that the air defense (offense?) arrangements for the Jap Eastern flank will be completed soon - maybe in 10 days.

The Japs are operating five, and possibly six CVs in the Bengal Area. They are having good success as the British have lost at least two cruisers and one carrier and have suffered bombings in the Ceylon Area. The departure of the KAGA from the homeland may be an indication of an offense in the Solomon Area. This would give them at least two carriers for their venture.

Minor bombings continue in the Anzac Area.
April 11

The Pacific Ocean Area was quiet except for submarine contacts at Christmas.

Small allied bombing raids by air were made on Lae, Vunakanau, Lukunai, Rabaul, and Faisi. These raids undoubtedly cause the enemy damage and slow down his offense.

April 12

Except for submarines seen by the Army off Christmas, the Pacific Ocean Area was without contacts.

The PLUNGER was refloated and needs about one month repair at Pearl.

This is now the period of placing our forces in position and readiness for offense. Without opposition, this should now proceed rapidly.

B-26s attacked a carrier at Rabaul and report a hit on the stern and a close miss. She was able to leave the harbor at high speed. There was also an air attack on an Orange AO at Lae.
April 13.

Operations scheduled are proceeding as ordered.

Task Force 2 completed target practice off OAHU. This is substantially Task Force 11 less LEXINGTON.

There has been no indication that Task Force 17, operating in the Coral Sea, has had any enemy contacts for some time.

The SUMNER reports good entrances to BLEACHER via Lahi Passage and the Narrows. She can now go to Nandi until May 1st if desired. She has done a fine job to date and now needs more gear (can be sent via RIGEL) to continue surveys.

Convoys for South Pacific reinforcements to STRAW, BLEACHER and ROSES should be underway from U.S. East and West Coasts. Arrangements are underway to escort and cover these landings.

An observation detachment of one marine officer, seven marines, and four Navy, provided with one 3"/23 gun and radio was set up on East Island French Frigate Shoals.

The heavy bombing and shelling of Corregidor continues. Ammunition will probably be the deciding factor there.

United Nations made aerial attack Lae - results very small. Both sides conducted aerial reconnaissance in Southwest Pacific Area.

April 14.

Vice Admiral Glassford gave an informal talk to several Flag Officers and some of CinCPac Staff on the campaign in the Far East and pointed out several lessons, (1) the Japs are not invincible, (2) there were allied command difficulties, (3) lack of our air made Jap task much easier, (4) the performance of Army Air in Manila shows that there must be improvements - and present USA pilots lack training and experience in Australia.

Task Force 17 (CinCPac 142027) was ordered to BLEACHER for replenishment and to depart from there the 27th for further operations toward the Coral Sea.

Cominch directed (141225) that, as operations permit, the Southwest Pacific be reinforced with one squadron of 1600 ton DDs, trading 1200 ton DDs for them.

The RIGEL will leave Pearl the 20th to take a relief detachment to FANNING Island, and will transport the Anzac force from there to Auckland. Enroute she will drop off some survey gear for the SUMMER. At Auckland she will be available for the base development there under Captain Bowman.
NAVAL ATTACHE AUSTRALIA TO OPNAV, CINCPAC

Authorities here estimate that Japanese shipping losses are such that they are now able only to support one aggressive move at a time; that with further extending and losses they soon can only hold and defend. In my opinion this is erroneous and does not properly evaluate the small tonnage required to supply their inactive troops.

COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOWESPACEFOR

AS OPERATIONS PERMIT BUILD UP DESTROYER STRENGTH SOUTH WEST PACIFIC FORCE TO EQUIVALENT 1 SQUADRON OF 1,600 TON DDs in EXCHANGE FOR 1,200 TON DDs.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC info NAVOBS WELLINGTON, COMSOWESPACEFOR

PENDING ARRIVAL GHORMLEY TO ASSUME COMMAND OF SOUTH PACIFIC AREA CINCPAC WILL EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND OF NAVAL FORCES THERE BUT EXISTING COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS OF SOUTH PACIFIC BASES WILL CONTINUE WITH COMINCH COORDINATING UNTIL GHORMLEY ESTABLISHES HEADQUARTERS AUCKLAND AT WHICH TIME THE FULL COMMAND SYSTEM OF PARA 3 MY 031905 WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE. INFO ADESS INFORM APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AND ARRANGE FOR NEW ZEALAND SHIPS HITHERTO ALLOCATED TO FORMER ANZAC FORCE TO COME UNDER CONTROL OF CINCPAC IMMEDIATELY.

COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOWESPACEFOR, MACARTHUR, CoS, USA

I APPROVE PARAS 3(b) AND (c) YOUR 110535 IN FORCE TEMPORARILY ENTERING SOPAC AREA MAY BE UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF CINCPAC WHEN YOU SO PRESCRIBE. YOU THROUGH GHORMLEY AFTER HE ARRIVES WILL EXERCISE COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF PACIFIC FLEET UNITS TEMPORARILY ENTERING SOWESPACE AREA AND WILL ARRANGE COORDINATING MEASURES WITH MAC ARTHUR. THIS APPLIES NOW TO TASK FORCE 17. YOUR PARAGRAP 5 APPROVED. WILL ADVISE AS TO ARRANGEMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS AFTER GHORMLEY ARRIVES HERE. SEE MY 141416 IN CONNECTION HEREWITH

COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOWESPACEFOR

PRESENT INTENTION MAINTAIN ABOUT 20 FLEET SUBMARINES WITH APPROPRIATE TENDERS IN SOUTHWESPACEFOR. IN CONNECTION WITH EXCHANGE OF SUBMARINES NOW IN PROGRESS CINCPAC IS TO DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND BACK SUBMARINES AFTER OVERHAUL OR TO SUBSTITUTE LATER TYPES. ARRANGE WITH INFO ADEE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF SPARES AND EXCHANGE OF TENDERS IF AND WHEN NECESSARY.
SECRET

APR 0CT

14 2027  CINCPAC to TASK FORCE 17 info COMINCH, COMSOWESPACEFOR

Cominch has placed you under operational command CinCPac effective immediately. Proceed to BLEACHER for replenishment, upkeep, preparing for further operations Coral Sea. Depart BLEACHER 27th. Dispose KASKASKIA, TIPPECANOE as desired keeping me informed. I will order DOBBIN, SOLACE to BLEACHER immediately. Information BLEACHER separately. Comsouwespac pass to MacArthur.
03 1351 My serial 09 of Jan. Change assignment Desron 12 from Lantflt to Pacflt.

04 0650 COMTASKFOR 17 TO COMANZAC

My 012250 Attack delayed until I have definite location enemy. Remaining vicinity 15 S 160 E.

10 0505 CINCPAC TO PACFLT AND VARIOUS OTHERS

Effective 10 April Pacflt administrative organization as follows. Units listed Pacflt conf. notice 7CN-42. Batships Pacflt Anderson all BBsx CruPacflt Fletcher CruDivs 3 4 5 6 9 11 x CarPacflt Halsey Cardivs 1 2 includes HORNET alll embarked aircraft Photo unit training group and service units x DesPacflt Theobald Desrons 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 Desdiv 22 Detroit Raleigh and tendrs x SubsPacflt Withers Subrons 4 6 8 10 Subase Pearl x Patwings Pacflt McCain Patwings 1 2 4 8 Transition Training Squadron x Serfor Pacflt Calhoun Serons 2 4 6 8 Minron 1 in Seron 6 x Amphibious Force Pacflt Brown x Marine defense forces x Type commanders duties as before except as provided in my 270159 of February.

11 0641 COMANZAC TO VARIOUS

Tabar Island reports large number aircraft course south southwest 2115Z 10th (zone zero) and 15 minutes later three more went south x on 8th April two enemy cruisers one destroyer anchored Lorengau from which three small seaplanes made forenoon reconnaissence dropping some bombs along coast x these vessels no longer there x reliably reported Japanese establishing base for small submarines south Wanangoi river posit 4-31 south 52-21 east x small vessel reported Lae yesterday was attacked this morning by our aircraft x Catalinas conducting reconnaissance from Tulagi today ordered attack shipping Paist island harbor x indications nine small orange vessels assigned Rabaul, one new cf expected Truk, possibility offensive operations by enemy in eastern New Guinea area commencing about 21 April.

12 1405 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Refer COMINCH 072135 and CINCPAC 090215 information just received states that free French motor escort vessel Chevrul will depart from Sydney shortly after 15th April to bring Strawboard under free French control x in view us agreements not to molest Vichy French territory it is desired that you postpone your reconnaissence until later information insures that Strawboard is in fact free French.
SUMNER TO CINCPAC

A PROSPECTIVE CHANNEL SHOWING MINIMUM 40 FOOT SOUNDING HAS BEEN MARKED OUT FROM HEAD OF LAHI PASSAGE TO EAST AND BUCYS PLANTED AT IMPORTANT POINTS X SHOULD BE USED IN EMERGENCY ONLY X SUMNER HAS MADE SEVERAL TRIPS ACROSS THIS AREA WITH SOUND BOATS X EACH TRIP REVEALED SURPRISING SHOALS OFTEN 40 FOOT SHOALS IN 40 FATHOM AREAS ALSO 30 FOOT JUST OUTSIDE BEST PASSAGE DISCOVERED X POSSIBLE MANY SHALLOWER SPOTS UNDISCOVERED X PROPER SURVEY THIS AREA HAS NEVER BEEN CONDUCTED X CONSIDER IT VERY DANGEROUS FOR LARGE SHIPS X IF ALSO DESIRED THE CHANNEL MARKED BY SUMNER COULD BE DRAGGED LATER BY MINESWEEPERS OR OTHER SMALL CRAFT X THIS WORK CONSIDERED IMPRACTICABLE FOR SUMNER BOATS BECAUSE OF WEATHER AND AREA THAT SHOULD BE COVERED TO MAKE THIS CHANNEL SAFE X AT PRESENT NOT EASY TO FIX POSITION THIS AREA WOULD BE DANGEROUS IN THICK WEATHER X TO MAKE PROPER CHANNEL A REGULAR HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY WOULD NEED TO BE CONDUCTED AND LARGE MARKER BUILT ON NEAREST ISLANDS FOR FIXING POSITION X ALSO A LARGE AMOUNT OF SOUNDING AND DRAGGING X ESTIMATE 1 MONTH X SEE NOTE AT TOP OF HO CHART 2013 X DIAGRAM OF PROSPECTIVE CHANNEL PLACED IN SOPA FILE X GOOD ENTRANCES NOW AT LAHI EGERIA AND THE NARROWS X BELIEVE PRESENT RELUCTANCE TO USE NARROWS WILL SOON BE OVERCOME.

CINCPAC TO COMINCH

REPORTED PRESENCE ENEMY SUBMARINES AND TENDER RABAUL INDICATES PROBABLE COMMENCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH PACIFIC AREA X CAN MORE DESTROYERS BE MADE AVAILABLE PACFLT FOR PROBABLE ANTI SUBMARINE OPERATIONS THAT AREA
Under consideration a joint supply service for South Pacific area except Canton for purpose effecting the supply of U.S. Army and Navy forces. Headquarters at Auckland. Subsistence stores less a few items can be supplied from Australia and New Zealand for both Army and Navy there and in outlying bases south of Equator. Opnav 072013. After consultation commanding general Hawaiian Area request you indicate in broad terms your recommendations on the overall problem to include necessary joint procurement and joint use of shipping and storage facilities and composition joint staff.

Negative your 150105 except for vessels mentioned in my 031351

(0pnav 031351) My serial 09 of Jan. Change assignment Desron 12 from Langley to Westfall.
April 14 (Continued).

Our Naval Attache in Australia does not agree with the Australian estimate (140910) that Jap shipping losses are such that now they are only able to support one aggressive move at a time and with further losses they soon can only hold and defend.

The S-34 and S-35 departed for operations in the Kurile Island Area.

The NAVAJO departed to tow the PRESIDENT TAYLOR to Pearl.

Bureau of Navigation wants a survey of Staff officers with view to reducing the 13% of line strength now so employed.

In his 141416 Cominch further clarifies his ideas of command relations in South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas.

Nandi mine fields are now almost complete. This work is being done by Mindiv 2.

Cominch in his 141600 states his plan to keep 20 fleet submarines and necessary tenders in the Southwest Pacific Area.

There were no important actions in the Southwest Pacific, but Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean seem to be proceeding well.

There is indication of some sort of reinforcements to the Mandates and Rabaul. While the Japs would like to take the offensive it seems more likely that they will hold in those areas for the time being at least because of lack of means.

April 15.

The mine fields at Nandi Roads have been laid with 862 mines. The SUMNER will check up on doubtful navigation points there.

The question of Seniority in the Southwest Pacific has come up. The British Rear Admiral is senior to our recent Task Force commanders. CinCPac desires that the command of our task forces which contain a carrier remain with our officers regardless of seniority.

The DOBBIN and SOLACE will be available to serve Task Force 17 at BLEACHER. He also has good fuel oil arrangements. Unless the Japs start up sooner than expected now he should have a good rest.

Captain M. C. BOWMAN will leave for Auckland Friday to start work on a base for SoPacArea at that point.
April 15 (Continued)

In view of increasing enemy activity in South Pacific area Cinpac (150105) has asked Cominch about DD reinforcement. This was not granted by Cominch (161236).

Task Forces 1 and 11 will operate in possible enemy submarine waters for the balance of this month.

Opnav (152130) is considering a plan to supply the outlying bases in the South Pacific Area and has asked Cinopac for recommendations on a Joint Staff. This Joint Logistic Service will take into account the supplies that can be obtained in New Zealand and Australia.

A channel 37' deep and 600' wide is considered by the New Zealand Board for Auckland to be completed about August 15, 1942.

The SAN DIEGO will join the Pacific Fleet about May 6th.

A sub attacked the S.S. Firethorn in Lat. 45-30 S and 174-10 N. This indicates reconnaissance around New Zealand.

Two Jap CV are expected at Truk April 28th. There is more submarine and air activity in Mandates. An offensive in the SW Pacific is shaping up.

Minor bombings and operations continue in the SW Pacific, although the Japs are not doing so much. This would indicate that recent air losses for them have hurt.

The press reports that our VB bombed Manila.

April 16

Opnav (152130) states that there is under consideration a joint supply setup for the South Pacific Area (less Canton) with headquarters at Auckland. He requests Cinopac recommend on the logistic problem south of the equator.

Opnav (151859) describes a merchant ship routing arrangement for all oceans giving limits, responsibilities, and means of coordination.

Comanzac (150500) informs us that the drydock at Sydney will be ready for CV in the immediate future.
April 18 (continued)

Cominch (162220) to Comsowespac says that it is essential that our task forces with CV operating in MacArthur's area be commanded by our officers with CV experience regardless of rank, and points out that Cincpac has power to ensure our seniority (This would keep Halsey there - undesirable).

Cincpac (170405) to Cominch again requests action on assignment of code names for bases. All commands seem to think up new names now.

Cincpac (162217) will send Desron 4 to the S.W. Pacific in accordance with a directive from Cominch. 1200 ton DD from that area will relieve Desron 4 here. It will also involve a shift of tenders.

Task Force 17 will arrive at Bleacher April 20. This will afford a good test of facilities there including the air field. While it is considerably east of Noumea, it seems safe from all enemy action now except submarines. If CV are to use this very much, avgas must be sent there.

There is some delay in the reinforcement convoys for the SoPac bases.

Admiral Nimitz pointed out the necessity for our action at Ocean and Nauru Islands. These are rich sources of phosphate which Japan needs to fertilize her crops. Japs have already looked these islands over.

One Jap sub was sighted near New Zealand (SE) and there are indications of one 200 miles SW of Midway and another near Oahu. A move of Jap subs into the Central Pacific is expected.

There are strong indications of an Orange offensive in the SW Pacific around the end of the month. The Japs are expected to use as many as four CV with suitable cruiser and destroyer escort and land based air from the Rabaul area. We are planning opposition. No BB are expected in this.

Air activities in the S.W. Pacific seems limited to reconnaissance.

There was no news today of importance from the Bengal area.
LONG 080-01 WEST ENTERING MARITIME CONTROL AREA LAT 08-00 NORTH LONG 079-30 WEST THENCE NORTH TO STATION SHIP ABEAM TABOGUILLA LIGHT FOR ENTRANCE INSTRUCTIONS SUBPARA (C) VESSELS APPROACHING CANAL ZONE FROM SOUTH AMERICA, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA KEEP TO SOUTHWARD AND EASTWARD OF LINE FROM POINT LAT 02-00 NORTH LONG 093-00 WEST TO LAT 04-50 NORTH LONG 080-00 WEST THENCE THROUGH LAT 07-20 NORTH LONG 078-47 WEST TO LAT 08-00 NORTH LONG 079-30 WEST THENCE NORTH TO STATION SHIP ABEAM TABOGUILLA LIGHT FOR ENTRANCE INSTRUCTIONS X PARA 3 BUNKER REQUIREMENTS OF VESSELS ROUTED TO WELLINGTON AT TIME OF ISSUING ROUTE INSTRUCTIONS X AMCON ANTOPAGASTA DELIVER TO MISTER GILBERT

OPNAV TO VARIOUS

MERCANTILE PACIFIC COASTAL ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS (MPORI) HEREBY PROMULGATED PRINTED COPIES TO BE MAILED SECTION 1 PARAGRAPH 1 subpara A VESSELS IN CONVOY OR INDEPENDENT BETWEEN ALASKA AND UNIT SAIL WEST COAST NORTHBOUND DIVERSIFIED COURSES TO NORTH AND EAST MEDIAN LINE USUALLY TRAVELED COURSES (2) SOUTHBOUND TO SOUTHWARD AND WESTWARD OF MEDIAN LINE USUAL COURSES SUBPARA (B) MAXIMUM USE MADE OF INSIDE PASSAGE TO ALASKA PARAGRAPH 2 SUBPARA A (1) BETWEEN PUGET SOUND AND SAN DIEGO INDEPENDENTS AND VESSELS IN CONVOY SHALL BE ROUTED ON DIVERSIFIED COURSES NORTHBOUND EASTWARD OF MEDIAN LINE 25 MILES OFF PRINCIPAL AIDS TO NAVIGATION (2) SOUTHBOUND TO WESTWARD OF ABOVE LINE SUBPARA (B) SMALL CRAFT ROUTED CLOSE IN SHORE PARAGRAPH 3 SUBPARAGRAPH A VESSELS PLYING BETWEEN US AND CANAL ZONE ROUTED DIVERSIFIED COURSES USUAL TRAVELED ROUTES 100 MILES OFF SHORE SUBPARA B SMALL VESSELS MAY BE ROUTED CLOSE IN SHORE X PARAGRAPH 4 WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA USUAL STEAMER TRACKS SECTION 2 PARAGRAPH 1 ENTRANCE TO PANAMA MARITIME CONTROL AREA SAME AS MPRI SECTION OF SUB PARAGRAPH 2 X THIS DISPATCH TRANSMITTED TO ALL OFFICES INTERESTED X (UNDERLINED PORTION GARbled)

COMINDIV 2 to CINCPAC, COMANZAC

Comindiv 2 replying 020411 and 162149 April will reply. Plan to finish Fiji fields 538 additional mines by time MONTGOMERY arrives about 3 May. Understand General Rose primarily concerned with mine protection against tank barge approach to ROSES especially SAVANNAH HARBOR. Since preliminary work must be completed on mines prior to loading have prepared subject to change 100 ROSES mines including 50 with 24 foot depth and 18 foot antennas to be layed at high water slack in designated areas as desired giving float submergence 4 to 8 feet in SAVANNAH HARBOR.
MERCANTILE PACIFIC ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS (MPRI) HEREBY PROMULGATED PRINTED COPIES TO FOLLOW IN MAIL X SECTION 1 PARA 1 GENERAL REMARKS X PARA 2 SUBPARA (A) CONVOYS BETWEEN US WEST COAST AND HAWAIIAN ISLANDS DIVERSIFIED COURSES WESTBOUND NORTHWARD AND EASTBOUND SOUTHWARD OF THE GREAT CIRCLE COURSES SUBPARA (B) VALUABLE CONVOYS ROUTED BY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS SUBPARA (C) SLOW CONVOYS ROUTED TO SOUTHWARD WHEN WEATHER CONDITIONS MAKE DESIRABLE SUBPARA (D) INDEPENDENTLY ROUTED SHIPS CLEAR OF CONVOYS BUT CONFORMING IN GENERAL X PARA 3 INDEPENDENTS AND CONVOYS FROM US WEST COAST TO SAMOA X FIJI AND SOCIETY ISLANDS ON DIVERSIFIED COURSES TO EASTWARD OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND USING AS A BASE COURSE GREAT CIRCLE SAN FRANCISCO TO A POINT BETWEEN TOMGA AND COOK ISLANDS X PARA 4 INDEPENDENTS AND CONVOYS TO EASTERN AUSTRALIAN PORTS NORTH OF LATITUDE OF AUCKLAND ROUTED AS IN PARA 3 FOLLOWING IN GENERAL THE GREAT CIRCLE COURSE SOUTHWARD OF SAMOA AND FIJI DIRECT TO DESTINATION X PARA 5 SHIPPING US WEST COAST FOR AUCKLAND GREAT CIRCLE THROUGH TUAMOTU ARCHIPELAGO THENCE DIRECT TO DESTINATION X PARA 6 SHIPPING FOR WELLINGTON OR PORTS IN SOUTHERN AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA DIVERSIFIED COURSES THROUGH TUAMOTU ARCHIPELAGO THENCE SOUTH OF CHATHAM ISLAND TO WELLINGTON OR SOUTH OF CHATHAM ISLAND AND SOUTH OF NEW ZEALAND TO DESTINATION X PARA 7 SHIPPING FROM HAWAIIAN ISLANDS BOUND SOUTH OR SOUTHWEST PASS WELL TO EASTWARD OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND AND FOLLOW TRACKS INDICATED IN PARA 4, 5, AND 6 X PARA 8 SUBPARA (A) SHIPPING BETWEEN CANAL ZONE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA AND PACIFIC ISLANDS INCLUDING AUSTRALIA (1) TO AUSTRALIA AND ISLANDS IN SOUTH PACIFIC GREAT CIRCLE COURSE BETWEEN TUAMOTU ARCHIPELAGO AND PITCAIRN ISLAND THENCE DIRECT TO AUCKLAND AND PORTS NORTHERN AUSTRALIA OR IF BOUND WELLINGTON SOUTH OF CHATHAM OR FOR PORTS SOUTHERN AUSTRALIA SOUTH OF CHATHAM ISLAND AND NEW ZEALAND TO DESTINATION (2) FROM AUSTRALIA AND ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC GREAT CIRCLE SOUTH OF PITCAIRN ISLAND (3) FROM HAWAIIAN ISLANDS OUTWARD BOUND VESSELS TO THE SOUTHWARD AND WESTBOUND DEEP TO THE NORTHWARD OF THE GREAT CIRCLE COURSES X SUBPARA (B) VESSELS SHALL GIVE GALAPAGOS AND COCOS ISLAND A WIDE BERTH XX SECTION 2 PARA 1 SUBPARA (A) DIVERSION IN PACIFIC AREA SHALL BE INITIATED BY AUTHORITY EXERCISING STRATEGIC CONTROL OF AREA IN WHICH SHIPPING MAY BE X SUBPARA (B) LOCAL DIVERSIONS SHALL BE MADE AS NECESSARY BY COMMANDERS OF AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN EACH CASE DIVERTING AUTHORITY FOR GENERAL AREA IS TO BE INFORMED X PARA 2 SUBPARA (A) VESSELS SHALL ENTER PANAMA MARITIME CONTROL AREA DURING DAYLIGHT AND ARRIVE AT BALBOA BEFORE DARK SUBPARA (B) VESSELS APPROACHING CANAL ZONE FROM HAWAII AND WEST PASS THROUGH LAT 06-55 NORTH LONG 082-00 WEST TO LAT 06-55 NORTH.
COMANZAC to CTF-17 info CINCPAC

Following is Comanzac 0150 GCT 14th action focas sent you for info. Sydney dock available about 22 April. J D EDWARDS and HMAS ADELAIDE with convoy expected arrive Noumea forenoon 19 Aprilx When ready J D EDWARDS ADELAIDE and AUSTRALIA proceed Sydney in company. LAMSON and LEANDER should remain Noumea until required depart for rendezvous with convoy. ACHILLES will be sent from Sydney direct to rendezvous. HOBART will complete refit about 22 April. Refit of AUSTRALIA estimated require 10 days. Unless situation requires it shift of flag to HOBART will not be made.

OPNAV to CINCPAC etc.

BRITISH UNITED STATES ROUTING AGREEMENT. Short Title BUSRA. Was recently concluded. Its principal provisions are (including modifications incident to agreement Southwest Pacific command).

(1) United States will control (sail and route) all merchant shipping in Western Atlantic (line of demarcation of Western Atlantic area has been promulgated to authorities concerned) and Pacific Areas (including southwest Pacific) issuing route from port of departure to 1st port of arrival in British strategic area when latter involved.

(2) British will control shipping in British home waters. Eastern section north and south Atlantic. Mediterraniam and Indian area issuing route from port departure to 1st port arrival in United States strategic area when latter involved.

(3) Opnav issuing single comprehensive mercantile Pacific routing instructions (short title MPRI) for whole Pacific Ocean, Admiralty, NSHQ Ottawa, ACNB and NZNB may suggest amendments to Opnav.

(4) Admiralty will continue to issue mercantile Atlantic routing instructions (short title MARI). Opnav and NSHQ Ottawa may suggest amendments to Admiralty.
(5) Opnav issuing mercantile Atlantic Coastal and Pacific Coastal routing instructions (short titles MACRI and MPCRI) covering routing within sea frontiers.

(6) Control of shipping in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other British territory in United States strategic areas will be exercised by United States using as their agents the personnel of existing British naval control service organization.

(7) British routing officers in United States strategic areas to be accommodated in same or adjacent buildings as United States routing officers vice-versa in British areas. Closest collaboration between British and U.S. routing officers essential.

(8) In areas under United States strategic control where British Officers available, routing instructions will be delivered to British masters through British routing officers (BRO) and vice versa.

(9) Arrangements for routing of convoys will remain as at present.

(10) Diversions of ships or convoys by authority exercising strategic control of area in which vessel located at time of diversion. Other authority may suggest diversions. Time and date at which estimated ship or convoy passing from one area strategic control to other to be included in "Route Signal". Such time and date called CHIP responsibility passing from originating authority to other authority at this time and date irrespective whether ship or convoy in precise position estimated or not.

(11) To prevent both U.S. and British authorities duplicating merchant ship movement reports (U.S. "MERCO" British "VESCA" Messages) and route signals. It is intended that gradually in U.S. strategic areas other than British territory, only MERCO and U.S. route signals (dispatches) will be sent action Opnav and Seafrons through which route passes. Admiralty and British staff officers (Intelligence) in area of departure. Similarly in British strategic controlled areas and British territory in U.S. controlled area only vessels and British route signals will be sent action Admiralty and British staff officers (Intelligence) in area of port of departure, Opnav and Seafrons through which route passes.
(12) British naval shore code being issued by Admiralty to Opnav and U S Seafrons.

(13) U S Master Control Cipher has been issued to admiralty and British intelligence centers at Ottawa, Kingston, Jamaica and Montevideo.

(14) Joint British American code (MERSIGs, Volume II) and appropriate recoding tables is supplied to various categories of shipping. Will be used for communication with ships at sea. (Reference Opnav 081235 April).

(15) Opnav will send dispatch to addressees signalling effective date of BUSRA which presently anticipated about 1st June.

(16) Copies of BUSRA being sent to all addressees.

(17) Detailed instructions covering method of reporting movements and route signals contained in "General Instructions for Routing Officers (Short Title GIRO)" being mailed to addressees responsible for such reports. If GIRO unreceived by effective date BUSRA addressees shall, pending its receipt, use same method of reporting presently used by British except Opnav and Seafrons involved shall be included as action addressees of all ship movement and route signal dispatches.

OPNAV to CINCPAC

Under consideration a joint supply service for South Pacific Area except Canton for purpose effecting the supply of U S Army and Navy forces, headquarters at Auckland. Subsistence stores less a few items can be supplied from Australia and New Zealand for both Army and Navy there and in outlying bases south of Equator. Opnav 072013, after consultation Commanding General Hawaiian Area request you indicate in broad terms your recommendations of the overall problem to include necessary joint procurement and joint use of shipping and storage facilities and composition joint staff.
CINCPAC to COMANZAC

Propose to comply Cominch 141225 by transferring Desron 4 to Southwest Pacfor in exchange for PERKINS FLUSSER and 1200 tonners. SELFRIJDE MUGFORD BAGLEY arrive Bleacher with convoy about 7 May can be relieved there by 4 stackers as soon as shore defense is able to assume antiaircraft defense of convoy. HENLEY HELM will be ordered to Roses with convoy arriving there about 3 May and can be ordered to report to you as soon as two 4 pipers are started for Pearl. BLUE JARVIS RALPH TALBOTT are temporarily on mainland escort run with availability at Mare Island for Radar installation. Can start them south from here about 3rd week in May in exchange for PERKINS FLUSSER and remaining 1200 ton ships. Ships of Desron 4 all have double beam sound gear 20mm guns and depth charge throwers. All except HENLEY HELM will have SC Radar and these two have preliminary work completed requiring only instruments which will be forwarded when available and can be installed in about 5 days with repair ship or equivalent help. Request all Radar equipment received by you for 1200 tonners but not installed be sent to Pearl with them. Also propose exchange DOBBIN for BLACKHAWK account spare part situation your comment on this requested.

COMINCH to COMSOWESPACFOR info CINCPAC.

TAKE UP FOLLOWING WITH ACNB AND ADVISE X WHILE I ACCEPT GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT COMMAND SHOULD BE EXERCISED BY SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT WHEN US AND AUSTRALIAN NAVAL FORCES COOPERATE TACTICALLY THIS CANNOT DEROGATE THE HIGHER PRINCIPLE THAT COMINCH AND CINCPAC ALWAYS RETAIN THE POWER TO APPOINT AS TASK FORCE COMMANDER ANY OFFICER UNDER THEIR COMMAND REGARDLESS OF RANK. IN PARTICULAR CMA OPERATIONS OF PACIFIC FLEET CARRIER UNITS IN SOPAC AND SOWAC AREAS HAVE BEEN PREDICATED TO UNDERSTANDING THAT COMMANDER THEREOF COMMANDS THE COMBINED FORCE WHEN AUSTRALIAN VESSELS COOPERATE TACTICALLY CMA REGARDLESS OF RELATIVE RANK OF OFFICERS CONCERNED. IN VIEW NECESSITY THAT OFFICER EXPERIENCED IN CARRIER OPERATIONS BE IN CONTROL MAY I ASK THAT YOU CONFIRM THIS UNDERSTANDING WITH REFERENCE TO FUTURE COMBINED ACTIVITIES. DELIVER TO MACARTHUR.
Complete list of code names bases twice requested promised by Opnav despatch 122037 March but not received. Have obtained at least partial list prepared by Comdg General Hawdept from war department directives but desire confirmation and assurance that full information has been received. Believe too many commands are unrelatedly employing code names and that confusion with serious effects might result. After receipt of complete and authentic list will control this within my command but believe broader coordination is necessary. Emmons list contains no name for Johnston Island or Auckland. Request verification of indications Fulcrum is name for latter.
SECRET

17 0503 (Continued)

Recommend South Bay field alternate 24 and 45 foot depths having floats 6 to 10 foot submergence. Subject to confirmation preliminary estimate includes 2 line fields (A) across INDIE LITTE entrance (B) halfway across HILLIARD CHANNEL from northward (C) across South Bay. Water depths indicate need for 40 anchors with 400 feet cable and 60 with 900 feet. Absence handling facilities ROSES makes desirable conduct of mining operations upon arrival and approval fields.

17 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMANZAC

CONTINUOUS STUDY AND CONSIDERATION OF ENEMY COMMITMENTS IN PACIFIC THEATER CONFIRMS THE VIEW OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF EXPRESSED IN PARA 4B OF DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AND EMPHASIZES THE ADVISABILITY AND NECESSITY OF MAKING ENEMY SHIPS AND SHIPPING THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF SURFACE AIR AND SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN ORDER TO HAMSTRING HIS CAPACITY TO SUPPORT HIS OPERATIONS. PARA.

NOTE THAT SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON SHIPS AND SHIPPING IN ENEMY WATERS IN WESTERN PART OF CENTRAL PACIFIC HAVE FORCED THE USE OF CONVOYS BETWEEN HOMELAND AND SOUTHWARD. PARA.

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY SHIPS AND SHIPPING TRAVERSING SOUTH CHINA SEA WILL ALSO SERVE TO HELP BRITISH SITUATION IN INDIAN OCEAN THEATER. PARA.

LEARY SHOW THIS DESPATCH TO MACARTHUR. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFORMED.
office within San Francisco service force sub command for this purpose but utilizing existing agencies procurement and storage. Joint staff there to coordinate requirements and shipping handling all stores until Auckland established and functioning.

Desirable supply all bases be as automatic as possible and that after requirements are determined ships be permanently allocated this service. Status White Poppy not clear. Present supply a responsibility of Australia.

If the above recommended organization is adopted the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, should be relieved of responsibility for supply South Pacific bases.
CONTINOUS STUDY AND CONSIDERATION OF ENEMY COMMITMENTS IN PACIFIC THEATRE CONFIRMS THE VIEW OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF EXPRESSED IN PARA 4B OF DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AND EMPHASIZES THE ADVISABILITY AND NECESSITY OF MAKING ENEMY SHIPS AND SHIPPING THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF SURFACE AIR AND SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN ORDER TO HAMSTRING HIS CAPACITY TO SUPPORT HIS OPERATIONS PARAM.

NOTE THAT SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON SHIPS AND SHIPPING IN ENEMY WATERS IN WESTERN PART OF CENTRAL PACIFIC HAVE FORCED THE USE OF CONVOYS BETWEEN HOMELAND AND SOUTHWARD PARA

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY SHIPS AND SHIPPING TRAVERSING SOUTH CHINA SEA WILL ALSO SERVE TO HELP BRITISH SITUATION IN INDIAN OCEAN THEATRE PARA LEARY SHOW THIS DESPATCH TO MACARTHUR XX CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFORMED.

ACNB confirms your understanding regarding exercise of command of combined units when PACFLT carrier units operate SWPAC Area. Suitable directive being promulgated RAN by ACNB. This refers to COMINCH 162220. ACNB has this.

18 1915 CINCPAC to TASK FORCE COMMANDERS.

RECENT INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCE ON ORANGE CARRIERS STATES X A X ORGANIZATION X CARDIV 1 AKAGA 1 AND KAGA X CARDIV 2 HIRYU PLUS SORYU X CARDIV 3 RYUJO ONLY X CARDIV 5 SHOKAKU AND ZUIKAKU X B X PLANE COMPLEMENTS X FIGHTERS X EACH 18 PLUS 3 SPARES EXCEPT RYUJO HAS 12 PLANES AND 4 X DIVE BOMBERS SAME AS FIGHTERS X TORPEDO BOMBERS X 18 PLUS 3 SPARES PER SHIP EXCEPT KAKA CARRIERS 27 AND 6 AND RYULO HAS SWABO.

19 2151 CINCPAC TO OPNAV.

Joint supply service South Pacific Area deemed practicable and necessary your 152130. Joint office staffed with personnel Army Navy Marine should be established Auckland and assigned responsibility under Ghormley supply outlying islands with such stores as can be obtained that region including joint purchase storage and use of shipping. Accordance your C72103 overall planning and coordination logistics Pacific Ocean Area being assigned Service Force hence logical above proposed joint office be a section of Service Force Sub Command to be established Auckland.

Supply material and stores South Pacific Area from coast also requires coordination. Recommend similar joint
URSER 00146 dated 22 March: tanks in limited numbers can be furnished for outlying bases after divisions have been equipped. 5 amphibian tractors for inter-island use at PALMYRA will be provided on request. 8 mortars 81 mm will be furnished. Sufficient ammunition being shipped to bring .30 caliber to 10 units of fire, .50 caliber AP to 7½ units of fire and 37mm AA HE to 10 units of fire. Additional needed for 10 units all types will be shipped as available. Com-14 inform CG Marforces 14th ND. CominCh informed.

ALUSNA Wellington 150015. Inquiries by New Zealand Military Attache regarding port facilities were made at request of Joint Army Navy Committee now making study of Logistic problem Pacific Area. Space requirements are for use by both services.
April 17.

The press reports that we have bombed TOKYO, YOKOHAMA, KOBE and NAGOYA. As only nine planes are reported shot down, nine other probably reached the bombing objectives. No dope yet from Halsey.

Cominch in his 171750 to Comanzac and Cincpac confirms and emphasizes that the best way to damage Japan at present is to give first consideration to attacks on her shipping. We have apparently expended a lot of bombs on air fields and buildings when the target should have been ships.

Opnav (151546) has issued ship routing instructions for the Pacific. No change is noted in our present set up.

Captain Bowman left for Auckland in connection with the establishment of a base there. The RIGEL will follow on the 20th.

Comindiv 2 (170503) tells of his plans for the completion of the mine field now underway at Nandi, and of his plan to mine ROSES.

Minor air actions and reconnaissance continues in the Southwest Pacific area. There are indications that our raids on Koepang are doing damage and that the Japs desire to move from there. Also the Japs desire early air raids on Darwin.

Our estimate for the Jap offensive in the New Guinea area still is that it will start around the end of the month. They will use CVs with usual flotilla. We are trying to get a force together to oppose. Task Force 17 will be ready; Task Forces 11 and 16 are otherwise committed.

The KASUGA MARU which we recently hit on the stern at Rabaul will go to YOKOSUKA for repairs and should be ready for service on the 23rd.

Relations with Vichy France are becoming more strained. Com-14 has warned against damage here by misguided Frenchmen.
April 18

The raid on TOKYO and vicinity has caused the Japs to search with their air, surface and submarine units. This search may possibly delay the SW Pac offensive as the RYUKAKU probably is at sea searching, as are air units from the KAGA. It should be noted that (1) this raid ties up important forces for a long time (2) The military damage is small (3) the risk of loosing a CV is great (4) Bombing of shore objectives in this manner does not altogether agree with Cominich strategy (his 171750 referred to yesterday). The raid does have, however, great public approval. As one result of this raid we see the good work being done by our radio intelligence.

NAS Midway seems to think that there is some life on Pearl and Hermes reef. Some Japs could have landed there from a submarine recently.

We are having trouble with the fuel tanks in the Yorktown VFs.

The Sumner will complete the survey at Nandi on April 27th.

Cominich is sending the approved code names to arrive here about the 25th. Maybe this will clean up and settle that matter.

Leary says in his (180135) that Cinc Pac view that our officers command task forces containing a CV regardless of rank is concurred in by the ACNB.

The airfield at TONGATABU is in fine shape and will probably be of value to TF 17 for the next few days. They arrive there tomorrow after a long stay at sea.

We are taking steps to oppose the expected move of Orange in the SW Pacific. Our date of commencement of the offensive is the end of the month, while Cominich thinks it will be the first week in May. Taking into account the possible delay due to air search mentioned above CincPac and Cominich are in agreement as to the time. CincPac will probably be unable to send enough forces to be sure of stopping the expected Jap offensive.

Con 14 wants 1,000 marines to guard the waterfronts in his district. This would be of some help to the not too good Hawaiian Defense set up.

Rabaul was attack by two planes. There was 1 hit and 2 misses on 2APs. 10 AP and one cruiser were in the harbor. They are the target - not the airfields.

The Jap base at KOEPANG may be moved.
April 18 (Continued)

Three ships of Batdiv 3 are returning to Japan.

Cincpac (181915) describes the loading of Orange CVs.

A squadron of Orange CE is enroute Wake today.

April 19

Cincpac in his 192151 recommends a logistic plan for the South Pacific Islands.

There was no news about the Tokyo raids except in the press.

A possible submarine contact was reported by the Army at Christmas.

The PREBLE reports that there is no sign of life at Pearl and Hermes Reef. The report of life there by a plane was investigated.

Reboul was again attacked by our planes with small results. 3 ships were reported in that harbor.

Vice Admiral Brown is on leave until May 1st.

April 20.

The problem of providing ways and means to deal with the expected Japanese offensive in the Southwest Pacific was discussed informally by Admiral Nimitz.

There is still no word from Admiral Halsey.

The landing field at ROSES is now ready for VFVs. In his 202050 to Com-14 the Major General Commandant said that a limited number of tanks can be supplied to outlying bases. The first priority for the tanks is offensive units but the Major General Commandant infers that he agrees that tanks are necessary for defense battalions on our outlying coral atolls. The TANGIER indicates that, after due notice, and providing modest supplies, we can operate PBY-5As (amphibians) at NOUMEA.

The PREBLE reports recent signs of life at KURE ISLAND. This seems to indicate a visit by the Japs within the past two months.

In his 202110 Opnav states that a Joint Army and Navy committee is now studying the Pacific logistics. So are we.
April 20 (Continued)

Cominich now wants tankers speeded up on the Hawaii - West Coast run. This is being done to some extent.

The Army bombed the FLYING FISH. They do considerable damage to our SS and something definite must be done to stop it.

The first job for the LAFTEY is the NEVADA escort to Bremerton.

Minor bombings continue on SALAMOA. These recent attacks by our forces may be slowing up the Jap effort in this area. More Jap troops are being landed at BOUGAINVILLE.

Indications for the next Jap offensive in the Southwest Pacific continue. Our date for the commencement is tentatively May 3rd.
BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA ARE PLANNING TO SEND TO NOUMEA MATERIAL FOR UNDERWATER DEFENSE AND IMPROVEMENT OF FACILITIES ON SHORE. THESE PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE THRU THE ACNB FOR WHICH PURPOSE THE LATTER ARE PREPARED TO SEND AN OFFICER IN CHARGE AND STAFF TO NOUMEA. SUBSEQUENTLY THIS PERSONNEL MIGHT EXERCISE CONTROL OF THE HARBOUR UNDER AN AUSTRALIAN PORT CAPTAIN BUT AFTER AN INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL AUBOYNEAU DOUBTFUL IF THE FRENCH WOULD AGREE. YOUR RECOMMENDATION IS REQUESTED. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF CONCURRS. CHICAGO DELIVER TO COMGEN US FORCES NEW CALEDONIA.
flying boat inspected aerodrome. Allied air operations 24 April fortresses marauders and B-25's attack Lae aerodrome and installations. B-17's attack shipping near Rabaul. Usual searches west Horn Island northwest Tulagi and south Salamaua latest photos Lae show 23 fighters dispersed off runway 3 others probably unserviceable near hanger. 4 bombers. 6 blast pits westernside. 3 dispersal areas east of northwest end runway.

COMANZAC to OPNAV info CINCPAC

Allied cruisers and destroyers in Task Force 44 must be conversant with U.S. Signal and Tactical Instructions in order to operate with Pac Fleet Task Forces. To this end am supplying Australia, Canberra, Hobart with General Signal Book, Tactical Instructions, Fleet Doctrine, Call Books. To communicate efficiently they should also have effective contact code air code and other crypto channels Pacific. Request authority issue class 4 allowance including ECM to above 3 ships. Sufficient cipher machines available ex sail boats. Will furnish liaison officers as required.
Army desires transport approximately 2000 personnel New Zealand to Fiji in May. In addition to hired transport propose utilize HMNZS MONOWAI and HMS ASCANIA as escort and to assist in transfer personnel. HMNZS MONOWAI 12th to 16th May HMS ASCANIA 12th to 28th May.

This is the first of 2 parts. Scheduled attack vessels southeast New Hanover unsuccessful due bad weather which also obscured Kavieng but 2 objects possibly ships sighted in straits there. Nil enemy air activity Cape Gloucester. B-26's bombed 3 transports Talili Bay (South Watom Island) obtained near misses. Confirms use this anchorage for dispersal shipping. 3 other marauders dropped incendiaries on wharf installations northwest side Simpson Harbor starting fires. Encountered little AA fire except machine guns from shore and ships in harbor. Marauders machine gunned motor transport and personnel. Saw in this harbor 2 large 5 medium transports of which one at new wharf. Reconnaissance Duke York revealed no aerodrome nor VP there but small freighter and yacht southeast thereof. Encountered AA fire from VLU Island. Submarine on surface ST. GEORGE Channel 9 miles southeast Cape Gazelle. 3 AP tonnage about 5,000 sighted underway in Ataliklikun Bay. Total shipping observed Rabaul area 23 April 16 vessels. No AA construction nor other activity seen Watom Island. End of part one.

Part 2. Possible ship or submarine which fired on our aircraft was sighted yesterday afternoon 90 miles northwest Port Moresby from whence planes sent to attack. Latter town raided 11 hours local time by 8 type 99 bombers escorted by 7 type 0 fighters not intercepted by Kittyhawks but antiaircraft kept planes up. 8 bombs dropped from 21,000 feet hit center runway making 300 yards thereof temporarily unserviceable. 3 enemy VF machine gunned ground installations without serious effect. Vicinity Cape Melville (Northeast coast Australia) 3 unidentified schooners sighted yesterday. Enemy officers 19 April arrived Salamaua in
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

PART I - MISSION

The Problem

1. There are many indications that the enemy will launch an offensive in the NEW GUINEA - NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMON ISLANDS area commencing about May 3, 1942. The problem here considered is how to deal with that offensive, insofar as the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas is concerned, while continuing to carry out the tasks assigned but not directly related to this problem.

The Situation

2. The assigned tasks of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas are:

(a) Hold island positions between UNITED STATES and Southwest Pacific Area necessary for security of the line of communications between these regions and for supporting naval, air and amphibious operations against Japanese.

(b) Support operations of forces in Southwest Pacific Area.

(c) Contain Japanese forces within Pacific Theatre.

(d) Support the defense of the continent of NORTH AMERICA.

(e) Protect essential sea and air communications.

(f) Prepare for execution of major amphibious offensives against positions held by Japan initially to be launched from South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Area.

3. These are supplementary to the following basic directive:

Tasks assigned you summarize into two primary tasks in order of priority:

first, covering and holding line HAWAII - MIDWAY and maintaining its communications with West Coast;

second, and only in small degree less important, maintenance of communication West Coast - AUSTRALIA chiefly by covering, securing and holding line HAWAII - SAMOA which should be extended to include FIJI at earliest practicable date.
4. The tasks assigned to the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area which bear on the Problem under study are:

(a) Hold the key military regions of AUSTRALIA as bases for future offensive action against JAPAN and in order to check Japanese conquest in this area.

(b) Check enemy advance toward AUSTRALIA and its essential lines of communications by destruction of enemy combatant, troop, and supply ships, aircraft and bases in EASTERN MALAYSIA and NEW GUINEA - BISMARCK - SOLOMON ISLANDS region.

(c)  

(d)  

(e) Protect communications within Southwest Pacific Area and its close approaches.

(f)  

(g) Support operations of friendly forces in Pacific Ocean Area and Indian Theatre.

(h) Prepare to take offensive.

The following despatch from the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Commander Anzac Force must be considered with the second task set forth above:

CONTINUOUS STUDY AND CONSIDERATION OF ENEMY COMMITMENTS IN PACIFIC THEATER CONFIRMS THE VIEW OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF EXPRESSED IN PARA 4B OF DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AND EMPHASIZES THE ADVISABILITY AND NECESSITY OF MAKING ENEMY SHIPS AND SHIPping THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF SURFACE AIR AND SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN ORDER TO HAMSTRING HIS CAPACITY TO SUPPORT HIS OPERATIONS PARA

NOTE THAT SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON SHIPS AND SHIPPING IN ENEMY WATERS IN WESTERN PART OF CENTRAL PACIFIC HAVE FORCED THE USE OF CONVOYS BETWEEN HOMELAND AND SOUTHWARD PARA

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY SHIPS AND SHIPPING TRAVERSING SOUTH CHINA SEA WILL ALSO SERVE TO HELP BRITISH SITUATION IN INDIAN OCEAN THEATER PARA

LEARY SHOW THIS DESPATCH TO MACARTHUR XX CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFORMED
5. From these tasks it will be seen that those which immediately apply are:

For Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area:

Check enemy advance toward AUSTRALIA and its essential lines of communications by destruction of enemy combatant, troop, and supply ships, aircraft and bases in EASTERN MALAYSIA and NEW GUINEA - BISMARCK - SOLOMON ISLANDS region.

For Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area:

Support operations of forces in Southwest Pacific Area.

6. It is inferred that the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, intends to employ large Pacific Fleet forces in the solution of this problem.
PART II - SURVEY OF OPPOSING STRENGTHS

1. (a) The Japanese are flushed with victory. Their morale is high. As long as the course of their operations proceeds according to plan their morale and efficiency will remain high. But when they are forced to improvise because of major setbacks a lowering of efficiency and morale can be expected. The impression is gained that they have definitely been held up in the EASTERN NEW GUINEA area by the losses inflicted by Vice Admiral Brown's Force and by the persistent bombing from AUSTRALIA and PORT MORESBY.

(b) Their planning, training, and experience is excellent and must not be underestimated. The attack on PEARL HARBOR was a workmanlike job in every respect. That operation may be taken as an example of what they can do in the way of planning and execution of the plans. Timing, the objective, the surprise, driving home the attack - all show that we can expect excellent work. Their army has shown ability and the will to reach objectives even in face of considerable opposition. They can travel over very bad terrain. Their food supply is very simple - a few handfuls of rice plus what the country can offer seems to keep them going in fighting trim. In landings they are perfectly willing to accept large losses from enemy fire anddrawings, and they do reach objectives in spite of losses. While the general terrain in the area under study is not the best for amphibious operations, they have already amply demonstrated great ability in equally bad places.

(c) It has been determined that, generally speaking, their airplanes have greater range than ours. In particular, by the use of belly tanks their fighters have a radius of something over 500 miles. They also have fairly effective seaplane fighters.

(d) Their aerial torpedoes are excellent, and the technique of their use has been very good. There is evidence that their aerial torpedoes run very accurately, take depth quickly after a very short run, and that they may sacrifice range for weight of explosive.

(e) They have amply demonstrated the excellence of their air power against surface ships when those surface ships have inadequate air protection.

(f) On the other hand, our men are just as brave, and those who have been properly trained are believed to be better than their opposite Japanese number. Our Navy under fire in
(f) continued.

this war, especially in air combat has left little to be desired. Our Army is untried except at BATAAN, where the ground troops were magnificent. But there, and in the MALAYSIA campaign, Army air showed lack of proper training and coordination. Our exercise of unity of command is probably inferior to that of the Japanese because of our lack of experience in this respect.

(g) Our submarines and their personnel have indicated considerable superiority.

(h) In general due to the superiority of our personnel in resourcefulness and initiative, and of the undoubted superiority of much of our equipment we should be able to accept odds in battle if necessary.

2. Character of the Theater.

(a) Hydrography, Topography. The Sailing Directions are adequate for ordinary navigation and for a general description of the Theatre. Certain points deserve emphasis:

(1) Navigation in the area is difficult due to inaccurate charts, rather strong currents, many atolls, shoals and reefs. However, prudent navigators can be expected to take our ships any place military operations demand.

(2) Navigation off the southeast coast of NEW GUINEA is particularly difficult due to inaccurate charts, many islands, shoals, and reefs, and the fact that the lead seldom gives warning of danger. Near the coast the water is often thick and muddy.

(3) The islands are very thinly populated and the cultivation there affords poor support for troops. A high and very rugged mountain range extends through the length of the island of NEW BRITAIN, with the highest peak 7546 feet. In NEW IRELAND the mountains are up to 6000 feet. But there, between Mt. BONGMUT (4265 feet) and the northeast tip of the island, there are two dips with a maximum elevation of 600 feet. The SOLOMON ISLANDS also present the characteristics of the others in that there is the usual chain of mountains for the most part covered with dense forest and rank undergrowth. Landings would present no great difficulties in the area as there are many harbors and beaches.
(b) The Weather. A chart of conditions for the month of May is attached as Annex "A". Note that there are apt to be hurricanes making up in the SAMOAN, FIJI, and CORAL SEA areas. In the SOLOMONS - NEW BRITAIN - NEW GUINEA area flying will be tricky with much rain and clouds. The pilot chart gives average conditions. This is to be studied in connection with particular operations. Our pilots recently reported that the passes in the mountains were clear of clouds only in the morning hours.

(c) Daylight will be from about 0530 to 1830 in Latitude 15° South on May 7th, while there will be a full moon on both May 1st and June 1st.

(d) The following distances are of interest:

- PEARL to SAMOA: 2276 miles
- PEARL to TONGATABU: 2780 miles
- PEARL to SUVA: 2750 miles
- PEARL to NOUMEA: 3400 miles
- PEARL to MORESBY: 4410 miles
- TONGATABU to NOUMEA: 930 miles
- TONGATABU to SUVA: 430 miles
- TONGATABU to MID CORAL SEA: 1700 miles
- SUVA to RABUAL: 1836 miles
- TRUK to RABUAL (water): 795 miles
- YOKOSUKA to RABUAL: 3180 miles
- RABUAL to LAE (water): 420 miles
- RABUAL to LAE (air): 350 miles
- MORESBY to LAE (air): 150 miles
- MORESBY to LAE (water): 1080 miles
- MORESBY to RABUAL (air): 440 miles
- MORESBY to RABUAL (water): 950 miles

3. INFORMATION

(a) While we get very good communication intelligence, a weakness is our lack of organization to obtain and evaluate combat intelligence to best advantage. Such an organization is being set up. We are able to obtain rather good CI and RI information, and our radar is improving. Our codes are thought secure. But a national weakness is that through gossip, carelessness, etc., we do not deny information to the enemy that is of value to him. Included are ship movements, building program, press releases, some future plans, and land military installations of all kinds.

(b) Due to his systematic collection of information in the past and to the almost certain existence of spies and sympathizers, we must assume that the enemy is well informed of the present overall strength of our armed forces, the details of our major bases, and the general location of our Navy.
(c) Our own communication facilities are excellent. So are those of the enemy, as far as we can judge.

4. **Enemy Forces.**

(a) Ultimate Japanese strength in the operation cannot be accurately estimated at this time. Annex "B" shows information dated April 22, 1942, on forces which might take part.

(b) The total naval forces, including air, which we may be expected to oppose in the area are estimated on April 22, 1942, to be:

- **CVs** - Five, namely: ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, RYUKAKU, KASUGA MARU, KAGA. (Note: There are indications that the Commander 1st Air Fleet in AKAGI may participate).
- **BBs** - At least one. (Note: This is not clear yet. 2 BBs were used on the initial attack on RABAUl and at least 2 BBs were used in recent operations in the BENGAL area).
- **CA** - At least five, namely: 2 - 7500; 3 - 10,000.
- **CL** - At least four.
- **DD** - At least twelve, exclusive of plane guards. (Note: 4 more DD indicated as possible).
- **SS** - Indefinite, but up to twelve for MANDATES - NEW BRITAIN area.
- **VB** - 81 (heavy); VF - 30; VP - 28; VO - 26. (Note: The following additional are estimated to be in the MARSHALLS: VB - 54 (heavy) VF - 54; VP - 28; VO - 26).

(c) The only thing known about troops is that there are transports in the RABAUl Area. It must be assumed that troops and transports are available in sufficient force for a major attack now that other campaigns have been successfully completed.

5. **Bases.**

RABAUl - This has a good harbor where a considerable number of ships can anchor. It is defended by AA, although recent reports do not show consistently heavy nor accurate AA fire. There are two landing fields - one near the harbor, and one 9 miles away. Both are available to VB. Hangars, shops, and storehouses are known to be used there by the Japanese for military operations.
RABAUL (continued)

We have no information on coastal batteries. Searchlights have been observed. The approaches may be mined and netted but such information is lacking.

There are air bases near RABAUL at VUNAKANAU (VF and VB), LAKUNAI (VF and possibly VB), SIMPSON HARBOR (VP anchorage), and MERAVAT. At the latter place the enemy is thought to be constructing a dispersal airstrip.

RABAUL also has a weather station.

SALAMAU - This is a seaplane harbor used for refueling VFs. One mile west of the town there is an airfield with hangars suitable for VBs and VFs. There is some AA protection. Nothing is known about mines or nets.

LAE - An advanced position for VB and VF air operations. Small ships have been observed in the harbor. This is closely associated and similar in use and defense to SALAMAU nearby. Both places are under the NEW BRITAIN Air Command.

GASHATA - This is mainly an emergency seaplane anchorage. There is a small landing field. Only VFs have been observed there. Our planes have received heavy AA fire from this place.

KAVIENG - Here there is a seaplane anchorage and a small landing field. No defenses have been noted.

LORENGAUA - An emergency seaplane anchorage. No facilities or accommodations ashore. Radio to RABAUL. Between 300 and 500 troops have been landed there this month. VF have been observed patrolling the harbor.

The enemy has also occupied KESSA, FAISI, BUKA PASSAGE, and KIETA. Very small landing fields exist at the last two.

6. Own Forces.

The situation with respect to own forces is set forth as well as it can be predicted for the period 1-15 May.

(a) Battleships.

The location of the seven battleships will depend upon the decision as to their next move. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has already decided to recommend that they return to the Coast. Reasons:

(1) Except in the Southwest Pacific there appears to be little change of finding suitable objectives for the employment of their power.
(2) In the Southwest Pacific there are no suitable bases yet ready for battleships, and fleet logistic facilities are insufficient to support them and additional large forces in that area.

(3) To furnish suitable air and surface screening to the battleships would take forces which can be utilized as carrier striking groups for which there are certain to be suitable objectives.

(4) Operating carrier groups and battleships in coordination reduces the freedom of action of the former.

(5) The only suitable base, PEARL HARBOR, is unduly congested and susceptible to air attack, particularly when reprisals for the TOKYO attack may be expected.

(6) The fuel supply is only now beginning to be held level without any drain by the battleships.

Task Force One containing the battleships will be in the area to eastward of CHRISTMAS about 23 April. The screen for the battleships is composed of only 5 destroyers. If the recommended decision is made this force will return to San Francisco.

(b) Carrier Task Forces.

(1) Task Force Seventeen at BLEACHER until 26th, our date. Can be at rendezvous northwest of NOUMEA 1 May our date. This force left PEARL 16 February and should not remain active much longer without a refit here.

(2) Task Force Eleven now en route to CORAL SEA should reach rendezvous on 30 April.

(3) Task Force Sixteen (2 CV) should arrive PEARL about 26th. Should be able to leave on 30th, reaching same rendezvous 13-15 May our date. The matter of the HORNET's planes is uncertain.

(c) Escorts.

All of the remaining surface forces are assigned to escort duty and are considered to be the minimum that anticipated conditions require, even with the cover which will be afforded by forces operating in the Southwest.
(1) HONOLULU will be at SAMOA with convoy beginning 29 April.

(2) INDIANAPOLIS arrives SYDNEY with convoy about 3 May.

(3) ACHILLES and LEANDER and 3 destroyers will be with ROSES convoy arriving there about 3 May.

(4) RICHMOND and DL will be with BLEACHER convoy arriving about 8 May.

Most of the destroyers involved in these escorts will be in the process of being turned over to the Southwest Pacific Force.

The BOISE will be at MELBOURNE on 23 April. Her condition is somewhat doubtful and she has little close-in AA defense and she has been ordered to MARE ISLAND but is available for an eastbound convoy.

(d) Oilers.

There will be seven fleet oilers available. In a separate study, Annex "C", it has been determined that the maximum force which these can keep fueled in the CORAL SEA until about June 1st is the equivalent of about four carrier groups. This could be further extended by the use of chartered tankers provided there is no trouble with their crews. The oilers available are:

NEOSHO, KASKASKIA, PLATTE, CUYAMA and TIPPECANOE at present. CIMARRON, SABINE return with Vice Admiral Halsey. KANAWHA available 2-3 May.

The SABINE is slated for overhaul beginning 15 May. The GUADELOPE will complete overhaul on 13 May. SEPULGA and RAMAPO are servicing at BORABORA.

(e) Submarines.

Most of our submarines are either on patrol off the Japanese homeland or are on route going or returning. The remaining units are scheduled to move to southwest AUSTRALIA via various patrols, including one on the TRUK-RABaul line. The arrival at that line can be expedited by cancelling or cutting short the patrols in the MARSHALLS. The submarines which might be thus available are:
Name | Depart PEARL | Arrive south of TRUK
--- | --- | ---
CAR | 20 April | 15 May
TAUTOG | 24 April | 19 May
GRAMPUS | 28 April | 23 May

(Can be expedited by about 8 days).

The GREENLING left for a patrol at TRUK on 20 April. the POLLACK and SILVERSIDES will be available on 30 April; the NAUTILUS on 15 May.

It would probably not be desirable to place patrols south of RABAUL because of interference with the submarines of the Southwest Pacific Force which will be ready to take over this area on 1 May.

(f) Aircraft

Only those aircraft which can fly to the area need be considered in this problem. They are:

(1) 90 VPB, Hawaiian Area (including 50 with Amphibian gear). 6 VPB at NOUMEA.

(2) 29 B-17's at OAHU - certainly not enough to provide a reasonably strong striking force in defense of the Hawaiian Area.

(g) Bases.

(1) Pearl Harbor is the only main base developed and available.

(2) Auckland is earmarked as a main base but has received little development yet.

(3) Sydney has many of the attributes of a main base with its harbor and dock facilities. It also has under construction the only drydock in the area which will take a capital ship (expected to be completed very shortly). It, however, has little in the way of defenses.

(4) Tongatabu. Designated as intermediate operating base by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. Fair anchorage; negligible defenses as yet. U.S. garrison arrives about 8 May, but provision of fighting aircraft is indefinite.
(5) Fiji. Nandi being developed as a spacious anchorage; good natural protection against submarines; U.S. fighter aircraft. New Zealand defenses mediocre. Suva anchorage small for carrier.


(7) Tutuila. Small naval station; very limited harbor; fair defenses.

(8) Borabora. Fueling base, too far removed from active theatre for consideration in this estimate.

(9) Canton, Christmas, Palmyra available as staging points for aircraft.

(10) Efate. An outpost for Noumea but little advanced toward enemy.

(11) Tulagi. Very advanced seaplane base. Australians are still using it in spite of an occasional bombing.

(12) Moresby. The probable enemy objective is a fairly developed base. Southwest Pacific aircraft are still basing there and are the ones carrying out almost daily reconnaissance and bombing against the enemy. This place of course receives frequent bombings.

(13) Townsville, Horn Island. Necessary air bases for the operation of B-17's and the staging of B-26's to Moresby.

(h) Expeditionary Troops.

(1) Second Raider Battalion will be ready to move to PEARL for final six weeks training on 1 May.

(2) First Raider Battalion will arrive SAMOA at end of April. State of training unknown.

(3) Amphibious Corps training will not be completed until summer, but five battalions have completed training with transports.

(i) Transports and Expeditionary AKs.

(1) Eight APs in various degrees of readiness are assigned. Two AKs will be assigned.
(2) 3 APD are assigned. They are being fitted with sound gear during the month of May but are available on 12 hours notice. They are sufficient to carry only three companies out of four in one raider battalion.

5. Logistics.

The enemy is apparently able to furnish logistic support for his advance. How far he can still go in this respect cannot be determined, but, with the shipping losses he has suffered, the limit may well be near.

Studies of our own fuel situation for proposed operation will be appended to this Estimate.
# Summary of Strength and Weakness Factors

## Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fairly accurate knowledge of direction of enemy advance.</td>
<td>1. Superior CV and possibly BB strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Present probability of being able to detect change in enemy deployment.</td>
<td>2. Probably stronger shore based airforce in the disputed area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Enemy advance base, RABaul, is within range of our shore-based aircraft.</td>
<td>3. Sufficient and seasoned amphibious troops and transports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bases supporting our naval forces in the South Pacific are potentially stronger than enemy bases within range of the disputed area.</td>
<td>4. Training and experience in amphibious warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Strength of MORESBY, though uncertain, includes shore-based aircraft.</td>
<td>5. Air bases though partially developed are in easy range of MORESBY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Larger and probably more efficient carrier air groups.</td>
<td>6. Better air-craft route from home bases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. More efficient submarine personnel.</td>
<td>7. Larger range carrier aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. In general more complete and effective material.</td>
<td>9. Active RDF systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Initiative due to superior strength, particularly in aircraft and amphibious forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Nearer to main base, particularly if TRUK is so considered. Thus easier logistic and other problems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Forces and bases flank our line of communication to PEARL HARBOR and West Coast.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakness</td>
<td>Own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present weakness of South Pacific bases.</td>
<td>1. Present weakness of South Pacific bases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long lines of communication, distantly flanked by enemy positions, thus need for escorts.</td>
<td>2. Long lines of communication, distantly flanked by enemy positions, thus need for escorts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties of inaugurating new command set-up.</td>
<td>3. Difficulties of inaugurating new command set-up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenuous logistic situation and usual necessity for fueling at sea.</td>
<td>4. Tenuous logistic situation and usual necessity for fueling at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untrained army pilots and general weakness of forces in AUSTRALIA.</td>
<td>5. Untrained army pilots and general weakness of forces in AUSTRALIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable necessity for proceeding roundabout the PAPUAN PENINSULA.</td>
<td>6. Probable necessity for proceeding roundabout the PAPUAN PENINSULA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherent weakness of amphibious expeditions.</td>
<td>7. Inherent weakness of amphibious expeditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III - ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

1. It is difficult to visualize just what grandiose ideas of conquest the enemy may have, but, in spite of our recognition of the problem posed by his indicated concentration in the NEW BRITAIN Area, we should consider some of the other demands which he or circumstances may place upon his forces.

2. To ensure holding what he has against our increasing strength, or perhaps simply to increase his holdings, he may:

   (a) Continue attack on INDIA.

   (b) Attempt to conquer all of AUSTRALIA.

   (c) Try both (a) and (b) at once.

   (d) Capture only enough of both to facilitate his hold on the N.E.I. and MALAYA.

   (e) Drive only along the island position to the southeastward of RABAUL, including NOUMEA, SUVA, etc. Or combine this with an attack on AUSTRALIA.

   (f) Attempt to capture HAWAII.

3. The expected attack on MORESBY might be a part of any of the above except 2 (a) and (f). Unless he has decided on 2 (a) or (b) the only demands which would prevent him from placing nearly all of his forces in the RABAUL area would be for:

   (a) A possible simultaneous drive against the Darwin Area.

   (b) Escorts against our submarines and other raiders.

   (c) Protective forces believed necessary against our raids.

   (d) Striking forces against our Mid-Pacific positions (particularly as revenge is an incentive). This includes any

   (e) Submarines and other raiders against our lines of communications.

   (f) Logistic and base difficulties.
4. All indications point to a cessation of the BAY of BENGAL offensive and a concentration at TRUK and southward thereof. Nothing appears to be making up toward HAWAII yet. Other demands do not appear to be very strong, so we may find a force in the Southwest even larger than that listed in Section II. The situation must continue to be watched and studied very closely. A move to the Southwest is indicated. Will it be only for MORESBY, or MORESBY and the SOLOMONS at this time or will a direct advance to NOUMEA or SUVA be attempted? Fast performance indicates that the enemy much prefers to make his moves under protection of land-based aircraft, - with fighters if practicable. Therefore, though the other possibilities cannot be discarded, it is believed the recognition of our immediate problem as being an attack for the capture of MORESBY is correct.
IV - OWN COURSES OF ACTION

1. Though the enemy still has the initiative, we can hope to detect changes in this deployment and may be able to act in time. We now have the fact of the approaching concentration in NEW BRITAIN. A most evident course is:
   
   (a) To oppose the enemy advance in the NEW BRITAIN area with full strength of the Pacific Fleet.

2. What prevents us from doing this?
   
   (a) Our task to protect territory and communications, particularly the HAWAII - WEST COAST combination.
   
   (b) The possibility of diverting some of the concentration by offensive operations against enemy communications and territory.
   
   (c) Logistic difficulties.
   
   (d) Difficulty in screening and supporting battleships in that area.

3. We have already made an early decision to try to return the battleships to the West Coast for the reasons previously given.

4. Danger from submarine and other raiders, particularly to troop and evacuation ships, places definite demands on cruisers and destroyers. These are already assigned for the month of May and are considered to be reduced to a minimum.

5. HAWAII is by no means considered impregnable, particularly with only 29 Army heavy bombers available. As this weakness can be compensated for to some extent by an efficient search, the VFPs are also necessary. However, it is considered that the number at NOUMEA can be raised to twelve.

6. Shall we keep for the HAWAIIAN defense either or both of the two carrier groups which are not now committed to the Southwest? Certainly not for passive defense. A raid to the westward, however, would help with the defense and continue the containing effect of our previous raids. However, with known increased air strength in enemy outlying bases it would be taking too large a chance to employ only one carrier in this way. Present
indications of the Southwest concentration make it appear that we must support the forces down there with at least one carrier, particularly as Task Force 17 should be brought back soon. Detailed studies attached in Annex "C", show that we can keep either two or four carrier groups in the Southwest during May. Therefore, decision is made to prepare Task Force 16 with its two carriers to leave for the Southwest as soon as it can be got ready. A report has just been received that it will enter PEARL on 25 April. If it is sent down, we will find it expedient to employ two two-carrier Task Forces as reliefs but we must avoid rigidity in our dispositions.

7. All submarines should be continued to be used offensively on the most lucrative patrol stations, but, among these the RABAUL area should be well patrolled. As Comsouwespacfor intends to send his submarines into that immediate area, we will keep one or two on the area boundary north of RABAUL. This can be done by employing the submarines now in the process of transferring to Southwest AUSTRALIA.

8. CRUISER RAIDERS. The enemy lines of communication are too well patrolled for us to risk a cruiser to raid them, but the fishing grounds east of KAMCHATKA offer good hunting. The project of sending a cruiser up there about 1 May is retained. She could also create radio deception on the way.

9. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCE. As strong a detachment of this force as possible should be assigned to operate under our Fleet Task Force Commander, and maximum assistance should be rendered by the shore-based aircraft.
PART V - RECAPITULATION

1. Because the enemy's most probable course is an early attack on MORESBY, a detailed study of it has been made and is attached as Annex "D". It will be seen that after the enemy moves transports south of the island barrier off the PAPUAN PENINSULA, the best opportunity will exist for our task forces to inflict serious damage on him. However, great skill must be displayed in coordinating the operations of our task forces, and affording mutual protection among the carriers. Information from air scouting by shore-based planes must be made available at the earliest possible moment.

2. Prior to or in conjunction with the attack on MORESBY the following must be guarded against:

(a) Capture of TULAGI, GIZO and other base sites in the SOLOMONS.

(b) Carrier raids on TOWNSVILLE, HORN ISLAND, NOUMEA and SUVA.

(c) Interference with landing our reinforcements at EFATE, TONGATABU and SAMOA.

(d) Attacks on our task forces by:
   (1) Shore-based aircraft.
   (2) Carrier-based aircraft.
   (3) Submarines.

3. Recapitulation of our decisions:

(a) Hold Task Forces 17 and 11 in the Southwest during the first part of May.

(b) Prepare Task Force 16 to proceed promptly to that area, overlap with and probably relieve those forces.

(c) Increase VPB at NOUMEA from 6 to 12 about 1 May.

(d) Obtain maximum assistance from Southwest Pacific Force.

(e) Continue escorting as now planned for May.

(f) Plan to send cruiser to raid BERING SEA fishing grounds to depart about 1 May.
(g) Continue offensive submarine patrols and increase length of those on TRUK-RABAUL line.

(h) Return Task Force One to arrive SAN FRANCISCO about 2 May.
**ANNEX "B" TO CINCPAC OPERATION ORDER NUMBER**

**SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF UNITS CONCERNED WITH IMPEACHING OFFENSIVE BASED ON NEW BRITAIN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARDIV FIVE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUKAKU</td>
<td>11 April - Bay of Bengal Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOKAKU</td>
<td>15 April - Departs Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 April - Arrives Rako.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 April - Enroute Truk for duty with 4th fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 April - (about) Leave Truk for New Britain Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARDIV TWO</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORYU</td>
<td>9 April - (until) believed to have been operating in BAY of BENGAH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 April - Scheduled to arrive in EMPIRE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(will send shore-base equipment via DD to SHORE (AIR) BASE and after its arrival, fly planes there) (Navy Yard availability -?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIRYU Location unknown - suspected to be near home waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARDIV THREE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RYUJO</td>
<td>9 April - BAY of BENGAH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 April - Departs SINGAPORE enroute KURE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 April - Scheduled arrive KURE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(has outstanding work to be done - may receive NYD availability).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RYUKAKU</td>
<td>3 April - On later date to carry 20 type O VF for use of CHITOSE Air and 1st Air Corps - (hence to MARSHALLS?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 April - In TRUK area probably in company with KAMIGAWA MARU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 April - Enroute EMPIRE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 April - In YOKOSUKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule</td>
<td>*(20 April - RYUKAKU scheduled to leave EMPIRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*(26 April - Scheduled to leave TRUK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 April - Left YOKOSUKA and apparently assigned offensive task in search.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 April - Enroute TRUK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26-28 April - Depart TRUK for (Marshall Area ! (New Britain Area (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARDIV ONE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKAGI</td>
<td>21 April - Enroute EMPIRE from BAY of BENGAH (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAGA</td>
<td>in dock SASEBO - indicated included in PORT MORESBY offensive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX "B" TO CINCPAC OPERATION ORDER NUMBER

CAR DIV FOUR
KASUGA

9 April - RABAUL - SAIPAN AREA.
13 April - Enroute EMPIRE via TRUK and SAIPAN
20 April - Scheduled arrive YOKOSUKA (for stores, planes, etc., (?)).
23 April - Scheduled depart YOKOSUKA (apparently had no part in search for BLUE on 18th and 19th) Probably on mission to TRUK and RABAUL?

FUJIKAWA MARU

20 April - Enroute RABAUL from PALAO.

BAT DIV THREE
3 Ships

9 April - BAY of BENGAL AREA.
HIYOKO KIRISHIMA 16 April - Enroute EMPIRE.
KONGO 24 April - Scheduled to arrive SASEBO.

RITU 2 (Probably BB)

21 April - Indicated enroute MANDATES and then to NEW BRITAIN area (could this be HARUNA?)

CRUDIV FIVE (less MACHI)

10 April - Departed SASEBO.
15 April - In YOKOSUKA area.
21 April - Enroute TRUK.
25 April - Arrive TRUK.

DESDIV 34 (of DESRON FIVE)

15 April - At TARIN - connection with COMBINED AIR FORCE COMMANDER.
21 April - Enroute home Navy Yard later to MANDATES FORCE.

CRUDIV 6 and 18

8 April - In NEW BRITAIN area.

CRUDIV FOUR

17 April - ATAGO at YOKOSUKA with 2 DESDIVS.
19 April - Cinc SECOND in TAKAO active in search operations for BLUE - YOKOSUKA area.

SUBRON EIGHT

1 April - Indications of movement from S. of KYUSHU area.
15 April - COMSUBFOR enroute MANDATES (JALUIT? TRUK?)
21 April - Tender believed in SUBRON EIGHT with SUBS in company indicated as near TRUK.
21 April - RDF indicates arrival COMSUBFOR at TRUK about 23 April.
NEW BRITAIN AIR COMMAND

1st BOMBER GROUP (Commander TAINAN AIR)
45 Long range planes (VB)
Base RZM (LAE) and RRE (VUNAKANAU)

2nd BOMBER GROUP (Commander FOURTH AIR CORPS)
36 - Type 97 VB (Land)
Base RZM (LAE) and RRE (VUNAKANAU)

3rd BOMBER GROUP (Commander YOKOHAMA AIR)
12-4 (Type 97) Patrol Planes.
9-3 (Type O Diesel -
Base RR (RABAL)

TENDERS
KAWA MARU
KAWA MARU

Commander NEW BRITAIN AIR asks for
Observation Planes......13 of Type
13 of Type

MARSHALLS AIR COMMAND

1st BOMBER GROUP (Commander CHITOSE AIR) Bases at ROI & WAKE
Type O Diesel land planes (VF) 27-9 (has sent 10 type 97 VB
Type 1 Diesel patrol planes 27-9
7 type 0 VF
__ type 1 VB
or VP
to WAKE)

2nd BOMBER GROUP (Commander 1ST AIR CORPS) Base at TAROA.
Type ___ VB (Land) 27-9
Type ___ VP (Land) 27-9

3rd BOMBER GROUP (Commander 14th AIR GROUP) Bases at EMIDJ &
12-4 Type 97 Patrol Planes
? (9-3 ? Type O ? _______?)

TENDERS
GOSHU MARU
KAMOI
____ MARU
FUEL SITUATION

TASK FORCE 17 AND 11 IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC


(b) Task Force 17 will arrive BLEACHER 19-20 April, having completed fueling to capacity from PLATTE on 14 April.

(c) KASKASKIA will fuel Task Force 17 BLEACHER prior to departure for rendezvous with Task Force 11 on 25 April.

(d) NEOSHO can arrive BLEACHER on 27 April.

(e) TIPPECANOE is at NOUMEA.

(f) Loading of tankers as follows:

- KASKASKIA: 112,000 Fuel, 300,000 Av Gas.
- NEOSHO: 102,000 Fuel, 2,800 Diesel, 150,000 Av Gas.
- TIPPECANOE: 65,000 Fuel.

(g) Task Force 17, patrol steaming (around 15 kts) uses about 5,500 bbls/day.

(h) Task Force 11, patrol steaming, uses about 5,900 a day.

2. On arrival BLEACHER, Task Force 17 will require about 30,000 barrels, which it will take from KASKASKIA. I estimate KASKASKIA will have previously fueled WRIGHT and TUCKER to amount of about 7,000 barrels, leaving 75,000 barrels in KASKASKIA when she departs BLEACHER.

3. On 25 April, at rendezvous, Task Force 11 will have used about 59,000 barrels. On completion fueling, this will leave around 16,000 barrels in KASKASKIA.

4. Neglecting, this remnant in KASKASKIA, there will be available in the area, in NEOSHO (with 17), 102,000 barrels, and in TIPPECANOE (at NOUMEA) 65,000 bbls, a total of 167,000 barrels. The combined needs of the two task forces are around 11,400 per day. Thus allowing for the two days previous steaming by Task Force 11 (25th to 27th), there will be fuel for about 13 days.
from 27 April, or until 10 May. On this date, both Task Forces should be full and both tankers empty. However, we have to have 10,000 barrels at ROSES between 3 and 10 May, which TIPPECANOE or NEOSHO will have to furnish, making this date around 9 May.

5. If an attack takes place before 9 May and the usual high speed is used, an additional 33,000 barrels will have to be used, thus moving the date of both forces being full and tankers empty to 6 May.

6. Both Task Forces will want additional fuel by about 13 May if an attack is made or by 16 May if not.

7. PLATTE will arrive PEARL around 27 April. CUYAMA will arrive PEARL around 27 April. KASKASKIA will arrive PEARL around 4-5 May. KANAWHA will arrive PEARL around 4-5 May.

8. PLATTE can arrive fueling area, northwest of NOUMEA, about 13 May, leaving here on 30th of April. CUYAMA can arrive fueling area around 16 May, leaving here same time. They can go in company however if we accept the reduction in speed for PLATTE and have both of them arrive on 16th. These two tankers will carry both Task Forces until 23 May, when both Task Forces will be full and both tankers empty. Task Forces then will want additional fuel around the 30th.

9. Meanwhile, TIPPECANOE and NEOSHO will be returning PEARL, having left area around 7 or 10 May, depending on whether or not attack was made. TIPPECANOE stopping by ROSES to fuel convoy there. It would be advantageous to empty TIPPECANOE first and start her to PEARL early, as she makes only 10 knots, but this advantage is probably outweighed by advantages of more expeditious fueling with two tankers and freedom of action to keep the two forces separated. Assuming the tankers leave 10 May, NEOSHO will arrive PEARL 23 May, TIPPECANOE 29 May. Neither of them can return by 30 May, hence KASKASKIA and KANAWHA will have to be used.

10. A tentative plan, subject to change as information on actual operations and consumption of fuel comes in, is as follows:
(a) NEOSHO and TIPPECANOE at disposal of Com-
taskfor 17 to meet needs both forces as
directed by him, except inform Comtaskfor
17 that 10,000 barrels fuel oil will have
to be reserved in TIPPECANOE or NEOSHO for
delivery to convoy at ROSES arrival 10 May.
We have to ask ROSES about when they need
or can take this oil, as first ship unloaded
may be the one that needs oil to get home.
These two vessels will take care of needs
until 6 or 9 May, depending on whether an
attack has taken place or not.

(b) Have PLATTE and CUYAMA depart PEARL around
1 May to arrive area around 16 or 17 May.
If an attack has taken place, PLATTE can
be sent on alone and get there around 13th.
These two vessels will take care of needs
until approximately 23 May, when these two
tankers will be empty, with both Task Forces
full. Task Forces will want to refuel around
30 May.

(c) KASKASKIA and KANAWHA will be ready to sail
from PEARL around the 10th and can reach
area by 26th. They can stand-by there until
needed. They will take care of needs until
around 7 June, tankers being empty and Task
Forces full on that date. More fuel will have
to arrive by 14-15 June.

(d) NEOSHO alone can arrive by about 10 June,
but TIPPECANOE cannot. As TIPPECANOE will
have been away since 1 March, it would be best
to send fuel to SUVA by chartered oiler
and keep KANAWHA in area, filling from SUVA
tanks or commercial tankers at that place.
We might keep CUYAMA there doing the same
thing. This can be worked out better as
more information on May Convoys come in.

12. A supplementary report will be submitted on possibi-
ilities for supporting Task Force 16 in addition in
area.
PART II

FUEL SITUATION

TASK FORCES 16, 17, 18, 11 in SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

1. ASSUMPTIONS:

(a) Task Force Sixteen will leave around 1 May and arrive in area around 15 May. This is based on 12½ knots advance, which will require about 15 knots steaming, allowing for flight operations.

(b) SABINE AND CIMARRON will accompany force.

(c) Force will require about 7,600 bbls/day.

(d) SABINE and CIMARRON can carry 105,000 bbls each.

2. If Task Force 16 leaves here 1 May, by 15 May, it will need approximately 114,000 barrels of oil. Part of this may have been taken out enroute, but net result will be the same. This will leave 96,000 barrels in two tankers, which will be exhausted by about 23 May. On that date, Force will be full and tankers empty. They can stay in area about 4 days more when they will have to return, arriving PEARL with 20% of fuel remaining about 15-16 June.

3. If it is necessary to keep these Task Forces in the area longer than this period, it will be necessary to divert commercial tankers from the West Coast to SUVA. The combined needs of the four Task Forces amount to 570,000 barrels a month, if they steam all 30 days. The 8 tankers (5 NEOSHO, 2 GUYAMA and 1 TIPPECANOE) working from PEARL, can complete a round trip to area, fuel and return, each 45 days, carrying a total of 670,000 barrels, or about 450,000 barrels a month. This leaves 120,000 barrels a month to be supplied from commercial tankers, which is 2 tankers a month. But, since these tankers can not fuel at sea, they can only act as feeders, necessitating retaining one large and one small tanker in area at all times, thus reducing the total that can be carried by our own tankers to 350,000 per month and requiring an additional 100,000 barrels to be diverted to SUVA in chartered tankers, giving a total of 220,000 barrels to be supplied by them.
PART II

4. The effect of diversion of chartered tankers to SUVA will, of course, slow down the rate of supply to PEARL by the increased distance and lay-over time awaiting discharge to the Fleet tankers directly serving the Task Forces. This will have the effect of losing one trip per month for 3½ tankers, or reducing the rate of supply to PEARL by some 210,000 barrels. With the present tankers assigned and the present 30 day turn around I believe our supply to PEARL can stand this reduction and still keep abreast of expenditures.

5. Helping this situation is fact that there is no possibility of forces steaming 30 days a month continuously.

6. We have enough provision ships to keep forces supplied with food. We can use ANTARES to supply general stores and special equipment may be sent on tankers.

7. The above does not allow for sinkings.

8. If the BBs operate from PEARL, PEARL supply can’t stand it.
ANNEX "D" TO CINCPAC OPERATION ORDER NUMBER

DETAILED STUDY OF PROBABLE ENEMY OPERATIONS IN MORESBY ATTACK

1. Theatre.

(a) This area is little known to us and accurate information cannot be obtained for this estimate. The southeastern peninsula of NEW GUINEA has a range of high mountains running through its long axis. Highest elevation is 13,255 but the elevation and exact location of the lower saddles and passes can not be determined. It is certain that there are no good roads except in the near vicinity of larger towns. The Japs have proved, however, that no terrain so far has been able to stop their advance. It appears warranted, however, to conclude that any overland advance against Moreseby can be made only by troops without heavy material, such as artillery, tanks and trucks.

(b) The approach to MORESBY by water from RABAUL is almost 1,000 miles unless a passage is made close to the eastern tip of NEW GUINEA. This course would reduce the distance to about 700 miles but would be most dangerous, if not impracticable, for a large force of transports.

(c) In addition to landing strips at LAE and SALAMOA, there are about 14 landing grounds, probably usable in good weather and emergency only, on the north side of the mountain range within short distance of the north coast.

2. Weather has been treated separately and has no great bearing on this estimate except for possible inland advance by water courses. The Japs were flooded out of the MARKHAM RIVER valley and the same can happen in other valleys. Clouds over the mountains will impede air operations over them.

3. (a) The sea distance from RABAUL to MORESBY has been mentioned. Critical air distances from MORESBY, ignoring detours required by mountains, are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SALAMOA</td>
<td>140 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAE</td>
<td>163 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GASMATA</td>
<td>265 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RABAUL</td>
<td>430 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMARAI</td>
<td>222 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARWIN</td>
<td>978 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROOT EYLANDT</td>
<td>624 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORN ISLAND</td>
<td>300 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWNSVILLE</td>
<td>600 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) Enemy air strength on shore in the RABaul area (including GASMTA, LAE, and SALAMOA) has already been estimated as about 250 planes. The exact number of shore-based planes will depend upon how many Japan can make available from other commitments and the losses inflicted by us prior to the beginning of the campaign. There is indication that the Japs are decreasing squadron strength and spares but she can easily make 250 planes available for a move against MORESBY. She has so far not begun with insufficient force and we can not afford to underestimate her now.

(c) CarDiv 5 and RYUKAKU will increase air strength by about 150 planes. CarDiv Two is also mentioned in connection with the present concentration but it is unlikely that all 5 carriers involved would be used in the main thrust unless it were stalled. These CV may be held to provide speedy reinforcement if needed.

(d) Japanese surface forces to be expected have been covered in the main estimate.

4. Own Shore Defenses.

The exact strength at MORESBY is not known but, on March 10, 1942, there were 7,000 ground troops and about 1,300 RAAF personnel. It is indicated that this will be or has been, increased to one division of American troops. Planes actually present are not known but most recent information, prior to March 30th, placed the following U.S. aircraft in AUSTRALIA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>In Commission</th>
<th>Repair and Erection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB (heavy)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB (medium)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB (light)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition 75 P-40 have been delivered to AUSTRALIA. Although the majority of this air strength can be concentrated in Northern AUSTRALIA, pursuit for the close defense of MORESBY must base or refuel there.

5. Enemy Land Forces.

Enemy ground forces for the attack are not known, but from past experience we must assume that initially they will be sufficient to accomplish the mission, if no interference intervenes. If the American division has not yet arrived at MORESBY, it is estimated the ground forces required would be about 20,000 and will require about 20 medium transports to move them.

This will be more simple for Japan as to air and surface forces because of nearness of established bases. As to ground troops, if an overland movement is attempted, supply will be difficult, although Japanese are adept at living off the land and on rations of little bulk. The defenders of MORESBY must be considered self-contained for bulk supplies during the operation, except that some items may be flown in.

7. Summary of Strength.

**Associated**

Protection by terrain and long distance required by sea. Vulnerability of carriers if Japan uses them to support attack. Vulnerability of Japs embarked troops.

**Japan**

Initiative. Proximity of several landing fields for shore-based air. Superior air strength. Long range fighters.

8. Enemy courses of Action.

(a) The Japanese have consistently followed a set procedure for attack of enemy held bases. A brief statement of this procedure is in order and will show what she will try to do at MORESBY. When employing a joint task force naval, air, and land, organization has been on the basis of the size of the landing force. For a division of 15,000 men and 1 battalion of paratroops the following has been used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shore-based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VB (heavy)</strong></td>
<td>3 - 4 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VF</strong></td>
<td>2 - 3 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VP</strong></td>
<td>2 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 75 - 100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier-borne</td>
<td>40 - 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregate 40 - 80</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 115 - 130</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Naval Force**

| CV    | 2       |
| CA - CL | 6        |
| SS    | 2 - 4   |
| DD    | 10 - 14 |
| AP    | 12 - 20 |
| Total | 32 - 46 |

402
ANNEX "D" (Cont'd)

For a brigade of about 5,000 troops the following has been used:

Air

Shore-based
- VB (heavy) 2 - 3 squadrons
- VF 1 - 2 squadrons
- VP 2 squadrons

Total 45 - 60

Carrier-borne
- 40

Aggregate - 85 - 100

Naval Force

CV 1
CA - CL 3 - 4
SS 1 - 2
DD 6 - 8
AP 8 - 10

Total 19 - 25

(Note: Strength of escort has varied with expected requirements).

(b) The force estimated for MORESBY attack is 20,000 troops and, although mere arithmetical computation ignores varying details of the immediate operation, it is highly valuable as a yardstick. For 20,000 men the following might be used:

Air

Shore-based
- VB (heavy) 5 - 7 squadrons
- VF 3 - 5 squadrons
- VP 4 squadrons

Total 120 - 160

Carrier-borne 80 - 120

Aggregate - 200 - 280

Naval Force

CV 3
CA - CL 7 - 8
SS 3 - 6
DD 12 or more
AP 20 - 32 Total vessels 48 - 73
ANNEX "D" (Cont'd)

The greatest probability of change in the foregoing is in the escort vessels but, when we remember that one convoy of 45 vessels approached JAVA, the above figures are far from fantastic.

(c) The tactics for landings have been:

(1) Mutual supporting forces move within boundaries 400 miles apart.

(2) Initial movements are in following order:
   i. Reconnaissance by 33.
   ii. Reconnaissance and limited day attacks by VP.
   iii. Bombing, sometimes unescorted, by T-96 heavy bombers from closest land bases.

Damage to runways, destruction of installations and obtaining meteorological information are initial objectives.

(3) For the destruction of enemy aircraft, a heavy air attack supported by land-or carrier-based VP follows.

(4) Just prior to the coordinated attack of all forces, a final bombing by 50 to 150 planes is made to destroy communications, coastal batteries, and AA weapons. The actual landing follows. The total sorties prior to a landing is from 150 to 300.

(5) Double protection is furnished convoys on the day prior to attack, namely, direct protection by planes from land stations within range and indirect protection by attacks on air bases from which enemy planes could operate against the convoy. Ship-based and shore-based planes cooperate in this protection.

(6) Airplanes, controlled by radio from landing units, protect motor landing craft from which troops land about dawn. Most of the air forces is held ready to attack enemy bases within range.
ANNEX "P" (Cont'd)

(7) Procedure after the initial landing has been quite uniform as follows:

i. Seaplanes or ship-based planes support land forces during the first day. Paratroops or others capture a field to be used by VF.

ii. As soon as possible, VF support the troops. By the 2nd or 3rd day type O-VF do this from a captured field or from a CV.

(8) Within 2 weeks the Japs have become well established and organized for defense of or further offensive from, the seized base.

It is believed that the foregoing procedure, with variations required by hydrographic and topography, contains the broad framework of a Japanese campaign for the capture of MORESBY. Overland advance from BUNA to MORESBY is air distance about 90 miles but actual distance over the ground much greater. Penetration for a short distance might be made in small boats to speed the advance but the whole operation would be time consuming. It would have the advantage of not exposing APs and surface craft to attack for several days during the approach to the landing. It would have good air cover during the disembarkation without unduly exposing CV. During the slow advance across the peninsula, however, troops would be subject to continual air strafing. Targets would be small but would have only rifles, probably for own protection. If it were possible to advance in strength across the peninsula, this would be the most probable course of action for Japan but topographical information compels the rejection of this course. If overland movement is possible, disembarkation will be done during darkness on the north coast. Strenuous efforts would be made to destroy or neutralize the MORESBY airfield, by bombing or by using paratroops. At the end, however, the Japanese might have another BATAAN on her hands with insufficient immediate strength to conclude it successfully.

(d) The most probable course of action against PORT MORESBY is to make a landing attack on the south coast near that place and to proceed overland against it. The details of this course of action might be as follows:

(1) Preliminary reconnaissance and bombing, which is now taking place. In this case VF are not necessary because of the proximity of landing fields. The front of about 400 miles on which
ANNEX "D" Cont'd.

the Japs provide air coverage can be covered by air from RABUAL, GASMATA, and SALAMOA with landplanes and by seaplanes, including seaplane fighters, from KESSA, FAISI, and TULAGI (if last is captured). Carriers from retired positions can cover holes in the air screen. Until the Japanese debouch into the CORAL SEA, they can be reached only by long range bombers without VF support. At the time of entering the CORAL SEA, the Japanese would be 1400 miles from FIJI, 980 from NOUMEA, about 900 miles from EAPE, about 450 miles from MORESBY, and 660 miles from TOWNSVILLE. At this point also they would be about 450 miles from their nearest shore based landplane fighters but they would still be within 300 miles of a possible seaplane VF base. This would be their most critical point insofar as shore-based air support is concerned. Also, at this point would be the possibility of proceeding against NOUMEA or TOWNSVILLE instead of going to MORESBY. If the operation is against MORESBY as is assumed herein, this point would be passed during darkness. Assuming 15 knots for their convoy this point would be passed about midnight or 30 hours before the landing. With 12 knots speed this point would be reached about darkness in order to use two dark periods in the most critical part of the approach and to make a landing about daylight. During the approach on MORESBY, VF from LAE and SALAMOA can cover during daylight and CV aircraft, from retired positions can assist in this coverage or they can attack AUSTRALIAN airfields within range. Bombers escorted by VF from LAE and SALAMOA can attack the MORESBY field and those in AUSTRALIA within range. The movement of this force can be covered by land-based aircraft according to the usual Jap pattern previously outlined. CVs must be exposed to shore-based air but need not be subjected to bombers escorted by fighters unless the Japs decide to come within range. The advance of the convoy can be covered by surface vessels and by submarines to prevent interference by our surface craft.

(2) During all the last two days of the advance, they would try to make the MORESBY airfield untenable for our aircraft. The actual landing of troops can be covered by both shore and carrier based planes.
(e) The conclusion from the foregoing is that the attack on MORESBY by approaching by sea from RABAUL is feasible. It has elements of risk such as bad weather over the NEW GUINEA mountains, subjecting APs to daylight attack by shore-based air, surface and subsurface forces; and by exposing CV to shore-based air attack. However, Japanese advances have been boldly executed in the past and the foregoing disadvantages would not stop them. Only bold and skillful action on our part or extremely bad weather would prevent the Japs reaching MORESBY with the greater part of their forces.

(f) If our land strength at MORESBY is as stated herein, 20,000 JAPANESE could probably overcome them. It is firmly believed, however, that if the enemy starts with only 20,000 men, aggressive attack can cause such heavy losses in APs that the eventual attack will fail.
April 21.

Cominich in his (211649) describes his plan for improvement of shore facilities and underwater defenses at NOUMEA.

The preparations for the expected Japanese offensive in the Southwest Pacific continue. In the mean time minor air activity is somewhat the same pattern as it has been for most of this month.

April 22.

Attached

An estimate was prepared concerning the employment of the Pacific Fleet to assist in dealing with the expected Japanese offensive in the SW Pacific. Intelligence indicates that preparations are in full swing.

Several submarine reports are being received from the South Central Pacific Area. While these may be true, they are considerably discounted. The Army at Christmas even reported Jap airplanes near there (birds?).

Opnav to Cincpac (222000) says the mining project at Suva will be completed May 2d.

The 2nd Raider Battalion will arrive at Pearl the middle of May. We may have a job for them one of these days.

The NEVADA left for Bremerton. Thus ends local salvage on that ship.

B-17's bombed a dock at Rabaul. 7 large AP were in the harbor. Results of high level bombing are disappointing.

Mail to the South Pacific is not very satisfactory. Other things not going any too well are torpedo supply and the Radar program.

The SEARAVEN was damaged at sea by a fire on board.

The BOISE is going to San Francisco for a refit. She has been in the far east since the war started.
April 23.

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department received an alert from General Marshall - period 25-30 April. This does not agree with our estimate. No air attack on the 14th District, or for that matter in the Pacific Ocean Areas, seems indicated this month. It would be better for Cincpac to initiate alerts in his areas, but at present (until the new command set-up is made fully effective) General Emmons probably feels that he must warn his people. We are, of course, taking large steps to counter Jap moves - especially an alert ordered for the 25th.

When Admirals King and Nimitz conclude present conversations it will probably be possible to formulate and pass along broad operational directives to the task forces.

Comanzac (240825) directs that Allied cruisers and destroyers be conversant with U.S. Signals and Tactical Instructions. It is, of course, necessary that we understand each other. Is this another thing to be studied and acted on here?

The intensive search for BLUE Forces off Japan has stopped. Task Force 16 enters Pearl the 25th.

Minor bombings and reconnaissance of each other's positions continue in the S.W. Pacific. No large amphibious force has been spotted in the Rabaul area yet.

April 24.

There was a possible submarine contact off Pearl entrance. While all these Central Pacific sub reports cannot well be true, it is very possible that there are enemy submarines in the Hawaiian area and to the south of that area. If they are in those areas they (1) are for observation only or (2) they are not efficient.

Cominich in his 242025 warned the Pacific armed forces to be on watch for Jap offensive, particularly as the emperor's birthday is the 29th. Our estimate of Jap moves still holds - probable time, May 3; probable place, S.W. Pacific area.

An intelligence center will be set up at Auckland. The intelligence set up is beginning to get better attention.

Cincpac 250245 gives plans for mining operations at Roses and Bleacher.

There has been a delay of nine days in the Wallis project which may be embarrassing.
April 24 (Continued)

Opnav (221724) is going to ship material such as A/T protection, mooring buoys, etc., to Auckland, Suva, Nandi and Noumea. The general defense and supply for our advanced bases will undoubtedly improve when Admiral Ghormley takes charge. Captain Bowman took over at Auckland today.

Cincpac (250357) makes some of the old Anzac surface force and 12 VP available to Task Force 17.

The general S.W. Pacific situation remains the same.

April 25

Task Force 16 (CVs - ENTERPRISE and HORNET) returned from their eastern Pacific operation. All went well with the job. As noted by our subs, sampans seem to be acting as lookouts as much as 1000 miles out from the coast.

Doubtful submarine contacts continue to be reported in the Hawaiian Area.

In his 231900 (and 00600) Cominch gives the AP's for the Pacific Fleet.

The New Zealand Naval Board has reported that Tombako, Nandi is entirely suitable as a fleet anchorage.

In a letter to Bunav, the Cincpac estimates that his staff will have to be somewhat increased but that other staffs will probably be reduced as a result of reorganization in the Fleet.

The 4th Defense Battalion at Roses has 14% down with malaria. That is a serious thing just at this time when Army reinforcements are coming and when an attack may come within a few days.

General MacArthur has given his directive to counter the Jap offensive. (Aidac).

Cincpac 260325 gives the fuel set-up for Task Forces 11, 17.

Darwin received a fairly heavy air attack. Other operations in the S.W. Pacific continue to follow the same pattern that has been used for the past few weeks.
Projected development bases includes shipment following Lend Lease Materials. To Auckland, 10 mooring buoys, 3 Acoustic sweeping gear, 1 mile A/T net, 5 individual ship protection A/T nets, Tank farm 561,000 barrels, 8 picket boats, 1 buoy boat, To SUVA indicator net 900 yds A/T net, 700 yards loop, 8 sonobuoys, 2 control units, 1 Buoyboat. To NANDI loop 2 and three quarters miles, indicator net, 10 sonobuoys, 5 individual ship protection A/T nets, 6 picket boats, 2 control huts, tank farm 80,500 barrels, 1 buoy boat. Signal equipment to NOUMEA 2 loops, 10 sonobuoys, 2 control huts, 1600 yards A/T net, 9 picket boats, 1 buoyboat. Shipping by partial shipment as material becomes available estimated date of completion early June. Following personnel for supervision installation and initial operations will be sent. To AUCKLAND 3 officers 4 men; to SUVA 3 officers 7 men; to NANDI 4 officers 18 men; to NOUMEA 3 officers 7 men. Will send four net tenders for assignment Comsoupac.

Allied cruisers and destroyers in Task Force 44 must be conversant with U.S. Signal and Tactical Instructions in order to operate with Pacific Fleet Task Forces. To this end am supplying Australia, Canberra, Hobart with General Signal Book, Tactical Instructions, Fleet Doctrine, Call Books. To communicate efficiently they should also have effective contact code, air code, and other crypto channels Pacific. Request authority issue Class 4 allowance including ECM to above three ships. Sufficient cipher machines available ex-S boats. Will furnish liaison officers as required.

Attention invited to the fact that the birthday of the Emperor of Japan is April 29. It may be that this date or the latter part of April might be selected by Japan for executing against Allied Forces important Offensive measures including coordinated sabotage. Opnav Army and USMC informed.
CINCPAC TO OPNAV

Urdis 222000 Request mine assembly personnel and material be assigned CominDiv 2 now at Fantan 2. Will be used by CincPac to lay minefields Roses and Bleacher and for future mining projects. Opnav please pass to NuNav.

CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 17

Following SouWesPacFor Forces available to you. Chicago Perkins at Noumea, HMAS Australia, Hobart and two DD which depart Sydney for Noumea soon. Inform ComSouWesPacFor where and when they are to report to you and other initial instructions. Also your desires as to air cooperation and suggestions as to separation of operations your forces and those of S-Boats about to operate in New Guinea, Solomons, Bismark area.

Intend increase VP with Tangier to twelve about 3 May. This tender and plane group hereby placed under your orders to assist you in operations Coral Sea.

At Efate beginning about 3 May will be the Leander, Achilles plus 2 ODDs under Cincpac and the Flussier, Helm and Henley under ComSouWesPacFor protecting convoy arriving that date.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CINC LANT
23 1900


Any of about ships now on temporary duty under NTS will when released be ordered by Opnav to report for duty in accordance with about assignment.

ComSoEastPacFor and CTF 12 inform ships concerned in their respective present movements. Opnav informed.

CINCPAC TO CTF 17
26 0327

Logistics arrangements for Task Force 11 and 17. Assumptions KASKASKIA fuels Task Force 11 and starts return to Pearl by 27 April and NEOSHO emptied by Task Force 17 and starts return to Pearl by 10 May. I will sail tankers from here to arrive vicinity Noumea as follows: PLATTE 12 May, GUYAMA and KANAWHA 17 May, KASKASKIA 23 May, and NEOSHO 3 June. Present intention is to maintain GUYAMA, KANAWHA in Noumea Area and use KASKASKIA, NEOSHO, PLATTE as feeders thus taking advantage high speed of latter group to transport oil and minimize their standby time in the operations theatre. Separate despatch covers TIPPECANOE which will be filled from other sources and kept in Noumea area as emergency reserve. Intend fill Samoa from chartered tankers about 15 May. WHITNEY, ALDEBARAN, LASSEN will arrive Bleacher about 25 May with repair facilities, provisions and about 3,000 tons replacement ammunition. ANTARES will supply general stores date later. This further assumes that ComSwPacFor will supply those units of his fource which operate under his command. Not definite but possible that Task Force 17 will depart for Pearl about 15 May.
To separate operations as directed CinCPac 250357
Comtaskfor 17 originator will operate area Afirm
east of Longitude 155 between NEW GUINEA - LOUISIAD
ARCHIPELAGO line and Latitude 20. Request Comsouwes-
pacfor action add keep me informed location own
submarines, especially in neutral zone between Afirm
and Baker which I may have to cross without warning.

Exchanging Desron accordance URDIS 230345 will send
WHIPPLE, EDWARDS to ROSES to relieve HELM HENLEY
about 5 May. Comdesdiv 57 with FORD, ALDEN and one
destroyer from Desdiv 58 depart Xray on escort duty
arriving BLEACHER about 15 May as relief for SELFRI
MUGFORD BAGLEY. Comdesdiv 58 with 2 DDs depart SYDNEY
about 24 May for PEARL via SAMOA to relieve JARVIS
PATTERSON. BLACK HAWK and remaining DD depart SYDNEY
about 26 May when relieved by DOBBIN. PERKINS FLUSSE
exchange for BLUE and RALPH TALBOT in NOUMEA area on
date to be designated by you. All hands informed.

This is Comtaskfor 42's 261446. Passed to you for
info: S 47 departed BRISBANE 22 April direct to
vicinity RABAUL arriving 1 May thence around NEW
HANOVER and NEW IRELAND departing 11 May. S 44
departed 24 April direct to ST GEORGES channel ar-
riving 2 May departing 14 May. S 42 departed 26 April
direct to Cape NARUM arriving 3 May departing 15 May.
S 38 departes 28 April direct to vicinity HURON Gulf
DAMPIER Strait arriving 7 May departing 17 May.
Advance to 12 south 216 miles daily north of 12 south
100 miles daily.

Task Organization contemplated by originator CTF 17.
Task Group 17.5 Air YORKTOWN LEXINGTON, Destroyers
Rear Admiral Fitch. 17.2 Attack Group MINNEAPOLIS
NEW ORLEANS ASTORIA CHESTER PORTLAND Destroyers
Rear Admiral Kinkaid. 17.3 Support Group AUSTRALIA
CHICAGO HOBART Destroyers Rear Admiral Crace. 17.9
Search Group TANGIER 12 VP Captain Sprague. Am con-
sidering advisability transferring my flag temporarily
to CHESTER or INDIANAPOLIS if latter joins.
April 26.

The TAMBOR reports sinking a medium tanker on April 15th and small freighter on March 23d, missed a freighter on the 30th possibly due to too deep torpedo setting. Unsuccessfully attacked a tanker the 6th, was depth charged by aircraft on the 12th. Score - 2 sunk, 2 missed. This is a disappointing score for a submarine in an area supposed to be quite active. She did, however, send in good information for future submarine operations in the Rabaul area.

Task Force 6 will be formed the 28th consisting of Service Force vessels.

An unidentified DD and AP were reported by Army in Lat 11-15S, Long 176-47 W. This is probably not enemy. There were, however, a number of unexplained sightings in the South Pacific today.

The TAUTOG reported sinking an enemy submarine 550 miles southwest of Oahu. Many submarine officers have long felt that a fine way to clear an area of enemy subs is to use our subs to hunt for and destroy them. This theory is not by any means proven by the recent success of the GRAMPUS and the TAUTOG, but bears watching.

The Commander Southwest Pacific set up his plans for deployment of his forces to counter the expected Japanese offensive in the New Britain area (Aidac). His search starts tomorrow. Task Forces 17 and 11 will join up under Rear Admiral Fletcher on May 1st east of the New Hebrides.

The air bombings by the Japs on Darwin, Moresby and other places in the New Britain area are increasing.

The Japanese are taking interest in Alaskan charts.
April 27.

An important directive from Cominch was received today (Aldac) relating to the employment of TF-1 and 16. Decision will be made tomorrow when Admiral Nimitz returns.

A Possible submarine contact was made 480 miles north-east of OAHU by a search plane.

The tempo of air operations has been stepped up in the S.W. Pacific. Darwin was heavily bombed.

It now seems fairly clear that the enemy will use 3 to 4 CV and usual cruisers and destroyers in the expected offensive. Initially we oppose with two CV task forces.

April 28.

Admiral Nimitz returned and the following general plan was adopted. TF-16 (2 CV, 4 CA, 1 DL, 7 DD, 2 AO) Vice Admiral Halsey commanding will depart for the CORAL SEA area on the 30th. TF-1 will return to the West Coast. Depending on developments TF-17 will leave the CORAL SEA area for PEARL about May 15 and TF-11 to follow about June 1st. They will reconnoiter going and coming, doing what damage they can to the enemy and his installations. The above will be covered in Operation Plan 23-42.

There is a plan underway to send the NASHVILLE to the BERING SEA to destroy Japanese fisheries.

Col. Lyman, USA, is apparently interfering with the New Zealand plans for NANDI airfield. We should not have to have these things come up. This is aggravated because it was referred to the Army at Oahu.


The Emperors birthday passed without much more than minor bombings in the S.W. Pacific. There are some good indications that our bombings are hurting the Japs. They may even be changing the direction of their effort to the east now instead of south from RABAUL. This may only be wishful thinking. At any rate there are more bombings and reconnaissance in the GILBERT Area.

A submarine was sighted in Lat 21 S, Long 176-30 E.
April 28, 1942

From: 17
To: 16
Subject: Cruiser attack on Japanese Siberian Fisheries.

1. Information.

Japanese fishermen leave their base at Hakodate for the fishing grounds off Siberia in the middle of April for crabs, and the middle of June for salmon. Thus, some crab fishermen should be there now while the salmon fishermen will not arrive until the latter part of June.

The importance of these fisheries to Japan is pointed out in the reference enclosed in Cominch serial 00210 of March 20, 1942. In that serial Cominch permits Cincpac to take any desired action. Cincpac has outlined the plan and requested approval (attached).

Two S-boats are now operating in the southern part of the area, one to the east and one to the west of the Kuriles.

Dates of return? 11 May

Comsubpac has recommended that a submarine "investigate the main areas of operation of the Japanese mother ships."

If a cruiser were also sent to the area the plan would be for the submarine to operate in the Sea of Okhotsh and the cruiser off the east coast of Kamchatka.

The NASHVILLE is available now, although it is a bit early for maximum enemy fishing activity. (A heavy CL is a suitable surface type for this operation).
2. It is proposed to send the NASHVILLE (and one destroyer, if directed) to operate against the fisheries outside the 3-mile zone. While the "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare", May 1941, must apply insofar as Russia is concerned, we are directed to commence unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Japan. This means that the enemy character of these fishing vessels must be determined. They are known to be armed, frequently officered by Japanese naval reservists, and escorted by naval vessels. Thus, they lose innocent character. It would defeat the purpose if these enemy vessels were to be sent in for adjudication. The Commanding Officer, NASHVILLE should sink the vessels, once their identity is established, as a military necessity. He should only make sure that he does not sink Russian vessels. In this latter case, it will be best to explain an accident later than to let a good Jap target escape.

3. NASHVILLE - alone

(a) Pearl to Kamchatka
   - to Dutch Harbor 2762 1200
   - to Pearl 1200 2046 122000
   - Days cruising 6008 12 268,000

(b) Pearl to Kamchatka
   - to Dutch Harbor 2762 1200
   - to Midway 1653 1149 97000ø
   - to Pearl 6765 63000

-2-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days cruising</th>
<th>Miles</th>
<th>Gallons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(c) Pearl to Midway</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>68,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>to Kamchatka</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>10,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Dutch Harbor</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>71,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Pearl</td>
<td>2046</td>
<td>122,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Pearl to Midway</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Kamchatka and return</td>
<td>3600</td>
<td>213,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to Pearl</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>68,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Pearl to Dutch Harbor</td>
<td>2046</td>
<td>122,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>to Kamchatka</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>71,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>to Dutch Harbor</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>71,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>to Pearl</td>
<td>2046</td>
<td>122,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Days cruising 15 323,000

Note: If a DD goes along (d) would be cut to about 5 days.

Note: This, of course gives the maximum time in Siberian waters, i.e., 17 days. And if a destroyer escort is deemed necessary, it is the best way to do the job. It does withdraw 244,000 gallons (5800 \( \ell \) bbls) from the 45,000 bbls capacity supply there (7000 bbls on Mar. 31, 1942).
4. Figures given in paragraph 3 above are relative. They are based on 15 knot steaming, subtracting 14% for war conditions, and always having 20% fuel remaining on board. Based on these figures (e) seems the route to follow. It has the added probability of minimum enemy interference.

5. I think that the circumstances permit sending the NASHVILLE without a DD. If she steams at 15 knots advance, suitable zigzag, she is reasonably safe. One DD is not assurance that she will be safe from S/M. A DD does, of course, give additional air security. Also, the DD could help roll up the enemy fishing line.
April 29.

The Tangier reports the landing field at Roses to be satisfactory for VF. This is good if true, as VMF 212 is soon enroute and NOUMEA is already crowded.

The preliminaries to the New Britain area are underway, but there is no change in the general picture there today.

The following are ordered to the new SOPAC area:

Commander - Vice Admiral Ghormley.
Chief-of-Staff - Capt. Callahan.
Comair SoPacFor - Rear Admiral McCain.

The Nashville will be ordered to carry out a raid on the Japanese Fisheries east of Kurchatov leaving here about May 3rd. She will go via Midway and probably return via Dutch Harbor.

April 30.

The reinforcements for BLEACHER, STRAW, and ROSES are about to arrive at their destinations and TF 17 is in a position to cover the last part of the movement. The auxiliaries of the Marine Amphibious Force in NZ will arrive there June 6th.

Cominch 301800 contemplates assigning the CURTIS as flagship of Admiral McCain. However, she is under overhaul for the next month but the WRIGHT (now in Australia) is offered by CincPac.

Normal condition of readiness was resumed in the Hawaiian Area, the Emperor of Japan's birthday having passed without incident. According to our dope this alert was premature, and so proved.

ComGen 2nd Marine Brigade in his 291915 reports progress on aviation facilities at STRAW.

Task Force 16 departed for the CORAL SEA Area. When he arrives in the general vicinity of the critical area he will have four CV task forces at his disposal.

One of our submarines will reconnoiter MAKIN on May 6th. A Maru visited there today, evidently bringing supplies.
April 30. (Cont'd)

The general condition of our intelligence set up is not the best. We get excellent RI and CI, but we are not yet employing all means which can be placed at the disposal of the Cinc Pac.

The SUMNER arrived at PAGO PAGO where she will get replacements of her gear.

A RDF is being constructed at WAKE.

The move of the Japs in the SOWPAC is underway but, aside from stepping up air offensives by both sides, nothing impressive has happened yet.

The activities of the ORANGE SECOND FLEET are unknown.

CinCPac in his 292343 requests arrangements for Strawboard be expedited.
GCT 29 1915

ComGen 2nd Mar Brig to CincPac of April '42

This from Commanding General Second Marine Brigade. Seaplane ramp capable of accommodating Catalinas, will be completed 30 April at Satapuala Upolu. VS 1 now using as auxiliary base. Started clearing landing field there.

GCT 30 1800

Cominch to CincPac of April '42.

Contemplate immediate assignment of CURTISS to South Pacific Force as flagship Comairsopac. Your comment requested.

GCT 29 2343

CincPac to Cominch

Free French ship CHEVRUID at Noumea considerably delayed your 121405. Troops for Strawboard already at Strawstack. Request arrangements be expedited and advise.
Cominich will

(A) transmit to Opnav fleet and frontier commanders notices of arrivals and departures from and to areas outside of the U.S. strategical control

(B) Transmit pertinent information to appropriate foreign authorities. Opnav will

(A) Issue corresponding routing instructions to outgoing ships to first port or position as opportunities within area of British strategical control information Cominich Fleet all HM ships, sea frontier commanders appropriate foreign authorities.

(B) Make diversions for both incoming and outgoing vessels while within area under United States strategic control

(C) Issue an approximate date.

Sea Frontier Commanders will arrange for provision of coverage and/or escort as for comparable U.S. ships.
COMINCH to VARIOUS SEA FRONTIER & DEFENSE COMMANDERS

30 1916

The Chief of Staff of the Army and CinC US Fleet have agreed on the following plan under which unity of command will be exercised as to defense commands, coastal frontiers, and sea frontiers of the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Coasts:

(A) The Chief of Staff and CinC may jointly declare the existence in sea frontier and defense commands of either a "state of non invasion" or a "state of fleet opposed invasion" or a "state of Army opposed invasion".

(B) When a state of non invasion is declared unity of command will be exercised in accordance with the joint despatch of the Chief of Staff and CinC of March 25th.

(C) When a state of fleet opposed invasion is declared unity of command is vested in the Navy, as regards fleet forces and sea frontier forces, excluding naval local defense forces, with sea frontier forces continuing in status of unity of command for operations over the sea against enemy sea borne activity as under a state of non invasion; unity of command is vested in the Army over all naval local defense forces and over all Army forces, except air units allocated by defense commanders to sea frontiers for operations over the sea.

(D) When a state of Army opposed invasion is declared, unity of command is vested in the Army over all Army forces, Sea Frontier Forces, and naval local defense forces.

(E) Unity of command in all cases will be exercised in accordance with par. 10 of Joint Action of Army-Navy 1935.

Existing instructions and agreements in conflict with the above are cancelled.

In accordance with the above plan, a "state of non-invasion" is hereby declared.

SUMNER TO CINCPAC

30 2110

Reference 142142 of Comindiv 2 and Comanzacfor 180310 x
This is first of two parts from Sumner. Following confidential notice to mariners suggested: Chart HO 2857. Nandi waters Viti Levu. To avoid minefields remain east of Boundary line drawn from NE edge of Casco Bay four point five miles 246 degrees then 8.9 miles to Vatu Mbulo repeat Vatu Mbulo Island on 209 x From that island 4.3 miles 169 degrees thence on 205 degrees for 3.3 miles to NE corner of Navula Reef. Center of channel one half mile wide dragged to 41 foot depth extends from 100 fathom curve on 076 and 3/4 degrees 1.2 miles to a point bearing 113.5 degrees.
distance one half mile from Navula Reef Light then on 017 degrees for 5 and 1/3 miles and from there 040 degrees for 9 and 1/3 miles to anchorage area overlapping swept channel shown in chart. Part two next.

MAY GCT

01 1736 COMINCH TO VARIOUS SEA FRONTIER AND DEFENSE COMMANDS

Pending the reaching of agreements as to the terms under which unity of command will be exercised as to defense commands coastal frontiers and sea frontiers and as an integral part thereof unity of command as set forth in para nine baker paren two paren and para ten of Joint Action of Army and Navy 1935 is hereby vested in sea frontier commanders over all naval forces duly allocated thereto and over all Army air units allocated by defense commanders for operations over the sea for the protection of shipping and for antisubmarine and other operations against enemy seaborne activities para

Defense commanders will allocate Army Air Units in full time basis but may rotate them as not less than two week periods as requisite for essential training.

01 1828 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

2 days prior arrival convoy Bleacher inform through U.S. SOFA the British consul GR Armstrong and Commanding Officer New Zealand Garrison of prospective arrival. Direct Brig. General Lockwood, Commanding US Army troops Bleacher to assume command that his arrival of all local defense forces under principle of unity of command. Request New Zealand chiefs of staff to direct CO New Zealand garrison Bleacher to operate under Lockwood under principle of unity of command pending decision by them of disposition of New Zealand and local native forces. After arrival convoy Bleacher inform GOC Fiji General Meade command relations established by you at Bleacher.

01 1927 COMINCH, OPNAV TO VARIOUS

Cancel my 3820 of the 25th February and my 3119 30th March. Following procedure crucial to arrivals and departures 19 naval vessels of British or other United Nations.
Reference your report April 1st subject logistic policy fuel oil. For establishing reserve pool of fuel oil in Chile for Navy and issue to commercial ships when no other supply available Latin American supply committee recommends following. Make application locally to Williamson Balbeur Co. Agents for International Petroleum Co. stating that Navy desires 10,000 tons maintained at all times for its own use. Based on experience with issues port or ports where foregoing to be stored left your discretion but suggest consideration 1/2 in each Antofagasta and Valparaiso. Any expense involved should be covered by request to Busanda for special allotment. If practicable fuel oil of Talara origin desired because of approximation to Navy special grade. If not best attainable commercial fuel is acceptable. Advise action taken.

Unwarranted despatches for the promiscuous exchange information and unevaluated reports of own and enemy operations by other than established communication channels and command echelons cause confusion, jeopardize security and delay transmission of high precedence traffic. The previously expressed principle of information for only those who need to know is hereby emphasized and repeated.

It is against policy of government to occupy Vichy French Territory. Your 292343. Suggest you inquire from ComGen. Noumea as to schedule of CHEVREUIL. Oral discussion with Admiral Auboyneau now arrived London indicated DeGaulle government definitely intends take over STRAWBOARD and will then welcome occupation by US. Naval Station Samoa pass to ComGen Samoa.
Reference your report April 1st subject Logistic Policy Fuel oil. For establishing reserve pool of fuel oil in CHILE for Navy and issue to commercial ships when no other supply available Latin American Supply Committee recommends following: Make application locally to Williamson Balbeur Company, Agents for International Petroleum Co., stating that Navy desires 10,000 tons maintained at all times for its own use. Based on experience with issues port or ports where foregoing to be stored left your discretion but suggest consideration in each ANTOFAGANTA and VALPARAISO. Any expense involved should be covered by request to BuS&A for special allotment. If practicable fuel oil of TALARA origin desired because of approximation to Navy special grade. If not best attainable commercial fuel is acceptable. Advise action taken.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO NAVSTA, TUTUILA

IT IS AGAINST POLICY OF GOVERNMENT TO OCCUPY VICHY FRENCH TERRITORY. YOUR 292343. SUGGEST YOU INQUIRE FROM COMGEN NOUMEA AS TO SCHEDULE OF CHEVREUIL. ORAL DISCUSSION WITH ADMIRAL AUBOYNEAU NOW ARRIVED LONDON INDICATES DE GAULLE GOVERNMENT DEFINITELY INTENDS TAKE OVER STRAWBOARD AND WILL THEN WELCOME OCCUPATION BY US. NAVAL STATION SAMOA PASS TO COMGEN SAMOA.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOWESPAC, NAVOBS WELLINGTON

DUE TO DELAY ARRIVAL GHORMLEY IN SOPAC AND DESIRABILITY ALL FORCES THAT AREA BE BROUGHT UNDER UNIFIED CONTROL IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION DESIRE CINCPAC ASSUME COMMAND OVER ALL LAND SEA AND AIR FORCES PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS LESS THOSE FOR LAND DEFENSE NEW ZEALAND AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE IN ACCORDANCE PROVISIONS MY 031905 OF APRIL AND SECNAV LETTER OF 20 APRIL NOW IN PROCESS OF DELIVERY. AFTER GHORMLEY ESTABLISHED HEADQUARTERS SEPARATE SOPAC COMMAND CAN BE SET UP. ADVISE COMINCH IN ADVANCE DATE AND HOUR YOU PROPOSE ASSUME COMMAND IN ORDER THAT ARMY AND GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED CAN BE NOTIFIED. ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY MATTERS PERTAINING TO U.S.A. FORCES IN SOPAC WILL BE ADMINISTERED AS DIRECTED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT. ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY MATTERS PERTAINING TO U.S. NAVAL FORCES SOPAC WILL BE AS DIRECTED BY CINCPAC. MY 141416 OF APRIL MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY. CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARMY INFORMED.
02 2056  COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Due to delay arrival Ghormley in SoPac and desirability of all forces that area be brought under unified control in view present situation desire Cincpac assume command over all land, sea and air forces, Pacific Ocean Areas less those for land defense New Zealand at earliest practicable date in accordance provisions my 031905 of April and Secnav letter of 20 April now in process of delivery. After Ghormley establishes headquarters separate SoPac command can be set up. Advance Cominch in advance date and hour you propose assume command in order that Army and governments concerned can be notified. Administrative and supply matters pertaining to USA forces in SoPac will be administered as directed by the War Department. Administrative and supply matters pertaining to U.S. Naval Forces SoPac will be as directed by Cincpac. My 141416 of April modified accordingly. Chief of Staff Army informed.

02 2211  COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Consider it imperative that AA guns at Midway be increased to 24 with all possible speed your 290337 Army advises that Emmons can give you 8 complete less height finder by 14th. Also 4 more without firecontrol equipment which has been requisitioned. Ex SARATOGA altimeters now at Pearl may temporarily fill lack of height finders. Twin 20 MM on 40 MM Army mounts shipped San Francisco to Pearl as follows 9 on May 7 and 11 on May 10.

04 0930  4TH DEF. BTN. TO COMINCH, CINCPAC

This from U.S. Naval Unit, Roses. Existing facilities Roses adequate for Catalinas.
COMINDIV 2 TO DOBBIN INFO CINCPAC

Considering our mining mission to protect vessels in Bleacher Harbor from submarines and surface craft offensive action problematical if satisfactory solution can be submitted if Egeria Channel, the Narrows and especially Lahi Passage are all left open. Two former may be protected by nets and shore batteries. Extensive mine protection Lahi with its reported cross currents may endanger own forces. Engineering investigation Bleacher may show a number of essential dredging projects exist. Provided the Narrows can be made safe for use by deep draft vessels can close Lahi thereafter by mining. Request your decision as to whether dredging operations should be requested.

COMINDIV 2 TO CINCPAC.

General Reade accepted mine cases Cincpac 270031. Completely equipped detail departed Suva on Bridge for Bleacher afternoon May 2nd. Roses mining detail with equipment departed Suva in Montgomery and Ramsay 1400 May 3rd to arrive Roses 0900 May 5th. All times local. Preparation mines being undertaken simultaneously at Bleacher and Roses.

AREA HEADQUARTERS AMPHIBFOPAC TO CINCPAC.

In addition to Harris combat loaded for Strawboard now at Strawstack ready for embarkation on Zellin troop and about 1000 tons cargo for strawboard. Estimate 4 days work loading with local facilities. Appears undesirable start loading with present uncertainty. Request 4 days notice of decision to execute strawboard operation.

TANGIER TO CINCPAC.

FREE FRENCH SHIP CHEVRIEUL WAITING TO LEAVE WITH EITHER GOVERNOR SAUTOT OR ADMIRAL DARIENLIEU PENDING OUTCOME CRISIS. PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE ADMIRAL WILL LEAVE BUT NEITHER DATE OR DESTINATION HAS BEEN SET.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC.

LONE WOLF PLAN. FOLLOWING SHIPS READY SAIL CANAL ZONE FOR WELLINGTON NEGAT ZED ON APPROXIMATE DATES INDICATED TO BE ROUTED INDEPENDENTLY VIA SOUTHERN ROUTE. ELECTRA CARRYING CARGO MAY 17. DELBRAZIL CARRYING CARGO MAY 19. WAKEFIELD CARRYING TROOPS MAY 26. COMPASEAFRON PROVIDE ESCORT FOR WAKEFIELD ONLY OP ONE DESTROYER PANAMA TO PRUDENT LIMIT OF ENDURANCE.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, ETC.

FROM COS. U.S. ARMY AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF US FLEET.
ACTION TO SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA.
COMMANDERS VESTED WITH UNITY OF COMMAND WILL NOT
PERMANENTLY TRANSFER UNITS OF SERVICE TO WHICH HE
DOES NOT BELONG FROM ASSIGNED STATIONS OR SUBDIVISIONS
OF HIS COMMAND WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM WAR OR NAVY
DEPARTMENT AS INDICATED. THIS WILL NOT BE INTER-
PRETED TO RESTRICT IN ANY WAY THE AUTHORITY OF SUCH
COMMANDER TO MAKE TEMPORARY MOVEMENTS OF MOBILE FORCES
OF EITHER SERVICE REQUIRED IN EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS
TO MEET A SPECIAL SITUATION UNQUOTE LEARY PASS TO
MACARTHUR. VAN HOOK PASS TO ANDREWS. ALL ADDRESSEES
DELIVER TO ARMY AND NAVY COMMANDERS AS NECESSARY.

OPNAV TO COMSOWESTPACFOR INFO CINCPAC

Changes to Cast Sail Prep 619 Afirm approved your
271620. For reasons expressed by 012030 do not issue
Pacific Fleet Publications to your units. Pacific
Fleet Forces based at New Zealand and New Caledonia
should be issued Asiatic aircraft code. Contact code
and authenticator. Destruction Cast Sail Prep 688
and associated publications authorized by Opnav 211705
March. Comdr South Pacific Force will hold class 6
allowance of Asiatic publications in addition to his
regular class 6 allowance of Pacific publications.

AREA HDQ. AMPHIB PAC TO CINCPAC.

Air field Strawstack now has capacity for squadron
present and enroute plus one additional squadron.
Concentration of ships this area now building up
makes additional air protection urgent. All possible
speed to provide additional squadron recommended.
1 May

Cominch 011736 (and see his 191630) issued a directive as to unity of command with reference to Defense Commands, Coastal, and Sea Frontiers.

Opnav 012030 considers it undesirable to risk Pacific Fleet publications in the Southwest Pacific.

Cominch 1927/01 concerns procedure in reporting and routing ships.

Cominch 011828 indicates the desired command set-up at Bleacher.

The SUMNER continues to do a fine job. In his 302110 he gives the navigation information on Nandi.

The preliminaries of the Japanese offensive in the Southwest Pacific are underway. There are indications that the main first objective is Port Moresby. The Solomons are to be attacked also. To keep our forces from interfering the Japanese plan to raid such places as Cooktown, Townesville, and Horn Island in Australia, and may raid as far east as Roses, Noumea, Fiji, and Samoa.

While there is no good information as to moves in the Central and North Pacific at this time, all positions as far east as Pearl Harbor and Dutch Harbor may possibly be recipients of a raid. However, it appears that the general known location of Japanese forces today preclude anything which threaten our positions or general security. In fact, there are reasons to believe that a small raid on Oahu, for example, might benefit our ultimate position more than it would Japan. For example, today we have a B-17 striking force of only 16 planes available. As long as we get no threats we are not apt to get more planes.

Our DD position in the Pacific Areas, always bad, will now commence to get worse as we send new boats to the Southwest Pacific in exchange for China Station 4-pipers. These ODD must have an overhaul and modernization as soon as the Pacific Fleet receives them.

Our lack of CA, CL, DD for the SARATOGA (our May 25 from Bremerton) is a real problem. Our BBs are trying to get in some sea time with 5 DDs.

Evacuation was started from Tulagi today.
May 2.

Admiral Nimitz made an inspection of the defenses of MIDWAY today. Admiral King has expressed his concern about this island, which in the opinion of Cincpac, is now able to withstand a moderate attack. Cominch 022211 directs that the A.A. defense at MIDWAY be strengthened.

Opnav 011939 states plans for the supply of outlying bases.

Cominch 022056 is directed to assume command when ready and thus put in effect the directive for the Pacific Ocean Areas.

There is a delay at Wallis (Cominch 022055).

The GATO certainly got hits on a vessel in the Marshalls. It is hoped that she sank the KASUGA MARU. The Marshalls may be good hunting grounds.

The offensive in the Southwest Pacific is in the preliminary stages. Bombings have been stepped up. Submarines are probably on station but enemy surface units appear still enroute.

The PRESIDENT TAYLOR was abandoned at CANTON. The salvage effort was worthwhile for experience and to indicate to ship owners that the Navy will attempt salvage of their vessels.

The S-35 returned from the KURILES because of mumps. Off Paramushiru Island a Jap sub fired at them - but probably not with magnetic torpedoes.

May 3.

The GATO probably did not sink the KASUGA. Also, ORANGE possession of magnetic torpedoes reported by the S-35, requires further confirmation.

Submarines are again reported by the Army. This time one was reported in Lat 11-36 S, Long 178 W. The report is doubted.

4th Defense Battalion (040930) reports that Catalinas can be operated satisfactorily at ROSES.

Admiral Ghormley arrives at San Francisco May 5th. Rear Admiral McCain will be here tomorrow.

Cominch 021515 states policy regarding information of own and enemy forces.

Operations in the Southwest Pacific are still in the preliminary stages noted yesterday.
May 3 (continued)

There is now fairly good evidence that there will be 2 BB and a total of 6 CV employed in the SWPacific campaign. Against that we have 4 CV, 11 CA, 4 CL, 22 DD. We do not know what General MacArthur has to oppose the enemy. It is probably that the enemy bomber and fighter strength have been considerably reduced by our own planes in bombings during the past few weeks. It is possible that losses have exceeded replacements.

Admiral Nimitz returned from a two-day personal inspection of Midway.

May 4

The probable line-up in the New Guinea-New Britain area for the offensive now underway is -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SWPac</th>
<th>OWN</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force: now</td>
<td>Enroute: Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td>- 2 2 4  CV 7 3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>2 5 4 11 CA 6 2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>2 2 - 4 CL 2-3 -</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- - - BB 2-4 2</td>
<td>1-2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2 12 8 22 DD 20-30 -</td>
<td>20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>4 2 - 6 ODD - -</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>4 - - 4 XCL 8-12 -</td>
<td>8-12</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- - - XPG -</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- - - PC 12-16 -</td>
<td>12-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 - - SS 18-24 -</td>
<td>18-24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The TANGIER 040630 says that the Free French ship CHEVRIEUL is still waiting to leave Noumea.

Area Headquarters, Samoa, 040351 states that four days' notice will be required to execute the Strawboard operation.
May 4 (continued)

Cominch 041505 initiates a Lone Wolf Plan.

Cominch 041819. Transfer of units must have OK of the Army or Navy Department. (In spite of unity of command)

Opnav 042010. Pacific Fleet publications will not be issued to vessels of the Southwest Pacific.

Area HQ Samoa 042315 says that the airfield at Strawstack is now OK for the squadrons present and enroute and requests that the arrival there of additional squadrons recommended be expedited.

Cominron 2 012318 and 030130 gives ideas on and progress of the mining projects for Bleacher and Roses.

The big news of the day is the report of Task Force 17’s action in the Tulagi area. As a result of his attack he sent in the following score:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Positively sunk</td>
<td>2 DD, 4 AT, 1 AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Beached &amp; sunk</td>
<td>1 CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Badly damaged</td>
<td>1 CL, 1 AV, 1 AK, 1 AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 VT</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>5 Seaplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 VF</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 4-engine VP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Moresby striking force seems to be composed of Cardiv 5 and Crudiv 5 and the time of attack on Moresby set for May 7th (local).

Surface units of the enemy are enroute in the Rabaul area. The presence of at least 1 CV of the KAGA type and 1 BB of the HARUNA type in the area seems confirmed.
MAY 12205

COMINDIV 2 TO COMSOWESTPACFOR, CINCPAC

Fiji minefields complete with 1436 mines May 1st. Nandi fields accordance mydis 142142 April. Other single line fields across inshore of passages unless otherwise stated with number mines as follows: Rovondrau Bay passages west 21 middle 32 east 27. Lauthala Harbor passes within Nukumbutau 10 within Nukulau 10 x Ovalau fields south Motuiki Channel 16 west Motuiki Channel 22 Ovalau line 65 Naingaini Passage 29 Line to Moon Reef 123. North Viti Levu Passages within Nananu Ira 5 Malake 10 Nukurauvuh 19 Nulombu Nuraivi 10 within Manava 10 Savusavu Bay Passages point 42 Nyau 20 within Kumbalau 17. North Vanua Levu Passages Sausau 21 Kia 14 within and across inside Mali 58. Recommended routes inside reefs unobstructed. Marked charts provided NOCF.

04 0249

AREA HDQS AMPHFORPAC TO CINCPAC

Cordially received by administration Strawhat complete cooperation extended nevertheless undivided control of island by US highly desirable and strongly endorse previous suggestion this be obtained by diplomatic means if possible. Island adapted practically unlimited development as air base. If major development planned better harbor facilities important consideration. From air bay on north coast about 4 miles from NE point of island appears offer favorable anchorage suggest SUMNER survey.

04 1615

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

TRANSDIVS EIGHT AND TEN NOW AT BLEACHER AND STRAW MOVEMENTS ARE DESIGNATED IN LONE WOLF PLAN FOR TRAINING SOPAC AMPH FORCE IN WELLINGTON AREA X TWO OF THESE TRANSPORTS ARE DESIRED AT SAN FRANCISCO IN TIME TO LOAD ABOUT 12 JUNE FOR SECOND ECHELON OF LONE WOLF MOVEMENT X NEVILLE AND BARNETT ARE NAMED IN PLAN BUT MAY BE REPLACED IF YOU SO DESIRE X TRANSPORTS SELECTED SHOULD LEAVE ALL PRACTICABLE LANDING BOATS AND TANK LIGHTERS IN SOPAC AS SPARES FOR AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING X REPLACEMENT BOATS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AT SAN FRANCISCO X ADVISE WHICH TRANSPORTS YOU RECOMMEND FOR RETURN ALSO APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF REPLACE- MENT LANDING CRAFT REQUIRED FOR THESE TRANSPORTS.
CINCPAC TO COMINCH

09 0543

BARNETT and GEORGE F ELLIOT both now in BLEACHER movement hereby designated for 2nd Echelon LONE WOLF movement latter ship vice NEVILLE named in plan. Infer from Cominch 041615 that other ships of Transdivs eight and ten are to be ordered direct to SPOONER from present missions at STRAW and BLEACHER. Cominch requested to confirm. If confirmed Comtransdiv 10 is directed to have all practicable landing boats and tank lighters transferred from BARNETT and ELLIOT to other ships present at BLEACHER for transportation to SPOONER and in addition to leave at BLEACHER such landing craft as can be picked up by ships from STRAW enroute to SPOONER advising Cominch direct inform Cinpcap of number of replacements each type which will be required at SAN FRANCISCO. Remainder is for action ComWestSeaFront: BARNETT and GEORGE F ELLIOT expected to be ready to depart BLEACHER about 17 May. Furnish by despatch direct to them info Cominch Cinpcap routings from BLEACHER to SAN FRANCISCO via SAN PEDRO for fuel.

09 1939

CINCPAC TO COMTRANSDIV 10

Designate third transport. Cominch 082131. Mydis 090534 hereby modified to include ship designated.

10 1835

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

YOUR 090543 AND 091931 CONFIRMED. ALSO SEE MY SERIAL 00322. 3 vessels DESIGNATED FOR SECOND ECHELON LONE WOLF REMAIN UNDER NTS FOR THAT OPERATION ON COMPLETION OF WHICH PROVISIONS OF NEXT SENTENCE APPLY. OTHER VESSELS OF TRANSDIVS 8 AND 10 NOW IS SOUTH PACIFIC WHEN UNLOADED REPORT CINCPAC FOR DUTY CONNECTION TRAINING AT SPOONER. WHEN UNLOADED SHIPS OF TRANSDIVS 2, 4 AND 6 NOW IN SOUTH PACIFIC LESS ARTHUR MIDDLETON ALSO REPORT CINCPAC TO PROCEED AS YOU MAY DIRECT. MIDDLETON PROCEED SAN FRANCISCO UNDER NTS REPORTING ON ARRIVAL TO COM 12 FOR CONVERSION.

11 2241

CINCPAC TO COMGENHAWDEPT, COMHAWSEAFRON, BASES & PACFLT.

The fact that Japanese have not used gas against United States Forces is not to be taken as a criterion that gas will not be used in future. It is directed that a survey of gas defense measures be made to ensure that we are prepared to minimize effects of surprise gas attacks.
CINCPAC TO COMTRANSDIVS 8 & 10

Completion present tasks in STRAW and BLEACHER convoys Transdivs 8 & 10 proceed as follows: (a) McCAWLEY FULLER depart STRAWSTACK about 14 May proceed via direct route to WELLINGTON NEW ZEALAND (code name LONGBOW). (b) AMERICAN LEGION NEVILLE depart about 16 May HUNTER LIGGETT about 30 May from BLEACHER proceed direct LONGBOW. (c) FOMALHAUT BELLATRIX when unloaded date indefinite depart STRAWSTACK proceed LONGBOW via BLEACHER. Units under (a) to (c) inclusive after arrival LONGBOW report to Vice Admiral Ghormley for duty in Amphibfor SouPac. (d) HEYWOOD GEORGE F. ELLIOT BARNETT continue duty under NTS when unloaded proceed independently to SAN FRANCISCO via SAN PEDRO for fuel on routings being furnished by ComWasSeaFront estimated departure dates HEYWOOD from STRAWSTACK 14 May ELLIOT from BLEACHER same day BARNETT from BLEACHER 16 May. ComTaskfor 17 has been authorized to modify orders of either ELLIOT or BARNETT to carry excess personnel to PEARL enroute SAN FRANCISCO if required. All three SAN FRANCISCO ships are to arrive there by 12 June at latest. Ships destined West Coast are to fuel only sufficient to reach SAN PEDRO with prudent reserve. Ships LONGBOW are to fuel sufficient to reach that port with reserve equal to 3,000 miles normal steaming. Provisions available LONGBOW. ComTransdiv 10 arriage transfer HEYWOOD landing craft to ships proceeding from STRAWSTACK to LONGBOW and advise ComTransdiv 8 additional craft which can be left at BLEACHER to be picked up by FOMALHAUT and BELLATRIX. NavAtt WELLINGTON pass to NZNB and BOWMAN. ComTransdiv 10 pass to Commander Defense Force SAMOAN AREA. Comtransdiv 8 pass to ComGen BLEACHER all for info.
MAY GCT
0245 AREA HQ AMPFORPAC TO CINCPAC

Your 031931 recommend all reports sightings Apia be made to CO US forces there only. Latter will take necessary action and report Area HQ. Enemy sightings will be reported Cincpac.

05 0411 CINCPAC TO AREA HQ AMPHPORPAC

SUMNER IS made available for survey work selected by you provided it will not prevent her immediate employment Strawboard project when authorized.

05 0437 CINCPAC TO NAVSTA TUTUILA

Recommendation urdis 040249 re undivided control passed to Cominch as were previous information and suggestion ur 080135 and 232051 March. This raises political question beyond cognizance of Cincpac. Consider authority vested in you by unity of command and agreement with local authorities gives you undivided military control.

05 0555 COMGENHAWDEPT TO CINCPAC

Repeat to Tangier for Patch (via USN channels) from General MacArthur: Suggest Tangier be directed pass Cincpac and Comsowespac intelligence reports to General Patch for his information and immediate staff only. Not to be passed to local government officials. In this way General Patch will be kept fully informed situation SWPA via secure communication channels and duplication will be avoided. In an emergency this headquarters will pass high priority information direct.

05 1315 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, COMSOWESTPACFOR, ALL SEAFRONT COMS

FOR ALL JOINT OPERATIONS IN EVERY THEATER OF OPERATIONS THE JOINT PLANNERS ARE DIRECTED TO EFFECT TIMELY CONSIDERATION OF COMMUNICATIONS ON ALL OPERATIONAL PLANNING INCLUDING A DEFINITE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING THE NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS FOR EACH OPERATION AND FOR EACH PHASE OF EACH OPERATION.
05 2201  CINCPAC TO AHQ WELLINGTON

A60 4/5 your A577 2/5 General Tinker is replying to C.A.S. signal direct. Understand the reply confirms in the main Tinker's agreement with C.A.S. in Fiji. Contrary instructions to those made in Fiji by C.A.S. and Tinker were forwarded by separate agencies who were dealing with Fiji works policy without reference to each other. Tinker has detailed Major Fleming to coordinate policy here with Army engineers. Fleming visited Fiji after Tinker's departure and apparently dictated memorandum on works policy which was given to Colonel Seltzer and Captain Ende and which detailed priority. Fleming states memorandum is in effect General Tinker and C.A.S. agreement. Fleming states matter was discussed by him with E/C Roberts.

05 0133  CINCPAC TO COMINCH

After inspection Midway plan send there 12 3 inch AA 8 37 mm AA and 12 twin 20 mm on 40 mm mounts. 12 Army AA referred urdis 022211 are same guns previously allocated and about to be delivered Third Defense Battalion. No other AA Army guns available this area. Plan send guns Midway with key personnel from AA and special weapons groups, Third Defense Battalion, who are only trained personnel immediately available. Fillers are to be recruits. In order accomplish foregoing and yet maintain combat value and readiness Third Defense Battalion urgently request by Fagtrans sixteen officers 455 enlisted marines and as soon as practicable 12 AA guns preferably 90 mm.
COMINCH TO COMUSNAVFORCES EUROPE

You are directed to call on General deGaulle and inform him of the Free French plan for the seizure of Wallis Island by Chevrueil. This is greatly delayed or possibly disrupted by the apparent controversy in New Caledonia between Admiral D'Argenlieu and Governor Sautot. Chevrueil is now at Noumea.

It is most urgent for military reasons that Wallis be adequately defended against Japanese. U.S. Navy is now ready to provide that defense as soon as Free French occupy the island but for political reasons does not wish to seize it so long as it remains under the Vichy government. Urge General deGaulle (A) to issue such instructions as will result in the earliest possible occupation of Wallis Island by the Free French government. Advise me as soon as accomplished (B) and authorize me to proceed with establishing defenses there with U.S. naval forces.

OPNAV TO DOBBIN

Dobbin deliver to Cast George Bleecher. Ramapo to Bobcat: Forts on islands Manila Bay have capitulated. Enemy in northern Luzon made fifteen mile advance to Bagabog; their forces retreated to Tuguegarao when attacked by our forces attempting crossing of Cagayan River. General strike in New Caledonia following arrests by High Commissioner of administrative council members and governor. Successful air raids on Lae and Rabaul. Fighting on border of China and Burma. One brigade estimated arrived Rangoon enemy reinforcements since 30th. 70 enemy planes observed in successful heavy bombing of Rangoon Mingaladon airdrome. Kroner.

TANGIER TO CTF 9

In view recent submarine activity off New Caledonia request authority to hold 3 planes flight 45 and use as anti submarine patrol to limit of extended engine time. Recommend 6 more patrol planes be assigned Tangier immediately for anti submarine patrol. These in addition to 12 now used in maintaining search directed Comtaskfor 17's 262010 April.
In his 050245 the Area Commander SAMOA gives his plan in which he will be the clearing house for information on enemy contacts in his area and action thereon. In his 040249 he suggests the desirability of undivided control of islands and of the potentiality of adding to SAMOAN area airfields. In his 050437 CinCPac states his views regarding unity of command at SAMOA.

Cominch 041615 will use two transports now at BLEACHER or STRAW in a Lone Wolf Plan. They are desired at SAN FRANCISCO June 12th to join the SoPac amphibious training project to be started at WELLINGTON.

CinCPac 050411 makes the SUMNER available for a short time to Commanding General SAMOA.

The mine field at FIJI has been completed - Comindiv 2 012205. CinCPac 052201 summarizes air field work at FIJI.

Cominch 051315 is a directive for communications in joint operations. This does not assure complete satisfaction.

The Commanding General HAWAIIAN (050555) wants General Patch at NOUMEA to get all Navy intelligence available to the TANGIER stationed there with the understanding that this will not go to the local government.

CinCPac 060133 gives his plan to reinforce MIDWAY. This important outpost has been given considerable thought.

Admirals Fletcher and Fitch should be in position now to attack important objectives in the Louisaide Islands area.

The NEOSHO and SIMS were apparently sunk by dive bombers in the Coral Sea. The loss of a fast new tanker makes the fuel supply to forces in that area more difficult than ever. And the loss of a DD, when we are already very short of that type in the Pacific, is a hard blow indeed. The score for the week is still in our favor.

The SS CHLOE was sunk and the SS JOHN ADAMS was set afire and abandoned in the New Caledonia area. This was submarine action which makes counter measures there necessary. A DD patrol and anti-SS air patrol has been started.

Admiral Ghormley's staff will leave San Francisco May 8th. The Admiral should be at Pearl to confer with Admiral Nimitz the latter part of this week.
May 6 (Continued)

Opnav 062104 relaying a message tells of a general strike in New Caledonia.

The Free French slowness in taking over Wallis continues to be embarrassing. For political reasons Cominch (061435) has put the matter up to General deGalle.

Jamming of our radio transmissions by the Japanese in the S.W. Pacific was handled by shifting to alternative wave lengths.

There is the suggestion that the Japs can recover our ECM from the HOUSTON. She probably sank in diveable waters. A plan for immediate shift to secure codes must be in hand as we can expect Japan to break our codes eventually.

The TANGIER (071045) wants more VP's. She will probably get them.

While the Japanese offensive continues as expected in the SW Pacific, it is noted that they have sufficient forces in the Central Pacific Area now available to raid in the Central and North Pacific Areas.

May 7

This was a red-letter day for our forces operating in the Coral Sea area. As a result of the exchanges between carriers in the past 36 hours we have sunk the RYUKAKU and badly damaged the SHOKAKU, while they have badly damaged the LEXINGTON and slightly damaged the YORKTOWN. There has been no news of the light forces but engagements are probable. At the end of the daylight period the YORKTOWN and LEXINGTON were retiring to the south. The LEXINGTON will transfer planes to make up YORKTOWN losses and proceed to Pearl. Admiral Fletcher faces the prospect of opposing two carriers tomorrow with only the YORKTOWN. Admiral Halsey can hardly arrive on the scene before the 11th. The situation is generally favorable.

The NEOSHIO is reported still afloat but a total loss.

In his 070121 (Opnav) the Army does not propose to send 6" guns requested by Bobcat for the defense of Makatea as there seems no prospect of Japan exploiting that place, while we have command of adjacent sea areas.
May 7 (Continued)

Cominch 071240 gives his views on command in the Pacific Ocean areas with particular reference to Samoa.

Cominch (071405) and ACNB have agreed on the development of harbor facilities at Noumea.

18 VPs will be the total stationed at Noumea.

ComNaval Forces Europe 071536 gives General DeGaulle's directive for Free French occupation of Wallis.
General assures me that the only desire of the Free French forces is complete cooperation with American and United Nations forces Your 061435. He is today directing Dargenlieu to proceed immediately with seizure and to inform you through the Senior U.S. Officer of anticipated date and detailed plans. The General is also ordering Dargenlieu to report to you the actual time of seizure and to request the United States Forces to defend the island immediately after Free French seizure. He desires to issue specific instructions as to whom Dargenlieu should report in order to insure complete collaboration. Request you inform me on this point. DeGaulle had been under the impression contact should be with MacArthur but I informed him MacArthur not responsible in this area. Lack of codes between French High Commissioner NOUMEA and Free French Delegation WASHINGTON led DeGaulle to ask by what means High Commissioner NOUMEA could notify American Navy of date agreed upon and conditions of operation. DeGaulle proposed in first place that his communication be passed to American Navy by American Consul NOUMEA. I rejected this proposal and suggested that High Commissioner should communicate through Senior American Officer on spot. I stressed necessity for secrecy surprise and speed and with this DeGaulle declared himself in complete agreement.
OPNAV TO TRENTON

Deliver to ComGen BOBCAT for action: 6 inch guns, heavy machine guns and long range patrol bombers are not available at this time for assignment to BOBCAT for denial of MAKATEA to enemy. It is believed here that enemy could not export phosphates from MAKATEA unless they had control of the entire area. In the absence of this enemy control and in order to carry out the directive outlined in letter of March 16 consideration should be given to reconnaissance missions of at least biweekly frequency using Navy observation scout planes now at your disposal. Further consideration should be given to the establishment of a radio contact on MAKATEA to warn of any enemy actions. Report action taken. Marshall. From War Dept.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 8 AGREEMENT RE WESTERN SAMOA ADVISE LOCAL NEW ZEALAND AUTHORITIES THAT MILITARY GOVERNOR AMERICAN SAMOA HAVING BEEN SUPERSEDED BY SENIOR TROOP COMMANDER SAMOAN GROUP AS MILITARY COMMANDER OF AREA AUTHORITY DEFINED THEREIN WILL BE EXERCISED BY LATTER OR MILITARY COMMANDER ON THE SPOT DESIGNATED BY HIM. YOUR 050437. SEE ALSO PARTS 2 AND 8 OF THE DIRECTIVE TO CINC PACIFIC AREAS WHICH GIVE YOU AUTHORITY TO APPOINT SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AND TO ASSIGN TO THEM SUCH FORCES AS YOU DESIRE.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

COMINCH AND ACNB HAVE AGREED TO DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL UNDERWATER DEFENSES AND NAVAL FACILITIES ON SHORE OF NOUMEA HARBOR. INFORMATION AS TO MATERIAL PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES TO BE Furnished AND CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THEIR ASSIGNMENT IS BEING Forwarded BY AIR MAIL. A CAPTAIN OR COMMANDER WILL BE DIRECTED BY BNNAV TO PROCEED TO NOUMEA AND REPORT TO PATCH. PERTINENT INFORMATION AS TO ORDERS TO BE ISSUED THIS OFFICER IS ALSO INCLUDED IN AIR MAIL LETTER. IT IS DESIRED THAT DEVELOPMENT OF NOUMEA HARBOR PROCEED UNDER US SUPERVISION AS RAPIDLY AS MATERIAL CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR PACIFIC FLEET TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPMENT OF EXTENT OF MAKING AVAILABLE A VESSEL SUITABLE FOR NET LAYING.
Deliver following to Civil Governor Western SAMOA from CinC Pacific Ocean Areas: Military Governor American SAMOA has been superseded by Senior Troop Commander (Major General CFB Price) as Military Commander of SAMOAN AREA. In regard to agreement Re Western SAMOA between Military Governor American SAMOA and New Zealand Authorities authority defined therein for Military Governor American SAMOA will hereafter be exercised by the Military Commander of SAMOAN AREA or by such Military Commander on the spot as may be designated by the Military Commander SAMOAN AREA. ALUSNA Wellington deliver to appropriate New Zealand authorities for information.

BARNETT and GEORGE F ELLIOT both now in BLEACHER movement hereby designated for 2nd Echelon LONE WOLF movement latter ship vice NEVILLE named in plan. Infer from Cominch 041615 that other ships of Transdivs EIGHT and TEN are to be ordered direct to SPOONER from present missions at STRAW and BLEACHER. Cominch requested to confirm. If confirmed ComTransdiv 10 is directed to have all practicable landing boats and tank lighters transferred from BARNETT and ELLIOT to other ships present at BLEACHER for transportation to SPOONER and in addition to leave at BLEACHER such landing craft as can be picked up by ships from STRAW enroute to SPOONER advising Cominch direct inform CinCPac of number of replacements each type which will be required at SAN FRANCISCO. Remainder is for action ComWestSeaFront: BARNETT and GEORGE F ELLIOT expected to be ready to depart BLEACHER about 17 May. Furnish by despatch direct to them info Cominch CinCPac routings from BLEACHER to SAN FRANCISCO via SAN PEDRO for fuel.

Have been in telephonic touch with your representative. Air force informed immediately regarding enemy position at 2100 GCT 8th and will send all available planes to attack. Fuel available BRISBANE and SYDNEY from shore tanks additional to that at NOUMEA.
Part 1 of two parts. I have communicated to General de-Gaulle substance of your despatch and outline of instructions to be sent to General Patch. Facts as reported by General Patch and interpretation given by him to political background of recent developments do not coincide with reports received by General DeGaulle from Noumea including message received today from Chief of Staff of Admiral D'Argeinlieu. Free French Officers are of the opinion that civil disorders began only after arrival American forces. Difficulties due to special character of population local intrigue and political agitation perhaps indirectly encouraged by American civilian action or American failure to act to support authority High Commissioner D'Argeinlieu. General DeGaulle informed he had no information about arrest of Sautot who in obedience to orders is returning to London to report to national committee and who left Noumea May 5 on Chevruil for Auckland. As no report has been received from Admiral d'Argeinlieu Free French National Committee cannot agree to any permanent or repeat permanent measures until reports are available and whole situation examined.

Part 2 of 091841 x With reference to 4 measures you propose: General DeGaulle agrees that martial law be declared as a temporary measure provided first that declaration should refer to necessity of this act as a military defense measure secondly that mention be made of fact that this action is taken in agreement with General DeGaulle as Chairman Free French Committee. DeGaulle states d'Argeinlieu proposed to Patch some time ago declaration of martial law to maintain order. General Patch as the military authority responsible for defence of New Caledonia has General DeGaulle's opinion full power to act under martial law including authority to provide for civil administration without assuming title of Governor. Believe this is crucial point. DeGaulle agrees that military protection of security of Admiral d'Argeinlieu should be assured on condition that his freedom of communication by code or cypher with General DeGaulle and with Commander South Pacific should be guaranteed. Very highly qualified civil servant now in Africa already appointed to act as civil governor of New Caledonia and ordered to proceed immediately to Noumea to exercise this function. General DeGaulle objects emphatically to constituting new civil government by American military authorities. He must protest against such action if taken as a violation of French sovereignty. Pending reports from Admiral d'Argeinlieu, General DeGaulle is not prepared to consider his final disposition. General DeGaulle urgently requests complete censorship be established in New Caledonia over all outgoing
reports of civil disturbances to avoid exploitation such reports by Vichy and Axis propagandists. Full report will be sent by mail. General DeGaulle agrees to maintain close touch with me pending clarification of situation.
Memorandum for Vice Admiral Ghormley (Aidac despatches)

MAY GCT

08 2028

Part 4:
Part four of Cominch 082046. Does the international political situation permit delegating to me authority to place Dargenl1eu and his mission in protective custody as these disorders grow into an immediate and dangerous military threat here Patch I? MAARSHALL UNQUOTE paragraph I desire you call on General DeGaulle and state that I dey value his splendid cooperation as reported your 071536. All communications between French authorities NEW CALEDONIA and U.S. Navy should be through General Patch.

Then inform him of the contents of General Patch's reports and state that allied military interests do not permit continuation of the intolerable political conditions in NEW CALEDONIA.

08 2046

Part 5:
Part five and final of Cominch 082046: Therefore I propose with General DeGaulles concurrence to direct General Patch to declare martial(law omitted) in NEW CALEDONIA, to assume the military governorship, to place Admiral Dargenl1eu under protective custody, and to form a civil government under a Free French citizen other than Dargenl1eu or Sau tot who will be generally acceptable to the French population. Martial law will be revoked as soon as conditions permit.

I request DeGaulles concurrence be confirmed to NEW CALEDONIA new civil government and the appointment of a new High Commissioner for French territory in Pacific Ocean.

Disposition of Dargenl1eu will be subject of future negotiation.

For your information on May 6th General Marshall requested British to take up this matter with DeGaulle but has agreed that hereafter Navy will have cognizance of the Free French military matters in Pacific Ocean Areas.
The high commissioner has requested the use of my military forces to assist on the maintenance of order. Beyond the point necessary to protect United States property I have refused to intervene. It is my belief that the events have injured the prestige of and local confidence in the Free French movement.

Part 2:
This is Cominch 082046. This action of Dargenlieu was devious and surreptitious and unknown to me. Any implication of American support thereof is unjustified. I do not believe that such action could have been accomplished had not American troops been present. From a military standpoint this may have injured the confidence of New Caledonians in Americans and will impair seriously the utility of their militia as part of my forces. May 7th "Further reference political situation here incarceration or Exgovernor Sautot and prominent citizens plus the deceptive means employed has so increased temper of population against Dargenlieu and his mission that open violence is now more imminent from military standpoint resulting disorders can be highly favorable to enemy. Part three follows.

Part 3:
The strike continues. I believe that demonstrations will continue and grow in intensity until source of trouble is removed by some means. The source of trouble is Dargenlieu and his mission. I believe Dargenlieu instigated the arrests previously reported at most inopportune time. While professing an understanding of my neutral attitude he seeks and expects me to use American troops against the common people of NEW CALEDONIA to protect him in his mission. If I use our troops to suppress this incipient rebellion against the present High Commissioner and his mission I will lose the military support of the local militia and the entire population which is important to U.S. militarily. The recent actions of Dargenlieu especially in view of the present military situation now cause me to be distrustful of his motives. This is further accentuated by the fact that potential fifth columnists appear to be prominent against his new advisors. (amongst)?
Memorandum for Vice Admiral Ghormley (Aidac despatches)

MAY GCT

09 0117 CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 17 INFO CTF 16, ETC.

Desire you retire with YORKTOWN, LEXINGTON, ASTORIA, PORTLAND, CHESTER, ANDERSON, HAMMAN, WALKER, RUSSEL, MORRIS to West Coast if practicable otherwise PEARL. Have other forces now under you join Halsey when you can release them. My 080351 modified accordingly. My 022155 KANAWHA or CUYAMA or both will be sent to BLEACHER if you desire to fuel there. SAMOA not available.

09 0207 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Withdrawal directed My 090117 based on following: (a) Damage to both carriers and heavy loss of planes has reduced their effectiveness to the point where combat with undamaged carriers and shore based aircraft would result in almost certain loss both carriers. (b) It is doubtful if either could return to contested area prior to Halsey's arrival. (c) Consider it undesirable to undertake extensive repairs PEARL. (d) LEXINGTON requires adequate escort. Escorts have been on strenuous duty for almost three months and most require work which can best be accomplished on coast.

08 2010 COMINCH TO COMNAVFORCES EUROPE INFO CINCPAC

This is part one of Cominch 082046. Five parts in all. Following despatch received by Chief of Staff from General Patch who commands all military forces NEW CALEDONIA May 6th. "The following change in the local political situation is reported reference your radio to NEW CALEDONIA April 3. Governor Sautot and four leading NEW CALEDONIA citizens have been arrested by High Commissioner Admiral Dargenlieu and confined aboard the Free French Gunboat CHEVREUIL last night about 7:30 p.m. Early today the CHEVREUIL departed for an unannounced destination. In protest Dargenlieu action a general strike has been called with public demonstrations and the population is highly incensed."
Memorandum for Vice Admiral Ghormley (Aidac despatches)

MAX CCT

02 0641  CINCPAC TO COMSOWES PAC

Task Force Sixteen should arrive your area about twelve May. Request include now in your intelligence bulletins. Task Force One returning to Coast.

02 1430  COMINCH TO CINCPAC, COMSOWES PAC

My 182032 April must not be construed as eliminating the possibility that enemy may attack HAWAII - MIDWAY line or launch attacks against our lines of communication via GILBERT-ELLICE-SAMOA line.

051315  COMINCH TO COMSWPACFOR INFO CINCPAC

Admiralty request discouragement of reported Japanese salvage operations of HMS PRINCE OF WALES or HMS REPULSE in position 03-40 North 104-30 East by submarine attack on salvage vessels.

Also say to General MacArthur that I wish to emphasize importance of submarine attacks on enemy ships and shipping proceeding to and from BURMA via SINGAPORE as indicated in My 171750 April.

08 0204  COMTASKFOR 17 TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOWES PAC, COMINCH

LEXINGTON two torpedo hits possibly more port side. Number 4 fire room flooded. Number 2 and 6 boiler rooms leaking but under control. YORKTOWN 2 bomb hits many near misses. Maximum speed 26 knots. Plane losses believed heavy. One enemy carrier received two thousand pound bomb hits two torpedo hits. Other enemy carrier undamaged. Enemy had superiority in number fighters.

08 1830  COMAMPHIBFORPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC, COMSWES PACFOR

Present situation Southwest Pacific impels me again to invite attention many HOKITLY trained and experienced PREP BAKER YOKE crews if equipped with long range bombers could provide important increase in our offensive strength in that area. Originator ComAmphibforPac. Admiral McCain estimates less than one week required for training and sea experience these pilots invaluable present opportunity to destroy enemy shipping and men of war.
WD 3669

WD WASH TO COMGENHAWDEPT

This morning Navy reports plane tenders under Cincpac's control leaving San Francisco May 11th with inspection party for your area or southward thereof. Suggest you contact Cincpac for authority to join in such parts of trip as are feasible under present plans. Navy asked you to notify us if arrangements difficulties arise. Keep us advised of changes in proposed itinerary, and location on various dates. Attention invited to recent New Caledonia messages regarding political relations to military situation - MARSHALL.

12 0245

NAS DUTCH HARBOR TO COMALASKAN SECTOR

Serious doubt exists in minds submarine commanders that Russian merchantmen in operating in and near Japanese waters between Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok display any neutral identification to differentiate them from Japanese vessels possibility exists such lack of identification is requirement of Japan request information effective submarine operations vicinity enemy waters require attack on all unidentified vessels.

11 2150

CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY COMINCH TO

From Chief of Staff US Army and Comdr in Chief US Fleet Action Supreme Comdr Southwest Pacific x Cincpac x Cinclant x Conag. Dgen Panama Canal Deptmt x Comsoupac xComsouwespacfor x Comdr. NavFor Europe x Comdg. Generals Western, Eastern, Central and Southern Defense Commands, Comdrs all sea frontiers x Opnav x Man Hook Pass to Andrews x Leary deliver Macarthur x Western and Eastern Sea Frontiers and Commandant 8th NavDist deliver respective defense commands x Opnav deliver Comdr Central Defense Command xx Boundary lines of Ocean areas, Sea Frontiers, and National Areas of strategic responsibility are designed to give a general definition to usual fields of operations x They are not designed to restrict or prevent responsible commanders from extending operations outside their assigned areas when such action will assist or support friendly forces, when it is necessary to accomplish the task in hand, or when it will promote the common cause. Comdrs of adjacent areas should keep each other informed as to operations in the vicinity and make direct arrangements for support and cooperation.
12 0255 CINCPAC TO COMWESSEAFRONT

Understand Fantan movement in 2076 contemplates that only 2 ships make there initially and that completion involves shuttling remainder between there and Fulcrum. Appreciate New Zealand troops must be returned Homeland. The Army here considers Fantan Harbor can accommodate all ships. Air coverage is available there. Recommend all Fantan movement in 2076 go there direct and further that ships not required for evacuation be used on homeward trip to carry large amount native cargo now understood accumulated that port. Requirement for escorts will be materially reduced by this procedure.

12 0731 CINCPAC TO COMTRANS DIV 8, 10

Completion present tasks in Straw and Bleacher convoys. Transdivs 8 and 10 proceed as follows. Afirm McCawley, Fuller depart Strawstack about 14 May proceed via direct route to Wellington New Zealand. Afirm Longbow, repeat Longbow, Baker, American Legion, Neville depart about 16 May Hunter Liggett about 30 May from Bleacher proceed direct Longbow to Cast from Fomalhaut Bellatrix when unloaded date indefinite depart Strawstack proceed Longbow via Bleacher. Units under Afirm to Cast inclusive after arrival Longbow report to V.A. Ghormley for duty in Amphibfor SouPac. Dog Heywood, George Fox Elliot Barnett continue duty under NTS when unloaded proceed independently to San Francisco via San Pedro for fuel on routings being furnished by Comwesseafront estimated departure dates Heywood from Strawstack 14 May Elliot from Bleacher same day Barnett from Bleacher 16 May x Comtaskfor 17 has been authorized to modify orders of either Elliot or Barnett to carry excess personnel to Pearl enroute San Francisco if required x All three San Francisco ships are to arrive there by 12 June at latest. x Ships destined West Coast are to fuel only sufficient to reach San Pedro with prudent reserve x ships destined Longbow are to fuel sufficient to reach that port with reserve equal to 3,000 miles normal steaming x Provisions available Longbow x Comtransdiv 10 arrange transfer Heywood landing craft to ships proceeding from Strawstack to Longbow and advise Comtransdiv 8 additional craft which can be left at Bleacher to be picked up by Fomalhaut and Bellatrix x NavAtt Wellington pass to NZNB and BOWMAN x Comtransdiv 10 pass to Commander Defense Force Samoan Area x Comtransdiv 8 pass to ComGen Bleacher all for info.
12 1245 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Prior to operation in Pacific consider essential 2 squadrons Wasp SB2U airplanes be replaced by SBD. Also desirable replace TBD with TBF if accomplished at San Diego half of present VSB personnel plus VTB personnel can be sent overland to receive planes familiarize and join Wasp on arrival. If accomplished, Norfolk it will be necessary to bring 30 TBD east by time Wasp arrives. Latter course obviates necessity visiting San Diego. x Comment.

12 0900 CO VMF 212 TO SNAP MAG 21 PH, CTF-9

Visited Roses today will require at least 20 days more construction for satisfactory temporary operations. Navy engineers just arrived to complete field. Fourth Defense 270 Radar operation. My 270 serial 106 not yet installed. 6 men assigned will keep in touch with progress. Will carry on best possible at Noumea mean time. x Little, Martin, Ross deserve plenty credit. x Little sending requisition. x Men and equipment arrived and unloaded Roses today.

12 1329 OPNAV TO COMSOWESPACFOR

Inquiry from Admiralty states belief that US tankers being used maintain naval stocks Suva now and will continue do so in future. Noting that E. J. Henry was employed recently that connection has commitment been made to replenish stocks as necessary with Navy allocated tankers assigned to Australia, New Zealand program. Suggest desirability this procedure if not already in effect.

12 1951 CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 1, SARATOGA

Saratoga hereby assigned temporarily to TF 1 is scheduled conduct trials Puget Sound 25-27 May then proceed San Diego for training. x Comtaskfor one direct four DD join Saratoga Puget Sound by 25 May provide escort and plane guard services during trials voyage to San Diego and training until relieved about 5 June by other destroyers to be designated by me later x Assign Task Group number x Battleship operations may be limited as required by this diversion of your DDs.
Night attacks on Oahu and/or outlying islands by 4 engined seaplanes may occur on or after 16 May. In order to make attack on Oahu it is believed fueling from submarine or shore cache must be accomplished. Appropriate alert against night attack including following measures will be taken. From 16 May until further notice. Comtaskfor 9 base 2 patrol planes at Midway. Midway observe islands and reefs within 400 miles of that place particularly in the late afternoon. Daily search plane in appropriate sector scrutinize all islands passed in the northwest chain. Army patrol French Frigate Shoal area with bombers in late afternoon and attack enemy units sighted. Comcarpac (ADM) base 6 marine fighter barking sands and provide for fighters direction from Kauai radars by Lt Comdr Griffin and two assistants using transmitters provided by navy. Cincpac communication officer will assist in arrangements. Comcarpac clear details as necessary with Commander Interceptor command. Para. Cincpac has augmented present mine and observations defenses French Frigate Shoal as follows. Special submarine patrol copy of whose orders is herewith furnished addresssees and who must not be attacked. PREBLE patrolling vicinity clear of own submarine patrol. Observation post specially alerted.
SECRET

MAY GCT

13 2043  CINCPAC TO CTF-17 INFO COMINCH, CTF-1

Direct Fitch and staff proceed on transport from BLEACHER to West Coast and join SARATOGA there as Commander new Task Force 11 to be formed on SARATOGA.

13 2323  COMINCH TO HEIM (ROSES)

Following despatch from Chief of Staff, Army, for delivery to Commanding General, ROSES Task Force: Can heavy or medium bomber squadron operate from your air base for extensive operations for limited period (Marshall to Chamberlain) query. Report actual stockage of following: Airplane ammunition by caliber, number of bombs by size, amount of aviation gasoline available. Immediate reply requested.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COS US ARMY

AS AGREED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THE PRINCIPLES OF JOINT COMINCH AND CHIEF OF STAFF USA 251745 MARCH AND 191630 APRIL forwarded my serial 0733 may 1, are extended to the Hawaiian coastal and sea frontiers and a state of fleet opposed invasion is declared now in effect.

YOU ARE DIRECTED AS FOLLOWS: ESTABLISH A SEPARATE DEFENSE SECTOR EMBODYING THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER AS DELINEATED IN YOUR HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PLAN ONE AND JOINT HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN. ORGANIZE A DEFENSIVE TASK FORCE COMPRISING ALL ARMY AND NAVY FORCES SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED BY CINCPAC FOR LOCAL DEFENSE OF THE SECTOR AND DESIGNATE THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AS THE TASKFORCE COMMANDER HAWAIIAN DEFENSE SECTOR. FORM SEA FRONTIER TASK FORCES AS APPROPRIATE. MAKE SUITABLE CHANGES YOUR HAWAIIAN DEFENCE PLAN ONE TO EFFECT THE FOREGOING.

THE ABOVE CHANGES DO NOT EFFECT THE HIGHER UNITY OF COMMAND HELD BY CINCPAC OVER ALL ARMED FORCES PACIFIC OCEAN AREA SPECIFIED IN COMINCH SECRET 031905 APRIL. INFORM COMGEN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT. YOUR SERIAL 042W MARCH 13.

OPNAV TO CINCPAC INFO COM-12

Underwater defense material and personnel for installation including nets leaving SAN FRANCISCO on SS HENRY KNOX about 22 May for FANTAN and FULCRUM same for WHITE POPPY and ROSES probably several days later ship unknown. Installation nets FANTAN 2 considered urgent as protection Army transports commencing about 10 June. Request CINCPac render all practicable assistance. Reported that CATALPA (YN-5) EBONY (YN-10) expected ready in time to proceed with HENRY KNOX. Your 120155 CHESTNUT availability would appear too late for purposes at FANTAN 2.

COMGENHAWDEPT TO --- INFO CINCPAC

Following from Arnold for your information. WD plans to establish squadron of 8 B-17s and squadron of 13 B-26 at NEW CALEDONIA and duplicate strength at FIJI. EFATE to be used as advanced air base and TONGATABU to be available if necessary. Movement to be completed by May 25th. Adequate stocks of fuel bombs and ammunition to be established at all four bases. Special attention to dispersion and camouflage signed EMMONS.
From Ghormley: Please inform BOBCAT and BLEACHER regret unable visit them this time hope to do so later time. Your 140541. Am proceeding CANTON today Thursday and SUVA 15th. Please inform SUVA. Contemplative having: Elpeck and Lt.Comdr. Funk visit STRAWSTACK Friday to confer with ComdGen regarding possibility using STRAWBOARD contingent temporarily defense NANDI aerdrome pending arrival Army that place. Please notify Price.

THI5 IS COMINCH 142140 PART ONE OF FOUR COMING: ANSWERING QUERY FROM MARSHALL REGARDING COOPERATION OF FORCES MAY 1ST TO 12TH THIS IS PARAPHRASE MACARTHURS REPLY OPERATION PLAN OF AIR FORCE IN CORAL SEA AREA REQUIRED EXTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL AREA SOLOMONS SOUTHEASTWARD FROM NEW IRELAND TO BOUNDARY BETWEEN AREAS: SAME DIRECTION FROM BUNA AREA A PATROL ALONG NEW GUINEA AND LOUISIAD NORTH COAST TO LIMIT OF RANGE THEN WESTWARD SOUTH OF THESE ISLANDS TO MORESBY, CORAL SEA WEST OF TULAGI, OFF TOWNsville ISLE ZONE EXTENDING 500 MILES; IN AREA MORESBY RABAUL MADANG THURSDAY ISLAND A PLANK RECONNAISSANCE PATROL: ACROSS MOUTH GULF CARPENTERIA AND OFF DARWIN NORMAL PATROLS. ASSEMBLED IN NORTH EAST AUSTRALIA MAXIMUM AIR STRIKING FORCE FOR USE AGAINST NAVAL UNITS. PURSUIT AFIRM CAST AND AFIRM AFIRM (AA) DEFENSES ALERTED. PRIOR THESE STEPS ATTACKED ENEMY AIR FACILITIES AND SHIPPING SUCCESSFULLY. COORDINATED RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WITH NAVY AND FURNISHED DETAILED INFORMATION TO COMTASKFOR. ALSO INFORMED HIM THROUGH LEARY WOULD GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT WITH LAND BASED AIR AND ARRANGE COMSOPACFOR FOR AIR RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL AREA NOUMEA AND NEW HEBRIDES NORTH AND NORTHWESTWARD TO AREA BOUNDARY. PART TWO FOLLOWS.

PART TWO: PARAGRAPH CONSIDER COORDINATION WITH TASK FORCE WAS ATTAINED. DUE TO DISTANCES REQUIRED OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT WHICH HAD TO USE ONE BOMB BAY TANK, UNSUITABILITY OF HYPO AFIRM ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS AND WEATHER IN NORTHERN PART OF AREA OPERATIONAL RESULTS WERE ONLY FAIR. ALL CLASSES BOMBARDMENT NOW IN AUSTRALIA FORCED OPERATE HIGH ALTITUDES FOR PROTECTION FROM AA FIRE AND PURSUIT. INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION ON THIS METHOD BOMBING ONLY PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST SHIPS UNDERWAY AND NOT ECONOMIC FROM STANDPOINT OF EQUIPMENT. URGENTLY NEED
DIVE BOMBERS AND TORPEDO PLANES WITH ADEQUATE RANGE, PERFORMANCE AND DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT FOR USE WITHOUT PURSUIT PROTECTION AGAINST SURFACE CRAFT. ATTENTION CALLED TO RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON EFFECTIVE RANGE OF OPERATING AIR FORCE BECAUSE MORESBY DUE LIMITED DEVELOPMENT WILL ACCOMODATE ONLY FEW BOMBARDMENTS PART THREE WILL COME.

PART THREE: AS NAVAL TASK FORCE COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR IMMEDIATE TACTICAL EXECUTION THERE IS SOME DANGER IN COORDINATING OPERATIONS OF THIS TYPE BECAUSE SUCH MOVEMENTS MUST BE ORIENTED WITH REGARD TO THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN CARRIED OUT IN THE AFFECTED AREA IN ORDER TO EXERCISE A SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE. EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF EFFORT BETWEEN NAVAL AND AIR FORCES IS DIFFICULT. BUT WHEN LAND FORCES ARE INVOLVED THE OPERATIONS MUST BE PLANNED AND EXECUTED BY THE AREA COMMANDER ON WHOSE AREA OPERATIONS TAKE PLACE X NARRATIVE OF AIR MISSIONS BY DATES FOLLOWS SECOND 8 B-26 ATTACK RABAUL 6 B-17 FAIL REACH SAME OBJECTIVE LATER DUE WEATHER. THIRD 2 B-17 ATTACK RABAUL. FOURTH 9 B-17 FAILED ACCOUNT WEATHER REACH RABAUL BUT SIX ATTACKED LAE REPEAT LAE AS DID 3 OF NINE P-39. 6 B-26 ATTACK BUNAKUNAN. FIFTH ON ALERT ALL BAKER SEVENTEEN AND B-26. SIXTH 2 OF 3 B-17 REACH AND ATTACK TARGET AT BUKA PASSAGE 3 MORE ATTACK WOOLARK ISLAND PART 4 FOLLOWS

PART 4 AND FINAL: 7TH 10 B-17 ATTACK NEAR DEBOYNE. 8TH 8 B-17 ATTACK CONVOY BUT SIX B-26 FAILED LOCATE IT AND ATTACK KITOB. 9TH WEATHER PREVENTED ONE B-17 REACH RABAUL BUT ATTACKED PLANES DEBOYNE. 6 B-26 FAILED SAME MISSION BUT 3 ATTACKED TORLESSE ISLAND. 5 MEDIUM AND 9 HEAVY FAILED DUE DARKNESS TO ATTACK CARRIERS EAST TOWNSVILLE. TENTH 7 B-25 FAILED REACH SHIPPING LAE AND FINCH BUT 4 ATTACKED DEBOYNE ALSO ONE B-26 ON AIRCRAFT THERE. ELEVENTH 9 B-17 UNABLE LOCATE CARRIER ATTACKED SHIPPING AT KECCA. 3 B-26 FAILED REACH RABAUL ACCOUNT WEATHER ATTACK DEBOYNE. 12TH WEATHER REQUIRED CANCEL MISSION 3 B-17 4 B-26 BUT CONTINUED RECONNAISSANCE WITH B-25 HUDSONS CATALINAS AND SOME B-17.
14 1247  OPNAV TO CINCPAC

Information requested your probable requirements for offensive influence mines and where depot facilities with special personnel should be located. Mines now available are Mark 12 for submarines, Mark 12 mod 1 parachute type for torpedo planes and mark 13 for bombing planes.

15 1910  COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Transmit to Patch for Action. Ascertain from D'Argenlieu when he will have Chevreuil carry out Free French occupation of Wallis. Impress on him urgency of early action in this matter. Chief of Staff Army informed.

16 0447  CINCPAC TO ALUSNA WELLINGTON

Request New Zealand Chiefs of Staff to direct Commanding Officer New Zealand Air Forces, Fiji, to report to the GOC Fiji under the principle of unity of command. Am directing the commanding officer, U.S. air forces that place to conform.
10 2347  CINCPAC TO COMINCH

LOSS OF LEXINGTON REPRESENTS ONE FIFTH OUR CARRIER STRENGTH IN PACIFIC. JPA LOSS ONE LARGE CARRIER WITH TEMPORARY SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ANOTHER LARGE CARRIER APPROXIMATES ONE FIFTH ENEMY CARRIER STRENGTH. AT PRESENT STAGE OF OUR CARRIER BUILDING PROGRAM WE CAN NOT AFFORD TO SWAP LOSSES WITH THIS RATIO. JAP SUCCESSES TO DATE DUE PRIMARILY TO DECISIVE AIR SUPERIORITY AND POSSESSION OF MANY MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AIR BASES. OUR AIRCRAFT STAGING POINTS BETWEEN WEST COAST AND XRAY TOO WIDELY SEPARATED TO BE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING TO SAME DEGREE AND EACH IS VULNERABLE TO DETERMINED MAJOR ATTACK DUE TO LACK OF SUFFICIENT AIR STRENGTH. EACH STAGING POINT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A FIXED CARRIER WHICH CANNOT BE SUNK BUT WHICH CAN BE CAPTURED OR RENDERED VALUELESS. EACH POINT MUST BE GIVEN SUFFICIENT AIR STRENGTH TO FORCE ENEMY ACCEPT LARGE RISKS IN CAPTURE ATTEMPTS.

WHILE IN MEANTIME WE BUILD UP OUR GENERAL AIR STRENGTH, IMPORTANCE PACIFIC AREA TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES RESURVEY OF DISTRIBUTION OF AMERICAN PLANE OUTPUT WITH LARGER ALLOCATION PLANES TO PACIFIC AREAS. PARTICULARLY NEEDED ARE CARRIER TYPE PLANES WITH MAXIMUM MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS. ALSO NEEDED ARE LONG RANGE NAVAL LANDPLANE BOMBER TO AFFORD RELATIVELY SAFE AND EFFICIENT PATROLLING AND SCOUTING IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY AND TO PROVIDE STRONG STRIKING FORCE.

11 2100  COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC

I CONCUR WITH FLETCHERS 110216 EXCEPT BELIEVE ENEMY CARRIER AIRCRAFT DO SEARCH. ADD FOLLOWING: HOWEVER HIGH COORDINATION EXISTS BETWEEN ENEMY SHORE AND CARRIER AIRCRAFT IN CONTRAST TO OUR PRESENT SITUATION. BELIEVE ENEMY SHORE PLANES AND CARRIERS ARE RADAR EQUIPPED. ENEMY NOW USING ME 109 FIGHTERS FROM CARRIERS AS WELL AS ZEROS. THE FORMER APPEAR TO HAVE ARMOR AND PROTECTED TANKS. ENEMY FIGHTERS AND TORPEDO PLANES GREATLY OUTPERFORM OUR PRESENT CARRIER TYPES. OUR AA FIRE IS STILL RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE BUT IS SUPERIOR TO JAPS. COMBAT PATROL MUST PATROL AT 20,000 FEET IF SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTION IS TO BE MADE.
12 1950 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

COMINCH 121950 PART 2 FINAL SAME ADEES XX ARMY HAS BEEN
REQUESTED BUILD UP BASE PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN
POPPY ROSES FANTAN BLEACHER PARA I CONSIDER YOU SHOULD
TRANSFER AIRCRAFT SERVICE UNITS TO POPPY AND FANTAN
ADEQUATE FOR OPERATING1 CARRIER GROUP PLUS ADDITIONAL
VPB AT EACH PLACE X SUGGEST IMMEDIATE USE OF YORKTOWN
AND LEXINGTON PLANES AND AVIATION SERVICING PERSONNEL
THAT CAN BE SPARED AS WELL AS ORGANIZED SERVICE UNITS
UNDERSTOOD NOW AT PEARL PARA AVIATION FUEL SITUATION
OBSCURE CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS ARMY AND NAVY BOMBS IN
AREA BUT NO TORPEDOES OR FACILITIES X ARMY BOMBS MAY
REQUIRE ADAPTERS X THIS MATTER CONSIDERED MOST URGENT
DESIRED EARLY ADVICE YOUR ARRANGEMENTS X

14 0517 CINCPAC TO COMGENHAWDEPT

COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FROM CINCPAC X
FOLLOWING IS DISPATCH 132140 FROM COMINCH TO CINCPAC X
QUOTE X ------- ------- X UNQUOTE X THIS FOR YOUR INFORMA-
TION X CINCPAC SUGGESTS ALL EQUIPMENT OF AA REGIMENT
BE SENT X DESIRE INFORMATION ASSISTANCE REQUIRED
ESPECIALLY GROUND CREWS AND PILOTS AT EARLIEST DATE X

14 0541 CINCPAC TO PALMYRA

FOR VICE ADMIRAL GHORMLEY X HEAVY AND MEDIUM ARMY BOMBERS
ARE BEING DIVERTED TO SUVA AND CALEDONIA X A NUMBER OF
THESE PLANES MAY BE MANNED BY NAVY PILOTS X DESIRE GET
THESE UNITS READY FOR OPERATIONS EARLIEST DATE X IMPERATIVE
CINCPAC ESTABLISH COMMAND ALL SHORE BASED AIR FORCES
SOPAC GET EFATE IN OPERATING CONDITION AND SET UP ADEQUATE
AIR RAID WARNING SYSTEM THROUGHOUT ISLANDS THAT ARE UNDER
CONTROL INCORPORATING IN IT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN AND NEW
ZEALAND COAST WATCHING PERSONNEL X EXPEDITE X OMIT BOBCAT
AND BLEACHER PRESENT ITINERARY X

14 0747 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

MY 140639 THIRD SENTENCE CHANGE TO READ ALL PARTS REFER-
ENCE NUMBER 140639 X FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH X PARA TWO X
CHANGE TO READ CONSIDER THAT THE PRIMARY TASKS
PART ONE OF FIVE PARTS ALL REFERENCE 140639 XX FROM OWN ESTIMATE WHICH AGREES IN GENERAL WITH OPNAV 121920 ENEMY PLANS APPEAR TO BE X AFIRM X DELAY MORESBY OFFENSIVE UNTIL MORE STRENGTH IS ASSEMBLED HOLDING TRANSPORTS IN GENERAL RABAUL AREA X BAKER X PROCEED WITH THE OCCUPATION OF NAURU AND OCEAN ISLANDS X CAST X POSSIBLY EXTEND OPERATIONS REFERRED TO IN BAKER ABOVE TO THE EASTWARD PRIMARILY WITH CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS X DOG X ATTACK OAHU NEAR FUTURE WITH LONG RANGE SEA PLANES X EASY X ASSEMBLE LARGE STRIKING FORCE WHICH FROM ITS COMPOSITION AND LOADING WITH ATTACK GAS APPEARS PREPARATION FOR ATTACK ON POPULOUS AREA DASH PROBABLY OAHU POSSIBLY WEST COAST X PARA TWO X I CONSIDER THAT THE PRIMARY TASKS I AM ASSIGNED CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS BY X AFIRM MAKING OAHU IMPREGNABLE X BAKER PLACING SUFFICIENT STRENGTH UPON EACH BASE OF THE CHAIN TO INFlict CONSIDERABLE LOSSES UPON ATTACKING ENEMY AND AT LEAST DELAY HIM X CAST MAINTAINING OUR STRIKING FORCES IN A STATE OF MAXIMUM MOBILITY TO ACT AGAINST ADVANCING ENEMY FORCES OR TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AS OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS X

THIS IS PART TWO OF MY 140639 XX PARA THREE X FULLY CONCUR THAT SHORE BASES SHOULD BE REINFORCED BY VPB AND WB X I AM STRONGLY CONVINCED HOWEVER THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE BY REDUCTION OF EITHER HAWAIIAN OR AUSTRALIAN AIR COMPONENTS X I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE IF THE MOBILITY OF AIRCRAFT COULD BE UTILIZED TO REINFORCE ANY OF OUR BASES BY MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT FROM OTHER BASES WHICH APPEAR TO BE LESS THREATENED X CONSIDER HOWEVER THAT DISTANCE AND TIME AS WELL AS TECHNICAL FACTORS MAKE IT A FALLACY TO COUNT ON SUCH REENFORCEMENT AFTER ACUTE NEED ARISES X IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WE ARE FAR FROM READY TO EVEN CONSIDER SUCH A METHOD IN THAT BOTH OAHU AND AUSTRALIA HAVE NOT BEEN BROUGHT TO REASONABLE AIR STRENGTH AND THE OTHER BASES ARE NOT READY TO RECEIVE THE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT X THE LATTER IS MORE THAN A LACK OF SERVICE UNITS X THE FIELDS ARE NOT YET PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF RECEIVING AND AFFORDING PROTECTION TO ANY NUMBER OF TEMPORARILY BASED AIRCRAFT X ROSES FOR INSTANCE IS NOT YET READY FOR ITS SQUADRON OF FIGHTERS X I NOTE THAT ARMY HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PUSH THE WORK OF PREPARING AIR FIELDS IN THIS RESPECT AND I SHALL DO EVERYTHING IN MY POWER TO EXPEDITE THIS AT ALL BASES X
NOW COMES PART THREE OF MY FIVE PART DISPATCH XX PARA
FOUR X AS REGARDS OPERATION CARRIER GROUPS FROM SOUTH
PACIFIC SHORE BASES WHEN LATTER HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED
CONSIDER THIS EXCELLENT EMPLOYMENT FOR CARRIER REPLACE-
MENT GROUPS X INTEND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION INCLUDING
BASING OF CARRIER AIRCRAFT SERVICE UNITS AS RAPIDLY AS
CARRIER REPLACEMENT GROUPS BECOME AVAILABLE AND MINIMUM
ESSENTIAL SHORE FACILITIES ARE PROVIDED X CONSIDER IT
INADVISABLE TO UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATE USE OF YORKTOWN
LEXINGTON PLANES AND AVIATION PERSONNEL IN THIS CON-
NECTION X TOTAL REMAINING YORKTOWN LEXINGTON PLANES
CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN ONE FULL GROUP X INTEND RETURN
YORKTOWN TO PEARL AND USE THESE PLANES WITH YORKTOWN
AIR PERSONNEL FOR BRINGING YORKTOWN AIR GROUP UP TO
STRENGTH X THIS GROUP WILL BE USEFUL PENDING YORKTOWN
REPAIRS FOR ASSISTING STILL INADEQUATE DEFENSE OF OAHU
AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR YORKTOWN AS SOON AS HER REPAIRS
ARE FINISHED X ALL LEXINGTON PERSONNEL NOW SLATED FOR
DIRECT RETURN WEST COAST FROM BLEACHER X BELIEVE THIS
PLAN SHOULD BE FOLLOWED X RECOMMEND LEXINGTON CREW AND
AIR GROUP PERSONNEL HE USED FOR COMMISSIONING ESSEX X
RECOMMEND THOSE NOT IMMEDIATELY NEEDED FOR THIS PURPOSE
BE RETAINED WITHIN THE NAVAL AERONAUTIC ORGANIZATION
AND TRANSFERRED ESSEX PRIOR HER COMMISSIONING X

PART FOUR STARTS HERE MY 140639 XX PARA FIVE X EIGHTEEN
PATROL PLANES FROM PEARL NOW BASED WITH TANGIER AT
POPPY X INTEND FURTHER DISTRIBUTION PATROL PLANES SOUTH
PACIFIC AREA AS RAPIDLY AS NUMBERS HERE MAKE THIS PRACTI-
CABLE X PARA SIX X THE ONLY SOLUTION PROMISING ADEQUATE
SECURITY IS IMMEDIATE PROVISION ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT BOTH
ARMY AND NAVY IN NUMBERS AND TYPES PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED
FOR HAWAIIAN AREA TOGETHER WITH AIRCRAFT FOR ISLAND BASES
IN ADDITION TO THESE INCREASE X IN CONNECTION FOREGOING
THERE ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN TRAINED PATROL PLANE CREWS
PATRON 61 AND 62 NOW AT ALAMEDA WHICH COULD WITHIN FEW
DAYS TAKE OVER AND BRING TO PACIFIC AREA ARMY LANDPLANE
BOMBERS X ACCORDING TO ANNEX EASY OF WPL DASH 46 DASH PC
CANTON SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AN ARMY PURSUIT SQUADRON X
UNDERSTAND THIS ASSIGNMENT CANCELLED BY WAR DEPT X
RECOMMEND PLAN OR MODIFICATION USING BOTH PURSUIT AND
ATTACK BE ADHERED TO X PARA SEVEN X AGREE HALSTEY SHOULD
REMAIN OUTSIDE OF RANGE OF SHORE BASED FIGHTERS TORPEDO
BOMBERS AND DIVE BOMBERS EXCEPT UNDER CONSIDERATIONS MEN-
TIONED IN YOUR 121945 AND HALSTEY IS BEING SO INSTRUCTED X
IF HE ADVANCES NORTHWARD IN PRESENT AREA PAREN NEW
HEBRIDES PAREN IT APPEARS IMPROBABLE HE CAN KEEP OUT
OF RANGE OF LONG RANGE SEA PLANES X WHILE ONLY MINOR
THREAT IN THEMSELVES THE KNOWLEDGE OF HALSTEYS POSITION
WOULD REDUCE BUT PERHAPS NOT PREVENT HIS PROSPECTS OF
OBTAINING MARKED SUCCESS IF ENEMY MOVES TO NAURU AND
OCEAN X HALSEY HAS AMPLE LATITUDE X HOWEVER IN VIEW OF CARRIER SITUATION WHICH WILL EXIST UNTIL SARATOGA AND WASP ARE AVAILABLE COMMA POSSIBLE ENEMY STRENGTH UNDER PARA ONE AFIRM AND POSSIBLE THREAT UNDER PARA ONE EASY BELIEVE INSTRUCTIONS YOUR 272058 OF APRIL TO MAINTAIN A FORCE EQUIVALENT TO TASK FORCE SIXTEEN IN SOUTH PACIFIC AREA SHOULD BE REVIEWED SO THAT HE MAY BE RETAINED OR MOVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INFORMATION RECEIVED X

NOW YOU HAVE PART FIVE AND FINAL OF MY 140639 XX PARA EIGHT X YOUR REFERENCE TO CONSERVING CARRIERS IS INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE RISKED AGAINST SUPERIOR FORCES IN DEFENSE OF BASES WHICH CAN DEFEND THEMSELVES X IN THIS I CONCUR X PARA NINE X WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR OPINION AS TO EXTENT WE SHOULD OPPOSE NEXT AND ALMOST CERTAIN ATTACK ON MORESBY X THIS HAS IMPORTANT BEARING UPON EMPLOYMENT HALSEY AND ATTACK WILL INFLUENCE MACARTHUR AND HIS EMPLOYMENT OF PLANES X PARA TEN X IN ADDITION TO MEASURES ALREADY MENTIONED I PLAN X AFIRM X TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS AGAINST EXPECTED SEA-PLANE ATTACK THIS AREA X BAKER X FIRST IF ENEMY DRIVE TO SOUTHEAST IS NOT INDICATED GIVE CONSIDERATION TO MOVING HALSEY TO CENTRAL PACIFIC SECOND MOVE SARATOGA TO THIS AREA AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE X TIME AND DISTANCES INVOLVED REQUIRE A DEFINITE DECISION IN THE NEAR FUTURE X THE END X

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

FOR YOUR ADVANCE INFORMATION RE ARMY TENTATIVE PLANS MY 121950 X ARMY PLANES NOW ENROUTE AUSTRALIA WILL BE DIVERTED REPEAT DIVERTED AS FOLLOWS 8 HEAVY 13 MEDIUM BOMBERS TO SUVA AND LIKE NUMBERS TO CALEDONIA X ONE REGIMENT ANTI AIRCRAFT NOW OAHU WILL BE SENT SUVA AND REPLACED BY REGIMENT FROM WEST COAST WHICH IN TURN WILL BE REPLACED BY REGIMENT FROM EAST COAST X GENERAL EMMONS WILL BE DIRECTED PROVIDE ARMY AIR HEADQUARTERS AND NECESSARY GROUND PERSONNEL FOR ARMY SQUADRONS X AFFORD EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE BY NAVY INCLUDING AID BY GROUND CREWS AND RELIEF PILOTS FROM LEXINGTON AND YORKTOWN AS AVAILABLE X AIM IS TO GET THESE UNITS INTO POSITION BY MAY 25TH OR AS SOON AFTERWARD AS POSSIBLE PARA CONSIDERED IMPERATIVE THAT AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE COMAIRSO PAC ESTABLISH COMMAND ALL SHOREBASED AIR FORCES 30PAC, GET EFATE IN OPERATING CONDITION, AND SET UP ADEQUATE AIR RAID WARNING SYSTEM THROUGHOUT ISLANDS THAT ARE UNDER CONTROL INCORPORATING IN IT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND COAST WATCHING PERSONNEL X OBTAIN DETAILS ARMY PLAN FROM EMMONS X CHIEF OF STAFF USA INFORMED X
THIS IS PART ONE OF TWO PARTS XX IN GENERAL AGREE YOUR
140639 WITH THESE COMMENTS: COM 14 142138 AND INDICATED
DATES DEPARTURE STRONG ENEMY UNITS FROM EMPIRE WATERS
LAST WEEK MAY CREATE THE PRESUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE
STARTING FROM TRUK 15 TO 20 JUNE AND LASTING MORE THAN
ONE MONTH X WITH THIS LENGTH OF TIME AND PROBABLE NAVAL
SUPPORTING FORCE OF 4 BB 5 TO 7 CV 6 CA 4 CL NUMEROUS
DD PLUS STRONG SHORE BASED AIR IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT
NOT ONLY MORESBY BUT ALSO EITHER NORTHEAST AUSTRALIA
OR NEW CALEDONIA AND FIJI MAY BE OBJECTIVES X SINCE MAY
12 THERE IS AN APPARENT SHIFT IN PART OF PLAN WHEREBY
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FOR CAPTURE MIDWAY MAY LEAVE GUAN
SAIPAN ABOUT 24 MAY SUPPORTED BY AT LEAST CARDIV 3 X
THIS MAY BE FOR ELIMINATING MIDWAY AS SUB REFUELING
BASE AND ALSO TO DIVERT OUR FORCES AWAY FROM SOPAC X
ALASKA IS ASSOCIATED BUT NOT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT X
HOWLAND AND BAKER MAY BE OBJECTIVES PRESENT OPERATION
INSTEAD OF NAURU AND OCEAN X WAR DEPT APPROVED NOT
SENDING PURSUIT PLANES TO CANTON ON GENERAL EMMONS
RECOMMENDATION X I AGREE PURSUIT SHOULD BE THERE BUT
THEY MUST COME FROM HAWAII GARRISON PARA TODAY'S REPORTS
FROM SOPAC BASES GIVE MORE FAVORABLE VIEW THAN YOUR
DESPATCH AS TO FEASIBILITY OF SHORE BASED AIR OPERATIONS XX

WHILE NOT FAMILIAR WITH ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING
OPERATIONS LAST WEEK I FEEL I MUST EXPRESS MY FEELING
THAT DESTROYERS MIGHT HAVE BEEN USED IN NIGHT ATTACKS
ON ENEMY ESPECIALLY SINCE JUNCTION OF TASK FORCES 11
AND 17 MADE A LARGE NUMBER OF DESTROYERS AVAILABLE X

YOUR 150825 X TASK FORCE 17 WAS ORGANIZED WITH AN ATTACK
GROUP OF CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING
NIGHT AND DAY ATTACKS ON ENEMY SURFACE CRAFT AND A
SUPPORT GROUP OF CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS TO PROTECT
CARRIERS OR ATTACK SURFACE CRAFT X ON THE MORNING OF 7
MAY THE SUPPORT GROUP 3 CRUISERS AND 3 DESTROYERS WERE
DIRECTED TO DESTROY TRANSPORTS REPORTED MOVING THROUGH
JOMARD PASS TOWARD MORESBY X AFTER THE ATTACK OF SHIPS
OFF HISTIMA ISLAND THE ONLY SURFACE SHIPS KNOWN TO BE IN
RANGE OF A SURFACE FORCE ATTACK WERE THOSE WHICH THE
SUPPORT GROUP HAD BEEN ORDERED TO DESTROY X WHEN TASK
FORCE 17 WAS ATTACKED BY CARRIER PLANES AT SUNSET ON
MAY 7TH IT WAS REALIZED THAT CARRIER GROUPS WERE IN THE
VICINITY BUT THEIR LOCATION WAS INDEFINITE X AT THAT TIME
5 CRUISERS AND 7 DESTROYERS WERE WITH MY CARRIERS AND IT
WAS NOT CONSIDERED THAT THE ATTACK GROUP WAS LARGE ENOUGH
TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL SEARCH AND ATTACK WHEN THE DIRECTION OF ENEMY WAS UNKNOWN X AFTER THE CARRIER AIR ACTION ON MAY 8TH SERIOUS CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO SENDING THE ATTACK GROUP IN FOR SURFACE ATTACK THAT NIGHT BUT THE PLAN WAS REJECTED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS X IT WAS REPORTED THAT ONE OF THE ENEMY CARRIERS WAS UNDAMAGED AND THE LEXINGTON REPORTED THAT RADIO INFORMATION INDICATED THAT A 3RD CARRIER HAD JOINED THE ENEMY X THE ATTACK GROUP WOULD THEREFORE HAVE HAD TO SEARCH FOR AN ENEMY WHOSE LOCATION WAS KNOWN ONLY GENERALLY TO BE 135 MILES TO THE NORTHWARD IN THE AFTERNOON X IF STARTED IMMEDIATELY THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE WOULD BE LOST WHILE APPROACHING IN DAYLIGHT SUBJECT TO ENEMY AIR ATTACK X BOTH OF MY CARRIERS WERE DAMAGED X OPERATING PLANES WERE GREATLY REDUCED IN NUMBERS X AND THE PRESENCE OF THE ATTACK GROUP WAS NEEDED FOR CARRIER DEFENSE X DESTROYERS WERE REDUCED TO ABOUT 50% FUEL PRECLUDING HIGH SPEED OPERATIONS FOR ANY EXTENSIVE TIME X AFTER THE SINKING OF THE LEXINGTON AT NIGHTFALL SURFACE SHIPS WERE CROWDED WITH SURVIVORS UP TO 300% OF COMPLEMENT IN SOME CASES GREATLY REDUCING THEIR MILITARY EFFICIENCY X ACTING ON MY BEST JUDGMENT ON THE SPOT NO OPPORTUNITY COULD BE FOUND TO USE DESTROYERS IN NIGHT ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY EXCEPT THE ATTACK BY THE SUPPORT GROUP WHICH I ORDERED X

16 0307
CINCPAC TO CTF 16 INFO COMINCH ETC
BELIEVE ENEMY ATTACK OCEAN AND NAURU INDEFINITELY POSTPONED X DESIRE YOU PROCEED TO HAWAIIAN AREA X AM ORDERING PLATTE AND CIMMARRON MONAGHAN AND HUGHES DEPART FROM NOUMEA ABOUT 2100 GCT 16TH AND PROCEED TOWARD POINT ACORN UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY YOU X ATLANTA BEING DIRECTED TO SAME POINT TO AWAIT YOUR ORDERS X DESIRE MEREDITH REMAIN WITH TANGIER FOR PRESENT AND THAT SALT LAKE CITY REENFORCE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCE UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS X AM DIVERTING KASKASKIA AND RAINIER TO BLEACHER FOR TIME BEING X TANGIER HAND TO VICE ADM GORMLEY X

17 0537
CINCPAC TO COMSCOWESPACFOR INFO COMINCH TANGIER
FOR SUPREME COMDR X COMINCH HAS DIRECTED THAT ANY FUTURE PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC BE CONCERTED WITH YOURS X PLAN FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE REQUIRES RETURN OF HALSEY TO HAWAIIAN AREA WHERE I EXPECT STRONG ATTACK X HAVE DETACHED FROM HALSEY SALT LAKE CITY AND MEREDITH WHICH WITH TANGIER WILL BE DIRECTED TO REPORT TO LEARY X THESE WITH GARCES SQUADRON ARE STRONGER THAN NAVAL FORCES ENEMY IS APPARENTLY LEAVING IN THE NEW BRITAIN DASH SOLOMON AREA FOR THE PRESENT X ARMY IS PLACING EIGHT HEAVY AND THIRTEEN LIGHT BOMBERS FROM THIS AREA ON EACH POPPY AND FANTAN X I AM SUPPLYING
TORPEDOES AND TORPEDO PERSONNEL TO SAME PLACES PLUS AIR SERVICE DETACHMENT BLEACHER X PREPARATION OF BASES TO RECEIVE TEMPORARY REINFORCEMENTS IS BEING RUSHED X PRIOR TO NEXT EMPLOYMENT CARRIER TASK FORCES IN YOUR AREA WILL SUBMIT GIST OF PLAN FOR YOUR COMMENT AND REQUEST INFORMATION AS TO YOUR PLANS FOR SCWESPAC FORCES X FROM PRESENT KNOWLEDGE BELIEVE FLETCHERS OPERATIONS WERE REMARKABLY WELL TIMED AND EXECUTED AT THE LOCATION WHERE THE ENEMY WAS MOST VULNERABLE AND HE LITTLE SUBJECT TO ATTACK BY ENEMY SHORE BASED AIR X I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE EXCELLENT COOPERATION FURNISHED BY YOUR FORCES TO FLETCHER DURING THOSE ACTIVITIES X THE IMPROVEMENT TO BE SOUGHT WHEN SIZE OF YOUR FORCES PERMITS IS CLOSER AIR COVER BY SHORE BASED AIR PARTICULARLY FIGHTER PROTECTION FOR SURFACE FORCES UNDERTAKING SUCH TASKS AS WERE ASSIGNED TO ADMIRAL GRACE X PARA X PLEASE INFORM ME WHAT AIR REENFORCEMENT COULD IN EMERGENCY BE STAGED FROM AUSTRALIA TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC TO REENFORCE POPPY ROSES FANTAN STRAW BLEACHER OR ANY OF THEM WHICH IF THE ESTIMATE OF COMINCH IS CORRECT MAY BE ATTACKED ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF JUNE X ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW CONCERT CAN BE BEST ATTAINED WOULD BE APPRECIATED X TANGIER DELIVER TO VICE ADMIRAL GORMLEY X

COMSCWESPACFOR TO CINCPAC

FLETCHERS 152126 UNDER OPERATING CONDITIONS CORAL SEA BELIEVE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT FOR COORDINATION SHORE BASED AIRSEARCH WITH ATTACKS BY FORCES AFLOAT THE BEST POSSIBLE X IMPROVEMENT POSSIBLE BY MORE FREQUENT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION REGARDING MOVEMENTS POSITIONS INTENTIONS OF THE TASK FORCE AND SUGGEST INFORMATION BEING DESPATCHED BY PLANE OR DESTROYER TO NEAREST SHORE BASE FOR TRANSMISSION X LIMITED RADIUS AND INSUFFICIENT NUMBERS SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT AND LACK OF ADVANCED AIR BASES AVAILABLE FOR RECONNAISSANCE PRECLUDES CONTINUOUS OBSERVATION OF MOVEMENTS OF OWN TASK FORCES X CLOSEST LIAISON MAINTAINED HERE WITH HEADQUARTERS SHOREBASED AIR BY USING COMMON OPERATION ROOM AND ALL INFORMATION IS RETRANSMITTED TO INTERESTED COMMANDS AT ONCE X
PRESENT INDICATIONS THAT THERE MAY WELL BE THREE SEPARATE AND POSSIBLY SIMULTANEOUS ENEMY OFFENSIVES X ONE INVOLVING CRUISERS AND CARRIERS AGAINST THE ALEUTIANS PROBABLY DUTCH HARBOR X SECOND AGAINST PORT MORESBY INVOLVING PRESENT FORCES THAT AREA PROBABLY REENFORCED X THIRD AGAINST MIDWAY OAHU LINE PROBABLY INVOLVING INITIALLY A MAJOR LANDING ATTACK AGAINST MIDWAY FOR WHICH IT IS BELIEVED THE ENEMY'S MAIN STRIKING FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED X THE TIME THESE OFFENSIVES WILL BE DELIVERED IS NOT CLEAR BUT BELIEVE SIGHTING HALSEY IN SOUTH YESTERDAY CAUSED POSTPONEMENT OCEAN AND NAURU OPERATIONS AND WILL EXPEDITE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL OPERATIONS X MY ORDERS TO HALSEY 160307 BASED ON FACT THIRD OFFENSIVE IS AGAINST THE MOST VITAL AREA AND THE MOBILE FORCES AVAILABLE TO USE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO EFFECTIVELY OPPOSE ALL THREE OFFENSIVES X SHALL ENDEAVOR MOVE OUT BATTLESHIPS AND SARATOGA AS SUPPORT AS SOON AS LIGHT FORCES AND ESCORT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE X THIS ACTION COMINCH FROM CINCPAC X

COMTASKFOR 17 TO CINCPAC

DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE FACT THAT COMSOWESTPACFOR HAS KEPT ME FULLY INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF HIS SHORE BASED AIR SEARCHES, AND ON THE FEW OCCASIONS WHEN RADIO SILENCE HAS PERMITTED A REQUEST FOR SHORE BASED AIR CORP ORATION IT HAS BEEN EXTENDED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND FULLY X HOWEVER UNDER THE PRESENT SETUP DUE TO THE NECESSITY OF RADIO SILENCE IN THE CORAL SEA AREA COMSOWESTPACFOR CANNOT BE KEPT INFORMED OF THE POSITION X FUEL SITUATION X OR INTENTIONS OF THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER X IT SHOULD APPEAR MORE LOGICAL FOR THE OFFICER CONTROLLING SHORE BASED AIR SEARCHES TO ADVISE THE MOVEMENT X FUELING X AND ATTACKS OF FORCES AFLOAT IN THE AREA X FOR THIS PURPOSE IT WOULD APPEAR ADVISABLE TO HAVE AN AIR COMMANDER OF SUITABLE RANK AND HIS STAFF X HE COULD THEN COORDINATE TRACKING AND STRIKING FORCES AND SHORE BASED AIR SUPPORT X THE ATTACKS MADE BY MY TASK FORCE HAVE BEEN BASED UPON RADIO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM LEARY BUT RADIO SILENCE HAS PRECLUDED BY INFORMING IN ADVANCE AND EXCEPT FOR SCHEDULED ATTACKS ON SHORE BASES THERE COULD BE NO close cooperation between shore based air and forces afloat during those attacks X FITCH AND SMITH IN GENERAL CONCUR BUT THIS SUBJECT IS TOO COMPLICATED FOR COMPLETE DISCUSSION IN THE LIMITS OF THIS DISPATCH ORIGINATED BY COMTASFOR 17 ACTION CINCPAC INFORMATION COMTASKFOR 16 COMSOWESTPACFOR X
May 8

Distressing news from the Coral Sea and action thereon by CinCPac is in the Aidac file for today. It also contains the NEW CALEDONIA situation.

The Japs have landed at TUGALI and attacked MAKAMBO and GAVUTU.

There is good indication that the attack on Port Moresby has been postponed and that the direction of the Southwest Pacific offense will shift to eastward. The SHOKAKU seems en-route to TRUK for repairs and thus may soon be a fine target for our submarines.

On the 4th the TAMBOR reconnoitered MAKIN Island. Results negative.

Carrier plane replacements are on their way from East Coast via Alameda.

CinCPac 090543 deals with LONE WOLF movement to NEW ZEALAND.

ComSoWesPac 090555 indicated that shore based planes from AUSTRALIA will be ordered to attack in the CORAL SEA area. They have not accomplished anything except scouting in that area so far.

There is evidence of enemy mining near NEW CALEDONIA.

The STRAW section of the East Coast convoy arrived at STRAWSTACK.

Task Force ONE is now at West Coast base.

The command set up at SAMOA under Major General Price is shown in CinCPac 082105.

The NEOSHO has not yet been found.
May 9.

The Commander-in-Chief discussed fully with members of the Staff as to whether the orders for the YORKTOWN to retire from the area should be in any way modified. If she stayed for at least one operation with Vice Admiral Halsey, she would add one carrier, apparently not badly damaged, and with about two-thirds of a complement of planes. It was decided to adhere to yesterday's decision for the following reasons:

(1) The enemy has postponed the Moresby operation and retired close to his shore based aircraft. He has remaining in the area one regular and one converted CV.

(2) Any carrier which is not 100% effective operates at a grave disadvantage in the duels which usually result when forces containing carriers oppose each other. Inflicting some damage on your opponent is not compensation for being sunk yourself. Besides damage and plane losses, the YORKTOWN has the wear and tear of three months at sea.

(3) The general situation with respect to carriers is such that we must husband our present carrier strength for future operations, some of which must be in areas now completely uncovered.

(4) The probable crowding by the LEXINGTON survivors adds to the decrease in effectiveness.

Present trouble in New Caledonia indicates the immediate necessity for the declaration of martial law. General Patch, there, has been communicating with C.G. Hawaii and the War Department. As the matter has been dumped in the lap of Cincpac, General Patch has been directed to communicate with Cincpac. In a long message from Comdr. Naval Forces, Europe to Cominch (091841, 2 parts) the results of his conference with General deGaulle is set forth in detail. The gist being that General deGaulle approves martial law to cope with immediate military situation but, until he has all the facts from his own people, he will not commit himself to permanent action. General DeGaulle seems to feel that the trouble all started because the Americans refused to support the Free French High Commissioner to New Caledonia. As yet Cincpac has no directive to give Patch.

Mining has commenced at Efate. The unloading of the garrison, which is underway, will take until mid June. The unloading of the Straw garrison, less, Wallis, should be completed about May 12. Vice Admiral Ghormley will probably visit these bases, including Bobcat, by air starting next week. Bleacher garrison is also unloading.
May 9 (Continued)

Opnav says that they cannot now direct transports to Pearl to evacuate citizens.

About May 15th the HAMMONDSPORT should leave Alameda with the following replacement planes: 21 TBF-1; 36 F4F-4; 75 officers; 400 men.

Fletcher, in his (Aidac), tells of his plans to return to Pearl via Bleacher for fuel. The Cinopac has recommended that Rear Admiral Fletcher be promoted to Vice Admiral and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. The WALKE, of his force, has gone to Brisbane for reduction gear repairs. Rear Admiral Crace, R.N., has been directed to report with his force to Task Force 16.

Apparently the Japs have postponed their attack on Moresby but have by no means given it up. They are getting reinforcements and will probably try again when they feel strong enough. In the meantime, they are indicated to try an occupation of Ocean and Nauru Islands. The occupation force will come from Jaluit and the covering force, consisting of a one-carrier task force will operate to the south of these islands. Task Force 16 has been informed of this.

It is indicated that the Japs will try a seaplane bombing raid on Oahu between May 15 and 20. They would possibly refuel their seaplane from a submarine at French Frigate Shoals. Counter measures are underway.

The NEOSHO was still afloat today but has not been sighted yet by the MONOGRAN who was sent to the rescue.

The performance of the Australian land based striking force in the past few days has been very disappointing. They can only report "near misses." They have, however, done good scouting.

We may have lost one VP of the TANGIER group yesterday. The VP reported being attacked by an enemy 4-engine seaplane.

The route home of the damaged Orange carrier is fairly well known. There is a chance for four of our submarines to take a crack at her before she reaches her repair yard.
May 10.

The HENLEY picked up 123 survivors from the NEOSHO and SIMS. Others are believed adrift on a raft in the general vicinity and the search continues.

The CHEVREUIL arrived at AUCKLAND. While all despatches concerning the friction between the U.S. Army and the French, and between the two French factions at New Caledonia must be read to fully understand what happened, the result is shown in Aidac 110055. (Note pink paper is Aidac).

Unloading at Bleacher should be completed the 1st week in June.

CTF-16 sent VMF 212 to POPPY because the landing field at ROSES is now unsatisfactory. That field must be put in satisfactory state as soon as possible because there is already some crowding of facilities at POPPY.

The SAN DIEGO arrives at San Diego May 16 and should be ready for Fleet work by June 1st.

The WASP will be withdrawn from the vicinity of Gibraltar and sent to the Pacific Fleet.

The ATLANTA left to join TF-16.

The NASHVILLE arrives at Pearl tomorrow for repairs. The length of time for these repairs is tentatively 5 days but examination here may indicate a longer period. Thus her operations of Kamchatka cannot begin before the end of the month.

Six S-type submarines will be sent from the Atlantic to operate in Alaska.

The extent of the damage (reported by the YORKTOWN in an Aidac) is not well enough known here to estimate time of repairs. A further report is requested. Apparently Fitch and Sherman were saved.

ComsouwestPac 110305 gives the present disposition of his forces.

The SUMNER 110315 reports progress on survey work.

Cominch (Aidac) feels that destroyers should have been able to get in a night attack in the Coral Sea battle. Fragmentary reports leads one to agree. At any rate, Fletchers promotion and citation recommended by CinC Pac is being held up by Cominch until further details of the duel are known.
May 10 (continued)

A recapulation of present enemy strength in SWPac from ComsowestPac is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>New Britain</th>
<th>New Guinea</th>
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<tr>
<td>VF</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>VB</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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This does not include reinforcements now en route from the Marshalls.

Shore watchers state following enemy losses in the TULAGI area (the price for TULAGI?):

Sunk - 2 CL, 3 DD, 1 AP(20,000-t), 2 AP (8-10,000-t)
Damage - 1 CA

Today Vice Admiral Halsey is fueling in the vicinity of EFATE. Tomorrow he will be joined by the CAs of TF-11 and will then operate to the northward.

The indications continue that TF-16 may have a chance to meet up with an enemy covering force south of Ocean Island.

The ATLANTA left to join TF-16. In the same group with her is the RAINIER who will be a floating ammunition depot in the SOPAC, initially at Bleecher.
May 11.

Cominch 101835 and CinCPac 090543 and 091931 and 120731 give information on transports for the Lone Wolf plan. LONGBOW is the code name for WELLINGTON.

CinCPac 112241 directs that a survey be made to prevent surprise and to minimize effects of gas attacks. We have good indication that the Axis will use gas soon both in Russia and by Jap Navy.

The UPOLU garrison is now established ashore.

Marine personnel for augmenting defenses at MIDWAY will be ready at SAN DIEGO on May 31st.

1 Barrage Balloon Squadron and one defense battalion will leave U.S. in June for defense of AUCKLAND. They will be relieved by the New Zealanders as soon as possible.

The search for the NEOSHO and SIMS survivors will end today.

The search for the NASHVILLE plane, lost last week, has been negative.

The NASHVILLE is in for a new propeller and rudder repairs. The time for these repairs is not yet known, but as soon as ready she will go on her KAMCHATKA operation. A prize crew will be put on board and she will be ordered to take prizes if possible. We could use crab trawlers here to supply outlying bases.

The bombing of MORESBY continues. While the MORESBY campaign is delayed the occupation force is centering at RABAUL. Some of this force plus some from JALUIT may be used to occupy NAURU and OCEAN Islands.

Task Force 16.3 (Rear Admiral Crace) will operate under V.A. Halsey between SYDNEY and PORT MORESBY for the present.

It is indicated that Task Force 16 may operate to the Northeast of the SOLOMONS.
May 12.

Vice Admiral Ghormley and his staff completed their conferences with Cincpac and his staff and will start tomorrow on an air trip to visit SoPac bases. All matters discussed were settled as far as known now. The future will undoubtedly bring forth matters not touched on. When Vice Admiral Ghormley takes over Cincpac will handle all matters pertaining to that area through ComSoPac. The new command will be ready to function after the inspection and the setting up of communications.

Cincpac 120255 to Cominch deals with troops at Fantan.

Cincpac 120731 to Cominch tells of plans for transports now in South Pacific Area.

Task Force 16 proposes to operate to the eastward of Vanikoro Island (S.E. Solomons).

The Army in Rdo Wash 3669 proposes an inspection of Pacific Island bases.

N.A.S. Dutch Harbor 120245 feels that Russian vessels operating out of Vladivostock are deliberately not flying neutral colors at behest of Japs. ComNWSeaFrontier directs that vessels presumed enemy be destroyed by his subs or other forces, and Cominch approves.

Cincpac 121951 gives plans for SARATOGA. This CV is urgently needed now.

Cominch 121245 (Aidac) is a very important proposal for disposition of forces in the Pacific. We certainly have inadequate forces now available. But what we do have seem to be best disposed to accomplish tasks assigned. In general, we must make our Pacific positions dangerous to attack, secure, provide for adequate striking forces, harrass the enemy. All this means more air, surface and subsurface strength than are now available to Cincpac.

Cominch 112150 gives policy on operations crossing boundaries of areas.

The WASP will be assigned to Pacific Fleet in the near future. She is now at Gibraltar.

It will take 20 days to get the airfield at Roses satisfactory for VF. C.G. Roses 12-0900.
Comtaskfor 9 (122358) gives the proposed operations of the force under Rear Admiral Crace, R.N.

Opnav 121329 states fuel plans for Suva.

Cincpac 130305 gives plans for countering an enemy air raid on Oahu scheduled 16-20 May.

It is interesting to note that yesterday not a single DL or DD of the Pacific Fleet was in any port.

Orange plans now seem to be (1) Attack Moresby when reinforced (2) occupy Ocean and Nauru starting May 18 (local) (3) Commence an operation May 21 with a force of about 3 BB, 2-4 CV, and usual light forces. The objective may be Oahu.
May 13.

Cominch shows increasing concern over immediate strengthening South Pacific bases (Aidac). CinCPac recommendations and plans are shown in the answer (Aidac). Evidently Cominch believes the enemy will strike at POPPY and ROSES after May 25th.

Cominch desires a report on past shore based air cooperation in CORAL SEA. This was almost completely lacking during the CV duel.

One AA regiment is being sent from HAWAII to NANDI at once.

VMO-25 goes from SAN DIEGO to SAMOA June 12th.

The Army has directed that complete facilities for 70 planes be provided at FANTAN.

ComSWPac suggests that the TANGIER and planes be moved from NOUMEA to ROSES to give better coverage in the SOLOMONS area.

Cominch repeats Army query 132323 and 132222 about suitability now of airfields and equipment for immediate reinforcements. It may be stated that not even VF8s can now operate at ROSES.

CinCPac 132043. Admiral Fitch and staff proceed directly to West Coast to form Task Force 11 in SARATOGA.

There are no new enemy developments.

May 14.

Admiral Halsey was sighted in a position probably 500 miles Southeast of TULAGI. The shadower who sighted was evidently not driven off at once. This sighting may (1) reduce his chances to surprise the OCEAN and NAURU occupation force and (2) speed up Jap central pacific offensive plans.

It is planned to operate 70 planes at FANTAN. These will be Army.

PALMYRA 141950 gives change in Vice Admiral Ghormley's air base inspection schedule.

ComGenHawDept 141905 gives air reinforcement plans for South Pacific bases.

The SARATOGA will be ready at SAN DIEGO June 5th.
The seaplane bombing of OAHU has evidently been delayed two days.

Opnav 141842 gives shipment for underwater defenses at South Pacific bases.

Cominch 141527 directs 14th Naval District reorganization under "Fleet opposed" unity of command.

Cominch 142100 gives the data on the efforts of shore based Australian air to support recent naval action in the CORAL SEA. Army efforts were of little help beyond scouting. This lack of mutual support is discouraging. Maybe Rear Admiral McCain can help.

There are several significant indications of future enemy action. During this present lull he may be preparing to:

(1) Attack the MIDWAY - OAHU line in force about the first week in June.

(2) At the same time as (1), attack the ALEUTIAN chain and ALASKA.

(3) Occupy NAURU and OCEAN about the 17th of May.

(4) Reinforce his NEW BRITAIN - NEW GUINEA force to strike to the Southeast at any time between May 25th and June 15th.

The NASHVILLE is delayed one day to load 8 - 37mm guns and personnel for MIDWAY.
May 15.

On April 23 we told Cominch we intended to bring to Pearl the 3 APDs assigned to the Pacific. Task Force 3 desires them at San Diego for training and anti-submarine work. Because these vessels can be used offensively by raider forces in the near future it was decided to refuse their use at San Diego and bring them to Pearl.

The courses of action open to Blue and Orange were reviewed by Admiral Nimitz in conference today. Decisions made and the reasons therefor are shown in Cincpac Aidacs 16 0307 and 16 0325.

Cincpac 16 0447 arranges for unity of command at Fiji. This places the New Zealand general in command until our army division arrives there.

The YORKTOWN damage can be repaired at Pearl, but no time estimate is made.

Opnav 141247 has mines available for SoPac defenses.

Cominch 151910 desires to known when Admiral D'Argenlieu will occupy Wallis. The idea is that Free France will occupy the island, then call for U.S. help. We have the troops waiting at Straw. The actions of the French in the South Pacific leave much to be desired.

Our submarine concentration at Truk has been unproductive. The sub at Ocean Island can now move to her assigned task now that the occupation campaign there has been cancelled by the Japs.

In a 2-part Aidac Cominch comments on the line of action Cincpac is now following. The Aidacs must be read for complete understanding and are attached.

Comtaskfor 17 did not make a night torpedo attack in his recent Coral Sea battle because (a) need of DDs to screen carriers (b) uncertainty of enemy position (c) fuel restrictions.

May 16.

Unless the enemy is using radio deception on a grand scale, we have a fairly good idea of his intentions. Of most interest is his preparation for an offensive in the Central or North Pacific. It seems quite possible that Orange will attack Midway and raid Oahu the first part of June. Present air weakness in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier makes it mandatory to employ a strong striking force in the area. The striking force can be assisted by a BB covering force. BBs will be moved out from the coast if the problem of protecting light forces can be solved. The views of Cominch and Cincpac are shown in the Aidacs attached.
May 16 (Cont'd)

A draft of Hawaiian Defense Plan No. 2-42 was made up and circulated among the staff. This is designed to make the proper set-up for "Fleet opposed invasion."

The positions of our submarines in the Central Pacific was discussed and it was decided to leave the concentration at Truk as it is for several more days.

Admiral Halsey's immediate intentions are not known but it is expected that he will try to get back to Pearl without being seen again. He should arrive at Pearl about the 27th.

The seaplane bombing raid on Oahu will probably not occur in the next few days, and might be delayed until the full moon at the end of the month.

May 17.

In the attached Aidac, Comin ch substantially agrees with the estimate of CinCPac of present enemy intention. He does not indicate a desire to bring out BBs from the Coast but desires available forces employed in attrition attacks. Steps were taken to organize a force for the defense of ALASKA and to expedite the return of Task Forces 16 and 17.

Marine reinforcements are being sent to MIDWAY via the KITTYHAWK.

Admiral Ghormley will arrive in AUCKLAND May 20th. He has been delayed in SUVA talking D'Argenlieu into the idea of taking WALLIS. Patch's 130617 gives D'Argenlieu's ideas on this.

The HELM picked up four survivors from the NEOSHO. The great that had abandoned ship died of thirst. It will be interesting and useful to determine (1) why men left the ship prematurely (2) why the search was so ineffective.

The Subs at TRUK have not produced results yet. That concentration should have been able to do more.

Comin ch wants the movement of 6 S-boats to ALASKA from the Atlantic expedited.

The Commanding General, Marines, HAWAII, will inspect MIDWAY, JOHNSTON, and PALMYRA next week.

KODIAK will receive mines sometime in July.

Indications of Jap bombing in the GILBERTs were received otherwise there was no change in the picture not referred to above.
PATCH TO CINCPAC FURTHER REFERENCE YOUR RADIO COMINCH 151910 ADMIRAL D'ARGENLIEUS REPLY RECEIVED X HIS LETTER STATES CHEVREUIL CANNOT CARRY MORE THAN 10 PERSONS PLUS A CREW OF 70 HENCE CANNOT CARRY AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FOR FREE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF WALLIS X HIS LETTER STATES BRITISH AUTHORITIES SUVA HAD CHOSEN A SOLUTION OF LIMITING ACTION TO DESTRUCTION OF RADIO STATION THERE X LETTER FURTHER STATES THAT CHEVREUIL COULD SAIL FROM NOUMEA BY THE END OF THIS WEEK TO EXECUTE THIS MISSION X WE HAVE EVIDENCE CHEVREUIL COULD CARRY FORCE OF 50 MEN PLUS CREW
CINCPAC TO COMINCH INFOR COMSOPAC

Pending investigation and study potentialities Auckland and Island Bases South Pacific Area desire hold abeyance specific assignment Lion and Cub bases. Your 162250. Probable specific units less than full base may be needed augment facilities now in or being established in area. Information on requirements will be forwarded as determined.

CINCPAC TO COMSWPACFOR, CO BLEACHER GOC FIJI CO BOBCAT CO ROSES CG DEF FORCES SAMOAN GR CO POPPY.

Rear Admiral J. S. MCCAin USN will under direction of Cincpac assume command of aircraft of the South Pacific area at 0700 GCT May 20. Command entails operational control including training and indoctrination. Abbreviated title ComAirSouPac. Initially will be embarked in USS TANGIER at Noumea. Base commanders addressed please acknowledge for their air units to CincPac who will pass to ComAirSouPac. ComSouWestPacFor is requested to place Tangier the Aircraft she is tending and Meredith under command ComAirSouPac. Alusna Wellington inform New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and Vice Admiral Ghormley.

COMAIRSOPAC TO CINCPAC

In connection indoctination crews Army planes being diverted to POPPY and FANTAN your 140647 utilization as many LEXINGTON Torpron pilots in addition personnel indicated your 172045 considered of utmost value in effective early readiness. Army VB units involved. Urge assignment as many as practicable.

COMGEN ROSES TO ---- INFO COMSOWESPACFOR, CINCPAC

Recommend occupation ESPIRITU SANTO NH which possesses excellent harbor, seaplane base, and airfield sites in 2nd channel areas. If authorized shall send small force including reconnaissance detachments, infantry, engineers, to initiate work on airfields with native labor such move also will require authority to divert PAUL JONES 3 days with destroyer escort both available VILA. Believe separate Task Force for permanent occupation should be sent promptly, with air components to follow as soon as base is ready. To insure retention of ROSES, further recommend immediate reinforcement by two additional regiments infantry and two batteries 155mm guns. Enemy reconnaissance recently observed over ESPIRITU SANTO and MALEKULA.
COMINCH TO COMNAVUNIT ROSES INFO CINCPAC, ETC.

Your 162036. 6 inch guns furnished in order to provide medium fixed defenses after Marine Defense Battalion including harbor defenses battery of 5 inch guns has been relieved by Army. Present concept is that either the 6 inch battery or 5 inch battery would be manned by Marine Defense Battalion but if ComGen ROSES requires that both batteries be manned then this should be done by personnel now available ROSES. The manning of fixed defenses in any of the island positions is not an assigned task of Navy Bluejacket personnel and it is not desired to change this policy. Army will provide additional personnel to man 6 inch guns but no definite date can be stated at this time.

CINCPAC TO COMINCH INFO CG DEFFORCES SAMOAN GROUP

Patch's reports in his 180617 and in ComGenHawDept 180700 show STRAWBOARD situation still most unsatisfactory and apparently efforts of Ghormley did not avail. Five ships now waiting STRAW. One since 28 April. Recommend our action not be further delayed.

CINCPAC TO COMINCH

In preparing this reply to query of combined Chiefs of Staff in your 131412 MacArthur's reply in your 142100 has been noted. Comtaskfor seventeen's 152126 and ComSouWesPacFor's 170508 and 190345 which are being passed to you for information have also been considered.

CinCPac's coordinating action prior to CORAL SEA battle comprised (a) assignment to Comtaskfor 17 task "Assist in checking further advance by enemy in NEW GUINEA - SOLOMON area by seizing favorable opportunities to destroy ships, shipping and aircraft". (b) Request to ComSouWesPacFor to continue dissemination of information and to inform of the operations of his forces which would support Fleet task forces. (c) Order to Fletcher to inform Leary when and where surface forces placed under his command should report and also his desires as to air cooperation.

As a result of information furnished Fletcher was able to deliver his highly successful attack against ships at TULAGI and to later time the battle with enemy carriers which turned back the MORESBY occupation force.

(continued on next page)
CINCPAC TO COMINCH (Continued)

Just how much the action of shore based striking groups against ships and bases assisted Fletcher is indeterminate but it and the previous sustained effort undoubtedly accumulated considerable effect. However the General ineffectiveness of high altitude bombing against mobile targets and the doubtful results from light bombing of shore establishments are evident and I concur in the recommendations of MacArthur concerning dive bombers and torpedo planes. I urge most strongly the addition of fighters which can furnish cover to surface forces at considerable distances at sea. The enemy has a most decided advantage over us in the possession of these types and in having them operated by the Navy so that best coordination with the surface Navy results.

From the reports previously mentioned it will be seen that remarkably good results obtained but improvement should be sought by the Fleet Task Force Commander furnishing the Commander of the land based air all possible preliminary information as to his intentions communication plan, etc., and later during radio silence sending if practicable further information by aircraft or destroyer as to his probable movements fuel situation and needs for air cover. Ships and aircraft of Pacific Fleet will be issued Asiatic Waters Air Code and contact pad to provide a common method of communication so that contact and other information reports can be exchanged immediately without necessity plain language. The shore commander should assign attack missions designed to render the greatest possible assistance to the Fleet Task Force when it is engaged and particularly should be ready to supply fighter protection when it is practicable. The last measure is one that both the Japs and the Germans make effective but which Allied surface forces are reported never to have received in the ABDA area. Much must be done to bring about coordination in this respect.
In event collapse STRAWBOARD negotiations recommend employment STRAWBOARD force to strengthen HAT and MAN and engineers to speed up air base on HAT.

Necessary bring YORKTOWN Pearl for fuel. Your 182030. If operations feasible contemplate using YORKTOWN as support for Halsey. If not feasible contemplate sending to Puget.

Have directed Commanding General Hawaiian Department to defer further transfer of planes to the South. Your 192340. Commanding General states he has received no instructions from War Department. Request you have War Department confirm.
17 2101 CINCPAC TO CG SAMOAN DEFFORCE

Action ComGen SAMOAN DefForce x info Cominich from CinCPac x Desire your opinion on readiness First Raider Battalion for operations against advanced and semi-isolated enemy bases x Immediate purpose of attack for time being would be destruction of shore facilities rather than permanent occupation x Desire recommendations and what you require for specific operations you may have considered in your estimate of current situation x TANGIER pass to Vice Admiral Ghormley for info.

17 2221 COMINCH TO COMWESSEAFRONT, COMNORWESSEAFRONT

There are strong indications that between about 30 May and 10 June enemy will attack MIDWAY - HAWAII line and will raid or even attempt to capture UNALASKA x CinCPac has been directed to create north Pacific Force xx Para 2 x Commander Northwest Sea Frontier place himself and all his Sea Frontier forces at disposal of CinCPac xx para x Commander Western Sea Frontier place all his sea frontier forces at disposal of CinCPac including sound school destroyers and submarines x CinCPac may be expected to order concentration of North Pacific Force initially at KODIAK and/or GOLD BAY in which direction you should move your surface forces as soon as they can be made ready while air forces proceed to ALEUTIAN area xx Para 3 x Move shipping out of ALEUTIAN area before May 30th x Observe utmost secrecy and enforce rigorous radio discipline x Greenslade pass to Dewitt x Parker x pass to Buckner x Arrange full coordination Army in ALASKA War Department concurs.

18 0635 CINCPAC TO COMWESSEAFRONT, COMNORWESSEAFRONT

What forces to reach ALASKAN area by thirty May can you provide in compliance with Cominich 172221 x What additional forces by ten June.

17 2220 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Differences in estimate due to earlier receipt by you of DI x Your 170407 Para ONE I have somewhat revised my estimate and now generally agree with you except I believe nemy attempt to capture MIDWAY and UNALASKA will occur about May 30th (note the double holiday) or shortly thereafter while enemy South Pacific campaign will be started middle or latter part of June and will be strong attempt to capture MORESBY plus Northeast AUSTRALIA or NEW CALEDONIA and FIJIS x

(continued on next page)
COMINCH TO CINCPAC (Continued)

Para TWO Estimate that MIDWAY attack may possibly be preceded by shipborne air raid on OAHU and that enemy intention includes effort to trap and destroy a substantial portion of the Pacific Fleet. Para 3 My estimate of enemy strength will be: MIDWAY attack force 4 fast BBs in Batdiv 3, Crudivs 4 and 8, Cardivs 1 and 2 possibly plus ZUIKAKU at least two desrons and a Landing Force x UNALASKA attack force Crudiv 7, Cardiv 3 (RYUOJO and HOSHO), at least 2 desdivs plus troops. Consider it possible that "AOE" is BEAVER INLET and that landing is planned there. Para Some indications that remainder first fleet may take up a supporting position to westward of MIDWAY. Para four I consider that our appropriate strategy is to make strong concentration HAWAIIAN Area and in view of last clause of para two chiefly to employ strong attrition tactics and not repeat not allow our forces to accept such decisive action as would be likely to incur heavy losses in our carriers and Cruisers. Para five Create for the defense of ALASKA the North Pacific Force comprising Northwest Sea Frontier forces and commands plus such Western Sea Frontier forces as you elect to include sound school destroyers and submarines plus such fleet units as you can make available all preferably to be concentrated initially at KODIAK and/or COLD BAY.

CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Your 152130 and 152136 crossed my 160307. Considerable difference in estimates based probably on the same data is noted. Latest information here does not confirm future enemy concentration at TRUK. Believe he may well try to capture vital HAWAIIAN Area at this time before reinforcements afforded by our war production can be received. Will watch situation closely and return Halsey to Southwest if imminent concentration that direction is indicated. Further details indicate YORKTOWN damage within capacity PEARL to repair in reasonably short time. Therefore have retained YORKTOWN air personnel and planes in YORKTOWN for readiness active carrier operations when ship repairs are completed. With respect to torpedo personnel and torpedoes for PANTAN and POPPY see my 160905. Army medium bombers are built to carry torpedoes. Will take appropriate action as soon as situation clarifies with respect to number of torpedoes and their status as regards strengthening for high speed drops. Will push readiness of bases and endeavor exploit all means of their mutual reinforcement. Must reiterate however that we should not count on such reinforcement arriving in time. Action for concert with SouWestPac under study and made subject of communication with MacArthur today. TANGIER deliver to VAd Ghormley.
17 1927  CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 16

It is not intended that you shall attack enemy island bases while returning this area. Consider it important that you not be sighted by the enemy.

18 2154  CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Situation your 172220 x Island reinforcements your 132140 x Request schedule of arrival all Army aircraft expected to arrive OAHU during remainder of May and June.
MAY

17 0555 COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC

From Ghormley x Your 140647 request information numbers location and ratings Lexington and Yorktown personnel and transportation contemplated x McCain will be ready assume command Air South Pacific 0700 GCT 20 May temporarily based on TANGIER at WHITE POPPY if available. As I will not have assumed command request you inform forces South Pacific area.

18 1135 SAMOA TO MARCORPS INFO CINCPAC

Early employment 1st Raider Bn demands men to bring organization to strength be sent this area first opportunity x Either Rear Echelon at Quantico or equal number selected volunteers with basic special raider training 31 mm mortar personnel not essential x Assumed plan for automatic training and forwarding future replacement now in operation.

18 1145 COMGEN SAMOAN AREA TO CINCPAC INFO TANGIER

Comgen Samoan Area fires that at CinCPac x Raider Bn ready for any operation desired x Your 172101 x If special type ships employed some special training preparation desireable x TANGIER give to Adm Ghormley.

18 1255 COMINCH TO SPENAVO LONDON INFO COMSOWESPACFOR CINCPAC

Refer to this as Cominch 181255 action Spenavo London info Comsowespacfor CinCPac xx Request you say to first Sea Lord in person that indicated imminence of enemy attacks on Midway and Alaska perhaps Hawaii has required withdrawal of carrier-cruiser groups from South Pacific para Comsowespacfor has cruisers and destroyers but no carrier wherewith to work against enemy activities in Coral Sea para will Admiralty entertain request for carrier from Eastern Fleet to join up with Leary temporarily, if so move had best be made at once para as alternative suggest consideration of coordinated eastern fleet and British shore based air raids on Rangoon or Andaman Islands and line of communication between Rangoon and Singapore.

18 2030 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Give consideration repair Yorktown at Puget in order to avoid exposure to attack to save shipment of material to Pearl to refresh personnel and possibly saving in overall time to prepare for service.
MAY
18 2012

COMWESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH COMNORWESSEAFRON

Aidac 30 May your 180635 surface Desdiv 23 less
LAWRENCE 4 DD Desdiv 70 less KILTY 3 DD RATHBURNEx
At SanFran 19 May ready x 4 Sail depart SanDiego
20 May x KILTY depart SanFran 23 May aircraft my
190742 LAWRENCE at NYMI available about 6 June x
Suggest 3 DD including KILTY LAWRENCE remain Westsea-
front anti submarine duty x Consider inadvisable strip
Frontier all aircraft.

18 2235

COMNORWESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC INFO COMWESSEAFRON

All my sea frontier forces herewith at your disposal
Cominch 172221 4 destroyers now in Alaskan waters plus
2 submarines CHARLESTON WILLIAMSON CASCO ORIOLE 14 YPS
15 Coast Guard vessels x Will augment these by 4 YP
and 4 AMCS by 30 May x Will also send 3 additional
destroyers if info addressee can take over coastal
escort duty x Also ONONDAGA x SPICA VEGA BRAZOS are
plying between Alaska and Seattle together with U S
GRANT and ST MIHIEL which operate for Army x Air forces
already reported x Look for 2 additional submarines
from SanDiego by 10 June.

19 0345

COMSOWEPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

Appreciate your assigning additional ships to this
area replying your 170537 x I have recommended that
the forces of the Eastern Fleet be brought to bear
upon the situation either operating from this area
as a base or by creating diversion in Eastern Indian
Ocean x In any event I will assist your action to
extent possible by direct support or through diversion x
Number planes here inadequate for direct reinforcement
of Soupac Area x Consider your forces in recent action
were handled with marked skill and fought with admirable
courage and tenacity x Am most anxious to perfect air-
naval cooperation x Suggest detail liaison officer from
here aboard flagship task force when operating this
area x A preknowledge of movements and communications
plan is also necessary to enable us monitor frequencies
used your scout planes x Call upon me freely x You can
count upon my most complete and active cooperation.
Signed MacArthur.
From LtGen Dewitt Comdg WDS and Fourth Army x Present strength and location combat airplanes in Alaska as follows: P-36 Elmendorf 4, Kodiak 3 and Ladd 6; P-40 Elmendorf 23 and Kodiak 20; B-18 Elmendorf 4, Juneau one and Kodiak quartet; B-26 anchorage 12; LB-30 Kodiak duet and anchorage unit; B-17 Kodiak single. Additional airplanes for Alaska: P-40 enroute 6 and 3 by June first, B-26 enroute 4 and 11 by June first. 14 RCAF pursuit airplanes Annette Island. Request being made for added pursuit squadron Umnak will advise you when further informed.

TANGIER TO CINCPAC

Make my 196000 read as follows x Your Government both with regard to rallying the Wallis Islands to Free France and with regard to their protection by American forces comma x from there on no change x

SOMSOUPAC(GHORMLEY) TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

Conferred Dargenlieu today x your 172051 x Results satisfactory x Following in two parts is translation Dargenlieu letter confirmation to me and my reply x Following our conversation this morning in the course of which I received some very interesting information on the political and military views of your government both with regard to rallying the Wallis Islands to Free France and with regard to their protection by American forces, I have studied the question with the greatest care. I have the honor to inform you that I intend to send the French sloop CHEVREUIL with an occupying force Saturday, May 23, at dawn. Its arrival is expected on Thursday, the 28th, towards noon. As soon as the rallying of Wallis Islands to Free France will be accomplished, the American authorities at Samoa and you, yourself, will be informed to that effect. It is understood that, without any delay, the American forces will disembark and will assure the defense of the Wallis Islands against a possible enemy attack. The civil administration will be carried out by a resident designated by me. Moreover, I am counting on the fact that at the moment when the CHEVREUIL arrives in the vicinity of the Wallis Islands, aerial patrols will keep guard over the islands in order to prevent any possible surprise by the enemy. These arrangements have been made in the shortest possible delay, a fact which I am sure you will appreciate in order to meet the desire of your government, which is in full accord with the
19 1600

(Continued)

directives of the French National committee. I would appreciate your being so good as to confirm the fact that you are in accord and beg you to accept, Admiral, the assurances of my highest consideration signed Dargenlieu. Part two follows.

19 1630

TANGIER (GHORMELY) TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

Second part x My reply "I hereby acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 May 1942, in which you confirm our conversation relative to the occupation and defense of Wallis Islands. I note that you will send the French sloop CHEVREUIL with an occupying force which will depart from Noumea at dawn Saturday May 23rd 1942, and that this force will arrive and occupy Wallis Island about noon on Thursday May 28, 1942. Such military measures by air or otherwise as may be expedient at the time will be taken to guard against possible surprise attack by the enemy during occupation by your forces. I understand that the American authorities at Samoa and myself will be informed promptly when the Wallis Islands have rallied to Free France in order that the American forces will without delay debark and assure the defense of Wallis Islands against possible enemy attack. I further confirm that the civil administration will be carried out by resident designated by the high commissioner for France in the Pacific. Allow me to express my appreciation of your very prompt and energetic action in this matter." From Ghormley xx In view of the fact I have not taken command request you inform Price and issue directive to him xx Force sent to Wallis must be prepared to assist in feeding the Population of approximately 5000 as food is believed to be very scarce.

20 0143

CINCPAC TO COMINCH INFO COMNORWESTAFRON COMALASEC

Composition North Pacific Force now planned with approximate dates arrival Alaskan waters ST LOUIS NASHVILLE CASE REID 30th LOUISVILLE HONOLULU 3rd INDIANAPOLIS GRIDLEY MC CALL FIFTH X EIGHT old DD six SS CHARLESTON and patrol craft from sea frontier forces about 30th x Think advisable leave 24 PBY as minimum for whole West Coast therefore only 11 available Alaska. De Witt reports total 105 Army aircraft but none at Cold Bay or Unmak x Comalasec informs these two army fields ready x Majority of army air must be based there in order to take part in defense of probable enemy objective and assist surface force x Please take steps to
20 0143

(Continued)

accomplish this and army air reinforcements if practicable x Inform Army that surface force will be almost completely dependent on them for air cover and that if enemy is in estimated strength our surface force is strong enough only to seize opportunities made possible by air action or as may be fortuitously presented x Under my strategic command Theobald in ST LOUIS will command surface force. With what Army commander will he deal and what will be the command relationship x

18 2145

CINCPAC TO MIDWAY

For CACHALOT your previous orders cancelled x Believe enemy will attack Midway using planes launched from a position fifty miles northwest of Midway. Patrol that area until further orders. Avoid detection. Midway acknowledge delivery.

18 2141

CINC to COMINCH INFO COMNORTHWESTAFRON

Please obtain for me information numbers types location Army aircraft expected to be in Alaska Aleutian Area remainder of May and in June x Your 172220 x

19 2330

COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC

Price informed Peck 4 days required for loading transports at Straw x I estimate 1 day required for transit strawstack to Strawboard x My 191600 x

19 2340

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Part 1 of Cominch 192340 x 3 parts x Your 182154 and 182141 para 1 War Department has been requested to improve existing defenses Hawaii as rapidly as possible including retention Hawaiian area for time being of forces destined for other areas also to issue appropriate instructions for deployment army forces Alaskan area to meet prospective situation para 2 present schedule arrivals aircraft Hawaii week beginning 19 May 23 B-17-E's of which 11 are part of group originally set up for south pacific by 25 May 26 B-26's these latter will require about 1 day after arrival to replace ordnance and other material removed during ferry flight and shipped out by other air transportation x
From COMINCH TO CINCPAC

PART 3 OF COMINCH 192340 XX DISPOSITIONS AS FOLLOWS
HEAVY BOMB AND 1 PURSUIT SQUADRON KODIAK, MEDIUM BOMB
AND REMAINING PURSUIT ANCHORAGE PARA 4 FIELD AT UMNAK
HAS AT LEAST ONE METALLIC 6500 FOOT RUNWAY, 29000 GALLONS
GASOLINE NOW WITH MORE ENROUTE X STATUS OF BOMBS EN
ROUTE DUE ARRIVE MAY 1000 LB 441, 500 LB 1500, 300 LB
2000, 100 LB 2500, 20,000 ROUNDS CAL 50 X FIELD AT
COLD BAY IS USABLE AND REPORTED TO HAVE LARGE AMOUNT
OF GASOLINE AND HAS BOMBS 1000 LB 340, 500 LB 1080,
300 LB 1200, 100 LB 1500
COMINCH TO CINCPAC

19 2235

Part two Cominch 192340 x They have torpedo racks but pilots require torpedo training para 3 Alaska now has 1 B-19-E, 3 LB-30's with ASV, 15 B-26s, 9 B-18, 47 P-40s, 11 P-36s. Arriving about 21 May 4 B-26s and 6 P-40s. Subsequently a schedule of replacement of B-26s may result in temporary absence from ALASKA of 4 planes at any one time between now and 30 July.

COMNAVEU TO COMINCH

19 2245

Part 1 of 2 partsxx Following is Admiralty’s reply to your 181255 "(A) We have seen enough of Japanese tactics to realise that it is their policy to operate several carriers in company, and hence to send one of the 3 carriers of the Eastern Fleet to the Southwest Pacific Area would only result in our forces being weak both in the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific Areas. We do not, therefore, consider that it would be justifiable to make such a detachment (B) We realize the necessity for the movements of the British Forces in the Indian Ocean and the US Forces in the Pacific being coordinated, and we appreciate the action taken by the US Fleet in April in an endeavor to relieve the Japanese pressure on the Indian Ocean x (C) Whilst there is doubt that the Japanese would welcome an attempt by our surface forces to break through the MALAYA DARWIN line so as to bring our forces within reach of their shore based air forces, we cannot believe that they would credit us with being so foolish as to do so (D) Hence, we do not consider that the knowledge that our surface forces were approaching the MALAYA DARWIN line would have any effect on the movements of Japanese naval forces x Neither would an air attack on the ANDAMANS or ports in JAVA or SUMATRA xx Part 2 follows with para (E).

COMNAVEU TO COMINCH

19 2246

Part 2 of 192246 x (E) Interference with the SINGAPORE-RANGOON line of communications is not considered practical at the present stage as to be effective it would necessitate our surface forces being maintained within striking distance of Japanese shore based aircraft for a considerable time. x At the moment the Eastern Fleet is at KILINKINI with 2 of the carriers making good defects after the MADAGASCAR operations, and in a few days we are being forced to practically demobilise the Eastern Fleet by sending two thirds of its destroyers to the MEDITERRANEAN to assist in getting a convoy on which the security of MALTA depends through to that place x

(continued on next page)
COMNAVEU TO COMINCH (Continued)

(G) CinC East Fleet is being asked whether he will have sufficient screening destroyers to proceed with part of his fleet to COLOMBO where its arrival might become known to the Japanese. If you consider such a movement would serve any useful purpose it will, if practicable, be made at the earliest possible moment. (H) Our intelligence points to a concentration of the Japanese fleet in the TRUK area in the latter part of June, but gives no indication of an attack on either ALASKA, MIDWAY or HAWAII. Obviously however you would not have redispersed your forces without good reason, and it would be helpful if we could know on what you base your appreciation.

CINCPAC TO COMNORWESSEAFRONT

Present plan to utilize only your forces now in ALASKAN waters and total of eleven VFB. Request names DDs.

COMNORWESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC

Your 200151 DDs Comdesdiv in GILMER, DENT, BROOKS, KANE

COMSWESPACFOR TO COMTASKGROUP 16.9

Suggest for your early consideration night raid on TULAGI by planes based ROSES. Targets indicated ComSoWesPac daily intelligence reports held by TANGIER. Similar operations for about 28 May now being planned here by RAAF planes to be temporarily based ROSES. Night attacks by submarines also being planned. I will keep you fully informed and request you reciprocate.

COM-14 TO NAS MIDWAY

Japan's Navy Day will be 27 May. 26 May our time. It is expected that MIDWAY will be attacked sometime after 25 May, possibly around 30 May when the moon is full. Attacks may be expected by planes from as many as four carriers supported by cruisers, destroyers, and possibly battleships. More information will follow. Your force being reinforced by CinCPac and by squadron of PT boats from here. PT boats should arrive early morning 25 May. 4 YPs should arrive early morning 26 May. 1 FY, a patrol yacht, should arrive about 26 May. Utilize the PT boats as striking force at discretion and FY plus YPs for patrol duty as desired. Disperse foodstuff, particularly cases, widely in areas where material can be covered with sand. Store water in containers and disperse.

(continued on next page)
20 0650 COM-14 TO NAS MIDWAY (Continued)

as much as possible x Ammunition should be dispersed as much as possible, keeping accessible x The Commander-in-Chief on his recent visit to MIDWAY was very much impressed with the fine spirit of the personnel and has extreme confidence in their ability to hold the Island x Both he and I charge you to give them hell.

20 1315 COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Arrange CHEVREUIL destroy Radio WALLIS as suggested your 190121 x You will consider this an occupation by Free French and land United States troops immediately thereafter x TANGIER pass to VAdm Ghormley x Acknowledge.

20 0943 GHORMLEY TO CINCPAC

ComGen ROSES 191759 ComGen POPPY G-45 xx In my opinion relatively small force can deny ESPRITU SANTO ISLAND to Japs advance if not in force x Opinion based on reported Jap methods in occupation TULAGI x Importance of ESPRITU SANTO to US cannot be over accentuated x As soon as practicable this position should be reenforced preparatory to our entering the second phase x If Japs occupy this island defense of lines of communications and positions ROSES and POPPY made most difficult x Recommend approval Patch plan detailed arrangements to be perfected by Patch and Chamberlain.

20 2045 CINCPAC TO COMGEN DEFFOR, SAMOAN GROUP

Vice Admiral Ghormley's 191600 191630 and 191605 and COMINCH 201315 being passed to you x Perfect and carry out plans for the occupation of STRAWBOARD observing meticulously the procedure agreed to by Ghormley and D'Argenlieu x RIGEL pass to Ghormley.
181701

I have total of 23 patrol amphibians in Alaska by 30 May provided
RON 43 from Western Sea Frontier takes over patrol of Northwestern
sector X also 9 VSO's X Surface Forces later dispatch.

COMNW SEA FRON CINC PAC

COMINCH

COMWESSEXAFRON

501
May 18.

A conference was held by the Admiral to discuss the measures to be taken to counter the expected Jap offensive in the Hawaiian Area and in Alaska. It is generally believed that a serious attempt will be made to capture Midway and raid Oahu. The date for this is indefinite but the Admiral wants everything possible done by the 25th of May. This might be about a week early. In general it was tentatively decided to - (1) reinforce Midway with part of a raider battalion, above reinforcements of marines already underway; (2) station about 4 subs off Midway; (3) use Midway to stage army VB to within reach of enemy CV; (4) search with about 12 PBY; (5) employ task force 16 plus the Yorktown group if ready in the critical area; (6) move out BBs with the Saratoga; (7) form a North Pacific Force and send it to Alaskan waters; (8) expedite navy yard repairs.

Doubtful submarine contacts continue in the Central Pacific Area. Today a small seaplane was sighted which could have come from an enemy submarine.

Conditions are not yet settled at Efate. The landing field is not ready for VF's and men are required to man six 6" guns and some short range weapons.

The Hawaiian Islands were placed on a special alert because of the possibility of a seaplane bombing attack.

The NEVADA will be repaired about October 1.

CinCPac 190117 suggests that Lion and Cub units now about ready will/be assigned definite destination until further study in Southern Pacific is completed.

CinCPac 190839 Rear Admiral McCain becomes Comairsopac.

Fletcher will arrive Pearl about May 28th.

Colonel Clements USMC, who got out of Corregedor April 10th gave a gloomy talk on how we lost the Philippines.

Aside from small scale air activity the Southwest Pacific seems quiet.
May 19.

Cominch 192200 deals with the manning of 6" guns at Efate.

CinCPac 200359 suggests necessity for and means to obtain coordination between ships and shore based air.

Com.Gen. ROSES 191759 recommends occupation of ESPIRITU SANTO. This is concurred in by prospective ComSoUPac. The C.G. also desires at least two more infantry regiments. The desire for more troops seems general as C.G. STRAW also wants more. The logistic item must be considered before all men requested are sent. Comairsopac (191120) wants more civilian personnel.

CinCPac 200113 urges Cominch action at STRAWBOARD. See aidac in this connection which directs action to be taken.

There is malaria at ROSES. Also at that place the field for VF will be ready June 20, while use of VBs is indefinite.

An estimate of the present situation is being prepared. CinCPac is busy today taking counter measures to oppose the Japanese American campaign. Specific developments are shown in the aidacs for the day.
The formation and despatch of the North Pacific Force (Task Force EIGHT) under Rear Admiral Theobald got underway. The vessels of the force present will depart Pearl May 23rd, and proceed to an Alaskan rendezvous via MIDWAY. The main reinforcement of MIDWAY, consisting of AA batteries, and ground personnel, and two companies of a Raider Battalion go to MIDWAY with Admiral Theobald.

Admiral Ghormley arrived in AUCKLAND.

CinCPac 210531 requests that the Army direct that no more planes be flown from here to AUSTRALIA for the present. Technically, he does not control these planes.

CinCPac 210137 gives plans for the YORKTOWN.

Rear Admiral Byrd and party leave here soon on the MACKINAC to inspect South Pacific bases.

Commanding General, SAMOA 202122 must feel that the French won't let us have WALLIS ISLAND and suggests a diversion for troops earmarked for that place.
May 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander-in-Chief.

Following is the latest status of Army and Navy aircraft based on Oahu:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Heavy bombers (B-17)</td>
<td>30 of these are already here. The remaining 20 are due within the next few days, to stay here until further orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Medium bombers (B-26)</td>
<td>Due within next few days, to remain here until further orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Medium bombers (B-18)</td>
<td>These are obsolescent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>Pursuit (P-39, P-40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Attack (A-20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>Does not include 18 planes at Noumea. Does include 16 at or enroute Midway. Total actually based Oahu and Kauai: 80. 11 more due within a few weeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>SARATOGA Squadron (22) and Marines (21). 27 more in reserve as CV replacements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Scout Bombers</td>
<td>SARATOGA Squadron (18) and Marines (11). 16 more in reserve as CV replacements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Torpedo planes</td>
<td>SARATOGA Squadron. 3 more in reserve as CV replacements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>VO/V3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>VF (large)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>VF (small)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Copy to:
Chief of Staff; Operations;
War Plans; Capt. McCormick.

A. C. DAVIS
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
ATTACK ON HAWAIIAN AND ALASKAN BASES

PART I - MISSION

The Problem

1. There are indications that the enemy will make a strong simultaneous effort, commencing after May 26, 1942, to -
   (a) Capture MIDWAY for possible subsequent operations against OAHU, and
   (b) Capture an advanced position in the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS.

   The problem here considered is how to deal with that enemy effort, while continuing to carry out tasks assigned but not directly related to this problem.

The Situation

2. The basic task of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, which applies is:

   "covering and holding the line HAWAII-MIDWAY and maintaining its communications with West Coast".

   The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, is assigned, among others, the following supplementary tasks:

   "(a) Hold island positions between the United States and Southwest Pacific Area necessary for security of the line of communications between these regions and for supporting naval, air, and amphibious operations against Japanese."

   "(d) Support defense of the continent of North America."

   "(e) Protect essential sea and air communications."
3. The following is quoted from a message from COMINCH:

"I consider that our appropriate strategy is to make strong concentration HAWAIIAN AREA and ---- to employ strong attrition tactics and not allow our forces to accept such decisive action as would be likely to incur heavy losses in our carriers and cruisers.

"Create for the defense of ALASKA the North Pacific Force comprising northwest and frontier forces plus such western sea frontier forces as you elect to include sound school destroyers and submarines plus such Fleet units as you can make available all preferably to be concentrated initially at KODIAK and/or COLD BAY."

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet will employ the major part of his forces to repel these attacks. He will expect full cooperation from Army forces stationed in ALASKA.
PART II - SURVEY OF OPPOSING STRENGTHS

1. (a) The Japanese have just experienced a setback in the NEW BRITAIN - NEW GUINEA Area. In spite of this, their morale is high.

(b) It is to be expected that the planning for this campaign will be excellent and the preparations complete. They are indicated having a rehearsal for parts of the campaign.

(c) Their planes, are generally speaking, of greater range than ours. Their fighters out-perform ours.

(d) They have amply demonstrated their ability to use their carrier air with great ability. We can no longer underestimate their naval air efficiency.

(e) On the other hand, our men are just as brave, and those who have been properly trained are believed to be better than their opposite Jap number. Our Army is untried except in Bataan. The Army air has not demonstrated that it has the ability to coordinate with surface forces, and they are not very successful in hitting mobile targets with their high altitude bombers.

(f) Our submarines have demonstrated considerable superiority. Division tactics have not been tried out against the enemy.
2. Character of the Theater.

(a) Hydrography, topography. The Hawaiian Sea Frontier presents no problem. Ships up to the size of CA's can enter and berth at MIDWAY, but must exercise extreme caution.

In the ALASKAN Sector navigation is difficult because of fog. Charts are only fairly accurate. Harbors are generally poor from the viewpoint of the fair weather sailor. The best anchorage for a Fleet is at COLD HARBOR, but it has no resources. The islands are rugged and very thinly populated and will not support troops.

(b) The Weather. The normal trades are expected in the Hawaiian Islands Area, while in the Aleutians south of the chain overcast weather with fog and occasional rain will be an average condition. North of the Aleutian chain there will be a somewhat higher percentage of good flying weather.

(c) Daylight will be from about 0341 to 2014 in Latitude 25°N on June 1st. In Latitude 50°N it will be from about 0023 to 2342.

There will be a full moon on June 1st.

(d) The following distances are pertinent:

- PEARL to MIDWAY 1149 mi.
- PEARL to SAN DIEGO 2200 mi.
- PEARL to DUTCH HARBOR 2046 mi.
- MIDWAY to SAIPAN 2300 mi.
- MIDWAY to DUTCH HARBOR 1653 mi.
- DUTCH HARBOR to COLD BAY 200 mi.
- DUTCH HARBOR to KODIAK 600 mi.
2. (Continued)

SAIPAN to TOKYO  1343 mi.
SAIPAN to TRUK  570 mi.
WOTJE to PEARL  1986 mi.

3. **Information.**

(a) Our sole source of information for this problem is RI and CI. The enemy may be deceiving us.

(b) We may expect the enemy to have had full information prior to December 7, 1941. Since that time he has not had such good opportunities. Nevertheless he spotted the return of Task Force 16 in April due to our radio carelessness.

(c) Communication facilities are considered equal, with the exception of our ECM.

4. **Enemy Forces.**

(a) Ultimate Japanese strength which will be employed in each sector cannot be accurately determined at this time.

In the **Hawaiian** sector he may employ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comin.ch estimate</th>
<th>CinCPac estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fast BBs</td>
<td>BBs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crudivs 4 and 8</td>
<td>CVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardivs 1 &amp; 2 plus 1</td>
<td>CAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 2 Desrons</td>
<td>DDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A landing force</td>
<td>SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>2 surbrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A landing force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. (Continued)

In the Alaskan Sector he may employ:

Cardiv Three (RYUJO and 1 XCV) 2 CV
NACHI (Flag CinC 5th Fleet) 1 CA
One section of Crudiv 4 2 CA
One old cruiser of TAMA type 1 OCL
Desron ONE, less 1 Desdiv, and Desdiv TWO 16 DD
Subron ONE 8-10 SS

This force will escort and cover auxiliary types consisting of transports, landing boat carriers, cargo vessels, and tankers.

(b) Shore based air can only be employed by some refueling method such as fueling seaplanes from submarines and/or tankers, and using CVs to act as staging points.

5. Bases.

The nearest bases are too far distant for consideration. He will be well over 2000 miles from any good base support.

6. Own Forces.

(a) Battleships.

We have seven battleships on the Pacific Coast. All of them can be moved westward, but because of entire lack of air support and inadequacy of screening vessels they will be kept where they are at the present. They could hardly be secure at Pearl during the period of this estimate because of the strong probability of an air raid.
6. (Continued)

(b) Carrier Task Forces.

(1) Task Force SIXTEEN should arrive in the OAHU area about May 26th. Departing OAHU 28 May it can arrive off MIDWAY, fueled, about 1 June.

(2) Task Force SEVENTEEN will arrive Pearl about May 28th. The YORKTOWN is damaged and must receive plane replacements. It is possible that she can be placed in service four days after arrival Pearl. If she cannot be given adequate temporary repairs in that time she will be sent to BREMERTON at once.

(3) The SARATOGA will be ready at San Diego June 5th. She could arrive in the critical area of the Central Pacific only if the Japs are considerably later than now expected.

(4) The WASP will not arrive in time to be considered.

(5) The LONG ISLAND is not suitable as a Carrier Task Force nucleus for present operations but might be used after June 15th.

(c) North Pacific Force.

This force is being formed at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. It comprises all of the forces which can reach Alaskan waters during the first week in June.
6. (c) (Continued)

As Task Force EIGHT, this will eventually comprise:
2 CA, 3 CL, 12 DD, PG, 1 AVP, 1 AM, 14 YP, 4 AMC, 15 CG, 6 SS,
20 PBY-5A, 9 VSO and all Army aircraft that can be made available.

The major part of this task force can rendezvous at COLD BAY or KODIAK about June 5th.

Being opposed to a force containing carriers, it must depend very heavily on land based air.

(d) **Escorts.**

All of the remaining surface forces are assigned to escort duty.

(e) **Submarines.**

At daylight May 26th submarines will be disposed off MIDWAY as follows:

1 - 50 miles NW of MIDWAY.
1 - 50 miles NNW of MIDWAY.
3 - in the arc 215-315 from MIDWAY distant 175 miles.

Eight more submarines will be ready at Pearl between May 24 - 30 to take up offensive patrol in the MIDWAY - OAHU Area.

Other submarines of the Pacific Fleet not under overhaul are on patrol in enemy waters.

(f) **Oilers.**

(1) The COMET with ten days oil for Task Force EIGHT is being sent to KODIAK for orders. The SABINE is available for that force also.
6. (f) (Continued)

(2) Other oilers will be used as necessary in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier.

(g) Aircraft.

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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**ARMY REMARKS**

13 Torpedo planes SARATOGA Squadron. 3 more in reserve as CV replacements.

**NAVY**

96 Patrol Does not include 18 planes at NOUMEA. Does include 16 at or enroute MIDWAY. Total actually based OAHU and KAUAI: 80. 11 more due within a few weeks.

43 Fighters SARATOGA Squadron (22) and Marines (21). 27 more in reserve as CV replacements.

29 Scout Bombers SARATOGA Squadron (18) and Marines (11). 16 more in reserve as CV replacements.

15 VO/VS

12 VJ (large)

26 VJ (small)
6. (Continued)

(h) Bases.

(1) Pearl Harbor is being cleared of shipping as far as possible.

(2) Midway can be used as a staging point for Army bombers.

(3) Alaskan bases are shown in Annex "A" to Task Force EIGHT Operation Plan No. 28-42.

(i) Defense troops at:

OAHU (Army) 64,843 total
MIDWAY (Marines) Officers Men
Defense Battalion 71 1828
2 Raider Companies 9 270

(ii) ALASKA (Army) troops 23,513 total

(iii) Note: The above does not include air personnel at MIDWAY who are sufficient to handle the 16 PBY (Navy) and the 54 Marine planes, but do include some air personnel in ALASKA.

7. Logistics.

The enemy will have a difficult logistic problem. Because of this the time spent by their combatant types east of 180° will be strictly limited. Should they establish themselves in Alaska or Hawaii their logistic supply will be an immediate objective of the Pacific Fleet forces.
7. (Continued)

Own logistic supply will mainly be from Pearl. Small Navy tankers and supply ships now assigned to Alaska cannot be diverted to supply Task Force EIGHT.

8. Summary of Strength and Weakness Factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fairly good idea of enemy intentions.</td>
<td>1. Superior CV and BB strength.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Present ability to detect changes in enemy intentions.</td>
<td>2. Sufficient and seasoned amphibious troops and transports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fairly strong shore based air.</td>
<td>3. Training and experience in amphibious warfare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Strength inherent in defense of strong positions.</td>
<td>4. Possible carrier VF superiority.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Reinforcement of MIDWAY.</td>
<td>5. Larger range of CV aircraft.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Adequate logistics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own</th>
<th>Weakness</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. We are forced to employ attrition.</td>
<td>1. Operation projected at long distance from own bases.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The YORKTOWN may have to go to Bremerton at once.</td>
<td>2. Must establish new bases.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. (Continued)

**Weakness (Cont'd)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. We have no adequate air or submarine protection for our BBs.</td>
<td>4. Inability to adapt themselves to forced change of plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Army air is of uncertain value.</td>
<td>5. Striking forces will be hampered by train.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Our submarines have not operated as a division against the enemy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Coordination with the Army in Alaska will be difficult.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART III - ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

1. The enemy knows our building program - and that in time - our forces will be sufficiently strong to take the offensive. He further knows our defenses are inadequate now - but gradually being strengthened. Hence, from the time factor alone, such operation should be conducted at the earliest possible time. While he is "extended", he is able to assemble a considerable force - as most of the occupied territory is unable to make any real effort. He knows that AUSTRALIA is being heavily reinforced from the United States and would undoubtedly desire to cut that supply line. But he may also consider MIDWAY to be just another WAKE and ALASKA undefended. Regardless of our ideas of his strategic possibilities, the purpose here is to discuss immediate possibilities.

2. To hamstring our efforts to build up facilities for the offensive we conclude that he will:
   (a) Attempt to capture MIDWAY.
   (b) Raid OAHU.
   (c) Attempt to secure an advance position in the ALEUTIAN Islands.

3. It is believed that his forces will depart for the ALEUTIANS from a point in northern Japan on May 25 or 26; and that the Hawaiian forces will depart from the SAIPAN Area a bit later. If these beliefs are accepted our opposing forces should be in initial positions in the ALASKAN Sector by June 1st and in the MIDWAY - OAHU Sector June 3rd.
PART IV - OWN COURSES OF ACTION

1. We have decided:

(a) To retain the battleships on the West Coast.

(b) To employ Task Force SIXTEEN to the northeast of MIDWAY initially as soon as possible.

(c) To employ Task Force EIGHT in the ALEUTIANS.

(d) To initially employ a submarine screen of 6 fleet submarines off MIDWAY.

(e) To employ Task Force SEVENTEEN in the MIDWAY - OAHU Area if temporary repairs can be made at Pearl. Otherwise the YORKTOWN will be sent to Bremerton.

(f) To expedite the arrival of the SARATOGA in the HAWAIIAN Area.

(g) To reinforce the submarine screen with 6 fleet submarines at Pearl as soon as possible.

(h) To reinforce MIDWAY with PBYs, AA, and a small Raider Group.

(i) To alert forces in the HAWAIIAN Area.

(j) To clear Pearl Harbor of ships as much as is possible.

(k) To hold Army bombers enroute to AUSTRALIA at OAHU during the present emergency.

(l) To use MIDWAY to stage Army bombers to enemy carriers.
2. Danger from submarines and other raiders along the Pacific lines of communications requires the continued use of convoys and escorts.

3. Not only our directive from Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, but also common sense dictates that we cannot now afford to slug it out with the probably superior approaching Japanese forces. We must endeavor to reduce his forces by attrition - submarine attacks, air bombing, attack on isolated units. The principle of calculated chance is indicated, as set forth in a letter of instructions to Task Force EIGHT. If attrition is successful the enemy must accept the failure of his venture or risk battle on disadvantageous terms for him.

4. There is the suggestion that the enemy will attempt to trap our surface forces. Our air umbrella will assist in preventing that.

5. While the difficulty of placing our submarines within reach of the enemy is extremely great, and dependent to a large extent on chance, the risk to them is no more than normal and we only do it at the expense of ultimate reduction in offensive patrol in close to the enemy homeland. The placing of submarine leaving Pearl May 28-30 will depend somewhat on the RI and CI information.
PART V - DISPOSITIONS AND FUTURE DECISIONS

1. More information of the enemy is expected. On present information the following, not indicated in Part IV, is planned:

   (a) All submarines available in the Hawaiian Area will be placed on a scouting line to the westward of Midway. They are assigned patrol sectors until contact. On contact they will close in for attack without regard to the assigned sectors.

   (b) The SARATOGA will be the carrier of a new task force which will be assigned to the Striking Forces operating in the critical area.

   (c) Key personnel under orders to other stations will be retained in present duties until further orders.

   (d) Leave and liberty for officers and men will be cancelled until further orders.

   (e) Extreme care will be used to prevent the enemy from gaining information of own deployment by radio or otherwise.

   (f) The Amphibious Force at San Diego will be put on 48 hours notice in order that it may load and retake any positions captured by the enemy.

   (g) Part of a marine Raider Battalion will be retained at Pearl for use in eventualities.

2. The disposition of the YORKTOWN should be determined by May 28th.

3. An Operation Plan for MIDWAY Area will be issued to all concerned prior to the departure of major forces.
COMALASKA SECTOR TO COMNOWESSEAFRON INFO CINCPAC

Essential that Army and Navy commands in Alaska have complete information as early as possible on total prospective aircraft reinforcements both services so as to plan and coordinate initial dispositions and operations.

CG STRAW TO COMSOUPAC INFO CINCPAC

Cinpcac 202045. Outline plan follows. First Echelon SUMNER SWAN with advance part 20 officers 200 enlisted plus one plane. Make rapid reconnaissance harbor and beach facilities. Seaplane operating area include photo reconnaissance report to Strawstack estimated time 2 days. Second Echelon ZEILIN HARRIS KIT CARSON followed by TURKEY and barge heavy engineering equipment. Disembark fuel garrison combat equipment supplies. Estimated time troops 4 days dash affirm king 8 to 10 days. Third echelon FORMALHAUT possibly MANOERAN with heavy cargo. When unloading facilities available estimated week to ten days after arrival second Echelon. Times estimates subject modification with full knowledge local conditions present plans did not anticipate call upon this force for food for population. Force has normal 90 day supply that could be drawn upon in emergency but recommend subsistence population organized separate project with independent line supply. Request information of established rate of exchange French franc versus American dollar in islands.

COMAIRSOUPAC TO CINCPAC

Following air reinforcements recommended by respective air commanders in indicated South Pacific Areas as being requisite to adequate defense thereof: Straw - 1 fightron 1 medium bombbron and 6 OS2U planes. Fantan - 3 fightrons 4 heavy bombrons 3 medium bombrons 2 dive bombrons and 1 patron. Poppy - 1 fightron 1 heavy bombron 1 medium bombron and 1 dive bombron. Roses - 1 heavy bombron 1 medium bombron and 1 dive bombron. Concur in these recommendations when fields and facilities for maintenance available (some months hence) except recommend additional fightron at Roses and 1 less heavy bombron at Fantan. Concentration at Fantan considered desirable in view central location and potential facilities. As result my inspection recommend and request following air reinforcements as soon
as planes and personnel can be made available: Straw - augment existing 3 VF 6 SSD-3 and 6 OS2U planes. Fantan - 9 VF to bring fightron to strength 1 heavy bombron 1 medium bombron 1 dive bombron and 6 VF planes. Poppy - 1 fightron 1 heavy bombron 1 medium bombron and 1 dive bombron. Roses - 1 fightron. Reinforcements expected your 140647 inclusive in recommended increases. Basis of strength in planes considered as fightron and dive bombrons 25, bombrons and patrons 12. Urge reinforcement VF be type P-38 if obtainable. Info aedes requested keep me advised of completion proposed fields and maintenance facilities. Cincpac pass for info to ComGen Straw ComGen Roses and Alusnob Suva for GOC Fantan. To ComGen by hand Poppy.

21 2209

COMNOWESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC

Request to pass to Theobald. Comairtask Group Alaska sometimes referred to as Comairalsec is Commander Perry commanding officer air station Kodiak who functions under Comairtask for Northwestseafron Commander Gehres who commands Patwing 4. Perry experienced flyer with broad Alaskan background will have 12 patrol amphibians including 1 recent replacement to cover Kodiak and westward through Aleutians. Parker Comalsec maintains headquarters ashore at Airsta Kodiak with close liaison with Buckner at Fort Richardson. Latter on inspection tour through Aleutians now hurrying back to anchorage. 2nd part from Comnorwesseafron follows.

22 0300

GHORMLEY to COMGEN STRAW INFO CINCPAC

Cincpac is in command Pacific Theatre including South Pacific Area until such time as I have taken command. Your 210456 is hereby referred to him for action. Attention invited to fact that I have promised Free French that our forces will occupy island as soon as it is declared Free French. Ref Cincpac 202045.

22 0311

COMGEN SAMOAN GROUP TO CINCPAC

Unidentified freigher sighted lat 14-10 south long 173-30 west at 1830 GCT 21 May. Course 200.
Search NEOSHO SIMS survivors abandoned. Aircraft will continue search during routine patrols and reconnaissance flights. HENLEY picked up one hundred twenty three men including 25 hospital cases then sank NEOSHO with two torpedoes. Commanding Officer NEOSHO stated additional large number men left ship in rafts immediately after engagement on 12 May one man from SIMS died aboard HENLEY and 13 May one man from NEOSHO died. 16 May HELM rescued 4 more NEOSHO men lat 15-25 long 154-56 one man later died on board. Other 3 men stated they only ones left alive out of 63 who abandoned ship in 4 life rafts at time of engagement and remained together throughout. No information yet as to fate of missing men. Later on 16 May in lat 15-16 long 155-07 HELM sighted empty NEOSHO whaleboat and two life jackets no men. All survivors able travel being returned via WRIGHT. Complete list survivors will be forwarded airmail.

Following msg sent to Chief of Staff Army Washn DC and is for Cincpac's information stop status report of units reference your 3839 20th stop 3 B-17's of the first provisional bombardment squadron have arrived here stop 5 of second provisional squadron already at POPPY no information received here on remainder of these aircraft stop 50 men being trained in torpedo maintenance and operation at 14th Naval District stop navy has assisted in preparing a tactical and technical torpedo training program that will be given B-26 combat crews upon arrival.
SECRET

MAY GCT

212142

HQ USMC TO COMGENDEFOR SAMOAN GROUP

Your dispatch 200125 see paragraph 20 my serial 003A7842 of 20 March. Subject approval CinCPac this HQ has no objection to increasing garrison of STRAWBOARD by 1 battery 3 inch 4 guns 37mm and 8 guns 50 caliber from 2nd defBn with additional personnel per T-0 when that place occupied. 420 men for 8th Marines and 350 men for DefBns proceeding via WHARTON in May. Urdis 190210 assignment additional personnel as labor troops impracticable due to other commitments. Detachment about 600 will be sent in June for attachment to 3rd Brig for training pending ultimate assignment to a Reinforced Regiment relieving 7th Marines.

22 2041

CINCPAC TO TANGIER

For Admiral D'Argenlieu: I desire to express my appreciation of your excellent plan for the rallying of WALLIS ISLAND to the Free French and I have directed the Commanding General at SAMOA to carry out the procedure agreed upon by you and Vice Admiral Ghormley. As a final arrangement it is requested that you direct the CHEVREUIL to meet the advanced Allied echelon of three ships 35 miles south of WALLIS at 2000 Greenwich time on 27 May. This advance echelon will follow CHEVREUIL into the lagoon at an interval of one hour for submarine protection but will not land troops until requested by your representative. It would be appreciated if such request were made promptly. I request that you confirm the foregoing arrangement to me by radio. Admiral Nimitz.

22 2115

CINCPAC TO MACARTHUR

Period extending 8-14 May. Maximum 11 and 12 May. Ciphered retransmissions by Japs to own forces were from fifteen minutes to one hour after original Allied transmission CinCPac replotting to ComsoWestPac's 221042. It is also noted that the Allied plain language contact reports and press releases are frequently very similar to encrypted despatches sent to this command.

22 2230

COMSOPACFOR TO CINCPAC

ComGen STRAW 220354 in my opinion in order carry out spirit of mission of force proceeding WALLIS and in view French temperment disposition it is better not to make actual rendezvous with CHEVREUIL. Any change in arrangements now might jeopardize whole project. Ghormley originator. SAMOA pass to ComGen STRAW. TANGIER give to ComAirSoPac.
Plan of General Patch for occupation ESPIRITU SANTO approved with following reservation. Army not prepared to furnish additional troops from U.S. therefore airfield not to be constructed until adequate defense is assured.

Minor preparation as seaplane base is desirable. Diversion PAUL JONES and escort authorized. Details by arrangement with General Chamberlain.

Cominch 201455 All tactical squadrons Marine Wing 2 are at or under orders Islands Pacific for defense duty. Marine Wing 1 in training status except subject to defense duty on call Army Interceptor Command and Western Sea Frontier. Defense duty reduced training about 25%. Impossible to train progressively with Pacific Amphibious Force due to lack airplanes and continuous absorption untrained aviation and ground personnel. Recommend defense duties Marine Air Wings Western Sea Frontier be subject to my approval and that wings be assigned adequate aircraft. Definite written recommendations now in preparation will be forwarded promptly. Recommend you release 3 groups 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing for transfer to Amphibious Force on Mainland and request early decision.

Admiral D'Argenlieu's Chief of Staff states that CHEVREUIL is under radio silence but following message transmitted this morning Sunday over both Allied and French circuits: Quote You must intercept the Allied Advanced Echelon of 3 ships 35 miles south of WALLIS ISLAND at 2000 GCT on the 27th of May 1942. The 3 ships will follow the CHEVREUIL into the lagoon at an interval of 1 hour for submarine protection but will not land troops until requested by you. end. unquote.

Your 210900. Will report progress construction of fields and request items in Part 2C Cominch secret 00190 dash 17 March 1942 as accommodations become available. Quoting my 070115 to CinCPac. Requirements present and prospective operations make more effective scouting patrolling urgent need.

(continued on next page)
MAY GCT
24 0330 (Continued)

Recommend one squadron VBP for this area earliest possible. Can operate STRAWHAT. Six additional VS0 for STRAWBOARD or preferably J2F5 should be available earliest possible after initiation that operation end quote.

24 0620 GHORMLEY TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

Going to Wellington tonight for few days Callaghan remains FULCRUM. I will recommend to Chiefs of Staff that New Zealand forces now in FANTAN remain there on account their familiarity with country and their services there are required in addition to our Army division now earmarked for that assignment. Also that New Zealand officers now serving with native forces remain there.
MAY GCT
23 2300 COMAIRSOU PAC BY TANGIER TO CINCPAC

Your 211950 x Request delivery of material as follows:
Fantan 24 torpedoes from west coast plus warheads and tractor field equipment with compressor x Poppy 12
torpedoes from west coast and 12 from east coast plus warheads and tractor field equipment with compressor x
Event foregoing impracticable because of required routing request entire shipment be consigned Fulcrum in lieu Xray for further distribution this force. Consider above will fulfill immediate needs of 2 squadrons medium bombers presently allocated this area.

24 0543 COMSOWESPAC TO CINCPAC

First part xx Connection forthcoming operations suggest use of radio deception create impression that task force New Hebrides Coral Sea Area may contribute in some extent by (A) delaying or postponing any New Guinea invasion x (B) Diverting units from Midway force to this area x or (C) Causing enemy under estimate forces available you xx Analysis radio traffic 28 April to 5 May connected operations this area indicates Cincpac originated 7 messages x Units at sea 5 X Systems used GEPAJ GUPID JITAJ EYPAJ GALUG x Some messages from forces at sea sent direct by radio others apparently flown to shore radio stations or tenders for transmission x Messages originated by me depended upon enemy sightings and intelligence info xx Suggest following plan x Near future ship at sea New Caledonia area transmit dummy message in Galug on taskfor commanders freq addressed you and me x Two days later Tangier transmit similar message (This is last half) message with time group about 6 hours old in JITAJ to you and me info several calls to simulate tanker arrangements and message being flown in to Tangier x Two days later message similar above two but in GALUG from Tangier simulating exchange of plans between task force comdrs x No dummy messages necessary from you as legitimate traffic to task forces will probably suffice However recommend including me as addressees suitable number x I will continue intelligence messages to task force comdras your fleet volume and freqs depending upon actual information x On certain messages will increase the precedence to simulate info that a striking force in this vicinity would require for attack x Dummy traffic to use one or more call signs Para 16 call sigh book xx Believe above plan might accomplish desired purpose with very little addition traffic on radio circuits x
urdis 232117 x Present strength and armament 2nd Defense Battalion reinforced pursuant urgent recommendations ComGen Strawstack in which item concur x Increasing importance Stack port base and airfield make reduction in strength not warranted x mission Strawboard indicates demand great strength anti-aircraft defense x More weapons and weapons of greater effectiveness required procurement 90mm batteries 20mm or 40mm guns urgently recommended x No part of additional 10 officers 225 men required to increase defense battalion Strawboard to Table D-155A can be taken from any source within this area unless assurance most expeditious replacement x Suggestion in Marcors 212142 therefore not feasible x Question labor troops not urgent at this time x

This dispatch for Admiral Ghormley x Recommendations your 240620 with respect to New Zealand troops remaining Fiji not repeat not in line with expressed views of United States Chiefs of Staff who would have to find and transport another U.S. division to New Zealand to keep their commitments.
MAY GCT

25 0215 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

HAVE GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION TO EMPLOYMENT OF BATTLESHIPS IN PRESENT SITUATION X YOUR 241540 X SOME LIGHT FORCES AND SARATOGA COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AS SCREEN BUT AM CONVINCED THAT LATTER’S STRIKING POWER IS NECESSARY WITH OTHER CARRIERS AND SHOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO PROTECTION OF BB’S X SARATOGA WILL BE MOVED OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE X BATTLESHIPS WILL BE HELD IN RESERVE ON WEST COAST UNTIL OBJECTIVES FOR THEIR STRIKING POWER ARE MORE DEFINITE X MY 230051 APRIL X WHEN EMPLOYED WILL Endeavor TO FORM SUPPORTING CARRIER’S AIR GROUP CHIEFLY OF VF X SUFFICIENT THIS TYPE AIRCRAFT NOT NOW AVAILABLE TO ME
May 25 0231

CG SAMOA TO CINCPAC

Defense force Strawhat and man established ashore all unloading completed 22 May.

26 0045

CINCPAC TO MARCORP HDQ INFO COMINCH

Urdis 212142 and CG Samoa 250045 x Cincpac has always felt that AA protection contemplated Strawhat and Strawboard was inadequate but compelled general shortage of armament and personnel. Overall situation will not be improved by strengthening Board at expense of Stack. Recommend AA armament Board be increased as soon as available equipment permits to strength in CG Samoa 200125 and then similar increase be made hat.

26 0140

CG SAMOAN TO CINCPAC

VMO-151 has reported and is established and operating on field at Strawstack in part of Marine airgroup 13.

26 0550

COMAIRSOPAC TO CINCPAC

16 Marine fighters will occupy roses by Friday 29 May. Remaining three delayed by leaking fuel tanks. Two weeks after delivery of 6000 feet length 150 feet width marston mat landing strip will be ready for heavy bombers. Equal amount of matting required for taxi lanes to dispersal points. Request rush delivery of marston mat which has been ordered by Sverdrup.
From COMINCH TO CINCPAC

26 1305

Consider your 0331Z/26 to ComFarEast Fleet and your 260345 to others may be cause for trouble with sources of information.

FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH

26 2005

Does comment contained urdis 261305 apply to info contained in dispatches mentioned or relative general character info disseminated in compliance your 122310 of January amended by your 141825 of March. If comment applies to second category above suggest Cincpac issue bulletins to activities Pacific Theatre including SouthWestPac, Cominch issuing to others for better control and security.

FROM COMINCH TO COMSOWESTPACFOR, INFO CINCPAC

27 1245

Review of your 260746 and similar earlier despatches confirms impression that ships spend more time in Australian ports than at sea. Para.

Whatever may be restrictions imposed by Australia you should see to it that our own ships seize every opportunity even make opportunities to engage the enemy.

FROM COMSOWESTPAC TO COMINCH, CINCPAC

28 0308

No opportunity conduct aggressive operations against enemy has been nor will be missed. Urdis 271245, Australians authorized impose no restrictions operations which are fully under control. Present unkeep period authorized to make necessary repairs incident 90 days continual operations, to install radars, 20 mm guns and other vital military equipment.
PARAGRAPH ONE BAKER MY OPPLAN 29-42 X BELIEVE ENEMY HAS SET JUNE FIFTH OUR DATE FOR HIS LANDING ATTACK X THEREFORE ON NIGHT 2-3 JUNE OR FOLLOWING MORNING PRELIMINARY ATTACKS ARE MOST PROBABLE X MY 300627 AND COMPATWINING 2 300522 X THE RENDEZVOUS MENTIONED OR WITHIN 50 MILES THEREOF MAY WELL BE USED BY ENEMY FOR FUELING HIS STRIKING FORCES X BASED ON ABOVE ESTIMATE OF DATES THIS MAY TAKE PLACE ON 31ST OR 1ST X TIME OF RENDEZVOUS MAY BE AFTER OWN SEARCHING PLANES REACH OUTER LIMIT OF SEARCH X SUGGEST USE OF B-17 STRIKING FORCE SUNDAY AND MONDAY TO REACH RENDEZVOUS AREA ABOUT 1500 Y IF NO CONTACT REPORT EARLIER X EXPECT 9 OR 10 ADDITIONAL B-17 WILL ARRIVE MIDWAY SUNDAY MORNING

AIDAC

310357
310243 (TO MIDWAY)

533
2 HEAVY BOMBARDMENT SQUADRONS COMMA OF 8 B-17E PLANES EACH WITH AIR COMBAT PERSONNEL ONLY COMMA WILL BE ORGANIZED FROM THE 301 AND 303 HEAVY BOMBARDMENT GROUPS BY THE 2ND AIR FORCE AND DISPATCHED TO HAWAII WITHOUT DELAY STOP PAREN REFERENCE YOUR 352 MAY 27TH PAREN STOP FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES ORDERS STATE THIS IS PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION BUT WAR DEPT INTENTION IS TO RETURN PERSONNEL TO MAINLAND FOR OTHER USE ON EXPIRATION OF PRESENT EMERGENCY STOP PLANES WILL BE PERMANENTLY RETAINED IN HAWAII AS PART OF ALLOCATIONS SCHEDULED FOR YOUR COMMAND PERIOD ESTIMATE THAT EARLIEST DATE PLANES CAN LEAVE WEST COAST IS MAY 30 AND DATE MOVEMENT CAN BE COMPLETED IS JUNE 2ND. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED AS NECESSARY

DATE 29 MAY 42 CRYPTO-GROUP UNKNOWN CBO S

ORIGINATOR WAR DEPT 281921 (3957)

INFORMATION

ACTION COMGEN HAWDEPT

INFORMATION CINCPAC

War Plans
PLAN TO PATROL 24 MAY AS FOLLOWS X ALINE SEARCH USING 6 PLANES ON A 420 MILE FRONT TO 6000 MILES THE MEDIAN BEING 315 DEG TRUE THIS TO BE INCREASED AS PLANE AVAILABILITY INCREASES AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RECEIVED

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X XXX X X X
SECRET

AIDAC 291311 AIDAC

FROM GHORMLEY X NZMB INFORMS ME AS FOLLOWS COMMANDING OFFICER OF JAPANESE DETACHMENTS HAS BEEN ORDERED TO TAKE SPECIAL LANDING PARTY TO CAPTURE MIDWAY ISLAND X PARTY IS TO ARRIVE 1900 JUNE 6TH X COMMENT X EXPEDITION STARTED FROM SAIPAN X COMPOSITION OF ESCORT FORCES UNKNOWN BUT FOLLOWING UNITS COULD BE AVAILABLE 4BB 12CAS 4CV 3 SEA-PLANE CARRIERS 2CL AND LARGE NUMBER DESTROYERS X OPNAV INFORMED XX ABOVE COMES FROM SECRET SOURCES.

NOTE: THIS WAS BROADCAST ON THE RPM FOX SCHEDULE./CWO

DATE 5/29/42

ORIGINATOR GHORMLEY

291311

CINCPAC

COMSWPACFOR COMAIRSOUPACFOR

CRYPTO-GROUP 1338 CBO LJO

INFORMATION

Operations
CLASSIFIED

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

INCOMING

AIDAC  SECRET  240845  ROUTINE

REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON PATROL OF LT(JG) ADY X IS IT TO
CONTINUE OR SHOULD PLANES JOIN THE PATROL FROM THIS STATION

AIDAC  AIDAC  AIDAC

DATE  24 MAY 42  CRYPTO-GROUP  1358  CBO  B

ORIGINATOR  ACTION  INFORMATION

NAS MIDWAY  COMPATWING 2  CINCPAC
240845

OPERATIONS  WAR PLANS  FCO  FRO  FIO  PRO  ACO  FMO  Med  Gun  Avia  Aero

Admiral
May 21

Cominch 211700 (Aidac) prospectively gives Alaska state of fleet opposed invasion until and if invasion in force of Kodiak or continental Alaska becomes imminent. Army and Navy air to be under General Butler. Command relationship between remainder Army Alaska force and Task Force 8 to be by mutual cooperation. Op-Plan 28-42 will be changed accordingly.

Cominch 211930 (Aidac) gives new estimate for attack on Midway and the Aleutians. This agrees generally with our dope previously written up (estimate of May 21).

ComNorWesSeaFrontier 212209 and ComAlaska Sector 210200 deal with current defense measures.

C.T.G. 12.2 220311 gives the situation on reinforcements for Suva area.

C.G. HawDept 220716 gives the VB setup for Poppy.

The NEOSHO search is officially over. The story is told in ComSWPac 220335.

Canton reports that a fighter approached the island. If true it must have come from a ship. The TANGIER VP spotted and attacked a submarine in Lat. 14-04 S, 162-30 E.

Cominch wants the Army to learn to drop torpedoes from B-26s. The Navy has something to learn on that.

Ghormley 220300 and Straw 210456 deal with the occupation of Strawboard. The French still have not acted.

ComAirSoPac has looked over his new command and says what he wants to make it tick in his 210900.

The enemy situation is shown in the attached estimate - so is our own.
May 22.

Cincpac 222041 gives plan for occupation of Wallis on May 27th. However, Admiral Ghormley's 222230 says that no rendezvous should be kept. In the meantime the CHEVREUIL left Noumea for Wallis today to destroy the radio station. That act will be considered Free French occupation and a signal for our marines to land.

The Japs are using our careless communications in Southwest Pacific to their advantage (Cincpac 222115).

Cincpac 230333 approves the occupation of Espiritu Santo with reservations.

Marine Headquarter's 212142 approves increasing garrison of Strawboard.

Hollandia was occupied by the enemy May 6th. There is very little activity in Southwest Pacific now.

Enemy plans for Hawaiian and Aleutian attacks are completed, and, unless we are badly informed should take place about June 1st.

Rear Admiral Theobald (CTF8) left for Kodiak to confer with the Army and Navy there on the operations of his force. He arrives there May 27th. The NASHVILLE was diverted from her fishing expedition to join Task Force 8.
May 23.

The CG at Straw (240330) talks about reinforcement there.

Admiral Ghormley is going to Australia for a few days. In his 240620 he recommends that the New Zealand troops remain at Fantan in addition to the 37th Army Division which is earmarked for that place.

The Tangier 232311 gives the plan of the Free French CHEVREUIL. It is what Cincpac recommended two days ago.

MGC Marines 211805 gives views on defense duty marine air vs training.

The British High Commissioner for Pacific Islands strenuously objects to our Army taking over British resident radios at Canton and Christmas. This set-up is under consideration along with the general communication problem in the SoPac Islands.

YP-277 was blown up by one of our mines at French Firgate Shoal. Two survivors were picked up by a DD there.

The following are to be added to PacFleet (See Aidac);

1 BB, 1 CV, 1 CL, 4 DD.

ComAlaska Sector (Aidac attached) recommends that not less than 54 torpedo planes or dive bombers supported by equal number of pursuit be made available Alaska in addition to present force. He also urges the Army in Alaska to move maximum possible bombers and pursuit from Kodiak and Anchorage westward. This seems a very good idea.

The plane search from Midway to NW to 600 miles will start tomorrow. At that station an error in placing demolition charges destroyed considerable avgas. Cincpac will send replacement gasoline there immediately, in drums.

The enemy is indicated leaving SAIPAN on the 26th for Midway. Thus, the attack can hardly take place in Hawaii before June 2nd. In the meantime the Army feels unnecessarily alerted now. They should only be alert for seaplane bombing now - not attack in force.
Preparations for the defense of Midway and the Aleutians continue. There were no new developments.

The performance of our YPs is not good. They evidently need more seagoing training. One (YP277) was blown up by a mine at French Frigate Shoals. He may not have been properly notified of this field but the fact remains that the operation was at fault somewhere. Others ran out of fuel and must be towed. In this connection Cominch directs that all craft capable of operating in the open sea be assigned the Sea Frontier, rather than the Coastal Frontier.

In answer to a Cominch query Cincpac 250215 again states his decision not to use BBs until they can be protected. The SARATOGA, as centre of Task Force 11 under Rear Admiral Fitch, will be ready to leave San Diego June 5th and will be moved westward.

Comairsopac gives his immediate torpedo needs in his 232300.

Cominch 251240 does not approve keeping New Zealand troops in Fiji mentioned yesterday.

C.G. Marines 250045 discusses Straw reinforcements.

Comsouwespac 240541 gives what looks like a very good radio deception plan. Might well be used now.

There is good reason to believe that Orange is using our plane-shore radio traffic to deduce our deployment. This also has the possible result of drying up our information sources.
May 25

The RICHMOND and shore batteries opened up on an unidentified plane at Bleacher. Later it was found to be a New Zealand photographic plane on unauthorized flight. The proper identification of friendly planes in time to safely withhold fire is one requiring constant attention.

C.G. Straw 252031 says unloading completed at Strawhat and Strawman on May 22d. Note that reinforcements at Straw have been requested and that Cincpac 260045 considers AA at Strawhat and Strawboard as projected to be inadequate.

Comairsopac 260550 gives further news on Roses air. CG Samoa 260140 does the same for Strawstack.

Preparations for the attack continue in Cominch Aidac. He gives several suggestions which were complied with. There is nothing to indicate a change of enemy plans - including estimated timing.

Task Force 16 returns to Pearl tomorrow.

C.G. Hawaiian Department seems worried about defense of Oahu and pointed out to Cincpac the necessity of a proper estimate of enemy intentions.
MAY 26th.

Cominch 261305 and CincPac 262005 reveal the delicacy of the dissemination of intelligence. On the one hand the effort is to prevent drying up information sources, while on the other hand the effort is to give information to those who can use it in time. It is a matter of great importance.

VPs are searching from JOHNSTON and MIDWAY. As a friendly sub saw what was thought to be a search light 600 miles west of MIDWAY, two VPs were sent to investigate. It does not seem probable that this was enemy in strength approaching MIDWAY.

The set up for an Intelligence Center at PEARL for the Pacific Ocean Areas was sent to Washington today. Generally speaking our present intelligence is mainly the decoding of 40% of the messages copied, and only 60% of possible messages are copied.

Cominch 271245 told the SouWestPac to get going. Too many ships in port too LONG.

The French occupied WALLIS 26th local.

It is estimated that BLEACHER will be ready in all respects June 21st.

Task Force 16 entered Pearl. Admiral Halsey has some kind of skin trouble and was sent to the hospital.

MAY 27th.

Both TF 16 and 17 are in port. The damage to the YORKTOWN is not enough to prevent operations on the evening of the 29th. She will be drydocked to patch oil leaks. Her replacement planes will come from the SARATOGA group here. As these forces have been at sea for a long time, liberty was granted (no liberty for others from 1330/26 until further orders). Because of the urgent necessity to get out on station T.F. 16 will leave tomorrow at 1100 and T.F. 17 about the 30th.

There was a general discussion of the MIDWAY problem conducted by the Admiral. General Emmons and General Richardson (from War Dept., and intimate of General Marshall) were present, as so was Rear Admiral Spruance, who will be
MAY 27th. (Cont’d)

C.T.F. 16 until Vice Admiral Halsey returns to the job from the sick list. While nothing new was brought out, all hands expressed views and were given a very clear explanation of the problem by Admiral Nimitz. General Emmons said that he hasn't anywhere near enough planes to defend Oahu. That is, of course, nothing new.

The business of being on the strategic defensive is very hard on personnel and material - especially when means are so limited. For example, T.F. 16 went all the way to ROSES to assist in the NEW GUINEA affair, came rushing back to head off the MIDWAY attack, and soon will probably have to hurry to the CORAL SEA area again. It is 3500 miles from PEARL to the CORAL sea. There are several remedies but they all involve more combatant ships of CV and DD type in the Pacific.

T.F. 8 will rendezvous initially at KODIAK instead of COLD BAY.

C.T.F. 1 again wants to reduce the fuel load in BB's. But it will be reduced by burning before he can steam from the West Coast to probable action areas.

The ComAmphForce wants submarine protection. He probably does not know the general situation when he demands the APD's, 40DD's, 3 weeks training - all after telling him that a part of his force must be ready to move for combat in 48 hours. While no one wants to see his transports sunk by enemy subs off San Diego it is hard to believe that the submarine threat is as great as C.T.F. 3 believes. Timidness won't win this war, neither will foolish recklessness.

ComSoWestPac 280308 explains why so many of his ships are in port. He does not propose to be at sea just to be at sea. The Jap planes in his area are only estimated at 150 total and the surface forces are small and inactive.

A submarine was attacked by a TANGIER plane in Lat 17° 52'S, 164° 08' E.

There is more evidence that own magnetic exploders on the torpedoes do not function 100%. In fact the torpedo picture is not the best.
MAY 27th (Cont'd)

It seems probable that ORANGE is now changing his codes. If true our Communication Intelligence will suffer for sometime. This may be important on getting into our defensive positions referred to above. Of course it may turn out that the Japs are pulling our leg and using deception on a grand scale.

Operation Plan No. 29-42, for the MIDWAY defense was issued.
GHORMLEY TO CINCPAC, COM-12, RIGEL

Army contingent headed by Colonel Boyers has arrived LONGBOW and is proceeding FULCRUM to establish "Port of Embarkation". Hope to get this coordinated with establishment of Naval Base that place. Boyers also has orders purchase ships which may be available and supplies etcetera. I have received no previous information of Army intentions in this regard which might result in Navy and Army working toross purposes even bidding against each other for facilities and shipping. Strongly recommend all such questions be coordinated in Washington and that I be kept advised fully in order to effect efficient cooperation here. Have not yet received information other than of vague verbal nature in regard to "Joint Purchasing Commission". Ghormley originator.

TANGIER TO CINCPAC, COMSOPAC (FROM GEN. PATCH)

Originator is Patch. Reference letter from CinCUS to CinCPac FF/A-1A16-1 number 00353 May 7th 1942 paragraph 2 and inclosure (B) thereof. Am informed 5 French Naval Officers scheduled to arrive NEW ZEALAND are being directed to proceed promptly to NOUMEA. Believe D'Argenlieu intends using them to command job of Port Captain. This will rock boat considerably. Do you desire me at this time to inform D'Argenlieu a U.S. Naval contingent is intended to exercise this function. Cite G-65-5.

Enroute CinCPac. STRAWBOARD 1st Echelon according plan. CHEVREUIL came from harbor to rendezvous signalled quote Island Free French protectorate since 2230Z/26 May unquote led way into harbor SUMNER SWAN following. Escort now STACK. SUMNER reports "situation on shore good. Free French took over without opposition and control Government and Radio. At 0100Z/28 Marines engaged in landing to be completed before dark. Survey presents no difficulties". 2nd Echelon loaded embarked standing by. Will proceed upon receipt report of reconnaissance condition anchorage beaches and unloading facilities. SAMOAN Area Gen originator. TANGIER hand to ComAirSoPac.
FROM CINCPAC TO COMGENHAWDEPT, COMPATWING 2

30 0151
My confidential serial 0334 of 31 January and my secret serial 0114W of 27 May. For rapid and effective coordination of effort during current emergency authority of commander naval base air defense shall be understood to include the ordering of aircraft of army bomber command on missions that include landing at or basing on Midway. Such aircraft while based on Midway are under the command of the commanding officer that place. It is desired that attack on Wake by long range bombers refueling at Midway be undertaken as soon as possible.

FROM CNBAD TO CINCPAC

30 0523
Your 300151 ComGen 7th air force now advises long range bombers have insufficient range to make attack on Wake from Midway.
From ComGen Haw Dept to WD CSA Wash.

Aircraft status Reurad 3995/29: B-17's, temporarily assigned 15 permanently assigned 41. B-26's temporarily assigned 6, none permanently. Following permanently assigned 18 B-18's, 7 A-20's, 135 P-40's, 22 P-39's and 28 P-36's. In combat readiness 48 B-17's, 16 B-18's, 6 A-20's, 4 B-26's, 120 P-40's, 21 P-29's, and 27 P-36's. Of this number 15 B-17's and 4 B-26's are at Midway and additional B-17 will be dispatched there tonight. There are 5 B-17's for Australia attached here; 7 B-17's of the 1st Provisional Squadron have arrived here. 3 B-17's of the 2nd Provisional Squadron are here and 5 are in Poppy. Other items no change.
SUPREME COMMANDER SOWESPAC AREA TO CINCPAC

01 0058

It is felt that the phrasing of para.6b your Directive 05928 ComSoWesPacFor may cause him to undertake direct coordination with force of SoWesPac area with ComSouWesPacFor instead of CinC of the Area. Although utilization of naval communication channels is advisable all dispatches pertaining to the coordination of any elements of my command should be addressed to CinC SoWesPac Area which is my official designation thus avoiding confusion and possible embarrassment to Admiral Leary who is governed by orders issued this general headquarters. signed MacArthur.

CINCPAC TO NAS MIDWAY

01 2217

My 312323 was intended to provide for return of B-17's only in numbers considered by you necessary to relieve congestion. Remainder should be kept available and used for striking as long as situation warrants. They should remain at least until enemy is located and if possible attacks delivered. Bear in mind that situation with respect enemy plans may be changing. Will advise you any available information. Interested parties informed.

CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC

01 2131

Your 010907 for present all communiques will be issued by me or by higher authority. Presume Secnav will continue address credentials Pacific Ocean Areas correspondents to CinPac. Transmit to me names correspondents your area who desire credentials all correspondents accredited by Secnav must further be accredited by me.

CINCPAC TO COMSOWESPACFOR

01 2135

For Commander in Chief SouWesPac Area. I understand your 010058 to refer to my serial 090W to Vice Admiral Ghormley. I am taking steps to insure that it is well understood that despatches pertaining to coordination of your forces are addressed to you. When the task now at hand is completed I shall take pleasure in concerting with you some operations which will curb and eventually drive back our enemy. Nimitz
CinCPac Oper Plan 29-42 of 27 May information paragraph

sub baker 6 and 8: Enemy MIDWAY occupation force includes two special pioneer battalions to restore and service air field for immediate use by Orange planes. Jap carriers and seaplane tenders carrying land planes earmarked MIDWAY Base. Heavy bombers and patrol planes ready to be flown in from WAKE. Ground crews munitions supplies and base equipment embarked with occupation force. Spearhead of landing force indicated as Jap Marines plus special Army unit. Principal objective indicated as Eastern Island.

They are even bringing guns captured on WAKE to defend our islands. Confident you have the stuff to smear their plays. Watch for razzle dazzle. MIDWAY has this by cable.

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From CINCPAC to COMINCH

Days developments to present time apparently summarize as follows: This morning there was an enemy reconnaissance of DUTCH HARBOR and vicinity. Believe report of carrier there was erroneous and our search has not located northern attack force. At MIDWAY a group of ships probably combatant first sighted 700 miles West may be escort group heading toward a rendezvous with the occupation force vessels sighted closer in. Believe the striking force has not yet been located. 9 B-17s are enroute to attack the supposed escort group and 6 more are moving from here to MIDWAY. There is not enough yet in picture at either place to confirm or deny my previous estimates or to warrant change in initial deployments.

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FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH

If New Zealand Air units are not to be withdrawn from Fiji my 011051 recommend that there be ordered that base a US Army Air officer of sufficient rank to ensure that unity of Air command is exercised by US. Failing that recommend that agreement be reached with the New Zealand authorities that US having preponderance of air forces its air commander should exercise unity of command regardless of relative rank. Your 162220 of April regarding command of combined surface forces in the southwest pacific is a precedent.
Changes in status: Following airplanes arrived 3rd June: 2 B17s, 3 B17s expected tonight and 3 LB30s assigned, and 4 B26s of the 69th squadron also expected tonight to be attached. 52 B17s, 4 B26s, 14 B18s, 6 A20s, 79 P40s, 17 P39s, 31 P36s, 7 O-47s are in commission. Under erection none. (Reurad 3995/29th) No combat or other losses. 7 B17s included above were dispatched to Midway this date. Emmons.

FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH, INFO COMGENHAWDEPT, COMHAWSEAFRON, COMWESTSEAFRON, COMNORWESTSEAFRON, ALL TF COMDRS, CO MIDWAY

Days development to present time apparently summarized as follows. This morning there was an enemy reconnaissance of Dutch Harbor and vicinity. Believe report of carrier was erroneous and our search has not located northern attack force. At Midway a group of ships probably combatant first sighted 700 miles west may be escort group heading toward a rendezvous with the occupation force vessels sighted closer in. Believe the striking force has not yet been located. 9 B17s are enroute to attack the supposed escort group and 6 more are moving from here to Midway. There is not enough yet in picture at either place to confirm or deny my previous estimates or to warrant change in initial deployments.
05 1225 From Cincpac to Cominch and others concerned.
June 4 summary to 0600 GCT 5th. Para. MIDWAY attack. The 2 main forces approaching MIDWAY were.
First. Bearing 260 Distant about 500 miles at dawn composed of 2 or 3 BBs cruisers possibly a carrier and auxiliaries totalling 20 to 23 ships plus a DD screen. One or two BB and two transports of this force damaged yesterday. Second. Bearing 320 distant about 200 miles at dawn composed of about 4 CV 2 BB 4 CA 6 DD. MIDWAY and carrier task forces concentrated all attacks on this second force. Results 3 CV burning 1 CV hit by 3 submarine torpedoes comma 1 or 2 BB and other ships damaged. In morning air raids MIDWAY suffered very heavy air losses but no serious damage to station. In afternoon Task Forces 16 and 17 had heavy air losses and the YORKTOWN received at least 3 bomb hits and is stopped 150 miles north of MIDWAY. Para. Reports are incomplete at present but believe enemy will if he can muster sufficient air continue duel with our 2 remaining carriers in order to proceed with landing attack on MIDWAY. It is certain that he has at least one carrier able to operate aircraft. We are executing night attacks with appropriate types. SARATOGA will arrive PEARL early on 6th and will be despatched as soon as fueled. Para. In ALASKA sector. Enemy large CV with small CV 2 or 3 CA and DDs was maneuvering about 250 miles southwest DUTCH HARBOR during day. Attacked DUTCH HARBOR at 0600 GCT. Para. Navy Commanders deliver to appropriate Army Commanders.
From Vice Admiral Ghormley to Cincpac, WHITNEY, Comgen BLEACHER, Cominch.

On April 28 Mr. Fraser the NEW ZEALAND Prime Minister sent the following message to the NEW ZEALAND Minister in WASHINGTON quote Please take up US question American troops assuming complete responsibility for defense of TONGA including relief of own artillery unit and NZ personnel with TONGA defense force all of which we advocate. There will be minor difficulties to be overcome with regard to defense force which consists local troops with Cadre NZ officers and NCOS and has British weapons. Complete relief on this base will therefore take time unquote. NEW ZEALAND military command has received no reply to this cable and is desirous of having the present unsatisfactory conditions from an administrative point of view especially for maintenance and supply clearly defined. See the Commander in Chief US Fleet despatch 011825 of May 1942. The Commanding General at BLEACHER by copy is requested submit recommendations to Cincpac with copy to me. WHITNEY hand this message to Comgen BLEACHER. Action Cincpac From VAdm Ghormley.

From Ghormley to Cincpac Info WHITNEY

WHITNEY pass to Comgen BLEACHER for Info. Relative my 051215 following recommendations received from IOC NZ military forces

"(1) NZ personnel except those with TONGA defense force be withdrawn (2) 2 four inch guns with ammunition and stores remain manned by US (3) 2 18 pound guns ammunition stores withdrawn to NZ (Your) TONGA defense force be equipped with US weapons and supplied and commanded by US Commander, present weapons shipped to FIJI for 3rd Battalion FIJI defense force"
From Cincpac to Cominch, Opnav, and others concerned.

June 6 summary to 0600 GCT 6th. MIDWAY attack. No Air Raid on MIDWAY since yesterday morning. Enemy attack forces approached during night and sub fired light bombardment but by daylight all forces sighted were heading Westward. Northwestern Force 2 BB probably damaged two CV showing damage 3 CA 5 to 10 DD making slow speed. MIDWAY striking groups bombing these CV today and tomorrow and Task Force Sixteen pursuing. Western Force 3 CA two damaged 2 CL 6 AP. MIDWAY aircraft further damaged 1 CA this force. Para. Sinking two carriers yesterday verified one having received three torpedo hits from NAUTILUS. No enemy aircraft evident today and all his forces believed withdrawing. End of Part 1.

From Cincpac to Cominch, Opnav, and others concerned.

This is last part of Cincpac 060831. Pass as in Part 1. Yesterday MIDWAY Marine fighters and bombers Army Bl7s and B26s and Navy PBVs and TBFs were magnificent. None caught on ground. Marine aircraft and B26 losses 50 percent. PBY heavy. Bl7 none. TBF 5 out of 6. All took heavy toll of enemy who apparently attacked with 4 carrier groups and some 2 engined bombers. Consider previous over water search operations from OAHU added greatly to efficiency of MIDWAY search and striking groups. AA fired downed 15 enemy aircraft. Para. ALASKA. Air raids on DUTCH HARBOR and UMNAK last night and today were light either as diversions or because of weather. A few of our aircraft have bombed enemy carrier and 2 torpedo hits are reported on enemy heavy cruiser. No occupation force sighted. Scouting by Navy PBVs outstanding. Navy commanders deliver to appropriate Army commanders. Comsowespac to Cinc Sowespac and ACNB. Comsopac to NZNB

Cincpac to Comsowespac Info Comserfor & Comsopac

Have been informed a number of small Dutch tankers escaped from INDIES and are now in South West Pacific. Such tankers ideal for servicing outlying islands. Vessels capacity around 15-20,000 barrels. Draft 15 feet or less speed 12 or better most desirable. Request you make preliminary inquiries as to availability such vessels and whether they can be spared. Preferable they be able handle cargoes part gas and part oil. Should be self sustaining for voyage at least 4,000 miles. Inform Ghormley and me.
GHORMLEY TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

It is necessary that unity of command FIJI be maintained at all times especially during difficult period of relief. Therefore recommend that all U.S. organizations arriving FIJI be directed report Major General Mead GOC FIJI Defense Force under principle of unity of command. Two that Mead retain command NTCH paragraph 25 Cominch serial 00330 is operative. Three that paragraph 25 be not made operative until practically all of U.S. troops have arrived in FIJI. Ghormley originator. Also recommend no N.Z. troops other than casuals be transported from FIJI in first shuttle trip of COOLIDGE from FIJI to AUCKLAND.

HQ STRAW AREA TO CINCPAC

Gen. Price left STRAWBOARD 1300 and arrive STRAWWHAT 1600 June 5 returned STRAWBOARD June 6. Operation STRAWBOARD considerably ahead schedule all troops and combat equipment ashore. Temporary defense established 2 AKs and barge unloading heavy gear inside lagoon.

CINCPAC TO COMINCH, ETC.

The forces which attempted to attack MIDWAY have retired some to the Westward others probably to the Northwest where they have entered an area of low visibility. There remained within bombing range before dark one group of one BB and five DD which Task Force 16 was attacking and one group of 2 or 3 CA and 2 DD to the West being attacked by long range bombers from MIDWAY. Results of these attacks not yet reported. The retirement may be temporary. All forces must be alert and prepared for further enemy action. South of ALEUTIANS a force of 1 CV 3 CA 8 DD was again sighted. Navy commanders deliver to appropriate Army commanders.

CINCPAC TO COMINCH

The results of actions with the previously reported enemy forces West of MIDWAY not yet received. Force sighted last night containing 2 damaged CV was not picked up and no carrier aircraft were sighted today. Believe good possibility 1 CV may have been abandoned and sunk by accompanying ships gunfire last night. SARATOGA group will leave tonight for MIDWAY area to deliver plane reinforcements to Task Force 16 and then act as circumstances indicate. Will act against ALEUTIANS attack force if situation continues favorable in MIDWAY area. No news from the ALEUTIANS other than as reported to you by NAS KODIAK and COMNOWESEAFRON today.
No enemy surface forces sighted in the MIDWAY area today. Believe he is continuing his withdrawal and am chasing with submarine from MIDWAY area and attempting to intercept with others returning from patrol. As reported in his 070756 which was sent to you Spruance is proceeding East for fuel after which I plan to send his force North. Other reinforcements for Theobald as separately reported. The BB reported gutted and abandoned by Commander Task Force 16 is shown by photograph to be MOGAMI class cruiser. A number of submarines are believed in the OAHU MIDWAY area. SARATOGA group with extra planes left this morning to meet Spruance. Para. Besides reported transport last night there were 2 contacts with enemy aircraft reported in the ALEUTIAN area.

Enemy group which Task Force 16 bombed yesterday suffered considerable damage and 1 MOGAMI was reported gutted and abandoned in Lat. 28-55 North Long 173-08 East. There appears to have been no BB in this group. Contact with surface forces lost during night and no aircraft sighted today except by submarines within distant air search of WAKE and 1 cruiser scout plane bearing 264 distance 545 from MIDWAY at 1830Z. Submarines active throughout MIDWAY-OAHU area and believed to be concentrating in approaches to PEARL HARBOR. Enemy contacts in ALEUTIANS 1 transport and 2 groups of aircraft. Navy commanders deliver to appropriate Army commanders.

Task forces sixteen and seventeen rendezvous in position 86 Quincy 50 at 19 hours GCT 10 June. SARATOGA fly aircraft bombs and personnel to ENTERPRISE and HORNET as directed by CTF16 to bring these two carriers to best practicable strength bearing in mind that SARATOGA will return to PEARL for replenishment and that ENTERPRISE arresting gear is not suitable for TBF planes. Radio silence is to be maintained in connection with plane transfer necessary instructions being transferred by plane or destroyer. Mydis 070121. SARATOGA also transfer to CTF 16 all copies of TF 8 orders and information concerning ALASKA recently furnished at PEARL.

TF 16 Rear Admiral Spruance HORNET ENTERPRISE NORTHAMPTON PENSACOLA VINCENNES MINNEAPOLIS NEW ORLEANS ATLANTA BALCH ELLET CONYNGHAM PHELPS DEWEY WORDEN AYLWIN MONAGHAN KASKASKIA (less destroyer escorting PLATTE if listed above) proceed to pass through point Blow Lat. 48-00 North Long 172-00 West at 0400 GCT 13 June at which time Taskfor 16 will pass.
under the command of CTF 8 Rear Admiral Theobald who may join at Blow if he desires. Until assigned another task by CTF 8 the task of TF 16 is to seek out and destroy enemy forces in the ALEUTIAN area and exploit any favorable opportunity to damage the enemy enroute. After TF 16 passes under command of CTF 8 the task of both forces is "destroy or drive out enemy forces in the ALEUTIAN-ALASKAN Area". TF 17 Rear Admiral Fletcher SARATOGA ASTORIA PORTLAND SANDIEGO MORRIS RUSSEL MUSTIN ANDERSON LAFFEY MAHAN SMITH PRESTON after completion of plane transfers return to PEARL. When TF 16 finishes fueling from CIMARRON GUADALUPE CTF 16 send them to PEARL with BLUE RALPH TALBOT and HUGHES as escort.

4157/7 MARSHALL C.of S., USA to COMGENHAWDEPT Info CINCPAC.

To meet immediate emergency full strength Army pursuit squadron or equivalent authorized to be temporarily based at MIDWAY until relieved by Navy or Marine units.

(Reference: Cincpac's request transmitted your radio 614 June 7) CINCPAC should be responsible for shipment, supply and return of unit when relieved. Acknowledge and advise of action to be taken. Cominch will be notified.

08 0731 COMSOUWESPAC to CINCPAC.

1st of 3 from MacArthur. For your information I have this date transmitted the following telegram for consideration by the joint Chiefs of Staff quote enemy defeats in Coral Sea and in central Pacific with heavy Naval losses, particularly in carriers, has brought about a new situation which should be exploited at the earliest possible date through offensive action stop the 1st objective should be the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND area against which I would move immediately if the means were available

08 0733 I have 3 divisions (32nd and 41st American and 7th Australian) which can be used in the support of a landing force but which cannot be employed in initial attack due to lack of specialized equipment and of specialized training. I have an excellent Naval component but which must have integral air element for such an operation step it is recommended that 1 division trained and completely equipped for amphibious operations and a task force including 2 carriers be made available to me at the earliest date - End part 2.

08 0735 Last and 3rd part. With such a force I could retake that important area, forcing the enemy back 700 miles to his base at TRUK with manifold strategic advantages both defensive and offensive with further potential exploitation.
08 0735 COMSOUWESTPAC TO CINCPAC (Continued).

Last and 3rd part. (Cont’d).

immediately possible. Speed is vital and it is not possible for us to act quickly enough if I must build equipment and train my divisions in its use. You have informed me that there is on the West Coast a force of 40,000 trained in amphibious operations. I cannot urge too strongly that the time has arrived to employ these troops, or a portion of these troops, in conjunction with the forces available to me in the initiation of offensive operation in the Southwest Pacific area unquote. Enf of 3 part dispatch.

07 2145 CINCPAC to COMPATWING 4, Info to: NOWESTSEAFRON, CTF 8, COMALSEC.

The Battle of MIDWAY has not lessened my close following of your splendid efforts. Your tireless persistence your courage and the bulldog grip you have kept on the enemy in snow rain and fog have aroused my admiration. You have kept the slant eyes from their objective so far. Hold on and your chance to smash them may be next. You will have help as soon as situation here permits.

08 2135 CINCPAC to CTF 1, Info to: COMINCH.

FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR DAYS OPERATE IN SQUARE ABOUT 300 MILES EACH SIDE SOUTHEAST CORNER LATITUDE 37-30 NORTH LONGITUDE 142-30 WEST PASSING THROUGH DESIGNATED POINT AT 0300Z/13 JUNE X NO SHIPPING KNOWN TO BE IN ASSIGNED AREA X WITHIN FOUR DAYS WILL SIGNAL ROUTE FOR CROSSING TRAFFIC LANES TO SOUTHWARD.

08 2022 HDQTRS MARCORPS to CG AMPHIBCOR, AMPHFORPAC & others concerned.

Cominch serial 00464 dated 6 June directs transfer 22nd Marines reinforced less advance echelon about 20 July to SAMOA for garrison duty in relief 7th Marines reinforced which will revert to 1st MarDiv when released by ComGen SAMOA after limited period of adjustment. Ships to be designated will be available for loading about 10 July at SAN DIEGO. Expedite organization and training. Personnel not procurable other sources will be taken from 2nd Division less 2nd Marines. Approximately one hundred graduates current ROC will arrive about 21 June. Expedite June nominations for field promotions which may be submitted by despatch. Further instructions will be issued covering assignment of about 40 excess officers of appropriate rank new in SAMOA to 22nd Marines on its arrival. Initial allowances equipment and supplies 90 days and ten units of fire.
08 2022  HDQRS USMC to CG AMPHIBCOR, AMPHFORPAC & others concerned.

(Cont'd)

Make available equipment on hand less than in hands 2nd Marines and less one half initial allowances for remaining organized units also ammunition less 2nd Marine requirements and 2 units of fire for remaining organized units. Submit requisitions for remaining deficiencies in 22nd Marines to normal sources of supply except weapons ammunition fuel and lubricants which should be submitted this headquarters. Pass to A F P F Com 11 and MarBase. Cominch Vice Chief Naval Operations BuMed BuOrd informed.

08 1935  COMINCH to CINCPAC CINCLANT COMSOWESPACFOR COMSOPAC.

Survey in progress as to numbers and disposition of salvage and other seagoing tugs with view to making available to Task Forces one or more such craft whenever action is impending. Para. Adopt and apply this principle.

08 2050  COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Contents of your 311221 May were published almost verbatim in several newspapers yesterday. Article originated with correspondent Stanley Johnson embarked in BARNETT until June 2nd. While your despatch was addressed Task Force Commanders it was sent in channel available to nearly all ships which emphasizes need of care in using channels para Cominch investigating on BARNETT and at San Diego.

08 1930  COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Highest quarters would rejoice in salvage of enemy combatant vessel for morale and publicity purposes.

08 2113  CINCPAC to All TF COMDRS Info to COMINCH.

There are good indications that Orange submarines have been ordered to search for and attack our forces returning to PEARL. RDF plots show Jap submarines on bearings and distances from MIDWAY. One. One hundred and thirty five degrees one hundred and five miles. One. One hundred and twenty four degrees three hundred fifty miles. One. Eighty one degrees two hundred ninety five miles. Presence of more submarines between MIDWAY and OAHU suspected.
Weather permitting four long range B-24's were scheduled to depart Midway last night to bomb Wake. Confirmation this mission not yet received.
CINCPAC to GOC FIJI, Info COMINCH, ADM. GHORMLEY, NAV. OBSERVER SUVA, FOR GEN. BEIGHTLER, COMGENHAWDEPT.

My 160327 established you in supreme command all allied forces FIJI under principle unity of command. Assume that principle now in effect for all land sea and air forces assigned defense FIJI. In order unity of command be maintained during period of relief NZ forces desire you retain supreme command until Cincpac directs CG US Army Force FIJI to assume supreme command accordance Cominch 00380. Desire NZ troops leaving FIJI in first shuttle trip COOLIDGE be held minimum preferably casually. Nav Observer SUVA pass to Commanding Officer or CG US Army forces on arrival.

CINCPAC to COMINCH.

Your 071954 and 071530. Though my 070829 contemplated employment of SARATOGA in Northern Area decision arrived at in my 080429 was made because hazard to one carrier would be unduly high and because SARATOGA air group requires more training. Continued strenuous employment for the two carriers involved must therefore be accepted. SARATOGA will furnish planes as needed to Task Force 16 and will then return to PEARL to replenish and ferry aircraft to MIDWAY and then complete training. Fitch will command SARATOGA Task Force. Fletcher will be given a rest and probably take WASP group. Through oversight believe move of battleships out of SANFRANCISCO on 5th was not reported to you. They are 1000 miles West of that place today and will be at sea available for eventualities until their return via SANPEDO on 19th. LONG ISLAND is with them in accordance my 020157. On her return she will be used for training carrier groups unless and until required to assist KITTYHAWK and HAMMONDSPORT in aircraft transport. Additional AVG's assigned will undoubtedly be very useful but increasing employment of BB's in advanced areas depends upon increased strength in regular carriers fighting aircraft and destroyers.

CINCPAC to COMINCH.

Three planes my 082133 returned MIDWAY. Had arrived vicinity of target too late to attack before daylight made security impossible. Fourth B-24 with General Tinker aboard feared lost about 40 minutes after takeoff. Special searches today and tomorrow.
Joint purchasing board now set up for immediate operation at Longbow which considered best location. Chormley sends this. Pending arrival navy and marine members board will function under Westbrook army member in collaboration with Navy Supply Officer. Cominich pass to ComGen SOS for info.
11 0336  COMSUBSOWESPAC TO VARIOUS

Submarine TAUTOG arrived today. Outstandingly successful results follow: One submarine off JOHNSTON Island April 26. 10,000 ton AK May 16. Item-one class and Item-28 submarines May 17. These 3 south of TRUK. 10,000 ton AK May 22 at Lat. 06 North Long. 159-28 East. 5,000 ton AK May 25 at Lat. 0407 North Long. 143-32 East. Total 3 subs 3 Marus.

11 0401  COMPTWING 4 TO CINCPAC COMINCH CTF 8, 16

Catalina reports unidentified ships in KISKA Harbor 110320 GCT. All here told.

11 0501  CINCPAC TO GHORMLEY

Urdis 100515. 37th Army Division not repeat not assigned NEW ZEALAND for land defense. Until departure for FIJI should be in same status as Marines in para IX LONEWOLF PLAN. In emergency or event attack 37th Division in NEW ZEALAND may be used as Task Force under GCC NZ military forces under principle unity of command.

11 0537  CINCPAC TO COMINCH

VADM Ghormley dispatch zero five one two one five. George Option Cast NEW ZEALAND Military Forces and Ghormley recommend: (1) New Zealand personnel except those with TONGA defense force be withdrawn (2) Two four inch guns with ammunition and stores remain manned by US (3) Two eighteen pound guns ammunition stores withdrawn to New Zealand (4) TONGA Defense Force be equipped with Unit Sail weapons and supplied and commanded by Unit Sail commander, present weapons shipped to FIJI for third battalion FIJI Defense Force. ComGen BLEACHER desires retain status quo. View Urdis zero one one eight two eight and logistics involved I concur and approve Ghormley's recommendations. Request steps be taken Army equip BLEACHER native defense force with Unit Sail weapons and ammunition and provide future supply that force. WHITNEY pass to ComGen BLEACHER for info CinCPac originator.

11 0921  NAS KODIAK TO CTF-8 INFO VARIOUS

Summary from ComAlsec and CPW-4 from last report to 110800 GCT nil enemy contacts in SEWARD area. Four enemy ships found KISKA by Catalina 110320. Army bombers ordered out. Catalina will keep under observation bomb at daylight and check ATTU first chance. Reinforcements arrived four to Sam Point four to Dutch Harbor one damaged landing. Total effective Catalinas 20. Under repair 10. Searching max sectors south tonight first priority KISKA. Local Army knows all.
MAY 28th

The subject of coordination of activities, Army-Navy at AUCKLAND comes up in Vice Admiral Ghormley's 280315. No great difficulty is expected.

The CinC has commended TF 11, 16, 17 for recent excellent work.

C.G. Samoa 290233 reports STRAWBOARD occupied by U.S. Forces. This ends a long wait and increases confidence in Free French. On the other hand Free French are trying to send in own people to run the Port of NOUMEA (Tangier 290339) (Espiritu Santos has been occupied by our forces)

The underwater damage of the YORKTOWN is slight and she will leave with TF 17 at 0700V/30. This gives us a much better chance to be successful at MIDWAY the first week in June. Also, the Army will have a total of around 60 B-17 at Oahu-Midway in the next few days.

CTF 1 282150 - very dangerous and wholly unnecessary.

The TANGIER search may now be more extensive than necessary and is hard on personnel and material. But Admiral McCain is the man on the spot to take corrective action.

A "front" is approaching MIDWAY from the west thus making the weather unfavorable for Blue.

Conversations between the CincPac and TF Commanders on MIDWAY plans continue. No change in the plan has been accepted.

MAY 29th

A submarine was reported 450 miles 282° from Midway and another 300 miles 220° from the same place. RDF gives and enemy submarine approximate 660 miles North of OAHU. As expected the enemy is beginning to try to find out if the coast is clear.

The SUMNER will soon make additional STRAW surveys. At STRAWBOARD the unloading is as difficult as it was expected to be, and there is good evidence that the loading of the ships for the SO PAC base reinforcements was poor - adding to difficulties.

The GRENADEIER got 1 AP and 1 AF on recent Jap patrol.
MAY 29th (cont'd)

Decendants of Japanese in U. S. Army at HAWAII are being shipped to the Mainland for duty. There still remains 14,000 plus employed by Army or defense on vital work in the islands.

Admiral Fletcher leaves tomorrow and the SARATOGA arrival here is to be expedited. The day is primarily concerned with perfecting the MIDWAY defenses.

In another AIDAC Cominch gives his ideas of enemy forces and plans.

Kiska and Attu might be enemy Aleutian objective, the former for a seaplane operating base.

MAY 30

In his despatch (300151) Cincpac desired an attack on WAKE by Army B-17s. This was proposed and adopted as a measure to neutralize ORANGE air now at that place which could be flown to Midway after occupation and to knock it out as a staging point. Our air people think also that there is a real threat that long range aircraft from WAKE might make a preliminary attack on MIDWAY. This may be true but it is doubted by the Plans Section. It was understood that this would not affect the readiness of the striking air on June 1. It was stated that the Army was all for this and that they only wanted permission to go. Their answer (300523) indicates a change of heart when the proposition was agreed to by Admiral Nimitz, because of the supposed threat from WAKE.

Our patrol planes from Midway ran into two Jap twin-motored VB from WAKE. One of our men was slightly wounded. As own search was to 700 miles it was realized that there might be contact with the WAKE search. This contact was not recorded by C.I.

Cincpac wants to know if the NEW ZEALAND air will also be taken from FANTAN when their troops go. It might be easier to have USA air after our troops arrive there.

Cominch is showing interest in the possibilities of a seaplane ramp at ROSES. At present we have only the TANGIER planes nearby.
May 30 (Cont'd)

The Japs are continuing aerial observation of the Gilbert, Ellice Groups and of Ocean and Nauru.

Our plans for the defense of Midway are going along. The SARATOGA will come out at 20 knots as soon as possible, thus making another CV task force available here by around June 8th. It was proposed to lay some metal airfield planking at Midway for VBs. But time is too short now although the material is in Honolulu. The Army is getting more VBs at Oahu.

In an Aidac: Admiral Theobald gives the initial deployment of his North Pacific Force and sets a rendezvous south of Kodiak for June 3d.

The two companies of American troops that occupied Espiritu Santo Island, New Hebrides, did so without incident on May 28th.

The CUTTLEFISH on patrol at a possible Orange rendezvous (Lat. 27° N, 170° E) sighted three enemy planes. It is hoped that she was not observed.
MAY 31st

The MIDWAY area was quiet. Nothing was reported by the search from MIDWAY or JOHNSTON. Nothing was heard from the Task Forces there nor was anything expected.

B-17s which just arrived at MIDWAY went out 700 miles west to try to sight an attack ORANGE at his supposed rendezvous. Results negative.

In his Aidac COMINCH is worried about T.F. 8. Apparently he thinks proper use is not being made of shore based air. To begin with, shore based air in ALASKA is limited, and in the ALEUTIANS almost non-existent. Furthermore, as noted before we cannot expect much from Army air against mobile targets.

C.G. Hawaiian Department 2245/31 gives a summary of his air strength.

In the past three days there has been an exchange of Aidacs on the employment of Raider battalions now available at STRAW. CinCpacs idea is that they could be very successful at TULAGI now, for example. Gen MacArthur thinks the idea not sound as we cannot now hold the place attacked nor support communications. This, of course, is not how the Raiders would be employed. COMINCH agrees that now is a good time to hit such a place but says that the raider battalion is not strong enough and proposes diverting other troops. Thus, neither seem to understand CinCpacs proposition.
June 1st.

One of our patrol planes searching from MIDWAY was attacked by a twin engine land plane. Two slightly wounded.

The SARATOGA, SAN DIEGO, and 4 DD should arrive at PEARL about June 5th.

CinCPac 012135 and General MacArthur's 010058 refer to cooperation between areas.

CinCPac 012217 deals with employment of VB at MIDWAY. It may be that we now have more there than can be handled.

Submarines made an attack in SYDNEY HARBOR but only sank a ferry boat. The war in the South Pacific has slowed down considerably. Our attempt to use a Raider battalion at TULAGI has been frowned on by General MacArthur. He sees a regiment intrenched there with a division at RABAUL. It is possible that he wont let this take place for personal reasons? In any event it is too bad as the Japs are now very weak and extended in that vicinity. A few weeks from now may be too late as they seem to plan to recommence their offensive.

ABEMAMA in the GILBERTS received two bombs yesterday.

CinCPac 012131 gives policy on communiques from the Pacific Ocean Areas. He will issue any that go out, but does not expect to issue any at the present.

In an Aidac from Rear Admiral Theobald he explains his conception of the ALEUTIAN strategy. CinCPac, in an Aidac, generally concurs and expresses confidence in Admiral Theobald.

There was a small flurry toward evening when a total blackout was ordered by Com-14 in anticipation of a raid. While possible, this was probably premature. Everything points to an attack on MIDWAY within the next 48 hours. The attack on the ALEUTIANS may start the same time. Our deployment is complete.
June 2.

There are increasing indications of impending attack on Aleutians and MIDWAY. Messages were sent to forces and stations calling for careful and prompt contact reports. CinC Pac 022319 gives the probable line-up of the Orange occupation force. It was suggested to Task Force 16 and 17 that a position further to the West might be advantageous. Own submarines off MIDWAY were given definite patrol points, the plan for them remaining as generally indicated in Operation Plan 29-42.

There has been excessive use of gasoline at MIDWAY. Since almost 400,000 gallons were accidentally destroyed last week the ability of CinCPac to keep enough AvGas at MIDWAY has caused concern.

There may have been an enemy submarine in UNALASKA BAY yesterday. It is probable that there are quite a few enemy submarines in the Central and North Pacific Areas on scouting and reconnaissance.

PBYs are again shown to be of little value when searching areas where there may be opposition. They are very vulnerable and slow. CinCPac urges a better type for this duty and suggests to Cominch that Army medium bombers operated by Navy would do.

The present plan is to send the SARATOGA and escort to join Task Force 17 from Pearl on the 6th. The CHESTER could hardly make this as she could probably not leave SAN DIEGO before the 3rd.

The Japs have reconnoitered SUVA.

June 3.

The day is generally summarized in CinC Pac 040245. Later indications are that DUTCH HARBOR had some kind of an attack but nothing serious. The force approaching MIDWAY has grown to 20-23 ships screened by DDs. B-17s attack getting 3 hits and about 3 near misses. Attack was not concentrated and probably 600 lb. bombs were used. As the day ends 4PBYs loaded with torpedoes are enroute from MIDWAY for a night attack. The CV attack on MIDWAY is scheduled for tomorrow at dawn. Our RI and CI is proving exceptionally fine.

Admiral Draemel goes to the Amphibious Force relieving Admiral Brown who goes to Com l. Captain Delaney goes to the NEW ORLEANS. Rear Admiral Spruance relieves Admiral Draemel.
June 3. (Cont'd)

C.G. HAW 040910 gives Army air strength today.

Cincpac 032225 recommends an air command at FIJI if NEW ZEALAND air stays there.

The 3rd echelon departs STRAWSTACK for STRAWBOARD the 4th.

Cincpac 040247 gives the disposition of the tuna boats recently made available to him.

The avgas situation at MIDWAY is satisfactory for the next 6-7 days as they have 543000 gals. now on hand. Receipt of more depends on what happens.

The whole course of the war in the Pacific may hinge on the developments of the next two or three days.
June 4th

CinC Pac 051225 generally records the start of what may be the greatest sea battle since Jutland. Its outcome, if as unfavorable to the Japs as seems indicated, will virtually end their expansion. We lost a large percentage of highly trained pilots who will be difficult to replace.

The remainder Task Force 1 will get underway from San Francisco and entire force take a position about 1,000 miles west of San Francisco. This move was not ordered by CinC Pac.

It will not now be announced that our forces are at WALLIS.

The FULTON is enroute to pick up YORKTOWN survivors. Salvage forces are also enroute.

There seems trouble in ALASKA between the Army and Navy over employment of Army air.

June 5th

As the day progressed mounting damage reports indicated a major defeat of the Japanese approaching Midway. It is summarized in Cincpac 060831 and 061915. Admiral Nimitz issued a conservative communique.

Cincpac 060401 suggests we obtain several small Dutch tankers which escaped from the N.E.I.

Vice Admiral Ghormeley’s 051215 and 060530 make recommendations regarding military forces at Tonga.

The enemy was quiet in other areas today.

The SARATOGA group will not arrive until tomorrow. The present plan is to have them join Task Force 17.

There is considerable to be done as a result of the Midway battle, but the most urgent is to rescue aviators and planes adrift in the wake of the battle.
June 6.

This was a great day for the American Navy. It is summarized in CinCPac 070803, 070829.

In his 070500 Vice Admiral Ghormley recommends that General Meade be retained in command at Fiji until U.S. Army have taken over.

The C.G. Straw 070757 indicates that unloading at Strawboard is complete. This is a very good job as unloading there was bound to be very difficult.

The SARATOGA group arrived and commenced fueling. They leave in the morning to rendezvous with TF-17. Developments will be waited upon before deciding where to send the group. Admiral Fitch, the Task Force Commander, will be here about the 8th in the CHESTER. As Alaska does not seem to be doing so well, it may be decided to send her there to help TF-8.

June 7.

In the Alaska sector the Army inadvertently fired on a Soviet ship.

The day in the Central and Northern Pacific Areas is summarized in CinCPac 080351 and 080931. The decision regarding the employment of the SARATOGA group is in CinCPac 080429.

The Commanding General STRAW describes the political and economic conditions at WALLIS where he has just completed a personal inspection. In general, the island people welcome the arrival of U.S. troops and can be expected to cooperate. Possibly because they see a source of food and clothes which they have not been able to get for over 1½ years, our Marines are quite welcome.

General Marshall (4157/7) authorizes Army pursuit for MIDWAY as a temporary emergency measure.

The following are Army planes in commission in the Hawaiian department today: B-17 61; B-26 23; B-25 1; LB-30 5; B-18 10; A-20 6; P-40 100; P-39 14; P-36 22; 0-47 7.

In his 080731 (ComSWPac) General MacArthur recommends an offensive now in the NEW BRITAIN area, but needs our amphibious force that is not quite ready. He would also need 2 CV groups.

CominCh concurs in CinCPac 072145.
June 7 (Continued)

Admiral Ghormely sees need of an additional mobile base hospital at FULCRUM.

18 PBY and 12 B-17 are being retained at MIDWAY for the present.

Admiral Nimitz has received many congratulations from all over the world for his victory at MIDWAY.

Cominch has ordered more planes for the PacFleet pool.

Our people at Chunking seem to be fairly sure of indications pointing to a Jap offensive into Siberia. There have been CI indications of this in the past week or so.

Submarines continue active off the East Coast of Australia. Otherwise that area is quiet.

June 8

Task Force One will operate for 4 days as shown in Cincpac 08 2135. The Amphibious Force was released from 48 hours notice for a regiment to depart and placed on orders to leave after a reasonable time from notification. Normal liberty in Oahu ends this evening when condition 2 goes into effect.

There is no news of contacts from any task force commanders. It seems very possible that all enemy forces except submarines have withdrawn from the Midway and Aleutian areas. Submarines may be trying to get into attack positions off Pearl. But because we cannot be sure that the enemy is not reforming for a new attack no chances are being taken.

On June 1st Mexico declared war on the Axis powers as of May 22d. U.S.A. declared war on Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, as of June 5th.

In the near future it is expected that the Free French vessels in the South Pacific will operate under Vice Admiral Ghormley.

Marine Headquarters 082022 gives plan for relief of 7th Marines at Samoa by the 22nd Marines.

As Captain W.L. Ainsworth is ordered additional duty to command DesFlots 1 and 2 Pacific, Cominch suggests Flotilla commanders be abolished. That would facilitate this administrative command set-up.
June 8 (cont.)

Cominch 081935 directs salvage tugs be sent along with task forces when there is impending action.

Cominch 08 2050. Apparently some leak of enemy dispositions for "American campaign" got into the newspapers.

Cominch 081930 suggests we salvage a Jap ship. The only one possible was the CA reported gutted and abandoned. However, a submarine in the area found evidence that the ship had sunk.

Cincpac 082113 gives a submarine warning in the Hawaiian Area.

Cincpac 082243 gives the command set-up for Fiji.

Cincpac 082029 explains the employment of the SARATOGA.

Cincpac 091135. General Tinker was probably lost in a flight to Wake.

June 9.

The area where the CA was supposed to be gutted and abandoned was again searched by the TROUT and search planes from Midway. The TROUT picked up two prisoners who had been floating around in the wreckage. It would have been fine to bring in such a ship to boost public morale, but wreckage may help.

CinCPac congratulated all major commanders involved in the Battle of Midway.

On May 4th the GAR sank one 6000-ton AK in the Marshalls and on May 17 sank a 1500-ton ship thought to be a "q" ship off Truk.

Comsopac 100545 discusses a joint purchase board at Longbow.

There have been no indications of Jap landings in the Aleutians although the possibility exists. The enemy force there is unreported and may be withdrawing. If nothing is heard of them by tomorrow the plan is to bring TF-16 back to Pearl. Cominch is rather noncommittal in a message giving his estimate of enemy plans. He gives three courses which the enemy may adopt. The problem is to guess which. For
Compatwing 4 110510. TI during last few days indicates formation of strong screening force by enemy in Northern area which is believed to be based upon his estimate that we will react strongly to his occupation of ATTU and KISKA. I consider that his drive for MORESBY and/or other Southern bases which is also well indicated by TI and past DI is a greater threat to our interests. I therefore propose to return Task Force 16 and the Fleet units of Task Force 8 to Pearl in preparation for future operations and will employ only submarines and shore based air against the enemy in the KISKA Area for the time being. Will return West Coast units to ComAlSec. Request your comment.

Agree in general with your 110929 especially as regards preparation TF 16 for future operations and for use of submarines and air against KISKA para two suggest part of TF 8 join up with TF 1 for operations and training approximately on line DUTCH HARBOR PEARL pending further developments.

Reference dispatch 051215 of June 1942 from VAdm Ghormley Commanding General Bleacher has assumed responsibility and command of all forces including local defense force. No change in artillery matters should be made. Recommend New Zealand command retain administrative and supply responsibilities for local defense force also that New Zealand personnel be not repeat not relieved. No serious difficulties in supply and administration are being encountered. American occupation of this island may not be of long duration but local defense forces must be so organized that they can continue to function and to be supplied from New Zealand after American forces have left. Therefore no extra weapons available for local forces and but limited supplies. Signed Lockwood.
4TH DEF BN TO CINCPAC

In the absence of General Chamberlin have assumed tactical command Roses urad 120059 May. Reference section 1621 revised statutes has 4th Def Bn been detached for service with unit sail army.

CHORMLEY TO CINCPAC

Following from Comsowestpac passed on to Cincpac quote account institution coastal convoys east coast. To combat present Jap submarine menace ACNB has urgent need for all available AMS vessels. Consequently I propose authorize withdrawal WILCANNIA and MIDURA now operating from White Poppy. ACNB has by hand unquote. Ghormley originator. If Cincpac agrees to withdrawal recommend arrangement for replacement from other source earliest practicable date to fill urgent need pending installation contemplated A/S defenses.

NAS KODIAK TO COMDR FLIGHT 11 INFO CINCPAC

Patrol Wing 4 delivering as per orders at 120120 three Catalinas dropped bombs on Kiska Harbor enemy as follows on CA 3 on transport one one destroyers one on gun boat one. Results not yet reported. One Catalina bombed DD and CL westside Kiska Island course west reports damage doubtful. Catalina P-43P sunk repeat sunk Jap sub Lat 51-00 Long 177-10 at 111800 GCT sub caught on surface course east true speed 20. Refueled and rearmed Catalinas enroute to bomb the Jap CA lat 52 long 177-05 West at 110225 GCT. Sand Point unit and tender moving to Atka to keep hammering. Shore based Nakajuna fighters operating from Attu. Local Army reads this. Own losses unreported at present. Four new Catalinas received today.
Continued

Umnak field reported scouted by 4 Jap VOs. Atka Harbor scouted by twin flat at 1505Z0. Nil carriers sighted. Very few CV type planes. Progression of RDF cuts in Bering Sea indicate force moving south. Weather predicted excellent along and north Aleutian chain Saturday. Conclusion Japs hit Atka Saturday. Big boats start bombing our bases. Possible carrier attack from north. Tender and planes falling back to Nicholski and Chernofski tonight. Gillis directed evacuate Atka people. Scorch earth. Patrol sectors 10 to 13 inclusive overnight. Search north for CV early daylight. About 40 effectives available. All precincts not reported. From Thursday morning to Friday evening Catalina shuttle express Kiska and return took all Gillis gas and bombs. Splendid organization of LtCom Norman Garton Comdg and continuous unremitting toil by crew made the schedule possible. Comalsec and local Army have this from Compawing Four.

COMNOWESEAFRON TO COMINCH INFO CINC PAC

This from General Dewitt deliver to Chief of Staff Army. Basis for constant request for both air and ground reinforcements for Alaska is conviction that Glenn, Mears, Randall, Morrow and Kodiak can be held if air and ground reinforcements repeatedly requested are provided and that successful defense of Dutch Harbor is dependent upon retention of Glenn and Randall. Kodiak cannot be successfully defended if posts to the westward fall. Protection of navy section bases Kodiak and Dutch Harbor essential in defense of Alaska. Comnowesaftron concurs entirely and emphatically with above statements. Again request 4 bombardment squadrons 2 equipped with B24S and 2 equipped with B-17 airplanes 1 trained infantry regiment one AA regiment and one composite AA Battalion be made immediately available for defense of Aleutian area. Sending from here as early as shipping permits one AA regiment each to Glenn and Randall and infantry battalion to Glenn together with 2 batteries field artillery 75 mm to Glenn and one to Randall. Buckner moving rapidly as possible one battalion infantry available to him to increase garrison Randall. Navy advises today Japs on Kiska and Attu with fleet force in addition north of Tanaga Island. B-17s unable to reach Kiska which can be reached by B24s. B17s can operate against fleet force north of Tanaga.
NAS KODIAK TO COMTASKFOR 8

12 1720

This from Butler Com 11th Air Force. Following paraphrase from Ft Glenn 5 B-17s back from Kiska at 120955 report Jap antiaircraft btrys definitely landed and cruiser based, landing from cruiser continued during raid, tent city seen, 1 enemy plane ran when attacked, no zero fighters or seaplanes seen, Bareckson counted 14 vessels in harbor and 2 entering at full steam. One pilot believed he saw geometrical design of destroyers headed southeast. 2 cruisers believed heavily hit. No losses no damage unquote.

12 2345

Com Fl 811 TO Com Fl 20

Plan for tonight completion daylight attacks Patron 43 planes now Atka base Gillis Hulbert rest resume attacks daylight tomorrow. 5 torpedo planes Patron 43 now enroute attack enemy heavy cruisers or carriers at dusk return base Atka. Gillis direct Dutch Harbor, Cold Bay Units patrols 41 and 42 return each individually arriving by 0500 GCT if possible. Last 4 planes Patrol 43 now Cold Bay remain that base prepare attack tomorrow. Patrol 43 maintain 1 plane contact with enemy Kiska forces during darkness. Dutch Group. Covering sectors 10 to 13 inclusive tonight.

13 1200

NAS KODIAK TO CTF 8

Supplement to my 122235 new enemy contacts made since. 1 CL 1 DD moored semisipochnoi repeat Semisopochnoi Island excellent forward site for ack ack protection to Kiska. Attacks not previously reported 122100 Catalina 2 bombs on cruiser lat 52 north long 178° 45' west. Cruiser plane attempted to prevent and beaten by PEY. Bomb results uncertain. 121845 2 bombs from pilot Johnston 1000 feet on DD. Same from Mr Greene from 1500 on CL both at Kiska results not observed. Irene chased by 4 engined PB. Also caught some shrapnel. 130210 Catalina 4 heavies on massed ships Kiska. Results not observed dicked for clouds. 130215 Ensign Dahl torpedoed CA near Kiska, good hit. 122343 3 Catalinas led by LtCom Doc Jones delivered 12 500 to Jap Kiska fleet. Did not wait count results but straffed set afire 1 4 engine PB. At 130521 the big party. 6 Catalinas placed 16 500 in the middle. At least 1 tremendous explosion. Plenty fires still blazing. New casualties since last report none except many bullet and shrapnel holes and 1 PB5A now a land plane bottom not water proof. All foregoing reports from navigators no army attacks included.
GINC PAC TO CO 4th DEF BN

Urdis 110840 negative. Unity of command gives you responsibility and authority to coordinate operations, organize task forces, assign missions and designate objectives but not to control Army administration and discipline nor to issue instructions beyond those necessary for effective coordination.

CINCPAC TO CINC PAC

Based on prospective advanced base activity deriving from WPL 46 FC and on recent increasing necessity for land-based aircraft, I believe a large scale program for construction of advanced bases and of numerous mutually supporting island airfields will be essential. Although shortage of shipping may retard base development, I believe local planning for South Pacific construction should be vigorously prosecuted and that every effort should be made to secure maximum accomplishment on current SoPac projects by coordination of personnel, materials, and equipment now available on area or scheduled for early arrival. To assist in accomplishing both objectives and to plan and direct an increasing number of SoPONER projects to support operations, the South Pacific Area request assignment at earliest possible date of 12 civil engineer officers additional to Bupers 059516. I also request 1 construction battalion for SoPONER to establish an advanced based headquarters including a receiving station for construction personnel and a storage depot for materials and equipment. Recommendations retarding advanced base construction will be made after conference with Admirals McCain and Byrd.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC

EARLY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ASSIGNMENT SERVICE TYPE AIRCRAFT TO REPLACEMENT CARRIER SQUADRONS EXISTING AND TO BE FORMED. THIS TO PROVIDE TRAINED REPLACEMENTS FOR CARRIERS NOW IN SERVICE AND TO START BUILDING UP SQUADRONS FOR CARRIERS NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION. INTENTION TO ESTABLISH AT AN EARLY DATE OFFICE OF COMMANDER CARRIER REPLACEMENT SQUADRONS PACIFIC FLAG OFFICER ON WEST COAST PROBABLY ALAMEDA DUTIES TO ORGANIZE FIT OUT AND TRAIN REPLACEMENT CARRIER SQUADRONS. COMMENT.

COMPATWING 4 TO COMFLT 11

Operations by Patwing 4 reported since My 131200. Catalina pilot Sorenson bombed KISKA sunk several 4-engined PBs in water and completely demolished adjacent radio or aerological station. Pilot Jackobson then dropped 600 pounder between 3 PBs remaining on water and one on adjacent beach. Results not observed but easy to assume. Japs clearing burning Southeast cape of island possibly for landing field. Catalina number 2 pilot Hildebrand returned this morning unable drop bombs in KISKA at 122300 driven off 3 times by zero fighters. Got away O.K. Last report enemy force at KISKA 4 cruisers 1 transport North of Head 4 transports 3 CL several DD South side. Catalinas 44 to 51 inclusive Lt.Cdr. D. Jones out of ATKA for DUTCH via KISKA at 131525. 4 Catalinas numbers 4 7 15 35 ATKA to DUTCH via KISKA at 131605. Results of night searches Southern sectors negative. Off on North day searching fog at 231415. GILLIS destroyed ATKA departed for DUTCH with school teacher and wife at 131516. Natives skipped when first Jap plane sighted. HULBERT rounded up evacuated 26 men 17 women 18 kids. Estimate 25 left. Casualties since last report 3 Catalinas abandoned destroyed ATKA due unrepairable combat damage 12 June. 1 Catalina crashed taking off KODIAK 131720 BuAero 04490 belly had under torpedo loaded wing. Torpedo dropped ran missed SPICA SAN MIEL exploded between docks. No damage. Personnel two previously reported killed over KISKA area LANSING William Hatey AMM1c no data available. KEITH Ellis J. Jr. seaman second class unmarried next of kin and beneficiaries mother and father Mr. Mrs. E.E.J. KEITH 112 Libbod Sargme Houston Texas request notify above and Miss Margaret Porter 2509 Henevert St. Houston Texas; insurance Seaboard Life Houston 2800 National Service 2000 National Mutual Houston 500 one wounded

(see next page)
is MORTENSEN Minton R. ACRM next of kin wife Josephine Nancy MORTENSEN 4077 Dwight St, San Diego request notify above and Mrs. Eazy R. Mortensen 452 Garfield Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah. Enroute to DUTCHe on GILLIS. Killed in take off crash Ens. Robert D. Jones, Jr., AVN USNR. Beneficiary wife Mrs. Robert H. Jones 2260 Alameda Ave., Alameda, Calif., one son two years. Requested notify also mother Mrs. Roberta H. Jones 909 South Oak St., Ablington, Texas Veterans Insurance 10,000. Lt (jg) Charles H. Holf, USN and crew of six slightly injured shaken. GILLIS ETA DUTCHe 2100 13 June. HULBERT at NICOLSKI WILLIAMSON at CHEROPSKI. Cominich pass to Bureaus.

14 0457 CNEAD TO CINCPAC

There are approximately 18 B-26 airplanes in this area which have withdrawn from availability to the Naval Base Air Defense in preparation for ferrying to points further Southwest. Commander Naval Base Air Defense is assisting in torpedo training of the B-26 crews. B-26 aircraft are considered of greatly more value as torpedo planes than as bombers. In view of the urgent need for long range torpedo planes in the Hawaiian Area it is recommended that representations be made for 18 B-26 aircraft to remain in this area.

14 0616 GHORMLEY TO COMINCH

Fully understand concur and will carry out principles enunciated your 171750 April with all forces assigned or which may be available this area. Cominich 111530. To strike enemy shipping it is necessary to have surface or subsurface combatant forces, which at present we lack, or land or seaplane bases within practicable striking range of hostile concentrations shipping lanes or focal points. Refer your 220523 May postponing construction airfield ESPIRITU SANTO. First echelon Marine Amphibious Force arrive LONGBOW today. Its offensive power should not be reduced by assignment to defensive roles such as protection of advanced airfields except when urgently needed. Desire initiate advance through New HEBRIDES SANTA CRUX and ELLICE Islands as soon as prospect of reinforcement is more favorable. The specific answer to your question is no enemy shipping in South Pacific Area or within effective striking distance available forces.
NAV ATT WELLING to CINCPAC, COMWESSEAFRON

15 0415

YOUR 140215 X PRESENT ALLOCATION FULCRUM 3 M/SA/S WITH 1 M/SA/A AND 1 M/S ARRIVING SHORTLY X LONGBOW 2 M/SA/S 1 M/S X FANTAN 3 M/SA/S LYTTELTON 1 M/S REMAINDER REFITTING AND ON PASSAGE FROM UNIT KING X IN VIEW PRESENT SUBMARINE THREAT IT IS FELT THOSE BASED SPOONER SHOULD REMAIN BUT IF 3 BASED FANTAN 1 COULD BE SENT WHITE POPPY IF YOU SO DESIRE WHICH WOULD LEAVE SMALL COVER FOR MANY SHIPPING MOVEMENTS IN FANTAN AREA

COMINCH to COM US FOR EUROPE info COMSOWESPACFOR, CINCPAC COMSOPACFOR

In addition to assignment of LEOPARD and TRIOMPHANT to ComSpPac request arrangement be completed with Free French authorities for assignment converted cruiser CAP DE PALMES and escort vessel CHEVREUIL to Commander South Pacific Cooperating under principle unity of command. Present arrangements as to pay subsistence of crews and maintenance of vessels to continue.

COMINCH to CINCAPC, Info CARPAC MATERIAL OFF AT SAN DIEGO, COMCARPACFLT.

Contemplate following disposition LEXINGTON YORKTOWN squadrons (A) LEXINGTON retain squadrons in commission with same designations for present detach up to 50 percent personnel for other duty build up with new personnel as replacement carrier group 11 West Coast (B) YORKTOWN retain squadrons in commission utilize personnel as required fill up HORNET ENTERPRISE build up with new personnel as replacement group 12 Hawaii. Comment.

CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMCARPAC (ADMIN) COMADCARTRANG GROUP AT SAN DIEGO.

Fully concur in all respects your 111922 except believe consideration should be given to better aircraft training and AVG operating conditions San Diego Area. War experience particularly recent has demonstrated necessity for trained carrier replacement groups. New aircraft deliveries and new flight school graduates to date have done little more than balance operational and battle losses of active carrier planes and pilots. Realize this condition has been unavoidable and is now improving. Meanwhile it has been and will remain essential to keep active carrier groups fully equipped and manned and to have have here in Hawaiian Area for immediate use reasonable pool of planes and pilots. Plan to build this pool into replacement group as soon as practicable and
(Cont'd)

15 2201

distribute other replacement groups as they are formed in accordance demands of situation. Present status active carrier groups is not good, General tendency operational fatigue due long continued intensive operations at sra and heavy battle attrition without relief that replacement groups will provide when available. Will return to mainland for assignment to new squadrons to extent that they can now be spared pilots who are most exhausted particularly those of YORKTOWN and ENTERPRISE groups.

16 0131

CINCPAC to PACIFIC FLEET, Info ComSouWestPacFor, ComAirSoPac, Cominich, ComSoPac, Com 11 12 13 14 15.

Striking Forces Pacific fleet hereby reorganized as follows. TaskFor 11 Rear Admiral Pitch in SARATOGA cruisers Rear Admiral Kinkaid in MINNEAPOLIS NEW ORLEANS ASTORIA DESRON 1 less FARRAGUT. TaskFor 16 Rear Admiral Fletcher in ENTERPRISE cruisers Rear Admiral Smith in LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, CHESTER, ATLANTA COMDESRON 6 in BALCH BENHAM ELIET MAURY GRIDLEY MccALL GWIN MONSSEN. TaskFor 17 Rear Admiral Mitscher in HORNET cruisers Rear Admiral Good in NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA, SAN DIEGO, COMDESRON 2 in MORRIS RUSSELL ANDERSON MUSTIN MAHAN PRESTON SMITH. TaskFor 18 Rear Admiral Noyes in WASP cruisers Rear Admiral Scott in QUINCY VINCENNES SAN FRANCISCO SAN JUAN DesDiv 15 and 23 less WOODWORTH plus PARENHOLT. This reorganization effective for ships now at Pearl at 0930 GCT 16 June and for units now in TaskFor 18 upon arrival San Diego. Other units listed are to complete currently assigned tasks before reporting to reorganized forces. Orders to temporary TaskFor 11 in my 130329, 131925, 140445 and my Opord 31-42 are not modified by this despatch. Approved upkeeps and overhaul remain unchanged. Units not listed herein continue present assignments.
CINCPAC to COMINCH.

My 170241 Task Forces 16 and 17 have been placed on 48 hours notice for rest reorganization and training with particular reference to new personnel. While these forces could be used in emergency this period of readjustment is very seriously needed and every day of training for the next 10 days and not to exceed two weeks will pay great dividends later. Will employ DD escort your 162230 to UNIMAK PASS and main body Task Force 8 to Nome. Pacific Ocean Areas continue quiet.

CINCPAC to PACIFIC FLEET, COMSOPAC, Info: COMINCH, COMAIRSOPAC, COMSWPAC, COMSEPAC.

Following Pacific Fleet units are hereby transferred to South Pacific Force effective 0000Z/19 June and will acknowledge this despatch to Comsopac for at first opportunity consistent with operational radio restrictions. At POPPY CURTISS McFARLAND and attached patrol planes MACKINAC. At Bobcat TERN. At Bleacher WHITNEY, SOLACE. At Straw or enroute thereto SWAN TURKEY CAMANGA YP 240 289 and 292. Enroute to Roses YP 239 and 346. At Fulcrum RIGEL. At Longbow Transdiv 8 less HEYWOOD GEORGE F ELLIOTT Transdiv Ten Less BARNETT LIBRA. Para. Following units now in South Pacific Area will not pass to command of Comsopac for but will rejoin the Pacific Fleet when so ordered by Cinpac upon completion of presently assigned tasks. At Poppy TANGIER MEREDITH. At Bobcat SEPULGA. At Bleacher RAINIER KANAWHA BARKER and Comindiv 2 in MONTGOMERY RAMSAY. At Straw O'BRIEN WALKER KINGFISHER SUMNER. At Fantan TUCKER CUMMINGS. At Fulcrum SAN FRANCISCO FARRAGUT. Para.ACHILLES LEANDER report to Comsopac upon completion of present assigned tasks.
Your 111245 May has been under continuous consideration which has been intensified by your 151310. All carrier task force commanders have studied and commented on problem presented. My conclusions based on experience to date follow: Modern naval warfare will continue to present tactical situations favorable to night destroyer attacks which must and will be exploited by our responsible commanders at the scene of action. Advent of carrier borne aircraft in fast moving carrier task forces has greatly curtailed such attack opportunities and has made such attacks prohibitive unless destroyers are present in numbers considerably in excess of defensive screen requirements. To date such excess over minimum requirements has not been available. In addition screening plane guarding and prompt development night radar contacts requires destroyers in constant attendance carriers. Greater distances and faster moving forces reduce ability destroyers to rejoin their carriers at succeeding daylight which situation is entirely unacceptable unless reasonably sure of immunity from enemy submarine and air attack or unless destroyers in excess of minimum defensive requirements are available. Fuel situation for destroyers is usually precarious even without high speed at night. Necessity for guarding the ever present and important tankers further reduces number available. Be assured that the question you raise is constantly in my mind and also in the minds of my Task Force Commanders who can be counted upon to exploit favorable opportunities. The destruction of enemy carriers which has already taken place and the availability to us of more carriers and destroyers which is expected from the building program should give added impetus to our aggressive operations of the future.

ComGen HawDept secret file 6663 of 16 May request support this effort to improve air component at CHRISTMAS ISLAND and to provide aircraft at CANTON ISLAND which now has none. This matter is important and urgent. Earliest possible favorable action is necessary.
Present plan of operation includes continuance of patrol plane scouting operations against enemy's advance in ALEUTIAN-ALASKA PENINSULA Area with Army air striking force disposed to attack located enemy forces that area. Contemplate use of submarines for observation ATTU and KISKA and to attack important enemy units as opportunities offer there and in middle ALEUTIAN area. When submarine reinforcements arrive will use new type vessels in the advanced stations and use old type on stations closer to UMNAK-DUTCH HARBOR approaches. Contemplate dispatching detachment of 4 PBYs to Nome to scout against enemy advance on that place. Will utilize Army bombardment and pursuit restricted by orders from Washington to operation in FAIRBANKS-NOME area as striking force against enemy advancing on latter place. Will escort and cover movement of individual Army transports, between SEWARD and Nome and reinforce escort as possible for WEST COAST-DUTCH HARBOR Naval transport movement giving such surface and air coverage as prior obligation to Army SEWARD-NOME movement permits. Will use main body for surface coverage as practicable and to exploit any opportunity for attrition attacks on detached enemy units.

Your 130333 Opnav 202035. In view present uncertainty place of Lion installation shipment Lion material to SPOONER appears in advisable. Referring Cub believe shipment material for construction advance air fields and bases merits consideration but to reduce demands on shipping and rehandling such material should be kept to minimum required and placed in storage in port advance as close as reasonable safety now permits to sites where material may be expected to be used. SPOONER appears unnecessarily distant. Suggest WHITE POPPY. Request your comment.
COMSOPACFOR TO CINCPAC

First shuttle trip PRESIDENT COOLIDGE from FULCRUM to FANTAN Cominch serial 00380 of May 13 leaves FULCRUM 25 June. My 240620 and 260415 May Cominch 021545 June. I reiterate my concern over withdrawal New Zealand forces from Fantan. Situation as presented in Comairsopac 220430 indicates necessity strengthening forward positions instead of retrograde movement at this time. In any case it is essential that New Zealand troops remain FANTAN until 37th U.S. Division thoroughly experienced.

CINCPAC TO CONAIRSOPAC INFO COMSOPAC

Have under consideration use of NOUMEA Harbor as rest and replenishment anchorage for carrier task forces. Desire you make preliminary reconnaissance NOUMEA Harbor and submit recommendation as to probable best area for protected anchorage. Have in mind utilizing SUMNER for detailed survey of recommended area. Desire also general survey facilities for basing ashore at POPPY at least 2 carrier aircraft groups while carriers are in port. Survey should cover present facilities and what in addition is needed for both carrier aircraft service units and flight crews of aircraft groups. Submit similar air facility survey as early as practicable for 1 carrier aircraft group each at BLEACHER and FANTAN.
MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC

Will collect data and forward at earliest possible date reference your 260317. In this connection I have just informed the war department that there are numerous signs of increased enemy activity in the Bismarck-Solomons area involving the development of airfields and ground installations while shipping activity considerably exceeds the requirements for normal supply. This may presage aggressive action but deem it more probable consolidation for defense. In either case the situation here is changing and I have requested the shipment of additional airplanes to meet the enemy development.

COMAIRSOU PAC to CINCPAC

In view transfer to Xray by Army of B-17s assigned this area affected yesterday. Your 250221. 18 VP planes considered minimum requirement POPPY. Believe division this number between FANTAN and POPPY undesirable except to cover some special situation. FANTAN requires 12 VP as soon as available. In addition have equipment present Singapore Squadron there with 6-9 Catalinas from lend lease planes understood currently in production. Effective POPPY 15 PBY-5S. 1 more aground HAVANNAH Harbor probably requiring lengthy hull repair.
**COMSOWESPAC to CINCPAC** (Part 1)

Cinmpac 242221 and 260317 available target information

**SOLOMONS BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO** forward my airmail 20 June register number 1059. 3 additional sets latest target maps plans interpretation sheets and photos being forwarded about 3 July for following localities TULGAI and vicinity FAISI BUKA NAMATANAI FENI KAVIENG RABAUL VUNAKANA U GASMA TA LAE GREENWICH. Natatives photos TULGAI will be forwarded but target information above mentioned contain full interpretations. Nil activity observed recent photos KIETA KESSA NISSEL FENI. RAAF publications 32A and ASD 203 forwarded airmets 15 and 23 May register numbers 0693and 0667 contain further information aerodromes and possible patrol plane operating area.

**COMSOWESPAC to CINCPAC** (Part 2)

Estimate Japanese land based air strength 25 June

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Copies Airmets plus enclosures also forwarded Comsoapc.
June 9th Cont'd

example, if we decide that the next/move will be in the Southwest Pacific we cannot afford to have our striking forces in the Aleutians. As the matter stands at the end of the day it seems a good guess that the enemy Midway force is withdrawing toward the west, some to the Mandates for fuel and repairs, and that the Aleutians force is unreported. There seems no doubt that the enemy is using radio deception to confuse our RDF.

Midget submarines similar to the two captured at Oahu last December were used last week to attack Sydney. They were probably transported there by large submarines.

June 10th.

NAS KODIAK 110921 gives the ALASKA summary while CinCPac 110929 gives plans for the future.

PATWING FOUR 110401 reports enemy activity at KISKA.

BLEACHER needs considerable time and equipment to fix up the air field.

CinCPac 110537 gives his views on the TONGA Defense Force, and his 110501 gives status of 37th Army Division.

Cominch has asked when Vice Admiral Ghormley would take command. It is assumed that he will take over the South Pacific Area just as soon as his communications are established and his other command arrangements completed.

The TAUTOG 110336 again describes his remarkable success at TRUK. (ComSubSoWesPac 110336)

June 11th.

Cominch 111645 agrees with the plan for future operations outlined in CinCPac 110929. CTF 8 will operate as indicated in CinCPac 112209. This change of employment from 110929 was made because of indications enemy was moving to the eastward in the ALEUTIANS. There has been no definite indication of a CV in that area for several days. TF 16 returns to PEARL to refit and prepare for action either North or South depending on developments. TF 1 continues to operate in present advanced position as long as possible without a tanker, This to provide support or a retirement point for TF 8 if necessary.

NAS KODIAK 120401 tells of bombing results at KISKA. The Landing there is definite, and a landing at ATTU is suspected.

CinCPac urges that all practicable steps be taken to expedite the completion of CVs now building.
June 11 (Continued)

The NORTH CAROLINA and WASP groups have left PANAMA enroute to the SAN DIEGO - SAN PEDRO area. The NORTH CAROLINA will join TF 1 while the WASP becomes the CV of TF 18.

Vice Admiral Ghormley 120216 recommends the use of the WILCANNIA and MIDURA.

C.G. BLEACHER 102340 and the 4th Defense Battalion 110840 give respective command set-ups.

The designation "Flotillas" in Atlantic and Pacific destroyer organizations has been abolished.

Mining at EFATE was completed today.

The SILVERSIDES returning from patrol of HONSHU reports sinking 1 SS, 3 AK, 1 AO.

Cominch again tells the Army air in the SW PAC that their best targets are enemy ships. Lately their reports indicate that they have preferred runways and shore installations while the harbors seem well filled with ships.

June 12.

The action in the Aleutians is developing as Kiska as shown by NAS Kodiak 121720, 12235 and 131200. Landing at Attu is possible also. While no one has actually seen CVs in the area the past few days, their presence is considered likely. Comnorwesseafront 121745 gives defense needs for Alaska. The messages from that area sent by Compatwing 4 have caused CinCPac to be concerned about that officers ability to handle the situation. But Compatwing 4 seems to have the complete confidence of Comalaska Sector. Our own submarine was bombed today, again showing how difficult it is to avoid this kind of a mistake.

Comsopac 130333 recommends on an advance base construction program.

CinCPac 130113 defines Unity of Command limitations for marines at Efate pending arrival of a relief for General Chamberlain who was detached leaving Col. Fasset, USMC, SCP.

The Japanese search from Wake toward Midway continues. That area is quiet.

As the threat to Oahu seems very small normal alert was resumed.
June 13th

In the Aleutians our efforts are mainly to bomb the Japanese at Kiska and to search for the suspected CV; Zero fighters were encountered at Kiska. Compatwing 4 140145 summarizes the situation.

Admirals Fletcher and Spruance arrived at Pearl.

The Central and South Pacific Areas are quiet.

CNEAD 140457 presents the need of B-26’s carrying torpedoes.

Ghormley 140616 says that he will need more forces and positions to be able to strike at enemy shipping.

Cominch 111922 plans a CV replacement and training set-up. This, under a flag officer, would train pilots and crews for CVs building also.

June 14th

Task Force One has been directed to return to the West Coast.

There were surprisingly few developments in Alaska - probably due to bad weather. The enemy continues to keep a large number of ships in Kiska for his landing there, but his carrier forces have not yet been located. Comtaskfor 8 continues to operate his main body in the vicinity of Lat. 48° N, 172° W, as previously directed by Cincpac. Both Army and Navy air continue to attack Jap forces at Kiska but an accurate account of results has not been received. The surface and air search for other enemy forces continues.

Cincpac has ordered that planes on the ferry route make reconnaissance of Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands.

NavAtt Wellington 150415 is a plan for redistribution of New Zealand patrol vessels in the South Pacific.

As he did after the Coral Sea battle, Cominch again feels that CAs and DDs should have been used in night attacks during the Battle of Midway.
June 14th (Cont'd)

The Free French DD Leopard will soon be assigned to Comdr. South Pacific Area.

A prisoner brought in by the TROUT from the Midway area confirms the belief that two cruisers of the Mogami class in the "western force" were sunk.

Outside of the Aleutians, the Pacific Ocean areas were quiet.

June 15th.

In the Aleutians it appears that the weather has prevented much activity during the past 24 hours. A flight of B17's which operated over Kiska was unable to bomb effectively due to weather. They report at least 16 vessels in the harbor.

Cominch 151300 gives proposed use of the crews of the Lexington and Yorktown. From that message it is inferred that the new CVs are ahead of the building schedule.

Cominch 1513 gives his ideas on employment of Free French units in South Pacific.

Notification to those concerned was made that Vice Admiral Ghormley will take command of the South Pacific Area on June 19th. At that time the Service Squadron South Pacific will be formed.

The Saratoga group will transport Army P40's to Midway for duty. The CV task forces at Pearl are placed on 24 hours sailing notice. CincPac 160131 gives the new command set up for the carrier task forces.

CincPac 152201 gives views on carrier pilots and training.

MacArthur is starting amphibious training. Otherwise his area is quiet.
June 16.

Task Forces 16 and 17 are utilizing the present period at Pearl Harbor to rest, refit, and replenish depleted and exhausted personnel and ships. They are ready to sail on 24 hours notice but the rest period will be extended as long as circumstances permit. When enemy moves become more clear a decision will be made regarding their next employment. The SARATOGA group, with Admiral Nimitz and Army guests embarked, spent the day training at sea off Pearl. The group will depart for the vicinity of MIDWAY tomorrow to ferry Army P-40s for duty at MIDWAY, and to train enroute.

The main body of Task Force 8 continues to operate in the vicinity of Lat 48 N, Long 172 W, in an effort to seize favorable opportunity for strong attrition tactics. The other units are scouting and attacking as weather permits.

Task Force 1 is enroute San Francisco via San Pedro. No further moves for this force are now planned. Thus, they will operate from San Francisco for training while being prepared to cover other operations.

The WASP - NORTH CAROLINA group arrive in the San Pedro - San Diego area the 19th. The NORTH CAROLINA will then join Task Force 1, and the WASP will be the center of the new task force under Rear Admiral Noyes.

Other surface units are engaged in escort.

The submarines are starting the offensive patrol in Japanese waters again. In the next few days six boats will be on station. A number are at Pearl for rest, refit and replenishment.

While the force the enemy is now employing in the ALEUTIANS is not definitely known, there is no good reason to believe that it has been substantially reinforced recently. There is the probability that the enemy is now working to base shore-based air and seaplanes at KISKA. The weather has been so bad in that area recently that definite news of his activities could not be obtained. Cominch sees the formation of a strong enemy northern force to protect the Eastern flank in case of an attack on Russia, and that he may move to occupy the St. Lawrence Islands and possibly Nome.

In the Central Pacific there is definite indications that no moves will be made in the forseeable future against the MIDWAY - OAHU line.

There continue to be indications that a resumption of the Moresby campaign is a definite possibility; but not in the very near future.
June 16 (Continued)

An attack on Russia in the next few days has been repeatedly predicted by several sources including Cominich.

Our activities in the South Pacific are confined to the multitudinous and complex problem of building up our bases and arranging for their logistic support.

In the Southwest Pacific activity was limited to the exchange of minor air attacks and search operations which have been underway for a long time.

June 17

In view of the fact that Task Forces 16 and 17 are badly in need of rest, refit and reorganization, their notice was extended to 48 hours. (Cincpac180247)

There is no further word from Task Force 8. As the Army is sending three transports with reinforcements for Nome from Seward via Unimak Pass, Comtaskfor 8 was directed to escort the move to Unimak with DDs, and from there to destination with his main body. It is considered that strong escort in the Bering Sea is necessary.

In anticipation of the formation of SoPac forces, Cincpac ordered certain vessels to that command in his 170323.

There is no new enemy information or activities.
June 18.

Task Forces at PEARL are continuing the rest and training period. As the SARATOGA group could save a round trip to MIDWAY by waiting for Marine replacement dive bombers to go there, she is being held over until about the 22nd to embark these in addition to the Army VF. The WASP group at SAN DIEGO will also have a short period of training there.

Task Force EIGHT is still silent, but the weather has cleared at KISKA to permit one Army bombing expedition. That group reports a direct hit on a transport and says that a photo shows no cruisers at KISKA. The whole situation in the ALEUTIANS remains vague.

In the Hawaiian Sea Frontier command relations have been under study for several days. Cominch desires the Fleet Opposed Invasion plan adopted here but CinCPac will probably point out difficulties of applying the Fleet Opposed Invasion formula to the Hawaiian Area.

CinCPac 172033 gives views on night attacks in carrier duels. Lack of DDs is an insurmountable obstacle to date.

CinCPac also suggests the possibility of the use of B-25 (or similar) from CVs for attack and then return to a field ashore.

CinCPac 182017 again urges that planes be placed on CANTON ISLAND for defense.

In the South Pacific the day was devoted to administrative matters of building bases and providing for their logistic support.

In the Southwest Pacific the routine aerial war continued.
June 19

Task Force 18 has arrived on the West Coast and will be ready for sea the 25th. Task Force 11 will depart for MIDWAY on the 22nd to deliver 25 Army VF and 18 Marine VSB and will return here the 29th. The other forces except Task Force 8 are engaged in normal activities. Task Force 8 is operating in the ALEUTIANS to try to stop Jap penetration there, mainly by air and submarine attack on the KISKA landing. To date results have been wholly ineffective and the Japs are presumably strengthening their occupied position(s). No CV has yet been located.

At MIDWAY one of our PBys and one of our B-17s on patrol failed to identify each other and exchanged a few shots. No great damage was done and the incident is not further explained.

The FULTON will base at MIDWAY in the near future to service submarines, thus advancing their operations nearer to enemy waters.

Also, operating from MIDWAY the BALLARD picked up 18 Japs in a boat who said they came from a CV sunk in the battle of MIDWAY.

Just off TATOOSH an enemy submarine sank a British merchant vessel. This is the second instance of definite sub activity in the Northeast Pacific in the past few days.

In the South Pacific developments were routine. One flight of Hudsons will be sent from NEW ZEALAND to POPPY soon and a squadron later. The South Pacific Amphibious Force will arrive in NEW ZEALAND early in August. The SUMNER will survey MULIFAUNA UPOLU as her next job.

OCEAN ISLAND was observed today by enemy air.

In general, the Areas were quiet.
June 20.

There have been no changes in the employment of the major task forces. Task Forces 16 and 17 at PEARL refitting and resting; Task Force 11 at PEARL preparing for the trip to MIDWAY; Task Force 18 at SAN PEDRO - SAN DIEGO training; Task Forces 1 and 3 on West Coast training. Thus, only Task Force 8 is active against the enemy. Rear Admiral Theobald will operate that force from ashore and Rear Admiral W. W. Smith will command the Main Body. It is thus again shown that a Commander embarked afloat can only run as many ships as he is in visual contact with.

Apparently ComTaskFor 8 did not comply at once with Cominich directive to place the ALASKA Air under the Army under the Fleet Opposed Invasion formula. Again it is shown (as in HAWAII) that it is hard to set up a fixed rule of command that will fit all conditions, and locations.

Consideration is being given to taking the offensive in the Southwest Pacific. Because of the Coral Sea and MIDWAY battles, the time may be here now to at least retake the enemy positions in the NEW BRITAIN - NEW GUINEA area. It is interesting to note that this question is aired over the radio and in the press today - origin General MacArthur.

MIDWAY prisoners are giving some interesting information on Jap Navy compositions. An accurate estimate of Coral Sea and MIDWAY enemy losses may soon be possible.

The Pacific Ocean Areas continue quiet. Weather apparently prevents air action in the KISKA area.

The movements of reinforcements to Nome from the SEWARD area has been delayed.
June 21.

There is no change in the employment of own forces, and no new information of the enemy except that a submarine shelled a lighthouse on Vancouver Island.

HOWLAND, BAKER, and JARVIS were reconnoitered by air (the latter by a landing party). No signs of the enemy were found. This is routine reconnaissance for planes enroute to and from the South Pacific.

Cominch does not remember ordering the SALT LAKE CITY to the Southwest Pacific. She was ordered there by CinCPac for temporary duty and will join the first Task Force sent to operate in the Coral Sea Area.

There is no news from the ALEUTIANS but Admiral Theobald has put the air there under General Butler as was ordered in CinCPac Operation Plan 28-42 and has sent in his general plan in 220455.

June 22.

The plans section is drawing up an operation plan for the early employment of the carrier task forces. While ideas are nebulous at present because of lack of good information from ALASKA, the general plan is to sail two CV's task forces to the CORAL SEA area about 3rd July. There they would be in a position to contend further Jap advances in the Southwest Pacific, and might be in a position to cover and support amphibious operations, such as the recapture of TULAGI. About August 24th two other CV task forces would arrive in the Southwest to relieve, but there would be an overlap of about four days during which it may be possible to stage a major offensive. Admiral Nimitz would retain strategic control of such a plan even though it is outside his area.

There is nothing significant from the ALEUTIANS. There is a possibility that the S-27 has been lost and that the codes she carried are captured. This is just a guess, but is being checked up on.

CinC Pac 230427 gives his views on the Lions and Cubs now ready to be moved.

There is no significant information of the enemy.
This to be handled with the utmost secrecy. Urge prompt and thorough consideration of establishing at French Frigate Shoal staging fuel station for fighter planes to Midway. Par 2 nature would be that of fixed carrier headed into prevailing north-easterly wind constructed preferably with overhang and slant or cantilever extensions from grounded hulk or base structure supported by piling. Par 3 have Con 14 engineers expedite consideration of this proposal which can be built chiefly of wood.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

This message to be handled with the greatest secrecy. Please say to First Sea Lord in person that recent success against enemy in Midway Area proports the renewal of the proposal that the Eastern Fleet undertake active steps against the enemy this time because of his reduced strength. Par 2 opportunity appears at hand to coordinate activities of Eastern Fleet with MacArthur's forces to northwest of Australia as against Timor or alternatively against enemy bases in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the communications which they shield. Par 3 1st course should serve to divert much of remaining enemy sea forces from strong action in New Guinea area which is now his likely next move and thus enable us not only to deal with such a thrust but to mount an operation designed to weaken his hold on Solomons and Bismarcks. Par 4 such a correlated effort might well develop into getting pincers on him applied in the areas west and east of New Guinea. Par 5 Leary pass to MacArthur.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

This message to be handled with greatest secrecy. Further evidence appears to support my 071530. Estimate 2 northern carriers and ZUIKAKU will rendezvous with Combined Fleet and retreating Midway force about 10 June. Par 2 estimate future enemy moves in order of probability first covering the return of crippled units Empire and of undamaged transports to Mandate Area closely followed by second assembly of available forces to move against south or southwest Pacific before our sea forces can be shifted there. Second renewed attack on Midway. Third renewed attack on Aleutians. Par 3 request your comments as movement of our carrier groups northward after rendezvous at 1900 June 10 now appears questionable.
CINCPAC TO COMINCH.

10 1957

Handle this message with greatest secrecy. Agree in general with estimate enemy intentions your 100045. Am taking measures to investigate possibility enemy occupation Aleutian points. Holding Task Force 16 in present area until situation is clearer.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC.

16 0132

This is to be handled with the utmost secrecy. There are a number of indications that current Japanese operations are in preparation for an attack against Russia. Included among these persistence in remaining at Kiska and establishment of strong air forces in Paramushira and the probable formation of a strong northern force. Occupation of Nome and the adjacent airfields also St. Lawrence Island may well be a part of this plan (2) Army reinforcements of Alaska contemplate reinforcement of Nome with troops and automatic weapons moved in by air (3) Suggest you consider preparation of a division of modern submarines for employment in the Aleutian Bering Sea Area in the event that a concentration of Japanese forces there appear to be confirmed.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC.

16 2230

Army plans to send about 1500 troops to Nome from Anchorage Seward Area in 2 or 3 Army transports or chartered vessels leaving about 21 June. Make provision for escort as necessary. Comalsec pass to Buckner. (To be handled with utmost secrecy).

COMINCH TO COMSOUTHESPAC.INFO CINCPAC.

23 1255

Handle this with the greatest of secrecy. British can be expected to agree to cooperation of detachment eastern fleet including at least 2 carriers for operations directed toward seizure and occupation of Timor or other suitable place provided detachment can be used in conjunction with land base air in northwest Australia including air umbrella. Para this project to be timed with seizure and occupation of Tulagi by South Pacific Force which is to include U S Task Force containing at least two carriers also to be employed in conjunction with land based air in northwest Australia and in New Caledonian and New Hebrides. Para British have been given target date August 1st.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC.

Second Marine Regiment Amphibious Force Pacific should be kept in readiness for a quick movement to the South Pacific. Decision on this will be made in the early future. Cincpac inform ComGen AmphCorPac.

COMAMPHIBCORPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC.

Your 231415 2nd Regiment reenforced embarked in CRESCENT CITY, PRESIDENT HAYES, PRESIDENT ADAMS, PRESIDENT JACKSON and ALHENA will be ready to sail by 1900 GCT June 24th on 24 hours notice. Captain Kiland in CRESCENT CITY acting DivCom. Comgen AmphibCorPac has this info.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC.

Following to be handled with utmost secrecy. Refer to this as Cominch 242306 part one of two.

For the execution of offensive operations indicated in Cominch 231255 repeat 231255 the following arrangements are contemplated para (1) seizure and initial occupation of Tulagi and adjacent islands to be accomplished by Task Force set up by Cincpac. Forces to be made available for this purpose to include at least 2 carriers with accompanying cruisers and destroyers, South Pacific Amphibious Force consisting of first division less seventh Regiment plus second Regiment, 8 APS 3 AKS, 4 APS and 1 AK of Pacamphfor, 4 APDS in Pacific and 2 APDS now enroute Pacific, 2 converted lumber schooners, 2 marine fighters and 2 marine dive bomber squadrons in addition to VMO 251 now enroute South Pacific, land based air South Pacific area, patrol planes as designated by CincPac, (Release of army aircraft now in Hawaii and slated for South and Southwest Pacific will be taken up here with Army), land based air Australia and Moresby, surface force and submarine task groups from Southwest Pacific Force. Part 2 and final coming.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Part 2 and final of Cominch 242306. Para (2) Marine air squadrons to be fitted out with aircraft available to you. They will require transportation to South Pacific by carriers and/or seatrain, as arranged by your. Retention WASP in San Diego area for carrier
qualifications prior to movement and possibly for transportation one squadron is suggested Para (3) Permanent occupation of seized islands in Southwest Pacific area will probably be accomplished by troops from Australia under the direction of the Commander SouthWestPac area. Transportation for these forces by Amphibious force AP'S AND AK'S may be necessary. Discussion with Army underway here as to whether additional Army troops will be sent from United States, and as to other questions this paragraph para (4) A directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the executions of this operation will be issued. This despatch sent for your immediate information in regard preparation plans, marine squadrons and WASP movement. Leary pass this despatch to MacArthur and make sure he has seen referenced dispatch. Chief of Staff Army informed by hand.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC.

Your 241943 both task forces should be made and kept ready for departure at 12 hours notice but may be kept in hand until circumstances require departure pending developments connected with operations planned to begin about August 1st. Handle this with the utmost secrecy.
COMSOPACFOR to CINCPAC
26 0015
Due to inexperienced radio and coding personnel your 230017 has just reached me. Cominch 242306 and 231255 reached me last night. I assume that the two messages from Cominch modify your suggested operations but of course the three do link up except as to date of execution. Am I correct in this assumption? You realize, of course, that my radio intelligence unit has not arrived. Hope you will speed them up as I have not succeeded in doing so.

CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMSOPAC.
27 0251
Handle with utmost secrecy. As operations your 242306 should be followed by quickest possible construction landing fields recommend ships Vice CNO 202035 carry material for this purpose including four Army type landing mats 5000 by 150. Most desirable that construction battalion with own housing accompany shipment. If this approved my 260019 to Vice CNO modified accordingly. Advise.

COMSOPACFOR to CINCPAC.
28 0607
Handle as most secret. Most desirable 2nd Marines. Cominch 271415. Be reinforced and combat unit loaded ready on arrival in this area for employment in landing operations as a reinforced regimental combat team.

CINCPAC to COMAMPHIBFORPAC, Info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, and COMSOWESTPAC.
27 2341
Exercise utmost secrecy in handling. Plan move Third Marine Defense Battalion from Pearl to Soupac area combat loaded. Transportation required approximately 1000 men 250,000 cubic feet (6,500 tons). Designate 1 transport fully equipped for combat loading and if required by amount cargo indicated above one cargo ship. Unless otherwise directed designated ship or ships are to proceed to Pearl in convoy 2098 sailing from West Coast 7 July.

COMAMPHIBFORPAC to CINCPAC, Info: COMINCH.
28 2013
Leary and Ghormley are info adees. Pass to them. Your 272341.
02 2314  COMSOPACFOR to COMAIRSOPACFOR, Info CINCPAC.

Handle this as most secret. Deliver this message to Comgen ROSES by air for his action from Comsopac. Proceed with construction bomber strip at BUTTON using part of your construction battalion, light equipment and local transport available to you. Report progress weekly. Acknowledge.

02 2100  COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPACFOR, COMSOPAC.

Handle this with utmost secrecy. This is part one of three parts. The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed upon this joint directive for offensive operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. Leary pass to MacArthur. Quote para 1 objective. Offensive operations will be conducted with the ultimate objective of seizure and occupation of the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-NEW GUINEA Area. Para 2. Purpose. To deny the area to Japan. Para 3 Tasks Afirm Task One seizure and occupation of SANTA CRUZ Islands, TULAGI and adjacent positions. Baker. Task 2 seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMON Islands, of LAE, SALAMAU, and Northeast Coast of NEW GUINEA. Cast. Task 3 seizure and occupation of RABaul and adjacent positions in the NEW GUINEA-NEW IRELAND area.

02 2145  Part two of Cominch 022100. Para 4. General instructions. Afirm. The composition of the forces to be used, the timing of the tasks, and the passage of command will be determined by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Baker. For planning purposes a target date for task one is tentatively set as August first 1942. Cast. Direct command of the tactical operations of the amphibious forces will remain with the Naval Task Force Commander throughout the conduct of all three tasks. Dog. The withdrawal of the Naval attached units of the U.S. Fleet may be ordered by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff upon the completion of any particular phase of the operation in the event that (1) conditions develop which unduly jeopardize the aircraft carriers, (2) an emergency arises in other Pacific areas which dictates such withdrawal. Easy. The eastern and western boundaries of the southwest Pacific area and of the south Pacific area respectively will, as of August first 1942, be longitude 159 degrees east from the equator southward para 5. Forces. Afirm. Ground air and Naval Forces now under command of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area. Baker. At least two aircraft carriers with accompanying

(continued on next page)
(Continued)

Cruisers and destroyers, and the South Pacific Amphibious Force, with necessary transport divisions. Cast. Marine air squadrons and available land based air support in South Pacific Area. Dog. Army occupational forces now in the South Pacific Area to be utilized to garrison TULAGI and adjacent island positions; troops from AUSTRALIA to provide other garrisons required.

02 2150 Part 3 Cominch 022100. Para 6. Command. Afirm. Task 1 seizure and occupation of SANTA CRUZ Islands TULAGI and adjacent positions (1) Task force commander to be designated by Cincpac (2) necessary naval reinforcements and landbased air support will be attached by the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area who will also provide for interception of enemy air and naval activities westward of the operating area. Baker. Task 2 seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMAN Islands and of LAE SALAMANUA and Northeast Coast of NEW GUINEA. The task forces engaged in this operation will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area. Cast. Task 3 seizure and occupation of RARAVI and adjacent positions in the NEW GUINEA-NEW IRLAND Area. The task forces engaged in this operation will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area unquote. Assume you will make Gormley Task Force Commander at least for task one which he should command in person in the operating area. He should also go to MELBOURNE for conference with General MacArthur as to all 3 tasks. Chief of Staff Army informed.

03 2254 COMINCH to COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, Info COMSOWESPAC.

The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff direct that there be set up in the South Pacific Area a Commanding General Army Forces, under the Commander South Pacific Area (a naval officer) para 2. The functions of the Commanding General are: (1) To coordinate and supervise the administration, logistics and training of all Army ground and air troops within the area. (2) To assist the Commander of the South Pacific Area in the preparation and execution of plans which involve the use of Army forces para 3 Nimitz pass to Emmons. Leary pass to MacArthur. Gormley pass to all Army commanders in South Pacific Area. Army Chief of Staff informed.
Handle this despatch with the utmost secrecy. The Chief of Staff Army directs that there be created 2 mobile air forces in the Pacific Theater, each comprising at least 1 heavy bombardment group, to be available to support operations anywhere in the Pacific Theater, as may be directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff. These mobile air forces will comprise: (1) A Hawaiian mobile air force, from units duly assigned to the Hawaiian Department, which will normally base and operate in Hawaii: An Australian mobile air force, from units duly assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area, which will normally base and operate in AUSTRALIA. Para 2. Nimitz pass to Emmons. Leary pass to MacArthur. Ghormley pass to subordinate Army Commanders South Pacific Area. Chief of Staff Army informed.

Your 230205. As result of agreement by combined Chiefs of Staff direct Comosopac to cooperate in so far as practicable in the supply and evacuation of inhabitants OCEAN and NAURU Islands using such island schooners as may be available. NEW ZEALAND government being notified through diplomatic channels. Handle with utmost secrecy.

Made personal inspection several good field sites ESPRITU SANTO. Your 022314. Require services Joseph Lykes upon completion her unloading ROSES, estimated date 7 July, to transport construction equipment and personnel SANTO. Can start immediately thereafter. 5000 feet Marston matting 150 feet wide required. Very secret.
All Army Commanders South Pacific Area. Utmost secrecy. First message is Cominch 032251. The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff direct that there be kept up in the South Pacific Area a Commanding General Land Forces, under the Commander South Pacific Area (a naval officer) Para 2. The functions of the Commanding General are: 1. To coordinate and supervise the administration, logistics and training of Army ground and air troops within the area. 2. To assist the Commander of the South Pacific Area in the preparation and execution of plans which involve the use of Army Forces. 2nd message is Cominch 032255. The Chief of Staff Army directs that there be created 2 mobile air groups in the Pacific Theater, each comprising at least one heavy bombardment group, to be available to support operations anywhere in the Pacific Theater as may be directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff. These mobile air forces will comprise: (1) A Hawaiian mobile air force, from units duly assigned to the Hawaiian Department, which will normally base and operate in Hawaii; an Australian mobile air force, from units duly assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area, which will normally base and operate in Australia. Nimitz, Emmons, Leary and MacArthur have this.

Handle this with utmost secrecy. From point negat 25 Taskfor 18 continue southwesterly to point hypo 66 I estimate you will reach by 0400 GCT 17th allowing for fueling delay. From point hypo 66 proceed toward point George 86 near which unless otherwise directed detach transport with escort to WHITE POPPY to await orders. Expect you will refuel combined Task Forces 11 and 18 enroute to or vicinity point George 86. Near this point opportunity will be afforded for conference with Comair-sopac and Comamphibforsopac as to operational details if required. Avoid sight or plane contact from islands.
05 1845 **COMINCH TO CINCPAC**

Handle this with utmost secrecy. Employment of fighters at Dutch on basis outlined your 031929 from forces available to you including units formed for ships to be commissioned near future satisfactory to Cominch. Next AVG available for Pacific is COPAHEE due for delivery 13 July should be operational in all respects prior to 1 September.

06 0130 **CINC SOWESPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC**

Handle with utmost secrecy. Action Comsopac from CinC Sowespac. 5 cruisers (AUSTRALIA, CANBERRA, CHICAGO, SALT LAKE CITY, HOBART) and only nine destroyers (Desron 4) available here one August. PERKINS, FLUSHER being returned CINCPAC after BLUE and RALPH TALBOT report. Comsowespacfor will direct officers proceed Longbow for conference with you 15 July. Also will have Sour Sail type subs available one August if desired. Advise.

06 2229 **CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 11 INFO COMINCH etc.**

Maximum secrecy enjoined. Comsopac 050510 modify mydis 300015. Taskforce Eleven depart Pearl 7 July. Complete gunnery practices including shore bombardment afternoon 8 July vicinity Cape Kalae Hawaii. Thence proceed by approximately direct route to rendezvous with Task Force 18 at Point Hypo 26 at 200Z/18 July. By separate despatch KANAWHA is being directed from Bleacher to meed and fuel Task Force 18 on 16 July. Leary inform MacArthur. Direct operational control Task Forces 11 and 18 still passes to Ghormely at 2000Z/10 July.

07 0125 **CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC**

To be treated with utmost secrecy. Turner after consultation with Fletcher and my staff suggests following major features for forthcoming operations Sopac. Turner expects arrive Fulcrum 11 July. Afirm reinforcement Santo and construction of landing fields to be carried out as soon as practicable two Marston landing mats departing Pearl in Oliver Wendell Holmes 6 July one mat for Santo construction equipment and personnel from Roses one mat for later use Guadalcanal construction equipment and personnel to be obtained from West Coast or Bleacher as decided later. **Baker** occupation and defense of Ndeni. Divert Transdiv 2 to Bleacher
send forward one DD with ground and air reconnaissance party to arrive Ndeni about 25 July to decide on sites for air and seaplane base and location defense force. Transdiv 2 depart Bleacher in time arrive Ndeni on dog minus two day 2nd Marine Regiment assigned as garrison. On arrival from east coast 5th Marine Defense Battalion less one third antiaircraft elements reenforce Ndeni garrison. Aircraft base and naval local defense personnel and material will be supplied later from us. Capt capture Tulagi, Gavutu, Florida and Guadalcanal Islands on Dog Day approximately one August. Forces first Marine Division less 7th Regiment plus First Raider Battalion, Third Marine Defense Battalion one third of AA elements 5th Defense Battalion 3rd Balloon Barrage Squadron and 6 planes VM0 251. Transdivs 8, 10, 10. Task Forces 11, 16, 18 Anzac Squadron possibly also TF 16. Considered essential to hold rehearsals landing attack employing 1st Mardiv less 7th Regiment plus first Raider Battalion Task Forces 11 and 17 Australian Squadron and 5 DMS to be assigned. Estimate about six days starting 23 July required for 2 complete rehearsals 2nd one to include firing by ships aircraft and troops. Because of central position yet more retired from enemy observation and apparently better landing beaches recommend Fijis as site for rehearsals and departure point for expeditionary force. Dog these operations will be covered and supported by air from Australia and by VPB and Army air Sopac as previously indicated. Suggest scouting from Ndeni by 12 VPB beginning about Dog minus two and from east coast Malaita by similar number beginning on Dog Day.

COMSOWESPACFOR TO COMINCH CINCPAC COMSOPACFOR

Handle with utmost secrecy. This for action Chief of Staff and Cominch from MacArthur and Ghormley. Information to Leary and Nimitz. This is the first of seven parts. Pursuant to the directive of the joint Chiefs of Staff contained in Cominch 022100 a conference has been held between General MacArthur and Vice Admiral Ghormley with regard to the execution of the offensive operation as therein directed. The plan of the operation in broad outline is as indicated below. Many details of execution and the timing of the phases may be modified materially after conference with the Amphibious Force and Carrier Force Commanders who have not yet arrived. Para Task One orthodox
JULY GCT

08 1012 (Continued)

landing attack by the Amphibious Force in the Tulagi Guadalcanal area stop the Southwest Pacific Force to support the operation by interdicting air and naval activities west of the operation area and by the participation of its naval elements Para tasks two and three are based upon two major concepts: Subpara A the progressive movement forward of air echelons in order to provide sufficient fighter and bomber coverage for surface elements Subpara B the isolation of Rabaul prior to its final assault. End of Part one.

08 1014 Following is part two of seven parts. In execution of this concept Tasks Two and Three have been divided into five phases in which the timing may be modified to compensate for variation in the scheduled development of airfields and the availability of shipping phase 1: The capture of Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea and the airfield at Gasmata on New Britain. Prior to the initiation of this phase it is necessary to continue development in the Port Moresby area and to provide airfields at Milne Bay at the Southeastern tip of New Guinea and at Buna on the North Coast of New Guinea Northeast of Port Moresby in order to provide fighter coverage for the surface vessels carrying the attacking forces to Lae. Phase Two: The occupation of Cape Gloucester and Talahea on New Britain and of Madang on New Guinea, airdromes of those points to be put in operation with the least practicable delay. Phase 3: The capture of Lorengau on the west end of Buka Island in the Solomons stop phase four: The capture of Kavieng stop Phase five: The capture of Rabaul. End of part two.

08 1015 Look out for part three. Adequate ground troops are available for the operation although but one division is trained and equipped for landing attack and it is probable that losses normal to this type of operation will prevent its employment throughout. Adequate shipping is lacking for the transport of the infantry divisions. Task one as now laid down requires the presence of AP'S, AK'S and supporting ships in the Tulagi Area from 36 hours to 4 days, where they will be outside the range of any supporting air base and exposed to continued hostile air surface and submarine attack stop The air force now in sight for the southwest Pacific Area is not adequate to interdict hostile air or naval operations against the Tulagi Area stop the carrier task groups will be themselves exposed to attack by land based air while unprotected by our land based aviation and it is extremely doubtful that they will be able to render fighter support to the transport area, especially should hostile naval forces approach. End of part three.
Part 4. Surprise is now improbable due to the depth of the existing hostile reconnaissance. The successful execution of the phases of Tasks 2 and 3 will depend upon our ability to maintain air superiority. This is doubtful at the present time due to the numbers of reserve planes available and to the fact that the fighters are now operating under a distinct handicap because of their limitations as to altitude and range. It is anticipated that this condition will be progressively ameliorated as regards altitude as replacements arrive with equipment permitting of efficient operation at twenty to twenty five thousand feet. Part 4 ends.

Part 5. During the last 3 weeks there has been a change in the enemy situation in the objective area which has been indicated in the operations reports submitted to the war department. The enemy has been and is making a major effort in the development of airfields at Kavieng Rabaul Lae Salamaua Kuka and Guadalcanal which will greatly facilitate the operation of its air elements throughout the area. Stop it appears at the present time he is installing the heavy equipment for an air base on Guadalcanal recent reconnaissance having shown 4 cruisers, 6 to 8 destroyers, 4 transports, 3 motor torpedo boats and numerous landing barges. 5 landing jetties have been constructed and ground installations have been initiated. Antiaircraft fire was encountered there by reconnaissance planes for the first time on July 7th. More to come.

Part 6. It is the opinion of the two commanders CMA arrived at independently and confirmed after discussion CMA that the initiation of this operation at this time without a reasonable assurance of adequate air coverage during each phase would be attendant with the gravest risk as has been thoroughly demonstrated by the Japanese reverses on the Coral Sea and at Midway. This is part six. The operation CMA one initiated CMA should be pushed through rapidly to its final conclusion CMA because a partial attack leaving Rabaul in the hands of the enemy enabling him to support by land based aviation the heavy concentrations that could be effected from the Truk area would expose the initial attacking elements to the danger of destruction by overwhelming force. End of part six.

Last of 7 parts. It is our considered opinion that in view of the recently developed strength of the hostile positions CMA of the shortage of airfields and airplanes for the continued maintenance of strong air support throughout the operation and of the lack of sufficient
shiping that would make possible the continued movement of troops and supplies CMA that the successful accomplishment of the operation is open to the gravest doubts Para It is recommended that this operation be deferred pending the further development of forces in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas and in the interim we proceed with an infiltration process through the New Hebrides and the Santa Cruz Island groups CMA in conjunction with accelerated air field construction in New Guinea, with a view to the development of bases for the support of the operation when it is deemed that adequate means are available for the execution of all 3 tasks in 1 continuous movement. Signed MacArthur and Ghormley.

CINCPAC TO CTF 8 INFO COMINCH

Handle with utmost secrecy. General situation and prospective operations other theaters which will require all our large carriers made advisable strong diversional attacks on Kiska and or Attu during July and August. Continuous pressure is desirable. No enemy carriers or other heavy units believed to be close enough Aleutians to give prompt support against hit and run bombardment attacks by our cruisers and destroyers coordinated if weather permits with our Army Navy air activities. Weather unfavorable to our air participation is probably unfavorable to enemy air activity but may not prevent surface bombardments which appear practicable with low cloud ceiling. Enemy shore installations will be good objectives even if no combatant ships or shipping are present. Comment and indicate ammunition replenishments required near future. Frequent aerial reconnaissance and photography important and necessary.

CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH

Handle with utmost secrecy. This is brief my serial 0151W now in airmail to you. You are hereby designated Task Force Commander for Task One Cominch 3 part 022100. You will exercise strategic command in person in the operating area which is interpreted initially to be the New Caledonia New Hebrides area. Para. Following Pac Fleet forces in addition those already under your command are assigned to you for Task One. Task Force 11 Vice Admiral Fletcher 1 CV 3 CA 1 DL 6 DD 4 APD. Task Force 16 Rear Admiral Kinkaid 1 CV 1 BB 2 CA 1 CL 1 DL 6 DD. Task Force 18 Rear Admiral Noyes 1 CV 3 CA 1 CL 3 DD. Marine Forces 2nd Marines reinforced 3rd Defense Bn VMDB 231 and 232 VMF 223 and 224 VMQ 251.
(Continued)
4 AO 1 AE 1 AG 5 DMS 1 AT Salvage. Para. Commander Southwest Pacific will have available the AUSTRALIA CANBERRA CHICAGO HOBART plus Desron 4. You are authorized to apply directly to Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area for additional forces required.
Para. With forces under your command you will commencing about August 1 seize and occupy Santa Crux Islands Tulagi and adjacent positions in order deny that area to Japan.
Para. Logistic support for this operation will be provided by Cincpac. The following arrangements have been made. Two fleet tankers Cimarron and Platte will accompany Task Force 11. KASKASKIA will proceed to South Pacific from Pearl about July 20. KANAWHA will fuel Task Force 18 then to Noumea. Chartered tankers with total 225,000 bbls fuel oil will arrive Noumea July 22 and again with same amount on August 2. It is expected that about 225,000 bbls fuel oil per CV Task Force per month will be made available to you in New Caledonia area. Requirements for diesel fuel avgas and stores for Pacfleet Task Forces will be met as requested by you. Para. Communications will be generally in accordance Pac 70 modified as directed by you. Para. Cincpac will remain Subbase Pearl and may from time to time issue further instructions in connection this operation. I have full confidence in your ability to carry this operation to successful conclusion.

COMALSEC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

This is CTF 8 reply to Cincpac 090339 Cincpac pass for information to Cominch. Have no comment additional to that contained in my 302100. My first objective will be ships and my second enemy installations at Kiska. Latter mainly in valley the trend of which requires that bombardment fire be delivered from southward over hills to westward of south head in water of mineable depth. Fire from eastward on ships in harbor would also be from mineable waters. Request four fast mine sweepers. Day of attack may be delayed by necessity of delaying final approach to await report of suitable visibility for accurate navigation fix required for indirect fire. Request ammunition replenishment as follows 8 inch 1100 rounds 6 inch 3600 rounds 5 inch 3000 rounds. Will command with flag in INDIANAPOLIS Smith in NASHVILLE.

CINCPAC TO COMAIRSOPAC INFO COMSOPAC

Most secret. Present indications 1 group 26 B-17's arrive Fantan Poppy area during July. So that logistic plans can be made what division of these planes will you make between Fantan and Poppy. Expedite reply.
10 0546 COMSOPAC TO SOMSWPACFOR INFO CINCPAC

Handle as most secret. Do not intend employ your submarines with this force for task one. Your 091717. Pass to CinC Sowespac area. Request you employ them in furtherance interdiction task assigned you during Task One.

10 1143 COMAIRSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOPAC

16 B-17's Poppy. Your 100235. And 10 Fantan as a desirable division consonant with tactical division FO group.

10 2118 COMINCH TO COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC

Para 4 addressees are directed to itemize to joint Chiefs of Staff specific additional forces not now prospectively available but absolutely essential to the execution of Task 1. Para 5 while recognizing that other demands to meet the world situation may prevent the assembly of forces and equipment in the southwest Pacific for immediate execution of Tasks 2 and 3 it is desired that local efforts in preparation for these tasks be vigorously pushed, including detailed operational planning para 6 participation in operations by British eastern fleet in northwest Australian area has been definitely postponed. Nimitz pass to Emmons and Leary pass to MacArthur. Comsopacfor advise if you hold higher crypto systems than this. Chief of Staff Army informed.

11 2000 COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC

Considering present known disposition hostile forces consider means now prospectively available Sopac sufficient for accomplishment Task One provided Sowespac Area be furnished sufficient means for interdiction hostile aircraft activities based on New Britain-New Guinea Northern Solomons area. Refer Comsowespacfor 081012 which in part quote the air force now in sight for the Southwest Pacific Area is not adequate to interdict hostile air or naval operations against the Tulagi area unquote. In this connection I wish to emphasize that the basic problem of this operation is the protection of surface ships against land based aircraft attack during the approach the landing attack and the unloading. By copy this despatch MacArthur is requested to answer that part of your inquiry relative to the additional means necessary to effect the required interdiction.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Part 1 of 2) fully appreciate the disadvantage of undertaking Task One before adequate forces and equipment can be made available for the continuance without interruption of Tasks Two and Three. This refers to your 081012 para two they feel however that it is necessary to stop without delay the enemy's southward advance that would be effected by his firm establishment at TULAGI. They recognize that enemy airfields at GUADALCANAL will seriously hamper if not prevent our establishment SANTA CRUZ and ESPIRITU SANTO. With these and other considerations in mind they do not desire to countermand operations already underway for the execution of Task One. Para. three. Cincpac has already made preparation to provide additional shipborne aircraft and additional surface forces for Task One. Army has set up at Hawaii available for South Pacific area one heavy bombardment group of 35 planes. Army also plans to increase rate of flow of replacement aircraft and will take all followup measures possible in support of the seizure and firm occupation of the Tulagi area.

Part 2 of above. To be decoded by addressees only. Part 2 of my 102100. Para 4. Addressees are directed to itemize to Joint Chiefs of Staff specific additional forces not now prospectively available but absolutely essential to the execution of Task 1. Para. 5. While recognizing that other demands to meet the world situation may prevent the assembly of forces and equipment in the Southwest Pacific for immediate execution of Tasks 2 and 3 it is desired that local efforts in preparation for these tasks be vigorously pushed, including detailed operational planning. Para. 6. Participation in operations by British Eastern Fleet in northwest Australian area has been definitely postponed. Nimitz pass to Emmons and Leary pass to MacArthur. Comsopac for advise if you hold higher crypto systems than this. Chief of Staff Army informed.
11 0045 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMSOWESTPAC, Info MacArthur.

Most secret action to CINCPAC, COMSOWESTPAC. Latter to hand to MacArthur. While afloat near future will be compelled lean heavily on intelligence reports from you as my intelligence unit will be divided. Request every effort be made keep me fully aware all items that will sustain steady flow vital information. Reports should be sent to both tactical and administrative headquarters.

11 1800 EMMONS to WDCSA Info CINCPAC.

CINCPAC directs transfer of 26 B-17 airplanes from HAWAII (16 to POPPY, 10 to FANTAN) with all necessary equipment and ground personnel stop to report to COMSOPAC for duty upon arrival at destination. Advance personnel leaving today and movement to be completed by 28th July. HDGCS this force will be gone at least 2 months and may not return. This reduces bomber strength in HAWAII to about 50 percent of authorized strength.

CINCPAC concurs in urgent request for early replacement in HAWAII of these airplanes, combat crews, ground personnel and equipment as follows: HQ and HQ Sqdn (hvy) 9 officers, 5 warrant officers, 128 men; 3 Bomb Sqdns (hvy) 111 officers, 3 warrant officers, 687 men; detachment ordnance company aviation 4 officers, 122 men; attached medical 4 officers 24 men; detachment material Sqdn 20 men. All above units with complete T/BA equipment. CINCPAC also requests frequent diversionary air attacks on BERRY and that a full squadron of bombers using alternate crews to permit maximum use of equipment be employed for the purpose as soon as they can be obtained. LB-30 or B-24 are suitable type airplanes. 3 LB-30's on hand. For this mission request at least 6 additional LB-30's or B-24 airplanes with 12 combat crews to arrive here not later than July 21st. This message held in highest secret classification.

12 0105 CINCPAC to COMAIRSOPAC, Info COMINCH, COMSOPAC.

COMINCH 102100 B-17s will be increased to 35. Plan send about 1000 men Army ground crews 1500 tons freight no bombs or fuel in PRESIDENT TYLER leaving PEARL about 22 July. ARGONNE has about 100 men 50 tons freight same purpose. Advise destinations you desire for aircraft ground crews freight. Do you expect operate any these B-17s from ESPIRITU SANTO and from AUSTRALIA staging at MORESBY?
SECRET
JULY (GCT)

13 0621 GENERAL PATCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Because of possible projected operation from this area question of complete censorship over Free French Government arises. I cannot guarantee either the loyalty or judgment of their operators. Consequently it becomes a military necessity for me to completely control their radio station. This will deny Free communication from the French authorities here including Admiral Dargenlieu with General DeGaulle and all other French possessions. Such action may violate an international agreement. If I am authorized to take such action 2 alternatives are open to Free French authorities, first, completely close their station for the desired period or periods, during which time they could use either the British system or ours, and second, turn over their code to us and we will transmit such messages as they desire which have no military value to the enemy. Recommend authority to impose this be secured from Washington or such authority as may be empowered to give it. Comairsoupac concurs.

13 0021 COMAIRSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOPACFOR.

Treat as most secret. On the assumption 4 squadrons involved your 120105 request 1 to FANTAN 1, 2 to POPPY and 1 to ROSES with proportionate distribution of stores and personnel. Request analysis of equipment and stores in order make specific changes in allocation if desirable also analysis of officer personnel included. Desire operate Koumac ROSES, and BUTTON when ready. Consider operation from MORESBY not advantageous initial stages. Urgently request 16 these planes at POPPY immediately. Sufficient ground service available for limited period.

13 0414 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESpac, MACARTHUR.

Cominch 022100 in part quote Army occupational forces now in the South Pacific Area to be utilized to garrison TULAGI and adjacent island positions unquote. In addition to Marine defense battalion units now planned estimate minimum required garrison as reinforced regiment. Such Army force lacking and available only in FANTAN and POPPY. Most inadvisable weaken either place until possibility of hostile counter offensive definitely past. Furthermore at present plan to later garrison SANTA CRUZ from present POPPY garrison relieving Second Marines for other duty. Cominch 012100 in part quote Army also plans to increase rate of flow replacement aircraft and will take all follow up measures possible in support of the seizure and a firm occupation of the TULAGI area unquote. Does this mean
JULY (GCT)

13 0414 (Continued)

garrison troops for SANTA CRUZ dash TULAGI dash GUADALCANAL question. If not request I be given authority to take matter up, at the proper time, with NEW ZEALAND authorities with view securing suitable garrison force from NEW ZEALAND. Leary pass to MacArthur.

14 0510 CTF 18 to CINCPAC.

Station in heading pass to Cincpac for action. Utmost secrecy. This from Comtaskforce 18. WASP casualty to starboard high pressure turbine evidenced by loud scraping noise even at lowest speeds. Impossible determine conditions without lifting casing which is being done making good maximum of 15 knots with port engine. If found necessary lift rotor for repairs propose send WASP into BLEACHER as we pass where estimate 4 days work by ships force assisted by WHITNEY. This based on assumption Fletcher can meet my convoy earlier than now planned. Air coverage by WASP now entirely dependent upon favorable wind conditions. Weather follows. 55682511.

15 0137 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOUPOPAC.

Handle as most secret. Comsoupac 130414 should be considered in connection my 130211. Request comment whether Army quote follow up measures unquote includes providing troops from U.S. to garrison SANTA CRUZ dash TULAGI dash GUADALCANAL areas. I consider AA recommended my 130211 is minimum essential from U.S. and additional two reinforced regiments desirable. In any event desire authorize Ghormley subject your approval to lay ground work now with NEW ZEALAND authorities for sending their forces northward to garrison bases when threat to NEW ZEALAND is lessened.

14 2226 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY.

Army does not intend to provide garrison troops from United States for SANTA CRUZ, TULAGI, GUADALCANAL. Their interpretation quote to take all follow up measures possible in support of the seizure and firm occupation of the TULAGI area unquote is release of Army occupational forces in rear positions of South Pacific area for garrisons in forward positions. This in reply to your 130414. As regards use of NEW ZEALAND troops am of opinion proposal would reopen FIJI discussion. If you believe you can handle without upsetting arrangements made you are author-
ized to take up at the proper time the use of NEW ZEALAND troops for garrison forces in advanced position. Army is dispatching from U.S. combat units previously authorized as follows: For FIJI 20 July 1 FA Batt 1 CA Batt 1 Inf Rgt less 1 Bn, for NEW CALEDONIA 20 July 1 Cav Rgt less animals plus air corps fillers and minor miscellaneous troops each place.

16 0612 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC and others concerned.

This despatch must be handled with utmost secrecy. Comsopac originator. Action is to Cincpac Info to Cominch, Comsowespacfor (pass to MacArthur), Comamphibforsopac, Comtaskfor 11, 16, 18. If you are not an addressee break no further. Cincpac 090633. On account delay arrival transports LONGBOW and delays due to weather in unloading and reloading August 7th local date tentatively set as Dog Day. Rehearsal exercises in PANTAN area now scheduled commencing 27 July local date. Comamphibforsopac has for info.

15 2015 CINCPAC to COM 14 Info CG MARFORCES 14 ND, ZEILIN, BETELGUESE.

Handle as most secret. Refer mydis 010159. Direct 3d DefEn combat load equipment and personnel for distant service in ZEILIN and BETELGUESE as soon as practicable after arrival. Expedite loading on 24 hour basis and advise prospective completion.

17 0602 COMSOPAC TO TF11, 16, 18, 44, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC

Part 1

Handle as most secret. SoPac Operation Plan 1-42 being distributed, briefed as follows: Task Organization (A) Task Force 61 (Expeditionary Force) Vice Admiral Fletcher composed of combined Task Forces 11, 16, 18, 41 and 62 (AmPhibForSoPac) (B) Task Force 63 Rear Admiral McCain composed of land based aircraft and patrol planes of SoPac area. Paragraph 1: CinCSoWesPac Area will interdict westward of operating area. Air Scouting by SoWesPac forces as arranged with Comtaskfor 63. Own submarines in vicinity RABAUL and TRUK.
JULY (GCT)

17 0615 COMSOPAC to TF 11, 16, 18, 44, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC
Part 2
Utmost Secret. Paragraph 2. This force will seize occupy defend successively TULAGI area and SANTA CRUZ. Operation in 3 phases: Phase one: Rehearsal of TULAGI attack in FIJI area beginning about 27 July. Phase two: Seizure TULAGI area on DOG Day. Phase 3: Seizure NDENI. Paragraph 3: (A) Task Force 61 - Phase 1 conduct rehearsals Phase 2 - Capture occupy TULAGI area and adjoining portion GUADALCANAL. Construct landing field. Defend until relieved. Phase 3 - Occupy and defend NDENI. Construct landing field. Paragraph 3: (B) Task Force 63 - Phase 1 - Continue scouting. Phase 2 - Cover approach to and operations in TULAGI area by scouting. Execute air attacks. Render aircraft support on call. Initiate patrol plane scouting from NDENI by DOG minus 2 Day and from MALAITA on DOG Day.

17 0625 COMSOPAC to TF 11, 16, 18, 44, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC
Part 3
Utmost secret. ComTaskFor 63 arrange with Supreme Commander SoWesPac Area relative coordination aircraft scouting. Paragraph 3 xray - Conference will be arranged by SoPac between interested commanders this force on coordination air activities. DOG Day tentatively August 7 will be promulgated by despatch. Bombing by our units of all submarines interdicted west of Longitude 155 East. Paragraph 4 - Logistic arrangements promulgated in written plan. Paragraph 5 - Use zone zero time. Maintain radio silence during phase one. Communications according to PAC-70. ComSoPac initially at FULCRUM moves to ARGONNE at WHITE POPPY about dog minus 5 day. LEARY pass to MacArthur.

18 0558 COMSOPAC to COMTASKFOR 11 info COMINCH, CINCPAC, ETC.
To be handled with utmost secrecy. After passing South of Latitude 20 degrees operate in general area within radius of 250 miles from Point HYPO 26. At first favorable opportunity contact Noyes and Kinkaid and assume command of Task Forces 11, 16 and 18 and inform me of prospective movements via shore based radio. I will inform you later of projected movements Task Forces 44 and 62 and arrangements for their rendezvous with you.
JULY (GCT)

18 0035 COMSOPAC to PATCH, CO 1ST RAIDER BN, COMAIRSOPAC, ETC.

Handle this as most secret. Sent by ComSoPac for action to ComAirSoPac. ComTransDiv 12 ComAirSoPac pass to Patch and to C.O. 1st Raider Battalion. CinCPac and ComAmphibforSoPac are info addressees. Modify my 150439: TransDiv 12 embark striking element 1st Raider Battalion on readiness to sail by 2000 GCT 23 July on orders to be issued later.

16 0400 COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH, ETC.

Handle as utmost secret. PICADOR plan received mail today. CinCPac 150251. Intend to employ 7th Marines my 140245 only in case of necessity. Uncertainty hostile reaction to pending operation dictates wisdom preparing most available effective force in my area for possible emergency use. Will release from standby orders as soon as situation permits.

18 2106 COMINCH TO COMALSEC info CINCPAC, COMTASKFOR 8, ETC.

Army has under consideration recommendation by General Dewitt to establish land based airfield on TANAGA Island in immediate future. In this connection desire your comment. Also desire information as to contemplated operations of Task Force 8 in Western ALEUTIANS.

18 2230 COMTASKFOR 18 to COMSOPAC info CINCPAC, CTF 11, 16.

Handle with utmost secrecy. Arrived BLEACHER last night except 3 destroyers still outside but in touch. This morning winds gale force maximum at 1800 GCT 67 knots from East Southeast barometer 2971 now moderated but am still standing by. No damage my force or other ships present except latter lost several small boats. No report yet from ashore. Carrier prior entry completed removal first 2 rows damaged impulse blading. Rotor has been lifted and replaced plant being reassembled. Plan to fuel transports as soon as tankers arrive. Here are weather numbers 4 6 8 3 4 5 1 4

19 1034 COMSOWESPACFOR to COMSOPAC info CINCPAC, CTF 61, 62, 63.

The following plan of air operation will be executed in support Task 1 Macarthur to Ghormley. Prior to DOG minus 5 existing 48 hour aerial surveillance will continue over area PORT MORESBY-LORENGAU-KAVIENG-BUKA-ONGTONG JAVA-TULAGI-SAMUMAI stop Thereafter all aircraft operations (continued on next page)
JULY (GCT)

19 1034 COMSOWESPACFOR TO COMSOPAC (Continued)

of the Southwest Pacific Area will be prohibited eastward of 158 degrees 15 minutes East Longitude between the Equator and 15 degrees South Latitude unless missions are requested by you. Starting DOG minus 5 following support will be given: DOG minus 5 to DOG plus 4 daily reconnaissances area PORT MORESBY-MADANG-KAVIENG-ONGTONG JAVA-POINT PRASLIN (NORTHWEST OF YSABEL ISLAND)-EASTERN-MOST POINT NEW GEORGIA ISLAND-TAGULA ISLAND, aviation will be prepared to strike hostile naval targets discovered in this area within 550 mile range PORT MORESBY during same period, morning DOG Day to DOG plus four days interdict hostile air operations in area RABAUL-KAVIENG and deny hostile refueling operations from BUKA island if used; DOG to DOG plus four days shorter range aviation to attack LAE and SALAMANUA periodically to prevent reinforcement to RABAUL from that area. Will advise if current development MILNE BAY permits of extended range bomber operations. All available aviation in this area subject to actual limitations of range will operate in your support on request to CinCSowesPac. Your comment or concurrence requested. Naval support will be given as previously arranged. Suggest you send courier to my headquarters BRISBANE with detailed plan of operations to arrive by DOG minus 5. Further details relative communication plan will follow.

20 0100 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH

Handle as most secret. Antiaircraft units at BORABORA and TONGATABU barely sufficient for partial protection against raids. Cominch 172026 CinCPac 182217. Consider it most inadvisable weaken them now. Intend employing marine defense battalions in seized areas until new Army units arrive for this purpose or until the need for antiaircraft protection present bases definitely lessens.

20 0130 COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC to CTF 11 info COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC

Of 2 secret parts this is the first and not to be deciphered except by adees. From ComAmphibforSoPac to ComTaskfor 11 info ComSoPac and ComAirSoPac. Plan sortie 8 hours Mike (minus 12) 22 July arrive rendezvous with Transdiv 12 CinCPac grid posit HYPO 2057 time 14 hours Mike 26 July. Paragraph.

(continued on next page)
JULY (GCT)

20 0130  COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC to CTF 11 (Continued)

Recommend Taskfors 11 and 18 and Transdiv 2 rendezvous this force same place and time in order permit conference and distribution plans for rehearsals proposed to begin 28 July North and West Coasts KORO Island.

20 0135  SAME AS ABOVE (Part 2)

Stop deciphering unless an adee. Second part of two secrets to ComTaskfor 11 info ComSoPac and ComAirSoPac from ComAmphibForSoPac. Following task organization proposed for attack force AFIRM Transport group XRAY 10 Afirm Prep 6 Afirm King BAKER Transport group YOKE 3 Afirm Prep 4 Afirm Prep Dog CAST Fire Support group LOVE 3 Cast Afirm 4 Dog Dog 6 Victor Option Sail seaplanes DOG 1 SAN JUAN 2 Dog Dog EASY Mine Sweeper group 5 Dog Mike Sail FOX Air Support group 1 Victor Fox 3 Victor Sail Baker squadrons with 1 additional squadron each type first 2 hours of DOG Day GEORGE Screening group 3 Cast Afirm 8 Dog Dog 2 Victor Fox squadrons 8 Victor Option Sail seaplanes HYPO Landing Force troops plus 10 Victor Option Sail seaplanes.

Paragraph.
It would be understood approximately half of available aircraft would be in transport area continuously during daylight. Paragraph.

Recommend one aircraft control group from carriers be transferred to McCawley for voice direction of air support group and 1 similar group be sent flagship screen to direct fighter cover. Paragraph.

Consider most desirable all vessels of attack force be Unit Sail ships. paragraph.

ComSoPac has directed strict radio silence be preserved during rehearsals. Paragraph.

As soon as you can answer by radio request decision on foregoing, names of vessels assigned and names of group commanders not in this command.

19 2310  COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC to CURTISS info COMSOPAC, CINCPAC

Especially secret is this from ComAmphibForSoPac info ComSoPac ComAirSoPac pass by hand for action to Com Transdiv 12. Your 172307 ComSoPac 180510 embark assault echelon first Raider Bn. ready in all respects for day or night landing in rubber boats against strong opposition. Rendezvous with this force which is escorted by Task Force 44 at CincPac grid position HYPO 2058 time 14 hours Mike 26 July. Expect rehearse at KORO Island beginning 28th. Have remainder Battalion ready to embark on short notice if ship becomes available. Guard 2562 primary 369 secondary frequency enroute rendezvous.
JULY (GCT)

23 1025 C.T.P. B TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

Persistent dense fog has continued and is predicted for whole area including objective to last until July 27th makes that day first probable bombardment day. Will move east to fuel and return to approach area to use first satisfactory day for operation. Cincpac deliver to Cominich for info.

28 0329 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

Boise departed Pearl today to raid enemy sampan patrol line reported 5 to 300 miles east of HONSHU to create impression BLUE striking force enroute Empire Waters. Hope for contact about 750 miles due east TOKYO on August 15th local date. Cruiser will retire toward Pearl at high speed 15 hours after first contact. Para.

No word yet from Theobald. Pacific ocean area generally quiet.

19 0737 COMAIRSOPAC TO COMSOPACFOR INFO CINCPAC

During forth coming operations intend placing CURTISS in Second channel at BUTTON. To afford all practicable AS protection request consideration be given to mining such entrances as may be considered practicable. Expect this harbor to assume increasing importance as matters progress, This is most secret.

20 1300 COMSOPAC TO CTF 11,16,18,44, COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, INFO COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWEAPACFOR.

Handle as most secret. Comsopac sends action to ComTaskForces 11,16,18,44, ComAmphibForsopac, ComAirSoPac and for Info to Cominich, CincPac, and ComSwesPacFor. Modify ComSoPac operation plan 1-40-2 para 3B phase 2 to read as follows "Cover the approach to, and the operation within, the TULAGI-GUADANANAL area by search. Execute air attacks on enemy objectives as arranged with commander expeditionary force. Render aircraft support on call. Initiate patrol plane scouting from NDENI about dog minus 1 day and from east coast MALATTA about dog plus 1 day". Make corresponding change in ComSoPac 170602. Leary pass to Mac Arthur.
JULY (CCT)

21 0802 CTF 18 to CONSOPAC info CINCPAC, CTF 11.

Maintain highest secrecy. For info to ComTaskFor 11 and Cinpac (delivery by NPI) Action to ComSoPac from CTF 18. Satisfactory trial underway completed by WASP making turns for 27 knots. Estimate maximum actual speed at present displacement in water about 70 degrees same as before casualty namely 25 knots but with decreased reliability. Recommend available replacement blading be sent PEARL and all three rows impulse blading replaced first available opportunity after employment now started. These numbers: 53803417, are weather.

21 0820 CTF 11 TO CONSOPAC info CTF 16,18,62,44, COMAIRSEPAC.

Urgent secrecy. Will assemble task forces 11, 16, 18, & 62 at 14 hours mikes (minus 12) 26 July at CINCPAC GRID pos 2007. Will hold conference in SARATOGA at earliest opportunity after rendezvous. From TaskForce 11. After rendezvous shall proceed to vicinity PANTAN for phase one. Consider it highly important confer with McCAIN and your representative earliest practicable date.

21 1106 COMTASKFOR 18 TO CONSOPAC info CINCPAC, COMTASKFOR 11, 16, COMPHIBFORSEPAC.

High secrecy. WASP repairs successful. Task Force 18 ready for sea. Transports fueled. Route marching troops ashore as practicable for acclimatization. Your Opplan 1-42 received delivered Fletcher by air holding for Kinkaid. No copies for transports or marines. Furnishing Crescent City 1 copy with authority to reproduce. Scott will conduct gun practice tomorrow for my cruisers and destroyers against barren island simulating Naval gunfire support of landing with air spot. I will fly aboard local Thursday forenoon for conference with Fletcher. My understanding that references to task force 18 no longer include transports.

23 0230 CONSOPAC TO CONSOWESPAC info CTF 61,62,63, CinCPac.

Handle as most secret. ComSoWespac pass to MacArthur. Unless addressed do not decode beyond here. So pac plans for air search follow: Beginning dog minus 2 day SoPac search disposed as to isolate Coral Sea east of Long 156 from enemy interference without detection and to cover target area to northward as far as range of aircraft permits, this coverage increasing in extent as scouts move to successive advance bases. Suggest SoWestPac aircraft beginning dog minus 2 day cover approaches to Coral Sea and target area by search west of 158 east Long. to maximum extent number and range of available scouts permit. For increased effectiveness SoPac scouted area will overlap an average of 120 miles West of that Long. Copies of our final air search

626
July (GCT)

23 0250 CONSPAC to CONSONESPAC Info CTF 61, 62, 63, CincPac (Cont'd)

Plan will be forwarded latter. Subject to above we concur your plan as contained ComSoWesPac 192034.

27 2211 CONSPAC to CTF 61, Info CONSPACFOR, CINCPAC, CTF 63, 62, MACARTHUR.

Most secret. This from ComSoPac. There are indications that enemy will commence some operations on 29th July from New Britain area. Request you consideration early termination phase one and commence phase Two my operation plan 1-42. Advise, Leary pass to MacArthur.

28 0201 CTF 61 to CONSPAC FOR Info CTF 62, 63, CINCPAC.

This is most secret. Comspac 272211. Irrespective of value exercise of phase one this force will be short estimated more than 50,000 barrels fuel after emptying PLATT & CIMARRON on 31 July. I consider it imperative that ships depart area PANTAN fully fueled and that they be topped off enroute from KASKASKIA and CIMARRON. CTF 62 comment to ComSoPacFor and originator CTF 61.

28 0539 CONAIRSOPAC TO CINCPAC CINCPAC TO COMGENHAWDEPT.

Treat as most secret. Cincpac pass to ComGen HawDept. Request 10 radio compartment gasoline tanks be shipped by air at earliest possible date to IIth bombardment group POPPY. Accomplishment of 1st phase of mission hinges on delivery by LB-30 or B-24. Everest to Harmon.

28 1440 CONAIRSOPAC TO CINCPAC Info CONSPAC.

Most secret. As utility field at BUTTON for B-17 prior D day coming operations still in doubt and as range those planes with out radio compartment tanks insufficient for bombing operations from ROSES and POPPY request urgency matter contained my 280539 be recommended to ComGen HawDept.

28 1830 COMINCH TO CONSPAC Info CINCPAC, CONSONESPAC.

It is most important that attacks your 170602 and 201300 be not delayed beyond August 7th and that this date be anticipated if possible in order that enemy may not be given time to perfect installations now under construction in objective areas for use against us.
JULY (GCT)

29 0041 COMAIRSOPAC TO CONSOPAC, info CINCPAC, COMGEN HAWDEPT.

Most Secret. Large scale bombing operations against TULAGI - GUADALCANAL planned for 31st in conference in SARATOGA must await arrival and installation additional gas tank in 10 BLY's or completion BUTTON field. Will attack as planned that date with as many these planes now so equipped - about 9. CinCPac pass to ComGen HawDept.

29 0857 CTF 61 to CTF 63 info CONSOPAC, CTF 62, 18.

Utmost secret. Your operation plan 1-42. Assume on dog minus 1 day planes searching sectors 3 and 5 will arrive outer limit search at sunset searching return leg by radar. Note that enemy striking group could approach undetected to launch air attack sunrise dog day by being to Northwest of sector 5 and north of sector 3 at sunset dog minus 2 day dog minus 1 day. On dog day suggest planes searching sectors 2 and 4 be abreast TULAGI by sunrise.

29 2335 CONSOPAC TO COMCHIN, info MACARTHUR, CINCPAC, COMSWPACFOR.

This to be handled most secret. Consopac sends. Leary pass to MacArthur for info. Your 291830 every effort has been made and is being made to comply for reasons you have indicated. See replies from Fletcher and Turner to my 272211 which were passed to you.

30 0820 CTF 63 TO CTF 61 info CTF 18, 62, CONSOPAC.

From ComTaskFor 63. If weather forecast indicates favorable navigation conditions will comply your 290857 as regards sectors 3 and 5 dog minus one. Otherwise daylight search will be made. On dog day will comply regarding sectors 2 and 4.

30 1601 COMCHIN TO CINCPAC, CONSOPAC, COMSWPACFOR.

This dispatch must be handled with utmost secrecy. If you are not an addressee break no further. The British Eastern Fleet will create an aversion in Bay of Bengal Code name STAB in accord following plan. All times Greenwich mean time. Three convoys with local escort will sail at 0400 August 1st in direction ANDAMANS. Force V from VIZAGAPATAM. Force M from MADRAS. Force T from TRINCOMALEE. Convoys will reverse course at 1700 August 1st and return to port before sunset August 2d. A covering force Afirm composition probably fast 1 BB or 2 CV's, cruisers and Destroyers will sail from COLOMBO 0400 July 31 to cover the eastwards forces T and M during August 1 and 2. Wireless diversion code name SPARKS maybe carried out to simulate breakdown in force Mike followed by CINCPAC cancelling operation. Force Afirn will act as circumstances dictate probably arriving COLOMBO August 4. Leary pass to MacArthur.
GCT CINCPAC TO COMINCH

30 0235

Recent photo reconnaissance Makin Gilbert Islands does not disclose definite enemy activity. Nevertheless plan to raid that island with marine raiders from submarines about August 17 to destroy possible fuel stores and installations. Para. No further word from Theobald not already reported.

29 1920 COMTASKFOR 8 TO CINCPAC

Based on prediction of good visibility there in late afternoon decided to approach Kiska 127th. At 30 miles from objective 2 hours before dark was compelled by thick fog to turn back despite prior encouraging weather indications. On second 90 degree turn LAMBERTON apparently turned prematurely rammed CHANDLER. MONAGHAN on own initiative left station to investigate collision rammed LONG. No vessel is dangerously damaged but all need repair. 3 mine-sweepers reported able to continue operations. MONAGHAN damage to bow limits that vessel to 20 knots. Damaged vessels sent to Dutch Harbor. Further report on them later. 1 sweeper available. Delay have caused disruption of air support plan due inability to issue necessary orders. Have operated in fog for 10 days. Few and widely spaced contacts with own planes during rare periods of slightly improved visibility have permitted only small percentage of required orders. In view of these factors and prediction of further protract period of adverse weather must withdraw to reestablish plans. With necessary modifications to operation plan greatly gravated by visibility in this area am now convinced that officer directing operations involving widely separated forces must control from base where essential coordinating orders may be issued. Accordingly am returning flag ashore Kodiak. Will advise further plans at earliest possible time. Cincpac pass to Cominch.

31 2145 CINCPAC TO CTF8

Utmost secret. Appreciate difficulties engendered by weather but consider important that your superior surface power be employed if feasible. As indications continue enemy surface and air forces in northern area are weak believe bold operations would be successful. Exploration of all means of utilizing weather to our advantage is indicated. Doubt if indirect bombardment would ever be particularly effective. Due danger their own forces under difficult navigational conditions question enemy employment mines. Suggest for consideration direct bombardment Kiska or radar sweep with cruisers along communication lines Kiska and Attu toward homeland or both. Ghormley's D-Day is 7th and diversionary effect your operations will be important.
JULY (GCT)

31 2145  CINCPAC to COMTASKFOR 8 info COMINCH

Utmost secret. Appreciate difficulties engendered by weather but consider important that your superior surface power be employed if feasible. As indications continue enemy surface and air forces in northern area are weak believe bold operations would be successful. Exploration of all means of utilizing weather to our advantage is indicated. Doubt if indirect bombardment would ever be particularly effective. Due danger their own forces under difficult navigational conditions question enemy employment mines. Suggest for consideration direct bombardment KISKA or Radar sweep with cruisers along communication lines KISKA and ATTU toward homeland or both. Ghormley's D-Day is 7th and diversionary effect your operations will be important.

AUGUST (GCT)

01 0301  COMTASKFOR 8 to CINCPAC info COMINCH

Consider adherence to KISKA bombardment best possible employment of this force. This is Part 1, 2 more parts to follow. For purpose set forth in your 312145 ComTaskForce 8 sends to CinCPac and Cominich as stated. Raiding lines of communication used only intermittently and in dense fog easy to attempt but practically sure of barren results. No more assured chance of fog free attack on ATTU than on KISKA with less chance of efficient weather prediction due to lack of observation of weather to westward.

01 0523  This is the second part of my 010301 from ComTaskFor 8. Believe KISKA only important enemy position in area at present. Topography of island restricts bombardment to 2 areas one to South other to East. Believe my plan bombarding from South by far the best. Bombardment from Eastward requires a direct fire on main camp West of North head and on main ship anchorages also hidden by North head. Only 2 secondary targets North Head and new camp in Southern end of harbor can be bombarded by direct fire from Eastward. Enemy shipping to KISKA observed rounding SEGULA Island indicating possibility of waters between KISKA and MOARTHUR REEF now mined against our submarines action however our submarine report there are no mines near approaches to KISKA. Bombardment from South best from all angles and believe bombardment plan will produce decidedly effective results. Consider possibility of mines in this area less likely. Intend increasing bombardment range of heavy cruisers are outside hundred fathom curve most of bombardment. Will use available sweep ahead of light cruisers in middle land.
COMTASKFOR 8 to CINCPAC info COMINCH
Part 3 of ComTaskFor 8 O10301

Utmost secret. Am modifying air support plan to insure excellent weather service and to assure daily repetition of operations until main body reports bombardment completed. Section three, and last of Comtaskforce Eight's O10301. New plan is believed to meet most of difficulties so far encountered. Experience indicates not enemy action but weather and delay caused thereby and lack of coordinating control were main obstacles. Fog persists about eighty percent of time in objective area during July and August. Last clear day was July 20. Fog in approaches lifts over land so that harbor is at times clear when visibility off shore is quarter mile or less. Will expedite next effort to maximum possible. Expect to initiate move within 48 hours.

CINCPAC to COMINCH

Most secret. Assume carrier group your O11550 refers to carrier task force. Until situation in Southwest and enemy intentions particularly his carrier fleet are clearer I feel unable to commit the additional force to the ALEUTIANS. In addition am reluctant to operate a Cast Victor in such bad weather area for any purpose. My 290525 June and 230327 July. AVG COPAHEE will be assigned Task Force 8 as soon as she reports ready for duty.

COMSOPAC to CTF 61 info CINCPAC, CTF 62, CTF 63

Most secret. Under information you plan to withdraw carrier support TULAGI area prior to Dog plus 3 Day. Necessity exists of providing continuous fighter coverage for area. Following plan proposed for your consideration:
(a) Carriers prior to withdrawal leave 2 fighter squadrons GUADALCANAL (assuming field is ready).
(b) Providing belly tanks fit fighter planes at ROSES, carriers fly tanks to ROSES about Dog plus 4 Day then ROSES planes fly to GUADALCANAL Dog plus 6 Day.
(c) LONG ISLAND from position 200 miles South GUADALCANAL fly fighter planes to GUADALCANAL and receive carrier planes for subsequent return to carriers.

Above plan operative only on contingency no hostile carriers destined near this area. Should hostile carriers be detected subsequent to landing your fighters these fighters would be immediately released to you.
AUGUST (GCT)

01 2355 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH.

Most secret. If weather continues unsuitable for your planned operation take advantage this condition to make sweeps to Southwestward ATTU - KISKA with one or two your cruisers most efficient in Radar operation.

02 2220 COMSOPAC to CTF 61, 62, 63, 16, 18, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC etc.

Most secret. August 7th local date hereby designated as Dog day under Comsopac Operation Plan 1-42. Leary pass to MacArthur.
AUGUST (GCT)
05 0003 COMINCH to CINCPAC info VARIOUS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the following operation for which the code name is FIREPLACE:

1. Occupy TANAGA Island and construct airfield thereon in order to deny area to Japan and to support own offensive operations.

2. Task 1 - Seizure and occupation;
   Task 2 - Construction of airfield and defensive works;

3. Ground force 1 Bn Inf Reinf 2 Btrys AA AW including 30 20mm Oerlikons 1 Btry AA 3 inch 1 Btry AA searchlight 1 Btry 155mm guns 1 Btry 75mm guns 2 Radars SCR 270 with crews 800 and 7th Engr Bn less 1 Co and service detachments approx total 3200. Air force such air units as may be directed by ComTaskFor 8 from units in ALASKA now under his control plus heavy bombardment squadron previously restricted to Nome. Naval units as directed by ComTaskFor 8.

4. Unity of Command vested in ComTaskFor 8 for Task 1. Upon completion Task 1 and when agreed upon by Army and Navy task commanders command of Army ground force will pass to senior Army commander for completion of Task 2. Naval Task Force Commander will remain in command of water borne units and combined air units as heretofore. Direct communication between Army and Navy commanders concerned is authorized.

5. Time of occupation to be determined by Joint Chiefs of Staff premised on earliest availability of shipping and naval support forces now in Task Force 8 which latter cannot be augmented until certain current commitments elsewhere have been met. CINCPac provide 1 combat loading transport for initial landing thence to be returned to previous duty West Coast. This transport to proceed San Francisco immediately report to Commander Western Defense command for loading, who will arrange for escort and routing to KODIAK with ComWestSeaFron. Commander Western Defense Command will arrange shipping for remainder of Army units involved.

6. Withdrawal of Naval units may be ordered by Joint Chiefs of Staff upon completion of Task 1 if conditions warrant.

7. Preparation for execution of FIREPLACE will be commenced upon receipt this dispatch. ComTaskFor 8 report to Cominich when forces have been assembled in KODIAK DUTCH HARBOR area with recommendation as to date of occupation. Buchner pass to DeWitt. Utmost secrecy for this dispatch.
Recommendation of General DeWitt to Cominich and Chief of Staff was entirely unilateral. ComTaskFor 8 will comment to CinCPac in another despatch. General's despatch follows:

To Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and Cominich, U.S. Navy, CG ADC and ComAlSec in full joint agreement on following:

TANAGA offers decidedly best airfield facilities and field can be constructed and in shorter time after landing than at ADAK. Disadvantages of establishing field on TANAGA lie in fact that its harbor facilities are such that landing and later supply may be delayed as a result of bad weather or hostile submarines. The sooner the attack on Kiska is made the easier and less costly it will be. There is divergence of opinion on following: ComAlSec is of opinion that if field is to be built on TANAGA the initial delays from probable bad weather and enemy action may be such as to prevent entirely accomplishment of operations. CG WDC considers, since time is pressing, it is preferable to risk possible delay due to weather and enemy action at TANAGA and secure better field than to be certain of delay due to construction difficulties and secure less satisfactory field at ADAK. ComTaskFor 8 feels if operation is directed he will require in addition to present force 1 CA 2 CVs 1 DD squadron and two squadrons Navy dive bombers to operate from Umnak initially and from TANAGA at earliest possible date and considers TANAGA Bay difficult to protect from hostile submarine action. I consider operation should be initiated at earliest possible date. Major items of equipment not available to CG ADC essential for operation: 1 transport equipped for ship to shore movement either BELL or ALLEN and 1 squadron heavy bombardment. Recommend TANAGA site be selected and urgently request expeditious reply TCYP here giving me freedom of action to proceed with plans while I have opportunity to confer with Buckner and ComTaskFor 8. Signed DeWitt CG WDC. ComTaskFor 8 sends to CinCPac for info.
05 0520 COMTASKFOR 8 info COMINCH, CINCPAC

Part 1 of 3. ComTaskFor 8 sends. Attended conferences with Generals DeWitt and Buckner concerning additional western air bases. DeWitt arrived with mind apparently fully made up on move and all details. Buckner same. I oppose creation of intermediate bases and prefer neutralization of Kiska at this time for reason set forth below. Comparing 2 base sites consider Army estimates of time to unload men stores heavy machinery at TANAGA too sanguine. Weather and submarine menace in open harbor were entirely discounted. Information recently gained by ComAlSec personal survey of TANAGA and ADAK disregarded. His estimate of difficulties at TANAGA and better harbor facilities at ADAK did not sway DeWitt's decision. In preliminary conferences with Buckner voiced my conception of Naval objections but merely informed DeWitt that I opposed plan for reasons of basic Naval strategy involved adding that these considerations were however concern of high Naval command and that I of course intended complete report to you. My thought was that large scale Naval commitments in two widely separated areas violates fundamental principles Naval strategy. Such concurrent operations are only warranted by preponderant Naval strength. Stations addressed deliver all three parts.

05 0556 Part 2 of 3 (same as above)

Consider that minimum reinforcements to Task Force 8 for necessary long continuing support of proposed project are 2 carriers one heavy cruiser one destroyer squadron 2 Navy dive bombing squadrons. Suggested that with these forces surprise operation to capture Kiska could be supported. Such action followed by neutralization as enemy base and withdrawal is better operation. Army preferred intermediate base as first move I offer for your consideration that step by step operations follow Dardanelles pattern. As campaign progresses this move must augment Naval commitments in this area. In later conversation stated this to DeWitt who agreed and further replied that he realized large fleet action could easily eventuate. I gathered that such eventualities in the Pacific Naval Campaign apparently had no deterrent effect upon his desire to prosecute his plans for the TANAGA base irrespective of whether or not this fitted your plans or those of Admiral King. At any time when immediate Naval support is inadequate TANAGA can become a second WAKE.
Part 3 of 3/ With total lack of Naval base facilities in nearby area day by day maintenance of this support for protracted period not possible. Defense plans based largely efficiency of land based air support in this area considered doomed to failure. Prospective Army TANAGA forces believed inadequate to delay strong enemy attack long enough to permit timely arrival of a naval force two days distant at inception of attack. Regret length but thought you would desire full exposition of my opinions particularly since your last directive requires diversion of enemy forces to the ALEUTIAN area which action would be strategically inconsistent with Naval operations designed initially to deny enemy action against the advance to and creation of a base in that area.

Conference was completed Anchorage yesterday with Theobald attending following investigation directed by Cominch 252000 July. Hewett has submitted report. While I agree with Buckner that TANAGA offers site for better and more readily built field than at ADAK believe he is much too optimistic regarding effects of weather. Harbor is open to prevailing fall storms and experienced observers declare it untenable under those conditions. Not only will unloading operations stop but loss of lighters upon which Army is placing main reliance is probable. In my opinion difficulties are underestimated and consequently means contemplated are considerable less than necessary to make the plan sound.
SECRET

AUGUST (GCT)

05 0143 CINCPAC to COMSUBPAC, CO 2ND MARINE RAIDER BN.

Treat with utmost secrecy. When ready about August 8 proceed with PECCAVI operation myser 0166W. MAKIN designated primary objective. Also reconnoiter and inflict damage on enemy at LITTLE MAKIN, APAIANG, MARAKI, as conditions permit. Information own and enemy forces will be furnished separately.

05 0730 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMGENSOPAC.

Handle as most secret. One of two parts. General Harmon following a personal inspection of FANTAN, POPPY, ROSES and BUTTON makes the following recommendations (in which I emphatically concur) as representing the minimum Army reinforcements necessary to provide adequate garrisons for present bases, to conduct operations incident to succeeding Tasks 2 and 3 and subsequent thereto, and to relieve amphibious units in seized areas: (a) Immediate dispatch to POPPY of 3 fighter squadrons equipped with P-38 airplanes for use in the GUADALCANAL and SANTA CRUZ areas. These airplanes can make flight from POPPY to BUTTON to GUADALCANAL or SANTA CRUZ. (b) Initiate immediate replacement of attrition of B-17s in the 11th group. (c) Dispatch as early as practicable one bombing squadron medium to POPPY for use in the GUADALCANAL area. (d) Prompt dispatch of replacement fighter and medium bomber airplanes to POPPY and FANTAN and dispatch as early as practicable of one fighter squadron to BUTTON, one to ROSES and one additional to POPPY. (e) Dispatch as early as practicable one bomber squadron B-17 to POPPY and one squadron B-17s to FANTAN for permanent station. End of part one.

05 0750 Part two.

This most secret. These for use anywhere in Sopac area. (f) Dispatch as available 3 bomber squadrons dive, one to GUADALCANAL, one to POPPY and one to FANTAN in that priority. (g) Dispatch of following ground force as early as practicable aid in the following order of priority: 1st to POPPY 1 infantry division, 2 regiments infantry, 2 battalions field artillery 105 howitzer. Most of this force to replace forces to be moved 2nd to SANTA CRUZ and GUADALCANAL direct 1 regiment coast artillery anti-aircraft 2 automatic weapons battalions coast artillery antiaircraft, one regiment coast artillery harbor defense 3rd to ROSES and BUTTON direct 1 infantry division less 1 regiment of infantry, 1 regiment coast artillery anti-aircraft, 1 battalion coast artillery harbor defense less

(Continued on next page)
AUGUST (GCT)

05 0730 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMGENSOPAC.

05 0750 Part two - (Continued).

1 battery 4th to POPPY one regiment infantry, one regiment coast artillery antiaircraft 5th no decision has been made as to availability of NEW ZEALAND troops. Availability would obviate need of corresponding U. S. Forces. Written recommendations follow. Comgensopac has by hand. Comgensopac is also sending the above recommendations direct to the Chief of Staff Army.

05 2213 CINCPAC to CTF 8.

Utmost secrecy. Report details recent inspection TANAGA. Unless landing was made and inspection party included technical assistants desire such a survey conducted at once and results reported to me earliest practicable date.

05 2205 CINCPAC to CTF 8 info COMINCH.

Utmost secrecy. Assume your 050520 sent before receipt Cominch 050003. Carry out plan contained Cominch 050003 assembling necessary forces KODIAK prior to arrival transport ordered in my 050955.

06 2035 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, Info COMINCH, CTF 17, 18.61.

It is my present intention to sail Task Force 17 plus GUADULUPE from PEARL about 17 August to relieve Task Force 18 plus PLATTE on station. Unless otherwise requested by you will route 17 to cross equator in longitude 174-00 West command passing to you at that point.

07 1030 CTF 61.2 to COMSOPAC, CTF 61, and info addressees.

Situation summary WATCHTOWER. Most secret. From CTF 61.2. Approach a complete surprise 18 enemy seaplanes destroyed on water one small schooner. No enemy ships present. In both areas opened shore bombardment 1910 GCT 6th with ships and planes light gun opposition soon silenced. Landings began FLORIDA area 2040 initial opposition light GUADALCANAL 2210 no opposition. Para. At 0220 GCT 7th about 25 enemy type 97 bombers passed overhead dropped several bombs no damage proceeded toward carriers 2 shot down 2 damaged. About 10 enemy type 99 dive bombers made 1 250 pound hit on MUGFORD 0400 considerable damage after deck house 2 guns two engines on 15 missing 5 dead 9 seriously injured. 2 enemy planes shot down. Para. Situation at 0900: GUADALCANAL all troops ashore estimated occupy on west line

(Continued on next page)
AUGUST (GCT)

07 1030 CTG 61.2 to COMSOPAC, CTF 61, and info addressees.

(Continued)

TENARE River and on east security line about longitude 160-06 in neither place in contact with enemy. On FLORIDA side HALAVO occupied no opposition. TULAGI occupied except east end fight continues CAVUTU captured heavy casualties TANAMBOGO still in hands of enemy attack underway. Para. Tomorrow request maximum fighter cover 2 VSB squadrons continuously in area. Request scouting against approach enemy surface forces from westward para. Early morning 8th expect send out SANTA CRUZ occupation force less PRES JACKSON, WILSON, plus McCauley, FULLER, HEYWOOD, TREVER, MUGFORD, some other APs later in day. Tonight 2 DMs searching for fighters shot down near RUSSEL ISLAND. One WASP dive bomber shot down by zero fighter according to pilot wounded gunner lost.

08 0330 CTG 61.2 to COMSOPAC, CTF 61.

Squadron Xray attacked 0100 GCT 8th by about 40 type 99 twin engine torpedo planes and 8 high altitude bombers. JARVIS hit in forward part of ship by torpedo disabled an towing into shallow water. ELLIOTT on fire amidships from bomb hit. Not known yet whether ship can be saved. At least 12 enemy planes shot down probably more by ships and fighters.

08 1955 CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMSOPACFOR.

Utmost secrecy. Assuming successful completion present operations recommend pending initiation Task 2 that Task 1 be extended to permit Ghormley to extend control as practicable northwest along the SOLOMONS to increase security of TULAGI area.

09 0315 FLETCHER to COMSOPAC.

FLETCHER sending to GHORMLEY. Following summary of messages delivered from TURNER. Quote at 051645 surface attack on screen coordinated with use aircraft flares. CHICAGO hit torpedo, CANBERRA on fire. At 2100 GCT. Heavy actions continue to westward. More of our ships in trouble. Submarines in area. At 2152 GCT. QUINCY sunk by torpedoes and gunfire. Air attack enroute. At 2325 GCT. VINCENNES sunk by gunfire and torpedoes. 0245 casualties heavy. At 2358. ASTORIA has fire in wardroom destroyer ordered to pump and ALCHTRA to tow through LUNGGA channel to ROSE to chance to save her. Movements requires protection which I am unable to provide. Unquote. Direct TURNER to make reports direct to you info to me.
AUGUST (GCT)

09 0508 CTF 62 to CTF 61, COMSOPAC, COMSWESPAC.

Following departed GUADALCANAL 0400 GCT 9th for NOUMEA via LERGO channel and north of SAN CRISTOBAL. Captain Reifsmider in command 5 APS, 5 AKs. CHICAGO, 4 DD, 5 DMs speed about 12. JARVIS enroute alone to ROSES expect to provide escort.

09 0725 CTF 62 to COMAIRSOPAC, COMSOPAC, CTF 61.

Expect depart 0730 Zed (Zone Zero) 9th GUADALCANAL for NOUMEA MENGO channel and north of SAN CRISTOBAL speed about 12 with seven APS, one AK, SAN JUAN, AUSTRALIA, HOBART, four APDs 10 DDs. Turner in McCawley with this detachment.

09 0750 COMSOPAC to CTF 61,62,63, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPACFOR.

Comtaskfor 62 direct withdrawal naval surface forces to WHITE POPPY. If 2nd marines still present direct them to land and reinforce CACTUS. If landing of 2nd marines has begun at APRICOT direct it to continue as planned. If 2nd Marines have departed CACTUS and landing at APRICOT not repeat not commenced divert 2nd marines to BUTTON to land and reinforce garrison there. Insure delivery this directive by despatch to appropriate task group commander. Comtaskfor 63 direct withdrawal patrol planes and servicing tender from MARMASIKE estuary. Likewise withdraw from APRICOT if 2nd Marines do not land there. Comtaskfor 61 cover movement as practicable without interference with fueling. Leary hand MacArthur. Comsopac sends action Comtaskfors 61, 62, 63. For info to Cincpac, Cominch. Comgensopac has by hand.

09 0950 COMSOPAC, TF 62, Info Comgen 1st mardiv.

Comsopac sends. Believe enemy landing forces proceeding CACTUS.

09 1000 COMSOPAC, to all US NAV SHIPS SOPAC AREA, info NAV ATT WELLINGTON

This is from Comsopac. Following instructions were sent in another system to TT coms: CTF 62 direct withdrawal naval surface forces to WHITE POPPY. If second marines still present direct them to land and reinforce CACTUS. If landing of second marines has begun at APRICOT direct it to continue as planned. If second Marines have departed CACTUS and landing at APRICOT not repeat not commenced divert second Marines to BUTTON to land and reinforce garrison there. Insure delivery

(Continued on next page)
09 1000 COMSOPAC to all US NAV SHIPS SOPAC AREA.

(Continued)

this directive by despatch to appropriate TG commander.
CTF 63 direct withdrawal patrol planes and servicing tender
from MARMASKE Estuary. Likewise withdraw from APRICOT
if Second Marines do not land there. CTF 61 cover movements
as practicable without interference with fueling. Unit
commanders of detached units take charge and carry out the a-
bove in the absence of other instructions.

09 1212 COMSOPAC to CTF 63.

From Comsopac. My 090750. Withdraw BREESE and ALDRICH with
McFARLAND.

09 0830 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH, COMSWPACFOR, MacArthur.

Most secret. Carriers short of fuel proceeding to fueling
rendezvous. Have been unable get situation reports from
TURNER direct. FLETCHER informs me "Am receiving despatches
from TURNER describing heavy losses in cruisers in engage-
ment which continues to westward". Also in garbled message:
CHICAGO hit torpedo, CANBERRA on fire, more of our ships in
trouble, submarines (question) in area, QUINCY sunk by
torpedo, air attack enroute". Para. Am withdrawing other
naval surface forces and patrol planes until such time as I
have shore based aircraft in such strength that I can pro-
tect my lines of communication to CACTUS and supply CACTUS
with sufficient aviation for effective defense. Request
immediate air reenforcement especially long range fighters and
heavy bombers.

09 1230 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, Info CTF 61, CINCPAC, TF 62.

Vessels Task Force 62 withdrawing in several groups and
possibly one or two single ships. Intend proceed north of
SAN CRISTOBAL to WHITE POPPY except three or four ships to
ROSES. Carrier groups proceeding to fuel in a rendezvous
to west of line BUTTON-ROSES. Modify searches to provide
maximum possible coverage for task force 62 units. Comsopac
sends.

09 1957 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMSOPAC, CAGENHAWDEPT.

Utmost secrecy. Comsopac 090830. One marine VF squad
18 planes proceeding SOPAC 15 August supplements similar
squadron arriving vicinity SANTA CRUZ Island 13 August in
LONG ISLAND. Estimate one CV replacement Squadron ready one
Sept. No further air support available from Hawaiian area
which now operating with minimum margin operating comple-

(continued on next page)
CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMSOPAC, COMGENHAWDEPT.

(Continued)

ments and no reserve for losses. Until his position improves recommend Ghormley be authorized retain his area Army heavy and medium bombers now enroute SUMAC and that additional support be furnished from SOWESTPAC Mobile Air Force and fighters as practicable.

CINCPAC to COMINCH.

Utmost secrecy. Request information status my 080155. In compliance with directive given Theobald when your 050003 was received he is having an inspection party landed TANAGA by submarine. I desire to cancel this if location of base is to be changed.

COMSOPAC (A) to COMSOPAC.

Handle with utmost secrecy. New Zealand Army is planning to provide reinforced division as requested by you total strength approximately 20,000 men. Despatch of force is subject to approval of New Zealand government. Prime Minister reserves his decision until after personal consultation with Admiral Ghormley. For planning purposes following requested at early date: Priority forward displacement of New Zealand units; names of APs and AKs to be made available; date of availability vessels at LONGBOW. Only 16 AA guns on wheels available (additional 32 on improvised mountings ultimately to be provided). Will this number suffice for lst echelon. Improvised mountings for 6 inch coast guns are being constructed. Will any 155 millimeter guns with marine units be made available until New Zealand is able to supply coast defense guns and mountings. Plans here contemplate United States Forces CACTUS-RINGBOLT area will provide equipment for moving New Zealand equipment from ship to shore. Force can be available beginning 25 August. Prime Minister states if immediate decision not necessary he will plan on leaving FULCRUM 14 August via Coronado but if early decision desired will try anticipate this date via Tasman. He has been informed early decision is urgent. New Zealand Army making preparations in advance of approval.

COMSOPAC, to COMSOWESPAC, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF61 & 63.

This is most secret. Believe enemy will execute landing attack against our troops in CACTUS area. Request you concentrate your submarines in that area. Request continue aerial reconnaissance as in your 260955 July. Action MacArthur.
August (GCT)

10 1830 COMINCH to CINCLANT, Info Commands concerned.

This is extra secret. Direct SOUTH DAKOTA escorted by minimum 3 destroyers proceed earliest practicable date PANAMA. Upon arrival PANAMA SOUTH DAKOTA report Cincpac for duty Batdiv 6. Hold Duncan LANDSDOWNE LARDNER Canal Zone for onward escort as directed by Cincpac. Intend that SOUTH DAKOTA shall augment Chormley.

10 2205 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info Cominch.

Treat as most secret. Desire full information as practicable of your plans as they develop. As reaction of enemy appears strong toward the south and negligible toward your area comment as to desirability rotating your force in small units to Bremerton for upkeep.

10 1418 ADMIRALTY to Cincpac.

Hush most secret. Following is (Cincpac from Admiralty).

A repetition of F.O.I/C Ceylon 0301Z/10 addressed Admiralty from FOIC Ceylon pass following to Cincpac from Cino E.F.

begins hush. Recent diversion carried out by Force A in Bay of Bengal appears to have been successful as Japanese have sent fighter float planes to Sabang, additional bomber squadron to Sabang and surface ship movements are reported in Malay area. 2. I have to return to Kilindini for operation in that area but have arranged wireless diversion to give impression that force as still operating in this area until 18th August. 3. We wish you all success in your present operation. 0259Z/10 ends, 0301Z/10 ends.

10 1840 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

War Department has directed Comgensopac to expedite through South Pacific Area movement of airplanes destined for Australia unless by their diversion they can be more effectively used in South Pacific Area. This message is unusually secret.

09 2040 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

Preliminary Army estimates on operation FIREPLACE. Phase 1 initial landing and occupation troops 2363 tonnage 12420. Phase 2. Reinforcements troops 5250 tonnage 30500. Phase 3. Additional equipment housing tonnage 10000. Phase 4. Monthly maintenence tonnage 9084. Army plan calls for moving heavy equipment from Chernofski to destination by barge speed of advance about 5 knots. Survey of island and harbor is being made by 2 Naval aviators, 1 Marine officer and 1 Civil Engineer embarked on FINBACK arriving there about 10 Aug. Your 052213.
AUGUST (CCT)
10 2147 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, Info COMINCH COMSWPAC.

Handle with ultra secrecy. Estimate ORANGE strength Bismarck Solomons 1 Chokai 4 Aoba 2 Tenryu 1 Yubari 6 Kamikaze 4 Minekaze 4 RC Subs 8 I subs 1 Chitose 2 to 4 Kamigawa 4 PT 4 PC 2 DM 16 SC 4 AM 6 to 8 AP 4 to 6 AK.
Enroute from Malaya 2 Mogami 4 Shigure 1 Kamigawa. Enroute from empire 8 Asashio 1 to 2 Kamigawa. Have no hint of damage to enemy surface craft except his announcement 2 damaged CA. Heavy air reinforcements have arrived or are enroute Rabaul but enemy air losses in recent engagements were very heavy. No indication any CV has yet left empire. Para. Your 101006. Most important to successful accomplishment Task 1 that landing be prevented. Assume you will use carrier task forces as practicable on opposition there-to. Most important that aircraft of Sowespac detect and report movement in time and that when our carriers are in range of enemy aircraft their bases be bombed in such a manner as to effect maximum damage during such period.

10 2159 CINCPAC to COMINCH

Intercepts from Ghormley indicate: (a) BUTTON to be strong point for reinforcement RINGBOLT CACTUS and occupation APRICOT. (b) 2nd Marines did not land APRICOT. (c) Operational losses PBYs appear considerable. (d) Fletcher's CV Task Forces probably commenced fueling yesterday. (e) As Orange expected to land reinforcements CACTUS Ghormley requests MacArthur's subs that area. (f) Radio contact established by ComSoPac with Vandergrift but no report yet. Para.
Bombardment at KISKA was hampered by fog during approach and low ceiling during firing which prevented spotting or observation of damage. Own loss 1 plane only damage to ships was minor due to own gunfire. Para.

Plan to sail VESTAL SoPac August 15th to assist in salvage and repairs.

10 2230 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, CTF 61, 62, 63 info COMINCH, ETC.

This is to be handled as most secret. Following is first situation report given me by Vandergrift timed 101202. We hold TULAGI JAVITU MARAMBO TANAMBOGU and have 5,000 men that area which was taken only after bitter fighting due restricted areas. Our casualties there estimated about 450. Jap casualties 100% running over 1,000. Also hold KUKUOKO to KOKI Point GUADALCANAAL digging in to defend beaches. Have few tools and no barbed wire. Patrolling to mop up garrison 300 troops and 2,000 pioneers who withdrew to bush. Have disposed of number and have suffered a few casualties. Airfield ready fighters and dive bombers.
AUGUST (GCT)

11 0206 GHORMLEY to CTF 61 info All Coms SoPac, CINCPAC

Handle as most secret. Ghormley sending Fletcher action. Leary pass to MacArthur. Harmon will have by hand. In addition to the continuing primary task of destroying carriers encountered the present tasks of carrier task forces are: (a) Cover BUTTON WHITE POPPY line of communications (b) Support CACTUS RINGBOLT garrison by destroying ships of hostile attack force (c) Cover movement of our aviation ground crews ground equipment and aviation supplies into CACTUS area. I hope we can give you about 24 hours warning of hostile landing attack force moving against CACTUS, and I estimate most probable point of hostile landing in West end of CACTUS. Will keep you informed of plans under Task (c) above.

11 0226 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH, ETC.

In order conserve carriers and their aircraft and other vital surface craft, request transport planes, maintained at 2 squadron level, for transportation personnel and material to CACTUS area. ComSoPac to CinCPac action and to Cominch, ComSoWestPacfor, ComGenSoPac, Comtaskfor 61, 62 and 63 information. Leary pass to MacArthur.

11 0650 CTF 62 to COMAMPHIBFORSPAC info COMSOPAC

Position here secure but feel that considerations not previously apparent should be presented. Movement of supplies and preparations of defenses progressing slowly due to shortage of equipment and material. Preparing to defend nine thousand yards beach. Is now obvious that a form of perimeter defense is required since hostile detachments fade into jungle before patrols. Have mopped up a few and suffered some casualties. Equipment and supplies captured indicate Jap meant this to be a major base and may attempt to retake it. Information desired as to prospective employment of Second Marines. We must have reconnaissance of sea and air approaches. Situation requires an additional infantry regiment on GUADANAL to defend against a major attack. Vandegrift to Turner. Rupertus has taken objectives after tough going reports he is digging in. He needs means to go after hostile detachments on FLORIDA. Action Com-AmphibforSoPac info ComSoPac.
AUGUST (GCT)

11 2030 COMINCH to CINCPAC

Your 062035 seems to me to unduly expose Hawaiian area because relief on station will involve absence of carrier group for some 12 to 15 days. Para.
Therefore request you explore practicability of rotation of carrier Task Groups so that at all times at least one such group will be within say 1200 miles of PEARL except when extraordinary circumstances warrant otherwise.

11 2209 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC info COMINCH, CINC SOWESPAC

Treat as ultra secret. Close association CinC 2nd and CinC 1st Air Fleet with CinC 4th and 8th Fleet and 11th Air Fleet suggests probability of formation of strong striking force for employment in BISMARCK-SOLOMONS in near future. Preliminary organization seems to be First Air Fleet task force: HIYEP, KIRISHIMA, SHOKAKU, ZUKAKU, RYUJO, HOSHO, TONE, CHIKUMA, KUMANO plus another cruiser. 2nd Fleet task force: HARUNA, KONGO, MYOKO, HAGURO, MAYA, TAKAO, one XA V 2 desdive. Need for logistic arrangements plus necessity assemble destroyer screen from present escort missions indicate movement surface reinforcements will not materialize for seven - ten days. Para.

Every means available must be employed to strengthen our position in RINGSBOLT CACTUS area prior to arrival above force in area. Cover must be furnished by carrier aircraft as long as necessary and carriers while within range enemy air bases should be given maximum protection by action of shore based air against these bases.

11 2220 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH

Delayed reports from Turner state CHICAGO torpedoed in stem can make 12 knots; PATTERSON, MUGFORD, RALPH TALBODT damaged by gunfire; ASTORIA blew up and sank; ELLIOTT stranded still burning.

12 0216 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CONTRANSDIV 12 info CINCPAC, ETC.

Handle as most secret. Early establishment air at CACTUS imperative. Load all APDs present and arriving with AvGas AvLub, bombs, ammunition, aviation ground personnel and material available and despatch earliest possible via LUNGA CHANNEL to arrive CACTUS late afternoon unload during night and depart early following morning return BUTTON. Furnish air coverage. Aviation ground personnel will be replaced BUTTON from William Ward Burrows. Aviation will be flown CACTUS from LONG ISLAND. Leary pass to MacArthur.
AUGUST (OCT)

12 0220   GREENMAN to CTF 62 info COMGRUPAC

From Greenman: Recommend immediate removal all inflammable material vicinity well deck and hangar including planes from cruisers ASTORIA type. Fires started this area within first five minutes of action drove engineering personnel from after engineeringroom and after fireroom resulting in immediate loss of fifty percent of power and intense heat and smoke made all after fire control and ship control stations untenable. Observations and statements of survivors indicate same situation developed in other two cruisers present.

12 0316 CONSOPAC to COMSOWESPACFOR info CTF 61, 62, 63, CINCPAC

Retired position our carriers while awaiting enemy attack with relation distance RABAUL to enemy objectives makes necessary they receive information enemy naval surface movements earliest moment. I am unable reliably to intercept reconnaissance pilots reports therefore request they be transmitted to me on Task Force Coms circuit as soon as received by you. Leary pass to MacArthur.

12 1056 CONSOPAC to MACARTHUR info CINCPAC, CTF 61, 63.

Most secret. Large assemblage vessels RABAUL as reported in ComSoWesPacfor 120335 may indicate initiation expected movement against CACTUS - RINGBOLT area. If air striking groups as outlined your 191034 July are still available attacks on such groups vessels would be of inestimable benefit in furtherance our joint operations.

12 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC

In view Japanese concentrations that appear to be directed toward RABAUL you should consider advancing 3 to 5 battleships of Task Force 1 to BLEACHER. Desire your comment. Para.

Am directing JUNEAU to join SOUTH DAKOTA. SOUTH DAKOTA's ETA PANAMA 19 August.

12 2047 CINCPAC to COMINCH

PBY5A landed on field at CACTUS yesterday. Field excellent condition 3600 feet long now and will complete additional 900 feet in 3 days. Captain Greenman in preliminary report recommends immediate removal all inflammable material including planes vicinity well deck and hangar from ASTORIA type. Survivors indicate serious fires there all 3 ships early part of action. LUNGA-KUKUM area bombed by three enemy planes. Target area otherwise quiet. Ghormley has requested MacArthur to employ air striking group against large number of ships reported at RABAUL. Para. Will reexamin inflammable situation on cruisers but do not intend to remove their planes.
AUGUST (GCT)

12 2337 CINCPAC to COMINCH

Utmost Secret. Following comments your 112030 and 121750 are based upon present estimate enemy intentions which may be further clarified before our next moves. Enemy strength appears to be destined for NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMON area; therefore consider improbable serious attack against MIDWAY and even less against OAHU. A raid in force is of higher probability but opposing it with one carrier task force would be ineffectual and might well result in loss of carrier without compensating damage to enemy. Para.

Unable provide logistic support in SoPac area for battleships task force I with ships now available and doubt BB usefulness unless we can operate them in close support CACTUS area. Consider we can best oppose enemy that area with shore based air, carriers and fast forces including new battleships. Therefore while developments next few days may change my opinion I believe that maximum carrier strength will be needed in South and that this can be obtained best by an overlapping relief of Carrier Task Forces on that station. Para.

Am bringing Task Force 1 into Pearl Harbor for possible use against landing attack this area. For reasons above I will not send any of the slow battleships South unless so directed by you. Para.

For reasons given in my 310215 and because additional planes being dispatched SoPac from HAWAII I again urge the air reinforcements requested in that dispatch.

13 0623 COMAIRSOPAC to COMGEN CACTUS info VARIOUS

Handle as most secret. ComAirSoPac originates. Radio Tulagi deliver to ComGen CACTUS for action. Four APDs Transdiv 12 will depart ESPIRITU SANTO daylight tomorrow morning Friday 14th proceeding direct route LUNGA harbor speed of advance 18 knots. Expect arrive ..............

13 1248 CONSOPAC to COMAIRSOPAC

If you have any expert Radar personnel send 1 or 2 to CACTUS on APDs repeat APDs tomorrow good Jap set there intact with plans needs expert to figure out how to work it.
13 1418 CTG 61.2 to CINCPAC, COMINCH, ALL SOPAC

This message was handed me by Turner tonight. CTF 62 dispatch 090230. Previously received by ComSoPac for other addresses is hereby reenciphered for your information. As of 9 hours 8th situation as follows: CTG 61.2 to ComSoPac CTF 61 info to CTG 62.4 and 6, ComAirSoPac, CinCPac, Comin, ComSoWestPac latter pass to MacArthur NPM pass my 080330 to same address para.

Progress retarded today by beach congestion stubborn enemy resistance north side one enemy air attack and one false alarm. Desire express appreciation for warnings by coast watcher Bougainville. Para.

ELLIOTTS fire caused by torpedo plane diving on board fire got out of control removed personnel and had ship torpedoed but she grounded on shoal and is still burning. JARVIS anchored not taking water engines and boilers ok hull bottom open from frame 30 to 55 deck damaged can make 4 to 7 knots own power will try to get her to ROSES starting tonight 14 enlisted missing 7 wounded para.

Continuing discharge of cargo tonight plan temporary retirement from area tomorrow see separate dispatch. para.

Shore GUADALCANAL KUKOOM and airfield occupied. Enemy troops and construction workers scattered considerable stores equipment captured. No advance yet to East. Condition airfields reported separately. Para.

FLORIDA area Marines hold TULAGI GAVUTU and TANAMBOGO except for occasional snipers. Assault on MAKAMBO planned for 2300 GCT on 9th. Severe enemy resistance after initial landing required use all 3 battalions of 2nd Regiment. This will delay APRICOT operations. Recommend use there of 7th Regiment. In view further operations CTF 62 remains on MCCAWLEY.

13 2135 CINCPAC to COMINCH

Most secret. I presume feasibility of Southwest Pacific land forces expelling Japanese from Northeast NEW GUINEA is being fully examined. This would tremendously improve our position with respect to RABAUL and its accomplishment should be assisted by enemy's preoccupation with RINGBOLT area.
14 0303
COMAIRSOPAC to STRINGHAM, MANLEY info ALL SOPAC COMS

Handle as most secret. On completion loading special cargo as previously arranged and when ready depart BUTTON early daylight Sunday August 15th proceed in company via VIRGEO. Route to LUNGA Harbor GUADALCANAL arrive late afternoon Monday 17th. Discharge cargo expediting all possible. Depart early morning 18th return BUTTON direct route speed of advance 18 and await orders. From ComAirSoPac to STRINGHAM and MANLEY for action by hand.

15 0746
COMSOPAC to CTF 63 info CINCPAC, CTF 61, 62

Handle as most secret. Four APDs due CACTUS today. It is planned to send in ALIENA FORMALHAUT with food, ammunition as soon after loading as possible and FULLER ZEILIN with antiaircraft and barrage balloon units soon as practicable. Hostile submarines and aircraft operating CACTUS area freely. Enemy surface vessels may be expected for purpose of blockading. ComAirSoPac comment on following proposals (to be initiated earliest possible date): (a) Maintain daily antisubmarine patrol VPB planes armed depthbombs in CACTUS area as many hours daylight as possible until air forces ashore are prepared assume this duty. Fuel available KUKOM field. (b) Bomber patrol sent daily into vicinity CACTUS RINGBOLT on offensive sweep against surface vessels. Due consideration to be given your primary task.

16 1146
COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC info COMSOWESPAC, MACARTHUR

Handle as most secret. ComSoPac sends to Cominchi, CinCPac action. Leary pass to MacArthur. Situation 16 August. 11,000 Marines hold North coast GUADALCANAL to depth 5 miles from KOLA Point to Point CRUX including airfield, engaged constructing perimeter defense improving airfield and patrolling against guerrillas, a few daily casualties. Total casualties to date probably exceed LLEN hundred. Some Afirm Afirm landed but no coast defense. 6,000 Marines hold TULAGI GAVUTU TANAMBOO NBANGAI MOKEMBEI and spots on adjacent FLORIDA coast line. Marines have only approximately 5 units of fire and 3 days rations due to early forced withdrawal of APs and AKs. With inadequate equipment attempting improve airfield GUADALCANAL on which fighters can now land. Enemy aircraft and submarines threaten all shipping in the area. Sent 4 APDs into area last night with AVGas AvLub aviation spare parts and some ground crews. No word as to success or failure of this action.

(continued on next page)
AUGUST (GCT)

15 1951 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COMSOWESTPAC, CINC COMSOWESTPAC-
AREA

Treat with utmost secrecy this message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander Southwest Pacific Area and to Commander South Pacific. Para. 1. Information received from CinC SWPA indicates that plans and preparations for operations in the NEW GUINEA area have progressed to such a point that, based upon the successful progress of Task One, it should be practicable to mount immediately that part of Task 2 involving the seizure and occupation of LAE, SALAMAUA and the Northeast Coast of NEW GUINEA. A message from Cincpac urges such action. Early execution of such an operation would appear to be especially desirable. Para 2. Execution of that part of Task 2 Cominch 022100 July involving the seizure and occupation of LAE, SALAMAUA and the Northeast coast of NEW GUINEA should be pushed. Para 3. With this end in view desire: A. Ghormleys estimate of time required for consolidating positions seized and occupied in Task One, including plans of relieving Marines for further offensive operations. B. Anticipated progress of measures planned by MacArthur before Ghormley is ready to provide forces for joint action Task 2. C. From Mac-Arthur and Ghormley recommendation of forces to be used for this limited Task 2. D. Estimated target date upon which above joint action could be launched. E. Date when direction of Task Forces involved in this operation should pass to Comsowestpacific Area.
Plan to fly VMF and VMSB planes from LONG ISLAND 18th or 19th. More experienced fighter pilots will be put on board LONG ISLAND to replace those now on board. Some fighter planes will still lack experienced pilots, and these will not be flown to GUADALCANAL. 1 AK now loading NOUMEA and one loading ESPIRITU SANTO with such rations and ammunition as can be unloaded in 24 hours. These will be sent GUADALCANAL with DD escort soonest possible. Will also carry nucleus ground crews of Army P-400 planes which plan to base GUADALCANAL. 3 Carrier Task Forces at sea to cover movement of supplies into GUADALCANAL, to attack ships of hostile landing attack force, and to meet hostile force comprising 4 BB 4 CV 8 CA 1 XAV and 2 desdivs which we are informed by CinCPac 112209 may attack between 19 and 21 August. End Part 1.

Part 2. Regardless of time of part 1 this message my 1156. Forces under ComAirSoPac engaged in search sea and land areas Southeast SOLOMONS and sea to East thereof to limit of range from ESPIRITU SANTO, and covering movement supplies to GUADALCANAL. 1800 2nd Marines (remainder in TULAGI) have reinforced ESPIRITU SANTO where we are pushing improvement airfield using half Cub 1 and construction personnel. Other half Cub 1 held pending clarification of situation. Regard next few days as highly critical and might be dangerous if carriers expend fighter planes in support of GUADALCANAL garrison and DD are expended escorting and screening under enemy shore based aircraft. As of August 8th fighter planes on board carriers had already been reduced from 99 to 73 planes with no replacements available this area. Once we succeed in getting critically needed supplies into GUADALCANAL area and basing planes there situation will be definitely improved. However this action forces us to strip NEW CALEDONIA of fighter protection. Ships of Amphibious Force enroute WELLINGTON to embark 5th Battalion and 3rd Barrage Balloon squadron and others will arrive STRAW about 25th to embark 7th Marines. Until air coverage can be given in the restricted waters between GUADALCANAL and TULAGI against enemy shore based aircraft and anti-sub protection can be given at entrances the protection of any ship entering that area is a major operation. Blockade running will entail an excessive loss of shipping. A determined enemy carrier attack against our carriers while planes of latter are protecting ships in CACTUS area might spell disaster. Under present conditions our carrier groups are the principle defense of this area and of our lines of communication from U.S. to Australia and New Zealand. JARVIS not yet located.
AUGUST (GCT)

17 0015 CTF 8 to COMINCH info CINCPAC

Most secret. FIREPLACE project unsupported by carrier aircraft makes UMNAK based long range fighters best answer to problem of air coverage. My air commander unable supply adequate air coverage due lack fighters sufficient endurance. Request representations be made Chief Air Corps immediately furnish one squadron fighters type capable proceed four hundred miles from base and then actively patrol at least four hours. Local advices suggest possibility conversion B-25 if C0 fighter type specifications stated available.

17 0141 CINCPAC to COMINCH

Greatest secrecy. While realizing that I have only a part of the general picture before me I feel I must present my view that our situation in the Southwest is by no means sufficiently secure so that we can spare the ships mentioned your 152014. Not only as means of transportation but of training urgently needed amphibious troops. Is the Third Army Division available to me for employment in the Pacific Ocean Areas. If not I recommend that it be made so.

17 0230 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC info COMAIRSOPAC

Handle as most secret. ComSoPac sends to Cominich, CinCPac action. Leary pass to MacArthur. It is my considered opinion that until positions now held have been firmly established and the South Pacific area has been reinforced by air and troops as I have recommended, and as recommended by ComGenSoPac, no further advance except by minor infiltration can be made without dangerously weakening our entire position. Lacking reinforcements there is also a reasonable doubt whether the positions now occupied plus NDENI repeat NDENI (which will be occupied as soon as practicable) could be held especially should the carrier task groups be withdrawn.
Treat as ultra secret. Intelligence at hand indicates ORANGE decision reoccupy GUADALCANAL and TULAGI bases. Force under Comcrudiv 6 probably consisting three AOBAS with DD screen to attack BLUE surface vessels in above areas. Crudiv 6 departed KAVIENG 14 hours inter (minus 9) 16th. 3 transports carrying Jap Marines in convoy destroyers and JINTSU plus possibly 2 Tenryus proceeding TRUK to GUADALCANAL area. Another escorted convoy carrying Army shock troops originally destined MIDWAY last June departed TRUK 9 hours inter (minus 9) 17th destined CACTUS may rendezvous with first group vicinity Greenwich Island 18th. Above movements indicated to have a covering force probably heavy cruisers possibly 2 Haguros one OR two Atagos plus destroyers. Reconnaissance of SOLOMONS areas to be conducted by 4 seaplanes of KINOKAWA MARU based on GIZO Island. Attack day can be as early as 20 August but actual date not indicated.

Your 162111 negative. Desire TF 18 return PEARL earliest date consistent with military situation existing on arrival TF 17. This necessary effect repairs WASP arrange future reliefs carrier task forces your area and meet logistic problem. Such reassignments of ships between Taskforces as required by damage and need for repairs authorized. Use planes pilots and material TF 18 to make good losses. Present intention return LONG ISLAND to SAN DIEGO as soon as her present operations with Marine Aircraft are completed. Advise date.

This message is from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Cinicpac, CTF 8 and Comdg. Gen. Western Defense Command. Greenslade pass to DeWitt. Theobald pass to Buckner. Extra Secret. Para one. In view of extremely adverse unloading conditions TANAGA as set forth by Comtaskfor 8 in all despatches and further emphasized following recent reconnaissance, plan to modify directive for FIREPLACE operation in Cominch 050003 by substituting ADAK Island for TANAGA Island. Para two. In the event that the development of ADAK is considered impractical by General DeWitt plan to cancel operation. Para three. Further comment and recommendation after consultation are desired from aedes.
AUGUST (GCT)

18 0646 COMSOPAC to COMSOWESTPACFOR, MacARTHUR, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 61, 62, 63.

Handle as most secret. Refer Cincpac 172047 request you (a) Station available SS'S CACTUS area vicinity SAVO Island earliest possible, notifying Sopac Task Forces assigned operating area and time arrival therein. (b) Intensify reconnaissance paying particular attention surface forces moving from RABAUL-GREENWICH toward Southern SOLOMONS. (c) Destroy vessels located with particular attention carriers and transports. (d) Reconnoiter GIZO and destroy forces located. (e) Stand by for call.

18 0916 COMSOPAC to CTF 61, 62, 63, 44 Info MacARTHUR, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 11, 16, 18, CG SOPAC.

Handle as most secret. Sopac OpOrder 2-42. Task Organization. (a). Taskfor 61 Adm Fletcher combined Taskforces 11 16 18 44 less detached units. (b). Taskfor 62 RAdm Turner Amphibfor sopac. Task for 63 RAd McCain land based aircraft and patrol planes of Sopac area. Para. one. For enemy information see Cincpac 172047. No positive info as to presence of carriers with hostile force however such presence considered highly probable. Cincoswespace area has been requested to station submarines vicinity SAVO Island. Intensify reconnaissance paying particular attention surface forces moving from RABAUL-GREENWICH toward Southern SOLOMONS, destroy vessels located with particular attention carriers and transports, reconnoiter GIZO and destroy forces located, and standby for call. Para two. This force will defend the CACTUS-RINGBOLT area by destroying hostile attack forces. Para three A. Taskfor 61 destroy hostile vessels prior to their arrival in and while in the CACTUS-RINGBOLT area. Taskfor 44 join Taskfor 61 soonest possible with cruisers AUSTRALIA, HOBART and PHOENIX (delayed) and 3 destroyers. Para three B. Taskfor 62 defend seized areas with Marine expeditionary force. Expedite movement food and ammunition into CACTUS RINGBOLT area.

19 0323 CTF 62 to COMAIRSOPAC.

Agree that use of small vessels to carry material and personnel CACTUS is an emergency measure only. Your 180043 see my 162136. The immediate need there now is food which must not be delayed plan is to use two or three AP's and AK's for which convoy to be unloaded in 12 to 30 hours. Later to transport material via one thousand ton lighters and tugs already requested pare. As soon as practicable propose CTF 62 Com 6th Com Sixth Construction Battalion your representative and staff members fly CACTUS make form plan for all later construction and movements personnel and material. Heavy lifts can not be handled CACTUS until sectional lighters firmer piers and shore cranes are available.
I AUGUST (GCT) 192320 COMSOPAC to COMTASKFOR 61, 62, 63, Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, MACARTHUR

Handle as most secret. From present estimate expect hostile attack in force on Cactus Ringbolt between 20 and 23 August. Early detection and prompt report to all our task forces vital in order that our striking forces may attack in time.

20 0041 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC info CTF 61,62,63 SROMSOWESPAC

Increased destroyer divisions now associated Bismarck Solomons Japanese Mandate areas colon Desdiv 27 of Desron 1 plus Comdesrons 2 and 4 paren accompanying units not apparent paren indicated Truk area show interest in 4th fleet Marshall area. Desdivs 15, 2 and another unidentified of Desron 3 recently at Davao now escorting convoy army troops plus shore air units plus 2 CA under Comcrudiv 7 to Truk dash Rabaul area. One unit of undetermined size ex Desron 5 will report to Cinc 8 Fleet for duty soon. Desdiv 4 and 17 ex plane guard squadron are now in Bismarck Solomons. Above units in most cases may be half or incomplete divisions. Some units engaged in escort duty round trip anticipated but total represents sizeable increase previous dog dog strength paren Desron 6 plus Desdiv 34 paren. Sum total estimated 30 - 35 DD. Orange previous boasted quote superior night torpedo technique unquote May be up for test. Above is ultra secret from Cinpac.

20 0220 COMSOPAC to COMINCH infor CINCPAC

Especially secret your 181422 screening group as whole commanded by Rear Admiral Crutchely Royal Navy with Australia group in south area. At 2055 L (-11) in obedience to signal he left formation and proceeded to transport area for conference with Turner on board McCawley conference lasted until 0115 L (-11). Crutchley report states "at 2055 I ordered Chicago (BODE) to take charge of Australia group and ordered Australia to close transports of Squadron X", Riefkohl in charge Vincennes group in north area. Ralph Talbot Lieut Comdr. William Callahan radar patrol north area. Blue Lieut Comdr H N Williams radar patrol south area is not available but in preliminary report makes report of aircraft radar contact but no surface vessels. Callahan states maintained radar sweeps to seaward with no contacts. Commanding officers cruisers consulted state radar ineffective due "land locked radar condition". Comment: It is possible Jap attack force afirm approached from such direction as to minimize land locked effect on their radar baker employed RDF from Savo Island combined with info from that station re movements our detachment cast or Japs have more efficient radar than ours. Will comment further regarding radar when more information available.
AUGUST (GCT)

20 0230 COMSOPAC to COMINCH info CINCPAC

Most secret. Cominch 181422 paragraphs 116 and 117 Grutchley report herewith quoted for the bearing they have on subject quote 116: It was most disappointing that RALPH TALBOT and BLUE failed to detect the enemy with radar. Their patrol beats had been arranged clear of the land to give warning and avoid interference to radar and with an effective contact range of only 12,000 yards they should have detected an approaching force. This failure could be explained by the enemy, having detected them from the air, making a circuit to the westward and approaching close to the land cape Esperance. 117: the results of the night action are disappointing too, but one must remember that the enemy had very much in his favour. He knew that everything he met was bound to be an enemy. The aircraft flares, which were excellently placed, had probably silhouetted our forces for him. The enemy would have been on tip toe whereas our personnel had undergone the strain of 48 hours in the combat area closed up at action stations most of the time, had fought three enemy air attacks and had suffered the strain of false alarm. It must be admitted too that the enemy displayed a very high standard of night fighting and were probably more efficient and more practised at it than were our forces which were assembled together for the first time to carry out this operation. Unquote.

20 0310 COMAIRSOPAC to CTF-62 infor COMSOPAC

Premise your 190323 relative immediate urgency food to watchtower realized and concurred in. However should not obscure fact that security supply that area of whatever nature dependent largely on local air coverage and fighter support. This cannot reasonably be expected to continue in any effectiveness longer than few days after arrival planes without aviation supplies. Facilities and personnel now in W W BURROWS of which only immediately necessary portion provided via McFARLAND. Bombs and avgas in quantity also required and available in Morinda and Kopara which essentials now being all transferred to latter vessel held in readiness to go. Urge that W W BURROWS be routed Cactus to arrive on completion unloading ALHENA and FORMALHAUT closely followed by KOPARA. Believe no cargo in those vessels which can not be unloaded Cactus via tank or artillery lighter understood available.
Handle as most secret. From Comsopac info Cominch Cincpac Comtaskfors 61, 62, 63. Leary pass to MacArthur. Operations 21st. Incomplete reports from Guadalcanal indicate enemy forces unknown strength well equipped machine guns mortars landed during night from two vessels type unidentified. Vessels withdrew before dawn. Enemy attacked our positions along Tenaru River, fled eastward from our bombers. Six APDs unload food GUADALCANAL - TULAGI tonight 21st. Two DDs protect Lunga Roads same time. Under protection three DDs and air coverage by carrier task forces AK ALHENA arrives Ringbolt tomorrow morning with food ammunition.

Cincpac to COMINCH. Info: COMSOPAC, COMGENHAWDEPT.

Utmost secret. Refer Comsopac 250330. Development of situation in Sopac area requires earliest practicable action in accordance Comsopac 050730, 050750, Cincpac 062205 of August and Cincpac 310215 July. We have made good start in our offensive. We have suffered moderate losses and damage which can be accepted if replacements already requested are immediately sent. Let's not let this offensive die on the vine. Urgency of situation is such that immediate replacements should be sent here to replace corresponding equipment from Hawaiian area which can be sent Sopac. Under above conditions repeat above conditions following planes essential to defense of Hawaiian area are ready to move on short notice. 22 Army B17-E 12 Navy PBY-5A all with combat crews. Additionally ready 50 Army fighter pilots less aircraft. Emmons has copy.

GHORMLEY/Info: COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 61 62 63 17 MacARTHUR, COMSWESPAC.

Handle as most secret. Operations 25th. Preliminary reports indicate enemy forces yesterday and today consisted at least 4 groups. 1 consisting 1 BB some cruisers attacked by our carrier air groups some hits. 1 group consisting 2 large CV's, 4 CA's 6 CL's 8 DD's discovered too late for attack. Planes this group believed those which attacked our carriers resulting some damage ENTERPRISE. 1 group consisting RYUJO 1 CA 2 DD attacked by our B-17's and SARATOGA air group, set on fire and believed badly damaged by latter. Group including BB at 1100 L (-11) today appeared to be retiring to northwest at Lat 04-18 Long 162-40. During last night ENTERPRISE and SARATOGA their task forces retired to southward to fuel. WASP ordered to support GUADALCANAL. Some ENTERPRISE planes to GUADALCANAL.

(Continued on next page)
During last night enemy DD's estimated at 7 shelled positions GUADALCANAL. Strafed by 3 SB's but no bomb hits. 1 enemy force consisting unknown number AP's escorted by cruisers and DD's approached GUADALCANAL from north this morning was hit by planes from GUADALCANAL at 0835 L (-11). 1 large AP hit left burning. 1 CA reported hit burning fiercely. Later same force was sighted retiring to north. AP had been abandoned. GUADALCANAL had air raid 06232 (GCT) 25th no report of results.

24 2325 CTF 16 to CTF 61 Info COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, COMAIRSOPAC.

This is most secret from Comtaskforce 16. ENTERPRISE sustained three medium bomb hits three near misses. Following out of commission. Number two and three elevators. First two wires and first barrier. After half gasoline mains. One firemain riser. One damage control riser. Degaussing gear. Starboard steering engine. After director. Group three AA guns. Group four ammunition supply. Following damage. Flight deck along starboard side number three elevator and at port after corner lifted two feet. After fifty feet hangar deck lifted two feet entire width. One large storeroom at waterline aft open to sea and flooded but bulkheads holding. Prevents maneuvering at high speed. Only small amount of rudder being used. Outer plating sprung and slowly leaking port side at stern. Heavy general damage to storerooms shops living spaces decks and bulkheads between frames 157 and 179. Planes on board in commission six VF 21 VSB 3 VT. 11 VSB at CACTUS. Could operate about 50 planes in emergency. About eighty dead one hundred wounded. Missing undetermined. Large quantity provisions destroyed. Exact extent underwater damage not determined. Fueling at this time not recommended. Propelling machinery not damaged.

25 0646 Am directing ENTERPRISE proceed on course between ROSES and WHITE POPPY in order fly side plane to ROSES with message and await further orders from you. Comtaskfor 16 242325 self explanatory. Recommend Taskforce 18 remain in area until situation clears and Taskforce 17 joins as soon as practicable on completion fueling tonight local 25th will proceed to join Taskforce 18. Due incompleteness of last contact reports was unable to fix with any degree accuracy position of enemy carriers. Convinced KYUJO very badly damaged and 2 cruisers torpedoed and 1 battleship hit by 1000 pound bomb. Estimate enemy lost more than 50 planes to carrier groups and anti-aircraft fire. Our plane losses 7. On 25th dropped 500 pound bomb on submarine number 425 while diving direct hit abaft conning tower believed sunk lat 12-30 South Long 164-15 East. Also strafed another number 417 same position damaged slightly. Still another dived same day lat 12-58 South
AUGUST (GCT)

25 0646 (Continued) (from CTF 61).

Long, 163-36 East. 2 destroyers dropped many depth charges possibly damaged. Sighted 2 more submarines 24 lat 8-30 south long 162 east. No attacks made. Have kept 18 fighters 6 TBF of ENTERPRISE group with personnel to strengthen SARATOGA group. Now have little more than complete group on board. Will have to provision in 10 days. On morning 24th shot down 2 twin engine bombers being used as search planes and 1 4-engine serial 43. Your attention invited my 241014 concerning 11 SBD and 7 TBF on ENTERPRISE group at CACTUS. In case surface forces are sent from this Taskforce for other operations they should come under your direct command as radio silence precludes proper command by me. Taskforce 44 plus SALT LAKE CITY available. Kinkaid recommends proceed WHITE POPPY.

25 2205 CINCPAC to COMINCH, info COMSOPAC.

Handle with utmost secrecy. Believe enemy may be capable of now attacking FANTAN or STRAN but consider such a move improbable because. Affirm. It would leave our strong forces of which he is cognizant on his flank. Baker. He is likely to consider our carriers more important and prior objectives. Cast. Recent battle damage and most difficult logistic problem decrease feasibility of such a project. My estimate difficulty his logistics confirmed by our own experiences to date. No enemy tankers have been sighted in area of operations or to eastward.

26 1812 COMSOPAC to CTF 16 Info CTF 61 62 63 17 18 COMINCH CINCPAC.

Most secret. Your 260639 received. Location hostile forces not definitely known. Assume you have received Ginchaps 260239. Proceed BLEACHER with units now in company passing south of FANTAN and if you have not already transferred planes and personnel to other carriers for adjustment land at NANDI those planes not required for defense PEARL later. Land necessary personnel also at NANDI via destroyer. Upon arrival BLEACHER make detailed survey of damage and report via shore radio special materials needed to expedite reconditioning at Navy Yard. My 260750 modified accordingly.
Para. Comsopac inform MacArthur. Harmon. This is part 1
Cominch 271320 total 3 parts handle with greatest secrecy.
Comsopac 250330 para following info from War Dept para War
Dept will authorize movement from Hawaii of any aircraft con-
sidered by Cincpac as necessary to success of present opera-
tion. Emmons being so advised by War Dept Para Chormley
and Harmon already fully authorized shift aircraft in South
Pacific as deemed expedient by them para Harmon was authorized
on 9 August to divert any aircraft enroute Australia and use
them as situation demanded in that area Para Any urgent re-
quest for air reinforcement should be made by Comsopac direct
to CinC Southwestpacific area who will make every effort toward
immediate compliance para Recommend advise Comsopac that
it is impossible to attempt send from US any Army Air reinforc-
ment for this action additional to that indicated in parts 2
and 3 which are to follow.

27 1322 Part 2 of above.
Following are reinforcements for Central and South Pacific
Areas (This part 2 my 271320) A 1 group of 35 B24 in US being
prepared for movement 10 Sept. B Crated fighters not ac-
companied by pilots nor crews are now enroute by ships as
follows. JANE CHRISTIANSEN departed US 11 August with 10 for
CANTON. CALMAHES sailed US 13 August with 2 for TONGA. WM
WHIPPLE with 28 for NECAL, and POMONA with 16 for FIJI left
US 18 August. PETER SYLVESTER sailed US 20 August with 3 for
HAWAII and 7 for CHRISTMAS. 8 more for CANTON were shipped
about 11 August and 12 more for HAWAII were shipped about 22
August past replacement pilots for 20 single engined fighters
left by air from West Coast 26 August destination NEW CALE-
DONIA. Para. Pilots in excess of above still under considera-
tion War Dept this ends part 2 more follows.

27 1324 Part 3 of above.
Continuing long message my 271320 this is part 3 which lists
reinforcements for Southwest Pacific Area. A on 24 August
following with full combat crews were enroute HAWAII to
AUSTRALIA, 13 B17, 11 B25's, 6 DC3 transports. B Crated
fighters, not with crews, are now enroute in ships as follows:
WILLIAM ELLERY due arrive WELLINGTON 23 August with 33.
BENJAMIN GOODHUE due BRISBANE 23 August with 9. JASON LGE
due Wellington 21 August with 9. PAYNE WINGATE departed
United States 27 July with 2. John Steele due WELLINGTON
25 August with nine. JOSEPH LANE with 17 due WELLINGTON
September 3. JOHN BAKER ASHE with 14 and ELIHU YALE with 36
due WELLINGTON September 10. C Following being prepared in
United States: 18 heavy bombers. 22 medium bombers, 44
fighters. 13 transports. Para. 3 part message ends. Chief
of Staff Army informed.
Handle as most secret. Based on present situation the following concept of operations is given for your guidance. Until the hostile strength and intentions are determined we must employ to the utmost our limits land based aircraft strength, while improving the CACTUS RINGBOLT position. What we wish to achieve is the combination (no matter where the enemy may strike) of our shore based aircraft and our carrier aircraft against the following targets in order of priority: Carriers, transports, battleships, cruisers, destroyers. Therefore the carrier task forces should for the present operate generally south of latitude 10 degrees south unless a promising target is located within striking distance, meanwhile covering the movements of supplies and reinforcements into the CACTUS area. Shore and tender based planes should continue as extended and intensive search as operating limitations permit. If and when reinforcements arrive the present limited search operations on the FANTAN STRAW front should be amplified.

Cominch most secret 251235 establishes clearly the need for an additional patrol plane squadron at FANTAN and one at STRAW. This in addition to reinforcements previously requested. Patrol planes originally based on FANTAN have had to be moved to BUTTON to replace losses and planes worn out in present activities. Scouting to north of FANTAN dash STRAW now woefully inadequate. Comairsopac has this in another system. Also require one patrol wing headquarters each FANTAN ONE and WHITE POPPY.

Operations 27th. Handle as most secret. Own surface forces no contact with enemy today. Several reports own patrol planes show enemy force of 1 BB 6 CA 1 CL 6 DD on various courses throughout today in vicinity lat 02-20 south long 161-45 east. No report enemy activity CACTUS-RINGBOLT.

Keep this secret. Originate by CTF 16 Action Consopac info CTF's 61. 62 63 17 18 1 Cinopac Comserforpac Comcarpac Cominch. TF16 proceeding BLEACHER accordance your 261812. ENTERPRISE does not need temporary repairs to reach PEARL as stated my 262137 evidently lost. Ready to proceed after fueling. To delay departure until arrival SAN JUAN and WILSON will delay.

(Continued on next page)
AUGUST (GCT)

28 1805 CTF 16. (Continued)

Ultimate readiness for action of ENTERPRISE. Request permission take about 23,000 bbls from WS RHEEM arriving BLEACHER 31 August. Have sent 14 SBD and 3 TBF to ROSES. No additional personnel. Remaining on board 6 VF and 6 SBD. This dispatch with ships report special materials needed being sent BLEACHER by plane in advance of arrival.

28 1026 GHORMLEY to CTF 61, 62, COMINCH, CTF 2.9, COMSOWESPAC, CINCPAC.

Handle as most secret. No sighting 28th of enemy surface vessels our forces engaged in air reconnaissance to limit of range, movement of aviation supplies food and ammunition to GUADALCANAL - TULAGI, protection this movement by task forces. From Ghormley. Leary pass to MacArthur. 9 P-400's arrived GUADALCANAL 1140 love (minus 11) 27th. Amphibious force plans to destroy Jap outposts nearby islands during period 1 - 3 September. Operations for 28th.

29 2340 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

Most secret. CTF 8 reply to Cincpacs 280007. My Op Plan 10-42 mailed 22nd. Plan in general conforms to similar operation for original objective outlined in my 132214. This covers operations of 1st phase FIREPLACE project with August 30 as Dog day. Covering force of 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser plus 3 destroyers, escort and transport force consists of 3 transports escorted by 2 CL's and 7 destroyers, tug and lighter group screened by 3 destroyers, TEAL, 2 Canadian Corvettes now proceeding. Landing commences about 0700 W (plus 10). Will support subsidiary landing TANAGA and ATKA. Intermediate phases of FIREPLACE troop and cargo movements obligate all forces for continuous coverage and escort until end of October. Estimate that final consolidation FIREPLACE positions will not be accomplished until end of year at earliest. Required naval support later phases can not now be predicted. Motor torpedo boats will arrive FIREPLACE about 6 September. When defensive situation warrants intend MTR attack on KISKA and submarines and air will resume full offensive. When field bombers is ready at FIREPLACE consideration must be given to surface ship overhaul and upkeep after 5 months then of intensive operation here immediately following many months similar operations to southward. ST. LOUIS boilers LOUISVILLE guns urgent but all ships need attention which operations to date have largely prevented.
August (GCT)

30 1010 Forrestal to Secnav, CominCh, Secy Gates, Info CinCPac.

Handle most secret not to be decoded by other than addressees beyond this point. From Undersecnav to Secnav Asst Secy Gates and CominCh for action transmitted by Comsopac. Quote in my judgement steady flow aircraft replacement especially fighters for Cactus imperative if position is to be held. Have particular reference to planes sufficient ceiling intercept high altitude bombers. Best for this purpose is P-38. Comsopac has asked for 2 squadrons this type and I hope his request will be granted. Sending similar message Lovett Forrestal.

29 1113 Comsopac to Info CinCPac, CominCh, Com3owEspac, CTF 61 62 63 CTG 2.9, MacArthur.

Operations 29th. Handle as most secret. At Guadalcanal evening 28th 2 SBD's sighted and attacked 3 large DD's 1 small DD bearing 355 course 180 distance 70 miles from Guadalcanal. Hit 1 small DD. 1800 L (-11) 28th 11 SBD's attacked same target then 15 miles north Namug Island. 2 large DD's hit. 1 blew up sank. Other hit amidship burning fiercely when last seen. Small DD previously hit was low in water trailing oil smoking. DD's had considerable gear on deck. 1 plane failed return.

29 1442 Comsopac to CTF 61 info CinCPac, CTF 62, 17, 18, 63.

Handle as most secret. Retire 1 carrier task force to White poppy to arrive forenoon Wednesday 2 September for fuel and provisions. Proceed by route to east of poppy passing well clear of Efate and within 50 miles of mare island to avoid possible interference by units enroute poppy-button. Commander of entering group fly 1 plane to button or roses when practicable to inform me composition entering group. Arrangements for entry and logistics by separate dispatch. Will start 2 fleet tankers on Monday to Taskforces remaining on station after loading on them provisions as practicable. Rendezvous for fueling to be designated later.

28 2355 CTF 16 to CTF 61 info Comsopac, Comaircomac, Comcarpac Adm.

From CTF 16 this is a retransmission my 260239 which apparently was lost. Additional information. Launched all flyable planes prior to attack of 35 bombers (approximately). Gasoline system drained and co2 blanket around tanks and in piping. Approximately 25 tons of paint removed since leaving pearl. Damage due to fires would have been much more extensive had this not been done. Total bag VF 6 in this action 29 enemy planes. Enterprise aircraft losses 3 VF 2 VSB 3 VTB of which 2 VF and 2 VTB believed lost in action remainder landed in water our of gas. All personnel recovered 1 VF 2 VSB 1 VTB. Pilot (Continued on next page)
AUGUST (GCT)

28 2355 CTF 16. (Continued.

losses 2 VG 2 VTB. Free gunner losses 4. Planes now on board in commission 6 VF 20 VSB 5 VTB. Your 250656 7 TBF directed to land CACTUS returned to land on ENTERPRISE and SARATOGA that night. Cincpac 231917 following transferred to ROSES. Photographic F4F-7. Radio transmitter and receiver coils for TBF planes. Also pay accounts for all ENTERPRISE personnel remaining on SARATOGA and at CACTUS.

.31 0242 COMSOPAC, to CTF 16 17 18 63 Info CINCPAC, COMINCH CTF 62.

From Comsopac for to CTF 16 17 18 63 for Action Info Cominch Cincpac CTF 62. Item assume the following: Afirm. That Task force 18 is retiring toward WHITE POPPY for provisions. Baker. That TF 11 is retiring southeastward with SARATOGA at reduced speed. Cast. That CTF 17 has instructions to contact oilers at grid posit George 6093 designated (Grid position is 165-00 east 14-15 south) my 300542 for fueling morning 2 September. On basis of the above assumptions the following directives are issued subjected to modification by TF commanders as required by circumstances at variance with assumptions. Afirm. SARATOGA group proceed to BLEACHER by route passing approximately 100 miles east of BUTTON and ROSES and south of FANTAN. Baker. Comairsopac arrange all possible air coverage by land based planes along route. Cast. TF 18 cover retirement of SARATOGA until south of lat 20 degrees then proceed WHITE POPPY in accordance with previous instructions advising me as soon as practicable composition entering group and eta. Dog NAVAJO with LAFFLEY will be directed proceed to point 100 miles due east of second channel ESPIRITU SANTO ETA that point 100 L(-11) 1 September thence on course 330 speed of advance 13 until joining SARATOGA. Easy. CINMARKON and GUADALUPE with escorts will be directed to proceed to point 50 miles due east of ROSES thence course about 350 to new fueling rendezvous for TF 17 in position lat 13-15 south long 168-35 east to arrive that position about 8 hours L(-11) 2 September. CTF 61 contact and retain one oiler for use with SARATOGA group if desired.
28 1240 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, Info COMSOWESPACFOR

Following greatest secrecy from MacArthur to War Dept is quoted for info and comment. Indications that enemy is preparing attack against NEW GUINEA. Evidence is accumulating that he contemplates a stroke here under cover of SOLOMON Islands operations. My position exposed due to absence of Southwest Pacific Naval Forces which are operating under South Pacific Area command. Enemy completely controls sea approaches to NEW GUINEA and when adverse weather hampers our air activities he can have transports directly into MILNE Bay. Unless I am afforded naval support my situation will immediately become critical if strong infiltration continues or if a major movement eventuates. I have been moving the maximum number of troops I can transport and supply with my shipping resources into NEW GUINEA as rapidly as possible. In order to secure my position I suggest that the added mission of covering the MILNE Bay area be given to GHORMLEY.

29 0310 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, info MACARTHUR, CG SOPAC, COMSWPAC

Most secret. Reference Cominch 281240. I am now forced to retire my carrier task forces in succession to reprovion. My remaining strength is needed to cover the movement of supplies and personnel into CACTUS necessary to strengthen that position. When the 7th Marines are embarked and if the situation then permits I intend to seize NDENI, the occupation of which and the establishment of an airfield thereon will greatly strengthen my position. This operation will require the close support of the carrier task forces. The increasing of our strength at CACTUS, and the inauguration of pressure up the SOLOMONS when I have the means, together with the carrier task forces in being on the flank of any hostile attack on AUSTRALIA is a greater contribution to MacARTHUR's assistance than any sacrifice move at this time of carriers to the MILNE Bay area. Until the strength of the hostile main effort is determined and it has been committed to a definite line of action I should keep my carrier task forces centrally located prepared to operate anywhere on the front SAMOA MILNE Bay. This means that for the present hostile infiltration tactics and the initial shock of a hostile main effort may have to be borne by ground troops and land based aviation. Land based aviation attack against Japanese infiltration moves should extract a constant toll of transports and escorting combatant ships which the Japanese cannot long sustain. Should Japanese repeat Japanese carrier supported main forces move to attack, our land based aviation should be able to equalize the opposing carrier strength. In short it is hoped that the resolute use of our defensive positions and land based aviation may create a favorable situation wherein I can decisively employ the carrier task forces, whether on my extended front or to the westward. It is hoped that my freedom of action will not be circumscribed by restrictive tasks or missions.
27 0411 COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMGENSOPAC.

Your 230424. Any augmentation of air units this theater RNZAF or American heartily concurred in. Proposal to transfer aircraft from 6 American squadrons to RNZAF squadrons with resultant withdrawal of American units thereby deprived of aircraft unsound. No economy of aircraft results. Continuation of American squadrons already experienced in specialized operations this theater as well as attrition replacement of basic equipment American combat crews believed essential to success. Coordination of Army Navy air units procedure sufficiently difficult. That of foreign units would present an impossible situation. Previous recommendations relative equipment RNZAF units made on a basis of better distribution lend lease material allocated Great Britain such that South Pacific would share therein and actual aid potential reinforcement by NEW ZEALAND units be available. Unless aviation supply situation radically changes for better all combat aircraft this area required for combat not training. Unqualifiedly opposed to proposal which is not only swapping horses but swapping streams.

30 2123 COMSOPAC to COMSOPAC info COMINCH, COMSWPACFOR.

Utmost secrecy. Cominchi 0845 as soon as your operations in progress permit turn over to operational control Comsopac vessels to provide support MILNE Bay operations. Advise. Leary pass to MacArthur.

31 0845 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Enemy sightings have indicated possible employment of screening force in area to 4 degrees south of equator between 159 and 163 east. Ultra secret from Comsopac. Suggest for your consideration the possibility of employing SS's profitably that general area within next week or ten days.

31 1046 GHORMLEY to CINCPAC, COMINCH, CTF 61 62 63.

Operations 31st. Handle as most secret. In air engagement 1145 L(-11) 13 enemy lost 5 zeros to P-400's and 3 zeros to F4F's. Our losses 4 P-400's 3 pilots missing. 19 F4 and 12 SBD's arrived GUADALCANAL from BUTTON 1440 L(-11) 305h. 18 bombers attacked our ships at EKUKUM at 1500 L(-11) 30th. CALHOUN sunk by estimated 3 hits after part of ship from 1500 feet. 45 enlisted unaccounted for. Some may be at GUADALCANAL. Evening patrol from GUADALCANAL sighted 2 cruisers and destroyers 20 miles north RUSSELL ISLANDS course 090 at 1745 L(-11) 30th. No report from 5 SBD's which went after them. Little dropped depth charges on SS at 1630 L(-11) 30th. Believed sunk. SARA-TOGA reports being torpedoed Lat 10-25 South Long 164-26 East. No further report from her. Have sent NAVALO to assist. Leary pass to MacArthur.
This is part 1 of 2 parts of CTF 61 msg 310930. Your 310242 SARATOGA 0700 M (-12) Posit Tuesday Lat 12 43 South Long 167 13 East. Proceeding 14 knots under own power.
At present NAVAJO not required but will intercept and have her standby. Ships now in company SARATOGA MINNESPOLIS NEW ORLEANS ATLANTA PHELPS MACDONOUGH TARRAGUT WORDEN DEWEY GRAYSON. MONSSEN remained behind to attack submarine. Request she be informed my movements. AUSTRALIA HOBART SELFRIDGE with NOYES. NORTH CAROLINA PHOENIX PATTERSON BAGLEY with MURRAY. Your assumptions A B and C absolutely correct. Request you designate rendezvous September 2nd for this force and tanker with our mail. Sent 20 VSB and 9 VTB to BUTTON 3 more VTB flying in Tuesday morning. Have 36 VF on board. Will await your instructions on where and how many to fly off. Have enough provisions to last until 10th on reduced rations. Recommend 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers accompany SARATOGA. End of part 1.

31 0931 Part 2 of above.

This is the 2nd and last part CTF 61 msg 310930. Subsequent examinations SARATOGA indicate all 4 shafts in good order. Proceeding at 14 knots on units A and C. Complete bushing and switching assembly on unit B burned. Other 3 assemblies damaged by arcing A and require thorough examination and test prior departure Sopac area. Number 15 fireroom and 14 outboard tanks and voids flooded. Number 13 fireroom leaking but under control. Flushing pump and torpedo compressor room (Compartment C-601E) and storeroom D-305A also partially flooded but under control.
June 23

Admiral Nimitz returned from an inspection of Palmyra and immediately approved Comtaskfor 8's general plan noted on the 22d. He also agrees with Comtaskfor 8 that, due to sending troops to Nome by air, there is no need for his main body to escort the reinforcement supply ships except two DD for each AF.

The 2d Regiment, reenforced, of the Amphibious Corps will be ready to sail on the 24th on 24 hours' notice. This is in response to Cominch directive that it should be ready to move quickly to the South Pacific. A decision on its move will be made shortly. There is now under consideration a plan by which a detachment of the eastern fleet including at least 2 CV would seize and occupy Timor or other suitable place at the same time a U.S. task force with at least 2 CV would operate to seize and occupy Tulagi. The target date is August 1st.

Except for Taskfor 8 in Alaska and Taskfor 11 enroute Midway, own forces are in port resting, training, and refitting.

Cincpac 240315 indicates the desire to use Noumea for CV task forces. The SUNNER will probably have to survey the S.E. area inside the reef as her next job. She can be released from work in the Straw area any time.

Comsopac 252230 still does not like the idea of withdrawing New Zealand troops from Fantan.

There is no further news of the enemy. His major forces are believed to be operating north of Latitude 35°. A guess is that there is an occupation force at Kiska and Attu covered by a force operating to the N.E. of the Kuriles.

June 24.

A preliminary scheme for carrying out the idea noted yesterday for TULAGI operation was received from Cominch and is attached. In that a directive for this operation will be sent later from Cominch the close examination of the development of the selected course is deferred. It would appear that there will be difficulty in (1) getting the marine squadrons carrier trained, (2) getting a field where they can operate. The troops seem adequate. Because of air difficulty it may not be possible to meet the August 1st date.

Own forces continue to rest and train, except the SARATOGA group which arrives at MIDWAY tomorrow, and TF-8 in ALASKA. There is no news from the latter.
June 24 (Cont'd)

The S-27 grounded at AMCHITKA ISLAND Aleutians and is probably a total loss.

A new set-up for TF commanders was placed in effect. Rear Admiral Kinkaid will act as commander of TF-17 until the return of Vice Admiral Halsey.

The GENERAL GORGAS has reported that she was attacked three times by a sub in the Eastern Alaska Bay. It has been known for several weeks that Jap subs are operating in Alaskan waters. There is nothing new from the enemy.

June 25.

Our forces continue rest, training, and preparation for further operations. TF-8 in Alaska is still quiet.

The problem of the proposed offensive in the SOLOMONS-BISMARCK area continues to receive careful consideration and study. While no decision can be reached until Cominch sends CinCPac a directive, active preparations for the operations are underway. Cominch has directed that two CV groups be made and kept ready on 12 hours notice. (Utmost Secret 251840 attached). The 2nd Marine Regiment is on 24 hours notice. There seems no urgency in sending out the task forces except for the desirability of having more strength immediately available in the south than is there now.

An army flight of three B-24s took off from OAHU this morning for Midway. They will fuel there and then go to bomb WAKE. The present schedule calls for their arrival at the target about dusk tomorrow.

There is still no real evidence of enemy intentions. He is known to be in Kiska and Attu. His submarines are active in the NE Pacific. There are indications that the Rabaul Area is being reinforced.

The mining at HIBBACHER has been completed. CinCPac recommended that a CUB be sent to FULCRUM.

The Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas was established today at Pearl. Com-14 will administer the Center, but CinCPac will retain operational control.
June 26th.

Discussions continued concerning plans for the offensive in the SOLOMON - BISMARK AREA. Our forces except TF 11 and 8 continue rest, training, and refitting. The SARATOGA group has delivered the Army and Marine Planes at MIDWAY. There is no further word of importance from the ALEUTIANS.

In his 270302 General McArthur gives information on his command, and ComAirSoPac 260105 gives his views of air requirements for his command.

The Air search for survivors at MIDWAY has ended and PEY's so employed will be returned to PEARL.

There is no significant information of the enemy.

June 27th.

In a most secret message to Cominch (attached) Cincpac gave his plans for the employment of the Amphibious regiment and Marine air and air in Sopac. While the offensive in the SWPac is still under discussion all combat task forces, except TF8, are training, resting, and refitting as before. There is no significant news from the ALEUTIANS.

An Army flight of three LB30s bombed WAKE by moonlight. Good results are reported.

One CUB is to be moved to FULCRUM during July. Comairsopac says that three bomber landing fields could be built at ESPIRITO SANTO.

TF8 now has 32 VP conducting search operations. Because of operational losses he wants 16 more now. He also has need for one 4 engine seaplane. The S-34 was damaged by depth charges and bottoming and must go to a Navy Yard for repairs. Since the S-27 cannot be salvaged she will be destroyed.

News of the enemy indicates nothing very important. In his 270735 Com SWPac gives an estimate of enemy ground strength in the SOLOMONS - BISMARK area.
June 28

As a result of deliberations extending over several days Cincpac 290409 and 290525 were sent.

There have been no change in own forces during the day. TF 8 continues to remain silent, except to say that he plans to employ submarines in extreme NW Pacific and in the western Bering Sea.

It is now planned to increase the SoPac PBYs to a total of thirty.

There is nothing new from the enemy.

June 29th.

Admiral Nimitz and Captain McCormick left today for a conference on the west coast with Admiral King. Various phases of current and projected operations will be discussed.

It has been decided to send TF 11, 18 and the 2nd Marines to the South Pacific next week. They will rendezvous on the equator and then pass to Admiral Ghormley for operational control. Rear Admiral Fletcher will be in tactical command.

As a result of Cominch despatch attached, the whole matter of the ALEUTIAN situation is again under review. Briefly the situation today is that the Army is not now prepared to move in and garrison KISHA as they would need strong intermediate points between there and DUTCH HARBOR. Occupation under present circumstances would, in Cominch opinion, create an opportunity for enemy attrition which we now have. TF 8 in his 300215 says that he needs reinforcements to proceed successfully. In view of Cominch despatch no CVs or raiders will be sent to TF 8.

Comairsoupac 280830 deals with NOUMEA as a possible CV anchorage. The Sumner leaves SAMOA on the 1st for NOUMEA to further investigate the harbor.

It now seems definite that a withdrawal of enemy surface forces from the North Pacific Area is underway. The extent of the move is not yet known. It seems probable that considerable reinforcements are enroute to the SOUTH PACIFIC.

The plans section has an estimate underway for an offensive in the BISMARCK - SOLOMONS AREA. Lacking Cominch Directive any such estimate must be rather indefinite.
June 30.

Admiral Nimitz's plane crashed on landing at Alameda. The Admiral was slightly injured.

The attached despatches, CinCPac 272341, 302145, 010159, Comgen STRAW 292015, Comsopac 300600 are noted as indicating preliminary marine plans for the offensive.

CinCPac 290409, 302359 and Comalaska 300215 and Cominch 291810 give the present Alaskan situation. In absence of Admiral Nimitz, the Chief of Staff feels that no action is appropriate here and that it is a matter for conversations between Admirals Nimitz and King.

Rear Admiral Fletcher has assumed command of TF-11 and that force will proceed to the South Pacific, as previously mentioned, on July 5th. TF-16 and 17 will continue training at Pearl for the present.

In his 302010 Commander Amphibious Force Pacific says that the Marines now desired for employment in the Southwest Pacific requires training and rehearsal before ready for the offensive. They will not have time for that if they are to be ready August 1st.

The project to place a landing mat on Tern Island, French Frigate Shoal, has been approved by Cominch and the time estimate is roughly three months. This project will permit VF to fly to Midway.

Johnston Island can now be used for VF and the initial planes are now desired.

Enemy submarines continue to be reported in the North and Central Areas but have done no damage. On the other hand, we have indications that Japan has resorted to much larger employment of convoys as a result of our sub activities.

There is no change in enemy dispositions worth noting.
This is CTF 8 estimate on answer to Cincpac 290409.
Air operations to date have shown that landing operations at Kiska and Attu both are beyond effective air support from any existing air field. The number of days required to effect seizure and destroy enemy installations or to capture and consolidate position Anstz is permanent occupation decided upon cannot be foreseen. For either type of operation ships should remain in close support until operations ashore are fully completed. Enemy surface forces including carriers may arrive to dispute sea control before withdrawal of our force is desirable. Without own carriers our surface forces from the beginning will be devoid of defensive fighter support and must suffer serious damage from enemy air forces in Attu-Miska area plus enemy air forces available from Paramushiro and carriers. Without carrier support damage and losses to ships and troops will probably more than negative any gain that can be envisaged from destruction of enemy shore establishments. With strong carrier support temporary seizure of Kiska and Attu to destroy enemy forces installations and supplies considered feasible and desirable. In view of mutual air support afforded each other by two enemy bases they should be attacked simultaneously which consideration requires further increase in strength of supporting forces. Continued occupation by us appears highly undesirable at this time. Required logistic support would create very vulnerable line of communication. Loss of supply ships and obligation of large naval force two protect the line would be inevitable. Believe Japs can be made to see that continued occupation by them is too costly. Offensive operation gives us full initiative in timing of attacks. Carrier planes can operate if on the spot taking advantage of even short breaks in the local weather. Patrol planes operating from tender at Adak could give scouting coverage. Enemy may be counted on to rush carriers to support surface force action. Strongly recommend attacks on two islands be made simultaneously and be undertaken only when strong carrier and heavy cruiser support is available.
Am supplementing my letter to you, My 270655. In light of my conversation with Ghormley, 2 carriers can be berthed Great Roads Noumea which is best protected anchorage. With most if not all supporting light forces, 1 carrier group can be based Flaines Des Gaies Field and 2nd group at Kommac Field both on west coast POPPY former about 100 miles and latter 200 miles northwest Noumea. Latter affords no dispersal. Is exposed and unprotected by AA guns and boasts poor communications but is serviceable. No housing or messing facilities exist for flight crews or service units. Either prefabricated housing must be provided including galley and mess equipment no complete advance base equipment similar to that for VP squadrons brought. Tontouia Field being reworked and not in commission until about 1 September.

Operations in South Pacific expected to require the use of 6 APDS and raider battalion. This in answer to your 290409. Para 2, in general, permanent establishments in Kiska, Amchitka and Attu must be preceded by preliminary establishments in Atka and Adak. Army is not now prepared to provide forces and equipment, in particular aircraft, for projecting establishments this far west in the Aleutians. Further we are not prepared at this time to support such projected establishments. Our occupation of the western Aleutians would inevitably bring about strong counter measures by the Japanese this would probably necessitate the support of our Fleet forces including carriers in a strength that would not fit in with South Pacific operation. Para 3, consider one raider battalion, even supported by additional troops on cruisers, probably insufficient for this proposed operations. Para 4, occupation of Kiska by either side presents opportunities to other side for profitable attrition tactics. If improvement of conditions now warrants the projection of landing forces to Kiska even more would raids appear to be in order. Para 5, surface force operations in immediate vicinity of Kiska harbor may now call for use of fast minesweepers. Para 6, request advice of specific operations contemplated.
CINCPAC to COMINCH Info CTF 8

Believe more aggressive action your 281635 practicable in near future with means now available for those to be supplied in accordance proposals to follow and also because indications today that enemy carrier strength is in or near OMINATO and other strength units are estimated to be retired between OMINATO and PARAMUSHIRO x Para X Our modern submarines are just beginning to arrive X I expect to reenforce patrol plane strength from Replpatrons pac X Request you urge army to add to their long range air which can be brought to bear X Para X On assumption that Army is prepared to take over KISKA and ATTU after they are recaptured and will occupy and construct airfield on AMCHITKA I propose send the Second Raider Battalion to act as assault troops and propose add thier four APDs and VINCENNES to Theobalds Force.

CINCPAC to COMINCH Info CTF 8

Part 2 of dispatch 290409 from Cincpac, These ships would be withdrawn from Southern Expedition and latter would be relieved in Taskfor 18 by SALT LAKE CITY. If Raider Battalion considered insufficient for landing there will be room in cruisers and destroyers for Army troops for landing after raiders have obtained beach head. Para. Believe that weather conditions make inadvisable risk carriers or LONG ISLAND that area and latter urgently needed for training carrier pilots. Consider shore based air though unsuitable for close support of landing can supply on selected days sufficient for success of expedition provided no carrier opposition encountered. Para. Experience with PTs convinces that due to frailty short range and poor habitability they are unsuitable for suggested use. Para. Request your comments.
CTF 3 TO CINCPAC.

30 2010

Your 300015 2nd Marine Regiment reenforced is combat loaded but is not repeat not prepared for offensive operations without rehearsal of specific operation contemplated in locality approximating conditions expected to be encountered.

CINCPAC TO CTF 8 INFO COMINCH.

30 2359

Your 30215 in view Cominch 291810 carriers and raider battalion will not be sent you. Request summary your contemplated operations. Do these require use DMS. Can make four available if urgently needed.
This from ComTaskFor 8 in answer to Cincpac 302359. Present plans of operation continue scouting against enemy advance in ALEUTIAN-ALASKA PENINSULA and against HOME with army air striking force disposed to attack located enemies in both areas. Continues bombing attacks on KISKA. Submarine plan stations 1 in PARAMUSHIRU-KURILE AREA 1 on PARAMUSHIRU - ATTU line 2 at ATTU, 2 at KISKA others in mid-Aleutians with 4 old submarines in UMNAK, DUTCH HARBOR AREA. All ordered to scout and take strong offensive action. Destroyers convey and air provide close in coverage for army transports to HOME. Destroyers escort other transports and auxiliaries. Main body to exploit any opportunity for attrition attacks on detached enemy units. No enemy surface forces located outside KISKA-ATTU AREA since June 12th. Now appears probable that air action in first week of campaign and results of MIDWAY VICTORY plus our western air striking concentration has discouraged enemy advance east of KISKA. If campaign to date has restricted enemy to seizure of 2 barren islands the nearest 575 miles from UMNAK submit that ALASKAN CAMPAIGN to date has successfully executed plan contained your Oplan 22-42 in defending against enemy advance on vital positions in ALEUTIAN-ALASKAN AREA. Major test of the situation here will come when Japanese next know that our main forces in HAWAIIAN AREA are too far removed to flank their advance through ADAK and ATKA on UMNAK DUTCH HARBOR COLD BAY AREA. Enemy position in the occupation at KISKA can be rendered unprofitable when ever carriers and troops can be made available here for commando attack. Believe present operating plans require all that my forces are capable of accomplishing. Do not need dog mike sails at this time. To date enemy has not mined waters used by our forces.

Cominch file A16-3(00177) dated 12 March, 1942 Joint Basic Plan for occupation and defense of BLEACHER, contains provisions whereby Navy Department provides necessary personnel, material and equipment necessary for construction land plane base BLEACHER. Commanding General reports arrival construction personnel representing Department Engineer Hawaii. Also reports department Engineer has certain Army construction equipment now at San Francisco earmarked for BLEACHER and requests that it be shipped. He also recommends that construction this field be joint task under supervision Hawaiian Department Engineer. It is desired that you in cooperation with CincPac determine single Agency responsible for supply of personnel, material and equipment for this entire project and notify War Department of your joint agreement. This necessary in order to eliminate confusion and duplication of effort. Commanding General BLEACHER being furnished paraphrase copy this radio. Cominch concurs in above. Pass this radio Cincpac.
FLORIDA Island. (g) Negatives and 10 contact prints of Stereo pairs all landing beaches FLORIDA TULAGI and GAVUTU Islands. (h) Written report by Intelligence Officers attached 1st MarDiv of visual air reconnaissance by them of FLORIDA and TULAGI supplemented by all possible local information they can obtain from Australian and New Zealand authorities.

2. Request also you endeavor assemble LONGBCW by 15 July several ship pilots familiar with waters around FLORIDA Island and several guides familiar with terrain and trails on FLORIDA and TULAGI suggest contact Burns Philip Company and Lever Pacific Ltd. as possible sources.

CinCPac 260019 requests priority transfer 1 construction battalion of C U E Number 1 to duty base FULCRUM. Com-8 effect transfer 6th Construction Battalion consisting of 17 officers 1071 men to Com-12 who will arrange FFT. Com-12 notify Com-8 date and place embarkation.
02 0031  COMGEN SAMOA TO COMAIRSOPAC

STRAWBOARD now ready for 1 six plane VS squadron completely equipped and self sustaining. Should bring tents cots bedding and field equipment until better facilities constructed. Can mess initially with Naval administrative unit. Because of many calls for utility service should have at least 2 preferably 4 J2F5 additional. Increased demands STRAWHAT and man and considerations essential training make duties squadron V3D-14 as at present necessitating division of squadron unreasonably onerous. Fulltime service of 12 plane squadron at HAT also considered essential. Copy to CO STRAWBOARD by mail.

02 0453  ALUSNA WELLINGTON TO COMSOPAC (COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC)

CinCPac 220305 passed to General Horley who notified NZ Govt. Prime minister replies he passed info to High Commissioner for Western Pacific who has jurisdiction over FANNING Island. Only connection NEW ZEALAND had with FANNING was through small defense force put there now relieved by U.S.

02 1331  VICE OPIV TO COMTASKFOR 8 VIA COMALSEC

Anglo Soviet recognition system provides signals your 290048 and 300005. Status distribution to Russian forces has been requested. Has ASRS been distributed your forces. See my 091240 June Basegram.

02 1928  CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC

CinCPac (Admin) pass by hand to CTF-11. On recommendation Rear Admiral Turner desire following be obtained for delivery to him at LONGEM by about 15 July. (a) Charts and sailing directions showing FLORIDA-TULAGI-GUADALCANAL and NDENI Islands and approaches with information obtained from Australian authorities which is not shown in U.S. publications. (b) Topographical maps of same. (c) Information as to airfields and possible sites for airfields. (d) Best information on strength, dispositions and defensive installations of Jap Ground, air and Naval forces in SOLOMONS particularly FLORIDA and TULAGI. (e) Negatives and 10 contact prints of overlapping reconnaissance strips of FLORIDA and TULAGI Islands scale 1 to 20,000. (f) Flat obliques to largest possible scale of north and south coasts of
Comsopac Comsopac C C first port embarkation FULCRUM in complete accord on policy for logistic maintenance South Pacific Area. Recommend Opnav and SOS Army promulgate following directive to all forces South Pacific Area quote Comsopac will assume responsibility for logistic support all U S Forces in Sopac area as quickly as shipping becomes available to meet requirements. Upon notification that Comsopac has assumed logistic responsibility FULCRUM will undertake automatic supply all fresh and frozen provisions for all bases no requisitions required. Dry provisions all bases less STRAW submit data port of embarkation San Francisco for automatic supply. STRAW same data to Comserforsubcom San Francisco. Comserforspac will be source supply for all bases for fuel and naval ammunition. Army ammunition. Army ammunition from San Francisco. All bases furnish respective sources of supply maximum information for automatic supply. For clothing all bases submit data appointed agencies San Francisco for automatic supply. Com-12 pass to Comgen San Francisco.

This is part 2 of my 020334. General stores Army and Navy submit data to appropriate San Francisco supply points for automatic supply. Furnish Comsopac copy all requirements on all sources of supply. Communication difficulties prevent general use itemized requisitions. Develop automatic supply maximum possible degree. Utilize itemized requests only when essential to correct deficiencies automatic supply. Shipments from San Francisco to move direct to bases WIRAMP transshipment whenever possible. When direct delivery impossible FULCRUM will designate transshipment point. Unquote. Com-12 pass to Comgen San Francisco.

(underline probably means "without")
GEN BLEACHER TO CINCPAC

From Comdgen Bleacher NR 7x1 3rd Cinopac. Comair- sopac for information. SOD runways usable dry weather available as follows NW-SE 4273 feet. With coral extension to 5000 feet by Aug 30 Yrute five two three hundred. NE-SW 3600 feet with coral extension to 5000 feet by October 15th. N-S 3600 feet no extension or improvement contemplated. Dispersal area for carrier group ready by Aug 15. Very limited repair gassing and arming facilities available by personnel and equipment station pursuit squadron. Limited space in 40 by 100 foot shop can be made available for equipment aircraft service units by Aug 30. Improvised housing and storing facilities can be made available for 250 officers and men for temporary period. Plan contemplated construction native huts for housing 350 officers and men of army bombardment group. This can be increased to provide for housing of carrier aircraft service units if assigned here. Bedding and mess equipment not available. Lockwood. (Note: Underlined group garbled).

CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC

This from Cinopac to Comsopac for action and Cinopac adm for info pass to Ghormley. Your 220630 June desire you proceed immediately construction airfield at Espiritu Santo utilizing personnel and material from Roses. Landing mat will be sent from Copper. This project has highest priority. Desire field ready for operation heavy bombers not later than July 28. Desire you reinforce Espiritu Santo with one Army heavy weapons company and one third AA gun and machine gun group of Fourth Defense Battalion from Efate using first available transportation.
JULY 5

06 0110 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

Request you make representation to Washington to prevent Russian ships stopping by Pribilofs due to difficulty in determining friendly or enemy character. Station ashore at St. Paul always reports enemy transport approaching thereby to date causing needless alarms. We should know that vessels approaching are enemy. Comtaskfor 8 originator. Comalsec by hand.

05 0620 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

In connection with possible future advances by Amphibious Forces this area careful study has been made of the problem of logistic support for such forces. Because of the non-availability of suitable vessel of medium size for this duty and the extreme vulnerability of larger ships in advance areas, above study discloses the need for (in addition to reefer type Tuna boats requested for servicing bases my 290345 June) additional 15 Tuna boats 300 tons refer capacity each for supplying Amphibious Forces in advanced areas lacking refrigerated storage. Request information of non refrigerated cargo capacity these boats in order prepare estimates additional vessels required to support above Amphibious Forces. Also require at least 50 raider transport type boats accordance para 4 King Annex George of William Prep Love 46-Prep Cast, would be of inestimable value for prosecution offensive island warfare.
With further reference to joint directives on subject of Army command South Pacific and Pacific Mobile Air Force which was dispatched to you through navy communications and will reach you through CinCPac to prevent compromising codes period, Major General Millard F Harmon has been designated as Commander Army Forces South Pacific and will depart shortly to assume command under Ghormley in that area. You will designate one heavy bombardment group of the 7th Air Force as the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force. This group will be administered, supplied, and trained as a part of the 7th Air Force. While based in Hawaii, it will be available to you under CinCPac for operation without reference to the War Department, but will not be moved out of Central Pacific area except on orders of the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff. War Department does not repeat not contemplate augmentation your bomber strength over that currently authorized. The latter is in reply your 1229-2.

Priority 4700 4th June 27 radio number 119 acknowledged. Birch, Holly, and Lampoon are your responsibility. Assumption of command of South Pacific Area by Admiral Ghormley of June 19 relieved Fantan and Bobcat from your command. Directive to Ghormlery (See WD Radio Number 3555-May 6) stated "matters of administration and supply pertaining to U S Army forces in South Pacific will be handled as War Department directs" previous instructions to Poppy and Bleacher making them responsible directly to War Department in matters of administration remain unchanged. Letter of instructions to General Beight- ler advised him that upon assumption of command all matters pertaining to supply and administration Fantan would be handled directly with the War Depart- ment. Letter of Commanding General San Francisco port of embarkation June 27, copy which has been mailed you relieved you from responsibility for sup- plying Bobcat and charged CG SFPE with responsibility therefor. War Department letter June 25 AG 400 copy of which is being sent you by airmail sets forth supply plan for U S Army Forces in South Pacific area except Bobcat but does not charge you with any responsibility in connection therewith.
Paragraph Tag has charged you with providing machine record service for Bobcat and Fantan. This is due to the available capacity of machine record facilities in the Hawaiian Department and lack of such facilities at Bobcat and Fantan. Effort is being made to remedy this situation and you will be advised when you are relieved from this responsibility.

Paragraph War Department radio number 3636-May 11th dispatched to you from Commanding General Army Air Forces approved alternate South Pacific ferry route and advised you that 3 million dollars was being allotted for construction staging fields. These instructions did not make clear that an air field was being constructed by Navy at Bleacher for Task Force there. Since one of the staging fields on alternate ferry route was also to be at Bleacher, some confusion apparently resulted as to responsibility for construction this air base. In order to eliminate confusion and duplication of effort, War Department radioed you on June 26 to confer with CinCPac and determine the single agency responsible for supply of personnel, material, and equipment for this entire air base project and notify War Department of your joint agreement. Subject of such agreement, you will continue to be charged with the construction of airfields on alternate South Pacific ferry route. Defense forces for Ostler and Lineout are under study. What is status of construction of airfields these 2 bases as well as Norfolk Island query Marshall
Army reports positive identification at KISKA Harbor:
1 battleship or heavy cruiser at least 4 destroyers,
2 light cruisers 2 tankers or transports and 3 fast
seaplanes (2 monoplanes and 1 biplane).
The Joint US Chiefs of Staff direct the following.

Subpara aim. It is a function of commanders exercising unity of command to coordinate reports concerning combat operations of own or enemy forces.

Subpara Baker. Originator will make all such reports to the commander exercising unity of command for coordination comment when appropriate and prompt retransmission as indicated below:

Subpara Baker 1. When the officer exercising unity of command is a member of the service other than that of the originator of the report the report after application of the principles stated above will be retransmitted to the head of the service of the originator that is the Chief of Staff US Army or the Commander in Chief US Fleet.

Subpara Baker 2. If the originator is a member of the same service as the officer exercising unity of command the reports will be treated as required by the practice of that service.

Subpara cast. Originators of reports whether in Army or Navy service who are not under the jurisdiction of the commander exercising unity of command in own sphere of activity concerned will by the most direct means available render reports of own or enemy operations to the commander responsible for taking action.
Question of control civil radio stations and exercise censorship has arisen at STRAWBOARD and BOBCAT and may arise at other Free French Islands garrisoned by US troops. Varying local conditions and requirements prohibit enunciating broad policy applicable to all islands. Consider imperative for military security to have authority to exercise control French civil radio stations and exercise necessary censorship at my discretion. It is noted urser 00254 of April Third does not include Free French as having agreed to my authority in Pacific Ocean Areas. Request you obtain necessary agreement from General DeGaulle stressing no desire to interfere with communication between him and his followers and requesting he announce my authority to the High Commissioner and his chief local representative at each island. Am prepared to handle French official communications over our circuits except in Society groups. At this time believe it advisable to suppress civil radio stations BOBCAT and STRAWBOARD. Will defer reply your 041901 until receipt reply this message.
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN COMINCH AND CINCPAC 4 JULY.

1. Cominich gave the background for his serial 00581 of 2 July pointing out amongst other things:

(a) After accomplishment of Tasks 1, 2, and 3, the plan will be to proceed to Truk-Chuam-Saipan.

(b) That he (Cominich) had rejected the conception that the line between South Pacific area and Southwest Pacific area was a "Chinese wall."

(c) As to paragraph 4a of the reference that MacArthur is thereby prevented from making unreasonable demands on Cincpac.

(d) That paragraph 4d of the reference is perhaps superfluous but serves to clarify.

(e) That paragraphs 5 and 6 of the reference are not wholly satisfactory but, again, that paragraph 4a gives necessary leeway.

2. Cincpac stated that he had already directed Admirals Ghormley and Turner to proceed to Melbourne as soon as may be to discuss the entire operation with General MacArthur.

3. Cominich discussed Bolero pointing out that this shift of front from U.K. to Europe was strongly backed by the President and the Army which accounts for difficulties in obtaining adequate forces for the Pacific campaign.

4. As to mobile air forces, Cincpac emphasized the need for adequate ground facilities, nucleuses and fighters at each staging point and advised that General Emsen had recently set up two groups of 21 planes each (8 B-17, 13 B-26) for Fiji and New Caledonia.

5. Admiral Jacobs stated that if necessary he would obtain presidential authority for a Vice Admiralty for Fletcher in advance of formal notification.
6. Cominch and Chief of BuPers will process Cinopac's letter of 24 June as to appointment of Task Force Commanders (regardless of seniority).

7. Cinopac stated that Task Forces 11 and 18 which are to give initial support to coming operations will be joined by Task Force 16 departing Pearl about mid July.

8. Cinopac advised that another landing field was being constructed at Midway (Sand Island) using a mat, which is already in the locality.

9. Cominch repeated that he wanted some means for fighter staging at French Frigate.

10. Admiral Turner recommended consideration of a diversion towards Alaska (or in any other appropriate direction) about 10 days before commencement of the Tulagi operation.

11. Admiral Turner stated that with respect to Lions and Oube, he had taken the liberty of advising the logistic people at San Francisco that such units required for the organization operations should take precedence over units being assembled for Roses and other localities.

12. Admiral Turner stated his view that with respect to captured islands, we should set a target period of one week for the establishment of an air field.

13. Cinopac stated that he had been nursing the idea of knocking out Makin.

14. It was decided that both raider battalions should be available for the Tulagi operation.

NOTE: At this point Admiral Turner withdrew.

15. Cominch and Cinopac discussed various phases of the Alaskan operations, are in accord that undue seriousness does not attach to the present situation unless Kodiak is threatened and agreed to reserve judgment as to the command for a short time pending further developments.

16. As to Alaska, Cominch mentioned that last Thursday, there had been an indication that Russians in Washington were prepared to undertake staff conversations with respect to projection of operations into Siberia.
17. Personnel.

(a) Cincpac advised that:
   1. Mitschers' assignment is okeh.
   2. Murray is to be Senior Navy Member of a Joint Board to
      pass on air fields in the Hawaiian area.
   3. Gunther be given consideration for promotion.
   4. If Halsey does not return, Fitch should be the Senior
      Air Flag Officer, PacFlt.

(b) Cominch stated that Seligman and others involved in the
    affair were in "escrow."

(c) It was decided that as a general proposition, PhibFor
    Commanders would be Rear Admirals and that the advance-
    ment of such a Commander to Vice Admiral would be deter-
    mined not only as the result of accomplishment, but also
    depending on whether he is a Task Force Commander direct-
    ly under a Fleet Commander.

(d) The possible availability of Admiral Hoover for employment
    in the aeronautic organization was discussed.

18. Cincpac stated that there had been procured in Oahu a small house for
    the accommodation of Senior Officers who needed rest and that consideration
    was being given to the establishment of a rest camp on Maui.

19. Vice Admiral Pye entered for the purpose of discussing employment of
    battleships.

20. Cominch stated his general agreement with the views expressed in a
    paper as to the employment of battleships prepared by Admiral Pye.

21. It was decided that:
   (a) North Carolina should join Task Force 16.
   (b) Continuous study should be given to the maintenance of a BatDiv
       in South Pacific.
   (c) In the interests of continued development of tactics for large
       forces (the necessity of which was pointed out by Admiral Pye)
when such BatDiv was established in the South Pacific and rotation became necessary relief would be accomplished at about a mid point between Pearl and the South Pacific station which would thus permit of periodic exercises for the whole of Task Force 1.

(d) An additional BatDiv Commander will be ordered to Task Force 1.

22. SecNav was requested by despatch to withhold release as to the award of a DSM to Cinpac until 10 July.

23. Cinpac pointed to the need for a survey looking to the establishment of medical storehouses in the South Pacific area.

24. Cinpac advised that Summer will survey the large area behind reefs at the southern end of New Caledonia which appears to hold possibilities as a large and secure fleet anchorage.

25. Admiral Jacobs advised that BuPers was giving constant consideration to the problem of maintenance of submarine captains and have arrived at these tentative conclusions:

(a) A Submarine Captain could be expected to hold up for three or four full patrols (total time of about one year) before he should be given a prolonged blow.

(b) The 30 odd small submarines in LantFlt afford a pool for promotion of captains of these ships into large submarines.

26. Cominch pointed out that Sea Frontier Commanders were available to Cinpac as Task Force Commanders.

NOTE: Cominch will go into the details of directives bearing on this subject and will clarify if necessary.

27. Cominch stated that Washington would be sent to Pacific about August 1st - when So. Dakota should be ready.

Check on tankers assigned PacFlt and give Cominch memo on 10 July.

Check also on replacement of 19 knot tankers by 17 knot tankers.

28. Cominch stated his view that oil storage should be placed in Tonga-Tabu for a full due before permanent storage was placed in other islands in that area.
29. Cinopac reaffirmed his view that all restrictions should be removed as to plane allocations to the end that each service should have available those types which it can most effectively employ.


31. Cinopac outlined his view that as a contingent operation while Task Forces were in the vicinity of Pearl without specific tasks it would be desirable to have carriers take B-25's to about 600 miles from Wake, there to be launched, bomb Wake and return Midway.

32. Cinopac advised that Bellinger was to make an inspection of all Pacific air bases and would afterwards come to Washington for conversations with Cominch.

33. Cinopac stated his objections to the JAN Grid. Cominch pointed out that in the interests of obtaining a common grid we had modified our grid nomenclature to conform to those of the Army grid and that as a result, he and General Marshall had prescribed the JAN grid for use in all operations. Cinopac withdrew his objections.

NOTE: Check to determine that modification has been made to General Signal Book - and issued.

34. Cinopac stated that there were about 10,000 persons of Japanese extraction in the islands who are eligible for the draft which War Department intends not to call. Their being called will take a lot of "dangerous characters" out of the islands. His view is that so long as they are limited to units of a battalion and used on fronts outside of Pacific area, they will render good service.

35. Cinopac expressed his satisfaction with the manner in which the military government in the islands is working out and urged that after the war, it should continue.

36. Cinopac advised that a trial was to be given to a modification of submarine operations in the Pacific whereby Fulton will be based at Midway and submarines will, after one patrol, return to Midway for upkeep and
rest of ten days to two weeks, will then make another patrol and then return to Pearl. Duration of patrols may be slightly reduced over the present 50-60 days.

37. Cinopac stated that there was a plan on foot to repatriate aliens from the islands to Japan via the West Coast. He stated that he now considers very little information gets out of the islands excepting perhaps by mail to the West Coast and then to the Empire by radio from South America and registered his objection to the method of repatriation contemplated, on the grounds that military security would thus be jeopardized.
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN COMINCH AND CINCPAC 5 JULY 1942.

1. Cinopac questioned whether Bagley would be made a Vice Admiral as a Sea Frontier Commander. Cominich pointed out that the circumstances in the Hawaiian Frontier differ materially from those in other large frontiers where the Commander has one or more flag officers under his command.

2. Cominich raised the question as to how Admiral Dunn's organization was working out and Cinopac expressed his satisfaction with the present set-up.

3. Cinopac stated that with the present expertness of the Salvage Unit at Pearl, he no longer feels it necessary to keep a dock available for wounded ships inasmuch as any ship that can be gotten into Pearl can be kept afloat or temporarily grounded pending availability of a dock.

4. Cinopac now requires that every ship in the Fleet have a salvage organization made up from all departments.

5. Cinopac considers that the Pearl Harbor Salvage Unit should be kept intact for the duration.

6. The Public Relations situation in PacFlt is satisfactory to Cinopac. In this connection, Cominich outlined the President's policy that one representative of a news service and no others should be allowed to go out in Task Forces.

7. Cinopac questioned whether seaplane fighters were to be made available.

8. Cominich stated that the problem at Ocean and Haru has been placed in the lap of the New Zealand Government.

9. Cinopac mentioned that the Gilbert Island natives on Christmas and Fanning Islands have given some trouble recently with respect to labor problems.

10. It was mentioned that there/eight to nine thousand Australian troops at Port Moresby.
11. Cinopac expressed a desire for heavier war-heads at the earliest possible date.

12. In discussion as to the use of radio deception, Cinopac expressed the view that it was very much of a double-edged sword; that the Japs have tried it a number of times and have always been detected in its practice.

13. In connection with the above paragraph numbered twelve, Cinopac repeated an observation that he had made during the April conversations to the effect that the Jap radio direction finding system is excellent and that it is only necessary for our forces to open up and they are detected. By comparison, he considers that we are decidedly weak. Comincoh expressed the view that our RDF work in the Atlantic was rapidly improving and that perhaps the weight of this experience might well be made available in the Pacific.

14. During the Midway action our people at Midway got morning and afternoon Honolulu papers.
NOTES FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF FOR CONFERENCE WITH GINCPAC

ABOUT 1 JULY.

1. North and Central Pacific Situation.

Attacks on MIDWAY and WESTERN ALEUTIANS probably had as part of the original Japanese objective preparation for attacks on EASTERN SIBERIA. KISKA, while not very tenable in winter months, would (and will) serve as a base for Japanese patrolling the 130th Meridian, north and south, would support further operations to cut ALASKA off from SIBERIA, and would, in conjunction with patrols from MIDWAY (if captured) and seagoing forces in the NORTH PACIFIC, serve to cover the approaches to JAPAN itself.

These Japanese operations against WESTERN ALEUTIANS and MIDWAY were given added incentive by the TOKYO raid.

In view of general situation in this area, continuance of two carriers in the NORTH PACIFIC is indicated.

If developments and distribution of Japanese forces indicate, a simultaneous widespread raid against Japanese patrols extending along the 160th Meridian and against Japanese fishing in the KAMCHATKA Area should promise profitable results. Should probably be made by well spread out destroyers, supported to the eastward by carrier task forces.

2. Russian Conversations. (If undertaken). To obtain from Russians factual data as to facilities in EASTERN SIBERIA on which to base estimates as to the amount of UNITED STATES assistance that can be projected through this area.
3. **SOUTH PACIFIC Operations.**

Operations in SOUTH PACIFIC have largely been covered in exchange of despatches covering the inauguration of plans for offensive operations in this area.

We are in the process of setting up, in Washington, two or three officers to concern themselves solely with future plans, in the PACIFIC in general, and in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC in particular, in order that the forces and materials can be planned, produced, and delivered to meet situations and exploit opportunities as they actually and prospectively will arise in the future. It would be well that at least one officer on your Staff be specialized in the same duties. If this is done, the two groups can be kept in continuous touch by mail and occasional personal contact, so that the difficulties presented by the 5,000 miles separating PEARL from WASHINGTON can be overcome in the best manner possible.

A case in point in regard to preparation for future operations is that of offensive mining (at the present time for that matter, as well as in the future) carried out by aircraft, including patrol planes, and by submarines, in order that proper plans for production of mines, distribution and stowage, etc., can be carried out.

4. **Employment of the British Eastern Fleet.**

The British are reluctant to do much more than to continue this large force relatively idle in the INDIAN OCEAN to protect against Japanese advances that they fear may be undertaken in this area. British carriers woefully weak, - do not carry many planes, no dive bombers, torpedo planes obsolete. Not suitable for operations against Japanese carriers nor for operations against Japanese land objectives.
In order to use them, have been giving consideration to making suggestion that one be used in conjunction with our Marine aviation.

In view of the weakness of these carriers, it is difficult to fit the British Eastern Fleet into profitable operations against the Japanese.

5. Control of Operational Reports.
The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, have before them the following draft of a directive:

"(a) It is a function of commanders exercising unity of command to coordinate reports concerning combat operations of our own and enemy forces. Such reports will be forwarded through the commander exercising unity of command, for coordination, comment when applicable, and prompt despatch. If initiated by the opposite service than that to which the officer exercising unity of command belongs the reports will always be forwarded as made to the head of that service, i.e., the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, or the Commander in Chief. If initiated by own service they will be handled as required by the practice of that service.

(b) Commanders or officers of either service, who are not under the jurisdiction of the commander exercising unity of command in a sphere of activity, will render reports of own and enemy operations direct to the commander exercising unity of action. In the most expeditious manner practicable,"
It is expected that this draft directive will be promulgated in the near future and will remedy the conditions regarding this matter recently reported by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, relative to MIDWAY operations.

6. **Communications in the SOUTH PACIFIC.**

The organization of communications in the SOUTH PACIFIC and the establishment of joint command posts are receiving the consideration of the War and Navy Departments. A joint committee is working on this matter and their study possibly will be furnished to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander, South Pacific Area.

It is understood that Commander Curts (Staff of Cinopac) is making a study of the situation as it exists by visiting the positions in the SOUTH PACIFIC Area.

Any recommendations that Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, may wish to forward as a result of Commander Curts’ study will be of value to the joint committee.

7. **BOLERO.**

BOLERO has to do with movement of troops to ENGLAND for cross channel amphibious operations next year, originally undertaken with the possibility that these operations would be carried out this year.
The employment of shipping and of productive capacity to meet programs in regard to special landing craft, and of training personnel to man these landing craft, all have Double A Priority.

It is anticipated that some of the special landing craft such as the 318' tank carrying ship and the 155' personnel carrying ship or boat will prove very useful in our future PACIFIC amphibious operations.

8. Anti-Aircraft Development.

We anticipate that by the time our new carriers are coming along the development of anti-aircraft weapons, including directors, guns, new types of ammunition, will be such as to permit us to project our operations into the areas of enemy land-based air with less hazard than exists at the present time. If this is the case, we will, in the future, have greater flexibility in selecting points of attack against the widespread Japanese positions.


10. Land Bombers for Patrolling Sea Lanes.


To be thoroughly worked out in connection with our strategical and tactical operations.
13. **Amphibious Force, PACIFIC.**

Our plans to build up a well organized and trained Amphibious Force, PACIFIC, while building one in the SOUTH PACIFIC, are constantly being interfered with by the necessity of meeting immediate demands. The thought has been, of course, to be prepared to carry out amphibious force operations in either area, both areas simultaneously, or concentrating rapidly CENTRAL or SOUTH, - probably SOUTH.

The bad part of the problem has been the development of Marine amphibious aircraft squadrons. Present plans is to concentrate on the organization of Marine Air Wing One with a view to bringing it up to at least half strength in the early future.

There have been many discussions with the Army regarding their participation in future amphibious training and in amphibious organizations. The Army does not wish to be under the Marines and not very much under the Navy. - Though they were perfectly willing to accept unity of command offered by the Navy for the BOLERO operations.

14. **Assignment of Naval Observers to Army Aircraft Used for Patrolling and Reconnaissance in Coordination with our Surface Forces.**

15. **The Command in the South Pacific, Including Army General in the South Pacific.**
ADDITIONAL NOTES FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF'S CONFERENCE WITH
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

1. CARRIERS FOR USE OF MARINE AIRCRAFT IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

This was giving us quite a problem to solve, inasmuch as we must keep our few existing carriers ready for operations at all times against enemy carriers, as well as carrying on other tasks with the Fleet.

One way would be to devote the other AVG's to this mission.

The second thought is the use of British carriers. At the present time the British have quite a number of carriers which cannot be usefully employed because they have no dive bombers for them and no modern torpedo craft. The question of using one or two British carriers in Eastern Australian Waters for our Marine aircraft (involving the use also of some flight deck crews) has been taken up with the British and they are looking into it. They, the British, admit that these carriers are not now paying their way.

2. DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF USING THE CARRIERS FOR BLASTING Kiska AND ATTU.
July 1st.

Except for Task Force 8 the Fleet in the Pacific is resting, training and preparing for further operations. Task Force 8 020150 gives his summary of current operations. This message was sent along to Admiral Nimitz.

General Marshall's 4584 of the 28th regarding the joint construction of an airfield seems to present no special problem. We have asked Com So Pac for comment and on its receipt will take necessary steps to settle the matter.

There are no significant changes in the enemy dispositions.

July 2nd.

Attached directive for the offensive was received by Cominich and those commanders concerned will talk it over tomorrow. Our present plans are not changed, except that Marine Defense Battalions we suggest are not included.

There is no new information of own Task Forces.

Vice CNO 022025 gives plan for a construction battalion at FULCRUM.

TONTOUTA field at WHITE POPPY is now O.K. for one carrier group, if used with caution. Rebuilding is underway.

C.G. STRAW 020031 says field at BOARID is now ready for up to six VB. He also gives needs and recommendations regarding air for the STRAW area.

Vice CNO 021331 states that the Anglo Soviet recognition signals provide means to work Russian vessels. However, as Opnav does not know whether or not Soviet ships have these signals on board, nor where signals are effective the net result is as stated in our despatch on the subject to CTF 8 this week. In the meantime Russian ships will be routed from Siberia thru the Bearing Sea and to U.S.A. via Dutch Harbor, and all foreign vessels operating South of the Aleutians west of Dutch can be presumed enemy.
July 2nd. (Cont'd)

ALUSNA 020453 states that the only interest New Zealand had in Fanning Island was their troops there.

Cincpac 021928 gives requirements for Rear Admiral Turner in connection with the attack on Tulagi. We are continuing to assemble material for use by the operating forces in that effort.

The following were sighted by a weather plane:
At Kiska, three cruisers, 3 VP, one unidentified vessel; at McDonald Cove Agattu, 3 AP, 5 DD; at Massacre Bay, Attu, 1 cruiser. B-17s have been ordered to attack.

The NAUTILUS returning from patrol off Honshu reports that all merchantmen sighted are being escorted by cruisers or destroyers. She sank one DD and one 1500 ton PC, and fired at and may have hit one DD, one 17000 ton AP, one 10000 ton AO.

A sub was reported in Lat. 20-08 S, 163-04 E.

There is nothing new regarding enemy deployments.

July 3rd.

Cominch 041632 (pink) directs that Comsopac cooperate in the evacuation of Ocean and Nauru Islands. There is no answer to CinCPac query regarding who is to be evacuated and where they are to go.

CinCPac 040057 (pink) delays the departure of TF-11 until after the 6th of July. Rear Admiral Turner will be here by then to discuss the forthcoming offensive.

Cominch 032255 (pink) establishes 2 mobile air forces. This does not seem to add to the total planes available in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

Cominch 032254 (pink) provides for an Army general under Comsopac. We have not yet received Comsopac views on this.

Comsopac 020334 02320 gives the logistic set up for his area. It is along the general plan suggested by CinCPac in conference with Vice Admiral Ghormely when he was here in May.

TF-16 and 17 are to undertake training off Pearl for the next 10 days or so. They will practice bombardment of shore objectives.
SECRET

July 3rd (Cont'd)

TF-8 surface vessels are inactive but the planes attacked enemy vessels at Kiska and Near Islands. Results are uncertain.

The OGLALA was placed in drydock - thus clearing 10-10 dock for the first time since she was sunk there on Dec. 7, 1941.

There are no significant reports of the enemy.

July 4th

There is no change in the Carrier Task Forces at Pearl; all three are on 12 hours notice. Task force 18 is enroute South Pacific. Task Force 8 submarines are active and report hitting three DDs at ATTU and one DD at AGGATU.

CominCh 041901 deals with radio at CANTON and CHRISTMAS.

A B-17 reconnaissance of HOWLAND and BAKER Islands produced negative results.

CinCPac 043144 directs immediate construction of a landing field at ESPIRITU SANTO for use in the coming offensive. The construction battalion will come from ROSES and the mat will leave PEARL on the 6th.

C.G. BLEACHER 030202 summarizes the air situation at that place.

There is now some evidence of mines at KISKA. Because of this 4 DMS are being held at PEARL to send north. Three go to SOPAC but a total of six are requested.

There is no further information of major changes in Japanese deployments.
July 5.

Rear Admiral Turner arrived and an all day conference was immediately started to discuss the TULAGI operation. The immediate job is to get a landing field in operation at ESPIRITU SANTO. Admiral Turner's plans, which have the general approval of Admirals Mimitz and King, are to (1) rehearse the landing between July 25 and 30 in the South Pacific (2) operate land-based planes from ESPIRITU SANTO by July 28 (3) use the 1st Raider Battalion and the 3rd Defense Battalion plus the 1st Marine Division, less the 7th Regiment, plus the 2nd Regiment - the latter to occupy NDENI on A-2 day. (4) the present rather nebulous idea is that it will be a daylight assault with cruiser and DD shore bombardment (5) CVs close in will provide fighter coverage for APs (about 5 days) and will dive bomb defended positions before the landing. Task Force 11 will leave Pearl July 7th. Decision on other Carrier Task Forces was not reached. However, the NORTH CAROLINA is enroute to Pearl.

Task Force 8 continues as before, i.e., dependence on submarines and air to stop the Japs in the ALEUTIANS. The fleet subs (GROWLER and TRITON, so far) are doing a fine job.

ComTaskFor 8 O60110 indicates some trouble with Russian merchantmen. CinCPac has requested Opnav to keep the forces in ALASKA fully informed of Russian movements.

ComSoPac 050620 requests additional small boat tonnage. His request will be studied and he will be given every consideration. As the program to meet his needs is far from completion, CinCPac is unable to do more at this time than urge Opnav to find ways and means to meet the needs of a very difficult logistic problem for this offensive. The needs will be met one way or another and cannot be allowed to stop the offensive.

There is the probability that units of Crudivs 6 and 18 and one Desron are in the TULAGI - GUADALCANAL area and that an airfield is being constructed on the north shore of the latter island. All Orange CVs are north of the equator. The SHOKAKU seems to be repaired and at sea training a new air group. There is no evidence of any change in employment of Jap units in the ALEUTIANS - KURILE area.
July 6th.

Conferences continued concerning the TULAGI operation. It was decided to sail Task Force 11 tomorrow. Admiral Nimitz returned and generally approved preparations.

Task Force 3 operations are confined to air and submarines. No more attacks are recorded but the GROWLER was damaged by depth charges to the extent that she must go to a navy yard. A plane reports no ships in KISKA harbor, but that 2 destroyers were observed in South Pass and 2 destroyers at Little Kiska.

In General Marshall's 042205 and 050043 the directive for the Mobile Air Force and the Army General for the South Pacific is given. The latter relieves C.G. Hawaii for responsibility in the South Pacific.

There seems to be considerable enemy activity on the North Coast of GUADALCANAL. Observed in the vicinity yesterday were 2 large AK, 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer.

July 7.

Task Force 11 sailed for a rendezvous with Task Force 18. After meeting, these forces under the command of Vice Admiral Fletcher will proceed to the South Pacific and report to Vice Admiral Ghormley for Task ONE of the offensive (TULAGI Operation) Task Force 16 will proceed South Pacific about the 15th or 16th. Decision has not been reached on the employment of Task Force 17, and that force and Task Force 16 continues training in the OHNU area.

Task Force 3 surface, submarine, and air elements continue scouting and waiting for favorable opportunities. The FINBACK attacked 2 DDs and probably sank one of them on the 6th south of KISKA Island. ComTaskFor 8 060740 summarizes enemy sighting at KISKA.

The arrangements for logistics for the forthcoming campaign in the South Pacific are underway. Except for enough tuna boats to comply with the request of ComSoPac there will be no difficulty in keeping four CV task forces supplied with fuel, AvGas, diesel, and stores during the month of August.

There continues evidence that the enemy is landing troops and workmen on the north coast of GUADALCANAL to construct a landing field. It appears possible that they will undertake the occupation of NAURU and OCEAN Islands in the near future. BatDiv 3 seems to be headed for HONSHU from the vicinity of the KURILS.
ESTIMATE

An Offensive for the Capture and Occupation of TULAGI and Vicinity.

July 6, 1942.
SECTION I

1. Summary of the Situation.

As a result of the battles in the Coral Sea and off MIDWAY Japan has suffered heavy and disproportionate naval losses. The losses are considered sufficient to permit us to take the offensive in the Southwest Pacific Area.

At present the only enemy activity in the Pacific Ocean Areas that threatens the accomplishment of tasks assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, is the occupation of positions in the Western ALEUTIANS.

2. The following directive has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet:

The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed upon the following joint directive for offensive operations in the Southwest Pacific Area.

Objective: Offensive operations will be conducted with the ultimate objective of seizure and occupation of the NEW BRITAIN - NEW IRELAND - NEW GUINEA area.

Purpose: To deny the area to Japan.

(a) Task 1: Seizure and occupation of SANTA CRUZ Islands, TULAGI and adjacent positions.

(b) Task 2: Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMON Islands, of LAE, SALAMANUA, and Northeast coast of NEW GUINEA.

(c) Task 3: Seizure and occupation of RAMAUL and adjacent positions in the NEW GUINEA - NEW IRELAND area.
General Instructions:

(a) The composition of the forces to be used, the timing of the tasks, and the passage of command will be determined by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

(b) For planning purposes a target date for task one is tentatively set as August 1, 1942.

(c) Direct command of the tactical operations of the amphibious forces will remain with the Naval Task Force Commander throughout the conduct of all three tasks.

(d) The withdrawal of the naval attached units of the U.S. Fleet may be ordered by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff upon the completion of any particular phase of the operation in the event that; (1) conditions develop which unduly jeopardize the aircraft carriers, (2) an emergency arises in other Pacific areas which dictates such withdrawal.

(e) The Eastern and Western boundaries of the Southwest Pacific area and of the South Pacific area respectively will, as of August 1, 1942, be Longitude 159° E. from the equator Southward.
Forces:

(a) Ground, air and naval forces now under the command of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area.

(b) At least two aircraft carriers with accompanying cruisers and destroyers, and the South Pacific Amphibious Force, with necessary transport divisions.

(c) Marine air squadrons and available land based air support in South Pacific Area.

(d) Army occupational forces now in the South Pacific Area to be utilized to garrison TULAGI and adjacent island positions; troops from AUSTRALIA to provide other garrisons required.

Command:

(a) Task I seizure and occupation of SANTA CRUZ Islands, TULAGI and adjacent positions.

(1) Task Force Commander to be designated by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

(2) Necessary naval reinforcements and land based air support will be attached by the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area who will also provide for interception of enemy air and naval activities of the operating area.
(b) Task 2 seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMAN Islands and of LAE, SALAMAU, and Northeast coast of NEW GUINEA. The task forces engaged in this operation will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area.

(c) Task 3 seizure and occupation of RABAUL and adjacent positions in the NEW GUINEA - NEW IRELAND area. The task forces engaged in this operation will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area.

SURVEY OF MEANS AVAILABLE AND OPPOSED

3. General Factors.

(a) The above constitutes most of the 2nd stage of the Pacific Campaign. Remaining in that stage are strong attrition attacks on enemy positions in the CAROLINE and MARSHALL ISLANDS. The sooner we accomplish the Second Stage, the sooner the war, and its terrific drain on our national resources, will be brought to successful conclusion. This point is stressed here because there is too often the tendency of the military profession to wait until everything is absolutely perfect before any operation can commence. Conditions will never be perfect, and we cannot afford to miss any chance while waiting for perfection.
(b) The Japanese have recently been up against their first real opposition and have taken a bad beating. In their present extended and disorganized condition they are less apt to be ready to meet us than they will after only a short period of consolidation of their remaining strength.

(c) Enemy morale must have suffered in the past two months. Ours can be considered excellent.

(d) Our amphibious training is incomplete; and, of importance, those troops who have received training are untried. We have yet to get the full measure of coordination between the Army and Navy, particularly to obtain full benefit from Army air forces.

In any island to island advance we will be most dependent on the strength and effectiveness of the Army aircraft unless the Navy can obtain landplane types.

Our troops are brave and willing but their performance has yet to be tested in battle. On the other hand, the enemy is known to be skillful and experienced. Their cooperation between all branches of the Service seems excellent.

(e) While we have had good success in the past making educated guesses as to enemy intentions, there are already indications that our sources of information are drying up. So far as we know our communications are secure.
4. Factors more directly applicable to armed forces.

(a) Vessels, including aircraft:

OWN - On July 6, 1942, there will be available:

At PEARL - Task Force ELEVEN - 1 CV, 3 CA, 2 DL, 6 DD.

Task Force SIXTEEN - 1 CV, 1 CA, 1 CL, 1 DL, 6 DD.

Task Force SEVENTEEN - 1 CV, 3 CA, 1 CL, 6 DD.

Enroute to South Pacific -

Task Force EIGHTEEN - 1 CV, 3 CA, 1 CL, 8 DD.

On WEST COAST -

Task Force ONE - 8 BB, 1 CL, 7 DD.

Note: Fleet oilers will be assigned to Task Forces.

AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS -

Offensively trained

1st Marine Division less 7th Marines available NEW ZEALAND July 24th 14,000 troops

2nd Marines (SAN DIEGO) ready now 5,000 "

Total - 19,000 "

Prospective offensively trained

3rd Army Division (requires training and some weapons) 15,000

2nd Marine Division (requires training and equipment) 10,000

7th Marines (when relieved about 1 September) 4,000

Total - 29,000
Defensively trained only
5th Defense Battalion and 3rd Barrage Balloon
Squadron due for transfer to NEW ZEALAND
about 1 July. Available 1 August.
3rd Defense Battalion ready PEARL July 15.

In SOUTH PACIFIC -

CRUISERS
ACHILLES) Upon release from Pacific Fleet.
LEANDER
ASCANIA
MONAWAI

DESTROYERS
LE TRIOMPHANT
LEOPARD

GUNBOAT
CHEVREUIL

SERVICE UNITS
SOLACE
RIGEL
ANTARES
WHITNEY
TERN
SWAN
TURKEY
COMANGA
7 YPS
Small craft not listed
12 YMS enroute

AIR
BALLARD
CURTISS
McFARLAND
MACKINAC
30 PBYs
4. (a) (Continued)

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

Transdiv Eight
NEVILLE
HEYWOOD (enroute)
G.V. ELLIOTT (enroute)
FULLER
FOMALHAUT (enroute)
BELLAATRIX

Transdiv Ten
MCCAWLEY
BARNETT (enroute)
HUNTER LIGGETT
AMERICAN LEGION
LIBRA (enroute 7/1)

In SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Task Force 42 - Rear Admiral Rockwell
(Based Brisbane)

GRiffin
Tulsa

Subdiv 201
S-37
S-38
S-39
S-40
S-41

Subdiv 51
S-42
S-43
S-44
S-45
S-46
S-47

Task Force 44 - Rear Admiral Crutchley (RN)

AUSTRALIA
CANBERRA
HOBART
CHICAGO
4 destroyers of Desron 4

Task Force 50 - Vice Admiral Leary

Desron 4 less 4 DD
ADELAIDE
STUART
ARUNTA
TROMP
WESTRALIA
KAUIMBLA
MANGOORA
GOLDSTAR
4. (a) (Continued)

**Task Force 50 (Continued)**

50.6 Service Group - Captain Paddock

- **DOBBIN**
- A & O Unit
- Aircraft Torp. Unit
- Aircraft Service Unit

**Task Force 51 - Rear Admiral Lockwood**

*(Based Fremantle)*

- PHOENIX
- VOYAGER
- LANAKAI
- ISABEL
- LARK
- WHIPPOORWILL
- TRINITY
- VICTORIA
- HOLLAND
- PELIAS (enroute)

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<tr>
<td>SALMON</td>
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<td>STURGEON</td>
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<td>SCULPIN</td>
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<td>TAUTOG</td>
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<tr>
<td>THRESHER (enroute)</td>
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<td>GAR</td>
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<td>GRAMPUS</td>
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<td>GRAYBACK</td>
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I-9
4. (a) (Continued)

**ENEMY** - Estimated air strength in the area under review:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VF</th>
<th>VB</th>
<th>Patrol Planes</th>
<th>Float Planes</th>
<th>VO</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ireland</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomons</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Available outside area for quick reinforcement of area under study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VF</th>
<th>VB</th>
<th>Patrol Planes</th>
<th>Float Planes</th>
<th>VO</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Marshalls</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gilberts</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimate of probable seaborne strength
(On 15 July under present known conditions)

- 4 CA - Crudiv 6 (4-AOBA)
- 3 CL - Crudiv 18 (1 KASHIMA - 2 TATSUTA)
- 12 DD - Desron 6, reinforced
- 4 XPG(XCL) - Gunboat division 8
- 4 XAM - Minesweep division 16
- 8 PC - SC divs 51-53
- 12 SS - Subron 7 (reinforced)
- 2 AV - NOTORO, KAMOI

3-4 XAV - Air tenders (FUJIKAWA MARU, etc)
4 (plus?) MTB - Motor torpedo squadron attached 8th Base Force RABAUL
6-8 AP - 8th Base Force (reinforced)
3-4 AK - 8th Base Force (reinforced)

Also, the following could be in the SW Pacific by August 1st:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cardiv 4</th>
<th>Cardiv 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>RYUJO</td>
<td>ZUIKAKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCV</td>
<td>JUNYO</td>
<td>SHOKAKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZUISO</td>
<td>(believed that repairs now completed)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Batdiv 3</th>
<th>Crudiv 8</th>
<th>Desron 10</th>
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<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>HARUNA</td>
<td>TONE</td>
<td>NAGARA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIRISHIMA</td>
<td>CHIKUMA</td>
<td>12 DD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Crudiv 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>ATAGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAKAO</td>
</tr>
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4. (a) (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crudiv 5</th>
<th>Desron 2</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 CL NYOKO</td>
<td>JUITSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 DD (Inc. HAGURO plane guards)</td>
<td>12 DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 AV SENDAI</td>
<td>Airon 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 DD</td>
<td>CHITOSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temp 8</td>
<td>CHIYODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 SS</td>
<td>12 SS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-3 XAV Miscellaneous Air-tenders aux. Seaplane tenders.

(b) Troops

The following maximum troop strength is estimated in the area under consideration as of June 25, 1942:

- NEW BRITAIN 12,000 (Vicinity RABAUL and adjacent small islands)
- NEW IRELAND 200 (KAVIENG and patrols at Cape St. George)
- ENANG ISLAND 50 (Southeast NEW HANOVER)
- MANUS ISLAND 400 (LORENGAU)
- LÆE (New Guinea) 800
- SALAMAU 200 (Probably split into small patrols from FINSCHAVEN to BUNA)
- TULAGI 1400 (Split in several nearby islands. Main strength and headquarters on GAVUTU)
- SOHANA ISLAND 600 (SOLOMONS - Buka Passage)
- KIETA (Bougainville) 500
- BUIN-VAISI 100

Note: The troops at RABAUL are believed to be Army and the remainder either Marines or Naval Landing Forces. At LORENGAU the garrison is definitely Marines.
(c) Personnel

We have two experienced Carrier Task Force Commanders, plus one who has not yet had battle flag command, and one who has commanded cruisers in battle.

Pilots with experience are spread very thin; and those recently in battle are shaken. All other personnel is adequate in experience and numbers.

As noted before, our personnel is beginning to show fatigue from recent strenuous duty.

The enemy has probably lost a number of experienced older officers including some of Flag rank, and must have lost a good percentage of their experienced pilots, and a large number of enlisted men.

(d) Material

There are some indications that our bombs are not as effective as they should be.

Our torpedoes are not as effective as the enemy's.

No serious machinery derangements have been experienced by our ships which prevents satisfactory mobility.

We are beginning to find that our airplanes are not as advertised, always "the best in the world". For example, except for armor protection the zero fighter is better than anything we have; our PBYs are extremely vulnerable; our B-17s do not have the radius under war conditions that they were thought to have.

The enemy material is generally good to excellent.
(e) Logistics

All our fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft, food, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, and general supplies must be transported to the area. While fuel may be a difficult problem if a large force steams at higher speeds than 15 knots more than a few days during the operations, it can be handled.

There is no indication yet that the enemy is unable to support himself in this respect.

One Construction Battalion can be made available. Troop replacements can be made by shifting less trained men to the more inactive positions to relieve fully trained troops for garrison duty in the active positions. Sufficient troops are available for the operation if used to maximum advantage. It is not believed that the Army in the SOUTH PACIFIC can arrive at TULAGI on the first target date to take over defense. Marine defense battalions can be ready, and later relieved by the Army.

Ample Jap troop replacements are considered available if the operation is prolonged.

Facilities

In the process of construction we have major advanced bases at BLEACHER and FULCRUM. Anchorages are available for a large force at BLEACHER and PEARL. Anchorages for one Task Force and a smaller are available at POPPY, FANTAN,
STRAW, BOBCAT and FULCRUM. Reports now indicate that two CV Task Forces can be accommodated at WHITE POPPY. One CV air group can be landed at the airfield but must use caution as the field is under repair.

There is no drydock for a CV south of PEARL. CA and smaller can be docked in AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND.

Tender repairs can be made available at any sheltered anchorage. Large repair can be accomplished at SYDNEY, but this will be hampered by lack of blueprints and spare parts. Moderate shore repair facilities are available at FULCRUM.

One hospital ship is at BLEACHER and one mobile unit can be made available in NEW ZEALAND.

Recreation is almost non-existent in the South Pacific except in NEW ZEALAND.

There is no indication that lack of facilities have hampered enemy operations. Large repairs can be undertaken at TRUK. A floating drydock which may be able to dock a CA is there.

5. Details of own and enemy positions.
Information regarding own bases in the SOUTH PACIFIC is appended marked "A".
Information on enemy positions is appended marked "E".

6. Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.

Strength Factors
6. (Continued)

**Own**

1. Enemy bases at RABAUL, LAE, SALAMAUA and TULAGI are within range of our shore-based aircraft.

2. Our bases supporting the operation are adequate except no air bases to eastward or southward are in range.

3. Ability to provide adequate logistics.

4. Almost unlimited potential strength.

**Enemy**

1. Excellent and experienced troops.

2. Good air coverage of the area.

3. Long range scouting.

4. Superior VF.

5. Better and shorter air route from home bases.


**Weakness factors**

**Own**

1. Difficult problem of neutralizing enemy shore based air so our carriers can approach the TULAGI area.

2. Present weakness of SOUTH PACIFIC bases.

3. Long lines of communications.

**Enemy**

1. General extended state of forces.

2. At present difficulty in replacing ships and steel products.

3. Recent losses resulting in new fleet readjustments.
Weakness Factors (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Untried amphibious troops.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. High percentage of inexperi-</td>
<td></td>
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<td>ienced pilots.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Difficult coordination with</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Army (land-based aircraft)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Must establish new bases.</td>
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</table>
SECTION II

1. Analysis of the Objective.

The decision has been made to proceed at an early date with the start of the Second Stage of the Pacific Campaign. It now remains to investigate how and when.

It is considered that the capture of bases in, and expelling the enemy from the SOLOMONS - BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO - ADMIRALTY ISLANDS are and will:

(a) Reduce the threat of AUSTRALIAN invasion to almost the vanishing point.

(b) Reduce the threat to our communications to AUSTRALIA and to our South Pacific bases.

(c) Permit us to initiate strong attrition against enemy forces and positions in the CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

(d) Constitute a springboard for further extension of control.

That objective will further the general plan of the campaign.

2. Survey of Courses of Action.

The methods by which we can drive the enemy out of the area and occupy it for our own purposes seem to be, broadly, two.

FIRST - to advance step by step to the Northwest from our positions in NOUMEA, EFATE and ESPIRITU SANTO.
SECOND - to simultaneously hit all enemy positions, neutralizing those which interfere, and occupying those selected.

3. At the outset it must be assumed that whichever the method to be adopted we cannot count on Allied troops, at least in the early stages. This will be an amphibious operation for which only Pacific Fleet troops are trained. General MacArthur has just advised that he is commencing preparations to train forces under him for amphibious warfare. Until his troops are thus trained, and until operational cooperation is well developed, there is definite danger in attempting to use Australian troops, including U.S. troops in Australia, or New Zealand troops, for the initial assault. But those troops may well be considered as a source of supply for garrisons when advance positions are captured. Later training may permit their use for assault. In any plan, the air support which General MacArthur can give from AUSTRALIA and from PORT MORESBY is essential to the success of the operation. If adequate air from MORESBY is not available we will be unable to neutralize enemy air at a very critical time. The naval forces assigned to the Southwest Pacific must also be fully employed in this operation.

In the first method the entire strength of the effort is progressively concentrated on single positions, while in the second there is considerable dispersion. The enemy has been
quite successful in the step by step operation. The general idea is well understood and requires no explanation here. The simultaneous assault and attack may be a very difficult operation because until we can neutralize enemy air in the area there seems no sure way of making approaches undetected. We are thus subjected to repeated air attack from shore-based air during at least the daylight period.

As was amply demonstrated at MIDWAY, an attacker who has not neutralized shore-based air in advance is at a great disadvantage. He can expect early discovery well outside his own carrier launching point. After discovery he has the choice of wading on in in hope of getting local air superiority before he is sunk; or of retiring.

Surprise in this operation is always a possibility, but the chances seem remote when possibilities of enemy search are considered. There is the possibility, however, that enemy air in the area can be sufficiently neutralized to permit a striking force to get within attack range undetected. This involves the large use of air from PORT MORESBY.

Whatever the method, when we are committed to the offensive and all that the offensive implies, we must expect and be able to afford disproportionate losses in gaining our objective. If we are not prepared to lose ships and men yet, then the time is not ripe.
It seems reasonable to suppose that by the first of August we will have the necessary trained troops. But, judging from the past, and from known plans to fight this war as a whole, the planes suggested above as necessary are not in sight. Take RABaul alone - we should be able to send at least 36 B-17 or B-24 over each air field in that vicinity two or three time in the 36 hours before bringing out carriers within reach.

Between now and the first of August much may happen, but for this discussion we will adhere to an assumption that the general picture remains the same. That is, that the war will go along without any major changes - such as an all-out attack on ALASKA, or the entrance of RUSSIA into the war against Japan, or the defeat of RUSSIA by Hitler, or the complete loss of the MEDITERRANEAN by BRITAIN, or the collapse of CHINA.
SECTION III
CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY

1. Despite losses in the Coral Sea, MIDWAY, and seemingly over-extended dispositions, the enemy is well capable of exerting very great pressure at almost any point he decides. Thus, he is dangerous - and may be a bit reckless. The evil of under-estimating an enemy was recently shown at TOBRUK (if the press is correct).

2. Summary of the Enemy's Situation.

(a) As of the date of this estimate the enemy seems to have three things in mind primarily involving his Navy:

(1) Operations in the Northwest Pacific, possibly, but not probably, including an attack on RUSSIA.

(2) Extension of his holdings in the Southwest Pacific to eliminate MORESBY and get near enough to strike at least at our AUSTRALIAN communications.

(3) Keep his Western flank secure while he consolidates his great and newly acquired possessions.

(b) His now depleted carrier divisions are operating north of the equator. He has been reinforcing both his air and troops in the Southwest Pacific. Some needed units are under repair.

(c) If by his MIDWAY campaign, he expected to gain a free hand in both the Northwest and the Southwest Pacific, that plan failed. He must now make other plans on a reduced scale.
3. **The effect desired by the Enemy.**

(a) The nature and extent of the next enemy moves are uncertain. Therefore it may be profitable to briefly review the past and remark on what seem to be trends. On December 7, 1941, the Japs effectively stopped us at the MIDWAY - OAHU line. We have only ventured past that line in the Central Pacific (generally the 160th Meridian) with submarine and air raids. Those raids have been only moderately effective. We were unable to divert him from his occupation of MALAYSIA and the PHILIPPINES. His first hurt came in the Coral Sea when he was forced to turn back. He then conceived his grandiose scheme of digging in on the MIDWAY - OAHU line and in the ALEUTIANS at the same time. Very fortunately for us we were able to make a good "educated guess" and were ready at MIDWAY. In the ALEUTIANS not much has happened one way or another. He may be hunting a weak spot or trying to set a trap. So far we have been able to keep the holes plugged.

(b) Viewed broadly, Japan now has under her control almost every natural resource needed for not only her war, but to support her as a first rate power with undisputed hegemony in the Orient. She would probably like nothing better than to sit back and consolidate her gains. In fact a peace which would give her all places now occupied would be just right. But she sees the danger of Allied interference and sees no way of compelling security desired without a bit more extension. She
also has a pact with Hitler which she cannot afford to break. In her present position her only salvation lies in a Hitler victory - or at least a European stalemate - and while the issue is in doubt she must better her position. She knows the United States is preparing to make a major effort in the European Theatre. And as long as we continue to make our major effort in Europe she feels that her chance is good to improve her Pacific position.

(c) **Enemy capabilities.**

The enemy has the strength available to:

1. Continue the ALEUTIAN offensive to include an attempt to occupy the ALEUTIANS and possibly the ALASKAN mainland.

2. Attack the OAHU - MIDWAY line in force.

3. Attack our air ferry routes from OAHU to the Southwest Pacific.

4. Continue her march from the RABAUL area to the South.

5. Attack SIBERIA.


(d) **Suitability, Feasibility and Acceptability.**

**Course (1).** This is not considered suitable nor feasible. It is believed that the enemy may attempt to gain security for course (5) by occupying only enough positions to prevent our
use of staging points from ALASKA to SIBERIA. If this is correct, the occupation of ATTU and Kiska in the ALLEUTIANs and of a position in the ST. LAWRENCE ISLANDS - Nome area would suffice. With our present deployment such a course seems feasible, suitable and acceptable.

Course (2). Now that the enemy has made one disastrous attempt in this direction it seems probable that further attempts - at least in the foreseeable future - will not be considered acceptable.

Courses (3) Both are suitable but (4) seems to be the most and (4) logical as it would, if successful, do most damage to our plans. With the enemy in Noumea, for example, he could be a great nuisance.

Course (5). Was mentioned above. Such action may be part of the Axis grand strategy but there are indications at present that Japan is unwilling. The naval forces involved would be minor.

Course (6). This again may be part of the Axis strategy for the purpose of supporting land operations to gain a stronger hold in INDIA and to eliminate the British threat to MALAY and N.E.I.

If course (6) is adopted he must remain on the defensive in the Pacific. Conversely he cannot be on the offensive in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean at the same time.
(e) Retained courses are (1) and (4). If he chooses between these courses, the latter is favored as the one he will adopt. He may attempt both but it is believed that his remaining carrier strength is insufficient for reasonable chance of success.
SECTION IV

SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION

1. As our general course of action has been selected there now remains only an examination of the details which will permit a decision as to the method.

2. Because the airplanes necessary to neutralize shore-based air throughout the area are not now in sight, an attempt to make simultaneous landings and capture the whole area in a matter of hours probably can't be made. It is considered to be a fine method which was only regretfully given up after most careful consideration.

3. The Adopted Course of Action.

As previously stated we are committed to step by step method. In view of this a general plan for the capture of TULAGI and its occupation to hold that point is to be discussed. After the TULAGI Area is made usable for operations by land-based planes, it is understood that we will proceed with task #2.

AN OUTLINE OF A PLAN FOR THE CAPTURE OF TULAGI

4. (a) In the following, "A" Day is the day that troops will land at TULAGI, now tentatively set as August 1, 1942.

(b) The following are assumed to be completely ready on A-5 Day:
(1) Task Forces 11 and 18 in the NOUMEA Area.
(2) FIRST Marine Division minus the 7th Regiment plus the 2d Regiment (reenforced) in transports within 1200 miles of TULAGI.
(3) 1st Marine Raider Battalion embarked in 6 APD in the NEW HEBRIDES - NEW CALEDONIA area.
(4) 30 VPB tender based in the NEW HEBRIDES - NEW CALEDONIA area prepared to scout the approach to the SOLOMONS.
(5) Australian ground, naval, and air forces ready.
(6) Australian surface ships in the Coral Sea area.
(7) Two defense battalions in the general area.
(8) Three DMS; 1 AH; 1 AT (Salvage) in the NOUMEA Area.
(9) One SS with raiders embarked within 500 miles of TULAGI.
(c) As there are probably not more than 1000 troops at TULAGI it is believed necessary to employ only one Raider Battalion to secure a beachhead and one regiment (2nd) for the landing. No shore bombardment by ships is contemplated. An estimate of the landing operation is appended marked "C".
6. **Broad schedule for the Plan.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Event</th>
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| -5  | (1) Task Forces 11, 18 and troops underway as necessary to reach Lat 18° S, 168° E at 11 hours local -3 Day.  
|     | (2) Search the NW sectors from the POPPY - ROSES bases to discover enemy craft.  
|     | (3) Commence harassing raid on TULAGI with 3 VPB.  
|     | (4) Commence harassing raid on RABAUL and BUKA air-dromes with B-17 or B-24 from MORESBY.  
|     | (5) Southwest Pacific submarines on station in the RABAUL Area.  
|     | (6) Australian surface forces commence operations in the Northeast Coral Sea to locate and destroy inferior enemy forces.  
|     | **NOTE:** This is not considered an essential operation based on present information of enemy forces. This force can be called on as escort of APs thus permitting Task Forces 11 and 18 to cover only.  
|     | (7) Defense battalions embarked.  
| -4  | (1) Continue search and harassing raids.  
|     | (2) Covering and landing forces enroute rendezvous.  

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**IV-3**
Day
-3 (1) Rendezvous just south of EFATE. Lat 18° S, Long 166° E, fueled except DDs. Commence approach.
(2) Continue search and harassing raids.
(3) Submarine raiders destroy seaplanes in TULAGI harbor.

Day
-2 (1) Continue approach. CV task forces in covering position. APs maintain speed of advance 12 kts. APDs speed up to arrive TULAGI just before dawn.
(2) Knock out VB landing fields at RABAUL and BUKA.
(3) Continue search.
(4) Fuel DDs as necessary.

Day
-1 (1) Concentrate heavy air pounding of landing strips knocked out to prevent repairs.
(2) Continue air search.

"A" Day
(1) APDs land raiders just before dawn.
(2) DMS sweep approaches.
(3) CVs continue covering operations and provide VF protection as close to APs as possible.
(4) At about 1000 local commence landing from APs.
(5) Continue search.
"A" Day (Cont'd)

(6) Continue air pounding of landing strips to prevent repairs.

(7) When landing completed APs withdraw.

(8) Move up one AVD to vicinity GUADALCANAL.

Day

A/1 (1) Continue search.

(2) Continue B-17 attack on airdromes.

(3) Land defense battalion.

(4) Commence unloading gear and preparation for building an airfield.

A/5 (1) Relieve landing force with defense battalion.

As soon as possible

(1) Move in Marine air when landing ship is ready.

(2) Relieve Marine defense battalion by Army garrison. Suggest colored troops.

(3) Commence task No. 2.
DISCUSSION OF EACH EVENT

A-5 event (1). It is assumed that the CV task forces will have been in the NOUMEA area for several days. During that time the task force commanders will have had an opportunity to discuss the plan for the capture of TULAGI as adopted by Commander, South Pacific Force. By day A-5 all command preparations will have been completed, including the communication set-up. As the APs have not room enough at NOUMEA they must leave from other bases for rendezvous with CVs. Those not participating in task #1 will remain in port.

A-5 event (2). The primary purpose of the PBY search is to prevent our striking forces from being surprised by an enemy carrier group. We can have available four seaplane tenders - the CURTISS, MACKINAC, McFARLAND and BALLARD. The latter two can only provide search fuel for 12 planes for 2 searches. The MACKINAC can fuel 12 planes for 4 searches. As the search cannot be effective from NOUMEA the tenders must be put in advance positions. Advance positions which seem favorable are at BELEP ISLAND, North NEW CALEDONIA; HAVANNAH HARBOR, EFATE; the Southeast Coast of ESPRITU SANTO; and NDENI. At first, it would seem desirable to use HAVANNAH HARBOR and BELEP. Later NDENI is to be considered. Because of gas limitations of the tenders, some will probably have to be put ashore in drums. Also, crews may have to live ashore. The CURTISS can go to EFATE with safety.
A-5 event (3). It would seem feasible to now commence a daily harrassing of positions in TULAGI area. This also has the definite reconnaissance purpose. Three PBY from HAVANNAH HARBOR are suggested.

A-5 Event (4). The VB at airfields at HABAUL and BUKA are a definite threat to any ships within 600 miles. While present ORANGE strength of long range planes will hardly permit long range search and attack at that radius, the threat is a real one and must be neutralized if possible. It gets worse as the CVs get in closer. The start of this effort would be with about 50 100-lb demolition bombs landed on dispersal areas, shops, hangars, etc., at VUNAKANAU; the same number at LAKUNAI, and about 25 on MALAGUNA. At BUKA about 25 100-lb demolition should be landed on the same type target. Later information may show better targets. Photos would also be taken on these flights. VB from AUSTRALIA, via MORESBY, would be employed and the attacks must be pressed home. In all these attacks the B-17s should bomb from 75 to 100 feet altitude.

A-5 Event (5). It will be assumed that only the S-boats are available. These will be placed - in ST. GEORGES CHANNEL - one boat; the remainder on a line NE of NEW IRELAND between BOANG and PUNA.

A-5 Event (6). The object of this is to elevate operations of like enemy forces. But as noted before, the most profitable employment of these forces is escort of the APs.
A-5 Event (7). As noted before, it is not believed that there is any chance of the Army being ready on the target date to move into the TULAGI area. The landing forces have no weapons for AA defense and are vulnerable to air attack. The defense battalion must provide almost immediate defense of both the seaplane area and the landing field area. A balloon barrage for the latter is provided during the construction stage.

A-4 Event (1). The search and harassing operations continue as before. Weather may reduce this from that herein planned.

A-4 Event (2). The CVs take up covering position as the situation demands. The speed of advance is assumed to be 12 knots for the transports.

A-3 Event (1). The rendezvous just south of EFATE is out of any enemy aircraft range except carrier borne. Fueling can be undertaken if needed with impunity, except that sub attack is always a possibility. This is probably too far from the objective to fuel DDs.

A-3 Event (2). As on previous days.

A-3 Event (3). This is an operation which we have never tried before. The submarine would gradually work its way into the immediate vicinity of the seaplanes moored at TULAGI. During darkness the raiders would get close enough to the seaplanes
in boats and from the deck of the sub to produce a simultaneous large volume of fire on the enemy seaplanes. While the deck gun may also be used, the main reliance would be placed on large volume small caliber fire. The operation requires much study and is only noted here as a reminder. If successful, the approach to TULAGI by the troops may be a complete surprise.

A-2 Event (1). No further remarks.

A-2 Event (2). This operation is of great importance and the success of the venture hinges, to large extent on its effectiveness. Here we must have pilots who will lay 1000-lb bombs right on the runways. 2000-lb bombs are fine for this but the probability of hitting is such that the double number of 1000-lb is best. It will probably do no good to try this from the customary 25,000 feet release point. In Europe it has been shown that 100 foot altitude of release is safer than very high altitude. If this operation is a success, the task is a cinch. If not, we may lose a carrier.

A-2 Events (3) and (4). The search is the same, and DDs are now fueled before being in land-based air bombing range.

A-1 Event (1). The object here is to prevent repair. Every effort must be made to make repeated low level flights over these fields to be sure that they remain out of commission.
...
July 8th

Task Force 11 and 13 are enroute to the South Pacific. Task Force 16 is training off PEARL and preparing to depart about for the South Pacific on the 15th. Task Force 3 continues as noted yesterday. Task Force 17 is training at PEARL.

Preparations have been made to send about 225,000 barrels fuel oil per CV task force per month to NEW CALEDONIA AREA.

TUTUILA air field is not yet ready for Army VB. They desire use of that field in emergency only.

There is considerable malaria at ROSES. Sickness there at this time could have an important bearing on the planned operations.

Vice Admiral Ghormley has returned to PULCRUM from his conference with General McArthur.

The Jap activities at GUADALCANAL continue. On the other end of the line own submarines are very busy. The FINBACK is credited with sinking a DD. In as much as the Japs do not seem to have much strength at KISKA, CINCPAC (pink) was sent to Commander Task Force 3 to urge action there by his surface forces.
July 9.

During a conference conducted by Admiral Nimitz, and attended by the C.G. Hawaiian Department and Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, the proposed tasks in the South and Southwest Pacific were discussed at length. It was decided to immediately send 26 B-17s to the Fantan-Poppy area, the transportation of ground personnel being provided by the Navy.

TF-11 and 18 will cross the equator tomorrow, and when they cross they will report to Commander South Pacific for duty in connection with Task One of the offensive. TF-16 and 17 are training in the Hawaiian area. The latter will be retained in or near Pearl pending developments.

TF-3 in his 100145 (pink) replied to CinCPac 090339 (pink) generally accepting the idea of a bombardment of ships and shore facilities at Kiska. The 4 DMS requested will be sent to him. His PBY patrol will move to Atka to give better search.

The airfield at Roses is now ready for heavy bombers.

The airfield at Johnston is now 3000 ft by 300 feet.

Two subs were sighted, one at 55-20 N, 134-30 W and the other near Pago Pago.

The THRESHER at Wotje believes that she sank 1 AV and 1 AC. Probably while on the bottom she was located by a magnetic sweep, and was grappled for. Depth charges landing close aboard did some damage and she may have to return to Pearl for repair.

There is nothing significant in enemy deployment.

July 10.

Task Forces 11 and 18 reported to Comsopac today for Task One of the offensive in the SW Pacific. TF-16 is out shooting, and will probably go south the 15th. TF-17 is being kept in the Pearl area for eventualities. TF-3 in his 100145 (pink) outlines his plan to bombard Kiska and vicinity with his surface forces. This is in response to a bit of urging by CinCPac (090339 pink).

CinCPac 101959 (pink) directs the transfer of 26 B-17s from Hawaii to the POPPY-FANTAN Area for use in Task One.

Cominch 102100 (2 part pink) gives the views of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the coming offensive, in reply to the estimate of Ghormley and MacArthur. The gist is that we will go right ahead with Task One.
July 10 (Continued).

The S-27 has been destroyed in the Aleutians. Complete destruction was not accomplished.

The ARGONNE left for the South Pacific to act as flagship for Vice Admiral Ghormley during the forthcoming offensive. Some Army personnel, ammunition, and equipment for B-17s in the POPPY-PANTAN Area went forward in the ARGONNE.

Cominch 101250 describes the method of contact reports in joint operations by the officer exercising unity of command.

It is just possible that a CV is operating in the FANTAN-POPPY Area. Enemy land planes there were reported today, but the report is apt to be erroneous. There are initial signs of large enemy operations about to build up in the SW Pacific. These operations can hardly take place for two or three weeks at the earliest.

July 11

Comsopac 112000 (pink) believes that he has enough forces except for interdiction hostile aircraft activities in the RABaul Area. In his 110045 he says that he has insufficient intelligence facilities and must lean heavily on Cincpac and Comsowespac during forthcoming operations.

There is being started a plan to exercise TF1 and 17 together, winding up with a bombardment of the south tip of the Island of HAWAII. Commanders involved will work up a plan for this. The main idea is to boost BB morale.

TF 16 has been training in the Hawaii area for support of amphibious operations.

TF 8 is quiet. Amateur Army radio deception in the Alaskan area recently brought censure from Opnav.

Cincpac 120419 refers the matter of release of Free French radio in the South Pacific to Cominch.

There is great need for tuna type vessels in the entire Pacific. The 14th District has been robbed of four to send south. This situation will not improve until fall. At that time about 50 small ships will be ready.

There is nothing new about the Japs. The SWORDFISH reports that in June the Japs were not engaged in salvage of the PRINCE OF WALES and RENOWN.
Proposed operations of Hawaiian Mobile Air Force of one heavy bombardment group will require augmented air transport facilities. Request one long range transport squadron be assigned Hawaii with C-54 type aircraft or equivalent.
Prospective needs antiaircraft artillery units in South Pacific advanced positions within range enemy shore based air far exceed present available units. Antiaircraft group 4th Defense Battalion is now being divided between ROSES and BUTTON resulting in inadequate protection both places. Present plans provide for dividing antiaircraft groups 3rd and 5th Defense Battalions to provide protection 3 places. This basically unsound and will result in reducing effectiveness of all elements of divided units. Survey of Army antiaircraft units now in South Area shows them inadequate for present bases and therefore not available for relieving Marine AA units at new bases. To provide adequate AA defense at new bases within range enemy shore based air and to provide mobile defense to support further offensive movements of which our attack elements are capable recommend expediting readiness of 10th and 12th Defense Battalions and immediate transfer of 3 Army antiaircraft regiments to South Area.

MARSHALL TO COMGENHAWDEPT

4849-12th Movement directed by Cincpac reurad 1463-11 was authorized by paragraph 3 of Joint Chiefs of Staffs directive July 10 to be passed to you by Nimitx. You were informed in War Department radio 4695 July 4 that replacement group designated as Hawaiian Mobile Air Force was not contemplated. Your request for replacement of units ordered to South Pacific by Cincpac is therefore not considered. Additional LB 30's or B-24's as requested by you for proposed attacks on Berry can not be made available in time. LB 30 with avs equipment now on West Coast enroute to you. Additional planes of this type not immediately available.
15 0237 CINCPAC to PACIFIC FLEET.

Amphibious Force South Pacific hereby established effective zero hours GCT 16 July. Composition Transdivs 8, 10, 1st Mardiv less 7th plus 2nd Regiment. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commands. In addition following units are temporarily assigned duty with Amphibforsopac Transdiv 12 CRESSENT CITY, PRESIDENT HAYES, PRESIDENT ADAMS, PRESIDENT JACKSON, ZEILIN, ALHENA, ALCHIBA, BETELGUESE, 1st Marine Raider Battalion, 5th Marine Defense Battalion, 3rd Marine Barrage Balloon Squadron.

14 1445 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Although not stated in my letter serial 00254 of 3 April Free French have concurred in your designation as CinC Pacific Ocean Area and recognize this as sphere of United States strategic responsibility. Your 120419 DeGaulle being advised that you are proceeding with suppression of civil radio stations.

16 0705 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMGENHAWDEPT.

Refer Urdis 041901. At conference with me today prospective British High Commissioner for Western Pacific who will exercise administrative control of Canton and Christmas agreed to following. Military security is paramount consideration. Close British radio circuits and use facilities under control Cincpac. Our personnel to encode outgoing messages for which British codes and cyphers will be made available to us. Incoming messages will be delivered without decoding.
JULY

17 2209 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info OPNAV, COMAIRSOPAC, COMINCH.

In regard Cominch 1211516 Fox NR 68 Comsopac sends.
Following is summary airmailed via Cinopac aviation strength, facilities and potentialities Auckland Area. Have been advised NZ Government ready and willing to organize train and reequip RNZAF to meet our requirements. Estimate available personnel sufficient to man, operate and maintain 20 combat squadrons during 1943 if required equipment can be made available. Recommend Affirm aviation for LION Base for AUCKLAND Baker sub depot for Army aircraft at NANDI be not delayed Cast If NANDI sub depot is out combine Army facilities with LION at AUCKLAND Dog Equip RNZAF as soon as aircraft available for duty outside NZ area Easy Equip RNZAF Singapore Squadron at SUVA with 9 Catalinas. Existing airfields AUCKLAND Area can accommodate carrier squadrons in addition to existing squadrons as follows: 4 fighter, 4 bomber, 2 torpedo, but no facilities available for additional personnel maintenance or overhaul. Require skilled mechanics machinery and technical personnel. This for info in advance receipt my letter. Further info gives existing organized combat squadrons as 4 Hudson and 2 Vincent general reconnaissance 4 Kittyhawks fighter 2 Vincent and 1 Hind Army cooperative. Of these 1 Hudson and 1 Vincent AC plus 3 Singapore boats in FIJIS. 1 additional Hudson forming for NOUMEA.

17 2247 C.G.: STRAW lto: COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

Radio AUCKLAND to Comsopac NWM info Cinopac. STRAW Force Comdr. My 162038 and antecedents same subject 3 additional messages filed this date. Originator holds 11 1st dated 6 July. This matter becoming quite acute Governor thru nonreply his dispatches suspects same not forwarded and has stated CO STRAWBOARD he intends resign as he obviously is not trusted by American authorities. His messages filed this date probably resignation. Originator should and desires visit STRAWBOARD but waiting solution this matter to avoid embarrassment. Cinopac 160435 noted. Since application provision transfer outgoing to our code involves additional delay suggest not apply this case. If authorized transmit NOUMEA direct in French code can feed gradually beginning with first filed which appears desirable solution. Meanwhile communication to MATTEI from his own superior explaining situation desirable to reestablish cordial relations.
18 0723 CTF 8 to TASKFORCE 8, Info CINCPAC, COMINCH.

Reconnaissance Kiska Harbor today reveals one cruiser 3 DD's 1 large AP 2 4-engined patrol planes, 2 or 3 landing boats. Overcast. Old camp enlarged. New camp south of bay and west of South Head. B-24's made unprofitable attacks on vessels. Opposed by 5 single float planes. Moderate to heavy antiaircraft from north and south head and cruiser at and above twenty thousand feet. Large buildings seen on North Head. Photos obtained. 1 B-17 shot down.

17 2026 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

In connection your 130211 Army antiaircraft cannot be made available from United States in time and suggest antiaircraft regiments at Bora Bora and Tongatabu be used. Army will furnish one replacement antiaircraft regiment as soon as can be assembled in United States and shipping provided. Replacement additional antiaircraft regiments requested probably can not be made due to prior Army commitments. Chief of Staff Army informed.
Munitions assignment board Washington has prepared list of deficiencies of critical items New Zealand ground forces. United States and New Zealand representatives in England are placing this before London munitions board which should take care initial equipment for New Zealand forces. Since it is desirable that requisitions for all items of any category of finished military equipment and munitions be submitted to one place it is recommended that further assignments for New Zealand forces be handled as follows: (a) Initially send to London requisitions for all munitions except for air forces and motor vehicles for ground forces which will be submitted to Washington (b) Munitions for U.S forces will be provided by U.S in normal manner (c) All requisitions to London or Washington to be approved by you or your authorized representatives, and allocations of supplies so furnished to be made by you or above designated subordinates (d) In obtaining concurrence of New Zealand authorities for proposed procedure, inform them that this is method in operations for requisitioning supplies for Australia. Chief of Staff Army informed.
Comtaskfor 8 to Cinpaca, Comincha

JULY GCT

18 1825

Cumulative reports from aircraft over Kiska indicate ships present 1 BB 2 CA 3 DD 1 AO 1 large 2 small AK. Increased antiaircraft plus boldness fighters makes tough opposition. Fighters release apparently harmless balls fire and smoke. Seems certain enemy constructing landing strip approximate location recommended H 0 187. Photos will be forwarded when delivered to originator.

Comalsec to Comincha info Cinpaca

19 0249

From Comtaskforce 8. This is my answer to your 182106 to Comalsec. Contemplated operations in accordance with Cinpaca 090339 is bombardment of Kiska about July 22 by cruisers and destroyers of Taskforce 8. Recommend decision on future operations await the results of present move. Commitment for bases as far west in Aleutians as Tanaga will involve naval support for supply line that will approximate twice the naval strength now stationed in this area plus carrier for continued aerial support.

Comsopac to cg poppy Bobcat straw info Cinpaca

19 0515

The present situation is such that for reasons of military security it has become necessary for radio communications in this area to be placed under my direct control. At zero hours GCT July 21st you will therefore suppress all civil radio stations and exercise censorship over all outgoing civil messages at all Free French Island garrisoned by U S troops. Inform Free French authorities General DeGaulle has recognized entire Pacific Area as sphere of United States strategic responsibility. He has been advised of this suppression of radio. You will transmit French official messages in their codes after encoding by our personnel. It is therefore necessary Free French make their codes available for transmissions. Incoming messages will not be decoded by United States personnel but will be delivered as received. French commercial messages may be handled if deemed expedient in individual cases but they shall only be handled if military load allows. No charges are to be made for any service. Messages now being held may be forwarded to destinations prior to application above policy. Desire the above policy be put into effect in such manner that if possible cooperation of Free French officials and cordial relations with them may be preserved.
COMINCH TO CINCPAC

Instructions are being issued by the War Department to the appropriate Army commanders directing the immediate discontinuance of radio deception and interference by Army radio stations in ALASKA during the continuance of the present status of command in ALASKA, i.e., "FLEET-OPPOSED INVASION". These instructions will permit the use of Army radio facilities in ALASKA for this purpose only upon request of the Naval Officer exercising unity of command in ALASKA.

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC

The procedure relative to the handling of New Zealand military requisitions recommended in Cominch 182026 will require a considerable addition to my Staff and would be a most probable source of friction with the New Zealand authorities where excellent cooperation now exists. This opinion based on unofficial discussions with New Zealand Army and civilian authorities. The situation here is different than in Australia as I am not in command of the land defenses of New Zealand. Reasonableness of requisitions submitted can be judged as well in London or Washington as here unless it is expected I, although not in command, investigate New Zealand defense plans and conditions of New Zealand equipment and supplies. To allocate here supplies furnished on New Zealand requisitions would be an especially excellent source of friction. I have given careful consideration to this subject since my arrival and earnestly recommend that final decision be held in abeyance pending the arrival in Washington of Colonel WESTROOK of the Joint Purchasing Board who has been sent from here to discuss this and in view of the above and other subjects with War and Navy Departments. Pending further instructions from you I am not submitting the proposed plan to the New Zealand authorities.
COMTASKFOR l to CINCPAC info COMAMPHIBFORPAC

It was originally intended to hold bombardment with Amphibious Force at SAN CLEMENTE resulting in exercise in most important phase of fire support and troop landing and better analysis due to accessibility of area. Your 120337 changed site but after conference with Commander Voegeli repeat Voegeli recommend bombardment exercise be shifted to SAN CLEMENTE. Limited ammunition prevents both.

COMALSEC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMNORWESSEAFRON

Summary by ComAlSec for Cominch, Cincpac Commonwesseafron. 2 light cruisers vicinity KISKA Sunday with pair of destroyers patrolling entrance no batteries observed Orient point. Says Wing 4. Monday GILLIS found ADAK untenable and under close observation. Was attacked repeatedly by trio of 4 engine bombers whose work was excellent and patterns good. Undamaged. 2 near misses. Retired towards NAZAN Bay trailed by 4 engined bomber. Entire area well scouted.

COMALSEC to COMINCH, info CINCPAC, CTF 8, ETC.

Based on reasonably complete information on KULUK Bay and meager information on TANAGA recommend former as having definitely better harbor and probably better site for landing field. Cominch 202205. Minimum additional naval support considered necessary 2 carriers 6 CL 12 DD 3 SS and motor torpedo boats plus necessary train and supply. DUTCH pass to ComPatWing 4 who is requested to comment if personnel knowledge these localities available.
21 1531 COMINCH to COMNAVEUROPE Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC.

My 141440 and 181324 Cincpac has directed Comsopac suppress and civil radio stations at discretion and to exercise censorship at all Free French Islands garrisoned by U. S. troops and to directly control Free French Govt stations in NEW CALEDONIA, BORA BORA, and WALLIS. In exercising this control official French radio communications will be transmitted for them in their codes. Outgoing messages will be encoded by our personnel to whom necessary codes must be made available. Incoming messages will be delivered as received without decoding. French commercial traffic will be handled as military load permits. No charge will be made for any service. This is policy which British have agreed to in FIJI, CANTON and CHRISTMAS. It appears to be in accord with DeGaulles wishes as given in your 171418. It is imperative that Dargenlieu be instructed accordingly without delay.

21 1536 COMINCH to Cincpac, Comsopac for Info.

Refer to this as Comnaveu 171418 passed by Cominich to you for info. Urdis 141440 communicated to General De Gaulle who requests further information as to measures already taken or planned for control of radio communications in South Pacific. French National Committee inquire (first) whether their agreement is sought for the closing of civil radio stations (2) What stations are to be closed. No information is available here concerning any commercial radio stations in NEW CALEDONIA or the WALLIS ISLANDS. French state TONGATAH is in British territory. They report existence of two official French Government stations in NOUMEA, one in WALLIS. All were taken over before end of 1940 and have since been operated by militarized personnel. Only messages passed by military censorship are accepted. If Commander in Chief Pacific has closed, or proposes to close, French official stations at NOUMEA the National Committee can not agree. They would consent to closing French station WALLIS. But they insist shutting down French official stations in NEW CALEDONIA is no more necessary or appropriate than closing of British or Dominion official stations in NEW ZEALAND or AUSTRALIA. French Committee willing to accept stricter censorship or direct control of NEW CALEDONIA stations by U. S. Military Authorities. They would wish Admiral Dargenlieu to be consulted. They are requesting additional information from him.
PATCH TO COMSOPAC

Patch to Ghormley following transmitted at request of Admiral Dargenlieu "I thank you for your answer. Here is the telegram of General DeGaulle which he asks me to communicate to you as well as to General Patch "I order you to keep under your control the radio stations of territories placed under your authority. Only an order from me could liberate you from this obligation. Radio stations of Noumea are to be occupied militarily. Conversations are presently taking place between the national committee and the American Government on this subject" consequently the traffic of our stations which have all been militarized and controlled since 8 months will continue until further orders signed Dargenlies" regardless last sentence Dargenlieus dispatch quoted above, all French radio traffic now closed including military. This is temporary solution only. French will not surrender their code without fighting. Unless otherwise directed by you I will impose American censorship over all radio traffic leaving Poppy except French Governmental radios certified by Dargenlieu in writing as such and as containing no information of value to the enemy. I am satisfied this will attain desired censorship. In order to avoid possible open combat with French and to maintain friendly relation, recommend you indicate approval my proposed compromise in your reply to Dargelieu.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC

In view recent commissioning of naval submarine base at Midway, plan establish Midway as naval operating base with senior line officer in command. Comment.

Commandant Marcorsps proposes to establish under Cincpac a command designated Quote Marine Aircraft Wings Pacific Unquote consisting of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing 4th Base Defense Air Wing plus a service group charged with distribution personnel and material. General officer commanding to have headquarters with Cincpac and to be charged with following duties (2) Organization, administration and distribution personnel and supplies within the 3 wings. (b) Recommendations to Cincpac covering plans for employment and distribution of Marine aircraft units Pacific. (c) Command of all marine aviation units above except those assigned specific task organizations. Commanding General 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Commanding General 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing concur. Please comment.
JULY (GCT)

22 0048 COMSOPAC (Via Comairsopac) to PATCH, Info Cominchn,Cincpac.

This is for action Patch from Comsopac. Comairsopac deliver. RDO Washington deliver to Cominchn and Honolulu deliver to Cincpac for info. Your 211140. Situation relative your closing military radios not understood. See last sentence Cincpac 160435. My 190515 authorized you suppress civil radio stations and exercise censorship over all outgoing civil messages. Please explain situation in full. Pending further clarification of situation I approve transmitting Dargenlieus official messages. We must accept such in good faith. It is not intended that Free French official governmental messages over Free French authentic military radios be censored.

21 1450 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMAMPHIBFOR SOPAC.

Plan to send Army antiaircraft regiment Cominchn 182118 directly into objective area upon arrival this area. This regiment could probably arrive in objective area as soon as could units from BOBCAT using shipping which will be available to me. This plan avoids depleting BOBCAT and BLEACHER of any of their present inadequate antiaircraft and avoids confusion and delay incident to the exchange of units at those bases.

22 1856 NAVFOREUROPE to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC.

Urdis 211531 communicated to DeGaulle. In very friendly discussion he expressed full understanding of necessity for unified control of all communications in strategic South Pacific Area and agrees to American control of radio stations accordance system outlined in instructions to Commander South Pacific. General DeGaulles agreement is subject to three conditions. First, he proposes only one modification insisting that messages between him and Dargenlieu shall be known only to them and sent in their personal private code to which no other French Commanders have access. Such messages if handled by American operated stations shall be transmitted without delay. He will approve of any technicalities or operating procedure which guarantees such secrecy between him and Dargenlieu. Second, representatives of French authorities will be designated to participate in censorship of all French messages. Third, General DeGaulle understands that the measures proposed are subject to adjustment if changing conditions warrant. Cominchn agrees to these conditions. DeGaulle is sending instructions to Dargenlieu in accordance foregoing. He expresses hope that U.S. Military authorities in NEW CALEDONIA will reach agreement.
I am informed by Comamphibforsopac that transports under his command are deficient in officer and enlisted personnel. This will be worse after forthcoming operations. Only one set boat crews which will delay unloading. Transport duty involving amphibious operations considered excellent training for young officers. 100 to 150 could be usefully employed and trained in 6 to 9 months. Sopac area is critically short of Naval personnel. I again urge establishment of personnel pool this area to man essential Naval activities and for replacements.

Your 220603 acceptance of strategic direction does not necessarily include obligation of assuming responsibility for provisioning equipping or supplying with arms. Fixed defense of territory wherever located other than territory in which United States bases are established is fundamentally duty of the nation which has sovereignty over such territory. Specifically as regards TAHIITI Free French Forces there have not in so far as known been organized into a task group and made available by Free French to a U.S. Commander for task assignment. United States has not assumed responsibility of provisioning equipping or furnishing with arms of Free French Forces in TAHTITI. Apparently negatized authorities for purposes of their own previously assumed this obligation. Reasons for a change are not apparent. Provisions of lend lease have been extended to Free French. Requisitions have been received for clothing and a small amount of equipment for Free French Forces in TAHTITI. These requisitions have been disapproved on grounds that strongly held U.S. positions cover defense of TAHTITI and adjoining islands, and payments for small amount of clothing and equipment is within means of local Free French Government. If for military reasons you desire a modification on aforesaid policy request your recommendations.

Recommend approval Marcorps proposals 221504 subject following. Propose incorporate Marine Aircraft Wings Pacific in quote Air Pacific Fleet unquote recommended my conf serial 02077 of July 14. General officer commanding Marairwingspac would probably have headquarters this area and deal with Cinopac through type commander air Pacific Fleet.
24 1405 COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOPAC

Your 220603, acceptance of strategic direction does not necessarily include obligation of assuming responsibility for provisioning, equipping or supplying with arms. Fixed defense of territory wherever located other than territory in which United States bases are established is fundamentally duty of the nation which has sovereignty over such territory. Specifically as regards TAHITI Free French forces there have not insofar as known been organized into a Task Group and made available by Free French to a U.S. commander for task assignment. United States has not assumed responsibility of provisioning, equipping or furnishing with arms of Free French forces in TAHITI. Apparently negatized authorities for purposes of their own previously assumed this obligation. Reasons for a change are not apparent. Provisions of Lend-Lease have been extended to Free French. Requisitions have been received for clothing and a small amount of equipment for Free French forces in TAHITI. These requisitions have been disapproved on grounds that strongly held U.S. positions cover defense of TAHITI and adjoining islands, and payments for small amount of clothing and equipment is within means of local Free French Government. If for military reasons you desire a modification on aforesaid policy request your recommendation.

24 1801 COMINCH info CINCPAC

(Is also ComAlSec 212225) Agree absolutely with Foster report and recommendations DUTCH HARBOR. Vice Cnpnav 2nd Endorsement of 1OB of 11 July. Urge immediate action most important points without awaiting letters on details as follows:

(a) Need immediately all or part of fighter squadron for which runways approach suitable.
(b) Require at once 1 additional squadron KINGFISHERS present convoy coverage totally inadequate.
(c) For immediate needs require 2 PC boats for patrol in AKATAN and UNIMAK PASS, 4 YP boats for Harbor Patrol and same number for carrying men and supplies to section bases.
(d) Approval and funds for breakwater between AMAKNAK and HOG Islands.
(e) Expedite Motor Torpedo Boats understood to be enroute.
(f) Provide within 3 months additional SeaBee battalion as most effective means of expediting construction.
(g) Provide as rapidly as possible 1 Lieutenant Commander, 5 Lieutenants, 16 Junior Lieutenants or Ensigns, 4 Supply Officers including 1 Lieutenant Commander or Lieutenant,

(Cont'd on next page)
COMINCH info CINCPAC (Continued)

1 Captain and 2 Lieutenants MarCorps. Enlisted personnel now aboard is barely sufficient for present needs Air Station without provision for Submarine Base or Section Base. For latter need following men by branches: Seamen - 347; Artificer - 107; Engineer - 108; Special - 50; Commissary - 23; Messmen - 20. New allowance Artificer which includes foregoing being requested.

COMINCH to COMALSEC, COMWESTSEAFRONT info CINCPAC, ETC.

From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commanding General, Western Defense Command and ComAlSec. You are directed to make joint investigation as early as practicable of TANAGA and ADAK Islands with a view to establishment of Army Air Station in that area. Investigation will give primary consideration to suitability and strategic location of air field but will give careful consideration to suitability of harbors in regard to protection against hostile attack and weather.

Joint report by despatch is desired. Report should include the major items of equipment not now available in the ALASKAN Area but absolutely required for establishment of proposed base.

Joint issuance of a directive for establishment of base is contemplated after receipt of report. This directive for reconnaissance is issued to ComAlSec in view of temporary absence of ComTaskFor 8. Reeves pass to Buchner. Greenslade pass to DeWitt.

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

Have received War Department letter OPD384SPA (7-77-42) of 10 July instructions for Major General Harmon designated ComGen U.S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area. Harmon has not yet arrived. Paragraph 2(a) of above reference says in part Harmon responsible "training of all US Army ground and air troops within the area". Paragraph 2(b) directs Harmon to make recommendations to the War Department in regard to the defenses of this area which is a responsibility of ComSoPac to CinCPac and by paragraph 10(b) Enclosure (B) to SecNav secret letter (30)A/16-3(28) of 20 April '42 subject United Nations Operations in Pacific Theater, Cominch is executive agent for Joint Chiefs of Staff. See paragraph 5 your letter instructions to me serial 090W of 14 May and your 190839 of May. Harmon's orders from War Department and the above reference regarding training and command Army Air Units this area at variance. In order that I may effectually command the forces assigned to me Unity of Command is necessary and clarification of responsibility for training air units is essential. Advise. ComSoPac sends this.
Partial clarification requested urdis 260248 contained my 230039 which apparently you have not yet received. In order to keep you and me informed official recommendations affecting defenses your area suggest you handle at first meeting with Harmon matter recommendations directed by War Dept. Believe Harmon now at FANTAN.

Pursuant letter of instructions from Commander in Chief dated July 12 I have this date assumed command U.S. Army Forces South Pacific Area except for administration and supply for which responsibility will be assumed later date. Propose to confer with Callahan and McCain Tuesday in SUVA and proceed NOUMEA Wednesday establishing provisional command post that place. Kind personal regards.

Major General Harmon having reported this area as ComGen SoPac is responsible for training all units all Army ground and Air troops SoPac Area. Rear Admiral McCain as Comairsopac is responsible under Comsopac direct direction for operational control all shore and tender based aircraft South Pacific Area and for training and indoctrination Naval Aircraft SoPac Force. All addressees in SoPac Area please acknowledge.

Russia has requested and Opnav concurs in establishment direct radio contact between Russian Navy controlled radio VLADIVOSTOK and Cinpac. Suggest initiate daily schedules between VLADIVOSTOK and Radio HONOLULU at 1300 and 0100 GCT HONOLULU using 7760 and 14920 KC respectively. Messages initially to be in crypto channels held by Taecker in office AmCon VLADIVOSTOK and Alusna MOSCOW (CSP 1405, 1406) use secret or confidential in first portion of text if applicable. Advise
31 0215 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info CGHD.

(Continued)

enforcement South Pacific or even to constitute reasonable defense Hawaiian Area when bulk of striking power of Fleet is South. Request Army send Hawaii minimum of two heavy bombardment groups of 35 planes each at earliest possible date to provide reserve for Sou pac operations which must not fail or reach stalemate stage.

30 2351 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Your 262215 all components of LION except for defense forces desired for SPOONER projects. After approval of shipment of LION 1 assembly of materials will take some time as LION was stripped to form CUBS 1 and 13 and will probably be stripped and other urgent demands until orders for shipment to SPOONER are issued. Combase for CUBS. 231908 indicated that CUB 1 was stripped of barges and lighters so that unloading of CUB 1 materials must be handled by Comamphibsopac equipment. Therefore consider it extremely important that LION materials be authorized for SPOONER at once both to avoid further diversions and to get materials in area where they are needed. Furthermore requests for LION and CUB materials should not be postponed until materials are needed as it requires from 3 to 6 months to secure delivery. CUB 1 was requested by me on 28th on file in Washington and shipment three months later is incomplete in essential items. Request for construction battalions not modified as 1st battalion# was requested with 1st shipment of materials. Furthermore construction detachments in So pac area were too small for the jobs and numbers of efectives have been greatly reduced by exhaustion and malaria.
JULY GCT

29 0800

COMDG ROSES TO COMAIRSOPAC

Bomber landed satisfactorily at BUTTONS. No repeat no marston mat required there. Have directed DALE and SS HOLMES depart BUTTONS for ROSES and will unload all mat here. BUTTONS impracticable as transshipment port.

30 2125

CTF 8 to TF 8 Info Cincpac, etc.

PRESENT OPERATIONS MY OPPLAN NUMBER 8-42 DEFERRED. Resume normal operations pending reorganization of forces and necessary modification of plan.

29 2345

COMSERFORPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSERON 8.

Directive mentioned Opnav 261639 not received. Request reconsideration Opnav 271539 establishing area petroleum officers as refers to Hawaiian Area and South Pacific for following reasons: (a) Highly satisfactory operation of existing arrangements with Army for joint needs in Hawaiian Area. (b) Unified control for supply of South Pacific Bases was established by Opnav secret serial 053812 of 15 July. Believe provisions Opnav despatch 261639 and 271539 should apply only to such areas as Australia and possibly New Zealand where several sources of supply must be reconciled with demands and available storage facilities.

31 0113

CINCPAC to OPNAV, Info COMSOWESPAC, etc.

Request reconsideration in effectuating your 271539. Needs Hawaiian Area now served by arrangement satisfactory to both services. Supply of South Pacific Island Bases already covered by Opnav Secret Serial 053812 of 15 July which places sole responsibility on Navy. Believe provisions urdis 261639 particularly applicable Australia and possibly New Zealand but prefer delay in establishing area petroleum officer latter place until further study made of necessity therefor.

31 0215

CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info CGHD.

Myser 0164L urser 00675. Numbers Army aircraft Pacific Ocean Area such that there is no reserve for situation expected to exist after completion of Task One in South Pacific. Available bombers at Oahu too low in numbers and shy sufficient trained flight crews to be considered as reservoir for re-
01 0233 CINCPAC TO COMINCH INFO COMSUBPAC, SOMSWPAC, ETC.

Your 291315. Pending outcome of operations now started by Ghormley no change is recommended in present plan to operate twenty fleet submarines from West Australia. Developments may require consideration of an advance base in Rabaul area.

Because of repair facilities Pearl now best suited main submarine base for entire Pacific with advance positions as situation demands.

More submarine hours in major focal points of Jap communications can be achieved from Pearl using Midway than from Southwestern Australia.

02 0141 CINCPAC TO VICE OPNAV INFO COMSOPAC, COM-12, ETC.

Until later advised request no definite arrangements be made load and ship Lion 1 and Cubs 2 and 3. This in reference my 220349 your 251953 and Com-12 280632. Cub 13 not involved this recommendation and should go forward as planned.
This is novel. Primary objective raided result. Radio station, Avgas, 1 single float seaplane and 1 four engined VP destroyed. Submarine indirect gunfire sunk 3500 ton AP and 1 FG and damaged enemy reserve area on shore. Heavy enemy air action encountered during daylight which attacked Jap troops and installations almost exclusively including secondary objective which we did not raid. Jap dead known 83, prisoners none. Own dead 1st Lieut. G. P. Holton, 13 men. Wounded 2 officers 16 men. Missing approximately 20 men. Cleared area 2400 18th local date.
COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, & Info Commands Concerned.

Following is summary of battle damage vessels Taskfor 44.

A - General Description. B - Temporary repairs made. C - Proposed final repairs. Para. MUGFORD (A) 100 pound bomb hits high order detonation on impact top after deckhouse frame 145-6 number 3 gun shelter and surrounding structure wrecked. Structural strength not impaired. Number 3 5" gun jammed both train elevation completely useless all hydraulic motors piping beyond repair FC instruments circuits demolished. All other armament undamaged. Capable making full power 20% fuel tank capacity contaminated. Longest leg 3500 miles at 15 knots steering engine gear operable. (B) Damaged gun and mount replaced by similar good gun removed from RALPH TALBOT and secured for sea. All holes weather deck blanked. (C) Recommend despatch in company CHICAGO STUART to Sydney for complete reconditioning. Para. RALPH TALBOT (A) Shell hit starboard shear frame 142 shell hit forecastle deck junction deckhouse side frame 54 starboard direct shell hit each number 4 5" gun slide and 1 torpedo tube mount shell hit after bulkhead quarter-mast storeroom superdeck frame 68 gun 4 completely out guns 1, 2, 3 no automatic elevation train order torpedo tube mounts 1 3 jettisoned correct list. All FC and IC out of commission also both Radars and starboard torp director. Diesel generator completely submerged power cables outside machinery spaces cut deagingussing cables submerged and damaged no sound gear or fathometer no power to bridge chart house gutted by fire. Capable making full power longest leg 4,000 miles at 15 knots steering engine gear Okay emergency radio working can drop depth charges. (B) All holes side and deck patched number 3 5" gun and mount exchanged for 1 removed MUGFORD. (C) Recommend despatch to PEARL or West Coast via PEARL in company for complete reconditioning. Para. CHICAGO (A) Torpedo hit on stem which sheared extensive structural damage forward shell. Compartments A 50402 and all forward flooded to water line. Keel deflected down from about frame 10 forward maximum 3 feet 9 inches below base line. Chain locker wrecked anchor windlass is out of line. Forecastle deck knuckled 2 cross lines forward windlass. Speed reduced to 12 knots on arrival. Gasoline can not be removed from starboard gasoline tank due broken stem cut out valve 4,000 gallons. All damage forward frame 15. (B) A 402 dewatered slow leak repairs bulkhead 10 showed between 2nd deck and 2nd platform both chain cables removed 1 bow anchor rigged over stern with wire cable for emergency use. Structural breakwater installed forward

(Continued on next page)
of chain pipes to protect bulkhead 10 all loose shell removed. (C) Recommend despatch to Sydney in company MUGFORD, STUART to drydock with view determine whether practicable rebuild bow sent port or install temporary bow prior departure Pearl. Projection keel below base line has not been removed. Vessel capable making maximum 14 knots smooth sea. PATTERSON damage minor all urgent work completed and vessel returned active duty. All above discussed with Comtaskfor 42 who concurs. MUGFORD, RALPH TALBOT now ready proceed. CHICAGO ready August 22 local.
July 12th.

The FULTON arrived at MIDWAY to tend submarines operating in Japanese waters. The present plan calls for the subs to go to PEARL every other war patrol.

CinCpac 130211 requests considerably more antiaircraft protection for own Pacific bases.

The principle developments of the day have to do with ComSoPac preparations for the forthcoming offensive. In his 130414 (Pink) he is concerned with Garrison troops and suggests that NEW ZEALAND be prodded to provide the TULAGI AREA requirements in part. His 120835 concerns command arrangements. He desires the ARGONNE to go to FULCRUM, and pick up his staff, then to NAUMEA. It would possibly be simpler and quicker for the ARGONNE to go to NAUMEA and report as Admiral Ghormley's flagship. This way his staff would have time to meet her before the active operations commence. Such a course will be suggested to him by CinCpac. His 120332 (Pink) concerns with AVGAS in drums for advance operations. Plenty of this will be available to him, but distribution may be a problem.

The delicate question of Free French Radio came up again in General Patch's 130621 (Pink). The general problem has already been presented to Admiral King so this message was sent along, emphasizing the need for naval control of Free French and other foreign radio stations in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

Comairsopac 130021 gives distribution of the four army B-17 squadrons as 1 to FULCRUM, 2 to POPPY, and 1 to ROSES and hints at more advance positions when facilities are ready.

In his 130035 General Marshall tells General Emmons that no plane replacement for the 35 sent south will be considered. This probably not the final word, and planes may be expected if a good need can be shown.

Task Force 8 remains quiet pending the arrival of 4 DMs which will permit active operations at KISKA and ATTU.

The reinforcements of air and troops continue in the RABAUL AREA. A good sized project for a landing field at GUADALCANAL SEEMS well underway.
July 13.

The WASP has developed engine trouble and her speed is reduced to 15 knots. Her Task Force commander plans to send her to BLEACHER for repairs which are estimated to take 4 days. It may be necessary to relieve Task Force 18 with Task Force 17. The latter force is preparing to operate with Task Force 1. There is nothing new from Task Force 8.

Plans are underway to turn the search operations from OAHU over to the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier.

General Emmons in his 1439/12 has requested one long range transport squadron for use by the Mobile Air Force.

Cominch received a letter originating by the Army which indicates that there are good air base sites on ESPIRITU SANTO. We also got that information from ComAirSoPac several days ago. It is hoped to have an airfield in operation on that island by July 28th.

There continue to be reports of occasional enemy cruisers, destroyers and MARUs in and near KISKA. The Army bombed a cruiser there yesterday but did not observe results.

The 8th Fleet and 8th Base Force have been set up to operate primarily in the RABUAL area. Enemy reinforcements there continue.

July 14.

TF 11 and 18 are in the South Pacific. Comsopac will make modifications in their rendezvous, the change being necessary due to a casualty to the WASP. TF16 will depart for the South Pacific tomorrow to support the Task One. TF 17 remains ready for any duty in the Pearl area. TF1 continues training on the Coast. It is now expected that the TENNESSEE can be made available for about six months modernization commencing Sept. 1st. TF 8 continues quiet.

Cincpac 150237 establishes the SoPac Amphibious Force.

Cominch 142226 (pink) states that no troops from the US will be sent to garrison the TULAGI area. Also that NZ authorities may be approached on the question of the use of their troops in the TULAGI area provided this does not reopen the FIJI question.

The question of the French and British radio stations in the Pacific theatre is still up in the air. See Cominch 14445. Cincpac desires that we take over their codes and code their messages for transmission over our systems. Such a proposition is
July 14. (Continued)

being sent to Cominch for approval.

The McFARLAND probably sank a Jap sub just south of NOUMEA.

No important enemy changes are recorded for today.

July 15th.

Task Force 16 departed for the South Pacific to be under Vice Admiral Ghormley for Task One of the offensive, thus being in addition to TF 11 and 18. Task Force 17 continues and is training at PEARL.

T.F. 3 activities are limited to search and to air and submarine attacks in the ALEUTIANS. Admiral Theobald is waiting for DMS before making an attack with surface vessels on KISKA.

Due to delays ComSoPac reports that he has moved the target date for the offensive along to August 7, 1942. His 160612 (Pink).

CinCPac 160705 gives instructions for operation of foreign radio stations in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

The TAFUNA airport, TUTUILA, will be ready August 1st.

It seems indicated that Jap subs may have received orders to take offensive action rather than just observe. The movement of several combatant units from the ALEUTIANS is underway, and several Jap freighters are enroute to that area.

The Japs are evidently quite busy strengthening their SOLOMON ISLAND positions. Work is underway on the airfield at GUADALCANAL, as noted before. Also, there is some sort of a landing on SANTA ISABEL ISLAND.

July 16th.

In his 170602 pink ComSoPac briefs his operation order for Task ONE.

Task Force 18 will be in BLEACHER tomorrow and soon thereafter we should know the status of the WASP. Task Force 11 is east of SUVA enroute to the NEW CALEDONIA - NEW HEBRIDES area. There is nothing new from Task Force 8. Task Forces 1 and 17 are preparing for a joint exercise.

Major General Beightler will take command at FIJI on 18 July.
July 16th (Continued)

There is some doubt as to the location of Jap CVs that were thought to be in the vicinity of the KURILES. None are indicated south of the equator, but the JUNYO may be transporting planes to the MARSHALLS.

It is indicated that there is considerable shortage of Jap shipping bottoms in the INDO CHINA area.

July 17th

During his informal morning conference Admiral Nimitz remarked on the possibility of the Japs making an attack on MIDWAY or JOHNSTON or CANTON while we have our main carrier strength in the South Pacific. That they might go further in their North Pacific campaign was considered possible but not so probable as the Central Pacific Area. With the sending of 35 B-17s south, our shortage of shore based air in the Hawaiian area becomes acute. In short, we are most vulnerable now with three fourths of our strength in the South. What we need, of course, is more carriers and attendant flotilla. Six CV striking groups could well be employed. Except for the RANGER (which is not too good) no additional CVs seem possible before next spring. Of course, the Japs may have no stomach for bringing CVs within our shore based air range. These generalities indicate grave concern caused by present shortages in the Hawaiian area.

TF 17 was placed on 24 hours notice. If the WASP can be repaired at BLEACHER in the next six or eight days (the ship gave a preliminary estimate of 4 days) it will not be necessary to relieve TF 18 immediately.

In his 180035 (pink) Comsopac changed the date for the raider battalion readiness from July 20 to July 23. In his 172209 he indicates that pilots for 20 squadrons RNZAF can be ready in the spring if we supply everything to them except their pay.

C.G. STRAW 172247 complains of the Free French radio set up at STRAWBOARD.

Cominch has established a new set up for Patrons. To relieve the squadron personnel of administration and maintenance geographical wing commands are set up and patrons are no longer assigned to any particular wing.

CTF 8 180723 gives his report on KISKA. One cruiser, 3 DD, 1 AP and planes are reported in that harbor. A Russian
July 17th (Continued)

ship was shelled by a Jap submarine SE of DUTCH HARBOR. The S.S. ARGATA was sunk by a sub in that general vicinity on the 15th.

The WASHINGTON and about 3 DD will leave the Atlantic for the Pacific Fleet late in August.

Cominch 172026 indicates that little AA for South Pacific bases can be expected from Army sources.

B-17s are leaving from HAWAII at the rate of one squadron a day for SoPac. Four squadrons are to leave.

There is nothing new of enemy deployments.

July 18.

TF-8 in his 181825 reports sighting 1 BB, 2 CA, 3 DD, 1 AO, 3 AK in Kiska harbor. Believe that the BB report is in error. In his 190249 he expects to shell Kiska about the 22nd. He also mentions the need of more forces to protect shipping from subs (which have been active the past week southeast of Dutch Harbor). Cominch 182106 (pink) requests comment on an army proposal for an airfield at TANAGA Island. CTF-8 sees logistic difficulties in such a plan which would require substantial addition to his force including a carrier.

TF-18 arrived in Bleacher yesterday in a gale. Admiral Noyes reports that the repairs to the starboard HP turbine of the WASP are almost completed.

Comsopac 190515 implements Cincpac instructions regarding foreign radio stations in his area. If commercial traffic cannot be handled over navy circuits consideration can be given to reopening commercial stations under military control.

Cominch 180226 deals with supply of munitions to New Zealand forces.

There is little new of the enemy. Again Admiral Nimitz tried to deduce enemy intentions. He feels that it is of greatest importance to push the work of the landing mat on Sand Island Midway so that that place can be made stronger. It is at Midway where the Japs can do the most damage to our Pacific war effort now. Also, the need for RDF coverage in the South Pacific was discussed.

The Japs are going right ahead with their project of strengthening positions in the SOLOMONS.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Supply of reinforcements to continue campaign in South Pacific.

1. Requests made by the Commander South Pacific Force for additional troops and by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department for additional aircraft to be used in prosecuting Task One in the campaign in the South Pacific have not been approved by the Navy and War Departments.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, believes that the forces being made available to the Commander South Pacific Force are sufficient in strength to permit Task One of the campaign to be undertaken with reasonable expectations for its successful accomplishment.

3. The military situation which will exist after the successful accomplishment of Task One of this campaign will, however, be radically different from the one that has existed in the Pacific since the fall of the Netherlands East Indies into Japanese hands.

4. Our forces, both land and air, will be in potentially close fighting contact with the enemy. The enemy will probably be in a position to move amphibious forces under cover of his shore-based aircraft for the recovery of the positions taken from him by our first step. The situation which has existed at Port Moresby is not analogous, because of the protection afforded Moresby by the mountain range beyond it and by its nearness to Australia.

5. It is unsafe to assume that the enemy will not exert every effort to recover the positions we may take from him. This will result in losses to us of troops and aircraft and probably of supporting ships. Unless these losses of troops and aircraft are made good by a steady flow of replacements from the
Subject: Supply of reinforcements to continue campaign in South Pacific.

United States, not only will we be unable to proceed with Tasks Two and Three of this campaign, but we may be unable even to hold what we have taken.

6. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that, if not already done, immediate steps be taken to provide an adequate flow of troops and aircraft to the South Pacific area. This flow may be expected to be necessary indefinitely while seizure and consolidation of new positions are being undertaken.

7. Transmission of this document via U.S. registered air mail is authorized.

C. W. NIMITZ

Copy to:
C.G. HawDept.
ComSoPac.
ComAirSoPac.
July 19.

Admiral Nimitz left Pearl to inspect JOHNSTON Island and will return on the 20th.

Task Force 18 at BLEACHER is riding out a storm which caused only minor damage. The WASP seems o.k. and will have a full power trial at the earliest opportunity.

Task Force 8 is preparing for the bombardment of KISKA about the 22d. The GRUNION operating off KISKA reports sinking 3 DD there on the 15th. Also affecting the ALASKAN situation is Cominch 191751 which will stop Army attempts at radio deception and jamming.

ComSoPac 200715 gives his recommendations regarding procedure in handling munitions for New Zealand.

Commander Amphibious Force South Pacific 200130 pink blocks out the forces he expects to use in Task One.

ComSoPac 200100 pink gives objections to taking AA away from BOBCAT and BLEACHER. References (pink) are attached.

ComSoWesPac 191034 pink gives a suggested plan for air operations from MORESBY and AUSTRALIA during the forthcoming offensive.

The recent formation of the 8th Fleet in the RABAUL area can be taken to indicate that the Japs intend to make the SOLOMONS - NEW GUINEA area much stronger. It is now a race to see whether or not we can kick them out in time, and with present forces.

The ZUIKAKU seems headed for SINGAPORE, possible for docking, but also possibly indicating a resumption of the offensive in the South Pacific.

July 20

The task forces in the South Pacific are proceeding to rendezvous for the coming offensive. TF 13 is in BLEACHER.

Admiral Nimitz returned from his inspection of JOHNSON ISLAND.

CTF 8 is presumably enroute to his bombardment of KISKA, in the INDIANAPOLIS. ComAlaskan Sector 210721 gives a summary of the situation. Also his 211019 regarding advance air sites in the ALUTAN he visualizes the necessity for the employment of two carriers plus attendant flotilla,
July 20 Cont'd.

CTF 1, 202215 gives his plan for a practice bombardment. He will eventually exercise off Hawaii with TF 17, - unless other needs for those forces appear.

The Admiral again emphasized the need for making MIDWAY strong as soon as possible. He views another attack in force there as decidedly possible. He also believes that B-17's can be usefully employed against the enemy's motored seaplanes who are now operating to the eastward of KISKA.

A trip for the BOISE to raid the Jap patrol line about 800 miles east of HONSHU will be coordinated with a bombing of WAKE, - as a diversion just before "D" day in the TULAGI AREA.

The Japs continue to reinforce their positions in the South West Pacific and seem to be making good progress on the landing strip at GUADALCANAL.
JULY 21.

The WASP made a successful full power trial and now TF-18 is ready to proceed westward. Comsopac is arranging conferences with representatives of the various task force and group commanders regarding both the training operation and the actual operation.

CTF-1 plan for an exercise with TF-17 in the Hawaiian Area has been approved. TF-1 will leave the coast August 1st.

TF-8 continues silent as expected while approaching Kiska.

Cominch 211531 approves inferentially CinCPac action on Free French radio. His 211536 goes further into detail. Comsopac 220048 says that the Free French military radio stations will not be censored. Thus, the matter is not yet entirely cleared up.

The 3rd defense battalion and army ground crews and gear (for the B-17s being sent south) left Pearl today.

Comsopac 211450 is planning on using the Army AA regiment coming from the West Coast in forward positions as soon as they arrive. Apparently, he will not move up any AA units from Bobcat and Bleacher.

Admiral Nimitz desires that the Army use B-17s freely when opposed by zero fighters. None were damaged in 13 contacts at Midway while 10 Zeros were shot down and 2 damaged. This is fine indication of the capability of the B-17s. They probably can be used to shoot up the Jap 4-engine seaplanes in the Aleutians.

Except for the intensified reinforcements and replacements of Japs in the SW Pacific, no significant enemy moves were noted. Subs near Oahu are possible. Reconnaissance of Howland and Baker today was negative.

The British system of assessing damage to enemy subs will be used by U.S. Navy.
July 22.

Task Forces 16 and 18 are in vicinity BLEACHER and will rendezvous with Task Force 11 south of FIJI on the 25th. Task Forces 1, 3 and 17 continue training.

Task Force 8 was supposed to bombard KISKA today but no direct report of what happened there has been received. There was a dense fog in the morning at KISKA which cleared somewhat towards evening.

General Patch's 211140 tells of more Free French radio trouble. Apparently the French will not make their codes available to us for censorship purposes.

Comin ch 221503 proposes setting up a Naval Operating Base at MIDWAY; and his 221504 proposes to set up a Marine Aircraft Wing under CinCPac.

The Japs are again trying to set up commercial relations with Chile and Argentina. They have had some small success running the blockade to France and are willing to try it in the Southeast Pacific. Yesterday they landed in small force at BUNA and GONA, New Guinea. This is only considered further consolidation of their position in the Southwest Pacific.

Our offensive in the TULAGI area is still in the planning stage. The present target date is August 7. Rehearsals start at KORO Island, Fiji, July 28th. CinCPac has given ComSoPac authority to redistribute troops at SoPac bases. Probably some units will be moved up from the more distant bases to seized positions.

July 23.

There is no change in any of our own Task Forces. Apparently Task Force 8 is operating in poor visibility in the vicinity of KISKA waiting for an opportunity to shoot up the place.

Preparations for the TULAGI operation continue. There is a possibility that the landing strip at ESPIRITU SANTO will be ready for bombers August 5th.

Commander Naval Forces EUROPE 221856 gives General DeGaulle's agreement to our censorship of Free French radio. A prime consideration is that DeGaulle insists that he be able to communicate privately with Admiral d'Argenlieu.

The airfield at FALEOLO, Samoa, is now ready for VF.
July 23 (Continued)

ComSoPac 232315 points out the need for more officers and men in transports. And he again renews his request for a personnel pool in order to quickly fill vacancies.

The Jap landing at GONA is not on a very large scale. Possibly 1000 troops were landed. That number is wholly inadequate to go overland for an attack on MORESBY.

In the ALEUTIANS the Japs are gradually strengthening their positions but show no desire to go further East.

Major General Harmon, U.S.A., who is to be the Senior Army man in the South Pacific, passed through Pearl today.

July 24.

The CV task forces in the South Pacific are heading for a rendezvous south of Fiji. TF-17 continues training and standing by at Pearl. TF-8 main body has encountered heavy fog and has moved along his bombardment day to the 27th when he hopes for clear weather. Admiral Nimitz directed that 4 MTBs be sent from here for such use as may be possible in the Aleutians.

Cominch 241405 states that CinCPac does not have the responsibility for clothing and supplying munitions to Free French Forces in the South Pacific.

Also in the South Pacific the censorship problem regarding Free French radio has apparently been settled to the satisfaction of all hands along the lines ordered by Cominch, and previously noted.

CinCPac 250309 recommends approval of the formation of Marine Air Wings in the Pacific.

The problem of supply of Canton came up in the Admiral’s informal conference. The Admiral desires to use Midway as a yard stick for channel depths. Also, concern was expressed over what Jap CVs are likely to do in the next three or four weeks. It seems improbable that they will be used against Vladivostok.

The Dutch ship TJINEGARA was torpedoed south of Poppy. There have been other enemy sub activities in the South Pacific during the past 10 days but their subs are generally ineffective.

There is nothing significant in Jap deployment today.
July 25.

Task Forces in the South Pacific are preparing for the coming offensive. A rehearsal in the FIJI area is scheduled for the 28th. Task Force 8 is still in a dense fog which Admiral Theobald thinks may clear sufficiently for him to bombard KISKA on the 27th.

CominCh 252000 directs Army and Navy in ALASKA to investigate and report on the establishment of an airfield at TANAGA or ADAK. The latter, at Andrew Lagoon, seems preferable. Also in his 241801 CominCh agrees with the Foster report (Secret file May 1942) regarding deficiencies at DUTCH HARBOR and indicates immediate steps to correct most important deficiencies.

CominCh 241405 tells of the supply problem at TAHITI. In general, CinCPac has very limited responsibility.

ComSoPac 260248 comments on General Harmon's duties in connection with training of Army Air and Defense dispositions. CinCPac despatch of yesterday, 262127, answered this.

The FLYING FISH returning from patrol off HONSHU reported sinking 1 DD, MINIKAZE class, and hitting 1 5,000 ton tanker with 2 torpedoes.

There is nothing new of enemy deployment.

July 26.

There has been no change in the employment of own task forces. TF 11, 16, & 18 are in the South Pacific to support the TULAGI operation. TF 17 remains ready at PEARL. TF 8 is waiting for good weather, expected tomorrow, to bombard KISKA.

Comgensopac 261201. General Harmon took over command; and Comsopac 270510 relieves Admiral McCain of Army air training and puts this under General Harmon.

The Russians seem to need our help. Opnav 251728 indicates closer trade relations. The press reports of the Russian-German war indicate that the German all out drive between MOSCOW and the Black Sea is meeting with very considerable success. The outcome of that campaign is bound to have profound effect on the War.

Admiral Ghormley wants a "LION" moved to FULCRUM. As the ultimate destination is not yet determined, and cannot be until
July 26. (Continued)

the conclusion of the current offensive, Cincpac is not yet ready to permit its movement to the South Pacific for storage.

Vice Admiral Halsey cannot return here before the middle of September. Thus the Admiral will recommend Rear Admiral Fitch be promoted to Vice Admiral and ordered as ComCarPac - eventually "Air Pacific". Murray will relieve Fitch as CTF 17.

The CUTTLEFISH made contact with an enemy submarine off LAYSAN Island. The SILVERSIDES reported the Jap sampan patrol at 500 miles east of Japan in Lat. 33-30 N.

There were no significant moves of the enemy reported.

During the month Admiral Nimitz has continued his conferences with General Emmons to ensure close cooperation between the Army and Navy. At these conferences there were also present usually the Army Chief of Staff and the Senior Army Air Commander and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Conferences held this month were on July 9, 13, 18 and 23. At the last conference General Harmon, who was passing through HONOLULU enroute to assume command of Army forces in the South Pacific, was also present.

July 27.

Task forces are employed as shown yesterday. TF 8 still has not good enough weather for the planned bombardment. The clearing weather predicted only produced a 2 mile visibility.

The BOISE departed to raid the enemy sampan patrol line reported 500 to 800 miles east of HONSHU, in order to create the impression that a striking force is enroute JAPAN. This diversion effort is set for August 4, PEARL date.

There are now at least two enemy subs thought approaching OAHU. These could be the harbingers of another raid on PEARL, but are probably only on routine reconnaissance. In any event, Admiral Nimitz feels that another raid in force is possible and urges the early completion of the landing strip at SAND ISLAND, MIDWAY, and the VF staging field at TERN Island, French Frigate Shoals.

As the Japs have mentioned some move to take place on "Y Day" and stated that this is July 29th, Vice Admiral Ghormley suggests omitting the rehearsals for Task One in his 272211 (pink).
July 27. (Continued)

General Meade, who was recently in command of NZ troops at FIJI, has evidently been lost in a plane about 10 miles from TONGA.

There has been a carrier reorganization by the enemy. It is now indicated that the CVs are completing training in Empire waters. The Japs continue to consolidate their positions in eastern NEW GUINEA and are apparently constructing two airplane fields on the North coast of GUADALCANAL.

July 28.

No definite word has been received from Admiral Ghormley regarding anticipating his target date of August 7 for Task One. Bearing on this, however, is ComAirSoPac 231440 pink and 29004L. In a despatch from ComGen ROSES 290800, the field at BUTTON is now ready so ComSoPac may decide to bomb TULAGI and GUADALCANAL on the 31st. Cominch 281830 pink states that the target date must not be delayed beyond August 7 and should be anticipated.

There is no further word of the bombardment of KISKA. Evidently the weather is not good enough to execute Admiral Theobald's plan. Planes observed a cruiser there and bombed shore activities today.

JOHNSTON Island is now considered satisfactory for B-17s, while WALLIS will be ready for the smaller types aircraft on August 15th.

There is now good evidence that Jap cruisers have Radar. The Japs are going right ahead with the strengthening of their positions in GUADALCANAL and Eastern NEW GUINEA. In the latter place they are penetrating inland. At GUADALCANAL three air fields are now reported under construction.

There is no news of changes in the deployment of major Japanese units.
AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS
MONTH OF AUGUST - 1942.

1. Preliminary

This is not a formal Estimate of the Situation in that much data usually included in the establishment of the basis for solution of a problem is omitted. Also, own Courses of Action and the Decision (Leading to planned action) is beyond the scope of this paper. What is sought here is a complete examination of Enemy Capabilities as far as the Pacific Theatre is concerned.

2. The Situation

(a) Enemy. As a result of the Coral Sea action and the Battle of Midway, Japan lost five carriers and had one damaged. They also had losses involving cruisers and destroyers. Some damage was inflicted on other units, including at least one battleship.

Shortly after the Battle of Midway, the Japanese carrier strength concentrated in Empire Waters, the last units coming from the Aleutians about the middle of July. During the latter part of July it is estimated that the carriers were reorganized and refitted. On August 1st it is believed that six CV and two XCV are available for employment. It is not to be expected that these carriers are as well trained or equipped as those encountered at Midway, nor can their screen be as complete. However, as there is danger in underestimating their present capabilities, it will be assumed hereinafter that they are all respects ready for any task.

There has been no recent change in Japan's battleship strength which effects this study. Ten battleships are available.

While little information is at hand regarding Japanese amphibious troops, large numbers who are well trained and equipped are believed available. It is known that Japan's shipping is already overtaxed and probably unable to undertake an additional major transportation and logistic problem.
(b) Own. Because of the employment of three carrier task forces in the South Pacific only one carrier task force is available on August 1st in the Central Pacific. Concentration of our carriers at Pearl from the South Pacific would take about twelve days. To move them to the Aleutains would involve about eight days more. Thus, to meet an advance of an enemy raiding or occupation force in the Central Pacific we would require over two weeks notice; and the North Pacific over three weeks notice.

Our battleship strength in the Pacific is still inferior to the enemy. TF-1 will operate near Hawaiian Area during part of August, but is not ready for battle because of lack of adequate screen and air coverage.

Air strength in the Hawaiian Area is inadequate to repel a determined raid. Midway is being strengthened by the addition of a landing strip on Sand Island. When that strip is completed, the entire present heavy bombing strength in the islands can operate from Midway. At present fighters can be brought into Midway by ship. The fighter staging project to Midway via French Frigate Shoals will not be completed before October.

A cruiser task force plus fairly good air strength is operating in the Aleutains. So far it has been ineffective, mainly because of bad weather and lack of air coverage in advance areas. The effort there is limited to attrition, using submarines and long range bombing. Effectiveness of long range bombardment of Japanese held positions in Kiska and Attu has not yet been demonstrated.

Our submarine offensive in Jap waters is now at low ebb because of the employment of submarines at Truk and in the Aleutians. This condition will continue during August.

3. Background.

(a) Merely as a reminder, certain points of Japanese ambitions and trends are set down in the briefest sort of a way. As far back as the early nineties the Japs were not satisfied with their lot and determined to do something about it. To raise living standards and to care for their population pressure, they decided (1) to become an industrial nation, and (2) expand. For the first they needed ready access to raw materials. For the second they needed land suitable to Japanese. Their progress in attaining these goals have been steady, if
slow; but they have consistently stuck to the main ideas. Now
that they have overrun the vast stretches of Malaysia need only
to consolidate their gains to accomplish hegemony in the Orient.
This being the case, it would seem reasonable that their one
and only desire at present is to prevent outside interference
until their exploitation of captured regions has made them im-
pregnable in what they call their sphere of influence. Their
attack on Pearl Harbor is further evidence that they desire
above all to prevent our interference with Asiatic operations.
The targets picked indicated only a desire to immobilize our
Fleet.

(b) With the above in mind it seems logical to
consider Japanese courses of action as limited for the present
to making secure their extensive gains, rather than considering
possible expansion not closely related thereto.

4. Threats to Japan.

Interference with Japanese plans can come from
the following:

(1) China. The Sino-Jap war has been dragging along
since 1937. While Japan dominates the richest part of China,
there is no proof yet that this military gesture has paid
commercial dividends. However, they cannot afford to lose
that war and might be well satisfied with a strong and con-
trolled puppet government and existing boundaries. As long
as the China venture continues Japan must continue to pour
in men and materials which they would probably rather use
elsewhere.

(2) England. (including India.) Today England
is only a minor threat mainly because of her preoccupation
with Germany. Her Far Eastern Fleet is not now able to penen-
trate the Malay barrier. Nor can her Fleet be of much use
in the Bay of Bengal. Burma is sufficiently occupied by Japan
to prevent an overland threat to the Indo-China rice. India is
hardly pro-British. While British sea power is always a danger
to Japan, there is nothing to indicate even a mild threat to
Japan during August.

(3) Australia. At present Australia cannot take
the offensive. Thanks to the United States there is the
definite probability that Australia will become the jump off
point for an offensive destined to defeat Japan. To make this
possible the supply lines to Australia must be kept open to the
United Nations. Of immediate interest is the Australian air activity
in the SW Pacific. This is, so far, decidedly of minor proportions
but enough to cause Japan some trouble and delay in consolidating
her positions in the New Guinea, New Britain-Solomon Area.
(4) United States. Lacking troops and bottoms for an offensive thru the Mandates (even if we had the required types combatant available) there is little we can do now except in the South Pacific. Of course, Japan may not know this. She knows that we have an enormous building program, and that potentially (and eventually) we can muster the requisite strength to move thru the Central Pacific and gradually gain and maintain control of the sea areas vital to Japan. Her idea may be that before we are ready for such a move, Japan will be strong enough so that the game will not be worth the candle. In the meantime our greatest threat is the supplies, equipment, and men we are sending to the Southwest. Except for submarines, Pearl is too far away for use as an offensive jump off point, and we are too weak to gain nearer positions north of the equator.

(5) Russia. Here the danger lies in the proximity of air in the Vladivostok region to industrial Japan. Japan can hardly feel secure while this threat exists. Certainly she will not provoke war until she thinks that Russia is beaten by Germany, and until that beating takes shape in the removal of Russian aircraft from Siberia to the German front.

5. Broad Courses of Action.

Based on the idea expressed above, i.e. that Japan must now prevent interference with her exploitation in the Orient, the following are her broad courses of action:

(1) Step up military operations in China with view to obtaining a satisfactory stalemate in the Sino-Jap War.

Any increase in such military operations will be primarily an Army project. But it would have effect on other fronts because it would involve further demands on her national strength. Now that Japan has effectively stopped nearly all occidental reinforcements she is in a better position to offer China a compromise peace. The masses of Chinese may well be glad to end the struggle. The leaders may become discouraged if they continue to receive promises, but little real support. Especially if the war continues favorable to the Axis, and if Japan can administer some sort of a major local defeat on the Chinese, and if Oriental intrigue can be reasonably successful, there is the possibility of sufficient Japanese withdrawal from China to be acceptable to the Chinese.

As this is not expected during August it will not be considered as bearing on the immediate problem.
A major effort to continue the offensive in the Indian Ocean.

If Japan could now occupy Ceylon their strategic position would be considerably enhanced as they would be in a position to better dominate the Bay of Bengal and the approaches of Singapore. Off-hand, it would seem logical that no such step would be taken unless Japan felt sure of the security of her eastern flank. And this is especially so now when the Far Eastern Fleet seems to have no idea of any action which will cause Japan trouble. On the other hand there is the bright prospect of winning India over to the Axis side. The effort would not be an attempt to conquer India, but to make a show of strength to discredit the British, and to bring the military, economic, and political fronts more nearly into alignment in that area. If Ceylon were captured, the stranglehold on India would be complete.

Operations to: first, gain a foothold in Australia and; second, to extend their positions within striking distance of the U.S. - Australia supply line.

Jap positions in New Guinea will never be entirely secure as long as Port Moresby is strongly held and can continue as an air base. It is assumed that the Australians for the present will continue their sporadic and nuisance-value bombings. If the Japanese capture Port Moresby they will continue to be within bombing range of Australian air fields. Such a condition could continue a long time without serious injury to either side. With the elimination of the Port Moresby nuisance, though, Japans positions in the Solomons and their capability to advance to Noumea would be considerably enhanced.

It does not seem reasonable that Japan will, in the foreseeable future, make a serious attempt on the Australian mainland.

Because of their many good positions and relative security north of Timor Sea, the Japanese are well placed for operations in northwestern Australia. That area is fairly well isolated from the populous eastern Australia by the great stretches of wasteland. In order to better secure Timor, and Java by denying Australia jump off points such as Darwin and Broome, and to reduce the submarine menace from Western Australia, Japan may very possibly plan landings in force in that region. Such a move could conceivably take place in August.

On the other hand, many signs point toward their desire to occupy Port Moresby and to expand down through the New Hebrides and to New Caledonia. For the occupation of Port Moresby they must go overland unless they are willing to make another and stronger attempt via the Coral Sea. If they
are going overland they must use many more troops than have been reported in New Guinea up to now. A possible indication that such is intended is the information of large army forces probably enroute. If they are thinking of a sea borne attempt they would probably want to be stronger than they were in May. And if the sea borne attack is contemplated we could reasonably expect it to take place only after airfields are completed in S.E. New Guinea and at Guadalcanal. That done, they could operate their carriers under an air umbrella to the S.E. and S.W.

They may be content to defer the Port Moresby project for a while and go ahead into the Santa Cruz Islands and New Hebrides. This sort of an operation would seem to call for considerable carrier strength, but not a comparatively large number of troops. If it were done step by step (and it probably would have to be as landing fields cannot be captured but must be built) the operation could hardly be more than started during August.

(4) Raids on our line from Midway to Suva.

These are always possible and well within Japan's capabilities. Good jumping off places are available to them in the Marshalls. Such operations South of Hawaii would not have to be in force, and would be hit and run in order to delay our efforts. It does not seem probable at the moment that Japan could seriously try to occupy and hold any positions east of the 180th meridian in the South Pacific. In the Hawaiian Area the most damage they could do would be at Pearl Harbor. Another successful surprise raid at Pearl is always a possibility.

(5) Seizure and occupation of the Hawaiian Islands.

While there is good reason for Japan to want to do this, her available strength for the operation is not in sight. It is true that she can bring to bear a force large enough to cover the necessary troop movement if most of our strength is elsewhere. But there just does not seem sufficient tonnage available to her to transport and support any such effort. It is true that if she could arrive at a time when our task forces are absent and when the Hawaiian air force is weak, Japan could probably gain a foothold on outlying islands. After gaining such a foothold she could easily lose the war in trying to dig in. It would offer the finest sort of attrition possibilities to us. We have only to remember that we could find no way to support Guam and Wake. In fact they were considered by many as a liability.
The seizure and occupation of Midway was undoubtedly a plan of the Japanese in early June. What their ultimate objective was in that campaign is not known. If they were satisfied merely to occupy it to deny it to us they would thereby, (1) restrict our westward air search; (2) deny Midway to us as a fuel topping off place; (3) eliminate our chance of bombing Wake with present planes. Maybe this, plus undoubted value to them for the same purpose to the eastward, is considered enough to cause them to make another attempt. But again, they would have an almost impossible situation. Holding Pearl, we could undoubtedly make their logistic problem impossible. And they could not defend the place against inevitable recapture. We conclude, then, that the Japs will not attempt to occupy Midway except as part of a campaign to capture all of the Hawaiian Islands.

(6) A further advance to the Eastward in the Aleutians.

Here it all depends on the estimate of why they went there in the first place. If they went there to cause a diversion they have succeeded in immobilizing a cruiser task force, and no further effort is immediately necessary. If they want a base to operate from to protect northern fisheries they may need only to strengthen present positions. If they want to interrupt a possible air ferry route to Siberia via the Aleutians they need go no further. But if they want to cause us serious worry in that region they must move considerably more to the east. As this is not a good CV operating area it would seem that the chances of large scale CV covering forces operating against shore based air now known present are small. Nevertheless, such a course is possible.

(7) An attack on Russia.

This depends so much on European operations now underway that it serves no useful purpose to guess. Suffice to say that CVs could be employed. 

but not essential.
6. Remarks

(a) We are no longer reading the enemy mail and today (August 1) we must depend almost entirely on traffic analysis to deduce enemy deployment. There is a chance that, during August, we will improve in this respect.

(b) We have only the flimsiest sort of a surface picket line to warn us of hostile approach, and must rely on air search and radar.

(c) As there are so many possibilities open to Japan there does not seem to be any profit in making wild guesses as to their next move. From a purely strategic point of view the only move during August which seems likely is expansion in the direction of the New Hebrides.
July 29th

In his 292335 (Pink) ComSoPac indicates his desire to anticipate his target date of August 7th. The sooner he can launch his attack the easier the job should be, as the Japs are making strong and apparently rapid progress in strengthening their positions.

Task Force 3 is still unable to bombard KISKA. Further scouting there indicates DDs and auxiliary types in the harbor.

A new command "Naval Air Forces Pacific" has been set up. Admiral Fitch will be the first Commander.

A recent photo reconnaissance of MAKIN ISLAND (GILBERTS) fails to show suspected enemy air or other activity there. Nevertheless Marine Raiders will be landed there by submarines about August 17th to destroy possible fuel, stores, and other installations. If no resistance is met it is still a good training exercise in a new kind of warfare for us.

Admiral Nimitz is anxious to get the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier started on conducting the daily routine search from OAHU.

Apparently the CinC 8th Jap Fleet has taken over command in the RABAUL AREA, where defense is being speeded up.

There are no changes in location of major Jap units.

July 30th.

Because of two collisions in dense fog involving two DMS and two DD, and because weather has made bombardment in accordance with his plan impossible Theobald has retired to Kodiak. (His 302125) His future plans are not known. Admiral Nimitz favors sending him some encouragement and a suggestion that a sweep along the Jap communications line to the westward of Attu may be profitable.

Admiral Ghormley has not yet set his day for the Tulagi operation but it is assumed that it will not be later than August 7th.

Serfor 292345 recommends on present petroleum supply system for Pac Fleet; and CinCPac 310113 desires to maintain status quo for logistics for present, with the possible exception of New Zealand.
July 30th (Cont'd)

Despite the desire of the C.G. at Fiji to retain some New Zealand troops there, Comsopac has directed that they return to their homes as planned.

CinCPac 312145 recommends an army air reserve of 70 planes be sent Hawaii now for possible use in the Pacific. The present number is wholly inadequate.

Comsopac 302351 desires that the Lion now assumed ready for shipment be sent to him now.

The Japanese seem to be stepping up their air reinforcements to the Rabaul Area. In their operations in Eastern New Guinea they managed to destroy five of seven Army dive bombers which attacked their landings. So far as is known, there is no change in the location of their major units. Most of their Navy seems to be in empire waters.

July 31.

In his 010301 pink ComTaskFor 8 answered CincPac 312145 concerning KISKA operations. Since the 22d, when Admiral Theobald arrived for his bombardment, the weather has been bad. There has never been the needed surface visibility. Finally, the double collision referred to yesterday made a retirement and modification of plan necessary. Now, ComTaskFor 8 wants to go ahead with his bombardment in spite of little hope of success. Admiral Nimitz feels that a radar sweep to the westward might be profitable.

There is nothing to remark about other task forces.

CinCPac 010233 recommends no change in the pattern of Pacific submarine operations pending the outcome of Admiral Ghormley's present operations which are to start on the 7th.

Army photo reconnaissance planes at WAKE were attacked by "zero" fighters.

The Japs have decided that they can see no profit in making war on Russia now as has been requested by Germany.

Apparently the Japs are taking air from the Marshall's to strengthen their positions in the Southwest Pacific. In that area enemy activity is being stepped up a bit.
CINCPAC TO OPNAV INFO SCMSOWESPAC

In reply last part your 011939 invite attention my 312231 not to all addes. As indicated therein arrangements have been made for supplying fuel to U.S. forces based New Zealand with tankers now assigned CinCPac. Question of taking on civil and military fuel requirements that dominion is one of policy and availability of British tonnage on which no opinions are expressed.

CTF 8 to CINCPAC

My 0Plan 9-42 essentially same as my 8-42 with same bombardment objective. New plan deletes offensive tasks of patrol planes until Baker plus two day. Plane and submarine action altered to produce more effective assistance to main body with minimum dislocation of effort due to delays. Have ordered alternate operation two cruisers in event of delay in separate letter of instructions.

CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info VOOpav, Comsopac(Adm) Serforsubcom.

My 220349 Comsonac has now requested LION 1 complete for SPOONER projects. Also total 6 construction battalions for SPOONER and 2 OAKS for Sopac. Recommend approval OAKS and such construction battalions as can be provided. Former to take precedence over CUBS 2 and 3. Am opposed to storage any LION components SPOONER and unless there are projects of which I am unaware believe many components LION unneeded there. Request your comment and dispatch or airmail outline of approved projects for SPOONER. Your 161635 Feb.
COMAMPHORSOPAC to COMSOPAC

This message consists of three parts. Following recommended. Cub 1 and 7th Construction Battalion be definitely routed to Cactus and Cub 13 to Apricot. 11th Construction to Apricot instead of Straw see Cincpac 310915 July. Cominch 031856 July one aviation engineer battalion to Straw vice construction battalion. One barrage balloon squadron to Apricot. 2nd Division Headquarters and 8th Marines to Longbow.

Cominch 031230 August. September 30 defense battalion to White Poppy for temporary use prepared for immediate withdrawal for offensive. One construction battalion to White Poppy for employment but as reserve for offensive. One construction battalion to Fantan for same purpose.

October 30 Headquarters Amphcorpsopac and 6th Marines to Longbow. Defense battalion to Fantan for temporary use prepared for immediate withdrawal for offensive. Aviation engineer battalion to White Poppy ready to accompany offensive. Division troops 2nd Division to Longbow. End part one.

Part two.
November 30 division troops 2nd division to Longbow. 1 barrage balloon squadron to Cactus 1 to Button.

Guns of foregoing defense battalions not repeat not to be employed if 5 inch.

7th Marines reinforced on relief by 22nd Marines embark combat loaded in Transdiv 2 and conduct amphibious training in Bleacher if not immediately required in forward area.

Marine aircraft group 23 plus one half VMO 251 to Cactus as soon as possible. Other half VMO 251 to be retained at White Poppy and trained and employed as observation aircraft ready for next offensive.

Of next 2 marine aircraft groups 1 to Apricot and 1 to be held at White Poppy in reserve for offensive both groups to be given carrier training.

All shore based VF airplanes Navy and Marine to be equipped with droppable fuel tanks with 200 percent spare tanks. Finish part 2.
Comence part 3. Further recommended that following be established and trained as soon as possible in Straw. (a) Two additional raider battalions (b) One additional parachute battalion (c) Replacement and reserve cadre adequate for replacements for two marine divisions on continuously active service.

Parachute battalion of first Marine Division should first be brought to full strength. This is the end of the three and last part.
5368-7th. Improper application of Joint Chiefs of Staff directive concerning procedure to follow in reporting combat operations and intelligence in your command indicated by report of recent operation of B-17 against Jap fighters at WAKE. Action took place July 31 but War Department not notified until late August 4th. Para.

Clarification OURAD 4945 of 17 July indicating proper procedure follows (pass to CinCPac). Para.

1st, the report should be addressed to Chief of Staff not to CinCPac. Para.

2ndly, the report should be sent through CinCPac for comment if he deems comment necessary. However, he has no authority to alter your original report. Para.

3rdly, the report should be transmitted promptly by CinCPac direct to Chief of Staff, not to Cominich. Para.

Cominich concurs in this interpretation.
My 080741. First attempt to bombard made at 1745, approach being made by Radar and sounding.-Launched spotting planes at 1750. At 1755 ran into thick fog that persisted inside hundred fathom mark and forced turn away. Spotting plane cruising at 1500 feet gave excellent information of shipping in Kiska and visibility conditions. Although under attack by float fighter and antiaircraft and hit repeatedly plane maintained station. Second approach by Radar and soundings at 1945. About 5 minutes before executing Roger fog lifted and permitted navigational fix but ceiling too low to permit plane spot or observation of damage. Firing groups adjusted positions and opened up. First salvos mistaken by Japs for bombs and replied to by antiaircraft barrage. Battery on South Head firing fixed projectiles, possibly 6 inch, at destroyers silenced by Nashville estimated range 9,000 yards.

09 0540 Part 2 of above.

Fire of shore battery showed excellent control possibly by spotting plane. Four-engine seaplane bombers (2) yellow, avoided heavy ships. Observed one unload entire rack of bombs at Elliot, missed astern. Float plane fighters very accurate with cannot, damaged SOC at 500 yards through fog patch, strafed destroyers one believed shot down. Huge white chemical flare possibly for artillery ranging dropped over Indianapolis. Plane report of Kiska harbor before firing included one very large auxiliary several smaller ships at least 4 subs at least one CL and 2 DD. After firing observation one large fire, tanker leaving harbor, shore battery silenced, many hits in target area. Only casualties one plane and crew missing, one pilot wounded in foot by shrapnel, numerous hits on plane. No damage to ships other than minor due to own gunfire. Firing CA not completed due to forced turn about from reported periscope. Ammunition expended 8 inch 631, 6 inch 3534, 5 inch 2620, small amounts 1.120 millimeter and machine gun. Shadowed until dark but not attacked by four engine seaplane. No contact our Baker plus one flights.
COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOPAC, CTF 8, CINCLANT

While it is deemed mandatory that communications essential to the conduct of operations actually in progress against the enemy shall have the first priority, that part of operating organizations concerned with constant assembly, evaluation and summary of operating information must include arrangements whereby pertinent information as to state of affairs can be sent to you and to me as opportunity offers, or can be made, without undue interference with the conduct of such active operations.

COMTASKFOR 62 to COMSOPAC, CTF-61, info VARIOUS

Delayed in transmission due to circuit congestion and radio silence is this situation summary as well as yesterday's and also report on GUADALCANAL air base. First Detachment this force departed GUADALCANAL through LENGO Channel late afternoon local 9th with part of transports escorted by wounded vessels and minesweepers. Final Detachment formed off TULAGI after dark and passed out same route. No contact with enemy since night action previous night except DDs dropped depth charges on 3 reported sound contacts vicinity CinCPac Grid LOVE 536063 about 0200 GCT 10th. Location JARVIS not known request ComAirSoPac cover as possible and inform me if sighted. It seems probable enemy unaware our losses recommend no publicity. Some evidence has appeared that enemy also suffered in the night action. Nothing further as to developments on shore. Para.

At 2300 GCT 10th plan to unite both detachments near Grid GEORGE 913634 thence course 157 at 13.5 knots toward POPPY, and to detach Transdivs 2 and 12 to arrive BUTTON morning of 12th local preparatory further operations. ComTransdiv 12 will deport available troops for reinforcement garrison on arrival. Para.

Plan arrive BULAPT Pass about 0200 GCT 13th request ComSoPac make necessary pilot and berthing arrangements. This is final summary for present.
CTF 8 sends in reply to CinCPac 102205. Tentative plan, covering force 2 heavy 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers to westward of advance. Lighters and tugs with heavy freight screened by 4 destroyers departing CHERNOFSKI dog minus 4 day land in FIREPLACE BAY weather permitting. Speed about 5 knots. Continuous anti submarine patrol by destroyers during unloading. Three transports escorted by 2 light cruisers, 4 destroyers pass UNALASKA dog minus 2 days land troops food essential light supplies in own boats eastern side commencing evening twilight dog minus 1 day. Allawhtwoxhsitrrth and clear of chain. When troops and essential immediate equipment landed transports screened by 3 destroyers retire to northward to await availability of lighters for discharge heavy equipment when two light cruisers 1 destroyer join covering force. Motor torpedo boats held initially in vicinity of FIREPLACE to attack enemy forces threatening FIREPLACE. At desirable time in operation will use for low visibility attack on KISKA HARBOR. Submarines observing and attacking ATTU KISKA AREAS and for observation and attack in north and south approaches FIREPLACE. PBY's with tenders based NAZAN for protective scouting of approaches FIREPLACE and provide close screens to forces as practicable. Army P-38's defensive screen NAZAN and maximum concentration bombers at UMNNAK for offensive operation at KISKA and against enemy surface forces threatening FIREPLACE. Waters east FIREPLACE totally unsurveyed. Prior operation intend submarine fathometer survey with sounding of beach approaches from small boat. Submarine sounding WESTERN BAY accomplished 11th. Above subject to modification after conference with troop commander now awaiting return 3 officers survey party due back from FIREPLACE next 48 hours.

From Rear Admiral Smith Quote CinCPac 130003. Heavy ship bombardment by direct fire from between LITTLE KISKA and SOUTH HEAD not practicable. Water shallow poorly charted and perhaps mined. Firing area so limited as to require ships to slow or stop. Could hit main camp only by indirect fire over north head. NORTH HEAD heavily hit 7 Aug. Further risk of cruisers in a repeat bombardment KISKA not justified unless coordinated with landing attack to capture and hold island. Report on 7 Aug. bombardment in mail. Attack in low visibility. Ships in harbor by motor torpedo boats supported by destroyers practicable and highly recommended. Unquote. CTF 8 concurs and sends this. MY O10301 stated that NORTH HEAD and camp at southwest end of harbor only direct fire targets from eastward. PBY pilot.
after observation from 2000 feet reports all north head area heavily hit bombardment 7th. Early repetition of identical operation which depends for success largely on surprise believed an unsound war operation.

Recent events emphasize absolute necessity have facilities for rapid unloading CUB materials at advanced bases. These islands have nothing in line unloading equipment and therefore nothing can be provided at destination. This problem does not refer to that of unloading during initial landing force attack operations where items small and can be men handled but refers to subsequent operations where many heavy items equipment have to be handled. Each base where a CUB to be landed should have standard pontoon wharves and barges as follows: 2 wharves and 4 bridge sections, 3 barges 100 tons, 3 barges 50 tons. Each barge to have outboard motor. Each wharf to have 5-ton derrick. For rapid establishment weight handling facilities ashore require either tractor and 2-wheeled gooseneck crane which can be carried on deck of vessel or must tow a flat deck barge from nearest advance base carrying crawler crane and tractors on deck. These would walk ashore from beached barge. Recommend first method with duplicate tractors and cranes on 2 ships in case one damaged although second method permits earlier use heavy equipment and worked efficiently at island bases before war. For immediate needs urgently request 3 complete sets pontoon units as described above. 1 set to be used BUTTON second at CACTUS third for next advanced base. Any units enroute for CUBS 1 and 13 may be considered as partial fulfillment requirements. In addition to foregoing facilities for unloading large ships the availability of 1000-ton covered barges similar those used between PEARL and outlying islands would permit transportation food ammunition to an advanced base in combat area without risking large vessel. Tug NAVAJO type made 12 knots with such a barge good weather. Could tow barge to destination leave at beach and return immediately without remaining in danger area. Maximum draft barge 9 feet but average draft loaded usual type materials 6 feet. Therefore torpedoes generally pass under. Recommend 4 be sent earliest practicable with 4 more later. 9 believed now available at PEARL but more should be built. Again desire emphasize importance all essential items for initial establishment of Airbase be sent in first convoy even if ships have to wait at loading port for certain items. Less risk and delay thereby than have ships spend many days unloading with primitive facilities in combat area.
From additional information obtained by recent survey party indicating good possibility of uncharted rocks and shoals, consider it inadvisable and too hazardous to make survey and take soundings eastern Bays of FIREPLACE by submarine. My 132214 will therefore be modified accordingly. Will use TEAL or similar AM to take soundings and make as complete survey as practicable in period remaining prior to landing of initial garrison.

Following is the consensus of opinions of recent action against KISKA. Targets covered: Shots main camp 2 thousand 286-6 inch, 1 thousand 101-5 inch 38, results large fire. South camp 690-6 inch shots no observation results. North head 180-8 inch, 1020-5 inch 38 shots heavy smoke and dust. South head 60-6 inch, 40-5 inch shots: Jap surface and AA batteries silenced. Harbor area 451-8 inch shots. Ship first reported as tanker now identified as destroyer - TOMOZURU Class - seen leaving harbor on fire disappeared later, possibly sunk. Large auxiliary beached on south shore of harbor with decks awash. Prior to bombardment 10 auxiliaries, 4 submarines, 1 large destroyer or small cruiser force one 4 engine patrol plane, were reported in the harbor with 1 destroyer and patrol boat patrolling off the entrance. During firing observing planes reported 8 inch fire in harbor as very accurate. Every reason to believe from analysis ranges and deflections used that light cruiser and destroyer fire on main camp was equally effective. Afterwards no reports from submarines of any ships leaving harbor. On day following bombardment only ships reported were 2 auxiliaries, 1 destroyer, 2 or 3 patrol boats in vicinity of South Pass with possible 2 destroyers in harbor. Both auxiliaries were hit by 2-500 pound bombs and possibly 1-1000 pound. Observation from 2000 feet upon August 8th reported North Head area very heavily hit all over. Flying at this height was no anti aircraft fire from North Head which was most heavily armed area. Good possibility that excepting the ships bombed the following day, other ships in harbor during bombardment were sunk. Comtaskfor 8 has summarized this. 1 SOC INDIANAPOLIS plane not recovered probably shot down. Other SOC planes hit by seaplane fighters. 1 INDIANAPOLIS plane receiving 157 holes. 1 ST. LOUIS pilot foot injury from shrapnel. No casualties to ships. ELLIOT struck by fragments from bomb or projectiles with few small minor holes. No Army Air Force planes bombed target area on bombardment day or day following. Visibility since has been poor preventing other than sketchy photographs. Appears now that any photographs will be too late to give any positive evidence of total damage. Cominich pass to Chief Staff Army.
15 0340 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

This is first part of a two part message from Comtaskfor 8. Deliver to Cincpac. Survey required your 052213 completed by experienced board. Summary of report follows terrain excellent for creation air field and land transportation. TANAGA Bay Truncated Funnel in which seas pile up during weather from south southwest to northwest. Even with light northwesterly wind of 10 knots heavy swell was running in TANAGA Bay when inspected. Logs and other debris thrown 70 to 100 feet beyond high tide mark. It is reasonable to assume that beached lighters under these conditions will be permanently stranded. Lighters should be towed to eastern side of island if approaching westerly gale can be predicted in sufficient time and all shipping will have to leave TANAGA bay. Task of landing supplies and equipment has been gravely underestimated and possibility of losing a considerable part of the equipment is strong. Completion summary. And end part one.

15 0357 Second part Comtaskfor 8 150340 to Cincpac. My 050520, 050556, 050625, 092040. Phase two is three times as comprehensive as phase one. Will cover fall and early winter. Period of worst weather in area. Refer page 11 and 201 HO 187. Waters to eastward of island totally unsurveyed with one long projecting reef and many rocks. See page 373 Coast Pilot Volume Two. There is no wharf. Navigation on eastern side dangerous as nothing but very sketchy survey possible. From conference deduce Army estimate problems transportation and unloading largely derived from experience at Umnak where cargoes transferred to lighters in land locked CHARMOFSKI and short haul to lee shore Umnak made on calm water days. Enemy opposition aside operation disregards fundamental considerations of navigational dangers, weather and seamanship. See Overesch report cargo handling in open sea by Army at Canton and Christmas. If not complete failure for these reasons length of time to completion phase two gives enemy every chance. Unanimous opinion of all local senior naval officers entirely disregarded in favor of local Army opinion in planning operation for which seamanship and navigational dangers are governing factors. Consider ADAK KEY position in middle ALEUTIANS. Occupation during fall presents none of foregoing seamanship and navigational problems. Army plans for fixed positions to westward of Umnak Dutch Harbor area must include plans for development of Adak as advanced naval base. End part 2.
C.G. CACTUS TO COMSOPAC

Party referred to your serial 130623 arrived ready to function. Tulagi reports all well and mopping up completed at Halavo Port, Purvis and Bungana Island. No slant eyes encountered. Large dump avgas at Halavo. Natives that area friendly and delivering some prisoners. Situation Guadalcanal no change. Consolidation of area continuing. Patrolling being conducted by Marines and Natives. Awaiting air support for operations against outlying detachments. Mopping up of distant detachments will require APD’s. Next vessel arriving should take off prisoners. Request reconnaissance plane passing drop message giving info obtained. Request 2000 silver Australian shillings for intelligence.
Situation report Guadalcanal Tulagi sector. August 11-16. Guadalcanal bombed by 3 Orange bombers high altitude on 12th and 14th 6 on 15th no damage 1 plane damaged AA fire. SS fired into position on 13th and 14th. No damage. 1 SS reported hit by 75 on half track. Tulagi situation excellent. Mopping up completed Halavo point Port Purvis Bungana Island. Patrolling and mopping continued Guadalcanal. Some Marine casualties. 50 enemy killed or captured 13th. Enemy planes dropped food ammunition by parachute. 15th Marines captured four of 6 loads seen dropped. Ground crews for aircraft arrived 16th.
AUG. OCT
18 2340

COMWESSEAPRON TO CINCPAC

Following paraphrased radio sent by me (General Dewitt Originator) to Commander Task Force 8 furnished for your information begin paraphrase CG ADC has been instructed to confer with you reference directive Joint Chiefs of Staff for further recommendations and comments fireplace stop development Adak not considered impracticable but as stated to you during conference in Alaska location of airfield Adak involved too long construction period and when accomplished is too distant from Kiska for protection and for neutralization and reduction Kiska stop except for possible difficulty in accomplishment task one, seizure and occupation, Tanaga meets all requirements stop this unexpected turn of events is deeply disappointing since decisions made and preparations for fireplace far advanced stop troops have been selected and equipped for fireplace mission and arrive Kodiak today stop if operation limited to occupation Adak my concern that possible reaction by enemy will be occupation of Tanaga or neutralization that place by construction of field on Amchitka with resulting local enemy air superiority during long period of time required for construction of Adak airfield stop If enemy accomplished this it will be difficult to ascribe sound reasons for the Adak occupation stop this attitude in fact would be untenable from military standpoint as a solution to the control of the Aleutians stop respect your views as to adverse unloading conditions Tanaga but feel such difficulties must be expected in operations of this character is war and overcome stop if you still feel unwilling to accept responsibility for naval support fireplace operation request you and General Buckner consider landing eastern Tanaga as last resort and with purpose of taking at least positive action towards consolidation our positions in Aleutians with expectation of ultimate control stop I can not repeat not conscientiously consent to abandonment fireplace end paraphrase stop above my views this subject and presented to you in compliance with directive joint Chiefs of Staff August 18th stop Hope you concur.
COMWESTSEAFRON TO CINCPAC

202248

Following paraphrased radio sent to Joint Chiefs of Staff 20 August furnished for your information. No reply received to my dispatches August 18th to Cincpac and Comtaskfor 8 but paraphrased message received sent by Comtaskfor 8 for Cominch. You agree to modification of directive for fireplace operation through substitution Adak Island for Tanaga Island because of necessity for speed in development of airfields in support of offensive operation towards ultimate objective since Comtaskfor 8 has agreed to support Adak operation. Do not consider and never have considered airfield construction on Adak impracticable. Initial landing force now at Kodiak ready to move. Recommend Adak occupation earliest possible date. Enemy reaction to Adak operation may be occupation of Tanaga or neutralization of that place by construction of field on Amchitka. This will result in enemy local air superiority during longer period required for construction of Adak field over that required for Tanaga field. Considering this possibility recommend issuance joint directive assigning mission to navy of furnishing constant protection for project until Adak field can be used by planes and also mission of preventing enemy action aimed at occupation and establishment of airfields east of Kiska. Suggestion of Comtaskfor 8 for development fighter strip Atak not considered feasible as part this operation due to necessity for dispersion available construction means both men and material and requirement of additional garrison for protection. Commanding General Alaska defense command agrees signed Dewitt.

FLETCHER TO COMSOPAC

21 1120

Sighted submarine in lat 10-30 S, long 162-30 E, August 20th. Dived before being bombed. Shot down 1 enemy float type patrol plane on 20th and 21st. Believe this force sighted from time to time. Does your intelligence confirm this. Communications most unsatisfactory own ships and enemy ships in Cactus area received very late. Referring Comgen Cactus 202013 consider it inadvisable to send cruisers and destroyers into Cactus nightly. Must retire on 24th for fuel and redistribution of provisions.
Indications point strongly to enemy attack in force on Cactus area 23-26 August. From available intelligence believe following enemy forces now within radius of about 600 miles from Kavieng. 1 possibly 2 other BB, 10 CA, 5 CL, 10 or 11 Desdiv, 8 or 9 Subdivs invading South Pacific. An undetermined number PT and other small craft additional to those previously known island based and sea planes New Britain and southeast probably increasing steadily over current estimate of 60 fighters and 50 to 100 bombers all types. Land forces include 1 division available Rabaul. 1 from Truk and a force enroute from Davao. Presence of carriers possible but not confirmed. Only evidence sighting you is Cinopac 140159. Realize communications not satisfactory. Making every effort to improve. Important fueling be conducted soonest possible and if practicable one carrier task force at a time retiring for that purpose. Your 211120. This from Comsopac to Comtaskfor 61 info Comtaskfors 62, 63 and Cinopac. Am sending Platte and Cimarron from Roses daylight tomorrow Sunday accordance by 220911.
Fletchers 241014 Ghormleys 241102 McCains 241333 all passed to you give best information I now have of carrier actions and plans for today. Intercepts indicate two carrier groups generally northeast of MALAITA and last night within 150 miles that place. RYUJO in western group damaged and reported burning fiercely. SHOKAKU and ZUIMAKU in eastern group. Photos show no hits attack on RYUJO with 500 lb bombs. CACTUS reports bombing attack yesterday afternoon which was intercepted by our fighters there enemy losses 5 twin engine type 97 bombers 5 single engine bombers believed CV based Mitsubishi 11 land zeros against own loss 3 P&F. During night 7 DDs shelled CACTUS. Para. Believe MAKIN reoccupied.

From pilots report of B-17s 4 hits made on large enemy CV with 500 pound bombs position lat. 06-35 Long 161-00 at 0625 GCT. Believe this CV to be one reported dead in water at 0713 GCT by 23Pil. 2nd Group B-17's attacked small carrier position latitude 06-02 longitude 162-45 at 0710 GCT believe 1 300 pound bomb hit.

Our carriers attacked by enemy carrier planes about 0540 GCT 24 August in approximate position latitude 09 degrees south longitude 163-15 east. 1 enemy carrier reported latitude 0550 south longitude 161-25 east at 0300 GCT August 24. Fuel your Task Force as soon as possible. Send GUADALUPE to WHITE POPPY with DD escort to refill. Be prepared for offensive operations to westward of grid posit previously designated. Further orders will be issued.

Attacked by carrier group at 1712. ENTERPRISE received 2 bomb hits aft. Fire under control. Some underwater damage. Proceeding to southward toward fueling rendezvous. Cancel request for tug ENTERPRISE steering under control. SARA-TOGA group attacked RYUJO extent damage unknown left burning badly. ENTERPRISE attack group proceeded CACTUS no information results of that group. Other attack groups attacked cruisers and a battleship some hits made. 2 large carriers 4 CA's 6 CL 8 DD lat 05-45 long 162-10 east course 120 speed 25 at 1530. Not located in time for attack. Task Forces 11 and 16 must fuel tomorrow. Task Force 18 fueled today will stand toward CACTUS to support that place in accordance operation order. ENTERPRISE planes at CACTUS remain there until further orders.
Discharged to CACTUS about 1500 tons or 3/4 cargo on board including 95 percent that taken at WHITE POPPY. Major items not left ammunition of 20 millimeter and larger sizes also barbed wire and miscellaneous gear. Estimated total now on hand 600 tons. Torpedo from submarine barely missed ship few minutes before clearing unloading area. Considered not advisable attempt tow BLUE due her location near SAVO Island at 21 hours L (-11) 23rd reported locations with movements enemy forces and recommendation Div Comdr. Unable get 300 prisoners prior departure today all casualties intended for us except 6 picked up patrol plane which delivered BUTTON where HENLEY MANLEY STRINGHAM and FOMALAUT arrived 800 L (-11) 26th. Fuel aboard 238000 gallons good 13000 miles at 14 knots provisions available 19 days crew plus 180 passengers. Personnel with me: Marines 4 officers 149 enlisted in special detail. 4 officers for WHITE POPPY. Navy medical unit 1 officer 6 men also 28 men evacuated as not suitable duty CACTUS. Patients 1 officer 13 ratings. A deceased Marine.

An sending repeat of my twenty five zero blank blank which apparently went astray. Noyes rejoined 26th and reported destruction three patrol planes on 25th. REKATA Bay searched and empty. No enemy sighted by searches 26th. My posit 0800 27th Lat 10-40 South Long 163-45 East operating that vicinity until contact TF 17. From CTF 61 Action Comsopac Info Cinopac, Comairsopac, CTF’s 16, 17 and 18. After further study believe bulk of attack group of SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU lost in attack on ENTERPRISE. RYUJO hit. One torpedo and 4 bombs 1000 lbs by SARATOGA group at 0440 GCT 24th.

Enemy submarines in RINGBOLT-CACTUS area are a threat to ships unloading supplies. Urgently require PC boats based at RINGBOLT equipped with listening device for continuous as patrol and defense that area. The same need exists at BUTTON which is staging point for supplies to CACTUS. Request 12 boats of the 110 foot type or similar be sent at earliest moment. 6 to be stationed at BUTTON and 6 at RINGBOLT. This with knowledge your 310121 July as need is most urgent.
27 0226 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, CTF 61, 62, 63, Comgensopac.

Special attention invited Comgen 1st MarDiv 25735. Comso-
pac sends Cinepac action Cominch, Comtaskfor 61, 62, 63 info. Comgensopac by hand. In addition to aircraft reinforcement required this area as requested by Comsopac, Comairsoopac and Comgensopac. Regular replacement program must be initiated immediately as one of the essentials necessary in order that present positions may be maintained and preparations made for a further advance. Reference despatch is only definite in-
formation on front line attrition rate so far available. By copy of this despatch Comairsopac is requested inform ad-
dressees and originator next information available on attr-
ition rate PBY's, B17's and other types not covered by reference.

26 2120 CTF 8 to Cinepac, Info Comseron 6.

My 260203 in order complete mining project FIREPLACE es-
timate total 1000 additional Mark 6 Mod 3 mines will be
required for secondary project. Priority for areas as fol-
lows. Bay of Waterfalls one standard leg. Bay of Islands
and Skagak Bay 1 standard leg whose southern extremity shall
be north of Cascade Rock to permit ready access to both
channels into expedition harbor with entrance landfall on
Eddy Island. Three Armabay 1 standard leg. Beyer Bay one
half standard leg. Landrum concurs entire mining plan
FIREPLACE.
DDs shelled position at 2400. Casualties 2 killed 3 wounded. No material damage. 3 SBD contacted at 0210 L (minus 11) my 242057. 2 SBD went out at 0245 L (minus 11) no contact. 3 SBD went out at 0245 no contact. 3 SBD went out 0300 scored 1 hit on destroyer. Ensign William E. Brown of ENTERPRISE failed to return. Large oil patches seen in area of contact after daybreak. At 0357 2 small planes bombed and strafed position. At 1150 21 twin engine 97 bombers dropped over 40 bombs on position from 27,000 feet. 4 killed 5 wounded no material damage. My 242335 and 242230 additionally. 1 transport hit on or near miss under stern with 1000 pound bomb and 2 25 type seaplanes shot down. At 1400 3 scout bombers flight 300 ENTERPRISE and 6 scout bombers VMBS 232 scouted 70 miles to north of floats marking contact. Large oil patches seen but no vessels. Destroyer already leaving oily trail bombed off North Coast SAN CRISTOBAL Island. No hits but all bombs fell close. Patrols to each flank of position developed no contact.

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info CTF 62, 63.

Enemy submarines in RINGBOLT - CACTUS area are a threat to ships unloading supplies. Urgently require PC boats based at RINGBOLT equipped with listening device for continuous A/S patrol and defense that area. The same need exists at BUTTON which is staging point for supplies to CACTUS. Request 12 boats of the 110 foot type or similar be sent at earliest moment. 6 to be stationed at BUTTON and 6 at RINGBOLT. This with knowledge your 310121 July as need is most urgent.

MARSHELL to CG HAWDEPT info CINCPAC

Further Army reinforcement heavy bomber aircraft Pacific theater in support of present action impossible. 15 B17s requested not available. Para.

Cominch has been notified of above summary.
COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH, CTF 61, 62, 63, CGSOPAC

Special attention invited ComGen 1st Mardiv 250735. ComSoPac sends CinCPac action Cominich Comtaskfor 61, 62, 63 info. ComGenSoPac by hand. In addition to aircraft reinforcement required this area as requested by ComSoPac ComAirSoPac and ComGenSoPac. Regular replacement program must be initiated immediately as one of the essentials necessary in order that present positions may be maintained and preparations made for a further advance. Reference despatch is only definite information on front line attrition rate so far available. By copy this despatch ComAirSoPac is requested inform addressees and originator next information available on attrition rate PBYs B-17s and other types not covered by reference.
Army 43rd Infantry Division Reinforced with 1 Regiment anti-aircraft 1 Battalion 155 millimeter 1 Regiment Engineers combat 1 Company Engineers maintenance 1 company ordnance (ammunition) miscellaneous services including hospitalization total about 21,000 sailing from West Coast for SoPac latter half September and early October. Troops and equipment will be dispatched as ships and escorts available. This is part 1 of 2 parts. Troops not necessarily in same ship as own equipment therefore a place for equipping and organizing necessary at destination.

Part 2 of 291240. ComSoPac advise destination selected. Largest ships COOLIDGE and MOUNT VERNON. This movement will not interfere with departure Marines Cominich despatch 021230 August or with ACORNS 1 and 2 early Sept. ACORNS 3 to 8 delayed until shipping available probably November also no other personnel transport available until then. Prompt return of shipping particularly transports important.

Objections raised by your mining experts precludes defensive mining of own waters or advanced bases and does not accord with mining recently completed here at KODIAK or world war German and British practice. According to mining officer here German and British are using same defensive mining technique in this war. While submarines can dive under knowledge of presence of mine field has deterrent effect. Recognize will not stop MTB. During next four months there will always be transports and cargo ships discharging at FIREPLACE which is wide open to Northward for quick raid by surface forces. In addition several navigable straits must be kept under continuous destroyer observation unless mined. A field effective for 3 months would be of great value. Use of ASUKSAK Pass will route own shipping. Five miles from nearest line of mines with excellent navigation fix for approach. Dip due to current may lower efficiency but would have to be accepted. Currents not greater than at KODIAK.
In view of the highly successful action of the modern submarines in the Alaskan Area coupled with the fact that this type of ship offers the only solution for continuous observation during prevalent low visibility of the Kiska - Attu areas request early replacement of the Finback and Grunion. In this connection attention is invited to CinCPac 180145 of June.
August 1

Admiral Ghormley will announce August 7th, local date, as Dog Day unless Admiral Fletcher cannot meet that date. Also, in his 020240 (pink) he suggests a method for VF coverage at TULAGI beginning D+3 Day.

The Army proposes to build an advance airdrome near ADAK but will only do so if there is a CV sent to protect them. CinCPac 020237 (pink) says that he is unable to comply at this time.

Task Force 8 has been directed to make a cruiser sweep along Jap communications west of ATTU (CinCPac pink).

CinCPac 020141 holds up the Lion shipment to Ghormley for the time being.

The LAFFEY grounded at SUVA and damaged one propeller. This sort of thing emphasizes the need of spare propellers, tail shafts and other spare parts in the South Pacific. Also, it indicates the need of a floating drydock, possibly at BLEACHER.

It is evident that the Germans need rubber and other supplies from Jap conquered territory.

There is considerable strengthening of Jap air in the Southwest Pacific but no indications yet of the employment of carriers in that area.

The Army B-17 which went to WAKE for photos was attacked by six fighters. Four were shot down, of which three were "zeros" and one resembled a Heinkel 112.

August 2.

Admiral Ghormley has set August 7th, local date, for Dog Day of the TULAGI operation.

No further word has been received from TF-8. It is expected that a cruiser bombardment of KISKA will be undertaken about August 4th. On that date the BOISE should commence the raid on the Jap sampan patrol east of HONSHU.

CinCPac (030427) will undertake the supply of fuel to the military forces at NEW ZEALAND, but expresses no opinion as to civil supply.
August 2 (Continued)

There is evidence of fuel trouble in the South Pacific. The trouble seems in distribution rather than a lack of fuel.

The photo reconnaissance pictures of WAKE taken July 31st reveal continued strengthening of that island by the Japs. At all occupied places the Japs seem to be working very hard to make their positions secure.

There is still no indication that Jap CVs have left Empire waters.

August 3

During his morning informal conference Admiral Nimitz brought up the following points:

(a) He desires that continued effort be made to commend the Army for good work done, and to be meticulous in recommending medals and giving them official credit when due.

(b) B-17s are very good against zero fighters and should be brought in contact every time conditions favor.

(c) The subject of use of our subs in the Japan Sea was discussed; objections raised; no decision reached or necessary at this time.

(d) The employment of air strength in the Hawaiian area was mentioned.

(e) It was decided that two planes, instead of one, should be used for long distance photo reconnaissance.

Task Force 1 is enroute to the Hawaiian Area for exercises with Task Force 17. Task Forces 11, 16, 18 are participating in the TULAGI operation under ComSoPac. Task Force 8 is preparing for further operations in the ALEUTIANS; cruisers to again attempt a bombardment of KISKA about August 7, and conduct a raider sweep to the westward. The KANE at ATTU was bombed by three 4-engine seaplanes with no damage.

The TUCKER, entering 2d channel at ESPRITU SANTO, hit one of the mines that had just been laid (presumably) by Mindiv 2 and is a complete loss. Such salvage as is possible will be undertaken by the NAVAJO.

The BISHOPDALE (XAO) hit a mine when leaving NOUMEA via Bulari Channel but apparently suffered little damage.

There is still no indication that the Jap CVs or BBs are underway from home waters. Signs, however, point to coming operations either in the Southwest Pacific or Indian Sea.

NAURU and OCEAN Islands are looked over daily now by Jap planes. This may be the forerunner of occupation there.
4 AUGUST

The combined chiefs of staff have decided to seize, occupy, and build an Army airfield on TANAGA Island in the ALEUTIANS (Cominch 050003 pink). The Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Comalsec seem to agree that TANAGA is better than ADAK and General DeWitt is anxious to go ahead with the project (CTF 8 050105 pink). CTF 8 050520 (pink) strenuously objects to the entire proposal. Two CVs are requested to cover the operation but are not now available. Comalaska Sector 051237 (pink) gives his opinion of the difficulties which will confront this expedition.

CTF 8 042355 gives his modified KISKA bombardment plan.

P-38s near ATKA shot down two Jap 4 engine seaplanes, leaving only two of these known to be at KISKA.

TF 11, 16 and 18 are engaged in the TULAGI operation.

TF 1 is enroute the HAWAIIAN area for training with TF 17.

Cincpac 050601 recommends on LIONS, OAKS, and construction battalions for the South Pacific.

Satisfactory arrangements have been made for censorship of British radio stations at CANTON, CHRISTMAS, and FANNING.

There is still no word from the ESSO LITTLE ROCK. That tanker is now overdue at NOUMEA three days.

The Japs continue to strengthen their defenses in the SW Pacific and are showing interest in the Bay of Bengal. So far, however, there has been no known move of major units from Empire Waters.

5 August

There is no change in the major task forces in the past 24 hours. Operations mentioned yesterday continue.

The BOISE operation is still unreported either by the Japs or by that ship.

In his 050750 (pink) Comsopac concurs in the recommendations of General Harmon for increased defenses of South Pacific bases.

Evidently the ESSO LITTLE ROCK arrived safely in SUVA, having been diverted there by SoPac authorities.
5 August (Continued)

An AV or CV was sighted just NE of NEW IRELAND. It is probably a Jap plane transport bringing air reinforcement to the RABAUL area.

No change was noted in the deployment of major enemy units.

6 August

The offensive against TULAGI and adjacent islands started this morning as planned. Fragmentary reports from both own and enemy sources indicate that the landing was preceded by bombardment and that it was a complete surprise to the Japs. ComSoPac did not report during the day.

No word has been received yet from the BOISE.

Task Force 8's action at KISKA is expected tomorrow - weather permitting.

The GREENLING on patrol off TRUK reports sinking 24,000 tons, including the BRAZIL MARU.

The CUMMINGS definitely claims to have sunk a Jap sub at Meli Bay, EFATE.

ComAmphibForSoPac 062235 recommends on disposition of Cubs and Construction Battalions, and troops in the South Pacific.

The High Commissioner for the Western Pacific now does not want to evacuate OCEAN and NAURU Islands. CinCPac will ask General MacArthur to release two ex-DD banana boats to supply these islands. The Japs surely intended some action there soon, but Admiral Ghormley's offensive may again cause them to postpone the project.

The Japs were not sufficiently perturbed today to order any major units for the defense of the SOLOMONS Area. Submarines and air already there were ordered to attack. There were no changes noted in the deployment of major Jap units.
August 7.

The TULAGI operation summary is found in ComTaskGroup 61.2 071030 (pink) and 080330 (pink). Evidently the operation is proceeding satisfactorily. As the landings may permit further extensions in the SOLOMONS to the Northwest which would increase security in the TULAGI area, CinCPac sent 081955 to Cominch. Admiral Fletcher's carriers are being withdrawn for fuel. Also they are vulnerable to shore based air in the combat area where they have been providing CV coverage.

Toward evening TaskForce 8 main body bombarded KISKA and withdrew. No results are yet known to CinCPac. Only minor damage was sustained by our force.

There has been no word from the BOISE, but no fear for her safety has been felt.

Our search plane from MIDWAY drove off a Jap Mitsubishi, four-engine type 97 plane 520 miles Southwest of MIDWAY.

In his 071553 to CG HawDept, General Marshall complains about contact reports. The Army here did not make proper report via CinCPac.

MARAMASIKI has been mined by our forces - probably to protect a seaplane tender.

The Japs are thought to be operating a seaplane tender at REKATA BAY, St. Isabel Island. This, if true, is too near TULAGI for comfort and we will attack them "in such a manner as to ensure destruction" of the AV.

Our PTs for ALASKA will arrive SAN FRANCISCO August 10. Even though the bombardment of KISKA is over, Admiral Nimitz decided to replace two DMS that were damaged in a collision in the ALEUTIANS last week.

There has been a large increase in Jap radio activity due mainly to our South Pacific offensive and our diversion at KISKA. The Japs are even apprehensive of our photo reconnaissance of WAKE. So far, however, they are not thought to have started major forces toward the active areas - relying on shore based air and submarines to repel attacks.
AUGUST 8

The fragmentary account of the day's operations at TULAGI is in Comsubpac 090830 pink, 091212 pink, 091230 pink, 091000 pink, 090950 pink, 090750 pink; CTF 62 090725 pink, 090508 pink; Fletcher 090315 pink. While there is not enough information available to CinCPac to reconstruct accurately the last three days events, it is evident that serious losses were incurred. Admiral Ghormley has adequate surface forces remaining but insufficient air.

There is no further news from the ALEUTIANS.

The BOISE completed her job of raiding the sampan patrol line east of HONSHU and is returning to PEARL.

The PERKINS damaged a propeller in the South Pacific and will be docked in NEW ZEALAND. The MORRIS and MUSTIN of TF 17 collided about midnight enroute exercises with TF 1 in the Hawaiian area. Although the damage to these DDs was apparently slight, it further depletes our DD strength at a time when they cannot be spared without embarrassment.

A recent report indicates that, of the GILBERT Islands, the Japs only now occupy MAKIN and LITTLE MAKIN. The ARGONAUT, NAUTILUS, and marine raiders will only raid those two places.

Aside from heavy air movement to the RABAUL area there is no indication of moves of major Jap units.

August 9.

In reply to Vice Admiral Ghormley's request for air replacements and further air strength CinCPac 091957 (pink) was sent. The strictly limited air available to CinCPac will not be able to satisfy ComSoPac needs.

ComSoPac 101006 (pink) indicates that reinforcements of the enemy are expected at GUADALCANAL. Such a successful move on the part of the enemy would seriously jeopardize our chances of accomplishing Task one. In the meantime, the 2nd Marines have not landed at NDENI, nor is any present intention of so doing indicated. Radio contact with landing forces has been established but the situation is far from clear. ESPIRITU SANTO has been selected as the present strong point (CinCPac 102059 (pink)).

In his 100340 (pink) ComSoPac outlines the planned reinforcement of Admiral Ghormley's forces by New Zealand troops.
August 9 (Continued)

Admiral Smith describes the bombardment of Kiska in his 090553. Fog hindered the approach and low ceiling prevented spotting the indirect fire and observation of damage.

Cominich states that for what appear to be several good reasons the Army will establish an airfield at Tanaga, Aleutians. Admiral Nimitz agrees with the plan.

Task Forces 1 and 17 are engaged in exercises off the Southern end of the Island of Hawaii.

Both the Washington and South Dakota are enroute to the Pacific. CinCPac has not assigned either yet.

It is very evident that the Japs are going to make a determined effort to defend their Southwest Pacific positions. While the CVs have not been started South yet there is some indication that at least some of them may start soon. In the meantime air strength in the Marshall and Carolines has been sent to the Rabaul Area, and Jap subs are concentrating to hit our forces in the Solomons.

August 10.

The good news of the day is contained in Comsopac 102230 pink which indicates landing at Tulagi area is successful. General Vandegrift's position at Guadalcanal is generally satisfactory as shown by CTF 62 110650. Fletcher will complete fueling tomorrow afternoon and will then operate as shown by Comsopac 110206. As a landing of Jap reinforcements on the west end of Guadalcanal is expected by Admiral Ghormley, and as further Jap surface air and troop reinforcements can be expected in the area soon, it is evident that the supply of the occupation forces is of utmost urgency. Admiral Ghormley has requested transport planes in his 110226 pink. The surface forces must now risk enemy air attacks in the delivery of supplies to the Marines.

Our S-boats have managed to sink one maru at Rabaul. It is known that they are not very efficient but will continue that vicinity for the present. The long range bombers of the SW Pacific Forces have not yet been able to deny to the enemy almost complete freedom in the use of his airfields at Rabaul and Buka.

The Boise arrived at Pearl. No enemy patrol sampans were sighted. She lost two search planes, and as radio was freely used in the attempted recovery, the Boise withdrew. The planes landed on the water at sunset and may have been picked up by the Japs.
August 10. (Continued)

There is nothing new from the ALEUTIANS.

The strong probability exists that the JAPS are forming a typical BB, CV striking force for employment in the BISMARCK-SOLOMONS area under the CinC 2nd Fleet. A rough guess is that such a force could arrive in that area about August 24th.

August 11.

The action of the surface screening forces northwest of GUADALCANAL on the 8th are summarized in CTF-62 090715 pink. Comsopac 112220 pink gives summary further losses. CinCPac 112209 gives estimate of enemy intentions and suggests what now must be done.

Our carriers are still in a retired position presumably awaiting necessity for covering reinforcements to the TULAGI area.

The captain of the ASTORIA, which blew up shortly after action, describes the great fire hazard because of planes on this type cruiser (Greenman 120220 pink).

Cominich 112030 pink feels that TF-17 should not relieve TF-18 on station as it thus unduly exposes the Hawaiian Islands. In his 121750 he suggests sending some old BBs from TF-1 to the South Pacific. CinCPac will probably not desire to do that.

Transport divisions 2 and 12 have arrived at ESPIRITO SANTO to reinforce the garrison there.

Comsopac 120216 pink gives his plan to send aviation supplies to GUADALCANAL. In his 121056 to MacArthur he requests action against the large number of Jap ships reported at RABAUL.

A PBY5A landed at the Jap made field at GUADALCANAL. In three days B-17s may be able to use it.

As the picture in the South Pacific is not yet completely understood here, Admiral Ghormley has been requested to furnish a brief narrative as soon as possible.

The SOUTH DAKOTA is due at the Canal Zone August 19th enroute CinCPac. Juneau to follow

There is nothing new from the North Pacific.

The enemy continues to strengthen his air in the South Pacific. 40 ships including 8 cruisers are reported sighted at RABAUL. A strong striking force may leave Japan for the SW Pacific in the near future.
August 12.

The consolidation of captured positions in the Southwest Pacific continues. 4 APDs will be sent to CACTUS with Avgas, lub oil, ammunition and air ground personnel, to arrive the 15th, local date. Presumably the troops that landed are in urgent need of food.

ComTaskfor 62 131258 and 101220 (pink) give a summary of his moves since the 9th.

The Southwest Pacific Air are stepping up air operations at RABAUL and claim hitting four ships in that harbor.

The Second Marines, less three battalions, landed at ESPRITU SANTO to reinforce that place. (ComCSPAC may have delayed this)

Cominch 121620 states his needs for information on current operations. Communication difficulties in the South Pacific makes up-to-the-minute news hard to get.

It has been decided to bring Task Force 1 to PEARL, arriving the 14th. CinCPac 122337 (pink) gives his views on the employment of BBs at this time.

There is no significant information from the North Pacific.

Indications continue that a Jap striking force composed of BBs and CVs will soon depart for operations in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS - NEW GUINEA Area.

August 13th

ComSoPac eleven part 131466 (pink) is a narrative of the first part of the TULAGI operation. The excellent of the Jap ships in night attack is of special interest. Current operations in the TULAGI area continue to be consolidation of captured positions.

CTF 8, 140131 recommends against further bombardment of KISKA. ComAlaska Sector (132214) gives plan for covering the Army move to TANAGA ISLAND. No date for the commencement of this operation has been given yet.

The GRENADIER reports having hit a tanker off TRUK with two torpedoes. For some time we have had five fleet subs off TRUK and six in the KISKA area. As a result only five of our submarines are on patrol off JAPAN today. To hit the shipping at KAVIENG, two of our submarines have been moved to that place from TRUK.
TF ONE will enter PEARL tomorrow morning and TF 17 the following day. For the present TF ONE will be kept at PEARL to be in a position to oppose an enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN AREA.

The marine pilots being sent to the South Pacific are reported insufficiently trained, and six weeks training time in the area is requested. Opinion here is that no squadron is ever sufficiently trained and that those enroute are as well trained as can be expected under the circumstances. In any event they are well enough trained to go to work down south.

The Japs found one of the BOISE planes and seem quite apprehensive lest a BLUE striking force be enroute JAPAN. They have hurriedly loaded three CVs to bolster up their defensive line. At present at least two CVs seem about ready for operations and a move to the South West Pacific is quite possible.

August 14.

Task Forces One and Seventeen arrived at PEARL from Joint Exercises in the Hawaiian Area. Task Force 1 will probably remain at Pearl about a month. Task Force 17 is scheduled to leave Pearl the 17th to relieve Task Force 18 on station in the South Pacific.

During the day ComSoPac eleven part 131400 (pink) came in giving the report of the TULAGI operation (as noted yesterday). ComSoPac 150746 (pink) and ComAirSoPac 130623, 140803 (pink) gives plans to provide food and reinforcements to the Marines in the TULAGI - GUADALCANAL area.

The JARVIS has not been located and an air search of her probable position was ordered. The ship is badly damaged and trying to reach NOUMEA.

ComSoPac requests fleet subs in the GUADALCANAL area, but CinCPac replied that none are now available.

Because of the many news items now originating in Australia and New Zealand and which give the Japs information they would not otherwise obtain, CinCPac has requested that Comininch and ComSoPac dry up the news sources.

Air reconnaissance of the New Georgia Islands including GIZO does not disclose enemy activities.
August 14 (Continued)

ComSoPac 140646 gives needs to unload Cub material. So far in this war little thought has been evidenced in providing for unloading ships at their destinations where harbor facilities are nonexistent.

ComTaskFor 8 150340, 150357 and 150720 gives the report of his survey of TANAGA. He does not approve the Army plan for an airfield there because of the seamanship difficulties in unloading and transporting material to the airfield site.

In his 140646 ComTaskFor 8 gives the results of his recent bombardment of KISKA. No doubt some damage to the enemy was caused but bad weather makes a photo check impossible.

There continues to be considerable evidence that a Jap striking force is about to move from the Empire to the South Pacific. Possibly the CinC 3d Fleet will be in command. However, it seems reasonably sure that the movement has not yet started.

As the Japs put in a new cipher last night, our hopes of reading their important traffic in the near future is remote. They are giving careful study to communication security. This may be due to so many U.S. Press stories about our reading their mail.

The SOUTH DAKOTA and 3 DD will transit the PANAMA CANAL about August 19th enroute duty in South Pacific. The WASHINGTON and 3 DD will follow about 10 days later.

August 15.

The South Pacific Forces continue to consolidate their positions in the TULAGI area. Losses of those landing are probably smaller than estimated. For example, an intercept from Cactus gives following losses - Killed: officers, marine 7, navy 1; enlisted, marine 89, navy 2; missing officers, marine 4, navy 1; enlisted, marine 64.

C.G. Cactus 160545 gives general situation in the TULAGI area.

Jap submarines are active in the SOLOMONS and at least one floating contact mine was sighted in the NEW HEBRIDIES area.

TF-1 and 17 are in PEARL for recreation, fuel, supplies, and minor repair.

There is no news of importance from the ALEUTIANS.
The SOUTH DAKOTA returned to Philadelphia for turbine repairs.

Cominch 15 951 pink suggests that now is the time to recapture the N.E. Coast of NEW GUINEA and desires comment from Vice Admiral Ghormley and General MacArthur.

The transports of the Amphibious Force are to be moved to the east coast after August 18th.

There is still no word from the JARVIS. Air search was negative.

A possibility exists that the CinC 2nd Fleet with a striking force is enroute to the S.W. Pacific.
16 AUGUST

The consolidation of positions captured in the TULAGI area continues. Comsopac 161146 pink and 161156 pink reviews the present situation. Comsopac 170230 pink states that no further advance is possible until he is able to secure firmly his present position and requires reinforcements.

The LONG ISLAND will fly off planes for GUADALCANAL August 20th.

Apparently the Marine raiders landed at MAKIN as planned. Jap radio reported their arrival.

Comsopac 170141 pink points out that he does not desire to send the Amphibious Force transports to the East Coast.

CTF 8 170015 pink requests fighter planes to give air coverage for the establishment of an Army airfield at TANAGA in the ALEUTIANS.

The Japs continue to show signs of making a large effort to recapture GUADALCANAL and to hold their NEW GUINEA - BISMARCK - SOLOMONS positions. If a force without carriers is to attack GUADALCANAL it could reach that place around August 20. But if CVs are to be used they cannot attack before the 25th - if todays estimate that all Orange CVs are still in home waters. It seems indicated that the Japs are interested in GIZO Island, NEW GEORGIA Group.

17 August.

CinCPac 172047 (Pink) gives information of enemy in the TULAGI area. The despatch is referred to in ComSoPac 180646 (pink) requesting more action from General MCArthur; and 180916 (pink) which briefs his Opord #2-42. The APD's which had been sent to GUADALCANAL with gas, stores, and air personnel arrived and departed safely. Plans are now underway to supply needed food to the landing troops. Apparently the process of digging in continues in a satisfactory manner and all serious opposition by enemy troops stationed there has ended. CTF 62, 170925 summarizes the situation at GUADALCANAL.

CinCPac 180215 gives directives for the relief of TF 18 by TF 17. The later left PEARL for the South Pacific Today.

Cominch 181420 plans to change the site of the proposed Army landing field from TANAGA to ADAK because adverse landing facilities at TANAGA. TF 8 seems to be marking time.
17 August (Cont'd)

It is not at all certain that the Jap CV's are still in home waters. They may be using a bit of Radio deception. It is certain, however, that the Jap will soon make a determined effort to recapture GUADALCANAL. There are no indications of enemy moves toward the North or Central Pacific Areas.

18 August

Admiral Ghormley's 190710 generally summarizes the TULAGI operation. There is no major change in the situation there yet but all indications point to an all out Jap effort to retake the captured positions.

Because of the difficulties of landing equipment for an airfield at TANAGA the Chiefs of Staff now contemplate changing the site to ADAK - but only if the Army considers ADAK feasible. If they do not consider it feasible the project may be cancelled. See ComWesSeaFron 182340.

The GRUNNION which was last heard on patrol in the northern approach to KISKA on July 30th may be lost.

MAIANA in the Gilberts was reconnoitered by a Jap plane yesterday. Apparently the enemy is sending a relief force to MAKIN.

There are still no definite indications that the Jap CVs have left home waters. But strong indications of 30-40 DDs destined to the BISMARK area are noted.

19 August

Further light is shed on the night action off SAVO Island in Comsopacs 200220 pink and 200230 pink. Our losses were heavy and there is still no explanation of why. The enemy seems to have suffered little or no damage.

The food situation there has not yet been cleared up. In fact since the initial landing not much of anything has been done by our Task Forces. And the air under General MacArthur has been of little help except for reconnaissance.

The LONG ISLAND flew in the Marine fighters and bombers as planned.

The target which a B-17 reported hitting on the stern with one bomb yesterday now is reported as being a destroyer. DDs have been intermittently shelling our shore positions and small boat
19 August (Continued)

patrols for the past two days. Enemy cruiser type seaplanes based on SAVO Island also have been attacking our small boat patrols.

Comsopac 192320 pink is preparing for an attack in the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI area between 20 and 23 August.

The Marine Raiders evidently found stiffer opposition at MAKIN than expected. Nevertheless the ARGONAUT 200830 indicates that they did a fine job.

The transports of the Amphibious Force have been ordered to the east coast departing at once.

TF 1 continues at PEARL. During the next 30 days groups of that force will exercise at sea off OAHU.

No news was received from TF 8.

Cinopac 200041 pink gives an estimate of enemy moves toward the SW Pacific. There is still no indication that Jap CVs have left home waters.

20 August.

Comsopac 211156 pink gives the general situation of the TULAGI operation. It is noted that the enemy ships which landed troops east of the Tenaru river, GUADALCANAL, got away before daylight and were not attacked by our forces.

The air strength at GUADALCANAL will be reinforced by 5 army fighters tomorrow. ESPIRITO SANTO is receiving vital supplies from NOUMEA via B-17s.

Only the APDs and the ALHENA (AK) are now scheduled to bring logistic supplies to the TULAGI area. The FORMALHANT was temporarily turned back as the C.G. there said that because of the landing mentioned above he could only handle one large ship at a time.

Comsopac 201407 gives the battle damage to the vessels of TF-44 and means to be taken for repair.

CTF-62 190323 and Comairsopac 200310 deal with the logistic problem at TULAGI. Apparently the food problem will be met before anyone goes hungry.

Subron 9 will go to IRELAND. This takes two new submarines from Subron 10, thus further reducing the already small number of modern submarines available to CinCPac.
20 August (Continued)

15 B-24s are to be sent to HAWAII starting next month. Even this small number will help the rather critical air shortage in the HAWAIIAN Area.

There is nothing new of note in the North and Central Areas.

Indications of enemy moves to reinforce the RABAUL area and to prepare for an attack on our recently captured positions continue. However, although three CVs have not been definitely located since the 16th, there is no good reason to believe that they have sailed from home waters.

The MACKINAC was almost hit by one of our SBED at NDENI. No serious damaged was reported.

21 August

ComSoPac 221056 (pink) reports on days operation. The annihilation of the 700 attacking troops is good news indeed. Admiral Ghormley feels the need of motor torpedo boats and has asked the SW Pacific area for any that can be spared. This need may have been shown by the damage done to the BLUE.

Fletchers 211120 states that he must withdraw to fuel on the 24th. There is plenty of fuel in the vicinity of his force.

ComSoPac 220910 gives his estimate of enemy forces now approaching the NEW BRITAIN AREA.

The NARWHAL arrived at MIDWAY from patrol off north HONSHU AND reports having sank 4 AK and 3 sampans totalling 18000 tons.

Cominch 211330 directs CTF 3 to commence the move to construct an army airfield at ADAO insteadof TANAGA as originally planned.

ComWesternSeaFrontier 202248 gives General DeWitts comments on placing of an airfield on ADAO as compared to TANAGA.

It now seems most probable that two striking forces are at TRUNK enroute to the SOLOMONS AREA and that the suspected all out attempt to recapture positions in the TULagi AREA starting as early as August 25th, Honolulu date.
August 22.

The consolidation of positions in the TULAGI area continues with Fletcher's striking forces standing by to prevent Jap reinforcements. A comparatively large number of enemy cruisers, destroyers, transports, and freighters have been sighted recently in the RABAUL area. This constitutes a threat to our Marines, but also offers a fine target for Fletcher if they ever come within his reach. A force of 1 CL 2 DD and 4 AKs was thought heading toward GUADALCANAL. Attack planes took off, but as the force turned away, no contact was made. The BLUE was ordered scuttled as she could not be towed.

The S-44 of the Southwest Pacific force sank a Jap cruiser off NEW IRELAND on the 19th. Heretofore these S-boats have not been very successful in the RABAUL area.

A B-17 landed at GUADALCANAL.

Admiral Fletcher will fuel his forces on the 25th.

In the North Pacific the day for commencing the operation to build an airfield at ADAK has been set as August 30th.

It is now indicated that enemy striking forces previously mentioned as heading toward the Southwest Pacific are in the TRUK area. This being the case, they cannot arrive in the TULAGI area before the 27th or 28th, local date.

August 23rd.

The arrival of enemy carriers in the SOLOMON AREA occurred yesterday. The CVs were a bit ahead of radio intelligence schedule as that source of information placed them in TRUK AREA. CinCPac 242305 with references mentioned attached give as clear a picture of the action as was available at the end of the day.

Rear Admiral Theobald reports that the Army has insufficient equipment to install an airfield at ADAK and ATKA simultaneously - as suggested by Cominch. The North Pacific continues quiet.

Except from the about sightings noted there is little known of major Japanese deployment. Everything continues to point to an all out attempt to recapture our positions in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL AREA.
August 24.

Admiral Ghormley's 251326 (pink) gives a summary of the day's operations. The forces to the North and East of MALAITA Island have retired to the Northward. There is a force still heading South in the TROBRIAND Island area. Cominch now believes that the enemy will strike at either the FIJI's or SAMOA. CinCPac has nothing to indicate such a move. The Japs have landed a small force on GIZO Island in the NEW GEORGIA group, and are operating seaplanes from REKATA on SANTA ISABEL Island. The ENTERPRISE received three bomb hits and some near misses but the vessel is under control and reports being able to operate as many as 50 planes in an emergency. A report of survivors from ships present at the TULAGI area landing shows a relatively large number of killed, wounded and missing. Generally, about 60% were saved from the cruisers which were sunk.

It is now reported that both NAURU and OCEAN Islands were shelled by cruisers on the 22nd.

Task Force 1 is preparing for exercises in the Hawaiian area.

While the logistic supply to the active areas involves a great amount of administrative traffic, there is no worry over food and fuel here. On the other hand, the supply of airplanes to HAWAII and to the South Pacific is inadequate for urgent needs and no proper movement of replacements and reinforcements is in sight.

Three Jap CVs and most of their BBs are still indicated in home waters. The movement of the CVs is of importance to CinCPac now, but the chances of learning very much definite about this seem only fair.
No further contact was made with the enemy forces except that a search plane which was shot down reported a CV well to the North of yesterday's position. That CV may have been the RYUJO.

GUADALCANAL had an air raid. Our planes shot down 7 VB and 5 "Zeros" with a loss of only 1 VF. Only minor damage and casualties were reported.

CinCPac 260239, ComSoPac 260342, ComTaskFor 16 260639 and ComSoPac 260750 (all pink) refer to the withdrawal of the ENTERPRISE due to her bomb damage. It is expected that she will be repaired at PEARL.

CinCPac 252241 (pink) urges Cominch to provide the reinforcements requested by Admiral Ghormley so that the offensive can continue to the successful conclusion of Task ONE.

In answer to Cominch message in which he expressed his "growing conviction" that the enemy are now massing to attack SAMOA or FIJI, CinCPac (252205 pink) replied that he does not agree with that idea.

The enemy made a landing at MILNE BAY, New Guinea. B-17s attacked the convoy but did not prevent the landing or the withdrawal of the convoy after the landing. General MacArthur has a division of Australian troops in that area but there is no report showing that they opposed the landing.

ComTaskFor 8 proposes to mine at KULUK BAY, ADAK, as a defensive measure and requests four light mine layers. These will be sent from PEARL.

There is still no definite word of the departure of Jap Cardiv 2 from home waters. As they are known to be about ready to go, the possibility of an undetected departure exists.

Admiral Nimitz informed General Emmons and Admiral Bagley of the general situation in conference today. Present also were Vice Admirals Pye and Calhoun. This supplemented the usual Thursday luncheon conferences which General Emmons always attends.
August 26.

A delayed message from Fletcher (250646 pink) gives his plans for the next couple of days, and his actions and recommendations.

Comsopac 261312 pink directs TF-16, as modified, to proceed to Bleacher. There a detailed examination of damage to the ENTERPRISE will be made and urgent repairs accomplished with the assistance of the VESTAL and divers from the SEMINOLE. Some ENTERPRISE planes will land at NANDI the 28th local, and the modified TF-16 (ENTERPRISE, PORTLAND, 3 DD) will arrive Bleacher about the 30th local.

Comsopac 271416 pink gives a summary of the day. The carriers seem outside our search and may be fueling. The force sighted at about the northern limit of our search planes does not seem to have any immediate objective.

Comsopac 270350 pink used Cominch's idea of a Jap move toward Fiji or Samoa to plea for more planes at those places. His request for a patrol wing headquarters at both Fantan and White Poppy will be met by Cincpac.

In his 271026 pink Comsopac gives his concept of present operations. The last sentence does not indicate much hope of reinforcements.

The FORMALHAUT 260307 is an example of the difficulties of unloading at places where facilities do not exist. Present AKs are built to unload at docks. The shortage of even elementary lighterage facilities results in being unable to unload any more than very limited cargo. There must be decided improvement in this situation. When more small vessels are available there will be an improvement. At present the logistic supply of captured positions is critical.

OTF-61 261930 gives a report of his current operations.

Comsopac 261336 requests PCs to patrol unloading waters in the TULAGI area against submarines which are known to be present and which are a definite threat. Three small patrol boats are enroute from Poppy but they have no listening gear. One NZPC now at Suva has been requested. 5 New Zealand PCs which recently passed thru Pearl enroute south seem well equipped for this duty but are coal burners.

Comsopac 270226 again urges that his air forces be reinforced.
August 26 (Continued)

CTR-8 262120 gives his general plan to mine the approaches to ADAK. This defensive mining is open to question. At any rate it cannot be done now as only four light minelayers carrying approximately 360 mines are immediately available. While Admiral Theobald is engaged in covering the operation to build an airfield at ADAK there is a possibility that he may also be able to take some offensive action. Admiral Nimitz desires to urge him to some sort of offensive operations even if it is only sending the MTBs, which just arrived at the Aleutians, to attack vessels that may be at Kiska. He will be asked what plans he has for the next few weeks.

There are continued indications that the Japs intend to make a very strong effort in the Southwest Pacific. It is possible that BBs and CVs have recently left home waters for that area. If these indications are correct, the danger to our Midway-Oahu line is non-existent for the present. Also, there is little danger of much addition to their combatant strength in the Aleutians.

Press reports of the Russian situation are very gloomy. It looks like STALINGRAD must fall shortly. The press also talks a lot about a second front in Europe. Nothing definite is known here about projected operations in Europe. However, our difficulty in obtaining men and munitions for the Pacific can be traced to very large movements to Europe.

August 27

The South Pacific was fairly quiet. Our Task Forces, less modified Task Force 16, are operating Southeast of GUADALCANAL covering the logistic move to that area. No contact with enemy carriers was made. A group of four enemy DDs were attacked by the Guadalcanal air north of MALAITA and one DD was probably sunk and two others damaged.

Aside from minor air reconnaissance by both our own planes and those of the enemy, the ALEUTIANS area was quiet.

In response to Admiral Ghormley's request for PCs, three will leave from PEARL for the South tomorrow. This cuts down the already small number in this area.

Indications that the enemy is going ahead with his preparations for an all out attempt to oust us from the TULAGI area continue. No new moves of major units from the Empire are known with any degree of certainty.
August 28.

Ghormley's 281026 summarizes the TULAGI operation.

As his carrier groups are now busily engaged in covering that operation he cannot comply with MacArthur's request for reinforcements in the Eastern NEW GUINEA Area. (ComSoPac 290310 and Cominch 281240). CinCPac generally concurs in the position taken by ComSoPac.

The ENTERPRISE has furnished the Service Force a list of material needs so that her repair can be expedited. ComTaskFor 16 281805 indicates that there was no real need for the ENTERPRISE to go to BLEACHER.

Air replacements for the South Pacific are now able to keep planes at present levels, but the future is not clear. Marshall's 270211 says that after the 19th Bombardment Group consisting of 35 B-24s arrives at Hawaii about September 10th that no more can be sent. ComAirSoPac 290607 gives an estimate of his air replacement needs.

As there are several small enemy detachments with radios in the TULAGI area ComTaskFor 62 will attempt to clean them out between September 1st and 3rd. Three APDs will provide transportation.

TaskForce 61 is short of both food and fuel and one CV group at a time will retire to NOUMEA to replenish. The supply of the troops ashore is being accomplished in spite of great difficulty.

CinCPac 290125 comments on the mining plans of ComTaskFor 8. Because of several objections the mining of ADAK as planned is not considered a good thing to do.

There is still no definite word that additional carriers have left Jap home waters. The possibility that they departed undetected continues. The enemy striking forces in the SOLOMONS area have not been seen in the past two days and are possibly just outside our air search getting ready to battle again.

There are indications that OCEAN ISLAND has been occupied by the Japs.

A report indicates that the Japs are operating landplanes in the ALEUTIANS. If this report is correct they must have constructed some sort of a landing field in the KISKA - ATTU Area.
CTF 16 282355 pink gives details of the ENTERPRISE engagement on the 24th. The ENTERPRISE VF-6 did a very fine job in knocking down 29 attacking enemy planes with small loss.

As indicated yesterday ComSoPac will retire one carrier task force at a time to NOUMBA for food and fuel. (His 291442 pink). He summarizes yesterdays operations in his 291113 pink. Most of this information was received separately from intercepts.

Cominch has suggested that Ghormley release Leary's units to cover MacArthur's communications to MILNE BAY. CinCPac will indicate his approval of this in principle to ComSoPac.

The Undersecretary of the Navy has added his voice to the pleas for more air strength in the SOLOMONS. We have indications that the Army is going to try to send a good number of fighters to the Pacific for distribution to Admiral Nimitz.

Cominch 291240 states that the 43rd infantry reinforced is to be sent to the South Pacific leaving the U.S. about the middle of September.

During a bombing raid at GUADALCANAL the CALHOUN was hit and sunk. While the W.W. BURROWS was trying to unload at TULAGI she grounded heavily.

Complete repair to the CHICAGO cannot be made handily in Australia so ComSWPac suggests that she be sent to Mare Island. It is now estimated that repairs and certain desired modernization items will require three months.

There is still no definite word as to whether or not OCEAN Island has been occupied.

Admiral Nimitz had Lt. General Emmons and Rear Admiral Bagley in for a conference to acquaint them with the situation. It was decided to send 25 fighter pilots to the South Pacific from those available in the Hawaiian Department.

CTF-8 292340 pink gives his plans for the operation to construct an airfield at ADAK. He estimates that he will be active in covering the movement from now to October and that completion of the project cannot be expected before the first of the year. In the meantime his surface units will require repair.

Nothing significant was heard today of enemy moves. The striking forces now south of the equator are thought to be someplace northeast of the SOLOMONS.
August 30.

The situation in the South Pacific is summarized in Admiral Ghormley's 31046 (pink). The extent of damage done to the SARATOGA is not known. She will proceed to BLEACHER for emergency repairs. The NAVAJO has been ordered to meet up with the SARATOGA to render such assistance as is practicable.

ComSoPac 310243 (pink) gives his plans for the next few days operation of the Carrier Task Forces. Incidentally, this message indicates that Admiral Task Ghormley is having a hard time finding out what his forces are doing.

ComAirSoPac 270411 (pink) comments on the employment of New Zealand Air. He also desires a Patwing under him at ILE NOU, which is being done.

CinCPac 302123 (pink) and ComSoPac 302240 (pink) directs the return of the Southwest Pacific cruisers and destroyers to Admiral Leary.

Admiral Ghormley (310245 pink) suggests the employment of submarines to operate against an enemy screening force thought to be northeast of the SOLOMONS. The few submarines available would have a hard time locating a good target in such a large area.

Cominch 271320 (3 part pink) gives the Army plan for reinforcements to the Pacific. This was mentioned yesterday but only the second part of the despatch was received then.

Difficulties in unloading ships at the advance positions in the South Pacific continue. This makes the prompt turnaround of the AK's impossible.

There was hard luck in the ALEUTIANS also. The CASCO was hit by a torpedo in NAZAN FAY and had to be beached. Off AMLTA Island the WILLIAMSON was accidentally damaged by own seaplane depth bombs. ComTaskFor 8 302032 gives his views on the mining at ADAK. He still wants to mine there and CinCPac still doubts the wisdom of the plan. Captain Hull will be sent North from here to investigate and report. The first wave of the supplies and equipment to build an airfield at ADAK has arrived at that place.

There is nothing new to record of enemy moves.
AUGUST 31

Cominch 011315 pink is unable to understand how the recent DD bombardments and landings could approach GUADALCANAL unmolested.

Comsopac 010305 pink and Comairsopac 310402 gives their ideas on the importance of GUADALCANAL to the Pacific War and the necessity of holding the place, - for which air strength is absolutely essential.

CTF 61 310930 pink gives disposition of the Task Forces. And Comsopac 011256 summarizes the days operations in that area.

TF 8 010105 desires that two fleet submarines now in the ALEUTIANS be replaced. Not only will Cincpac be unable to replace those submarines, but will also have to withdraw one more in the near future. It is now expected that only three fleet subs plus 5-boats will be available in the ALEUTIANS. Better targets are presented to fleet subs in other areas.

It now appears that the CASCO is being towed to DUTCH HARBOR.

The best guess now is that Cardiv 2 is still training in home waters. Only two ships of Batdiv 2 are indicated in the RABAUL area. It seems probable that the Japs have occupied both OCEAN and NAURU Islands.

At MILNE Bay the Japs may have been forced to retire to their ships by Australian ground troops.
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

July 24, 1942.

Subject: Japanese Naval Operations; Estimate of.

1. GENERAL

(a) There has been no mention of Midway in the radio traffic since the middle of June. Kiska and vicinity have been repeatedly mentioned as has Dutch Harbor, the latter place in connection with Radio Intelligence reports. No other American areas have been mentioned. Various areas in the Solomons have been very prominent including Guadalcanal and a place name designation believed to be Buna or possibly Gona. There have been many new place name designators assigned, including Woodlark Island, Daussy Island and several new unidentified Australian places. The assigning of place name designators has in the past been invariably followed by naval operations either surface or air in those localities.

(b) There has been no significant connection noted between any of the major forces with Malaya or the Indian Ocean, or with any American areas. There have been several messages or fragments of messages connecting the Second Fleet and First Air Fleet with both Palau and the Solomons. There is still a close connection between the Second Fleet and the Fourth Fleet.

(c) The CinC First Fleet recently issued a radio operation order to a group of destroyers but this probably ordered them to detached duty, either to convoy or to relieve the destroyers now in Malaya. It will be recalled that CinC First Fleet also has the task of screening the homeland and whenever units of the fleet return home for recreation, repairs, etc., they come under his command and upon their departure are ordered to return to their regular or special duties.

(d) The Acting CinC First Air Fleet or Chief of Staff First Air Fleet was at Palau recently, apparently for inspections and conferences with local officials. The carriers are still in the vicinity of Japan.

2. CONCLUSIONS

Based on Radio Intelligence and fragments of messages the most probable operations of the Japanese Fleets in the immediate future are as follows:

(a) Further consolidation of gains in the Aleutians, and further advances to the eastward unless offensive action is taken by us.
July 24, 1942.

Subject: Japanese Naval Operations; Estimate of.

Forces involved will not exceed 1 CA, maximum of 1 DesRon with leader, and one SubRon (operating in entire Aleutian area) plus aircraft and tenders, supply ships, etc.

(b) Further consolidation of gains in Solomons and eastern New Guinea with immediate objective as Port Moresby. In view of the new place name designators in the Louisiade Archipelago and Australian areas it is evident that the Japanese are planning further operations to the south and west. This office does not believe that, at least in the immediate future, any large striking force will be involved. Any offensive operations by the Allied Nations in this area should be expedited.

Forces Involved - CruDiv Six, CruDiv Eighteen, DesRon Six, Gunboat Division Eight, maximum of one SubRon (operating to southward) plus the normal shore based aircraft groups, Army forces, and supply vessels.

(c) Strong indications of offensive action from Java and Timor areas have been recently noted. The objectives are not clear but the sudden increase of the Third Fleet activity plus presence in Palao of Chief of Staff First Air Fleet is significant.

Forces Involved - Probably no more than normal Third Fleet augmented by CruDiv Five.

(d) Persistent indications of a movement toward Singapore and Indian Ocean lead to the conclusion that a large increase in convoys may be expected there.

Forces Involved - ZUIKAKU, two CA's, and present Malay Force of destroyers, submarines, etc.

3. It will be noted that no mention is made above of the BatDivs and CarDivs. At present the CarDivs which are the key to the situation are in the Empire. The direction of movement of these carriers will indicate the next operations. If the carriers move to Palao, Takao area the next operation will be to the south and west. If the carriers move toward Saipan the direction of operations will be toward the east and south. It is hoped and expected that information will become available to forecast the movement in sufficient time. Apparently plans have not progressed to the point where the fleet is preparing to move as yet. In other words, the forthcoming operations of the Japanese Fleet have not progressed.
July 24, 1942.

Subject: Japanese Naval Operations; Estimate of.

...to the point where they are discussed in messages between fleet commands and units, nor to the point where the scope or area is indicated to Radio Intelligence. It is, of course, possible that no operations other than those mentioned in Paragraph 2 are planned for the immediate future.

W. J. ROCHEFORT.
MEMORANDUM

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Capt. McConville

On about 24th August start working the attached estimate one to come the latter part of August and early September. It should be ready on short notice any time after 24th August.

OWN.

To: 17

retain
AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS
MONTH OF AUGUST - 1942.

1. Preliminary

This is not a formal Estimate of the Situation in that much data usually included in the establishment of the basis for solution of a problem is omitted. Also, own Courses of Action and the Decision (Leading to planned action) is beyond the scope of this paper. What is sought here is a complete examination of Enemy Capabilities insofar as the Pacific Theatre is concerned.

2. The Situation

(a) Enemy. As a result of the Coral Sea action and the Battle of Midway, Japan lost five carriers and had one damaged. They also had losses involving cruisers and destroyers. Some damage was inflicted on other units, including at least one battleship.

Shortly after the Battle of Midway, the Japanese carrier strength concentrated in Empire Waters, the last units coming from the Aleutains about the middle of July. During the latter part of July it is estimated that the carriers were reorganized and refitted. On August 1st it is believed that six CV and two XCV are available for employment. It is not to be expected that these carriers are as well trained or equipped as those encountered at Midway, nor can their screen be as complete. However, as there is danger in understimating their present capabilities, it will be assumed hereinafter that they are in all respects ready for any task.

There has been no recent change in Japan's battle- ship strength which effects this study. Ten battleships are available.

While little information is at hand regarding Japanese amphibious troops, large numbers who are well trained and equipped are believed available. It is known that Japan's shipping is already overtaxed and probably unable to undertake an additional major transportation and logistic problem.
(b) Own. Because of the employment of three carrier task forces in the South Pacific only one carrier task force is available on August 1st in the Central Pacific. Concentration of our carriers at Pearl from the South Pacific would take about twelve days. To move them to the Aleutians would involve about eight days more. Thus, to meet an advance of an enemy raiding or occupation force in the Central Pacific we would require over two weeks notice; and the North Pacific over three weeks notice.

Our battleship strength in the Pacific is still inferior to the enemy. TF-1 will operate near Hawaiian Area during part of August, but is not ready for battle because of lack of adequate screen and air coverage.

Air strength in the Hawaiian Area is inadequate to repel a determined raid. Midway is being strengthened by the addition of a landing strip on Sand Island. When that strip is completed, the entire present heavy bombing strength in the islands can operate from Midway. At present fighters can be brought into Midway by ship. The fighter staging project to Midway via French Frigate Shoals will not be completed before October.

A cruiser task force plus fairly good air strength is operating in the Aleutians. So far it has been ineffective, mainly because of bad weather and lack of air coverage in advance areas. The effort there is limited to attrition, using submarines and long range bombing. Effectiveness of long range bombardment of Japanese held positions in Kiska and Attu has not yet been demonstrated.

Our submarine offensive in Jap waters is now at low ebb because of the employment of submarines at Truk, and in the Aleutians. This condition will continue during August.

3. Background.

(a) Merely as a reminder, certain points of Japanese ambitions and trends are set down in the briefest sort of a way. As far back as the early nineties the Japs were not satisfied with their lot and determined to do something about it. To raise living standards and to care for their population pressure, they decided (1) to become an industrial nation, and (2) expand. For the first they needed ready access to raw materials. For the second they needed land suitable to Japanese. Their progress in attaining these goals has been steady, if
slow; but they have consistently stuck to the main ideas. Now that they have overrun the vast stretches of Malaysia need only to consolidate their gains to accomplish hegemony in the Orient. This being the case, it would seem reasonable that their one and only desire at present is to prevent outside interference until their exploitation of captured regions has made them impregnable in what they call their sphere of influence. Their attack on Pearl Harbor is further evidence that they desire above all to prevent our interference with Asiatic operations. The targets picked indicated only a desire to immobilize our Fleet.

(b) With the above in mind it seems logical to consider Japanese courses of action as limited for the present to making secure their extensive gains, rather than considering possible expansion not closely related thereto.

4. Threats to Japan.

Interference with Japanese plans can come from the following:

(1) China. The Sino-Jap war has been dragging along since 1937. While Japan dominates the richest part of China, there is no proof yet that this military gesture has paid commercial dividends. However, they cannot afford to lose that war and might be well satisfied with a strong and controlled puppet government and existing boundaries. As long as the China venture continues Japan must continue to pour in men and materials which they would probably rather use elsewhere.

(2) England. (Including India.) Today England is only a minor threat mainly because of her preoccupation with Germany. Her Far Eastern Fleet is not now able to penetrate the Malay barrier. Nor can her Fleet be of much use in the Bay of Bengal. Burma is sufficiently occupied by Japan to prevent an overland threat to the Indo-China rice. India is hardly pro-British. While British sea power is always a danger to Japan, there is nothing to indicate even a mild threat to Japan during August.

(3) Australia. At present Australia cannot take the offensive. Thanks to the United States there is the definite probability that Australia will become the jump off point for an offensive destined to defeat Japan. To make this possible the supply lines to Australia must be kept open to the United Nations. Of immediate interest is the Australian air activity in the SW Pacific. This is, so far, decidedly of minor proportions but enough to cause Japan some trouble and delay in consolidating her positions in the New Guinea, New Britain-Solomon Area.
(4) United States. Lacking troops and bottoms for an offensive thru the Mandates (even if we had the required types combatant available) there is little we can do now except in the South Pacific. Of course, Japan may not know this. She knows that we have an enormous building program, and that potentially (and eventually) we can muster the requisite strength to move thru the Central Pacific and gradually gain and maintain control of the sea areas vital to Japan. Her idea may be that before we are ready for such a move, Japan will be strong enough so that the game will not be worth the candle. In the meantime our greatest threat is the supplies, equipment, and men we are sending to the Southwest. Except for submarines, Pearl is too far away for use as an offensive jump off point, and we are too weak to gain nearer positions north of the equator.

(5) Russia. Here the danger lies in the proximity of air in the Vladivostok region to industrial Japan. Japan can hardly feel secure while this threat exists. Certainly she will not provoke war until she thinks that Russia is beaten by Germany, and until that beating takes shape in the removal of Russian aircraft from Siberia to the German front.

5. Broad Courses of Action.

Based on the idea expressed above, i.e. that Japan must now prevent interference with her exploitation in the Orient, the following are her broad courses of action:

(1) Step up military operations in China with view to obtaining a satisfactory stalemate in the Sino-Jap War.

Any increase in such military operations will be primarily an Army project. But it would have effect on other fronts because it would involve further demands on her national strength. Now that Japan has effectively stopped nearly all occidental reinforcements she is in a better position to offer China a compromise peace. The masses of Chinese may well be glad to end the struggle. The leaders may become discouraged if they continue to receive promises, but little real support. Especially if the war continues favorable to the Axis, and if Japan can administer some sort of a major local defeat on the Chinese, and if Oriental intrigue can be reasonably successful, there is the possibility of sufficient Japanese withdrawal from China to be acceptable to the Chinese.

As this is not expected during August it will not be considered as bearing on the immediate problem.
(2) A major effort to continue the offensive in the Indian Ocean.

If Japan could now occupy Ceylon their strategic position would be considerably enhanced as they would be in a position to better dominate the Bay of Bengal and the approaches of Singapore. Off-hand, it would seem logical that no such step would be taken unless Japan felt sure of the security of her eastern flank. And this is especially so now when the Far Eastern Fleet seems to have no idea of any action which will cause Japan trouble. On the other hand there is the bright prospect of winning India over to the Axis side. The effort would not be an attempt to conquer India, but to make a show of strength to discredit the British, and to bring the military, economic, and political fronts more nearly into alignment in that area. If Ceylon were captured, the stranglehold on India would be complete.

(3) Operations to: first, gain a foothold in Australia and; second, to extend their positions within striking distance of the U.S. - Australia supply line.

Jap positions in New Guinea will never be entirely secure as long as Port Moresby is strongly held and can continue as an air base. It is assumed that the Australians for the present will continue their sporadic and nuisance-value bombings. If the Japanese capture Port Moresby they will continue to be within bombing range of Australian air fields. Such a condition could continue a long time without serious injury to either side. With the elimination of the Port Moresby nuisance, though, Japans positions in the Solomons and their capability to advance to Noumea would be considerably enhanced.

It does not seem reasonable that Japan will, in the foreseeable future, make a serious attempt on the Australian mainland.

Because of their many good positions and relative security north of Timor Sea, the Japanese are well placed for operations in northwestern Australia. That area is fairly well isolated from the populous eastern Australia by the great stretches of wasteland. In order to better secure Timor, and Java by denying Australia jump off points such as Darwin and Broome, and to reduce the submarine menace from Western Australia, Japan may very possibly plan landings in force in that region. Such a move could conceivably take place in August.

On the other hand, many signs point toward their desire to occupy Port Moresby and to expand down through the New Hebrides and to New Caledonia. For the occupation of Port Moresby they must go overland unless they are willing to make another and stronger attempt via the Coral Sea. If they
are going overland they must use many more troops than have been reported in New Guinea up to now. A possible indication that such is intended is the information of large army forces probably enroute. If they are thinking of a sea borne attempt they would probably want to be stronger than they were in May. And if the sea borne attack is contemplated we could reasonably expect it to take place only after airfields are completed in S.E. New Guinea and at Guadalcanal. That done, they could operate their carriers under an air umbrella to the S.E. and S.W.

They may be content to defer the Port Moresby project for a while and go ahead into the Santa Cruz Islands and New Hebrides. This sort of an operation would seem to call for considerable carrier strength, but not a comparatively large number of troops. If it were done step by step (and it probably would have to be as landing fields cannot be captured but must be built) the operation could hardly be more than started during August.

(4) Raids on our line from Midway to Suva.

These are always possible and well within Japan's capabilities. Good jumping off places are available to them in the Marshalls. Such operations South of Hawaii would not have to be in force, and would be hit and run in order to delay our efforts. It does not seem probable at the moment that Japan could seriously try to occupy and hold any positions east of the 180th meridian in the South Pacific. In the Hawaiian Area the most damage they could do would be at Pearl Harbor. Another successful surprise raid at Pearl is always a possibility as long as it preserves the carrier fleet.

(5) Seizure and occupation of the Hawaiian Islands.

While there is good reason for Japan to want to do this, her available strength for the operation is not in sight. It is true that she can bring to bear a force large enough to cover the necessary troop movement if most of our strength is elsewhere. But there just does not seem sufficient tonnage available to her to transport and support any such effort. It is true that if she could arrive at a time when our task forces are absent and when the Hawaiian air force is weak, Japan could probably gain a foothold on outlying islands. After gaining such a foothold she could easily lose the war in trying to dig in. It would offer the finest sort of attrition possibilities to us. We have only to remember that we could find no way to support Guam and Wake. In fact they were considered by many as a liability.
The seizure and occupation of Midway was undoubtedly a plan of the Japanese in early June. What their ultimate objective was in that campaign is not known. If they were satisfied merely to occupy it to deny it to us they would thereby, (1) restrict our westward air search; (2) deny Midway to us as a fuel topping off place; (3) eliminate our chance of bombing Wake with present planes. Maybe this, plus undoubted value to them for the same purpose to the eastward, is considered enough to cause them to make another attempt. But again, they would have an almost impossible situation. Holding Pearl, we could undoubtedly make their logistic problem impossible. And they could not defend the place against inevitable recapture. We conclude, then, that the Japs will not attempt to occupy Midway except as part of a campaign to capture all of the Hawaiian Islands.

(6) A further advance to the Eastward in the Aleutians.

Here it all depends on the estimate of why they went there in the first place. If they went there to cause a diversion they have succeeded in immobilizing a cruiser task force, and no further effort is immediately necessary. If they want a base to operate from to protect northern fisheries they may need only to strengthen present positions. If they want to interrupt a possible air ferry route to Siberia via the Aleutians they need go no further. But if they want to cause us serious worry in that region they must move considerably more to the east. As this is not a good CV operating area it would seem that the chances of large scale CV covering forces operating against shore based air now known present are small. Nevertheless, such a course is possible.

(7) An attack on Russia.

This depends so much on European operations now underway that it serves no useful purpose to guess. Suffice to say that CVs could be employed.
6. Remarks

(a) We are no longer reading the enemy mail and today (August 1) we must depend almost entirely on traffic analysis to deduce enemy deployment. There is a chance that, during August, we will improve in this respect.

(b) We have only the flimsiest sort of a surface picket line to warn us of hostile approach, and must rely on air search and radar.

(c) As there are so many possibilities open to Japan there does not seem to be any profit in making wild guesses as to their next move. From a purely strategic point of view the only move during August which seems likely is expansion in the direction of the New Hebrides.
Recent reinforcements in area have come via Truk. Army in Davao appears to be showing interest in this area. Present forces appear to be committed where now located, except Rabaul. Scattered land forces are incapable of mutual support. I estimate maximum that could be assembled as a striking force in area without abandoning present positions is about 5,000, provided shipping and assault equipment is available. These could be taken from Rabaul. Reinforcements from outside area are subject only to available shipping and escort forces but could probably not reach area in less than 20 days.

O. T. PFEIFFER.
### U. S. FORCES IN SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

1. **Present Defense Forces:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efate</td>
<td>6936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espiritu Santo</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>17673</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tongatabu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tutuila</td>
<td>10730</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upolu</td>
<td>4260</td>
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<td>Savali</td>
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<td>Wallis</td>
<td>2426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borabora</td>
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**Total** 79,303

2. **Mobile Defense Forces:**

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<tr>
<th>Battalion/Marines</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Marine Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Marine Defense</td>
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<td>3d Barrage Balloon</td>
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**Total** 2,375

3. **Mobile Attack Forces:**

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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1st Marine Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Marine (Regt)</td>
<td>4736</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Marine Raider</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 19,039

4. **Present Forces South Pacific Area**

**Aggregate** 100,717

5. **Prospective increases by October 1st (Picador & Opium):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Army AA Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Marines (reinforced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Marines (reinforced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Barrage Balloon Squadrions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Av. Engineer Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Pioneer Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 11,734
6. Contemplated Garrisons: (from 2 and 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ndeni</td>
<td>5124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulagi - Florida</td>
<td>4541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
<td>1762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,427</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Remaining for offensive or defensive action (less combat losses) after operations contemplated in Phase 1-9987 (2 plus 3 less 6 but not including 5)

**NOTE:** Present contemplated distribution will have to extend to Malaita and Santa Isabel Island. This will probably be accomplished by using AA regiments and defense forces now in present bases plus the Army AA regiment in prospect.
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS
September 1, 1942.

1. Preliminary.

This is a continuation of the Estimate of enemy capabilities for the month of August. Much contained in that estimate will not be repeated. Events to September 1st, 1942, are reflected herein.

2. Brief of Events during August, 1942.

South Pacific. The offensive in the SOLOMONS started on August 7th. All enemy positions in the TULAGI area were captured. About 15,000 Marines were landed. An airfield at GUADALCANAL was captured and air search advanced to NDENI and ESPIRITU SANTO. Since that time our forces have been consolidating positions under the protection of carrier task forces and shore based air. As was to be expected, repercussions were immediate. On the 9th an enemy cruiser and destroyer force sank four of our screening cruisers and damaged one cruiser and two destroyers off SAVO Island. One good sized enemy landing attempt was annihilated on GUADALCANAL. Our positions in the area have been bombed frequently, and minor landings continued to the end of the month. The bombing raiders have been attacked very successfully by our air forces at GUADALCANAL causing the enemy considerable losses. A large number of submarines continue to attack our line of communications to the TULAGI area. On the 24th (local) four large groups of enemy ships were discovered north and west of MALAITA approaching the TULAGI area. One group contained 2 CVs; another contained 1 CV; another was thought composed of 1 BB, 4 cruisers and several destroyers; and the fourth was probably made up of 2 or 3 APs escorted by cruisers and destroyers. Our carriers and shore based air engaged in an air duel with these enemy vessels. As a result the enemy sustained damage to her carriers and other vessels, the extent of which is obscure, and returned to the northward. The Japs lost a large number of carrier based planes in the duel. The ENTERPRISE received bomb hits which will keep her out of action for a long time. On the 30th the SARATOGA was torpedoed and seriously damaged by a Jap submarine - reducing our carriers available in the Pacific to two.

Gilbert Islands. On August 17 (local) a Marine Raider group made a very successful landing on MAKIN Island from submarines. While stiffer opposition was encountered than was expected, the raid stirred up the enemy considerably and was well worth while.
Central Pacific. The BOISE was sent toward Japan to attack an enemy sampan patrol line estimated to be 500 to 800 miles east of HONSHU. No patrol vessels were sighted, but due to an error in navigation the BOISE lost two search planes. One of these planes was found four days later by the Japs and apparently created the impression that a BLUE striking force was enroute Japan. At any rate, the enemy hurriedly sent out a force built around 3 CVs to investigate.

North Pacific. On August 7th the main body of Task Force 8 bombarded Kiska. The firing was indirect and low ceiling prevented spotting or observation of results. No enemy reaction has been noted following this attempted diversion. It has been decided to build an Army airfield on ADAK Island. Task Force 8 will cover this operation which began on August 30th. The CASCO was torpedoed by a Jap sub at NAZAN Bay and severely damaged.

3. The Situation.

(a) Enemy. Our offensive in the TULAGI area has produced severe repercussions in Japan and all signs point to an early and major effort on their part to recapture the positions we have taken. Indications are that a large portion of enemy air and surface units throughout the entire Pacific Theatre are being concentrated in the South Pacific. The estimate of strength of these forces changes from day to day and is not included herein, but is available on short notice. Strong striking forces consisting of at least 3 CVs (one may be badly damaged), 1-2 BBs, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and good sized shore based air are operating in the South Pacific. Additional carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers now may be enroute to that area. Troops are being transferred to the RABaul area from as far west as the N.E.I. and PHILIPPINES. The enemy has made a new landing at MILNE BAY which now seems unsuccessful. His efforts in NEW GUINEA have been small since the Coral Sea Battle. The enemy occupied OCEAN, NAURU, and APAMANA Islands during the last part of August.

(b) Own. Two carrier task forces are now operating in the South Pacific. The ENTERPRISE and SARATOGA will either be repaired at PEARL or on the West Coast. They cannot be in service in the area during September.
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS (Cont'd)

(b) Own (Continued).

The positions in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area are being improved gradually. The supply of food and ammunition to the forces ashore is proceeding under great difficulties. Unloading facilities are primitive in the extreme. While enroute and unloading, our ships are constantly vulnerable to enemy submarines, shore based air, destroyers, cruisers, motor torpedo boats. The enemy striking forces and submarines threaten the line of supply from the South. There is a great shortage of shore based aircraft in the area. Army types are particularly desired.

Two new BBs, the WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA plus 1 CL and 6 DDs are now enroute to the South Pacific. They are expected to arrive in the active area about September 5th and 15th.

As there has been no improvement in the Army air situation in the Hawaiian Area, the extreme vulnerability of the MIDWAY-HAWAII line continues. It must be assumed that for the next 30 days a raid on that line could not be prevented. One group of B-24s are scheduled to arrive at HAWAII about September 10th and the Army has advised that no more heavy planes are to be expected in September. To reduce the possibilities of a successful enemy landing, Task Force 1 is being kept at PEARL.

Task Force 8 continues to operate in the ALEUTIANS. The net result to date has been the immobilization of the surface forces. Our Fleet submarines there have probably sunk at least six enemy DDs. We have lost one submarine and a number of airplanes.

Our submarine offensive in Jap waters continues to be at a low ebb because of withdrawals to ALASKA and to TRUK and KAVIENG.

Our convoy operations continue to be satisfactory as no losses have resulted. The escorts employed are urgently needed elsewhere.

4. Threats to Japan.

(1) China. No additional remarks.

(2) England. No additional remarks.
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS (Cont'd)

(3) Australia. The air attacks in the Southwest Pacific continue to be of a minor character. No substantial increase in the threat from Australia during the month is noted. However, as time goes on the forces in Australia should become considerably better trained and equipped. As long as our submarines continue to base on both the west and east coasts Japan will be uneasy about them.

(4) United States. The present offensive in the Southwest Pacific is the only active threat. It is now too early to say whether or not this threat will become critical. The long pull threat of the United States continues.

(5) Russia. Because of the deterioration of Russia's position on her western front the threat to Japan is remote. The potential danger of hostile Russian action against Japan still exists.

5. Broad Courses of Action.

At this time it seems almost a certainty that there will be an all out offensive to recapture lost positions in the SOLOMONS and, if all goes well, to extend positions toward NEW CALEDONIA.

But as we can never be sure, the following must be considered within Japanese capabilities:

(a) Another attempt to capture MIDWAY.

This is not considered possible as long as the Japs are engaged in a major effort in the South Pacific. But Japan can now break off in the south and muster a large force off MIDWAY before we can bring in sufficient forces to prevent a landing. If the enemy arrives off MIDWAY in force, undetected, MIDWAY would probably fall.

(b) A further extension of effort in the ALEUTIANS.

This is considered possible but not probable. It seems more probable that her effort there will be to supply present positions for the winter.

(c) An attack on Western AUSTRALIA.

This possibility would cause us serious embarrassment and might do large damage to our TULAGI venture by the draining off our surface and air to repel such an attack. It must not be discounted and should be regarded as a diversion attempt.
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS (Cont'd)

(d) Raids on our positions from MIDWAY to NOUMEA.

These would be to cause diversion and must be considered quite possible. They would be in connection with a main effort in the SOLOMONS.

(e) An offensive toward INDIA.

This would require a strategic defensive attitude in the Pacific. Possible, but improbable.

(f) An attack on RUSSIA.

Mainly an army effort and would not greatly effect current estimated intentions in the Pacific.

6. Most probable enemy intention.

As stated above the most probable enemy intention as of September 1, 1942, is to recapture the SOLOMONS and extend further to the South. The capture of eastern NEW GUINEA, including Pt. MORESBY, is considered a part of the plan. His effort may be visualized as follows:

1st, proceeding and during an all out attack in the GUADALCANAL-TULAGI area the enemy may be expected to (in that area):

(a) Continue his submarine reconnaissance in that area and along our lines of communications, and attack prime targets.

(b) Continue air attacks on our ships and positions using shore based air.

(c) Occasionally shell our shore positions.

(d) Attack our transports and freighters with cruisers, destroyers, and motor torpedo boats bothday and night; especially while unloading.

(e) Make minor repeated landings.

2nd, during a major attack in the GUADALCANAL-TULAGI area to:

(a) Raid our positions in the NEW HEBRIDIES.
6. (continued)

The purpose of this would be to break up our lines of supply and destroy advanced airfields, airplanes, and supplies of all kinds.

(b) Occupy NDENI.

This would be to deny it to us, give them an advanced position for further moves south, and protect recaptured positions.

7. There are listed below possible diversion attempts which might precede the major attack or be timed with the attack. As these are considered not probable they are not discussed further.

(a) A raid in force on FIJI or SAMOA.

(b) A light raid on OAHU.

(c) A light raid on our air staging positions south of OAHU.

(d) A raid on MIDWAY or JOHNSTON.

8. Except for events since August 24th, this estimate was completed that day. Since then captured documents and events have shown the estimate to be substantially correct.