Command Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN
Nimitz “Graybook”
7 December 1941 – 31 August 1945

Volume 7 of 8

Running Estimate and Summary
maintained by CINCPAC staff
covering the period 1 July 1945 to 31 August 1945

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The 8 volumes are paginated as follows:

**Volume 1** (7 December 1941 to 31 August 1942): pages 1 - 861
**Volume 2** (1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942): pages 862 – 1262
**Volume 3** (1 January 1943 to 30 June 1943): pages 1263 – 1612
**Volume 4** (1 July 1943 to 31 December 1943): pages 1613 – 1830
**Volume 5** (1 January 1944 to 31 December 1944): pages 1831 – 2485
**Volume 6** (1 January 1945 to 1 July 1945): pages 2486 – 3249
**Volume 7** (1 July 1945 to 31 August 1945): pages 3250 – 3548
**Volume 8** (Selected dispatches concerning the period 30 December 1941 – 30 April 1942 and pertaining to the Battle of Midway): pages are not sequentially numbered. Note: Volume 8 contains dispatch copies, many of which were poorly reproduced at the time of compilation. Some portions are illegible.

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United States Naval War College, Newport, RI
2013
GRAYBOOK SUMMARY

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1 JULY 1945 - 31 August 1945
GABILAN (SS 252) tracked properly illuminated hospital ship approximately 300 miles southeast of TOKYO, suspected to be enroute to MARCUS or WAKE.

For the third successive day there have been almost no plane sightings of ships among south KOREAN Islands.

Two more submarine contacts are reported; one by a merchantman southeast of the MARIANAS near yesterday's PC contact, the other near PARECE VELA by a PC escorting a convoy.

TF 31 dissolved this date and all local defense functions assumed by Commander RYUKYUS. TF 32 remains in the area as covering force. Composition 3 OBB, CA/CL and escorting destroyers. CTF 32 has overall command of other 3rdFlt forces in the area, including TF 39 (Mine Flotilla), TG 30.5 (Search and Recco. Group - FAW 1), and unit of 30.9 (Logistics Support Group). TF 38 departed LEYTE today for exercises preparatory to extended operations.

573 B-29s were over the Empire last night on bombing and mining missions. 159 aircraft struck KUMAMOTO, 136 aircraft hit SHIMONOSEKI, 100 aircraft were over UBE and 154 bombed KURE. One plane was lost enroute to the target, 6 of the crew have been reported rescued. 24 B-29s mined the east entrance to the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS; the NANAO and FUSHIKI areas were also mined.

142 Mustangs attempted to strike the NAGOYA airfields. HAMAMATSU was the only field hit due to bad weather conditions over the other targets. 12 aircraft from the same group hit HAMASHIMA seaplane base destroying 1 hangar, 1 SCL, 4 SD; other light vessels were damaged. 2 planes were lost, 1 pilot rescued.

In the RYUKYUS on the 1st 21 B-25s bombed CHIRUN airfield in southern KYUSHU. P-47s on continuous CAP over KYUSHU destroyed 4 seaplanes and flamed 1 Betty. Neutralization raids were carried out against other islands in the RYUKYUS.

7 P-47s escorted by 1 Privateer left 1 DD and 1 medium freighter burning in HANGCHOW BAY. 2 3000-ton freighters were damaged off the SW coast of KYUSHU.

FAW 1 planes sank 2 small ships and damaged 1 in the YELLOW SEA.

During June search planes of the 7thFlt destroyed 161 ships totalling 30,320 tons and damaged 209 totalling 25,435 tons. In addition 9 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 18 March (18 Mar. - 30 June, Incl) total 4,941. 5 enemy planes destroyed by TG 99.2 since 1 July.

COMPHIBSPAC 271435 (pink) outlines tentative agreement with FEAOF and 5th AF for employment of Marine Air Warning Squadrons in OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 010151 (pink) outlines action to be taken to alleviate critical backlog of shipping at OKINAWA.

COMHANSEAPRON 010500 (pink) recommends category of defense of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS be reduced to Category of Defense A with modifications.

CINCPAC ADV 010842 directs that CTF 93 continue to have responsibility for neutralization of Jap islands in the Central Pacific.
2 July (Guam date)

Commanding Officer of SPROSTON (DD 577) definitely claims sinking a midget submarine on 28 June.

MURRAY (DD 576) is enroute to intercept and board Japanese hospital ship believed to be TAKASAGO MARU. This vessel may be heading for WAKE. Special air search has also been initiated.

TF 38 is conducting exercises in PHILIPPINE SEA enroute to fueling rendezvous.

TIGRONE arrived at GUAM with 23 survivors transferred to her from three other boats. Added to the record total of 28 survivors which she earlier picked up and disembarked at IWO, this makes a total rescue of 51 fliers brought in by one boat on one patrol.

493 B-29s hit Empire industrial targets on 1 July. Fighter opposition was nil to weak at all targets. At UBE fires were visible to 125 miles on withdrawal.

A 24 plane CAP maintained continuously over southern KYUSHU during daylight on the 2nd shot down 4 Zekes and 4 Tonys.

FAW 1 planes off western KYUSHU probably sank 1 SAS and 3 SD on the 1st; on the 2nd 1 SC was destroyed off KUNSAN and 1 SD damaged. It attacks near CHUSAN ISLAND 7 P-47s escorted by a PB4Y-2 destroyed 1 SA, left 1 FTC burning and damaged 1 enemy aircraft on the ground. From 25 June to 1 July inclusive planes of FAW 1 sank 15,230 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 9,510 tons. The cumulative totals are 137,875 tons sunk, 138,400 tons damaged, with 37 enemy aircraft destroyed and 26 enemy aircraft damaged. During the week 3 PB4Y-2s with crews were lost.

TAF planes, in addition to KYUSHU and CHINA Coast attacks, continued hitting ISHIKAKI and KIKAI airfields. MAC-31 is now at CHIMU Field and MAG-14 is at AWASE Field, both on OKINAWA.

CINCAFPAC 301407 recommends to JCS continuation of existing Area Petroleum Officers to control theater petroleum requirements.

RICHARDSON 012010 announces that effective 1 July ComGenPOA-ComGen Hawaiian Department assumes the title ComGenAFMidPac.

CINCPAC ADV 020021 directs MURRAY (DD 576) to intercept and board hospital ship suspected enroute to WAKE.

CINCPOA ADV 020255 (pink) recommends ComPhibsPac and ComGen 6th Army be charged jointly with embarkation of OLYMPIC land forces.

CINCPOA ADV 020908 (pink) expresses no objection to designation of 7th and 27th Divisions in OKINAWA as GHQ reserve for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 020913 (pink) requests CINCAFPAC’s concurrence in proposal for providing Port Director Units at all ports in KYUSHU.
2 July (Guam date)

LAPON (SS 260) sighted a hospital ship headed for CHICHI JIMA on 2 July.

The evening of 2 July approximately 275 miles NW of WAKE a party from USS MURRAY boarded the Jap A// TAKASAGO MARU enroute to WAKE and finding no reason to detain her directed her to continue her voyage.

The night of 3 July 434 B-29s hit TOKUSHIMA, KOKI, TAKAMATSU and HIMEJI. Photographs taken on the 2nd show the following percentage destruction of built-up areas which were attacked on the 29th with incendiaries: MOJII 28.3%, NOBEOKA 36%, SASEBO 17.9% and SHIMONOSEKI 36%. In the 4 targets here assessed, total destruction reported is 1,755 square miles, which is 28% of the total built-up areas in the targets. The assessment is not complete because of smoke.

On 2 July 56 P-47s protected 5 photo PB4Ys over KYUSHU, driving off 13 Oscars after they had damaged 1 Liberator and wounded 2 crewmen. The 24 plane F4U CAP was over KYUSHU for 2 hours prior to noon, apparently, and not during all of daylight as planned. On 3 July 26 P-47s hit the Kanoya airfield control tower, strafing barracks and administration buildings, and firing 6 single-engine aircraft.

Off TSUSHIMA ISLAND a FAW 1 Privateer destroyed 1 SD by bombing and strafing on the 2nd. On the 3rd 1 SD was sunk NE of SATSU TO, and FAW 13 planes probably sank 1 and damaged 1 SD off HACHIJU JIMA.

In attacks on the 2nd against SAKISHIMA 1 TBM was shot down by MIYAKO AA. A Dumbo picked up all members of the crew. On the 3rd 32 F4Us hit ISHIGAKI, exploding 1 single-engine enemy aircraft on the ground, and scoring a direct hit on a gun position.

MURRAY (DD 576) 031310 reports boarding the Jap A// TAKASAGO MARU and after examination directing her to proceed on her voyage.

4 July (Guam date)

TF 38 is enroute to its first rendezvous, with task groups exercising independently. Units of TG 30.3 departed MARIANAS enroute to rendezvous. TF 39 starts sweep of area "JUNEAU" tomorrow. TF 32 and CVE of TG 32.1 are in support. British oilers are enroute to their fueling rendezvous.

On the 4th, approximately 320 planes were over the Empire on attack, escort, mining and reconnaissance missions. This total includes about 500 B-29s at TAKAMATSU, KOKI, TOKUSHIMA and HIMEJI, 30 B-29s mining, 132 F-51s over TOKYO airfields, 32 P-47s to KYUSHU, 48 P-51s scheduled for KYUSHU, and 104 fighters scheduled to escort photo planes over KYUSHU (confirmation of last 2 missions have not been received).

Enemy aircraft opposition to the P-51 strike was slight and only 1 Jap plane was shot down. On the ground 8 enemy aircraft were destroyed, 4 probably destroyed and 20 damaged.

On the 3rd 26 B-25s and 32 F4Us attacked CHIRAN drone and dispersal areas. 48 P-51s of the 5th AF swept the western coast of KYUSHU, losing 1 plane.

North of the YANGTZE RIVER mouth a convoy of 2 large DD, 1 small DD, 2 PC, 1 FTC, 1 TB was attacked on the 4th by 8 P-47s, 6 PB4Y and 2 Privateers. Rocket hits fired the small DD and strafing fired 1 PC and damaged 1 DD and the TB. PB4Ys fired 6 torpedoes from 4-5,000 yards at altitude of 100-150 feet, getting good runs, but no hits.

- Continued -
4 July (Guam date) (Cont'd)

COM FEAF 040540 recommends that all air-sea rescue services from OKINAWA be operated by FEAF.

COMINCH & CNO 041350 (pink) requests review of requirements for artificial harbors for CORONET.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz returned to GUAM from the West Coast.

5 July (Guam date)

TAKASAKO MARU departed WAKE at 1600/5th and was intercepted 2½ hours later and boarded by MURRAY (DD 576). MURRAY reported that the ship had 974 patients, all bona fide. 490 were Navy, 484 Army. 15% were tuberculosis, 14 men were wounded, and the rest were suffering from serious malnutrition. Estimated 15% would not survive the voyage. 25% might be restored to duty in 60 days. Most certain no stores were landed. Destination believed YOKASUKA. No allied personnel aboard. The ship was directed to continue her voyage.

On the 4th 48 P-51s of the 5th AF swept KYUSHU, meeting no interception but some AA. 96 P-47s escorted 4 photo PB4Ys over KYUSHU through 3-10/10 clouds. There was no interception. On the 5th 32 P-51s of the 5th AF were over KYUSHU from 1200-1410, from 10,000 feet to the deck. 6 Georges intercepted, 4 of which were shot down, with the remaining 2 probably destroyed. There were no P-51 losses.

26 B-29s laid 228 mines in the western entrance to SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, in MAIZURO and in FUMAKAWA HARBOR (NW HONSHU).

103 P-51s struck TOKYO airfields on the 5th. On the ground 5 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 10 damaged. Hangars and installations were fired at SHIMODATE, and small and medium shipping targets were damaged south of TOKYO BAY. There was no enemy air opposition. 2 P-51s were damaged by AA.

3 pairs of Privateers roamed over southern and central KOREA, destroying or damaging 5 bridges, blocking 4 tunnels, destroyed 2 and damaged 4 locomotives, damaged a power house, a radio station and 5 lighthouses. An FTD was sunk south of SAISHU TO. F4U F6Ms sank 1 300-ton AK off the YOUKOF and damaged a lighthouse and barracks with bombs. Off GOTO RETTO (western KYUSHU) 1 SD was sunk and 1 damaged.

30 F4Us hit OKINO-ERABU and 24 F4Us plus 13 TBM's hit Wan Airfield at KIKAI.

6 July (Guam date)

TAGASAKA MARU now believed headed for YOKOSUKA rather than HOKKAIDO. However she started out on course 330, speed 15, and this course and speed was confirmed by a plane sighting at noon yesterday.

TF 39, the Mine Flotilla in area JUNEAU, has been maintaining radio silence, and has apparently not been discovered. TF 32 has deployed in a covering position to the westward of OKINAWA. TF 38 will pass south of IWO tomorrow towards its fueling rendezvous on the 8th with TG 30.3.

Sub sweep starts at 1900 tomorrow prior to run-in.

- Continued -
577 B-29s were over 5 Empire targets between 0018 and 0342 on the 7th. Fighter opposition was nil to slight at all targets and AA was generally nil to moderate.

On the 6th 112 P-51s attacked TOKYO airfields for the 2nd day in succession. Again airborne opposition was light with claims 1-0-6. On the ground P-51s claim 6-1-9. 1 P-51 was lost and 7 damaged.

FAW 16 planes destroyed 1 SD off SURUGA WAN, and left a second SD burning. FAW 1 planes sank 1 FTC and 1 FTD off SAISHU TO, exploded a gas dump on shore and shot down 1 Val.

From OKINAWA 6 photo PB4Ys and 5 P-51s escorted by 136 F4Us and P-47s were weathered out of KYUSHU at 1300. The fighters then attacked a possible FTB, with possible damage and destroyed several small boats in the AMAMI Area. At 1730 35 P-47s hit TOKUNO damaging the runways, dispersal areas, and gun positions.

COM3RDFLT 030515 (pink) expresses intention to carry out 10 July operation solely against aircraft but to strike NAGATO on 16-17 July.

CINCAFPAC 031353 (pink) requests transfer of 7th AF effective 6 July, including 3 Long Range Fighter Groups.

CGUSPCT 051200 (pink) comments to CINCPAC concerning MAPKO operation for obtaining intelligence in KOREA.

CINCPOA ADV 060553 (pink) requests ComGenAAFPOA's comments on disposition of 20th AF fighters in the RYUKYUS.

CINCPOA ADV 060554 (pink) concurs in transfer of 7th AF units not later than 15 July.

CINCPAC ADV 060617 requests that 1st Marine Aircraft Wing be released to operational control of Com7thFlt immediately.

CINCPOA ADV 060626 directs that all 7th AF units in OKINAWA report to CTG 99.2 pending assignment to CINCAFPAC.

CINCPAC ADV 060822 (pink) concurs in use of destroyers for FORT BAYARD project until about 15 September.

CINCPAC ADV 060829 recommends to Cominch facilities at MANUS to be made available to the British Pacific Fleet.
7 July (Guam date)

GABILAN (SS 252) reports attacking an RO sub off TOKYO.

Com3rdFlt has detached a destroyer, McDERMUT (DD 677), with ComDesDiv 108 embarked to search for and intercept the TAKASAGO MARU. She has orders to board, seal her radio, and escort her clear of our forces. CTF 94 has despatched planes to assist in the search. They have been directed to fly along an arc which represents line of position of ship at 15 knots from her last reported position.

TF 39 has completed sweep of the first 12 miles of area JUNEAU without encountering any mines. TF 32 remains in a covering position. TF 38 is at fueling rendezvous with TG 30.8.

31 P-51s of the 5th AF, forced by weather to stay in the KAGOSHIMA BAY Area of KYUSHU, attacked locomotives and railroad cars. 6 photo PB4Ys, escorted by 128 fighters, found KYUSHU overcast and got no pictures.

FAW 1 planes damaged 5 3D south of SHANTUNG PENINSULA. Just west of SASEBO a Privateer, attacked by fighters, shot down 1 and then itself was shot down. Subsequent search failed to locate survivors, and the SEA ROBIN, lifeguard in the area, believes the enemy has them.

PBJs on the nights of 5/6th and 6/7th scored rocket hits on 4 300-foot unidentified vessels and 1 150-foot ship, all south and southeast of HONSHU.

FAW 16 planes during June sank 16,300 tons of enemy shipping and damaged or probably sank 11,150 tons more. They destroyed 3 enemy aircraft and probably destroyed or damaged 13.

12 F4Us in attacks on the SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 6th burned 3 planes on the ground. TAF planes burned four at TOKUMO on the 7th out of 12 possibly operational planes seen.

COMINCH & CNO 071310 (pink) outlines RAF airfield construction forces and requests CINCPAC to designate destination for lst echelon, known as Shield Force, and time for movement of 2nd echelon, known as Vacuum Force.

8 July (Guam date)

TAKASAGO MARU was picked up by a search plane at 1005 8th at 32-10 N 157 E. Destroyer is on intercepting course. No report of her investigation received.

Minesweepers of TF 39 are progressing in area JUNEAU about as scheduled. On the 7th 19 moored mines were swept and 5 floaters destroyed. All were found along the general line indicated by captured charts.

166 TAF planes attacked OMURA airfield and installations. The 47 B-24s, 25 B-25s and 94 P-47s hit AA positions, barracks, shops and dispersal areas with fragmentation bombs and incendiaries. Many fires were started. 1 B-25 and 9 B-24s were holed by AA but all returned safely.

In attacks on MITAKO on the 7th 12 F4Us and 18 TBMs destroyed 2 twin-engine planes in a revetment. Other F4Us at AMARI burned 4 of 11 3D and probably damaged the other 7. 3 float planes were strafed and 2 exploded.

- Continued -
8 July (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CINCPOA ADV 080301 (pink) contains proposed reorganization of PhilSeaFron and Com7thFlt in order to free the latter for OLYMPIC.

CINCPOA ADV 080340 (pink) requests ComGenPOA and ComHawSeaFron recommendations for reductions in the category of defense.

CINCPOA ADV 080302 (pink) requests early determination by CINCAFPAC of location of Naval Air Base in the KYUKUS.

CINCAFPAC 061059 (pink) concurs with CINCPAC 020913 concerning provision of Port Directors for OLYMPIC.

2 July

Minesweeping operations in EAST CHINA SEA continue. TF 38 strikes TOKYO tomorrow.

On the 9th 549 effective B-29s were over SENDAI, Gifu, YOKKAICHI, SAKAI and WAKAYAMA, bombing with incendiaries. On the same date 30 B-29s mined the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

43 B-24s attacked OMURA airfield with P-47 escort. The P-47s shot down 10 biplane trainers over western KYUSHU. 61 B-25s with 48 P-4U escorts, weathered out of CHIRAN, attacked TOKUNO airfield and OKINO-ERABU with 43 tons of frag clusters. 48 other P-4Us, weathered out of KYUSHU, attacked KIKAI, AIMA and TOKUNO.

On the 8th 114 P-51s attacked airfields in the TOKYO area meeting aggressive enemy fighter opposition. P-51s shot down 5 and destroyed 23 on the ground. 7 P-51s were lost, but 3 pilots rescued.

2 Privateers of FAW 1 broadcasting a description of their trip over CBS, sank 2 SCS and 2 luggers, and damaged 1 SD and 2 more luggers off SW KOREA. West of SASEBO 8 P-47s escorted by 1 Privateer, sank 1 FTC and damaged a 2nd and fired a 150-foot ship. The explosion of the FTC knocked down 1 P-47. The remaining P-47s were attacked by 8 Tojos and Georges and 1 P-47 was shot down. 1 Tojo was also shot down.

FAW 1 seaplanes on the 9th sank 1 SD south of SHANTUNG PENINSULA, and damaged a small PT. Fire from the latter vessel holed 1 search plane and wounded 5 members of the crew.

COM7THFLT 060200 concurs in CINCPAC 060329 concerning recommended facilities for BPF at MANUS.

CINCPAC ADV 080614 warns Com34dFlt that TAKASAGO MARU has a short coal supply and that she should not be brought into a U.S. port.

CINCAFPAC 090057 (pink) objects to phrases in CINCPACA Joint Staff Study concerning transfer of command from Commander Amphibious Forces to ComGen Expeditionary Troops.

CINCPAC 090900 (pink) directs Com7thFlt to provide 2 LSTs for CINCAFPAC headquarters ships.

CINCPAC 090901 (pink) outlines naval organization ashore for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 090907 (pink) recommends relocation of MCB KYUSHU from TAKASU to the western side of KAGOSHIMA.
10 July (Guam date)

ComDesDiv 108 reported that he had taken the TAKASAGO MARU under escort and was proceeding on a general southwesterly course clear of TF 38's operating area. He was directed to release her sometime between 1800 today and 1800 tomorrow, to proceed to YOKOSUKA.

TF 39 is proceeding with their mine clearance without incident. 37 more mines swept and about one-third of the area covered. Force was snooped on the 5th and 6th; 1 plane was shot down.

ComServDiv 104 is shifting all facilities from KERAMA to BUCKNER BAY.

Forces from CHINA are landing on 5 islands off the CHINA Coast in the north part of FORMOSA STRAITS; landings will continue through to the end of July.

Com3rdFlt reports preliminary results of the 1st 3 of 7 strikes against TOKYO airfields on the 10th. Only 9 aircraft were seen airborne in the target area. Photos show 693 aircraft on 17 fields, with pilot reports adding 175 more on 7 additional fields, for a total of 868 on 24 fields. So far 72 enemy aircraft have been destroyed on the ground and 30 damaged. The 37 fuses were highly effective. The force was snooped about noon and 2 recco planes were splashed by our CAP. Our losses so far are 1 F4U and 4 TBM. TF 38 will retire tonight to refuel and rendezvous with TF 37 tomorrow.

109 P-51s hit airfields in the NAGOYA-OSAKA area on the 9th meeting 36 aggressive enemy fighters over OSAKA. The P-51s scored 12-4-10 in the air, and 4-0-1 on the ground. 1 P-51 was lost and 5 damaged. On the 10th 102 P-51s hit airfields in the KOBE-OSAKA Area shooting down 1 airborne enemy aircraft and scoring 13-0-4 on the ground. 3 P-51s were lost.

On the 9th 43 B-24s with 6 P-47 escorts attacked OMURA airfield starting 3 fires. On the 10th 41 P-51s attempted to sweep KYUSHU, but weather prevented. 1 P-51 was lost.

On the 9th Privateers in TSUSHIMA STRAIT sank 2 SD and left a 3rd burning, beached 1 lugger and sank 1. In SW KOREA 2 phosphate plants were bombed. FAW 13 Liberators slightly damaged 1 125-ft picket boat and seriously damaged 1 FTB E of HONSUH at 36-13 N. FAW 1 planes, from 2 - 8 July inclusive, sank 8,780 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 1,040 tons, destroyed 4 enemy planes and damaged 3. Since arrival in the area FAW 1 planes have sunk 159 seagoing ships for 1/5,650 tons, damaged 194 for 138,930 tons, destroyed 41 enemy aircraft and damaged 29.

COMGENIAAFPOA 090847 concurs in transfer of Hdqtrs. 7th AF to FEAF with detailed recommendations to follow.

CINCPPOA ADV 100055 directs transfer of operational of 7th AF and temporarily of 20th AF units in KUWAIT to FEAF.

CINCPPOA ADV 100218 (pink) comments on CINCPAC 090215 concerning coordination of air forces.

CINCPPOA ADV 100238 (pink) provides tentative deployment of Privateer squadrons following OLYMPIC.

USAPPAC 100417 (pink) requests 14th AF intelligence information for purposes of coordination of operations between FEAF and 14th AF.

CINCPAC 100601 directs ComGenAFMidPac to review requirements for service troops in rear areas with a view to their reduction.

CINCPPOA ADV 100748 (pink) requests that ComGen CHINA provide CTR 33 with naval officers familiar with CHINA situation.
11 July (Guam date)

ComDesDiv 108 reported releasing TAKASAGO MARU at 24-57N 150-05E at 1000/1 on the 10th with orders to proceed to YOKOSUKA. After release she was tracked at 14 knots, but subsequent sightings indicate a speed of advance of only 9 knots.

TF 38 is scheduled to fuel on the 12th. At 1400 it will depart from fueling rendezvous for the run-in to northern HONSHU. CTG 94.1 has extended sectors from 120 which run east of HONSHU to a maximum distance of 1120 miles and is running a barrier patrol between the force and JAPAN.

43 B-24s weathered out of KYUSHU on the 10th hit KAKI. 59 escorting P-47s ran into accurate AA which killed 2 pilots and forced 3 others to ditch. 62 B-25s bombed RONOH. 1 B-25 was lost as a result of a mid-air collision. 43 escorting F4Us strafed KIKAI and knocked out 5 AA positions. Accurate AA killed 1 pilot, forced a 2nd to ditch and a 3rd to belly land at base.

On the 11th bad weather over KOKUBU and MIYAKONOJO caused 150 F4Us and 9 TBMs to hit MIYAZAKI Airfield, starting large fires. 54 F4Us and 9 TBMs weathered out of KANOA EAST hit INUJO Airfield in the TANEGA SHIMA.

On the 10th FAW 13 planes left 1 of 2 1000-ton FTD dead in the water. FAW 13 planes on the 11th damaged 2 picket boats at 39-00 N, 141-55E; FAW 1 planes sank 1 SC and fired 1 SD in TSUSHIMA STRAIT.

29 B-29s laid 260 mines on the 9th. 1 B-29 was lost, believed shot down by AA in the target area.

Photos taken on the 11th show the Maruzen Oil Refinery at WAKAYAMA to have been 95% destroyed by the attack of the 6th-7th.

CINCPOA PEARL 030335 (pink) requests CINCAFPAC and COMGEN CHINA to comment on NAPKO project.

CINCPOA ADV 060825 constitutes Comdt. NOB OKINAWA as administrative senior for all naval activities in the OKINAWA Group.

CINCPAC ADV 110146 (pink) is OpPlan 4-45 for TF 95 for interruption of enemy shipping on CHINA Coast and in the EAST CHINA SEA.

CINCPAC ADV 110153 (pink) forms TF 95 composed of CruDivs 12 and 16.

CINCPAC ADV 110626 requests reply from CINCAFPAC concerning NAPKO.

CINCPAC ADV 110653 (pink) concerns destinations of units made available to CINCAFPAC from POA.

COMNAVGROUP CHINA 110752 (pink) proposes to provide CTF 95 with Chinese interpreters.

CINCPAC ADV 110827 (pink) cancels OpPlan 2-45 for defense of West Coast against Japanese carrier task force.

CINCPAC ADV 110828 lists ports and installations in the SEA OF JAPAN where heavy shipping traffic may be expected.

CINCPAC ADV 110832 (pink) requests ComGenFMFPac to prepare and keep up to date plans for the capture of WAKE.
12 July (Gum date)

Task Force 38 will be in position to strike northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO on the morning of the 13th.

Mine Flotilla continues sweeping in area JUNEAU. Almost half of the field has been covered. A total of 152 moored mines have been swept and 21 floaters sighted.

526 B-29s attacked Empire targets on the night of 12/13 July. 42 B-25s of a group of 58 attacked Kanoya drone on the 12th through the clouds with 16 hitting other targets. 64 P4Us flew cover. 47 B-24s found TSUIKI closed in and hit WAN airfield on KIKAI with 1451 frags. Results were unobserved. 61 P-47s escort hit TANEQA and KIKAI. VF(N) in the KYUKYUS splashed 1 Sally at 0420.

From 2345-0415 on the night of 11/12th 1 PBM of FAW 1 made 4 runs over SHANGHAI at 600 feet and dropped 9 100-lb. bombs and 3 fire bombs at 6 TB and PT tied up at the docks. No hits observed. The city was dimmed out.

Privateers of FAW 1 on the east coast of KYUSHU on the 12th destroyed 1 factory, heavily damaged a second when the boiler blew up, knocked out 1 span of a railroad bridge, burned 1 passenger train and 2 locomotives. AA holed both planes. 1 SD was destroyed north of SHANGHAI.

CINCPAC ADV 120814 (pink) requests DepCom 20 and ConGenPOA to inform CINCPAC in detail concerning Army units required in support of 20th Air Force.

- Continued -
12 July (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CG USFCT 121000 (pink) stipulates that all attacks on targets in CHINA Theater be cleared with CG CHINA Theater and that only precision bombing of urban targets be undertaken.

CG USFCT 121015 (pink) requests comment concerning FORT BAYARD project.

CINCPAC 121159 (pink) invites CINCPAC and DepCom 20th AF to attend conference at MANILA 17 July with CHINA Theater representatives concerning deception plan.

13 July (Guam date)

3rd Flt reported that TF 38 on the morning of the 14th was attacking northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, having effected complete surprise.

The Mine Flotilla on the 13th swept 43 more mines and departed the operating area for BUCKNER BAY for logistics. Sweeping will be resumed on the 19th, and is now two days ahead of schedule.

32 P-51s swept KYUSHU on the 12th meeting no interception. They strafed and damaged 1 SC, several small boats, and several airfields.

The Tactical Air Force, KYUKYUS, was dissolved as of 140001. (CTG 99.2 130803). 7th AF units (B-24, B-25, A-26 and P-5) temporarily assigned to the TAF now report to ComFEAF for operational control, as do 20th AF units (P-47) temporarily assigned to TAF. All Marine units report to the 2nd Marine Air Wing for operational control. The 2nd MAW now assumes the designation of TG 99.2.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 18 March: 18 March - 30 June inclusive - 4,941; 1 July - 13 July: TF 38 74, TF 37 0, TF 93 79, TG 30.5 4, 20th AAF 0, TF 94 0, TG 99.2 30; total 187.

COMINCH & CNO 112135 (pink) directs CINCPAC to submit by dispatch proposals for reorganization of naval forces in the southwest Pacific.

MACARTHUR 130731 (pink) directs ComAllied Air Forces, subject to concurrence of ComGen CHINA, to strike targets in SHANGHAI area in support of TF 95.

CINCPAC ADV 130744 requests Com7thFlt to submit a list of projects not yet completed but which are necessary for development of naval aviation in the PHILIPPINES during the war.

CINCPAC ADV 130749 (pink) comments on JCS 1406/2 which concerns the transfer of command of the KYUKYUS to CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADV 130751 (pink) in reply to COMINCH 112135 recommends reorganization of naval forces in the Southwest Pacific.

CINCPAC 130851 (pink) concurs in relocation of Naval Base from TAKASU to west coast of KAGASHIMA WAN north of YAMAGAWA KO.

CINCPAC ADV 130901 (pink) submits recommendations to COMINCH covering carrier air group complements during early 1946.
13 July (Guam date) (Cont’d)

RICHARDSON 131033 (pink) recommends against reduction or modification of category of defense in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

CINCAFPAC 131309 (pink) recommends postponement of MANILA meeting to 1 August in order that General Spaatz may be present.

CINCAFPAC 131311 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC 120726 concerning operational control of the 1st Marine Air Wing.

RUNNER 131320 (pink) reports results of mine reconnaissance off the SE Coast of KYUSHU.

14 July (Guam date)

Attacks on northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO were carried out on the 14th by planes of TF 38. Extensive damage to shipping and docks.

At noon, bombardment Group ABLE (TU 34.8.1) bombarded KAMAISHI for 2 hours. The steel mill there was demolished. Coke ovens were hit and burning furiously. The entire area was covered with dense smoke rising thousands of feet above the city, making detailed assessment of damage difficult. 1 plane crashed in the harbor.

In the afternoon, Com3rdFleet detached CruDiv 16 (R. Adm. Jones in PASADENA, SPRINGFIELD, ASTORIA, WILKES-BARRE) and 6 DD of DesRon 25 for a night speed anti-shipping sweep along the coast between 39N and 40N.

Part of Bombardment Group BAKER (TU 34.8.2), consisting of IWO, WISCONSIN and MISSOURI, plus 7 DD of DesRon 54, was detached early this morning to bomb Muroran. Primary target assigned is the steel and iron mills. Secondary target is the coal liquefaction plant.

Weather hampered plane strikes - the only field not completely closed in was Obihiro. Partial flash reports show 24 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and 62 damaged, mostly at Matsushima, Matsuda and Misawa fields in northern Honshu. 1 snooper was shot down 85 miles from the force.

In attacks on shipping the following resulted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 train ferries at sea</td>
<td>1 train ferry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 small AK</td>
<td>4 medium tankers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ODD</td>
<td>1 medium AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 picket boats</td>
<td>5 medium AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total - 15</td>
<td>8 small AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 DE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 tug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 lugger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total - 24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Continued -
Dock facilities at Hakodate, and railroad yards and rolling stock in southern Hokkaido were heavily damaged, with 27 locomotives destroyed.

Final reports of TF 38 strikes on the Tokyo Plains area on the 10th show 109 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and 231 damaged.

Photographs taken on the 10th of 65 airfields in the TOKYO area show 1791 operational planes (1478 single-engine, 313 twin-engine). The planes were extensively camouflaged and dispersed as much as 5 miles from runways, with existing roads used for taxiways.

On the 10th 1160 combat sorties expended 454 tons of bombs and 1648 rockets.

Our losses were 17 planes, 10 in combat and 7 operationally, with 7 pilots and 6 aircrewmens lost.

In the RYUKYUS one Betty was shot down at 21,000 feet, 50 miles north-west of OKINAWA.

The TAF, now dissolved, destroyed 625 airborne enemy aircraft from 7 April to 13 July, 496 by two Marine Air Wing planes, and 129 by AAF 301st Fighter Wing Plans. 29 were probably destroyed, 9 ships were destroyed and 37 damaged.

ComGenAir 091442 (pink) requests comments of ComGen FEAF concerning absorbing the 7th Air Force by 5th and 13th Air Forces.

100450 (pink)

ComGenAAFPOA/suspends any presentation of the "numbered Air Force proposal to Admiral Nimitz."

Com7thFleet 120014 (pink) comments to CINCAF PAC concerning reorganization of the 7th Fleet prior to OLYMPIC.

WARCOS 122019 (pink) requests that MANILA conference be deferred in order that General Spaatz may attend.

ComGenFEAF 122215 (pink) recommends that 7th Fighter Wing take over administration of Air Force units in Hawaii and that 7th Air Force be retained in existence under ComGen FEAF.

Com3rdFleet 132105 (pink) constitutes annex A-1 Op-Plan 9-45 movement and attack schedule 21 July through 8 August.

Com3rdFleet 132122 summarizes 3rd Fleet operations off TOKYO on 10 July.

Com3rdFleet 132145 (pink) outlines coordination required in support of operations from 21 July through 8 August.

Cincpac Advance 140255 (pink) proposes conference at Guam about 20 July concerning occupation of JAPAN.

Cincpac Advance 140256 (pink) concurs in postponement of Manila conference to 1 August and inquires whether conference will be on staff level or between commands themselves.
14 July (Guam date) (cont'd)

Com3rdFleet 140425 constitutes Op-Order for shipping sweep by TG 35.3 consisting of CruDiv 17 and DesRon 25 plus three destroyers.

Cincpoa Advance 140901 (pink) requests CinCAFPac DepCom 20 and CTF 93 to provide coordination required by Com3rdFleet.

15 July (Guam date)

Tf 38 completed second day's strike on northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, and is retired to southeast to rendezvous with oilers and TF 37. (See air summary for results of air strikes.

No report of the shipping sweep by CruDiv 17.

Bombardment of MURMON met no airborne or surface opposition. At the NIHON Steel Plant there were terrific explosions and fires. At the WINDISHI Iron Works many buildings were demolished or on fire.

On the 14th, in addition to bombardment support, Tf 58 flew over 600 strike sorties. Airfields and shipping were the principle targets, ranging from SENDAI to NEMURO. Only 2 airborne enemy aircraft were seen, both Bettys, and 1 was shot down, the other damaged. Most of the destruction was on northern HONSHU fields, especially MATSUSHIMA, MASUDA, and HACHINOE. Airfields in western HOKKAIDO were totally closed in.

In attacks on shipping 23 ships and 25 barges were sunk (for 41,000 tons) including 5 of 7 railroad ferries.

Ships damaged totalled 24 plus 3 luggers for 43,000 tons.

On the ground 30 locomotives were destroyed and 16 damaged, and heavy damage was inflicted on 6 trains, numerous warehouses, wharves, factories, hangars, barracks, railroad yards, and bridges. A large part of KUSHIRO was burned out.

Our combat losses were 9 planes, 3 crewmen, and no pilots.

On the 15th the 1st 3 strikes, all that are so far reported, were carried out again in weather that closed all but a few fields. There was no airborne opposition. 4 Jap planes were destroyed on the ground and 1 was damaged.

9 ships and 6 small craft totalling 12,000 tons were sunk.

9 ships and 30 small craft for 12,000 tons were damaged.

105 P-51s attacked NAGOYA airfield on the 15th meeting a few unagressive Jap airborne planes. Score in the air was 4 planes destroyed, and on the ground 9 destroyed. AA destroyed 3 P-51s.

15 Privateers of FAW-1, in attacks around the coasts of KOREA sank 1 SCS and 3 SD, and damaged 3 SCS, 4 SD, and 1 tug. 3 locomotives were exploded, a railroad bridge was destroyed and 1 damaged, and a tunnel was closed, and damage was done to 4 railroad stations, 1 power plant, 1 roundhouse, 2 locomotives and 30 cars.

- continued -
15 July (Guam date)(Cont'd)

6 Privateers of FAW-1, scheduled to attack SHANGHAI shipping the night of the 15th, from fragmentary inflight reports apparently set a refinery and several ships afire, and returned with 4 of the planes seriously damaged.

COMGEN FMFPAC 142133 (pink) outlines troop requirements considered necessary for capture of WAKE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150728 (pink) directs CTF 38 Op-Plan 2-45 be modified to comply with Cincpac directives making enemy combatant vessels at TOKYO BAY primary targets.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150722 directs ComSubPac to make 4 submarines available for lifeguard duty in the RIUKUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150725 passes CINCFPAC 111425, 131311 and CINCPAC 120726 concerning 1 August conference and operational control of First Marine Air Wing.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150727 directs Com2ndCarTF serial 00211 of 26 June be modified to assign shipping as primary objective of 3rd Fleet.

16 July (Guam date)

At 0747 yesterday a plane of TG 30.6 saw and attacked a submarine at 151E, scoring one hit before the sub submerged. Escorts from the group were ordered to the scene. Planes tracked until LAWRENCE C. TAYLOR (DE415) gained contact at 1138. The DE fired a full hedgehog pattern, making several hits followed by 2 violent explosions. Much debris recovered. This is a definite sinking.

TF 95 also sorties on the 16th for sweep along the East China Coast.

All 5th AF missions at OKINAWA except 1 were cancelled because of weather. 8 P-51's provided cover for a lifeguard sub and then swept Southern KYUSHU, shooting down 1 George caught taking off from KUMAMOTO.

100 P-51's were over NAGOYA airfields on the 16th where they met 74 enemy aircraft. 1 P-51 was lost over the target, and 1 operationally. The VF encounters were 15,000 feet to the deck, from KUMOZU to YOKKAICHI and west to the mountains.

Infight reports from FAW-18 planes on the 16th indicate the sinking of 1 coastal patrol boat off KII SUIDO and the destruction of 2 SD south of HONSHU.
16 July (Guam date)

CGUSC'T 121145 (pink) outlines estimated requirements for construction troops, port companies for FORT BAYARD operation.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 160141 (pink) concurs in Richardsons 150946 concerning designation of an air force for operation under ComGenPOA.

CINCAFPAC 160247 (pink) indicates that garrison beach parties are required at all beaches on KYUSHU.

COMGEN USASTAF 160727 (pink) indicates strategic air force requirements for construction troops in MARIANAS and KYUKUS and numbers that can be released for other operations.

COMGEN AF 20 160830 (pink) comments on CIN3rdFleet 132145 in expressing intention to continue attacks on primary targets.

COM3rdFLEET 162013 (pink) acknowledges CINCPOA 150728 directing modification CTF 38 OpOrder to include enemy warships as primary targets.

RICHARDSON 150150 outlines requirements for construction troops for support of 20th Air Force.

USASTAF 151401 announces establishment of Headquarters USASTAF effective 160001 July.

RICHARDSON 160001 constitutes general order number 7 establishing Army Air Forces Middle Pacific commanded by Major General James E. Parker.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160138 requests that RICHARDSON 150150 be brought to the personal attention of Admiral King.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160149 requests that ComGen USASTAF handle informally such matters as require action pending the designation of a headquarters under ComGenPOA for Army Air Forces.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 160155 informs CominCh that agreements with Air Marshall Lloyd contemplated use of British engineers for development of KUME.

CINCAFPAC 160249 outlines proposed air operations by FEAF in support of 3rd Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160853 passes to ISCOM OKINAWA GHQSWPA 071329 concerning the accreditation of War Correspondents.

CINCAFPAC 161121 expresses intention to retain operational control of 7th Fleet.
17 July (Guam date)

Summary of 3rd Fleet operations 14th-15th:

- 966 combat sorties flown
- 140 ships of 71,000 tons sunk
- 235 ships of 88,000 tons damaged
- 37 aircraft destroyed on ground
- 45 aircraft damaged on ground
- 24 planes, 10 pilots & crewmen lost in combat
- 18 planes lost operationally
- 84 locomotives destroyed; 45 damaged
- No airborne opposition
- Coastal industrial targets extensively destroyed or damaged.

Bombardment Group "B" plus a British Task Unit consisting of the KING GEORGE V and escorts, bombarded the HITACHI area. Due to low overcast, there was no air spot and results were unobserved.

Hunting for better weather on the 18th TF 38 launching point has been shifted to the south.

TF 32, TF 39, and probably TF 95, are operating to the eastward of OKINAWA in an attempt to avoid the hurricane.

These forces have been removed from operational control of Com 3rd Fleet and are directly under CinCPac.

About 380 planes from the 5th and 7th Air Forces and from the 2nd MAW attacked KYUSHU targets on the 16th damaging several locomotives, bridges and small craft.

From these attacks 1 F4U is reported missing and 1 P-47 was ditched.

FAW-1 planes on the 17th sank 1 trawler and damaged 5 SD, 1 SCL, and 1 tug, and FAW-18 planes sank fishing boat at HAHA JIMA.

Single PBJ's scored 2 rocket hits in a 200 foot repair vessel at the north end of KAGOSHIMA BAY, and 2 more in a 170 foot vessel in SUO NADA.

FAW-1 planes, during the week of 9 through 16 July, sank 1640 tons and damaged 2940 tons of enemy shipping.

FAW-18 planes from 1 through 17 July sank 27 ships, all under 150 feet, and probably sank or damaged 45 for 11,000 tons.

28 B-29s laid 252 mines at RASHIN, GENSAN, KINAN and FUSAN.
CINCPAC ADVANCE 170523 (pink) requests comment from CINCAFPAC proposal to have ComGen'EN report to CINCAFPAC now for planning CORONET and to be released from operational control about 1 December.

CINCAFPAC 170717 (pink) indicates August 1 conference was to be on staff level.

COM FEAF 171725 (pink) directs FEAF ADVON to continue operations in support of 3rd Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170031 revives Com3rdFleet of operational control of TF 32, 39 and 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE outlines to COMINCH proposal of accreditation of correspondents to CINCAFPAC, 20th AIR FORCE and CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170342 proposes to transfer to CINCAFPAC AAF POA units with exception of those committed to defense of the RYUKYUS and JCC OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170524 indicates KERAMA RETTO will be used as an emergency anchorage and that military control be maintained.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170539 directs TF 94 to assume responsibility of neutralization of central CAROLINES, MARCUS and SONINS.

18 July (Guam Date)

All assigned targets of TF 38 in the TOKYO area were weathered in on the 17th. Few targets of opportunity were attacked and minor damage was inflicted on shipping and ground installations. TF 37 aircraft operated to the north in somewhat better weather and destroyed 13 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged installations at NIIGATA, MASUDA and NAMU SHIMA. On the morning of the 18th TF 38 reconnoitered the TOKYO AREA and by afternoon launched heavy strikes against warships at YOKOSUKA. In the face of the most intense flak yet seen the targets were well hit but smoke and fires prevented damage assessment. At noon on the 18th Com3rdFleet formed TG 35.4 with CruDiv 13 less 2 ships and DesRon 62 less 1 ship. This force proceeded at high speed to MOJIMA SAKI and conducted minor bombardment retiring to the east to rejoin TF 38. Poor visibility obscured results and no shipping was found.

From OKINAWA 40 F4Us of second Marine Air Wing attacked MIYAKONOJO. On the 18th from OKINAWA P 51s damaged boats and docks at MIYAZAKI on KYUSHU and scored 12 direct hits on a 10,000 ton AK at AMAMI leaving it down by the stern, afire and probably aground.

27 B-29s conducted mining operations at SEISHIN and FUSHIKI-MANAO. FAW 1 probably sank an FTC in TSUSHIMA STRAITS and sank 2 luggers south of SHANTUNG.
18 July (Guam Date) (Cont’d)

CTF 99 VIA JCC OKINAWA 120918 amends his 120042 concerning aircraft of 2nd Marine Air Wing to be made available to COMGEN FEAF.

CINCPAO ADVANCE 180822 requests that CNO, COMGEN ASF and CINCAFPAC hereafter furnish timely notice of ships destined for OKINAWA in order that backlog of cargo now afloat with discharge at OKINAWA may be controlled.

COM3RDFFLEET 171356 (pink) reports operations of TF 38 and TF 37 of 17 July off TOKYO.

CINCPAO ADVANCE 180651 (pink) designates to CINCAFPAC elements to comprise the First Marine Air Wing for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAO ADVANCE 180703 (pink) requests recommendations of COM/THFFLEET and COMPHIBSPAC concerning petroleum logistics to be provided by COMSERV/THFFLEET at MANILA.

COM3RDFFLEET 180912 reports additional results of operations of TF’s 38 and 37 on 17 July.

COM3RDFFLEET 181033 reports operations of 18 July off TOKYO.

JSC 181200 (pink) requests CINCPAO comments on proposal to provide an artificial harbor for protection of small craft in lieu of artificial harbor for ocean-going vessels.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 181255 comments on JCS 150417 concerning joint communication board for coordination of communication matters in FOA.

CTG 35.4 181545 reports results of bombardment of NOJIMA SAKI the night of 18 July.

19 July (Guam Date)

Ships in BUCKNER BAY were ordered to leave port yesterday evening and operate to the south of OKINAWA. TF 39 and TF 32 are still at sea. TF 39 will return to BUCKNER BAY after storm passes, fuel and resume sweeping, probably the 24th. TF 95 is south of OKINAWA but will commence their EAST CHINA SEA operations tomorrow.

561 effective B-29s attacked 5 EMPIRE targets the night of 19 July. 96 P-51s attacked NAGOYA area airfields on the 19th, meeting only slight enemy fighter opposition. There were only 11 VF encounters and enemy pilots attempted to evade. P-51s claim 9 enemy aircraft shot down. Few planes were observed on NAGOYA airfields - several were apparently empty. 2 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground. 77 P-51s attacked southern KYUSHU targets, damaging several locomotives and box cars, and scoring 2 hits on a large AK in NAZE HARBOR. FAW-1 sank 7 SD off west central KOREA, and damaged 2 others. 3 Jap VF attacked without success. Off SAEKI a sub-chaser was damaged and an SD was damaged in BUNGO SUIDO.
19 July (Guam date) (Continued)

FAW-18 planes left 1 SD sinking off SHIONO-MISAKI (HONSHU). PBJs hit a 400 foot AK and 175 foot patrol vessel in the south entrances to the INLAND SEA. The night of the 18th there were 6 raids on the OKINAWA area, with an estimated 9 aircraft. No attacks have been reported on land targets. 2 MAW VF(N) shot down 2 JILLS to the north of OKINAWA, and later got 1 ZEKE, making 34 kills for VMF(N) 533, and 500 kills for the 2nd MAW since 7 April. WASP "Fuddle Operation" was conducted against WAKE on the 18th without incident.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 182252 (pink) requests information from CINCAFPAC concerning the latest plan for action of Air Warning units on outlying positions.

CINCAFPAC 190455 (pink) requests concurrence in proposal to change "Objective Area" with a radius of 120 miles centered on SATA MISAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 190513 (pink) attaches CVE ASW groups from 3rd Fleet and assigns them operational control CTF 94.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 190647 (pink) releases to CINCAFPAC all coast artillery units in POA except units at PELELIU and OKINAWA.

CINCAFPAC 190647 (pink) requests comment on proposal to move certain elements of 2 Armored Divisions from West Coast in amphibious lift.

CINCAFPAC 191117 (pink) proposes to take no further action on CINCPAC 170523 concerning release of Com centen for CORONET.

CINCAFPAC 191423 (pink) reiterates request to JCS for artificial harbor capable of sheltering ocean going vessels.

CINCAFPAC 190533 (pink) expresses opinion that transfer of 7th Fleet and Manus may be accomplished subject to necessary arrangements with JCS concerning AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH interests.

20 July (Guam Date)

TF 37 and TF 38 complete their replenishment on 21 July and depart that night for their next strike. Com3rdFlt ordered DesRon 61 detached for a shipping sweep of SAGAMI WAN to take place the night of 22/23 July. DesDiv 113 also ordered detached for shipping sweep in the BONINS the same night. TF 95 enters the EAST CHINA SEA on 21 July and starts a sweep along the CHINA COAST.

10 B-29s of the 509th Group bombed various EMPIRE targets on the 20th. Only 2 B-29s were lost in the 600 plane attacks on the night of the 19-20th. FAW-18 planes attacked 3 x 2000 ton FTCs on the eastern HONSHU COAST (37-40N), damaging 1 by strafing. Off southeastern KYUSHU a PBJ caused an explosion in a 200 foot coaster. On OKINAWA on the 19th 3-4 bogeys were detected, but none closed. During alerts in the evening 2 enemy aircraft crashed on OKINAWA and 1 apparent suicide hit near the CHAS. J. BADGER (DD 657) in BUCKNER BAY. Three men were slightly injured by one of the land crashes, but no material damage was inflicted.
20 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

COMPHIBSPAC 170550 (pink) requests overall approval of revised training schedule of amphibious troops for OLYMPIC.

COM3RDFLEET 201337 (pink) expresses intention to throw light force sweeps along EMPIRE COASTS at every opportunity.

COMINCH AND CNO 201819 (pink) approves proposals and CINCPOAs 130751 for reorganization of 7th Fleet.

CINCAFPAC 191119 (pink) agrees to receive British Corps Commander and accompanying officers to arrive if practicable by 1 August.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 192327 (pink) concurs with CINCAFPAC 191119 concerning British Corps Commanders and accompanying officers.

COMGENCHINA 200710 (pink) recommends holding conference at GUAM on or about 30 July concerning resources and requirements of CHINA THEATER.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 201100 (pink) approves construction of an artificial harbor for CORONET, project to be a responsibility of Navy.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 201108 (pink) defines directive of VICTORY 73 for division of responsibility at OKINAWA as applying only to the RYUKYUS.

CINCPAO ADVANCE 190655 directs ComGen 10 to transfer Marine Aviation units on ASW search to Com Air Wing 1.

COM7THFLEET 190702 lists air fields, control of which have been retained by Commander Allied Air Forces under CINCWSWA in accordance with Army directive similar to COMINCH AND CNO number 7.

CINCPAC ADV 200114 expresses nonconcurrence in the establishment of a naval NATS unit on MACTAN ISLAND.

21 July (Guam Date)

TF 37 and 38 are headed west for strikes on KURE KOBE AREA. Fueling groups are following fast carriers to new fueling rendezvous south of HONSHU. TF 95 starts sweep north along coast of EAST CHINA on the 22nd. TF 32 has left BUCKNER BAY for a covering position north of area JUNEAU where minesweeping will soon be resumed by TF 39.

On the 20th 90 P-51's attacked airfields in the NAGOYA-OSAKA AREA, finding only 1 airborne enemy aircraft. 2 P-51's were lost to AA and 1 operationally. 27 B-29's laid 214 mines in KOBE-OSAKA waters, in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, and in the GENSAN AREA.
21 July (Guam date) (Cont’d)

WARCOS 202208 (pink) outlines logistic arrangements for provision of LCMs and naval escort craft in FORT BAYARD project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210229 (pink) estimates from September 20 to October
9 CV, 5 CVL will base ENIWETOK 6 CV, 2 CVL at LEYTE. After 10 October proportions
will be approximately reversed placing British Pacific Fleet units at ENIWETOK.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210645 (pink) approves ComSubPac plan for minefield
investigation.

WARCOS 202209 (pink) proposes to place Lieutenant General Alvan C.
Gillem command 13 Corps in charge of amphibious training of divisions for CORONET.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 211808 (pink) requests Com7thFleet to implement COMINCH
directive 201819 concerning re-organization of the 7th Fleet.

22 July (Guam Date)

Search planes from OKINAWA sighted a submarine surfaced southeast of AMAMI,
at 0750 on the 23rd and attempted to exchange recognition signals. At 1315 the
same sub was sighted again and positively identified as enemy. A strike plane then
attacked the sub which went down stern first leaving a persistent oil slick. Photos
indicate the sub was similar to the German 1600 ton minelaying type. DesRon 61
encountered a four ship convoy 5 miles south of MAJIMA SAKI at midnight, sank one
medium and 1 small cargo ship and damaged the escort. The Fast Carriers pass north
of the BONINS this morning of the 23rd and start their run-in to their launching
point for strikes on the KOBE-KURE Area. ComGen 10 reports that an unidentified
plane over BUCKNER BAY early yesterday morning dropped a bomb or torpedo which
hit the MARATHON (APA 200). Damage is under control.

BB NAGATO - Superstructure badly damaged, unable to determine if she is
on the bottom.
1 DD, next to NAGATO, blown in half and sunk.
1 ODD heavily damaged.
1 Cable-Layer destroyed.
3 small AK destroyed.
7 MTB destroyed.
DD converted to flak ship - stern blown off.
4 luggers and 2 small craft damaged.
TAKASAGA MARU, anchored about 700 yards from NAGATO near 2 small combatant
ships may possibly have been damaged. Our losses were 14 aircraft.

Planes of TF 37 flew 51 combat sorties with no personnel losses against
airfields in the north TOKYO area. They destroyed 13 enemy aircraft and damaged
25, all on the ground. On the 22nd P-51s hit CSAKA airfields, sighting 4 airborne
enemy aircraft, 1 was shot down. 1 Emily was destroyed on the water. Hangars,
buildings and factories were damaged. AA destroyed 1 P-51, the pilot was rescued.
On the 23rd 77 effective B-29s attacked the UBE COAL LIQUEFACTION plant by radar.
FAW-18 planes in SAGAMI BAY destroyed 1 SD and 6 barges, and probably destroyed
2 SD. 1 PB4Y was reported having ditched.
22 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

COMINCH AND CHO 201303 (pink) (VICTORY 135) proposes to establish special TG for construction of artificial harbor for OLYMPIC.

COMINCH 212043 directs proposed Joint Communications Center Pacific, indicating the board will be advisory or not as may be determined by commanders concerned.

COMGEN USASTAF 212250 (pink) announces that all USASTAF fighters will be withdrawn from escort mission and given primary counter air force operations as required by Com3rdFleet in support of his Op-Plan 9-45.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220410 (pink) directs Commodore Hartley as ComServDiv 103 commands units of ServRon 10 at the objective during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220719 (pink) requests to CINCAFPAC that COMGEN FEAF refrain from issuing orders which directly or by implication attempt to control operations of the fleet and to make area assignments in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220726 directs that joint cargo handling continue until each service can assume individual responsibility at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220729 directs CTG 99.1 to reduce present force drastically to eliminate requests for barracks and garrison ships.

COMFEAF 220731/1 (pink) requests that he be informed in advance of changes in operations of TF 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220742 (pink) approves procedure ComServFor 7th Fleet to provide petroleum logistics for OLYMPIC forces in MANILA AREA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220839 (pink) amends OLYMPIC Warning Order by changing site of NOB to TARA-MISAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220842 congratulates ComGen 10 and others concerned on high average rate of unloading cargo at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220843 requests COMGENPOA to secure CINCAFPAC concurrence rather than CINCPAC for units destined for OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221040 (pink) concurs in COMGEN USASTAF 220715 outlining latter support of 3rd Fleet operations.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221149 (pink) announces modification of Op-Plan 4-45 adding TF 95 in command of V. Adm. Oldendorf.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221150 (pink) directs that effective 250200 GCT TF 95 will comprise TFs 32, 39, 95, TG 99.1, 30.5, TU 30.9.4.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221244 directs that COM MARIANAS transfer 147th Infantry to OKINAWA at the earliest and transfer of 206th AAA AW battalion to IWO JIMA

- continued -
22 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

COM3RDFLEET 211300 constitutes action report covering operations off TOKYO 18 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221620 warns All Pac concerning encounters with friendly submarines at night.

23 July (Guam Date)

TF 95 reports first sweep conducted as planned. Force was snooped the evening of 21st on their approach, but no air attacks developed. Only contacts were small craft and junks. The junks turned out to be CHINESE and were not attacked. The force is due to arrive BUCKNER BAY this morning. TF 39 resumed minesweeping, and reports their buoys remained in position despite the storm with a few flags lost the only damage. 18 mines were swept. TF 92 completed their shipping sweep inside the KURILES, without results. The force left somewhat earlier than planned due to being intensively snooped. On the evening of the 22nd the force bombarded the southeast coast of PARAMUSHIRO with undetermined results. BARB (SS 220) reports 4 frigates patrolling off LA PERouse and its approaches. On the 18th she fired 1 torpedo and sank one of the four. Early yesterday a demolition party was landed and placed a 55 pound charge under the railroad which runs along the coast of KARAFUTO. BARG states "while boats were returning at 0147K train arrived on schedule and blew sky high."

Planes of TF 38 attacked KURE at dawn on the 24th, achieving surprise. Targets are combatant naval strength at KURE. 645 B-29's were airborne for strikes against OSAKA - NAGOYA targets. 258 planes of the FEAF (37 B-25's, 81 P-51's, 140 P-47's) attacked shipping in the SHANGHAI AREA on the 22nd sinking two ships and damaging 11. In addition to the 2 ships destroyed and 11 damaged, numerous small craft were destroyed or damaged. There was no AA and no interception. A coastwatcher near AMOY reports that 7th Fleet search planes on 12-14 July killed at least 120 Jap troops. The estimate of kills beyond this figure is unknown because of Japs burning the bodies and burying the bones. There were no CHINESE casualties.

General Chamberlain G-3 Headquarters CINCPAC, Brigadier General Dumas G-3 Headquarters COMGEN TEN and others attended conference at Advance Headquarters Commander In Chief, Pacific Fleet, GUAM, from 20th to 24th July 1945.

ADMARITY 202253 announces CCS decision that from 1 June Admiralty replaces COMINCH as effective agent for dealing with FRENCH NAVY.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210825 authorizes jointly accredited correspondents in POA to transmit over any facilities available to the press on material which has been cleared by cognisant censors.

JCS 211338 announces approval petroleum supply procedure outlined by CINCPAC CX 22431 of 30 June, concurred in CINCPAC 032041 of July.

COMINCH AND CNO 221915 (pink) outlines JAVAMAN project in support of OLYMPIC and indicates that certain Naval support will be required.
23 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

COMINCH AND CNO 221921 (pink) describes JAVAMAN project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 230903 (pink) directs CominPac to continue sweeping area JUNEAU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 231226 (pink) requests comment from CINCAFPAC on CB requirements for construction of Marine Fields on KYUSHU.

24 July (Guam Date)

On the 24th planes of TF 38 struck the EMPIRE from northern KYUSHU through the INLAND SEA to NAGOYA, with combatant shipping at KURE as the primary target. An incomplete report from the first 3 of 7 strikes for TF 38 shows the followins results:

- 8 enemy aircraft shot down
- 11 destroyed on ground

**Ship damage at KURE:**
- CA TONE - hit with many bombs and left
- CL OYodo - burning badly
- ISE CLASS BBxCV at north tip KURAHASHI hit twice.
- ISE CLASS BBxCV
- CA AOBA - hit with unknown results.
- Large CV at south end MITSAKO hit with 3 x 1000 pounders.
- BB HARUNA as yet unlocated.

CruDiv 17 and 7 destroyers of DesRon 53 conducted a sweep across the mouth of KII SUIDO. On their way in they made contact with and sank a small vessel, probably a picket. No other contacts were made, but the force bombarded the KUSHIMOTO seaplane base, the SHIONOMI SAKI landing field, and the radio station at UWANG HANTO.

Partial reports of B-29 strikes on 7 targets indicate that 625 planes were airborne, and that 1 B-29 was lost over OSAKA. In addition the above, 10 B-29s of the 509th Wing attacked targets in SUMITOMO, KOBE and YOKKAICHI. From OKINAWA 2 groups of B-24s escorted by 32 P-51s strike TSUIKI, and 48 P-51s sweep KYUSHU. On the 23d FAW-1 Privateers shot down 1 Topsy and 1 Tojo, sank 1 SD, set fire to 2 SCS, and damaged 3 SD, and on the 24th damaged 1 SC and 1 SD. FAW-18 planes destroyed 1 SD off HAMAMATSU, and 2 x 135 foot Diesel sea trucks in the ISE BAY, south of NAGOYA.

Commander of a task unit consisting of 7 LST's escorted by UNDERHILL (DE 682), 4 FC, 3 SC and 1 PCE reported UNDERHILL was probably completely destroyed by a submarine at 19-20N 126-42E. ComPhilSeaFron estimates there are three submarines in the vicinity and has despatched numerous ASW ships to the neighborhood.

Com3rdFleet reports that during the last replenishment period TF 38 received from the logistic support group:

- 6369 tons of ammunition
- 379,157 barrels of fuel oil
- 1635 tons stores and provisions

TF 39 continued sweeping in JUNEAU. 29 mines destroyed yesterday.
24 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

COMGENCHINA 231321 (pink) announces plan to arrive at GUAM 6 August for conference.

CNO 232105 (pink) announces approval of JIC 153/20 which approved records of OAHU mapping conference 25-29 May.

COMPHIBSPAC 240140 (pink) requests COM5THFLEET to submit to CINCOPAC for approval assembly dates for PHIBSPAC forces for OLYMPIC with emphasis on early assembly for indoctrination and training.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240317 (pink) approves memorandum for record 2.3 July concerning partitioning of OKINAWA and agrees, on receipt of CINCAF PAC, to direct COMGEN TEN to report to CINCAF PAC 1200 31 July.

COMBATRON-1 240325 (pink) announces organization of Task Force 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240636 (pink) requests from COMINCH copy of JCS 659/3 and information as to JCS decision placing Air Sea Rescue responsibility on area Commanders.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240644 (pink) modifies OLYMPIC Warning Order by directing that MANOSE RIVER CUB will remain in support of 5th Phib Corps.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240850 (pink) directs Rear Admiral Low to conduct shipping sweep EAST CHINA SEA.

CINCAF PAC 241349 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC 220742 concerning procedure for provision of petroleum logistics by SERVON 7 in MANILA AREA.

25 July (Guam Date)

After meeting poor weather over priority targets in the INLAND SEA on the 25th TF 38 and 37 departed to the southward to replenish.

TF 38 heavy strikes on the primary targets on 25 July were weathered out. Fragmentary reports on targets of opportunity show 18 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 20 damaged, mostly at MIHO and YONAGO. 1 Myrt was shot down over the force. Several small vessels were attacked. The ISE, reported moderately damaged on the 24th, was hit again and a violent explosion followed. Final reports for TF 38's attacks on the 24th show the following damage inflicted:

18 enemy aircraft shot down (3 over force, 15 over target).
21 destroyed on ground, 53 damaged.

Kure warships were damaged as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heavily damaged</th>
<th>Moderately Damaged</th>
<th>Slightly Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB x CV HYUGA</td>
<td>CL OYODO</td>
<td>BB HARUNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA TONE</td>
<td>CV KASURAGI</td>
<td>CV HOSHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV OF KUMA CLASS</td>
<td>BB x CV ISE</td>
<td>CV ASO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV AMAGI</td>
<td>CA AOB A</td>
<td>OCA ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AG SBITSU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- continued -
25 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

Outside of KURE waters 3 DD were damaged, 1 midget sub was strafed, and the CVE KIYO was hit by 2 rockets.

**Merchant Shipping**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunk</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 medium AK*</td>
<td>1 medium AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 small AK</td>
<td>3 medium AK*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 luggers</td>
<td>Many luggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 1 sank, 2 damaged by night hecklers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An incomplete account of ground damage shows 9 locomotives destroyed and 5 damaged; HAMAMATSU had 3 warehouses and a power plant burned, and a small factory plus 2 radio stations destroyed. Shop buildings, oil stores, and factories were destroyed or damaged at TOYOHASHI (West of HAMAMATSU), KUSHIMOTO (southwest tip of HONSHU), ITAMI, TANABE, YOHATE, KISATO (all OSAKA), YONAGO (MIHO), and OKAYAMA. Our losses will be reported later. Final report shows that TF 37 planes destroyed 21 enemy aircraft and damaged 57 on the ground, and inflicted the following damage to shipping.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunk</th>
<th>Probably Sunk</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 medium AK</td>
<td>1 KOBE type CVE</td>
<td>1 ODD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 small AK</td>
<td>1 SCS</td>
<td>1 train ferry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 junks</td>
<td>1 junk</td>
<td>2 large AK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In attacks on ground targets in north and east SHIKOKU and in the OKAYAMA-FUKUYAMA area of southern HONSHU hangars and airfield installations were destroyed or damaged, and damage was inflicted on flak positions, factories, radio and radar stations. TF 37 lost 8 aircraft to AA and 11 operationally. 9 pilots and 3 crewmen were lost. On the 24th 81-P51s hit NAGOYA airfields in 2 groups. Strafing and rocketing destroyed 1 locomotive and 1 wooden building; damaged 12-15 railroad cars, a railroad bridge, a radar station, a radio tower, a small factory and 7 or 8 buildings. 2-3 SD left burning in SURUGA WAN. 2 P-51s were damaged by flak. From OKINAWA 120 B-24s attacked KIANGWAN drone at SHANGHAI on the 24th. 54 P-47s and 32 P-51s attacked shipping in the YANGTZE RIVER, hitting 1 PG with a 500 pound bomb, damaged 3 FTD, and burning 1 S division ship.

JCS 241824 (pink) (V-273) proposes plan for coordination of U.S. Navy and Air operations when and if RUSSIA enters the war against JAPAN.

COMINCH AND CNO 241722 (pink) cancels previous directive requiring that definite number of Cruisers, Destroyers and Submarines be maintained in 7th Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250425 (pink) outlines proposed Seaplane operations during OLYMPIC.
25 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250904 (pink) comments on COMINCH 241824 concerning division of operating areas with RUSSIAN Forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250907 (pink) outlines plan function for COMSERVDIV 103 in objective area during OLYMPIC.

CINCAFPAC 251009 (pink) concurs in JCS V-273 concerning division of operating areas with RUSSIAN Forces.

CINCAFPAC 251011 (pink) approves memorandum for record of 23 July with one change.

CINCAFPAC 251431 (pink) requests CINCPAC concurrence in JAVAMAN project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250726 explains proposed coordination of VLR strikes with operations of Fast Carriers.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250908 outlines views on location of major NATS base in the PHILIPPINES.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250905 (pink) directs that CRUDIV 5 be prepared immediately for service in NORPAC.

26 July (Guam Date)

Only sighting near scene of torpedoing of UNDERHILL was a sonar contact by BARTON (DD 722) which dropped a full pattern on a good sonar contact at 15-33 N 127-21E at 261628/1, causing a slight oil slick. Mership ADELPHI VICTORY reported this morning that two torpedoes were fired at her and missed, 200 miles east of ENIWETOK. TF 37 and TF 38 complete their replenishment at noon on 27 July and head north for their launching position on the 28th. TG 95.2 is proceeding north for a sweep off SHANGHAI. TG 95.3 is providing cover for the minesweeping group in area JUNEAU. CVE planes are providing cover for TG 95.2.

On the 25th 76 B-29s hit the HAYAMA and MITSUBISHI oil refineries at KAWASUKA. 1 B-29 is missing. 352 effective B-29s attacked MATSUYAMA, TOKUYAMA and OMWA on the 27th. 2 Privateers of FAW 1 (VPB 124) are missing from a patrol up the west coast of KOREA. Ramming tactics by Jap fighters are suspected. This squadron since its arrival at OKINAWA on 16 June (40 days) has lost 9 planes and 6 complete crews. FAW 1 planes sank 1 SCS in TSUSHIMA STRAITS on the 25th and on the 26th sank 1 SD in the same area. FAW 18 planes sank 1 SD in SAGAMI WAN, and damaged 6 fishing vessels at 33-43, 136-00. PBJs scored 2 rocket hits on each of 2 small vessels off the HONSHU Coast.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL 261514 (pink) outlines plans for implementation of PASTEL.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261225 (pink) requests comment from COMNORPAC and CINCPAC PEARL concerning concerning method of exercising control of OSS office in NORPAC.
26 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC of 22 July COMINCH 251652 PASSED TO CINCPAC ADVANCE (pink) reiterates recommendation against establishment of Joint Communication Board in the Pacific Theater.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260151 announces transfer of all U.S. Army forces in the Ryukyus, except USASTAF forces, to CINCPAC 1200 31 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260145 congratulates COMGEN TEN and COMGEN 24th Corps for their successful accomplishments of their missions under CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260249 recommends to COMINCH that office of Deputy of COMTHFLEET be abolished.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260722 directs COMCAR DIVS 23 and 26 proceed immediately to Eniwetok and report to CINCPAC for duty.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260827 directs COMAIRPAC to have thorough physical examination of Read Admirals Gunther and A.C. Davis.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260824 recommends that work on Cruisers 1 to 10 be limited to essential repairs.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261228 announces the establishment of Air Sea Rescue JUNKS along East China Coast and directs that action be taken to prevent their being attacked by our forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261244 delegates responsibility for Air Sea Rescue to COMHAWSEAFRON, COMMARGILS, COM MARIANAS and to COMFAIRWING 1 in their respective areas of operation.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261414 suggests that CHINESE be warned of danger of operating vessels of any kind in East China coastal waters.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260723 directs the formation of TF 49 and its preparations for duty in NORPAC.

WARGOS 1223367 (pink) outlines proposal for movement of ATC ATLANTIC facilities to PACIFIC with planned augmentation of PACIFIC facilities.

COMINCH AND CNO 252104 (pink) quotes JCS 659/1 concerning theater responsibility for Air Sea Rescue.

COMGEN USASTAF 252256 (pink) concurs with JCS V-273 and recommends that targets lying along air boundaries be assigned to either RUSSIA or United States.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260149 (pink) directs COMGEN 10 to report to CINCPAC with all U.S. Army forces under his command effective 1200 31 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260150 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC 250847 concerning modification of memorandum for record of 23 July.
27 July (Guam Date)

Planes on ASW patrol made possible contact with a submarine 200 miles NE of ENIWETOK, near whereMerihip ADELPHINE VICTORY reported yesterday that torpedoes were fired at her. TF 38 scheduled to repeat strikes against INLAND SEA-KOBE. TG 95.2 swept up to 32-30 N east of SHANGHAI last night, and this morning are scheduled to be east of NINGPO on a southerly course. No contacts yet reported. AOE cover for this group and for the minesweepers being provided by TG 95.3. On the 26th TG 95.4 completed sweeping the last few miles of the JUNEAU mine line. Clearance sweeps about 12 miles further SW, and check sweeps still further south are scheduled for today. Tomorrow a check sweep along the axis of the field will be started. 330 mines have been swept and 50 floaters sighted to date.

TFs 37 and 38, in the KURE-KOBE-NAGOYA areas on the 24th and 25th report destruction of 156 enemy aircraft and damage to 212. Of these TF 38 destroyed 132 and damaged 148, TF 37 destroyed 24 and damaged 64. In addition TF 38 damaged 22 warships for 258,000 tons, sank 62 vessels for 25,000 tons, damaged 120 other vessels for 60,000 tons, sank 1 medium and 6 small AK, a tug and 12 small craft, while TF 37 probably sank 1 CVE and 2 small AK and damaged 1 ODD, 1 train ferry, 24 AKs a small tanker and 12 Corvettes. On the ground TF 38 destroyed 25 locomotives and damaged 11, and burned 40 hangars. During the 2 days TF 38 lost 64 aircraft, 30 pilots, 17 aircrewman. Of these, 40 aircraft plus 25 pilots and 15 crewmen were combat losses. TF 37 lost 24 aircraft, plus 9 pilots and 3 aircrewmen. 10 of the aircraft were combat losses. Revision of TF 38 report for the 24th shows 2 moderately damaged cruisers now classed as heavily damaged; addition of 1 unnamed CV to the heavily damaged column, addition to the slightly damaged column of 2 De, 2 SS and the CVE KAIYO. 2 groups each consisting of 4 VT were intercepted and driven off by RAPCAP and night fighters. TF 37 planes shot down 3 and TF 38 planes got one of these attackers. On the 25th a dumbo flew across HONSHU to rescue 2 pilots down off MTHU. On his return he skillfully landed in the fleet formation out of gas. The personnel were taken aboard and the FBM sank. FAW-1 Privateers sank 10 miscellaneous small craft, damaged one and shot down two enemy fighter planes. All FAW-1 planes returned safely. FAW 18 search planes destroyed 1 x 100 ft, pikeX boat sank 2 and damaged 4 fishing boats, left 1 x 850 ton TFD burning and sinking east of HONSHU at 37-28 N.

COMINCH AND CNO 272111 (pink) outlines priority and method of providing communications and aerological teams for RUSSIANS.

COMGENAIR (POTSDAM) 261559 (pink) instructs USASTAF to prepare for re-arrangement of B-29 deployment in connection with planning in event of Japanese capitulation.

CNO 261451 (pink) instructs COMWESSEAFRON to expedite lend-lease transfer vessels under MILEPOST.

COMINCH 262020 (pink) instructs CINCPAC ADVANCE expedite delivery vessels for transfer under MILEPOST.

CINCPAC PEARL 270019 (pink) recommends disapproval of proposed OWI station at ATTU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270250 (pink) requests early complete information on JAVAMAN.

- continued -
27 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270253 (pink) recommends category of defense in the Hawaiian Group be reduced to category A.

COMGENCHINA 270800 (pink) proposes occupation of WEICHOW ISLAND as preliminary to FORT BAYARD operation.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 280108 (pink) instructs COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFLT, COMNORPAC and COMSERVPAC be prepared initiate operations outlined in CINCPAC 0005067 of May on short notice.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 271317 sets forth changes in Task Organization and operational control of Navy units in OKINAWA.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270310 deals with shipping control in the Hawaiian Area contemplates disbanding JOSCO in October.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270312 instructs COM MARIANAS to transfer part of 206th AAA AW BN from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA.

CINCAFPAC 261601 implements memorandum for record of CINCPAC-CINCAFPAC conference on transfer of control of U.S. held areas in the RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270505 advises COMAIRPAC proposed transfer of 2 VPB squadrons to NORPAC must be expedited.

CINCAFPAC 280457 (pink) requests COMGENAFMIDPAC to comment to Chief of Staff CINCAFPAC on CINCPAC proposals regarding Hawaiian Defense matters.

COMPHIBSPAC 250740 (pink) assigns task of capturing islands for air warning and fighter director to South and Southwest of KYUSHU to 40th Infantry, 158th RCT assigned task of securing northern TANEGA SHIMA if ordered.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 280812 (pink) replies to COMGENCHINA proposal concerning WEICHOW project.

CINCAFPAC 280849 (pink) proposes abolition of theater area boundaries.

COMPHIBSPAC 280835 (pink) outlines agreement between CINCAFPAC, COMGEN 6TH ARMY on responsibility for loading OLYMPIC forces.

28 July (Guam Date)

After successful attacks in INLAND SEA the THIRD FLEET retired to southwest. Tonight a bombardment Group consisting of 3 BB's, 2 CA's, 10 DD's plus British Units will bombard the HAMAMATSU Area. Carriers are scheduled to strike in the TOKYO Plains Area tomorrow. TG 95.2 completed its sweep off SHANGHAI, apparently undetected. Its only contact was one small craft sunk by a destroyer of DesDiv 47. Submarines and Dumbos continued their splendid work. Four Subs picked up a total of seven pilots in the immediate vicinity of the EMPIRE. Meanwhile, one Dumbo, having first picked up 2 carrier pilots off the HONSHU coast, landed in the INLAND SEA to rescue 5 survivors from a B-29 while the second picked up the pilots of 1 VF, 2 VT, 2 VB and the entire crew of a third Dumbo - 17 in all.
28 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

A flash report of the lst 3 of 7 strikes by TF 38 planes on the KURE-KOBE area on the 28th shows 19 airborne enemy aircraft destroyed and 75 enemy aircraft destroyed on ground. Left burning and heavily damaged were the BB HAYA, BHM CV ISE, CL OYODO, CA AOBA, and CA TONE. Strike photographs showed the BM CV HYUGA resting on the bottom from the 24th attacks, with the topside well smashed and the deck amidships under water. The CVE KAIYO was again damaged. Also damaged were 12 miscellaneous light craft including 4 DD and 2 DE. 562 effective B-29's attacked 7 EMPIRE targets shortly after midnight, in fulfillment of the promise given the resident of 11 Japanese cities by radio and by leaflets in the previous 24 hours. 7 B-29's from NORPAC put 15 tons of 500 lb. incendiary clusters on KATACKA NAVAL BASE. All planes returned safely.

Admiral Sherman and party departed GUAM for MANILA conference, on 29th.

29 July (Guam Date)

Within the past two days every major unit of the Japanese Fleet except NAGATO has been sighted by aircraft - most of them sunk or immobilized. In addition to units attacked by THIRD FLEET carrier planes in the INLAND SEA, 2 carriers were seen at SASEBO, and the 2 CA were seen in SINGAPORE. A force consisting of 3 BB, 2 CA and 10 DD from TF 38, and a British Unit including King George V and DD of TF 37 bombed HAMAMATSU starting at 2320/1 last night. Only damage sustained was minor operational damage to two British Destroyers. TF 95 sweeping in the JUNEAU area. Exploratory sweep of suspected field to the north was negative. In suicide attacks early on the 29th, CALLAGHAN (DD 792) was sunk and PRITCHETT (DD 561) was damaged. Attacking planes were described as biplanes with non-retractable landing gear flimsily constructed of wood and fabric - probably obsolete or trainer planes - expertly piloted. A submarine rescued 7 men from a B-29 100 miles south of SHIKOKU, and a Dumbo from OKINAWA returned to the same place in INLAND SEA from which 5 B-29 aviators had been rescued the day before and rescued an additional officer.

Amplifying reports from TF 38 increase the number of aircraft destroyed on the ground in the KURE-KOBE area by 36 planes to make a total of 111 and of aircraft damaged by 63 planes to a total of 114. Photos show the CL OYODO an OCA lying on their sides, 3 subs sunk, the BB HAYA beached and burning and the BM CV HYUGA sunk. In addition CA AOBA battered and burning with guns silenced and stern on the bottom, the BM CV ISE burning and apparently on the bottom, the CA TONE badly damaged (but she continued firing all day). Of the two CVs present, the AMAGI and the KATSURAGI, one suffered tremendous explosion with debris to 1,000 feet, while the other hit on prior attacks, appeared gutted. Final damage assessment awaits full photo coverage. Also damaged were one CVE, 6 DD/DE and 9 minor craft. TG 38.3 failed to reach KURE in the last strike but along the northern shore of the SUO NADA sank 23 miscellaneous smallcraft. One AH was attacked by mistake; 4 near misses left her down by the stern. On the ground 13 locomotives and 4 oil cars were destroyed. Planes of TF 37 in attacks on SHIKOKU and central HONSHU, destroyed 8 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged 26, sank 1 DD and 29 other vessels of which 17 were junk, damaged 3 DD, 2 DE, 2 SS, 7 good sized merships and about 100 small craft.
29 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

Principal accomplishments of FEAF were the reported scoring of 5 or 6 hits (including 3 or 4 1000-pounders) by 10 B-24s of the 5th AF on the CVE KATSURAGI, while 42 B-24s of the 7th AF claim 4 direct 1000-2000 lb hits and several near misses on the BB HARRUNA. In addition KANoya and KAGOSHIMA airiromes, KAGOSHIMA railway yards, and other miscellaneous targets in KYUSHU were attacked by B-24s A-26s, P-47s and TOKYO airfields were hit by 134 P-51s. 

COMPHIBSPAC 280930 (pink) sets forth plan assembly for COMPHIBSPAC forces for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 280917 (pink) advises COMINCH that CINCPAC considers establishment OSS/OWI broadcasting station in ALEUTIANS undesirable.

CINC BPF 290209 (pink) lists subjects which CINC BPF proposes to discuss at GUAM.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 290525 (pink) instructs COMSERVPAC, COMNORPAC and COMMARIANS take appropriate action in accordance with COMINCH AND CNO 272111 in order to provide communications and aerological teams for RUSSIANS.

30 July (Guam Date)

A preliminary report for the lst 4 of 6 scheduled attacks on E. HONSHU airfields states that few planes were seen over the target area and no airborne enemy opposition was encountered. 58 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 68 aircraft were damaged. Nests of 3 large subs and many midgets were discovered along the western coast of SAGAMI WAN, at ATAMI, TAGA, and SHIMODA. 2 midgets were destroyed by rockets and 1 large SS, 6 midgets, 1 AS, and 1 PG were strafed. A special late afternoon strike was being against the sub nests. Other attacks on shipping at MAIZU, KUZE, and SAGAMI WAN resulted in sinking of 4 smallcraft and damage to CVE, 4 DD, 7 good sized merships and 11 minor craft. The lst 2 strikes of TF 37 were weathered out. On the 3rd attack 2 airborne enemy aircraft were destroyed while on the ground 5 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 5 damaged. In attacks on shipping 1 lugger was sunk, several small craft were probably sunk, 3 DD, 4 DD and 6 small craft were damaged. A minimum of 6 enemy aircraft approached the RYUKUS in 5 raids, during which the CALLAGHAN (DD 792) was hit by a possible Kamikaze and sunk. A P-47 shot down 1 Betty, F6F's of the 2nd MW shot down 2 and probably destroyed a 3rd Betty, and AA claimed shooting down 2.

Carriers completed strikes on shipping and air installations in the TOKYO Area and retired to the southward where they will start fueling today. On the night of 30-31 July ComDesRon 25 with 6 destroyers swept up into the head of SURUGA WAN and bombarded SHIMIZU town. Supplementary report of the previous night's bombardment by 34.8.1 (Bombardment Group Able) lists serious damage to Imperial RR workshop and the aircraft propeller plant of Japan Musical Instrument Co., Prop. Plant and hits on the TENRYU RIVER BRIDGE and the railroad and roundhouse. No opposition was encountered. The JUNEAU Minesweeping Group has completed its sweep a day ahead of schedule and is retiring to BUCKNER BAY. A total of 343 mines were swept and 61 floating mines destroyed.
JULY (GCT)

30 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

ANDAMAN SEA FORCE operated off PHUKET, clearing minefields off PHUKET conducting air strikes over the MALAY PENINSULA. One British minesweeper was sunk by a mine, another was hit and so damaged by a suicide plane that she had to be sunk by her own forces. British submarine sank several small craft in MALACCA STRAIT. A fighter pilot went down in mouth of SURUGU WAN. A Dumbo went after him and cracked up on landing. This left 9 in the water. Then a B-17 went in and dropped a boat. The survivor sailed out and were picked up by FIETO (SS 265) There is no change in the reported status of major task fleet units. TheCVs AMAGI and KATSUNAGI are apparently still afloat although large portions of their flight decks are missing.

31 July (Guam Date)

The Third Fleet is fueling today. Heavy ships of TF 95 replenished yesterday and are due to depart soon for shipping blockade off SHANGHAI. PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38), CABOT (CVL 28) and escorting DD are scheduled to conduct training strike on WAKE today. Convoys enroute OKINAWA are splitting up and maneuvering to avoid the typhoon. ARD 21 has broken loose from her tug, but was reported riding well. Other tugs have been ordered to assist.

Final report for TF 38 shows that 114 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the 30th and 101 were damaged. The afternoon strikes were chiefly on fields in the NAGOYA area, as TOKYO was closed in. In addition to previously reported shipping damage, one DD and one mership are reported sunk, and an old type CL, another DD and 4 miscellaneous merships damaged. One strike was carried out on 10 subs in SHIMODO KO, but results have not yet been reported. On the ground 8 locomotives were destroyed and 4 damaged, bomb hits were scored and large fires were started at the KANTO Special Steel Co and the JAPAN International Aircraft Co both at MIRATSUKU. Strafed and rocketed were 2 radar station, 4 hangars, 17 factories and railroad cars and turntables. No report on our losses, nor on TF 37 results, is yet available. 130 P-51s (excluding 12 lifeguard escort) attacked KOREE airfields. They saw only 7 enemy aircraft airborne, all too far away to attack. Only 14 enemy aircraft were observed on KOREE airfields. Low level strafing and rocketing destroyed 2 locomotives and caused considerable damage to ground installations and harbor craft. In addition OMAURA airfield was hit and fires started and 83, P-47s set the whole of SENDAI (KYOSHU) afire with napalm. Inflight reports from 6 Privateers of TG 95.9 ordered to destroy the SEIEN RIVER bridge in northwest KOREA indicated that they destroyed the main bridge and 1 small bridge, destroyed 2 locomotives, strafed equipment on a new airfield there and coal mine buildings and damaged 8 luggers. FAW-1 planes sank 6 small craft and most in TSUSHIMA STRAITS. FAW-18 planes sank a mership and damaged 3 fishing boats. No reports from B-29s.

COM7THFLEET 300237 (pink) initial report on 30 July conference at MANILA. States MacArthur reaction to probable landing of Marines and advises possible need for 3 Marine Divisions.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 302306 (pink) replies to initial report of 30 July conference. States nonconcurrance in deferring landing of marines, naval officer on spot must have free hand to act. Limits availability of marines to 3 divisions. Requests saving clause in event of further JCS directive.

- continued -
COMGENCHINA 310900 (pink) advises CINCPAC difficulties FORT BAYARD no more serious than initially envisaged. Will not require equipment jeopardizing OLYMPIC. WEICHOW ISLAND an alternate not an additional operation.

COMINCH AND CNO 302029 (pink) advises that aerological plans outlined CINCPAC 120446 approved by SOVIETS and action initiated.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 310810 (pink) refers to COMINCH AND CNO 302029 and instructs COMSERVPAC comply.

1 August (Guam Date)

Both TF 37 and 38 with their logistics support groups retired to the southward in search of better weather. They will fuel today and then depart for KYUSHU strikes on the third, a delay of one day. TF 95 also was inactive. Local RYUKYUS naval forces executed modified typhoon plan X, avoiding the storm to the south. Convoys in the Philippines Sea are finding better weather. ARD 21 which broke loose from its tug, has been riding well, and her tug expects to be able to make up tow this morning. PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38) and GABOT (CVL-28) completed their training strike on WAKR. Preliminary reports are 9 guns put out of action; 6 others damaged; distillation and power plants damaged; 1 dump burned. Light AA fire, moderate shore battery fire inside 10,000 yards. No personnel casualties. Two planes lost operationally. Gun director on PENNSYLVANIA hit. Report from HMS STYGIAN indicates that a small British submarine penetrated into SINGAPORE and exploded one of the heavy cruisers there. The mother submarine, which was waiting off HOVSBOROUGH, commented: "Spectacle great. Consider cruiser was well-distributed over countryside.

662 combat sorties were flown over the EMPIRE on the 31st by units of the 5th and 7th Air Forces. Attacked NAGASAKI and KAGOSHIMA. Other planes sank 5 small craft and damaged 13. 61 medium bombers dropped 72 tons of bombs on MIYAZAKI drone, and 64 mediums dropped 76 tons on KANOYA. All August 2 strikes by FEAF against airdromes and installations in KYUSHU have been cancelled because of weather. The 6 Privateers of FAW 1 amplifying their previous report advise they made direct hits with half-ton bombs on the SEISEN RIVER bridge destroying 1 span completely and causing it to fall into the river. 1 pier was slightly damaged. 774 effective B-29's attacked HACHIAJI, TOYAMA, NAGAOKA, MITO and the KAWASAKI PETROLEUM COMPLEX while 44 more (total 818) mined. Results are reported to have been good. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, and AA generally meager.

CINCPAC 311509 (pink) requests instructions concerning operational control Headquarters 2nd Marine Air Wing.

COMINCH AND CNO 011310 (pink) outlines proposed new boundary between United States, British areas and SWPA.
2 August (Guam Date)

At about 1100/K yesterday a search plane from PELELIU sighted 30 survivors in the water at 11-30, 133-00, dropped a transmitter and emergency lifeboat. Later other survivors were seen in lifeboats. Dumbo planes were sent out with emergency equipment, ships were diverted to the scene, and other ships were sent out from ULITHI. By midnight several ships were at the scene, and reported that the survivors were from INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35), sunk on the night of the 29th. The SALAMAUA ASW Group made a sonar contact about 200 miles to the west. The contact was not retained, but the search is continuing.

On the lst 37 P-51s and P-47s hit the KOBE-NAGOYA area meeting no airborne enemy aircraft, and observing few on the ground. They destroyed 1 locomotive and damaged barracks and hangars at OKAZAKI, administration buildings at ITAMI, hangars at NAGOYA east. We lost 1 P-47 and 3 P-51s; 1 pilot was observed to bail out; the other 3 are missing. FEAF planes flew 525 combat sorties on the lst. In attacks on shipping 1 mission of 24 B-25s (5th AF) destroyed 8 vessels and 2 lugers and damaged all northwest KYUSHU. In other attacks on shipping 1 small mership was destroyed, and 1 large AK plus 2 small AK were damaged. 4 P-51s (5thAF) on a VF sweep off KYUSHU, intercepted 16 Franks over TAKE SHIMA that were attacking B-24s. The P-51s shot down 4 Franks with no losses to themselves. 23 B-24s (7th AF) dropped 51 tons on AMAMI and KAKEROMA, and were attacked by 12-20 Jap VF, of which, 2 were destroyed and 1 damaged. 2 B-24s were damaged, 2 men were killed, and 6 wounded.

O2 1500

CECIL J. DOYLE (DE 368)/contains information concerning sinking of INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35).

CINCPAC ADVANCE 020126 outlines CINCPAC views concerning proposal to establish Pacific Joint Communications Board.

CINCAFPAC 020311 (pink) authenticates Sherman - Chamberlin - Lindsay 1 August agreement for coordination of air operations.

COM7THFLEET 020547 (pink) places Commander Submarines advance base and recuperation both Navy 3002 to report to COMPHILSEAPRON for matters pertaining to defense, maintenance and construction.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 020710 (pink) redesignates former ICEBERG reserve as MARIANAS OLYMPIC reserve, directs addressees to implement and contains detailed instructions therefor.
2 August (Guam Date)(Cont’d)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 021036 (pink) advises a special operation by 509th Bomb Group, instructs addressees no ships or aircraft of Pacific Fleet to approach within 50 miles NAGASAKI, KOKURA or HIROSHIMA immediately before, during and after time of strike (to be announced later).

CINCPAC ADVANCE 021429 (pink) requests confirmation of assumption that all combat units British Pacific Fleet will be at CINCPAC disposal and of assumption that COMINCH will not object to practice raids against TRUK, WAKE and PONAPE.

3 August (Guam Date)

Third Fleet is remaining in fueling area. OKINAWA based craft of TF 95 returned from typhoon plan sortie. No reports from TG 95.2 and TG 95.3 blockading SHANGHAI. About 400 survivors of the INDIANAPOLIS have been recovered and search for others continues. Commanding Officer, one of survivors, says that he believes the ship was hit forward by two torpedoes or a mine at about 0045/K 30 July. This was followed by a magazine explosion and the ship sank in 15 minutes. Survivor of Japanese MTB sunk on the first by the CUMMINGS (DD 365) said his mission was to evacuate navy personnel from KITA DlO JIMA; stated 40 to 50 MTB’s based at CHICHI JIMA. ASPRO (SS 309) rescued an Army pilot in SAGAMI WAN at 35-11 N, 139-21 E. This position is 25 miles inside the bay, and 8 miles from the shore at the head of the bay. Two search Privateers sighted the survivor in a B-17 lifeboat, and coaxed the submarine in. The planes and submarine were attacked by five "Georges" enemy VF and five VO. Although all strafed and 4 bombs were dropped ASPRO escaped undamaged and our aircraft shot down 2 VO and damaged the VF. Boarding party left aboard a junk when COD was forced to dive was recovered by other submarines.

139 USASTAF P-51’s attacked the NAGOYA-KOBE area sighting only 1 airborne aircraft and observing very few on the ground. Other ground damage included 14 locomotives destroyed, and damage to 2 hangars (KOMAKI), factories at (KAKOGOWA), stations, power lines and natural gas tanks. 14 small vessels 50-150 feet were damaged or fired. Photographs of B-29 strikes against TOYAMA show more than 90% of the city enveloped in flames. At NAGAOKA photos of poor quality show a considerable number of large fires. Usual sorties were flown in CENPAC. From SWPA, CTG 73.4 passes on a report from a coast watcher at AMOY that FAW-17 planes have killed 750 to 1,000 Jap troops attempting evacuation AMOY to SWATOW.

COMINCH AND CNO 301733/14 defines condition for approach of recognition signals in non-combat areas.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 311355 sets forth operational control FMF ground forces on OKINAWA.

010900

PENNSYLVANIA (BB)/describes 1 August FUDDLE on WAKE.

COM7THFLEET 020018 describes NATS proposed Flight Wing; suggests MACTAN ISLAND for headquarters.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 030207 states necessity for disbanding TF 93.
CINCPAC ADVANCE 030208/643 officially dissolves TF 93 and 93.4, directs 93.4 report to COMGEN USASTAF for duty.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030227 approves completion air facilities under construction SAMAR and completion of seaplane ramp JINAMOC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030347 recommends authorized complement of PhotoRons 1 and 3 be increased from 6 to 9 PB4Y-1P that crew replacements based in forward area for these squadrons be similar to other multi-engine squadrons.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030225 withdraws recommendation for major NATS base at SAMAR and recommends MACTAN instead.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030742 advises FMF PAC marine personnel required for local defense and internal security OKINAWA and directs use of at least 2 infantry companies or equivalent under command COM NOB OKINAWA pending arrival requested MP battalions.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030912 operational control Headquarters and Headquarters squadron 2nd MAW passed to FEAF, appropriate change being made in memorandum for record GUAM conference 23 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030913 changes CINCPAC 271317. Makes COM NOB OKINAWA CTF 99, directs 99.3.12 report to CTF 99, COMGEN2NDMAV, TU 99.2.1, TU 99.2.2 and Headquarters and Headquarters squadron report FEAF for operational control, TU 99.2.3 report to COMAIRWING 1 for operational control.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030915 advises addressees AITUTAKI and PENRHYN considered to have sufficient Post War Significance to justify token garrisons. Requests instructions if Navy and Coast Guard personnel will be required.

CTU 95.9.2 011355 requests that communication facilities (CTU 95.9.2) 311301 July be expedited.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 311338 (pink) requests operational direction 64th and 30th Engineers be returned to CINCPOA on or about 31 July.

COM/7THFLEET 310756 (pink) establishes new command; U.S. Naval Forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA. COM/7THFLEET directs COMEV/7THFLT, COMAIRW/7THFLEET to direct commanders all U.S. Naval Shore. Air and Seaplane facilities for new command for duty. Sets forth responsibilities of new command.

COMGEN AIR 311349 (pink) recommends AMCHITKA most suitable location for basing VLR Squadron in NORPAC and describes facilities.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 311351 (pink) advises FMF/PAC units should be prepared for occupation duty on basis of 5th Phib now, 4th MarDiv in September, 3rdPhib (less 4th MarDiv) in October.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 301523 (pink) advises reducing SS 7th Fleet to 2 squadrons and of plan to further reduce to 1 Sq after British Command area is formed and provided enemy CAs SINGAPORE are immobilized.
Richardson 302320Z (pink) dissents at length the proposal for change in category of defense for the Hawaiian Group.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030211 (pink) requests continuance of aggressive air attacks for neutralization of Formosa.

CINCPAC 030429 (pink) suggests paragraph 3 Sherman-Chamberlin-Lindsay memorandum be amended making 5th Fleet primarily responsible for air defense and omitting provision now in the memo concerning offensive responsibilities.

4 August (Guam Date)

FAW-1 PBMs sank 1 SD in HAICHOW WAN, damaged a dredge and shore installations while FAW-18 Liberators shot down 2 enemy aircraft and damaged 2 more off SAGAMI WAN and off CHOSI POINT. No reports received of USASTAF strikes. All missions FEAF on the 3rd were weathered. No reports for 4 August. CAP shot down 1 twin-engine snooper at 30,000 feet, 25 miles west of the island. 15 sorties were flown from PALAU, attacking and sinking 1 SD. 6 NORPAC B-24s dropped 9 tons on KATAOKA NAVAL BASE and KOKUTAN CAPE, both on SHIMUSHU, with unobserved results.

There was little naval activity yesterday. Early morning of the 4th enemy SS made two unsuccessful torpedo attacks on an OKINAWA to LEYTE convoy. An escort, EARL V. JOHNSON (DE 702) made 4 depth charge attacks, the last of which resulted in a severe delayed underwater explosion. Oilers and carrier forces of the THIRD FLEET are moving East from the PHILIPPENES SEA to a position about 450 miles ESE of TOKYO, where they will replenish on the 6th prior to further strikes. Two destroyers from the 7th Fleet boarded a Japanese hospital ship in the JAVA SEA, found her with munitions on board, and are taking her into MOROTAI.

WARCOS 021745 (pink) advises of necessity for early installation early warning radar and fighter director installations for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030154 (pink) authenticates Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsey agreement of 1 August concerning air coordination.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040024 (pink) demurs to CINCPAC 030429 on grounds that proposed change would affect respective responsibilities of FEAF and 5th Fleet within objective area.

CINCPAC 040109 (pink) sets forth proposed early warning and fighter director radar installations for OLYMPIC in response to WARCOS 021745.

COMGEN USASTAF 040353 (pink) authenticates Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsey agreement of 1 August concerning air coordination.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040747 (pink) directs 3rd Fleet to concentrate next effort against enemy air in northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040841 (pink) requests that agreements concerning long lines as well as internal wire installations already made for OLYMPIC also apply to CORONET.
AUGUST (GCT)

4 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

COM3RDFFLEET 041011 (pink) acknowledges CINCPAC 040747 and advises strike plan for 8 August.

COMMAF SWPA 302140 states COM AF 13 responsibility for operations in SWPA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 032345 requests COM7THFLT to furnish complete data on existing operational command areas effecting units of AIR 7THFLEET.

5 August (Guam Date)

Carrier Task Forces are proceeding towards their rendezvous tomorrow morning with their oiler groups at 38N 149E. Reserve group of oilers is standing by further to the south where they will be joined by the ANZIO ASW Group. BRISTOL (DD 857), an oiler escort, damaged her bow while alongside ASHTABULA (AO 51) and is returning to GUAM for repairs. Adm. Low's fast striking force and the heavy covering force under Adm. Oldendorf leave their SHANGHAI patrol stations this afternoon for BUCKNER BAY. RAZORBACK (SS 394) reports destroying 6 sea trucks and damaging 2 small craft by gunfire in the southern KURILES on the 2nd.

58S effective B-29s attacked 5 targets last night. 96 hit MAEBASHI (50 mi. NW TOKYO). 256 hit NISHINOMIYA (NW OSAKA), 12 groups by radar, 4 visually. 65 hit IMABARI (NW SHIKOKU) by radar. 64 hit SAGA (E. of SASEBO), 2 by radar and 2 visually. 107 hit UBE coal liquefaction Co by radar. VF opposition was nil at IMABARI and SAGA, nil to slight at UBE and NISHINOMIYA, and nil to moderate at MAEBASHI. AA was about the same. No planes have so far been reported lost. All 7th AF missions and all but one 5th AF missions were weathered out. In the latter, 25 B-25s put 14.5 tons on an unidentified industrial area in east central KYUSHU, damaging a railroad bridge and railroad yards. FAW 1 PHM's sank 2 small merchant ships and damaged a PC and several small ships. FAW 18 planes sank 1 SD off KUMANO NADA, were attacked by 8 Zekes, shot down 2 and damaged 2 others. A search plane over TRUK sank a 40-ft. launch loaded with oil drums. 4 Privateers of FAW 4 carried out an anti-shipping sweep off PARAMUSHIRU, bombing TORISHIMA BETTO and damaging 1 SD and 10 landing craft with strafing.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 041451 (pink) collaborates on reasons for change in Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsy agreements contained in CX 30410. States proposed change not intended to lessen FEAF effort but to obtain assurance that primary responsibility for air defense in CAP rests with Fifth Fleet.

COMGEN AIR 041943 (pink) contains technical data and information on JAVAMAN PROJECT.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050100 (pink) instructs COM MARIANAS to inaugurate air search and provide ships to intercept enemy units MARCUS bound.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 042320 (pink) replies to CINCPAC 041451. Recommends original draft Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsy agreement stand. Future details be subject future agreements between FEAF, COMPHIBSPAC and USASTAF.
5 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050751 (pink) special requests to FEAF and USASTAF unnecessary in view of planned routine operations.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050754 (pink) makes TAGOBAAN available COM5THFLEET to copy communications of interest to CINCPPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050755 (pink) confirms need of 500 aircraft pool at OKINAWA for OLYMPIC.

CINCAFPAC 050845 (pink) contains further information relative to JAVAMAN PROJECT.

6 August (Guam Date)

Third Fleet fuels this morning prior to strike tomorrow. TF 95 encountered no surface activity. INTREPID (CV11) completed her training strike on WAKE yesterday. Buildings and gun positions were destroyed and others damaged. Light AA holed one plane. There were no casualties. The lifeguard submarine SEAROBIN (SS 407) bombarded the island with 135 rounds of 5" after the strike. Shortly before midnight the Merchant Ship ETHIOPIAN VICTORY at 16-55N, 169-48E sent out SOS signals and said she was on fire and abandoning ship. Nearby merchant ships are providing assistance. Cause of fire not known.

President Truman has announced that HIROSHIMA was bombed on the 6th (ELD) by an atomic bomb with explosive power equal to 20,000 tons of TNT. The bomb was described as having more than 2,000 times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" and 11 ton bomb. The bomb was dropped by planes of the 20th AF. Of the 588 effective B-29s attacking on the night of 5-th-6th, none was lost to enemy action. 1 ditched north of SAIPAN, and 12 were rescued from it. 6 P-51s are reported down from the TOKYO fighter strike scheduled for the 6th. The SCABBARDFISH has picked up 3 pilots, 2 others went down over land and 1 in TOKYO BAY. Results of the strike have not yet been received. TARUMIZU in southern KYUSHU was attacked by more than 275 FEAF planes on the 5th, using high explosive incendiary bombs. Returning pilots describe the entire city as being aflame. 1 Privateer of FAW 1 was shot down by ships AA off FUSAN and burned with no visible survivors. In TSUSHIMA straits other FAW - planes sank 1 SC and left another sinking. In addition a lugger was sunk and an SD was damaged.

CINCAFPAC 060719 (pink) acknowledges and states that action is being taken on request for continuing neutralization of FORMOSA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 060819 (pink) states that units of 1st MarAirWing now at EMIRAU to be concentrated in southern PHILIPPINES as soon as possible, following which island is to be taken over by the British.
ENTEMEDOR (SS 340) sighted a small Japanese Hospital ship headed into MARCUS. Ship sighted by search plane at about the same time. Ship departed yesterday evening unharmed after bombing raid in the afternoon. CASSIN (DD 372), on station north of IWO, was ordered to intercept, board and investigate. Later last night a destroyer from one of the 3rd Fleet fueling groups intercepted a lighted hospital ship at 31-33N 150-00E and reported she was tracking her. Third Fleet is scheduled to strike northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO this morning. TG 95.2 and 95.3 report maintaining barrier for 4 days. Night sweeps were conducted by TG 95.2 between latitudes 32 and 33 as far west as 122-30W. On the last two nights, night search planes assisted. TG 95.3 operated a little further to the south, and provided day CAP for TG 95.2 and searches. Both forces were snooped, but neither was attacked. Four planes were shot down by the CAP, and one driven off by gunfire. Neither force had any enemy surface contacts. TG 95.3 conducted a fighter strike on TINGHAI on the 6th.

114 effective B-29s with 96 P-51 escorts attacked TOYOKAWA NAVAL ARSENAL (SE NAGOYA). 97 P-51s attacked TOKYO airfields, meeting no airborne enemy aircraft and scoring 1 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 21 damaged on the ground. Ground installations were damaged and 2 x 200 foot ships were damaged. 4 P-51s were lost to AA, and 2 to other causes. 3 pilots were rescued and 3 are missing. Approximately 450 FEAF planes were over KYUSHU and TSUSIMA STRAITS waters on the 6th. Of these 168 attacked KAGOSHIMA starting a number of large fires in the railroad yards in factory areas. 154 planes attacked MIYAKONJO using mostly Napalm bombs, starting 20-30 fires in the city. 49 B-25s attacked shipping in TSUSIMA STRAITS and nearby land targets, sinking 6 ships and damaging 3 others. On the ground 2 radar stations, buildings and docks were damaged. AA shot down 2 B-25s and holed 11 others. FAW-1 planes sank 6 vessels on the seventh, left 1 SK sinking, and damaged 2 small tankers, all in TSUSIMA STRAITS while FAW 18 planes sank 1 SC in SURGUA WAN.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070330 (pink) reports to COMGENCHINA on further progress of FORT BAYARD project and naval proposals for participation therein.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070824 (pink) disapproves request for floating storage at OLYMPIC.
7 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070833 (pink) states that Navy can furnish assistance and materials in Ell component for JAVANMAN peculiar to PT boats plus 1 LCM from OKINAWA. Recommends all materials be obtained from COMGEN TEN.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070902 requests comments on policy concerning attacks on Junks, states CINCPAC inclination to interdict all traffic north of YANGTZE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070819 requests that JCS 100345 of December 1944 be modified to eliminate CINCPAC responsibility for shipping for Army controlled ports in RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070020 prescribes use of standard AAF air defense grid for use by CINCPAC forces in air warning and fighter direction and radar telling circuits.

8 August (Guam Date)

CASSIN reports that she intercepted and boarded the KIKU MARU at 1830 K, 8 August in Lat. 26-46N Long. 150-29E. No violations of any kind were found. Patients on board were 84 wounded, 42 nutritional deficiency and 4 tubercular, a total of 130. The ship was directed to proceed. Ship had papers indicating she was boarded and satisfactorily inspected on 4 August by a Sub-Lieutenant of the Royal Navy. Carrier planes of the 3rd Fleet are attacking north HONSHU this morning. 3 BB, 2 CA, 10 DD, and a British unit of cruisers and destroyers is scheduled to bombard KAMAIISHI this morning. Mership ETHIOPIAN VICTORY, earlier reported on fire, is now reported proceeding to ENDWETOK under her own power.

TU 12.5.6 (NEW JERSEY, BILOXI and DD's) report completion of their training bombardment on WAKE. 11 buildings, 2 ammunition dumps and 1 AA Gun were destroyed. Damaged were 5 guns, and RDF station, distillation plant, bridge and power plant. Light to moderate coast defense and AA fire was encountered. Our forces sustained no damage and no casualties.

242 effective B-29s attacked YAWATA, accompanied by about 140 FEAF P-47s. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, and AA varied. Most of the bombing was by radar and 2/3 of the planes reported results unobserved. 3 lost two operational, one combat, 2 crewman rescued from one, survivors of a second sighted in raft. 36 (of 64 effective) bombed the NAKAJIMA Aircraft Co visually at TOKYO. 6 others hit the TOKYO ARSENAL. Results are described as good to excellent. 1 B-29 was hit by AA and exploded over the target. 1 chute was seen. There was no fighter opposition. 92 attacked FUKUYAMA, half by radar and half visually. General conflagration. No losses have been reported. The Atomic bomb destroyed 4.1 square miles of the built-up area of 6.9 square miles of HIROSHIMA, 60% of the city. Amplification of previous reports indicate 65.5% of the built-up area of NAGAOKA was destroyed, and less than half a city block of TOYAMA'S 1.86 square miles of build-up area was left. 3 B-29s of the 509th Group are scheduled to attack NAKASAKI URBAN area. In the North Pacific 5 B-24s attacked KATAGA NAVAL BASE and 4 Privateers attacked TORISHIMA RETTTO and ONEKOTAN ZAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 081955 announces declaration of War by Russia on Japan.
AUGUST (GCT)

8 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CG USFCT 080500 (pink) concurs in plan FORT BAYARD operation. Requests Navy Department action to obtain JCS approval.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 080522 (pink) approves COM3RDFLEET plan for 9 August

CINCPAC ADVANCE 081540 (pink) concurs in CINCAFPAC amendments to agreement on logistics responsibility for RYUKUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 082227 (pink) recommends to COMORPAC that CTF 49 bombard selected objectives in KURILES.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 071505 (pink) outlines Red Navy desires for communications set up.

9 August (Guam Date)

Two enemy submarines were reported on the LEYTE-OKINAWA route. Two of our lifeguard submarines report definite periscope sighting, one at 29-55 131-53 and one at 38-15 112-06. SALAMAU ASW Group reports a successful encounter with midget submarines on the OKINAWA-LEYTE convoy route, with one midget reported sunk and a second probably sunk, both at 20-26N 126-54E. After a rather successful strike yesterday TF 38 and TF 37 are scheduled to renew their attacks against the northern EMPIRE today from a launching position somewhat further to the south. Fighter sweeps over TOKYO Plains fields are also scheduled. The force encountered more air opposition than usual. BORIE (DD 704) was hit by a suicide plane on her signal bridge, but is able to return under her own power. A bombardment unit consisting of BatDiv 8, CruDiv 10, 2 British light cruisers and screening destroyers bombarded KAMAISHI. Ships used own planes to spot. Hits were scored in coke oven, transfer tables, rolling mill, storage plant and new industrial area beyond steel plant. No casualties to our own forces.

Incomplete reports of the first TF 38 strikes on N. Honshu targets indicate that TF 38 planes destroyed 124 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged 57, mostly at MATSUSHIMA, JINMACHI, MISAWA, and HACHINOE dromes. The planes apparently were fueled and burned. There was no air opposition over the target, but 11 enemy aircraft were splashed by ships guns and TOMCAT CAP. The BORIE (DD 704) was hit by a suicer but splashed 2 others. The WASP shot down a suicide close aboard. In attacks on shipping TF 38 planes sank 1 DE, 1 PF, 1 PTD, and 7 luggers. Planes from TF 37 also attacking N. Honshu targets destroyed 22 enemy aircraft. They sank 1 DD and damaged 2 DE and 1 net layer. 100 effective B-29s attacked the NIPPON OIL REFINERY CO. at AMAGASAKI from 0019-0307 K, bombing by radar. In flight reports show results. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, AA meager to intense. No losses have yet been reported. 151 F8A F-47's escorting B-29s shot down 12 enemy aircraft probably destroyed 1, losing 5 P-47's at YAWATA. 78 B-29s took off from 0245-0327 K to attack the MAKAJIMA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, OGUKUBO PLANT at TOKYO. In heavy attacks on 8 targets not previously reported concentrated principally on KYUSHU and the TSUSHIMA STRAITS area, planes of the F8A F-47's sank 8 small AK and damaged 1 DE or PF, 1 PF, 1 SCL, and 2 SD. In air combat P-51s shot down 6 enemy fighters. 18 B-24 attacking USA, destroyed 8 enemy aircraft on the ground and 24 B-25s destroyed a bridge near TAKANABE.
9 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

FAW-1 planes destroyed 3 small AK and damaged 1 small FT, 1 tug, and 2 luggers. One Frigate was lost in the explosion of the ship it attacked. PBJ's damaged 2 small FT with rockets on the night of 8/9.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 082028 (pink) assigns North Pacific Force Crudiv 5 CDivs 23, 26 and DesRon 45 establish and maintain control of communications from the ALEUTIANS across the SEA OF OKHOTSK. Neutralize Japanese bases in the area and protect convoys between ALEUTIANS and escort Turnaround points in the SEA OF OKHOTSK.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090027 advises addressees of operational boundary established for operations U.S. and SOVIET forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090050 (pink) requests action to ensure that U.S. submarines in the SEA OF JAPAN north of SOVIET, U.S. boundary be protected pending reallocation. Requests use of TARTARY STRAIT for entry and exit. States that Pacific Fleet Submarines will be kept outside neutral zones pending establishment of liaison.

COM3RDFLT 090129 (pink) advises of intent to continue present attacks on 10, 12th and 13th.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090216 (pink) requests that requests for action by Pacific Fleet Units in support of USFCT be addressed to CINCPAC via CGUSFCT.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090503 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC ADVANCE 070553 which outlines proposed naval participation in FORT BAYARD project with minor reservation.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090616 (pink) detaches CRUDIV 16 from CTF 95 and directs it to report 3RDFLEET.

CINCSWPA 091403 (pink) states boundary line delimiting air and naval separating areas for US and USSR and states that CINCSWPA air forces not operate north of boundary line at SEA OF OKHOTSK except on specific authorization.

10 August (Guam Date)

Although somewhat hampered by the weather, TF 37 and TF 38 continued strikes against air, shipping and communications targets in northern HONSHU. Today both forces are scheduled to fuel. Units of the Mine Flotilla left BUCKNER BAY to start sweeping in area SKAGWAY today. In the North Pacific TF 92 (20 CL and 5 DD) is scheduled to rendezvous with 7 DD of DesRon 54 at 47-00 154-45 preparatory to an anti-shipping sweep and bombardment along the KURILE CHAIN. Submarines rescued 4 pilots from TF 37 and 38 yesterday. JALLAO reports sinking a large ship believed to be the TARAYASU, with 3 hits, and PARGO reports getting 6 hits in an escorted convoy on the 8th, both in the INLAND SEA. POMFRET sank a junk by gunfire off west coast of KYUSHU, DEVILFISH shelled radio and radar installations on TORI SHIMA and MUSKALLUNGE after failing to score hits with torpedoes in 7 northbound sea trucks in the KURILES, surfaced - damaged 2 in a gun action, receiving a hit in her periscope, with 1 man killed and 2 wounded.
In 2 days of attacks against HOKKAIDO and northern HONSHU TF 38 and 37 destroyed 318 and damaged 326 enemy aircraft. Revised report on shipping indicates that TF 37 sank 1 ODD, TF 38 sank 1 DE, and both forces together sank 2 DE, 1 FTD, 3 SD, and 6 luggers, damaging 2 DE and 1 FTU, all on the 9th. On the 10th in the first 4 strikes TF 38 planes damaged 1 Karbokan and 7 merchant vessels. Results of TF 37 shipping attacks on the 10th will be reported later. On the ground TF 38 (on the 9th) destroyed 10 hangars and damaged 16, and destroyed 3 locomotives. On the 10th, despite bad weather, TF 38 planes destroyed 11 locomotives, 4 freight cars, 4 tank cars, and damaged hangars, barracks, railroad facilities, bridges, factories, and other industrial buildings. TF 37 in strikes on the 10th destroyed 3 locomotives, 3 freight cars, 3 tank cars, plus cranes, factories, docks and air installations. No report on our losses has yet been received. 72 B-29s hit the TOKYO ARSENAL, (it was the secondary target), half bombing by radar and half visually. Results were unobserved. No B-29 losses have so far been reported. On the 9th 2nd MAW damaged 27 F4Us, 6 SD and 8 motor launches in attacks off south KYUSHU.

COMFAIRWING ONE 080700 reports refusal of FEAF to provide air cover for rescue submarines.

ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK 080940 reports official Soviet statement that Soviet shipping no longer using LA PERCUSE, reports preparations for beginning convoy of merchant ships.

COMINCH AND CNO 092200 instructs CINCPAC to deal directly with ALUSNAS MOSCOW and VLADIVOSTOK where desired.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 100012 directs COMSOPAC to exercise administrative and operational control NABS, Air Fields and aviation matters in SOPAC.

TF 92.

COMINCH AND CNO 101605 approves NATS establishment at MACTAN with installations held to a minimum.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957 (pink) contains detailed description of Soviet convoy plan.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 091540 (pink) requests that Soviets be advised when all American submarines have left their zone.

COM3RDFLEET 092115 (pink) advises intention to shift attacks after 11 August to TOKYO AREA if northern targets inaccessible or no longer profitable.

COMINCH AND CNO 092202 (pink) requests comments on Red Navy convoy Plan.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 100811 (pink) comments to COMINCH at length on Red Navy convoy plan.
10 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 101609 (pink) quotes text of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS relating to occupation of an operational airfield at each principal anchorage.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 101614 (pink) warns against relaxation of vigilance against Japanese attacks as a result of Japanese peace proposals.

11 August (Guam Date)

On completion of fueling yesterday, the Carrier Task Forces and their fueling groups remained in the same general area awaiting improved weather and political developments. Contained reports are received from submarines active both in rescue and offensive capacities. PLAICE recovered five airmen from a B-25 off KYUSHU on the 11th and BALAO recovered a RANDOLPH bomber pilot and his radioman off north HONSHU on the 10th. In addition to previously reported POGY results from her JAPAN SEA patrol sank a medium tanker and damaged a large tanker. ARGONAUT bombarded a radio station on SHICHIHATSU and on the 7th BUMPER sank a tug, a barge and a lugger off BANKA ISLAND on the 5th.

Final reports on 3rd Flt attacks on the 10th indicate that planes from TF 37 and TF 38 during 2 days attacks destroyed 398 enemy aircraft (13 airborne) and damaged 314. The aircraft types ran more to trainers than they had previously. Very few operational twins were found. Two previously untouched stock pile fields at MAHUKOOGA and at OBANAZAWA provided most of the planes for the destruction on the 10th. In attacks on shipping in addition to damage previously reported planes of TF 38 sank 5 merchant ships and 4 luggers and damaged 11 merchant ships, 2 passenger ferries and 4 luggers. CTF 38 states "enormous damage was inflicted upon airfield installations, oil storage, transportation facilities, docks, shipyards, and industrial buildings." TF 37 in attacks on shipping on the 10th sank 6 merchant vessels and 8 small craft; probably sank 1 DE, 1 merchant ship and 2 luggers and damaged 1 DE and 8 merchant vessels. On the ground considerable damage was inflicted on locomotives and railroad equipment, barracks, hangars, and a power station. 5th and 7th AF planes flew about 600 combat sorties over KYUSHU and near by sea areas on the 10th. Heaviest attacks were on KUMAMOTO with high explosive and Napalm. The city was left flaming and smoke obscured. Other attacks included 22 B-24s on CITTA, 36 B-25s on AMAMI, 39 B-25s on shipping in the JAPAN SEA, and 43 P-47s on CVE's in SASEBO Harbor. In the latter attack 11x1000 pounders were described as near misses, with apparently no damage inflicted on the ships. Oil storage tanks were hit, however. In attacks on shipping in the JAPAN SEA and elsewhere 1 DE or DD, 5 merchant vessels and 3 small craft were sunk and 1 DE or DD and 3 small craft were damaged.
11 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 020912 (pink) requests sterilization by 1 December 1945 of mines laid in Central, South and Eastern HONSHU ports and INLAND SEA areas except SHIMONSEKI STRAITS approach etc.

CINCAFPAC 101407 (pink) requests that amphibious force representatives designated to work with 6th, 8th and 10th Armies contact respective Army commanders for detailed planning.

CINCAFPAC 105507 (pink) requests comments on proposal to authorize direct liaison between representatives of 5th PhibCor and 13th AAF, latter assigned mission of supporting 5th Phib during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 102314 (pink) concurs in foregoing despatch but points out that 1st Marine Air Wing is component of FMF forces, suggests Marine ground forces be supported where practicable by Marine Aviation.

COMINCH AND CNO 102000 (pink) quotes at length War Department policy for public relations and censorship concerning military use ATOMIC BOMB.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 102315 (pink) states that although CINCPAC does not favor NAPKO project at this time he is prepared to furnish submarine to transport personnel if required.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 102317 (pink) states provision of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS for coordination with CINCAFPAC and controlled by COMPHIBPAC of amphibious movement and debarkation. Instructs amphibious force commanders to establish liaison with appropriate Army commanders.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 110217 (pink) states that CINCPAC intends to continue headquarters at GUAM in event of Jap capitulation, but moving between GUAM and SOUTH DAKOTA when necessary.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 110829 (pink) advises that presence of pressure mines makes it impracticable to operate in KOBE-Osaka area until February 1946.

COMGENCHINA 111215 (pink) requests that FORT BAYARD project be continued even though Japanese capitulation
12 August (Guam Date)

OAK HILL, LSD 7 at 21-15N, 131-02 E reported at 2236 KING last night that she was followed by a piloted torpedo for 20 minutes, that the speed of the torpedo was 10 knots and that the torpedo exploded 2000 yards astern. She was south bound and escorted at the time. Com3rdFlt reported at 0620 KING this morning that the TOKYO area was under attack, and that a snooper had been shot down. 30.8 the fueling group, is proceeding to the southward. TG 38.5 has been formed from the following ships of TF 37: KING GEORGE V, 1 CV, 2 CL's and accompanying DD's. The remainder of TF 37 is proceeding to MANUS. At 2045 ITEv 1 last night the PENNSYLVANIA was hit aft by an aerial torpedo while anchored in BUCKNER BAY. The dispatch states that the weather was clear, plane approached low on water and attacked undetected. Damage and casualties undetermined. V. Adm. Oldendorf and staff uninjured. He had shifted Flag to the PENNSYLVANIA and now is returning Flag to TENNESSEE. 2 OCL's (RICHMOND, CONCORD) and 12 DD's of TF 92 in an anti-shipping sweep of north KURILE chain yesterday destroyed a total of 10 trawlers and one small mership. A simultaneous bombardment was conducted by TF 92 against MATSUMA, KURABU ZAKI and SURIBACHI starting many fires. Considerable return fire was received from KURABU ZAKI with no damage suffered by our forces, except machine gun hits (no casualties on DD NG DERMOT). TF 92 is now returning to ATTU.

On the 12th PBM's of FAW-1 fired a lighthouse in HANGCHOW Wan and destroyed a lighthouse-weather station at the tip of SHANTUNG PENINSULA. FEAF planes attacked KYUSHU and nearby shipping targets on the 11th with about 575 aircraft. Attacks on shipping sank 8 AK plus 4 small craft and damaged 1 submarine, 2 transports, 1 lightship and 1 barge. Most of the shipping was sunk in the INLAND SEA. Other attacks were made on KURUME with 159 tons of incendiaries, on TOSU railroad yards near KURUME, east KYUSHU bridges (6 were hit and damaged), YAMAKAWA and IBUSUKI on the south tip of KYUSHU. Cover was furnished by 82 P-51s, 1 Zeke was downed and 2 P51s lost. 8 F4Us damaged a bridge and a lighthouse on YAKU SHIMA, and strafed TOKUNO airfield.

At 0900 Admiral Sherman and party departed for conference at MANILA.

13 August (Guam Date)

TF 38 retired to the southward during the night and commenced fueling at 0600 this morning at 32N, 142E. TF 37 (less 38.5) enroute to MANUS. Sweeping operations by 95.4 are underway in the SKAGWAY AREA. MinRon 20, fast minesweepers are proceeding toward TOKYO from BUCKNER BAY. CinCFLT reports that 4 carriers and 4 destroyers are now cruising in BAY OF BENGAL awaiting developments. Reports has been received from the PENNSYLVANIA stating that she has a large hole 30 feet long and 20 feet wide in bottom of ship, aft, that both starboard propeller shafts are broken and the inboard port shaft and rudder are damaged, that flooding was believed to be under control. BORIE (DD 704) with TF 38 was hit by suicide plane on 9 August 1945, reports the following casualties to ships company: killed in action: 1 officer, 34 enlisted men; 13 enlisted men missing; 2 officer, 32 enlisted men wounded.
An incomplete flash report of the 1st 4 3rd Fleet strikes against the TOKYO area indicates that planes of TF 38 shot down 21 enemy aircraft (12 believed to be snoops and 9 Kamikazes), and destroyed 46 enemy aircraft on the ground plus 71 damaged. Bad weather in the morning improved as the day wore on. No enemy planes reached the force. A report on damage to ground targets, including electronic plants and airfields installations, is scheduled to follow. FEAF planes flew 675 - 700 strikes over KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, and sea areas on the 12th. The heaviest attacks were at MATSUYAMA (SHIKOKU). In attacks on shipping 12 small and medium AKs were sunk, and 1 claimed CA (in TSUSHIMA STRAITS), 1 AS, 6 small AK, and 3 luggers were damaged. 137 P-47s and P-38s attacked KYUSHU bridges, destroying 2 and damaging 2. KANOYA and CHIRAN dromes were heavily attacked. 3 enemy aircraft were shot down. In one encounter 10 P-51s saw 30-40 Franks and shot down 1. All but 4 Franks fled. 26 MAW-2 F4Us hit MATSUYAMA drome in northern FORMOSA, flying more than 500 nautical miles to the target in their first FORMOSA attack. They used 167 rockets and strafed. 1 enemy aircraft was exploded on the ground and others were probably damaged. Some factory and building targets were also strafed.

Admiral Sherman and party returned from conference at MANILA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 110858 (pink) warns COMGENFMFPAC to alert 1 RCT from 6th Marine Division for immediate occupation duty if required.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 111344 (pink) advises that entry and exit of U.S. Subs into TARTARY STRAIT depends on exchanges of liaison groups and development of system of recognition signals.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120111 (pink) requests early action on FORT BAYARD proposal.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120112 (pink) requests complete data on status of 3 PCE (R) reported to have been converted into communication ships.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120244 (pink) states that commanders of Fast Carrier Task Forces should take all practicable measures to insure that VF pilots on dusk CAP are capable of night landings.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120405 requests that pilots of OKINAWA based planes be briefed that friendly submarines are operating in JAPAN SEA, south of KOREA and in the vicinity of KYUSHU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120807 (pink) advises of and describes modifications of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS with respect to areas of responsibility of COM5THFLT and COM7THFLEET.
Report from Com3rdFleet at 0620 this morning states the THIRD Fleet is attacking the TOKYO Area. At 0730 KING time Com3rdFleet acknowledged receipt of orders from Fleet Headquarters to suspend attack operations. TF 37 (less 38.5, British Carrier Group is proceeding to MANUS. 30.8 remaining in fuelling area southeast of TOKYO. 95.4 is continuing sweeping of SKAGWAY area. Additional vessels en route from BUCKNER BAY ETA SKAGWAY area daylight 16 August. Com3rdFleet has directed MINRON 20 (fast mine sweepers) to join TG 30.8 (oiler group). PBY Dumbo plane rescue reported yesterday as being in TOKYO BAY has been confirmed. This Dumbo rescued three survivors of a torpedo plane from the TICONDEROGA. Of four TBC-based fighters lost yesterday attacking the EMPIRE, three were rescued, one by the sub TIGRONE just west of SURUGA WAN. The TIGRONE also reports that an otherwise dull day was relieved by bombardment of MIKOMOTO ISLAND resulting in five hits in radio station 6 on light tower. SPIKEFISH reports sinking I class submarine at 29N-124E after tracking it for 11 hours with 2 torpedo hits out of 6. One prisoner rescued from wreckage.

On the 14th 725 effective B-29s attacked 6 targets. 161 aircraft hit HIKARI ARSENAL, 143 hit OSAKA ARMY ARSENAL and 110 hit MARIFU RAILROAD YARDS (IWAKUNI, SW HONSHU). No losses have been reported for any of these last day missions. There was no fighter opposition, and AA was nil to moderate. 135 aircraft hit NIPPON OIL REFINERY CO. at AKITA, 89 hit ISEZAKI URBAN (NW TOKYO) and 32 hit KUMAGAYA URBAN (NW TOKYO), all by radar. Again there was no fighter opposition, and no losses have been reported. AA was nil to meager at all 3 targets. Reports of FEAF activities on the 13th show 263 sorties flown. Shipping attacks by B-24s and B-25s in TSUSHIMA STRAITS resulted in sinking 3 AKs and damaging 1 FTD. 42 P-47s on a sweep off KOREA report destroying 1 enemy aircraft over KEIJO, with 2 probably destroyed. 1 P-47 is missing. In a separate dispatch ComAF 5 reports that the CVE KALY, attacked in BEPPU WAN (NE KYUSHU) by the 38th Bomb Group on the 9th, is now lying on her side. On the 13th 2nd MAW F4Us burned 1 x 75 and 1 x 100 ft. boats in the W. RYUKUS, and 1 operational Betty on WAN airfield, KIKAI JIMA. FAW 1 planes damaged 1 SB and 1 SA in TSUSHIMA STRAITS on the 14th. In the North Pacific 7 B-24s put 10.5 tons on KATAOKA and SURIBACHI airfields, and 2 Privateers hit KURABU with 24 x 100 pounders.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 120246 sets forth responsibility for execution of Federal Foreign Propaganda program.

CINC BPF 121202 (pink) advises of plan to move 3 small British groups with air and logistics support to HONG KONG, SHANGHAI and possibly SINGAPORE.

CINCAFPAC 121527 (pink) sets forth amendments to 3rd edition BLACKLIST plan; 24th Corps to be occupation force KOREA.

COMINCH AND CHC 122148 (pink) approves assembly personnel and material for operation to supply Chinese (FORT BAYARD plan).
14 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 140629 (pink) warns action and info addressees to be prepared to execute CAMPUS on short notice, 5th PhibCor to be ordered to report to COMGEN 6TH ARMY, designates Lt. Col. B. J. Truitt, as MarAirBase commander YOKOSUKA, Col. B. L. Smith MarAirBase commander SASEBO-NAGASAKI, instructs COMAIRCPRAC nominate ComAirBase KURE, Capt. G. J. Dufek designated COMNAVAIRBASE OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 140819 (pink) instructs COM7THFLT at earliest possible date pass to COMPHILSEAATRON all remaining functions as senior Naval Commander SWPA.

CINC BPF 140829 (pink) deals with logistics necessary in connection with Admiralty plan to send British Naval forces to HONG KONG.

CINCPAC 141455 (pink) advises that vessel loaded with materials and personnel for construction of bulk aviation gas facilities TOKYO is on route from Manila, requests water facilities at OKINAWA and TOKYO be provided.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 142304 orders cessation of offensive operations against Japanese forces, continue searches and patrols, maintain defensive and internal security measures.

15 August (Guam Date)

Swan songs of the submarines: During the last few days of hostilities ARGONAUT, in EAST CHINA SEA destroyed a junk by gunfire SHIME KOSHIKI (this on the 12th) on the 11th, POMFRET in EAST CHINA SEA sank sea truck off FUKAYE SHIMA and on the 13th an empty cargo junk in SAISHU KAIKYO both by gunfire (POW total 23 Japs and 7 KOREANS). LAMPEY in JAVA SEA sank 1 junk, 1 lugger, PARCO in SEA OF JAPAN sank small AK on 11th, CAVALA was attacked by unidentified dive bomber at noon yesterday in 35°40'N, 141°20'E; bomb missed 100 yards astern, and no damage, POGY reported at noon yesterday from 40°14'N, 146°E that she had successfully exited from the SEA OF JAPAN via LA PERouse STRAIT On the surface. APA 124 (LA GRANGE) in BUCKNER BAY was hit in superstructure amidship by suicide plane at 1948 UT on evening of 13th. Fire was soon brought under control. Considerable structural damage resulted. TF 38, while retiring southeastward yesterday, was being heckled by numerous bogies. At 1323 UT Com3rdFlt reported that he was continuing to splash those approaching the Force, and that so far the count on such was 5 since noon. The force is operating at economical speed in an area southeast of TOKYO, with 30.8 and 112.2 further to the south. CINCBEFF in DUKE OF YORK and accompanying DD's joined TG 38.5 this morning. Regimental Combat Team of 5th Marines departed GUAM last evening in 5 APA's (12.1.2) escorted by 3 DD's, to report to Com3rdFlt for duty on 16th. OZARK (LSV 2) with Brig. General Clements and Headquarters Task Force A, 6th Marine Division, embarked, accompanied by SHADWELL (LSV 15) and 2 DD's are enroute to report Com3rdFlt for duty, ETA noon on 17th.

Prior to the receipt of CINCPAC's order to cease offensive operations planes of the THIRD Fleet encountered about 45 Jap fighters over CHOSI, ATSUGI, and SAGAMI WAN, shooting down 26 of them. On the ground at HYAKUHIHARA 5 unidentified enemy aircraft were destroyed. During the morning and early afternoon the CAP shot down 8 enemy aircraft approaching the force, and a DD shot down 1. Total enemy aircraft shot down was 35 - total destroyed 40.

- continued -
15 August (Guam Date)(Cont’d)

Final figures on the THIRD Fleet attacks on the 13th show 422 enemy aircraft put out of action on that day: 19 shot down, 254 destroyed on ground and 149 damaged on ground. The percentage of flamers was very high. Nagano loaded with over 100 trainers, was wiped absolutely clean. 1 RO Class sub was destroyed and 1 damaged; 8 luggers were destroyed and 22 damaged. On the ground 14 locomotives were destroyed and 5 damaged; 11 hangars were destroyed and 5 damaged; 13 industrial buildings, 7 airfield shops, and 5 warehouses were damaged. In 1167 offensive and 414 CAP sorties on that day we lost 20 aircraft (12 combat), with 6 pilots and 2 aircrews. On the 14th F6F planes in 185 sorties sank 3 AK, 1 sloop, and 2 small craft, and damaged 1 PT, 2 flak boats, 7 small AK, and a large number of small craft. We lost 3 P-47s, with 1 pilot recovered. 7 B-29s on 13-14 August dropped 5.5 million leaflets telling the Japanese people the terms of the Jap surrender offer and the reply of Secretary of State Byrnes, plus the terms of the Potsdam declaration. The populated centers - TOKYO, KOBE, OSAKA, KYOTO, NAGOYA - got most, but all islands were covered. 2 B-29s on the 15th and 4 on the 16th are scheduled to drop 4 million leaflets on 31 major cities, keeping the Japanese people up to date on negotiations. In the North Pacific on the 14th 2 Privateers attacked PARAMUSHIRU, and 6 B-24s put 13.5 tons of incendiary clusters on KASHIWABARA staging area, starting a large fire.

CINCPAC ADVANCE L42310 (pink) requests Japanese to send ship to rendezvous with Halsey and lead him into SAGAMI WAN.

CINCPAC & CINCPAC ADVANCE L50218 congratulates General MacArthur on appointment as Supreme Commander.

MARSHALL L42318 (pink) informs addressees to British Chief of Staff have issued instructions to Admiral Fraser for acceptance of Japanese Surrender in HONGKONG and have asked concurrence of U.S. Chiefs of Staff on instructions to Mountbatten which are set forth in full.

COMINCH AND CNO 150000 advises of receipt by State Department of Japanese. Sets forth full text of reply.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150206 (pink) sets forth changes in BLACKLIST Staff Study.


CINCPAC ADVANCE 150216 (pink) advises that Halsey acknowledged receipt orders for cessation of air attacks at 142130 August but that initial attack was under way when directive was received by CINCPAC.

CINCPAC 150245 (pink) sets forth priorities on allocation of seaborne troop lift for Phase one of BLACKLIST.

CINCPAC 150305 (pink) warning order for execution of BLACKLIST operation COM GEN 6th and 8th Armies and 24th Corps directed to expedite arrangements with 5th, 3rd, 7th Amphibious representatives, and all action addressees are instructed to initiate the execution of operations to occupy JAPAN and KOREA.
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 150355 instructs Japanese authorities designate radio station in TOKYO for use between headquarters. Station JUM on frequency 13705 KC be used in intern.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150620 requests immediate dispatch to Japanese authorities that any Japanese aircraft approaching our naval disposition must be destroyed for defense purposes.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150846 sets forth in detail naval requirements in addition to those contained in BLACKLIST.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150842 enjoins officers to conduct themselves properly in their treatment of Japanese.

CINCPAC 151333 (pink) advises that accomplishment of occupation mission the U.S. zone of KOREA will require 1 additional Army Division if DARIEN is occupied, states that occupation of SHANGHAI by 2 divisions of 3rd PhibCorps is feasible barring unforeseen developments, recommends that any other occupation on CHINA COAST be U.S. forces be subordinated to primary operations.

COMINCH 151844 warns of intense activities along shores of SAGAMI WAN probably organized prior surrender but possibly indicating contemplated treachery.

SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS 150503 directs cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces notification of effective date and hour of such cessation directs the Japanese Imperial Government to send representative and sets forth means for this representatives to reach MANILA.

16 August (Guam Date)

At 0200 Admiral Sherman and party departed for Manila conference with Japanese Representatives.

SEA SCOUT sank small coastal vessel on 15th in the GULF OF THAILAND. CARBONERA destroyed 4 schooners, 2 junks, 2 sampans off the MALAY COAST prior to 15 August. TIPTOE and TRUMP (British) sank 15 junks and 1 patrol vessel all before 9th in vicinity of south of JAVA. PLAICE exploded 12 mines in last 4 days, vicinity 32-28N, 128-12E. FIPPER was forced down, bombed and depth charged by Jap radar plane at 1845 1)-9) yesterday, 16th. TORSAY sank 2 MIKURA Frigates before final bell with torpedoes in the SEA OF JAPAN. ATULE exploded a frigate with 1 hit on morning of 13th and possibly scored 1 or 2 hits on another frigate after 165-mile chase also in JAPAN SEA. BALAO sank one picket and beached another in TONTWAN on 14th. All submarines south of HONSHU except 1 off BUNGO SUIDO and 1 off KII SUIDO for life guard duty are being returned to base. For present submarines are remaining on station in YELLOW SEA, EAST CHINA SEAS, SEA OF JAPAN and in northern KURILES AREA. Apparently some enemy submarines continue their attacks. HEALY (DD 672) reported submarine contact at 75-13N, 144-19E at 0852 (-10) on 16 August. Challenge unanswered, HEALY made 3 attacks, and there are indications of damage to sub. Additional DD's have been sent to the scene. Clearing of SKAGWAY of mines progress despite breakers during the nights of 14th and 15th. TF 30 is operating in vicinity of POINT READY, and replenishment units in vicinity of POINT DRINK.
16 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC 141101 (pink) states amendment in BLACKLIST plan, substituting 5th Amphibious Corps for 1st Army Corps in SASEBO-NAGASAKI area. Removes 27th division from 24th Corps for use in B-60.

MACARTHUR 150529 (pink) announces assumption of command as Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces by General MacArthur. Announces channel of communication with Japanese Imperial Government will through MacArthur Headquarters.

COMGENMIDPAC 150930 recommends that JCS be requested on V-J day to remove restriction imposed on Hawaiian Area by modifying category defense B.

COMINC AND CNO AND JCS U.S. ARMY 152127 (pink) suggests in view of Japanese capitulation previous arrangements for liaison groups at KHABAROVSK and VLADIVOSTOK be modified. Suggests provide liaison representatives with Cruiser to deal with Russian command in whatever ASIATIC port appears desirable. Mentions possibility of Dairen but warns that occupation of that port is not to be communicated to Soviets at this time.

JCS 160045 (pink) directs CINCPAC to release to full control of Admiral Fraser such parts of the British Pacific Fleet as he requests.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160250 (pink) advises that Rear Admiral Sherman will proceed to Manila to represent CINCPAC during meeting with Japanese representatives. States intention to send a liaison group headed by a Flag Officer to represent CINCPAC at CINCPAC headquarters at TOKYO AREA.

CINC SAMAR 160433 (pink) refers to FORT BAYARD operation. Announces assignment of officers from NABU 13, announces receipt of designation of 7 LSTs. States intention to begin loading on arrival.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160724 (pink) suggests cancelation of exchange of Flag Officers between CINCPAC headquarters and PEARL and Soviets at VLADIVOSTOK in lieu thereof Admiral Settle to be provided with Cruiser and proceed initially to VLADIVOSTOK.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160809 (pink) sets forth naval facilities required to be furnished at (A) YOKOSUKA (B) OMINATO (C) HIROSHIMA (D) SASEBO.

KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS 161117 advises Soviets that Japanese forces of KWANTUNG Army have ceased all military movements and requests Soviets cease their attacks. Sets forth procedure for maintaining communications.

CINCPAC 161141 (pink) states that CINCPAC has no further need for Military Liaison Group for KHABAROVSK, inquires if project shall be continued in these circumstances.

WARGOS 161608 sets forth agreement by Japanese of receipt of messages from U.S. Government and MacArthur. Sets forth steps which are being taken in response thereto.
18 August (Guam Date)

War is not yet over for some of our subs. In SEA OF JAPAN reports that the fallen enemy is maintaining day and night air patrol of SEA OF JAPAN and that she has been dunked four times and bombed once since the 16th. This is report of the PIPER. Enemy submarines also are reported. Merchant ship (BOWLINE KNOT) on a westerly course at ten knots sighted submarine at 1430(-10) yesterday at 10-24N, 154-52E. The submarine was sighted 500 yards on ships port quarters, remained partially surfaced for two minutes, then submerged. No indication of hostility. A DE has been ordered to investigate and take offensive action if and as may prove necessary. A plane of Fleet Air Wing ONE at 1430(-9) yesterday sighted an unidentified submarine 28N-128-45E on a southerly course, speed between 6 and 10 knots, running decks awash. CTF 95 has directed Fleet Air Wing ONE to attack the submarine if it proceeds south of 27-20N. TF 33 is replenishing again today. BatDivs 3 and 4 (less MARYLAND) have been assigned to the THIRD Fleet and are being assembled at BUCKNER BAY by August 22 as TG 32.90. TF 31, TOKYO Occupation Force, R.Adm. Badger in IOWA with SAN DIEGO, 6 APA, 1 AKA, 1 LSV, 1 LSD, 6 DMS, 6 APD and DesDiv 106 has been directed to conform to the movements of TF 33 and remain within TBs range until otherwise directed.

JNP (RDO TOKYO) 170212 requests that Allied forces refrain from approaching the home waters of JAPAN proper until sufficient time has elapsed for the cease fire order will have been fully effectuated.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS 170711 confirms the impression of Japanese GHQ that the tasks of the representatives in Manila does not include signing of surrender agreement. Orders them to act without further delay.

MACARTHUR 171357 quotes messages nos. 5 and 7 from Japanese GHQ, no. 5 advises Soviet forces still on offensive, requests steps be taken to bring this offensive to a halt. No. 7 advises that the parties for CHINA, MANCHURIA and the south left on 17 August.

WARCS 171907 quotes broadcast from KHABAROVSK to CO KWANTUNG Army suggesting that Japanese cease military action at 1200 20 August, whereupon Soviet troops also will cease.

COMINGH AND CNO CHIEF OF STAFF 161940 (pink) proposes cancellation of Army, Navy liaison groups for KHABAROVSK and VLADIVOSTOK with Russia in view of termination of hostilities. Instructs Military mission MOSCOW contain Soviet concurrence.

COMGEN CHINA 170615 (pink) passes along Chinese request that the term MANCHURIA be defined as including LIAONING, KARIN and HEILUNGKIANG but not JEHOI which Chinese consider integral part of CHINA.
August (GCT)

18 August (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170906 (pink) instructs COMMARGILS and COM MARIANAS make plans and preparations to receive surrender of Japanese forces remaining in BONINS, MARIANAS, CAROLINES and MARSHALLS, refers to CINCPAC OpPlan 12-45. Preliminary plans to be made for activation naval air fields at WAKE and MARCUS for use of NATS.

CINCAFPAC 171045 (pink) advises that JCS WX 5181 has been passed to COMPHIBSPAC who is asked to submit best estimate earliest possible date for movement to CHINA.

COMGEN USASTAF 180810 (pink) states USASTAF desire to reserve right to review current construction projects in light of post V-J, requirements for VLR and to propose construction which may be required.

19 August (Guam Date)

Merchant ship sighted supposed enemy submarine eastbound on surface at 01-09N, 132-19E. Plane of FAW ONE sighted another submarine yesterday morning in same location as previous day (28N, 128-50E) and also on southerly course, speed 6-10 knots. Search is being conducted by 2 DD's. COD on her 17th war patrol in South CHINA SEA and JAVA SEA ending August 4 sank 23 junks and an oil barge for a total of 2200 tons sunk. Progress of clearing SKAGWAY area continues. THIRD Fleet is continuing to replenish today. TF 38 is being reformed as TF 38, 2nd Carrier Task Force, and TF 39, 1st Carrier Task Force. Aboard the LEVY yesterday, Japanese officers representing the Atoll Commander at MILLE tentatively accepted unconditional surrender terms, subject to approval of MILLE Commander. The terms were presented by Captain H. B. Grow, acting for Rear Admiral Harrill (ComMars-Gils). Japanese were given 48 hours in which to communicate with Imperial Headquarters for final instructions.

WARCOS 190023 (pink) sets forth President Truman's attitude toward acceptance of surrender of HONGKONG by British Officer.

COM3RDFLEET 190219 (pink) sets forth in detail Com3rdFleet's alternative plans for landing of marines in coordination with 11th Airborne.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 192113 (pink) contains instructions for MacArthur and Wedemeyer concerning arrangements for surrender of HONGKONG with British Officer.
20 August (Guam Date)

The Third Fleet is continuing to replenish and reform today. Replenishment will be concluded by dusk. ANTIETAM, INTERMED and CABOT escorted by 9 DD’s sortied ENIWETOK at dawn today for POINT READY to join THIRD FLEET. BAT is dawn 25 August. Sweeping of the southern half of the KAGWAY area will be finished 25 August. Information concerning the axis, depth and spacing of this minefield was obtained from the Japanese representatives at MANILA. Information concerning enemy submarines also was obtained from these envoys. 8 subs are at sea: 3 near OKINAWA, 3 in the vicinity of the MARIANAS and 2 near TRUK. On the 16th these submarines were ordered to cease hostilities and return to base. This order was repeated on the 18th. However, yesterday morning a plane of FAW 16 reported an enemy submarine at 14-14N, 127-42E, submerged with periscope showing, on a course of 60 degrees. The periscope disappeared after 8 seconds. Also a late dispatch from COMPHILSEAFROM reports an attack by DD SMITH on a good sonar contact at 21-15N, 127-33E early morning of 21st. This attack was made after failure of submarine to answer challenge. The Japanese Commander of MILLE ATOLL has displayed a signal indicating he was ready to sign the instrument of unconditional surrender. Arrangements are being made to effect the surrender aboard a DE at noon on the 22nd. The Japanese envoys departed MANILA for JAPAN at 1300 yesterday.

WARCOS 182313 (pink) advises representatives of Australia, Canada, France New Zealand and Netherlands be invited to attend Japanese surrender and that State Department will request CINCPAC make provisions accordingly.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS 190909 (pink) contains official text of (1) Proclamation by Emperor of Japan accepting POTS DAM terms. (2) Instrument of surrender. (3) General Order Number 1 containing directions from Imperial General Headquarters to all its commanders in Japan and abroad to cease hostilities and surrender to appropriate commanders. Order also covers disarmament, status of Police Force, supplying of information, disposition of ships, minefields etc.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS 191047 (pink) requests SACSEA and GOC Australian Military forces to arrange between themselves areas in which each will receive surrender of Japanese forces.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS 191615 (pink) amends paragraph in General Order Number 1 dealing with surrender of forces on ASIATIC mainland, KARAFUTO and KURILE ISLANDS to CINC Soviet Forces.

21 August (Guam Date)

To avoid the typhoon, THIRD Fleet units moved to the southward yesterday, and at dusk return to assigned areas to the north. No reports of surrenders of enemy submarines yet. A merchant ship sighted a periscope yesterday afternoon at 12-39N, 125-30E. A floating mine resembling a barrel was exploded by strafing late yesterday afternoon at 21-21N, 127-50E. This is just 19 miles to the eastward of the sonar contact made by the destroyer SMITH early yesterday. Aviation personnel rescued by submarines since 28 May totaled 227, of these 47 were from carriers, a total of 82 were Navy and 145 were Army.
21 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

The Japanese Government has been informed that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will accept the surrender of the Japanese armed forces in TOKYO BAY on a United States Battleship on 31 August 1945, on 26 August an advance party will arrive by air at ATSUGI airdrome. U. S. Naval forces (led by a Japanese ship) will arrive in SAGAMII WAN, and U. S. Naval Forces (with Japanese pilots) will advance into TOKYO BAY. On 28 August, the main airborne force will commence landing at ATSUGI airdrome and Naval and Marine forces will land in the vicinity of YOKOSUKA Naval Base. These forces will occupy and establish themselves at once within a specifically designated area pending consummation of the formal surrender. On 29 and 30 August these landings of airborne and naval forces will continue. On 31 August designated later, landing of airborne and naval landing forces will continue; at an hour aboard a U.S. Battleship in TOKYO BAY the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will receive from duly authorized representatives, the proclamation signed by the Emperor and the instrument of surrender to be signed at this ceremony, and immediately following the ceremony of surrender, these two documents together with General Order No. One will be promulgated to the Japanese people.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 202137 (pink) advises that in view of large amount of air seaborne traffic in the JAPAN and KOREA areas and throughout the KURILES weather centrals will be needed. Suggests that liaison to handle details of ship and aircraft movement coordination be handled by liaison group aboard ship.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210616 (pink) advises of concept of operations for landings on CHINA COAST concurred in by representatives of CINCPAC, COMTHFLT, COMCHIN and staff members of CINCPAC and sets forth concept in detail.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 210941 (pink) changes surrender date set forth in SCAP Z 517 from 28 August to 31 August. States instructions received by SCAP concerning acceptance of surrender in SEA-AUSTRALIAN areas by SAC and AUSTRALIANS and requests latter to arrange between themselves division of the area.

22 August (Guam Date)

Units of the Third Fleet have completed replenishment, have reformed for the pending operation, and are operating at economical speed in areas assigned. As of 20 August 460 mines plus 3 floaters have been swept in the SKAGWAY Area. A Check sweep of the southern extremity of the area corroborated the information received from the Japanese envoys at MANILA as to the southern limit of the minefield. Plane of Fleet Air Wing 18 reported a submarine yesterday morning, submerged, at 15-53N, 153-51E. Destroyer Escorts CRONIN and GILLIGAN made depth charge attacks on separate contact in vicinity of 21-22N, 127-19E. Contacts were challenged prior to attacking. The CRONIN evaluates these contacts as probably non-submarine. Aboard the USS LEVY (DE 162) inside MILLE Lagoon, shortly afternoon yesterday, the Imperial Japanese Navy Commander of MILLE ATOLL surrendered unconditionally to Captain Crow, acting for Rear Admiral Harrill, Commander, Marshall-Gilberts Area. August 28 has been set for raising American Flag on main island of the Atoll.

CINCPAC 210517 (pink) concurs in putting in effect the General provisions of Com3RDFlt's plan 2 with certain supplementary instructions.
COMGEN CHINA 210755 (pink) states assumption of COMGEN CHINA that Pelesdoes will be included in CHINA THEATERS area.

CINCPAC 220915 (pink) replying to COMGEN CHINA CBF 5250 (not held) states that CINCPAC has made no estimate for Army service troops to support marine forces available for CHINA COAST operation.

COMGEN CHINA 211220 (pink) states in detail understanding of COMGEN CHINA THEATER representatives concerning availability logistics support and personnel lift of occupation forces for CHINA THEATER.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 212230 (pink) states that disarmed Japanese military personnel may be used for such purposes and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by naval commanders pending arrangements to return them to their homes in accordance with Potsdam proclamation.

COM3RD FLEET 212327 (pink) sets forth COM3RD FLT opPlan 11-45.

COM3RD FLEET 212329 (pink) sets forth Annex B to COM3RD FLT opplan 11-45.


CINCPAC ADVANCE 220729 (pink) advises that operation MAJESTIC is suspended indefinitely.

COMGEN CHINA 221200 (pink) advises that to the knowledge of the Generalissimo no negotiations had been initiated between CHINA and BRITAIN concerning British operations in HONGKONG area.

COMGEN CHINA 221210 (pink) advises WARGOS and COMINCH that necessary military coordination between British and CHINA relative to occupation of HONGKONG by British is not being made.

JCS 221835 (pink) states that adjustments of boundaries of SWPA also changes command responsibility as agreed to at Potsdam will become effective with formal surrender. Commander Allied Naval Forces SWPA will be abolished and all naval forces except U.S. will pass to British control.

COMGEN CHINA 171110 (pink) sets forth in detail plans for movement of central government troops into strategic areas in CHINA to cope with the problems of orderly surrender and preservation of law and order.
23 August (Guam Date)

Third Fleet is operating at economical speed in an area southeast of TOKYO. DORTCH (DD 670) made a submarine contact at 31-59N, 143-18E early yesterday morning. The submarine fired a yellow flare. No attack was made by the DORTCH. ComTHIRD Fleet has directed CTG 30.8 to conduct an air and surface search of the area, and CTG 38.4 to search the area from scene of contact forward toward EMPIRE. If the submarine is located, it will either surrender immediately or be destroyed.

COMINCH 231516 (pink) advises that CINCBPP had been instructed to hold HONGKONG forces at LEYTE or other convenient ports pending further orders, and to conform to MacArthurs views on timing Jap surrender.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 221934 (pink) states that no further action is desired with respect to NAPKO project.

COMINCH AND CNO 201945 sets forth presidential directive to all concerned to take necessary action to prevent release of any information concerning Atomic Bomb.

COM3RDFLT 211431 advises COMGENSTHARMY that 3rdFleet will execute plan 2. Directs COMGENSTHARMY to arrange with Admiral McCormick for naval gunfire support, suggests that COMGEN11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION send air support liaison officer.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220823 sets forth schedule of return of amphibious corps and MarDivs to U.S. when relieved or released.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 230833 advises COMMORPAC he is considered Task Force Commander and instructs him to initiate compliance OpPlan 12-45.

CINCAFPAC 231127 advises CINCPAC of numbers of officers of Allied Powers correspondents etc, who will be present on MISSOURI for surrender ceremony.

COMINCH AND CNO 230836 sets forth views of CINCPAC on proposal for grounding PENNSYLVANIA on OKINAWA to provide coast defense. Advises that ship will be towed to GUAM for drydocking and limited repairs.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 230838 concurs to implication to discontinue are cancellations to bonus to Merchant Marine; influence of Marine war risk insurance; would establish termination date for operations and campaigns in progress. States belief that Armed Guard and armament should remain on Merchant Ships for the time being.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 232217 concurs in use of Hospital ships for evacuation of WAKE and MARCUS.
24 August (Guam Date)

Units of the THIRD Fleet are operating in designated areas to the north of fueling area and east of Point PRIEST. TF 38 has proceeded to operating areas in coastal waters north and south of TOKYO. Later in the day, units will be proceeding to Point PRIEST, rendezvous point for entrance plan. All force, group, and unit commanders have been given full discretion in taking action to avoid the path of the storm.

TG 35.90 (R. Adm. McCormick), with BatDivs 3 and 4, is en route to Point PRIEST, ETA 2340(-9), 26 August. BIRDDOG destroyers are on station between OKINAWA and TOKYO for air-sea rescue duty.

Japanese GHQ reports to SCAP that four merchant vessels were attacked and sunk by a submarine, presumably Russian, on 22 August in the coastal waters of northern HOKKAIDO.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240811 deals with the establishment of seaplane and surface air-sea rescue services within area of responsibility of Com3rdFlt.

JCS 232208 (pink) directs Wedemeyer to inform MacArthur when British have coordinated arrangements for surrender of HONGKONG with him and with the Chinese; advises that British will provide facilities through HONGKONG area for assistance and support of Chinese and American forces in CHINA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240812 (pink) directs addressees to comply with OpPlan for occupation and control of coastal waters of JAPAN and KOREA as soon as practicable.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240820 deals with implementation, operational control, and logistic support of Marine fighter groups, naval search and transport squadrons.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240812 requests dispatch advice of text of Annex No. 11 of CINCAFPAC Operations Instructions No. 4.

SCAP 241505 advises that necessary arrangements to accomplish surrender of Japanese forces in HONGKONG to British are to be made directly between Rear Admiral Harcourt, General Wedemeyer, and Chinese Board of Military Operations. Contains supplemental instructions.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240120 expresses CINCPAC desires concerning anchorages accorded major ships in TOKYO BAY.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240156 directs addressees to nominate a CarDiv for temporary duty in 7th Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250145 states CINCPAC intention that CarDiv in Asiatic waters be commanded by R. Adm. A. C. Davis, and that ships be those best prepared for extended service.
25 August (Guam Date)

The schedule for the entrance and occupation of the TOKYO BAY AREA has been postponed 2 days because of the typhoon over the EMPIRE. Fleet units are in the areas assigned south and east of the TOKYO BAY AREA, operating at discretion to avoid the path of the storm. TG 38.1 and 38.4 are in coastal waters to the north and east of TOKYO, TG 38.3 to the south and west of TOKYO. With 38.3 is the WASP, which sustained damage to the forward end of the flight deck from heavy seas in the typhoon. CTF 32 (V. Adm. Wilkinson) with ComPhibOp 12 (CTF 33) with ComGen 11th Corps 1st Cavalry Division and 112 Cavalry RCT embarked has reported to Com3rdFlt for duty and is enroute from PHILIPPINES to SAGAMI WAN entrance, ETA 0600, 3 September. With approval of SCAP a Japanese relief vessel departed YOKOSUKA for MARCUS 16000 TG-9) 25 August on direct course ETA 0600 I(-9) 28 August. Departs MARCUS 16001(-9) 29 August, ETA TOKYO 0800 I(-9) 1 September. Vessel is destroy type with explosives removed, guns inoperative. This vessel has been granted safe passage. CTG 111.2 (British) with 2 CW, 2 CL, 4 DD, 1 AS, 9 SS, 1 AA and 8 AMS reports that he intends to sail TG 111.2 to arrive off HONGKONG daylight 28 August. He will endeavor to bring Japanese Naval and Military representatives on board on 29 August and to enter HONGKONG harbor as soon as arrangements have been made to preserve law and order. Final surrender to take place on 1st September subject to the surrender to the Supreme Commander having been effected.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250139 (pink) asks when ships of 5thFlt will occupy and control coastal waters of JAPAN.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250801 (pink) advises of ETD 7th InfDiv from OKINAWA and recommends that if Russians seize KEIJO, PUSAN be substituted as objective.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250839 (pink) modified OpPlan 12-45 with respect to organization of mobile service forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250853 (pink) requests concurrence proposed date for ComPhilSeaFron to assume responsibility as senior naval commander SWPA.

COMINCH AND CNO 241626 (pink) advises that proposed set-up of areas in Pacific for matters U.S. Naval jurisdiction as set forth in COMINCH 191646 was for planning purposes.

COMGENCHINA 200725 (pink) asks whether composition of Marine Corps will be adequate for service functions in SHANGHAI AREA.

COMGENCHINA 250820 (pink) states assumptions of SHANGHAI will be accomplished by Chinese while Marines occupy TAKU and TSINGTAO, further assumes Marines will be self-supporting. Advises that entire air support can be furnished by CHINA THEATER, Port of SHANGHAI will be operated with resources intended for FORT BAYARD.

CINCAFPAC 241511 reiterates guiding concerning in utilization of resources must be 1st priority to occupation of JAPAN, 2nd to KOREA and reviews at length plans and CINCAFPAC attitude toward operations in other areas.

- continued -
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 250608 postpones all dates for occupation operations for 48 hours.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250907 recommends that JCS directive 823/5 be revised so that all logistic support for strategic air forces be made army responsibility.

CINCSWPA 251101 concurs in proposal for transfer of responsibilities senior Naval Officer SWPA as indicated in COM7THFJT 180140.

CINCAFPAC 251505 states CINCAFPAC attitude toward repatriating and opinion that it is inadvisable to initiate repatriation of Japs on WAKE and MARCUS prior to 3 September.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 25 1457 advises that SCAP will coordinate evacuations of POW TOKYO AREA, requests 3rd Fleet not to undertake unilateral action.

26 August (Guam Date)

At 0800(-9) at a point 20 miles southeast of O-SHIMA a Japanese ship is scheduled to meet units of the THIRD Fleet, transfer emissaries to the MISSOURI via NICHOLAS, and lead them into SAGAMI WAN in the following order: Task Group 30.1 (Fleet Flagship Group), Task Group 30.2 (British Flagship Group), Task Force 35 (including Task Group 35.90) (Support Force) plus CTG 30.6 in SAN JUAN, Task Force 37 (British Support Force), Task Force 31 (YOKOSUKA Occupation Force). Fighter cover for these units will be provided by CTG 38.4. Rear Adm. Hall (CTF 33) with Vice Adm. Wilkinson (Com3rdPhibFor CTF 32) accompanying, TransRon 16 and TransDiv 65 with ComGen11th Corps, 1st Cavalry Division, and 112th Cavalry RCT embarked en route TOKYO area to arrive 1 September. INTREPID, CABOT and four destroyers have been detached from Task Force 38 to proceed to BUCKNER BAY arriving 30 August and to report to Commander SEVENTH Fleet for duty.

SCAP 260419 (pink) states that indications are that initial movement of light Armed troops of 7th Division can take place departing OKINAWA 4 September arriving KEIJO on the 7th, to be followed with heavier equipment, actual occupation of KEIJO to take place on 11 September.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260127 (pink) advises that Corps Troops are scheduled to land with Marine units in North CHINA and that if this plan is followed by similar CINCPAC units will be available to use at SHANGHAI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260908 (pink) advises of plan to activate WAKE as Naval Air Base under COMMARGILS, instructs COMSERVPA.C, COMAIRPAC render assistance and COMAIRPAC to nominate commander NAB WAKE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260907 (pink) same as 260908 except to MARCUS and places island under cognizance of COM MARIANAS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260821 (pink) advises CINCAFPAC that AAA units required in his 251509 are not available and gives reasons.
26 August (Guam Date) (Cont’d)

CINCBPF 250210 advises of forces available for taking surrender RABAUL, OCEAN and NAURU.

CTG III.2 250628 advises of intent to sail TG III.2 to arrive off HONGKONG 23 August and receive Japanese naval and military representatives on 29 August to accept final surrender (subject to surrender to SCAP have been affectuated) on 1 September.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260901 asks if TACHIBANA can make trip to WAKE or MARCUS returning with full load of Japanese without reconditioning.

SCAP 261409 states policy with respect to surrender of sidearms and swords must be turned in and policy is to request Japanese officers to attend surrender ceremony without arms to avoid necessity of tender at ceremony.

SCAP 260111 states desire of SCAP that senior Japanese commanders formally surrender to designated representatives of CINCAFPAC (subsequent to final surrender) as follows: in PHILIPPINES to COMGENAFWESPAC, at Manila; in the RYUKYUS to COMGENTENN; in KOREA to COMGEN24THCORPS.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER GHQ AFPAC 260434 advises that representative of CINCAFPAC would board MISSOURI in TOKYO to install EHF radio and equipment and message center for CINCAFPAC.

WARCOS 262008 advises that designation of COMGEN TEN to receive surrender in RYUKYUS is contrary to provisions of General Order Number One.

COMINC AND CNO 251555 outlines tentative ultimate postwar disposition of units of Pacific Fleet.

27 August (Guam Date)

Plane of Fleet Air Wing 18 sighted a periscope early yesterday afternoon at 09-25W, 140-15E (S.E. of YAP) Yesterday morning, carrier planes of 38.1 sighted a submarine flying the Japanese Ensign and a black flag at 38-47 143-12. About 40 minutes later a second Japanese submarine, also flying the national ensign and a black flag was sighted at 37-42 144-52. DD’s were despatched to intercept both subs and board them. At the same time 35-80 was directed to send a prize crew for each submarine to relieve the temporary boarding parties. Subs will then be brough to SAGAMI WAN. A Destroyer and Destroyer Escort are departing GUAM today for TRUK to conduct preliminary negotiations for surrender. Negotations for the surrender of ROTA, PALAUS, MARCUS and JALUIT are already underway. R.Adm. Harcourt, RN, CTG III.2 in INDOMITABLE is to enter HONGKONG tomorrow, August 29th to accept the Japanese surrender of HONGKONG on behalf of the United Kingdom, subsequent to the general surrender ceremonies at TOKYO. ComNorPac reports that the Army intercepted a plain language message from MATSUWA reporting RUSSIAN landings on the 26th. Japanese Destroyer met the 3rd Fleet off 0-SHIMA at 0800 yesterday as scheduled and the transfer of representatives to the MISSOURI was effected without incident. TF 31 commenced
conducting minesweeping yesterday. If sweeping of American aerial mines has been satisfactorily completed, the SAN DIEGO and destroyers will anchor off YOKOSUKA today and the heavy ships will be moved into TOKYO BAY 29 August.

COMNORPAC 262220 outlines COMNORPAC plan to enter OMINATO with TF 92 on 8 August with air cover by TF 49.

COM3RDPLT 270711 reports contact with Japanese DD of O-SHIMA to pick up Japanese emissaries, pilots and interpreters.

JCS 251944 (pink) confirms British assumption that Japanese commanders will be required to furnish information direct to representatives of the allied commanders.

DEANE 261520 (pink) contains certain amendments to instrument of surrender of Japanese required by USSR.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261713 (pink) warning order for initiation of preparations for operation BELEAGER with target date 30 September 1945.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270209 (pink) outlines for planning purposes only tentative logistics plan for naval and marine forces BELEAGER (part 4, Annex H, OpPlan 12-45).

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270108 (pink) advises flag officers that questions concerning disposition and use of captured or occupied territory are political and that where government policy has not been announced high ranking officers are abstained from expressing their own opinion.

COM7THFLT 270513 (pink) sets forth 7th Fleet Op Order 4-45 for operations in YELLOW SEA.

COM7THFLT 270755 (pink) directs action addresssees to assume logistics responsibilities 7th Flt, further directs COMSERVRON 7 furnish logistics requirements to naval units in SWPA.

COMGENCHINA 271300 (pink) concurs in inclusion of a reduced strength MAW for Marine Corps operations in TIENTSIEN or TSINGTAO area of North CHINA.

COMGENCHINA 271328 (pink) concurs in recommendation that decision of certain landings in north CHINA will be at TAKU and CHINWANGTAO and that henceforth reference will be to TIENTSIN AREA.

CINCAFPAC 271419 (pink) confirms assumption that any information required of Japanese Commanders shall be delivered direct to representatives of allied commanders.
Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Sherman and party left for TOKYO.

No word has been received on actual location of units in the SAGAMI WAN-TOKYO BAY area. However, TF 31 should be inside TOKYO BAY with the heavy ships moving in today. In addition to the two Japanese submarines which surrendered yesterday and now en route to SAGAMI WAN with prize crews, the SEGUNDO (SS 398) captured a third submarine at 39-10N, 144-45E, has put a prize crew aboard, and is escorting it to TOKYO. One of the submarines which surrendered yesterday displaced 5000 tons, has two decks and is equipped for catapult plane and schnorchel. ComPhilSeaFron relieved Com7thFleet of all duties as Senior Naval Officer in SWPA, except those as Commander Allied Naval Forces SWPA. Task designation of PhilSeaFron is now TF 93. Com7thFleet departed Manila yesterday in MINNEAPOLIS with CruDiv 6, to rendezvous with ComDiv 16 off OKINAWA. Minesweeping group has departed Philippines for sweeping operation at KEIJO on west coast of KOREA. A CVE group will provide air cover. Two Australian cruisers, SHROPSHIRE and HOBART with two DD's are en route to TOKYO to participate in surrender ceremonies. With planes in the air and DE's firing salutes, R.Adm. Harrill yesterday witnessed U.S. colors hoisted at MILLE ATOLL.

COMGENCHINA 281225 (pink) expresses desirability for TF 93 units to enter SHANGHAI at earliest possible date, request comment on practicability minesweeping and enter by 15 September; states that occupation of SHANGHAI by Chinese troops will proceed on schedule.

COMINCH AND CNO 272312 advises that War Department agrees to maintain token garrisons AITUTAKI and PENRYHN pending completion State Department negotiations.

CINCBPF 280700 proposes that CINCBPF accept responsibility for conveying all allied POWS from HONGKONG to MANILA; that SACSEA arrange for repatriation of all Indian personnel from MANILA to INDIA; that movement begin as soon as CINCAFPAC is ready to receive POWS.

SCAP 281225 sets forth exact breakdown of responsibility for acceptance of surrender of Japanese Armed Forces between SACSEA and ComGenAustralian Forces.
29 August (Guam Date)

At 1405 I yesterday Admiral Nimitz and members of his staff arrived at TOKYO BAY by seaplane, and 15 minutes later Admiral Nimitz broke his flag in the SOUTH DAKOTA. SEGUNDO (SS 398) is escorting her captured Jap sub with prize crew aboard to TOKYO. Planes of FAW 18 commenced tracking a submarine at 1000 yesterday at 15-12N, 147-14E, on westerly course. Sonor buxys were dropped, oil slick seen. Today is "L" Day for landings in TOKYO BAY area. At 0600 airborne landings commenced at ATSUGI airfields, and Marine landings of 4th RCT at YOKOSUKA and at FUTTSU SAKI were to be coordinated with the airborne landings. R.Adm. Carney will accept the YOKOSUKA Naval Areas 30 minutes after the Marines land. Japanese men of war will be collected in the YOKOSUKA area. 12 submarines with escorts gathering off SAGAMI WAN to participate in surrender ceremonies. Already in TOKYO BAY are the SOUTH DAKOTA, MISSOURI, DUKE OF YORK, IOWA and TF 31. Other units in SAGAMI WAN.

CINCAPPAC 281219 (pink) explains designation of COMGEN 10TH ARMY to receive Japanese surrender in RYUKYUS.

COMTHFLT 290050 (pink) advises of expectation that target date of 7 Sept for KEIJO can be met with small advance party by air on 4 Sept. subject approval of SCAP and successful negotiations and reception.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 290751 (pink) instructs COMTHFLT comment direct to COMGENCHINA on proposal for TF 93 to enter SHANGHAI.

MOUNTBATTEN SACSEA 291357 (pink) requests permission to ask COMGEN USFCT for information concerning American units to enter on schedule HONGKONG.

SCAP 281233 sets forth islands and areas to be surrendered to SACSEA and COMINCH-AUSTRALIAN military forces respectively.

CINCPAC 281553 sets forth General Order No. 41 General Hqts SWPA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 281823 advises that CINCPAC has concurred in occupation of OCEAN and NAURU by British with understanding that occupations forces are subject to coordination by CINCPAC-POA.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 290811 requests ComHawSeaFron to resubmit recommendations for reduction of his forces.

CINCAP PAC 291431 advises of revised dates occupation KANOYA AREA; requests that Japanese ship meet U.S. Naval forces West of SATA-MISAKI with pilots and interpreters to lead U.S. ships into KAGOSHIWA WAN.

ADMIRALTY 282353 and 282359 comprise a single dispatch but quotes two messages: First from British Consul to Secretary of State for Colonies advises of Consuls ability to set up civil administration and requests instructions. Second is reply from Secretary of State Colonies instructing Consul to comply with instructions of CTG 11.2 who will establish military government by proclamation.
30 August (Guam Date)

Admiral Halsey's headquarters were established at YOKOSUKA Naval Base at 1045 I yesterday. Landings of Marines and airborne forces continue. AP 137 GENERAL STURGIS, escorted by 2 DE's arrives off O-SHIMA today with representatives of allied governments to be present at signing of surrender. SEGUNDO and other submarines scheduled to be present at ceremonies entered SAGAMI WAN today. YOKOSUKA airfield is ready for limited service and Com3rdFleet recommends it be used by NATS as early as possible for evacuation of POW's. WASP, damaged in typhoon, is being detached from 38.3 and routed to Pearl via ENIWETOK. Remainder of TF 38 is reforming into two Carrier Task Forces of two groups each. Intermé and POW camps in YOKOSUKA have been found to be black hell-holes. Evacuation of POW is well underway. POW (except U.S. personnel and Marines) will be evacuated to Manila as directed by SCAP. At PAGAN ISLAND in the north MARIANAS a plane of FAW 18 at 0945 K saw crosses and waving people; second plane saw personnel disembark from a launch and remove crosses at 1020 K, also red flashed believed by crew to be small arms fire. Two other launches offshore did not land. A third plane saw no crosses visible from 50 feet at 1500 K.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 302141 (pink) advises MacArthur that Stilwell may accept surrender of RYUKYUS but will act subject to supervision of Admiral Nimitz.

31 August (Guam Date)

The 4th Marine RCT landed in the YOKOSUKA Area. 38.1 is replenishing today while 38.4 has returned to the area north of TOKYO. In view of the desperate situation in POW camps, Admiral Nimitz has proposed joint action by Army and Navy and that contact teams of 20 be formed and flown to every POW camp in the Empire, to supervise care, administration, evacuation, etc. CarDiv 5 in ANTIETAM, INTREPID and CABOT with DD's has reported to Com7thFlt for duty, and as CTF 72 is proceeding to EAST CHINA SEA and YELLOW SEA to support SEVENTH Fleet operations, and to make a show of force over CHINA Coast and KORSA. Com7thFlt in MINNEAPOLIS is already operating in EAST CHINA SEA with CruDiv 6 and 16. Further sweeping of SKAGWAY Area has been deferred in favor of ARCADIA Area to the northwest which will be completed by 10 September. Other sweeping assignments include KEILIO Area, west coast of KOREA ("E" Day for landings is 7 September for 7th Division and 24th Corps Sweeping starts 4 September). MinDiv 8 from OKINAWA will rendezvous with ComNorPac 30 miles south of point "ARGOSY" on 6 September, to sweep channel of Eastern TSUGA STRAIT to OMINATO. (ComNorPac plans to enter OMINATO on 7 September. Sweep unit will arrive off southern KYUSHU on 3 September to sweep path into KAGOSHIMA WAN to the KANOYA Airfield. ("T" Day 4 September). GILMORE with 18 subs departed SUBIC BAY last evening for PEARL. Only submarines now operating are 5 subs in SEA OF JAPAN and one on lifeguard duty off SAKISHIMA GUNTO. 12 submarines at TOKYO will return to U.S. immediately after surrender ceremonies. Yesterday morning Rear Admiral Whiting, representing Commander Mariana Area, accepted the surrender of MARCUS ISLAND on board the destroyer BAGLEY. Surrender negotiations continue throughout the Pacific, with surrender ceremonies being deferred until the TOKYO surrender is accomplished tomorrow. Vice Admiral Murray left GUAM this morning in PORTLAND to accept the surrender of TRUK.

CINCPACFPAC 310137 (pink) reiterates desirability earliest possible entrance SHANGHAI; advises that former TF 93 now designated TF 74.
03 1310 MURRAY (DD 576) TO COMMARIAL AREA, CINCPAC ADV.

After thorough search found no grounds for detaining TAKASAGO MARU and directed her continue voyage. Crew 157 civilians Navy boat crew and communicators. Naval medical 169. Half sand ballasted. Rations on board estimated 1500 men 1 month. General and medical stores very low. Her captain states destination WAKE to evacuate sick and wounded. Expects stay few hours then return MURORAN. Received utmost cooperation. By 030730. My fuel midnight 96000 gallons. Trail trailing. Ship reports sighting surfaced US submarine on 28th or 29th and aircraft today. Boarding party gained impression this crew fully aware of ultimate fate of Empire.

04 0540 COMFEAF TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPAC, COMAFO, COMAF5, CGPOA, COMSUBPAC, COMGEN TTN, COMGEN ADVON FEAF.

AX 74805. Re CINCPOA ADV HED 300304 to CG 5th AF subject Air Sea Rescue services. This HED concurs in the establishment of a single agency to operate air sea rescue service from OKINAWA and current plans contemplate such operation. Since far east air forces will have primary interest in the service, on arrival in OKINAWA of its air sea rescue units FEAF will assume responsibility for all air sea rescue in the RYUKUS-CHINA SEA-YELLOW SEA-EMPIRE area west of 134-40. The 5th Emergency Rescue Group Hq, 3rd Rescue Sqn, 6th Rescue Sqn and 14 Rescue Boat Sqn have been ordered into OKINAWA to provide necessary service. Provisions of Allied Air Forces SOPF number 29 June 24 will govern operations. Request for assistance of naval facilities will be made as necessary to operate the best service possible to facilitate the rescue of airmen of the Army and Navy Air Forces.

06 0617 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSWPA INFO COMINCH, COM7THFLT, CG AIRFMPAC.

Addendum 2 to Opsns Instructions No. 96 issued by Hqtrs AAF SWPA under date of 27 June places 1st Marine Aircraft Wing under operational control of the Royal Australian Air Force. Request the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing be released now to the operational control of Com7thFlt to prepare for future operations.

06 0626 CINCPOA ADV TO CTF 93, CTG 99.3 INFO COMGEN TTN, CINCAPAC, CG FEAF, CGAARPO COMGEN 7TH AF.

1st action added direct all 7th AF units established in OKINAWA to report to CTG 99.2 for operational control until command of the 7th AF is passed to CINCAPAC.

06 0829 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COM7THFLT, CINCPAC, CNB MANUS, CINCPAC PEARL.

After conference with ComNavBase MANUS it is recommended that at the earliest date the following principles be approved in connection with the use of MANUS by the British Pacific Fleet in order to increase the effectiveness of its support of forthcoming operations.

A) CINCBCF be authorized to establish British construction forces and construct on LOS NEGRAS ISLAND in the vicinity of Red Beach and DRAGOON dock (between HOKOTA and NOKERANG airstrips) such facilities as he requires using if desired camps and camp sites as made available by Comdt NOB MANUS.

B) CINCBCF be authorized to establish a Monab at PTYHILL in addition to the one already established at FONAN and be permitted to share also the use of HOKOTA airstrip as necessary to meet requirements of transport operations.

- Continued -

3319
06 0829  CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COM7/THFLT, CINCAPAC, ETC. (CONTINUED)
(C) Unused housing at the Section Base MANUS be made available temporarily for the use of British personnel who would furnish their own messing arrangements at that base.
(D) A detachment of British officers and men be accommodated and messed at the headquarters of the US Naval Base for purpose of maintaining communications and general administrative coordination.
(E) CNB MANUS be authorized to make available to CINCBP surplus buildings and equipment subject to their being replaced at a later date as required.

Early concurrence of CINCAPAC and CONSERV/THFLT requested.

08 0200  COM7/THFLT TO CINCAPAC INFO COMINCH, CNB MANUS, CINCPAC ADV, COM7/THFLT, CONSERV/SONESPAC.
Concur in CINCPAC ADV 060829.

08 0614  CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT, COMDES DIV 108 INFO CTF 33, CTG 30.8, COMSUBPAC, MCDERMUT.
Officers who previously boarded TAKASAGO MARU report English speaking Japanese aboard and that her coal supply probably gave little reserve over requirements for round trip from EMPIRE to WAKE. Desire that we be spared necessity for diverting a ship to top her in or the embarrassment of obtaining coal and looking out for the sick and wounded pending arrival of such coal if the ship is brought into one of our ports for lack of coal.
Ascertaining at once if she has sufficient coal to carry out Com3rdFlt 072123. If not escort her to position Lat 37 N Long 143 E then release her before daylight 10 July with orders to proceed by most direct route to TSUGARU STRAITS. Upon release MCDERMUT proceed on easterly course for 4 or more hours then to rendezvous with TG 30.8 during daylight hours. This modifies Com3rdFlt 072123.

09 0847  CONGENA AFPOA TO CINCPAC, CINCAPAC.
NBR 5016.
This headquarters concurs in the transfer of headquarters 7th AF to the FEAF effective this date. Detail recommendations as to the units which are to be transferred to FEAF with the hqtrs of the 7th AF will be forwarded not later than 15 July.

10 0055  CINCPAC ADV TO GG 10 INFO CINCAPAC, CG FEAF, CG 2nd MAR AIR WING, DEP COM 20AF, CGA AFPOA COMINCH, COM3RDFLT, COM FAIRING 1, CONGENPOA.
Transfer operational control of 7th AF and temporarily of 20th AF units based in RYUKYUS to ComGen FEAF. Retain 2nd MarAirWing under your operational control for the primary purpose of air defense RYUKYUS and also for support of other US forces in the Western Pacific.
Under your direction CG 2nd MarAirWing may make aircraft available to participate in offensive operations of FEAF when agreeable to local commanders concerned.
Advise all concerned when transfer becomes effective.
10 0601 CINCPAC TO COMAIRPAC INFO MARCOS, CINCPAC ADV HQ.
CX 24411.

With further operational responsibility practically eliminated except for support of 20th AF the continuing necessity for shipment to AFMIDPAC of large number of service type units from ETO, MTO and the U.S., whether from redeployment or otherwise is not understood here. It is believed desirable that you service force requirements be completely reexamined in the light of changed operational concepts and plans and the critical shipping situation developing as a result of large shipping backlogs in indirectly redeployed units. The utmost economy in requirements is essential in order that available troop lift can be utilized to the greatest advantage, and in order that UNREMARKED needed in AFPAC to launch operations directed by Joint Chiefs of Staff may not be REMARKED by less essential troop movements. Request conference with your representatives in MANILA on or about 1 August on this subject.

06 0825 CINCPAC ADV TO CG 10 INFO COMAIRPAC,COMSERVPAC,AIRPACSUBCOMFORD,CINCPAC PEARL, COMINCH & CHC, JSOC OKINAWA, JSOC IE SHIMA, CO CINCPAC 12, CTU 99.3.4, CTU 99.1, CTU 99.3.2, COMMARIANAS, CTU 99.3.4, 99.3.7, CGTFPAC, COMPIAFSPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT

Effective upon relief of Commo F. D. Kirkland USN by RAdm J. D. Price USN as CTU 99.3.4 the Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA will be expanded to include all naval and Marine shore facilities including all naval and Marine Air Bases in the OKINAWA Group subject to the following:

(A) Naval Base IE SHIMA will remain under the operational control of IsCom IE SHIMA but its Comdr will report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA for type and administrative command.

(B) Naval communication activities in the Joint Communication Center will remain assigned to the operational control of the officer in charge of the JCC but will also report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA for type and administrative command.

(C) ComNavAirBases OKINAWA will retain units presently assigned to him but will report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA.

(D) Organization and control of TU 99.3.5 Construction Troops OKINAWA will continue unchanged COMUS remaining assigned as before but all Naval Construction Troops will be under the overall administrative control of Comdt NOB OKINAWA for naval purposes.

(E) Marine Corps units including Marine Air Wing 2 Prov Marine AA Group 12th Service Bn and units rehabilitating will for purposes of the general administration of the naval service be under the supervision of CTU 99.3.4. Their operational control and Marine Corps administrative channels remaining unchanged. Issue necessary orders to implement the foregoing.

11 0628 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL.
Request early reply to my 030335 (Top Secret).

11 0628 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO OTF 38, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Answering Com3rdFlt 100100, SEA OF JAPAN ports capable of ship repair in order of importance are MAIZURU, FUJAN, OTARU, HIGASHI-IWASE, TSURUGA, NIIGATA and RASHIN. Other important ports where heavy shipping traffic may be expected are SEISHIN, FUSHIKI, GINZAN, BOKUROSHI, REISO, SATARA, YUKI and KONAN. Known facilities for building and repair at HONSHU ports JAPAN SEA follows. MAIZURU has 3 drydocks, 660 feet 260 feet and 750 feet respectively plus 2 building ways 350 feet each and 3 cranes of 10 to 20 tons capacity each. HAGASHI-IWASE is port

For present more valuable targets are available in southern HONSHU. The primary targets are combatant ships.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding it is hereby directed that the IsCom OKINAWA proceed with the construction of Army Air Transport Command facilities at the Naha Airdrome as required by the Base Development Plan.

In view your 111425 propose existing arrangements stand until conference with our representatives at MANILA about 20 July at which time conditions under which 1st MAV will be readied for next operations should be determined.

The logistic support of the 20th AF by Army resources has been far from adequate insofar as engineers are concerned. It is requested that DepCom 20th AF and CG POA inform CINCPAC in detail as to the Army units required both for internal and theater logistical support to implement JCS WARX 29978 in an adequate manner.

Request you submit a list of projects not yet completed but which are considered necessary in connection with naval aviation development in the PHILIPPINES needed for this war. Include battalion months of effort required for each project. Submit this report in dispatch form by 15 July, following it in more complete letter form as soon as possible. There are some indications that a part of the naval construction effort is now being diverted to post war naval development. In view of man power shortage particularly in engineers it is imperative that only projects required to prosecution of this war be undertaken.
13 2122 COM3RDFFT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 37, ALL TGC 3RDFFT.

Final report 3rdFFT strikes 10 July. On 1160 combat sorties against TOKYO airfields 454 tons bombs dropped 1643 rockets fired destroying 109 planes on ground and damaging 231. Many other planes believed damaged by VT fused frags but positive proof lacking. No air opposition at target and only planes known to be near force were the 2 snorkers shot down by CAP. Own losses combat 4 Corsair 1 Helldcat 5 Avengers 7 pilots 6 crewmen. Operational 1 Corsair 4 Helldcat 2 Avengers. Shipping sunk 1 small freighter 1 sampan 1 launch. Damaged 1 barge 1 motor junk. Ground targets destroyed 1 hangar KDNEMARU 2 hangars NASUNO 1 hangar TSUKUBA 1 highway bridge NOSIDOME. Damaged hangars and shops TSUKUBA HYAKURIGAHARA UTSONOMIYA MAEBASHI ATSUGI YOKOSUKA YACHTMATA KATOURR SHIROI TOKOROWA KASAMIGAURA IMBA. Several factory buildings KOIZUMI. 10 car freight train UCHI HARA. Power house YABE.

Surfaces sub sighted by plane 37-15 N 147-20 E at 1615 on 11th being held down by destroyers approximately 18 floating mines sighted 11th between 35-00 N 146-20 E and 37-55 N 149-15 E. 5 floaters reported 12th within 50 mile radius of 40-30 N 149-30 E. Possible sub contact 0316 13th at 40-50 N 144-35E. Request immediate release 10 July strike figures.

14 0425 COM3RDFFT TO CMCURDIV 17 INTO CTF 38, ALL TGC TF 38, CTFLOT 6, COMDESRON 25, CINCPAC ADV, COMSUBPAC, COMINCH.

Form Task Group 35.3 RAdm Jones in PASADENA with CruDiv 17 DesRon 25 less MURRAY KIMBERLY SIGSBE1. At 1600 14 July TG 35.3 depart from TF 38 proceed to point Lat 39-00 N 144-00 E to arrive 1900 14 July. Then proceed due west to approximate position 39-00 N 142-05 E to arrive 2300 14 July. Remaining outside 100 fathom curve conduct high speed anti shipping sweep to northward destroying any enemy encountered. At 0200 15 July from approximate position 40-00 N 142-17 E set course to rejoin TF 38 at earliest possible time during daylight 15 July. CTF 38 advise ComCurDiv 17 data on launching point and point OPTION for 15 July. Furnish night fighters over TG 35.3 during darkness 14-15 July and CAP during daylight 15 July.

Note you will be in joint zone and friendly subs may be encountered.

15 0549 CINCPAC ADV TO CINC_BUFFER info COMTHFFLTL, CNB MANUS, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Following comments are made on the detailed requirements listed in paragraph 3 of your 040107 of June. Se also my 060829 and CominCh and GNO 141440:
(A) Agree with the understanding that the British personnel will eventually be concentrated in the LOS NEGRROS Area.
(B) Agree. LOS NEGRROS available.
(C) Same.
(D) Agree.
(E) Agree on a temporary basis.
(F) LCT'S and LCM'S will be made available as practicable considering the requirements of all ships present.
(G) Agree. It is understood that the housing for British Naval personnel will be supplied directly or replaced as required from British Resources.
(H) Agree but consider that this covered storage should be erected at LOS NEGRROS.
(I) Agree.
(K) Agree and again suggest LOS NEGRROS as the eventual site.
15 0722 CINCPAC ADV to COMSUBPAC, COMFAIRWING ONE info CTU 30.5.2

ComSubPac allocate 4 submarines for lifeguard duty for RYUKYUS based planes when other commitments permit. These are in addition to present stations off SAKISHIMA GUNTO and northwest FORMOSA but include any assigned to station off EAST CHINA COAST. Air sea rescue unit of FairWing ONE advise initial stations desired and priority for filling stations. RYUKYUS based air commands will be advised to make request for lifeguard service, to supply strike and distress information and to arrange ASR details direct with CTU 30.5.2

15 0725 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH.

Your 131940 see CINCAFPAC 111425 and 131311 and CINCPAC 120726 passed separately.

15 0727 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RD FLEET info CTF 38.

Com2nd Car Task For serial 00211 of 26 June 1945, in subparagraph 3C is in conflict with my Op-Plan 4-45 which assigns shipping as a primary attack objective for the 3rd Fleet. Take appropriate action.

15 0150 RICHARDSON to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC ADV HQ, WARCOS.

RJ 65728.

In answer to your CX 24411 of 100601 GCT July.

Para. At present this headquarters is charged by CINCPAC with responsibility not only for support of 20th Air Force but also for other Army units in FOA and for support of air transport operations and air operations other than 20th Air Force. These missions are in addition to those assigned by CINCAFPAC.

Para. Troops available to discharge responsibilities are not only inadequate now but have been ever since I assumed command. In order to meet my directives and fulfill the requirements for the ICEBERG operation and in the forward areas, it was necessary to strip the rear areas of many units essential to effect the proper maintenance, care and repair on supplies and equipment at the authorized levels. At the present writing I am forced on the 1 hand to use tactical troops for service functions while directed by the War Department to train the units in question for their primary combat mission. The units furnished for ICEBERG and the forward areas must be replaced if this base is to function efficiently. Even the forward movement of the units referred to has been inadequate to meet completely the operational needs of the forward areas.

Para. The unit priority list expresses, in order of importance, minimum troop requirements remaining unfilled. When units have been offered to FOA the acceptances are balanced against the unit priorities list. Only a portion of the total FOA requirements have been met. The priority list totals 49642 in ground units. Of this 12957 has been made available from all sources, leaving an unfilled balance of 36685. The unfilled balance is allocated 2567 to forward areas and 11018 to MARSHALL GILBERTS and HAWAIIAN area. This does not include shortages of 16460 AAFPOA and 33095 20th AF.
Para. Troop requirements are under continuous review with the primary purpose of providing adequate support with maximum economy.

Para. Request that instances of apparent overestimates by this headquarters of types of troop units be cited in order that custody of those instances may be made.

Para. Representatives will be sent to conference MANILA about 1 August. Can AGENDA for this conference be mailed to this headquarters? Considering that estimates of troop needs made by this headquarters are based for the most part upon responsibilities assigned by CINCPAC, and release of units is performed by him, it is recommended that CINCPAC be invited to send representatives to the proposed conference.

USASTAF to PACDIVATC, WARCOS, CINCFAPAC, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CG USFCT, CG USFET, CINCSEA, COMGENFEAF, COMAF 14, COMGEN BOMCOM 21, COMGEN BOMCOM 20 (BOTH HQ), COMFITTERCOM 7, COMGEN 10, AFMIDPAC, AFWESPAC, COMMARIANAS, CDAD Guam, COMGENAIR, DEPCOMAF 20, POA ADMIN, ATSC, POATSC, CO 7 AACS WG, CONAS, COMGEN ATC GRAVEL POINT, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER WAR DEPARTMENT.

Pursuant authority from Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in message WARX 29978 dated 11 July of higher classification not to all or needed, establishment of headquarters United States Army Strategic Air Forces (Short Title USASTF) is announced effective 160001 Z (GCT) July. Functions, duties and responsibilities of USASTF include all those previously charged to 20th Air Force and additional functions outlined in letter AG 322 dated 11 July subject "Redesignation, relief, assignment and disbandment of Air Force units". To implement this action, Hq AAFPOA and DEFCOMAF 20 POA at Guam are redesignated HQ USASTAF, also Hqs AAFPOA Admin and DEFCOMAF 20 PA Admin at Hickam field OAHU are redesignated administrative headquarters United States Army Strategic Air Forces (short title USASTF ADMIN) having all those administrative and supply functions assigned to USASTAF. ComGen MidPac is announcing by separate action formation of additional Air Force Hq to assume functions of AAFPOA other than those now assigned to USASTAF.

Para. Mailing adress of USASTAF will be APO 234, of USASTAF ADMIN will be APO 953. Radio traffic to USASTAF at Guam will be sent to addressee call sign KWLA radioteletype call RGE, both formerly assigned DEFCOMAF 20 POA. Pending assignment address will be sent to addressee call sign KHKO radioteletype YAF both formerly assigned AAFPOA ADMIN and DEFCOMAF 20 POA ADMIN. Address will be send to KHYG presently assigned AAFPOA Guam is discontinued.

Para. Request all addressees pass to affected subordinate commands.

Request Richardson's RJ-65728 DTG 150150 be brought to the personal attention of Fleet Admiral King since it states succinctly the Army troop situation in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

Your NR 0207 DTG 151401. Request that your headquarters handle in-
16 0149 CINCPOA ADV to COMGEN USASTAF info CINCPAC, COMGENPOA, COMING, CINCPOA PEARL. (Cont'd)

formally such matters as may require action pending the designation of a headquarters pursuant to the direction of paragraph 5 of UCS WARX 29978 DTG 110101.

16 0155 CINCPOA ADV to COMINC HQ, ISCOM OKINAWA.

The agreements recently reached with Air Marshall Lloyd contemplate the use of the British Engineers to develop at KUME additional airfields primarily for the use of the Army Strategic Air Force or associated British units.

16 0853 CINCPAC ADV to ISCOM OKINAWA info COMGEN 10, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC, SECNAV, COMINC.

My 070407 not to all is hereby cancelled. GHQSWPA 071329 signed MacArthur is quoted herewith in part for your information and guidance:

"Appreciate your offer of assistance. Believe it advantageous however that War Correspondents accredited to this command report its activities in same manner as they have in the past. They will be assigned to AFFAc operational units, using signal corps channels provided by those units for relay through MANILA. Censors from this command will be stationed at transmission points of this command."

CINCPOA correspondents will not be given release on matter dealing with AFFAc operations. Instruct CINCPOA press censors accordingly and report when this has been done.

16 0001 RICHARDSON to CINCPAC info WARCOS, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMGEN 10, CG AFWESPAC, CG USASAF, COMMARINAS, COMMARGILS, CG CPBC, CG WPBC, CG SPBC, CG FACDIV ATC.

RJ 65790.

General order number 7 this headquarters dated 16 July 1945 establishes effective 160001Z (GCT) July 1945 provisional HQ and HQ SQ Army Air Forces MIDPAC. Same order establishes Army Air Forces Middle Pacific Short Title AIRFORMIDPAC which will consist initially of all AAF units currently assigned to AAFPOA. Maj General James L. Parker USA is announced as Commanding General Army Air Forces Middle Pacific. This refers to USASTAF radio 0207 DTG 151401 July and RJ 65765 DTG 150946 both not to all or needed. Prov HQ AIRFORMIDPAC will assume those functions of the Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Area for which HQ AAFPOA was previously responsible to AFMIDPAC, by letter of instructions this headquarters dated 13 December 1944 as amended.

16 1121 CINCPAC to CINCPOA BOTH HQ info COMTHFLT.

C 25993

CINCPOA 080301 refers. Although immediately after receipt of the directive contained in JCS 1259/11 suggested the transfer to your command and control of 7th Fleet I now refer, in view of later developments, to keep the fleet, whose commander is also commander allied naval forces, under my operational control.
17 0031 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 32, CTF 39, CTF 95 info COM3RDFLEET, CTF 99, COMSUBPAC, COMGENFEAF, CTG 30.5, COMINCH, COMSERVDIV 104.

Cincpac hereby relieves Com3rdFleet of operational control of forces under action addressees. Predicted location of typhoon center 180800(I) (-9) Lat. 25-00 N Long. 122-00 E. 181800(I) (-9) Lat 27-30 N Long 122-30 E. Movement northerly speed 15 knots. Suspend operations all action addresses immediately. Forces retire to eastward of OKINAWA until typhoon is clear. Currently expect winds 35 knots in OKINAWA anchorages.

17 0227 CINCPOA ADV to COMINCH, SECNAV info CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

Current directives give area commanders control of communiques and censorship with respect to the operations of forces under their command. The latter is an unquestionable military necessity. In the MARIANAS by mutually satisfactory arrangements correspondents accredited to CINCPOA have covered activities of 20th Air Force and their material has been transmitted by CINCPOA facilities after censorship by 20th Air Force censors. The presence on OKINAWA of forces under control of CINCAFPAC has created desire on the part of correspondents to cover local operations of forces of both CINCAFPAC and CINCPOA.

Para. My 040826 my 070407 GHQSWPA 071329 ISCOM OKINAWA 151337 and my 160853 show development of situation at OKINAWA. I am agreeable to simultaneous dual or triple accreditation and a joint censorship or some similar arrangement as indicated in my 160852 in order to furnish prompt clearance for press material concerning operations under different commanders conducted in same general vicinity. In absence of such arrangement which could be prescribed only by higher authority I will continue to impose on CINCPOA correspondents restrictions such as those in my 160853.

17 0342 CINCPAC ADV to CINCAFPAC info USASTAF, COMINCH, COMGENPOA.

The units listed in ComGenAAFPOA 150746 passed to you separately are proposed for transfer to FEAF except that it is considered necessary that those units committed for the defense of RYUKYUS, wire construction on OKINAWA and for air division JOC OKINAWA continue under the operational control of CINCAFPAC.

17 0524 CINCPAC ADV to COMGEN 10 info CTG 99.1, CTG 99.3

Your 160917. Anticipate KERAMA RETTO will be used as emergency anchorage only. Desire military control that area maintained but concur in movement AAA gun bn to OKINAWA at your discretion.

17 0539 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 94 info COMGENUSASTAF, CTF 93

Effective immediately Task Force 94 will assume the responsibility for the neutralization of central CAROLINES, MARCUS and BONINS. In this connection see my 010842. Direct communication is authorized with ComGen USASTAF with regard to any assistance that may be practicable as indicated in AAFPOA letter 24 June.
17 1356 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC BOTH HQ info 21BOMCOM, COMAIRPAC, COMAIR TWO, COMGENIO, CTF 93, CTG 99.2, COMFEAF, COMAF 5, CTF 37, ALL TGC 3RDFLT.

All assigned targets TF 38 weathered in shortly after sunrise 17 July and the only 2 sweeps launched aborted. Flash reports show few meager targets of opportunity including 10 float planes in river vicinity SHIOYA SAKI of which 4 burned and 5 damaged. Hangar and dock 2756 1KISU demolished. Oil dump KUJI fired. Para. TF 37 with slightly better luck in weather destroyed 13 planes on ground at NIIGATA MATSUSHIMA and MASUDA. 3 planes combat losses but pilots recovered. Installations including hangar MUSUDO destroyed. Hangars and barracks at NIIGATA airfield and railroad station KAJIBANDI damaged. 3 locomotives exploded.

18 0822 CINCPAC ADV to CNO. COMGEN ASF, CINCAFPAC info COMVESSEAFRON, COM RYUKYUS FORCES, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMGENAAF, COMINCH.

An excess backlog of approximately 900,000 measurement tons of cargo now is afloat for discharge OKINAWA AREA. This is largely due to the following causes:

A. Diversion of shipping from deferred operations to OKINAWA.
B. Redeployment of Army forces from ETO and MTO to OKINAWA without sufficient advance notice for CINCPAC to integrate into shipping schedules in accordance with discharge capabilities.

Further difficulties are being encountered by requests from CINCAFPAC to ComGen SF PE for shipping to OKINAWA without prior request to CINCPAC for tonnage allocation.

An additional complication arises from the sailing of the shield and vacuum convoys to OKINAWA without previous reference to CINCPAC.

A condition has thus arisen where CINCPAC is unable to comply with the provisions of JCS despatch 100345 of December 1944 due to conditions beyond his control. If JCS 100345 of December 1944 is to be an effective instrument all agencies requiring shipping allocations to POA ports must clear with CINCPAC sufficiently in advance to allow for sound planning of shipping schedules.

It is requested that action adees endeavor to furnish timely notice in order prevent further aggravation or recurrence of present conditions. CINCPAC ADV 290659 of May also refers.

18 0912 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CTF 38, CTF 37.

Add to my 171356. TF 38 planes sank 1 picket boat 2 small craft damaged 7 luggers 3 small craft. Destroyed 2 locomotives 1 hangar. Damaged 1 train 3 locomotives 3 factory buildings 2 radio stations 2 light-houses 2 warehouses 1 hangar. All ground targets MITO AREA. 1 VF lost in combat 2 VF with pilots lost operationally. Para. TF 37 also damaged 3 planes on ground. Sank 1 JUNK and damaged 1 SB 1 SC 1 BOOM defense vessel 1 Junk 6 fishing smacks 1 barge. Additional ground targets damaged hangars MATSUSHIMA trains SAKAMACHI area radar KINKASAN.

Para. Bombardment HITACHI completed as scheduled. Spotters weathered out. No damage assessment possible. No damage our ships.

Para. Clearing weather permitted 2 sweeps 3 strike TOKYO area afternoon 18th. No reports yet.
Reconnoitered TOKYO during forenoon watching weather. In afternoon launched heavy coordinated attack on combatant shipping YOKOSUKA. Coordinated reports attack carried out as planned in face of most intense Flak ever seen. Targets well hit but too much smoke from burning targets and other fires to accurately assess results. Suggest CINCPAC arrange photo recco. Will fly final report days operations to IWO 22 July.

At 2350 I (-9) cruisers this Task Group at range 8 miles commenced minor bombardment radar and radio installations and possible coast defense guns on POINT NOJIMA SAKI. Fired about 240 rounds. Poor visibility prevented observing results. Although large explosion resulted no lasting fires observed. 2 mark 11 radars frequency 91 and 97 Megacycles which had been tracking us for several hours during approach were silenced. No counter battery. Still shelling no results yet.

Comment on JCS 150417 GCT (WARX 32627) proposal to establish a Joint Communication board for coordination of communication matters pacific area. It is not indicated to whom the board would be responsible. Assuming that function of board would be strictly advisory to the principal commanders.

Para. (A) Following additional assumptions made as to composition and operation of proposed board
(1) Members to be the senior staff communication officers of 3 service commanders pacific plus representatives from ComPhibsPac. This would equalize Army and Navy representation
(2) Working committees from same staff sources to assist board.
(3) Continuing coordination by board and committees normally to be conducted by dispatch with meetings only when needed to be held at headquarters service commanders.
(4) Required Groups of officer specialists to be established as working committees to effect continuous coordination essential particularly in frequency matters.

Para. (b) Under above listed assumptions CINCPAC acquiesces in establishment of a pacific joint communications board. In effect it would formalize conference procedure currently utilized

Para. (C) Concur fully in the guiding principles.

Para. (D) If above concept of proposed board is at variance with JCS concept request more information upon which to base recommendation.
19 0655 CINCPOA ADV to COMGEN 2nd MARAIR WING, COMDT NOB OKINAWA.

As soon as practicable pass to Com Fair Wing 1 responsibility for local anti submarine air patrol and operational control of VMF 254, VMB 612, VMFT 232 and VMTB 242. On arrival of MAG 25 it will be assigned to the operational control of Comdt NOB OKINAWA through ComGen 2nd Marine Air Wing.

19 0702 COM7THFLEET to CNO info COMSOWESPAC SEAFRONS, COMSERSPAC, CINSWPA, CINCPAC/ CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMAIR7THFLIT (LOG), COMSOPAC, COMAIRPAC, CTF 72 BASESHIP, 1ST GRP 71, COMAIR7THFLIT.

Your 121624. CINCSWPA has overall control of all air facilities in Southwest Pacific Area. Control of following fields has been retained by Commander Allied Air Forces operating under CINCSWPA: OTNAN and LAGOON fields GREEN ISLAND. PIVA north and south and TOKOKINA fields BOUGAINVILLE, Treasury, MUNDA and EMIRAU. Under direction from War Department identical in TENOR with COMINCH CNO number 7 CINCSWPA will clear with War Department the abandonment or release of control of any U.S. Air Fields under control of Commander Allied Air Forces. Naval air and air support units have been ordered forward from above named fields from time to time and allied air force units have occasionally been ordered to operate from Navy built air bases since 15 June 1944 but BIFCDMLA PEARL retains control for United States. CINCSWPA concurs with foregoing. ComAir7thclears roll ups of seaplane bases with you after obtaining concurrence CINCSWPA, COM7THFLIT and COMAIRPAC.

20 0114 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH info COM NATS, CINCPOA PEARL HQ, COMAIRPAC.

While I agree that additional service may be required by NATS in the PHILIPPINES and that the proposed organization is sound and necessary I do not concur in the establishment of what appears to be a major NATS unit at the naval air base MACTAN ISLAND. The logistic and construction implications are such as to leave considerable doubt that activation of MACTAN ISLAND could be accomplished in time to assist in the present war. This answers your 181351.

20 1303 COMINCH AND CNO COMINCH HQ info CINCPAC BOTH - COMINCH PASSED TO CINCPAC.

VICTORY 135.

CINCPAC CXB-24957 and JCS 201148 refer. I desire a TG Charged with the construction and establishment of the artificial harbor project be set up in the immediate future, initially directly under COMINCH AND CNO, later to pass to CINCPAC. This group to be commanded by a young Rear Admiral or a Commodore especially fitted to give energetic direction. Nominations by my headquarters are desired. The staff, which initially need not be large, should include civil engineers and 1 or 2 officers.

21 2043 COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Your 181255 your assumption that the proposed JCB pacific would be responsible to the principal commanders of the pacific namely CINCPAC CINCPAC and COMGENUSSTAF is correct. Whether or not this board would

- continued -
21 2043 COMINCH TO CINCPAC ADV HQ (Continued)

be only an advisory agency is for the above commanders to decide. Membership of proposed board would be that agreed to by the 3 PACIFIC commanders. Terms of reference of proposed board wholly a matter of local agreement. Consider essential that full time working committee be formed to coordinated and assign frequencies within Pacific Theatre.

22 0726 CINCPOA ADV to COMGEN TEN info COMDT NOB OKINAWA.

Your 180806.
In view pending command reorganization desire joint cargo handling continue under COMDT NOB OKINAWA as heretofore until such time as each service can assume responsibility for handling own cargo.

22 0729 CINCPOA ADV to CTG 99.1 info CTF 99, COMPHIBSPAC, COMBATRON 1.

Your 151551 not understood. Your requirements for 2 APB and 1 APA flagship indicate either that large numbers of personnel who are assigned to shore bases are being improperly quartered on board ship rather than ashore or that evacuation of personnel who are not supposed to remain in the area is not being carried out with transportation which is available daily.
Para. Neither is your request for additional escort types understood. You now have 18 DD 6 DE 8 APD in addition to numerous smaller craft which should be ample for the local defense and support of the area.
Para. It will be necessary to reduce your present force drastically in the near future in preparation for future offensive operations. It is therefore directed that you immediately reduce your requirements for barracks or garrison ships and that you so organize your escort and patrol assignments that your essential tasks can be performed with reduced forces.
Para. Specifically (A) crescent City will be detached about 25 August (B) No APA flagship will be provided (C) no additional garrison LST will be provided but the 20 LST now present will probably be reduced to 10 LST on 1 September. No additional escort or patrol craft will be provided but the present allocation will be reduced by 1 September to not more than 17 DD. Nil DE. Nil APD. 48 LCS/LCI. 18 PC/SG. Nil APB.

22 0842 CINCPAC ADV to COMGEN TEN, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMDT NOB OKINAWA info COMINCH AND CNO.

CINCPOA notes with gratification that during the first 17 days of July the average rate of unloading cargo at OKINAWA was approximately 35,000 measurement tons per day as compared with 20,000 in June and 17,000 in May. Please extend to the officers and men responsible a "Well Done".

22 0843 CINCPAC ADV to COMGENPOA, info CINCARPAC, COMGEN TEN, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

Concur your 210049. In view pending transfer of responsibility for RYUKYUS to CINCAPPAC request hereafter you secure his concurrence rather than mine for acceptance of units for that area.
22 1244 CINCPAD ADV to COM MARIANAS info COMGENPOA, CINCPAD PEARL, COMGEN TEN, COMGEN WPBC, ISCOM IWO JIMA, ISCOM SAIPAN, ISCOM TINIAN.

Garrison needs in RYUKYUS require that you transfer 147th infantry regiment to OKINAWA at earliest. Upon arrival destination operational control of unit passes to COMGEN TEN.

Para. To augment garrison strength IWO JIMA and to provide opportunity for training as a unit transfer 206th AAA AW Bn (less Bries C and D) from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA.

211300 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADV HQ info COMGEN 21 BOMCOM, CTF 93, COMAIR IWO, ALL TCS 3RD FLEET, CTF 37, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMAF 5, COMGEN FEAF, COMGEN TEN, FEAF ADVON, CTG 99.2.

During afternoon 18th July TF 38 flew 592 sorties against TOKYO AREA.
On the ground 30 planes destroyed including 15 BETTYS KUMAGAYA 3 BETTYS JODAMA and 42 were damaged at HYAKURIGAHARA KESPOI YARABE. Our plane losses: in combat 6 VB, 3 VF, 13VB all to flak, operational 1 VF jettisoned and 1 VB. Personnel lost in combat were pilots of 6 VB, 3 VF, 3 VT plus crews of 4 VB, 3 VT. Shipping. YOKISURA photos show: NAGATO superstructure badly damaged but unable determine whether she is on the bottom, 1 DD by dock next to NAGATO slown in half and sunk 1 ODD at 3rd Dock heavily damaged with cable layer alongside, disintegrated 3 small cargo vessels and 7 MTB near NAGATO destroyed by several shorts stern blown off, fleet DD converted to flak ship. Also ATIOMAHAVT and CHIKA respectively 4 luggers and 2 small craft were damaged. Ground. Flak positions at YOKOSUKA well covered by VT fuze bombs and pilots report definite diminishing intensity subsequent to release. At IMVA 3 locomotives destroyed, 1 damaged with 3 more damaged YUNOTO. 4 hangars were destroyed and 12 damaged at 7 fields. Power plant transformed destroyed and 4 electric cars derailed by rockets at KUMAGAYA. Ammoc dump exploded HITAKURIGAHARA oil tank burned YOKOSUKILLA RR yards at mito, airfield facilities HYAKURIGAHARA RR cars and turntables in KIRYU KUMAGAYA, UMOTO area and many other barracks shops and small industrial buildings damaged by rockets and straffing. Photos show TAKASAGA MARU anchored YOKOJUKOKO about 700 yards from NAGATO near 2 small combatant ships and may possibly have been damaged. Also on afternoon of 18th TF 37 flew 51 combat sorties without any personnel losses against airfields north TOKYO area 13 planes were destroyed on the ground at KONOIKE KITAOI KATORI MARUFO MOBARA and 25 were damaged at same fields plus MIYAKIWA. 2 VF planes were lost in combat and 2 operationally. 24 Junks were damaged near GHOSI. Hangars plus installations at KONOIKE, MIYAKAWA, JOBARA, KATORI, MARUFO with railways freight cars at KATORI were well strafed and rocketed.

Para. Photos of HITACHI bombardment covering all targets except P-581 show HITACHI engineering works 21-00 and HITACHI arms factory P-458 severely damaged. HITACHI copper refinery 312 damaged.

Para. New subject. Free Balloon shown ONI WEEKLY NR 927 sighted at 33-42 north 146-12 east at 1300 July 19 at 19000 feet ascending 300 feet per minute. Shot down by CAP sunk before recovery possible.

22 1620 CINCPAD ADV to ALPAC.

In night anti-shipping sweep recently U.S. Destroyers fired on a friendly submarine in a joint zone. Fortunately no damage resulted.
incident apparently caused by large error in navigation and by mistaken belief that radar contact at 27,000 yards could not be a submarine.

Para. SOF-1 prohibits attacks in a joint zone on submarines outside torpedo range of heavy ships unless identified as enemy beyond possibility of doubt. Single radar contacts may be submarines or surface ships and must not be attacked until positively identified as the latter. Near boundaries of Joint Zones commanding officers must also be alert to possible errors in navigation and be governed accordingly. Tactical situation will rarely justify firing on a single unidentified target when any possibility exists that it may be a friendly submarine.

20 2253 ADMIRALTY to CINCMED, FOGWAF, CINCSA, BAD, CINCEI NA PARIS, CINC BPT, COMINCH info FOGA, FOLEM, VA MALTA - COMINCH PASSED TO COMNAANW, COMNAVEU, ALUSNA PARIS, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMYTH PLT.

CCS have decided that from 1st June ADMIRALTY replaces COMINCH as executive agent for dealing with FRENCH NAVY under CCS 358 (Revise) (Para 3) ADMIRALTY letter M054025/43 of 18/10/43 not to all refers.

Para. Following will be normal procedure under new arrangements:

A. Requests by the FRENCH NAVY for supplies will continue to be processed through established channels.

B. Proposals initiated by FRENCH requiring formal reference to CCS will be communicated by Admiral Fenard to BAD, to expedite decision Marine PARIS should inform ADMIRALTY at the same time as they instruct Admiral Fenard.

C. Proposals initiated by FRENCH not requiring formal CCS decision will be made either through Admiral Fenard to BAD or direct to ADMIRALTY in latter case, ADMIRALTY will be responsible for informing COMINCH and obtaining his consent when necessary.

D. Proposals initiated by ADMIRALTY or COMINCH and requiring ANGLO-US agreement will be cleared through BAD reference being made to CCS when necessary. The ADMIRALTY will be responsible for ARRANGING clearance with FRENCH.

E. Proposals from subordinate FRENCH authorities not made through Marine PARIS or Admiral Fenard should be made to the British Commander in Chief concerned who will forward them to the ADMIRALTY info BAD and NA PARIS. This procedure is designed to ensure single channel of approach. Admiralty will be responsible for clearing such proposals with CCS, COMINCH and FRENCH as may be necessary.

Para. Executive action to implement decisions will be taken by ADMIRALTY with Marine PARIS. BAD will also communicate all formal decision of CCS to Admiral Fenard and keep the latter informed of such other decisions as they may deem appropriate.

Para. BAD and NA PARIS are requested to inform Admiral Fenard and Marine PARIS respectively of the above and to emphasize the great importance of using 1 channel only at a time for making proposals.

21 0825 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ISCOM OKINAWA, info COMINCH, SECNAV, COMSERON 10, CINCPAC.
21 0825 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ISCOM OKINAWA, info COMINCH, SECNAV, COMSERRON 10 CINCAFPAC. (Cont'd)

material which has been cleared by cognisant censors. CINCPAC will continue to honor as jointly accredited those Navy correspondents who are temporarily in SOWESPAC. Army Correspondents desiring joint accreditation status should apply through SECNAV for Navy accreditation. Temporary Navy accreditation may be secured from CINCPAC in emergency cases where application has been made to SECNAV.

21 1338 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAFPAC, COMGENUSASTAF, CINCPAC - WAR DEPT PASSED TO CINCPAC, DEPCOMAF 20.

WARX 35909 in JCS 1362/2, copies of which will be forwarded to your headquarters by officer currier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved petroleum supply procedure for the Pacific as outlined in CINCPAC message CX 22431 of 30 June 1945 and concurred in by CINCPAC in naval message 032041 July CINCPAC PEARL to ANPB and memorandum 11 July acting Chief of Staff, 20th Air Force, to ANPB.

24 0850 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBATRON-1 info COMCRUDIV 16, COMINCH.

CTF 95 230415. When RFS direct R.Adm LOW with the same force as in preceding operation proceed to conduct shipping sweep in area west of Long 125-00E between Lat. 30-00 N and 32-30N. Avoid mine restricted area in SHANGHAI-GHUSAN AREA. Keep COM3RD FLEET, COMGEN CHINA and CTF 99 informed of movements this force.

25 0908 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH-CNO info CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT, COMNATS, COMNATSPAC, COMAIRPAC.

After conference with COMNATSPAC and representatives of COMAIRPAC SUB-COMFORD adhere to opinion expressed in my 200114 and consider that major NATS base in the PHILIPPINES for support of Pacific Fleet operations in this war should be located at SAMAR with turnaround facilities at MANILA. Para. However will submit firm recommendation after conference between my Deputy Chief of Staff and Com7th Fleet in MANILA about 1 August. Para. Assume COMINCH-CNO serial 001487 of 10 June applies.

25 0726 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RD FLEET info CTF 37, CTF 38, COMGENUSASTAF.

Situation your 240543 appreciated. Concurred in VLR 24 July strikes only after careful consideration of difficulties involved in routing required for attacks on targets adjacent to yours. Weather precluded VLR strikes on targets further east. You will continue to be info on all VLR intents to include precise routes to and from targets when they are known to be near your force. Army Strategic Air Force advises that all aircraft will show IFF from lands end hereafter. Believe it impracticable to eliminate problem especially since VLR effort will soon be greatly augmented. For each individual operation where your effort and that of Strategic Air Force are against same enemy area everything possible will be done to effect coordination that will avoid Army Strategic Air Force units passing over or near your forces.
Reference JCS WX 32627 reiterating a proposal contained in W 14399 for a local joint communications board to coordinate. Control and integrate signal communications in the Pacific. Our radio C 19319 of 16 June did not concur in this proposal. Stating as follows: "Cooperation and coordination between services in the Pacific has already been laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with primary responsibilities in some cases. Pre establishment of a formal board with a limited membership to handle one these only is therefore believed to be unnecessary and undesirable. CINCAFPAC-CINCSWPA has used most effectively a local committee organization which includes not only the members proposed in W 14399 but also representatives of all interested elements. To coordinate frequencies. To designate call signs. And to insure the efficient utilization of equipment. Such committees are now operating to insure the effective coordination of these matters in prospective operations. CINCPAC and 20th Air Force, among other, are represented. This arrangement has proven so effective it is considered inadvisable and undesirable to change it" CINCPAC and USASTAF have had and will have membership on all committees affecting their interests and the findings of such committees have been and will be formalized and coordinated in the respective headquarters formal operations instructions. Communications annexes and signal operations instructions and standing signal instructions of the forces concerned. Since under the provisions of JCS 1250/4 and 1331/3 CINCPAC is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of operations I must reiterate now concurrence in the establishment of an agency (in which AFFPA would have the minority membership) for the control of such a vital element to successful operations as signal communications. Since both the Navy and the Strategic Air Forces are supporting forces in the projected operations it does not seem appropriate that an agency should be constituted that would enable such forces to control the signal communications of the commander carrying primary responsibility. The primary consideration in the coordination of communications in this theater has been to guarantee all of the contributing forces all the signal communications they require to insure success in combat. Any disagreements in committees having to do with these matters would be brought to the attention of commanders. The existing system has operated with complete success and harmony. It is considered that a joint communications board would be less effective than the procedure which has been followed with complete satisfaction during the entire period of our operations. The Joint Board could accomplish no more and might be less efficient or give rise to friction which has so far been non-existent. Changes of this nature should not be considered just when the decisive campaign in the Pacific is about to be accomplished even if having some theoretical long range object they would add an element on uncertainty by providing a new and unproven agency to replace 1 which has operated with complete success and satisfaction in the past. We are already committed to the operations and it is too late to consider basic changes in such a vital matter.

Effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July control of U.S. held areas in the RYUKYUS and U.S. Army Forces therein passes to the control of CINCAFPAC except for units of the Army Strategic Air Force which remain under COMGEN-USASTAF. Control of the naval operating base OKINAWA and all U.S. Naval forces including Marines in the RYUKYUS remains under CINCPAC.
JULY (GCT)

260145 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGEN TEN, COMGEN 24TH CORPS info CINCAFPAC, COMGENPOA, COMINCH AND CNO, COMGEN 7, 27, 96, 77 and 81ST DIVISIONS.

On the occasion of the transfer of the 10th Army from his command the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas congratulates the 10th Army the 24th Corps and the officers and men concerned on their magnificent record of achievement in the campaigns of the past 3 years. The Pacific Fleet will long remember its close association in battle with the troops who fought at ATTU, MAKIN, KWAJALEIN, ENIWETOK, SAIPAN, GUAM, PALAU and OKINAWA. In these operations there was developed a standard of unity of propose and of integrated effort which will not be forgotten. To you all "Well Done" the sincere good wishes of the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet go with you all.

260249 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH and CNO info COM7THFLT, COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT.

Your 251532 not to all. Recommend office of Deputy Commander 7th Fleet be abolished now. As a matter of policy I do not wish to have Deputy Commanders assigned to Task Fleet Commanders which status will be assumed by COMSEVENTHFLEET on 1 October. Hendren still required in SOPAC.

260722 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 info CTG 95.8, COMAIRPAC, COMCARDIV 23, CTF 96, CINCPAC PEARL.

Direct COMCARDIV 23 in HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75) proceed immediately to ENIWETOK where upon arrival COMCARDIV 23 report by despatch to CINCPAC for duty. Direct COMCARDIV 26 in FANSHAW BAY (CVE 70) proceed immediately, where upon arrival report to COMCARDIV 23 for duty.

260827 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Rear Admiral E.L. Gunther and Rear Admiral A.C. Davis now on leave in mainland. On Expiration leave of these officers and prior their departure from mainland desire that both these officers have thorough physical check to determine their fitness for duty at sea. COMAIRPAC take necessary action.

260824 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH and CNO.

Your 241910. Recommend that work on Cruisers one to ten be limited to essential repairs in order that they may render maximum service before being decommissioned.

261228 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSUBPAC, CTF 95, ALL TG COMDRS TF 95, CTF 99, CTG 99.2 info COM3RDFFEET, COM7THFLT, COMGENCHINA, COMGENUSASTAF, COM5THFLT.

COMGENCHINA reports that rescue agency known as AGs has started operating picket junks off and paralleling EAST CHONA COAST AMOY to FOCHOW. Picket junks will be utilized to pick up downed aircrewmen. Following markings will be used. Red Sail with white patch on center. Red Cloth with white patch spread over the cabin. White area running length of Gunwales boxed in by 3 inch Red Stripe. Operational base these picket junks MEIHUA (25-58N 119-49E). Intended that these junks will operate over considerable period of time. Take appropriate action to prevent attacks on these junks by our forces.
26 1244 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMMARIANAS, COM MARGILS, COMFAIRWING 1 info CINCPOA PEARL, CINCAPAC, CG USASTAF, CG PEAFL, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMAIRPAC, COMSOPAC, COMMORPAC, COMHAWSEAFRON.

The current JCS directive pertaining to the operational control of the Sea Air rescue is contained in paragraph 3 of JCS 659/1 which states "Operational control of air sea rescue activities and facilities is a responsibility of theater or area commanders".

Para. Within the Pacific Ocean Areas this responsibility is delegated to COMHAWSEAFRON, COMMARGILS, COMMARIANAS and COMFAIRWING 1 for Hawaiian Sea Frontier MARSHALL GILBERTS SUB AREA the MARIANAS SUB AREA and the combat areas to the westward of 135-00 degrees east longitude respectively.

26 1414 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMGEN US FORCES CHINA THEATER info COMNAVGROUP CHINA.

U. S. Navy surface forces are operating in various parts of EAST CHINA SEA including waters close along CHINA coast and will continue to do so in order to exercise control of those waters. Suggest CHINESE be warned of danger of operating vessels of any kind in such coastal areas.

26 0723 CINCAPAC ADV HQ to COMCARDIV 23 Info COMMORPAC, COMINCH, CINCAPAC PEARL HQ, CTF 95, COMCARDIV 26, COMDESRON 45, KITKUN BAY (CVE 71), HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75), NEHEMA BAY (CVE 74), FANSHAW BAY (CVE 70), MANILA BAY (CVE 61), SAVO ISLAND (CVE 78), FULLAN (DD 474), GUEST (DD 472), HUDSON (DD 475), Haldorff (DD 480), STANLEY (DD 478), WAINWRIGHT (DD 419), BENNION (DD 662), KILLEN (DD 593), GRANT (DD 649).

Upon your reporting to CINCAPC for duty acc my 260722 form Task Force 49 composed of info ships and prepare them for duty in NorPac.

27 0310 CINCPOA ADVANCE to CCGRENPOA info COMSERVPAC, COM 14, CINCPOA PEARL.

Reference CINCPOA serial 3769 of 18 March subject shipping control Hawaiian Area. The interchange of comments both formal and informal in connection therewith and proposed changes in that directive have been noted and given consideration. Meantime JOSCO has apparently been functioning effectively. In view of prospective marked decrease in shipping activities involving both services jointly in POA it is contemplated that JOSCO will be disbanded about October. At which time Com 14 will be required to assume responsibilities for CINCAPC shipping in Hawaiian Area which are now charged to JOSCO. CCGRENPOA will be called upon to designate an agency with which Com 14 can coordinate such joint shipping activities in the Hawaiian Area as would previously been handled by JOSCO.

27 0312 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COM MARIANAS info CCGRENPOA, CCGENWESPACBACOM, ISCOM IWO JIMA, ISCOM SAIPAN, CINCPOA PEARL.

CCGRENPOA dis 250332. In order not to reduce the AAA defense of IWO JIMA at this time and to assemble elements of the 206th AAA AW Bn for training transfer the 206th AAA AW Bn (less Btries C and D) from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA as soon as practicable.
26 1601 CINCAFPAC to COMGENAFMIDPAC, COMGEN 10, COMGENAFWESPAC, COMGEN FEAF, COMGEN ISCOM OKINAWA info COMGEN ISCOM IE SHIMA, WARCOS, WARTAG, CINCPOA BOTH HQ, CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY.

CX 28598.

Para. 1. Reference (forwarded to action addresses on 25 July 1945) is memorandum for record of staff conference by representatives of CINCAFPAC-CINCPAC at GUAM 21/23 July 1945, subject: Transfer of Control of United States Held Areas in the RYUKYUS from CINCPAC to CINCAFPAC.

Para. 2. Under provisions of agreements in reference and effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July, 10th Army with assigned and attached United States Army units and the United States Army Forces of the Island Commands of OKINAWA and IE SHIMA will be transferred from control of CINCPOA to CINCAFPAC.

Para. 3. At the same date and hour:
SubPara A. The 10th Army including assigned and attached units will become a tactical and administrative command reporting directly to CINCAFPAC. COMGENAFMIDPAC will publish the necessary orders passing administrative control directly at AFPAC of 10th Army this constituted.
SubPara B. The Island Commands OKINAWA and IE SHIMA, including all United States Army units assigned and attached thereto, are redesignated Army Service Command 1, short ASCPM 1. ASCOM 1 thus constituted is assigned to COMGENAFWESPAC. ASCOM 1, less United States Army antiaircraft units, passes to the operational control of COMGEN 10th Army. Antiaircraft units, ASCOM 1, pass to the operational control of COMGEN FEAF.
SubPara C. COMGENAFMIDPAC will issue the necessary orders to constitute ASCOM 1 and assign ASCOM 1 and included units to AFWESPAC.
SubPara D. COMGENAFMIDPAC will include in his orders all units now enroute or scheduled for movement to the RYUKYUS under AFMIDPAC orders, and redeployed units already assigned to AFMIDPAC by AFPAC orders.

Para. 4.

SubPara A. At the same date and hour COMGEN 10TH ARMY WILL:
(1) In conjunction with the local naval and air forces, assume control and defense of the U.S. held areas of RYUKYUS. (2) Conduct such minor offensive operations from time to time as may be necessary to protect and consolidate U.S. positions in the RYUKYUS or as hereafter directed by this headquarters. (3) Conduct military government in the RYUKYUS.
SubPara B. COMGENFEAF, reinforced Marine Air Defense Units and U.S. Army antiaircraft units (see paragraph 3 B above) will support the 10th Army and conduct the air defense of the RYUKYUS.
SubPara XRay. (1) COMGEN 10th Army, COMGEN FEAF and COMMANDANT NAVAL OPERATING BASE, OKINAWA, will make local arrangements for coordination of defense of the U.S. held positions in the RYUKYUS, forming such boards, committees or information centers as may be required. (2) COMGEN 10th Army will exercise overall coordination of internal security in the RYUKYUS. The commander of each force will provide his own internal security. (3) COMGEN FEAF will exercise local air control in the RYUKYUS as arranged with local air commanders concerned.

Para 5. Logistics (at the same date and hour).
SubPara A. Supply. (1) COMGEN 10 charge with responsibility for logistic support of U.S. Army forces within the RYUKYUS (including FEAF and USASTAF) except for air force technical and air force ammunition supply. (2) COMMANDING GENERAL AFMIDPAC will continue existing logistic support of all U.S. Army Forces (except FEAF air corps technical and ammunition supply which remain as currently arranged) in the RYUKYUS. Responsibility for delivery terminates at the waterline. (3) Logistic support of all naval and marine forces will remain the responsibility of CINCPAC.

SubPara B. Evacuation of casualties. (1) CINCPAC retains responsibility for hospitalization of naval and marine corps patients and for surface evacuation of patients of all services. (2) COMGEN 10 will assume responsibility for hospitalization of army patients, including USASTAF, and in emergencies navy and marine corps casualties in excess of hospital capacities under control of CINCPAC in the RYUKYUS.

SubPara C. Transportation. (1) COMGEN 10 will be charged with the responsibility for: (A) call forward from the regulating points the destination of all ammunition shipping and other shipping for the support of army forces in the RYUKYUS. (B) the unloading of all army cargoes, including USASTAF cargoes and ammunition for navy and marine corps units, and the integration of arrivals of such additional shipping as may be directed by this Hqtrs.

SubPara D. Construction. (1) CINCPAC continues to perform all dredging and harbor salvage operations. (2) COMGEN 10 will be responsible for the initiation and prosecution of construction of all Army and Military Government facilities and for the Army portion of Joint Facilities. (3) Existing supervision headquarters will temporarily be retained within headquarters 10th Army.

SubPara E. A Sub-Area petroleum officer will be assigned by the responsible to this headquarters for requisitioning, call forward, delivery, storage and issue of all petroleum products (Bulk and Packaged) in the RYUKYUS except for those fleet units normally supplied by naval service squadrons or divisions.

Para. 6. Direct radio communication between CINCAFPAC and COMGEN 10 will take place so as to become effective at 1200 I, 31 July 1945. Call signs and frequencies to be assigned by separate radiogram the APPAC station of this circuit will be temporarily provided by AFWESPAC.

Para. 7. For further details, see provisions of memorandum for Record of staff conference by representatives of CINCPAC-CINCAFPAC ag GUAM 21/23 July 1945, all provisions of which are hereby placed in full effect. Detailed orders will publish later.
JULY (GCT)

27 1317 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTG 99.2, CTUs 99.2.1, 99.2.3, 99.3.4, 99.3.12 info COM7THFLT, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGEN TEN. ALL TF AND TG COMDES PAC FLEET.

Following changes in Task Organization and operational control effective 311200 (1) July.

Commandant NOB OKINAWA assume designation CTF 99 and report by dispatch to CINCPAC. Present TU 99.3.12 report to CTF 99. COMGEN 2ND MARINE AIR WING with headquarters pass to operational control COMGEN AIR FMF PAC. Present TU 99.2.1 pass to operational control COMGEN FEAF. Present TU 99.2.3 report to CTG 96.9 (COMFAEWING 1).

02 0126 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Para. A. CINCPAC ADVANCE 181255 still presents CINCPAC'S views. COMGENUSASTAFS concurrence in Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to establish Pacific Joint Communication Board noted in COMGEN USASTAF 162325. The Navy Communication interest in Pacific is naturally considered equal to that of Army and no general dominance of Pacific Communications by Any 1 of 3 services would be acceptable.

Para. B. In POA Joint Communications have been utilized fully. In SWPA separate army and navy communications have been utilized and there is obviously no desire by CINCAPAC to change. It is therefore not expected that CINCAPAC will be agreeable to any coordination and integration of service communications which might affect the degree of control he now has.

Para. C. If board were established in accordance CINCPAC 181255 and was advisory only it is probable that coordination but not integration could be improved. CINCPAC and CINCAPAC have coordinated communication matters by conferences and dispatches. This can be continued and is reasonably satisfactory.

Para. D. Referring to your 212043 the creation of a full time working committee to coordinate frequencies within Pacific may become necessary in connection with large scale operations when frequency representatives for 3 services should be together to adjust frequency difficulties as they occur.

Para. E. No comment on command responsibilities expressed and implied in CINCAPACS C 27447 will be made herein as COMINCH is already fully informed.

Para. F. In view of CINCAPACS expressed opposition to the formation of a Pacific JCB and a method of coordination is working at present recommend against any further effort at this time in this connection.

02 1500 CECIL J DOYLE (DE 368) to COMWESCARSUBAREA info CTF 94 (INTERCEPT).

Have arrived area. Am picking up survivors from USS INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) torpedoed and sunk last sunday night.
Following effective 1 August.

Para. 1. In non combat sea and land areas which are defined in para 2 below. (A) Recognition signals for warships and aircraft are abolished except as required for training purposes. (B) Recognition procedure for entry into defended ports is abolished. (C) Warships merchant Ships and Ground Forces are not to engage aircraft. (D) Aircraft are not to engage warships and Merchant Ships. (E) Use of IFF by warships and aircraft is abolished except as required for training purposes and for purposes of distress and air/sea rescue. (F) Holders of recognition signal publications are to retain them.

Para. 2. Non combat areas are defined as follows. (A) S.A. North Atlantic including Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico, Arctic Ocean, Baltic and North Sea, Mediterranean. Black and Red Seas. South Atlantic Ocean east of 74-00 West to longitude of Cape Town, North and South Pacific East of 82-00 west but see paragraph 3 below. (B) Land Areas. United Kingdom. European theater. West Africa (Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria, French West and Equitorial Africa, and Belgian Congo). Countries bordering on the Mediterranean Sea (Except Spain and Spanish Morocco) and the Mideast west of 45-00 East.

Para 3. Notwithstanding the instructions above in the Panama Sea Frontier recognition signals will continue to be used between local defense forces and aircraft and such instructions concerning local defense forces engaging aircraft as are in effect in that area will continue in effect.

Para 4. All other areas including the ports of Capetown and Aden are combat areas and full British/United States recognition procedures will continue to be used.

CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMGENFMFPAC Info CINCAFPAC, COMGEN3RDPHIBCORPS, FMFPACREP OKINAWA, COMGEN 10, CO2NDPROVMAR AAA GROUP, COL2DTHSERVICE BN, ISCOM OKINAWA

In connection CINCPOA ADV HQ 260151 (ALPOA). Operational control of PMF ground units OKINAWA will be as follows:
(a) 3rd PhibCorps units rehabilitating OKINAWA will be under COMGENFMFPAC.
(b) 12th Marine Service Bn will be under Commandant NOB
(c) 2nd Prov Marine AAA Group will be under Marine Air Defense Command.

PENNSYLVANITA to CINCPAC PEARL HQ Info CINCPAC ADV HQ

Completed operation FUDDLE WAKE. AA fire meager and inaccurate. Shore battery fire moderate inside 10,000 yards. Coverage CINCPOA ADV 230907 being furnished by USS CABOT. No personnel casualties. Fragment hit on PENNSYLVANITA disabled 1 director Mark 50. 1 F6F and 1 SC lost operationally both pilots recovered unhurt. Preliminary reports indicate following. 9 guns including both 8 inch at PEACOCK POINT out of action. Damage to 6 other guns distillation and power plants. 1 dump burned.
COMTHFLT to CINCPAC/CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMNATSPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMNATS

Have conferred with your Deputy Chief of Staff regarding NATC major base in PHILIPPINES in accordance your 250908. Information given him is now submitted to you for consideration in submitting your firm recommendation. NATS proposed flight wing will consist initially of 2 R4D squadrons Numbers 6 and 13 and 1 Meron Number 10. These squadrons will serve the Asiatic area only. MACTAN suggested as location headquarters service maintenance facilities for wing. MACTAN ISLAND considered logical site for repair and maintenance NATS equipment service PHILIPPINES and adjacent areas with twin engine airplanes for the reasons that: A. It is centrally located with respect areas served by the wing. B. Local weather conditions best this area. C. Will make common use of station aircraft supply transportation and repair facilities of Naval Air Base MACTAN. Facilities for initial use by NATS to extent of 6 R4D wing 300 NATS personnel will be available MACTAN 1 September. Suggest present facilities MANUS and SAMAR continue to be utilized by NATS as necessary AKILDHAT NATS move to MACTAN be progressive as facilities MACTAN become available. Suggest trans-Pacific NATS PHILIPPINE terminal be LIFTITE to turn around and Ron facilities only. It being understood that major repair and maintenance will be provided in MARIANAS and HAWAII. NATS trans-Pacific seaplane terminal facilities now being constructed SANGLEY and will allow progressive expansion of NATS seaplane service. SAMAR which is now PHILIPPINE terminal of NATS trans-Pacific landplane service is suggested as temporary terminal to be used only until Neilson Field MANILA facilities now under construction are completed. Neilson facilities to be supplemented by use of strip at SANGLEY which will be available prior to completion Neilson.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 93 Info COMAIR IWO, COM7TH AIR FORCE, COMMARIANAS, COMGENPOA

The reorganization of air forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas has made it necessary to disband Task Force 93. The mission of your force has been accomplished under difficult conditions in an efficient manner for which I am most appreciative and congratulate you on a job well done.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 93 Info ALPOA

The Strategic Air Force Pacific Ocean Areas with designation of TF-93 and TG-93.4 are dissolved. CTF-93.4 report with the forces under his command to ComGen USASTAF for duty. See my 242315 May concerning fighter defense IWO JIMA.

COMTHFLT Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMAIRPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMAIRTHFLT, COMINCH CNO

Your 141155 is hereby approved insofar as CINCPAC is concerned.
Increasing photographic missions to meet the requirements for amphibious operations, assessment of target damage, photography for use in connection with shore bombardment, photo reconnaissance of bypasses bases plus the increased attrition rate due to enemy action dictate the necessity for a readjustment of the present deployment, rotation and composition of Navy photoRons. Therefore recommend:

(A) That the authorized complement of PhotoRons 1 and 3 be increased from 6 to 9 PB4Y-1P as soon as practicable.
(B) That these 2 squadrons be supported forward on a crew replacement basis in a manner similar to other multi-engine squadrons.
(C) If required in order to implement the above or to provide compensating personnel complements recommend PhotoRons 4 and 5 be decommissioned.

Para. This is my action on COMAIRPAC 242028 and serial 001735 both of July not to or needed by all.

Marine personnel will be used for local defense and internal security of Naval Operating Base OKINAWA. CINCPAC ADVANCE 030737 an MP Bn has been requested from COMINCH for this purpose however until such time is available COMGENFMFPAC will meet this requirement on a temporary basis by providing at least 2 infantry companies or equivalent units from FMF personnel locally available at OKINAWA. Such unit or units should report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA at earliest. Comdt NOB OKINAWA is authorized to require COMGEN 1stMARDIV to furnish such additional troops for tactical purposes as the situation may require.

Headquarters and headquarters squadron 2nd Marine Air Wing inadvertently not mentioned in memorandum for record GUAM conferece 21-23 July reference your 311509. Operational control that unit passed to FEAF so that the method of controlling Marine Air Defense units through the 2nd Marine Air Wing Headquarters will continue. My 271317 being changed accordingly.
03 0915 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO info CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 311607. Consider that there is sufficient possibility that AITUTAKI and PENRHYN may have post was significance to justify continuance of present token garrisons. Navy and Coast Guard personnel will be substituted for Army garrisons if you so direct or if it is the only means by which garrisons can be maintained.

01 1355 CTU 95.9.2 to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGEN USA STAF, COMGEN 20TH AF, CTG 94.11, COMGEN FEAF, COMGEN FEAF ADV HQ, CTG 95.9.

Your 301539 it is desired to continue rescues inland sea all pilots. Conference representatives COMGEN FEAF advise that they will continue their splendid and cooperative fighter cover for all rescue missions and searches necessary. Communication facilities recommended my 311301 not all or needed should be expedited for optimum rescue operations.

30 2140 COMAAF SWPA to COMAF 13, COMGEN 85 FIFTER WING (ADC), COMAIR 7TH FLEET, CINCPAC info COMAAF PACIFIC AT GUAM, COM AF 5, COMPHILSEAFLPON (INTERCEPT)

Further to myrad AX-78080, 21 July (not to all). ComAF 13 combat responsibility includes entire 5th Air Force area of responsibility in SWPA, as outlined in inclosure 1 to operations instructions number 96. This combat responsibility includes strike and recco air-sea rescue and operational control of all shore and tender-based aircraft of ComAir 7th Flt, as outlined in para 3B(1), operations instructions number 96, except units specifically placed under control air defense command for airways, air-sea rescue operations.

Para. 85 fighter wing will assume responsibility for (A) air-sea rescue airways coverage in PHILIPPINES at 00011(-9), 5 August 45, and FETEC the operations of VPB 71 bases SAMAR and 1-half VPB 20 based LINGAYEN to accomplish this mission. (B) area, strike and recco air-sea coverage on or about 15 September 1945 for all craft operations within and from the PHILIPPINES, at which time 1 Army air-sea rescue squadron will be assigned in addition to Navy squadrons. Letter directive follows to ADC.

03 2345 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM7THFLEET info COMINCH.

COMAAF SWPA 302140/1(-9). Request letter report giving complete data on existing operational command arrangements as they affect all units of air 7th Fleet.
07 0020 CINCPOA ADVANCE HQ to ALPOA info CINCAFPAC.

The standard army air force air defense grid which is now employed by the forces under CINCAFPAC is hereby prescribed for use by forces under CINCPOA in cases when a grid is employed in exchanging air warning and fighter direction information on radar reporting and radar telling circuits. Effective date 1 September 1945. This grid is not to be confused with the AMS world Polyconic grid which is used for gunfire and air support. It is not intended to replace the polar coordinate system used by fleet elements at sea or the polar coordinate system of local reporting from a fixed reference point at the scene of an operation. The air defense grid supersedes the Jangrid the use of which in the POA is accordingly discontinued. Information on the air defense grid will be disseminated separately.

07 0819 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMINCH Info CNO, CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA PEARL HQ

JCS 101409 and the resulting agreement between CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC Memorandum for Record of 23 July 1945 subpar 3, 4 and 5 of para 2E regarding division of responsibility for shipping in the RYUKYUS imposes a condition for the present wherein the overall responsibility for procurement and sailing of shipping remains with CINCPOA but responsibility for unloading and turn around at OKINAWA is divided between CINCPOA and CINCAFPAC.

Subpar 2E5 specifically provides that CINCAFPAC may introduce additional shipping at OKINAWA without reference to CINCPAC. Under such circumstances CINCPOA does not have the authority to exercise the overall control over shipping in the RYUKYUS which JCS require of him under JCS 100345 of December 1944. Request JCS 100345 of December 1944 be modified to eliminate CINCPOA responsibility for shipping in Army controlled ports of RYUKYUS.

07 0902 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN CHINA Info CTF 95

Reference C.F.A.W. 1 022330 separately passed. Would appreciate your comments as to attack on junk traffic. I consider visit and search will normally be impracticable and that visual identification as to friendly character will usually be unreliable. My inclination is to interdict all traffic north of the YANGTZE. Early reply requested.
08 1955 CINCPAO ADVANCE HQ to ALPOA.

The Soviet Union has announced that a state of war exists between that country and JAPAN.

09 0027 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLT, ALL TF AND TG COMDRS PAC FLT, COMSUBPAC, COMNORPAC, COM5THFLT info COMINCH, CINCAPAC, CG FEAF & ADVON, CG USASTAF.

Following operational boundaries established for operations US and Soviet Forces.

Para. In sea of JAPAN the boundary will be along the lines connecting CAPE BOLTIN (41-50N 129-43E) to point 40-00N 135-00E to point 45-45N 140-00 E thence along parallel 45-45N to line connecting CAPE CRILLON (NISHI NOTORO MISAKI on southern tip of southern SAKHALIN) with SOYA MISAKI (on northern tip of HOKKAIDO). U.S. forces air and naval (including Submarines) will operate to the south and east of this boundary.

Para. In the north Pacific, SEA OF OKhotsk and BERING SEA. Boundary will be established along the line from CAPE DEZNEV to DIOMERE ISLAND thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and UNITED STATES to the parallel 51-30N thence to point 50-35N 157-00 E thence to point 49-50N 156-20E thence along parallel 49-50N to the ONEKOTAN STRAIT thence southwest along the KURILE ISLANDS CHAIN. The area to the south and east of this boundary is a zone of United States operation, to the north and west a zone of mutual operations. The zone of mutual operations the operations of the USSR and UNITED STATES naval and air forces will be coordinated.

Para. In the SEA OF JAPAN operations of the U.S. forces north and west of the boundary will be subject to coordination with the USSR.

Para. The boundary line between operational zones of the UNITED STATES and SOVIET air forces in KOREA AND MANCHURIA shall be as follows: CAPE BOLTIN, CHANGCHUN, SINGKING, LIAOYUAN, KAILU, CHHIFENG, PEKING, TATUNG, and thence along the southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA.

Para. United States aviation will operate south of this line including all the above named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated. When necessary for United States aircraft to attack targets or make reconnaissance flights north of the boundary line coordination will be effected by local liaison. Further information regarding identification and recognition signals later included liaison arrangements.
08 0700 COMFAIRWING ONE to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CTU 95.9.2, COMSUBPAC

Shipping strike by FEAF AD ECH August 7 TSU SHIMA STRAITS did not provide cover submarine at lat 32-45 long 128-00. Dumbo was assigned and fighter escort requested this sub for maximum rescue coverage. Fighter escort was refused although request was relayed to COMGEN FEAF AD ECH by landwire and CW. After refusal message was delivered also by hand for determining policy fighter escort future strikes to insure maximum rescue coverage and protection submarine lifeguards stationed for primary duty to cover FEAF strikes. Explanation refusal or policy future requests not answered. FEAF AD ECH establishing own rescue facilities limit their equipment and exercising operational control on other than distress frequencies this includes crash boats. Duplication and resulting confusion hazard efficient rescue and unnecessarily jeopardizing lifeguards. This change in cooperation is recent but applies to practically all air sea rescue operations.

08 0940 ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK to COMINCH AND CNO info MOSCOW - CNO PASSES TO COMNORPAC, COMSUBPAC, CINCPAC BOTH HQS.

Convoy officer today officially states Soviet shipping no longer using LA PERouse. Would not divulge exact date stopped altho local rumors indicate several days. My 010030. They also preparing to start convoying by planes and warships merships to and from VLADIVOSTOK via TARTARY and INOKHOTSK. Describes LA PEROUSE as dangerous for their use because of Jap subs as well as American warships. Also expresses Fear 1st KURILE STRAIT might soon be closed because of military operations.

09 2200 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV info COMNORPAC, ALUSNA MOSCOW, ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK.

Deal directly with ALUSNAS MOSCOW and VLADIVOSTOK on such matters as you require. New Subject. Tentative plans for a suitable ship for communication purposes at PETROPAVLIVSK should be made. Interpreters are available COLD BAY connection HULA project. Suggest this ship be communication link to Soviet Naval Command pending establishment GUAM-VLADIVOSTOK circuit.

10 0012 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSOPAC, COMAIRPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERONSOPAC.

COMSOPAC is directed to exercise administrative and operational control of Naval Air Bases and airfields and aviation matters in SOPAC utilizing the services of a naval aviator whom COMAIRPAC is hereby directed to order to the staff of COMSOPAC. COMAIRPAC shall exercise type command functions including aviation logistic support and aviation personnel matters. This answers COMSOPAC 310223 July.

10 0812 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORPAC info COMINCH, CTF 90,91,92, ALUSNA MOSCOW, ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK.

Your 100030. Continue operations of Task Force 92 as planned. Aerial bombarding of KURILE chain authorized. In order that Russians may be notified announce your intents to me and to ALUSNAS MOSCOW and VLADIVOSTOK.
10 1210 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 95, CINCAFPAC.

Glance at UrDis 070902 and CFAW L 022330 concur with interdiction of all sea traffic north of YANGTZE RIVER. Action being taken by this headquarters to notify Chinese of then policy on shipping strikes. Recommend this unrestricted warfare not start until 25 August, so Chinese KS H sufficient time to get notice out.

10 1605 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COM7THFLT, COMAIR7THFLT, COMINATS.

Temporary establishment headquarters NATS ASIATIC WING with service and maintenance facilities at MACTAN approved. Ur 030225 and my secret speedletter serial 001911 of 1 August refer. Hold installations to a minimum as MACTAN is not to be a post war base.

12 0405 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info COMGENFEAF, COMGENFEAF ADVON, CTF 95.

Request pilots of OKINAWA-based planes be briefed that friendly submarines are operating in JAPAN SEA. Others are south of KOREA and in addition to lifeguards there will be submarines on special missions in vicinity of KYUSHU. Recent bombing of submarine lifeguard BARTFISH indicates pilots are not being properly briefed as to boundaries and bombing restrictions in submarine patrol zones. SOP-23 requires that no submarine shall be attacked in a submarine patrol zone. Therefore pilots must refrain from bombing unidentified targets during daylight and should not attack single targets during darkness or low visibility.

12 0246 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to EISENHOWER, MCDONALD, MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WHEELER AND GILES.

WARX 43488.

Propaganda directives originated by the Office of War Information have been reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as causing some confusion in certain theaters as regards their authenticity and status. Clarify this situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to recall that under executive order No. 9312, the OWI is responsible for planning, development and execution of the federal foreign propaganda program subject to approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where areas of actual or projected military operations are concerned and subject to control of program execution by theater commanders. Army and Navy liaison officers designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate in preparing the OWI directives which are reviewed by the OWI overseas planning board on which the state, War and Navy Departments are also represented.

Para. Since propaganda directives must be kept abreast of developments it is desirable to hold administrative processing to a minimum, hence they are normally communicated by OWI to its representatives in the field.

Para. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that these directives be accepted in accord with executive order No. 9312 as reflecting the approved national propaganda policy for execution under your control insofar as military considerations permit. Whenever exceptions are made to any particular directive for circumstances peculiar to any theater, the nature of the exceptions and the reasons therefore will be communicated for the information of the appropriate agency of the War or Navy Department.
14 2304 CINCPOA ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS to ALPOA info COMINCH.

Cease offensive operations against Japanese forces. Continue searches and patrols. Maintain defensive and internal security measures at highest level and beware of treachery or last moment attacks by enemy forces or individuals.

14 2310 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, COM3RDFLT.

As essential preliminary to further naval operations TOKYO BAY AREA request Japanese authorities be directed to send Japanese ship to meet Halsey 20 miles bearing 135 from O SHIMA to lead his forces into SAGAMI WAN and advise time of arrival at rendezvous.

15 0000 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COM3RDFLT.

For your information the State Department has received official Japanese acceptance of surrender demands and is replying through the intermediary power to the Japanese as follows:

1. Direct prompt cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces, informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of the effective date and hour of such cessation.

2. Send Emisaries at once to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with information of the disposition of the Japanese forces and commanders, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enable him and his accompanying force to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender.

For the purpose of receiving such surrender and carrying it into effect, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and he will notify the Japanese Government of the time, place and other details of the formal surrender.

15 0218 CINCPAC AND CINCPOA ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR.

Please accept my hearty congratulations on your appointment as Supreme Commander for the occupation of JAPAN and my assurance of full support by the forces and resources available to me.

15 0620 CINCPOA ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info COM3RDFLEET, COMINCH.

Request immediate despatch to Japanese authorities that our own measures for defense require our naval forces to destroy any Japanese aircraft approaching our dispositions. See COM3RDFleet 150423.
SUPREME COMDR ALLIED POWERS to THE JAPANESE EMPEROR, THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT, THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS into MARCOS (JCS), CINCPAC ADVANCE, USASTF, SACSEA, COMCHINA, GENERALISSIMO, U.S. MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW, SOVIET AUTHORITIES, GEN T0, COMETIFAF.

Pursuant to the acceptance of the terms of surrender of the Allied Powers by the EMPEROR OF JAPAN, the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers hereby directs the immediate cessation of hostilities by Japanese Forces. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is to be notified at once of the effective date and hour of such cessation of hostilities, whereupon Allied forces will be directed to cease hostilities.

Para. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers further directs the Japanese Imperial Government to send to his headquarters at Manila, Philippine Islands, a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the EMPEROR OF JAPAN, the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender. The above representative will present to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers upon his arrival a document authenticated by the EMPEROR OF JAPAN, empowering him to receive the requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Para. The representative will be accompanied by competent advisors representing the Japanese Army, the Japanese Navy and the Japanese Air Forces. The latter advisor will be thoroughly familiar with airborne facilities in the TOKYO AREA.

Para. Procedure for the transport of the above party under safe conduct is prescribed as follows: Party will travel in a Japanese airplane to an airdrome on the island of IE SHIMA from which point they will be transported to MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. In a United States Airplane. They will be returned to Japan in the same manner. Party will employ an unarmed airplane, type Zero Model 22, L2, D3. Such airplane will be painted all white and will bear upon the sides of the fuselage and top and bottom of each wing green crosses easily recognizable at 500 yards. The airplane will be capable of inflight voice communications in English, on a frequency of 6970 kilocycles. Airplane will proceed to an airdrome on the island of IE SHIMA, identified by 2 white crosses prominently displayed in the center of the runway. The exact date and hour this airplane will depart from SATA MISAKI, on the southern tip of KYUSHU, the route and altitude of flight and estimated time of arrival in IE SHIMA, will be broadcast 6 hours in advance, in English, from TOKYO on a frequency of 16125 kilocycles. Acknowledgement by radio from this headquarters of the receipt of such broadcast is required prior to take-off of the airplane. Weather permitting, the airplane will depart from SATA MISAKI between the hours of 0800 and 1100 TOKYO time on the 17th Day of August 1945. In communications regarding this flight, the code designation "BATMAN" will be employed.

Para. The airplane will approach IE SHIMA on a course of 180 degrees and circle landing field at 1000 feet or below the cloud layer until joined by escort of United States Army P-38s which will lead it to a landing. Such escort may join the airplane prior to arrival at IE SHIMA.
August (CCT)

15 0355 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to THE JAPANESE EMPEROR, THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT, THE JAPANESE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS INFO WARCOS, CINCPAC.

I have been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (The United States, The Republic of China, The United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and empowered to arrange directly with the Japanese authorities for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest practicable date.

Para. It is desired that a radio station in the TOKYO area be officially designated for continuous use in handling radio communications between this headquarters and your headquarters. Your reply to this message should give the call signs, frequencies and station designation. It is desired that the radio communication with my headquarters in MANILA be handled in English text. Pending designation by you of a station in the TOKYO AREA for use as above indicated, station JUN on frequency 13705 kilocycles will be used for this purpose, and WTA MANILA will reply on 15965 kilocycles. Upon receipt of this message, acknowledge. MacArthur.

15 0215 CTF 95 to CINCPAC ADVANCE INFO CTF 99.

Originator and CTF 99 jointly recommend as follows. Your 110456 refers.

A. To meet situation as it exists now. Effective 1 September CTF 95 dissolve Task Group 95.5 CINCPAC abolish title commander Naval Forces RYUKYUS and assign to CTF 99 duties my OpPlan 3-45 paragraph 3E. Items 1 to 6 inclusive. Remainder duties under this paragraph will be assumed by units of TF 95.

B. To meet developments during and after OLYMPIC or occupation of JAPAN. When control of shipping is passed by COMPHIBSPAC establish Task Organization JAPAN similar to that proposed IP VPN MVNIE. Each organization to take over control of CHOP line to be established by CINCPAC. Consider duties in a above will not be affected except in magnitude of shipping with corresponding increase in escorts required. If approved CTF 95 will transfer personnel and vessels now assigned TG 95.5 to permit accomplishment assigned responsibilities. CTG 95.6 will be assigned duties as SOPA at BUCKNER BAY and will carry out plans prepared by Naval Base Commander for clearing harbor in emergency. He will be responsible for military functions afloat including such as control of BOCKE AA fire etc.
With the termination of hostilities against JAPAN it is incumbent on all officers to conduct themselves with dignity and decorum in their treatment of the Japanese and their public utterances in connection with the Japanese. The Japanese are still the same nation which initiated the War by a treacherous attack on the Pacific Fleet and which has subjected our brothers in arms who became prisoners to torture, starvation and murder. However the use of insulting epithets in connection with the Japanese as a race or as individuals does not now become the officers of the United States Navy. Officers of the Pacific Fleet will take steps to require of all personnel under their command a high standard of conduct in this matter. Neither familiarity and open forgiveness nor abuse and vituperation should be permitted.

Refer appendix C to my serial 0005103. It is requested that naval requirements as stated in reference plus the following be presented to Japanese Emissary at MANILA.

1. That the Japanese Imperial High Command will promptly direct all Japanese and Japanese controlled ships, warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft to comply with the following instructions:
   A. Ships in harbors to remain in harbor pending further directions from CINCPAC; ships at sea report their positions in plain language immediately to the nearest U.S., British or Soviet Radio Station on 500KC/S(600 meters) and to the call sign N00 on 1 of the following high frequencies: 4235, 8470, 12705, or 16940 KC/S. Proceed to nearest allied port or such port as CINCPAC may direct pending further orders. Ships will burn navigational lights at night and display searchlights with beams held vertically.
   B. Submarines will remain on surface fly a black flag or pennant and show lights at night. Report their positions in accordance with (A) and proceed on surface to nearest of following ports. AGANA GUAM, MIDWAY ISLAND, SUBIC BAY PHILIPPINES. Upon arrival at point 10 miles from entrance to port communicate with port and lie to until boarded by allied naval forces.
   C. All warships and merchant ships whether in port or at sea will immediately train all weapons fore and aft. Torpedo tubes will be unloaded and all breech blocks will be removed from all guns.
   D. All minesweeping vessels will carry out prescribed measures of disarmament, fuel as necessary and be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the direction of CINCPAC.

2. The Imperial High Command will forthwith direct that Japanese naval aircraft are not to leave the ground or water or ship pending directions from CINCPAC.

3. The Japanese High Command will forthwith direct that any neutral merchant ships in JAPAN or Japanese controlled ports are to be detained pending instructions from CINCPAC.

4. The Japanese High Command will forthwith issue categorical directions that:
   A. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times; where possible they are to be removed.
B. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbors are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.
C. All demolition charges in all ports and harbor works are to be removed or rendered ineffective and their presence indicated.
D. The existing wartime system of navigational lighting is to be maintained except that all dimmed lights are to be shown at full brilliance.
E. All pilotage services are to continue to operate and all pilots are to be held at their normal stations ready for service and equipped with charts.
F. Japanese Naval and other personnel concerned in the operation of ports are to remain at their stations and continue to carry out their normal duties.
5. The Japanese Imperial High Command will be prepared to deliver forthwith to CINCPAC representative in TOKYO BAY AREA:
   A. Corrected copies of charts showing all minefields laid by Japanese or Japanese controlled vessels or aircraft and all other underwater obstructions.
   B. Details of all Japanese coastal convoy routes, searched channels and of all buoys lights and other navigational aids.
   C. Exact information with regard to disposition of Japanese naval units.
   D. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace diesel gasoline and coal.
6. The Japanese Imperial High Command will forthwith direct that except as may be required for the purpose of giving effect to the above special orders all personnel in Japanese warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft are to remain on board their ships pending further directions from CINCPAC or his representatives.
7. The Japanese Imperial High Command will issue instructions forthwith that:
   A. The YOKOSHUKA, HIROSHIMA, OMURA and KABAYAMA airfields be prepared immediately for occupation by U.S. Marine and Naval Air Units.
   B. The YOKOSHUKA Naval Base be prepared immediately for occupation and possible operation by U.S. Naval Service Units.
   C. All troops and personnel other than those required for normal care taking functions be removed from the foregoing areas prior to the arrival of U.S. Forces.
15 1844 COMINCH TO CINCPAC BOTH HEADQUARTERS

Reports from Soviets yesterday given high evaluation by them indicate following: Intense activity reported along shores SAGAMI WAN on 13 and 14th August Jap dates. Many troops naval personnel and civilian volunteers concentrating that area and digging fox holes and gun positions. Beaches contain many anti-landing devices and entire shore this bay reported heavily fortified. If this report true activity probably organized prior surrender orders but possibility of treachery connection BLUE landings must be considered.

15 0930 COMGENMIDPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCARPAC, COMGENCENTFAC-BACOM.
RJ 62266.
Recommend Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested to remove, effective V-J Day, restriction now imposed by modified category of defense B under which this area now operating ordered reduce present alert status of ground and air forces in Hawaiian Group after formal declaration V-J Day.

16 1117 Kwantung Army Headquarters to Supreme Headquarters Soviet Russian Forces in the Far East.

1st. Japanese 1st line forces have ceased all military movements at their present positions. It is hoped that the Soviet Forces will also cease their attacks. Especially in the vicinity of MUTANKIANG, the Soviet attacks should be speedily stopped.

2nd. Hereafter, the intentions of the Japanese side will be notified every hour for 10 minutes on frequencies of 6035 kilocycles and 15330 kilocycles, which will be transmitted via wireless on frequencies of 13330 kilocycles and 5815 kilocycles and 7490 kilocycles at the same hour. The Soviet side is requested to carry out similar communications via the Khabarovsk radio and the Tass news agency. Wireless communication should be established between the supreme field headquarters of both the Japanese and Soviet Armies. Specify the wave length on which your communication will be transmitted.

16 1608 WARCOS to MACARTHUR info DEANE, WiDEMEYER, WHEELER, SPAATZ, Nimitz.

Urgent NR 1497 following is text of English language broadcast from TOKYO dated 16 August furnished for your information. We are in receipt of the message of the U.S. Government transmitted to us through the SWISS Government, and of a message from General MacArthur received by the TOKYO radiograph office, and desire to make the following communication:

Para 1. His majesty the Emperor issued and Imperial order at 4 PM on August 16 to the entire Armed Forces, to cease hostilities immediately.

Para 2. It is presumed that the said Imperial order will reach the front line and produce full effect after the following lapse of time.
A. In JAPAN proper, 48 hours;
B. In CHINA, MANCHURIA, KOREA, southern regions - except BOUGAINVILLE - NEW GUINEA and the PHILIPPINES, 6 days.
continued

16 1608 WARCOS to MACARTHUR info DEANE, WEDEMEYER, WHEELER, SPAATZ, NIMITZ. (Cont'd)

C. In BOUGAINVILLE, 8 days.
D. In NEW GUINEA and the PHILIPPINES, in the case of various local headquarters, 12 days. But whether and when the order will be received by the 1st line units, is difficult to foresee.

Para 3. With a view to making the August wish of his majesty, regarding the termination of the war, and the above-mentioned Imperial order thoroughly known to all concerned, members of the Imperial Family will be dispatched as personal representatives of his majesty to the headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army, the expeditionary forces in CHINA and the forces in the southern regions respectively. The itinerary, type of airplane, marking, etc, will be communicated later. It is accordingly requested that safe conduct for the above be granted.

Para 4. As regards to the request to dispatch a competent representative accompanied by service advisers, to the Headquarters of General MacArthur in MANILA, leaving SATA MISAKI in KYUSHU on August 17, we feel greatly embarrassed, as it is impossible for us to arrange for the VENAINL of your representative on August 17 due to the scarcity of time allowed us. We will, however, proceed at once with the necessary preparations and notify General MacArthur as to the date of the flight of such a representative which will take place as soon as possible.

Para 5. It is proposed to MAS if communications with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the following manner:

A. Sender and receiver on the Japanese side, the General MEHR NO YS or the government.
B. RSSMPOONS on the Japanese side, TOKYO station, call sign JNP, frequency 1 QHRES. 740 kilocycles.
C. Means of communications, radiograph.
D. Language, English.

Para. Communication received from General MacArthur. We request therefore, that the message be repeated, bearing upon the type fully and clearly.

Para 7. In order to make sure that we have received without fail all the communications sent by General MacArthur, we beg him to repeat them once again through the route of communication specified under heading single quote 5 KVMTZVYNI end single quote of the PRES communication end of quote.
As stated in our radiogram No. 1 it takes some time for the said order to reach the front line and produce full effect. It is earnestly requested that the allied forces will refrain from approaching the home waters of JAPAN PROPER until the order will have been fully effectuated.

Reference your radiogram number 4 August 16th. Your assumption that the signing of surrender terms is not among the tasks of the Japanese representatives to MANILA is correct. The directive from this headquarters is clear and explicit and is to be complied with without further delay.

MacArthur.

Following messages have been received from the Japanese General Headquarters (Z 507) quote message number 5 while on our side the Imperial Order has already been given to cease hostilities, the Soviet Forces are still positively carrying on the offensive and their spearhead is reaching near a point west to MUKDEN early this morning. As the result, the Japanese Forces in MANCHUKUO are meeting great difficulties in carrying out the Imperial Order. It is urgently requested that the Supreme Commander would take proper steps to being about immediate cessation of the Soviet offensive.

Para 1. The parties for CHINA and MANCHURIA left TOKYO today at 9:30 AM.
Para 2. The party for the south, reported in our previous message to leave on the 18th, left TOKYO also today at 9:30 AM. In order to avoid possible delay due to bad weather.
Para 3. The type and markings of the planes and their routes are as communicated before. Unquote addressees southwest Pacific area take necessary action to provide safe transit Japanese parties for CHINA, MANCHURIA and the south. See also my Z 503. Following message received from the Japanese Government Quote message number 6 please correct the sender of our radiogram number 4 from (Japanese GHQ) to the (Japanese Government). MacArthur.

Following is text of broadcast from KHABAROVSK in Russian to the USSR on 17 August furnished for your information. "To the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army:
Para. The Staff of the Japanese KWANTUNG Army addressed over the radio the Staff of the Soviet Troops on PRAHUNLEAST suggesting that they cease military operations, whereas not a word has been said about the capitulation of the Japanese Armed Forces in MANCHURIA.
Para. At the same time the Japanese went on with the counter-offensive in number of sectors of the Soviet-Japanese Front.
Para. I suggest to the Commander KWANTUNG Army troops that he cease all military operations against the Soviet Troops along the entire front, lay down arms and surrender, at 12 O'Clock on August 20.

Para. The time mentioned above is given in order that the staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY could issue the order to cease resistance and surrender to all its troops. As soon as the Japanese begin laying down their arms, the Soviet troops will cease military operations.

Para. Commander in Chief of the Soviet Troops in the Far East Marshal VASSILYUKOVICH August 17, 1945, 6:00AM.

Para. Following is text of English language broadcast from TOKYO dated 17 August furnished for your information. "Jap TOKYO to WTC MACARTHUR headquarters in English at 12-41 PM. (Text) to the supreme Allied Commander radiogram number 7, August 17-our representative to Manila is selected. Due to necessary internal procedures, he is scheduled to leave TOKYO on August 19. Further details will follow." JE HULL OPD.

20 1945 COMINCH AND CNO to NAVOP.

The President on 15 August 1945 issued the following directive: Appropriate departments of the government the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent the release of any information in regard to the development, design and production of the Atomic Bomb, or in regard to its employment in Military or Naval warfare, except with the specific approval of the President in each instance.

21 14,31 COM3RDFLT to COMGENSTARNY info COMGEN 11TH AIRBORNE, COMGEN FEAF, COMGEN 8TH ARMY ADV OKINAWA, CINCPAC ADVANCE, CTF 31, COMGEN 6TH ARMY, CTG 35.90, CTF 38, CTF 32.

Your 210517 (CX 35347) will execute my plan 2 including occupation of forts vicinity FUTTSU SAKI which I will arrange to have vacated when I am met by emissary off OSHIMA. Desire you arrange direct with RAdm McCormich now in IDAHO at OKINAWA (departing 24th) for naval gunfire support desired by Army forces. McCormich will advise me in the premise when his group joins me. I will make all necessary arrangements for gunfire support for Marine Landing Force. I suggest that CG 11th Airborne Div MAAQ send air support liaison officers and any desired JASCO elements with McCormich to report to me. My plans call for carrier plane CAP to cover airborne landings with air coordinator constantly over objective. I intend using frequencies as follows. Air coordinator and direct support aircraft for 11th Airborne division 129.78 MC. SAGAMI WAN combat air patrol 24.02.
Para 1. Based on the assumption that arrangements can be made for the 5th Amphibious Corps including 3 MarDivs to be released in December-January from occupation duty JAPAN (either being relieved by Army Units or being released without relief) the following schedule of return of amphibious corps and Marine Divisions to U.S. is recommended for planning purposes: October 4th MarDiv. December 3rd MarDiv. January 5th Phib Corps and 5th Mar Divs. May 3rd Phib Corps and 6th Mar Div. Units returning will include personnel long in area. Above is dependent on strategic situation however your approval is requested for planning purposes. In May anticipate 1st MarDiv will be in CHINA and 2nd MarDiv in MARIANAS-MARSHALLS-WESTERN CAROLINES.

Para 2. Recommend that 2 AAA Group Headquarters and 5 AAA Bns be disbanded and the personnel used for rotation and to augment the service command. Remaining 2 AAA Bns will be required Marianas for present.

Para 3. ComGenFMFPac concurs in the above. In addition he will submit recommendations for disbandment and readjustment of other units as the tactical situation permits.

Para 4. 6th defense Bn at MIDWAY and Marine Defense force JOHNSTON will be reduced to minimum.

Para 5. 52nd Defense Bn can be released from assigned duties now and returned U.S. 51st Defense Bn will be required Marshalls for the present.

Para 6. The disbandment of units the processing of equipment and supplies the closing out of camps etc., will require a temporary augmentation of the service command involving an estimated additional 600 commissioned and warrant and 10,000 enlisted. ComGenFMFPac will submit above requirements to MARCORPS by separate correspondence.

CINC PAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info COMGENFMFPAC, MARCORPS, CINCPAC PEARL

Your 202222 just received. Commander North Pacific Force has been considered to be a Task Force Commander of the Pacific Fleet and has been included in the Task Organization of all major operation plans issued by CINCPAC. Initiate compliance my OpPlan 12-45 of which pertinent extracts have been furnished you. Keep me and Com3rdFleet informed of your plans and the intended position and movements of your forces. Do not enter OMINATO until after 31 August. Acknowledge.

CINC PAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

For the surrender ceremony there will be 50 senior officers of this headquarters and other major army headquarters. These are in addition to 30 Allied officers who will attend representing the Allied Powers. Correspondents, newsreel men etc APPAC 135, CHINA 13, USASTAF 14, total 162. Request that the arrangements on the MISSOURI be made on the foregoing basis reference Commander 3rd Fleet 220513 GCT.
CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO info CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 171545. No suitable site for grounding PENNSYLVANIA without extensive preparation at OKINAWA. Because no protected anchorage exists in typhoon weather consider mooring ship in present damaged condition unwise. Unless directed to contrary will tow PENNSYLVANIA to GUAM earliest practicable for drydocking and limited repairs to facilitate further tow to pearl harbor or west coast pending final decision as to disposition.

Para. Do not recommend use of OBB for coast defense Pacific Island Bases for following reasons.

A. If grounded extensive repairs, RIP RAP construction necessary to prevent failure ships girder as seas wash out support of bow and stern.
B. Vulnerability of target.
C. Difficulty of regunning.
D. Unknown changes in gunnery planes and clearances to be expected from changes in support due to sea action.

Para. Extent to which this was has shown sea coast batteries to be an obsolete form of defense.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPAC, ADMIRALTY.

Concur UrDis 191945 on assumption that implications involved in discontinuing combat areas are following:
1. Cancellation payment of bonuses to Merchant Crews.
2. Influence on Marine war risk insurance rates.
3. Would establish termination date for operations and campaigns not yet officially terminated. Attention invited to CINCPAC 150510, 150907 and serial 07052 of 18 August defining Merchant ship control procedure in FOA following formal surrender which is similar to COMINCH serial 003611 of 15 December.

Para. Until there is more definite assurance that there are no isolated independent groups of Japanese unwilling to comply with surrender consider that Armed Guard and Armament should be maintained on Merchant Ships and troopers in Western Pacific until occupation of Japan has been accomplished.

CINCPAC ADV to SUPREME COMDR ALLIED POWERS info COMINCH, COMGRDFLT, COMMARGILS, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

As indicated in discussions between Rear Admiral Sherman and Rear Admiral Yokoyama at Manila CINCPAC-CINCPOA is entirely in accord with use of Japanese Hospital Ships to relieve the situation in the Pacific Islands and requests that the evacuation of WAKE and MARCUS be handled as a matter of urgency in that order. Request this action be initiated in your reply to Imperial Japanese Headquarters message number 21 quoted in your 231531. CINCPAC will supervise by detailing Destroyer to escort each Hospital ship.
CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM3RDFLT Info CINCAFPAC, COM5THFLT, COMGENFEAF, COMNATSPAC, COMMARTIANAS, CTG 94.11, CTU 95.9.2, COMGEN USASTAF, COMGEN FEAF ADVON, CTG 30.5

Desire your Op Plans 10-45 and 11-45 establish seaplane and surface air sea rescue services within your area of responsibility as soon as practicable after arrival in TOKYO BAY. Coordinate operation of rescue facilities with air sea rescue group at TWO (CTG 94.11) through COMMARTIANAS and with air sea rescue unit OKINAWA (CTU 95.9.2) through Com5thFleet. Through ComGen FEAF coordinate with any rescue activities which may be established by him in TOKYO area. Direct communication between subordinate commands charged with rescue control is authorized.

Para. My 190119 assigns CW frequencies for distress and rescue control.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to SUP COMDR ALLIED POWERS Info COMINCH, COM 3RD FLEET, COM 5TH FLEET, COMMORPAC

Annex 5C Basic Outline Plan for BLACKLIST assigns to CINCPAC responsibility for "care and disposition of captured Japanese naval vessels equipment and supplies. Investigation care and disposition of occupied Japanese naval shore establishment". Corresponding Annex (Number 11) of CINCAFPAC Operation Instructions Number 4 not yet received. Request dispatch advice of text in connection these responsibilities in order that plans and preparations may be made.

SUPreme Commander of the Allied PoWers to CINCBRITSPACFLT, COMGENCHINA, Info WARCOS, SACSEA, CINCPAC ADV HQ, CTG 111.2, CTF 111, Admiralty British Joint Staff Mission Gen GARDNER

CX 6419

By radio 222148Z (not to all) CINCBRITSPACFLT advises that British Chiefs of Staff desire that HONGKONG surrender to Rear Admiral Harcourt conforming to timing required by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Further requests information by urgent dispatch as to earliest date HONGKONG surrender should be effected.

Para. In CRB-5693, 23rd, (not to all) ComGenCHINA informs Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek has agreed to delegate his authority for acceptance of surrender of Japanese forces in HONG KONG to a British Commander. Also that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek will designate a Chinese and an American officer to participate in surrender acceptance. Further advises that Generalissimo has requested British to effect military coordination on operational matters connected with HONG KONG surrender with General Wedemeyer and the Chinese Board of Military Operations. Requests Supreme Commander for Allied Powers to make appropriate arrangements.

Para. Desire that necessary arrangements to accomplish surrender of Jap forces in HONG KONG to Rear Admiral Harcourt be made directly between Admiral Harcourt, General Wedemeyer and the Chinese Board of military Operations. The surrender date can be fixed for any day following that on which the instrument of surrender is accomplished, now scheduled for 31 August. Further request that this office be kept informed and advised of date and hour of acceptance of surrender. Para. This office will direct the Japanese to surrender the Japanese forces in HONGKONG to RAdm Harcourt.
AUGUST (GCT)

24 0120 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM3RDFLT

Your 21415 desire anchorages be assigned to ships concerned as follows unless there are compelling reasons to contrary. F 68 KING GEORGE 5TH F 69 DUKE OF YORK F 70 SOUTH DAKOTA F 71 MISSOURI F 72 INO F 85 ANCON F 86 TETON. Other ships in anchorage F as desired avoiding assignment in battleship column to any types except battleships. Advise.

24 0156 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFLT Info COMINCH, CTF 38, CTF 39, COM 7THFLT

Nominate a carrier division consisting of 2 CV and 1 CVL for temporary duty in 7th Fleet.

25 0145 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFLT Info COMINCH, CTF 38, CTF 39, COM 7THFLT, COMCARDIV-5

My 240156. Since Basic Post War Plan contemplates maintenance 1 carrier division in Asiatic waters, duty may be of considerable duration. It is my present intention that division be commanded by Rear Admiral A C Davis ComCarDiv 5 with ships best prepared for extended service.

24 1511 CINCPAC to WAR COS info CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMGENCHINA.

CX 36421.

COMGENCHINA CFBX 5404 dated 21, CINCPAC 210818 to COMINCH and my CX 33830 dated 15th are references. This radiogram answer WX 50 one 81, 19th and WX 53744, 24th.

Para. The guiding consideration in the utilization of resources, particularly of amphibious shipping, for occupation operations along the CHINA COAST must be that 1st priority is given to the occupation of JAPAN to the fullest extent of the resources required. KOREA has 2nd priority. It ISN possible that after the occupation starts a delay may be permissible after the 1st Phase movements, however, the present time planning should be firm on sending the 2nd phase divisions with the possible exception of 1 division in KOREA, which would give a total of 16 divisions in JAPAN and 2 in KOREA with a possible availability of 1 division for another location as indicated in my CX 33830. CINCPAC representatives indicated that the heavy availability of amphibious shipping by the 30th of September would practically eliminate any problem of priority since at that time there would be a 14 division lift available. On this basis and with the limitation indicated in the 1st paragraph the concern of CINCPAC in his 210818 is generally concurred in.

Para. Since conference with representatives of CINCPAC and COMGENCHINA information has been received that DARIEN is now occupied by Russians. It therefore appears that the marine contingent specified in CINCPAC 210818 would be a sufficient participation of U.S. troops along the CHINA COAST. CINCPAC agrees to the relief on 1 Div of the 5thPhibCorps from JAPAN about October 1. It will be replaced by 1 on the Philippine divisions if practicable or by 1 being redeployed.

Para. The agreement indicated in para A of CFBX 5404 is believed to interrupt the deployment into JAPAN to give priority to a movement into CHINA until 15 phase 1 Divisions have been placed in JAPAN.

- continued -
24 1511 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMGENCHINA (Cont'd).

Para. Regarding repatriation of Japanese to the main islands of JAPAN, rate of increase and quota allocations to all commanders must necessarily be determined by this headquarters in the light of the overall situation in the Far East existing at the time involved.

25 0608 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to CINCPAC ADV, COMGEN USASTAF, COMGEN FEAF, COMGEN 8TH ARM. ADV (OKINAWA), COM 3RD FLT info SACSEA, COMGENCHINA (PASS TO GENERALISSIMO), CG 6TH ARM. CG 10TH ARM. (PASS TO GEN CHAMKETS COMGEN XXIV CORPS, COMPHIBSPAC, COM 5TH FLT, COM 7TH FLT, GOC AUST MILFORCES, CG AWESPAC, WARCOS.

CX 36535.

Refer my 2529 too 210343, Z 531 too 210401, Z 532 too 210425 and CX 3565 too 220645 stating requirements Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for accepting surrender of JAPAN. Due to typhonic conditions all dates specified herein for operations on the 26 August and thereafter are postponed 48 hours. New Schedule: Movements of advance party by air and preliminary naval movements on 28th; air movements in force and naval landings on 30th; Surrender ceremony on 2nd September; advance party landing KANOYA 3rd September; landing in force KANOYA 4th September.

25 0907 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGENPOA, COMGENUS-ASTAF.

In view of the termination of the war with JAPAN, early demobilization of Armed Forces and prospective post war developments of advanced bases in the Pacific Area it is recommended that JCS directive 823/5 dated 7 October 1944 be revised and all logistic support for the strategic air forces be made a responsibility of appropriate Army agency.

25 1101 CINCSWPA to CINCPAC ADV info WARCOS, COM 7TH FLT.

CX 36614.

Concur in proposal for the transfer of responsibilities senior naval officer Southwest Pacific Area contained in COM 7TH FLT 180140. Com Allied Naval Forces will terminate when Southern command area is transferred to British now scheduled for 2 September 45. This answers your 220703.

25 1505 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC/POA ADVANCE.

The rate and timing of repatriating Japanese from any area must of necessity be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (Z 572) since determination will be governed by conditions existing in JAPAN after occupation thereof the urgency of Japanese repatriation from WAKE and MARCUS as incicated your 2322172 (GCT) must be governed accordingly. In any case it is deemed inadvisable to initiate repatriation action prior to 3 September.
THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to COM3RDFLT (HALSEY) info CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

CX 36686.

Reference your 240219Z (GCT) it is not believed advisable for 3rdFlt to undertake any unilateral action re assistance and evacuation of prisoners of War TOKYO BAY AREA. Action being taken by this headquarters to effect coordination in this matter.

CINCEFF to CFTI 111 info CINCPAC ADV, ACNB LAND FORCE HQ MELBOURNE, ADV LAND FORCE HQ MORATAI, GOC 1ST AUSTRALIAN ARMY LCE, NOIC NEW GUINEA, NOIC DARWIN, NOIC SYDNEY, RAFT RAD, GLORY, HART, SNO MANUS, MANANG, CEF, FONAP ADMT VA(Q).

At request of ACNB following forces have been allocated to cooperate with Army Forces under direction of GOC 1st Australian Army Group for taking surrender of RABaul.

Para. Subject to confirmation of requirement and no unforeseen commitments the same force will be available for OCEAN and NAURU.

Para. Effective immediately, TG 111.5 composed of GLORY, CAPTAIN A.W. BUZZARD CTG, and 2 sloops selected from HART, ERNE, BLACK SWAN, AMETHYST.

Para. HART report ships selected and name of senior officer to CINC info other addressees of this signal.

CTG 111.2 to CINCEFF info CFTI 112, CFTI 111, SACSEA, CINC EI, CINCPAC ADV ADMIRALTY, JSM, SUPREME COMDE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL GAIRDNER, CTG 111.3 CTG 111.4.

1. Intend to sail TG 111.2 to arrive off HONGKONG daylight 28 August.
2. Endeavor will be made to bring Japanese Naval and Military representatives on board on 29 August and to enter HONGKONG harbour as soon as arrangements have been made to preserve law and order.
3. Final surrender to take place on 1st September subject to the surrender to the Supreme Commander having been effected.
4. Intend Task Group Follows minesweepers into harbour whilst carriers provide air cover.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM7THFLT

Your 250229. Contemplate use of ship with her Japanese crew and U.S. Prize crew. Do not desire recondition her. Can she make trip to WAKE or MARCUS and carry full load passengers from there to JAPAN.

SCAP to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Treaty terms provide for disarming enemy forces your 252202. This is construed to include swords, pistols, dirks and so forth of Japanese Officers and men. At surrender ceremonies it is the policy to require Japanese Officers to attend without arms thus avoiding the tender of these weapons from the vanquished to the victors but as weapons they should form a component part of the disarmament program.
In carrying out the provisions of paragraph 1, subpara (E), "General Order Number 1, Military and Naval", advance copy of which was handed your representative in MANILA 20 August 1945, it is desired that senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in certain areas formally surrender to designated representatives of the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, subsequent to General surrender of Japanese Armed Forces at TOKYO, as follows:

A. In the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Western Pacific, whose headquarters are at MANILA, at a time and place designated by him. (z-585).

B. In the RYUKYUS, to the Commanding General, Tenth United States Army, whose headquarters are at OKINAWA, at a time and place designated by him.

C. In KOREA, south of 38-00 north latitude, to the Commanding General United States Army Forces in KOREA (Commanding General 24th United States Corps), whose headquarters are at OKINAWA, soon move to KOREA, at a time and place designated by him.

It is desired that the senior Japanese Commander in each of the above areas make contact with the above designated commander concerned by the most expeditious means for preliminary instructions providing for accomplishment of such surrenders on or immediately after 2 September 1945.

Memo 994.

Representative of GHQ AFPAC (Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Schenck) will board USS MISSOURI in TOKYO BAY to install and operate VHF radio telephone and telegraph equipment and message center for CINCPAC. Request name of officer aboard MISSOURI that Colonel Schenck should contact.

Designation of COMGEN 10TH ARMY to act for CINCPAC in receipt of surrender in RYUKYUS per your CX 36856 is not understood here in view of the provisions of paragraph 1 D, General Order Number 1, transmitted to you in WARX 49961 of 15 August and quoted in your Z515 which direct Japanese in RYUKYUS to surrender to CINCPAC. Advise.
In connection with selection of ships for early return to tentative ultimate post-war disposition of following units under your command is furnished for planning purposes. Ships under construction or repair and ships in Lant are not included. Refer Mydis 122358 for establishment reserve Fleets. Schedule of build up of reserve Fleets now in mail to you.

   C. Decommission Pac West Coast. PENNSYLVANIA (BB38).

2. Battleships Atlantic Fleet.

3. Carriers PacFlt.
   C. Decommission Pac West Coast. SARATOGA (CV 3).

4. Carriers Lant Flt.
   C. Decommission in Lant. RANGER (CV 4). ENTERPRISE (CV 6).

5. Cruisers PacFlt.

6. Cruisers Lant Flt.
C. Decommission in Lant. DETROIT (CL 8), RICHMOND (CL 9), CONCORD (CL 10), TRENTON (CL 11), PENSACOLA (CA 24), SALT LAKE CITY (CA 25).

7. Destroyers PacFlt.
A. Active. DesRons 10, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65.
B. Reserve Fleet. DesRons 21, 45, 46 less DD 552, 47 less DD 555, 48, 51, 52, 54, 56 less DD 586 and 481 plus DD 578, 595, 596.
C. Decommission in PacWest Coast. DD's 514, 552, 481, 586, 639, 714.

C. Decommission Lant. DesRons 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 31 DD 555.

26 2220 COMNORPAC to CINCPAC ADV info COMSUBPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVVPAC, COMINPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMQRPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM3RDPHIEFOR, COM3RDFLT, CTF's 90, 91, 92, 49.

Plan depart 30 and 31 August with forces present this area as indicated by oporder 9-45 in mail today. Route through AMCHITKA pass via lat 49-11 N long 17 3-00 E and point BUGLE rendezvousing with minesweepers 30 miles south point ARGOSY 0300Z(GCT) 6th September. Will FJEL 6th and 7th conduct minesweeping operations to clear channel eastern TSUGARU STRAIT to OMINATO anchorage 7th, and if completed enter OMINATO with Task Force 92 on 8th under air cover provided by Task Force 49 operating vicinity route point CAZETTE.

27 0711 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCAFAC.

Contacted Japanese Destroyer HATUZAKURA off O-SHIMA 0800 this date carrying naval emissaries, pilots, and interpreters.

Para. Took staff Captains Y. Takasaki of YOKOSUKA and I. Otani from naval headquarters TOKYO plus 2 interpreters on board MISSOURI. Received satisfactory preliminary information from naval emissaries and informed them of the time schedule and requirements of the occupation operations. Preliminary arrangements satisfactory and no untoward incidents. Minesweeping by elements of Task Force 31 commencing this date.

Para. Intend SAN DIEGO and Destroyers anchor off YOKOSUKA 28 August if sweeping operations for American Aerial Mines satisfactory completed. CTF 31 obtains further complete information from Japanese naval emissaries tomorrow.

Para. Further intend moving heavy ships into TOKYO BAY 29 August if minesweeping has progressed satisfactorily. H-Hour set for 1000 I(-9) 1 Day 30 August.

Para. Will establish liaison with Army advance party by air from COWPENS to ATSUGI after advance party arrives.

Para. Arrangements incident to your arrival covered by separate dispatch.
27 2312 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSOPAC.

War Department agrees maintain token garrisons your 240205 AITUTAKI and PENRYHN pending completion State Department negotiations.

28 0700 CINCBPF to CINCFPAC info ADMIRALTY, CTF 111, SACSEA, CTF 37, VA(Q), CINCEI, CINCPAC ADV, RAPT, CTG 111.2, CTG 111.3.

After consultation with Major General Harrison of staff of SACSEA understand that your intention is that allied POW and internees CHINA, FORMOSA and JAPAN will in the first place be taken by USN transportation to PHILIPPINES for rehabilitation prior to repatriation, and that CINC AFPAC accepts responsibility for receiving them there.

Para. Propose that (A) CINC BRIT PAC FLT accepts responsibility for conveying all allied POW internees from HONGKONG to MANILA. (BM ER) SACSEA arrange in conjunction with the INDIA government for the repatriation of all INDIAN personnel from MANILA to INDIA.

Para. If para 2 (A) is agreed intend to start this movement as soon as you can inform me that POW and internees can be received at MANILA.

28 1225 SGAP to SACSEA(MOUNTBATTEN) CINCMF(BLAMEY) info COMALF(MELBOURNE), WARCOS (JCS) CINCPAC ADVANCE.

CX 10428.

The Japanese Imperial government has been informed that: "The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16°-00 north latitude, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLAND INDIES, NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, south east ASIA command, and to the Commanding General, Australian Forces as later designated."

Para. Exact breakdown of responsibility with the areas listed for the acceptance of surrender of Japanese Armed Forces located therein, was to have been arranged between Mountbatten and the Australians. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has charged with preparation of the details of execution based on the agreement made.

Para. Since only a partial agreement has been reached covering but a portion of the areas listed and because timely preliminary arrangements must be made for and within the entire area, the Japanese Imperial Government is being informed that paragraph 1(c) of General Order Number 1 has been amended to read as follows: "(1). The Senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16°-00 north latitude, MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA, LESSER SUNDAS (including BALE, LOMBOK and TIMOR), BOERCE, CERAM, AMBON KAI, AROE, TANIBAR and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, MALMAHERA and DUTCH NEW GUINEA shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, south east ASIA command." "(2). The Senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within BORNEO, BRITISH NEW GUINEA, the BISMARCKS and the SOLOMONS shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, Australian Military Force."
General Order Number 1, military and naval, is amended as follows:

(Z 627) para 1 delete subpara C of part 1 and substitute therefor the following 2 subparas:

SubPara 1. "The senior Japanese commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ADAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16 degrees north latitude, MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA LESSER SUNDAS (including BALI, LOMBOK, AND TIMOR), BOFORS, CERMA, AMBON, KAI, AROE, TANIMBAR, and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, HALMAHERAS, and DUTCH NEW GUINEA, all surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, ASIA command".

SubPara 2. "The Senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within BORNEO, BRITISH NEW GUINEA, THE BISMARCKS and SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, AUSTRALIAN Military Forces".

Para. 2 from SubPara D part 1 delete "RYUKYUS". Para 3 in SubPara E part 1 insert "RYUKYUS" preceding the phrase "and the Philippines". Para 4 in SubPara a of part 2 insert "Naval and" following the word "Land". Para 5 in part 12 delete the 14th word "Forces" and substitute thereto "Powers".

Following General Order Number 41, General Headquarters southwest Pacific Area dated 28 August 1945 is quoted for information and guidance:

"Para 1. In accord with instructions from the U.S. JCS, effective 1200 I (-9), 2 September 1945:

A. The portion of the Southwest Pacific Area south of the following described boundary, except as noted below, is transferred to British Empire control: beginning on the coast of INDO-CHINA at 16-00 north; thence to intersect at 07-40 north 116-00 east the boundary between the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to 05-00 north 127-00 east; thence east to 05-00 north 130-00 east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00 east; thence to 02-20 south 159-00 east; thence south.

B. The following commands stated in general orders 1, 18 April 1942, are abolished: (1) Allied Land Forces, SWPA. (2) Allied Naval Forces, SWPA. (3) Allied Air Forces, SWPA.

C. All Australian, Netherlands east Indies and New Zealand land, sea and air forces now under the control of the Commander in Chief SWPA, except as hereinafter indicated, will pass to British Empire control.

Para. Pending availability of transportation to evacuate, or other action to dispose of, and in order to facilitate communications, bases, airfields and other installations now occupied, with personnel and supplies therein pertaining to the U.S., will remain under control of the Commander in Chief, United States Armed Forces, Pacific, for any installations, supplies and personnel, and the commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for
(cont'd)
naval installations, supplies and personnel. The 2 last named commanders
will negotiate directly with appropriate Australian and Netherlands East
Indies agencies for the expeditious evacuation of areas so occupied.
Para. Present coordinating control over logistic arrangements and
present shipping services rendered by agencies of the SNPA will be passed
progressively to agencies designated by the British Empire by direct negoti-
ation and in such a manner as to facilitate continuity of operational
procedure where required and in the interest of good administration.
Para. Elements of forces and personnel of the Allied Powers indicated
in para 1 C above who are serving with U.S. forces or allied Headquarters
north of the boundary described in para 1 A will remain temporarily on duty
therein until orderly relief may be made without detriment to good opera-
tional procedure where required and in the interest of good administration.

28 1823 CINCPAC ADV to SCAP info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, CINCBP.

Your 2814. I have concurred in the occupation of OCEAN and NAURU
by British Commonwealth forces under the direction of CINCBP. It should
be understood that such forces are subject to coordination by CINCPAC-
CINCPOA since these islands are within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

28 2353 ADMIRALTY to CTG III.2 info CINCBP, CINC EAST INDIES. (INTERCEPT)

Part 1 our 282359 REF am 130032 Aug am 130042 Aug 131957 Aug not to CTG
III.2. 1. Following message from Gimson for Secretary of State for Colon-
ies carried by messenger to MACAO and transmitted by telegraph from H. M.
Consul. "Most immediate. Have sufficient staff and complete SCLEMQ,A
available to set up Civil Administration immediately except patrol of new terri-
tories. For a short period without outside ASSOC DFCTS AG GRUDO H JYES
as officer administrating the government. Request immediate advice situa-
tion at present quite. In NS QLTAI for incoming Allied commander to meet
me immediately on arrival. Suggest landing at or near Stanly Camp". 2. Fol-
lowing reply sent by Secretary of State for Colonies. "Your message has
been repeated to Rear Admiral Oarcourt who has been empowered immediately
on his arrival in HONGKONG to establish military administration by procl-
amation.

28 2359 ADMIRALTY to CTG III.2 info CINCBP, CINC EAST INDIES (INTERCEPT).

Part 2 final Admiralty 282359 prec part 2353. You should then at once
comply fully with his instructions. In the meantime warmly approve your
initiative and plans you have made". 3. You should convey Secretary of
States message to Gimson in case he has not received reply via MACAO. 4.
Both above messages have been repeated to Ambassador CHUNKING.

29 0811 CINCPOA ADV to COMHAWSEARRON info CINCP AC PEARL.

In view of the changed status of the war with JAPAN it is desired that
you resubmit recommendations for the reduction of forces within the Haw-
aiian Sea Frontier. This to supersede your serial 0003 of 29 July giving
consideration to recent directives affecting this subject.

AUGUST (GCT)

3369
From the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers subject is occupation of the KANOYA AREA. (Z 645) revised dates for these operations are as follows: Advance party will land 3 September and main forces will land 4 Sept. 1945. Desire that Japanese ship beginning not later than 0600 hours, 3 September 1945, take station to meet U.S. Naval forces at 20 miles, bearing 270 degrees, from Sata-Misaki, southern Kyushu, and lead these forces into Kagoshila-Wan. 8 pilots with interpreters will be available on Japanese ship. These instructions supersede those contained in para 9 of document 4 of "Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers presented to the Japanese representatives at Manila, Philippine Islands, 20 August 1945". Acknowledge.

Effective 0300 GCT 2nd September that portion of the SWPA south of the following line Indo China coast at 16-00N 116-00E thence along AOUTHHER international treaty limits of Philippine Archipelago to 05-00N 127-00E thence 05-00N 130-00E Equator 130-00E Equator 140-00E 02-00S 146-00E and 02-00S 159-00E reverted to British and Australian control. 2. ACNB assumes naval responsibility for eastern portion of this area to SEAC for THEL western portion. 3. The boundary between SEAC and the Australian area is yet to be decided but for guidance the initial Australian responsibility will be for Borneo and to the eastwards, and the lesser areas to the eastwards of Jymbok. It is unlikely however that the Australian army will engage in any operations in Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera or Celebes (except Pinrane). 4. Until the control of Shihsec is relaxed the present boundaries and ship lines established for the control of shipping in the SWPA and adjacent commands remain effective. Chop line between areas referred to in para 2 above will be promulgated as required. FKVECAD all HMA ships under the control of CINC SWPA revert to the control of ACNB but are to continue their present assignments until directed otherwise by this authority. 6. Communication plan as in my 371 and 471.
In order to aid in the alleviation of a critical backlog of shipping now awaiting discharge at OKINAWA, the following action will be taken immediately:

(A) ComGenPOA ComGenFMFPac and Navy Type Commanders will postpone shipment of all materials not required to establish the facilities prescribed in CINCPAC PEARL dispatch 162139 May (as augmented by CINCPAC ADV 100231 June) to arrive OKINAWA after 1 November 1945, or in the case of airfields becoming operable after 1 November, materials will be shipped at a rate to correspond with operational dates.

(B) ComGenPOA will postpone shipment until after 1 Nov. 1945 of all materials not required to make Army installations (other than airfields) essentially operable by 1 November 1945. For airfields see (A).

(C) Hut and prefab housing for all NCBs Army Engineer Aviation General Service and Construction Battalions and Regiments will be cancelled. Such troops will continue to use camp facilities initially unprovided. Recommended changes to current OKINAWA echelon schedules to implement this directive will be submitted by action addes by 7 July.

In accordance with existing POA policy ComPhibsPac to have overall responsibility for loading the ships of the assault echelon conforming insofar as possible to the desires of CG 6th Army. ComPhibsPac and CG 6th Army will include in their overall loading plans recommendations to CINCPAC and CINCPAC as to responsibility for loading all shipping exclusive of the assault echelon. Your concurrence or comment requested.

Your CX 2256 (DTG 010945). No objection to designation of 7th and 27th Divs in OKINAWA as GHQ reserve for OLYMPIC provided that in the event both the 7th and 27th are committed in OLYMPIC another division arrives OKINAWA not later than 1 January 1946 to support garrison forces in emergency.
CINCPAC is equipping Port Director Units for OLYMPIC to be established as follows: 1 unit of 25 officers in vicinity of mouth of MANOSE RIVER, 1 unit of 10 officers at YAMAKAWA at Western Entrance of KAGOSHIMA WAN, 1 unit of 40 officers in vicinity of TAKUSA for naval base on eastern shore of KAGOSHIMA WAN, 1 unit of 25 officers in ARIAKE WAN at SHIBUSHI of FUKUSHIMA GAWA (alternate location UCHINOURA WAN), 1 special unit of 20 officers for Army port at KAGOSHIMA CITY to perform such strictly naval functions as piloting, assembly, routing, sailing and reporting of shipping and distribution of charts and hydrographic information.

5 specially equipped LCI will house these units until provision established for them ashore. These units include intra harbor voice and visual signalling equipment. Of these LCI 2 are being equipped at PEARL and 3 are presently at OKINAWA.

Port Director personnel will be assembled at PEARL. Commanding officers these units on or before 1 August will be ordered report to ComPhibsPac for planning purposes. Other port director personnel will join their respective LCI in time to mount to objective with major forces.

Complete Port Director Units will report to ComPhibsPac when required in time to accompany assault echelons and will later report to CG 6th Army along with other units of PhibsPac as outlined in CINCAPAC operations instructions No. 1.

Request your comments or concurrence.

Ref VAR 25859 detailed information mentioned consists of JPS 703/1 a study of problem bearing no approval but which is being forwarded to you for information. In view of experimental nature these installations, their doubtful effectiveness. The over-riding priorities necessary to their timely construction with consequent impact on other essential preparations for CORONET. And the difficulties of delivery, I am of the opinion that plans for this operation should not depend on the provision of artificial harbors unless they are an essential requisite for success. Request you consult with CINCAPAC on the matter and submit your views.

Your 020152 intend carry out 10 July operation solely against enemy aircraft and air installations in accordance with carefully laid plans and elaborate briefing. On 16-17 July strikes will undertake destruction enemy men of war TOKYO BAY Area with emphasis on NAGATO and destroyers. Now tentatively planning destroy enemy men of war KURE-KOBE Area subsequent to 20 July replenishment.

Ref CINCPAC-CINCPAC agreement general principles of coordination of forces dated 16 May 1945 request 7th Air Force be transferred to command AFPAC effective 6 July. Info here indicates following units now RTUKYUS: 494 Heavy Bomb Gp, 41 Medium Bomb Gp, 28 Photo Recon Sq, with 319 Light Bomb Gp now displacing and 11 Heavy Bomb Gp loaded and ready to displace. In addition to above, 318, 413 and 507 Fighter Groups attached to 7th AF now installed.
05 1200 CGS(FCT TO CINCPOA VIA RDO GUAM.

Comments as requested in radio 030335 concerning OSS project in KOREA follow. It is highly desirable that intelligence be obtained concerning Japanese activities in KOREA. This theater is undertaking a project to obtain intelligence and has started to train agents for overland penetration of KOREA from CHINA. Due to the inaccessibility of the target area it is estimated that the agents cannot be in position in KOREA for at least 2 months. In view of this delay, CHINA Theater looks with favor on the subject project which, it is assumed, can be initiated immediately.

Since the base area and the 2 radio listening stations will be outside this theater it is not considered desirable for CHINA Theater to sponsor the project. However, any intelligence which is obtained from this project will be of value to this headquarters.

06 0553 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGENA AAFPOA, DEP COM 20TH AF INFO CINCAFPAC, COMGENPOA, CTF 99, CTG 99.2.

CINCAFPAC 031353 request your comment and recommendation with particular reference to units of 20th AF now in RYUKYUS. Assume 0000 I(-9) 15 July as time of transfer.

06 0554 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAFPAC INFO CINCPOA PEARL.

Your 031353 first obtained from my PEARL HQ. Concur in transfer not later than 15 July. Will advise further after consultation with DepCom20thAF concerning units that command.

06 0322 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCAFPAC, COMythepl.

CINCAFPAC 051221. Concur in use of destroyers for FORT BAYARD project until about 15 September when they must be withdrawn for COMINCH.

07 1310 COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA PEARL, CINCAFPAC.

The British Chiefs of Staff have arranged for the dispatch of 2 assemblies of RAF airfield construction personnel and equipment to the Pacific for eventual preparation of VFA facilities in RYUKYUS. It is my understanding that this construction force will be pooled with our own and employed wherever needed until required for RAF needs late in 1945.

The 1st convoy known as SHIELD FORCE consists of 8 ships (SAMJACK, SAMAFRIC, SAMSEITE, SAMUTA, SAMFEUGH, SAMCEY, SAMALMIU, SAMBRE) containing 15,000 tons construction equipment and 1000 vehicles. The movement is underway and ships will arrive canal zone in order named between 7 and 19 July. EMPRESS OF AUSTRALIA containing 3100 construction and administrative personnel arrives Canal Zone about 19 July. The 2nd convoy known as VACUUM FORCE composed of similar ships cargo and personnel is scheduled to sail from United Kingdom between 14 July and 1 August.

Air Marshal Lloyd who is familiar with all details of these assemblies is enroute GUAM for consultation. Following consultation with him request you:

(A) Designate destination for SHIELD FORCE arrange routing and provide such escorts as may be required,
(B) Submit recommendation as to movement of VACUUM FORCE which can if necessary be held in United Kingdom,
(C) Advise contemplated employment these forces.
The following measures of reorganization of units now in the 7thFt are proposed to be made at the times indicated in order to improve the support of OLYMPIC and subsequent operations and facilitate Pacific Fleet administration. Your comment or concurrence is requested. Turner and Barbey have concurred.

A. About 1 October Com7thFt relieved from duties in SWPA and report to CINCPAC for duties in OLYMPIC.
B. About 1 October ComPhilSeaFron report to CINCPAC for duty as a Fleet Task Force Commander under the operational control of CINCSWPA in command of naval forces assigned for duty in Philippine Sea Frontier.
C. On 15 August ComServRon 7thFt change title to ComServRon 7. ServRon 7 becomes unit of ServPac assigned to operational control of Com7thFt until 1 October and thereafter to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron to render service to all Fleet units in PHILIPPINES as required.
D. Effective 15 August all naval shore facilities including naval air bases in PHILIPPINES pass to command of ComPhilSeaFron.
E. Effective 15 August Com7thFt relieved from duties in SWPA and report to CINCPAC for duties in OLYMPIC.
F. Effective 15 August all units now in 7thFt relieved from duties in SWPA and report to CINCPAC for duty as a Fleet Task Force Commander under the operational control of CINCSWPA in command of naval forces assigned for duty in Philippine Sea Frontier.
G. About 1 October Com7thFt relieved from duties in SWPA and report to CINCPAC for duties in OLYMPIC.
H. About 1 October Fairwings 10 and 17 pass to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron.

Submit by letter your detailed recommendations as to reductions in defense measures to conserve personnel and resources on the assumption that category of defense of Hawaiian Area remains as at present but degree of implementation becomes discretionary with CINCPAC.

CINCAPPAC 060319. Determination of organization of naval shore based units OLYMPIC and naval base development planning are being handicapped by discrepancies between CINCAPPAC Operations Instruction No. 1 and the staff studies with regard to the location of the naval air base. CINCAPPAC and CINCPOA staff studies both showed development of existing Japanese naval air base KANoya for U.S. Naval Air Base. This arrangement had the advantage of proximity to Naval Base at TAKASU which will be the center of major naval activities and naval cargo discharge.

If Naval Air Base Marine Air Bases and Marine Divisions operating areas are all to be west of KAGOSHIMA BAY it may be advisable to consider relocating Naval Base at KAGOSHIMA CITY and Army port facilities at TAKASU thus shortening overland supply lines for both services. Your early comment requested.
08 1059 CINCPAC TO CINCAPAC ADV INFO 6TH ARMY, COMAIRF, COMPHIBSPAC, COM7THFLT.
CX 24,062.
Concur your 020913 relative Port Director Units for future operations.
Request:
1. That in addition to Port Director Units listed in reference consideration be given to establishing units at MIYAZAKI, ISHIKAKI and KUSHIKINO to aid in the control and routing of shipping.
2. That a representative from Port Director's staff for SHIBUSHI, and for any of the localities requested above at which you agree to establish Port Director Units, confer with representatives of 6th Army and APWESPAC earliest practicable date at headquarters 6th Army for coordination of operating procedures.
3. Designations and strengths of all Port Director Units which will pass to 6th Army control be furnished this headquarters in order that they may be included in the troop list for the operation.

09 0900 CINCPAO ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMINCH & CNO.

As many LSTs as possible are being allocated for OLYMPIC Operation. Any assigned especially for communications or other special purposes must necessarily cause a corresponding reduction in assault lift. In view of need expressed by your for LST COM7THFLT is directed by this letter to make immediately available to you for use as GHQ communication ships 2 LST from those now assigned to his command and is further authorized to increase the number to 3 if you so require. He is also directed to send such assistance as is needed for structural alterations and installation of your signal communication equipment. LSTs will continue as units of Pacific Fleet.

09 0957 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC/CINCPAO ADV INFO MARCOS.
CX 24,142.
The following refers to Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC, U.S. Pacific Fleet and FOA, 16 June 1945: The statement bottom of page 16 "When the Commanding General Expeditionary Troops (ComGen 6th Army) assumes command of the ground forces established ashore he will report to CINCPAC who then assumes command and responsibility for the campaign in JAPAN" is not concurred in. The responsibilities of CINCPAC are set forth in JCS 1331/3, particularly para 18(1) "is charged with the primary responsibility of the conduct of the operation OLYMPIC including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commanders". I will accompany the troops and will exercise at all times the command responsibility directed, as quoted above, by the JCS.

09 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO COMREPDPL, COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMSERVPAC
CGCSPAC INFO COMINCH & CNO, MARCOS, CINCPAC, CG 6TH ARMY, CTF 96,
CINCPAC PEARL, CTF 92, CINSPAC, COMNORPAC, CONREPPOA, COM3RPHIBFOR, COM5TH PHIBFOR, COM7TH PHIBFOR, COMGENAFPOA, COMGEN 5TH FIBCORPS, COMAIRPAC,
COMSERVPAC/COMCSPAC.

MyDis 300601. A rear admiral will be designated by CINCPAC ADV as Commandant Naval Operating Base. The Naval Operating Base will embrace all naval and Marine activities on KYUSHU as indicated in the following sub paras:
(A) Idon 9 will be utilized to establish the Naval Operating Base facilities at TAKASU.
(B) The 2 Cubs to be designated should be ordered to report to CG 6th Army for further assignment.
(1) 5thPhibCorps for employment during the amphibious phase in the vicinity of the mouth of the MANOSE RIVER.

- Continued -
(2) The other to XI Corps for employment during the amphibious phase in ARIAKE WAN. Both crews will pass to control of the Comdt NOB on completion of the amphibious phase.

(C) The shore based facilities of the PT operating base at YAMAKAWA KO will be under the Commandant NOB. The tenders and boats will be under operational control of Com 7th Flt.

(D) The Naval Air Base will be commanded by a naval aviator who in turn will be under the Comdt NOB. Com AirPac requested to nominate the prospective commander KAMOYA Naval Air Base.

(E) The Marine Air Bases at CHIRAN TOJIMBABA and MATSUNAGA will be commanded by Marine aviators. During the complete assault phase while supporting V PhibCorps the Marine Air Base commanders will be under the Marine Tactical Air Commander at each field. Upon completion of the combat operations of V PhibCorps the Marine Air Bases will pass to control of the Comdt NOB. Com AirPac requested to nominate 3 Marine aviators for command of 3 Marine Airfields.

(F) (1) The naval construction troops assigned to construct Marine airfields initially will be under the control of CG 6th Army. They will pass to the control of Comdt NOB upon completion of airfield construction.

(2) The 4 NCBs with V PhibCorps will remain under the control of the V PhibCorps until withdrawal from KYUSHU at which time they will be assigned to Comdt NOB.

(3) All naval construction troops other than those mentioned in (1) and (2) above will be under the continuous control of the Comdt NOB.

(H) The Marine AAA Groups will be under control 39 6th Army. For purposes of general administration of the naval service they will be under administrative control of the Comdt NOB. However Marine administrative matters will remain under normal Marine Corps channels.

(I) The various naval communication activities will be assigned to the operational control of the respective officers in charge but will be under Comdt NOB for type and administrative control.

Geographical locations listed above are subject to changes which may arise from further studies.

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09 0907

CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC COMTFI ET INFO COMSERV PAC CINCPAC PEARL.

ComServPac recommends that the location of the NOB be changed from vicinity TAKASU as proposed by CINCPAC serial 0005061 18 June to a location on a level plain of the western side of KAGOSHIMA WAN just north of YAMAGAWA KO. The following advantages will be gained by a change of location:

(A) Construction time on waterfront facilities will be materially reduced since only 4,000 waterfront feet of sheet steel pila will be involved in lieu of 23,400 ft.

(B) Dredging operations will be reduced from 2,327,000 cu.yds. to approximately 1,000,000 cu.yds. and the base can begin to function independent of dredging operations.

(C) Pontoon requirements will be materially reduced.

(D) Considerable road construction and improvement will be eliminated due to flat area at the new location.

(E) Certain waterfront development is existing and can be utilized in lieu of complete new construction.

(F) New location is adjacent to PT operating base and in the same general land area as all other naval activities except those at ARIAKE WAN with resultant possible consolidation of administrative control.

(G) Anchorage and waterfront facilities will be in a more protected location.

(H) Naval airfields can be constructed as conveniently and rapidly as the existing fields at KANOA can be lengthened and brought to proper grade.

- Continued -
(I) Ample flat and usable area exists at the new location so that crowded conditions need not be the consideration for the establishment of both naval operating base and naval air facilities as might have proved evident at the former location.

(J) Since the construction time is limited to 120 days maximum, a new location which requires less construction effort appears to be more practicable and feasible from the standpoint of reduced shipping space required, possible reduction in forces involved and the consolidation of all naval activities in a general land area.

The advantages to be gained in relocating the Naval Base and Naval Air facilities as recommended by ComServPac from a base development point of view are such that this plan appears desirable. Acceptance of this plan will alleviate discrepancies given in CINCPAC ADVANCE 090215. Request your views.

10 0218 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAPPAC INFO DEFCON20TH AF, COMINCH.

Your CX 24152 (090215) is welcome because it opens the way to an early solution of the problems concerned. The definite information now available as to the future organization of the Army Air Forces will facilitate this solution. I am in complete agreement that the system of coordination must facilitate placing the full force of all air power on any objective with minimum restriction as to targets. I believe that this can best be achieved along functional lines with little use of restrictive boundaries. My conferences with Gen. Giles indicate that he shares this belief. The coordination of the operations of the 20th AF and of the aircraft under my control has been achieved effectively by full exchange of information with maximum freedom of action as to targets.

It will undoubtedly become necessary in the future for fleet units including carriers to attack targets in the INLAND SEA and to operate not only in the PHILIPPINE SEA west of the 135th Meridian but also in the EAST CHINA SEA later in the SEA OF JAPAN and possible also in the YELLOW SEA. I must retain complete freedom of action in such matters subject to the realities of the strategic and tactical situations as they develop.

With reference to sub paragraphs A and C of your message you may be assured that the inferences with which concern you are mistaken. I am opposed to any restrictions which delay or impede using any available weapon to damage the enemy. The text concerned is part of a general concept and refers only briefly to the salient features of the operations planned. It does not cover the full use of forces against targets of opportunity and may require amplification in that respect.

Gen. Giles has agreed to send Major General Kuter and I will send Rear Admiral Sherman to meet with your representative to clarify these matters at MANILA at any time convenient on or after 15 July. I consider representation from the headquarters Army Air Forces inadvisable because it would in turn necessitate representation from the headquarters of Cominch. I believe that these 3 officers can very quickly evolve solutions which will be mutually agreeable to you to Spaatz and to me.

10 0238 CINCPOA ADV TO COMAIRPAC INFO FAW 1, FAW 18 AIRPACSUBCOMFORD.

Requirements for 4 Privateer squadrons for OLYMPIC approximately D plus 45 to 60 should be met by reductions elsewhere in accordance with following tentative deployment on 1 January 1946 by squadrons: 4, RATS8BANE 3 OKINAWA 5 TWO and MARIANAS including ASR squadron 3 PhilSeaFron. Weather aircraft are included. Designation of specific squadrons can be deferred until late November.
Reference is your CPBK 430. Concurrence in NORTH CHINA and KOREA operations of RYUKUS based FEAF aircraft. Operations will begin on or after 15 July. Request 14th AF keep FEAF and Advon FEAF informed of hostile situation and areas occupied by friendly forces in subject area and any other pertinent matters. FEAF will be excluded from bombing attacks except in case of military necessity as determined by this headquarters. FEAF will arrange for attack of targets in proposed area with 14th AF and will notify latter of missions prior to their dispatch and results thereof on completion of missions. FEAF will be authorized direct communication with 14th AF for the coordination of operations in KOREA and NORTH CHINA, with your headquarters and this headquarters as information addressees. Your comments or concurrence requested.

A cruiser and destroyer task force has been formed whose tasks will include operations along the CHINA Coast. Request that you arrange to have 1 of Miles officers familiar with CHINA situation with particular emphasis on coastal shipping and as many Chinese speaking interpreters as possible up to 9 report to senior naval officer at SAMAR for further transfer to join Rear Admiral Low in U. S. ship GUAM.

Request your comment and recommendations concerning NAPKO project of the Office of Strategic Services transmitted to you by JCS memo of 18 June.

My OpPlan 4-45 modified as follows:

1. Add to task organization: (N) Cruiser Task Force (TF 95) RAdm Low in GUAM (CBA), CruDiv 12 and 16. Desron 26 less BACHE (DD 170) MULLANY (DD 526) plus WILLARD KEITH (DD 776) J.W. OWENS (DD 776) MASSEY (DD 776).

2. Add in subpara 3(a) to tasks of 3rdFLT: Provide air cover for cruiser task force as practicable from units in the RYUKUS area on request of TF 95.

3. Add in subpara 3(b) to tasks of RYUKUS forces: Provide air cover for cruiser task force as practicable on request of TF 95.

4. Add new subpara 3(N): Cruiser task force exercise control of the EAST CHINA SEA, interrupt enemy shipping along the CHINA Coast, mislead the enemy as to our next assault objective by conducting repeated sweeps in the EAST CHINA SEA. Make initial sweep from the vicinity of TIN YUN TAO (26-22N 120-30E) northerly to about lat 28-40 N. Be prepared to conduct further sweeps when ordered. TF 95 request air cover as required direct from TF 99 and from naval air commanders concerned. Keep CINCPAC COM3RDFLT and all interested air and naval commands in RYUKUS Area informed of movements. Base at OKINAWA.

5. Add to para 4: Logistic support at OKINAWA available from ComServDiv 104 in HAMUL.

Form TF 95 RAdm Low in GUAM composed of CruDiv 16 CruDiv 12 DesRon 26 less BACHE (DD 170) MULLANY (DD 526) plus WILLARD KEITH (DD 776) J.W. OWENS (DD 776) MASSEY (DD 776). When RFS about 13 July TF 95 proceed to EAST to RYUKUS Area. Upon completion fueling proceed to execute initial task assigned by 110146. Upon completion return to vicinity of OKINAWA. Arrange directly with ComServDiv 104 for logistic support.
Destinations recommended your 090443 July acceptable except following. You show engineer power plant maintenance detachment for SAIPAN in November whereas no such unit listed in CX 21538 and must mean engineer refrigeration maintenance detachment due in November for which no destination given. Of 4 Engineer Dump Truck Companies listed in CX 21538 already accepted 2921 company for OKINAWA per your 142245 June leaving 1 each for OKINAWA, Cahu and SAIPAN although you list 2 for SAIPAN. Likewise acceptable are destinations contained in your 100340 assuming 130 Engineer General Service Regiment to be the 1302 for TINIAN and the 72 Finance Disbursing Section to be the 272 for TINIAN.

MILES (COMNAVGRP CHINA) to CINCPAC ADV.

Ur 100748. Will selected Chinese personnel fill your interpreter requirements. We have no Americans with qualifications. Desire to set up direct radio contact between Task Forces and Hqtrs ComNavGrp CHINA Eastern Command. Short title COMNAVCHC. Radio call CT 39. ComNavCHC is located at KIENYANG EAST CHINA Lat 27-23 Long 118-03 and has direct operational control of coastal intelligence nets from SHANGHAI to SWATON. Also operational control of 13000 U.S. Navy trained guerrillas. I am now temporarily at KIENYANG in wide swing along coast available anywhere for conference. When do you want personnel. Suggest CHANOTING 25-45 116-23 as pick up field.

CINCPAC ADV TO COMCINCPAC, COMNISEAFLRON, COMNESSEAPRON, COMAIRPAC, CONG3RDFLT, CONSTHDFLT, COMSHERPAC INFO COMINCH & CHO, CINCPAC PEARL, COMSUBPAC.

Cancel my OpPlan 2-45. CINCPAC 271215 March refers. (FIREBREAK Operation).

CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COM3RDFLT, CON3STHDFLT.

Request CG MIF Pac prepare and keep up to date plans for capture of WAKE ISLAND by Marines supported by fast carrier task force. Assume enemy garrison now 2700 but deteriorating due to repeated attacks and lack of supplies. Keep CINCPAC advised your estimate troops required and units tentatively earmarked. Initial report desired as to earliest date considered feasible and troops contemplated for employment.

The following refers to Joint Staff Study, U. S. PacFlt and POA, 18 June 1945. There are a number of differences in concepts between certain sections of the above document and the Staff Study and Instructions of CINCAPAC relating to the employment and coordination of air forces. Some of these have been subjects of conferences and correspondence between our staff officers, but definite conclusions have not been reached. On the last exchange, your representative indicated disagreement with certain features of air coordination suggested by this headquarters and indicated that an alternate scheme would be submitted. This scheme has not yet been received. My general concept is that a simple system of coordination which will permit the full force of all air power to bear on any objective with minimum restriction as to targets is the correct system. Experience in the PHILIPPINES Campaign indicated that 2 air forces could operate in the same area without interference providing each was informed that the other would be present. The system that my representatives have proposed follows this general line of thought.

- Continued -
A. Specifically, on page 7 of the document referred to above, there is a strong implication that you desire to impose restrictions on Army Air Force operations against shipping. I consider that this restriction is unnecessary and undesirable. In the scheme of air coordination proposed by this headquarters, the primary target for Army Air Forces in the KYUKUS was indicated as the land areas, and on the Navy Air Force in the KYUKUS the sea areas, each being free by coordination with each other to operate in the primary areas of the other. I do not agree that Army Air Forces can not operate against shipping.

B. On this same page, you indicate that the Army Air Forces operating from the KYUKUS would be subject to such measures of coordination as you find necessary for safety or operating effectiveness. There is a need for a closer understanding on this subject. I have already agreed that the assignment of areas of air, surface and submarine activities is your responsibility. It is expected, however, that this be coordinated with my headquarters as has been the practice during the last year. As to the matter of traffic control, it is probable that this control can be handled locally between air force commanders in the KYUKUS without imposing undue restrictions. Eventually the PEAF will be the predominating air force and the commander should have a voice in the coordination provisions prescribed. This matter should be clarified.

C. On page 8, the action of the Army Strategic Air Force is confined to the island of HÖNSHU. This is not believed to be in accordance with intentions. Conferences with representatives of the Strategic Air Force have already indicated the intent of placing its full weight in the objective area for 10 days previous to the OLYMPIC assault. Moreover, there are targets along the MAN-CHURIAN mainland and selected targets in northern KYUSHU and SHIKOKU which are included within the anticipated objectives for the Strategic Air Force. These targets are prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but early decisions as to coordinating provisions are necessary.

D. On pages 17, 34, and 27 a plan is indicated to turn over a part of the Marine air forces operating in the objective area to the 7th Air Force for the purpose of escort and protection of shipping to and from the objective area. This plan diverges somewhat from our agreement that Marine air operating in the objective area would be under the control of CINCPAC. Generally, it is believed that this plan is meritorious. However, since it has not previously been explored in conference, it is believed that it should be further examined in its relationship to the general coordination of air in the objective area.

E. Annexes 2 and 3 to Appendix B diverge from similar concepts of the employment of air which has been favored by this headquarters. These matters should be adjusted at the earliest practicable date.

Para. Since the above points have many ramifications, it is not believed that they can be settled satisfactorily by radio. Moreover, the Strategic Air Force has an important interest in the general air coordination. A conference at the earliest practicable date is suggested. MANILA is preferred because detailed planning is not going on here, but if you prefer otherwise, we will conform. If this is agreeable to you, I will arrange to have the Army Air Forces, Washington, or the Army Strategic Air Force, send representatives in order that final conclusions on these matters can be reached. For purposes of planning, I suggest that the conference be held about 20 July.

11 2140 CINCPAC TO CHAIRMAN, CINCPEAC, CINCFOA, CGOA, CGFC, COMAF 5, COMAF 7, AX 75775.

I. Effective immediately upon transfer to PEAF of operational control of the 7th AF and 20 AF units in the KYUKUS you will direct the operations of these units to extend the air offensive from bases within the KYUKUS against KYUSHU, SHIKOKU and HÖNSHU west of 135-00 E to:

- Continued -
11 2140 CONFEAF TO CG ADVON FEAR. INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAO, ETC. (CONT'D)

(A) Neutralize and destroy hostile air forces wherever they may be found.
(B) Destroy air installations, ground forces and defenses, \HISLIND\ industrial and harbor installations.
(C) Disrupt water lines of communication and close critical points on land lines of communication.

2. Upon establishment of the 7th AF Hq in the RYUKYUS, the ComGen 7th AF will take over operational control of the 301 Fighter Wing.
3. CG Advon FEAR will immediately institute photographic missions per instructions given him by CONFEAF on 7 July and report to this headquarters when he is ready to strike.

11 1425 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMAAF.
CX 2414.

Ur 060617. Relating to placing 1st Mar Air Wing under operational control of 7th Flt to prepare for future operations is reference. Addendum 2 Allied Air Forces Opns Instructions 96 refers only to those 1st Mar Air Wing units in SOLOMONS July 15 date for assumption of control of 1st Mar Air Wing units in SOLOMONS by RAAF command was agreed to by ComGen 1st Mar Air Wing in conference with air officer commanding RAAF command and Com Allied Air Forces August 15 tentative date for release of units of 1st Mar Air Wing from operations was recommended by ComGen 1st Mar Air Wing based on directives to his headquarters for preparation for OLYMPIC, and consideration of tactical missions in the SOLOMONS. Remainder of 1st Mar Air Wing is operating under 13th AF in direct support of operations in RYUKYUS and covering fleet units in LEMTE GULF. In view of above do you still desire the PMAW released immediately to the operational control of Com 7th Flt to prepare for future operations.

11 2336 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMGENFEAF, CTF 95, COMGEN CHINA.

My 1101/46. To support initial sweep of TCF 95 request heavy strikes on enemy air bases and other important targets in SHANGHAI area and FORMOSA on date of sweep. CTF 95 advise predicted date and confirm or correct when definite.

12 0217 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CINCPAC PEARL HARBOR, DEPGEN 20AF.

Ur 071310 and 111737. Ships of SHIELD and VACUUM forces may be sailed as scheduled. Upon arrival PANAMA propose they be sailed independently and unescorted to ENIWETOK where they will remain until called forward to RYUKYUS in regular schelon convoys as required. There is at present a very heavy backlog of shipping at OHTHAWA that will be gradually reduced. Selective unloading is now in effect and will be for some time. It is expected but can not be assured that personnel with their equipment will be discharged fairly promptly. No special priority can be granted the British ships. They will be integrated into the immediate requirements of the RYUKYUS as a whole. Representatives of CINCPAC British Admiralty and 20th AF are at present conferring on OHTHAWA as to the most effective manner for handling such integration. Will advise you of developments. Also see my 110334.

12 0446 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Reference mission of Capt Frankel CINCPAC approves of aerological plans submitted by Capt Cyrille and makes the following recommendations. (A) Establish a duplex radio teletype circuit between GUAM and a station to be located at KHABAROVSK or hqts of Soviet Far East Command with tentative transmission frequencies from GUAM 7530 Kcs 10445 Kcs 17930 Kcs and transmission frequencies from KHABAROVSK 7350 Kcs 10200 Kcs 10390 Kcs. (B) Establish a simpler manual
12 0446 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH (CONT'D)
circuit connecting a station to be located at PETROPAVLOVSK with the station at Khabarovsk with frequencies to be designated by the Soviets. (C) Assemble the communication and aerological material and personnel in the U.S. (D) In the event negotiations completed prior assembly material contained in recommendation (A) initial establishment of simplex manual circuit connecting GUAM and Khabarovsk recommended using GUAM transmitting frequencies.

12 0728 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CGPOA, CGFEAF, DCOMAF20, CG7THAF, CINCPAC PEARL.

Minutes of 21 June conference on signal (radio) intelligence plan are concurred in subject to following comments.
A. Movement and establishment of radio intelligence units except where already provided for in troop movement schedules and base development plans are contingent upon:
1. Availability of necessary shipping space.
2. Ability of those responsible for base development in each area concerned to provide the sites facilities and services required for operation and maintenance of these units.
B. Circuit referred to in subpara 18 B(1) as Army multiplex circuit is the Strategic Air Force GUAM OKINAWA multiplex teletype circuit (using Navy supplied multiplex) 1 channel of which has been allocated by StratAirFor for MI use.
C. Paras 10 & 11. Do not concur in plan for 2 AF direction finder stations on already crowded INFO JIMMA. 1 such station now operated there by 8th radio sqdn mobile. Consider it could be made to serve both FEAF and 20th AF. As alternative consider FEAF and 20th AF could arrange for similar dual use of StratAir FCA station on GUAM.

12 1000 CGUSFCT TO CGUSAPPAC, CGSNA, CGFEAF INFO CINCPAC ADV, CGLAF, CGADVECH FEAF.

This Headquarters concurs in priority of targets recommended in TopSec CENX 15388 ref MANILA secret rdo 23484 please confirm last city named in 23484 as it was barbed in transit. Ref your top sec CX 24399 in view of status of FEIPING as a Chinese National Shrine we must insist that any contemplated bombing attacks on this city be cleared thru China Theater. Further we desire to reemphasize the necessity for precision bombing of targets in any Chinese city. Area bombings of crowded Chinese cities in occupied areas of China would result in more deaths and hardship among friendly Chinese than among Japs.

11 2159 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV.

Army has not agreed to my proposal that the existing arrangement at Okinawa should be continued in effect. My modified proposal is contained in paragraphs 2 to 6 and enclosure of JCS 1/06/2 which are quoted herewith for your information and comment.

"Para 2. As stated in JCS 1/06/1, CINCPAC and the Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) have made a Joint Logistic Plan for the CLEMETIC Operation in which have been integrated carefully the matters of priorities of base development, allocation of projects and the movement of supplies into the area, and have set up service forces for their implementation. CINCPAC has been charged with the responsibility for base development on Okinawa. This responsibility has caused him to allot much of the Naval Construction Engineers to Army developments. Undoubtedly when and if control of these developments is passed to the Army he will continue to allot as may be practicable units."

Continued
of these construction battalions to the meeting of Army requirements. If this control of development of Army facilities is to be transferred as recommended it is my understanding that the control of the development of Army fields both for the Army Strategic Air Force and the Far Eastern Air Force will be included in the transfer.

"Para 3. Both during OLYMPIC and in the continuing future OKINAWA will be a primary naval base in control of a vital sea area and an air base. During OLYMPIC and perhaps for a short period thereafter important facilities and developments are required for use by the Army forces of invasion.

"Para 4. As stated in JCS 1406/1 I am doubtful as to the wisdom of disturbing this agreed organization which is now at work and progressing well. However if the Chief of Staff US Army has strong convictions that more effective progress in the prosecution of OLYMPIC will be effected by the transfer to CINCPAC of the responsibility for the development of facilities considered essential for his operations and full control thereof including the logistics involved I acquiesce. This transfer of control to CINCPAC to include full responsibility for and control of development of all Army installations and projects in the RYUKYUS (including those for the Army Strategic Air Force) movement of Army supplies into the area and such harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to by the 2 commanders concerned.

"Para 5. In view of the fact that the defense of the RYUKYUS is primarily integrated to the general naval defense of the sea areas of the Pacific Ocean Areas that the defense is primarily air and naval in nature and according to agreed plan is being implemented by preponderantly naval air and naval surface forces responsibility for the defense of the RYUKYUS should remain with the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC) as is the case with every other position in the PAC. Such Army forces as may be required in the defense of the RYUKYUS from time to time should be assigned by CINCPAC to the operational control of CINCPAC.


Para 1. CINCPAC in consultation with CINCPAC will arrange to transfer to the latter at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 August responsibility for and control of all Army and Army Air Force (including Army Strategic Air Force) installations and development projects in the RYUKYUS the movement of Army troops and supplies into the area and such harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all US Army forces located in the RYUKYUS including the 10th Army will pass to CINCPAC except as indicated in the last paragraph below.

Para 2. Similarly CINCPAC will retain responsibility for and control of all naval and naval air installations and development projects in the RYUKYUS. The movement of naval forces and supplies into the area, and harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all US naval forces in the RYUKYUS will be vested in CINCPAC.

Para 3. The defense of the RYUKYUS Area and its military government will remain a responsibility of CINCPAC in accordance with existing directives. For this purpose CINCPAC will assign to the operational control of CINCPAC such US Army Forces as may be required from time to time. End of Enclosure)."

12 1015 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC/CINCPAC INFO CGSOSOT, CINCPAC INFO CGDAP, CINCPAC INFO CGDAP MARCO
CGFX 689. Preparation for FORT BAYARD is subject. Your remarks and recommendations are requested on the following:

A- CHINA Theater's responsibilities in convoy operation.
12 1015  CGUSFCT TO CINCPAC CINCAFPAC INFO CGSOSCT, CCREUSFCT, CGL/4AF, WARCOS (CONT'D)

B: Naval harbor facilities required at FORT BAYARD and availability thereof to CINCAFPAC reference 94/19-HPS including movement to FORT BAYARD.
C: Nature and extent of command and liaison required between forces of CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC and CHINA Theater involved in FORT BAYARD operation. If a conference is believed necessary on the above, let us know.

12 1159  CINCAFPAC TO CINCPAC ADV DEP COMAF 20.

CX 22942. JCS radiogram WX 29914 dated 10th approves plan PASTEL as amended. CINCAFPAC's detailed implementation plan requires final coordination prior to completion. Invitation extended deception representative your headquarters to conference here 17th July with CHINA Theater and CINCAFPAC representatives for that purpose. Advise.

11 2135  COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCPA ADV INFO COM/7THFLT.

Submit by dispatch your concrete proposals for reorganization of naval forces SWP subject to following considerations.
(A) Reorganization of Service Force 7thFlt should be accomplished earliest practicable and is not contingent upon departure of Com/7thFlt for JAPAN.
(B) Naval bases in the PHILIPPINES will pass to jurisdiction of Commander Philippine Sea Frontier.
(C) Upon the reorganization of Service Force 7thFlt and establishment of Service Squadron 7, Commander US naval forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA will be established. This command will function under Com/7thFlt until CINCWSWA relinquishes area responsibility to British at which time Comdr naval facilities will report to CINCPA direct.
(D) Concurrently with change in area responsibility or sooner if you so desire the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS should pass to CINCPA jurisdiction and representations will be made to the JCS dependent upon your comments.
(E) Maintain in PHILIPPINE Area naval force sufficient to contain Japanese force remaining in SINGAPORE Area.

13 0731  MACARTHUR TO CINCPA ADV, CG CHINA, COMAAF INFO CTF 95.

CX 25198.

CINCPA ADV HQ 110153 giving composition of TF 95 and initial movements, 110146 giving initial mission TF 95 and 112336 requesting strikes on enemy air bases and other appropriate targets are references.

Condr Allied Air Forces will:
(1) Subject to concurrence ComGen CHINA Theater strike airfields and other appropriate targets with heaviest strikes within capabilities in the SHANGHAI area and FORMOSA on date of initial sweep of TF 95.
(2) Inform CINCPA ADV HQ and CTF 95 of strike intents earliest possible. Para. CINCPA ADV HQ requested to notify this Hqtrs with info to AAF and ADV HQ FRAF OKINAWA date of initial sweep.

Request concurrence CG CHINA Theater on strikes SHANGHAI area with info to above addreses.

13 0749  CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Your 112159. I am concerned at the degree to which the processes of reorganization and changes involved in any new command arrangements for OKINAWA will absorb effort and create confusion during the critical 3 and one half months remaining before the OLYMPIC assault. During this all too brief period a stupendous base development task is to be accomplished. The latest reports show that this task is well in hand. Construction is accelerating and during the lst 10 days of July approximately 350,000 tons of cargo
were unloaded.

Commenting on the specific proposals of JCS 1406/2 I wish to point out that:

(A) The assurance of paragraph 2 "He will continue to allot as may be practicable units of these construction battalions to the meeting of Army requirements" is undesirable. Actually, although 4 and 1/4 construction Bns are now working on Army airfields in order to get them activated promptly for tactical reasons, current plans call for gradually transferring these battalions to naval and to general island development. The excess of naval engineering effort over naval requirements will approximate requirements of and should be used on projects of common necessity and defense which will be under JCS 1406/2. It would be better if no commitments were made on the JCS level concerning use of NCBs on Army projects.

(B) As of 7 July 27 and 1/2 NCBs were present of which 15 and 3/4 (including 5 and 1/2 regular Bns, 6 Stevedore Bns, 2 Pontoon Bns and 1 Truck Bn) were on general island development, 3 on naval base construction, 4 and 1/2 on naval and Marine airfields and 4 and 1/4 on Army airfields. Of 32 Army Engineer Bns present 13 were assigned to general island development and 19 to Army airfields. The category of "general island development" which includes work on roads, waterfront, water supply, fuel systems, cargo discharge and supply dumps and which now absorbs 26 and 3/4 out of 59 and 1/2 Bns will decrease in relative priority. Many of the common projects can be allocated to either Army or Navy. However to avoid impeding the whole effort present engineering plans must remain virtually unchanged and the separation of service responsibilities must take place slowly and carefully. It will probably be necessary to continue supervision of common projects by ComGen 10 for a considerable period. Recommend addition to paragraph 3 of the directive of a sentence approximately as follows: "The Commanding General 10th Army and his Headquarters and also the present Island Commander OKINAWA will continue to act for CINCPAC as at present in connection with defense and developments of common necessity until released under arrangements mutually agreeable to CINCAP and CINCPAC.

(C) I am in hearty agreement with paragraphs 3 and 5 of JCS 1406/2 as drafted by you. It is my intention to use OKINAWA as a base not only for OLYMPIC and CORONET but also for extending control by the Pacific Fleet initially over the EAST CHINA SEA and as rapidly as possible over the YELLOW SEA and the SEA OF JAPAN. The Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA is vital to the readiness of the fleet for effective support of OLYMPIC.

13 0751 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COM7THFLT, CINCAP, COMPHILSEAFRON, CINCPAC PEARL COMSERVPAC.

Your 112135 not to all addressee. Following recommendations are submitted. See my 083031 and Com7thFlt 120014.

(A) On 15 August ComServFor7thFlt change title to ComServRon 7. ServRon 7 become unit of ServPac assigned to operational control of Com7thFlt to render service to all fleet units in PHILIPPINES.

(B) Effective 15 August establish Commander U S Naval Forces AUSTRALIA NEW GUINEA to function under Com7thFlt until CINCPAC relinquishes area responsibility to British at which time Comdr US Naval Forces AUSTRALIA—NEW GUINEA report to CINCPAC direct.

(C) Effective 15 August pass to command of ComPhilSeaFron all naval shore facilities including Naval Air Bases in the PHILIPPINES and to ComNavFor AUSTRALIA—NEW GUINEA all US naval and naval air facilities in SWPA outside PHILIPPINES except MANUS.
13 0751 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COM7THFLT, CINCAPAC, COMPHILSEAFRON, ETC. (CONT'D)

(D) Effective on or before establishment of NEW BRITISH command area transfer ADMIRALTY ISLANDS to the Pacific Ocean Areas.

(E) Effective 15 August Com7thPhibFor with flagship and staff detached 7thFlt report to ComPhibsPac. Other units now in 7thPhibFor pass to command of ComPhibsPac bombastant units to be reallocated to meet current operational requirements and other units to form subordinate command of AdComPhibsPac to render service to all PhibsPac units in the PHILIPPINES.

(F) When new British command area is formed all British naval forces remaining in Pacific Theater pass to command of CINC BPF.

(G) On 1 October CINCPAC pass to CamFidl.SeaFra operational control of all units then under his command except those otherwise assigned by CINCPAC to meet OLYMPIC requirements. At this time Air7thFlt change role to CamFidl.SeaFra and pass to operational control of CamFidl.SeaFra.

(H) On 1 October ComPhilSeaFron report to CINCPAC for duty as a fleet task force commander under the operational control of CINCPAC in command of naval forces assigned by CINCPAC for duty within PHILIPPINE Sea Frontier. These forces to be sufficient to contain Japanese naval forces in SINGAPORE Area.

13 0851 CINCAPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COM7THFLT. CG AFVESPAC. CG6THARMO. COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

CX 25216. Cite your 090907. Location of Naval Base north of YAMAGAWA KO instead of at TAKASU concurred in. Army plans no facilities in this area. This also answers your 080802Z.

13 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, CTF 33, DCNO.

Concur in principle with your 091314 except consider 1 February and 1 November 1946 to be more appropriate dates. To assist in planning the changeover in carrier air group complements the following recommendations are submitted:

(A) Changeover to 36 VB CVLG's be made as soon as practicable. CVLG's for CVL-48 Class be 24 VF and 24 VBF.

(B) No model distinction between VF and VBF and all single-seaters on any 1 carrier to be same model. VF and VBF in CVG's and CVL's to be about half and half.

(C) Increase VF(P) in CVG's from 2 to 4.

(D) No change in night groups or units.

(E) CVEG's and MCVG's 12 VBF and 12 VSB.

(F) Standard and spotting CompRons 20 VF and 9 VSB as soon as practicable. ASW CompRons 12 VF and 15 VSB.

Strongly recommend careful analysis VF requirements contained in above comments before cutting back VF production.

13 1033 RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC ADV. CG CPBC.

RJ 65600.

Inasmuch as any downward revision of category of defense would release, for other use, Army personnel in limited numbers only, disproportionate to the resulting loss of efficiency and security, it is recommended that no change be made in the present modification of category of defense B. This answers your radios 191335 June TOPLSETO DKE 2359 July also.
13 1309 CINCAF PAC TO CINCPOA ADV, CG US ARMY STRAT AF (WASH) INFO WARGOS, CG FEAF, CG AAF 20, DEP COM AAF 20.

CINCAF PAC TO CINCPOA ADV.

CX 25301.

In view of WARGOS 30889 of 12th, not to all, conference proposed for this headquarters 20 July in our CX 24785 for coordination of air operations is now suggested for 1 August in order that General Spaatz ComGen U.S. Army Strategic Air Force can be present. Action addes please concur or comment with info to all.

13 1311 CINCAF PAC TO CINCPOA ADV INFO COMA AF.

CINCAF PAC TO CINCPOA ADV.

CX 25302.

Concur in your 120726 reference maintaining existing arrangements on operational control of PMAW and discussion of PMAW preparation for future operations at MANILA Conference.

13 1320 RUNNER TO COMSUBPAC (PASSED TO CINCPOA ADV FOR INFO).

RUNNER 3rd.

More info area between 39-11 and 39-20. Made zig zag search up coast passing within 1 mile of 1 SAKI, 0 SAKI, SANGAN SHIMA and OSHAKO SAKI. Also east west searches on Lat lines 39-10, 14 and 18. Tanker and escorts seen hugging beach. Anti submarine vessels traversed area freely. Gear working perfectly. Consider this survey shows definite absence of defensive minefields offshore this area. 10 days practice has made evaluation of contacts less difficult. Resurveyed vicinity of 36-37 140-50 today approaching from direction of shore. This revealed that the vicinity is definitely clear. Complete report on southern AREVESLOOJMDW. WX 08001, 65775, 2 AUG 23 IVPP OKTR 36-40N 141-20E.

09 1442 COMGEN AIR TO CG FEAF INFO CGA APOA (BOTH HQ).

WARX 29026.

Administration of Air Force units in HAWAIIAN AREA is subject. Do not think the creation of another numbered Air Force for this purpose is desirable at this time ReURad CX 23168 dated 4 July 1945. 1 possibility is by the 5th and 13th AF absorbing the combat units and service elements of the 7th AF and using the Hqtrs 7th AF to administer the Army air units not in FEAF and proposed USAFAF in the HAWAIIAN ARA. This plan is now within the capabilities of the theater and appears to be the simplest solution. You plans and comments desired.

10 0450 CG AAFPOA TO CG FEAF INFO CG AIR.

5058.

In furtherance of the proposal which I discussed with you and General MacArthur in MANILA regarding the establishment of a numbered air force in HAWAII I have dispatched a message to Gen Richardson with info copies to you and General Arnold (see my 101027 July). This message contained the proposal on which I intended to request Admiral Nimitz concurrence of July 11th and on which Gen. Richardson might comment. In view of the info contained in WARX 29026, date time group 091442 July, addressed to you, I feel that I must now suspend any presentation of the numbered Air Force proposal to Admiral Nimitz. The 7th AF is now yours. General Arnold's message appears to concur in the basic idea of establishing a numbered Air Force in HAWAII. Difficulty arises only in the designation of a numbered Air Force Hqtrs to do the job. I will be very much interested in receiving a copy of your reply to General Arnold.
Conference proposes for 20 July in Manila, reference your CX 24152 and CX 24795, at which United States Strategic Air Force in Pacific should be represented, is subject.

Para. In view of the importance of the United States Army Strategic Air Forces to be established as in WARX 30438, ComGenAir is very desirous of having General Spaatz represent him personally at the conference in Manila.

Para. Since General Spaatz can not be present in Manila until 1 August would it materially interfere with your planning to postpone the conference from 20 July to 1 August.

The following comments on CinccoA ADV 080301 are based upon certain assumptions which have not been discussed in the proposed reorganization of units now in the 7th Fleet. Prior to separation from SWPA provision should be made regarding the duties of Com7thFleet as ComA.
2. Provision should be made for control of naval bases in Manus, New Guinea and Australia and a command designated to be responsible for their roll up.
3. Provision should be made for the operational control of submarines SWPA. Subject to the above. Concur with A B C E F G and H. Also concur in principle with D except that date of transfer should be not before 1 September and preferable later. New subject. It is suggested that unnecessary reorganization can be avoided, with the last possibility of confusion during the critical period of mounting our forces for the OLYMPIC operation, if the transfer of naval shore facilities from control of ComServ 7th Fleet to Com PSF is delayed until after 1 October. Exact date to be determined later. On that date Com 7th Fleet reports to Cinpac for duties in OLYMPIC and CPSF will have control of naval shore facilities through ComSeron 7.
This is annex A-1 to my Op-Plan 9-45. Movement and attack schedule subsequent to 21 July. See my 261227 June.

Para. Completion replenishment at 1600 21 July Task Force 38 proceed via direct route to point click to arrive 1200 23 July. Thence proceed to launching position vicinity lat. 31-30 Long 135-00 to arrive 0430 24 July. Conduct sustained strikes against combatant naval strength KURE, sweep MIHO, strike air and air installations KURE-KOBE area. At dusk commence diversion retirement toward OKINAWA then proceed to launching position vicinity lat. 32-00 Long 136-10 to arrive 0430 25 July. Make sustained strikes against combatant naval strength KURE-KOBE area, sweep MAIZURU, strike air and air installations KOBE-NAGOYA area. At dusk proceed to fueling rendezvous Lat 28-00 Long 138-00 to arrive 0700 26 July.

Para. Fuel and replenish until 1200 July when proceed to launching position vicinity Lat 33-00 Long 138-30 to arrive 0400 28 July strike air and air installations in TOKYO-NAGOYA area. At dusk retire to southward until time to arrive launching position vicinity Lat 33-30 Long 138-30 at 0400 30 July. Continue strikes as for 28 July.

Para. Task Unit 34.8.1 be prepared bombard HAMAMATSU area of HONSHU at about 2300 28 July or about 1200 30 July as specifically directed later rejoining Task Force 38 on completion. Ammo allowance 30 rounds 8 and 16 inch HC per gun. CTF 38 provide night fighters or CAP for Task Unit 34.8.1 as required.

Para. Completion strikes 30 July Task Force 38 proceed to fueling rendezvous Lat. 28-00 Long 138-00 to arrive 1200 31 July.

Para. Comfuel 1200 1 August Task Force 38 proceed to fueling position vicinity Lat. 31-40 133-30 to arrive 0430 2 August. Conduct sustained strikes against shipping SASEBO, sweep FUSAN shipping, strike air and air installations northern KYUSHU-KURE area. At dusk proceed via Lat. 27-55 Long 137-40 and Lat. 28-35 Long 142-45 to fueling rendezvous Lat. 33-30 Long 147-00 to arrive 0500 5 August.

Para. Comfuel 5 August proceed via point CHARM to launching point vicinity point LIFE or via points CHARM and SCIENCE to launching point vicinity point GAZETTE as later directed accordance later instructions launch air strikes against air and air installations in TOKYO PLAINS area vicinity LIFE or against same targets north HONSHU-HOKKAIDO from vicinity GAZETTE commencing dawn 7 August. Retire east at suck and return at dawn to continue strikes from same position on 8 August.

Para. Task Unit 34.8.2 be prepared bombard HONSHU or HOKKAIDO targets on 7 or 8 August as later directed. CTF 38 furnish CAP for Task Unit 34.8.2 as required.

Para. Task Force 37 be prepared operate in conjunction with Task Force 36 in accordance this schedule as practicable. Also be prepared for separate operations on north HONSHU-HOKKAIDO targets during this period. Movement and attack schedule for Task Force 37 by separate annex later.

Para. Present intention return Task Forces to bases upon completion of strikes 8 August.

Para. All of above schedule subject to change due to weather and tactical developments.

Para. All positions north and east and times I (-9).
Request you institute following coordination plan connection Annex Al my OpPlan 9-45. My 132105. Throughout period concerned continuation maximum practicable effort of air forces against the Empire. Specifically request following: By OKINAWA Air. On 24 & 25 July maximum effort KYUSHU fields striking fields northern KYUSHU all possible. 28 July strike northern KYUSHU and sweep KURE area fields. Repeat on 30 July major concentration on KURE area. 1 August maximum effort northern KYUSHU fields. 2 August southern KYUSHU fields.

By Task Force 93: On 24 & 25 July maximum effort NAGOYA area airfields. 28 and 30 July maximum effort KOBE Area airfields. 1 August and 2 August maximum effort KOBE-NAGOYA airfields.

21 BomCom: Continuation basic strategic plan best request following exceptions if at variance with such plan. 24-25 July attack air facilities TOKYO PLAINS area. 1 or 2 August TOKYO-NAGOYA area air facilities.

In setting up coordination request strikes on the areas assigned to OKINAWA and IWO air be by groups staggered throughout the days in question to keep enemy air constantly occupied and thus reduce air retaliation potential. Unforeseen delays may preclude adhering exactly to schedule in which case CINCPAC is requested if practicable to adjust coordination accordingly to accomplish the effect herein outlined.

140255 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC.
My planning staff have been giving considerable attention to compliance JCS WARX 17064 (142307 June). It would be extremely helpful if 1 or more of your planners could visit GUAM about 20 July for a brief conference concerning occupation plans and incidentally orient my planners connection your CORONET concepts as they now stand.

140256 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC INFO COMINCH, CG USASTAF, DEPCOM USASTAF.
Your 131309. Delay until 1 August of conference concerning air coordination OLYMPIC first requested by your dispatch GX 24152 of 9 July is agreeable to me. Request information as to whether you now propose a conference on the staff level between planning representatives of CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and COMGEN USASTAF or a conference between the Commanders themselves.

140901 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC, DEPCOM, CTF93 Info CGFEAF, CINCPAC PEARL, COM3RDFLT CTF 38, CTF 37.
132145. Will appreciate your cooperation in coordinated air strikes at places and times desired by Com3rdFlt 132145 insofar as practicable. Request you inform this Hq and info addees of your intent and firm plans.
14 2133 COMGEN FMFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COM 3RD FLEET, 
COM 5TH PHIBFOR, COMGEN SERVCOMD FMFPAC, COMGEN 5THPHIBCORPS, COMGEN
4TH MARDIV.

Consider 1 MarDiv (reinf) less 1 inf regt as ground force required to
accomplish your 110832. 4th MarDiv nominated. Earliest date to commence
mounting from MAUl 15 September with target date pending on rehearsal
requirements naval forces to be employed. Reinforcing units nominated and
as follows: 5th and 10th Amtracs Bns. MAUl. 1 Co 1st
Armd Amph Bn. SAIPAN. 4th Amph Trk Co and 1 Prov Amph Trk Co. MAUl.
1 bomb disposal plat. GUIAM. VAC-4. MAUl. 1st rocket det. MAUl. 1
Prov heavy mortar Co. MAUl. 43rd NCB. MAUl. This will require following
substitutions be made for units now scheduled for employment with VAC.
4th and 9th Amtrac Bns at GUIAM substituted for 5th and 10th Amtrac Bns.
1 NCB to be assigned to 2nd MarDiv at SAIPAN to be substituted for 43rd
NCB. Early approval desired above tentative troop list in order that
changes indicated in unit assignments to VAC may be effected at earliest
practicable date. Contemplated that no garrison forces are provided from
above assault force.

15 0728 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RFLEET info CTF 38.

Insure that CTF 38 Op-Order 2-45 modified to conform with objectives
your 030515 and my 112335 to the end that enemy combatant vessels remaining
TOKYO BAY are destroyed.

15 0720 CINCPA ADV HQ to CINCPAC info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING.

It is not quite 2 months since our conference in MANILA at which we
discussed the subjects covered by your CX 25423 DTG 140723 and as I thought
arrived at understandings which, although they represented concessions on
both sides, were to serve as the basis for our preparations for OLYMPIC
in the limited time available. Pursuant to those understandings I have
released to you all the major combat elements of the Army then under my
control except the headquarters 10th Army, headquarters 24th Corps, the
7th and the 27th Infantry Divisions and various attached units all of
which are still engaged in mopping up operations on OKINAWA but all of
which are by agreement or by accepted plans available to you for OLYMPIC
or CORONET as you desire.

Para. It is true that relatively few service troops have been released
to you but that is because as was well known there existed in the Pacific
Ocean Areas a shortage of Army Service Troops for Army purposes which has
been partly but only partly alleviated by the use of naval personnel to
fill Army deficiencies.

Para. My 080301 July asked your comment or concurrence on matters
which pertained to the internal organization or the 7th Fleet and speci-
cally left under your operational control the naval forces assigned to
your area. Similar reorganizations have been made within the Army forces
in the Pacific Ocean Areas without reference to me.

Para. I will be glad to confer with you again in connection with these
problems at any time that you can arrange to be my guest at Guam for that
purpose. Current operations will require my presence here for a considerable
period.
FBX 717.

1. Utilization of FORT BAYARD is subject. Reference urad WARX 22283, WARX 25857 and WARX 2772 (last 2 radios were not sent to all and are not required to understand this radio). China theater has completed the study of material and personnel resources required by CHINA theater for this project and available to CHINA theater and INDIA BURMA theater.

2. The results of this study are as follows: A. FORT BAYARD will be used by CHINA theater as an auxiliary temporary supply base with an air and auxiliary ground line of communication forward to support CARBONADO modified. Target date for 2nd report area is 15 August 1945. B. The capacity of the port area is to be 5 liberty ships or their equivalent per month. C. Type cargo delivered forward initially will be primarily drummed oil. D. Personnel requirements in FORT BAYARD area estimated as 4300 of which CHINA theater can supply 506, INDIA BURMA theater can supply the equivalent of 3147. The shortage is 647 made up of 1 military police company to and E 15-37 less 1 traffic platoon, strength 124; Quartermaster petroleum supply company to and E 10-377 less 1 operating platoon, strength 108; Ordnance mam company to and E 9-127, strength 116; 1 Quartermaster based depot company to and E 10-367, strength 76 and 1 port company to and E 50-177, and 1 Headquarters and Headquarters detachment port battalion to and E 55-116. CHINA theater is prepared to accept the cost of transporting personnel plus certain equipment from INDIA BURMA theater to CHINA theater and to improvise initially to cover the above shortages. However, CHINA theater must request that the most expeditious action be taken to meet the 647 shortage listed above. E. The material loading on the 1st 5 ships is satisfactory to CHINA theater as specified in WARX 25506 with the addition of T/E equipment for 1 port company and 30 days B rations for 5,000 men. The loading schedule for the follow up shipping will be forwarded to you as soon as possible. In general it will cover maintenance requirements of U.S. forces in port area including AV Gas for transports and fighter squadrons and cargo to be forwarded which we will now examine in closer detail. F. The initial destination of the 1st 5 ships should be determined by CINCAPAC CHINA theater recommends MANILA.

3. At this time WEICHOW TAO is a questionable venture and will require diversion from FORT BAYARD. The information of this area and FORT BAYARD REQUESTED has been forwarded by separate radio.

4. Concur that LUZON air route appears inadvisable at this time if facilities now allocated to CHINA theater must be used. A detailed study of this will be continued here. CHINA theater has just seen WARX 29972 answers required will be sent later.
CINCAPPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CG 6TH ARMY, COMTHPHIB, COMSERVPAC (Cont'd)

Army units for KOSHIKI RETTO, southeast KYUSHU and east KYUSHU landings is not correct. In addition to 4 naval garrison beach parties desired by 5th amphibious Corps, 6th Army desires 1 each naval garrison beach party for operational attachment to each of 8 engineer shore battalions scheduled for employment. Further desire 3 battalion headquarters attached to supervise these beach parties.

16 0727 COMGEN USASTAF to CINCAPPAC info COMGEN AFMIDPAC, CINCPA BOTH HQ, COMGEM AIR, COMGEN USASTAF ADMIN.

0261 look at CINCAPPAC ADV 120814 GCT July. Requirement given below is based on following assumptions: A. This headquarters responsible all USASTF construction in MARIANAS and KYUKUS; B. withdrawal of all construction assistance on USASTF airfields such as naval construction battalions; C. Withdrawal of all USASTF units from construction other than VLR and allied functions; D. USASTF can obtain support from a theater for engineer units other than those supplied by Army Air Forces, ie, spare parts companies, heavy shop companies, dump trucks companies and ordance medium maintenance companies. E. The following engineer aviation troops now in this theater or committed to 4 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 34 battalions, 2 depot companies, 4 maintenance companies, 3 topographical companies, 1 air force Hq company and 3 utilities companies will be retained by USASTF as long as required. F. Maintenance will be performed in areas to rear of MARIANAS by undesignated air force. 5 utilities companies and 1 separate company now assigned in such areas. Presuming above assumptions correct, USASTF will require 1 engineer command, aviation, 6 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 36 battalions, 2 Depot companies, 6 Maintenance companies, 3 topographical companies, 1 air force Hq company, 1 topographical battalion and 3 utilities companies in addition to units referred to in D above from a theater. This creates a shortage of 1 engineer command aviation, 2 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 2 maintenance companies, and 1 topographical battalion between units required and units on hand or committed USASTF. It is understood if the strategic situation remains stabilized as far as VLR requirements are concerned that as construction is completed a progressive release of aviation engineer units will be made to a number required for maintenance purposes only.

16 0249 CINCAPPAC to COMGENFEAF info CINCPA BOTH HQ, DEPOMAF 20, COM3RDTFLEET, CTF 93, CTF 38, CTF 37.

CX 25865

In support of operations 3rd Fleet as outlined in his Annex 1A operations Plan 9-45 (3rd Fleet Radio 132105 with info FEAF) desire comGenFEAF in coordination with other KYUKUS based air forces support operations to the maximum extent practicable with strikes in the KYUSHU-KURE area on schedule as indicated in Commander 3RD Fleets 132145 (info to FEAF). Schedule of strikes to be flexible and to be adjusted to conform to any change in plans of Commander 3rd Fleet due to unforeseen delays. Desire you submit earliest your scheduled plan for support including estimated striking force and targets with information to aces in CINCPA ADV 14091.
Subject operations in coordination 3rd Fleet. Comments on Com3rdFleets 132145Z (GCT) follows as requested by your 150045Z. Presume air facilities mean airfield installations. Attack against such installations at variance with basic strategic plan. Many VLR primary targets principally aircraft production installations are located TOKYO-NAGOYA area. Intentions are to strike our primary targets during the period 24 July - 2 August when weather forecast indicates reasonable chance visual bombing. Otherwise incendiary destruction of urban industrial areas will be continued.

Your 150728 acknowledged. CTF 38 will comply.

A The Headquarters 10th Army to report to you now for CORNET planning and to be released from my operational control about 1 December.
B The Headquarters 24th Corps to be released to you now.
C The 7th and 27th Divisions to be released to you about 1 October.

Your 140256Z, August 1 conference coordination of Air. Staff conference was intended, however Army Air Forces wish ComUSASTAF to attend. No objection attendance commanders. Final decisions will of course remain with CINCPAC, CINCAF PAC and COMUSASTAF.

CINCPAC CX 25865 orders that Far East Air Forces, in support of Com3rdFleet operations outlined in his radio 132105 and in coordination with other RTUKYUS based air forces, conduct air attacks to maximum extent practicable in the KYUSHU-KURE area. Schedule of these air attacks will be as outlined in Com3rdFleet 132145 and will be flexible to conform to any change in plans of Com3rdFleet due to unforeseen delays.

Para. Advon FEA F missions currently ordered comply with this directive. Advon FEA F will announce his air intent daily with information to CINCAF PAC, CINCPOA FEARL, CINCPOA ADV, COMSTRATAIR, COM3RD FLEET, CTF 38 and CTF 37.

Para. CINCPOA ADV is requested herewith to direct that radios containing information on fleet operations plans and fleet movements include CG ADVON FEA F as info adee. Copies of references above being forwarded CG ADVON FEA F by special safehand courier July 18.
18 0651 CINCPAC ADV to CINCAF PAC info 5th HAIRFORCE, FEAF, COMPHIBSPAC, COMSERVPAC COMSERSV/THFLEET, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMGENAIRFMPFAC, COMGEN1STMAW, COMGEN2NDMARAIRWING.

Following Marine Air Units will comprise the 1st Marine Air Wing for OLYMPIC. Wing HedRon-1, Wing Seron - 1, Marine Air Groups 12, 14, 33, 61 as presently organized. Marine Air Group 32 consisting of HedRon 32, Seron 32, VMSB-244, VMSB-343, VMFT-344. Marine Air Group-24 consisting of Hedron-24, Seron-24, VMF(N)-541, VMF(N)-533. Hedron-62 with air Warning Squadrons, 3, 4, 9, 12 and GCI units 1 through 5 inclusive attached. AWS 3 and AWS 4 are light weight units. VMD-254. Colonel Roberts USMC on staff ComGenAirFMFPac arrives MANILA on 19th with detailed logistic information.

18 0703 CINCPAC ADV to COM/THFLEET, COMPHIBSPAC info COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERSV/THFLEET, COMSERVISON 10.

CINCPAC 162111. Paragraph 8 reads "petroleum logistics required by 7th Attack Force afloat that assemble in the MANILA area for the OLYMPIC operation will be provided by ComServ 7thFleet and will be slated by CINCPAC."

Para. ComInCh 112135 not to all confirms decision to reorganize service force 7th Fleet and establish servron 7. It appears to CINCPAC that ServRon 7's responsibilities with respect to petroleum logistics in the MANILA area will be identical insofar as 3rd and 7th attack force are concerned. See also my 130751 not to all.

Para. Request your joint recommendations as to changes in CINCAF PAC's 162111 necessary in light of COMINCH 112135 and my 130751 which ComF 7th-Fit furnish to ComPhibsPac.

18 1200 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAF PAC, CINCPAC info AGWAR, NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Victory 65 BG 142. The provision of a harbor of refuge for the protection of Lighterage and small craft constructed of block ships which would satisfy your primary concern as outlined in CX-24937 is within our means and can be provided on time.

Para. Expansion of the project to include Caissons for the protection of ocean-going vessels requires overriding priority over other major war programs with possibility that this might interfere with other programs more essential to the success of the operation.

Para. Navy Department has advised that its towing facilities are being augmented by 10 ATA's and 45 Liberty ship towing installations. Therefore believe towing of steel caissons and block ships can be undertaken without serious detriment to CINCAF PAC's and CINCPAC's towing programs from west and gulf coasts to forward areas. Navy Department will select towing units with regard to suitability for ready ships which latter may be largely non self propelled.

Para. Navy Department states that given priority caissons can be constructed and delivered to theater on time. Ability to assemble at site must be considered.

Para. In view of the impact on other programs and requirements and the necessity of having reasonably firm assurance that if the caissons are constructed they will be used CINCAF PAC's recommendation is requested - continued -
18 1200 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA Info AGWAR, NAVY DEPART. (Cont'd)
as a matter of urgency as to whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide only a harbor of refuge for small craft constructed wholly of block ships or whether they shall proceed with the construction and delivery of the artificial harbor as defined in CINCAFPAC'S CX-24,937 which includes the provision of Caissons capable of sheltering cargo shipping, on the understanding that addressees are willing to accept possible impact on towing and other programs. Further request CINCPOA'S comments on naval phases of project both towing and siting.

18 2252 CINCPAC ADV to CINCAFPAC Info COMPHIBSPAC, COM5THFLEET, CINCPOA PEARL.

In the ICEBERG operation unexpected delays occurred in the early establishment of adequate air warning facilities in the outlying positions which necessitated reliance for air warning on vulnerable surface craft with resultant loss in men and ships. It is of mutual and paramount importance that air warning units that are to go into outlying positions for OLYMPIC be so loaded and echeloned that their efficient functioning is assured at the earliest possible time at the outset of the operation to give the maximum protection to the amphibious effort. Information as to your plans for the early activation of air warning units on outlying positions will be appreciated.

19 0455 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE Info CG 6TH ARMY, CG FEAF, COMPHIBSPAC.

CX 26663.
Objective area designated in para 3x(4) AFPAC operations instructions number 1 dated 20 June is subject. AFPAC, FEAF and COMPHIBSPAC are in agreement in changing delineation of objective area to that area south of 32-30N which is enclosed by arc of circle having radius of 120 nautical miles with center at SATA MISAKI (31-00 N 130-40 E). Purpose to allow more water area for forces of COMPHIBSPAC. Request comments or concurrence.

19 0513 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 94. CTG 30.8, CTG 32.1 Info COM3RD FLEET, CTF 32, CTU 30.9,15, CTU 32.1,2, COMCORTDIV 70, GSSS (DE 444), COMSERDIV 10, SALAMAUA (CVE 96), ULVET W. MOORE (DE 442), K.C. CAMPBELL (DE 443), WM. SEIZERLING (DE 441).

Info ships hereby detached 3rd Fleet and assigned to CTF 94 for temporary operational control for employment as ASW Task Group.
Para. CTG 32.1 detach SALAMAUA, CTG 30.8 DETACH DE'S and sail to rendezvous as directed by CTF 94.

19 0647 CINCPOA ADV to CINCAFPAC Info COMGENPOA, CINCPOA PEARL.

CINCPOA coast artillery unit requirements are now 1 Bn at PELELIU and 1 Grp Hq and 3 Bns at OKINAWA. All other coast artillery units COMGENPOA Dispatch 160213 are available now for release to you. Advise disposition desired. Upon departure these units present stations operational control passes to you.
Para. By 1 August the coast artillery units at OKINAWA will pass to your operational control therefore no action will be taken by CINCPOA on request for conversion of 1 CA Bn at OKINAWA to FA contained COMGENPOA 160213.
I 111!

19 0611 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, CINCPAC, info COMPHIBSPAC, CG 6THARMY, CG 8TH ARMY.

CX 26685.

Armed divisions for employment in CORONET will not be available for dispatch from the United States until November or December. If staged through PHILIPPINES, arriving in December or January, respectively, only very limited period can be allowed for shakedown and mounting out on or about 20 January. War Department has agreed to shipment direct to objective area in sea-trains or other means provided armored divisions can be handled at destination as required (W 16507, 13 June).

Para. The following reinforcing units should accompany armored divisions in assault shipping; 2 battalions 155 Gun (SP), 2 engineer combat battalions, 2 Treadway Bridge companies, 2 Ordnance Bn companies (Tank), 2 Ordnance Ammunition companies, 2 Quartermaster Gas Supply companies, 2 Quartermaster truck companies (Aug), 1 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile), 1 Quartermaster Truck company, petroleum (Equipped under Column 2 B). L Corps headquarters should be alerted to accompany this shipment in the event that a definite requirement is established therefor.

Para. Preliminary investigation here indicates feasibility of releasing from OLYMPIC 90 LST PARV at XRAY plus 35 and 12 AFA, and 6 AKA at XRAY plus 50 for dispatch to west coast to lift 2 armored divisions, reinforced, direct to CORONET objective area to arrive not later than Y Plus 5.

Para. Request CINCPAC concurrence in utilization of assault shipping as proposed herein with information copy direct to War Department.

Para. Request War Department confirmation of availability of units listed above and approval of assault loading and proposed movement of 2 armored divisions, reinforced, as indicated, from west coast direct to objective area.

Para. Movement of these units by amphibious lift as priority would:
A Insure ample time for preparation prior to entry into combat.
B Relieve congestion in staging area and ports, and
C Effect appreciable reduction in Back-Log of shipping.

Para. Early reply appreciated.

19 1117 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS.

CX 26793.

No further action being taken, reference your 170523 (GCT) relative to tactical units on OKINAWA, in view of recent directive of the Joint Chief of Staff.

19 1423 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CINCPAC ADVANCE, info BNIL PEARL, BNIL CINCPAC.

CX 26866.

This replies to radio Joint Chiefs of Staff 181200. The recommended artificial harbor will be used for the operation as planned and the possible impact of its provision on towing and other programs has been fully considered and is accepted. It is recommended that Joint Chief of Staff authorize construction and delivery artificial harbor as defined in CX 24937 which includes caissons capable of sheltering cargo shipping.
19 0533  CINCAFPAC to CINCPOA ADV info WARCOS (FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF). COM/THFLT.

CX 26668.

I have just concluded a series of conferences in an endeavor to accommodate the transfer of the 7th Fleet as proposed in your 080301 and the transfer of MANUS as proposed in your 130751. This modifies my CX 25993 originated 161121. I believe that this can now be accomplished as you desire subject to the comments of Com/7thFleet 120014 and to the overall approval of features which involve the AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH governments. It is my understanding that these features will of necessity have to be arranged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

17 0550  COMPHIBSPAC to CINCPAC ADV info ADOCOMPHIBSPAC BTH, CinCPAC PEARL Hq. CINCAFPAC. CG 6TH ARMY. CG 2ND. 3RD. 5TH MAR DIVS. CG FMF PAC. CG 5TH PHIB CORPS. COM 3RD, 5TH, 7TH PHIB FOR. COMPHIBGRPS 11, 12, 13. 14.

Following requested training schedule modifies my 090915. 202220 and 270635 all of June and has been approved in part by you. Request overall approval.

A. Philippines 12 LSTs 10 LSM and TransRon 16 now being employed on continuous bases. Approved by your 190122 of May and 220618 of June.

B. An additional TransDiv is required in PHILIPPINE area for period of 1 month commencing 25 July for training additional ROTS not included in original tentative training schedule. Requested by CINCAFPAC. Action not known.

C. TransRon 15 (less BERRIEN, BLADEN, BARROW, LACERTA, MULPHEN). 20 LST and 10 LSM to arrive PHILIPPINES 30 days prior to loading. Requested by COMPHIBSPAC 090915 of June approval not received.

D. GUAM 3RD MAR DIV TransDiv 37, 10 LST, 10 LSM available 21 August. Approved by your 280724.

E. SAIPAN 2ND MAR DIV 4 APAs including a division flagship of TransRon 12, 10 LST and 10 LSM available 8 September. Requested by Com5thPhib 140021.

F. OAHU 5TH MAR DIV 4 APAs including a division flagship of TransRon 24, 6 LST and 12 LSM available 26 August. Requested by Com5thPhib 140021.

G. OAHU 98TH DIVISION ConTransRon 22 in WESTMORELAND. KARNES, BOTTINEAU, BOWIE, KINGSBURY, ALAMANCE, SAPPHO. 10 LST and 10 LSM available 1 August. Approved by your 092316.

20 1337  COM3RDFLT to 3RD FLT ECM HOLDERS info COMFAIRWING 18, COMSUBPAC, CINCPAC ADV HQ, COMMARIANAS, COMGEN TEN, COMGEN FEAF ADVON, COMFAIRWING 1.

It is my intent to tighten blockade and keep pressure on the enemy by throwing light force sweeps against EMPIRE coast and outlying islands at every opportunity. Objectives denial of coastal sea lanes to enemy destruction shipping and bombardment of shore targets. These raids will usually be ordered suddenly.

Para. Keep currently familiar with locations within operational range with emphasis on enemy coastal shipping refuges. Enemy mine fields. And coastal targets such as harbor facilities, railroad bridges, yards and tunnels. Radar and radio stations, shore batteries, factories, towns.
20 1819 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ info COM7THFJT, CINCAFPAC, COMSUBPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMSERVPAC.

Your 130751. Items A B C E G and H are approved. Item D is under consideration. Item F and future of CNAF are under advisement and dependent on action by JCS on proposal to reorganize SWPAC area. Make nomination to me for Rear Admiral to command U. S. Naval forces AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA. What are your plans for Task Force 71.

19 1119 CINCPAC to WARCOS, (FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF), CINCPAC ADV HQ.

CX 26794.

Will be glad to welcome British Corps Commander and accompanying officers. Suggest their arrival earliest date and if practicable by 1 August. Reference Joint Chiefs of Staff V 66 BG 145, 18th. CINCPAC requested to comment or concur directly to Joint Chiefs of Staff, information to CINCPAC.

19 2327 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH info CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

I concur in CINCPAC 191119 to WARCOS concerning arrival British Corps Commander and accompanying officers.

20 0710 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC, CINCPOA info WARCOS, COMGENAF 10, COMGENSOCHINA, COMGENUSFCHINA, COMGENLATACT.

CFBX 1169.

Agree that meeting between representatives from Headquarters CHINA THEATER, Headquarters CINCPAC and Headquarters CINCPOA at GUAM as suggested in radio 140304 is highly desirable.

Para. A study and assessment of resources and requirements of CHINA THEATER is being made now. This study will be completed about the end of July. If you agree it is recommended that conference be held on or about 31 July. Composition of CHINA THEATER party will be furnished later. Present plans are to leave on or about 30 July. Suggest that CHINA THEATERS officers return via MANILA to insure coordination of operations.

Para. Captain Painter has arrived and is providing very valuable assistance in both our future and operational planning.

Para. For MacArthurs request clearance for 1 C 54 aircraft through your area on or about 31 July. If you feel that a meeting between CHINA THEATER officers returning from GUAM and your people would be beneficial they will return via MANILA for a brief conference.

20 1100 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to AGWAR(ACTION) PASS TO NAVY FOR ACTION info CINCPAC FOR MACARTHUR, CINCPOA FOR NIMITZ, VICTORY 128 BG 198.

Construction and provision of an artificial harbor to meet the strategic requirements set forth in CINCPAC CX 24937 of 12 July is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The construction and establishment of this artificial harbor is charged to the Navy. The Navy will proceed with this project with priority above all Military and Naval programs except manhattan project and will be assisted by appropriate agencies of the War Department as necessary. Appropriate action by the Joint Logistical Committee and Joint Military Transportation committee is directed.
20 1108 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC FOR MACARTHUR info CINCPAC FOR NIMITZ.
AGWAR, NAVY, NAVY DEPARTMENT VIA AGWAR VICTORY 129 BG 192.

With regard to your C 26799, directDEE in Victory 73 pertained only to the KYUKYUS. This does not preclude the transfer of responsibilities pertaining to USSTAF units elsewhere in the Pacific by mutual agreement as provided in WAR 62773 of 3 April.

20 2208 WARCOS to CINCPAC, COMGEN USFCT info CINCPOA ADV HQ.

WARX 35530.

For operation and maintenance of LCM's for FORT BAYARD PROJECT CINCPAC is requested to (see Navy Rad 192133) arrange loading and onward shipping of personnel with equipment to destination. Possible use of naval escort craft for this should be examined. For information 4th and 5th ships depart NEW ORLEANS POE 16th and 21st July respectively.

Para. New subject. CHINA THEATER should arrange to furnish tents fuel and necessary logistic support to these navy personnel on arrival. Believe it proper that navy personnel used in port operations not be charged against existing navy troop ceiling.

Para. New subject. To facilitate detailed arrangements for these operations, it appears desirable for CHINA HQ to establish liaison in CINCPAC headquarters. CHINA'S CFBX 689 July 12 refers. WD has not received info copies of inter theater cables (CFBX 689) which announce decisions reference split of responsibilities for the operation. It is requested that War be included as info addressee on all inter theater cables reference decisions for implementation of this operation.

21 0229 CINCPAC ADV to COMAIRPAC SUBCOMFWD info CMAIRPAC, COM3RDFFLEET, CTF 38.

From Sept 20 to Oct 10 3 U.S. Groups containing 9 CV, 5 CVL, 5 BB, 19 Cruisers will base ENIWETOK. 2 U.S. Groups containing 6 CV, 2 CVL, 4 BB 12 Cruisers will base LEYTE. After October 10 for indefinite period proportions will be approximately reversed. In addition 5 British CV and 3 CVL will base ENIWETOK.

Para. These estimates are for planning purposes only. They may change radically at any time before or during forthcoming operations. Composition of Groups as to identity of specific ships can not be provided at this time.

21 0645 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMSUBPAC info ADCCOMINPAC, COMINPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, COM5THFLEET, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, JICPOA.

Plans for minefield investigation proposed in your 181445 are approved subject to following qualification of last sentence. Mine detection subs will in emergency be considered available for offensive missions, air sea rescue duties or reconnaissance if necessity arises. ComnPac arrange direct with ComSubsPac for conference if desired.

21 1808 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM7THFLEET info CINCPAC.

My 130751 COMINCH 201819. Request implementation items approved obtaining concurrence of CINCPAC where appropriate.

Para. Request your comment on future submarine requirements SWPA.
Repeated to all addresseees. Reference 26685 of 19 July 1945. It is suggested here to place Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem who now commands the 13th Corps Headquarters in charge of this force upon completion of the scheduled amphibious training of the units you have indicated you desire. This is proposed in order to carry out what is considered are your desires. It is assumed that other reinforcing units for this corps headquarters will be furnished there by you if you intend to use this corps in the role of an Armored Corps. Gillem's Corps is an infantry corps but he happens to be 1 of our best Armored Commanders also. Furnishing reinforcing units requires minor changes to present redeployment schedule in order to meet target date as follows:

A. 1 field artillery battalion (155 Millimeter Gun) (self propelled) will be indirectly redeployed instead of directly redeployed in 9th month.
B. 2 Engineer combat battalions will be indirectly redeployed instead of directly redeployed in 10th month.
C. Indirect shipment remainder reinforcing units will be delayed in order to marry up with this force.

Para. Upon receipt CINCPAC concurrence concerning assault shipping and your comment or concurrence to the above proposal, the necessary implementation here will be accomplished. An early reply would be helpful.

Request USASTAF message no 0313 dated 171643 GCT sent to your headquarters be withdrawn and destroyed and the following substitute therefore: All fighters assigned to USASTAF will be withdrawn from their primary mission of escort and given the mission of counter air force operations of destroying the Japanese air force both in the air and on the ground, attacking airfields and airfield installations, on the dates and at the places requested by Com3rdFleet during the execution OpPlan 9-45. The VLR forces will be employed against major air targets such as aircraft engine plants, propeller plants, and other major industrial areas in the general area and on the same dates requested by Com3rdFleet. Your headquarters will be currently informed as to the names of the places and dates of attack.
VICTORY 135.

CINCPAC CXB-24957 and JCS 201148 refer. I desire a TG charged with the construction and establishment of the artificial harbor project be set up in the immediate future, initially directly under COMINCH AND CNO, later to pass to CINCPAC. This group to be commanded by a young Rear Admiral or a Commodore especially fitted to give energetic direction. Nominations by my headquarters are desired. The staff, which initially need not be large, should include civil engineers and 1 or 2 officers.

COMPHIBSPAC 190220. CINCPAC intends that Commodore Hartley in his capacity as COMSERVDIV 103 command the units of SERVRON 10 at the objective in OLYMPIC. These units will initially be largely those for repair and salvage. COMSERVDIV 103 will be under the operational control of COMPHIBSPAC. Captain Curtis will be assigned to the staff of COMSERVDIV as chief salvage officer.

Operations instructions number 96 issued by Hqters Allied Air Forces SWPA dated 12 July with distribution to officers under my command are objectionable to me in the following respects:
A. They give orders applicable to "All Forces" concerning air sea rescue within the Pacific Ocean Areas.
B. They undertake to prescribe primary air attack areas and to issue orders in connection therewith which affect the operations of the Pacific Fleet while operating within the Pacific Ocean Areas.
Para. It is requested that the Commanding General Allied Air Forces SWPA be directed to refrain from issuing orders which directly or by implication attempt to control the operations of the United States Pacific Fleet or to make area assignments within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

CINCPAC approves procedure COMSERVFOR 7TH FLEET (SERVRON 7) provide petroleum logistics for OLYMPIC amphibious forces assembling in the MANILA AREA. These requirements to be slated by CINCPAC. In addition SERVRON 7 should similarly provide for all other naval forces in the MANILA AREA. Accordingly request deletion of "7th attack Force Afloat" and substitution "Pacific Fleet Units."

Mydis 090901 modified as follows:
- continued -

3402
JULY (GCT)

22 0839 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLEET, COM7THFLEET, COMATRPAC, COMGENFMFPAC, COM5THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMSERVPAC info COMGEN 6TH ARMY, COM3RDFLBFOR, COMGEN5THPHIB-CORPS, CINCPOA PEARL, COM5THPHIBFOR, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COMINCH AND CNO COM7THPHIBFOR, COMGENSERVCOMDFMPAC, MARCOPS, COMGENAAPPOA, CINCPAC, COMGENPOA, CTF 96, CTF 99. (Cont'd)

1. The site presently selected for the NOB is at TARA-MISAKI in KAGOSHIMA BAY.
2. The site presently selected for the Naval Air Base is at MINATO.
3. Insert as paragraph (G): The naval hospitals and naval ammunition Depot will be under the Commandant NOB.

22 1040 CINCPAC ADV to COMGEN USASTAF info COM3RDFLEET.

Concur your 220715. (Ref: 3rd Fleet Coordination.)

22 1149 CINCPAC ADV to COMBATRON 1, COMCRUDIV 16, COMINPAC, COMRAEING 1, COM- SERDIV 104, COMNAVPOR KYUKUSU info COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC, COMGENFEAF, COMGENFEAFAADVON, CTF 99, COMGEN CHINA, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COMSERON 10.

My OpPlan 4-45 will be modified as follows:

(1) Add to Task organization: (N) (TF 95) V. Adm. Oldendorf. With forces assigned.

(2) Change Tasks of 3rd Fleet to read: Attack Japanese naval and air forces; shipping, shipyards, and coastal objectives. Protect sea and air communications along the central Pacific axis.

(3) Modify SubPara 3(N) to read: Maintain control of the EAST CHINA SEA and its western approaches. Interdict to limit of capabilities the movement of hostile naval forces and shipping in the YELLOW SEA, TSUSIMA STRAITS and the southern part of the SEA OF JAPAN. Protect friendly shipping. Cover and defend our positions in the RYUKUS. Provide air-sea rescue services. Support operations of other forces. Conduct minesweeping as directed by CINCPAC.

(4) Add to SubPara 3(X)6: CTF 95 area of military responsibility is that part of the combat area west of the 135th meridian except that the 3rd fleet will enter therein in execution of its assigned tasks upon giving prior notification to forces concerned.

(5) Add new SubPara 3(X)8: For purposes of coordination direct communications between CTF 95 or his subordinate commanders and the commanders of other forces is authorized as at present.

(6) This dispatch is effective 250200 at which time my dispatch 110146 is cancelled.

22 1150 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLEET, COMBATRON 1, CTF 95, CTF 39, CTG 99.1, CTG 30.5, CTG 30.9 info COMINCH, CTF 99, CINCPAC PEARL, COMATRPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMRESFOR, CINCPAC, COMGENFEAF, COMGENFEAFAADVON, COMSERON 10.

Effective 250200 GCT forces assigned to operational control 3rd Flt will comprise those units now assigned to TF-37, TF-38, TG-30.6, TG-30.8, TG-30.9 less TU-30.9. Forces assigned to operational control CTF 95 (V Adm Oldendorf) will comprise those units now assigned to TF-32, TF-39, TF-95, TG-99.1, TG 30.5, TU 30.9.4 plus such other combatant ships now

- continued -
in Leyte which were formerly assigned to Com3rdFlt and which are not included in the forces listed.

Para. For the information of both commanders the Kasaan Bay and Salamamu ASW groups are assigned to CTF 94.

Para. Rotation of CVE to TG-30.3 or to TU-32.1.2 may be arranged directly by CTG-32.1.

Para. This reassignment does not affect assignments to Com3rdFlt contained in my 220259 and 220612. Assignment of additional ships or transfers between 3rd Fleet and TF 95 will be controlled by CINCPAC. Com3rdFilt make recommendations when and as necessary.

22 1915 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, CINCPAC, CG AAF, COFS ARMY.

Refer WARX 33621 to COMGEN FEAF held by 20 AF Guam and OAHU. For Javaman project in support of OLYMPIC COMGEN AAF has requested assistance from Navy. It is indicated that your approval will be sought on basis project will be under command FEAF and CINCPAC and be self supporting at Bunkhouse and all support operated by OSS personnel to be shipped via Manila. If you approve operation it appears wasteful to ship special facilities for single operation if available at Bunkhouse for temporary use. This applies particularly to LCM, automotive equipment, shops and housing.

Para. Operation is set out in separate message. Facilities requested are 1 LCM(3) and following functional components less personnel: 1 A-3, 1 D-12, 1 E-11, 1 G-8, 1 F12A.

Para. Extensive work on boats required in secluded place for security reasons. Advise whether you can provide all or part of facilities on temporary basis.

22 1921 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAD ADVANCE info CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, CG AAF, COFS ARMY.

Project my 221915 is to destroy Shimonoeki tunnels with 6 drone 85 foot aircraft rescue boats and involves installing JAP SEA truck and luggage disguise which is prefabricated ready to ship. OSS expects to request ISCOM to assign midget Sub-Base on KOTOBU PENINSULA. If Jap marine railway at base can be used, estimated installation time with facilities requested in 1 week per boat. 6 Spare boats and disguise kits being provided.

23 0903 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMIN PAC info COMPHIBSPAC, COM3RD FLEET, COMBATRON 1, ADECOMINPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Upon completion sweeping area JUNEAU continue minesweeping operations in EAST CHINA SEA using those minesweepers which have arrived most recently in combat area. By use of rotational plan of overhaul and rehabilitation it is expected that sweeping will continue indefinitely. Minefield north of area JUNEAU and field in vicinity of SHANGHAI-CHOSEN are desired swept as early as practicable and prior to OLYMPIC. Your 220837 refers.
TOP SECRET. Memorandum for record dated 23 July signed by Major General Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman approved by CINCPAC. On receipt CINCPAC concurrence I will direct ComGen 10 with US Army Forces in the RYUKYUS report to CINCAFPAC effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July which was earliest date acceptable to your representative and other Army conferees.

2.3 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCAFPAC, COMGENPOA, COMGENAIR, COMGEN AAF 10, COMGENSOSCHINA, COMGEN CCC CHINA, COMENTACTCT, WARCOS

TOP SECRET. CFBX 1480

Due to staff conference at Manila 1 August conference at GUAM has been postponed until after 4 August. Message GUAM 202351Z (GCT) refers. Presently plan to leave CHUNGKING 4 August will arrive GUAM late 5 August or early 6 August. Party expected to number about 15 officers and men (including General Simpsons party) Request information as to whether this will be satisfactory. Names of persons composing party will be forwarded later. New Subject: (For WARCOS) Eminently satisfactory is Colonel L. J. Lincoln's presence at this conference He can return with CHINA Theater party.

23 2105 CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ

TOP SECRET. Mapping and photography of JAPAN JCS 756/2 revised by JIC 153/12 is subject your 161208 of May. JIC 153/20 has been approved and is being forwarded you by air mail. Recommendations of OAHU mapping conference 25-29 May were approved and reassignment of responsibilities for mapping photography of Japanese areas to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC mutually with assistance of USASTAF are to be accomplished in accordance with conference agreements.

24 01 40 COMPHIBSPAC to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC/POA ADV HQ

TOP SECRET. In preparation for OLYMPIC it is considered most important that ships assemble early for indoctrination and training. The large numbers involved and the complex organization plus fact that present duties of PhibsPac does not permit tactical training require this receive special attention. It is recommended that main elements of the advance and amphibious forces my serial 000279 of 18 July assemble by 10 September as follows: At LEYTE Gunfire and Covering Force, Escort Carrier Force, Western Attack Force, South Attack Force, 3rd Attack Force. At MANILA 7th Attack Force. In MARIANAS and HAWAI 5th Attack Force. At LEYTE and in HAWAI Reserve Force.

Para. Assembly date of 10 September is approximately 10 days in advance of dates set forth in Joint Staff Study. Submit that complexities of training, loading, rehearsals, movements to loading, rehearsal, and objective areas, to gather with necessary upkeep and logistics require a longer period than at present allowed. If you concur in proposed plan request you submit to CINCPAC for approval.
CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH

24 0636

TOP SECRET. Request by air mail copy JCS 659/3 of 24 March 1944 and by dispatch information as to any JCS decision which places on area commander responsibility over and authority to coordinate sea air rescue within his area.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM3RDFLT, COM7THFLT, COMAIRPAC, COM5THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMGENFMFPAC Info COMINCH & CNO, MARCORPS, CINAPPAC, COMGEN6THMARY, CTF 96, CTF 99, CINCPA PEARL, COMCNPAL, COM3RDHLBPOR, COM5THHLBPOR, COMGEN 5THPHIBCORPS, COM7THHLBPOR, COMGENAIR FOR MID PAC, COMGEN AMFOA, COMGEN SERVCOMDFMFPAC

TOP SECRET. Para (B) bydis 090001 modified to extend that the OTJB at MANOSE RIVE (or such other place on the West Coast as may be selected) will remain in support of V Phib Corps as long as needed by the Corps. On or before withdrawal of the V Phib Corps from KYUSHU this CUB will pass to control of Commandant NOB.

24 1349

CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMSERVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, COM7THFLT, COM5THFLT, COMSERV10, COMSERV7THFLT

CX 28065 TOP SECRET. Concur in change outlined your 220742Z (GCT) July in reply to our 162111. Servon 7 will provide for all naval forces that assemble in the MANILA area. Request Servon 7 be advised of substation additional requirements for inclusion in AFPAC plates.

24 0325

COMBATRON-l to COMESCAR, USS TENNESSEE, COM FAW-1, COMCRUDIV-16, COMINEPAC, COMSERV DIV 104, COMNAVFOR RYUKYUS Info ALL TF, TG COMS PAC, COM3RD & 7THFLTS, COMGENFEAFADV, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINAPPAC, COMGENFEAF, COMGEN CHINA, COMINCH, COMPHILSEAFRON.

Organization TF 95. 95.1 TENNESSEE force Flagship Captain Heffernan. 95.2 EASY striking Group RAdm Lowe. 95.3 Heavy striking Group V.Adm Oldendorf. 95.4 Mine Group RAdm Sharp. 95.5 Base Covering Group R.Adm Cobbs. 95.6 OKINAWA Logistic Group Comdr Ueliher. 95.7 Philippine Training Group, R.Adm McCormick. 95.8 ESCOVFOR R.Adm Durgin. 95.9 Fleet Air Wing 1, R.Adm PERRY. This dispatch effective 250200 GCT.

24 0850

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBATRON 1, info CRUDIVS 16, COMINCH.

CTF 95 230415. When RFS direct R.Adm Low with the same force as in preceding operation proceed to conduct shipping sweep in area west of Long125-00E between Lat. 30-00N and 32-30 N. Avoid mine restricted area in SHANGHAI-CHUSAN area. Keep Com3rdflt, COMGENFEAF, COMGENCHINA and CTF 99 informed of movements this force.

23 1226

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINAPPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT, COMSERVPAC.

Request your comments on COMSERVPACS 210215. CINCPAC considers a total of 4 strips on 2 or 3 fields required to support lst Marine Air Wing.
Referring to item H your 130751 and my 201819 the requirements of my 181305 September 1944 and myser 00107 of 12 January 1944 for maintenance of definite numbers cruisers, destroyers and submarines in 7th Fleet hereby cancelled.

V-273.

As a basis of discussion with the Soviet General Staff on the subject of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made the following proposal in connection with U.S. Naval and Air Operations when and if RUSSIA enters the war against JAPAN:

A. U.S. Naval surface forces may operate without restriction in the seas of JAPAN and OKHOTSK.

B. U.S. Submarines may operate without restrictions in the SEAS OF JAPAN and OKHOTSK south and east of a line connecting following points: coast of KOREA at latitude 38 north thence to latitude 40 north longitude 135 east thence to latitude 45-45 north longitude 140 east thence east along that latitude.

C. U.S. Air Forces will operate without restriction south and east of a line connecting following points: CAPE LOPATKA-west to a point at latitude 51-10 longitude 147 degrees-thence to point latitude 45-45 longitude 144-20 thence to point latitude 45-45 longitude 139-30 thence to point latitude 41-20 longitude 133-20 - thence westward to SEISHIN KOREAN-thence north to railroad at KOREAN border-thence westward along railroad to YUNGI and CHANGCHUN-thence along the river to LIACYUAN KAILU and CHIHFEING-thence along the railroad through TOJUN, PACCHANG, WANCHUAN, TOTUNG, FENGCHEN, TSING to JWEIJSU-thence northwest to the border of outer MONGOLIA.

D. The location of these lines may be changed from time to time by mutual agreement as deemed necessary or desirable.

Para. U.S. Submarines and air operations north and west of these lines will be coordinated with the RUSSIANS and similarly their submarine and air operations south and east of these lines will be coordinated with U.S.

Para. Your comment is requested to arrive terminal by 260600Z (GCT).

NOTE (On Originator) - call sign JEBG (The station from which this dispatch was received) has been used on dispatches originated by COMINCH AND CNO and JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - Location is POTSDAM, GERMANY.
25 0425 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMPHIBSPAC info COM5THFLEET.

Your 240650 seaplane operations during OLYMPIC will be conducted in KOSHIKI and ARIAKE WAN AREAS as determined by COM5THFLEET. Concur in desirability of establishment of tender based seaplane operating area adjacent to other naval activities. Final determination of site upon recommendations of commanders concerned.

25 0904 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

Your 241824 (V 273). Strongly urge that decision be reached as to areas in which Pacific Fleet will control and be responsible for safety of shipping (including such part of the sea route from the United States to Russia through the SEA of OKhotsk as may be a U.S. Pacific Fleet responsibility) and that RUSSIAN submarines be excluded from that area. Difficulties of communications, language and unaccustomed recognition procedures make it extremely inadvisable permit RUSSIAN submarines operate in areas where United States ships and aircraft are escorting shipping.

Para. The boundary proposed for United States submarines is satisfactory.

Para. It is recommended that since the ports railroads and rivers listed in paragraph C of V 273 as the Air Force boundary are themselves centers of target concentrations they be assigned definitely to the United States or RUSSIA in all cases.

25 0907 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM5THFLEET info COM5THFLEET, COMPHIBSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL CINCPPAC APO, COMSERVPAC.

Your 240358 and 222354. It is expected that COMSERVDIV 103, Commo. Hartley will be responsible for other logistic activities in the objective area as well as for repairs and salvage as indicated in my 220440. Captain Curtis will be assigned to his staff. He will be assigned the CAMPBELL (CGC-AGC) as flagship and with adequate assistants to permit him to discharge these duties. It is expected that he will remain in the area as COMSERVDIV 103. As such he will be under the operational control of COM5THFLEET after departure of COM5THFLEET. The Army Sub Area petroleum officer may accompany Commodore Hartley or Admiral Turner as arranged by the latter. The assignment of the SPENCER (CGC) and INGHAM (CGC) will be determined later.

25 1009 CINCPAC to WARCOS info CINCPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

CRECO, 28231.
Concur with Joint Chiefs of Staff V-273 24th.

25 1011 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGEN 10, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMGENAMIDPAC, COMGENAFESPAC.

CX-28232.
Reference memorandum for record, dated 23 July 1945, relating to RYUKYUS, signed by Major General Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman, approved by CINCPAC with the word "Administrative" changed to "Operational" on page 2, para 3A(1)(A)1. CINCPAC ADV in his 240317/z (GCT) has approved memorandum.
CINCAP PAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, USASTAF, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGEN-AFPDA, AFMIDPAC, COMGEN PEARL.

Subject is JAVAMAN project reference WX 33621 and COMINCH 221915/Z (GCT) and 221921/Z. Request your concurrence in proposed operational project now assigned to FEAF for execution. Target date later to be determined will precede OLYMPIC target date.

WARCOS to CINCAP PAC ADVANCE info COMGEN AFMIDPAC - COMGEN AFMIDPAC PASSED TO CINCFOA BOTH HEADQUARTERS.

WARX 31108.

A study is now undergoing priority consideration wherein ATC facilities (Aircraft crews and maintenance personnel) of the Atlantic be moved to Pacific beginning in August.

Para. New grand totals 4 engine transport aircraft to be in the Pacific under this study will be: 373 in August, 375 in September, 399 in October, 453 in November, 537 in December, 600 in January, 655 in February, 707 in March.

Para. 2 plans being considered. Plan 1 is to base majority of ATC HAWAII with personnel fed to that point by water transportation. Plan 2 is through movement by air from West Coast. Ultimate destination to be PHILIPPINES, LEYTE or MANILA or both.

Para. Shipping implications and comparison of net Pacific gain against new Atlantic loss will be resolved here.

Para. Needed without delay is estimate of theaters ability to:

Para. A. Receive via air total 7600 personnel in August, 18000 in Sept, 28000 in October, 39000 in November, 46000 in December, 55000 in January, 61000 in February, and 67000 in March.

Para. B. Provide holding area in Hawaiian department to accommodate 12500.

Para. C. Provide accomodations for greatly increased permanent personnel at HICKAM. (Assuming plan 1 above is accepted)

Para. D. Provide terminal facilities in PHILIPPINES and assume full responsibility for passengers upon landing, to include necessary ground transportation.

Para. E. Provide storage and disbursing facilities for ATC total POL requirements of 41000 short tons in August building up to 115000 in March.

Para. F. Provide service forces to support such increase.

Para. Directly related and in amplification this problem is radio DTG 111617 of 11 July 45 (dispatched via Navy channels).

Para. For COMGEN AFMIDPAC only. This is ATC augmentation message to be brought to attention of Colonel Hobson, OPD, now TD in Pacific which was subject of earlier communication. Hobson to extend TD LA Hawaii and arrange TWX with WD for further details of necessary. Extreme size of backlog on West Coast forseen between now and March 1946 is causing great concern here.

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCRAC ADVANCE HQTRS.

Ur 240636. Copies of JCS 659/1 and 659/3 being forwarded airmail. No subsequent JCS action modifies paragraph 3 of 659/1 which states "operational control of Air Sea Rescue activities and facilities is a responsibility of theater or area commanders."
25 2256 COMGENUSASTAF to JEBG(FOTSDAM, GERMANY) info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC.

Concur with Joint Chiefs of Staff V-273, 20-4th. Recommend that targets lying along outlined air boundary be assigned to either RUSSIANS or United States.

26 0149 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMGEN TEN info COMINCH AND CNO, CINCAFPAC, CTF 95, COMGENAFMIDPAC, COMDT NOB OKINAWA, COMGENFESWESPAC, COM3RDFLT, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMGEN USASTAF, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT.

Effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July report to CINCAFPAC with all United States Army Forces under your command. At that time control of United States held positions in the RYUKYUS will be governed by JCS 181409 July and memorandum for record dated 23rd July as approved by CINCPAC 240317 and CINCAFPAC CX 28232 (DTG 251011).

26 0150 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info COMGEN TEN, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMGENAFMIDPAC COMGENFESWESPAC, HOUSSOS SWPA.

Your 250847 concur. Copies of memorandum distributed to naval service will have change incorporated.

26 1225 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMNORPAC, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

TOP SECRET. Cominch & CNO 251750 request your comment and recommendations as suggestions as to how CINCPAC should exercise control. Expedite reply.

26 1514 RISSEL JOINT SECURITY CONTROL (MARSHALL), CINCAFPAC, Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, COMGEN USFCT

TOP SECRET. WARX 38701 Following for your information in implementation planning PASTEL. (A) Chinese underground SHANGHAI presently under United States control. Includes important employers and labor, steamer lines, street railways, harbor activities, public utilities plus 15,000 coastal pirates. (B) ComNavGroup CHINA on 14 July proposed beginning training within 6 weeks 1500 key SHANGHAI personnel for intelligence sabotage Jap installations and protection of port against Jap sabotage. (C) COMINCH concurring directs ComNavGroup CHINA that it be "accomplished at expense of your other obligations unless it has sufficient importance to ComGen USFCT to carry increase in theater ceilings on personnel and freight in order to meet a target date for completion, which date is a matter for his decision" Evaluation follows. (A) Sequence of actions if taken and date set by ComGen USFCT will bear on enemy estimate PASTEL. (B) Assistance provided by CINCAFPAC or CINCPAC to above projects will accelerate and augment appearance your GIOTIMAVS SHANGHAI area in accordance PASTEL. (C) May be possible to relate pirate activities to those of TF 95 in operations EAST CHINA SEA. Radio traffic between GUAM and HOCHWAN could support this relation. (D) If attention SHANGHAI area maintained or exaggerated after X-55 per PASTEL special means implementation by Joint Security Control must be coordinated appropriately.
for U. S. aircraft to attack targets or make reconnaissance flights north of the boundary line coordination would be effected by local liaison and within 24 hours after application. It was further agreed that position of the line would be reconsidered if communications proved too slow to effect prompt coordination.

Para 4th Question- Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 July 1945?

Para 4th Answer- The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with Military Operations of the Soviet Union against JAPAN, to establish liaison groups between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison groups with General MacArthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.

Para American Liaison Groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the FAR EAST, MARSHALL VASSILIEVSKI, in Khabarovsk, and with the Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yemesh in Vladivostok.

Para. The Soviet Command is ready to accept the Radio-Teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.

Para Action- Agreed with the understanding that Liaison would be effected by the commanders in the field without reference to WASHINGTON and MOSCOW.

Para 5th Question- it is assumed that, after D-Day, Soviet or U. S. air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or U. S. ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet Aircraft:

Para 5th Answer- The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above mentioned ships and planes.

Para, For the purpose we can designate:
SubPara (a) Naval ports: in the Japanese Sea, port NAHODKA (American Strat); in the OKhotsk and BERING SEA REGIONS-NIKOLAEVSK, on the AMUR, and PETROPAVLOVSK, on KAMCHATKA.
SubPara (b) Airfields: in the region of VLADIVOSTOK, in the region of ALEXANDROVSK on SAKHALIN ISLAND and in the region of PETROPAVLOVSK on KAMCHATKA.

Para Action - Agreed with the understanding that the method of identification of damaged aircraft arriving at Soviet fields would be established by the Commanders in the Field.

26 1559 COMGENAIR(POTSDAM) to COMGEN USASTAF info CINCPAC, CINCPAC, AGWAR FOR CASAIR.
26 1559 COMGENAIR (POTSDAM) to COMGEN USA STAF info CINCPAC, CINC PAC, AGWAR FOR CASAIR.

Victory 343 BG 400

In connection with planning for program in event of a Japanese capitulation it is planned to implement fully the B-29 program as now scheduled, the units to be deployed as early as practicable. You should prepare for rearrangement of the deployment so as to deploy the 40 B-29 groups in OKINAWA, PHILIPPINES, MARIANAS and for 2 groups in the ALEUTIANS.

26 1951 CNO to COMWESSEAFRON info COMNORPAC, COM 13, COM 17, CINC PAC BOTH HQ.

Desire that you expedite lend lease transfer preparation of vessels scheduled for MILEPOST and that you sail them to cold bay as early as practicable maintaining satisfactory standards as regards readiness for transfer. Advise COMINCH and CNO and info addressees of revised estimated date arrival COLD BAY all ships which have not yet departed SEATTLE. Action being taken to advance date of arrival SEATTLE remaining vessels not yet available to you.

26 2020 COMINCH to CINC PAC ADVANCE info CINC PAC PEARL, CINCLANT, COM 13, COM WESSEAFRON, COMNORPAC, COM NAVDET FT RANDALL, COMPASEAFRON.

Expedite movement and delivery vessels scheduled for transfer under MILEPOST anticipating arrival and transfer dates as much as practicable. Advise interested addressee new arrival dates when known.

27 0019 CINCPOA PEARL to CINC POA ADVANCE.

It is the opinion of communication officers here that northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO are included in the directed beam of OWI SAIPAN station. The proposed station if placed in ATTU would be no closer to the population center of objective area than is OWI SAIPAN. Interrogation of FWS has so far failed to indicate any general knowledge of operation of propaganda stations of OWI. FWS has been unable to detect any difference between the OWI and OSS programs except the pretense of OSS that it comes from a Japanese source. Control of the station could be exercised only by assignment of FWS indoctrinated control officer with freedom of communication with CINCPAC staff. Conclude that station is unessential and recommend that it not be authorized. This refers to your 261225.

27 0250 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMINCH, CNO, CIN CPA F PAC.

CINCPAC has no technical data in connection with the JAVAMAN project. However from his general knowledge and based on Pacific Fleet experience with similar projects he is doubtful of the value of the project when measured in terms of the naval support eventually required to place the boats in the desired location. CINCPAC requests as complete information as possible on this project and especially as to naval personnel ships or boats that may be required and how it is proposed to move the boats from OKINAWA to destination.

Para. If it is decided to carry out the project it is recommended that CINCPAC assign a site on OKINAWA and provide the resources required. CINCPAC will provide such material as they Army cannot provide to the extent to which such material is available from naval sources and excess to project of higher priority.
In order to facilitate economy in use of personnel and resources and in view vastly improved strategic situation it is recommended that the category of defense in the main islands of the Hawaiian Group be reduced to category A and that in view of his continuing responsibilities as area commander CINCPOA be authorized to determine the degree of implementation required with respect to fighter protection, anti-aircraft readiness, mobile combat troops and harbor defenses.

Para. It is also pertinent at this time to consider the necessity for retention of the powers conferred on the Military Commander of the Territory of Hawaii by executive order 9489 of 24 October 1944. Lieut. General Richardson COMGENPOA considers that they should be retained. Having overall responsibility for the security and safety of the territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean Areas, I feel that the state of the war is now such that continuation of the powers vested in Military authority by that order is no longer justified and according recommend that it be suspended or revoked.

1. The purpose of the FORT BAYARD operation is to open a sea supply route to a temporary base in CHINA, augmenting hump tonnage, to assist in supporting further operations to the maximum extent possible.

2. The FORT BAYARD area has the functions of furnishing a port for unloading and airstrips for distributing car 0. Intelligence information at hand and a study of aerial photography indicates that these facilities are neither ideal nor immediately available. The airstrip will need matting and possibly rebuilding of subgrade, the beaches in the river are wide mud banks drying at low tide and ship berths appear desirable to handle the required tonnage, the hydrography is far from ideal; pilots may be required for river navigation, present indications appear to dictate a limited draft of ships to 19 feet although the 1st 3 ships are loaded to 22 feet and must cross the bar at high tide. FORT BAYARD as a port, despite difficulties, is most desirable as a step toward later operations.

3. As an alternate operation, or as a preliminary phase of opening FORT BAYARD, WEIRKOW ISLAND PRN(10906)9598913509X FURTASLP CINCPAC considered. This island is now in Chinese hands and the abandoned runstrip appears easy to reconstruct and lengthen. The harbor appears suitable to anchor AKs fully loaded. The sandy beach in the harbor appears useable for all types of landing craft at all tides.

4. Air cover entirely adequate for either operation will be furnished from a field now in our hands at PAKHOI (109-04 21-29). Preliminary plans envisage using 4 P-38 planes giving continuous convoy cover 100 miles west of the 114 meridian. If convoy arrives at 114 meridian at night fall this should provide daylight cover west of the 114.
5. There is reported a considerable number of enemy troops in INDO CHINA and YO HAINAN ISLAND with minor enemy naval installations. In order to interdict the movement of these troops by water and to protect the port area it is believed that a squadron of PT boats would be extremely valuable.

6. The plan involving use of the island could be put into effect almost immediately, after both PAKHOI and WEICHOW are in our control. Enemy resistance may delay occupation of LUICHOW PENINSULA and it is desirable that time be allowed in the FORT BAYARD OPERATION after occupation to survey the river, install navigational aids and unloading facilities before AKS are called up. Our thought is that WEICHOW would be used to accept shipping if LUICHOW is not secured by 20 August and shift thereafter made as soon as possible to FORT BAYARD.

7. For the WEICHOW operation it is assumed that the convoys would proceed south of HAINAN ISLAND. Intelligence sources do not indicate that there are any minefields in TONKING GULF, however HAINAN STRAIT was once reportedly mined. The mines in this strait are reported to have broken loose and carried into TONKING GULF. There has been no friendly mining since May 1944 at which time HAIPHONG HARBOR area had 90 day mines laid by the 14th Air Force.

8. Request your consideration to furnishing a naval command to assist in the operation and to be responsible for the following:
   A. To provide required surface convoy protection and minesweeping,
   B. Assume the responsibility of channel and harbor surveying, installing navigational aids and piloting to anchorage area,
   C. The installation and operation of port protection facilities, such as air, anti-aircraft, and harbor defense boats,
   D. Furnishing qualified personnel and equipment for functioning of port director in the harbor including maintenance of all landing and other craft,
   E. Provide the necessary command and auxiliary units including housekeeping with 30 days consumables for naval personnel in the area and shipping to move personnel and equipment supplies by the Navy,
   F. Functional components as outlined in our CFB 1007 (Top secret not to all) including 1 Stevedore company and 1 water front engineer company. These units plus pontoon cells for 2 ship berths are considered necessary. Naval engineers requested could install docks and erect the other naval facilities outlined,
   G. CHINA THEATER will assume responsibility for supply of all class 1, 3, and common usage ammunition supplies for naval personnel,
   H. Material and logistical support required for port operations would be responsibility of the naval command.

9. Requested are your comments on the above prior to the departure of CHINA THEATER representatives for conference at your headquarters. This is a planning message only and is not a request or requisition for assignment of naval resources.
27 2111 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.


Target date all personnel and material 25 August. CNO will assemble RUSSIAN speaking liaison teams Washington prior Target Date. Soviets have agreed in principle establishment facilities and are ready to accept material now. Items still undertermined are frequencies and detailed arrangement as to entr.u.s. personnel. Unless otherwise advised assume you will direct COMSERVPAC provide all communication equipment and communication personnel.

Para 1st Question - has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish U.S. weather liaison groups in PETROPAVLOVSK and Khabarovsk as presented to GENERALISSIMUS STALIN by President Truman on 23 July 1945.

Para 1st Answer - The Soviet Command agrees to establish in PETROPAVLOVSK and Khabarovsk radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the Radio stations and equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose.

Para As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal of experience in working with American radio stations.

Para In addition to these 2 stations we shall increase the network of local stations in order to give better information on weather.

Para action - Agreed as above except that the radio stations to be established in PETROPAVLOVSK and Khabarovsk are to be manned by U.S. Personnel.

Para 2nd Question - U.S. Naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the seas of OKHOTSK and JAPAN. U.S. Submarine forces will operate without restriction in the seas of OKHOTSK and JAPAN, south and east of a line established by connecting and following points: coast of KOREA at 38-00 North, thence to 40-00 north 135-00 east, thence to 45-45 north 140-00 east, thence along the parallel of 45-45 north. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U.S. Submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of Naval operations?

Para 2nd Answer - separate zones of Naval and Air operations are to be
set up for the U. S. and the USSR in the SEA OF JAPAN. The boundary
between these zones will be along the lines connecting CAPE BOLTINA on the
cost of KOREA to point 40-00 north 135-00 east to point 45-45 north 140-00
east; thence along the parallel 45-45 north to the line connecting CAPE
CRILLON (KONDO) (on the southern tip of southern SAKHALIN) with CAPE SOYA
MISSAKI (SOYASKI) (on the northern tip of HOKKAIDO).

Para. The USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line.
U.S. Naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This
line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine
craft and for aviation.

Para. Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line
may be subject to change.

Para. U. S. Naval and air operations north of this boundary line and
Soviet Naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject
to coordination.

Para. In the SEA OF OKHOTSOK there shall be a zone of mutual operations
for the naval and air forces of the U. S. and the Soviet Union. Operations
in the OKHOTSOK SEA will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.

Para. In the BERING SEA there shall be a zone of mutual operations
of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation
bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from CAPE DEZHNEV to
DIOMEDE ISLAND and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of
the USSR and the U. S. to parallel 51-30 north and thence through 50-35 north
157-00 east; thence to 49-50 north 156-20 east and thence along the parallel
49-50 north to the 4th KURILE STRAIT.

Para. The remainder of the BERING SEA as well as bordering regions
of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the U. S. Fleet.

Para. Action - Agreed with the understanding that operations by U. S.
and Soviet Naval and air forces in the SEA OF OKHOTSOK and the BERING SEA
would be coordinated by mutual understanding and cooperation.

Para 3rd Question - U. S. Air Forces will operate without restriction
south and east of the following line: CAPE LOPATKA, west to point at 51-10
north 147-00 east, thence to point at 45-45 north, 144-20 east, thence to
point at 45-45 north 139-30 east, thence to point at 41-20 north 133-20
east, thence westward to SEISHIN, KOREA, thence north to railroad at KOREAN BORDER
thence westward along railroad to YUNGKI and CHANGHUM, thence along the
river to LIANYUAN, KAGLU and CHINNENG, thence along the railroad through
TOLUN, PAOCHEANG, WANCHUAN, TATUNG, FENGCHEN, TSINING to KWEISUI, thence
northwest to the border of OUTER MONGOLIA. This boundary will be subject
to later change as the situation may require. U. S. Air operations north
and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this
boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff
have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations?

Para 3rd Answer - The boundary line between operational zones of the
U. S. and Soviet Air Forces in KOREA and MANCHURIA shall be as follows:
CAPE BOLTINA, CHANGCHUN, LIANYUAN, KAILU, CHINNENG, PEKING, TATUNG and
thence along the southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA.

Para. U. S. air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line
must be coordinated.

Para Action - Agreed with the understanding that when necessary for
JULY (GCT)

28 0108 CINCPA ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC, COM3EDFLT, COMMORPAC, COMSERVFAC, info COMINCH COMWESSEAPRON, COMPHIBSPAC, CINCAPPAC, COMCARDIV 23, COMCARDIV 26.

Be prepared initiate operations under concept my serial 0005067 of 26 May on short notice. Copy will be delivered COMCARDIVS 23 and 26 at ENIWETOK.

28 0457 CINCAPPAC to COMGENAFMIDPAC info WARCOS, CINCPA ADVANCE HQ.

GX 28945

Request that you express direct to the Chief of Staff with information copy here your views regarding Hawaiian Defense matters that were raised in CINCPA advance dispatch 270253.

25 0740 COMPHIBSPAC to COM3THFLT info CINCPAC, CINCAPPAC, CG 6THARMY, COM 3RD, 5TH, 7TH PHIBFORC, COMPHIBGRPS 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14.

Enclosure (A) my serial 000279 of 13 July. The task of capturing outlying islands to south and southwest of KYUSHU for establishment of air warning and fighter direction stations is now assigned to the western attack force mounting the 40th Infantry Division, in addition to previously assigned tasks. The Southern Attack Force mounting the 158th RCT is assigned the tasks of landing on and securing northern TENEGA SHIMA if ordered and of reinforcing elements of the 6th Army ashore as directed. In order to avoid confusion with the term "Follow-Up Echelon" which the Army desires used in place of "Garrison Echelon", the follow-up force (TF 49) is renamed the reinforcement force. In Para 11 the reserve force is erroneously termed the reserve attack force.

28 0812 CINCPA ADVANCE to COMGENCHINA info COMINCH, CINCAPPAC, COM7THFLT.

The difficulties in connection with the FORT BAYARD operation outlined in your 270800 appear to be greater than were originally envisaged to a degree which prompts me to invite attention to the last sentence of my 130228 June. From the information now presented it appears that the WEICHOW Project would be a preliminary to the FORT BAYARD project and that the total resources involved would be greater than could be spared without undue detriment to OLYMPIC. It would probably be infeasible to abandon WEICHOW until long after FORT BAYARD is occupied. However, I will of course, be glad to learn more about the project and make this comment before our pending conference only because you so request.

Para. Although a technical factor which can be adjusted it should be noted that while FORT BAYARD borders on the Pacific Ocean areas WEICHOW ISLAND and the TONG KIng GULF are in the southwest pacific area.

28 0849 CINCAPPAC to WARCOS info CINCPA ADVANCE, COMGENAFMIDPAC.

GX 29008.

I recommend most strongly the abolition within the U. S. sectors of the Pacific theater of the area boundaries. They have long ceased to serve any useful purpose and now seriously complicate the proper strategical and tactical handling of forces in this single theater of operations. They have long been ignored as delimiting anything beyond an academic exercise of overall authority and represent the complete opposite to the service unification of command which has now become the operational basis in the theater. CINCPA ADVANCE 270253 refers.
Your 112340 not to all. CINCAFPAC, COMGEN6THARIIY and COMPHIBSPAC agree on responsibility for loading OLYMPIC forces as follows. COMGEN6THARIIY has overall responsibility for loading from SWPA all army troops plus those navy and marine troops who will be under 6th Army control at objective. CINCPAC has overall responsibility for loading all navy and marine troops from POA plus those navy and marine troops from SWPA who will be under CINCPAC control at objective. COMGEN6THARIIY has responsibility for loading all army troops from POA exclusive of RYUKUS and will load as arranged with COMGEN6THARIIY. COMGEN6THARMY has responsibility for loading all army troops both ground and air from RYUKUS and will load as arranged with COMGEN6THARIIY and COMGEN6THARIIY. CINCAFPAC is amending OLYMPIC operations instructions to include COMGEN6THARMY responsibility and amending COMGEN6THARIIY responsibility as indicated herein. COMPHIBSPAC has responsibility in loading all assault shipping insofar as safe and proper deliver of all assault forces to objective beaches is concerned. Joint planning by COMPHIBSPAC and COMGEN6THARMY for loading assault forces progressing very satisfactorily. This despatch has been agreed to by all concerned. Speed letter in amplification follows.

Subject is assembly for OLYMPIC. COMPHIBSPAC 240140, COM5THFLT 250245, CINCPAC 260740. Not to all or needed. CINCPAC has approved to the extent of operationally practicable, the following plan for assembly except that no prior commitments of ships will be altered to meet assembly dates:. A. Major units gunfire and covering force assemble LETHTE 10 Sept. B. ESCARFOR LETTE 15 Sept. C. 3rd Western, and Southern Attack Forces LETTE 10 AWTH. E. 5th Attack Force Marianas, Hawaii and Manila 10 Sept. F. Reserve force LETTE and HAWAII 10 Sept.

Para. Ships having prior commitments which will delay them will join their respective forces as soon after assembly dates as practicable.

Para. Upon assembly ship movements will be controlled by respective force commanders subject to general instructions from higher authority.

Para. Initial logistics indoctrination and training should be stressed in early employment of forces.

Para. It should be understood that PHIBFOR commanders are responsible for assembly and training of ships.

Northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO are within directed beam of OWI SAIPAN station. Proposed station in ALEUTIANS would be no closer to population center of objective area than is SAIPAN. Your 251750. Anticipate increased communication activity ALEUTIAN and consequent need for present and possibly additional facilities there. For these reasons plus uncertainly as to how BROADAIXE/PASTEL could be supported thereby consider establishment OSS/OWI broadcast from ALEUTIANS undesirable.
For BPFLO. It is intended to discuss the following subjects at Guam during visit of Commander in Chief.

Para. 1. The inclusion of CVL's as a group in tactical cooperation with CV's.

Para. 2. How British Task Groups will be required to operate in October onwards including the scale of effort.

Para. 3. Long term requirements of British Task Groups.

Para. 4. Facilities at Eniwetok as a result of report from Tyne CINCPAC ADV HQ 07/04/15 refers.

Para. 5. Routing policy. My 200619 refers.

Para. 6. Relief for late commander. COYRT your 2309/15 refers.

Take appropriate action accordance COMINCH AND CNO 27/21/11 passed you separately keeping CINCPAC advised. COMSERVPAC request from CNO such personnel and material required and not presently available for this utilization. CNO hereby requested advise CINCPAC of all action taken to implement.

Para. Unless I receive other instructions I will adjust plans to make all early landings contingent operations with timing to be determined later and will if requested make 3 MarDivs available to Army for Japan because it appears impossible for Army to move sufficient divisions rapidly without some marines.

Para. The foregoing concessions will permit reaching an agreement unless unforeseen demands are made. His plans are being made and ours will be expanded to cover Korea and China insofar as troop allocations are concerned.

Do not concur that landing of marines or occupying airfields must be deferred until troops land in strength. No commitment of that nature is to be made as such action is likely to be necessary in order to exercise essential control. The naval officer on the spot must be free to act expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and judgement to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussions.

Para. 2nd Para your 300237 not entirely clear. It is interpreted to mean that landing operations by naval forces will be contingent upon the situation which exists when naval forces arrive in Japanese ports and
McMorris to Sherman (Cont'd)

Developments which immediately follow with the time of any such landing if made to be determined by events as they unfold. If this interpretation is correct then concur otherwise need amplification.

Para. In view prospective requirements for marines elsewhere it appears here that no more should be committed in Japan proper than is essential for early stages of occupation. Some will doubtless be required initially. You are authorized to make up to 3 divisions available for early and rapid movement into Japan, if your discussions there indicate advisability of so doing.

Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequent directives giving CINCPAC a free hand until CINCAFPAC arrives in Japan with his forces any agreements or understanding you make should carry a proviso for revision of any part that might prove to be inconsistent with any later directive issued by JCS.

COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, COMTHFLT, COMGENCHINACT, COMGENCCCT, COMGENDSO.

CFBX 2231

Difficulties in connection with operations against Liuchow Peninsula is subject your 281202Z Guam refers. Difficulties of Fort Bayard operation are no more serious than initially envisaged. Our CFBX 1803 was for planning purposes and information only. The operation will be undertaken with resources available or being made available to this theater. This headquarters if fully in sympathy with presently projected strategy and will not expect equipment or resources which would in any way jeopardize Olympic.

Para. Weichow Island is an alternate operation. It will only be undertaken if Japs prove unexpectedly stubborn in Bayard area and it becomes apparent that as a result there will be a protracted delay in securing that port. This headquarters sincerely appreciates your interest in theaters operations.

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Project as outlined in your 120446 has been approved by Soviets and action initiated. CNO will provide all material and personnel required for the establishment of the Siberian facilities. Additions to and revisions of this project brought about by CINCPAC/POA serial 0005762 of 20 July and my 272111 have not yet been submitted to Soviets and are to be considered separately. Advise COMSERVPAC to take no further action.

CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMSERVPAC info CINCPAC Pearl HQ.

Comply with directive to COMSERVPAC in last sentence COMINCH 302029 passed you separately. See CINCPAC 120446 passed you.
31 1509 CINCAPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGEN FEAF ADVON, COMGEN FEAF.

CX 29846.

Not specifically included in Marine Air Units available operational control CINCAPAC (reference memorandum for record GUAM conference 21-23 July) is headquarters 2 Marine Air Wing which normally control as integrated force all RYUKYUS Marine Air Defense units. Without above Headquarters these units would operate directly under headquarters 7th Air Force OKINAWA. Your intentions regarding operational control headquarters 2nd Marine Air Wing requested. Pending instructions COMAF 7 exercises operational control Marine Air Defense units through 2nd Marine Air Wing Headquarters.

01 1310 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed in principle that that part of the southwest pacific area lying south of the boundary described below shall pass from U.S. to British Command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreements of the Australian, New Zealand and Dutch governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected. "Beginning on the coast of INDO CHINA at 16 degrees north; thence to intersect at 07-40 north latitude 116-00 east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North BORNEO; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05-00 north longitude 127-00 east; thence east to 05-00 north 130-00 east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00 east; thence generally southeast to 02-20 south 146-00 east; thence east to 02-20 south 159-00 east; thence south". What are your views concerning the disposition of EMIRAU which lies north of this British area of responsibility.

02 0311 CINCAPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMGENUSASTAF, WARCOS, COMGENPEAF.

CX 30145.

Agreements for coordination of air operations, signed by Sherman, Chamberlin, and Lindsay, dated 1 August 1945, approved with following change in sub paragraphs 1 A and B, X Ray minus 7 should be X Ray minus 8. Copies for local distribution will be changed.

02 0547 COM7THFLT to COMSUBS 7THFLT, COMPHILSEAFRON info COMINCH AND CNO, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC AND TGC 7THFLEET.

Effective 15 August 1945 COMSUBS 7THFLEET will direct Commander Submarines Advance Base: A. Navy 3002. And Navy recuperation Camp. Navy 3002. To report to COMPHILSEAFRON for matters pertaining to defense, maintenance and construction. The operational and administrative control will remain with Commander Submarines 7th Fleet. The intent of this directive is to establish a command relationship between COMPHILSEAFRON and COMSUBS 7THFLEET analogous to that outlined in general order number 21.

AUGUST
02 0710 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSEVPAC, COMGENPOA, COMGENFMFPAC info CINCAFPAC, COMGEN 10TH ARMY, COMMARIANAS, CINCPA POA PEARL HQ.

Cancel CINCPA POA PEARL 110149.

Para. 1. Former ICERBEG reserve now redesignated Marianas OLYMPIC reserve. Action addressees will reconstitute this reserve by 15 October with same items and quantities as originally prescribed for ICERBEG and will maintain same at prescribed levels until ordered discontinued by CINCPA. Effective 15 October and weekly thereafter action addressees will notify CINCPA info COMMARIANAS of any existing deficiencies and estimated date of replenishment. Negative reports are desired.

Para. 2. COMPHIBSPAC or COMGEN 6TH ARMY will forward all requests for supplies from the Marianas OLYMPIC reserve direct to COMMARIANAS for release. COMMARIANAS will coordinate shipments. Action addressees or their designated representatives will make available for shipment those supplies requested which are in the Marianas OLYMPIC reserve.

Part. 3. Emergency supplies for the RYUKUS or other areas will be filled from regular stocks of normal supply agencies. Marianas OLYMPIC reserve shall not be considered a source of such emergency supply unless replenishment of the reserve can be effected by 15 October. COMGEN POA 200425 not to or needed by all refers.

02 10 36 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM3RDFLT. CTF 94, CTF 95, info CTF 38. COMFAREWING 18. COMGEN USASTAF.

A special operation will be conducted by the 509th Bomb Group on 4 or 5 August at a time to be announced later. No ship or aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will come within 50 miles of NAGASAKI, KOKURA, or HIROSHIMA from 4 hours before to 6 hours after the announced time. Acknowledge.

02 1429 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

CINCBPF 290254 and 290209. Am I correct in assuming that all combat units of British Pacific Fleet will be at my disposal during OLYMPIC including preparatory phases. If so assume you will have no objections to proposals of reference. In view early arrival CINCBPF in GUAM for discussions various matters request reply your earliest convenience.

31 1338 CINCPA ADVANCE to COMGENPOA info CINCPA PEARL HQ.

In accordance with para 3 of recommendations made by representatives of CINCAFPAC, COMGEN20THAF and CINCPA at the inter-theater mapping conference held at Pearl 25-29 May which has subsequently been approved by all commanders of theatres involved and the JCS it is requested that operational direction of the 64th and 30th Engineer Topographic Battalions and attached units be returned to CINCPA on or about 31 July. Outstanding requisitions from AFPAC will be completed on the terms of present arrangements.
JULY - AUGUST (GCT)

31 0756 COM7THFLT to COMSERV7THFLT, COMAIR7THFLT info CNO, COMINCH, CINCPAC/POA BOTH HQ, CINCAFAC, COMSERTHFLT, ALL TF AND TG COMDRS 7THFLEET, & CSWPSF.

Effective 15 August 1945 there is hereby established under Commander 7th Fleet the command U.S. Naval forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA. TF 70. Which will include all U.S. Naval Bases and shore facilities and Naval air and Seaplane bases in SWPA outside the Philippines except MANUS. The name of the Commander U.S. Navy for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA, CTF 79, and the location of his headquarters will be announced.

Para. COMSERV7THFLT and COMAIR7THFLT respectively will direct the commanders of all U.S. Naval Shore, air and Seaplane facilities within the Area delineated to report to Com U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA for operational and administrative control. Units decommissioned but not yet moved forward are to be included.

Para. Com U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA will be responsible for:
A. Logistic support as practicable for Pac Fleet and allied Naval Forces, units in his area.
B. Expeditious roll up and staging of U.S. Naval personnel and equipment scheduled for forward movement.
C. Orderly transfer of excess material and of facilities or equipment duly authorized to be taken over by other allied services.

Para. COMSERV7THFLT as COMSERON 7 will continue to provide logistic support for U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA and to schedule and provide shipping for roll up. New Subject. COMSERVFOR 7THFLT, COMSERON 7, will retain responsibility for operation. Administration and defense of MANUS pending further decision on Para D of CINCPAC 130751 not to or needed by all.

31 1349 COMGENAT to CINCPAC ADVANCE, DEPCOM 20TH AF info GHQ SWPA.

WARX 41360.

In connection with terminal VICTORY 343 of 26 July, the following information received from ALASKA DEPARTMENT is submitted for your info:
A. Year round port operation at AMCHITKA practicable and adequate. B. Capacity avgas AMCHITKA 1,510,000 gallon existing. C. Capacity hardstands total 150 very heavy bomber AMCHITKA, length of longest runway 10,000 feet, 2 additional runways 5,000 feet each. D. Available for very heavy bomber deployment is tenthaling. Some prefabricated tent frames and necessary tentage are available. Material for mobilization type construction is available in theatre but additional labor will be required.

Para. In event it becomes necessary to deploy a very heavy bomber force in North Pacific Area, it is believed that AMCHITKA is the most suitable location. COMGEN ALASKAN DEPARTMENT is being advised of the contemplated strength and composition of force for planning purposes.

31 1351 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGENDMFPAC info MARCORPS, CINCPAC PEARL.

WbDis 280119 not to all or needed. Target date for the next major operation for which the 3rd Phib Corps is scheduled is 1 March and readiness date for this operation may be set by FMF PAC accordingly however due to the general world situation with which you are familiar and in order to take advantage of a surrender or collapse of the Japanese Empire FMF units should be prepared for occupation duty which might well include active combat with readiness dates as follows:
(1) 5th PHIBCORPS units ready now, (2) 4th MarDiv reinforced ready by 1 Sept. (3) 3d PHIBCORPS units (less 4th MarDiv) by 1 October.
30 1523 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO ADMIN info COMSUBPAC.

Your 201819. Am reducing U.S. Submarines 7th Fleet to 2 squadrons totalling 24 submarines. Plan further reduction to 1 squadron after British Command area is formed provided enemy cruisers SINGAPORE are immobilized at that time. Estimate life guard requirements only after 1 September 1945.

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCPAC - AFMIDPAC PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

RJ 67045.

Here reference is made to CINCPAC radio CX 28945 dated 28 July 1945, to COMGENAFMIDPAC with info to WARCOS and CINCPAC advance. The subject matters under discussion are indicated in CINCPAC dispatch 270253Z (GCT) July 1945 to COMINCH. At this point it is especially desirable to invite attention to the fact that CINCPAC dispatch referred to above treats and relates 2 distinct subjects which actually are unrelated, namely: (1) the category of defense for the Hawaiian Group, which is prescribed by the JCS; and (2) executive order No. 9459 of the 24th of October 1944, prescribed by the President directing the secretary of War to appoint the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas Military commander for the territory of HAWAII. Para. I will express my views on these 2 subjects in 2 parts in the order listed.

Para. Part 1. Category of defense period under present directives of the JCS HAWAII is under category of defense "B" modified, which provides for fighter protection, consisting of a Group of day fighters of 3 sqs and 2 night fighter flights; 5 battalions of guna (anti-aircraft); 5 battalions of anti-aircraft artillery automatic weapons; 1 battalion and 1/2 of searchlights; complete early-warning radar comera and integrated air warning service. These defenses in general are located around the critical areas of PEARL HARBOR, HONOLULU, and principal air fields. They have been determined by the best local military opinion to be the minimum necessary to provide adequately against the eventuality of a suicide attack by the Japanese. Compared with the overwhelming resources in aircraft and anti-aircraft at the disposal of the American Army, these defensive forces are small indeed and they represent the minimum insurance that the United States Army charged with the grave responsibility of defending HAWAII should provide to protect the vital installations of HONOLULU and especially PEARL HARBOR. To reduce them in order, as CINCPAC recommends "to facilitate economy in use of personnel and resources, etc" is unjustifiable just so long as there is any possibility of a sneak raid and it is particularly unwarranted in view of our ample resources in aircraft and antiaircraft. Any economy of personnel or resources so effected would be extremely small compared with the over all strength of the Army. The reduction could only be justified if the Army was in dire need of units of the character employed in the defense, which of course is not the case. Para. It is true that the strategic position of the U.S. forces in the Pacific is much more favorable at this time than at any time since the War began and that the likelihood of the Japanese attacking HAWAII is remote. To date, however, I have received no official communication from CINCPAC-CINCPAC notifying me of the complete destruction of the aircraft carriers and aircraft carrier escorts of the Japanese Navy, which constitute the main potential threat to any attack on these islands, either by aircraft of a single carrier or of a group of carriers, and I therefore can not assume the impossibility of a sneak suicide raid. Furthermore, it is

- continued -
pertinent to observe that the American people have invested in this war billions of dollars, several of which are represented by extensive vital installations in HAWAII, notably PEARL HARBOR, and the people would be in no mood to condone a failure to provide adequate defenses should a Japanese suicide attack occur, especially in view of the prodigality of troops and resources provided by congress.

Para. I can not give my consent to the reduction proposed by CINCPAC BOTH for reasons of prudence and caution, and because the omens would be on the U.S. Army and on the local Commanding General should the risk be accepted of having inadequate defense forces in the event of an air suicide attack by the Japanese.

Para. Therefore, I recommend that there be no change in the present category of defense of the Hawaiian Group, namely category "B" as now modified. Paragraph

Para. Part 2. Presidential executive order number 9489, 24 October 1944. The recommendation by CINCPAC in his radio 270253Z (GCT) that the said order be suspended or revoked is based on the following 2 grounds: (A) that its provisions affect his overall responsibility for the security and safety of the territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean Areas; and (B) that the state of war is now such that continuation of the powers vested in Military authority by that order is no longer justified. These contentions will be answered seriatim.

Para. (A) CINCPAC'S authority and responsibilities as theater commander stem from directives of the JCS and therefore his responsibilities must be interpreted in the light of these directives. There is an apparent misunderstanding on CINCPAC'S part that his directives in some way impose upon him responsibilities connected with the executive order. I know of no directive from the JCS or from any other authority that relates my responsibilities under the executive order to CINCPAC'S responsibilities as charged to him by extant joint Chiefs of Staff DIRECTIVES.

Para. Executive order 9498 replaced certain security measures that were exercised by me as Military Governor under martial law and which were felt to be necessary for the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. At this point it should be emphasized that Presidential Executive Order is not concerned with military operations against the enemy but deals with the control of civilians in U.S. Territory. It places in the hands of the Military Commander means whereby he may secure these islands against espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage that might be practiced by civilians in our own territory. The authority for the exercise of these powers stems from the President to the Secretary of War, who was directed by the President to delegate this authority to me, the commanding General Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas and to appoint me Military Commander of HAWAII. This authority does not stem from the JCS and therefore must legally be interpreted as a separate authority because where I challenge in the courts by a citizen or alienfor any act of mine committed under this authority I could not plead as a defense that I acted under the authority of CINCPAC-CINCPOA exercising unity of command under joint Chiefs of Staff directives. As an illustration of the misunderstanding referred to supra, CINCPAC-CINCPOA invoked this executive order as the reason for not releasing my headquarters to the control of CINCAFPAC in the implementation of JCS directive 1259/4 of April. In his dispatch 260229 G GCT April 1945 he states "Pursuant to the terms of executive order 9489
issued by the President, COMGENPOA is designated as the Military Commander for the Territory of HAWAII and has responsibilities, powers, and authority which make it necessary that in this capacity COMGENPOA continue in his present relationship with CINCPOA in view of CINCPOA responsibilities with respect to the Hawaiian Area" but for reasons stated above I am unable to recognize that CINCPOA legally has jurisdiction over me under this order. Therefore, CINCPOA’S contention that the provisions of the Executive Order affect his overall responsibility for the security and safety of the Territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean Areas is untenable insofar as it applies to the executive order.

Para. Turning now to CINCPOA’s 2nd contention, that the state of war is now such that the continuation of the powers vested in military authority by the Executive order is no longer justified, and his further statement that “Lieutenant General Richardson, COMGENPOA, considers that they should be retained” my comments are as follows:

Para. It is true that the present writing I consider that the powers of that order should be retained, although CINCPOA has never invited my recommendations or discussed the subject with me. The reasons for the retention of the executive order are obvious from a study of the security orders issued under its authority.

Para. At the present time there are 6 essential security orders in existence covering the following subjects: They are necessary because of the large alien population in HAWAII.

Para. 1. Conduct of enemy aliens and prohibition against their possessing firearms, short wave radio, etc; 2. Instructions to civilians covering vehicular traffic, vacating of congested areas and use of lights in the event of air raids, air raid alarms, etc;

Para. 3. Designation of restricted areas requiring identification passes for entry such as harbor areas and certain vital installations and the handling of explosives in these areas;

Para. 4. Travel control of civilians necessitated by the limited amount of joint shipping in Pacific Ocean Areas; priorities are established for necessary surface and air civilian travel;

Para. 5. Mail and cable and radio censorship and control of short wave radio.

Para. 6. The cargo and passenger control which coordinates commercial use of harbors and harbor equipment with the needs of the military.

Para. In addition, executive order 9498 is the only authority for the evacuation of American citizens deemed dangerous to the U.S. Since the effective date of the order, 24 October 1944, 6 citizens of Japanese ancestry have been evacuated from the territory to TULE LAKE segregation center CALIFORNIA. In testimony before a hearing board these persons openly confessed their loyalty to JAPAN expressing a desire that JAPAN win the war. Some of them refused when drafted to serve in the Army of the U.S. Therefore, it is believed, still other Japanese of TFDPRLEHUECNSYASE the community.

Para. Minimum use is being made of the authority contained in the said executive order and the security orders which I have issued pursuant to it are reviewed periodically with the view to rescinding any regulation not necessary to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. For example, a month ago I dispensed with the Curfew and presently study is being given to relaxing civilian censorship.
Para. My policy has been and will continue to be the rescission of all restrictive security orders just as soon as the need for them disappears.

Para. In view of the above it is recommended that the executive order be kept in effect and, to summarize, that the status of both the category of defense and of the executive order remain for the present undisturbed.

Relaxation of air attacks on FORMOSAN airfields and installations gives the enemy opportunity for rehabilitation and restoration of his air strength and supplies threat. There is some evidence that this is now being accomplished. Request you continue neutralization of FORMOSAN in order to protect our communication lines to the PHILIPPINES, to safeguard our forces and installations on OKINAWA from air attack by FORMOSAN based planes and in order to deny the enemy the use of gasoline and other supplies remaining in FORMOSAN.

Navy has raised the point of the necessity for the early installation of shore based radar for early warning and fighter direction purposes during OLYMPIC. They emphasize the extreme importance of early establishment of land based air warning and fighter direction facilities in order to minimize losses in an operation where frequent and sustained suicide attacks by the enemy may be expected. The foregoing points were raised in connection with a discussion between war and navy department staff officers and are furnished for your information.

It appears to CINCPAC that the change proposed in your 030429 would effect a considerable change in the responsibilities of FEAF and 5th Fleet within the objective area. As it now reads subpara 1(B)(3) states the employment of 5th Fleet aircraft but recognized the planned volume and
04 0024 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGEN USASTAF.

weight of FEAF air effort within the objective area as worked out between FEAF and COMPHIBSPAC. As proposed the change would release FEAF from responsibilities within the objective area which it should share in order to give the troops and ships the maximum cover and support. Accordingly request text stand as now drafted.

04 0109 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS info CG6THARMY, COMGENFEAF, COMPHIBSPAC, CINCPAC ADV.

CX 30632.

Refers to your W 42740 not to all MPLIKOPING of navy emphasis of importance for early installation of shore based radar for early warning and fighter direction purposes in OLYMPIC. Plans include establishments for such purposes on 6 outlying islands to south and southwest of objective area on XRay minus 3. With no satisfactory outlying Ground Locations to the east and southeast coverage in that direction will be provided by naval ships radar screen until ground installations are established at corps beachheads on XRay plus 2. CINCPAC has been requested to comment on the above by our 28053 of July not to WARCOS.

04 0353 COMGENUSASTAF to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGENAIR, COMGENFEAF.

1253.

Approve air coordination agreement of 1 August 45 signed by Sherman, Chamberlain and Lindsay together with changes proposed by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC in their dispatches: CINCPAC 030154, CINCAFPAC 090429 (GCT).

Local copies will be changed.

04 0747 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFFLEET info CINCAFPAC, COMINCH.

Your 040351. In view CINCAFPAC 040403 desire you concentrate your next effort against enemy air forces in north HONSHU and HOKKAIDO instead of TOKYO area. All available intelligence data will be furnished in separate despatch.

04 0841 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Request that agreements made for OLYMPIC apply also the CORONET concerning long lines as well as internal wire installations at naval establishments.

04 1011 COM3RDFFLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CTF 38, CTF 37.

Your 040747 wilco. Planning strike 8 August. (reference strike against enemy air forces in north HONSHU and HOKKAIDO instead TOKYO AREA).
04 14:51 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMGENUSASTAF.

CX 30858

Reference your 040024Z, in the agreements of 16 May 1945 we agreed that all air forces in the objective area during the amphibious phase would operate under your control. Responsibility for the air missions in that area necessarily goes with control. The agreement also contemplated that FEAF would be employed. The objective area and arrangements therefore are now being coordinated in the detailed planning conference in progress. CX 30410 was not intended to imply a withdrawal or lessening of FEAF air effort in the objective area or to release FEAF from responsibilities within the objective area which it is expected to share in heavy volume, but to obtain assurance that the 5th Fleet would be primarily responsible for the mission of air defense or CAP in that area as FEAF and the 3RD FLEET are in other defined areas. Request that my suggestion in CX 30410 be reconsidered.

04 1943 COMGENAIR to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCAFPAC.

WARX 44043.

Here is further technical data and information requested on JAVAMAN PROJECT in your 270250. JAVAMAN PROJECT involves the employment of 80-5 foot rescue boats each carrying 50000 pounds of explosives. These boats are carefully disguised as Jap luggers and sea trucks and are remotely controlled by radio, radar, and television from aircraft having a control range of 55 to 80 miles. The cruising range of loaded boat is 800 to 1200 miles. For this operation 6 disguised ARB boats will be employed, 4 will be loaded missiles and 2 will be escorts and will proceed from BUNKHOUSE to destination under own power. Skeleton crews leave missiles between 10 and 20 miles from target and will return to BUNKHOUSE by 2 escorting ARB boats. 4 Millile ARB boats are then directed to target by radio control and television from B-17 control planes. When disguised Milliles enter magnetic field of tunnel, M.A.D. equipment on boat by telemetering records on television screens in B-17 and operator by remote detonation SCUTTLES boat over target. No personnel required from CINCPOA. All personnel, for project already on detached service to CINCAFPAC. Present plans, because of disguise factor of this CM OHK JNPPD PPQATION, do not contemplate use of naval escort ships for naval escort aircraft. 2 disguised ARB boats will serve as surface escorts and plans call for FEAF to provide air cover for control planes and ARB Missiles. State of development of this equipment and technique has, as result of many tests against simulated targets, been determined to be completely operational and practical.

05 0100 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM MARIANAS.

Inaugurate appropriate air search and provide naval surface unit for possible interception enemy MARCUS bound units in connection CINCPOA PEARL 041956.
04 2320 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGENUSAStAF.

After thorough consideration of your 041451 GCT and all the associated questions believe that the phraseology of the agreement of 1 August 1945 is preferable to the change proposed by your CX 30410. If the language were to be changed it would be necessary to redraft the paragraph considerably to bring out the fact that FEA and also USASTAF must share in the responsibility for providing in the objective area the full weight of air effort required for air defense and for support of the troops and ships therein. I believe it better to let the draft stand as 1st approved by your 020378 and my 030154 and let the details within objective area be developed in the further planning between FEA, PHIBSPAC and USASTAF.

05 0751 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFFLEET info CINCAFPAC, COMGENUSASTAF, COMGENFEAF.

Your 042125. Consider it unnecessary to make special request on FEA and USASTAF in view nature their routine operations at this time. Their strikes are made as often as practicable and cover wide areas FEA, USASTAF and TF 38 operations are all mutually supporting as now planned.

05 0754 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC, COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC.

CINCAFPAC has requested that the USS TACLOBAN (EX-TULSA) be made available primarily to copy navy communications of interest to CINCAFPAC and transmit same to CINCAFPAC headquarters on shore in objective area. TACLOBAN is hereby made available for this duty and during the OLYMPIC operation will be assigned to COM5THFLEET for operational control. Since TACLOBAN has previously performed same duty for CINCAFPAC no additional installations will be made.

05 0755 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info COM5THFLEET, COM3RDFFLEET, CAPSOF, COMNOR OKINAWA, COM NABS OKINAWA.

Replacement carrier aircraft must be available at OKINAWA during OLYMPIC to meet needs of the fleet. Existing directives which require the buildup to 500 pool aircraft as rapidly after 1 November as is feasible are confirmed.

05 0845 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV info WARCOS, COMGENAIR, CINCPAC PEARL, AFMIDPAC, USASTAF, COMGENFEAF, DONOVAN OSSF.

CX 30946.

Para. 1. Reference my CX 23307 CINCPAC ADVANCE 270250 GCT and COMINCH 261625 GCT. Proposed to destroy KAMON TUNNEL in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

4 air rescue boats of 35 foot length disguised as enemy craft and loaded with 25 tons high explosive each are sailed into west entrance of STRAITS. Boats are fitted with remote control, radar and television devices and self destructive elements and are controlled from aircraft at a maximum range of 100 miles. Boats are directed to target located by magnetic indicator and scuttled. Main charges are detonated by time delay and counter mining.

Part. 2. All necessary operational equipment and personnel has been assigned FEA. FEA will recover personnel after boats are abandoned by their crews. A heavy bombing attack in the area will cover the operation.
05 0845 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARGOS, COMGENAIR, CINCPAC PEARL, AFMIDPAC USASTAF, COMGENFEF, DONOVAN OSSF. (Cont'd)

No navy personnel, ships or aircraft will be required.

Para. Part 3. Reference COMINCH 221915 GCT project will be expedited and shipping conserved if you can furnish for not to exceed 3 months effective 1 September the following functional components less personnel: 1 A-3, 1 G-8, 1 E-11, 1 D-10, 2 N-18, 1 P-12A, 1 C-8. It is desired to establish the project and above facilities in a navy base area if possible.

Para. Part 4. Request your concurrence in the operation and indication of extent above logistics support you can furnish. Separate radio follows with code name for operation.

06 0719 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

C 31175.
Action being taken. Reference your 030211 requesting continuation of neutralization of FORMOSA.

06 0819 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH AND CNO.

Your 011310. EMIRAU ISLAND is now in use as a base for Marine Air Group 61. However it was agreed at MANILA conference 30 July – 1 August that all units of 1st Mar Air Wing will be concentrated in southern PHILIPPINES as soon as possible. After this is done recommend EMIRAU be released to British as it will not be needed in the near future by our operating units and may be of use to British in connection with their mopping up of RABAUL and KAVIENG. Further recommend retention "Right to Use" if needed at a later time.

04 0403 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CG FEAF, COM3RDFLT.

CX 30653.
Strong indications that Japs intend an airborne operation against OKINAWA area after 9 August. Troop Carriers are being concentrated in northeast HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, both beyond operating radius of FEAF at OKINAWA. Suggest if practicable that 3rd Fleet during present operations in EMPIRE waters strike the concentrations in northeast HONSHU and HOKKAIDO.

07 0331 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH & CNO info COMNORPAC, COMCHUPAC, COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 061648 recommend CONCORD and RICHMOND remain on present duty until ice closes traffic into AMUR RIVER about 1 October then proceed CANAL ZONE.
Para. 1. Formal presentation of JEMEDAR made at 1000, 6 August. CINCPAC and key staff attended. Afternoon devoted to discussion of availability of personnel and supplies. Everyone must cooperative and intention solving all difficulties.

Para. 2. Admiral Sherman feels that JCS must issue a directive to establish responsibilities among the theaters if operation is to be carried out on time. He feels CHINA should handle land matters and GUAM or MANILA handle the naval responsibilities.

Para. 3. Lincoln says that War Department is also interested in cutting red tape with this operation and that end S & P produced a draft directive. No action has been taken due to absence of key people at POTSDAM.

Para. 4. All timing is based on securing target area by 15 August. 7th Fleet questions whether channel will be secured from ground attack (coastal or field batteries) in time to set up the initial convoys about 20 August. Conference working on assumption that convoys can safely pass into channel on or about 20 August.

Para. 5. Tentative ETD GUAM night of 7 August.

The representatives of COMGENCHINA now at GUAM inform me that it is confidently expected that the Chinese Army will occupy FORT BAYARD on 15 August. Although numerous exploratory dispatches have been exchanged definitive action does not appear to have been taken to ensure the operation of the port and the unloading of the supplies available. In my opinion the advantages to be gained by such action and the obvious disadvantages of failing to deliver effectively even token supplies to the Chinese when they first take useful seaport are controlling and justify the minor diversion of naval resources involved.

Para. 2. In view of the short time remaining earliest concurrence in the following is requested.


B. Rear Admiral E. Buckmaster proceed via air and break flag in SPENCER (CGO) or INGHAM (CGO) as commander South China Naval Force (TF 93) which will consist of 1 CGO-4; YMS-1PGB(R)-5POM-2LCS(L) designated by Com 7thFlt plus 2 CVE-6DE-7LST-1AOG-1AGS designated by CINCAPAC. CTF 95 prepare the forces assigned for movement to FORT BAYARD when andas requested.
07 0553 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, COMGENCHINA info COM/TH/SL/E, COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COM/TH/SL/FT, COM/ESC/AROLINES, WARCOS.

by COMGENCHINA and develop naval base facilities at FORT BAYARD. The Escort Carriers with 2 destroyer escorts will be released to CINCPAC after arrival of the 1st AK convoy at FORT BAYARD.

6. On arrival in FORT BAYARD CTF 93 and forces under his command will cover and support the forces of the CHINA THEATER.

D. CINCPAC replace as promptly as possible such naval advance base components supplied by the 7th Fleet as need to be replaced.

E. LSTs to be used only for the initial lift. Other naval craft to be released as required by CINCPAC if necessary to avoid interference with OLYMPIC.

07 0717 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMGENCHINA, CHUNGKING.

GENERAL CARAWAY SENDS:

CINCPAC is sending despatch today to CNO, CINCAFPAC, COMGENCHINA concerning JEMEDAR operation. Components listed therein cover naval requirements for operation of port. In addition it establishes small naval surface force to provide protection for port and convoys thereto. This message is FERN 6.

Para. 2. In opinion of CHINA party proposal if approved furnishes minimum requirements for operation in time to meet target dates.

Para. 3. Recommend that CHINA THEATER make request that War Department take necessary action in conjunction with Navy Department to obtain approval and implementation of CINCPAC's proposed action.

Para. 4. Admiral Sherman and CINCPAC's staff state that the diversions of components and ships to JEMEDAR will not interfere with MACARTHUR'S logistic support of OKINAWA forces. They further state that personnel and shipping which are necessary to OLYMPIC committed to support of CHINA may be withdrawn for period of that operation, to be replaced or returned CHINA after.

Para. 5. Admiral Sherman indicates naval units operating port installations being placed under Flag Officer because that furnishes most convenient means of administration and control. He indicates that CINCPAC may consider dividing forces into 2 parts, placing port installations under CHINA at later date. It appears that CHINA theater should insist on operational control now of naval shore installations at port with administrative control remaining under Admiral Buckmaster since these installations will be supporting CHINA and not be for support of naval forces.

07 0824 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMSERVPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, CNO, COMSERON 10.

Refer to your 262225 of July. Due to importance of subject operation consider floating storage too great risk. Request contained your 262225 floating storage OLYMPIC is disapproved.

07 0833 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, CNO.

Reference your 2514,31 July and 050845 Aug. Feasibility and desired ability of JAVMAN are believed to be matters for determination by CINCPAC and COMGENPEAF. Navy can furnish from resources available to COMNOB OKINAWA such assistance and materials in E-11 component as are peculiar to PT boats plus 1 LCM. Suggest that all other materials referred to in COMINCH 221915 be supplies from stocks available to COMGEN10 COMGEN.
AUGUST (GCT)

08 0500 CGUSFCT to CINCAFPAC, WARCOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ, COM7THFLT.

3010.
Concurrence with plan outlined by Advance Headquarters CINCPAC in Top Secret GUAM 070553 of 7 August is expressed by Commanding General China Theater.
Para. To CINCAFPAC. Request your concurrence in proposed arrangement.
Para. To WARCOS. Request action in conjunction Wash. Navy Department to obtain JCS approval and urgent implementation of action proposed by CINCPAC to make timely provision for operation of port at JEMADAR and a small naval surface force to protect port and convoys proceeding thereto. Request that directive be issued including provision for continuation of cooperative action essential to continued use of JEMADAR port until sub- function becomes available, all without detriment to OLYMPIC, and that command arrangement include operational control by Commanding General CHINA THEATER over shore installations, since these will be serving this theater.
Para. Every effort being made to insure occupation of FORT BAYARD by 15 August and security of area including local approaches by 20 August.

08 0522 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM3RDFLT.

Your 080309 approved. Assume you will take maximum advantage of any improvement in weather to expand coverage over assigned area. With emphasis on destruction KATANA force. Interested commands will be advised.

08 1540 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSEITVPAC (APO), GHQ SUB AREA PETROLEUM OFFICER, ASCOMI OKINAWA.

Concur proposed amendments your top secret 040939.

07 1505 ALUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH AND CNO - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Vice Admiral Gavrilov head of Red Navy Communications today presented Navy's desires for communication set up for use of their operational liaison groups 4th question Victory 351 refers. They desire 2 circuits between VLADIVOSTOK and WASHINGTON 1 being the circuit VLADIVOSTOK MOSCOW WASHINGTON as now established. A 2nd to be a direct circuit between VLADIVOSTOK and WASHINGTON. For this circuit they propose to use 1 station at VLADIVOSTOK of about 10 Kilowatt power manual operation using international code. This station has previously established communacions with HONOLULU on 13635 KC between 0300 and 0400 GMT. See my 241410 CCT and related dispatches. They desire this frequency and time for 1 schedule but request our recommendation regarding additional frequencies and schedules. They believe 6 periods per day for sending and receiving will be adequate. The call sign SAB is proposed for WASHINGTON and GAL for VLADIVOSTOK. They sedire our recommendations and suggestions regarding this circuit before establishing definite program of tests. They desire to establish 1 circuit for our own use between VLADIVOSTOK and GUAM 24 hour service is desired and the following wave lengths and
AUGUST (GCT) - continued -

07 1505 ALUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH AND CNO - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Schedules are proposed between 2100 GMT and 0900 GMT. Basic wave length is 7990 KC. Between 0900 GMT and 2100 GMT, basic wave length is 14480 KC. Suggested call signs are VLADIVOSTOK KBN, GUAM ZTK. Soviet will use own station at VLADIVOSTOK but desire U.S. to furnish facilities at GUAM. They are sending a communication team of 1 officer, 4 radio operators, and 3 coders to GUAM as part of liaison group. Following is over and above any stations or facilities which United States may desire to establish at VLADIVOSTOK for own use. New Subject. At a meeting with SLAVIN today regarding weather facilities, see my 040820, he stated that questions concerning this project were under study but that no answers were ready at this time.

08 2227 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORPAC info CTF 49, COM3RD FLT.

Present task force 49 will pass to you operational control upon departure ENIWETOK. Consider it desirable that you arrange coordinated air attack and surface bombardment against an objective in the KURILLES as soon as forces can be assembled and also make sweeps against enemy shipping which may appear.

08 2023 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORPAC info COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, CGUSFCT, ALL TF COMDRS PAC FLT, COM3RD FLT, COM7TH FLT, COM8TF FLT.

North Pacific Force with forces currently assigned plus CruDiv 5, CarDivs 23, 26 and DesRon 45 as separately reconstituted for this purpose assigned following additional tasks.

- Establish and maintain control of a line of communications from the ALEUTIANS across the SEA OF OKhotsk.
- Neutralize Japanese bases threatening this line of communications.
- Provide protection for convoys against hostile air, surface and submarine attacks between the ALEUTIANS and escort turn around points in the SEA OF OKhotsk.

Para. This modifies my OpPlan 4-45.

09 0050 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info COMSUBPAC.

There are U.S. submarines in the SEA OF JAPAN north of the boundary established in VICTORY 371. Request action to ensure that they not be attacked. Orders have been issued for them to move south of the boundary line.

Para. In view lack of recognition signals propose to keep Pacific Fleet submarines outside "Mutual" zones until liaison becomes effective except for the SEA OF OKhotsk south of 47th parallel which must be used by submarines in passage.

Para. Request use of TARTARY STRAIT be obtained for entry and exit of submarines as soon as possible.

09 0129 COM3RD FLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 37, CTF 38.

Your 082226 intend continue present attacks on 10th fuel 11th strike 12 and 13th. Will advise later as to Task Force 37 ability to participate after 10th. Details of plans by separate dispatch.

AUGUST.
09 0216 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNAVGR CHINA info COMGEN CHINA THEATER, COMINCH.

CTG 95.2 060733 passed separately. I request that requests for support of the activities of U.S. forces in CHINA by units of the Pacific Fleet be addressed to CINCPAC whenever time permits and normally through the Comdg General U.S. Forces in CHINA. Departure from proper channels in matters of this nature will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding and will not be conducive to the most efficient use of the resources which can be made available to support the CHINA THEATER.

09 0503 CINCPAC to WARCOS, CG USFCT info CINCPAC ADVANCE, COM7THFLT.

CX 31898.
Reference WX 45950 and CFEX 3010. Concur in CINCPAC ADVANCE 070553Z (GCT) relating to Naval planning for FORT BAYARD except OPS PCE (R) is not available. All PCE'S this area have been converted to communications ships and are planned for use in our coming operations.

09 0816 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 info COM3RDFLT, CTG 95.2.

Detach CruDiv 16 when RFS and direct ComDruDiv 16 with his division proceed LETTE reporting on arrival to COM3RDFLT for duty. CruDiv 16 will be available for inclusion in TF 38 for operations scheduled commence late August.

09 1403 CINCUSPA to COMAAP info CINCPAC ADVANCE, CG USASTAF, COMANF.

CX 32046.
Boundary line connecting the following points delimits air and Naval operating areas for U.S. and USSR air and naval forces: point at intersection of 45-45 north latitude and line joining CAP CRILLON (KONDO) (southern tip of SAKHALIN) and CAPE SOYA MISSAKI (SOYASAKI) (Northern tip of HOKKAIDO), west to point at 45-45 north latitude 140-00 east longitude, point at 40-00 north latitude 135-00 east longitude, CAPE BOLTINA (MUSU KUTCHI) on KOREAN COAST, CHANGCHUN, LIAOYUAN, KAILU, CHIHFENG, PEKING, TATUNG, southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA. All points inclusive to US Forces. RUSSIAN naval and air forces will operate north of the boundary line and U.S. naval and air forces will operate south of the boundary line. Air forces of this command will operate north of the boundary line and in the SEA OF OKHTOK only on specific authority from this headquarters. Reference our CX 26304 designating area of operations for FEAF in north CHINA and KOREA, FEAF will operate north or west of line indicated in reference only on authority of this headquarters. Clearance is being requested of commanding general USFCT for operations of FEAF in area included between the line: MUSU KUTCHI, MUKDEN, PEKING and the line: CAP BOLTINA (MUSU KUTCHI) CHANGCHUN, LIAOYUAN, KAILU, CHIHFENG, PEKING.
Answering your 09300 Red Navy submits following. They estimate convoys can be initiated within 5 to 10 days after beginning of hostilities and consider that it will be necessary to despatch from 3 to 4 convoys of from 12 to 15 vessels per convoy per month but add that convoys can begin as soon as the U.S. Navy has laid down the necessary operating arrangements in the region around the southern portion of KAMCHATKA and in OKHOTSK SEA. Their plan submitted for your consideration calls for U.S. convoying of Soviet merchant and mile post vessels to PETROPAVLOVSK except they desire such milepost vessels as are properly equipped trained to be used as escorts with convoys to PETROPAVLOSK Despatch of these convoys to be entirely as decided by U.S. Naval authorities. Convoys for NIKOLAEVSK will be made up at PETROPAVLOVSK Responsibility for maintaining line of communications between PETROPAVLOVSK and NIKOLAEVSK will be a mutual responsibility of U.S. Navy and Soviet Pacific Fleet but they state they desire U.S. Navy to have control and responsibility of convoys until they arrive at NIKOLAEVSK. The composition of the escort vessels and the convoy commander to be assigned by U.S. Navy. Red Navy will furnish supplementary escort strength but is not able now to state numbers or types. Despatch of convoys to NIKOLAEVSK to be a matter of agreement between their Pacific Fleet and the convoy commander. They assume that the escort arriving at NIKOLAEVSK will pick up return convoy with PETROPAVLOVSK at 1st destination. Despatch of this return convoy to be a matter of agreement between their Pacific Fleet and convoy commander. Likewise despatch of convoys from PETROPAVLOVSK to UNITED STATES to be a matter of agreement between convoy commander and commander PETROPAVLOVSK Naval Base but UNITED STATES to have entire responsibility and control of these convoys. They desire that the same system that was used with convoy movements from the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND to northern posts of the USSR be established. They will take the necessary steps to insure that Soviet submarines will be excluded from areas where convoys are operating and an anchorage will be arranged at PETROPAVLOVSK for escorts and attending auxiliaries. Soviet vessels in BERING SEA between 50-53 north and 57-30 north and east of 166-00 east have been directed to proceed to U.S. Ports. Vessels in allied ports will be instructed as to their future movements by Soviet Convoy Officer.

New Subject: They request initial numbers of liaison group for VLADIVOSTOK be held to lowest possible minimum because of lack of accommodations there. They would also like to be informed of number of U.S. submarines operating in SEA OF JAPAN. The naval section of the Soviet liaison group at GUAM will consist of 4 officers and 7 enlisted men. They were advised that this group could probably be flown to GUAM in U.S. plane which brought in U.S. Liaison Group on assumption this group will be flown in. Request confirmation. They are greatly interested in matter of recognition between surface craft and aircraft and between surface and aircraft and will submit their ideas shortly.

While delivering substance of your 090050 to Red Navy was advised that an American submarine was observed at 1410 on August 8th about 52 miles south of CAPE GAMOV and at 1540 on same date Soviet airplane observed fragments of a Merchantman which had been sunk in the region where the sub had been seen. Presence of U.S. Subs within this area complicates...
commencement of their naval activity and they desire to be informed when all submarines have left their zone. They will take such action as they can to assure that submarines are not attacked. With reference to passage of TARTARY STRAIT they promise early reply.

For strikes after August 11th fueling intend to be prepared to shift full weight of attack to TOKYO AREA if my assigned primary northern targets are inaccessible or if fields now under attack are no longer good targets.

Refer ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957 being passed to you. Comment on convoy and escort control proposals therein. With respect to recognition systems CNO 091415 refers.

Para. Specifically recommend that (A) Chop line as suggested in study be established within the SEA OF OKhotsk east of which the UNITED STATES have complete responsibility for air and surface protection of convoys and east of which no Russian Submarines operate. West of the Chop line the reverse situation should exist. (B) Convoys assemble at ADAK and routed direct through the KURILES via ONNEKOTAN, SHASUKOTAN or MUSHIRU STRAITS to Russian ports or direct to PETROPAVLOSK. Minimum traffic between PETROPAVLOSK and ports to westward. (C) Minimum use of PETROPAVLOSK. No U.S. Naval shore establishments in Russian ports except for communications and liaison. (D) Dispatch of westbound convoys to be controlled by COMMORPAC and eastbound convoys by Russian Naval Command. Direct coordination and consultation between COMMORPAC and appropriate Russian naval commander required.

The text of my Joint Staff Study CAMPUS dated 9 August insofar as naval landing force operations are concerned now reads as follows. "At each principal anchorage occupied an operational airfield will if practicable be occupied to facilitate communications and airborne troop landings and for eventual development for naval purposes. The timing of this occupation will be such as to support the landing of troops in strength but may be adjusted by the local naval commander as necessary to meet the requirements of the situation as it develops after the arrival of naval forces in Japanese ports. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the anchorages occupied may be occupied if such action becomes necessary to insure the safety of naval forces".

Para. If time permits desire advance notification of any landing force operations under naval command.
The public announcement by the Japanese of counter proposals for the termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance against Japanese attacks. Neither the Japanese nor Allied Forces have stopped fighting. Take precautions against treachery even if local or general surrender should be suddenly announced. Maintain all current reconnaissance and patrols. Offensive action shall be continued unless otherwise specifically directed.

Desire that any mines laid in SASEBO, NAGASAKI, KOBE, OSAKA, NAGOYA, TOKYO, all other southern and eastern HONSHU ports, and all INLAND SEA areas other than eastern approach to SHIMONSEKI STRAITS and other than INLAND SEA area between 133-00E and 134-45E be sterilized by 1 December 1945. Also request that the number of mines planted in INLAND SEA area between 133-00E and 134-45E that will not be sterilized by 1 December 1945 be held to a minimum. Sterilizing times for other targets indicated in COMGEN21BOMCOMS 300035 June and COMAF 20's 290740 July as agreed to by my 020256 July.

Tentative troop lists for BLACKLIST are approaching completion in current conferences with 6th, 8th and 10th Army commanders and with FEA. Request that representatives of the Amphibious Forces which you intend to designate to work with each Army Commander be instructed to contact Army Commanders for detailed planning. Headquarters 6th Army now San Fernando, Pampang, Headquarters 8th Army now LYTE; headquarters 10th Army now OKINAWA. Army commandants will be responsible for the loading out of FEA elements.

FEAF has assigned 13th Air Force mission of support 5th Amphibious Corps during OLYMPIC. Propose authorizing direct liaison between representatives 13th Air Force and 5th Marine Amphibious Corps on matters pertaining operational coordination and utilization aircraft warning control groups in direct support Marine OLYMPIC operations. Involves sending aircraft and liaison personnel to HAWAII required for liaison purposes. Your comments requested.

Your 101507 concur subject to the comment that the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is planned to be furnished as a component of the units of the Fleet Marine Force which may participate in OLYMPIC. As far as practicable Marine Ground Forces should be supported by Marine Aviation and Ground Air Liaison with Fleet Marine Force should be carried on by Marines.
10 2000 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMEASTERN, COMWESTERN, COMGULFSEABORON info SECNAV.

In order to conform with War Department policy for public relations and censorship purposes concerning military use of ATOMIC energy and ATOMIC bomb war Department policy is quoted below for guidance. Doubtful matters should be submitted to Navy Department Pentagon for clearance War Department or U.S. Office of Censorship representatives. "1. Censors may pass material dealing with ATOM BOMB and military use of ATOMIC energy within bounds of official releases only. 2. Industries universitites, individuals etc may be identified with the overall development in general terms but may not elaborate on their technical contributions. 3. Historical information of non-military nature concerning ATOMIC energy provided technical information on ATOMIC research after January 1940 is not revealed. Censors should stop for security reasons following information. 1. References to specific processes formulae and mechanics of operation. 2. Stocks location of stocks procurement of stocks and stocks consumption. It may be said that uranium is used. 3. Quality and quantity of production of active materials for ATOM bombs. 4. Physics characteristics and future military improvements or developments of ATOMIC energy or ATOMIC BOMB. 5. Descriptions or pictures of bomb and nature of its action other than comparative explosives equivalents such as equal to 20,000 tons of TNT or 2000 times more powerful than any bomb yet used. 6. Techniques of operational use of the bomb. 7. Information as to relative importance of the various methods or plants or of their relative functions or efficiencies. General references may be to these installations only plants adjacent to OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE and RICHMON, WASHINGTON and the laboratory near SANTE FE, NEW MEXICO."
COM: 5TH PHIBFOR, COM: 7TH PHIBFOR, COM: 6TH ARM, COM: GEN 5TH ARM, COM: GEN 6TH ARM, COM: GEN 10

the 6th Army, COM: 5TH PHIBFOR the 6th Army and COM: 7TH PHIBFOR the 10th Army"


In the event of a Japanese surrender it is my present intention to continue to exercise my command from my headquarters at GUAM except when my presence is required elsewhere for particular purposes. Admiral Halsey will remain in MISSOURI. Admiral Spruance will break his flag in NEW JERSEY. SOUTH DAKOTA will remain in company with Admiral Halsey and will be prepared to serve as my flagship when required. I expect to move between GUAM and SOUTH DAKOTA by seaplane when necessary.

Due to quantities of United States pressure type mines laid in KOBEOSAKA AREA specifically in the OSAKA WAN it appears impracticable to operate in that area until sterilizers render the mines inoperative in February 1946. KURE appears to be preferable as a base from which to control INLAND SEA. This affects CAMPUS and BLACKLIST to a controlling degree.

Regardless of Japanese surrender request all material, shipping and personnel designated for FORT BAYARD at GUAM conference be considered as firm agreements. All material, shipping and personnel agreed upon are required by CHINA THEATER whether port is established at BAYARD, KOWLOON or elsewhere.

Refer to CASCU top secret serial 00015 dated 11 July and COM: 5TH FLT 2nd endorsement serial 000155 of 7 August thereto subject dusk and dawn fighter patrols.

Para. It is considered infeasible to accomplish the training of fleet pilots on any such scale as visualized. Commanders of fast carrier task forces should take such measures as are practicable to insure that VF pilots flying dusk CAP'S are capable of landing on board parent carriers after dark.

Para. The maintenance of the day CAP after sunset is within the operational control of appropriate commanders and should be so ordered if required.
12 0807 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMINCH, CINCAPPAC, COM3RDFLT, COMNORPAC.

For occupation planning am modifying concept my Joint Staff Study with respect to areas of responsibilities of action aees. COM5THFLEET will command naval occupation western HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU and will control INLAND SEA, southern half of SEA OF JAPAN, and waters east of line from southern tip of KOREA at 127-00 east south to 32-00 north 127-00 east southwest to 26-30 north 123-00 east thence south to 20-00 north. This will give COM7THFLEET responsibility for planning and conducting operations from LUTCHOW PENINSULA along CHINA COAST, in YANGTSE RIVER, and in YELLOW SEA. It will more nearly conform to boundaries between zones of action of 6th and 10th armies. Request your comment.

11 0858 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGENFMFPAC info FMFPAC REP MARITANAS, COMGEN3RDPHIBCOR.

Alert 1 RCT From 6th MarDiv for immediate occupation duty if required. Unit should be completely equipped and ready for active combat operations. 5 units of fire and 30 days supply to accompany. If employed this RCT will be withdrawn later for subsequent employment with parent division. Advise unit designated earliest.

11 1344 ALUSNA MOSCOW to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINCH AND CNO.

Soviets consider that entry and exit of U.S. submarines through TARTARY STRAIT can be arranged for only after exchange of liaison groups between Soviet and United States Pacific Fleets and after a system of recognition on which they are presently engaged has been worked out. Cincpac 090050 refers.

12 0111 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Request early action on my 070553 since the operations involved will be required to support operations directed by WARR 47513 (JCS 102217) even if Japanese surrender.

12 0112 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM7THFLT.

CINCAPPAC 090503 indicates that 3 patrol craft escort (rescue) have been converted into communication ships. It is noted that they were not included in your 121406 or 300821 as available for OLYMPIC. Please furnish me complete data on status these craft including date authority and extent of their conversion, present employment, source and service ownership of additional equipment.

Para. All ships of the Pacific Fleet which participate in CAMPUS will be assigned by me to an appropriate Task Organization.
Further to my 120226. I have now been instructed by CTF 111 to prepare a plan to move 3 small composite groups with air and logistic support to HONG KONG, SHANGHAI and perhaps SINGAPORE.

Para 2. To achieve this all Cruisers and majority of destroyers of TG 37.3 may be required to augment TG 111.2 and these ships will require replenishment as far as possible at MANUS.

Para 3. Further signal will be made when situation has been appreciated and instructions of HM Government which are expected have been received.

Para 4. MJJLT WXIKE (A) Requirements of CTG 38.5 should continue to have 1st priority. Some reduction in JULYR requirements may prove possible if situation clears quickly.

(B) Units of Fleet Train and Escorts which are operationally useful should not come south of MANUS.

(C) Movements of CVE'S to AUSTRALIA should continue as previously arranged.

12 1527

CINCPAC to COM3RDPHIB, CHESTARY, COM7THPHIB, COM5THPHIB, WARCOS, COMPHIBSPAC, USASTAF, CG 6TH ARMY, FIFPAC, CG 8THMARY, CG 10TH ARMY, ASCOM, CG AFVESPAC, COMGENIFAF, AFMDPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

CX 33017.

BLACKLIST Play, 3rd Edition, dated 8 August, is hereby amended to designate the 20-4th Corps as occupation force, KOREA. the 20-4th Corps will assume responsibilities assigned 10th Army in KOREA, functioning as a Task Force directly under this headquarters. Responsibilities of the 10th Army in the RYUKYUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain unchanged.

Para. Tentative troop list for BLACKLIST distributed 12 August as inclosure to letter this headquarters file AG 322 (11 August 1945) GC (not to all or needed) is amended as follows: on page 1 substitute the words "Part 1: 24th Corps", for the words "Part 1: 10th U.S. Army". Delete the following units from Part 1: Headquarters and Headquarters Company 10th Army, 519 Military Police Battalion (Army), 85 signal operations battalion to headquarters and Headquarters company ASCOM 10 is designated headquarters and Headquarters company 24.

Para. The 10th Army will reinforce headquarters, 24th Corps with commissioned and enlisted personnel, and such other appropriate resources as may be available, to enable the 24th Corps to perform its assigned area command and military government functions.

12 2148

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGEN CHINA, COS USA.

Assembly of personnel and material and arrangements for shipping your 070553 are approved for employment on CHINA COAST in accordance with JCS directive to be issued when destination determined.

AUGUST (GCT)

3443
WARNING ORDER. Be prepared to execute operation CAMPUS on short notice in accordance CINCPAC Joint Staff Study serial 0005103 August 9. Troop list will be in accordance CINCPAC 100904, 120623, 120624, 5thPhibCorps should be ordered to report to COMGEN 6TH ARMY for planning.

Para. Lt. Col. B. J. Truitt, USMC is designated as MarAirBase commander YOKOSUKA. Col. B. L. Smith, USMCR is designated as MarAirBase commander SASEBO-NAGASAKI and should be ordered to report to COMGEN 6TH ARMY MARAIN at earliest for transfer with ground ech. Capt. G. J. Dufek, USN is designated as COMNAV AIRBASE OMINATO. He should be ordered to report for transportation to CO of ACORN to be designated for this NAB.

Para. Suggest COMTHFLEET and COMPHILSEAFRON confer and advise COMCAFPAC earliest practicable date for transfer.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COM7THFLT, COMPHILSEAFRON, COMINCH.

Since COM7THFLT will be required to operate as a Task Fleet Commander outside the southwest Pacific area in connection with occupation operations at an earlier date than contemplated for OLYMPIC, it is desirable that he pass to COMPHILSEAFRON at the earliest possible date all his remaining functions as senior Naval Commander in the SWPA originally planned for 1 October accordance paragraph G of my 130751 approved by COMINCH 201819 and placed in effect by my 211808. Request your early concurrence.

Para. Suggest COM7THFLEET and COMPHILSEAFRON confer and advise me and CINCPAC earliest practicable date for transfer.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COM7THFLT, COMPHILSEAFRON, COMINCH.

14 0829 CINC BPF to CTF 112, info CTG 111.2, CTG 38.5, CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Admiralty have now stated intention of sending British Naval Force to HONGKONG subject to arrangements with U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Para 2. Force will be drawn from TG 111.2.

Para 3. Provision of oilers is essential to this move even at some expense of TG 38.5

Para 4. Consider following moves will provide maximum flexibility

(A) SAN ANTONIO and SAN ADOLFO to refill at ULITHI (B) WAVE EMPEROR and SAN AMADO after refitting at ENIWETOK to proceed to ULITHI.

Para 5. CTF 112 (A) report intentions to CINC BPF and CTG 38.5 (B) make direct arrangements with CINCPAC ADVANCE and COMSERVFOR 10 regarding ULITHI.

33551.

Further to conference of 11 August with your representative (Admiral Sherman) a vessel capable of sustained speed 17 knots is being loaded MANILA with materials and personnel necessary for construction of bulk aviation gasoline facilities TOKYO to go forward from OKINAWA 1st Navy echelon. Inasmuch as water capacity this vessel is limited it is requested that navy facilities for watering at both OKINAWA and objective area be made available. The name of vessel will be given in a separate radio. Advise if watering facilities for approximately 500 personnel will be available.

AUGUST (GCT)
WARX 49578.

For your information with reference to WAR 49042, the British Chiefs of Staff now inform the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that they have issued instructions to Admiral Fraser concerning acceptance of surrender of Japanese at HONGKONG.

Para. In another paper the British asked the concurrence or comment of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on instructions already sent to Mountbatten on which, in view of the time factor, the British are going ahead with all preparations. These instructions in summary are that, after acceptance of Japanese surrender, main tasks will be:

A. Reoccupation of key areas of occupied territory and surrender and disarmament of Japs.
B. Release of British and Allied prisoners of war.
C. Protection of British interests in CHINA.
D. Participation in the occupation of JAPAN.

Para. Assumptions on policy are:

A. Parts of Southwest Pacific will pass to British and Australian command on cease fire.
B. Highly important British accept HONGKONG surrender and show British flat at main Chinese ports.
C. British take part in Japanese occupation with British Commonwealth force in which Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand and probably Canada will each be represented by a Brigade Group supported by an air component.

Para. Mountbatten has been asked to submit plans for operations in order of priority:

A. Complete occupation of BURMA, reopen MALACCA STRAITS, and occupy SINGAPORE and key areas of MALAYA.
B. Reestablish a British garrison in HONGKONG using initially British Pacific Fleet and an Australian force from BORNEO. These to be released as soon as possible with Brigade and tactical air force from SEAC.
C. Small forces for certain Chinese ports.
D. Occupation of JAPAN.
E. Dispatch of force to SAIGON. Arrangements being made to ship French forces and civil affairs personnel as a follow up. Mountbatten's forces should not occupy more of INDO CHINA than necessary to assure the control of headquarters of the Japanese southern armies.
F. Dispatch forces to JAVA as soon as possible to accept surrender there. Arrangements are being made to ship Dutch security forces.
G. SUMATRA is in lower priority than JAVA.

Para. Australian forces are being asked to take initial responsibility for BORNEO and enemy occupied territories in the east. At later date Mountbatten must be prepared to provide the Australians a small proportion of force and some merchant shipping.

H. Mountbatten should appreciate that many of these arrangements are subject to agreement of Governments, which the British are now undertaking.

Para. This ends summary of orders issued by British Chiefs of Staff to Mountbatten.

Para. Request Wedemeyer's and MacArthur's expeditious comments on the foregoing.

Para. This message passed to Nimitz at request of Navy Department.
15 0216 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COININCH.

At 142130 Halsey acknowledged receipt of orders to suspend air attack operations. The initial attack was already underway when I received your directive to suspend the operations.

15 0305 CINCPAC to CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 10TH ARMY, CG XXIV CORPS, COMGEN FEF, CG AFFESPAC, ADMIDPAC, INFO CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMPHIBSPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM7THFLT, COMXXIVPHIBFOR, COM7THPHIBFOR, CG FMFPAC, CG USASTAF, WARCOS, COM5THPHIBFOR, CG 1ST ARM.

CX 33638.

Follows warning order for execution of BLACKLIST operation. Action adees will immediately initiate the execution of operations to occupy JAPAN and KOREA as outlined in BLACKLIST. COMGEN 6TH and 8TH Armies and 24th Corps will expedite arrangements respectively with Commanders 5th, 3rd, and 7th Amphibious Forces and air Task Force Commanders. Operations instructions number 4 directing preparations for the occupation of JAPAN and KOREA being issued this date. B Day the effective date of OL number 4 is 15 August 1945. Operation MAJESTIC suspended indefinitely. Warning Orders for execution of B 60 will follow. No actual landing in JAPAN or KOREA will be made prior to a date to be announced later.

15 0245 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE, CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 10TH ARMY, CG XXIV CORPS, AFFESPAC, AFFESPAC, ADMIDPAC, COMPHIBSPAC.

CX 33634.

Priorities for allocation of seaborne troop lift for phase 1 BLACKLIST are as follows: 1st, for 6th Army, 3 and 1/3 reinforced Army Divisions plus headquarters and supporting troops as follows: GHQ AFFESPAC, 6th Army, 11 Corps, 14 Corps, destination TOKYO. 2nd, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Marine Division of the 5th Amphibious Corps, plus available elements of 5th Amphibious Corps Headquarters both from MARIANAS, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 3rd, for 6th Army, 2 Reinforced Army Divisions plus 6th Army and 1 Corps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination OSAKA. 4th, for 24 Corps, 2 Reinforced Army Divisions plus 24 Corps Headquarters and corps troops, destination KIEJO. 5th, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Army Division plus 9th Corps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination OMINATO. 6th, for 6th Army, 1 Marine Division plus remainder of 5th Amphibious Corps Headquarters and supporting troops from HAWAII, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 7th, for 6th Army, 1 Reinforced Army Division from HAWAII, destination OSAKA. 8th, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Marine Division from Marianas, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 9th, for 6th Army, 1 Reinforced Army division, destination OSAKA. 10th, for 6th Army, 1 and 1/3 Reinforced Army Divisions, destination OMINATO.

Para. Where more than 1 Division is allocated for initial movement to a given objective, the movement may, at the discretion of the Army or Corps Commander concerned, (6th Army, 8th Army or 2 AFJLXKVRJRS) and as arranged with the corresponding naval task force commander, be conducted by reinforced division rather than by simultaneous movement of the entire allocation.

Para. The following paragraph for CINCPAC only: this message confirms priorities handed Admiral Sherman at Manila 13 August on BLACKLIST priorities and troop lift estimates. The estimate for the troops involved in the initial movement to the TOKYO area should read "personnel, 151 allocation of shipping should be obtained from the Army Commander concerned".
15 1333 CINCPAC to MARCSS FOR JCS info CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMGEN US FORCES CHINA.

CX 33830 - This radio in 4 parts.

Para 1. Present planned BLACKLIST contemplates employment, JAPAN 19 Divisions, KOREA 3 Divisions, Philippine Garrison 2 Divisions, reference WX 49334. It is considered that forces and shipping allocate for JAPAN proper must remain available pending determination of conditions after initial landings which will be made by 14 Divisions.

Para 2. By confining KOREAN occupation to KEIJO AREA and reducing initial entry to the initial division only, a division with shipping can be made available for DARIEN at a relatively early date. Eventual accomplishment of occupation mission in the United States zone of KOREA will require commitment of an additional Army division not now allocated if DARIEN is occupied.

Para 3. Occupation of SHANGHAI by 2 divisions of the 3rd Phib Corps is proposed by CINCPAC in conjunction with COMGEN CHINA when shipping becomes available, this can be accomplished if no unexpected requirements arise in JAPAN proper or KOREA.

Para 4. It is recommended that any occupations on the CHINA COAST by United States forces further to those cited above be placed in a contingent category dependent upon the development of the situation in higher priority areas and availability of resources.

15 0206 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM5THPHIBFOR, COMNORPAC, COMGEN 5THPHIBCORPS info CINCPAC.

Para 1. CINCPAC staff study BLACKLIST mailed today. Following changes made since publication.

A. 24th Corps designated as occupation force, KOREA. 24th Corps will assume responsibilities assigned 10th Army in KOREA, functioning as a Task Force directly under CINCPAC. 10th Army responsibility in the RYUKUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain unchanged.

B. In B 2 the 5th Phib Corps is substituted for the 1 Corps in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI AREA. The 1 Corps, reinforced with the 98th Division will be employed for B 10 in the GOSAKA AREA.

C. 27 Division is removed from 24 Corps and will be employed in B 60. 27 Division replaces 98 Division within the 14 Corps. 38 Division remains in APPAC reserve.

D. 96 Division is included in 24 Corps replacing 27 Division.

E. Delete all references to occupation of any part of KARAFUTO. Such operations will not be conducted.

Para 2. Foregoing changes also apply to applicable parts of my Joint Staff Study CAMPUS.
With Japanese capitulation previous arrangements for liaison groups Army and Navy at Khabarovsk and Vladivostok appear to be subject to modification. In this connection it is suggested that a Cruiser or other suitable vessel be provided for the use of Army and Navy liaison representatives to deal with the Russian command in whatever Atlantic port appears desirable such as Dairen. The sending of a Cruiser for this liaison purpose should be considered in connection with previous directive regarding the occupation of Dairen by United States forces. (For Deane reference to visits to or occupation of Dairen is not to be communicated to the Soviets at this time).

Para 2. Taking foregoing into consideration information desired from MacArthur and Nimitz as to what changes if any they desire as regards present arrangements for liaison groups at Khabarovsk and Vladivostok informing military mission Moscow at same time.

Para 3. In connection with above CINCPAC is advised that a group visa for Navy liaison group has not as yet been received but Rear Admiral Settle with 8 additional Naval officers and 6 enlisted men are proceeding by air to Guam from Washington evening 16 August to report to him for further assignment in connection with this duty.

My serial 0002 of 13 August Re: Fort Bayard operation. Have assigned 6 officers from NABU 13 including Commander John Harold Sedtz USNR 86937 to this operation. Latter assigned acting Commanding Officer of NABU pending confirmation or designation of another by higher authority. Essential to have an organized NABU to avoid confusion. New Subject. Designation of 7 LST's received this date. Have not yet arrived but are expected tomorrow. Unless otherwise directed will begin loading upon arrival. At moment appears that 3 additional LST's will be required but will advise of additional shipping requirements later. Personnel from GROFAC Pearl not arrived. Request shipping designator.

In view of current developments believe it better to cancel exchange of Flag Officers on basis originally planned. Your 152127. The presence of a Russian Liaison Group at my headquarters would have many disadvantages. Para. In lieu thereof propose that Rear Admiral Settle report to CINCPAC break his flag in a cruiser and proceed initially to Vladivostok and later to such other port as may be desirable.

Para. Propose to use Louisvllle escorted by a destroyer if you concur.

Ref: Rad 152127Z the mission assigned to the U.S. Military liaison group which has been organized for station in Khabarovsky was to effect operational coordination and liaison with the Red Army in connection with Military operations against Japan. So far as this command is concerned direct liaison in no longer necessary query shall the project be continued.
CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Your 141507. CX 33547. My 150846 also refers. Naval facilities required to be furnished in each occupational area as follows:

A. Entire naval base at YOKOSUKA with all present facilities and living quarters for approximately 7600 Navy and 5400 4th Marine RCT, 250 acres minimum space. YOKOSUKA Naval air base with living quarters for 4000 Navy personnel. Recreation area SAGAMI BEACH with 1 mile of beach and 50 acres for athletic fields. 50 trucks at least 1 1/2 tons, 25 passenger vehicles.

B. OMINATO. Entire naval base at OMINATO with all present facilities. KABAYAMA airfield with living quarters for 3000 personnel. 50 truck not less than 1 1/2 ton, 10 passenger cars. Clearance all highways between port and airfield.

C. HIROSHIMA airfield with living quarters for 3500. Pier and landing facilities as close as possible to airfield with 10 acres cleared for sorting area in rear. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton, 10 passenger vehicles. Clearance all highways between port and airfield.

D. SASEBO. Entire naval base at SASEBO with all present facilities. OMURA seaplane base and airfield with all adjacent unloading facilities. Living quarters for 4000. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton, 10 passenger vehicles.

E. All existing wire communications systems between and in subject airfields and adjacent naval bases or ports. All existing radio station installations at these naval bases or ports and airfields and all communication facilities for port control to be left intact.

F. Airfields to be complete with all existing facilities. Runways taxiways and adjacent areas cleared of debris and ready for operation.

G. Naval bases to be complete with piers workshops, drydocks, hospitals and equipment cleared of debris and ready for operation.

H. Facilities at airfields and bases to include adequate electric power, water and sewage disposal.

Para. Various additional facilities may be required and will be requested as the situation develops.

CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV. fAIFAC. WARCOS, COMGEN 3THAR, 3THAR, 3THAR, ASCOM 1, 3THAR, 3THAR, 3THAR, 3THAR, 3THAR, 3THAR, 3THAR, 3THAR, 3THAR.

CX 33452.

BLACKLIST plan, edition number 3, this headquarters dated 8 August 45 is amended as follows:

A. In B2 the 5th Amphibious Corps is substituted for the 1 Corps in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI AREA. The 1 Corps, reinforced with the 98 division, will be employed for B-10 in the OSAKA AREA.

B. The 27 Division is removed from 24 Corps and will be employed in B-60. The 27 division replaces the 98 division within the 14 Corps. The 38 Division remains in AIFAC reserve.

C. The 96 division is included in the 24 Corps replacing the 27 Div.

D. Delete all references to operations for the occupation of any part of KARAFUTU. Such operations will not be conducted.
15 0529 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV, COMGENCHINA, WARCOS, SAGSEA, COMGENUSASTAF, MIL
MISSION MOSCOW.

CX 33657.

Pursuant to directive from the President of the United States and in accordance with agreement among the governments of the United States, Chinese republic, United Kingdom, and Union of Socialist Republics I have been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces to accept, coordinate and carry into effect the Japanese surrender. I assume command accordingly. The channel of communications with the Japanese Imperial Government and Japanese Imperial Headquarters will be through this headquarters. MacArthur.

16 0045 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC, BRITISH ADMTY DELEG.

WARX 50182.

You will release to the full control of Admiral Fraser such parts of the British Pacific Fleet as he requests.

16 0250 CINCFOA ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMINCH, WARCOS.

Your CX 33831. Will send Rear Admiral Sherman to represent me at Manila during meeting with Japanese representatives 17 August.

Para. The presence of a liaison group to represent me at your headquarters in the TOKYO AREA will be very advantageous and I propose to send a group headed by a Flag Officer with communication and intelligence personnel as required. Will advise shortly as to personality.

15 1442 COMGENCHINA to WARCOS Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMGENIB

TOP SECRET. CFRX 4740 In view of final decision that immediate requirements of China Theater for U S troops to occupy key positions cannot be furnished, determined measures must be taken to retain control of the situation here. Refer WAR 49574. First: It is urgently requested that no aircraft be removed from the India-China Wing, ATC, see WAR 49943. The present instructions issued General Turner in personal ATC message from Washington have caused him to take the measure of alerting 50 C-54's the removal of which from the Hump is costing China Theater 12000 tons per month and this loss in the absence of immediate U S occupation forces on the CHINA COAST is jeopardizing the new mission of the China Theater WARX 47523. Chinese troops are being alerted for move to secure the most critical areas however their arrival will be a matter of weeks or months if airlift is not employed. Adequate forces to insure security of these key areas cannot be moved in time unless all presently assigned aircraft are available to lift the troops and to bring fuel into CHINA. 2nd: It is urgently requested that additional assistance be given by making Avigas available at the airfields in vicinity of NANKING and in the TIENTSIN-PERING area for the movement of occupational Chinese forces. It is suggested that U S Navy convoy shipment of avigas.

Para. Utilizing vessels set up for JEMEDAR should meet our emergency requirements for the NANKING area, provided we can expect continued shipments, means which can be made available plus personnel and equipment
---(continued)---

previously allocated by CINCPAC, CINCPAC and WAR for JEMEDAR should enable us to handle this operation. Request that all resources allocated for JEMEDAR be diverted to NANKING.

Para. In addition request the 7 LST's originally earmarked for naval pre-convoy in JEMEDAR be retained after off loading at NANKING with addition of any others which can be made available for lift of drummed avigas from OKINAWA to TIENTSIN.

Para. 3rd: The allocation of LCI craft for coastal or river movement intra CHINA would materially increase our capabilities for the movement of forces into the vital areas. It is recommended that Task Force 93 be augmented by a minimum of 50 LCI for this purpose.

Para. The urgency and importance of the above must not be underestimated. There are reports that fighting is already in progress between Central Government and Communist Troops in the TSINGTAO area and elsewhere, with the Communists attempting to seize all key towns and airfields in northeast CHINA. Each day's delay in placing a major force in the critical areas increases the probability of widespread civil conflict and jeopardizes our 1st task of securing the key areas within CHINA as stated in WAR 49574.

COMINCH AND CNO CHIEF OF STAFF to MILAMS MOSCOW - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC - CINCAFPAC.

My 152127 and MILAMS MOSCOW MX 25322 since arrangements with Soviets for exchanging Army, Navy liaison groups KHABARAVOSK and VLADIVOSTOK and U.S. Headquarters were to effect war operational coordination we now propose to cancel these liaison missions.

Para 2. In order to provide for contact with the Soviet Pacific Naval headquarters we propose to send a Cruiser and 1 or 2 Destroyers initially to VLADIVOSTOK and later to such other ports as may be desirable.

Para 3. Obtain Soviet concurrence on above and advise originators and info addressees. Upon receipt of Soviet concurrence regarding visit to VLADIVOSTOK CINCPAC make detailed arrangements and notification direct through ALUSNA MOSCOW keeping COMINCH advised.

Para 4. If the need should arise for additional liaison in connection with coordination of POSC surrender activities proposals therefor will be furnished at a later date.

COMGEN CHINA to WARCOS info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC.

Reference paragraph A of 4th document "General Order Number 1 Military and Naval" (WAR 48672 as amended by subsequent messages) request that the term "MANCHURIA" be defined. Chinese authorities state that the term "MANCHURIA" includes only 3 provinces, namely, LIAONING, K'ING and HEILUNGKIANG. However since the Japanese created the puppet government of MANCHUKUO they have included the province of JEHOL which the Chinese government considers to be an integral part of CHINA and not a part of MANCHURIA. The Chinese state that MANCHURIA as a geographical term definitely does not include JEHOL and they feel it to be vitally important that JEHOL be expressly excluded from the term "MANCHURIA" as used in the surrender documents. Request that this matter be clarified and if possible that JEHOL be definitely excluded from MANCHURIA as used in General Order No. 1.

Request prompt information as to action taken.

AUGUST (GCT)
This message refers to Wedemeyer's 4352, MacArthur's 33449 and 49334 and Cincpac's 120242.

Priority areas to be occupied as given in WX 47945 and 48004 will not be changed at this time. However, it is desired that every effort be made to expedite the movement of U.S. Forces into key ports on the CHINA COAST. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the attitude of the Japanese administration and armed forces in the Japan Homeland and the subsequent size and speed of movement of U.S. Forces into the Japanese Homeland remains to be determined. In preparing a reply to 49334, it is requested that consideration be given to proceeding with arrangements on a basis that in addition to KEIJO or another KOREAN port, Dairen if not already occupied by the Russians, a CHINA COAST port will be entered prior to commitment of forces for 2nd priority objectives in JAPAN PROPER as set forth in BLACKLIST plan dated 25 July. This suggestion is made with the thought that it may be practicable to set up arrangements so that forces intended for ports around the YELLOW SEA can, up to their actual landing, still be shifted to the Japanese Homeland if the developing situation so indicates.

On the matter of a specific port or ports on the CHINA COAST, this is left for the time being to Commanders concerned. Wedemeyer should obtain views of the Generalissimo on the port to be selected, if any one can be entered in the near future. For your information, State Department considers the occupation of TSINGTAO or TAKU should take priority over SHANGHAI. In light of the foregoing and in answering 49334, and this message, request that, after consulting Wedemeyer, MacArthur and Nimitz furnish their best estimate of time schedule on a port in KOREA, DAIREN and a CHINA PORT. In your time schedule there should be included alternate ports to be occupied by the forces set up should DAIREN and/or KEIJO have been previously occupied by the Soviets.
17 0906 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMMARIANAS, COMMARGILS info COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COMATRPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCAFPAC.

Make plans and preparations to receive the surrender of all Japanese forces remaining in the BONINS, MARIANAS, CAROLINES and MARSHALLS. For these purposes the command areas shown in Appendix 1 to Annex B of my OpPlan 12-45 are applicable. Advise means required to implement plans.

Para. Plans should include provision for concentrating prisoners in the larger islands or atolls and for their repatriation when circumstances and shipping permit subject to arrangements between CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC.

Para. Make preliminary plans for activating naval airfields on WAKE and MARCUS for use of NATS and other transient aircraft.

17 1045 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

C-34353.

From Sherman. Have passed JCS WX 50111 to COMPHIBSPAC and asked him to submit to you and CINCAFPAC his best estimates of timing under the present priorities and possible alternatives to permit earlier movements to CHINA.

Para. Estimates by Wilkinson contemplates arrivals TOKYO as follows: B plus 16, 11th Corps Hdqtrs, 1st Cav Div and 112 RCT. B plus 20 2 American B plus 29 43 inf Div and 14th Corps Hdqtrs. Assuming use of same ships the 9th Corps Hdqtrs and 1 Div would arrive OMINATO B plus 40. 2nd Div OMINATO at B plus 47.

Para. 6th Army estimates 1st arrivals as: 5th MarDiv B plus 31. 99th B plus 41. 3rd B plus 47. 27th B plus 57.

Para. CINCAFPAC has asked COMGEN CHINA to send representative here.

Para. Perhpas Carter can produce a helpful estimate from his own records.

18 0610 COMGEN USASTAF to CINCPOA ADVANCE info CINCAFPAC, COMGENAIR, COMAF 20, COMAF 3, COMMARILLAS.

2346.

Further reference CINCPOA ADVANCE Top Sec message date time group 160808Z August and our number 2229 date time group 176131Z, your attention is invited to the fact that prior to the termination of hostilities war department policy prescribed that USASTAF construction be in accordance with minimum war operational requirements. As a result, much of the construction that now exists is not desirable for either permanent or semi-permanent use. In view of either the permanent or semi-permanent nature that many USASTAF installations may have, USASTAF desire to reserve the right to review current construction projects in light of post V-J day requirements and to propose construction that may be either of a permanent or semi-permanent nature as well as projects in categories you list. You are advised of USASTAF APOS position in this matter inasmuch as your policy makes no provision for future war department approval of post-war projects.
WAR X 51481.

In reply to a message from the Prime Minister, the President has answered as follows: "From the U.S. standpoint there is no objection to the surrender of HONGKONG being accepted by a British Officer provided Military coordination is effected beforehand by the British with the Generalissimo on operational matters connected with assistance and support through that area to Chinese and American forces who may still be either engaged against the enemy or involved in securing surrender of Japanese forces in the hinterland. General MacArthur will be instructed to arrange for the surrender of HONGKONG to the British Commander whenever the above coordination is effected.

Para. The Secretary of State informed T. V. S. that here this morning of thus contemplated action stating that it did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of HONGKONG.

COM 3 RDLT to COMGEN THAMNY info CINCAPPAC, CINCPAC ADV, CTF 31, COMGEN THAMNY.

HALSEY TO EICHENBERGER.

Predicated on assumption fleet arrives SAGAMI WAN 23rd, airborne landing 11th AB division takes place 25th, and troops will initially occupy only ATSUGI-YOKOSUKA and area to southward I have formulated 2 alternate plans (plan 1) 4th Marines and Fleet Marine landing force under B. C. Clement land at SHINJUKU. 4th Marines spearheaded by tanks make 2 prong simultaneous advance on YOKOSUKA airbase and YOKOSUKA naval base. Fleet Marine protect rear and flanks. Ship fire support in both SAGAMI WAN and TOKYO BAY. Plan 2 forces land at YOKOSUKA air base and envelope YOKOSUKA naval base from rear by land.

Para. Both plans contemplate landings on same day as airborne landings with H hour for naval landings approximately same at time designated for airborne landings or as you may direct. Plan 1 preferred as it avoids exposing transports to treachery in very restricted waters. Both plans permit subsequent isolating and disarming enemy forces on peninsula south of YOKOSUKA-SHINJUKU line after fleet landing forces take over security duty at YOKOSUKA air and naval bases.

Para. Navy landing forces comprise 4th Marines and 1800 (3 battalions) marines from the fleet under Clement, a reserve force of 1200 (3 battalions) U.S. bluejackets and 1 battalion (400 men) from British Fleet for security duty. An additional reserve of 5 battalions (2000 men) of U.S. bluejackets can be mustered but with inferior equipment.

Para. In order to crystallize details of my plans request following information earliest (A) on what air field or fields will 11th AB division land (B) is my plan 1 agreeable to you (C) what if any support of airborne operation do you require from 3rd fleet air surface or ground forces (D) do you wish to designate H hour for my forces or will you be satisfied with my intent to time it with initial airborne landings (E) are you agreeable to my normal amphibious organization (CTF 31 R Adm Badger Commander attack Force) Brig Gen Clement Commander Landing Force) under which Clement is COMGEN ashore until notified that he is relieved by the officer you designate.

Para. With the answers to the foregoing I can meet any time table with 72 hours notice in advance of earliest scheduled date of airborne landing.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, WEDEMEYER INFO NIMITZ, WHEELER, SPARZ
BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION.

WARX 51776.

Concerning WARX 51431, MacArthur will arrange for the surrender of HONGKONG to a British Commander as soon as the military coordination with the Generalissimo on operational matters indicated by the President is effected by the British. Wedemeyer will keep MacArthur informed of the progress of these arrangements with the view to expeditious action.

WARX 51397.

State Department requests you be informed that the President has now decided that, in addition to representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, representatives of Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and the Netherlands will be invited to be present at the acceptance of the Japanese surrender. Reference is WARX 50043. Communications have gone to those governments asking them to name representatives and to communicate, if possible, directly with you on details, including arrangements for attendance.

Para. State Department requests appropriate instructions be issued to you to provide for the presence of these representatives. The foregoing is for your information and guidance.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS to CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMGEN CHINA (GENERALISSIMO), GHQ AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES (GENL BLAYDE), CHIEF, U.S. MILITARY MISSION, MOSCOW (CINCO SOVIET FORCES, FAR EAST), CG 29TH CORPS, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 6TH PACSBA INFO WARCOS (JCS), CG 10TH ARMY, 24TH CORPS, USASTAF CG AF WESPAC.

Herewith for information are official texts of 3 basic documents governing general surrender of Japanese and Japanese controlled armed forces which are being handed by me to Japanese representatives at my headquarters 20 August 1945 for compliance as indicated. (A) proclamation by the Emperor of JAPAN. "Accepting the terms set forth in declaration by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China on July 26 1945 at POTS DAM and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign on my behalf the instrument of surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to issue general orders to the military and naval forces in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. I command all my people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms and faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the instrument of surrender and the general orders issued by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters hereunder".

B. "Instrument of surrender". We, acting by command of and on behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain 26 July 1945 at POTS DAM, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which 4 powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

- continued -
Para. We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese Armed Forces and all Armed Forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

Para. We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircrafts, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

Para. We hereby command the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese Forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

Para. We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper and to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

Para. We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the POTS DAM declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commanders for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representatives of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration.

Para. We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

Para. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.


C. General order number 1, military and naval. "The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese Armed Forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese Armed forces and Japanese controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, The Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in
detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out (a) the Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within CHINA, (excluding MANCHURIA), Formosa and FRENCH INDO-CHINA north of 15-00 north shall surrender to Generalissimo CHIANG KAI-SHEK. (b) The Senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, and auxiliary forces within MANCHURIA, KOREA north of 38-00 north and KARAPUTO shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

Para. (c) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA SOUTH of 15-00 north, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLANDS INDIES, NEW GUINEA, BISMARCS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender (to the Supreme Commander South East Asia Command or the commanding general Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. (d) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands, MIYAKUS, BORNEO, and other Pacific islands shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Para. (E) To the Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of JAPAN, minor islands adjacent thereto, KOREA south of 38-00 north and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

Para. (F) The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrender, and all surrenders of Japanese forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

Para. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in JAPAN and abroad to disarm completely all forces of JAPAN or under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated, and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied commanders indicated above.

Para. Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed.

Para 2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete information with respect to JAPAN and all areas under Japanese control, as follows:

A. Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.

B. Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civilian, giving complete information as to the number, type, location, and condition of such aircraft.

C. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.

D. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 tons (Gross), in and out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position, condition and movement.

E. Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps showing locations and layouts of all mines, minefields, and other obstacles to
movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

F. Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

G. Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

Para 3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military, naval and civilian aircraft remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.

Para 4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

Para 5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will insure that:

A. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.

C. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of above.

Para 6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:

A. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies, and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in section 4 of this order).

B. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.

C. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defense, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications installations and establishments.

D. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the productions or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by military or part.

Para 7. Military organization in connection with its operations.

Para 7. The Japanese Imperial Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs A, B, and D of section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of each.

Para 8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.
Para 9. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:

A. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved, to include the administrative and supply service essential to provide adequate food, shelter clothing, and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores, records, arms, and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the Command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoners of war and civilian internees.

C. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by allied authorities.

D. The Japanese imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their locations. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.

Para 11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared, on instructions from Allied occupation commanders, to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.

Para 12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces of other Allied military authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders, and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of Allied Military authorities and the Japanese Government.

19 1047 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS TO SACSEA. 300 AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES (DELIVER GENERAL BLAKEY IN MANILA) INFO HARCOS(JCS) CENTR PAC ADVANCE.

2 517.

It is anticipated that the actual surrender in TOKYO will take place 26 August. Instructions received by this headquarters direct that: "The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16 degrees north latitude, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLANDS INDIES, NEW GUINEA, ELMARKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, southeast ASIA command or the Commanding General, Australian Forces - the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers".

Para. Action addressers are requested to arrange between them the areas within which they will respectively receive the surrender of Japanese forces and advise at earliest.
Order number 1, military and naval, is amended as follows: (z627)

Paragraph 1 delete subparagraph c of part 1 and substitute therefor
the following 2 subparagraphs: (1st subparagraph) "The senior
Japanese commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces
within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China
south of 16°00 north latitude; Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Lesher Sundas
(including Bali, Lombok, Ceram, Ambon, Kai, Arce, Tanimbar, and
islands in the Arafura Sea, Celebes, Halmaheras, and Dutch New
Guinea, shall surrender to the supreme Allied commander, Asia
command" x (2nd subparagraph) "The senior Japanese commander and
all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Borneo, Brit New
Guinea, the Bismarcks and Solomons, shall surrender to the commander
in-chief coa Australian military forces" x paragraph 2 from sub-


Originator SCAP
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CINCPAC-PoA ADV HED
291856

Action Japanese imperial ghq
CINCPAC ADV/COMGEN CHINA
COMGEN CHINA (For General Shidou)/GOC Australian
Military forces to General Blamey)/Pashed chief US
Military mission Moscow SAC SEA/Mountbatten/Wargoh/
JCS/Cg 6th army Pashed/Cg 8th army/Cg 10th army/Cg
24th corps/USA STAF (see next page for readied adees)
PARAGRAPH D PART 1 DELETE "RYUKYUS" X PARAGRAPH 3 IN SUBPARAGRAPH E PART 1 INSERT "RYUKYUS" THE PHRASE "AND THE PHILIPPINES" X PARAGRAPH 4 IN SUB PARAGRAPH A OF PART 2 INSERT "NAVAL AND RPT,"

FOLLOWING THE WORD "LAND" X PARAGRAPH 5 IN PART 2 DELETE THE 14TH WORD "FORCES" AND SUBSTITUTE TUREDE "POWERS"

(ADDITIONAL ADDEES FROM READDRESS)
INFO TO: COM7THFLT
COM5THFLT
COMNDRPAC
COM3RDFLT

Add Connell to and all families

Cary

CLASSIFICATION:  
(S.O.P.)
19 1615 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES IN THE FAR EAST (CINCPAC) ADV. COMGEN CHINA, USASTAR CG AFVESPAC, JCS, CCHOFTHUR, CCG AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES (GENERAL BLAIR) CHIEF US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW (CINC SOVIET FORCES FAR EAST) INFO CG 24TH CORPS, CG 6TH ARMY, SACSEA, CINC PAC (JCS) WARX 52004.

My Z 515, date time group 190909 GCT, (Z 520) paragraph "(C)", General Order number 1 military and naval ", sub-paragraph (B) is hereby amended to read "The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, and auxiliary forces within MANCHURIA, KOREA north of 38-00 north latitude, KARAFUTO and the KURILE ISLANDS shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East". Reference Washington Radiogram WX 51396 (not to all nor needed).

20 2137 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to DEANE INFO NIMITZ, MACARTHUR, SPAATZ.

WARX 52004.

The following with reference to your M 25339 is for your information.

Para. There will be a large number of U. S. aircraft operating over and into JAPAN, particularly in the next months. These include the occupational air forces, transport runs into and from JAPAN and KOREA, and naval air operations. A transport route from the ALEUTIAN'S probably will be inaugurated. U. S. Naval and merchant vessels will operate throughout the north Pacific and the SEA OF JAPAN. The requirement for the best possible weather service over JAPAN and adjacent areas in the north Pacific will therefore be intensified as a result of the Japanese capitulation and the weather centers will be needed.

Para. As for the liaison groups, it is recognized that some means of liaison will be necessary to handle the details of post hostilities problems you mention. However, the great bulk of these will concern the coordination of movement of ships and aircraft into a port or areas immediately adjacent to a port. It is considered that this liaison can most expeditiously be handled by a liaison group aboard ship, which will permit the liaison group to be present on the spot required and not be immobilized at a place where it may not be needed. In this connection it is believed that the great bulk of the new problems which will arise as the result of the Japanese capitulation will, on the soviet side, require resolution in MOSCOW rather than by commanders in the field.

Para. Since the Soviets have already been informed of the decision on this matter and the weather personnel and equipment is now en route, it is considered no action should be taken to justify this decision to the Soviets at this time unless they raise the question.

21 0918 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COMGEN CHINA, COMTHFLT.

A conference took place at Manila 19 August between representatives CINCPAC, COMTHFLT and COMGEN CHINA. The following concept of operations was concurred in by COMTHFLT, by COMGEN CHINA'S representative and by the headquarters of CINCPAC on the staff level. It is recommended for approval as the basis for interim operations and for further planning. This constitutes my comment on COMGENCHINA'S CFBX 4740 CFBX 4906 and JCS 50181.

- continued -
Para. It appears that 30 September is the earliest realistic planning date for landing marines on CHINA COAST without undue interference with occupation JAPAN and KOREA.

Para. Concept of operations:

A. Establish north CHINA naval force under COMTHFLT in SHANTUNG-CHINHANGTAO area as soon as possible to consist of 2 battle cruisers, 4 heavy cruisers, 1 CarDiv and accompanying destroyers. This force would control YELLOW SEA and GULF OF CHIHILI and also support occupation of KOREA.

B. Establish YANGTSE patrol under COMTHFLT with 2 light cruisers destroyers and small types as CHINA THEATER forces reach YANGTSE. This force could reinforce the 3rd PhibCorps.

C. Establish south CHINA patrol under COMTHFLT with gunboats and destroyers escorts as soon as CHINA THEATER forces take a port. Troops available are the 3rd Phib Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops, the 1st MarDiv and the 6th 1 KarDiv less 1 regiment. In view of prospect demobilization requirements it is not advisable to commit the 4th MarDiv which would make a total of 6 Marine Divisions in JAPAN and CHINA. CINCAPPACs' representative indicated that a MarDiv from the 5th PhibCorps could be released from JAPAN when relieved in October by the 86th or 87th Inf Div. This MarDiv could reinforce the 3rd PhibCorps.

Para. Information from COMGENCHINA indicates that unless unfavorable developments occur divisions of the Chinese combat command controlled by American officers will by late September be in control of SHANGHAI, NANKING and CANTON and that no other troops will be needed in SHANGHAI to make naval operations feasible in the YANGTSE RIVER.

D. Operate temporarily in 7th Fleet approximately 72 landing craft infantry for use as coastal and river transport and gunboats.

E. Divert supplies intended previously for FORT BAYARD to such port as COMGENCHINA may designate. TIENTSIN TAKU and/or.

F. Prepare for occupation CHINGWANGTAO and TSINGTAO or, alternately if CENTRAL CHINAsituation required, when forces are ready, occupation of SHANGHAI area.

Z 534.

Reference is made to my Z517 of 19 August. Desire that message be voided and the following substituted therefor: "It is anticipated that the actual surrender in TOKYO will take place 31 August". Instructions received by this headquarters direct that: "The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, SOUTH OF 1600 north, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLANDS INDIES, NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, southeast ASIA command, and to the Commanding General, Australian Forces, as later designated".

Action addressees are requested to arrange between themselves the areas within which they will respectively receive the surrender of Japanese forces and advise this headquarters at earliest.
21 0517 CINCAFPAC to COM3rdFLT Info CG8th ARMY, CINCPAC ADV HQ, CG FEAF, CG 11TH AIRBORNE

CX 353/47. From CG 8th Army to Com3rdFlt. Reference your radio dispatched 190219. In view of the fact that HAYAMA, ZUSHI and KAMAKURA have been selected as the headquarters area of the Supreme Allied Commander, and advice given the Japanese emissaries that the initial landings would be in restricted areas, it is considered advisable to put into effect the general provision of your Plan 2, with not to exceed what is normally considered to be a regimental combat team, of 3 battalions of infantry and 1 battalion of supporting artillery, initially. Additional troops to be landed as required. Landing force as limited above is acceptable. Brigadier General Clement will report by radio upon my assumption of command about 1200 I (-9) 28 August. His force will land in the vicinity of YOKOSUKA and occupy the general area: URAKA-KUBITI-PUNAKOSHI-YOKOSUKA, all inclusive. Commanding General 11th Airborne Division is charged with coordination of boundaries. Airfield for 11th Airborne and H Hour will be designated by SCAF. Employment of elements of the 3rd Fleet air and naval gunfire support will be arranged directly with Commanding General 11th Airborne Division at OKINAWA. Recommend liaison officers be dispatched by air to Headquarters 11th Airborne Division to coordinate details. Essential personnel to furnish communications to be supplied by AFPAC Jasco unit at OKINAWA. The emissaries were directed to have the area evacuated of Japanese troops but we must be alert to guard against surprise.

22 0915 CINCAFPAC to COMGEN CHINA Info CINCPAC ADV HQ

TOP SECRET. CFBX 5409 Your topsecret radio Z 515 assigning areas of responsibility for accepting surrender Japanese omitted reference to the BELLWRIGHT ISLANDS. We are assuming that subject area is including in CHINA Theater's area of responsibility in absence of instructions to the contrary.

21 1220 COMGEN CHINA to WARECS Info CINCPAC, CINCPA, COMCENLT, COMGENALCHINA, COMGENOSCHINA, COMGENOCHINA

TOP SECRET. CFBX 5404 REPRESENTATIVES of CHINA Theater, General Caraway
and Captain Painter, USN proceeded to MANILA, 18 August pursuant to a message requesting conferences among representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPAC, and CONGENCHINA. Message CX 34316 refers. Discussions dealt with availability of occupation forces for CHINA and with problems of logistic support and personnel lift. The following subjects were discussed on a planning level only and agreements reached on that level as indicated below:

Para A. The question of priorities for occupational forces. It was agreed that the 1st priority must remain JAPAN and KOREA. It was tentatively indicated that forces would probably be moved into key points on CHINA coast after 10 divisions had reached JAPAN and 2 divisions had been put ashore in KOREA. 1st 2 divisions therefore could land in CHINA approximately 30 September.

Para B. Naval assistance for CHINA. Preliminary examination and planning are under way covering operations of 7th Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid to support CHINA Theater forces and to control coastal waters. As presently planned 3 naval forces would be established to include: A SOUTH CHINA Naval Force basing general in the CANTON area; A NORTH CHINA Task Force in TSINGTAO—CHIPECO—CHINHANGTA area, and a YANGTZE patrol for operations in the YANGTZE. The not firm and is subject to approval by CINCPAC, CONGENCHINA and CNO, WASHINGTON.

Para C. United States forces for occupation in key areas on CHINA Coast. As previously agreed between CINCPAC, CINCPAC and CONGENCHINA LOP Marine divisions (less 1 regimentation team) will be available for occupation of key points on the Chinese coast with a possibility of later getting a 3rd Marine division if it can be replaced by 1 of the US Army divisions presently enroute from United States.

Para D. Furnishing of transportation for movement of Chinese forces to key occupational areas. As previously agreed at for 2 Marine divisions initially allotted to the occupation of CHINA Theater areas can be turned over to CHINA Theater for movement of forces thereafter (about 15 October). In addition, an exploratory examination is being undertaken to determine whether approximately 50 landing craft infantry can be furnished for use in moving the Chinese troops along the West, YANGTZE and HLE Rivers/or coastal movement. CINCPAC has stated that this type craft is not suitable for large scale movement of US forces into JAPAN and KOREA.

Para E. Convoy to open port and furnish supplies to CHINA. It was agreed that the convoy of the 1st 5 ships plus the additional equipment and personnel furnished by CINCPAC and CINCPAC would be run into the SHANGHAI NANKING AREA as soon as SHANGHAI and NANKING are secured (estimated about 15 September). It was further agreed that the 1st convoy could go into NANKING if necessary to facilitate distribution of gasoline and other critical supplies. Thereafter the main port would be established at SHANGHAI. The lower YANGTZE must be swept YFC mines prior to the bringing of the convoy into CHINA.

Para F. Evacuation of U.S. and Allied Personnel Liberated in ASIA. Discussion on staff level in CINCPAC indicates that shipping could possibly be made available by the JOHNSHIRE recovered personnel could be assembled.
and transported to a port area and meanwhile CINCPAC is examining the availability of evacuation and hospital ships and NAFS aircraft for rapid movement of recovered personnel to CHINAWA or the MARIANAS for processing and necessary hospitalization prior to their being placed in the normal evacuation pipeline via the Pacific, the United States.

Para C. Japanese disarmed and civilian personnel in CHINA. Preliminary discussions were held with representatives of CINCPAC and CINCPAC on priorities for evacuation of Japanese disarmed personnel from CHINA to the Japanese main islands and it was agreed that early evacuation of all Japanese military and civilian personnel from CHINA was mandatory to prevent serious unrest in CHINA and the possibility of large groups of Japanese becoming established in Chinese communities.

Para. Information will be furnished CINCPAC when firm request for naval assistance are forwarded through War Department for processing as per instructions in WARX 51172. That is all.

21 2230 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR info NIMITZ, WHEELER, SPAATZ, WEDEMeyer.

WARX 52674. United States Policy Board C 34637 follows:

Para. "The 4 Allied Powers are bound by the POTS DAM ultimatum to permit the return of Japanese military forces, after they are completely disarmed, to their homes. Pending such return, which of necessity depends on the availability of transportation, this personnel may be used for such purposes and subject to such conditions and directives as may be prescribed. B C N D national Commanders authorized to receive the surrender. Surrender Japanese soldiers should be considered as disarmed personnel and not necessarily as prisoners of war.

Para. Until the Japanese Armed Forces are secured, discussion and commitments concerning treatment of Japanese disarmed forces during the period between their surrender and their return to their homes should be held to the essential minimum."

Para. Desire you inform Mountbatten of above suggesting that he may wish to adopt a similar policy reference the STL F this personnel.

21 2327 CINCPAC to CTG 30.1, CTG 30.2, CTG 30.9, 30.5, 30.6, 30.8, CTF 31 35, 37, 38, COMFLTFCTASKFOR, COMAIPAC into COMGENTHAIRFORCE, CMAIRPAC SUBCOMDPF, COMSOUTH, COMCHIN, CINCPAC, COMCPAC, COMCINCPAC, COMAIPAC, CTF 94.1, CTF 95, CTF 95.2, CTF 99, COMSERON 10, SOF SERON 10 UNTIL, COMCINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMCINCPAC, COMAIPAC, COMCINCPAC, COMCINCPAC, COMAIPAC, COMCINCPAC, COMCINCPAC.

Here is COMCINCPAC OpPlan 11-45.

A. Task Group 30.1 Fleet Flagship Group Captain Murray.
B. Task Group 30.2 British Flagship Group Captain Nicholl.
C. Task Group 30.3 Air Search and recon. Group Captain Grant.
D. Task Group 30.6 Allied POW rescue group Commodore Simpson.
E. Task Group 30.8 Logistic Support Group RAdm Beary.
F. Task Group 30.9 ENTRMNOK service group Commodore Acuff.
G. Task Force 31 YOKOSUKA occupation force RAdm Badger.
I. Sub 1 and Sub 2 Task Forces 33 and 34 respectively commanders and forces as assigned by CTF 32.
J. Sub 3 and Task Force 36 landing force Maj General (as specified for each landing).

- continued -
I. Task Force 35 support force RAdm Jones.
J. Task Force 37 British Support force VAdm Rawlings RN.
K. Task Force 38 2nd Carrier Task Force VAdm McCain until relieved by VAdm Towers.
L. Task Force 39 1st Carrier Task Force VAdm Sherman.

Units for all groups and forces less task forces, 33, 34 and 36 as currently assigned subject to later modification by dispatch. Units assigned Task Forces 33, 34 and 36 as directed by CTF 32.

Para. Japan has surrendered. Information of TOKYO BAY AREA and enemy forces by mail and separate dispatch. Army forces have seized ATSUSHI airfield and CINCPAC Advance Headquarters are established there. CTF 31 forces hold YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE and airfields and 3rd Fleet forces are disposed in the TOKYO BAY-SAGAMI WAN AREA. 3rd Fleet Air is patrolling HONSHU and the TOKYO BAY AREA. KANOKA airfield KYUSHU is held by our occupation forces. This OpPlan stems from CINCPAC AND CINCPAC OpPlan 12-45 and covers landing of 8th Army units in TOKYO BAY AREA which operations coincide with execution of CINCPAC B-20 operation.

Para. This Fleet, while continuing missions assigned in my OpPlan, will land and firmly establish ashore at locations as arranged with CINCPAC designated elements of the 8th U.S. Army and assist the Army in enforcing surrender terms in order to gain and exercise military, political and economic control of the Japanese Empire.


SubPara X1 SubPara X1 and X3 my OpPlan 16-45 apply.

X2 3rdPhib will land 11th Corps headquarters, 1st cavalry Div and 112 BAY OVER DL KECT YOKOHAMA and YOKOSUKA about 31 August, American Div over beaches at SAGAMI KANAGAWA about 6 September and 43rd Div over YOKOHAMA-YOKOSUKA docks 13 September. All dates subject to later delay.

X3 Annexes A-3 G H I and J my oplan 10-45 apply to this plan.
X4 Annex B special instructions to Task Forces Annex D air plan will be issued by separate dispatch.
X5 This plan will be placed in effect by dispatch.


Para. Command locations as in annex F my oplan 10-45 with CTF 32 and CTF 39 added as Major subordinate commands. Commander 3rd Amphibious Force or his delegated group commander is in command of the Amphibious Operations until the landing force is established ashore at which time command of forces ashore passes to the landing force commander. Communications in accordance with CTF 70-6 CINCPAC OpPlan 12-45 and Annex H my oplan 1-45.

Commander 3rd Fleet in MISSOURI in TOKYO BAY.
Annex B my Oplan 11-45. Special instructions to Task Forces.

Para. Task Force 31 assist Army Forces as necessary to clear dock areas in YOKOSUKA:YOKOSAO AREAS in preparation for disembarkation of troops by 3rd Phib on about 31 August and 13 September. Render such assistance as CTF 32 may request in furnishing advance dock parties at YOKOSUKA, special communications during landings and traffic control through YOKOSUKA naval zone. Provide such personnel and vessels to CTF 35 as may be required to accomplish Tasks assigned to him.

Para. Task Force 35 clear water and beach approaches in area SAGAMI KANANA-EKO SHIMA and mark same in preparation for amphibious landings that area on about 6 September. Obtain necessary units, APDs and other personnel and vessels as may be required for this purpose from CTF 31. Provide fire support units for all landings as CTF 32 may request.

Para. Task Force 37 provide fire support units for landings as CTF 32 may request.

Para. All Task Forces authorized communicate direct with CTF 32 in arranging details accordance these instructions keeping originator advised.


Para 1. General Air Tasks outlined Annex D my Oplan 10-45 apply except no air base assembly required from surface units 3rd Fleet. 3rd Flt area of responsibility is combat area east of 135th Meridian and east of air coordinating line except when directed by CINCPAC western boundary 3rd fleet area of responsibility moved eastward to 139th Meridian for sea and area in the Japanese homeland to correspond to western limit occupation area 6th Army. Also when directed by CINCPAC northern boundary 3rd fleet area of responsibility moved southward to 40th parallel except that CTF 35 will coordinate activities 3rd fleet and north pacific force in HOKKAIDO-OHIMATO area insofar as cooperation with 8th Army is concerned.

Para 2. Operations (A) CTF 38. When basic plan placed in effect CTF 38 responsible for general air tasks east of 139 meridian (areas stars and Flagstaff) and east of the line of demarkation of occupation areas for 6th and 8th armies. Within this area of responsibility (1) conduct daily air searches sea approaches Japanese homeland. (2) conduct air patrols over airfields Japanese homeland. (3) Maintain show of force over Japanese territory. (4) Provide air cover occupation forces. (5) Be prepared to furnish direct air support for attack and ground forces as requested by Com3rd PhibFor as follows: For each landing area air cover, air support group with coordinator, Tactical observer and photo planes plus both observer and combat air patrol for SAGAMI landing, all controlled by CASCU in 3rd PhibFor Flagship. (6) Be prepared to furnish direct air support for ground forces as requested by 8th Army upon assumption of command ashore. (7) Be prepared to act against any opposition encountered when directed by Com3rd Flt. (8) Be prepared to strike Japanese airborne or ground aircraft air installations or enemy troop concentrations as directed by Com3rd Fleet. (9) Be prepared to reinforce support and/or cover 3rd Fleet forces as directed. (B) CTF 39. When basic plan placed in effect CTF 39
responsible for general air tasks sea area between 135th and 139 meridians (area stripes) and Japanese homeland between air coordination line (Annex D my OpPlan 10-45) and the line of demarkation occupation areas 6th and 8th armies. Within this area of responsibility (1) conduct daily air searches sea approaches Japanese homeland. (2) conduct air patrols over airfields Japanese homeland. (3) Maintain show of force over Japanese territory. (4) provide air cover for occupation forces moving through sea area of responsibility. (5) Be prepared to act against any opposition encountered when directed by Com3rdFlt. (6) Be prepared to strike Japanese airborne or grounded aircraft, air installations or enemy troop concentrations as directed by Com3rdFlt. (7) Be prepared to reinforce support and/or cover 3rd Flt forces as directed. (C) Com3rdPhibFor. When basic plan placed in effect Com3rdPhibFor being responsible for amphibious and landing operations of 8th Army will (1) request from CTF 33 and 39 air cover required for movement of amphibious forces within the limits of the areas of responsibility of the 2 forces. (2) Request from CTF 38 direct air support required in the conduct of the Amphibious and landing operations. (D) CTG 30.5. When basic plan placed in effect CTG 30.5 will (1) Conduct daily and nightly patrols outlined in tasks assigned in Annex D my OpPlan 10-45. (2) Limit patrols to east of 139th meridian and/or south of 40th parallel when directed by COM3RDFlt. (3) Be prepared for offensive patrols and searches as may be directed by Com3rdFlt. (4) Be prepared to control serve and accommodate limited numbers of transient seaplanes. (5) Be prepared to cover and support 3rd Fleet forces as directed.

Para 3. Garrison. (A) MAG 31. (B) NATS landplane unit. 1 garrison squadrons and ground echelons will be assigned appropriate tasks when installed.

22 0729 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3FLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMGENFLTFAC COMGRUPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMGENSEABRON, COMSUBPA, COMARILS, COMPHIBSEABRON, COMUNSEABRON, COMMARINAS.

Operation MAJESTIC suspended indefinitely.

22 1200 COMGEN CHINA to CINCPAC info CINCPAC, MARCOS.

WFBX 5587.

Commanding General CHINA THEATER is instructed to inform CINCPAC of any British-Chinese negotiations re HONGKONG. WAX 51776 refers. To the present no information concerning subject negotiations between the British and Chinese governments has been reported to me. Query addressed to Generalissimo headquarters elicited that to their knowledge no negotiations had been instituted between the 2 governments covering operations in HONGKONG area.
22 1210 COMGEN CHINA to WARGOS, COMINCH info CINCPAC, CINC PAC.  

CFMB 5586. 

We are instructed that arrangements for full military coordination should be made between British and Chinese Governments prior to British participation in operations in the CHINA THEATER. Also General MacArthur has been instructed to arrange surrender of HONGKONG to British Commander when such coordination has been completed. CINCPAC has forwarded us a message for information which indicates that CINCPAC is requesting fuelling and servicing facilities from U. S. resources in Philippines for British Naval forces earmarked for occupation of HONGKONG. To my knowledge the necessary military coordination between the British and the Generalissimo is not being made reference WAX 51481.

22 1835 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ info COMMANDER US NAVAL FORCES AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA.  

WAX 53079. 

Adjustment of the boundaries of the southwest Pacific area (SWPA) and changes in command responsibilities agreed to at terminal will become effective at the time of the formal surrender of JAPAN. Concurrently therewith the command "Commander Allied Naval Forces SWPA" will be abolished and all Allied Naval vessels of this command other than United States vessels will pass to British Empire control.

17 1110 COMGEN CHINA to CINCPAC, CINC PAC info WARGOS, CG CGCT, CG SOSCT.  

CFMB 4920. 

The problem of orderly surrender of the bulk of Japanese Troops in the CHINA THEATER with the preservation of law and order in presently Japanese occupied areas resolves itself to one of rapidly deploying central government troops into strategic areas.  

Para. Means of moving occupational armies are limited to air, rivers, destroyed railroads highways, due to the condition of the latter 2 and the engineering problems involved in repairs, only air and water routes offer any immediate possibilities for rapid movement of troops and supplies.  

Para. The bulk of troops to be moved are in south and central CHINA where by means locally available concentrations may be assembled in the WUCHOW (111-40-23-30) CANTON And HANKOW AREAS.  

Para. Plans are being formulated to airlift 1 Army to MANKING requiring 30 days with the resources available. This will be followed by a 2nd Army which will be moved to north CHINA, this move will require approximately 20 additional days. These troop movements are less than 50 percent of the movement considered essential to meet the emergency situation with which we are faced.  

Para. The additional movement of 1 Army (35000 men plus 2000 tons) from WUCHOW to SHANGHAI and 1 Army from WUCHOW to TAKU are considered urgent.  

Para. The limitations of airlift are largely based on pool available in the theater, the only present supply line being over the hump.  

Para. The following water routes are good movement possibilities:  

1. Coastal CHINA SEA.  

2. YANGTZE river from HANKOW to SHANGHAI.
3. The WEHT RIVER from WUCHOW to HONGKONG. United States air attrition of Chinese river craft has been so heavy that but few powered craft remain available for rapid troop deployment. It therefore follows that limited air lift is the only rapid troop movement and supply means available to this theater under present conditions.

Para. The following measures would help to remedy this situation:

A. Open an east coast port or NANKING as recommended in my CFBX 4780. It is assumed that the Japanese would not attempt to deny allied use of the YANGTZE.

B. The assignment of suitable river and coastal vessels. By CFBX 4740 recommended LCI craft for this purpose. Later planned essential water movements are 1 additional Army from WUCHOW to TAKU, 1 from CANTON to HANGCHOW and 1 from either HULPHONG or CANTON to TAKU. These are minimum essential moves and should be followed by a continuing redistribution of U.S. sponsored troops to the critical key coastal areas.

Para. Based on the above and your present commitments in the Pacific would appreciate your comment and suggestion as to methods and means which might be available to this theater from your resources.

22 1934 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ info MACARTHUR, WEDEMEYER.

WARX 53111
Book message. Your 102315 (not required by information addressees). In view of Japanese surrender no further action desired with respect to NAPKO project for introduction of OSS personnel into KOREA by submarine.

23 1516 COMINCH to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC, CG CHINA THEATER.

For your information. British COS have issued instructions to CINCPAC that forces intended for HONGKONG should be held at LEYTE or some other convenient port until further orders. CINCPAC has been directed by them to conform to MacArthur's views on the timing of Jap surrender.

23 2208 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, WEDEMEYER info NIMITZ, WHEELER, SPAATZ, BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION

TOP SECRET. WARX 53785
Top secret book message Wedemeyer is directed to inform MacArthur when military coordination with him and with the Chinese Board of Military Operations is completed by the British at which time MacArthur will arrange for the surrender of HONG KONG to the British. In this connection the British desire that the surrender should be made to a British commander to be nominated by Admiral Fraser.

Para. The British Chiefs of Staff further state that they will give full facilities through the HONG KONG area (so far as the conditions of the port allow) for the assistance and support of Chinese and American forces who may still be either engaged against the enemy or involved in securing the surrender of Japanese forces in the hinterland. Further to WARX 51776, the British Chiefs of Staff state that military coordination on operational matters is being effected by them.
24 0118 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMMORPAC Info SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED FORCES

TOP SECRET. Comply with directive my OpPlan with respect to occupation and control of coastal waters of JAPAN and CHINA as soon as practicable after 31 August. Inform me as to your plans.

24 0820 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCAFPAC Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMAIRPAC, COMGEN-FMFPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT

TOP SECRET. Reference your 220851 not to all or needed. Units listed on Page B-5 my serial 0005103 include those units listed in your operations instruction 4 Annex 3. Initial operations of Marine fighter groups to be under Com3rd and 5th Fleets for protection anchorages and escorts for shipping. Operational control of these groups to pass to CINCAFPAC when and as desired by CINCAFPAC. CINCPAC retains responsibility for logistic support of all units, except as modified by my 200700. This cancels my 120624. Naval search squadrons and NATS augmented by VMR squadrons remain under naval control at all times.

25 0139 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM5THFLT.

My 240118. Your 241415. When will ships of 5th Fleet occupy and control waters of JAPAN.

25 0801 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH info CINCAFPAC, COMGEN CHINA, COM7THFLT.

JCS 242317. The proposals of my 210818 with respect to CHINA assumed the prior seizure of a port in KOREA. TransRon 17 will be ready to sail from OKINAWA 7 September for KOREA with the 7th Infantry Division embarked plus designated Corps Troops. Date of sailing 40th and 96th Divisions from the PHILIPPINES not available to me. Will advise when known.

Para. If the Russians seize EKJO recommend the occupation of FUSAN which commands the KOREA and TSUSHIMA STRAITS and controls important rail communications.

25 0839 CINCPAC ADV to COMSERVPAC info COMSEVRON 10, COMSERDIV'S 101, 102, 103, 104, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMSEVRON 6, COMMORPAC, COM1STCARTFPAC, COM2NDCARTFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

This organization of mobile service forces for operation CAMPUS-BELLEAGER modifies my OpPlan 12-45.

Para. COMSEVRON 6 will operate directly under COMSERVPAC, will provide replenishment at sea for the Fast Carrier Task Forces and other fleet forces as required, and will allocate to their logistic support groups service units from those assigned to SERVRON 6. COMSEVRON 6 may himself command 1 of these logistic support groups.

Para. COMSEVRON 10 will operate directly under COMSERVPAC, will provide mobile base services in the RYUKYUS AREA, MARIANAS AREA, MAR-GILs AREA and at LEYTE, and will allocate to service divisions in occupied areas in JAPAN and to the rear bases above mentioned service units from those assigned SERVRON 10. COMSERDIVS 101, 192 and 103 with their staffs
may be moved forward to naval anchorages in occupied areas in JAPAN and
CHINA at the discretion of COM7TH, 3RD and 5TH Fleets respectively. This
modifies my 160833.

25 0853 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Refer my 220703. Your concurrence COM7THFLT 180140 requested.

24 1626 COMINCH AND GNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

My 191648 was for planning purposes and comment is directed both as
to permanent setup and time or times of implementation. Comment should
include any desired interim proposals. Reply need not be made until you
have had adequate opportunity for consideration.

20 0725 CG CHINA to CINCAFPAC passed to CINCPAC ADV, JCC GUAM.

CFB 5250.

Joint Staff Study BELEAGER section 6 para B mentions landing forces
to consist of Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops in addition to Marine
Division query will the composition of Corps be adequate to provide
necessary port and limited area construction, hospitalization, military
police, ordnance maintenance, motor transportation, port loading and
unloading, signal service, depot supply for common user items, and house-
keeping personnel such as Army postal service, food inspection, Malaria
control and survey, water publication and port overhead in support of
approximately 7500 American Troops (in addition to the Landing Force) in
the SHANGHAI AREA to include 3 or 4 fighter groups, 2 Recon squadron, 2
air service groups and an air depot group. Information is urgent to
determine stoppage of certain units now ready for air and water lift from
U.S. that were previously set up for BAYARD. Also info required for
decision with IBT as to disposition of units presently suspended in IBT
where intended to support BAYARD. Prefer bringing in all necessary
supply and supporting troops (other than air corps) direct from Pacific
to conserve critical transportation trans INDIA and CHINA. Can similar
supporting units be later supplied for other ports such as CANTON if
required by U. S. Operations.

25 0820 COMGEN CHINA to CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA ADV info COMGENSOSCHINA, COMGENIB, SCAP.

CFEX 5849.

Refer to CINCAFPAC 35704 dated 22 August. CINCAFPAC 210618 GCT also
refers it is now assumed that occupation of SHANGHAI will be accomplished
by Chinese Central Government Forces. Marine Divisions will occupy TAKU
and TSINGTAO in that priority. It is assumed here that these Marine Units
will be self supporting and will be supplied by CINCPAC. No marine air
units are required as CHINA THEATER can furnish entire air support. CHINA
THEATER will operate port of SHANGHAI with resources previously available
for operation of PORT BAYARD including some from INDIA BURMA THEATER and
some from CINCPAC as listed in his 070553. Through this port we will
eventually support all CHINA THEATER, U. S. Forces and INDIA BURMA THEATER
port operating units and all common user items for 3500 shore based Navy
which should take care of LCI crews and YANGTSE patrol shore units.
26 0419 SGAP to WARCOS FOR JCS info COMGENCHINA, CINCPAC ADV, COM7THFLT, COM7THPHIB, COMGEN 24TH CORPS.

CX 36853.
Reference WX 54514, also CINCPAC 250801 not to all or needed. The present plan is for the 7th Division to occupy KEIJO on 11 September. Conferences this date indicate that the initial movement of lightly armed troops, IE, APA and AKA, can take place leaving OKINAWA on the 4th arriving KEIJO on the 7th. This movement will be followed with heavier equipment as rapidly as possible. This plan is being approved and instructions are being issued to COMGEN 24TH CORPS and others to execute generally as indicated.

26 0127 CINCPAC ADV to COMGENCHINA info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGEN FMFPAC, COM7THFLT.

Your 250150 to CINCAFPAC and 250820 to CINCPAC. Corps Troops to be landed with other units of the Fleet Marine Force in North CHINA are in general limited to those required for the direct support of the Amphibious Corps and attached combat units ground and air. Detailed list follows in separate dispatch.

Para. If these troops are committed in North CHINA as now proposed there will be no similar units available from resources under my control for use at SHANGHAI.

Para. Your 250820 refers to TAKU whereas my 210818 refers to CHING-WANGTAO. Suggest this be left open as a local tactical matter until your liaison party arrives and meanwhile we both refer to "TIENTSIN AREA".

26 0908 CINCPAC ADV to COMMARGILS, COMAIRPAC, COMSERVPAC info COMINCH AND CNO, COMNATSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMGEN FMFPAC.

My top secret 170906. Plan to activate WAKE as naval air base (under administrative operational control and logistic support of COM MARIANAS) to support limited operation of search and patrol aircraft and primarily for servicing transient aircraft including scheduled operation of NATS. Provide no defenses. Limit personnel to minimum for accomplishment above mission initially for landplanes. COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC render such assistance as COMMARGILS may require. COMAIRPAC nominate naval aviator rank Captain or Commander as prospective Commander Naval Air Base WAKE.

26 0907 CINCPAC ADV to COMMARIANAS, COMAIRPAC, COMSERVPAC info COMINCH AND CNO, COMNATSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGEN FMFPAC.

My top secret 170906. Plan to activate MARCUS as naval air base (under administrative operational control and logistic support of COM MARIANAS) to support limited operation of search and patrol aircraft and primarily for servicing transient aircraft including scheduled operation of NATS. Provide mission initially for landplanes. COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC render such assistance as COMMARIANAS may require. COMAIRPAC nominate naval aviator rank Captain or Commander as prospective Commander Naval Air Base MARCUS.
26 0821 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info CINCPOA PEARL, CG FMFPAC, CG 6TH ARMY, COMGENPOA.

UrDis 251509. Present tentative plans for demobilization of Marine Corps units include the disbandment of all Marine AAA Group Headquarters and AAA Bns with the exception of 2 Marine AAA Bns which have definite post war commitments in the Pacific Ocean Area. Employment of 2 Amphibious Corps and 5 Marine Divisions in CAMPUS and BELEAGER simultaneously necessitates the disbandment of certain other FMR units in order to meet additional service requirements and to permit a partial demobilization of Marine Corps personnel. In view of the above regret that AAA units requested UrDis 251509 are not available.

Para. All Army AAA units in MARIANAS are available for release to you. MyDis 161512 July refers.

24 0118 CINCPAC ADV to COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMINORPAC, SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED FORCES.

Comply with directive my OpPlan with respect to occupation and control of coastal waters of JAPAN and CHINA as soon as practicable after 31 August. Inform me as to your plans.

26 1713 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC, COM7THFLT, COM7THPHIBFOR, COMPHIBPAC info COMGEN2NDMARAIRWING, COMGEN4THMARAIRWING, COMGEN6THMARDIV, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENCHINA, COM5THFLT, COMGENSTMARDIV, COMGEN3RD MARDIV, COMINCH AND CNO, CTF 99, COM3RDFLT, CINCAFPAC, COMGENFMFPAC, MARCORPS, COMGEN3RDPHIB, COMORPAC, CTF 95, COMMARIANAS, COMGENPOA, FMFPAC REP MARIANAS, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COMGENSERVCMDFMFPAC.

WARNING ORDER. Initiate preparations for operation BELEAGER with target date (M-Day) 30 September 1945 in accordance Joint Staff Study serial 0005105 August 13 with exception of modifications contained herein. Admiral T.G. Kinkaid will command the operation with Vice Admiral B. E. Barbey in command of amphibious forces and Major General Keller E. Hobby USMC commander expeditionary forces. Occupation troops will consist of 3rd Phib-Corps Hq. Hq Troops, 1st Mardiv Reinf. occupying TIENTSIN AREA and 6th Mardiv reinforces (less 4th RCT) occupying TSINGTAO AREA. An alternate to the foregoing if Central CHINA situation requires, when forces are ready, is the occupation of SHANGHAI AREA. 4th Mardiv will be in area reserve in HAWAIIAN AREA. Marine Aviation units will consist of 1st MarAirWing including hedron 1, seron 1, 1 MarAirWing wgn, MAG 12 with Hedron 12, Seron 12, VMF 115, VMF 211, VMF 218, MAG 24 with Hedron 24, Seron 24, VMF(N) 535, VMF(N) 541, MAG 32 with Hedron 32, Seron 32, VMSB 244, VMSB 343, VMTB 134, MAG 25 with Hedron 25, Seron 25, VMB 152, VMF 153. COMGENSTMARAIRWING report to COMGEN3RD PHIBCORPS and COM7THPHIB FOR by dispatch for planning.

Para. Col. W. J. Fox USMCR is designated as Commanding Officer MAB No. 1 in TIENTSIN AREA. Col. F. J. Schlapkohl USMC is designated as Commanding Officer MAB No. 2 in TSINGTAO AREA. These officers should be ordered to report to COMGENLSTMAW for duty at earliest. COMGENLSTMAW advise earliest of planned distribution of air units between MAB No. 1 and MAB No. 2.

Para. MAB'S will be under command of COMGENLSTMARAIRWING. LSTMAW will be under operational control of COMGEN3RD PHIBCORPS. When COMGEN3RD PHIBCORPS assumes command ashore in CHINA he will be under operational...
control of COMGENCHINA and will report by despatch to COMGENCHINA accordingly

Para. MyDis 220626. 1 GROPAC
   A. For TIENTSIN AREA. Other GROPAC
   B. For TSINGTAO AREA. Both GROPAC'S are assigned operational control

3RDPHIBCORPS. COMSERVPAC advise designation of GROPAC for each area and
order CO of each to report at earliest by dispatch to COMGEN3RDPHIBCORPS.

COMSERVPAC advise location availability date and shipping implications of
each component. COM7THPHIBFOR will be responsible for providing shipping,
loading and movement of all units mounting west of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and
for issuance of general loading and sailing instructions to COMAIRPAC and
COMSERVPAC for units under their cognizance mounting in the HAWAIIAN area
and west coast. CINCPAC PEARL will provide shipping and COMSERVPAC will
arrange for the loading and movement of all units under COMSERVPAC and
COMAIRPAC cognizance mounting from the HAWAIIAN AREA and the west coast.

Para. Mounting out supplies30 days classes 1, 2, 3, 4, including water
in DRUMS and cans 2 gal/man/day 5 days, winter clothing, chemical protective
clothing and equipment, construction supplies as directed by 3RDPHIBCORPS
for minimum rehabilitation airfields, waterfront facilities and roads, class
V 3U/F combat troops, 1 U/F service troops, V-A 10 missions. Direct liaison
and communication between COM7THPHIBFOR, COMGEN3RDPHIBCORPS, COMSERVPAC and
COMAIRPAC is authorized. Instructions on resupply, levels, maintenance etc.,
to be issued later.

27 0108 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ALL FLAG OFFICERS.

Questions as to disposition and use of captured or occupied territory
are political ones to be determined by responsible officials of the govern-
ment. Where the governmental policy has not been announced the American
position should not be embarrassed by high ranking naval officers giving
expression to their own opinions particularly as they may be lacking
information on all the considerations involved. You will be governed
accordingly.
Following is U.S. Military Mission Moscow RUSSIA MX 25416 to War Department dated 25 August 1945.

Antonov called me early this morning and handed me the following letter which he wishes transmitted to General MacArthur: "After reading your letter of 19 August 1945 which contained the Instrument of Surrender of Japan the General Staff of the Red Army considers it necessary to include in this Instrument the following amendments.

1. Change paragraph 3 to read we hereby command all Japanese Forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith. To preserve and save from damage all ships, aircrafts, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and by the separate Allied High Commands in their respective theaters of operations or by agencies of the Japanese Government at their direction.

2. Change paragraph 5 to read: We hereby command all civil military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and by the separate Allied High Commands in their respective theaters of operations to be proper and to effectuate this surrender and issued by them or under their authority and we shall direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non combatant duties unless specifically relieved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces or by the separate Allied High Commanders in their respective theaters or under their authority.

3. Change paragraph 8 to read: The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or to such organization as the Allied Powers may create for these purposes who will take such steps as they deem proper to effectuate these terms of surrender". Antonov stated that the above amendments had the approval of Generalissimo Stalin. He explained that the amendments to paragraphs 3 and 5 were for the purpose of taking care of the local situation in the different theaters of operation.

Para. In connection with the amendments proposed in paragraph 8 he stated that initially the authority of the Emperor would be subject to the sole authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, but that it might later be founded desirable to set up an organization for the government of JAPAN similar to that which now exists for the government of Germany. I request I be given information upon which to base a reply. Ends.

Concur in including a marine aircraft wing at reduced strength for marine corps operations in TIENTSIN and/or TSINGTAO area of north CHINA.
CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGENFMFPAO, COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC, COM/THPFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COM/3RDPHIBCORPS, COM/7THPHIBFOR, COMGENPOA info COM/THPFLT, COMGENAIRMFPAO, COMLCHG & CNO, MARCORPS, COMNORPAC, COM MARIANAS, COMGENLSTMAW, FMFPAO/MARIANAS, COMGENLSTMAR DIV, COMGENSERVCOMD/FMFPAO, CTF 99, CTF 96, CINCPAO PEARL, COM/GEN6THMAR DIV, COMGENCHINA.

For planning purposes only following tentative logistic plan for land based naval and marine forces BELEAGER part 4 of annex H to my OpPlan 12-45 is effective. Target Date (M-Day) 30 September. CINCPAC agencies as indicated herein are responsible complete logistic support marine and naval unit in occupied areas. Occupied areas TSINGTAO and TIENTSIN.

Para 1. Supply.
A. Mounting supplies. COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMGENFMFPAO and COMGENPOA responsible in accordance existing policy for providing following mounting supplies: 30 days classes 1, 2, 3, 4 including water in drums, cans 2 gal/man/day 5 days, winter clothing, chemical protective clothing and equipment. Construction supplies as directed by COM3RDPHIBCORPS for minimum rehabilitation airfields, waterfront facilities and roads. Class 5 e units fire combat troops, 1 unit fire service troops, V-A 10 missions.

B. Resupply. Agencies listed above responsible for providing re-supply. COMGENFMFPAO is charged with responsibility for coordination of procurement, assembling and shipping of re-supply of all classes for all Navy and Marine forces ashore in the objective. CINCPAC will furnish shipping as requested by COMGENFMFPAO. Resupply shipments of classes 1, 2, 3, 4 will be scheduled to arrive 15 Day intervals beginning M plus 10 and will consist of 30 days each until supply level is reached. Supply levels to be maintained at objective 30 day minimum and 30 day operating level of classes 1, 2, 3, and 4. 3 units fire combat troops, 1 unit fire service troops. 10 missions class V-A. Automatic supply 1st 120 days. Supplies in MARIANAS, OKINAWA, and HAWAII will be used in accordance current directives Direct liaison and communication between COMGENFMFPAO, responsible supply agencies, 7th Fleet and 7th PhibFor authorized.

Para 2. Transportation.
COM/7THPHIBFOR responsible providing shipping, loading and movement all units mounting west of Hawaiian Islands and issuance general loading and sailing instructions to COMAIRPAC and COMSERVPAC for units under their cognizance mounting in Hawaiian Area and west coast. CINCPAC PEARL provide shipping and COMSERVPAC arrange loading and movement all units under COMSERVPAC and COMAIRPAC cognizance mounting Hawaiian Area and West Coast. Shipping designators later by despatch.

Para 3. Medical. Medical service as in part 1 this annex. Evacuation to Marianas by surface. 3 AH'S will be assigned. Air evacuation by VRE-1 to OKINAWA and MARIANAS 2 planes per day.

Para 4. Troop list. 3RDPHIBCORPS consisting of HQ and HQ Tps, 1st MarDiv, 6th MarDiv (less 1 RCT) plus 1stMarAir Wing consisting of Hedron 1, Seron 1, MWQ Sq, MAG 12 with Hedron 12 and Seron 12, VMSQs 115, 211, 213 MAG 24 with Hedron 24 and Seron 24, VMF(N) Sqs 533, 541; MAG 32 with Hedron 32, Seron 32, VMSQs 244, 343, VTB Sq 134, MAG 25 with Hedron 25, Seron 25, VMSQs 152 and 153. 2 CROPACs. Troops TSINGTAO AREA 22,100, TIENTSIN AREAS 31,100 total troops 53,200.

Para 5. Base Development. Construction limited to that essential to placing airfields, roads and waterfront facilities in operational status. 2 Marine Airfields will be established, 1 in TIENTSIN AREA, the other TSINGTAO.

27 0755 COM7THFLT to CTF 79, COMPHILSEAFRON, COMSERVRON 7 info COMSERVPAC, COMSERVRON 10, COMSERDIV 101, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCAPAC, CG AFWESPAC, COMINCH.

Action addresses hereby directed to assume as applicable all present logistic responsibilities and commitments of COM7THFLT in the supply of Allied Naval Forces. Further direct COMSERVRON 7 under the operational control of COMPHILSEAFRON and administrative control of COMSERVPAC furnish logistics requirements personnel and supplies to all naval units afloat and ashore in SWPA including all U.S. Navy vessels. Thus continuing logistics support to naval forces AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA and MANUS and having access to the resources of MANUS, HOLLANDIA, PHILIPPINE BASES and other south west pacific bases. In the event means are not then available make representations to COMSERVPAC for necessary additional supplies and facilities. Responsibility of COMSERVRON 7 for logistics support to the 7th Flt terminates upon the departure of latter in operation CAMPUS at 0800 I(-9) 28 August 1945. 7th Flt thereafter will receive logistic support from Commander Service Force Pacific.

27 0513 COM7THFLT to GUAM CB2, AA CUNNINGHAM, (DD 752), COMDESDIV 127, NEW ORLEANS (GA 32), ALASKA (CB1), STEVENS (DD 479), TR EVANS (DD 754), HARADEN (DD 583) BURNS (DD 588), COMDESRON 64, info CINCPAC ADV, COM7THFLT, COMPHILSEAFRON, COM3RDFLT, INGHAM CG, COMCARDIV 27, ALL TFG AND TGC 7THFLT, COMDESIV 44, CTF 95.4, RADN BUCKMASTER.

This is my OpOrder 4-45.
A. Cruiser Group TG 77.3 RADMLOW. CruDiv 16, ALASKA and GUAM. CruDiv 6 San Francisco, New Orleans, Minneapolis and Tuscaloosa. DD's Haraden (583), Stevens (479), Wiley (597), Bell (587), Burns (588), Hubbard (748), Cunningham (752), Frank Evans (754), John Bole (755).
Para 1. Enemy forces have been forbidden to operate. However be prepared for attacks and alert for treachery. Further information including enemy and allied mine fields in Annex C my OpPlan 13-45 now being distribut-ed by air. Own forces are not yet operating in the YELLOW SEA. TG 94.5 is sweeping area SKAGWAY, and may sweep mine line 7 just west of KUKUZAN to Fair Wing 1 continues regular searches.
Para 2. This force will operate to control the YELLOW SEA.
Para 3a. Rendezvous as directed off OKINAWA and proceed into the YELLOW SEA. Conduct operations as directed by Commander 7th Fleet.
Para 4. Logistics in OKINAWA and as called forward.
Para 5. Guard 7th Fleet Task Force and Task Group commanders circuit (4135 series) and appropriate POA Foxes. Commander 7th Fleet in Minneapolis

27 1328 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCARPAC, COM7THFLT.

CFBX 6132.

Subject is your 260127 concur in your recommendation that whether the landing in NORTH CHINA be at TAKU or CHINWANGTAO be left for decision later. Henceforth we will refer to TIENTSIN AREA.
27 1419 CINCPAC to WARCOS (JCS) info CINCPAC ADV, CG USASTAF, COMGEN IIB, COMGEN CHINA, BRIT JOINT STAFF MISSION.

CX 10320.
The assumption contained in WX 54882, 25 August is correct.

25 1944 JCS to MACARTHUR info NIMITZ, SPAATZ, WHEELER, WEDEMEYER, AND BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION.

WARX 54882.
The British Chiefs of Staff have asked if their assumption is correct that the Japanese Commanders will be required to furnish any information required direct to the representatives of the Allied Commander and their representatives.

Para. We are informing the British Chiefs of Staff that the foregoing assumption is correct and that you are acting accordingly.
28 1225 COMGENCHINA to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC info COM7THFLT, CGSOSCT.

CFBX 6228.

Your CX 36362 it is desired that AK'S and LST'S in original Task Force 93 enter SHANGHAI at earliest practicable date. Preliminary information given by my representatives recently in MANILA indicated that necessary minesweeping would allow entry on 15 September. Please comment. Occupation of SHANGHAI by Chinese Nationalist Troops will proceed on schedule. See my CFBX 5404. For Lattimore. As Port operations will be from ship to wharf directly naval boat, barge and DUKW crews from IBT THEATER are being dropped.

28 1219 CINCAFPAC to WAR DEPT - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

C 10526.

Among other minor changes made in General Order Number 1 replying your WX 55352 is 1 directing the Japanese to surrender their forces in the RYUKYUS to CINCAFPAC with Commanding General 10th Army being designated to receive the local surrender. That officer has been under the command of CINCAFPAC since August 1 and the designation of CINCPAC to receive the surrender there would not only be confusing administratively but would also controve the general directive providing that respective local theater commanders receive surrender.

29 0050 COM7FLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COM7THPHIB.

Your 250759. Expect to meet new advanced target date of 7 September for KEIJO landing with lightly armed troops of 7th Division and elements of 24th Corps using shipping immediately available and follow with heavy equipment as additional shipping availability permits. 40th Division should land KEIJO about 1 October. The date and place of landing the 96 Division in KOREA are not yet firm.

Para. 24th Corps plan also includes sending a small advance party by air to arrive 4 September if approved by SCAP and can be negotiated.

29 0751 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM7THFLT info CINCAFPAC, COMGENCHINA, CG SOSCT.

Comment direct to COMGENCHINA his CFBX 6228 DTG 281225. Re: It is desired that AK'S and LST'S in original Task Force 93 enter SHANGHAI at earliest practicable date.
29 1357 MOUNTBATTEN SACSEA to CARTON DE WIART MA CHUNGKING info HARCOURT, CTG 111.2.

SAC 20299.

With reference to BAAG signal 6420 of 2616JIJ not to CTG 111.2. If you and Ambassador see no objection I should like you to give Wedemeyer the following message from me. "As you know Rear Admiral Harcourt will take surrender of HONGKONG as soon as General MacArthur has concluded his surrender meeting in TOKYO and will when Admiral Fraser thinks fit, hand over to SEAC forces under Major General Festing. In the meantime the Generalissimo has stated he will not send Chinese Troops to HONGKONG. I have reports that some small American Units are however planning to enter HONGKONG by air or overland. May I have details.

30 2141 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC.

WARX 57346.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer not to change the provisions of General Order Number 1 as approved by the President. Reference surrender procedure in the RYUKUS and therefore direct that while the arrangements now in progress under the direction of General Stilwell may be continued their execution by Stilwell will be subject to the supervision of Admiral Nimitz.

31 0137 CINCPAC to COMGENCHINA info CG SOSCT, COM7THFLT(AFLOAT) - INTERCEPT MESSG.

Cite CX 11158. Entrance SHANGHAI earliest practicable date is desirable reurad GFHBX 6228 AV exact information respecting progress of minesweeping will come from Navy sources. Original Task Force 93 now designated Task Force 74 by 7th Fleet operation Plan 13-45.

30 2141 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HQ. info CINCLANT, COMWESSEAFRON.

My 191827 refers. Your 280740 approved except those CV'S unable transit Canal without prior removal gun sponsons are to be routed via CAPE OF GOOD HOPE or STRAITS OF MAGELLAN depending upon shortest route at time of release.

31 1138 CINCPAC AFLOAT to COM3RDFLT info CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Your 310404 approved with the understanding that tenure of occupancy of minor naval bases will be limited to time required to seize or render inoperative the midget submarines and suicide craft present. Early report on adequacy of YOKOSAKA airfield for R5D operations desired.

31 1745 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Subject is OCEAN AND NAURU. Following furnished for your information. British Chiefs of Staff propose "A" NAURU surrender to AUSTRALIAN commander and "B" OCEAN surrender to AUSTRALIAN commander acting in behalf of UK in company with a representative of the high commissioner for the Western Pac. U.S. Chiefs of Staff have replied in substance as follows: To interest of expediting surrender and occupation these islands there is no objection to use of AUSTRALIAN forces and shipping provided commander concerned reports to CINCPAC for this employment and accepts surrender in his name. Whether representative of CINCPAC is to accompany AUSTRALIAN forces is left to CINCPAC discretion.
Item 3. Whatever facilities can be afforded under (1) and (2) above the First Sea Lord considers it essential that we should have increased use of Manus and that we should be given authority to install 1 more Monab at Pyiyliu. Some storage for ammunition at Manus is also required. These additional facilities at Manus will certainly be required for the forthcoming operations.

Item 4. Eagle Farm at Brisbane is not being used to any extent by US air forces and is required urgently by the BPF to erect aircraft which are being shipped to Australia.

Item 5. We can provide some 3,600 engineers and 3,000 pioneers (unskilled labour) to construct airstrips at any intermediate base which may be allocated for the BPF. In addition to these labour forces we have call on 2,500 RAF constructional personnel who are the lst echelon of the VLR project and are now on passage to the Pacific and may be available if any delay occurs in supporting work at Okinawa. Can it be stated that the services of these parties will be required at a forward or intermediate base.

Item 6. A very early reply would be appreciated in connection with Item 2 since the constructional personnel are immediately available and ships carrying material now in Australia cannot be held and have to be unloaded now unless allocated elsewhere.

I am making representations to General Marshall in connection with Item 4.

03 2226 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR NIMITZ AND ARNOLD

WARX 26350. EYES ONLY. KYOTO, HIROSHIMA, KOBE AND NIIGATA will not be attacked by any forces under your command unless further directions are issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para. Knowledge of the above instructions will be limited to the minimum number of persons essential to carry out the instructions.

04 0825 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAPPAC (NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR ONLY)

I request that COMPEAF be directed to cancel his O40540 which I consider to be improper and lacking in military courtesy. Responsibility for air sea rescue operations within the PCA west of Long, 135-00 E has been assigned by me to ComFarWing 1 and my directive must stand until other arrangements have been reached between you and me.

05 0820 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCWP (NIMITZ TO FRASER)

While I regret the delay in your visit I agree as to the advantage in conferring after the conference in Europe. I am holding Hopkins here through the 6th for conference with Commodore Boak to assist me in making further recommendations to Admiral King concerning your increased use of Manus.

05 0815 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO KING)

Your 031300. Item 1. The anchorages in question will probably be Leyte Ulithi and Eniwetok. Item 2. Establishment of British shore facilities or use of British construction forces at such anchorages is not recommended. Item 3. Increased use of Manus by BPF is desirable. Commodore Boak will arrive Guam tomorrow 6 July for conference concerning details. Item 4. CINCPAC agrees. Item 5. British construction forces are not repeat not desired in Marshall, Marianas Caroline or Philippines. Reports on Kume Shima indicate desirability turning the island over to British for development with British resources.
Para 1. The following is submitted for consideration in connection proposals understood to be before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for changes in command responsibilities in the Ryukyus.

Para 2. The recently captured positions in the Okinawa group are being developed to meet initially requirements in connection with Olympic and subsequently requirements in connection with other operations for the defeat of Japan. The developments include bases for the operation of the tactical and strategic air forces of the Army, a Naval Operating Base for the support of the Pacific Fleet including airfields for fleet aircraft and also facilities for staging and mounting troops. The Naval Operating Base at Okinawa is vital to the readiness of the fleet for effective support of Olympic. It is also essential to future fleet operations in the East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and Sea of Japan. It will be our most western naval base through the final phases of this war and extending into the post war period.

Para 3. Plans have now been integrated and the development of the various base installations and facilities is in progress. A change in overall command from CINCPAC to CINCPAC as understood to be proposed would be undesirable simply because it would be a change and the required reorganization would be inherently wasteful of much needed time. The development of Okinawa during the next few months will be best supported by avoiding changes. The support of future fleet operations including Fleet Air Wings after Olympic will be best assured by retention of present command arrangements. Even though a transfer to CINCPAC would facilitate Army operations administration and logistics in the immediate future, naval operations administration and logistics would suffer now and during the foreseeable future.

Para 4. If however a change is decided upon it is recommended that it be based on the following principles:

A. CINCPAC to assume responsibility for the local ground and air defense and military government of the Okinawa Group. CINCPAC to retain responsibility for the naval defense as at present.

B. CINCPAC to retain direct command and control of the Naval Operating Base including the waters of Buckner Bay and the shores thereof and the naval and marine airfields at Yonabaru Chimu Awase and the island of Tsugen Shima.

C. CINCPAC to retain direct operational control of naval forces based in the Ryukyus including Fleet Air Wing 1.

D. CINCPAC to retain control and responsibility for the sea areas now in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

E. CINCPAC to retain direct control of units of the Fleet Marine Force and naval construction troops in the Ryukyus except as they may be passed by him to the temporary control of the Island Commander to assist in island defense and general island development.

F. CINCPAC to retain operational control of the naval communications facilities and naval radio stations except as he may pass them to local control by the Island Commander for joint use under arrangements agreed to by CINCPAC.

G. Naval personnel and resources to be released by the Army Island Command as rapidly as possible under the concept of JCS 032140 of April 1945.
I do not know what prompted CINCPAC'S 090057 at this time. It appears to substitute "at all times" for "in case of exigencies". The phrase objected to appeared also on page 10 of my preliminary draft of 13 May and has not before been objected to. The language immediately preceding was drafted by CINCPAC and incorporated in our agreement of 16 May. The matter should be of little consequence but I am disturbed by the implications. I shall make no reply pending receipt of your comment. You may have information as to background which is not available to me.

I am deferring action on certain matters connection OKINAWA until future command status is settled. Accordingly request I be informed if it is decided to let present arrangements stand.

CNO 052055. Recommend no repeat no change in category defense or command arrangements in ALEUTIANS at this time because of possible requirements incident to Russian entry into war.

It appears to me the 1st part of last sentence on page 16 referred to in CINCPAC'S CX 24142 and in your 090857 was not entirely necessary particularly in the light of the immediately preceding paragraph. The last part "who then assumes command and responsibility for the campaign in JAPAN" does present a basis for proper objection, and for that reason should be withdrawn. There is a continuing responsibility vested in CINCPAC. However "including control in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault" is intended to apply only in those cases in which exigencies or emergencies arise during the actual amphibious assaults being executed against hostile beaches.

Your CX 24142 DTC 090057. The sentence referred to will be deleted incident to the next revision of my Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC which will be issued after the conference referred to in your 090215 and my 100218. However it is my understanding that "including control, in case of exigencies of the actual amphibious assault" is intended to apply only in those cases in which exigencies or emergencies arise during the actual amphibious assaults being executed against hostile beaches.
The JCS have this date approved the following directive:

1. The War Department has established an air command designated "U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF)" consisting initially of those combat and service units assigned to or operating with the 20th AF, the Hq and Hq Sqn, 8th AF, and other elements subsequently to be mutually agreed upon by CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and the Commanding General, USASTAF, or as prescribed by higher authority.

2. ComGenUSASTAF is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of land based strategic air operations against JAPAN with the object of accomplishing the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN's military, industrial and economic systems to a point where her capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. He will collaborate with CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC in such strategic air operations of Army Air Forces or Navy carrier based air forces as CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC may elect to conduct. This responsibility will be discharged in accordance with directives which have been or which may be issued from time to time by the JCS through the ComGen, Army Air Forces as executive agent.

3. ComGenUSASTAF will continue operations to support the accomplishment of the overall objective to defeat JAPAN and will cooperate with CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC in the preparation and execution of plans for the invasion of JAPAN.

4. ComGenUSASTAF will be responsible for the internal administration and internal logistical support of all forces assigned to USASTAF and will present his requirements for theater logistical support to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC respectively, as required. USASTAF will be administered as directed by the War Department. CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC are charged with the responsibility of meeting CG USASTAF's logistic requirements subject to the overall availability of resources.

5. A headquarters will be designated to discharge the functions of AAFPOA which are not assumed under the provisions of this directive by USASTAF. The transfer of functions will be subject to agreement between CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and COMGEN USASTAF.

6. All understandings, commitments, agreements and directives with reference to the 20th AF will remain in effect and apply to USASTAF until amended or rescinded by the appropriate authority.

7. Commanders concerned will implement this directive as expeditiously as possible without interference with current operations.

8. Directives in conflict with the above are modified accordingly.
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1. The War Department has established an air command designated "U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF)" consisting initially of those combat and service units assigned to or operating with the 20th AF, the Hq and Hq Sqdn, 8th AF, and other elements subsequently to be mutually agreed upon by CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and the Commanding Generals, USASTAF, or as prescribed by higher authority.

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7. Commanders concerned will implement this directive as expeditiously as possible without interference with current operations.

8. Directives in conflict with the above are modified accordingly.

Plan PASTEL as agreed at conferences between your representatives and Joint Security Control in Washington is approved. Para 5 B (4) of the plan calls for an annex setting forth details of specific responsibility and timing of the strategic operational deception and special deception measures to implement PASTEL. It is suggested that you hold conference of planning and communications representatives of all addresssees in order that this annex may be expeditiously prepared and coordinated.
My 020152 and your 030515. The continued existence of the remaining Japanese naval forces makes it necessary to use on defensive missions larger naval forces than would otherwise suffice. The remaining heavy enemy ships must be eliminated prior to OLYMPIC and this elimination is the responsibility of the Pacific Fleet. If NAGATO HAKUNA ISE HYUGA and other important enemy vessels are still in being and KEEBLELOCKS 4 is ordered our escort requirements will be larger than need otherwise be.

11 0030 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO WEDEMEYER, NIMITZ, MACARTHUR INFO KINKAID. WARC 29972.

With reference to the FORT BAYARD supplemental supply project for CHINA, there remain additional factors of interest to the JCS on which further action appears necessary. These include the exchange of additional information, with information copies to the JCS on:

(1) Wedemeyer's estimate of enemy air capabilities and evaluation as to sufficiency of available counter measures;  
(2) Information on minefields; and  
(3) Earliest considered estimate of unloading time required for FORT BAYARD.

To enable JCS to evaluate cost of continuing supply through FORT BAYARD subsequent to 5 cargo ships now scheduled, it is desired that CINCPOAC after necessary consultations with CINCPAC and CG CHINA Theater, submit his views on naval resources required. For planning purposes, it will be assumed that 3 cargo ships per month will follow the lst 5.

At such time as adequate information becomes available to Wedemeyer, the JCS desire him to submit complete plan for the FORT BAYARD supplemental supply project to include: Hydrographic information, aid for discharging cargo needed from outside CHINA-BURMA-INDIA Theater, unloading time for ships, AA defenses for FORT BAYARD, target date, air support plan and enemy and allied mine fields.

13 0747 CINCPOAC ADV TO COMINCH. (NIMITZ TO KING ONLY)

My comments on JCS 1406/2 drafted in form for general use are transmitted separately. If you must acquiesce in giving Army control over their projects and can get no better settlement paragraph 4 of my 050655 represents the absolute minimum with which we can operate successfully. You should know that General MacArthur and General Kenney are virtually in control of their OKINAWA projects now. General Kenney is obviously operating on the assumption that JCS 1406 as originally proposed is or soon will be approved. I shall if possible avoid disagreeable incidents with him but an early decision will be helpful in that regard. I have confidence in Stilwell and he is optimistic as to unloading and base development. Price will take over our OB on 15 July.
I have been concerned for some time with regard to the execution of the directive set forth in JCS 1259/4. This directive required a transfer of Army and Navy resources "as expeditiously as possible" until each service was under the control of its own service commander. The fundamental purpose was to rearrange the command system in the Pacific to facilitate the war against JAPAN and it must have been the intent that this rearrangement be effected prior to the launching of the decisive campaigns. This directive specifically indicated that "conflicting provisions of existing directives to CINCPOA and CINCSWPA are modified accordingly." With this interpretation in mind, you will recall I sent staff representatives to GUAM in mid-April to explore the general problem and determine procedures to comply with JCS directions. This conference was not fruitful because of the differences in our respective interpretations of the JCS directive. In response to your radio 160250 GCT April in which you proposed to turn over administrative but no operational control of Army forces in your area I accepted in radio CX 14288 as a 1st step in compliance with instructions, but stated that greater control of Army resources would be required by me. This reply took into consideration that under the operating procedures in Pacific Ocean Areas an abrupt reversion of resources to appropriate service control in certain instances was inadvisable. I proposed in my CX 14288 to turn over at once all Naval resources under my command to you. This was rescinded for the reasons set forth in your 2003/4 GCT April. There have been numerous exchanges of radiograms between you and myself concerning separate features of this general problem, but the resultant effect as it applies to the compliance with the JCS directive has been disappointingly meager. On several occasions you have quoted certain directions which were issued prior to JCS 1259/4 and which you believed were not modified by JCS 1259/4 irrespective of the quote given earlier in this radio. In this belief I do not concur.

Three and one-half months have now elapsed since the issuance of the JCS directive and I find that there has been transferred to my full control the 7th Air Force, 9th Corps Hdqtrs, 4 InfDiv, and a sprinkling of combat and service support troops, with administrative control only of other units, a control completely ineffective in so far as the fundamental concept of the directive of the JCS is concerned. There remain under your control General Richardson's Hdqtrs, 1 of my main echelons of command in the Pacific, an Army hdqtrs, a Corps Hdqtrs, and numerous ground, combat and service support units estimated to aggregate upon arrival of redeployed units between 325,000 and 350,000 troops.

It has become increasingly embarrassing for me to plan future operations with the Army resources of the Pacific when I am denied the authority to control the relative priority of their retention at various locations or determine the relative importance of their requirement in comparison with their need for the invasion of JAPAN. I must necessarily under the existing circumstances resort to negotiations for each individual unit with you, causing great administrative labor and delay. Determination of the Army redeployment requirements of resources from EUROPE and the U.S. without a knowledge of the detailed employment or need for the resources now in the Pacific in your area is little better than an educated guess, with the inevitable result that any unnecessary movement of resources into the Pacific will cause a dispersion and waste of the critical shipping means of the U.S. This situation has been exemplified in the last few days in a conference of various officers throughout the Pacific to survey our deficiencies as relates to the support of the
20th Air Force. This conference was attended by 42 officers of various organizations. The solutions accepted at the conclusion of this conference necessarily reflect the maze of conflicting and complicated command arrangements and leave uncertainty and confusions in many minds.

4. By your 080301 GCT July you indicate a need for the naval resources of the Pacific to be more closely controlled by you in order to launch the operations against JAPAN. I likewise need a closer control over the Army resources of the Pacific to fully perform my functions. I consider that the time has now come for final accomplishment of the JCS directive concurrently with consideration of your 080301 July. This would involve:

(A) A plan for the burn over of Army resources in the Pacific to CINCAFPAC.

(B) A determination of the localities to be transferred on the basis of paramount interest.

(C) The establishment of procedures whereby operational control of the forces of each service may be placed under CINCSWA or CINCPAC to conduct operations as specifically directed by the JCS from time to time.

(D) A target date for completion of the above.

5. If you are now prepared to discuss the full implementation of the JCS directive, it is suggested that a conference be arranged. If, however, you are of the opinion that these are irreconcilable points of view, I feel that they should now be presented to the JCS for decision.

17 0723 CINCAFPAC TO CINCPA ADV HQ. WARCOS INFO CINC US FLEET (CONTINUED)

14 0304 CINCPA ADV TO COMGEN US FORCES CHINA INFO CINCUSF. (NIMITZ TO WEDEMEYER INFO MACARTHUR)

Your 121015. It would be extremely helpful in clarifying our plans and concepts of future operations if you or your representative could visit my headquarters at GUAM to discuss naval support of your operations along the CHINA Coast and the employment of fleet units to exercise control of the sea areas adjacent to the Coast of CHINA. If you find such a visit feasible I will invite General MacArthur to send a representative also.

16 1119 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

C 25992

In view of your 150720 I doubt that any practicable result can eventuate from another conference on a theater level and therefore prefer to leave any further clarification if they so desire in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
TOP SECRET. From JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR and NIMITZ. In order to facilitate preparation for and execution of OLYMPIC, CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC will arrange to transfer to CINCAFPAC at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 August control of U.S.-held areas in the RYUKYUS, all U.S. Army forces located in the RYUKYUS, including 10th Army, responsibility for defense of the U.S.-held positions, and responsibilities pertaining to USSTAF units now vested in CINCPAC.

Para. CINCPAC will retain responsibility for and control of all naval and naval air installations and development projects in the RYUKYUS, the movement of naval forces and supplies into the area, and harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all U.S. Naval forces in the RYUKYUS will be vested in CINCPAC.

TOP SECRET. From JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ. For your information pertinent extracts of CINCAFPAC's C-24215 of 9 July have been passed to the British Chiefs of Staff at CCS 17 July 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted in principle the use of British Commonwealth forces for employment in the main operations against JAPAN. The substance of the British proposal was covered in WAR 28274 of 7 July to MACARTHUR, copy of which War Department will repeat to CINCPAC together with CINCAFPAC's reply, C-24215 of 9 July. The acceptance in principle of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff pertained only to ground forces. The British proposal as regards a tactical air component was left as a matter for further discussion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further approved the British request to dispatch an Army corps commander to the Pacific to consult with CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC on the various factors involved in the employment of British Commonwealth forces and to submit recommendations as a result of such conferences. It is understood that air and naval officers will accompany the corps commander. It is requested that CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC indicate when this visit can be conveniently made.

Para. Although decision has not been made, the British Chiefs of Staff indicate they have under consideration the use of the 8th Indian Division from ITALY which had a notable record in the Italian campaign, and is therefore acclimated, the 2nd or 36th Divisions (both British) now in SEAC, as well as veteran NEW ZEALAND, CANADIAN and AUSTRALIAN divisions. The British Divisions are not included in the SINGAPORE campaign. Due to improbability of reequipping British, Indian and Australian divisions the Canadian division with U.S. equipment would probably operate in a U.S. corps. Plans have not developed to the point where decision can be taken on the composition of the forces.
Following is relay of War 28274 dated 7 July to MacArthur from Marshall. British participation in the invasion of Japan is subject. In addition to the British Pacific Fleet and BIR force of 10 squadrons, the British now propose that the BIR force be increased to 20 squadrons at a later date when more airfields become available, and that a British force of 3 to 5 British, Indian and Dominion divisions participate in CORONET under American command. The British do not give source of these divisions but some or all are apparently expected to be released after the capture of Singapore, scheduled for November 1945. They would also be carried in British ships, provided with the necessary assault lift and supported by the East Indies Fleet augmented by the British Pacific Fleet if necessary and by a tactical air force of some 15 squadrons. The British have made the 3 following specific suggestions as to the use of this force:

A. A force of 1 or possibly 2 divisions in the assault, together with 2 or 3 divisions in the build-up, administratively largely self-supporting.

B. A force of 3 divisions in the assault and immediate follow-up and 1 or possibly 2 divisions in the build-up, relying, to a considerable degree on American administrative assistance.

C. A force of up to 5 divisions in the build-up administratively largely self-supporting.

British prefer a course which allows them to take a part in the assault. Simultaneously with CORONET the British would maintain pressure from Burma toward Siam and additionally might conduct amphibious operations against Siam, Java, Sumatra or Hong Kong. Request for use at the coming conference your initial comments by 9 July on this proposal, followed by any more detailed comments you wish to make. It is evident that the use of these British Divisions should replace U.S. Divisions to the same number. Such a course would meet with wide public approval from the viewpoint of lessening the requirements of U.S. soldiers, especially on the part of the articulate who assail British and ATFDCK administration for non-participation of allies in conquest of Japan, etc. Request your views include comment on command and control arrangements.

Now begins answer to preceding War message. C 24215 from CINCPAC "From GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur to WARCOS for MARSHALL cite C 24215. Msg is top secret. The scope of the British proposal for participation in CORONET, replying your W 28274, presents problems not heretofore encountered when the Canadian and French contingents were considered. These problems must be viewed in their proper perspective as they relate to the specific operation in contemplation unless complexity, particularly as applies to logistics, and lack of homogeneity of forces destroy combat effectiveness or require a delay in target date. This operation, at present visualized as being launched across beaches on the 2 sides of Langemood Bay, is confined to narrow limits. There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of responsibility along national lines. The assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for the closest coordination of air, naval and ground forces, and within the
ground forces themselves. Acceptance of the British in the assault with the differences in organization, composition, equipment, training procedures and doctrines will complicate command, operations and logistic support. Redeployment geared to the support of HOMOGENEOUS forces and now well advanced, would have to undergo a large scale readjustment, particularly taking into consideration a parallel line of British logistic channels, including separate bases, storage, issuance and maintenance facilities, and personnel therefore. The changes in redeployment alone will have world wide effect and is apt to cause confusion. British forces participating in operations against SINGAPORE in November could not be prepared for the assault phase in CORONET. It is considered doubtful that these forces could participate even in the follow-up. Certainly, to utilize considerable numbers of troops without adequate opportunity on the part of higher commanders of this area to exercise command functions prior to their use would be a most dangerous expedient. Moreover, it would be entirely unsatisfactory to have the availability of troops scheduled for CORONET dependent in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availability of these troops as well as all others committed must be certain for a fixed date. Bearing the above in mind, it is considered that any solution in the use of British troops must encourage their employment in the assault and the establishment for them of a separate logistical chain. Considered solely from the standpoint of public approval, the following general plan is suggested as being one which will obviate the full impact of the objectionable features indicated above. This plan takes into consideration previous communications relating to the use of Australian forces as well as Canadian forces.

A. Limit British Empire participation to 1 corps of 3 divisions; 1 British, 1 Canadian, and 1 Australian.

B. Re-equip British division and corps troops and Australian division with American equipment, logistic support to be provided by the United States on the same scale as provided for our troops.

C. The Australian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division, now concentrated in the BORNEO-MOROTAI area.

D. Require British division and corps troops to be concentrated by 1st December in the BORNEO-MOROTAI area or as an alternate, in the United States, if these units can be equipped there.

E. Amphibiously train 1 British division and 1 Canadian division prior to arrival in concentration area. The Australian division is already amphibiously trained.

F. Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British to arrive in the objective area about Y plus 10. It will there be
used as the AFPAC Assault Reserve Afloat. Canadian division to be lifted directly from the United States, Australian division from the BORNEO-MOROTAI area, and British division and corps troops from either area depending on where it is concentrated.

G. Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United States army. Reserve the privilege to utilize divisions separately within American corps if the exigencies of the situation so demand. I doubt the advisability of employing troops of native origin in this complex operation where homogeneity of language within the corps is required. Likewise, there is a question of the advisability of utilizing troops of tropical origin in a temperate zone without an extended period of acclimatization. Hence, the acceptance of Indian troops is not concurred in. The British division should be Anglo-Saxon. The foregoing comments are equally applicable to Allied Air components, aggravated by the difficulties of integrating relatively small air forces in tactical operations under the restrictions imposed by a comparatively limited air deployment potential. There are ample American air forces in or projected for this area to support all troops in CORONET operations. Therefore, I recommend that the offer of the British tactical squadrons be declined and acceptance of the proposed increase in British very long range squadrons be delayed until the availability of more airfields is assured. Although not mentioned in your radiogram, it is presumed that you have considered that extensive augmentation of Allied effort in the Pacific, including components from the various forces, may cause a demand for the establishment of an overall command under CCS control similar to that employed in EUROPE.

20 1407

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH

Confirmation is requested of my understanding that JCS 181409 vests in CINCAFPAC responsibility for Military Government in the RYUKYUS.

21 0810

CINCPA ADV HQ to COMGEN USASTAF.

To clarify logistic planning request you obtain definition of "External logistical support" and "Internal logistical support" as used in JCS despatch 110101 WARX 29978 paragraph 4.

21 1415

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WEDEMEYER, AGWAR, info NAVY

VICTORY 169 BG 248 for your information the combined chiefs of staff on 20 July approved the following directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia with the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff would take steps to obtain the agreement of the DUTCH, NEW ZEALAND, and AUSTRALIAN governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command setup in Southeast ASIA and Southwest Pacific. Directive begins.

Para 1. Your primary task is the opening of the STRAITS OF MALACCA at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British
Commonwealth Land Forces should take part in the main operations against JAPAN which have been agreed as the Supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in the outer zone to the extent that forces and resources permit.

BOUNDARIES OF COMMAND
Para 2. The Eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include BORNEO, JAVA and the CELEBES.
Para 3. Full details of this extension are contained in the appendix.
Para 4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon as practicable after the 15th August, 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility.
Para 5. From that date, such DOMINION and DUTCH FORCES as may be operating in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue to be based on AUSTRALIA.
Para 6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an AUSTRALIAN COMMAND under the British Chiefs of Staff.

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN MAIN OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN
Para 7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force of from 3 to 5 divisions and, if possible, a small tactical air force should take part in the main operations against JAPAN in the spring of 1946. Units of the EAST INDIES FLEET may also take part. Certain important factors relating to this are still under examination.
Para 8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with the assault lift for 2 divisions. The exact composition of this force and its role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur and the British force commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Para 9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations against JAPAN must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below.

OPERATIONS IN THE OUTER ZONE
Para 10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations assigned to:
SubPara A. complete the liberation of MALAKA.
SubPara B. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the BURMA-SIAM frontier.
SubPara C. Capture the key areas of SIAM.
SubPara D. Establish bridgeheads in JAVA and/or SUMATRA to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course.
Para 11. You will submit a programme of operations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so.

DEVELOPMENT OF BASES
Para 12. You will develop SINGAPORE and such other bases as you
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WEDEMEYER, AGWAR info NAVY.

21 1415

may require to the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese. Directive ends. Appendix Begins.

EASTERN BOUNDARY OF COMMAND

Para. Beginning on the coast of INDO-CHINA at 15 degrees north; thence through the BALABAC STRAIT along the 193 9 boundary line between the PHILIPPINES and BORNEO to latitude 05 degrees north, thence eastward to 05-00 north - 123-00 east, thence southward to 02-00 south 123-00 east; thence southeastward to 08-00 south - 125-00 east; thence southwestward to 18-00 south - 110-00 east end of directive and appendix.

TOP SECRET

NIMITZ ONLY

JULY (GCT)

211820 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC/CINCPOA BOTH HQ. info COMINCH AND CNO ADMIN.

Understanding contained in your 201407 is confirmed.

25 0830 CINCPAC to COMANF info COMINCH, CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Eyes only for Kinkaid, King and Nimitz. CX 28196 authority granted your 240610 to intercept, board and inspect for violations of existing conventions and to bring into port if violations are discovered Hospital Ship TACHIBANA MARU.

25 0906 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Nimitz to Towers only. Obtain from COMAIRPAC and send to me in this system his nomination 6 escort carriers with 2 Flag Officers to concentrate in MARSHALLS in near future for use in KEELBLOCKS 4 if required. Also warn COMSERVPAC to be continually prepared on short notice nominate SERVPAC units listed page 6 my serial 0005067 of 26 May. Utmost secrecy directed.
Coordination of plans for the procedure to be followed in the event of Japanese governmental surrender is now a pressing necessity. Early information is desired regarding the conference reported to be in progress at Guam on this subject.

Para. It appears to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF that in such event immediate naval occupation of critical parts of Japan is desirable to include in each case, if practical, an operational airfield to facilitate communication and permit airborne troop landings.

Para. It also appears to JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF that it would be highly desirable for similar procedure to be followed on the Asiatic mainland in following order or priority: Shanghai, Fusan in Korea, Chefoo, and Chingwangtao on the Manchurian border. Also that preliminary landings on Asiatic continent might best be carried out by Marines. A landing at Taku to permit the blocking of the critical communication points of Peking-Tsintien would be more desirable that at Chingwangtao but probably is impractical from the viewpoint of Naval Craft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not desire to become involved in the campaign in China on the mainland other than by air, but it is considered highly desirable to seize the ports in order better to facilitate the reoccupation of the country by CHINESE Forces. The occupation of the north tip of Formosa would be a great aid to air operation and communication to Japan and China.

Para. There appears to be a necessity for an early decision as to the movement of divisions of the 1st Army now in the United States, particularly as concerns complication regarding their equipment now enroute to Philippines. It might be desirable to route some of these divisions directly to Japan as follow up units, thus avoiding the shipment of divisions from the Philippines for the same purpose.

Para. The formal surrender or enforced submission of the Japanese government will be received jointly by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz or their designated representatives. In order that there may be a continuity of policy of procedure in dealing with Japanese Imperial Headquarters or its ministries, representatives of CINCAFPAC and CINCPOC will jointly perform this function until CINCAFPAC has actually landed in Japan and personally assumed this responsibility. The foregoing provisions will not be allowed to interfere with conduct of local surrenders by naval or other U. S. Commanders concerned.
28 0102  CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC, COMSERVPAC info CINCPOA PEARL Hq.

NIMITZ TO MONTGOMERY AND SMITH ONLY INFO HOOVER ONLY.

Plans for procedure to be followed in case of Japanese surrender are under development. It is anticipated that requirements would include 1 streamlined ACORN and 1 streamlined GROPAC for emergency use at YOKUSUKA air and seaplane base and 3 other ACORNS and GROPACS to follow promptly for other areas. Survey situation and advise units most readily available. My present inclination is to direct COM MARIANAS to be ready to produce a streamlined ACORN by stripping local facilities. Comment.

28 0107  CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMORPAC info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO FLETCHER ONLY, INFO KING.

In order to be ready to execute KEELBLOCKS 4 on short notice am sending you PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY and CHESTER and 2 more Destroyers and am preparing Task Force 49 with 6 CVE and 9 DD ready to move on short notice from ENIWETOK. 2 Heavy landplane search squadrons have been sent you.

Para. Use forces available to extend and exercise your control of the eastern portion of the Sea of Okhotsk.

Para. Request from me info COMSERVPAC such augmentations in auxiliary vessels as you must have to service your combat units as they are increased.

27 1318  CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAPAC info COM7THFLEET, COMINCH.

My 270920. If agreeable to you will send Rear Admiral Sherman accompanied by Brig Gen Mandell, Brig Gen Goss, Capt Espe, Col Mable and Lieut Comdr Grant to arrive MANILA afternoon 29 July to coordinate occupation plans.

New Subject. Conference with COMGEN CHINA my 140304 will take place 4 August and presence of representative from your headquarters would be welcome.

27 0920  CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCAPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

NIMITZ TO KING, INFO MACARTHUR AND SPAATZ.

The following information is furnished to inform you of the status of planning in reply to 2nd sentence of JCS 261446 (V 357).

Para. During the visit of CINCAPAC representatives to CINCPAC's Advance Headquarters 21-23 July which was concerned primarily with making detailed arrangements for compliance with the JCS directive V 73 of 18 July concerning the RYUKYUS copies of CINCAPAC's plan BLACKLIST were received and since that time CINCPAC's tentative plan CAMPUS has been revised to accord with BLACKLIST insofar as the occupation of JAPAN by Army Forces is concerned. CAMPUS contemplates naval and amphibious
operations in 3 phases. Phase A. Emergency naval occupation of TOKYO BAY.
Phase B. Complete deployment of naval occupation forces.
Phase C. Amphibious operations connected with the occupation of JAPAN by U. S. Army Forces.

Para. Copies of the CAMPUS draft as revised will be taken to MANILA for conference with representatives of CINCAFPAC on 29 July. Propose draft separate plan for occupation critical points CHINA COAST (using Fleet Marine Force) in conference with COMGEN CHINA who will arrive GUAM 4 August under present arrangements and with CINCAFPAC representatives.

COMMORPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMSERVVPAC.

31 0112
Reur 280107 request 1 AD be made available this command upon arrival CRUDIV 5 and escorting DD's. With arrival TF 49 request following additional auxiliaries 1 AC, 2 YO, 2 YOG, 1 ATF, 1 YG, 4 LCM and 1 refrigerated cargo ship in addition to the 1 presently supplying all armed forces in the ALEUTIANS.

30 1306
CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM7THFLEET.

MCMORRIS TO SHERMAN ONLY.

Do not concur that landing of Marines or occupying airfields must be deferred until troops land in strength. No commitment of that nature is to be made as such action is likely to be necessary in order to exercise essential control. The naval officer on the spot must be free to act expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and judgement to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussions.

Para. 2nd paragraph your 300237 not entirely clear. It is interpreted to mean that landing operations by naval forces will be contingent upon the situation which exists when naval forces arrive in Japanese ports and developments which immediately follow with the time of any such landing if made to be determined by events as they unfold. If this interpretation is correct then concur otherwise need amplification.

Para. In view prospective requirements for marines elsewhere it appears here that no more should be committed in JAPAN proper than is essential for early stages of occupation. Some will doubtless be required initially. You are authorized to make up to 3 divisions available for early and rapid movement into JAPAN if your discussions there indicate advisability of so doing.

Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequent directives giving CINCPAC a free hand until CINCAFPAC arrives in JAPAN with his forces any agreements or understanding you make should carry a proviso for revision of any part that might prove to be inconsistent with any later directive issued by JCS.
28 1948
COMAIRPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

MONTGOMERY TO NIMITZ INFO HOOVER.

Concur that streamlined ACORN be produced from units currently in Marianas. Your 280102. Additionally are ACORNS 53, 55 and 57 all West Coast. Last scheduled for RATSBAINE other 2 presently un-assigned.

28 1239
CINCPA ADVANCE HQ to CINCAPPAC info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR.

Your 280459. I consider that JCS 142307 June (WARX 17064) together with JCS 261946 (BG V 357) constitute a directive requiring prompt compliance on my part and accordingly will send Rear Admiral Sherman and party to MANILA tomorrow as planned the coordination of occupation plans is the principal purpose of their visit at this time. They will have incidental conferences with COM7THFLT and COMPHIBSPAC concerning naval matters and those required can remain for conference with your staff and USASTAF representatives concerning OLYMPIC air coordination.

Para. My 140304 gives the purpose of the conference with COMGEN U.S. Forces CHINA at GUAM on 4 August. However advantage will be taken of that meeting to improve coordination and understanding on various matters now pending including the FORT BAYARD project and possible occupation measures along the CHINA COAST. Your representative will be welcome at that time as always.

28 0721
CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH info BUPERS.

NIMITZ TO EDWARDS info JACOBS.

In view of JCS 271000 (Victory 371) request immediate assignment to my headquarters of an officer qualified to be my liaison officer with Commander Soviet Pacific Fleet. Captain Frank F. Thomas believed to be well qualified and is requested if available. If not available request names of others available.

01 0931
CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM7THFLEET.

FOR REAR ADMIRAL SHERMAN EYES ONLY.

Immediate delivery desired. Various articles in press and other pronouncements are critical of existing command arrangements in Pacific. CINCPAC desires that if possible agreement be reached regarding command exchange of information spheres of operation intelligence etc of air forces of CINCAPPAC, CINCPA and COMSTRATEGIC AIR FORCES in order to secure close coordination and effectiveness. Believe SPAATZ entertains much same concept as ourselves. If not already done make every effort to secure an understanding for maximum effective air effort against Japanese by coordinated action. Such a goal is not incompatible with retention of independence of action by respective commands.

Para. Your 010545 just received. If you think advisable delay departing to act on this message.
30 0237 COM7THFLT to CINCPOA ADVANCE HQ (Cont'd)

JAPAN because it appears impossible for Army to move sufficient divisions rapidly without some marines.

Para. The foregoing concessions will permit reaching an agreement unless unforeseen demands are made. His plans are being made and ours will be expanded to cover KOREA and CHINA insofar as troop allocations are concerned.

28 2113 COMSERVPAC to CINCPAC/POA BOTH HQ, COMAIRPAC.

SMITH TO NIMITZ INFORMATION HOOVER AND MONTGOMERY ONLY.

Your 280102 GROPAC immediately available at PEARL for streamlined GROPAC provided it not be used in FORT BAYARD or OKINAWA as previously suggested. For 3 other GROPACS recommend (A) slowdown and curtailment OKINAWA base development thus permitting CNOB to form 3 suitable GROPACS from personnel under his command and equipment drawn in construction materials pool shipments see entry 119 of my serial 001402 of 19 Dec 1944. (B) 1st alternate form 2 GROPACS from OKINAWA as outlined in (A) and a similar unit from MARIANAS. (C) 2nd alternate form 3 GROPACS from units assembling on West Coast for OLYMPIC. If emergency action be taken on (C) under personal direction of service force representatives consider that suitable units could be ready for sailing in 30 days.

28 0459 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

C 28946.

Will be glad to welcome Admiral Sherman and his party who I understand will be prepared to discuss matters pertaining to air coordination for OLYMPIC your 271318. Our respective views on occupation are so divergent that I believe it would be difficult to coordinate them prior to the receipt of some directive from the JCS. We will of course be glad nevertheless to discuss the matter with Sherman when he comes.

Para. Regarding the WEDEMeyer conference, it was our understanding that it had as its purpose the coordination of the FORT BAYARD project. Insofar as this headquarters is concerned it would not be deemed advisable to attempt to expand it into a discussion of plans for operational occupation of the CHINA COAST until a definite directive has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
NMDTZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

01 0545 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS.

Completed air coordination conference and expect return GUAM tomorrow 2 August.

Para. Plans for occupation coordinated satisfactorily insofar as troop movements are concerned. Early naval occupation of "Japanese Waters" accepted by CINCPAC but any landing whatsoever by naval or marine elements prior to CINCPAC'S personal landing is emphatically unacceptable to him. Accordingly I have left that feature as one on which agreement could not be reached and in which Joint Action is not essential and concentrated on other features which because of their nature do require coordination. There will be no written record of our planning conference other than the plans themselves which will be adequately correlated except for landing force operations prior to the arrival of Army troops in strength.

31 0024 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

EYES ONLY. SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS ONLY.

Conference and revision of both BLACKLIST and CAMPUS proceeding satisfactorily although considerable insistence still required on my part. CINCPAC'S headquarters is hoping for a directive along OLYMPIC lines or which will give CINCPAC overall command for the occupation.

Para. Have deleted provisions for early landings and inserted provision for a CINCPAC representative to go to Halsey's Flagship and thereafter Halsey and the CINCPAC representative would function as the Quote Joint Representatives Unquote mentioned in last paragraph of JCS message.

Para. It now appears that CINCPAC will occupy the KOBÉ OSAKA KYOTO AREA instead of the KURE area so the 5th Fleet will be initially at KOBÉ. The 5th PhibCorps is planned to occupy the KOBÉ–OSAKA AREA initially. The 3rd PhibCorps is reserved for the CHINA COAST which I now believe will not be covered in CINCPAC'S plan as it is WEDEMEYERS area.

Para. Have promised to make TULSA available for purpose of guarding navy circuits and supplying CINCPAC with intercept traffic after landing. They will not ask for the 3rd LST.

30 0237 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS ONLY.

Cordially received. Had long and very amicable conference with General MacArthur. He accedes to naval features and to naval and air show of force as soon as fighting stops. He considers it unwise to risk landing any marines or seizing airfields until troops arrive in strength. He had the JCS message but did not consider it a directive and has asked for one.

Para. Unless I receive other instructions I will adjust plans to make all early landings contingent operations with timing to be determined later and will if requested make 3 MarDivs available to army for

- continued -
03 0209  CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING ONLY.

Your 312010. My understanding is that Shermans relief should have about 2 months overlap and that he would be available in August and preferably early August. It is my desire that Sherman remain with me until all plans and preparations for OLYMPTC are completed but not necessarily until after execution OLYMPTC which might drag indefinitely. My 260811 was based on assumption that Schoeffel would be available in August.

03 0212  CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING ONLY.

Cities of KYOTO HIROSHIMA KOKURA and NIIGATA were reserved for special attack with which you are familiar. SecWar directed substitution NAGASAKI for KYOTO. Understand reason being that latter is an important cultural center that he did not wish destroyed. Request I be informed if KYOTO is to remain immune from normal bombing attacks. Assume also that JCS are familiar with fact that POW camp is at NAGASAKI.

03 0911  CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING.

Sherman returned from MANILA and reports that BLACKLIST and CAMPUS have both been revised and are mutually acceptable except for the question of landings by naval or marine personnel before CINCPAC lands in person. The language of CAMPUS in this regard was drafted as follows "At each principal anchorage, an operational airfield will if practicable be occupied to facilitate communications and airborne troop landings, and for subsequent development for naval purposes. The timing of this occupation will be such as to support the landing of troops in strength, but may be adjusted by the local naval commander as necessary to meet the requirements of the situation as it may develop after the arrival of naval forces in Japanese ports.

Para. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the principal anchorages may be occupied if such action becomes necessary to ensure the safety of naval forces".

Para. Since this particular language was not accepted by CINCPAC it was noted on the margin of copies furnished him that "it is subject to later revision as directed by CINCPAC".

Para. The sequence of ground occupations as now contemplated by BLACKLIST and CAMPUS in the 1st Phase is as follows KANTO PLAIN. SASEBO-NAGASAKI. OSAKA-KOBE-KYOTO. KEIJO AOMORI-OMINATO. The 5th PhibCorps is planned to be used in the OSAKA-KOBE-KYOTO area and the 3rd PhibCorps is left available for use on the CHINA COAST.

Para. An offer to place a command ship (AGC) at the disposal of CINCPAC was accepted. An offer to accommodate in Halsey's flagship the representative contemplated by last paragraph of JCS 261946 V 357 was not accepted on the grounds that CINCPAC would have no representative before he arrived in person.

- continued -
CINCPAC ADVANCE TO COMINCH (CONT'D)

Para. Am informed that all discussions were carried on in a most amicable manner and that General MacArthur received my representative most cordially.

Para. Agreements concerning coordination of all air forces from now until after OLYMPIC were quickly reached to the satisfaction of all concerned in conference between SPAATZ, KENNEY, CHAMBERLIN, SHERMAN and PRIDE.

Para. I see no better time than the near future for a visit to the Western Pacific by you and Marshall and hope that you will come prepared to make decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RD/FLEET.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY ONLY.

It is imperative that there be no interference with operations of 509th Bomb Group. Although their objective has been indicated it may be changed. It is accordingly directed that you send no planes over KYUSHU or western HONSHU until specifically authorized by me. It is my intention to give you freedom of action as soon as the special mission has been completed. At this time it appears probable that task will be completed on the 5th and that you can strike as you currently plan on the 6th. Will keep you informed.

Para. After your next attack desire your fleet return to port in order that it may be ready to renew operations in late August.

COM3RD/FLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

As soon as possible after arrival in PRDY would very much like to visit you with about 4 of my staff. If agreeable to you please designate convenient date arrange air transportation and advise.

New Subject. Intend shift my flag to New Jersey ENIWETOK leaving Missouri in all respects ready to receive CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ TO COM5TH/FLEET, COMPHIBSPAC.

NIMITZ TO SPRUANCE AND TURNER ONLY.

As yet no agreements have been made in connection with the coverage of OLYMPIC by press representatives. Until arrangements have been made between CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC as to the degree to which Pacific Fleet correspondents may cover operations on shore make no firm commitments connection reception AFPAC correspondents in ships of the fleet. Requests for such commitments should be referred to CINCPAC for coordination.
04 0612 COMGENUSASTAF to CINCPOA, CINCAPPAC.

EYES ONLY NIMITZ AND MACARTHUR.

Operational intention is to strike primary HIROSHIMA at 060945/K (-10) or secondary KOKURA at 061010/K or tertiary NAGASAKI at 061030/K. A firm decision confirming the times listed above will leave this headquarters by 051430/K. It is mandatory that no friendly aircraft enter a 50 mile area around the 3 targets scheduled for attack between the hours 060545/K and 061700/K if firm decision confirms the above target times.

04 2253 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM3RDFFL.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY.

Your 040805 may further complicate an already complicated situation with respect to command and coordination of air forces in the Pacific Theater. In the minds of many Army Air Commanders there begins to arise questions as to which forces are "Primary" and which are "Supporting". Accordingly I must request that your suggestions as to overall coordination of FEAF, USASTAF and Fleet Aircraft be made to me only. Definite agreements have been made as to principles and are being mailed to you which cover this matter from now through OLYMPIC.

06 1630 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Pursuant to agreement with Soviets, 4th Question Victory 351 refers. Look up. Joint Chiefs of Staff will propose establishment Army and Army Air operational liaison group at KHABAROVSK headed by General officer to which will be attached only 1 Captain and about 2 enlisted from Navy, and establishment at VLADIVOSTOK of naval operational liaison group headed by Flag Officer to include 3 officers and 3 enlisted from Army Air Forces. Estimate here that total personnel VLADIVOSTOK group will entail 20 officers 45 enlisted to handle liaison, convoy and routing, and necessary communications which would include ADAK FOx, ADAK-VLADIVOSTOK, ship to shore, and VLADIVOSTOK-GUAM via KHABAROVSK weather central. Envisaged that operational communications with PETROPAVLOVSK would be to station ship as no shore facilities other than weather central contemplated there. Your comment on this arrangement with particular reference to number of personnel VLADIVOSTOK is requested as a matter of urgency. In this connection note that reciprocal Soviet liaison group of similar composition at GUAM may be expected. Similar information has been provided MacArthur and Spaatz by Army in WARX 44735.
ARNOLD to SPAATZ info CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

WARX 44014.

Further to WARX 29973 dated 10 July which states your overall mission priority of objectives is as follows:

Para. 1. Mission.

SubPara A. Your overall mission is as stated in JCS 742/12. In carrying out the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN'S military, industrial and economic systems, your priority of objectives is as follows:

Para. 2. Objectives.

SubPara A. Primary objectives (in order).

SubPara 1. Initiate and carry out attacks upon suitable Japanese railway targets of special importance to economic traffic.

SubPara 2. Continue the present program against aircraft production.

SubPara 3. Conduct concentrated attacks against major ammunition storage areas.

SubPara 4. Complete the present program against industrial concentrations and stores located in urban areas.

SubPara B. Secondary objectives.

SubPara 1. Attack selected arsenals producing heavy ordnance.

SubPara 2. Direct available surplus effort against secondary aircraft targets and against nitrogen production and oil storage as auxiliary to invasion and preparatory to post invasion operations.

SubPara C. Other objectives.

SubPara 1. Mining operations. To continue present mining operations that cannot be performed by FEAFF or Navy in order to maintain the blockade of Japanese Home Islands.

SubPara 2. Photography. Continue the program of photographing for operational purposes and complete the present program of photographing JAPAN and approaches thereto as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE

HALSEY TO NIMITZ.

Pending receipt of directive from you I have formulated OpPlan for preliminary steps phase 1 salient features being. A. Arrangements for delivery of your terms. B. Receive local surrender on board MISSOURI and dictate local terms. C. Com3Rdflt in MISSOURI with suitable screen proceed initial anchorage SAGAMI WAN. D. Fleet at sea in striking position. E. RAdm Badger local Task Commander with headquarters YOKOSUKA and staff and necessary subordinate Task Commanders supplied to Com3Rdflt. F. Initially occupy only YOKOSUKA including airfield and seaplane base and locally initiate following measures. 1. Minesweeping. 2. Evacuation enemy armed forces from YOKOSUKA PENINSULA except key hostages and certain service personnel. 3. Spiking or covering continuous enemy installations. 4. Harbor patrol. 5. Local security. 6 Minimum
COM3RDFTL to CINCPAC ADVANCE (Cont'd)

essential civil administration. 7. Sanitation. 8. Receiving Ship facilities and hospital ships. 9. Communications. 10. Other local practicable measures. G. Com3rdFleet will initiate the following: 1. Instructions for withdrawal of enemy forces beyond a specified fixed line. 2. Freezing of all enemy forces in TOKYO AREA. 3. Delivery of specified shipping weapons, equipment and transportation. 4. Delivery and care of allied prisoners. 5. Security air patrol and other necessary surveillance measures. 6. General communication regulations and restrictions. 7. Preparations to receive CINCPAC including readiness of WISCONSIN. 8. Preparations to receive ship borne or air borne occupation personnel and forces. 9. Logistic support of Badgers local occupation force.

Para. Foregoing not complete but intended to indicate nature and extent of plans to utilize forces and facilities immediately available and pave the way for extension of control.

Para. Plans will be prepared take similar measures at other designated focal points east of arbitrarily assumed line 134 east assuming CTF 95 will act west of 134.

Para. Plan will be airmailed to you when annexes are completed but no distribution will be made other than to Badger pending further instruction. Am prepared to send staff representative to GUAM.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. NIMITZ TO KING. Your 061630. Is it intended to establish a direct radio circuit ADAK to VLADIVOSTOK or will relay through KHABAROVSK be satisfactory. See Annex 1 to Appendix C KEELBLOCKS 4.

Para. I have succeeded in limiting the liaison officers exchanged with CINC British Pacific Fleet to the grade of captain. This has the advantage of avoiding large liaison staffs and permitting business to be transacted between liaison officers and appropriate staff officers except where major policy is concerned. Strongly urge that liaison officers exchanged with Soviet CINC be captains also. If Soviets are permitted to send a flag officer British will undoubtedly demand to do likewise. Housing of senior officers and their staffs is an important factor.

Para. Otherwise concur in your 061630.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. NIMITZ TO KING ONLY. In a separate dispatch I am proposing to order Rear Admiral Buckmaster to command the South CHINA Naval Force as a task force commander. Before the FORT BAYARD project became urgent I had planned to recommend eliminating the Western CAROLINES Sub-area as an echelon of command no longer necessary and such a recommendation will follow in a few days.

Para. It appears probable that FORT BAYARD will be followed after OLYMPIC by CANTON and HONGKONG either by combat operations or as a result of Japanese collapse or local withdrawal. It is therefore timely to establish a flag officer in the area and have him
07 0554 Prepared to handle additional forces when necessary.
Para. For the present prefer that he remain responsible to CINCPAC in order to avoid precedents in connection with relations with CHIANG KAI SHEK.

07 0837 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMCARDIV 4

NIMITZ TO BOGAN ONLY. Have been informed that you will be ordered as Comdt NCB KAGOSHIMA reporting to me for that duty about 15 September after suitable leave. Commodore Kessing now comdg LION 9 which will be 1 of major components your command. Comment on proposal that he serve as you deputy and chief of staff.
Para. Desire you visit my headquarters prior going on leave.

08 2226 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RD.FLEET info COMINCH, COMNORPAC.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY INFO KING AND FLETCHER.

In order to indicate strong support of RUSSIAN attack desire you continue operations against enemy air forces and airstroke installations and targets of opportunity in northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO and ETOROFU for at least 2 days after 10 August.

09 0443 CINCPAC to WARCOS passed by COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV HQ (ADMIIRAL NIMITZ EYES ONLY)

TOP SECRET. C 31697 EYE ONLY for GENERAL MARSHALL from MACARTHUR.
Reference WAR 45369 (0715537). I am certain that the Japanese air potential reported to you as accumulating to counter our OLYMPIC operation is greatly exaggerated. We have recently seen the 3rd Fleet approach the northern and central shorelines of JAPAN close enough for gunfire bombardment and yet no reaction from the Japanese air has taken place. Our air forces are daily flying throughout JAPAN and provoke no reaction. The situation repeats that of the PHILIPPINE campaigns. Prior to the invasion of LUZON, reports were received of the concentration of air both on LUZON and on FORMOSA. An erroneous estimate of widely dispersed planes being held back for the eventuality of landings was repeatedly made. I further doubt the often repeated reports that large numbers of aircraft are still being manufactured in JAPAN. As to the movement of ground forces, the Japanese are reported as trying to concentrate in a few areas in which landings can be effected from TOKYO southward, and it is possible that some strength may have been drawn from the areas of northern HONSHU. I do not credit, however, the heavy strengths reported to you in southern KYUSHU. The limited capacity of railroads and the continued shipping losses discourage belief that large forces can be concentrated or supported effectively in southern KYUSHU. Kenney's air forces are now becoming effective from OKINAWA and it is anticipated that there will be a rapid buildup to an effective strength in early September of approximately 2000 combat planes, and prior to OLYMPIC of approximately 3000 planes. These are in addition to the VDR and escorting fighters in the MARIANAS. It is anticipated that this great weight of air will quickly seek out
09 0443 (continued)
and destroy in the southern Japanese islands all enemy air potential and will practically immobilize ground forces in their present positions. The maintenance of such forces in southern KYUSHU cannot fail to become increasingly difficult and it is anticipated that they will be greatly weakened prior to OLYMPIC.

Para. In my opinion, there should not be the slightest thought of changing the OLYMPIC operation. Its fundamental purpose is to obtain air bases under cover of which we can deploy our forces to the northward into the industrial heart of JAPAN. The plan is sound and will be successful. An attack directly into TOKYO or to the northward thereof would have to be made without the benefit of land based aviation other than VLR and for that reason alone would be fraught with greatest danger. I seriously doubt the advisability of a direct attack into TOKYO without the installation of heavy air forces closer than OKINAWA. Only a limited study has been made of the SENDAI and OMINATO areas. Insofar as OMINATO is concerned, weather alone would seem to indicate the impracticability for an attack during 1945 or early 1946, especially for the installation of air forces which would prepare the way into the industrial heart of JAPAN. SENDAI has somewhat greater potentialities although some difficulty in establishing satisfactory bases might be experienced. This area is very close to the TOKYO area and would be subject to heavy infiltration of ground troops therefrom. Throughout the Southwest Pacific Area campaigns, as we have neared and operation intelligence has invariably pointed to greatly increased enemy forces. Without exception, this build-up has been found to be erroneous. In this particular case, the destruction that is going on in JAPAN would seem to indicate that it is very probable that the enemy is resorting to deception.

07 1535

OPD WAR (MARSHALL) to MACARTHUR passed by COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV HQ

TOP SECRET. FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ONLY. MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR EYES ONLY. WAR 45369.

Intelligence reports on Jap dispositions which have been presented to me and which I understand have been sent to your staff are that the Japanese have undertaken a large buildup both of divisions and of air forces in KYUSHU and southern HONSHU. The air buildup is reported as including a large component of suicide planes which the intelligence estimates here consider are readily available for employment only in the vicinity of their present bases. Concurrently with the reported reinforcement of KYUSHU, the Japanese are reported to have reduced forces north of the TOKYO PLAIN to a point where the defensive capabilities in northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO appear to be extraordinarily weak viewed from the standpoint of the Japanese General Staff. The question has arisen in my mind as to whether the Japanese may not be including some deception in the sources from which our intelligence is being drawn.

Para. In order to assist in discussions likely to arise here on the meaning of reported dispositions on JAPAN proper and possible alternate objectives to OLYMPIC, such as TOKYO, SENDAI and OMINATO, I would appreciate your personal estimate of the Japanese intentions and capabilities as related to your current directive and available resources.
09 2205 COMINCH AND CHO to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

KING TO NIMITZ EYES ONLY.

Desire your comments on WAR 45369 (071535) and MACARTHURS 31897 (090443) passed to you EYES ONLY. Send your reply info MACARTHUR.

10 0731 CINCAFPAC to CINCPOA ADV, COMGEN TEN info AFMDPAC, JCS.

32204.

Concur Richardson's 262220 concerning return of infected prisoners to RYUKYUS. Reference CINCPOA ADVANCE 280725 and COMGEN TEN 030434+2. Desire prisoners presently at OKINAWA remain there pending immediately forthcoming conference in RYUKYUS between representative of Chief Provost Marshall AFFPAC and COMGEN TEN.

10 1135 COMINCH AND CHO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

KING TO NIMITZ.

This is a peace warning. TOKYO has indicated in ultra channels that JAPAN wishes to bring about peace immediately and that she will accept the Joint Declaration by leaders of U.S., Great Britain and CHINA provided that the stipulations do not include a demand for alteration of the authority of the emperor to rule the state. It is now probable that the Swedish or Swiss governments will soon transmit official messages to the Allies regarding Jap capitulation desires. Your movements and dispositions should be guided by this information pending further more definite word or instructions.

01 1400 COMINCH AND CHO to ALUSNA-MOSCOW - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADV, COMNORPAC.

Pursuant to terminal agreements and conversations with Russians it is apparent that U.S. convoy of Soviet shipping from West Coast ports and of HULA 2 ships cannot be instituted after outbreak of hostilities until operational liaison groups are set up and functioning. Apparent further that western terminus these convoys must be SAKHALIN GULF area until Soviets open LA PEROUSE or we open TSUSHIMA. In order plans here for institution convoy escorts may have firm basis desire answers to following in light of foregoing stipulations. A. What is deadline beyond which sailings from west coast ports and COLD BAY should cease until escort can be effected. B. What is size and frequency of convoys desired by Soviets when sailings can be resumed. C. Where is desired CHOP line where U.S. responsibility and control of convoys ceases and Soviet escort begins. In connection foregoing desire arrangement with Soviets whereby their submarines keep clear of convoys while under U.S. protection and whereby anchorage at PETROPAVLOVSK is available for U.S. escorts and necessary supporting fuel and repair ships thereafter. Ends.
10 1357 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLT.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ.

Your 100613 acknowledged and understood. Must make sure however that you understand the following. During last 2 days over 500 enemy planes positively destroyed or damaged in north HONSHU and a great many others strafed rocketed, bombed and undoubtedly damaged but not claimed. North HONSHU is for the time being wrecked and powerless. Stationary fog belt whose southern edge lies at about lat 39. This unless otherwise directed I will now do in effort to find an operating area from which to attack HOKKAIDO KURILES but unless you signify that such attack is of utmost urgency will not take the abnormal risks to pilots involved in flight operations when fog is present or positively imminent. Typhoon may alter all plans. Will keep you advised.

10 1646 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLT. info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY INFO KING.

Your current orders hereby amended. While striking at discretion move your fleet to southward and prepare to execute operations under concept of joint staff study CAMPUS dated 9 August. 10 copies will be flown to Island Commander TWO JIMA forenoon 11 August to await pickup by carrier aircraft. COM3RDFLEET remain in Missouri. Am ordering New Jersey to GUAM. My 082226 amended to accord with above.

10 1608 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET info COMINCH, CINCAFPAC.

Pending the arrival of the Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet in Japanese waters the Commander 3rd Fleet will be his designated representative for purposes indicated in JCS 261946 Victory 357.

10 1602 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 info COMAIRWING 1, COM3RDFLT, COMINPAC, CINCAFPAC.

Alert 2 squadrons of patrol seaplanes and adequate tenders for immediate movement northeastward for duty with Com3rdFlt. Alert all available fast minesweepers and a suitable tender for similar movement. Advise numbers available and prospective dates readiness. See my joint staff study CAMPUS.

Para. Prepare units of BatRon 1 now in OKINAWA (except your Flagship) for similar movement with suitable screen.

10 1604 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORPAC info COMINCH, COM3RDFLEET.

NIMITZ TO FLETCHER INFO HALSEY AND KING.

Warning order. In the event of Japanese capitulation which now appears imminent you will be directed to employ forces under your command for naval occupation HAKODATE - ACOMORI - OMINATO area with forces under your command. Forces contemplated are 3 CA, 2 OCL, 9 DD, 1 AV, 1 AVP, 1 AR, 1 AR available minesweepers. You will be authorized embark in a ship of this force and exercise personal command if in your judgement such action is advisable. An AGC may become available.
10 1144  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, USASTAF, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

WARX 47190.

TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, AND SPAATZ FOR INFORMATION.

As a result of administrative errors code word OLYMPIC was compromised by being published in a memorandum classified restricted. Investigation failed to show that meaning of code word was compromised. As a matter of absolute safety decision reached to cancel OLYMPIC and substitute MAJESTIC instead.

10 2002 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

FROM ADMiral KING FOR THE EYES ONLY OF ADMIRAL NIMITZ.

SecNav is of the opinion that an opportunity should be afforded the American people to pay tribute to the men of the Navy which they will undoubtedly wish to express. He suggests that whenever operational requirements permit a task group composed of some outstanding vessels be sent back to the U.S. as a token return of the Fleet. He further suggests that your return with this group at least to the 1st port of call would enhance public enthusiasm and interest but the Secretary appreciates that any arrangements depend on demands of your time in the Pacific. Desire your comments.

11 0216 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMINCH, COMUSASTAF.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING AND KINCAID.

In the event of Japanese surrender it is my plan to place at your disposal immediately 1 of the command ships (AGC) now in the Philippines and to assign it to a special task group which will be commanded by a Flag Officer and will include an appropriate escort. I believe that this class of ship will best serve you as a headquarters afloat with adequate accommodations and communications. Request your comments.

09 0326 COMAF 20 to CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMUSA STAF.

APCOM 5449. KIRKPATRICK TO NIMITZ AND SPAATZ.

Note: This is extract of copy to Washington (In view of the effects at TRINITY and HIROSHIMA which far exceeded optimistic expectations, Pursell Parsons and Farrell believe question of targets should be reviewed immediately. The subject was discussed with Nimitz and Spaatz today at GUAM and both concurred in our views expressed below.

Para. Because of great potency targets should be practicable be at least 3 miles on a side. Targets with partially burned out areas having large remaining population and some industry offer great possibilities for psychological effects. We consider the "Scare Radius" to be at least 10 miles. It is recommended that the War Department should no longer require visual bombing but leave decision to the field command. Every effort will be made to get best bombing conditions. We consider remaining approved targets with exception of KOKURA as inadequate or improperly shaped areas. We do not want to waste any of effects. It is recommended that the list be revised to include several large cities. It is expressly recommended that the region of TOKYO be included as a target.
COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

EYES ONLY ADMIRAL NIMITZ.

Plans under consideration contemplate that for the occupation of JAPAN and the enforcement of surrender terms MACARTHUR will be the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers and together with representatives of the U.S., GREAT BRITIAN, CHINA and USSR will accept the Japanese surrender on board the MISSOURI. You will be the U.S. representative. Foregoing for your advance information.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMGENUSFCT CHUNCKING, info COMGEN USASTAF GUAM, COMGEN US ARMY LIAISON SECTION HDQTS SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND KANDY CEYLON.

WAR 47945.

TOPSEC BOOK MESSAGE TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, MEDEMEXER, SPAATZ AND WHEELER FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Para 1. Further to WARX 17964 14 June 1945 and VICTORY 357 of 26 July, key areas of JAPAN proper, KOREA and the CHINA coast will be occupied upon capitulation or collapse of the Japanese Government. Occupation operations will be initiated on order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para 2. Preparations for the operations required under paragraph 1 above, must be subsidiary to, and without jeopardy to, those for directed operations prior to Japanese capitulation or collapse. The operations following Japanese capitulation should in so far as practicable be planned as developing from the dispositions, preparations and arrangements for the Campaign in JAPAN, except that as practicable Marine Corps troops allocated CINCAFPAC should be used for preliminary landings on the ASIATIC CONTINENT.

Para 3.

A. In order that there may be a continuity of policy and procedure in dealing with the Japanese imperial High Command and existent agencies of the Japanese Government, representatives of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC will jointly perform this function until CINCAFPAC has landed in JAPAN and assumed this responsibility.

B. Except as indicated in paragraphs 3C and 3D, below, CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC are charged with carrying out the military operations incident to the occupation in accordance with the same command responsibilities and arrangements established under WARX 87938 of 25 May 1945. In preparing plans for occupation operations on the CHINA COAST, CINCPAC and CINCPAC will collaborate with COMGENCHINA.

C. COMGENCHINA will assume command or operational control of Pacific Theater forces after they are established ashore on the CHINA COAST in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon by the commanders concerned. COMGENCHINA is responsible for coordination GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-CHEK of those parts of those parts of the occupation plans pertaining to CHINA.

D. Forces involved in the immediate naval occupation of critical ports in JAPAN, as contemplated in VICTORY 357, and on ASIATIC MAINLAND will continue under the control of CINCPAC until such time as CINCAFPAC and COMGENCHINA are in a position to exercise control of the occupation.
Para 4.
A. The immediate objective of occupation operations against JAPAN and KOREA is early introduction of forces (including seizure of critical ports and port facilities and airfields) into major strategic land and sea areas in order to seize control, immobilize and disarm enemy forces and impose the conditions which are required by the immediate military situation. Earliest possible U.S. custody of allied prisoners of war and interned persons is essential.
B. The 1st objective of occupation operations on the CHINA COAST is to afford such assistance to CHINA THEATER forces, by gaining control of key ports and communications points, as is practicable without involvement in a major land campaign.

Para 5.
A. Prompt occupation in JAPAN PROPER is the supreme operation and constitutes a 1st charge upon resources available to Pacific Commanders.
B. Early occupation of KEIJO in KOREA and acceptance of surrender of Japanese forces in that area constitutes a second charge upon such resources.
C. Subject to the above priorities, operations will be undertaken on the CHINA COAST and FORMOSA.

Para 6. The responsibility for the execution of the terms of surrender in JAPAN PROPER and in KOREA is assigned to CINCAFPAC.

Para 7. CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC will arrange for immediate acceptance of possible local surrenders by any U.S. Commander on the spot. These arrangements will include provision for continuity in dealing with local Japanese authorities.

Para 8. Planning will recognize the probability of participation of small allied task forces of other nations in subsequent phases of the occupation and in accordance with directives to be issued later.

Para 9. In order to facilitate operations, KOREA is included in the Pacific Theater in so far as United States Command is concerned.

Para 10. CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and COMEACHINA after consulting or exchanging views will submit recommendations concerning occupation operations on the CHINA COAST and FORMOSA.

Para 11. Upon designation of a supreme commander for the Allied powers, as is contemplated, the foregoing responsibilities and command arrangements become subject to the authority conferred upon him by his directive.

CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

C 32837.
FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ALONE FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR.

In view latest plans for surrender received this date which differ fundamentally from those previously envisioned it is suggested that if possible you send a representative to this headquarters as these latest instruction make necessary a reconsideration of all local plans previously considered.
Para. 1. Deeply concerned am I relative possible lack of appreciation in Washington of explosive and portentous possibilities in CHINA when JAPAN surrenders. Instructions emanating from Washington (I cite WAR 47943, WAR 47945 and WAR 48004) indicate that I have failed to impress the implications of Chinese Communist movement and effect upon realization of U.S. objectives in this area.

Para. 2. It is my considered opinion that the American contingents contemplated in occupational plans (WAR 40831) must arrive as promptly as possible in CHINA. WAR 47945 places Japanese Archipelago in 1st priority, KOREA in 2nd, and CHINA in 3rd or last priority. As I view overall situation in Far East upon surrender of Japanese, the Archipelago will present no immediate problems relative to control, repatriation, disarmament or disturbances of revolutionary character; whereas on the ASIATIC MAINLAND we are confronted with 2 serious possibilities requiring prompt action on part of Allies. 1st, Chinese communist forces may precipitate civil war in CHINA; 2nd, the Japanese Army remaining on the mainland, approximately 2,000,000 strong, may continue to fight either in force or in isolated areas, requiring continued employment of air and land forces. The area of CHINA is so vast and communications so limited, the problems posed by the above 2 conditions obviously require TTMEX and appropriate disposition of allied forces, American and Chinese. Definitely CHINA THEATERS minimum requirements for American occupational forces should be given 1st priority.

Para. 3. The Chinese communist leader today issued a radio proclamation to Japanese and Chinese puppets admonishing them to surrender to nearest anti-Japanese troops. Ambassador Hurley has provided State Department with copy of proclamation. The primary object of Chinese communists is to obtain Japanese arms and equipment and thus further strengthen their capabilities. It is not unreasonable to expect Japanese cooperation in this regard. The geographical objectives of the Chinese communists have been and continue to be the very same key and strategic points and theas RECOMMENDED as vital by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who selected the majority of such points and areas for projected American occupation; including SHANGHAI, NANKING, TAKU, TIENTSIN, PEKING, TSINGTAO and CANTON. We will do utmost to dispose and employ Chinese forces in strength to preclude widespread uprising and disorder, and to localize Chinese communist efforts. U.S. resources available will be employed in consonance with new CHINA THEATER.

Para. 4. In my personal letter to you, delivered by SIMPSON, and in subsequent radios, I have tried to portray the problems presented in CHINA, particularly pertaining to the total lack of organization and planning. We Americans can and do make plans embodying sound recommendations, but their implementation in this land of confusion, intrigue and indecision remains problematical. I am sure that you appreciate my position and earnest desire to comply with instructions from Washington. Throughout my service here I have tried earnestly and objectively to
12 0520 COMM CHINA to WARESOS, MACARTHUR, NIMITZ.

PROVIDE YOU AND THE Joint Chiefs of Staff factual data and considered judgment relative to the application of instructions to the realistic conditions prevailing in CHINA.

Para 5. Recommendations in view of above following forces be dispatched in 1st Priority.

Sub-Para A. 2 divisions to SHANGHAI area.
Sub-Para B. 2 divisions to TAKU area.
Sub-Para C. 1 division to CANTON area.
Sub-Para D. If above is impracticable, I consider it imperative that, as absolute minimum, 2 divisions be dispatched to SHANGHAI AREA, 1 division to TAKU AREA and 1 regiment to CANTON AREA immediately.

Sub-Para E. If at all possible MACARTHUR stipulate at surrender meeting that Japanese commanders in CHINA be instructed to surrender to Chinese Central Government Commanders.

12 1837 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ info WEDEMEYER.

WARX 48625.

As a matter of urgency request MACARTHUR and NIMITZ comments on WEDEMEYERS 4352 of 12 August be furnished Joint Chiefs of Staff with info copies to Wedemeyer.

Para. As for WEDEMEYERS recommendation in paragraph 5 E, present draft of general order number 1 to be issued by Japanese GHQ provides for the surrender of Japanese commanders and all forces within CHINA (excluding MANCHURIA) to the GENERALISSIMO. This general order has not yet been finally approved.

12 2051 MARSHALL to WEDEMEYER info NIMITZ, MACARTHUR.

WAR 47943.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY FOR MACARTHUR'S AND NIMITZ'S EYES ONLY. FOR WEDEMEYER'S EYES ONLY FROM MARSHALL.

Para. We are in a discussion now regarding deployment of troops into JAPAN and the return of tired out high score men from the Pacific to the United States. The 1st requirement involves immediately the diversion of C-54's to a special run from the Philippines to OKINAWA and another prospective run into JAPAN. This diversion of course immediately reduces the evacuation from the Pacific of high score men by the multiple of just that many planes.

Para. What I should like to know from you is how soon you feel we could make a 1st reduction of HUMP tonnage in order to release C-54s I mean by this a reduction prior to the opening of a port; for the situation thereafter of course you already have notification.

Para. I should like an estimate from you as to how much longer the present Hump tonnage will be required in order to complete the equipment of the ALFA divisions on the assumption that no further combat operations are required but that of course numerous movements will be involved in order to herd the Japanese Army according to plan. Please acknowledge receipt immediately.
From 5 to 6 PM, conferred with General MacArthur and staff concerning occupation and surrender. He considers that as supreme allied commander he is now fully responsible for, and commands all phases of the occupation of JAPAN. He desires no communication with Japanese authorities by forces in the Pacific except through his headquarters. He expects to summon Japanese representatives to MANILA to make a preliminary arrangement for the surrender.

Para. He reiterated in most emphatic terms his disapproval of the use of a fleet landing force prior to the arrival of troops in strength and prior to the clearance of Japanese forces from the area under armistice arrangements. This disapproval is based on both military grounds and effect on service relationships.

Para. He repeated his full agreement with occupation of Japanese ports and coastal waters and complete blockade by the ships of the fleet.

Para. For the initial seizure of the TOKYO AREA he proposes a joint operation using the 11th airborne and 27th infantry divisions, both airborne, and at the same time landing the 4th Marine Combat Team. This operation would not take place until conditions set at MANILA had been met.

Para. I expect to take off at midnight.

Para. General MacArthur was shown the foregoing paragraphs.

WAR to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ, COMGENCHINA.

COMES ANOTHER RELAY AT REQUEST OF WAR TO CINCPAC ADVANCE AND COMGENCHINA EYES ONLY MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR EYES ONLY.

WAR 48342.

Para. For your information and guidance the President today dispatched to the Prime Minister, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Generalissimo Stalin messages stationg in substance as follows:

Para. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is proposed as supreme Commander for the Allied powers to accept, coordinate and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces.

Para. If you will furnish name of the officer you wish to act as your representative, General MacArthur will be instructed to make the necessary arrangements for the representative to be present at the surrender.

Para. The message to the Prime Minister stated that it is contemplated that MacArthur will direct the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to surrender unconditionally Japanese Forces in Southeast ASIA and parts of MALAYSIA to Admiral Mountbatten or his subordinate commanders. In the message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, it is stated that Japanese Imperial Headquarters will be directed to have Japanese Forces in CHINA other than those opposing the Russians surrender unconditionally to the Generalissimo or his subordinate
commanders. In the message to Stalin it is stated that MacArthur will direct Japanese Imperial Headquarters to have Japanese Forces in the Soviet Area of operations surrender unconditionally to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East or to his subordinate commanders.

Para. Preliminary instructions are being issued to General MacArthur and immediate advice is requested concerning designated representatives so that MacArthur may be notified. It is suggested that direct communication with MacArthur on arrangements be initiated at once. This ends substance of messages sent to heads of State by the President.

Para. The President would like to have the General Surrender take place on American soil, that is, a Battleship, preferably the Battleship MISSOURI.

Para. The present plan for the acceptance of the surrender by you as Supreme Commander provides that each of the 4 Major Powers, U.S., CHINA, UK and USSR, will have a representative present, and Admiral Nimitz will serve in the capacity of U.S. representative at the formal surrender. Admiral Nimitz has been informed of this and also concerning the use of the Battleship MISSOURI.

Para. The foregoing constitutes your preliminary instructions.

Para. The following is purely for your information and is furnished and will be used for planning only.

Para. The State Department has replied to the Japanese Government informing that that the Emperor will be required to authorize and insure the signature by the Government of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the POTS DAM declaration and will be required to direct surrender of Japanese Armed Forces and issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms. No reply has been received from the Japanese Government.

Para. Now being considered on a planning basis for use in case the Japanese accept the conditions is a message to the Japanese Government that it should immediately:

Para. (1) Direct cessation of hostilities by Japanese Forces, informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of the effective date and hour of such cessation.

(2) Send Emissaries to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with information of the disposition of the Japanese forces and commanders, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enable him and his accompanying forces to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender.

Para. Separate Subject: The British have now proposed transfer to them of areas agreed at terminal effective on capitulation being accepted.

14 1916

COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS.

KING TO NIMITZ.

Suspend attack air operations forthwith.
COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS.

FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ONLY.

Include in your plans the return of a representative force of distinguished combatant vessels to the United States whenever in your estimation vessels can be spared from duties in connection with the Naval phases of the occupation of Japanese Territory. Your 110736. Concur in your views as to your return in person. SecNav has been informed of the substance of your reply. Submit for approval Brief of your plans.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RFLEET. info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO HALSLEY INFO KING.

MacArthur will be appointed Supreme Allied Commander to "Exercise Supreme Command over all Land, Sea and Air Forces which may be allocated for enforcement in JAPAN of the surrender terms by the Allied Forces concerned". Until otherwise directed by me do not land any in JAPAN. See COM7TH FLEETS 131050 passed separately.

COMGENCHINA to WARCOS info MACARTHUR, NIMITZ.

EYES ALONE TO WARCOS FOR JCS INFO EYES ALONE TO MACARTHUR AND NIMITZ.

CFBEX 4580.

Para 1. Provision embodied in last paragraph of WARX 48625 is subject. I am sure that you recognize that MANCHURIA may properly be termed the critical area in connection with current and projected activities of Chinese Communists, and possibly Soviet Communists. If the General Order Number 1 to be issued by Japanese Headquarters provides for the surrender of Japanese Commander and of forces within CHINA to the Generalissimo but excludes MANCHURIA insofar as the Generalissimo is concerned, following implications should be noted:

SubPara A. The attitude of Soviet Russia toward the Chinese Communists has never been determined accurately nor have Soviet intentions in CHINA been formalized to a degree that Americans can view the situation with equanimity. However it is not unreasonable to expect penetration of Soviet communists ideologies in MANCHURIA with cooperation of Chinese Communists. If the General Order above referred to excludes MANCHURIA as now contemplated, there is extreme danger that Japanese equipment will become available surreptitiously or openly to the Chinese Communists in MANCHURIA. Further the Chinese Communist overall plans will be facilitated. If on the other hand the General Order clearly stipulates that Japanese Forces would surrender only to Soviet Russian Forces and/or the Generalissimo's forces, the above dangers would be minimized perhaps obviated.

SubPara B. The ideas embodied in this message and in messages I have sent to you the past several days might suggest partisan leaning on my part. This is not the case. However, the U.S. policy has been and continues to be full support of the Generalissimo who heads the only officially and universally recognized constituted government in CHINA. The Generalissimo is concerned at present to be the strongest
COMGENCHINA to WARCOS info MACARTHUR, NIMITZ. (Cont'd).

Chinese leader and the only one capable of possibly accomplishing a modicum of stability during this period of uncertainty. It would therefore appear sound to create conditions by continued U.S. Political, Economic, and Military support (short of involvement in fratricidal war) which would strengthen the existing central government's position. This support should include iron clad stipulations designed to insure surrender of Japanese forces and equipment to the Generalissimo throughout CHINA including MANCHURIA, except in the immediate combat areas of the Russians.

SubPara C. I view ASIA as an enormous pot, seething and boiling, the fumes of which may readily snuff out the advantages gained by allied sacrifices the past several years and may also definitely prelude realization of the objectives of the Atlantic Charter, and the TEHERAN, YALTA and POTS DAM agreements. In my CFB 526, 9 July, paragraphs 2 and 3, pertinent ideas and suggestions are expressed that have stronger and immediate application today.

Para 2. I am so remote from international negotiations, it is with some misgivings that I submit following 2 alternate suggestions:

SubPara A. Schedule a conference with representatives from Soviet Russia, U.S., Great Britain, China in DELHI, INDIA, as early as possible to investigate and recommend appropriate steps necessary to preclude Civil War in CHINA, or.

SubPara B. 3 Big Powers issue agreed proclamation to Chinese Communists and Chinese Central Government that Civil War will not be tolerated in CHINA in any form or degree; that Big 3 are determined to take appropriate steps and employ necessary force in premises; that political and internal affairs must be settled without employment of force; that Big 3 recognized CHINA sovereignty and right of determination by Chinese of Form of Government; that employment of force by factions in CHINA has serious implications with regard to peace in the Far East and world order in general.
Para. Since the resources immediately available to CINCAP PAC will be required for the execution of BLACKLIST, it would be impossible to divert forces to CHINA as suggested by Wedemeyer in the priority recommended and only at a future date is redeployment were continued to supply the means required.

CINCAP PAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGENCHINA, COMINCH, WARCOS, COM3RDflt, COM5THflt, COM7THflt, COMGENMFPAC, COMPHIBSPAC.

CX 33438.

Your 120243/Z, prompt occupation of JAPAN in case of surrender constitutes a first charge upon resources available in the Pacific and is dependent on use of Divisions, including 5th Amphibious Corps, which have been prepared for MAJESTIC. Use of 5th Amphibious Corps in KOREA would cause large scale changes in fundamental arrangements for supporting troops and inevitably cause delay and confusion. In accord informal conferences with Admiral Sherman will proceed on basis that 5th Amphibious Corps will be utilized in JAPAN PROPER. 24th Corps will occupy KOREA. Noted is your plan for 3rd Amphibious Corps and 1 Regimental Combat 6th Marine Division.

Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, info Nimitz Wedemeyer.

WARX 49182.

Para. Read with reference to WAR 48672:

Para. A. The President has approved the wording of the 1st document which is the directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with the deletion in the 1st sentence of paragraph 3 of the words "as witnesses TDA".

Para. B. The President has approved the wording of the 2nd document which is the proclamation by the Emperor of JAPAN.

Para. C. The President has approved the wording of the 3rd document which is the instrument of surrender with deletion of the words "by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" at the end of paragraph 7 and with the addition of provision for signatures of representatives of the Allied Powers. The President desires that, after you have signed accepting the surrender, you invite the 4 representatives of the Allied Powers to place their signatures on the surrender document below and to the left of the signature of the supreme commander, in order as follows and with the following designations printed or typed under the respective signatures: U.S. representative, Republic of CHINA representative, United Kingdom Representative, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative. The official document will be in the English language.

Para. D. The 4th document which is General Order No. 1, is under consideration here and minor modifications are being made.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, info NIMITZ, WEDEMEYER.

Para E. There are minor editorial changes in the 1st and 3rd documents. Official copies of the 1st, 3 documents are being forwarded today by courier to MacArthur.

Para 2. With reference to the directive to the supreme commander for the Allied Powers, this will become effective when you are officially notified by the War Department of Japanese Capitulation.

Para 3. The British, the Chinese, and the Russians have now all agreed to the proposal of the President contained in WAR 48342. The Russians have designated Lieutenant General Deiviankl as their representative. The British have designated Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser.

Para 4. War Department messages 48342 and 48672 are being passed to Admiral Nimitz and General Wedemeyer.

WARX 49042.

The British Chiefs State that they assume that the U.S. will take the lead in all general matters concerning an early Japanese Surrender but have asked that the U.S. Chiefs keep them informed.

Para. British consider it of paramount political importance that a British Commonwealth Force be sent at the earliest possible moment to accept the surrender of the Japanese at HONG KONG. They propose to send a detachment of the British Fleet at once to HONG KONG, followed as soon as possible by an Australian Force in British Shipping, subject to agreement with the Australian Government and to necessary arrangements being made with you and Nimitz. They also propose that the adjustment of the boundary of SWPA as agreed at TERMINAL should take effect upon the date of the cease fire order. They ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to be prepared to instruct you and Nimitz to make available the forces to send to HONG KONG. British will seek the agreement of the Australian Government and instruct Admiral Fraser to concert his plans for HONG KONG with you and Nimitz. End of British proposal.

Para. The U.S. Chiefs have answered this proposal as follows:

Para A. Agree to keep British informed of pertinent action taken by the U.S. Chiefs and have passed WARX 47945 to British.

Para B. The U.S. Chiefs will accede to a request to release to British control at time of surrender all or part of the British Pacific Fleet. However, Nimitz has accepted a British Offer of a force of 1 BB, 2 CL, 1 CV and the necessary destroyers to participate with the U.S. Fleet in the Naval occupation of JAPAN, if such occurs.

Para C. Occupation of HONG KONG is a matter for arrangement between the British and Chinese Governments. The release of British Forces is unrelated to any British proposals regarding HONG KONG. No arrangement with General MacArthur for release of Australians appears necessary other than detailed local arrangements for the turnover.

Para D. Agree that the adjustment to the boundary of SWPA should take effect on the date of the Japanese surrender. End of U.S. answer.

Para. The above is furnished you for your information. TERMINAL agreement referred to provided for a passage from U.S. to British Command as soon as possible of that part of SWPA lying south of following described boundary: beginning on the coast of INDO CHINA at
WARCOS to CINCPAC info CINCPAC, COMGENCHINA, COMGENTR.

16-00N; thence to intersect at 07-40N 116-00E, the boundary between the Philippine Islands and British North BORNEO; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to 05-00N 127-00E; thence east to 05-00N 130-00E; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00E thence generally south east to 02-20S 146-00E; thence east to 02-20S 159-00E; thence south

14 0403 CMDRDFLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 31.

CAMPUS 9 August. Strongly recommend reconsideration your 120241. Assignment of a MarDiv considered necessary for following reasons:

A. Uncertainty of Japanese behavior.
B. Necessity of conducting shore operations on a normal combat scale.
C. Task will include occupation of air base, naval base and adjacent danger points. Enforcing evacuation of control zone. Establishing secure and effective perimeter.
D. Length of interval between naval occupation and the arrival of designated Army occupation forces.
E. Inadequacy of equipment training and experience of personnel of fleet landing force for other than tasks not involving risk of stiff combat.

Para. Any problem of Army-Navy jurisdiction could be solved by transferring to CINCPAC operational control any troops of MarDiv employed beyond limits of naval zones.

14 0812 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINGH.

NIMITZ TO KING.

For your information Sherman brought me from Manila a copy of Marshalls W 48672 to MacArthur which contains complete copy of proposed directive to Supreme Commander, proclamation by the Emperor of JAPAN, instrument of surrender and general order number 1.

14 0813 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR.

I concur heartily in the proposal that the initial seizure of the TOKYO AREA be effected by a Joint operation using the 11th Airborne and 27th Infantry Divisions both Airborne and at the same time landing the 4th Marine Combat Team and other units of the Fleet Landing Force.
CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC, COMGEN CHINA info COM7THFLT, COMINCH.

Request CINCAFPAC pass to COM7THFLT Wedemeyer CFBX 4538 and similar messages which it is appropriate that he see in view of his prospective assignment as Task Fleet Commander responsible for naval operations along the CHINA COAST. Request COMGEN CHINA also include COM7THFLT as appropriate.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH, COMGEN CHINA, WARCOS, COMPHIBSPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COM8THFLT, COM9THFLT.

I concur in your CX 33436 DTG 140925. Re: Occupation of JAPAN PROPER constitutes first charge....

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH.

Your 141916. What action should be taken regarding submarine attacks, bombardment etc. Re: suspend attack air operations forthwith.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ info WEDEMEYER.

WARX 49334.

With reference to WARX 49304, the Chiefs of Staff have received the following memorandum from the White House:

Para. "Referring to memorandum dated 11 August directing such advance arrangements as are practicable for the occupation of Dairen and a port in Korea.

Para. Further information, it is now considered wise from a political point of view to also occupy as soon as possible after the Japanese surrender some other mainland ports that definitely are not in the area of Soviet operations". This ends memorandum from the White House.

Para. The Chiefs of Staff are not able to appraise your capabilities to execute the primary mission of securing JAPAN PROPER and to seize Dairen and a port in Korea as envisaged in WARX 49304 and also to seize 1 or more ports in CHINA definitely not in the area of Soviet operations. Your analysis of the matter will be appreciated for their use.
HALSEY TO NIMITZ.

Sherman's 181019 can meet all requirements but may find it advisable to move heavy ships into TOKYO BAY on 25th instead of 24th depending on satisfactory completion of sweeping and on plans for covering landings (see my 190219 to EICHELBERGER); this should not upset any other known plans of yours or MacArthur's. Landing forces from fleet consist of:

A. 1800 marines in 3 battalions under Clements' command and assigned tasks commensurate with their capabilities and equipment.
B. 1200 U.S. Bluejackets in 3 battalions and a British Landing Force of 400 men available for security duty in wake of combat troops.
C. Reserve of 2000 additional Bluejackets in 5 battalions available for security duty but poorly equipped.
D. Special Bluejacket operating companies of artificers for service duties pending arrival of seabees and garrison forces. Your 181535 my plans have at all times taken limitations into consideration and I contemplate minimum use ashore consistent with security and doing a proper job. New Subject. Your 181354 most helpful and everything should proceed smoothly.

MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR, WHEELER, WEDEMEYER info NIMITZ.

WARX 50693.
MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR, WHEELER AND WEDEMEYER info NIMITZ.

U.S. Chief's have informed British regarding matters give in WARX 49578 in substance as follows:
A. Accept in principle participation of British Ground Forces in occupation of JAPAN, details as to size and composition being matters for later determination.
B. Presume British will shortly furnish views concerning forces for KOREA.
C. Consider previous agreements on the employment of British Ground and Air forces in the Pacific superseded and request information concerning disposition of tiger force elements already in the Pacific.
D. Point out the following in connection with British proposal regarding operations outside of their agreed area of responsibility:
   Pacific theater less areas agreed to pass to British on day of Japanese surrender (WARX 49042) is an area of U.S. responsibility and U.S. will continue with operations in that area connected with Japanese surrender;
   Generalissimo is the Supreme Commander in CHINA;
   Governmental agreement provides for Mountbatten to be responsible for surrender matters in SEAC and parts of MALAYSIA and U.S. commander for the Pacific Theater;
   Chinese agreement to surrender arrangements obtained on the basis that surrender of Japs in CHINA (excluding those opposing the Russians) would be a matter for the Generalissimo;

- continued -
U.S. Chiefs have already issued instructions that U.S. forces entering the CHINA THEATER will be with the approval and cognizance of the Generalissimo and subject to control of Wedemeyer who (as his chief of staff) is responsible to the Generalissimo.

E. Matter of priorities within British Area of responsibility is British concern so suggest that any resources that the British have available beyond those required in their own area of responsibility be defined with a view to their use in assisting in the U.S. area of responsibility.

F. U.S. has placed the opening of a CHINA PORT (in collaboration with and to assist Chinese) in a priority below the securing of JAPAN and a port in KOREA. If British are able to make forces quickly available to enter a CHINA PORT, they should be considered for the main effort.

G. Summarizing, U.S. government considers any matters concerning British Forces entering CHINA THEATER should be arranged between British and Chinese Governments. After completion of such governmental arrangements, coordination involving MacArthur, Wedemeyer and Nimitz can go forward. If such governmental arrangements are completed, U.S. stands ready to integrate British proposals (agreed by the Generalissimo) with other Pacific operations. This ends U.S. reply.

Para. The above is furnished for your information.

Capt Carroll B. Jones, Naval aviation member advance party to TOKYO was informed by GHQ today that he would not be allowed to inspect and obtain first hand information on airfield and facilities YOKOSUKA. Party will be kept together vicinity ATSUGI to prevent possible incident. All available information field and facilities YOKOSUKA is to be supplied to advance party by Japanese.

It is my present concept that as soon as troops occupy JAPAN in strength (in about 1 month to 6 weeks) it will be possible to greatly reduce fleet strength in the western Pacific. At that time I propose to have Spruance take over all forces in Japanese waters and return approximately 2/3rds of the present fast carrier task force to the eastern Pacific. At the same time Fletcher can return to the north Pac or take leave and Halsey can be returned for leave. All fast battleships can be returned except NEW JERSEY and possibly 1 other. It will probably be necessary to retain many of the cruisers and destroyers. Some of the old battleships can return at the same time.

Para. The foregoing is admittedly general in nature and will be made more specific as the situation clarifies. It is furnished now in response to your 141418.
US ARMY LIASON SECTION KANDY CEYLON TST 236 to WAR DEPARTMENT COMMANDER IN CHIEF ARMY FORCES PACIFIC ADMINISTRATION MANILA, PHILIPPINES COMINCH-passes to CINCPAC.

To Marshall personal info MacArthur and Wedemeyer both personal from Wheeler TST 236. Here a paraphrase of top secret emergency operation signal sent by the Commander in Chief British Pacific Fleet to the Commander in Chief East Indies Fleet info Admiralty and SACSEA on the 16th of August. Begins.

1. Dispositions have been made for the occupation of HONGKONG as follows:
   A. Under Rear Admiral Harcourt in INDOMITABLE with venerable SWIFTSURE 3 DD's and PRINCE ROBERT task force III.2 sailed from SYDNEY completed insofar as possible with rehabilitation personnel and supplies on the 15th of August for MANUS and LEYTE. This force could arrive off HONGKONG the 26th of August.
   B. Proceeding with the Australian Government are negotiations for SHROPSHIRE (Commodore Collins) HOBART and 2 DD's to depart from SUBIC with the date of arrival at HONGKONG 2 days after leaving SUBIC. Run mine sweepers are sailing from MOROTAI probably 20 August. Submarines and MAIDSTONE and OXFORDSHIRE which are now at SUBIC would also join with this force.

2. Task Group III.3 under rear Admiral Servaes in BERMUDA with COLOSSUS and 3 DD's left SYDNEY 15 August headed for MANUS and LEYTE and subsequently for duty elsewhere along the CHINA COAST as required.
3. Task Groups III.2 and III.3 are augmented respectively by EURYALUS and ARGONAUT and 1 DD each at MANUS.

Para. For your information, the President today sent to Generalissimo Stalin the following message: "Replying to your message of August 16, I agree to your request to modify General Order Number 1 to include all the KURILE ISLANDS in the area to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. However, I should like it to be understood that the United States government desires air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some 1 of the KURILE ISLANDS, preferably in the Central Group, for military purposes and for commercial use. I should be glad if you would advise me that you will agree to such an arrangement, the location and other details to be worked out for this purpose.

Para. Regarding your suggestion as to the surrender of Japanese forces on the island HOKKAIDO to Soviet forces, it is my intention and arrangements have been made for the surrender of Japanese Forces on all the islands of JAPAN PROPER, HOKKAIDO, HONSHU, SHIKOKU, and KYUSHU to General MacArthur.

- continued -
Para. General Macarthur will employ allied token forces, which, of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation of JAPAN PROPER as he considers it necessary to occupy in order to accomplish our allied surrender terms.

Para. The foregoing is for your information and guidance and you should amend General Order Number 1 to include all the KURILE ISLANDS in the area to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East.

23 1945
MARSHALL to COMGENCHINA info CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA ADVANCE HQ.

WARX 53670.

Generalissimo has informed the President in substance as follows: "British have been notified that I agree to delegate authority to a British Commander to accept the surrender of HONGKONG and I will also designate a Chinese and an American Officer to participate therein. British have been asked to effect necessary military coordination on operational matters with Wedemeyer and the Chinese board of military operations." End of message from Generalissimo.

Para. You will shortly receive a JCS directive on this.

24 0148
CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM7THFLT

TOP SECRET. NIMITZ to KINKAID EYES ONLY. CruDiv 16 with screen has been assigned to you and action is being taken to send you a fast carrier division. The importance of the projected operations in the YELLOW SEA KOREA and north CHINA accordance my 210818 indicate the desirability of your shifting your flag into a CB or CA at early date and exercising tactical command of the North CHINA Naval Force leaving your rear echelon to follow in AGC. Request your views and estimate of timing.

24 1053
CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info COMINCH, WARCOS

TOP SECRET. CX 36334 Prime Minister of Australia by urgent dispatch expresses the desire of his government to have Task Force 74.1 consisting of 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers proceed TOKYO BAY to arrive there before surrender August 31st stating that in view of the part played through the Pacific war by Australian forces in association with United States forces the government would be grateful if we would provide necessary facilities, including logistic support to enable this to be done. The force is now at SUBIC and it is stated would have to sail before AM 25 August and fuel at OKINAWA. The Prime Minister also stated that the government wished and Australian force to operate under an Australian commander subject only to SCAP. With your concurrence as to logistic support I propose to reply giving approval but stating that in order to avoid confusion it is deemed essential that the Commander Australian Squadron report to Com 3rd Fleet upon arrival. Your urgent comment requested.
HALSEY to MACARTHUR info NIMITZ. Request statement of your policy concerning my initiating on and after thirty first assistance and evacuation to POWs located in any waterfront POW camps in TOKYO BAY area.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, WARCOS, COM3RD,FLEET, CTF 95, COM5TH,FLEET

TOP SECRET. Your 241053 concur. Will provide fuel OKINAWA and TOKYO.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ Info WEDEMEYER.

WARX 54514.

Warx 47945 directed the occupation of KEIJO in KOREA as a 2nd choice upon resources available to the Pacific Commanders. Warx 49004 directed that, in accordance with the Presidents desires, arrangements would be made to occupy a port in KOREA. Warx 49334 requested analysis of your capabilities of securing JAPAN and also occupying a port in KOREA. Warx 50181 directed MacArthur and Nimitz, after consultation with Wedemeyer, to furnish the best estimate of a time schedule for the occupation of a port in KOREA including an alternate port in case the Russians had occupied KEIJO.

Para. While Stalin has agreed in a message to the President to receiving the surrender of Jap forces as provided in General Order No. 1, there is no certain assurance that the Soviets will not continue their occupation movements southward in KOREA until such time as they meet U.S. forces. There are unconfirmed reports that the Soviets are planning movements south of the 30°08'' degree line.

Para. Request earliest possible reply to directive contained in Warx 50181 insofar as KOREA is concerned.

Halsey to MacArthur info Nimitz. Request statement of your policy concerning my initiating on and after 26 August assistance and evacuation to POWs located in any waterfront POW camps in TOKYO BAY AREA.

Nimitz to King only. The value of the combatant ships of the Japanese Navy is extremely little insofar as the major powers are concerned. Their nuisance value in the hands of the Chinese or certain other nations might be very great. The process of division can be very vexatious and complicated. Accordingly recommend that high level decision be made to make Japanese fighting ships available in JAPAN for technical inspection and then destroy them.
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

25 0803 CINCPAC ADV to COMSOPAC, COMMARGILS info CINCPOA PEARL HQ, COMINCH.

Nimitz to Hendren and Harrill info King. The resident commissioner TARAWA has asked COMMARGILS concerning plans for reoccupation OCEAN and NAURU. Due to the more urgent requirements elsewhere these islands have a relatively low priority insofar as the use of U. S. Forces is concerned.

Para. Requests from British Commonwealth sources for information concerning plans to occupy ocean and NAURU should be countered by suggestion that those interested submit to COMSOPAC plans and proposals for accomplishment of occupation using British resources.

25 1010 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADV info SUPREME COMDE FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.

SCAP 250608 just received. Still recommend approval my 250935.

25 0813 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Kinkaid to Nimitz only. Eyes Only. Your 240148. My intention has been to command projected 7th Flt operations in KOREA and north CHINA with my flag in ROCKY MOUNT. Date RFS ROCKY MOUNT has been advanced to 1 September which will permit me to embark with staff in time to join Amphibious Group departing OKINAWA for objective area. Believe command function can be exercised more effectively from AGC than from BB because of better communications and presence of entire staff. Present Plan. Minesweeper Group start sweeping channel through line 7 minefield on E minus 7 and start sweeping in objective area on E Minus 3. Covering Group for minesweeping operations composed of 2 CVE'S now assigned 7th Fleet plus CruDiv 6 and Destroyer screen. Fast Carrier Division upon reporting will be directed replenish then relieve CVE'S which will return to base to prepare for next operation. CruDiv 16 join and proceed to objective area with Amphibious Group.

25 1138 CINCPAC ADVANCE to SCAP.

As a matter of urgency strongly recommend your approval Com3rdFleet 250935. In order to expedite request your reply be to Com3rdFleet info CINCPOA. Your 250608 applies.

25 1458 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COM5THFLT.

From King to Nimitz and Spruance. AP press releases here report interview with Spruance in which he questions the political wisdom of American retention of OKINAWA. It is probable that the United States will desire to continue the occupation and use of OKINAWA. In such event it is essential that the American position should not be handicapped or embarrassed by ill-advised expressions of opinion on such matters by high commanders in the field. Desire that you issue appropriate instructions in regard to foregoing.

AUGUST (GCT)
26 0822  CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING ONLY.

Unless you see reasons to the contrary I plan to consolidate my
my headquarters at Pearl as soon as the occupation of JAPAN is well in
hand and to turn the command facilities at GUAM over to Commander
Marianas to use and to maintain in readiness for such future use by
CINCPAC as may be required. The processes of demobilization and
rollup can be handled much better at Pearl in close touch with the
type commanders and with a United Staff.

26 0829  CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM3RDFLT.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY.

I will shift my flag from South Dakota to Missouri about 0900
on the day of the surrender ceremony and will shift it back to South
Dakota when I return to that ship after the ceremony. To comply with
instructions from higher authority it will be necessary that you
transfer your flag to South Dakota after I return to Guam and then
and then send Missouri to GUAM for my further use as Fleet Flagship.

26 0128  CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMGENCHINA.

NIMITZ TO WEDMEYER ONLY.

Your 250823. Marine Air Units are integral components of the
Fleet Marine Force. Each Marine Amphibious Corps on the field has
attached to it a Marine Aircraft Wing. It is not desired to operate
Marine Amphibious Corps without such support. For operations in CHINA
my Joint Staff Study contemplates a Marine Aircraft Wing to reduced
strength. Your concurrence requested.

26 0147  CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM7THFLT info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KINNAID INFO KING.

Your 250813 does not indicate satisfactory compliance my 240118 in
that is appears to contemplate delaying use of the naval forces avail-
able to you until minesweeping starts and then to orient them entirely
with respect to the movement of troops.

Para. I do not consider that there is any air threat which requires
use of Fast Carriers to cover minesweeping operations. There is ample
access to YELLOW SEA west of Mine Line 7.

Para. My purpose in assigning to the 7th Fleet a Fast Carrier Divi-
sion, a Heavy Cruiser Division, the GUAM and ALASKA and their escorts
is to establish in the YELLOW SEA immediately an impressive naval force
which well in advance of the arrival of troops can occupy and control
those waters and can by a timely show of naval force influence the
general situation in north CHINA and the special situation now develop-
ing as indicated by JCS 242317. See SubPara A of 3rd Para my 210618.

Para. Expedite compliance my 240118 using Cruisers initially and
augmenting with Fast Carriers when they arrive. Acknowledge.
SCAP to WARCOS FOR JCS info COMGEN CHINA, CINCPAC ADVANCE, COM7THFLT, COM7THPHIB, COMGEN 24TH CORPS.

CX 36853.

Reference WX 54514, also CINCPAC 250801 not to all or needed. The present plan is for the 7th Division to occupy KEIJO on 11 September. Conferences this day indicate that the initial movement of lightly armed troops, IE, APA and AKA, can take place leaving OKINAWA on the 4th arriving KEIJO on the 7th. This movement will be followed with heavier equipment as rapidly as possible. This plan is being approved and instructions are being issued to COM GEN 24TH CORPS and others to execute generally as indicated.

COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMINCH.

EYES ONLY. KINKAID TO NIMITZ INFO KING.

Your 260147. Regret misunderstanding. Com7thFleet will shift flag into MINNEAPOLIS 27 August and depart Manila with CRUDIV 6 on 28 August to be joined by CRUDIV 16 off OKINAWA for operations SHANTUNG CHINWANGTAO AREA accordance SubPara A of 3rd Para your 210818. Unless otherwise directed will turn over to Philippine Sea Frontier duties outlined my 180140 as of 28 August.

WARCOS to CINCAF PAC - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

WAR 55315.

State Department gives information that Russian foreign office have asked whether General Order Number 1 has been amended to include KURILES in area to be surrendered to the USSR. Secretary of State is replying confirming that General Order Number 1 has been so amended.

Para. The foregoing is for your information.

COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ. The introduction of Japanese PubInfos into the picture involves some security consideration which appear unacceptable from a military standpoint and unfair to Allied correspondents from the standpoint of censorship. From both standpoints I look with the utmost disfavor on enemy personnel being accorded the privilege of visiting American men of War or naval installations and urge that U.S. Navy stand on its security rights in resisting any such concessions nor or later.
NIMITZ TO KING

Your 251540. Propose to send approximately following to Atlantic Coast ports under command Vice Adm. F. C. Sherman arriving Canal Zone about 10 October. MISSOURI (BB 63), NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55), WASHINGTON (BB 56), NEW MEXICO (BB 40), MISSISSIPPI (BB 41), IDAHO (BB 42), NEW YORK (BB 34), RANDOLPH (CV 15), WASP (CV 18), ENTERPRISE (CV 6), RANGER (CV 4), MONTEREY (CVL 26), BATAAN (CVL 29), LANGLEY (CVL 27), BOISE (CL 47), RICHMOND (CL 9), CONCORD (CL 10), DESRON 25 and DESRON 23 less BRAINE (DD 630). All except MISSOURI allocated to LantFlt by your 251555 and would be transferred to CinClant for duty upon arrival Atlantic. Missouri would return to Pacific upon completion visit.

Para. Propose approximately following to Pacific Coast Ports under command Admiral Halsey arriving by Navy Day. SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57), WISCONSIN (BB 64), INDIANA (BB 58), ALABAMA (BB 60), IOWA (BB 61), WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48), COLORADO (BB 45), MARYLAND (BB 46), ARKANSAS (BB 33), TEXAS (BB 35), TICONDEROGA (CV 14), HORNET (CV 12), SARATOGA (CV 4), BUNKER HILL (CV 17), BALTIMORE (CA 68), PITTSBURGH (CA 72), AMSTERDAM (CL 101), VICKSBURG (CL 86), TUCSON (CL 98), DESRON 61.

31 0404 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC AFLOAT - CINCPAC AFLOAT PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

Subject: Proposed operations in 3rd Fleet area of control. I propose the following.

A. On receipt of adequate information from Japanese initiate Navy operations to temporarily seize all minor Japanese bases for the sole purpose of taking possession of midget submarines, suicide craft, human torpedoes, and other naval installations and equipment. In each case appropriate arrangements to be made with Army. Unless a general covering directive is received from you I will in each case report what installations and vessels are located and will request instructions as to moving same to YOKOSUKA, SINKING, or destroying.

B. Will make general survey of 3rd Fleet area of responsibility and will then make recommendation as to the establishment of inspection or visiting patrols or permanent guard for (10 groups missing - being serviced)

CUFF will make specific recommendation concerning base development necessary for the support of the eastern control forces.

31 0402 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC AFLOAT - CINCPAC AFLOAT PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

Subject: Estimate and intentions based on current information and pertinent instructions from CINCPAC AFLOAT. I plan to institute the following measures.

A. Immediately return officers and men in the fleet landing force who are attached to ships departing for overhaul on 3 September.

B. Order into SAGAMI anchorage all ships due to depart from the western Pacific under Vice Admiral Shermans command to pick up their landing force personnel and clear up fag ends.
C. Place remaining 3rd Fleet Fast Carrier forces under command of Vice Admiral Towers.

D. Establish system of rotation for 3rd Fleet carrier task forces operating in EMPIRE waters. Forces not relieved at sea to anchor in SAGAMI and TOKYO AREA. Separately after completion of fly fly operation will make recommendations as to strength of carrier forces required at sea to cope with Japanese situation.

E. Upon receipt of your action on these recommendations will make reestimate of fuel and logistic support requirements with view to earliest release of surplus.

F. Will at later date separately submit further estimates based on contemplated withdrawal of additional forces to west coast.

31 1743 JCS to NIMITZ, MACARTHUR

WARX 57808.

In view of the Division of responsibility established in the RYUKYUS by JCS 181409, JCS 100345 (Dec 44) should be interpreted as requiring that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific assume responsibility for the supervision and utilization of shipping to Army controlled ports of the RYUKYUS.

29 2316 CINCPAC AFLOAT to COMINCH info CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

NIMITZ TO KING.

Para 1. Your 282050. The following comments on CINCPACS C 10526 of 28 August are based on my understanding that the RYUKYUS are located in the Pacific Ocean Areas and that certain positions therein were transferred to CINCPAC (NOT CINCSWA) as stated in Victory 73 "To facilitate preparation for and execution of OLYMPIC".

Para 2. The realities of the situation are that as in the Marianas, Marshalls and elsewhere the surrender of Japanese held islands is best accomplished by the use of naval vessels and landing forces of minimum size. The Japanese forces if repatriated must be transported in ships. Islands which we do not need as bases do not need to be occupied by our troops in strength.

Para. If the enemy held positions in the RYUKYUS are to be transferred to CINCPAC as soon as they surrender to CINCPAC it will be advantageous to have them surrender direct to CINCPAC. If the RYUKYUS are to revert to the control of CINCPAC-CINCPAC it will be better to have them surrender to CINCPAC.

Para. It is feasible for CINCPAC to accept the surrender of the remaining islands in the RYUKYUS.

29 1755 JCS to NIMITZ, WEDEMEYER, MACARTHUR.

WARX 56636.

As a basis for interim operations and for future planning the JCS approv e the concept of operations on the CHINA COAST as outlined in CINCPACS 210818 of August with exception of last para which should read:

Para. "F. Prepare for occupation of TIENTSIN-TAKU and/or CHINGWANGTAO
and TSINGTAO or, alternatively if CENTRAL CHINA situation requires when forces are ready, occupation of SHANGHAI AREA.

Para. Command arrangements for these operations will be as prescribed in WARX 47945, 11 August 1945.

28 1830 CINCPAC to SCAP info COM3RDFLT, COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, COMGEN 8TH ARMY.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO HALSEY.

Com3rdFleet 281101. In view circumstances outlined in reference urge that you immediately authorize Halsey to take immediate action to contact POW and to take such steps as necessary for alleviating their condition and moving them into American Jurisdiction. In order that the intolerable conditions outlined in reference may be corrected in minimum time and to provide for possible failure or delay in communications Com3rdFleet is hereby authorized, if no reply is received from you by 1300 TOKYO TIME today, to initiate such local action as to POW as humanitarian considerations require.

28 1101 COM3RDFLT to SCAP info CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO MACARTHUR INFO NIMITZ.

Swiss representative of international Red Cross now with CTF 31 anchored off YOKOSUKA reports many prisoners of war sick, 150 seriously ill in SHINEGAWA CAMPS hospital. All camps desperately in need of food. 200 aviation personnel in bad state at OMORI camp on the waterfront. The urgency of the situation is confirmed by extensive photographic coverage of POW CAMPS with prisoners waving to planes and signs "Food " on ground, by information from Japanese Emissaries that there are 6,125 allied prisoners of war in the TOKYO AREA of which 417 are bedridden, and by information obtained from British Marine prisoners who escaped from KAMAOKKI CAMP and where picked up by picket boat near SAGAMI WAN ANCHORAGE. All of the facilities under my command are available to you and to the Commanding General of the 8th Army for the immediate extension of urgent care, assistance and evacuation of the allied prisoners of war in eastern HONSHU. I suggest that liaison officers of the 8th Army be sent to me at YOKOSUKA in order that I may initiate and expedite this task in accordance with your policies.

Para. I have immediately available in TOKYO AREA 3 hospital ships 2 APDS, 30 doctors, 90 corpsmen, and clothing and food for 3000 men. I will have available on the afternoon of 1st September in addition to above 2 LSVS 2 APAS, 20 additional doctors and 60 corpsmen, food and clothing for 4000 men. I have a tactical organization ready with all available information and prepared to act.

Para. I propose for most expeditious action. A. To send medical assistance and food with Red Cross and Japanese Liaison to TOKYO BAY waterfront camps promptly reporting to COMGEN 8TH ARMY and to you on conditions found. B. To receive released POWS on board hospital ships and APAS in TOKYO BAY for evacuation to points COMGEN 8TH ARMY directs. C. Send on 3 September with 8th Army liaison party 1 LSv, 1 APA with appropriate escorts and minesweepers to an east coast port in the SENDAI AREA to contact camps in that area extend medical assistance and evacuate to points COMGEN 8TH ARMY directs. D. To establish transient hospital clothing and supply station for POW at YOKOSUKA for use as required.
Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: 00

FROM: 03

DATE:

SUBJECT: This is a copy of the stenographic record of my contemporaneous talk at Leavenworth.

09-00

06-03 - Excellent. Please send me a copy, Bill.
Lecture

THE NAVY IN WORLD WAR II.

Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept.


In the period between the two World Wars we gave very little consideration to the problems of combined or joint operations. Each service went about its own business as if decisive battles of future wars were to be fought independently by air, ground or naval forces. Consequently, when we entered World War II most of our officers were sadly lacking in a knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of their sister services. Jealousies between the services, shortages of funds, lack of facilities, equipment and personnel had retarded training and a development of technique for welding air, ground and naval units into a smooth working, efficient team operating under a single command. During the progress of World War II we learned this team work, but we learned it the hard way, after the fighting started. In order to keep alive this "know how" and to employ our techniques and to disseminate this knowledge to as many officers as possible considerable time has been allowed to this course to the study of air and naval operations, by these two forces acting alone and in coordination with the ground forces. To assist us in putting over this instruction the Chief of Naval Operations has very kindly designated several of his most distinguished and outstanding officers to address the class during the academic year. We are honored today in having as our first Navy guest speaker, Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, who will talk on the Navy in World War II. There is no officer better qualified to address the class on this subject. Shortly before World War II and shortly thereafter he played a very prominent part in the preparation of war plans for the operation of our naval units on all seas of the globe. After that assignment he was detailed as Commander of the aircraft WASP, and followed it in all its engagements until it was sunk by enemy action in 1942. In accord with long standing Navy tradition Admiral Sherman was the last person to leave.
the VASP before it sank, and swam for an hour and a half in the ocean, covered with oil, until he was picked up by a rescue party. After he left the VASP he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet and of the Pacific Ocean areas. In that capacity he participated and planned many of the operations that took place in this very extensive area.

It is a great pleasure for me this morning to introduce an old friend and a distinguished sailor and aviator, Admiral Sherman.

Thank you.

Vice Admiral Sherman Speaking --

It is a very great privilege for me to be out here to visit this school. It is my first visit to Leavenworth and it is my understanding that the visits by Naval officers out here have not been as many as they should have been in the past. We intend to take advantage of every opportunity to increase the interchange of officers between our service schools.

During the past year we have worked out a new organization of the National Military establishment and by legislative fiat have created a framework. That framework can be no better than the people in it, and we all look to the educational process to produce the people who will be aware, not only of their own problems, but of the problems of the other services, to make the whole organization work and work well. And it is in these principal service schools that in peace time a great deal of the progress will have to be made.

I was asked to talk this morning about the strategic and tactical concepts of the Navy in World War II. The time available will not permit me to give you a consecutive account of the war in the Pacific and I do not think it necessary to inflict it on you. This diagram (a Pacific wall board) will however, be of use in picking out examples of some of the major points that I would like to make.

Looking back to the prewar years we were all brought up to understand that the purposes of naval forces were really three. First, in peacetime to implement National policy and to further diplomatic action. In war to make sure that we have the use of the seas and that our opponents do not have the use of the seas, whether for military operations or for the move-
mont of commerce. The third great purpose of naval forces has always been to hinder or to support military operations on shore. Under that concept battle at sea by the naval forces is only a means to an end, and I think it is very important to bear that in mind not only in trying to interpret what has gone on in the past but in interpreting and solving our problems for the future. We shouldn't let our concepts of naval warfare revolve too much around an enemy battle fleet and disposing of that enemy battle fleet as an end in itself. For example, after we landed in the Marianas, in the summer of 1944, the Japanese fleet came out and attempted to fly aircraft into Guam, a southern island, in order to strike our forces and our transports that were off Saipan. Admiral Spruance who was in overall command of that operation was then faced with two alternatives. One was to go after the Japanese fleet, manuever and engage, the other was to be a little more conservative and to give primary consideration to the security of the transports and shipping at the objective area. He made his decision; he operated in such a way as to achieve his primary purpose which was to insure the landing of those troops and the capture of the Marianas. He also succeeded in destroying practically every Japanese airplane that flew. The results obtained in sinking enemy shipping were not as great as they could have been if he had gone full speed after the enemy. But, on the other hand, the way he operated kept the other Japanese forces coming in from another direction from getting in on his transports. I gave you that as an example of the correct interpretation of the purpose of that naval force.

Back in the period between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the beginning of World War I, there developed a concept of naval strategy exemplified in the writings of Mahan, which placed great emphasis on the concentration of naval forces at the key points. The navies' naval forces actuated in part by the results of the naval concept which was general among naval officers and others concerned with the problems. The Germans appraised their naval problem as one which required tremendous concentration. They knew that they could not be strong everywhere, therefore they attempted to be strong in the North Sea. That in turn imposed on Britain the necessity for reducing the British Naval deployment around the world in order to in-
crease it in home waters and to form what became the Grand Fleet. So there resulted two opposing concentrations with minimum deployment away from the vital North Sea area and the record of World War I from a naval point of view is distinctive because of that great concentration of two very strong fleets opposing each other across a narrow sea and sparring for opportunities to win a decisive action.

During the period between World War I and World War II all of our thinking in our navy and to a degree in the navies of other countries was influenced by that concept of having the strongest possible battle fleet. It resulted in our own training in the Navy being pointed toward fleet action, our preparations being pointed toward fleet action. For many years we had practically our whole fleet concentrated on the coast of southern California, which in terms of the distance from the western Pacific to the eastern Atlantic was strategically a mid-point. That strategic concept of concentration of forces and training to bring about a great fleet action in the event of war after which you would gain control of the seas and all other things would be simple, extended even to the preparation of the forces for the minor aspects of war.

In 1939 we did not have an amphibious force. We had not prepared and we had not trained for moving troops overseas and landing them against opposition. Our anti-submarine forces were not as good as they should be, our reconnaissance forces were not adequate. We were prepared to fight a great fleet battle but we were not prepared for the day-in and day-out dirty work of naval warfare.

When the war began we were still operating under the battle fleet concept. We had nearly the whole effective fleet in the Pacific concentrated. The results of that you know. We had too many ships packed in one port and we lost a great many of them for the time being. That reverse (Pearl Harbor) had one very useful effect in that it freed the carriers and the task forces that were left to follow out a newer and better concept of fleet operations which was of the fast task forces operating separately.

The first phase of the war in the Pacific for the Navy was one of
establishing and maintaining a line of communications. After the withdrawal out of the Philippines into the Dutch East Indies, the loss of the Dutch East Indies, it was decided to hold Australia as a base for further operations. And to a predominately naval command, with headquarters at Pearl Harbor, was given the task of maintaining the lines of communication from Pearl Harbor to Australia. We had Pearl, we had Midway in our possession, we had Johnston Island, which is about here, we had the island of Canton, we had the Samoa Islands which are down here. We moved into Fiji. An Army task force at the beginning of the war was dispatched and occupied New Caledonia and from then on our early naval operations were continued to hold that line. The Japanese, after their initial success, had their holdings down to the coast of New Guinea and they, in effect, had control of the Pacific out to this red broken line. In the spring, May of 1942, it developed that the Japanese were going to try to extend their holdings down to the Solomon Islands and also to invade Australia. So we were forced then into defensive naval action in which we used the carriers and light forces available to stem that advance. After one or two minor strikes by the carriers it eventuated in the battle of the Coral Sea in which both sides suffered losses. The Japanese lost the Shoho, we lost the Lexington, but we, in effect, held the line there. Then, as you all know, we moved into the Solomons and there we engaged in a war of attrition for nearly a year.

Going back to prewar strategic concepts. We had always visualized amphibious operations as being conducted by the movement of troop convoys with the necessary transports and assault shipping. We visualized as being separate from any such movement what we called a naval covering force. In World War I the grand fleet in the North Sea acted as a covering force for the first movement of the British Expeditionary force across the channel. In our own Spanish War the Atlantic acted as a covering force to cover the movement of our troops from the United States to Cuba. The old concept of a covering force was that it interposed between the troop movement and the enemy fleet. Then when we went into the Solomons we did not do that. We were short of forces and we used our carrier task force in the immediate support
of troop movement. We concentrated first in the Fiji islands where we held a rehearsal than we moved up to Guadalcanal all in one compact body. There were no preliminary attacks; the assault came in at daylight, preceded only by an hour or two, by our air attacks, and it was all one compact force. That was not the best way; we learned that the older concept of a separate movement was better and in all subsequent operations in the Pacific war we always used a naval covering force or a naval striking force which was separate from the amphibious movement. That concept is so important that I would like to develop the use of the covering force and the factors that control the timing of its use. The first operation over long distance at sea was the assault on the Gilberts when with our air deployed in those 6000 (in the Gilbert Islands) three support we went in and took Tarawa and Makin. Well, our problem was to move ships all the way down from Pearl Harbor to the objective and one of the strategic problems in a long overseas movement was the fact that we had the tractor groups, the amphibian tank and the amphibian tractor, which had to be the first units to land. They had to be embarked in LST's, which were all slow speed, and in a movement over a great distance that presented a difficult strategic problem because those units had to sail and be at sea long before the 15 knot transport group with the great majority of the troops. The significance of that is that the timing of the first strike by our carrier task force had to be early enough to give cover and protection to the movement of that slow tractor group so that the latest time at which we could begin the air attack on an objective was the time when our tractor groups, which were relatively defenseless, would come within striking distance of the enemy air ashore. That point is not well understood and it has lead to some conjecture as to the type of preliminary operations that we conducted. So that one of the prime considerations in the use of our carrier task force to cover an amphibious operation was that it had to strike early.

The next consideration was that instead of merely deploying in readiness for action wherever we landed in the Pacific, with this well developed network of Japanese air bases, we always had to use our carrier task force for two purposes. One was to beat down the enemy air which was within
striking distance of our amphibious assault and the other was to give direct support to the amphibious assault.

Our first prime objective in our central Pacific campaign was to get into the Marshalls. However, if we had gone into the Marshalls as an initial operation we would have had enemy air bases here on this flank, we would have had the air bases at Eniwetok and Moleolap on that flank and this whole mass of bases in the central Pacific. So we landed here as a first operation to take these out. Then for the Marshalls assault we used our carrier aircraft to smother Eniwetok, which was the only base within reach of the objective area. Our actual landing was at Kwajalein so that our carriers had the strategic task of denying any enemy air operations from Eniwetok, Wotje, Moleolap and Jaluit all of which were in enemy hands.

In planning that operation then we had to have our carrier task force arrive and begin its engagements at about the time that our low speed tractor group was in this position on its way down to Kwajalein. Actually we did that by moving the carriers all the way around and coming in from this direction in order to develop a certain degree of surprise. Having gotten on station then, about four days or five days ahead of the assault, they had to operate continuously from that time until the assault took place. Then there developed the other requirement of close air support for the troops that were landing which meant that these same aircraft operating from the same carriers which were moving out at sea at high speed had then to be passed to the control of the amphibious commander and later to the control of the troop commander after he was ashore. So, starting in that operation and going on through the war in the Pacific we developed the tactical requirement that the same mass of aircraft would have to first be the striking power of the covering force, then the same aircraft would have to shift to direct support of an amphibious landing and eventually be under the control of the commander of troops on shore. That took a good deal of doing. We went through a great many growing pains. But it was a well worked out and functioning system at the end of the war.

After we took an air base there then developed another requirement for the carrier task force, which was to continue to give air cover and air
support to the position ashore until fields could be activated and our own shore based air flown in. In the Solomons action we made the mistake of pulling out too soon. We withdrew the carriers on the morning of the third day. Incidentally, the amphibious commander and the troop commander had said they only wanted them for one day. We stayed an extra day and pulled out on the third day and it turned out not to be long enough. But at that stage of the war we didn't have fueling systems worked out, we didn't have the replacement aircraft, or the spare pilots to keep going. But toward the end of the war we found that we had to be prepared to keep the carriers on station until our shore based air had been moved in and was functioning. So these are the major requirements in the duration of the sustained carrier operation. It had to begin early enough to give security to the approaching amphibious force, it had to continue long enough to cover the establishment on shore until shore based air could take over and during the course of this period it had to be sufficiently flexible so that it could be shifted from a plane strike mission in strategic support of the operation over to a close support, detailed pinpoint troop support operation.

Another consideration which governed our operations of carriers throughout the war was that each one of these preliminary covering strikes had to be placed properly in the light of the next operation ahead. For instance, after we were established on shore in the Marshalls, Admiral Spruance took the carrier task force battle ships and cruisers out west and made the first strike on Truk. This was a form of strategic support which took the pressure off this area completely. As soon as he got back in from Truk we took Eniwetok and then in order to get photographs and information on the Marianas, about which we had known nothing since the beginning of the war, we turned them around and sent them up to strike the Marianas, which again was protecting this area because it hit the Japanese right in the pipe-line through which they would have to reinforce this area, and at the same time got us the information we needed with which to make a decision on the next operation. Until we got the results of those two attacks in support of the Marshalls operations we lacked the photographs and the data on which to decide as between Truk and the Marianas.
The next operation of the covering force was in connection with the movement up to Hollandia. During the campaign in the Solomons and on up to the spring of 1944 the southwest Pacific forces had had to move up the coast of New Guinea in jumps which were governed primarily by the effective radius of their own fighters in order that they would have their land based air to cover and support their landings. With the rapid augmentation of the fleet by the delivery of new ships we had gotten to a point where we could sustain the operations of the fleet more rapidly than we could assemble and mount amphibious operations. Furthermore, the timing of any move in the central Pacific had to be so adjusted that before we moved from Tarawa up to Kwajalein, for instance, or from Kwajalein to the Marianas, we would have to develop those air bases, get them functioning, and get the land based air to the point where it was effective. So, in order to keep the fleet busy we then shifted it over to covering and supporting the landing at Hollandia. The form of that support which was arranged by a conference down in Brisbane was for the carriers to move all the way out to Palau and deliver a strike there. The reason for the selection of that objective was first to cut off that avenue of supply of Japanese air to Hollandia. Second to get a very nice bag of Japanese cruisers and destroyers which we knew was in port, and third to again strike a place which would give indirect protection to the development of those bases back here.

That operation was successful and as an additional dividend on the way back to the base the carrier task force moved over and attacked Truk. It was always a prime consideration in our naval operations in the Pacific to strike the Japanese positions in the Mandates frequently enough to keep them from becoming safe bases for interfering with the operations along the New Guinea coast. During the early days in the Solomons we had not been able to do that and the result had been that all during the Solomon campaign we were regularly and consistently worked over by Japanese forces coming down from the Mandates, delivering attacks on the Guadalcanal position and then withdrawing.

The next major operation was the movement into the Marianas and that
was accomplished in the summer of 1944, primarily to give us a base area from which we could strike Japan proper. The results of that I need not go into but they were very decisive. Following the seizure of the Mariannas we worked on down into Palau. General MacArthur's movement into Morotai took place the same day under cover of heavy strikes on Mindanao, following which the carriers ranged north to develop information and also reduce Japanese strength in the Philippines as a whole. There again the principle was the same, strike the place from which interference might come and also get information and third keep up the pressure and continue to destroy enemy aircraft.

From then on the pattern, the use of that force, had been pretty usefully established: In general, always to reach out, conduct preliminary strikes, fall back, give direct support to the landing, then move out again. The times when we had failures, and we had them, were usually due to mistakes in preliminary planning, over-optimism on the part of the construction people and the shore air commanders as to the date by which they could be ready. Over-optimism in the Guadalcanal operation was responsible for some of our initial reverses. Over-optimism as to the time when the shore based air force could take over was responsible for, not bad results, but disorderly results in our initial landings in the Philippines where at one time the carriers were turned loose and then had to go back. Well, we should have planned to keep them there all the time but the over-optimism on the date by which the fields in Leyte would be operating was due to the fact that the aircraft photographs did not show the mud and bad terrain on which we were planning to build fields.

As the war progressed it became necessary to plan on getting into Luzon. That was a very interesting plan because the preliminary features, the support of the operation involved so many different headquarters. There were five theaters, or the equivalent, represented in the preliminary conference which took place in Hollandia in New Guinea one or two days after we landed in Leyte. The China theater was represented, the India-Burma Theater, the southwest Pacific, the central Pacific and the 20th Air Force, so we had five signatures on the coordination plan for that show. And the
supporting measures ranged all the way from B-29 attacks on Japan to strikes by the carriers along the South China coast, strikes against Formosa, strikes against Okinawa, the attacks from our own Army aircraft in the southern Philippines against Luzon, bombardments of Iwo Jima by ships based in the Marianas. These all had to take place and they were all part of the overall concept of using naval forces, long range air forces, to give the best possible strategic support to a difficult landing, and then shifting the mobile naval units to close support as rapidly as possible. That worked out very well and we then were ready for further and even more difficult objectives. The landings in Iwo Jima and Okinawa as far as the over all strategic concepts presented no new features. The Japanese fleet had been more or less destroyed but we still had this fundamental necessity for a fleet to support the landings, and to cover the landings, in its own offensive operations. Actually although we had no enemy fleet left that is where we took our greatest damage in the Pacific. As I recall it we had 323 ships I think it was, put out of action in that three months and at that period of the war the major feature which governed all of our operations, strategical and tactical, had gotten into one of simple arithmetic. We used to keep three curves, one was the numbers of Japanese aircraft considered to be operational, another was the daily volume of Kamikaze attacks. The other curve, to appropriate scale, was the availability of light escort vessels. As long as our curve of availability of ships stayed above the slope of the one of Japanese aircraft we felt that we would be successful.

These are really the salient features of the strategic concepts governing the use of our major naval forces. In our planning for the future we are giving primary emphasis to keeping in being the basic units that are needed to make war under the concept you can separate naval strategy from air strategy. You cannot separate either one of them from ground operations. We are keeping an amphibious force, we are keeping a carrier striking force, we are keeping an anti-submarine force for the protection of lines of communications. We are keeping a submarine force to cut enemy seas communications and we are keeping the cruisers, do-
strangers and gun fire ships that it takes to make them all go.

Looking ahead at the broader aspects of naval strategy and naval deployments we can see that as time goes on and up until the time when any possible opponent creates a concentrated battle fleet, that our naval operations will be distinguished by avoidance of concentration because our only requirement is to be able to oppose an enemy force with something stronger, and to the demand that we be able to deploy our forces so that we can meet our responsibilities and achieve success with a smaller total strength.

Another problem that we have had is to deploy our fleet and so adjust the use that we make of the personnel and funds that we have so as to carry on our training with greater emphasis on joint training. I would say that in our operations today about 50% of our training is associated with joint training or training of civilian components rather than merely training internally in a fleet of the type we maintained before the war.

These are the high points and I would be very glad to answer any questions that anyone wishes to ask. Before closing I want to again express my gratification for the privilege of appearing out here and my hope that this interchange of instructors, students and visitors between our service schools will increase in the future.