I did quote her completely enough (in my opinion), in my post at http://www.ibiblio.org/bgreek/forum/vie ... =10#p16195. If you read the paragraph that she wrote as I quoted there, and still consider it to be linguistics driving interpretation, then I cannot agree with you but let's not argue okay? In that same post I did give clear reasons why I can easily reject such reasoning that she used. Also, I do not claim that my claims about "ινα" is correct, but they are falsifiable. All you need is a statistically significant number of examples where an "ινα" clause unambiguously does not describe a purposed result. If you cannot produce these counter-examples, I will stick to my claims, because I have looked at hundreds of instances as well as all of Margaret's examples up to page 100. And if my claims hold for every instance, then it is justifiable for me to say that "ινα" has precisely the meaning I claim, which is distinct from hers.Jonathan Robie wrote:David, I find this really unhelpful. I've been around too many discussions where each person claims that their opinions are based on pure solid linguistic grounds and other people's opinions are based on theological assumptions, and Margaret's own work at least tries to let the language drive her interpretation and not the other way around. If you want to disagree with Margaret, I suggest that you quote her completely enough that it's clear what she says, then explain your own view, focusing on her arguments in detail.David Lim wrote:But I still think that it is quite clear that unlike me, Margaret claims too broad a meaning for "ινα" in her thesis in order to make certain interpretations possible. Specifically, on purely theological grounds she claims that statements of the form "X ινα πληρωθη Y" in the NT cannot mean that "X" was so in order that "Y" might be fulfilled. Her rejection of this is untenable based on the explicit statements by the writings themselves, as I brought up in that earlier thread. Furthermore, I do not accept basing linguistic claims on theological assumptions. But I know that personal convictions are personal, hence, I say, to each his or her own convictions.
And if I have made any theological assumptions, you should point them out, and I will retract them. It was not my intention to be antagonistic towards theological opinions, but merely to point out that I do not support linguistic claims based on them. We all have our own opinions, but it won't do to make claims about a language based on our personal theology. It is better to say "I don't know" rather than "Since it makes more sense for the writer to mean this and that, and therefore this grammatical construction must have this or that function.", because what one person thinks the writer cannot possibly mean could be exactly what another person thinks the writer must mean. To avoid that, the only way is a corpus-based approach.
It is a theological assumption. Either the writings were intended to describe future events or they were not. And either they are accurate or they are not. Once you choose one assumption from each pair, you have made theological assumptions. Furthermore, your statement that "Jesus and others were not following some script where they acted in specific ways to make sure these prophecies were fulfilled" is at variance with the writings themselves as I stated in my earlier post. You will probably have some explanation of the meaning of Matt 26:54-56, among other statements scattered throughout the writings, that nullifies my objection, but every explanation will have to be based on some theological assumptions.Jonathan Robie wrote:I don't think that's an accurate summary of what she said. Are you referring to 3.5 Introducing a quotation from the Old Testament?
I don't see this as a theological assumption.Margaret Sim wrote:A slightly different type of independent clause introduced by ἵνα, is that of the quotations in the gospel of John where ἵνα introduces either a quotation from the Psalms or a statement reported to have been made earlier by Jesus.
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In the case of quotations from the Psalms, the source text was not a prophecy, but a commentary on the psalmist’s situation or a cry to God for help. I claim that current events caused the observers to remember something that had been spoken of earlier. This seems to be a more logical way of viewing such an utterance, than seeing it as a claim of fulfilment. It is difficult to view an event as taking place solely to make something predicted earlier come true, while having no relevance during the lifetime of the original hearers of the prediction, particularly when the earlier writing was not in a prophetic book. Surely what we have here may be the author attributing to Jesus the realisation that in fact the event recalls words spoken earlier. The event does ‘fulfil’ the earlier words, but did not take place in order to fulfil it.
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Consider the following example from John 13:18:
Example (21)The words quoted come from Psalm 41:9, in which the psalmist bewails the behaviour of a close friend in turning against him. Jesus is presented as recalling that psalm and seeing a fulfilment in his own life with the betrayal of Judas, who even as Jesus spoke was eating with him. Indeed this context is of the fellowship meal with all reclining together as they ate and drank. It is a ‘fulfilment’ or an application of Psalm 41:9, but Judas did not act the way he did in order to fulfil it. John may also be presenting Jesus as indicating the appropriateness of fulfilment. Recall that previous examples of the use of ἵνα in this section have shown a representation of what someone believed should be done. This is not the same as indicating that Judas was impelled to act as he did in order to fulfil Psalm 41:9.οὐ περὶ πάντων ὑμῶν λέγω· ἐγὼ οἶδα τίνας ἐξελεξάμην· ἀλλ’ ἵνα ἡ γραφὴ πληρωθῇ· Ὁ τρώγων μου τὸν ἄρτον ἐπῆρεν ἐπ’ ἐμὲ τὴν πτέρναν αὐτοῦ.
In most of these quotes, the writers of the Psalms did not think of themselves as writing prophecies to be fulfilled later, and Jesus and others were not following some script where they acted in specific ways to make sure these prophecies were fulfilled. Judas was probably not thinking of Psalm 41:9 at the time that he betrayed Jesus, that's not why he did it.
Also, whether Judas was thinking of the quoted psalm is irrelevant because the "ινα" clause there simply means that the betrayal transpired in order that the quoted verse would be fulfilled, and does not specify how the betrayal was guaranteed to transpire. In particular it does not mean that Judas himself followed the quoted verse to fulfill it.
I have also given a clear explanation of "ινα" that makes sense. That does not mean that my explanation is correct. Likewise just because her explanation may make sense does not make it correct either. Moreover, having confusing translations is not a reason to change an understanding of a word.Jonathan Robie wrote:Margaret is providing an interpretation of ἵνα that makes sense, given these assumptions. The traditional explanation of ἵνα makes this verse hard to understand in the given context, and has resulted in some rather confusing translations.
I believe (though I may be wrong) that you did not read what I wrote carefully enough, since I've already explained this very example many times. As I have made clear before, I do not claim that the "ινα" clause describes a purpose for what is described in another clause, as it may be a content clause describing a purposed result (and whom it is purposed by depends on the context). Anyway let me answer Moon's question and it should answer to this as well.Jonathan Robie wrote:In her thesis, this is what she says about John 6:29:
Margaret Sim wrote:Several other examples of nouns which occur in a stative clause and are explicated by ἵνα and the subjunctive use figurative language: βρῶμα, ἔργον, ἡ αἰώνιοϲ ζωή. This also alerts the hearer to expect an utterance which does not reflect a state of affairs in the real world, but an interpretation of such.
Consider example (9) below:
[...]Τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ ἵνα πιστεύητε εἰς ὃν ἀπέστειλεν ἐκεῖνος.
In terms of traditional grammar it is indeed an epexegetic noun clause, in that it seems to explicate the content of τοῦτο, or ἔργον. Since the context dictates that the clause introduced by ἵνα cannot indicate purpose, grammarians have struggled either to fit in a ‘purpose’ somehow, or to find a label for this use. If we leave on one side the insistence on a telic interpretation of ἵνα, we should be able to view this clause from the perspective of its communicative function. I claim that the reader is being invited to infer the speaker’s thought and attitude from such a use. In many of these examples the ἵνα clause is deontic, marking what the speaker thinks should be done.