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Book 6 – The Panjab and Dehli

[May–June, 1857]

Chapter 1 – First Conflicts in the Panjab

May

State of the Panjab

Although to Lord Canning it had appeared that the most formidable dangers which threatened the security of the Anglo-Indian Empire took shape in the lower countries, because those countries were almost wholly destitute of the defence of European troops, he saw far off, at the furthest extremity of our British dominions, other great perils scarcely less in degree, but of a widely different kind, and counteracted by more favourable conditions. In the lower provinces he feared the malice of the Native soldiery. In the Panjab he dreaded, most of all, the enmity of the people. Sipahi regiments were scattered all over the Sikh country; but the province was, indeed, the great European Garrison of British India. The strength of English manhood may have been slight in relation to the actual defensive requirements of our frontier province abutting upon the Afghan country, from which, even from remote periods, succeeding dynasties had looked for the stream of foreign invasion – small, too, in comparison with the numerical power of the Native regiments, regular and irregular, which were posted in all parts of the Panjab. But even with the mysterious failure of Mirath before his eyes, the Governor-General was full of confidence when he counted up the European regiments on the frontier, and felt that they might overawe the Sipahis. Yet he could not help regarding with some disquieting apprehensions the state of the general population of the province. Little more than seven years had passed since the Empire of

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Ranjit Singh had been brought under the yoke of the English. The State had been overthrown by the soldiery. It was the license of its military bands that had unintentionally opened to us the gates of the country of the Five Rivers, and the same power, revived or reawakened, might now cast us out, and restore for a while the dynasty of the Singhs. Men of the most sanguine temperament, inflated well-nigh to bursting with national self-love, could hardly believe that the Sirdars of the Panjab, who had lost so much by the conquest of their country, had become wholly reconciled to British rule and eager to perpetuate it.

Bacon

The truth embodied in a few pregnant words by the greatest master of common sense that the world has ever seen – “So many overthrown estates, so many votes for troubles” – could not be ignored at such a time. Then there was that other great fount of danger – “disbanded soldiery” – which might send forth a sudden torrent to swell the great stream of trouble323. “Walled towns, stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like,” wrote the same great master – “all this is but a sheep in lion’s skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike.” The breed and disposition of the Sikhs were stout and warlike. We could not regard with contempt the military prowess of the nation which had sent forth the men who, in the great battles of the Satlaj, had taxed to the utmost the skill and valour of Hardinge and Gough, with the best troops of the British Empire at their back, and had driven our Dragoons like sheep before them on the plain of Chilianwala.

Nor was the only danger which threatened the position of the British in our great frontier province, that which glared upon us from the Panjab itself. Beyond the border were turbulent tribes, occupying the Afghan passes, whom it had been our policy now to bribe, now to awe, into submission. An irruption of these predatory hordes into the plain of Peshawar would have caused wide-spread confusion, in the midst of which bodies of Afghan Horse, led, perhaps, by one of the

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chiefs of the Barukzai family of Kabul, might have streamed. down upon our position, and burying, as they had. before done, all jealousies and animosities in the grave of a common purpose, might have allied themselves with the Sikhs, and swept the English out of the country. But thinking of this, Lord Canning thought also of the recent subsidiary treaty with Dost Muhammad, of the friendship that had been outwardly established between the two nations, and, above all, of the fact that the strongest feelings of self-interest dictated to the Amir a course of neutrality at such a time, and that love of English money was stronger than hatred of the English race. Thankfully and hopefully, he remembered the wise advice of Edwardes and the admirable diplomacy of Lawrence324; and he ceased to be troubled by the thought of an Afghan invasion, tremendous as would. have been the disaster if it had come upon us at such a time.

There were some other circumstances, too, in our favour. The population of the Panjab was a mixed population. There were national and religious diversities, which forbade the union and concentration which gave force even to the feeble. In other parts of our Empire there were diversities of faith, but long contact had rubbed off the angularities which kept them apart, and in the Hinduised Muhammadan, or the Muhammadanised Hindu, might be seen something almost amounting to fusion. But there was a gulf between the Sikhs and the Muhammadans of the Panjab – between both and the people of Hindustan. The Sikhs learnt with no feeling of joy or sympathy that the King of Dehli had been proclaimed in his old capital, and that Muhammadanism was likely again to be dominant in Upper India. They called to mind exciting national prophecies, which said that the Sikhs would some day stream down to the sack of Dehli; and the old greed of plunder was revived strenuously within them. It might be better for them, at first, to cast in their lot with the Faringhis, whose hour would come sooner or later; it was too soon to strike then. There was some comfort in this thought. There was comfort, too, in the remembrance that the Panjab had. been disarmed; that the warlike population of the conquered. country no longer went about with swords at their sides, or had firelocks stored in their houses. In all such cases it is

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probable that the disarmament is but partial; for whilst the searchings of authority are active, many implements of war are buried in the ground, or hidden in stacks or thatches, ready to be exhumed or extracted from their hiding-places, if necessity for their use should arise. Still the danger from that source – of many arms in the hands of men. knowing how to use them – though not, perhaps, wholly removed, had been greatly diminished; and in numerous instances the sword had been turned into the ploughshare or the reaping-hook, and soldiers had settled down into the peaceful ways of agricultural life. That they felt the benefits of a strong and a just Government after the years of unrest which had followed the death of Ranjit Singh is not to be doubted; and their martial instincts might have been dying out under the subduing influences of a reign of order.

These circumstances were to be counted up in our favour; and there was one more to be added to the account. As the country below the Satlaj had been well-nigh swept of its military strength to garrison the Panjab, so also might it be said that the lower provinces had been drained of the best energies of the political and civil branches of the service to govern and to administer it. Lord Canning, ever hopeful and sanguine; and, manly himself, appreciating the power of individual manhood in others, looked confidently towards the country in which John Lawrence and his lieutenants stood vigilant and ready for action. Resolute that the Panjab should in all senses be a success, Lord Dalhousie had looked around him for men of good performance and of good promise, and the flower of the two services was planted there when he handed over the Government of India to his successor. There Robert Montgomery and Donald Macleod, afterwards Chief Rulers of the Province, filled the places next in rank to the Chief Commissionership. There Thornton and Roberts, Barnes and Ricketts, of the one service – Edwardes and Nicholson, Becher and Lake, Taylor and James, of the other, and many other resolute and sagacious men, were teaching the people to respect and love them. There, too, was that famous Panjab Irregular Force raised by the Lawrences, and commanded by Neville Chamberlain, with picked officers under him – men such as Coke, Wilde, Daly, and others of the same stamp – a force of horse and foot, trained alike to activity and to endurance amidst the difficulties of a mountain frontier eight hundred

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miles in extent, and little likely, it was believed, to sympathise with the Purbiah regiments of Hindustan. If anywhere throughout our Indian dominions confidence could be placed in the men whose lot it would be to grapple with the dangers rising, up before them, it was in the “pet province” of Lord Dalhousie. No man knew better than Lord Canning how all might be lost by individual feebleness, or all might be won by individual strength. All had been lost at Mirath and Dehli; but he had abundant faith in Lawrence and in those who worked under him in the Panjab; and as days passed, and he learnt, somewhat slowly by reason of postal and telegraphic interruptions, the events which were developing themselves in that province, he felt more and more assuredly that his confidence was not misplaced. Of these events I now proceed to speak.

Lawrence at Rawalpindi

The summer heats had driven Sir John Lawrence from Lahor. The ceaseless labour of years had weakened a robust frame and impaired a naturally strong constitution. A visit to England had been recommended to him; but with that great love of his work, which was shared by all who worked under him in the Panjab, he was reluctant to leave the country so long as he could do his duty with manifest advantage to the State. But he had recognised the necessity of consenting to a compromise, and going out half-way to meet the urgency of the case325. There were cool and pleasant places within the range of the great province which be administered – places in which he might do his work, during the extreme heats of the summer weather, without the waste of strength, which could not be arrested at Lahor. So he had been wont, in the month of May, to repair to the refreshing. slopes of the Mani Hills; and thither he was this year bound, when. the first tidings of the disastrous events at Mirath and Dehli were brought by telegraph to the Panjab. Then he stood fast at Rawalpindi, a spot from which he could observe well all that was passing in the Panjab, and looking down, as it were, from an. eminence on the

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varied scene below, could issue mandates to his lieutenants all over the country, and make his presiding genius felt beyond the limits of the province he governed.

May 11–12

Montgomery at Lahor

Next in authority to the Chief Commissioner was the Judicial Commissioner. Mr. Robert Montgomery was a Bengal civilian of thirty years’ standing in the service. A member of a good Irish Protestant family, he had been taught and disciplined in early youth at that school which had imparted the rudiments of education to the Lawrences. There, on the banks of the Foyle, these young contemporaries had become familiar with the stirring watch. words of Derry: “No surrender!” There, if they did not acquire much classic lore, they laid broad and deep the foundations of a manly character. Hardy, robust, and well-disciplined, they went forth into the world by different paths; but time brought the Derry boys again together to sit beside each other on the same Bench, and to learn the same great lessons. When the Lahor Board of Administration was dissolved, Henry and John Lawrence and Robert Montgomery were its members. On the institution of the new administrative system, under the Chief Commissionership of John Lawrence, Mr. Montgomery became Judicial Commissioner326. There were some characteristic differences between him and his chief; but they lay mainly on the surface. An unmistakable benevolence of aspect, and a rare gentleness of manner, might have led some to suppose that he was one made to shine only in quiet times and in happy circumstances. Bat the genial smile and the kindly voice, which won all hearts, denoted not the absence of that resolute will and that stern courage which spoke out so plainly in the look and bearing of the Chief Commissioner. It only needed a great occasion to show that he could. be hard as a rock and cruel as steel to resist the oppressions of the proud, and to smite the persecutors of our race. And those who knew him best said of him that it was a fortunate circumstance

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that they had then at Lahor, as chief director of affairs, one who was a man of impulse, with whom to think was to act, and whose very defects, including a want of caution and circumspection, were of a kind to be essentially serviceable in , such a conjuncture.

State of the troops at Mian-Mir

The hour of the great crisis found Mr. Montgomery at the civil station of Anarkali, situated at the distance of a mile from the Panjabi capital. In the city of Lahor itself there was a mixed population, numbering nearly a hundred thousand, the most numerous classes being Sikhs and Muhammadans, many of them born soldiers. The Fort, which was within the walls of the city, was garrisoned by a company of an European regiment, some details of European artillery, and half a regiment of Sipahis. These detachments for garrison duty were relieved at fixed intervals, and returned to the cantonment of Mian-Mir, six miles from Lahor, where the great bulk of our military force was posted. At that station were three regiments of Native Infantry’ and a regiment of Native Cavalry, watched by the 81st Foot and two troops of European Horse Artillery. Two of the Sipahi regiments were among the most distinguished in the service. The 16th Grenadiers was one of the “beautiful regiments” which had fought under Nott against the Afghans of Kandahar, and the 26th had done so well under Pollock, that Lord Ellenborough had made it a Light Infantry corps. The other Native regiments were the 49th Infantry and the 8th Cavalry. Roughly computed, it may be said that the Native troops outnumbered the Europeans as four to one.

May 11

May 12

On Monday, the 11th of May, it was known at Lahor that the Mirath regiments had revolted. On the morning of the 12th came the still more exciting intelligence that Dehli was in the hands of the rebels. The tremendous significance of these tidings was not likely to be underrated by a man of Montgomery’s intelligence and experience. But it did not bewilder him for a moment. He saw clearly that the safety of India depended at such a time on the salvation of the Panjab. “The Panjab in the hands of the enemy, and all Upper India must be lost. It was certain that the great arsenal of Dehli had gone from us; it was impossible to exaggerate the helplessness of the English if the magazines of the Panjab and the adjacent territories were also to be wrested from them. Any success on the part of the Regular

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Sipahi regiments might stimulate all the Irregular battalions in. the Panjab to revolt, and this might be followed by a rising of the people. But it was not equally clear how this gigantic evil was to be arrested. Understanding well the Native character, Montgomery knew that the Sipahi was not less likely to be driven into hostility by his fears than by his resentments. It might, therefore, be the safer course to keep things quiet, and to betray no symptom of suspicion. But, on the other hand, it was impossible to overrate the advantage of striking the first blow. The party that is first to be the party of action. has a double chance of success.

But the general knowledge that there was a, spirit of mutiny in the Bengal Army might not have induced the authorities at Lahor to take the initiative, and might not have justified them in doing it, if there had been. no particular knowledge of local disaffection among the Panjabi troops. This knowledge, however, had been obtained. On a suggestion from Mr. Montgomery, Captain Richard Lawrence, Chief of the Police and Thagi Departments in the Panjab, had commissioned the head-writer of the Thagi office, a Brahman of Oudh, to ascertain the feelings and intentions of the Lahor troops. A fitter agent could not have been employed, for his were both the country and the caste of the most influential of the Purbiah Sipahis. He did his work loyally and well. Scrupulous as he was, on the score of caste, as any Brahman in the service, he had no sympathy with the treacherous machinations of men who were eating the salt of the British Government, and were under the kindly care of its officers; and he brought back to Richard Lawrence, after brief but satisfying inquiry, tidings that the regiments at Mian-Mir were ripe for revolt. “Sahib,” said the faithful Brahman, “they are full of fasad327 – they are up to this in it;” and he laid his hand upon his throat. It was plain that they were only waiting for information from the countries below to break into open mutiny.

The Council at Anarkali

In this conjuncture Montgomery took counsel with his colleagues – the chief civilians and staff-officers at Anarkali, who assembled in the house of Macpherson, the Military Secretary. They were Mr. Donald Macleod, Mr. Egerton, Colonel Ommaney, Mr. Roberts, Captains Macpherson, Richard Lawrence, and Waterloo Hutchinson. There was an animated. discussion. Macpherson had already

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talked the matter over with Robert Montgomery, and they had agreed that it would be expedient to deprive the Sipahis of their ammunition328. It was now suggested by the former that this should be done – that the ammunition should be lodged in store, and that the regiments should be told that, as they had obviously much anxiety with respect to the greased cartridges, it was the order of the Government that all ground of alarm should be removed for the present by leaving them without any ammunition at all. On this Richard Lawrence said, “I would disarm them altogether;” to which Macpherson replied that it was scarcely probable that the military authorities would consent to such a measure. After some further discussion Montgomery determined that he and Macpherson should drive over to the military station and propose to the Brigadier, at any rate, to deprive the Native regiments of their ammunition, In ordinary course of affairs, the Chief Commissioner would have been consulted. But there was an interruption of the telegraphic communication between Lahor and Rawalpindi; so the responsibility of deciding upon immediate action rested with Montgomery, and he cheerfully undertook it.

Brigadier Corbett

The station of Mian-Mir was then in military charge of Brigadier Stuart Corbett, an officer of the Indian Army, who had served the Company for nearly forty years, but had lost but little of the bodily and none of the mental vigour of his prime; and it was a happy circumstance that he had none of that incapacity to grasp strange incidents and new situations – none of that timid shrinking from responsibility – which is so often evinced by feeble minds, trammelled by the associations of long years of convention and routine. A happy circumstance, indeed, that to such a man Montgomery now communicated the alarming tidings which had been received from Mirath and Dehli. Corbett saw at once that there was a pressing necessity for prompt and vigorous action; and though, at first, knowing well the feelings of the officers under his command, he could not embrace the bold project of disarming the troops, he did not hesitate to adopt the proposal to render the Native regiments comparatively harmless by the seizure of their ammunition. But, as the day advanced, he began to doubt whether the precautionary measures on which they had resolved in the morning would

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suffice for such an emergency. So he wrote to Macpherson in brief decided language, more emphatic than official, saying that he would “go the whole hog” and disarm the troops altogether And Montgomery readily consented to the proposal329.

The Station ball

May 12–13

It was a bold measure and to be accomplished only by secrecy and suddenness. But neither Montgomery nor Corbett doubted for a moment that a single white regiment, with a good complement of European Artillery, resolutely commanded and skilfully handled, could overawe the Native Brigade, and force them to lay down their arms. A general parade was, therefore, ordered for the following morning. There was nothing in it to invite suspicion. Everything went on as usual in Cantonments. A ball was that evening to be given by the officers of the station to Colonel Benny and the officers of the 81st Foot. All suggestions as to its postponement

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were wisely set aside. Nothing was to be done to excite suspicion. The Sipahis of Mian-Mir, and their brethren of all classes, were to see that the English were feasting and dancing in total unconcern, as ever conscious of their strength and confident in their security. So the rooms of the Artillery Mess-House were lighted up at the appointed time; and hosts and guests assembled as though bent only on the enjoyment of the hour. A few there knew what was coming in the morning, and others had a vague impression of an impending danger – an approaching crisis – that might turn that gaily decorated ball-room into a grim battle-field. Some vague reports passed from one to another about the muster of which they had read in the order-book; and the more suspicious were well pleased to think that they could. lay their hands upon their swords in a moment. The greater number neither knew nor suspected, but grumbled, saying that it was an inconsiderate and unkindly thing at best to order a general parade for the morning after a ball. And so they danced on into the small hours of the morning, and saw their wives and daughters home, as though there were nothing to disturb the smooth surface of ordinary events. The Native sentries posted here and there in Cantonments saw nothing the movements of the English to indicate anxiety or mistrust. If the Sipahis had, as was alleged, really planned the destruction of the English at Mian-Mir, they must have rejoiced in the thought that their victims, utterly regardless of their doom, were going blindfold to the shambles.

May 13

The disarming parade

But when the hours of morning-darkness were past, and day had dawned upon Mian-Mir, other thoughts than these took possession of the Sipahi mind. The Brigade assembled on the parade-ground. There was nothing peculiar in the appearance of that assembly, except that Montgomery, Roberts, and others of the chief civil officers from Anarkali were to be seen mounted on the ground330. Every soldier obeyed the orders that were issued to him. The regiments were drawn up in lines of contiguous columns. The Artillery and 81st (not numbering more than two hundred and fifty men) were on the right, the Native Cavalry on the left, and the Infantry regiments in the centre; the white men appearing as a mere dot beside the long line of the blacks. At

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the head of each regiment was read aloud the Government order disbanding the mutinous 34th at Barrackpur. These formal proceedings over, the serious business of the morning commenced. The Native regiments were ordered to change front to the rear, and at the same time the 81st also changed front, so as to face the Sipahis; the Artillery then in the rear, loading their guns unseen by the Native regiment. When this manoeuvre, which seemed whilst in execution to be only a part of the Brigade exercise of the morning, had been accomplished, a staff officer, Lieutenant Mocatta, Adjutant of the 26th regiment, who could speak the Native languages fluently and correctly, was ordered forward by the Brigadier to read his address to the Sipahis. He did it well, in a clear loud voice, explaining to them that now, a mutinous spirit having evinced itself in other regiments, and brought many good soldiers to certain destruction, it was better that the distinguished regiments at Mian-Mir, which had done so much good service to the State, should place themselves beyond the reach of temptation by surrendering all means of offence; so they were ordered to – “Pile arms.”

Whilst this address was being delivered to the Sipahis, the 81st fell back by subdivisions between the guns; and when the word was given to pile arms, the Native regiments found themselves face to face with a long line of Artillery, and a row of lighted portfires in the hands of the English gunners. At the same time the voice of Colonel Renny rung out clearly with the command, “81st, load!” and then there was the rattle of the ramrods, which told that there was death in every piece. For a minute the Grenadiers had hesitated to obey the order; but thus confronted, they saw that to resist would be to court instant destruction; so they sullenly resigned themselves to their fate, and piled their muskets to the word of command, whilst the Cavalry unclasped their belts and laid their sabres on the ground. The 81st then came forward and removed the arms, for which a large number of carts were waiting, near the parade-grounds, and the Sipahis went baffled and armless to their Lines331.

May 13

It was a great design executed with consummate skill; and if by a first blow a battle was ever won, the battle of the Panjab was fought and won that morning by Montgomery, Corbett, and Renny.

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Seizure of the Fort at Lahor

But this bloodless victory at Mian-Mir was not the whole of that morning’s work. Whilst the parade was being. held,. three companies of the 81st were marching to Lahor to secure the Fort. A wing of the 26th Sipahis was on garrison duty there. It was yet wanting two days of the completion of their tour of duty; and unless they wondered why none of their officers were dancing at Mian-Mir, there was nothing to create- suspicion that there was anything unwonted in the air. But when suddenly, a little while after sunrise, news came that the Europeans were marching on the Fort, they saw at once that whatever plots were to have been acted out on the 15th, they had been discovered, and that the game was altogether lost. Colonel Smith, with his three companies, marched into the Fort. The Sipahis were ordered to lay down their arms. Resistance was hopeless, and they obeyed to a man. The companies of the 81st were then told off to their various duties. and the Sipahis were marched to Mian-Mir, crestfallen and dispirited, there to learn the history of the eventful parade of the morning, They found the place bristling with the bayonets only of the white men. European. picquets and sentries were , posted everywhere. Arrangements were being made to secure the safety of the women and children in the English barracks, and messengers were speeding to different parts of the country to warn our countrymen of the danger with which they were threatened.

May 13

Govindgarh and Amritsar

To secure the safety of one point, although that one point were the great capital of the Panjab, had not been, on that 12th of May, the sole object of Montgomery’s exertions. With a strong European Brigade, Horse, Foot, and Artillery, the authorities at Mirath had refused to divide their force, and had looked only to the safety of the station. But at Lahor, with only one regiment of English Infantry and a few English gunners, in the face of a still larger body of Native troops, Montgomery took a comprehensive view of all surrounding dangers, and turned the scanty means at his disposal to larger account than most men would have deemed possible. But it was his good fortune to find in the military chief a kindred spirit, and to meet with ready response to all his suggestions. If at that time there had been, on the part of the military, any ominous

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shakings of heads and feeble wringings of hands, all would have been lost. But to Corbett and Renny nothing seemed impossible. With the perilous work before them of disarming the Mian-Mir troops, they had sent off three companies of their one white regiment to Dolor; but the crisis was one which demanded even further sacrifice of immediate strength. It was certain that there was much to be done with small means; but it is in such daring and such doing that greatness consists. Another company of the 81st was despatched in Native carriages, hastily collected, to afford succour to another place which seemed to be girt with danger.

The fortress of Govindgarh, which lies some thirty miles from Lahor, is the military stronghold of the great city of Amritsar, the spiritual capital of the Panjab – a city invested in the minds of the Sikh people with the holiest associations.

May 11

In no place throughout the Panjab was the influence of the priesthood so powerful; in no place had the spirit of nationality so largely survived the subjugation of the people. There the Sikh inhabitants were more likely to rise than in any part of the country; and to that centre, more than to any other point, were the Sikhs likely to turn their eyes for a given signal of general insurrection. From the first moment, Montgomery had recognised the paramount importance of securing the Fort and overawing the city. On the morning of the 12th, with the Dehli telegrams before him, be had written to Mr. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner, advising him of what had happened below, telling him that at Lahor they might have to fight for their lives, and urging upon him the immediate necessity of “caring for Govindgarh.” “I would advise,” he said, “every precaution being adopted beforehand, so as to be ready in case of a row. You shall have the best information of all that is going on, and the more quietly we move the better. Do not alarm the Sipahis by any previous acts, but keep the strictest watch on them; and the feelings of the city- should be ascertained by every source at your command. ‘Open communication with Jalandhar, and find out what is going on there. My advice is to be fully alive and awake, and prepared for the worst, without creating any alarm by any open act. If the troops should rise, you have the Fort to go to, and can defend yourselves.” And these stirring words were addressed to a lieutenant worthy of his chief. Mr. Cooper was not a man to be appalled by any danger; and under him

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again there was another civil officer, Mr. Macnaghten, Assistant Commissioner, equally ripe for any hazardous enterprise that might fall in the way of his duty.

Cool and collected, and fertile in resources and expedients, these two now bethought themselves of turning to the best account every possible circumstance that was in their favour. The report at Amritsar was that the disarmed Sipahis from Mian-Mir were coming in a body to help the regiments at the former place to seize upon Govindgarh. The fortress was garrisoned mainly by Sipahi troops. The only Europeans were the gunners of a weak company of Artillery. There was, how-ever, in the Cantonment a horse battery, under Captain Waddy, manned by white soldiers, and this was now removed into the Fort. Cooper, with a party of Irregular horsemen and some faithful Sikhs, took post opposite the Fort gates, whilst Macnaghten went out on the Lahor road to raise a body of villagers to intercept the advance of the rebel Sipahis. The agricultural communities were known to be on our side. They were in a state of unexampled prosperity. There had been one of the richest harvests known for years. Many of the peasantry were hardy Jat cultivators, with no sympathetic leanings towards the Sipahis from Hindustan. They promptly responded to the call, and arming themselves with whatsoever weapons they could seize – perhaps only the implements of their calling – went forth to form a living barrier against the wave of insurrection which, it was believed, was pouring in from Lahor. But safety, not danger, was on the road. About midnight, a noise as of a coming multitude was heard. Macnaghten mustered his villagers, and formed across the highway a sturdy rampart of carts, behind which they awaited the approach of the enemy. But they found themselves face to face with a most welcome arrival of friends. It was the company of the 81st, under Chichester, that had been sent to the relief of Govindgarh. Before daylight the relief had been accomplished, and the fortress was safe.

Firuzpur

So, for the time, by the exertions of Montgomery and Corbett, and those who worked under them, the two great cities of Lahor and Amritsar were placed beyond the reach of immediate, danger. By prompt and unexpected movements on the part of British authority, the revolt of the Sipahis had been paralysed in the very hour of its birth, and

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on the spots most favourable to its vigorous development. But there were other places, at no great distance, which, although of far less political importance, suggested grave doubts and anxieties to our chiefs; and Montgomery, therefore, on the same day sent expresses to all the principal civil officers in the Panjab, bearing copies of a confidential circular letter, in which they were informed of what had taken place, and warned to be in readiness to act promptly and vigorously in the event of an emergency, but to maintain outward calmness and quietude in the face of danger – to be fully alive to the magnitude of the crisis, but to betray no symptom of alarm or excitement. Instructions were issued for the safe custody of the Treasuries, for the strengthening of the Sikh Police, and for the detention of all Sipahi letters; and it ended with the assuring words: “I have full reliance on your zeal and discretion.”

There were two places, especially, which it was most important to secure, on account of the military resources they contained. At Firuzpur and Philur were large quantities of munitions of war, with but few European troops to defend the magazines against the too probable assaults of the Sipahis.

May 13

The 45th and the 57th

At the former place were an arsenal and a magazine of considerable dimensions – the largest in that part of India. Two regiments of Native Infantry and a regiment of Native Cavalry were posted there, and the temper at least of one of the regiments was more than suspected. Appearances, however, were less formidable than at Mian-Mir, for the European strength was greater in proportion to the Sipahi force. The 61st Queen’s was cantoned at Firuzpur, and there also were two companies of European Artillery. The station was commanded by Brigadier Innes, an old Sipahi officer of good repute; but he laboured at that time under the disadvantage of being a stranger. He had arrived to take command of the brigade only on the morning of the 11th. On the following night news came from Lahor that the Sipahis Mirath and Dehli had risen, and the Brigadier was informed that the Native troops at Lahor were to be disarmed on the following day. On the 13th the Brigadier, anxious to discern for himself the bearing of his men, held a morning parade. Their demeanour was not encouraging. If there were nothing openly defiant in their manner, there was an absence of that easy, careless, unoccupied look which characterises the Sipahi in quiet times. It was plain that something was coming.,

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The parade dismissed, Brigadier Innes called a Council of War. The members summoned were the principal political officers, the Commandants of the several regiments, and the Commissary of Ordnance. There was no attempt to obscure the fact that the temper of the Sipahis was most suspicious, and that the safety of the station depended on prompt and vigorous action. Instantly to disarm the Native regiments in a body was not held to be a measure that could be attempted without danger; why is not very clear. So it was determined to divide them – a poor half-measure, which could scarcely be crowned with success – and to disarm them separately on the morrow. But the morrow of vigorous action never comes. The man for a crisis is he who knows no morrow, but is resolute to strike to-day. The regiments were paraded separately, and marched off to different camping-grounds at a distance from their Lines. The 57th quietly obeyed orders, and bivouacked on their allotted space for the night. The 45th, who were marched through the great Bazaar, lost there the little loyalty that was left in them; for among the buyers and the sellers were scatterers of sedition, and sparks flew about everywhere to bring on a great explosion. It happened, too, that as they went the Sipahis caught sight of the European soldiery, and, believing that a hostile movement was intended, raised a cry that there was treachery abroad, and numbers of them fell out, loaded their muskets, and made a rush for the magazine. The rest marched on to their camping-ground.

The outer defences of the magazine were in a state to favour the ingress of the mutineers. The ditch was filled up, and the walls were in ruins; so the Sipahis of the 45th were soon within the so-called intrenchments. But the magazine itself was less assailable, for it was protected by a high wall, and the only entrance was defended by a guard of Redmond’s Europeans. The Sipahis within did their best to assist their comrades with scaling-ladders332; but the English soldiery were more than a match for the mutineers within and without.

May 13–14

The former were seized and disarmed; the latter were driven back, but not before Redmond himself had been wounded. The magazine was thus saved, and three more companies

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of the 61st having been thrown into it, its security was established. But to save the magazine was in effect to sacrifice the Cantonment. With so small a body of European troops, it was impossible to defend one part without exposing another. The vet y division of the Sipahis, which had been thought an element of strength, was in result only a source of difficulty and danger. The remaining companies of the 61st, menaced on both sides, could do little or nothing to save the Cantonment. For the great Bazaar poured forth its multitudes to plunder and destroy. The bungalows of the European officers, the mess-houses, the churches, Protestant and Catholic, were sacked and fired. The night was a night of terror; but the families of the English officers were safe in the barracks of the 61st, and the fury of the assailants did not fall on our defenceless people.

Meanwhile the 57th had remained inactive on their camping-ground, and when morning dawned it was found that there had been but few deserters. The Brigadier, therefore, declared that he would regard them as loyal soldiers, if they would lay down their arms in the European Lines. The Light Company marched in with apparent willingness; but as the others were following, they saw a movement of the 61st, directed against some men of the 45th, who had been tampering with their more loyal comrades, and believing that the Light Company had been trapped, they broke in dismay and fled across the plain. After some time the efforts of their officers to dispel the fear which had seized them were successful, and they were brought back again to their camping-ground. Little by little, as the day advanced, confidence was restored; and before nightfall they had been marched to the European barracks, and had surrendered their arms and the colours of their regiment. But the Sipahis of the 45th were still roaming about the station, defiant and ripe for mischief; and in the morning there was a report that the mutineers intended to seize the regimental magazines. To remove the ammunition into the general magazine was impossible; so the Brigadier determined to destroy it. Two loud explosions were presently heard, and it was known that the magazines of the 45th and 57th had been blown into the air.

There was now nothing left for the 45th but flight. Their comrades were disarmed. Their ammunition was destroyed. The Europeans were now comparatively free to act, and the

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troopers of the 10th Cavalry had not yet drawn. a sabre against their officers. The chances, therefore, were all against the Sipahis; so they took their colours, and turned their faces towards Dehli. And then, for the first time, a spasm of energy seized. upon the Brigadier. Some companies of the 61st, with two guns of the horse-battery, went in pursuit, and then two squadrons of the 10th Cavalry took up the work of the tired footmen, and with Major Marsden, the Deputy Commissioner a dashing officer and a bold rider – drove them some twelve miles from Firuzpur, and scattered them over the country, till they threw away their arms and colours, and hid themselves in villages or crouched in the jungle. Some were taken prisoners by their pursuers, some were given up by the villagers; but it is believed that some also succeeded in joining the Sipahi force within the walls of Dehli.

The great magazine of Firuzpur had been saved; but there was no lustre in the achievement. The British had nothing on which to congratulate themselves but the bare fact. The fact was one of large proportions, for the loss of such supplies of ordnance stores and their gain to the enemy would have weakened our means of offence, and made the work of reconquest far slower and more difficult333. But when we think of what Corbett had done with his one weak regiment at Arian-Mir against a far larger body of Sipahis, we marvel and are mortified as we dwell upon the record of events at Firuzpur. The 61st, supported by the Artillery, could have done what the 81st had been doing, and. might have saved the Cantonment. But Innes, shrinking from responsibility, resorted to half-measures, and accomplished only a half-success. We must not, however, judge him too severely. He did at least as much as most Native Infantry officers, accustomed only to the routine of quiet times, the harness of the regulations, and the supremacy of the Adjutant-General’s office, would have done, and indeed afterwards did, when suddenly brought face to face with a great and trying emergency. Perhaps it is less strange that he only half succeeded, than that lie did not fail outright.

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Philur

There was yet another place of great military importance, the seizure of which was supposed to form part of the first great group of measures designed for the subversion of British authority in the Panjab, and which it was, therefore, of the utmost moment to secure. This was the Fort of Philur, lying between Jalandhar and Lodiana, on the great high road to Dehli. It had been described as the “key of the Panjab;” but, like other keys of the same kind, it was by no means in safe keeping. A considerable arsenal was planted there, but there were no European troops to protect it. When the day’s work was done, and the Ordnance Commissariat officers had gone to their homes, there was not a white face to be seen in the Fort. The Sipahis of the 3rd Infantry garrisoned the place and occupied the adjacent Cantonment. At a distance of some twenty-four miles was the military station of Jalandhar, where the 8th Queen’s were posted, with two Native Infantry regiments, a regiment of Native Cavalry, and a proportionate force of Artillery. The Infantry regiments – the 36th and the 61st – were known to be tainted. They had been in recent contact with corps which had already broken into rebellion. That these Jalandhar regiments had, in concert with the 3rd, plotted the seizure of the Fort of Philur, with its guns and stores, was believed, if it was not proved to be a fact; and only prompt action could avert the threatened disaster. The work to be done was very much the same work as had been so successfully accomplished at Mian-Mir, and with the same means. The European regiment and the Artillery might have disarmed the Sipahis and secured the Fort of Philur.

May 11–12

The brigade was under the command of Brigadier Johnstone, a Queen’s officer of the regulation pattern. He was absent from Jalandhar when news came of the great events at Mirath and Dehli, and Colonel Hartley, of the 8th Queen’s, was in temporary command of the force, On the 11th, the first vague tidings of disaster were passing along the telegraph wires through Jalandhar to Lahor. No action was taken on that day; the story might be exaggerated; it might, therefore, be better to wait for further information.” Next day all doubt was removed, and Colonel Hartley took counsel with the chief civil and military officers at the station. It was plain to everyone that, as an essential measure of security, Philur must be occupied by European troops. It was agreed, therefore, that a detachment of the 8th should be sent off

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secretly under cover of the night. Other measures of precaution were to be taken. The guns, duly covered by European detachments, were to be posted so as to sweep the parade-grounds of the Native troops, and the gunners were to be always at their posts. Europeans from Olpherts’334 troop of Horse Artillery were to act as Cavalry and patrol the station. The ladies and children were placed either in the Royal Barracks or in the Artillery schoolroom and library. Every officer in the Cantonment was constantly alert, day and night, in case of the anticipated surprise; and as it was expected that the Native Cavalry troopers would make a rush upon the guns, heaps of stones were scattered about so as to impede the advance of the horsemen, and to throw them into confusion whilst our grape-shot was acting upon them. But with these defensive measures our action ceased.

May 12

If there was any thought of striking the arms from the hands of the Native soldiery it was speedily abandoned. The reason given is, that in the neighbourhood of Jalandhar were several smaller stations occupied only by Sipahi troops, and that if the regiments there had been disarmed, their comrades at Hoshiarpur, Kangrah, Nurpur, and Philur would have risen against their defenceless officers at those places, and would have streamed down upon Jalandhar, recovered the arms of the regiments there, and set the whole country in a blaze.

Meanwhile, at Philur, on the 12th of May, the Artillery Subaltern Griffith, who, as an Assistant Commissary of Ordnance, was in charge of the magazine, was doing all that resolute manhood could do to protect the precious charge confided to him. Intelligence of the outbreak had been brought by an officer of the Telegraph Department, who came laden with help in the shape of the necessary apparatus to place the interior of the Fort in direct communication with Jalandhar. In the course of a few hours this was done, and a message came right into Griffith’s private office-room, informing him that succours were on their way. Hopefully, cheerfully, the Artillery Subaltern then, with a little handful of Europeans attached to the magazine, addressed himself to the work of holding the Fort during the critical hours of the darkness. At sunset the gates were closed. A gun was brought down to the gateway,

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and all through the night the little party of Englishmen kept guard, relieving each other with ready portfire, and keeping watch from the ramparts to catch the first sound of any com-motion in Cantonments which might indicate that the Sipahis had risen. But all was quiet in the station, and all was quiet within the Fort. The Sipahis of the 3rd were not yet ready. The appointed hour of revolt had not come. So the night passed, and the day dawned; but ere the dawn had come the looked-for deliverance was at hand. A hundred and fifty men of the 8th Foot, two Horse Artillery guns, and a party or Panjabi Horse, appeared under the walls of the Fort. The gate was thrown open. The relieving force marched in; and, to the dismay of the Sipahis, European sentries were posted everywhere in their place, and the arsenal of Philur was saved. It was truly a good night’s work; for the Fort might have become the rallying-place of all the mutinous regiments in that part of the country, and it was preserved, as has been already shown, to be of immense importance to us in our subsequent retributory operations335.

Footnotes

323. The numbers, however, must not be exaggerated. The remains of the Panjabi Army, after the second Sikh war, probably did not exceed 26,000 men. Of these about 10,000 were Sikhs, 7,000 Panjabi Muhammadan, 4,000 hill Rajputs, 4,000 Hindustanis, and 1,000 Gurkahs. About 4,000 of these old soldiers were enlisted into the Panjab Irregular Force, and an equal number into the Military Police.

324. Ante, vol i., p. 316, et seq.

325. On the 13th of May, Sir John Lawrence, in a letter to Colonel Edwardes, wrote: “I have been very unwell and unable to write. The night before last I put some aconite on my temple. It is a deadly poison. In the night it worked into my eye, and I was nearly blinded.”

326. During the existence of the Lahor Board of Administration, Montgomery, who was a civilian of the Thomasonian school, who had graduated in the North-Western Provinces, concurred in the opinions and supported the views of John more frequently than those of Henry Lawrence; but at a later period, his measures both in Oudh and the Panjab indicated his mature acceptance of the principles and policy of the latter. In no one have the Native aristocracy found a more generous advocate than in Sir Robert Montgomery,

327. Sedition.

328. The original suggestion came from Richard Lawrence. –G.B.M.

329. It has been stated, and upon authority commonly trustworthy – that of Mr. Cave-Browne, in his very valuable work, “The Panjab and Dehli in 1857” – that it was the consideration of a more pressing local danger that caused the extreme measure of disarming the troops to be agreed upon. It is said that intelligence had been received to the effect that the Sipahi regiments bad conspired to seize the fort of Lahor. It was garrisoned as above related, by some European Infantry and Artillery, and a wing of a Native regiment. During the first half of the month of May, the 26th were on garrison duty; but on the 15th of the month they were to be relieved by the 49th. And it was agreed that the wing marching out and the wing marching in – more than a thousand men in all – should turn upon the Europeans and slay them; and then, at a given signal to be seen from a distance, the Sipahis at Mian-Mir should rise, massacre their officers, seize the guns, fire the Cantonments, and release all the prisoners in the goal. Nor was the rising to be confined to Mian-Mir. It was believed that at Amritsar, at Firuzpur, at Philur, and Jalandhar, the Sipahi regiments were alike prepared to break into rebellion, and that everywhere their first measure would be the seizure of our magazines. The authority for this story was a Sikh police-officer – said to be a plan of more than ordinary intelligence, and of undoubted loyalty to the British Government – who had communicated it to Richard Lawrence. But after a very searching inquiry into the events of that morning at Mian-Mir, I have been compelled to discard the whole story, so far at least as concerns its alleged effect upon the minds of Montgomery and Corbett, and the consequent disarming of the troops. Mr. Browne says that God’s mercy in permitting- the timely discovery of this plot “alone saved hundreds from the snare laid for them.” But there are grave doubts as to the existence of the plot, and it was not even talked of until after the measure of disarming the troops had been agreed upon. What Richard Lawrence, Captain of Police, really ascertained, at Montgomery’s suggestion, was that which is stated in the text. And it is the belief both of Montgomery and Richard Lawrence, as now before, me under their own hands, that no new information of any kind caused Corbett to adopt the bolder course.

330. They had ridden over from Anarkali in the morning. It appears that they were not at the ball.

331. The arms were taken under a guard of the 81st to the Lahor Fort.

332. Brigadier Innes says that the Sipahis of the 45th “made a rush at the intrenchments with scaling-ladders, which must have been previously prepared.”

333. Mr. Cave-Browne says: “Thus, although the Cantonment had to some extent been sacrificed, there was the consolation of knowing the magazine was saved. Had it fallen into the hands of the mutineers, with its piles of shot and shells, its pits of gunpowder, and its well-stored armoury, Dehli had not been re-won under four times four months.”

334. Henry Olpherts of the Bengal Artillery – cousin of William Olpherts of the same corps, then serving at Banaras. – Ante, p. 152, et seq.

335. See ante, pp. 141–2, for the story of the equipment of the siege train and its march from Philur.

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
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