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Chapter 5 – Last Days of General Anson

May 12

At Head-Quarters

Disquieted by reports of the uneasy nervous state of the regiments at Head-Quarters, but little apprehending the approach of any gigantic danger, General Anson was recreating himself on the heights of Simlah, when, on the 12th of May, young Barnard rode in from Ambalah bearing a letter from his father. It informed the Commander-in-Chief that a strange incoherent telegraphic message had been received at the latter place from Dehli. But it was plain that the Mirath Sipahis had revolted. An hour afterwards, another message was brought to Anson, confirming the first tidings of revolt. Confused though it was, it indicated still more clearly than its predecessor, that the Native Cavalry prisoners at Mirath had escaped from gaol, that the Sipahis thence had joined the Dehli mutineers, and that there had been at both places a massacre of Europeans104.

When this intelligence reached the Commander-in-Chief, he did not at once take in its full significance; nor, indeed, did men of far greater Indian experience – the Head-Quarters staff, by whom he was surrounded – perceive the dire purport

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of it. But he discerned at once that something must be done. He saw that the city of Dehli and the lives of all the Europeans were at the mercy of the insurgents, and that it was incumbent upon him to send down all the white troops that could be despatched. from the Hills, to succour our imperilled people, if the flames of rebellion should spread. So he sent an Aide-de-camp to Kasaoli, on that day, with orders for the 75th Foot to march to Ambalah105; and, at the same time, the Company’s European regiments at Dagshai and Sabathu were directed to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment’s notice. But he did not put himself in motion. He wrote to Lord Canning, saying that he anxiously awaited further reports, and that if they were not favourable he should “at once proceed down to Ambalah.” He had scarcely despatched this letter, when a third telegraphic message was received, from which he learnt more distinctly what had happened at Mirath on the preceding Sunday.

May 13

Next morning, he wrote again to Lord Canning, still saying that his own movements would depend upon the information he received. But he was beginning, to discern more clearly the magnitude of the danger, and he ordered the two Fusilier regiments to move down to Ambalah106, and the Sirmur battalion107 to proceed from Dehra, to Mirath. From the first he appears to have perceived clearly that the most pressing danger which threatened. us was the loss of our Magazines. He felt that the great Magazine at Dehli, with its rich supplies of arms and ordnance stores, and implements of all kinds, must already be in possession of the mutineers, and he lost no time in taking measures to secure our other great military store-houses, by sending European troops for their defence. “I have sent express,” he wrote to Lord Canning on the 13th, “to desire that the Fort at Firuzpur may be secured by the 61st Foot, and the Fort at Govindgarh by the 81st. Two companies of the 8th from Jalandhar to Philur.” The importance of securing the latter place could scarcely,

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indeed, be over-estimated108. How it was accomplished by the authorities of the Panjab will hereafter be told. In this place it need only be recorded that thence was it that the siege-train was to be drawn which was to open the way for our re-entrance into Dehli, or to perform any other service that circumstances might demand from it in the operations to be now undertaken. An Artillery officer was despatched thither with all speed to make the necessary arrangements109; and the Gurkah Regiment, known as the Nasiri Battalion, and then believed to be loyal to the core, was ordered down from Jatogh, near Simlah, to form, with a detachment of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, an escort for the train from Philur to Ambalah. This was not more than any soldier of a few years’ experience would have done; but as it wan; an important, though an obvious movement, and tended much to our subsequent success, it should be held in remembrance by all who say that in this conjuncture Anson did less110.

May 14

First movements of General Anson

Before the day was spent, the Commander-in-Chief had made up his mind that he must quit Simlah. “I am just off for Ambalah,” he wrote to Lord Canning, at eight o’clock on the morning of the 14th. ... “This is a most disastrous business,” he added, “and it is not possible to see what will be the result. They say the King of Dehli is at the bottom of it. I doubt it; but I have no doubt that he has taken advantage of the opportunity, and is assisting the insurgents. ... If the mutineers, having possession of the city, make their stand behind the walls, we shall want a good force and artillery. This must be collected at Karnal, as it would not be wise, I think, to divide

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the force we shall have and send part from Mirath on the opposite side of the river. But I hope to hear something which will enable me to decide what is best to be done when I get to Ambalah.”

May 15

He reached that place on the morning of the 15th, and many there. sinister reports met him ere. It was plain that the Native regiments in the Panjab were in a state of open or suppressed mutiny, and, therefore, that he could not expect immediate assistance from that province. “We are terribly short of artillery ammunition,” he wrote. “The two companies of Reserve Artillery I asked for from Lahor and Lodiana cannot, of course, now be given, and we have no means of using the siege-train. All the European troops within reach will be here on the 17th. If we move upon Dehli, I think it must be from Karnal. It is extraordinary how little we know of what is going on in other parts of the country – nothing whatever from Agra, Kanhpur, Oudh, &c.” On the following day, he wrote again to Lord Canning, saying: “I have been doing my best to organise the Force here, ready for a move; but tents and carriages are not ready, and they are indispensable. We are also deficient in ammunition, which we are expecting from Philur. I hope we shall be in a state to move shortly, if required. But we have no heavy guns for Dehli, if we are to attack the mutineers there. We must not fritter away or sacrifice the Europeans we have, unless for some great necessity.”

The Ambalah regiments

Many troubles and perplexities then beset him It has been already shown that the Native regiments at Ambalah were in a state of smouldering mutiny, kept only from bursting into a blaze by the contiguity of European troops111. The incendiary work, which, in the preceding month, had so mystified the Commander-in-Chief and the General of Division, had by this time explained itself. It was clear that the Sipahis were ripe for revolt. With the strong European force now gathered at Ambalah, Anson might have reduced them to impotence in an hour. To the vigorous understanding of Sir John Lawrence nothing was clearer than that the true policy, in that conjuncture, was to disarm the Native regiments at Ambalah before advancing upon Dehli; and he impressed this necessity

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upon Anson by telegraph and by post from Rawalpindi, but the Commander-in-Chief refused to sanction the measure112. It seemed to be an easy escape out of some difficulties which beset his position at Ambalah. He had the wolf by the ears. lie could not with safety carry the regiments with him, and he could not leave them behind. But he was met with remonstrances from officers on the spot, who protested that sonic pledges had been given to the Sipahis which could not honourably be broken, though in truth the Sipahis themselves had practically violated the compact, and there would have been no breach of faith in turning their treachery against themselves. It was, however, resolved to appeal only to their good feelings, and so they were left with arms in their ‘hands to use them on a future day foully against us in return for our forbearance113.

Mutiny of the Nasiri Battalion

Another source of anxiety was this Before the week had passed, news came to Ambalah that the Gurkahs of the Nasiri Battalion, from no sympathy with the regular army, but from some personal causes. of disaffection, had broken into revolt just when their services were wanted, had refused to march to Philur, had

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plundered the Commander-in-Chief’s baggage, and threatened to attack Simlah.

The panic on the Hills

Then there came a great cry of terror from the pleasant places which Anson had just quitted, and in which, only a few days before, the voice of joy and gladness had been resonant in a hundred happy homes. It was the season when our English ladies, some with their husbands, some without them, were escaping from the hot winds of the Northern Provinces and disporting themselves, in all the flush of renovated health and strength and new-born elasticity, under the cheering influence of the mountain breezes on the slopes of the Himalayas. It might well have been regarded, in the first instance, as a happy circumstance that so many of our countrywomen were away from the military cantonments, in which mutiny and murder had so hideously displayed themselves; but when it was known that these joyous playgrounds were being stripped of their defences, and that if danger were to threaten the homes of our people there would be nothing but God’s mercy to protect them, a feeling of insecurity and alarm arose, which needed but little to aggravate it into a great panic. When, therefore, tidings came that the Nasiri Battalion, at a distance of some three or four miles from Simlah, had risen in rebellion, there was general consternation. It was rumoured that the officers and their families at Jatogh had been murdered, and that the Gurkahs were marching on Simlah intent on slaughter and spoliation. Then, for the greater part of two long days, many tasted the bitterness of death. The agony of terror swept our English families out of their holiday-homes, as with the besom of coming destruction; and in wild confusion men, women, and children streamed down towards the plains, or huddled together at the point esteemed to be best capable of defence114. Never, at any time or in any place, have the consummate gallantry of Englishmen and the heroic endurance of Englishwomen been more nobly – more beautifully – manifested than in the great conflict for supremacy of which I am writing. But the incidents of those two days on the Hills are not to be regarded with national pride. The strong instinct

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of self-preservation was dominant over all. Men forgot their manhood in what seemed to be a struggle for life115; and it is not strange, therefore, that delicate ladies with little children clinging to them, should have abandoned themselves uncontrolledly to their fears.

But the panic was a groundless panic. The Nasiri Battalion, though grossly insubordinate, was not intent on the murder of our people. The Gurkahs had grievances, real or supposed, to be redressed, and when certain concessions had been made to them, they returned to their allegiance, and afterwards became good soldiers116. And not without some feeling of shame our people went back to their deserted homes and found everything just as it had been left. Those, whose excited imaginations had seen blazing houses and household wrecks, re-entered their dwelling-places to see with their fleshly eyes the unfinished. letter on the desk and the embroidery on the work-table undisturbed by marauding hands. Even the trinkets of the ladies were as if they had never been out of the safest custody. But confidence, which is ever “a plant of slow growth,” is slowest when once trampled or cut down; and it was long before our English families at the hill-stations recovered the serenity they had lost. Every officer fit for service was called to join his regiment, and the European soldiery were too much needed in the field to allow any force to be left for the protection of the tender congregation of women and children on the slopes of the great hills117.

Preparation of the Siege-Train

The Commander-in-Chief had, indeed, other things to consider than these social alarms. The defection of the Nasiri Battalion was a source of perplexity upon the other grounds, as it was hard to say how the siege-train could be escorted safely to Ambalah.

It was of the highest importance, at this time, that the European

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troops should be exposed as little as possible to the blazing heats of the summer sun. It was the sultriest season of the year, and cholera was already threatening our camp. The regiment of hardy Gurkahs, of whose loyalty there had been no previous doubt, were just the men for the work; and now their services were lost to us for awhile. There was nothing, therefore, left but a resort to Hindustani troops of doubtful fidelity, or to a contingent force supplied by a friendly Native chief. Meanwhile there was great activity in the Magazine of Philur. Day and night our troops, under Lieutenant Griffith, Commissary of Ordnance, toiled on incessantly to prepare the siege-train and to supply ammunition of all kinds for the advancing army. A day, even an hour, lost, might have been fatal; for the Satlaj was rising, and the bridge of boats, by which the train was to cross the river, might have been swept away before our preparations were complete.

The Departments

But there were worse, perplexities even than these. The elaborate organisation of the army which Anson commanded was found to be a burden and an encumbrance. The Chiefs of all the Staff-Departments of the Army were at his elbow. They were necessarily men of large experience, selected for their approved ability and extensive knowledge; and it was right that he should consult them. But Departments are ever slow to move – ever encumbered with a sense of responsibility, which presses upon them with the destructive force of paralysis. These Indian Military Departments were the best possible Departments in time of peace. They had immense masses of correspondence written up and endorsed with the most praiseworthy punctuality and precision. They were always prepared with a precedent; always ready to check an. irregularity, and to chastise an overzealous public servant not moving in the strictest grooves of Routine. It was, indeed, their especial function to suppress what they regarded as the superfluous activities of individual men; and individual men never did great things until they got fairly out of the reach of the Departments. They were nominally War Departments. There would have been no need

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of such Departments if war had been abolished from off the face of the land. But it was the speciality of these War Departments that they were never prepared for war. Surrounded as we were, within and without, with hostile populations, and living in a chronic state of danger from a multiplicity of causes, we yet were fully prepared for almost anything in the world but fighting. Without long delay we could place ourselves in neither a defensive nor an offensive attitude. We could “stand fast” as well as any nation in the world, but there was never any facility of moving. As soon as ever there came a necessity for action, it was found that action was impossible. The Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General, the Chief of the Army Medical Department, each had his own special reason to give why the “thing” was “impossible.” No ammunition – no carriages – no hospital stores – no doolies for the sick and wounded. Each head of a Department, indeed, had his own particular protest to fling in the face of the Commander-in-Chief. Nunquam paratus was his motto. It was the custom of Departments. It was the rule of the Service. No one was at all ashamed of it. It had come down by official inheritance from one to the other, and the Chief of the Department merely walked in the pleasant paths which, years before, as a Deputy Assistant, he had trodden under some defunct Chief of pious memory. In a word, it was the system. Every now and then some seer like Henry Lawrence rose up to protest against it. And when, in the plain language of common sense, the truth was laid bare to the public, some cried, “How true!” but the many smiled incredulously, and denounced the writer as an alarmist. And so General Anson, having found things in that normal state of unpreparedness in which his predecessors had delighted, had followed in their footsteps, nothing doubting, until suddenly brought face to face with a dire necessity, he found that everything was in its wrong place. The storm-signals were up, but the life-boat was in the church- steeple, and no one could find the keys of the church118.

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It was not strange, therefore, that Anson felt it would not be prudent, with the means then at his disposal, to risk “an enterprise on Dehli.” “It becomes now a matter for your consideration,” he wrote to Sir John Lawrence on the 17th, “whether it would be prudent to risk the small European force we have here in an enterprise on Dehli. I think not. It is wholly, in my opinion, insufficient for the purpose. The walls could, of course, be battered down with heavy guns. The entrance might be opened, and little resistance offered. But so few men in a great city, with such narrow streets, and an immense armed population, who know every turn and corner of them, would, it appears to me, be in a very dangerous position, and if six or seven hundred were disabled, what would remain? Could we hold it with the whole country around against us? Could we either stay in or out of it? My own view of the state of things now is, that by carefully collecting our resources, having got rid of the bad materials which we cannot trust, and having supplied their places with others of a better sort, it would not be very long before we could proceed without a chance of failure, in whatever direction we might please. Your telegraphic message informing me of the measures which you have taken to raise fresh troops confirms me in this opinion. I must add, also, that this is now the opinion of all here whom I have consulted upon it – the Major-General and Brigadier, the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, and Commissary-General. The latter has, however, offered a positive impediment to it, in the impossibility of providing what would be necessary for such an advance under from sixteen to twenty days. I thought it could have been done in less; but that was before I had seen Colonel Thomson. Indeed, it is very little more than forty-eight hours since I came here, and every turn produces something which may alter a previous opinion119.”

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Correspondence with Lord Canning

But these doubts were but of brief duration. Let Adjutants-General, and Quartermasters-General, and Commissaries-General suggest what difficulties they might, there were other powers, to North and South, in whose sight all delay, in such a crisis, was an offence and an abomination. Lord Canning, from Calcutta, and Sir John Lawrence, from the Panjab, flashed to the Head-Quarters of the Army emphatic messages, urging Anson to move on Dehli, with such force as he could gather; and followed up their eager telegrams with letters scarcely less eager. The Governor-General, to whom Anson had not communicated the views which he had expressed in the preceding letter to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, was overjoyed by the thought that there was so much activity at Head-Quarters. Encouraged by the earlier letters of the Military Chief, and still more by a message he had received from Mr. Colvin, at Agra, Canning wrote on the 17th to Anson, saying that he learnt the good news “with intense pleasure.” “For,” he added, “I doubted whether you would be able to collect so strong a body of troops in the time. I cannot doubt that it will now prove amply sufficient, and I am very grateful to you for enabling me to feel confident on this point. An unsuccessful demonstration against Dehli, or even any appearance of delay in proceeding to act, when once our force is on the spot, would have a most injurious effect – I mean in Bengal generally. Every station and cantonment is in a state of excitement, and anything 0. in the nature of a check would give confidence to the disaffected regiments, which might lead to something worse than the horrors of Dehli. Allahabad, Banaras, Oudh (except Lakhnao, which I believe to be safe), and a host of places of less importance where Native troops are alone, will continue to be a source of much anxiety until Dehli is disposed of. It is for this that I have telegraphed to you to make as short work as possible of the rebels, who have cooped themselves up there, and whom you cannot crush too remorselessly. I should rejoice

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to hear that there had been no holding our men, and that the vengeance had been terrible.”

Correspondence with Sir John Lawrence

Whilst Lord Canning was thus expressing his gratitude to Anson, Sir John Lawrence, who was nearer the scene of action, and in closer communication with the Commander-in-Chief, knowing better what were the prevailing counsels at Head-Quarters, was urgent in his remonstrances against delay. He knew the temper of the people well; and nothing was clearer to the eye of his experience than that, in the conjuncture which had arisen, it was necessary above all things to maintain an appearance of successful activity. Any semblance of paralysis at such a time must, he knew, be fatal to us. At such periods the Natives of India wait and watch. It is in conformity with the genius of a people, equally timid and superstitious, to be worshippers of success. John Lawrence knew well that if at any time the English in India should betray symptoms of irresolution in the face of danger, thousands and tens of thousands, believing that the day of our supremacy is past, would first fall away from, and then rise against their masters. I But we had reached an epoch in the History of our great Indian Empire at which the impression of our coming fall was stronger than it bad ever been before, and there were those who, on the first sign of weakness in our camp, would have pointed exultingly to the beginning of the end. It was not a time, indeed, to calculate military means and resources, or to regard strategical principles in the conduct of our armies; but simply to move and strike – to move somewhere and to strike some one. And it was to this necessity of prompt and vigorous action that the counsels of John Lawrence ever pointed – not to any particular line of procedure to be dictated to the Military Chief. “I do not myself,” he wrote to Anson, on the 21st of May, “think that the country anywhere is against us – certainly not from here to within a few miles of Dehli. I served for nearly thirteen years in Dehli, and know the people well. My belief is, that with good management on the part of the Civil officers, it would open its gates on the approach of our troops. It seems incredible to conceive that the mutineers can hold and defend it. Still, I admit that on military principles, in the present state of affairs, it may not be expedient to advance on Dehli; certainly not until the Mirath force is prepared to act, which it can only be when set free. Once relieve Mirath, and give

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confidence to the country, no difficulty regarding carriage can occur. By good arrangements the owners will come forward, but in any case it can be collected. From Mirath you will be able to form a sound judgment on the course to be followed. If the country lower down be disturbed, and the Sipahis have mutinied, I conceive it would a paramount duty to march that way, relieve each place, and disarm or destroy the mutineers. If, on the other hand, all were safe, it would be a question whether you should consolidate your resources there, or march on Dehli. I think it must be allowed that our European troops are not placed at this or that station simply to hold it, but to be ready to move wherever they may be required. Salubrious and centrical points for their location were selected; but so long as we maintain our prestige and keep the country quiet, it cannot signify how many cantonments we abandon. But this we cannot do, if we allow two or three Native corps to checkmate large bodies of Europeans. It will then be a mere question of time, by slow degrees, but of a certainty the Native troops must destroy us. We are doing all we can to strengthen ourselves, and to reinforce you, either by direct or indirect means120. But can your Excellency suppose for one moment that the Irregular troops will remain staunch, if they see our European soldiers cooped up in their cantonments, tamely awaiting the progress of events. Your Excellency remarks that we must carefully collect our resources; but what are these resources, but our European soldiers, our guns, and our materiel: these are all ready at hand, and only require to be handled wisely and vigorously to produce great results. We have money also, and the control of the country. But if disaffection spread, insurrection will follow, and we shall then neither be able to collect the revenue, nor procure supplies.” “Pray,” he continued, “only reflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed, when we acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded, when guided by timid counsels? Clive, with twelve hundred, fought at Plassey in opposition to the advice of his leading officers, beat forty thousand men, and conquered Bengal. Monson retreated from the Chambal, and before he gained Agra, his army was disorganised and partially annihilated. Look at the Kabul catastrophe. It might have

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been averted by resolute and bold action. The Irregulars of the Army, the Kizlbashis, in short our friends, of whom we had many, only left us when they found we were not true to ourselves. How can it be supposed that strangers and mercenaries will sacrifice everything for us? There is a point up to which they will stand by us, for they know that we have always been eventually successful, and that we are good masters; but go beyond this point, and every man will look to his immediate benefit, his present safety. The Panjab Irregulars are marching down in the highest spirits, proud to be trusted, and eager to show their superiority over the Regular troops – ready to fight, shoulder to shoulder, with the Europeans. But if, on their arrival, they find the Europeans behind breast-works, they will begin to think that the game is up. Recollect that all this time, while we are halting, the emissaries of the mutineers are writing to, and visiting, every cantonment. ... I cannot comprehend what the Commissariat can mean by requiring from sixteen to twenty days to procure provisions. I am persuaded that all you can require to take with you must be procurable in two or three. We have had an extraordinary good harvest, and supplies must be abundant between Ambalah and Mirath. The greater portion of the country is well cultivated. We are sending our troops in every direction without difficulty, through tracts which are comparatively desert. Our true policy is to trust the Maharajah of Patiala, and Rajah of Jhind, and the country generally, for they have shown evidence of being on our side, but utterly to distrust the regular Sipahis. I would spare no expense to carry every European soldier – at any rate, to carry every other one. By alternately marching and riding, their strength and spirits will be maintained. We are pushing on the Guides, the 4th Sikhs, the 1st and 4th Panjab regiments of Infantry, from different parts of the Panjab, in this way. If there is an officer in the Panjab whom your Excellency would wish to have at your side, pray don’t hesitate to apply for him. There is a young officer now at Head-Quarters, who, though young in years, has seen much service, and proved himself an excellent soldier. I allude to Captain Norman, of the Adjutant-General’s office. Sir Colin Campbell had the highest opinion of his judgment; and when he left Peshawar it was considered a public loss.”

Of the exceeding force and cogency of this no doubt can be entertained. It was the right language for the crisis – rough,

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ready, and straight to the point. The great Panjab Commissioner, with his loins girt about, eager for the encounter, impatient to strike, was not in a mood to make gentle allowances or to weigh nice phrases of courteous discourse. But, in what he wrote, he intended to convey no reproaches to the Military Chief. It was simply the irrepressible enthusiasm of a nature, impatient of departmental dallyings and regulation restraints, and in its own utter freedom from all fear of responsibility not quite tolerant of the weakness of those who, held back by a fear of failure, shrink from encountering heroic risks. It was not that he mistrusted the man Anson, but that he mistrusted all the cumbrous machinery of the Head-Quarters Departments, which never had been found ripe for sudden action – never had improvised an expedition or precipitated an enterprise, ever since Departments were created – though, in truth, he could not see that in the machinery itself there was anything to unfit it for prompt action. “I should greatly regret,” he wrote two days afterwards, “if any message or letter of mine should annoy you. I have written warmly and strongly in favour of an advance, because I felt assured that such was the true policy. However much we may be taken by surprise, our military organisation admits of prompt action. The country is almost sure to be with us, if it were only that we save them from trouble; and this will more especially be the case in an affair like the present, when we have really to contend only with our own troops, with whom the people can have no sympathy.” The Commissariat, in such a case, is ever the chief stumbling-block; and the impediments thrown up are those of which military men take the most, and civilians the least account. Anson was told at Ambalah that they were insuperable. But John Lawrence, at Rawalpindi, could not recognise the force of the obstructive argument. “I cannot comprehend,” he wrote to Anson, “why Colonel Thomson requires so much supplies. To carry so much food with the troops is to encumber the column and waste our money. To guard against accidents, three or four days’ supplies should be taken, but no more. My belief is, that ten thousand troops might march all over the North-West, and, provided they paid for what they required, no difficulty in obtaining supplies would be experienced.” It is plain, too, that at this time the Dehli difficulty was, in the Panjab, held to be a light one, for Lawrence added: “I still think that no real resistance at Dehli will be attempted; but, of course, we must

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first get the Mirath force in order, and, in moving against Dehli, go prepared to fight. My impression is, that, on the approach of our troops, the mutineers will either disperse, or the people of the city rise and open their gates121.”

Final Orders of the Civil Government

Whether General Anson ever recognised the fact that the conjuncture was one in which all rules of warfare must bow their necks to stern political necessity, is not very apparent; but if he still maintained his opinions as a soldier, he knew well that it was his duty to yield his judgment to the authority of the supreme Civil power; and when he received an emphatic enunciation of the views of the Governor-General, he prepared to march down upon Dehli. “I regret,” he wrote to the Governor-General on the 23rd of May, “that it has not been possible to move sooner upon Dehli. The force is so small that it must not be frittered away. You say in your telegraphic message that Dehli must be recovered, ‘but [the operations] to be undertaken by a strong British force.’ There is not this in the country. We have collected all within reach. I venture to say that not an hour has been lost, and that the movement of the troops from Ambalah will have been accomplished in a space of time which was not considered possible on my arrival here.” And he concluded his letter by saying: “I should be glad to know whether you consider the Force with which I propose to attack Dehli sufficient – and, namely, ‘a strong British Force.’”

May 23

He had by this time clearly calculated his available strength for the great enterprise before him – and it was this, as detailed in a letter which he wrote to General Hewitt at Mirath: “The force from Ambalah consists of the 9th Lancers, one squadron of the 4th Lancers, Her Majesty’s 75th Foot, 1st European Regiment, 2nd European Regiment, 60th Native infantry, two troops of Horse Artillery. They are formed into two small brigades. Brigadier Halifax commands the first. ... Brigadier Jones the second brigade. Four companies of the 1st Fusiliers, one squadron of 9th Lancers, two guns, Horse Artillery, were moved

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to Karnal on the 17th, and arrived on the 20th. Six companies of the 1st Fusiliers followed on the 21st. Her Majesty’s 75th Foot and 60th Regiment of Native Infantry marched on the 22nd. One squadron 9th Lancers and four guns will march on the 24th or 25th. The above will be at Karnal on the 28th. The 2nd Europeans, 3rd troop 3rd brigade of Horse Artillery will probably follow on the 26th. The whole will be at Karnal on the 30th. I propose then to advance with the column towards Dehli on the 1st, and be opposite to Baghpat on the 5th. At this place I should wish to be joined by the force from Mirath. To reach it four days may be calculated on.” “A small siege-train,” he added, “has left Lodiana, and is expected here on the 25th. It will require eleven days to get it to Dehli. It may join us at Baghpat on or about the 6th, the day after that I have named for the junction of your force. I depend on your supplying at least one hundred and twenty Artillerymen to work it. You will bring, besides, according to statement received, two squadrons of Carabineers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, one light field battery, one troop of Horse Artillery, and any Sappers you can depend upon, and of course the non-commissioned European officers belonging to them.”

Whilst Anson was writing this from Ambalah, Lord Canning was telegraphing a message to him, through the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, announcing the reinforcements which were expected at Calcutta, and adding that everything depended “upon disposing speedily of Dehli, and making a terrible example. No amount of severity can be too great. I will support you in any degree of it.” There was nothing uncertain in this sound. But it is clear that the Governor-General, in his eagerness to strike a sudden and a heavy blow at the enemy, very much underrated the military difficulties with which Anson was called upon to contend, and believed overmuch in the facile execution of the impossible; for, on the 31st of May, he telegraphed again to the Commander-in-Chief, saying: “I have heard to-day that you do not expect to be before Dehli till the 9th (June). In the mean time Kanhpur and Lakhnao are severely pressed, and the country between Dehli and Kanhpur is passing into the hands of the rebels. It is of the utmost importance to prevent this, and to relieve Kanhpur. But rapid action will do it. Your force of Artillery will enable you to dispose of Dehli with certainty. I therefore beg that you will detach one European Infantry regiment and a small force of European

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Cavalry to the south of Dehli, without keeping them for operations there, so that Aligarh may be recovered and Kanhpur relieved immediately. It is impossible to overrate the importance of showing European troops between Dehli and Kanhpur, Lakhnao and Allahabad, depend upon it.”

It is easy to conceive what would have been the perplexity in General Anson’s mind, if he had received these instructions. The recovery of Dehli seemed to be an enterprise beyond the reach of the slender means at his disposal; but he was expected also to operate in the country beyond, and in the straits of his weakness to display strength on an extensive field of action. The Army was already on its way to Dehli: For whilst the Military Departments were protesting their inability to move the Army, the Civilians at Ambalah – officially the Commissioner of the Cis-Satlaj States, and the Deputy Commissioner of the district, individually Mr. George Barnes and Mr. Douglas Forsyth – were putting forth their strength, moving all the agents beneath them, and employing the influence which their position had given them among the people to accomplish promptly and effectually the great object now to be attained. It little mattered if, at such a time, the ordinary Civil business were temporarily suspended. It behoved, at such a moment, every man to be more or less a soldier. So the Civil officers, not only at Ambalah, but all around it, in the important country between the Jamnah and the Satlaj, went to work right manfully in aid of the military authorities; collected carts, collected cattle, collected coolies, and brought together and stored in Ambalah large supplies of grain for the army122.

May 11

And this, too, in the face of difficulties and impediments may it. which would have dismayed and obstructed less earnest workmen; for ever, after the fashion of their kind, Natives of all classes stood aloof, waiting and watching the issue

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of events; from the capitalist to the coolie all shrunk alike from rendering assistance to those whose power might be swept away in a day.

Protected Sikh Chiefs

There were other important services, which at this time the Civil officers rendered to their country; doing, indeed, that without which all else would have been in vain. In the country between the Jamnah and the Satlaj were the great chiefs of what were known as the “Protected Sikh States.” These states, at the commencement of the century, we had rescued by our interference from the grasp of Ranjit Singh, and ever since the time when the Rajah of Patiala placed in the hands of young Charles Metcalfe the keys of his fort, and said that all he possessed was at the service of the British Government, those chiefs, secure in the possession of their rights, had been true to the English alliance. They had survived the ruin of the old Sikh Empire, and were grateful to us for the protection which we had afforded and the independence which we had preserved. There are seasons in the lives of all nations, when faith is weak and temptation is strong, and, for a little space, the Cis-Satlaj chiefs, when the clouds of our first trouble were lowering over us, may have been beset with doubts and perplexities and fears of siding with the weaker party. Their hesitation, however, was short-lived. The excellent tact of Douglas Forsyth, who took upon himself the responsibility of calling upon the Maharajah of Patiala for assistance, smoothed down the apprehensions of that chief, and he took his course manfully and consistently, never swerving from the straight path of his duty. The chiefs of Jhind and Nabha, followed his example, and were equally true to the British alliance123. It

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was of the utmost importance, at that time, that the road from Ambalah to Karnal should be kept open; for it was to the latter place – once a flourishing military cantonment, but at the time of which I am writing deserted and decayed – that the troops from Ambalah were now marching; and there the fugitives from Dehli had mostly assembled, and something of an attempt had been made to re-establish the shattered edifice of British authority upon a fragment of the ruins of Dehli124. Above all, to hold Karnal was to keep open the communications between Ambalah and Mirath, and so to facilitate the junction of the forces from those two points. Happily for us, in this juncture, the Nawab of Karnal, a Muhammadan nobleman and land-owner of large influence in that part of the country, threw the weight of his personal power into the scales on our side125. This, doubtless, was great help to us; and when the Jhind Rajah sent down his troops to Karnal, the danger of a general rising of the mixed population of that part of the country had passed away. The Contingent arrived on the night of the 18th, and on the following morning the first detachment of Europeans marched into the cantonment126. Meanwhile, the Patiala Rajah was occupying Thaneswar, on the great high road between Ambalah and Karnal and thus the communication between these two important points was fully secured.

At the distance of a few miles from the station of Karnal lies the town of Panipat, a place famous in Indian annals; for there, on the neighbouring plain, had great armies contended, and thrice with tremendous carnage the destinies of India had been decided on its battle-fields. At this point the bulk of the Jhind Contingent was now posted, and as fresh detachments of the army from Ambalah marched into Karnal, the advanced guard pushed on to Panipat, where it was presently joined by the rear companies of the Fusiliers, two more squadrons of the Lancer regiment, and four guns. The Europeans, weakened though they were by

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the burning heats of May, were eager for the conflict, and already there had grown up amongst them that intense hatred of the Native races which afterwards bore such bitter fruit, for even then they were beginning to see before them evidences of the destroying hand of the Insurgent.

May 27

Death of General Anson

With the last of the European regiments General Anson left Ambalah, on the 25th of May; and, on the 26th, he was lying at Kama helpless and hopeless, on the bed of death, in the mortal agonies of the great pest of the country. On the following day, Sir Henry Barnard arrived in Camp, a little after midnight, just in time, as he said, to receive the dying farewell of his chief. Anson was all but gone; but he recognised his friend, and, in a faint voice, articulated: “Barnard, I leave you the command. You will say how anxious I have been to do my duty. I cannot recover. May success attend you. God bless you. Good-bye127.” And another hour had not spent itself before General George Anson had passed beyond the reach of all human praise or censure. The great responsibility thrown upon the Chief-Commander had filled him with mental anxiety, which had increased the depressing influences of over-fatigue and exposure to the climate in the most trying season of the year. He had evinced much tender consideration for the health of his men, and he was one of the first to be struck down by the fiery blasts of the Indian summer. He was a brave soldier and an honest gentleman; and another brave soldier and honest gentleman, whilst the corpse lay unburied in the next room, wrote a letter, saying: “I solemnly declare to you on my character as an officer, who, at all events, came to this country with the prestige of recent service with him, that not an hour has been lost in getting the small force now advanced as far as Panipat, and I hope to keep pushing on, as fast as I can get them up, on Dehli. The day I heard of the disaster at Dehli – which at Ambalah preceded any account from Mirath – I immediately despatched my son, who rode to Simlah during the night to warn the Commander-in-Chief, and bring him down. He has himself detailed all his movements to you, and I cannot but entertain hope, had he lived, you would have taken a different view of his conduct, and not attributed any want of

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energy to him. Whatever might have been accomplished by an immediate rush from Mirath could not be expected from Ambalah. The European troops were all in the Hills. Nothing but three regiments of Native troops and some Artillery Europeans were at the latter place; and when the regiments on the Hills were assembled, the General was met by protests against his advance by the leading Staff and Medical Officers of his Army. The Commissariat declared their utter inability to move the troops; the medical men represented theirs to provide the requisite attendants and bearers. Still matters went on. Troops were moved as fast as could be done, and arrangements made to meet the difficulty of bearers, Ammunition had to be procured from Philur, for the men had not twenty rounds in their pouches, and none in store; and the Artillery were inefficient, as their reserve waggons were all at Lodiana. It is only this day that I expect the necessary supply of ammunition to arrive at Ambalah. I have determined (I say I, for poor Anson could only recognise me and hand me over the command when I arrived last night) not to wait for the siege-train128.”

General Barnard in command

Thus passed away from the scene one of its chief actors, just as the curtain had risen on the great drama of British action. With what success Anson might have played his distinguished part can now be only conjectured. There are those who believe that alike in wisdom and integrity he far outshone all his colleagues in the Supreme Council, and that when the crisis arrived he took in the situation and measured the work to be done with an accuracy and precision which none beside, soldier or civilian, brought to bear upon the opening incidents of the War129.

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Little time was allowed to him to recover from the first shock of the storm before it overwhelmed and destroyed him. But it would be unjust to estimate what he did, or what he was capable of doing, by the measuring-rod of those who, during that eventful fortnight, believed that the recovery of Dehli was to be accomplished by the prompt movement of a small and imperfectly equipped British force. It is not in contemporary utterances that we are to look for a just verdict. We must put aside all thought, indeed, of what even the wisest and the strongest said in the first paroxysm of perplexity, when all men looked to the Chief of the Army to do what then seemed to be easy, and found that it was not done. How difficult it really was will presently appear. And though the result of a sudden blow struck at Dehli might have been successful, it is impossible, with our later knowledge of subsequent events to guide us, not to believe that in the month of May the risk of failure was greater than the fair prospect of success. And we may be sure that if Anson had flung himself headlong upon the stronghold of the enemy and failed, he would have been stigmatised as a rash and incapable general, ignorant of the first principles of war.

Summing up of Lord Canning

Perhaps the judgment of Lord Canning on these initial delays and their causes may be accepted as sound. and just. “The protracted delay,” he wrote, “has been caused, as far as I can gather from private letters from General Anson since I last wrote, by waiting for the siege-train, and by want of carriage for the Europeans. As regards the siege-train, I believe it to have been an unwise delay. We shall crush Dehli more easily, of course; but I do not believe that we should have been exposed to any reverse for want of a siege-train, and the time lost has cost us dear indeed. As to the carriage and Commissariat, it is impossible, in the absence of all information, to say how far the delay was avoidable and blamable. It would have been madness to move a European force at this season with any deficiency of carriage (with cholera, too, amongst them), but I greatly doubt whether General Anson was well served in this matter of carriage.

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From many letters from Head-Quarters which have been before me, I am satisfied that, with the exception of one young officer, there was not a man on the Army Staff who gave due thought to the political dangers of delay and to the perils which hung over us elsewhere as long as no move was made upon Dehli. With the Staff, the Medical Staff especially, arguing the necessity of completeness, and none of them apparently conscious of the immense value of time, it is very probable that time was lost. On this subject you will see a letter from Sir John Lawrence to the Commander-in-Chief. It is very earnest and practical, like all that comes from him, and I wish with all my heart that he had been nearer to Head-Quarters, His counsels and his thorough knowledge of the country would have been invaluable. You must bear in mind, however, in regard to his estimate of the time which should have been sufficient to put the army in motion, that a great change was made in the Commissariat three years ago, when the Transport establishments were given up, and it was determined to trust henceforward to hiring beasts for the occasion. We are now making the first experiment of this change. Economically, it was a prudent one, and in times of ordinary war might work well; but I shall be surprised if General Anson were not greatly impeded by it. Could it have been foreseen that our next operations would be against our own regiments and subjects, no sane man would have recommended it.”

From the death-bed of General Anson Sir Henry Barnard had received his instructions to take command of the Dehli Field Force. And taking that command, he cast up at once the difficulties of his position. He thought that if Anson’s death had not been accelerated, his last moments had been embittered, by the reproaches of eager-minded civilians, who could not measure military difficulties as they are measured by soldiers; and he felt that, in the execution of his duty to his country, he might bring like censure upon himself. He was in a novel and wholly unanticipated position130, and he felt that he was expected

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to do what was impossible. But he went resolutely at the work before him; and flung himself into it with an amount of energy and activity which excited the admiration and surprise of much younger men. He determined, on the morning of the 27th, not to wait for the siege-train, but after exchanging some six-pounders for nine-pounders, to march on to Dehli, forming a junction on the way with the Mirath force under Brigadier Wilson. “So long as I exercise any power,” he wrote to Lawrence on the day after Anson’s death, “you may rest assured that every energy shall be devoted to the objects I have now in view, viz., concentrating all the force I can collect at Dehli, securing the bridge at Baghpat, and securing our communication with Mirath. For those objects all is now in actual motion. The last column left Ambalah last night, and the siege-train will follow under escort, provided by Mr. Barnes. I have noticed to the Commissariat that supplies will be required, and hope that, when within two days’ march of Dehli, our presence may have the influence you anticipate, and you may soon hear of our being in possession of the place.” On the 31st he wrote from Garunda “I am preparing with the Commanding Engineer the plan of the position to take up when we reach Dehli, and hope that no let or hindrance will prevent our being ready to act upon the place by the 5th.”

The force from Ambalah was now in full march upon Dehli. The scorching heat of the summer, which was taking terrible effect upon the health of the European soldiery, forbade much marching in the daytime. The fierce sun beat down upon the closed tents of our people, and as they lay in weary sleep, or vainly courting it, there was stillness, almost as of death, in our camp. But with the coolness of evening Life returned. The lassitude was gone. Men emerged from their tents and were soon in all the bustle and preparation of the coming march. The clear starlit nights are said to have been “delicious131.” But as the English soldier marched on beneath that great calm canopy of heaven, there was within him the turmoil and the bitterness of an avenging thirst for blood. It fared ill with those against whom charges were brought of inflicting injury upon fugitives from Dehli. Some villagers, believed to be thus guilty, were seized, tried, condemned, and executed amidst every possible

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indignity that could be put upon them by our soldiers under the approving smiles of their officers132. And ever as they marched on, there was an eager desire to find criminals and to execute judgment upon them; and it was not easy for the hands of authority to restrain the retributive impulses of our people.

The day of action was now not far distant; and all believed that it would be a day of signal retribution. “Most of the men,” it has been said, “believed that one battle would decide the fate of the mutinous regiments. They would fight in the morning; they would drink their grog in Dehli at night133.” Even the sick, in the hospital tents, sat up, declared that they were well, and with feeble voices implored to be discharged that they might be led against the hated enemy. But Barnard’s force was weak, and impatient as were his troops to push forward, it was necessary that they should form a junction with Wilson’s brigade, which was advancing from Mirath, on the other side of the river. What that brigade had done since the disastrous night of the 10th of May must now be briefly related.

Footnotes

104. The first telegram, as given in a letter from Anson to Lord Canning, ran thus: “We must leave office. All the bungalows are on fire – burning down by the Sipahis of Mirath. They came in this morning. We are off. Mr. C. Todd is dead, I think. He went out this morning, and has not yet returned. We learnt that nine Europeans are killed.” This was received at three P.M. The second message, received at four, said: “Cantonments in a state of siege. Mutineers from Mirath – 3rd Light Cavalry – numbers not known – said to be a hundred and fifty men. Cut off communication with Mirath. Taken possession of the Bridge of Boats. 54th Native Infantry sent against them, but would not act. Several officers killed and wounded. City in a state of considerable excitement. Troops sent down, but nothing known yet. Information will be forwarded.”

105. Captain Barnard had, on his way to Simlah, warned the 75th to be ready to march on the arrival of orders from Head-Quarters.

106. Major G. O. Jacob, of the 1st European Regiment, who happened to be at Simlah, rode down to Dagshai during the night, and warned the regiment early in the morning.

107. A corps of brave and faithful Gurkahs, whose good services will be hereafter detailed.

108. Mr. Cave-Browne says: “A report did float about the Panjab, the truth of which we have never heard denied, that one member of the Staff suggested that all European troops should concentrate on Philur, and, taking boat down the Satlaj, make for England as fast as possible; another, however – one who, alas! fell among the earliest victims of the rebellion – suggested that the Philur Fort, with its large magazine, might be made available for a very different purpose. Hence the idea of a siege-train.” This last was Colonel Chester, Adjutant-General of the Army.

109. Captain Worthington, who was on sick-leave at Simlah at the time.

110. The author of the “History of the Siege of Dehli,” says: “On the 16th Sir John Lawrence telegraphed to Jalandhar to secure the Fort of Philur. Two marches to the south, and commanding the bridge over the Satlaj, it contained the only magazine that could now furnish us with a siege-train,” &c., &c. But it is clear that General Anson had sent instructions to this effect three days before.

111. Ante, book iii., chapter v,

112. See Panjab Report of May 25, 1858: “The Chief Commissioner conceived that the first step was to disarm these regiments whom it was equally dangerous either to leave at Ambalah or to take to Dehli. This course the Chief Commissioner lost no time in urging, but when the Commander-in-Chief took the matter in hand, the local military authorities pointed out that they had pledged themselves not to disarm the Sipahis. It was in vain urged per contra that the compact had been no sooner made than it was broken by the Sipahis themselves. There was not, indeed, the shadow of a reasonable hope that these men would prove faithful.”

113. It should not be omitted altogether from the narrative that on the 19th the Commander-in-Chief issued another address to the Native Army, in the shape of a General Order, in which, after adverting to the general uneasiness of the Sipahis and to his former efforts to allay it, tie said: “His Excellency has determined that the new rifle cartridge, and every new cartridge, shall be discontinued, and that in future balled ammunition shall be made up by each regiment for its own use by a proper establishment entertained for this purpose. The Commander-in-Chief solemnly assures the Army that no interference with their castes or religions was ever contemplated, and as solemnly he pledges his word and honour that none shall ever be exercised. He announces this to the Native Army in the full confidence that all will now perform their duty free from anxiety and care, and be prepared to stand and shed the last drop of their blood, as they have formerly done, by the side of the British troops, and in defence of the country.” Such words in season might be good, but the season had long since passed.

114. This was the Bank. See Cave-Browne’s “Punjab and Dehli in 1857,” which contains an animated account of the two days’ panic on the Hills. The writer says that at the Bank were congregated some four hundred of our Christian people, “of whom above a hundred were able-bodied men.”

115. Mr. Cave-Browne describes “ladies toiling along – on foot, vainly trying to persuade, entreat, threaten the bearers to hurry on with their jahpans, on which were their helpless children, while men were outbidding each other, and outbidding ladies, to secure bearers for their baggage.”

116. It is said that one of their principal causes of complaint was the fact that they had been ordered to march down to the plains, and that no arrangements had been made for the protection of their families in their absence. They were also in arrears of pay.

117. Mr. Cave-Brown relates that as the Commander-in-Chief was riding out of Simlah, Mr. Mayne, the Chaplain, informed him that the station was in great danger from the number of “budmashes” in the Bazaars, and asked that some Europeans might be sent up for its protection. The General said that he could not spare any. “What then, are the ladies to do?” asked the Chaplain. “The best they can,” was the answer.

118. On the 18th of May General Barnard wrote from Ambalah, saying: “And now that they [the European regiments] are collected, without tents, without ammunition, the men have not twenty rounds apiece. Two troops of Horse Artillery, twelve guns, but no reserve ammunition, and their waggons at Lodiana – seven days’ off! Commissariat without sufficient transport at hand. This is the boasted Indian Army, and this is the force with which the civilians would have us go to Dehli.” – Compare also letter quoted in the text, page 123.

119. The views of General Anson at this time are thus stated in an unpublished memoir by Colonel Baird Smith, from which other quotations will be made: “It is generally understood that the course which recommended itself most to his mind was one strongly opposed to the popular instinct at the moment. Recognising, as all conversant with military affairs could not fail to do, that strategically considered the position of a weak force at Dehli must be, if not utterly false, yet of extreme danger, he is believed to have advocated the withdrawal of the small and isolated detachments on the Dual), and the concentration of the whole available British force between the Satlaj and the Jamnah, there to await the arrival of reinforcements by the line of the Indus, and, while permitting the fire of revolt to burn as fiercely as it might within the limits indicated, to check its spread beyond them on the northward, and ultimately to proceed to quench it with means that would make the issue certain.” – Unpublished Memoir by Colonel Baird Smith. MS.

120. This is to be understood as referring to the measures taken in the Panjab.

121. In a previous letter (May 21) Lawrence had written: “At Dehli the Sipahis have murdered their officers and taken our guns, but even there they did not stand. No number of them can face a moderate body of Europeans fairly handled. Of late years, even when fighting under our own banners in a good cause, with European officers at their head, and English comrades at their side, they have seldom done anything; as mutineers they cannot fight – they will burn, destroy, and massacre, but not fight.”

122. Mr. Barnes, in his official report, has recorded that, “As soon as it was seen by the Commander-in-Chief that an onward movement should be made, a sudden difficulty arose in the want of carriages. The Deputy Commissary-General having officially declared his inability to meet the wants of the army, the Civil Authorities were called upon to supply the demand. At Ambalah there has ever been a difficulty to furnish cattle of any kind, the carts being of a very inferior description; however, such as they were, they had to be pressed into service, and in the course of a week, after the utmost exertions, five hundred carts, two thousand camels, and two thousand coolies were made over to the Commissariat Department; thirty thousand maunds of grain were likewise collected and stored for the Army in the town of Ambalah.”

123. See Mr. Barnes’s report. “The first object was to provide for the safety of the Grand Trunk Road and the two stations of Thaneswar and Lodiana, which were without reliable troops. I accordingly directed the Rajah of Jhind to proceed to Karnal with all his available force. The Maharajah of Patiala, at my request, sent a detachment of all arms, and three guns, under his brother, to Thaneswar on the Grand Trunk Road between Ambalah and Karnal: The Rajah of Nabha and the Nawab of Maier Kotla were requested to march with their men to Lodiana, and the Rajah of Faridpur was desired to place himself under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Firuzpur. Thus all points of the main line of road were secured, and the Rajah of Jhind was also instructed to collect supplies and carriages for the field force, to protect the station of Karnal,” &c. It should be added that Sir John Lawrence bad telegraphed on the 13th to “get the Maharajah of Patiala to send one regiment to Thaneswar and another to Lodiana.” The policy from the first was to trust the great Cis-Satlaj Chiefs.

124. Brigadier Graves and Mr. Le Bas, who had effected their escape from Dehli, were the representatives of the military and civil authority.

125. Mr. Raikes states, in his “Notes on the Revolt,” that “When we had no military force near Karnal, and all men watched anxiously the conduct of each local chief, the Nawab of Karnal went to Mr. Le Bas and addressed him to the following effect: ‘Sir, I have spent a sleepless night in meditating on the state of affairs; I have decided to throw in my lot with yours. My sword, my purse, and my followers are at your disposal.’ ”

126. This advanced detachment consisted of four companies of the 1st Fusiliers, two Horse Artillery guns, and a squadron of the 9th Lancers.

127. “Letter of Sir 11. Barnard to Sir Charles Yorke, May 27, 1857. “This,” he adds, “was at half-past one A.M. on the 27th; at 2.15 he breathed his last.” Cholera was the immediate cause of his death.

128. Sir Henry Barnard to Sir John Lawrence, May 27, 1857. MS.

129. See the statements of the author of the “Red Pamphlet:” “It was a common practice to sneer at General Anson as a mere Horse-Guards’ General, as one who had gained his honours at Newmarket. But it is nevertheless a fact that this Horse-Guards’ General, by dint of application and perseverance, made himself so thoroughly a master of his profession, that, when the mutiny broke out, he drew up a plan of operations, which his successor, a Crimean General, carried out in all its details, rejecting as crude and ridiculous the suggestions sent up by the collective wisdom of Calcutta.” History may not unwillingly accept this; but when it is said that General Anson, “when brought, in both the Councils” – that is, the Executive and Legislative Councils – “face to face with men who had made legislation for India the study of their lives, distanced them all,” one cannot help being somewhat startled by the boldness of the assertion. [The judgment recorded by the author of the “Red Pamphlet” was based on opinions expressed at the time, on the spot, by men who had excellent opportunities of forming an opinion. The fact remains that it was only after Lord Canning had emancipated himself from the thraldom of the advisers bequeathed to him by Lord Dalhousie that he achieved the successes which will be recorded in subsequent volumes. – G.B.M.]

130. “It is a novel position,” he wrote to Sir John Lawrence, “for an officer to find himself placed in who comes to the country prepared to treat its army as his own; to make every allowance for the difference of constitution; to encourage its past good deeds and honourable name; to have side blows of reproof,’ because he has not treated them with the utmost severity, and rather sought occasion to disgrace than endeavour to support them. That I have endeavoured to support them I fully admit, and, if a fault, I must bear the blame.” – MS. Correspondence.

131. See the “History of the Siege of Dehli, by One who Served there,” for a very animated account of the march.

132. “The fierceness of the men increased every day, often venting itself on the camp-servants, many of whom ran away. The prisoners, during the few hours between their trial and execution, were unceasingly tormented by the soldiers. They pulled their hair, pricked them with their bayonets, and forced them to eat cow’s flesh, while officers stood by approving.” – History of the Siege of Dehli, by One who Served there.

133. “The history of the siege of Dehli, by one who served there.”

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