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Chapter 3 – Progress of Events in the Panjab

May

Policy of Sir John Lawrence

Whilst Daly’s Guide Corps was making this splendid march, and the Panjab was contributing the first-fruits of its accumulated strength to the succour of the English Army at Dehli, events were ripening in the frontier province, and John Lawrence and his associates were laying fast hold of the crisis with a vigorous tenacity, as men knowing right well the sovereign importance of promptitude of action. The Chief Commissioner, in earnest council with Edwardes and Chamberlain, had clearly marked out the policy which was now to be pursued for the preservation of the Panjab. When intelligence of the events at the capital, and especially of the disarming of the Native regiments at Mian-Mir, reached him, he had been at first somewhat startled by the boldness of the conception, and perhaps inclined to question the wisdom of the achievement. For John Lawrence, with all his immense energy and resolution, was a, man cautious and circumspect, who never acted upon impulse. If he thought at the beginning that this open movement against the Sipahis on the part of the Sirkar – this vehement declaration of want of confidence in men who had as yet, within his own circle of administration, done nothing disloyal – was hastily to proclaim a war that it was not desirable to precipitate, there was substantial reason for the doubt349. But he very soon felt full assurance that what had been done had been done wisely and well. And from that time, sternly recognising the fact

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that the crisis had come, that there was nothing to be postponed or coqueted with, or smoothed down, he flung himself into the work before him, full-brained and strong-armed, and grappled with it as perhaps, no other man could have done. Then he, in his turn, startled others by the boldness of his conceptions. There were men equally shrewd and courageous at Lahor, who learnt with alarm that the Chief Commissioner was enlisting Sikhs and Afghans into the service of the State. But this policy was based upon a sound estimate of the antagonism between the Purbiah Sipahis from Hindustan and the Panjabi races, whether Sikhs or Muhammadans – a natural antagonism fostered and increased by the conduct of the former350. To replace these Hindustanis, among whom. it every day became more apparent that mutiny was spreading like a pestilence, by the mixed races of the province and the frontier, might be to substitute a new danger for the old; but the one was certain, the other merely conjectural. And there was good reason to believe that so long as we were capable of asserting our strength, the military classes of the Panjab would array them-selves on our side, if only for the sake of gain. Among the Sikhs, Dehli was both an offence and a temptation. Old prophecies had foretold that the Imperial City of the Mughul would some clay be given up to the plunder of the Khalsa. And it was not to be doubted that the destruction of the Hindustani Army of the Company would tend, sooner or later, to assist them to recover the ascendency they had lost. Sir John Lawrence saw this clearly enough; but he had to deal with an immediate necessity, and he had no need at such. a time to take thought of the Future. So he asked the consent of the Governor-General to the raising of local levies, and this, sought and granted on a small scale, soon expanded into larger proportions, and Sir John Lawrence held in his hand an

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open commission to act according to his own judgment and discretion351.”

This policy met with general favour among the chief political officers in the province, and there were few who did not press for permission to recruit in their own districts. But it was soon apparent that there was in some parts, especially on the frontier, overmuch of hesitation, resulting from want of confidence in our strength. Meanwhile other precautionary measures were being pressed forward with that promptitude and energy which always distinguished such operations in the Panjab. The Police were strengthened. The utmost vigilance was enforced upon them. The different passages of the Panjab Rivers – the fords and ferries – were watched and guarded; and every effort was to be made to intercept those emissaries of evil who, in the guise of wandering fakeers or other religious mendicants, were sowing the seeds of sedition broadcast over the country352. Then, again, great endeavours were made – and with wonderful success – to save the Government Treasure, the loss of which was not to be calculated by the number of rupees to be struck off our cash-balances. It was emphatically the sinews of war to the enemy. Wherever it was held, under Native guards, at outlying stations, it was removed to places of security and stored under the protection of European soldiers. And at the same time an order went forth – merciful in the end, but terrible in the hour of our need – to punish all offenders against the State with a deterring severity, which would strike a great fear into the hearts of the people. “There was no room then for mercy,” it was said; “the public safety was a paramount consideration.” The ordinary processes of the law were set aside, and authority was given to any two civil officers to erect themselves into a special commission to try criminals, and to execute upon them when needed, the sentence of death. At the same time, seeing that it was better to remove the means

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of offence than to punish its commission, he tried to clear the province of all that mass of disaffected non-military humanity from Hindustan353, which was either hanging on to the skirts of the Purbiah Army, or had followed the Faringhis in the hour of success, moved by the great lust of gain to worship what they now reviled. And all these measures for the internal security of the province seemed to John Lawrence the more necessary, as he was straining every nerve to send down troops to Dehli, and thus was weakening his own defensive powers. For this reason, too, it seemed to him that we should act vigorously, and at once, against our declared enemies, taking the initiative whenever opportunity presented itself, and establishing a reputation for that confidence in our own resources, the belief in which by our adversaries is always a tower of strength. And already events were hurrying on to this desired point. One great opportunity was close at hand, and others were pressing on tumultuously behind.

Events at Peshawar

On the 21st of May, Colonel Edwardes returned to Peshawar354. Little sunshine greeted him there. His colleagues, Cotton and Nicholson, had no cheerful intelligence to offer him. A great cloud was over the place. The Sipahi regiments had shown unmistakable signs of that feverishness which presages revolt. Cotton had divided his Hindustani troops in such a manner as to render joint action more difficult; and he had placed Europeans, with guns, in their immediate vicinity, to be prepared for a sudden rising. From many parts of the country tidings of fresh mutinies had come in, and there was a general belief that the whole Native Army was rotten to the core. Intercepted letters showed that the excitement was not confined to those whose names were

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written on the muster-rolls of our regiments355. Nicholson, who, with his wonted energy, had been pushing forward the work of raising local levies, had found an uneasy feeling among the chiefs of the principal tribes, and a general unwillingness to enlist into the service of a Government which seemed to be in a state of decrepitude, if not of decay. “Men remembered Kabul,” wrote Edwardes at a later period. “Not one hundred could be found to join such a desperate cause.” It was clear, therefore, both to him and to Nicholson that it was necessary to sweep away the doubts and uncertainties which were keeping I up this dangerous state of unrest, and to assert, vigorously and undeniably, the power of the English on the frontier.

May 21

On the night of the 21st, they had gone to rest in their clothes beneath the same roof, both assured that a few more hours would ripen their plans, when an express arrived informing them that the companies of the 55th had mutinied at Naushahra, some twenty-four miles distant from Peshawar, and that there was no reliance to be placed on the 10th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry at the same place. The former regiment had been brigaded at Mirath and other stations with the 3rd Cavalry, and was regarded as a fugleman corps, whose every movement would be strictly followed by the regiments in the Panjab. It needed not any long-sustained conversation between Edwardes and Nicholson for both to arrive at the conclusion that the Native troops at Peshawar should be at once disarmed. So the Commissioner and Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar went straightway to the Quarters of the Brigadier, and woke him up in the dead of the night. Starting from his sleep, Cotton saw beside him his two political associates; and, wondering what had brought them his bed-side, prepared himself to listen. He was not a man in any emergency to be flustered, and he soon took in with a cool brain the whole state of the case. It would be necessary to send European troops from Peshawar to coerce the refractory regiment at Naushahra and Hoti-Mardan, and the white troops at Cotton’s disposal, already weakened by the requirements of

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the Movable Column and by summer sickness, could little afford a further draft from them, whilst the Hindustani regiments were in armed force in the cantonment. Moreover, it was plain that the tribes on the Frontier were eagerly watching events, and the excitement was every day increasing. But there were two aspects in which this might be regarded, for thus to strip the Frontier of a large part of its defenders – to reduce the available force at the disposal of the British Government to a handful of European troops – might be to encourage the Afghans to stream through the Khaibar Pass in an irresistible spasm of energy for the recovery of Peshawar. The risk of action was great; the risk of quiescence seemed also to be great. But to those three brave men, in midnight council assembled, it appeared that the bolder would be the better course; and so it was resolved that they should be the first to strike, and that four of the five Sipahi regiments should be disarmed at break of day356. The responsibility of the blow would rest with Cotton. He did not hesitate to accept it.

Disarming of the Sipahi regiments

There was no time to be lost. So he at once summoned the Commanding Officers of the Native regiments to his Quarters. Day broke before they were assembled. There, in the presence of Edwardes and Nicholson, Cotton told them what he had determined to do, and ordered them to parade their regiments with all possible despatch. Then there arose a storm of remonstrance. Protesting their entire confidence in the fidelity of their men, these Sipahi Commandants clamoured vehemently against the threatened disgrace of their regiments; and one declared his conviction that his corps would never submit to lay down its arms, but would rise against the order and resolutely attack the guns357. Cotton listened attentively to all

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that was said, but the discussion proceeded after argument had been exhausted, and, after a while, Edwardes, thinking that time and words were being wasted, broke in with an emphatic sentence, to the effect “that the matter rested entirely with Brigadier Cotton.” On this Cotton at once exclaimed: “Then the troops as originally determined will be disarmed.” This silenced all further remonstrance. Not another word was said by way of argument. The regimental Commandants received their instructions and went forth to do the bidding of their chief.

It has been stated that the Peshawar Force had been wisely cut in two, as a precautionary measure, by Brigadier Cotton. It was now arranged that Edwardes should accompany Cotton to the right wing, whilst Nicholson went to the left with Colonel Galloway of the 70th Queen’s who stood next in seniority358. With the former were Her Majesty’s 87th Fusiliers, with the latter the 70th, both with detachments of Artillery to support them. It was a moment of intense anxiety. The Sipahi Commandants were parading their men, and. the Queen’s Regiments were lying in wait to attack them on the first sign of resistance. The suddenness of the movement took the Sipahis aback; they laid down their arms to the bidding of their own officers. And as the piles grew and grew, under the mournful process of humiliating surrender, a feeling of profound grief and shame took possession of their officers, and it is recorded that some of them cast their own swords and. spurs upon the heaps of abandoned musketry and sabres in token of the strength of their sympathy with the Sipahis, and their detestation of the authority which had degraded them359.

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The arms surrendered, Brigadier Cotton addressed the regiments, praising them for the readiness with which. they had obeyed orders; and they went to their Lines. Thus was the work done well and thoroughly – and without the shedding of a drop of blood. The effect upon the minds of the people was magical. They believed that we were strong because we were daring. The old aphorism, that “nothing succeeds like success,” was here triumphantly verified. The tribes, who had held aloof whilst danger threatened us, and. the issue was doubtful, now pressed forward eagerly to do homage to the audacity of the English. Without another halt of doubt, or tremor of hesitation, they came forward with their offers of service. “As we rode down to the disarming,” said Herbert Edwardes, “a very few chiefs and yeomen of the country attended us, and I remember, judging from their faces, that they came to see which way the tide would turn. As we rode back friends were as thick as summer flies, and levies began front that moment to come in.” Good reason, indeed, had Sir John Lawrence to write to the Peshawar Commissioner, with hearty commendation. saying: “I look on the disarming of the four corps at Peshawar as a master-stroke – one which will do much good to keep the peace throughout the Panjab. Commandants of Corps are under a delusion, and whilst in this state their opinions are of little value. ... We are doing well in every district – Becher famously360.”

Punishment of Deserters

But although the Native regiments at Peshawar had been disarmed, they had not been rendered altogether innocuous. Arms on that frontier, though for the most part of a ruder kind than our own, were abundant, and our disciplined Sipahis, fraternising with the border tribes, might have returned to do us grievous injury361. It was, perhaps, too much to expect that the entire body of Sipahis would remain quietly in their Lines; for if the active principle of rebellion were within them, they would be eager to cross the Frontier, and if they were under the pressure of a great panic, confused and bewildered by the blow which had fallen upon them, they would surely believe that it was the design of the English to destroy the soldiers whom they had

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disarmed. It was scarcely, therefore, to be hoped that at such a time there would be no desertions. But it was necessary at once to arrest these natural impulses to leave the Lines362. It was not a time for tenderness – for mercy – even for justice. A stern example was to be made of the first offenders. So the Police were put upon their track, and the tribes were encouraged to arrest the fugitives. Many were brought back, in the firm grip of their supposed friends and confederates – some of them after falling among thieves and being despoiled of all they possessed.

Those were the early days of our great trouble; and Regulation and Routine were still paramount amongst us. The technicalities of the Judge-Advocate had not been dispensed with, and the trial of these deserters, therefore, was conducted with all due ceremony and formality363. Colonel Galloway was President of the Court-Martial assembled by order of General Reed, and the first result was that the Subahdar Major of the 51st, found guilty of desertion, was sentenced to death; whilst a Hawaldar and a Sipahi were condemned to short terms of imprisonment. The leniency of these latter sentences provoked Cotton and Edwardes; but the public execution of a high Native officer might still have a good deterring effect. So on the evening of the 28th of May, what was called, in the semi-official language of the time, “an useful timber frame-work” was erected on the parade-ground, and a general parade was ordered for the following morning. “The Subahdar Major of the 51st was hanged this morning,” wrote Edwardes to Nicholson on the 29th, “in presence of all the troops, who behaved well. I occupied the road in rear of Cantonments with Horse and Foot levies, in case the 51st should refuse to attend the parade, as some people expected, in which case General Cotton would have put them to the bayonet364.” But soon the “useful timber frame-work” thus called into requisition for the first time at Peshawar was put to larger uses, until the process of suspension became tedious, and convicted offenders were blown from the guns.

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Destruction of the 55th

In the meanwhile retribution was overtaking the 55th Regiment at Mardan. “An hour hence,” wrote Edwardes on the day after the disarming at Peshawar, “a small force of three hundred European Infantry, about two hundred and fifty Cavalry (Native Irregulars), and eight guns, six of which are howitzers, will march from this Cantonment to the ferry at Dobandi, and thence proceed to-morrow night in one long march to the Fort of Mardan, for the purpose of disarming the 55th Native Infantry, which is said to be in a state of mutiny.” The expedition was commanded by Colonel Chute of the 70th Queen’s365, and with it, as political officer, went Colonel John Nicholson, ever eager to be in the thick of the action. It has been already related that the 55th had been ordered to relieve the Guide Corps at Hoti-Mardan, It had proceeded thither from Naushahra, leaving two companies at the old station under Captain Cameron. There the Queen’s 27th (Enniskillens) had been stationed with Brougham’s battery; but the former had been ordered to Rawalpindi, and the latter to Peshawar. And now, with the exception of a little handful of Europeans, who had been placed in charge of the sick and the women and children of the old European garrison, the place was left to the mercy of mutinous native troops366. The situation was one of extreme danger. But it was manfully confronted by Lieutenant Davies of the Enniskillens, who, having placed his helpless charge in a convenient barrack, drew up his little body of staunch Englishmen, fully accoutred and ready for action, and prepared to meet his assailants. These signs of resistance were too much for the mutineers. Having fired a few random shots from a distance, they made off towards the river, intending to cross by the bridge of boats, and to join their comrades in Hoti-Mardan.

May 22–24

But Taylor, of the Engineers, with characteristic readiness of resource, broke the bridge, by drawing out the boats in mid-channel, and only a few men made the passage of the river and joined their head-quarters in the course of the night. The rest returned to their

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Lines, and for a while remained sullen and inactive. But a summons came to them to march to Mardan, and on the night of the 22nd they went thither peaceably under Cameron’s command.

They went to swell the tide of treason. There was no doubt of the treachery of the main body of the regiment, although with lip-loyalty it was still deceiving its officers, after the old fashion; and its Colonel, Henry Spottiswoode, who is described as “a devoted soldier, who lived for his regiment,” protested that he had “implicit confidence” in his men, and implored Cotton not to act against them. So strong, indeed, was his trust, that even the warnings of some men of his own corps could not shake it. Two hundred Sikhs had been enlisted into the regiment since it had been stationed in the Panjab, and these men now offered, if separated from the rest, to fight the whole of the Hindustani Sipahis. But Spottiswoode shook his head and declined the offer. He had faith in his children to the last. He would “stake his life on their staunchness;” and he did. On the night of the 24th, the advance of the force from Peshawar was suspected, if not known, by the Sipahis, and the Native officers went to the Colonel for an explanation. Spottiswoode knew the truth of the report but too well. He could answer nothing of an assuring kind, and the deputies went unsatisfied from his presence. Then his heart sunk within him. It was all over. The mutual confidence on which he had relied so much was gone forever. He could not bear the thought of the future, so left alone in his room he blew out his brains367.

May 25

As day was breaking on the 25th, Chute’s column, having been strengthened by a body of Panjab Infantry under Major Vaughan, came in sight of the Fort of Hoti-Mardan. No sooner was their advance discerned from the walls than the 55th rose in a body and rushed forth tumultuously, turning their faces towards the hills of Sawad. Now that their Colonel was gone, they felt that there was no hope for them. So they went, taking with them their arms, their regimental colours, all the treasure they could seize, and all the ammunition that they could carry with them. Chute sent

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on a detachment of all arms of his little force, whilst he occupied the Fort with the remainder368; but the mutineers had a long start, and the country was such that our guns could not be brought within range of the fugitives. These things were in their favour.

Nicholson in pursuit

But there was one thing terribly against them. Nicholson was there. His foot in the stirrup, his sword by his side, and a few trusty horsemen in behind him, all his old martial instincts, of which civil employment had long denied the gratification, grew strong within him again, and he swept down upon the flying Sipahis with a grand swoop, which nothing could escape or resist. It was said afterwards that the tramp of his war-horse was heard miles off. “Spottiswoode’s light-hearted boys,” he wrote to Edwardes on the 24th, “swear that they will die fighting. Nous allons voir.”

May 24–26

And a day or two later he wrote to the same beloved correspondent saying, “The 55th fought determinately, as men, who have no chance of escape but by their own exertions, always do.” But the pursuing party killed about a hundred and twenty of the mutineers, captured about a hundred and fifty, with the regimental colours, and more than two hundred stands of arms369. The rest took refuge in the Lund-khur hills. And many of those who fell on that day fell under Nicholson’s own strong arm. Of those under him, none fought so well as his own Mounted Police. The men of the Irregular Cavalry only “pretended to act370.” “I did not get home till 7 P.M. yesterday,”

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he wrote to Edwardes on the 20th of May, “having been just twenty hours in the saddle, and in the sun the whole day. So you may fancy I was dead beat, and my horse too. He carried me over seventy miles.”

If there had been any doubt before as to the man of men – the one, of all others, strong in action and swift in pursuit, by whom desperate work, such as Edwardes had spoken of in Calcutta, was to be done best, the question was now settled. All men saw in this the first of Nicholson’s great exploits in the mutiny-war, the forerunner of many others of the same stamp. It was a fine thing at that time – nothing finer in the whole history of the war – to mark the enthusiasm with which men, all earnest in the great work before them, rejoiced in the successes of their brethren, and sent forth, one to another, pleasant paeans of encouragement. The chief officers of the Panjab were bound together not merely by the excitement of a common object; the bonds of a common affection were equally strong within them, and each was eager to express his admiration of the good deeds of another. There may have been good fellowship in other provinces, but in none was there such fellowship as this. Men of the stamp of Edwardes and Nicholson, Becher and Lake, James and McPherson – all having equal zeal for the public, but not all enjoying equal opportunities, or, perhaps, possessing equal powers, free from all jealousies, all rivalries – were strong in mutual admiration, and were as proud of the exploits of a comrade as of their own. This great raid of John Nicholson stirred the hearts of all men to their depth. Edwardes in letter after letter, in brief but emphatic sentences, had sent him those fine, frank, genial words of hearty commendation, which no man ever uttered more becomingly or more accept-ably, and afterwards recorded officially that his friend “with a handful of horsemen hurled himself like a thunderbolt on the route of a thousand mutineers.” And John Becher, all a-glow with admiration of the two Peshawar Commissioners, wrote to Edwardes, saying, “I rejoice to see you thus riding on the whirlwind and controlling the storm, and glad amidst the thunder-clouds. Your letter sounds like a clarion-blast full of vigour and self-reliance; and I am proud to see you and Nicholson in this grand storm, masters at your work; right glad that Nicholson did not leave. There was work for his war-horse, and he is in his element – the first who has struck a

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death-blow. And we may be proud of John Lawrence as a master-spirit in these times371.”

June 2

A terrible example was now to be made of the mutineers of the 55th. A hundred and twenty Sipahi prisoners were in the hands of the British. They were all liable to the punishment of death. It was not to be doubted that the time had come when the severity of the hour would be the humanity of all time. But these rebels, though taken fighting against their masters, and known to have had murder in their hearts, had not shed the blood of their officers, and there were some amongst them who in the tumult of the hour had been carried away by the multitude without any guilty intent. The voice of mercy, therefore, was lifted up. “I must say a few words for some of the 55th prisoners,” wrote Nicholson to Edwardes. “The officers of that regiment all concur in stating that the Sikhs were on their side to the last. I would, therefore, temper stern justice with mercy, and spare the Sikhs and young recruits. Blow away all the rest by all means, but spare boys scarcely out of their childhood, and men who were really loyal and respectful up to the moment when they allowed themselves to be carried away in a panic by the mass.” And Sir John Lawrence wrote also in the same strain to the Commissioner of Peshawar. “In respect to the mutineers of the 55th, they were taken fighting against us, and so far deserve little mercy. But, on full reflection, I would not put them all to death. I do not think that we should be justified in the eyes of the Almighty in doing so. A hundred and twenty men are a large number to put to death. Our object is to make an example to terrify others. I think this object would be effectually gained by destroying from a quarter to a third of them. I would select all those against whom anything bad can be shown – such as general bad character, turbulence, prominence in disaffection or in the fight, disrespectful demeanour to their officers during the few days before the 26th, and the like. If these did not make up the required number,

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I would then add to them the oldest soldiers. All these should be shot or blown away from the guns, as may be most expedient. The rest I would divide into batches: some to be imprisoned ten years, some seven, some five, some three. I think that a sufficient example will then be made, and that these distinctions will do good, and not harm. The Sipahis will see that we punish to deter, and not for vengeance. Public sympathy will not be on the side of the sufferers. Otherwise, they will fight desperately to the last, as feeling certain that they must die372.”

And in these opinions, equally politic and merciful, the military authorities concurred; indeed, there was at one time some talk of suffering those men of the 55th, who had not actually committed themselves, to retain their arms, and even of rewarding the best of them. But subsequent investigation proved that the Hindustanis who had not left the Fort owed their immunity from actual crime rather to accident than to loyal design; so they were discharged without pay, and sent beyond the Indus, whilst the Sikhs, who had made gallant offer of service, were left with their arms in their hands, and drafted into other regiments.

June 10

Then came the stern work of retribution. On the 3rd of June, twelve deserters of 51st had been hanged; and now on the 10th, the parade-ground of the 87th Queen’s, on which the gallows had been permanently erected, witnessed another scene of execution still more ghastly in its aspect. The fugitives from Hoti-Mardan had all been sentenced to death. A hundred and twenty criminals had been condemned to be blown away from our guns. But the recommendations of the Chief Commissioner had tempered the severity of the sentence, and only one-third of the number had been marked for execution. Forty prisoners were brought out manacled and miserable to that dreadful punishment-parade. The whole garrison of Peshawar was drawn up, forming three sides of a square, to witness the consummation of the sentence. The fourth side was formed by a deadly array of guns. Thousands of outsiders had poured in from the surrounding country to be spectators of the tremendous ceremony – all curious, many doubtful, some perhaps malignantly eager for an outbreak, to be followed by the collapse of British ascendency. The pieces of the Europeans were loaded. The officers, in

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addition to their regulation arms, had for the most part ready to their clutch what was now becoming an institution – the many-barrelled revolver pistol. The issue was doubtful, and our people were prepared for the worst.

Under a salute from one of the batteries, the Brigadier-General appeared on parade. Having ridden along the fronts of the great human square, he ordered the sentence to be read. And this done, the grim ceremony commenced. The forty selected malefactors were executed at the mouth of the guns373. No man lifted a hand to save them. The Native troops on parade bore themselves with steadiness, as under a great awe, and when orders went forth for the whole to march past in review order, armed and unarmed alike were obedient to the word of command. To our newly-raised levies and to the curious on-lookers from the country, the whole spectacle was a marvel and a mystery. It was a wonderful display of moral force, and it made a deep and abiding impression. There was this great virtue in it, that however unintelligible the process by which so great a result had been achieved, it was easy to understand the fact itself. The English had conquered, and were masters of the position. Perhaps some of the most sagacious and astute of the spectators of that morning’s work said to each other, or to themselves, as they turned. their faces homeward, that the English had conquered because they were not afraid. The strength, indeed, imparted to our cause by the disarming-parade of the 24th of May had been multiplied ten-fold by the punishment-parade of the 10th of June. And it is hard to say how many lives – the lives of men of all races – were saved by the seeming severity of this early execution.

Among the rude people of the border the audacity thus displayed by the English in the face of pressing danger excited boundless admiration. They had no longer any misgivings with respect to the superiority of a race that could do such great things, calmly and coolly, and with all the formality of an inspection-parade. The confidence in our power, which the disbandment of the Native regiments had done so much to

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revive, now struck deep root in the soil. Free offers of allegiance continued to come in from the tribes. Feeling now that the English were masters of the situation, their avarice was kindled, and every man who had a matchlock or a tulwar, or, better still, a horse to bring to the muster, came forward with his tender of service to the British officers at Peshawar. The difficulties and perplexities of the crisis could not obscure the humours of this strange recruiting. Herbert Edwardes, who was the life and soul of every movement at that time, has himself sketched its comic aspects with an almost Hogarthian fidelity of detail374. But this passed, whilst every week developed more strikingly its serious results. For, as the month of June advanced, and news came that the English had not retaken Dehli, and across the border went from mouth to mouth the rumour of the fiery crescent, there was increasing danger that Musalman fanaticism might prevail over all else, and that a religious war once proclaimed, it would be impossible to control the great tide of Muhammadanism that would pour itself down from the North. If in that hour the English had been weak at Peshawar, they might have been overwhelmed. But much as those wild Muslims loved Muhammad, they loved money more, and when they saw that we were strong, they clung to us, as the wiser policy.

The end of the 55th may be narrated here. Even more deplorable than the fate of these men, thus suddenly brought face to face with ignominious death, was the doom impending over their comrades, who had escaped from Nicholson’s pursuing horsemen across the border into Sawad. There they found the country rent by intestine feuds; almost, indeed, in the throes of a revolution. The temporal and spiritual chiefs – the Padishah and the Akhund – were at strife with one another. The mutineers took themselves and their arms to the former, but he had no money to pay them, and our sleek, well-fed Hindustanis soon discovered that they had committed a grievous blunder. In a little while the body of their leader – the self-made shattered corpse of a white-bearded Subahdar – was floating down the river under the walls of Naushahra, and his followers, disappointed and destitute, were turning their faces towards the country of the Rajah of Kashmir, sick of Musalman

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fanaticism, and hoping to excite sympathy and obtain service under a Rajput government. These poor deluded Hindus, who had abandoned pay, pension, peace, everything that was dear to them, under a blind besetting belief in the bigotry of their Christian masters, now found themselves breast-high in the bitter waters of Muhammadan persecution375. They had escaped the chimera of a greased cartridge to be despoiled of their sacred threads and circumcised. They had fled from a random rumour to confront a revolting reality. And now they were fain to go skulking along the border, taking their gaunt bodies and tattered garments to any place of refuge open to them, seeking rest, but finding none; for as they huddled along the Hazarah border, stumbling through rocky defiles, more inhospitable than their Muhammadan persecutors, John Becher raised the friendly clans to hunt them out like vermin. Then their misery was at its height. Hungry and naked and footsore, it was death to them to move, it was death to them to remain still. Another venerable Subahdar set an example of suicide to his followers by shooting himself, declaring that it was better to die at once than to perish slowly by starvation. Becher himself has told with rare force of language how first one detachment then another was assisted by friendly Kohistanis and others, whose services he had most sagaciously enlisted, until the whole were either destroyed or brought prisoners into our camp376. Then came the last scene of all, in which the

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Gibbet and the Guns were the chief actors. On the very outskirts of civilisation, where only a few Englishmen were gathered together, the last of “Spottiswoode’s light-hearted fellows” paid the penalty of their folly or their crime. One party after another of the fugitives was brought in, tried by a military court and sentenced to death; and they were hung up, or blown away, on some commanding ground, to be a warning and a terror to others. Brave and sullen they went to their doom, asking only to die like soldiers at the cannon’s mouth, not as dogs in the noose of the gibbet. Little less than two hundred men were executed at that time in the Hazarah country. “Thus, hunted down to the last like wild beasts, was consummated the miserable fate of the 55th Regiment, and thus they afforded a salutary example to other mutinous regiments, by proving the far reach of our power, and that there was no refuge even beyond our border377.” If any had not been thus hunted out, their fate was perhaps worse than that of the executed malefactors, for they were sold into slavery, and compelled to apostatise for their lives.

Alarms on the Frontier

Elsewhere, however, were ominous symptoms upon the Frontier. Nicholson, since his great raid against the fugitives of the 55th, had been still in the field, and he had frequently written to Edwardes that the Musalman chiefs on the border were eagerly watching the progress of events, and encouraging the rebellion of our Native soldiery; who, at the same time, had been making overtures to them. There was, too, a, notorious outlaw, named Ajun Khan, who was believed to be intriguing with our troops at Abazai, a fortress on the banks of the Sawad River, and Nicholson was eager to make a swoop upon him378. “The game

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May 26

is becoming nicer and more complicated,” he had written on the 26th of May from Mardan, “Ajun Khan has came down to Prangar, and it is generally believed that he has done so at the instigation of our troops there. This does not seem improbable. There is no doubt that for some time past emissaries (mostly Mullahs) from the Hills had been going backwards and forwards between the 55th Native Infantry here and certain parties in their own country.”

May 30

Four days afterwards, he wrote from Omarzai, saying: “We are just starting for Abazai. I will let you know this evening whether I recommend. the disarming of the 64th Native Infantry. I am strongly inclined to believe that we should not merely disarm but disband that corps, and the 10th Irregular Cavalry. There is no doubt that they have both been in communication with the Akhund of Sawad. ... If the disarming of both or either corps be determined upon, we can do it very well from here, without troubling the Peshawar troops.. I believe we did not pitch into the 55th one day too soon. That corps and the 64th were all planning to go over to the Akhund together. I have got a man who taunted my police on the line of march with siding with infidels in a religious war. May I hang him?”

On the following day Nicholson wrote from Abazai, saying: “We arrived here all right yesterday, and found the 64th looking very villainous, but of course perfectly quiet. They have been talking very disloyally both to the Ghilzis” (men of the Kalat-i-Ghilzi Regiment) “and people of the country, and the former have ceased to associate with them. The latter have been rather hoping for a row, in the midst of which they may escape paying revenue.” What he saw was quite enough to convince him that it would be well to do the work at once.

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Approval had come from Cotton from Edwardes, and front Lawrence. So a detachment of Europeans, with some Panjabi details and some guns of Brougham’s battery, the whole under that officer, were sent to disarm the companies at Shabkhadr, and afterwards those at Michni, whilst the force at Abazai was. being dealt with by other components of Chute’s column. The teeth of the 64th were drawn without difficulty. But the annihilation of the 10th Irregular Cavalry was reserved for another day. Nicholson recommended that no action should be taken against the Irregulars until tidings of the fall of Dehli should have reached the Panjab. He little thought how remote was this event at the beginning of June; that long months were yet to wear away in unsuccessful efforts to accomplish the great object for which the Panjab was pouring out so much of its military strength. And others were of the same sanguine temper all over the Province – fortunately, for this faith, strong though delusive, sustained them, and they worked with better heart and greater vigour for holding fast to the lie.

June 10

There was now no further service for Chute’s column to perform. So it marched back to Peshawar, and Nicholson rode on in advance of it, to resume his political duties. On the 10th of June, Edwardes welcomed his friend and fellow-workman with warm congratulations on his success. “Nicholson. came in from Abazai this morning,” he wrote to Sir John Lawrence, “looking rather the worse for exposure; and we have been going over the batta question, &c., with the General, and have decided to say nothing about it till Dehli falls, and then to disarm the 10th Irregular Cavalry, and. exempt from the abolition of batta the 21st Native Infantry, the Kilat-i-Ghilzi Regiment, and the 17th and 18th Irregular Cavalry, if they keep quiet.” And in the same letter he wrote to the Chief Commissioner, saying, “What a terrible job is the going off of those three regiments from Jalandhar and Philur towards Dehli!” It was a source of sore distress and dire aggravation to Edwardes and Nicholson that, whilst they had been doing so much for the defence of the province and the maintenance of the honour of the nation, others were throwing away every chance that came in their way, and by their weakness and indecision suffering the enemy to escape.

For in other parts of the province there was not always that glorious audacity which secures success by never doubting its

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attainment.

Mutiny at Jalandhar

In the first week of June, the Sipahi regiments at Jalandhar, whom, as we have already seen, Brigadier Johnstone had not disarmed in May, were swelling with sedition and ripe for revolt. Major Edward Lake, who, in early youth, had shared with Herbert Edwardes the distinction of striking the first blow at the Multani insurgents of ’49, was Commissioner of the Jalandhar division. He had been absent on circuit when the events occurred which have been detailed in a previous chapter379, but before the end of the month he had returned to Head-Quarters, had closely observed the temper of the Sipahis, and had been convinced that they were only waiting an opportunity to break into open rebellion. He strongly counselled, therefore, the disarming of the regiments. But there was no Cotton at Jalandhar. The Sipahi commandants shook their heads after their wonted fashion; and the Brigadier, tossed hither and thither by wild conflicts of doubt, at last subsided into inaction.

June 7

Events were left to develop themselves, and they did so with all possible advantage to the mutineers. On the night of the 7th of June, the Native battalions – two regiments of Foot and one of Horse – inaugurated a general rising by setting fire to the house of the Colonel of the Queen’s regiment. In a little while the Lines were all astir with the sights and sounds of open mutiny; and the officers were making their way to the parade-grounds, whilst women and children, in wild excitement, were hurrying to the appointed place of refuge. It is not easy to describe the uproar and confusion which made the midnight hideous, nor to explain the reason why, in the presence of an European regiment and a troop of European Artillery, the insurgents were allowed to run riot in unrestrained revolt. The incidents of the rising were of the common type. They were not distinguished by any peculiar atrocities. It seems that there was a general understanding among the Sipahis that on a given day they should set their faces towards Dehli. As a body, they did not lust for the blood of their officers; but in the excitement of the moment, murderous blows were dealt. Adjutant Bagshawe, of the 36th Regiment – a gallant officer and a good man – was mortally wounded whilst endeavouring to rally a party of his Sipahis. The death-blow did not come from one of his own men, but

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from a trooper who “rode up and shot him.” Other officers were wounded in the confusion of the hour; houses were burnt, and property was destroyed. But there were instances of fidelity and attachment on the part of the Sipahis; men came forward staunchly and devotedly to save the lives of their officers. And altogether there were the usual contradictions and anomalies, which, more or less all over the country, seemed to indicate the general half-heartedness of the Sipahi revolt.

It was obviously the intention of the Jalandhar Brigade to pick up the long-wavering regiment at Philur, and then for the whole to march on to Dehli380. A trooper of the Cavalry galloped forward in advance of the rebel force to give the 3rd the earliest tidings of their approach.

June 8

The conduct of the last-named corps appears to be inscrutable, except upon the hypothesis of a long-cherished design, and that patient, sturdy resistance of all immediate temptations, which. seems in many instances to have distinguished the behaviour of men waiting for an appointed day and a given signal. The 3rd, that might have done us such grievous injury when the siege-train was in its 0-rasp, now that the time had come, cast in its lot with the Jalandhar mutineers, and swept on towards the city of the King. It is one of the worst disgraces of the war that these Jalandhar regiments were ever suffered to reach Philur. There was no lack of men eager to pursue the mutineers; but the one word from the one responsible authority was not spoken until all orders might as well have been given to the winds. The mutineers had done their work and marched out of cantonments by one o’clock in the morning, and not until seven was the word given for the advance of the pursuing column. The extreme consideration

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of Brigadier Johnstone for his European troops was such that he waited until the fierce June sun had risen – waited until the commissariat was not ready – waited until the enemy had escaped381. The pursuers marched out and marched back again, never having seen the enemy at all.

The history of the so-called pursuit appears to be this. In the course of the day, there being a vague impression that Philur might be in danger, Olpherts, with two of his guns, carrying a small party of the 8th Queen’s on their carriages, and accompanied by the 2nd Panjab Cavalry, pushed on to that place, where they found that the officers of the 3rd had escaped into the Fort, and that the Sipahis were crossing the river at a ferry some four miles distant. After a while, the main body of the troops from Jalandhar came up, and then the question arose as to whether anything could be done. Those who would fain have done something, did not know what to do, and those who knew what should be done, were not minded to do it. No one from Jalandhar knew the way from Philur to the Satlaj, and the Philur officers, shut up in the Fort, sent out no one to guide them. So the result was that no one did anything, and the pursuing column bivouacked bravely for the night. It is understood that the highest military authorities were convinced that Brigadier Johnstone had done his duty nobly – but History and the Horse Guards are often at issue.

Ricketts and Thornton

Such, however, are the alternations of light and shadow in this narrative, that the narrator has never to tarry long without an example of that activity of British manliness which saved the Empire in this great convulsion. Whilst the Jalandhar Brigadier was thus earning the approbation of the highest military authorities, two junior civilians, acting only on their own impulses, were

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doing their best to cut off the march of the mutineers. One of these was a young gentleman named Thornton, who had been one of the first to enter the service by the open door of general competition, and who seemed to be bent on proving that the reproach levelled at the new order of civilians – that they were men of books, not men of action – was unfounded and unjust. He had ridden over from Lodiana to Philur to pay the regiment there, had learnt that the troops had risen, and. had pushed. on with all haste to the river-bank and cut away the bridge of boats. Hurrying then back to Lodiana, he found that Mr. Ricketts, the Deputy-Commissioner, had received by telegraph information of the rising at Jalandhar, and was already making such preparations as he could for the security of that important post. Lying on the great high road from the Panjab to Hindustan, it was to be assumed that the mutineers would sweep through it, carrying destruction with them, on their route to the appointed goal of Dehli. Little was it that Ricketts could have done in any case, but that little was made less by the fact that the news of the Jalandhar rising reached the Sipahis at Lodiana almost as soon as it had reached himself, and they were not less prompt in action. Those Sipahis were a detachment of the 3rd from Philur. They were waiting for the signal and ready to strike. Their first movement was to seize the Fort and the Treasury, There were no European troops, so this was easily accomplished. The situation was one of infinite peril. The mutineers from Jalandhar and Philur might be expected at any hour. But the Satlaj was still between them, and if Ricketts could guard the passages of the river only for a little space, the pursuing column might come upon the fugitives before they had crossed. Fortunately, the 4th (Rothney’s) Sikh Regiment had reached Lodiana that morning after a long and weary march. Three companies, under Lieutenant Williams, were now told off for service, and the Rajah of Nabha was called upon for a Contingent. The chief sent detachments of Horse and Foot, with two six-pounder guns, and with these Ricketts went out to dispute the passage of the river.

June 8

The first thing was to ascertain the exact position of the enemy. So Ricketts, crossing the river in a ferry-boat, walked along the opposite bank to Philur, and there learnt that the insurgents, having been baulked by Thornton’s destruction of the bridge, had made for a ghaut, some four miles higher up, at a narrow bend of the stream, and

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were preparing for the passage of the Satlaj382. Possessed of this important information, the gallant civilian recrossed the river, rejoined the detachment, and, in concert with Lieutenant Williams, made his arrangements to check the advance of the mutinous regiments. Had Johnstone, with the Europeans, been in pursuit of the mutineers, the enemy would have been between two fires, and the bulk of them would have been destroyed. But the Brigadier made no sign; and so Ricketts and Williams had all the work and all the glory to themselves. It was ten o’clock at night when they came within sight of the Sipahi regiments. The road was bad, the sand deep, the ditches numerous. Their guides had misled and deserted them, and much good time had been lost. The main body of the enemy, some sixteen hundred in number383, had already crossed, and our little handful of Sikh troops now came suddenly upon them. Ricketts, who improvised himself into a Commandant of Artillery, took charge of the guns, and Williams directed the movements of the Cavalry and Infantry. The guns were at once unlimbered, but the horses of one of them took fright and fled, carrying the six-pounder with them. The other gun, a nine-pounder, was well served, and before the enemy knew that we were upon them, it delivered a round of grape with good effect, whilst at the same time Williams’s Sikhs poured in two destructive volleys. The mutineers returned the fire, and then the Nabha troops turned their backs upon the scene and fled like a flock of sheep. For some time the unequal contest was nobly maintained. Round after round from the one gun was poured in so rapidly and so steadily, that practised ears in Johnstone’s camp, on the other side of the river, thought that they discerned the utterances of two or three field-pieces; whilst at the same time the Sikhs, spreading themselves out so as not to be outflanked by superior numbers, poured in volley after volley with destructive effect. But gallant as were these efforts, they could not last. During well-nigh two hours they kept back the surging multitude of the enemy; but then the gun ammunition was expended. The cartridges of the Sikhs

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had been nearly fired away; Williams had fallen, shot through the lungs; and the midnight moon revealed, with dangerous distinctness, the position of our little band. There was nothing, therefore, left for Ricketts but to draw off his force and return to the British Cantonment.

Rising at Lodiana

June 9

Then the mutinous regiments, no longer obstructed or opposed, swept on to Lodiana. About an hour before noon, on the 9th of June, they entered the city. The company in the Fort fraternised with. them. The turbulent classes rose at once, scenting a rich harvest of rapine, and for a little while disorder and destruction were rampant in the place. There were some peculiar elements in the population of Lodiana, from. which danger was ever likely to flash out in seasons of general excitement384. Large numbers of aliens were there. Foremost amongst these were the Kabul refugees – the miserable incapables of the Saduzai Family, with their swarms of dissolute retainers – all eating the bread of British compassion but hating the hand that fed them. Then there was the great colony of Kashmir shawl-weavers, who, sheltered and protected as they never could have been elsewhere, followed their peaceful calling unmolested, and held their gains in the most perfect security. Both of these classes now rose against us with a vehemence proportioned to the benefits they had received. The Kabulis were “conspicuous in the outrages and plunder committed in the city;” and the Kashmiris were among the foremost in “plundering the Government stores, in pillaging the premises of the American Mission, in burning the churches and buildings, in destroying the printing presses, and in pointing out the residences of Government officials, or known well-wishers of Government, as objects of vengeance for the mutinous troops.” Besides these, there were large numbers of Muhammadan Gujars, who had been wrought up to a high state of fanaticism by the preachings of an energetic Maulavi, and who were eager to declare a jahad385 against us. All these persons now welcomed the mutineers, and aided them in the work of spoliation. The prisoners in the gaol were released.

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Whatsoever belonged to Government – whatsoever belonged to Englishmen – was destroyed, if it could not be carried off; the quiet, trading communities were compelled to contribute to the wants of the mutineers in money or in kind; grain and flour were carried off from the bunniahs’ shops; and, wherever a horse or a mule could be found, the rebel hand was laid instantly upon it. It was too much to expect that these traders, how much soever they may have benefited by British rule and profited by the maintenance of order, should take any active steps to aid the authorities in such a crisis. The bankers secreted their money-bags, and the merchants looked up their wares, and every man did what he thought best for himself in the face of the general confusion.

Escape of the mutineers

And what was Johnstone doing all this time? Johnstone was playing out with admirable effect another act of the great tragedy of “Too Late.” The Europeans had heard the firing of the preceding night, and had waited eagerly for the order to move, but no order came. Three hours after Ricketts’s one gun had been silenced by want of ammunition, Henry Olpherts, with his splendid troop of Horse Artillery, and a party of the 8th Foot, was suffered to go through the ceremony of taking command of the “advance” of the force that was to march to the rescue of Lodiana and to the extermination of the Jalandhar mutineers. But no sooner were they ready to move than fresh misgivings assailed the mind of the Brigadier. It would not be “safe” to send forward such a force without adequate supports. In vain Ricketts sent expresses to Johnstone’s Camp, urging him to send forward the Horse Artillery to his aid; but the day wore on, the succours never came, and the enemy rioted unchecked in Lodiana until nightfall386. Then. the insurgent regiments made a forced march towards Dehli, and when at last our Europeans made their appearance at Lodiana, pursuit was hopeless. The Jalandhar insurgents had escaped.

The evil, which had been thus done or suffered by our inertness,

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was small in comparison with the danger which had been escaped. It was the true policy of the enemy, at that time, to occupy Lodiana. With the Fort in their possession – guns mounted and manned, the Government treasure in their hands, and the bulk of the population on their side – they might, for a while at least, have successfully defied us. To the British cause, the loss of this important city, lying on the great high road from the Panjab to Dehli, would, indeed, have been a heavy blow. It would have affected disastrously, perhaps ruinously, the future operations of the war, by deferring in-definitely the capture of Dehli. But instead of this, the mutinous regiments merely carried themselves off, by the least frequented routes, to the Great Head-Quarters of Rebellion, there to swell the already swollen numbers of the garrison, without increasing its actual strength387.

It was now necessary to make a severe example of all who had been guilty of aiding and abetting the mutinous Sipahis or who had taken advantage of the confusion which they had created. It was easy to bring the guilt home to the offenders, for plundered property was found in their possession; and now that English authority had reasserted itself in all its strength, witnesses flocked in from all sides, eager to give damnatory evidence against their fellow-citizens. More than twenty Kashmiris and others were promptly tried, and as promptly executed. The telegraphic wires brought from higher official quarters the necessary confirmation of the sentence of death, and on the evening of their trial the prisoners were hanged. Others detected in seditious correspondence shared the same fate. “It was by such measures as these,” wrote the Commissioner

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of the Cis-Satlaj States, “that the peace was preserved; any vacillation or tender-heartedness would have been fatal, for rebellion would have spread in the province, and many valuable lives would have been lost in recovering our authority. So long as order was maintained here, our communications with the Panjab on the one hand, and the Dehli force on the other, were kept unimpaired; as it was, with daily convoys of treasure, ammunition, stores, and men passing down the road, I am happy to say that not a single accident occurred.”

The next step was to disarm the people of Lodiana. Taking advantage of the presence of Coke’s regiment, which afterwards made good its march to Dehli, Ricketts disarmed the town. of Lodiana. And in other parts of the Cis-Satlaj States the same process was carried on with the zeal, vigour, and success that distinguished all the efforts of the officers of the Panjabi Commission.

June–July

But, doubtless, as on former occasions, of which I have spoken, there were many concealments, even in our own territories; and, moreover, the contiguity of the Protected Native States afforded opportunities of evading the search, to which the people on the border eagerly resorted. Mr. Barnes called upon the chiefs to adopt similar measures, and they formally complied; but he said that they were slow to move and suspicious of our intentions388. There was, in truth, a general feeling of mistrust;. and it was presently ascertained that the people were not only concealing arms, but making large purchases of saltpetre and sulphur, and other components of gunpowder, for use in a day of danger. It was all in accordance with their genius and their temper, and it could excite no surprise in. any reasonable mind. But it was necessary to grapple with these evils; so proclamation was made, rendering the carrying of arms a misdemeanour, and restrictions upon the sale and export of all kinds of ammunition and their components389.

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Whilst preventive and precautionary measures of this kind were being pushed forward. throughout the Panjab, there were unceasing efforts all along the great road to Dehli to furnish the means of transporting stores for the service of Barnard’s army. In this most essential work civil and military officers worked manfully together; and although there were many difficulties to be overcome, the great thoroughfare was soon alive with carts and carriages and beasts of burden conveying downwards all that was most needed by the Army, and especially those vast supplies of ordnance ammunition which were required to make an impression on the walls of the city which we were besieging390391. It is hard to say what might not have befallen us if, at this time, the road had not been kept open; but the loyalty of the great chiefs of the Protected Sikh States, and the energy and sagacity of Barnes and Ricketts, secured our communications, and never was the Dehli Field Force in any danger of the interception of its supplies.

Thus was the Panjab aiding in many ways the great work of the recovery of Dehli and the suppression of the revolt. It was sending down material, and it was sending down masses of men. Nor was this all that it could do. The Panjab had become the Nursery of Heroes. And it was from the Panjab that now was to be drawn that wealth of individual energy upon which the destinies of nations so greatly depend. Death had made its

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gaps in the Dehli Army. The death of General Anson sent General Reed down to the Head Quarters of the Army as Senior Officer in the Presidency, and, therefore, Provisional Commander-in-Chief. Who then was to command the Frontier Force? For some little time there was a terror in the Peshawar Council lest Brigadier Johnstone, who had smoothed the way for the safe conduct of his Native troops to Dehli, should be appointed to the command of the division. It could not be permitted whilst Sydney Cotton was there. Little by little regulation was giving way to the exigencies of a great crisis; and when news came that the Adjutant-General of the Army had been killed in the battle of Badli-ki-Sarai, there was a demand for the services of Neville Chamberlain as the fittest man in the country to be Chief of the Staff of the besieging Force. So Nicholson was “instinctively selected to take command of the Panjab Movable Column, with the rank of Brigadier-General392,” whilst Chamberlain proceeded downwards to join the Head-Quarters of the Army. What Barnard and his troops were doing it is now my duty to narrate.

Footnotes

349. See the following extract from a private letter addressed by Lawrence to Edwardes, in which the position of affairs is most accurately stated in a few words: “The misfortune of the present state of affairs is this, – Each step we take for our own security is a blow against the regular Sipahi. Ho feels this, and on his side takes a further step, and so we go on, until we disband or destroy them, or they mutiny and kill their officers.”

350. On the parts of the Sikhs and Panjabis there happily existed a considerable degree of antipathy, if not downright enmity, towards the Sipahis of the Native Corps of the Line. The latter had rendered themselves insufferable by assuming airs of superiority, and regarding the former with disdain, as being themselves more warlike and better soldiers. “We mar-ed (beat) Kabul, we mar-ed the Panjab,” was the every-day boast of the Purbiah Sipahi to the Sikh, whom he further stigmatised as a man of low caste. The bad feeling between the two races was still further fostered by the cold shoulder usually turned by the Purbiahs to the Sikhs and Panjabis, whom they could not openly prevent enlisting into regiments of the Line.

351. I ought not to omit to state that, as many Sikhs had enlisted into the Sipahi regiments, an order went out to excerpt these men from the Hindustani corps, and form them into separate battalions.

352. I have been told that the picture in the first volume of this History, of the wandering emissaries of sedition, who, in one disguise or another, traversed the country, was purely an effort of my imagination. As this opinion has been made public through an influential channel, I may note that the statement in the text is from Sir John Lawrence’s official report, laid before Parliament.

353. “The traitorous symptoms evinced and the intrigues set on foot by the non-military Hindustanis in the Panjab territories, rendered it necessary to remove large numbers of them. These people were employed to a consider-able extent among the police and other subordinate civil establishments; and as camp-followers they swarmed in every Cantonment, and in the adjacent cities. Most of the lower class of employees were discharged, and numbers of camp-followers deported out of the province.” – Sir John Lawrence’s Official Report.

354. The regular Hindustani regiments at Peshawar consisted of the 5th Cavalry and the 21st, 24th, 27th, and 51st Infantry regiments.

355. “Thanesur Brahmans and Patna Muhammadans, Hindustani fanatics in the Sawad Valley, and turbulent outlaws in Gitanah, were calling upon the Sipahis to declare themselves The whole disclosed such a picture of fanatic zeal and base treachery as made the very name of a Purbiah Sipahi suspected and loathed.” – Cave-Browne.

356. The 21st Sipahi regiment was exempted from the operation of the disarming order. It was the senior regiment in the Cantonment, and as such, according to military etiquette and usage, the other battalions looked to it for an example. It had certainly not given a signal for insurrection, and whatever may have been the feelings with which it regarded the supremacy of the English, it had shown no active symptoms of disaffection. It was thought advisable, therefore, to spare it, the more especially as it was held to be “indispensable to keep one Native Infantry corps to carry on the duties of the station.”

357. “It was impossible not to sympathise with the soldierly feelings of Colonel Harrington and Major Shakespeare; but when Colonel Plumbe has implicit confidence in the 27th Native Infantry to be unshaken by events in Hindustan, and had nothing to recommend but conciliation, whilst the Colonel of the 51st, on the other hand, predicted that his men would attack the guns if called on to give up their muskets, hesitation was at an end.” – Edwardes’s Report.

358. Brigadier Cotton at this time commanded generally the Frontier force, whilst Colonel Galloway was Brigadier commanding the station.

359. Colonel Edwardes’s official report. “As the muskets and sabres of the once honoured corps were hurried unceremoniously into carts, it was said that here and there the spurs and swords of English officers fell sympathisingly upon the pile.” General Cotton says that the conduct of some of the Sipahi officers then, and afterwards, was of a highly insubordinate character, and that serious consequences to them would have ensued, “had it been prudent to exhibit such a division in the European element in the eyes of the Native troops and the people of the country.”

360. Major John Becher of the Engineers, Deputy-Commissioner of the Hazarah Division of the Panjab.

361. MS. Correspondence.

362. The desertions were principally from the 51st Regiment.

363. The Judge-Advocate said that drum-head courts-martial were “obsolete.” It was not long before they were revivified into institutions of the present.

364. MS. Correspondence.

365. Brigadier Cotton wished himself to go in command, but Edwardes persuaded him to remain at Peshawar, where his services were more needed.

366. It should be stated that there was a detachment of the regiment posted on the Atak to guard the ferry at Khairabad. These men were the first to mutiny.

367. See an interesting note in Mr. Cave-Browne’s book, vol., i. p. 170. Colonel Spottiswoode had served chiefly with the 21st, and had been only for a few months in command of the 55th.

368. It should be stated that the officers of the 55th, with about one hundred and twenty men, came out of the Fort and joined Chute’s force. It was doubted whether they were more faithful than the rest. Colonel Edwardes (Official Report) says that they were brought over by the threats and persuasions of their officers.

369. Colonel Chute to Brigadier Cotton, Mardan, May 26.

370. “There were some Irregulars, but they only pretended to act. Captain Law, who commanded. a party of the 10th Irregular Cavalry, got wounded in setting a vain example to his men, one of whom treacherously fired into the 5th Panjab Infantry. The 5th, under Major Vaughan, followed as close as infantry could do, and showed an admirable spirit throughout the day.” – Edwardes’s Report. Nicholson wrote that “the casualties in the 10th Irregular Cavalry the other day were an excellent index of the state and value of the corps.” – “These casualties were one European officer, wounded whilst trying to get his men to advance, one Sawar killed, not by the 55th, but by Vaughan’s men, into whom he treacherously fired.” – MS. Correspondence.

371. Nicholson himself was very anxious that too much credit should not be given to him for this exploit. It was stated in the public prints that he had commanded the expeditionary force from Peshawar, and that he had been twenty hours in pursuit of the enemy; and he requested that it might be explained with equal publicity that Colonel Chute commanded the force, and that he (Nicholson) had been twenty hours in the saddle, but not all that time in pursuit.

372. MS. Correspondence.

373. It is a significant fact that neither Sir Herbert Edwardes, in his Official Peshawar Report, nor Sir Sydney Cotton in his published Narrative, says one word about this punishment parade. And what these brave men, being eye-witnesses of the horror, shrunk from describing, I may well abstain from dwelling on in detail. There is no lack, however, of particulars, all ghastly and some grotesque, in the cotemporary letters before me.

374. See the Peshawar Mutiny Report, especially paragraph 66, which will be found entire in the Appendix.

375. Mr. Cave-Browne says that “many a sleek Brahman was made a compulsory Muhammadan, doomed to servile officers in their masjids; others were sold for slaves: Rumour has it that one fat old Subahdar was sold for four annas (sixpence).”

376. See Major Becher’s published report – Panjab Mutiny Papers. In a private letter to Edwardes (July 1) he gives a graphic description of the flight of the Sipahis and the raising of the border clans. “After making a march,” He said, “in the direction of Khagan, they turned back and went by the more difficult road through the Kohistan, along the Indus to Chilass, and with faces towards Giljit, or some other portion of Kashmir, as to the promised land of safety. One of their officers shot himself at the prospect; one or two have died already; several are very ill. They have no carriage and are rather hungry The road is very difficult even for men of the country. They have no shelter, and I believe that very few can escape; besides which, the Maharajah Gulala Singh has moved a regiment to his Giljit frontier, and. swears he will polish off every man he meets. He has also warned the Gujars and people of the country to pay them off. I have had several messengers who have seen them. They are mostly Hindus. Looking naked as they do, the women and children throw stones at them and cry, ‘Out on you, black Kafars without decency!’ And they were shocked by the habits which they witnessed in the early morning. The people of Pakli and Hazarah have come forth like spirits at my bidding. I have been deluged with clansmen, and our camp is very picturesque. ... I have received satisfactory assurances from all the border chiefs. If the Saiads of Khagan had not, like good men and true, manned their front, I think the Sipahis would have tried an easier route; but then again they would have found men of Gulab Singh’s ready at Muzuffarabad.” – MS. Correspondence.

377. Major Becher’s Report.

378. This uneasy feeling on the frontier bad been of long standing. Sue the following significant passage in Mr. Forsyth’s Mutiny Report: “Of the causes which led to this rebellion it is not for me to speak, but I cannot refrain from recording one fact, which was not without significance. In August, 1856, a letter from the Akhund of Sawad, addressed to Fath Khan, of Pindi Gheb, was brought to me at Rawalpindi. Among much other news, the writer stated that the Muhammadans of Lakhnao had written to Dost Muhammad, informing him that Oudh had been taken by the British, and that as they supposed that Haidarabad would follow, there would soon be no stronghold of Islam left in Hindustan, and unless some effort were made the cause of true believers would be lost. In the event of the Muhammadans of Lakhnao entering on any plan, they wished to know what aid they might expect from the Dost. The sagacious reply to his observation was stated by the writer to be, ‘What will be remains to be seen.’ ”

379. Ante, pp. 333–4.

380. I find the following, in the Panjab Mutiny Papers. It seems to leave little doubt with respect to the foregone design: “These intentions were by chance divulged by a wounded Hawaldar of the 3rd Native Infantry to an officer, who found him concealed at Humayun’s tomb, after the capture of Dehli. This information was given without any attempt at palliation or reserve It was from the lips of a man who knew his end was near, and conveyed the impression of truth to its hearer; it is, moreover, borne out by known facts and circumstances. It was, strictly, that all the troops in the Jalandhar Duab had agreed to rise simultaneously; a detachment from Jalandhar was to go over to Hoshiarpur, to fetch away the 33rd Native Infantry, failing which the 33rd were to remain (and they did so); then their arrival at Philur was to be the signal for the 3rd to join, when all were to proceed to Dehli, facing the river as best they could.” – Report of Mr. Ricketts.

381. I give this on the authority of Brigadier Johnstone, who himself says: “The pursuit of the mutineers commenced before seven o’clock of the morning following the night of the outbreak. It could not have been undertaken earlier. The direction taken by the rebels was not ascertained till half-past three o’clock. Preparations had to be made in obtaining carriage for the infantry, providing rations, &c., perfecting the equipment for guns, horses, &c., and these, after the utmost despatch of officers, as ready and zealous as men could be, were found impossible to be completed at an earlier hour. The complaint of one writer I understand is, that the haste of departure in pursuit was so great, that the Infantry had to march without rations and other comforts, which is true,” &c. &c. – Letter to Lahor Chronicle.

382. “At the Lusam Ferry, four miles above Philur, the advanced guard of the mutineers managed to seize a boat that was on the Jalandhar side, and crossing over in numbers, took possession of the other side also.” – Mr. Barnes’s Report.

383. “The greater part of three regiments of Infantry and one regiment of Cavalry, but without guns.”

384. “It is filled with a dissolute, lawless, mixed population of Kabul pensioners, Kashmir shawl-workers, Gujars, Bavriahs, and other predatory races. There is a fort without Europeans to guard it, a city without regular troops to restrain, a district traversed by roads in every direction ... a river which for months in the year is a mere net-work of fordable creeks.”

385. Holy war.

386. “In the mean time no troops arrived in pursuit. I sent twice, begging the Horse Artillery might advance, and they might have caused them (the mutineers) immense toss; but they could not be trusted to the 4th Sikhs or the small detachment of Panjab Cavalry, and had to wait for the European Infantry; and so this second great opportunity to destroy these mutineers was lost, and as they had four miles’ start of the European Infantry, of course pursuit was hopeless that evening.” – Ricketts.

387. “I imagine their plan was temporarily to hold the Fort and City of Lodiana, where they could command the Grand Trunk Road from the Panjab to Dehli, whence they could have spread disorganisation throughout Cis-Satlaj, and have shaken the Sikh States, and by cutting off supplies and placing troops in requisition to attack them, have made a most untoward diversion for our small force before Dehli; but their ammunition was expended; in their hurry in leaving Jalandhar they had carried off blank for balled ammunition, and so they had to hurry on by forced marches, avoiding any possibility of collision with our troops.” – Mr. Ricketts’s Report. The writer admits that this is for the most part conjecture, but he thinks that it is borne out by the fact that, if their ammunition had not failed them, the mutineers had the game in their own hands. I have had no opportunity of investigating the hypothesis that the Jalandhar regiments supplied themselves with blank cartridges by mistake.

388. Mr. Barnes’s Cis-Satlaj Report.

389. At this time communication between Calcutta and the Panjab was very slow and irregular, and tidings of the legislative enactments passed in Calcutta had not yet reached the Frontier Province. But Mr. Barnes, writing at a later period, observed, “That in the measures adopted for the trial and punishment of mutineers and heinous criminals, or for disarming the population, or checking the importation of military stores, we only anticipated the acts almost simultaneously passed at Calcutta by the wisdom of the Legislative Council.”

390. These services were afterwards becomingly acknowledged by General Wilson, who wrote to Sir John Lawrence, saying: “I beg to bring specially to your notice the very important services rendered by the Commissioner of the Cis-Satlaj States, Mr. G. C. Barnes, to whose good government, under yourself, may be partly attributed the preservation of peace in these districts, and to whose influence with the independent chiefs I am mainly indebted for the valuable aid of the Patiala and Jhind Contingents, by means of which our communication with our rear has been kept open, and the safe escort of numerous convoys of stores and ammunition to the camp has been effected; and his most energetic assistant, Mr. G. H. Ricketts, the Deputy-Commissioner of Lodiana, of whose unflagging exertions in procuring carriage, aiding the movements of troops, and forwarding supplies, and of his hearty co-operation with the magazine officer in the despatch of ammunition, I am deeply sensible, and cannot speak too highly.”

391. To the activity of Captain Briggs, who organised a military transport train, and worked it with admirable success, we are mainly indebted for these good results. But we are a, little too prone to forget such services as these, or, perhaps, we undervalue the importance of feeding an army and loading its guns.

392. These words are in Colonel Edwardes’s Official Report. The writer adds “How common sense revenges itself on defective systems, when real danger assails a state! Had there been no struggle for life or death, when would Neville Chamberlain and John Nicholson, in the prime of their lives, with all their faculties of doing and enduring, have attained the rank of Brigadier-General? Why should we keep down in peace the men who must be put up in War?” [Yes; but Nicholson voluntarily entered a service in which promotion was regulated by seniority; and, again, voluntarily transferred himself from military to political employ. The excellence of the system was proved by the fact that when danger arose, the system, well administered in the Panjab, sent the best men, irrespective of actual rank, to the front. – G.B.M.].

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
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