Page 457

Chapter 6 – The Last Succours from the Panjab

May–July

The Question of Peshawar

The hope of the Army before Dehli in the noble efforts of Sir John Lawrence was not doomed to be disappointed. It has been seen how he responded to every call for reinforcements; how, as time went on, and the pride of the Mughul was still unbroken, the great Panjab Commissioner was little by little stripping his province of its most reliable troops, until it appeared to others that he was going too far in these sacrificial efforts. A great conflict of opinion, indeed, had arisen among the leading intelligences of the Panjab. To the chiefs of the great Peshawar Council it seemed that the maintenance of the integrity of the frontier was a paramount necessity, to which all other considerations should yield. Before the end of May Edwardes had written to the Chief Commissioner, saying: “Things seem to be settling down in Hindustan, and to be pretty safe throughout the Panjab, and I think that if you could in any way manage, it would only be prudent to throw some more strength upon this point. For Peshawar is a vital point, as it were, and. if we conquer here we are safe everywhere, whereas disaster here would roll down the Panjab. It was absolutely necessary to disarm the regiments, and yet it recoils on us, for we want Native troops. ... We must husband our Europeans, and we do so. We carry them about on elephants and carts like children. If they want a post-chaise per man they must have it. Can you not think of any way to help us at this pinch? ... You know on what a nest of devils we stand. Once let us take our foot up, and we shall be stung to death476.”

But the eyes of the Chief Commissioner were turned in another direction, and far other thoughts were pressing on his

Page 458

mind. Peshawar seemed to him to be a source of infinite weakness to the whole Empire. Sir John Lawrence had ever held fast to the opinion that the recovery of Dehli was an object of such magnitude, that all else was dwarfed beside it; and in the steadfast pursuit of this object he was prepared even to abandon the Peshawar valley, leaving it in the hands of Dost Muhammad of Kabul in free and friendly cession, and retiring within the line of the Indus. For Peshawar was ever a great blister to our European Army, drawing thither to the frontier regiment upon regiment, and battery upon battery, whose presence could not be dispensed with so long as we held those dangerous breadths of country beyond the river. To release these regiments from the necessity of keeping watch and ward upon the border would have been immense gain to us at such a time. So Lawrence proposed, in the event of the weakness of our European Army threatening with failure the enterprise against Dehli, to invite the Ameer of Kabul to Peshawar, to ask him, in pursuance of his alliance with the British Government, to occupy the valley with his troops, and finally to promise that, if he should remain true to us, the British Government would make over the coveted territory to him in perpetuity.

June

To this effect, therefore, Lawrence wrote to Edwardes, telling him to consult Nicholson and Cotton on the expediency of the projected movement. The letter was written on the 9th of June. His Secretary – Captain Hugo James, a man of great mental vigour, capable in action as in council, but who seems to have shared the common fate of Secretaries, of whom little more account is taken than of the pens they wield, and to have received far less than the credit which he deserved – was startled by the proposal, and recorded a memorandum against it. With characteristic frankness and candour John Lawrence sent it on to Peshawar, adding a note to it in the following words: “Here is James’s view of the matter. All appears to depend upon the if in the third line. If we can hold the Panjab, doubtless we should retain Peshawar. But I do not think that we could do so. Troops from England could not be in Calcutta before October, and up here before December or January. A retreating army which has not been beaten can command supplies. ... One thing appears to be most certain, which is, that if disaster occurs at Dehli, all the Native Regulars, and some of the Irregulars (perhaps many) will abandon us. We should, then, take time by the forelock.”

Page 459

Protest of Colonel Edwardes

June 11

But there was nothing in this to convince the Peshawar Council. Nicholson had just returned from his first great raid, and he and Cotton concurred with Edwardes heartily in their opposition to the project: “We (Edwardes, Nicholson, and Sydney Cotton),” wrote Edwardes on June 11, “are unanimously of opinion that with God’s help we can and will hold Peshawar, let the worst come to the worst, and it would be a fatal policy to abandon it and to retire across the Indus. It is the anchor of the Panjab, and if you take it up the whole ship will drift to sea. For keeping the mastery of the Panjab, there are only two obligatory points – the Peshawar valley and the Manjha; all the rest are mere dependencies. Multan is valuable as the only practicable line of retreat to the sea; but if we hold on resolutely to Peshawar and the Manjha, we shall never need to retreat. If you abandon Peshawar, you give up the Trans-Indus; and giving up the Trans-Indus, you give up the homes of the only other troops besides Europeans from whom you expect aid. ... The loyalty of the Multani Pathan border is a source of the greatest comfort to us now, but what a blow to them if we let the Afghans overrun the Derajat. And as to a friendly transfer of Peshawar to the Afghans, Dost Muhammad would not be a mortal Afghan – he would be an angel – if he did not assume our day to be gone to India, and follow after us as an enemy. ... Europeans cannot retreat – Kabul would come again! ... We believe that at Peshawar and Lahor we can ride out the gale, if it blow big guns, till the cold weather comes, and the English people send us a white army, in whom (to use the slang of the day) ‘implicit confidence’ can be placed.” And again on the following day: “The more I think over your proposal to abandon Peshawar, the more fatal it seems, and I am convinced that whatever doubt may hang over our attempt to hold it, the attempt to give it up would be certain ruin.”

June 20

Eight days afterwards he wrote again, still more earnestly: “I don’t know anything in this war that has surprised me so much as the judgment you have now formed on this subject. It is useless to re-discuss it; but I earnestly hope you will never have cause to propose it to Government, and that if you do, Government may not consent, fur I believe that the move would be more damaging than any other we could make. As to deliberately giving up the Trans-Indus, by choice as a boundary, on the score of expense,

Page 460

it surprises me more and more. for you and I have often considered this matter, and I always understood you to be convinced that the Indus is not a practicable boundary, and that it would take an army of twenty thousand men or more between Atak and Multan, and never be secure.”

Reply of Sir John Lawrence

To this the Chief Commissioner replied, earnestly setting forth the advantages of concentrating the British forces in the territories upon the hither side of. the Indus: “Here we are,” he wrote, “with three European regiments, a large artillery, and some of our best Native troops locked up across the Indus – troops who, if at Dehli, would decide the contest in a week. What have we got for all the rest of the Panjab? We have barely two thousand Europeans. I doubt if we have so many holding the posts of Philur, Govindgarh, and Firuzpur, Lahor, and Multan. We have not a man more with a white face whom we can spare. We cannot concentrate more than we have now done, except by giving up Rawalpindi, and eventually Peshawar. Should the Sikhs rise, our condition on this side the Indus will be well-nigh desperate.

June 22

With the Peshawar force on this side we should be irresistibly strong. There was no one thing which tended so much to the ruin of Napoleon in 1814 as the tenacity with which, after the disasters at Leipsic, he clung to the line of the Elbe, instead of falling back at once to that of the Rhine. He thus compromised all his garrisons beyond the Elbe, and when he was beaten in the field, these gradually had to surrender. But these troops would have given him the victory had they been at his side at Bautzen, and the other conflicts which preceded Leipsic.”

June 25

On the evening of June 25, the Peshawar Commissioner received from Sir John Lawrence, at Rawalpindi, a message in the following words: “A severe action (at Dehli), apparently with little result, on the 23rd. Bareli mutineers en route to Dehli. Gwaliar Contingent have mutinied. Agent has left. If matters get worse, it is my decided opinion that the Peshawar arrangements should take effect. Our troops before Dehli must be reinforced, and that largely. They must hold their ground.” On the receipt of this message, Edwardes, Cotton, and James477 met together in

Page 461

Council and determined on another remonstrance against the project,. which from the first hour of its enunciation had so much disturbed and alarmed them. The letters of the Chief Commissioner were sufficiently perplexing, but they suggested rather proposal and discussion than immediate action, whilst the brief, expressive sentences of the telegram indicated an intention to do the thing and at once. The language, indeed, was fast becoming the language of absolute instruction. There was no time to be lost.

June 26

Opinion of General Cotton

The chief military and the chief civil authority at Peshawar, therefore, put forth severally energetic written protests against what they believed to be so fatal a measure. “We have pushed our conquests,” wrote General Cotton, “up to the very mouths of the Afghanistan passes, and at this very moment, by God’s blessing, our strongest position in India is at the mouth of the Khaibar. By our good rule we have engaged the affections (I may say) to a considerable extent of the border tribes, and in the hour of need they (who, not many years since, were our most bitter enemies), relying on our great name and power, have come forward to help us against the disaffection of the very troops with whom we had conquered the Sikhs, Panjabis, and others. A retrograde movement from Peshawar, believe me, would turn all these parties, now our friends, against us. The Panjab Irregular Force, Pathans, Sikhs, Panjabis, and such like, no longer respecting our power, will, in all likelihood, turn against us, and their most valuable services be lost to us forever. My dear Sir John, our removal from Peshawar cannot fail to be disastrous, and cannot be effected. without immediate confusion throughout the whole of this part of the country, and throughout the length and breadth of British India. Hence the measure will seriously injure the interests of our forces in all quarters, whilst the additional strength. to be gained would be small, and, indeed, we could afford no timely aid. In handing over the Peshawar district to the Dost (a measure which we may pretend to be a mere matter of expediency and not of necessity), the Afghans will at once see our weakness, and will duly profit by the same against the common enemy. To this frontier, and to the present strength of our position on it, as well as to Calcutta at the opposite end of our territory, we must look for the recovery of our power throughout the intermediate kingdoms of the Bengal Presidency. Our great name is upheld on our frontier, whilst

Page 462

Calcutta and this seaboard, in the plenitude of power, with European reinforcements continually arriving, will afford eventually and more surely the necessary succour. At this very moment six or eight regiments of Europeans must be between Calcutta and Dehli, en route to the seat of war, and treble that amount will be eventually thrown in from home and elsewhere, and by such means must our supremacy be recovered. When could our troops reach the seat of war, and in what numbers and condition? These questions must be duly considered, and by them the loss and gain of our removal from hence be balanced and determined on. I earnestly implore of you, my dear Sir John, to hold to our position on this frontier. The required succour must indeed be thrown in from Calcutta, not from this. ‘When the reinforcements from above and below, at present in progress towards Dehli, have reached their destination, I feel confident that that city will again fall into our hands, and I am very much mistaken if disaffection does not then cease in all quarters, and our power being thus established, mutiny will gradually disappear throughout the land.”

Opinion of Colonel Edwardes

On the same morning, Colonel Edwardes wrote, with like decision: “General Cotton, James, and myself are all of opinion that you should not go throwing away your means in detail by meeting General Reed’s demands for reinforcements. Dehli is not India, and if General Reed cannot take it with eight thousand men, he will not take it with nine thousand or ten thousand. However important a point, it is only a point, and enough has been done for it. You will serve the Empire better by holding the Panjab than by sacrificing the Panjab and recovering Dehli. You will sacrifice the Panjab, if you either withdraw General Cotton’s force from Peshawar, or fritter away Nicholson’s Movable Column, already too weak. Make a stand! ‘Anchor, Hardy, anchor!’ Tell General Reed he can have no more men from here, and must either get into Dehli with the men he has, or get reinforcements from below, or abandon the siege and fall back on the Satlaj, leaving Dehli and its dependencies to be reorganised in the cold weather. There are two policies open to you – to treat the Panjab as secondary to the North-West Provinces and go on giving and giving troops to General Reed till you break down in the Panjab, or to maintain the Panjab as your first duty and the most important point of the two, and

Page 463

to refuse to give General Reed any more troops than you can spare. We are decidedly and distinctly of the latter opinion. ... We consider that if you leave the Peshawar frontier, we shall not hold together for a month, lout be demoralised and despised, and reduced to the condition of a flock of sheep. ... If you hold the Panjab, you will facilitate the reconquest of India, from the sea-board. We have only got to hold on three months. Do not try too much. We are outnumbered. Stick to what you can do. Let us hold the Panjab, coûte qui coûte, and not give up one European necessary to that duty. Whatever takes place in Central India, we shall stand in a firm and honourable attitude if we maintain the capitals on the sea and the frontiers here. Between the two it is all a family quarrel – an insurrection in our own house. If we let foreigners in from the frontier, the Empire is invaded. We may pretend to make friendly presents of provinces, but we cannot disguise that we have lost them by weakness. India has not yet recovered from our expulsion from Afghanistan. The world ignores our voluntary cession of it after Pollock’s expedition, and knows well that we could not hold it. Do not repeat the policy, and give up the Trans-Indus. No words of mine can express my sense of the disgrace and ruin that it will bring upon us. It is abandoning the cause of England in the East. Don’t yield an inch of frontier; gather up your resources, and restrict yourself to the defence of the Panjab. It is a practicable and a definite policy, and we will support you to the last. ... If General Reed, with all the men you have sent him, cannot get into Dehli, let Dehli go. Decide on it at once. ... Don’t let yourself be sucked to death as General Reed is doing. He has his difficulties, and we have ours. You have made vast efforts for him, and no one can blame you for now securing your own province. ... The Empire’s reconquest hangs on the Panjab.”

Opinion of General Nicholson

Whilst Cotton and Edwardes were thus throwing all the earnestness of their natures into their letters to the Chief Commissioner, protesting against the abandonment of Peshawar, Nicholson, who was Nicholson. proceeding to take command of the Movable Column, visited Lawrence at Rawalpindi, and orally reiterated the arguments on which the three friends based their opposition to the retrograde movement. Lawrence, however, still clung to his opinion. “Admitting,” he said, “which I do, that there is

Page 464

much force in the arguments adduced in favour of the maintenance of our hold on Peshawar, what are we to do when all the British troops which we can scrape together exclusively of those at Peshawar, have been despatched to Dehli and still more be required?” “Rather than abandon Peshawar,” answered Nicholson, “let us give up Marri and Rawalpindi. Give up every place but Peshawar, Lahor, and Multan.” To this Lawrence replied “that such a measure would isolate those three places, lock up a fine force in Peshawar, and expose us to destruction in detail.” But nothing that Lawrence could urge shook Nicholson’s deeply-grounded convictions. They parted. The soldier passed on to his appointed work. The statesman remained to ponder the eagerly enforced opinions of his chief advisers in the Panjab, whilst awaiting the decision of the Governor-General to watch the progress of events, and to do all in his power to avert the necessity, the apprehension of which had so much alarmed and perplexed him.

He had written to Lord Canning on the 10th of June, enclosing the letter which on the day before he had sent to Edwardes; but communication with Calcutta was at that time slow and uncertain in the extreme, and the brief telegraphic message which he had asked for in reply had not arrived in the third week of July. The momentous question was still unsolved. Neither had come the order, “Hold on to Peshawar to the last,” nor the permission, “You may act as may appear expedient regarding Peshawar” – in one or the other of which forms he had requested that a telegraphic message might be sent to him. Events, as they were then developing themselves, seemed rather to strengthen the probability of the dreaded alternative being presented to us. He knew little of what was passing below Dehli, but there and in the Panjab itself were awkward symptoms of accumulated danger. The numbers of the enemy were increasing, and with numbers there was increased confidence within the great imperial stronghold. And regiment after regiment was falling away from its allegiance in the territories which John Lawrence governed; so that we appeared to be drifting closely and more closely upon the terrible alternative which he had so greatly dreaded. Still, therefore, he felt convinced that the advice which he had given was wise and salutary; and again he wrote to Lord Canning on the 24th of July, saying: “All these reinforcements ought to enable our army to maintain itself in its present position, and allow the

Page 465

mutineers to expend their power against our entrenchments. But should further aid be required from this quarter, our only resource would be to abandon Peshawar and Kohat, and to send the troops thus relieved on to Dehli. It seems to me vain to attempt to hold Lahor, and insanity to try to retain Peshawar, &c., if we are driven from Dehli. The Panjab will prove short work to the mutineers, when the Dehli Army is destroyed. ... My policy would then be to bring the troops from across the Indus and send them to Dehli; in the mean time to send all our women and children down the rivers to Karachi, and then, accumulating every fighting man we have, to join the Army before Dehli or hold Lahor, as might appear expedient. Colonel Edwardes, General Cotton, and Nicholson are for maintaining our hold on Peshawar to the last. They argue that we could not retire in safety, and that the instant we attempted to make a retrograde movement all would be up against us. This I do not believe; but granting that insurrection would immediately ensue, I maintain that the force at Peshawar would make good its retreat. It contains more soldiers, more guns, more power, than that with which Pollock recovered Kabul after forcing the passage of the Khaibar. Between Peshawar and the Indus are no defiles, but an open country; the only difficulty is the passage of the Indus, which, with Atak in our hands, ought not to be a work of danger. It is for your Lordship to decide what course we are to pursue. In the event of misfortune at De are we to leave that Army to its fate and endeavour to hold its own, or shall we, by a timely retirement from beyond the Indus, consolidate our resources in the Panjab, and maintain the struggle under the walls of Dehli? I pray that your Lordship will decide one way or the other. If we are left to decide the matter ourselves, time will be lost in vain discussions; and by the time we decide on the proper course to follow, it will prove too late to act effectually.”

July 15

Decision of Lord Canning

Whilst this appeal was slowly making its way to its destination, an answer to Lawrence’s letter of the 10th of June was circuitously travelling up to the Panjab. It was dated July 15, and it said: “The outbreak at Indore on the 1st will no doubt have interrupted the dawk as well as the telegraph to Bombay. I therefore send a steamer to Madras with this letter and the despatches which accompany it; and I shall request Lord Harris to telegraph to Lord Elphinstone my answer to

Page 466

your question regarding Peshawar. It will be, ‘Hold on to Peshawar to the last.’ I should look with great alarm to the effect in Southern India of an abandonment of Peshawar at the present time, or at any time until our condition becomes more desperate or more secure.” Thus, officially, was the momentous question settled by the “highest authority;” practically, indeed, it had settled itself before Lord Canning’s letter was received. The contingency, which had been contemplated, never arrived; it was not left for the nation to discern the evil effects of either the retreat from Dehli or the abandonment of Peshawar. The question never went beyond the domain of discussion, and it is of little use now to speculate as to which movement would have been attended with the more disastrous results. But there would have been a grave omission from the pages of this history if there had been no mention of this discussion. For nothing is more significant of the magnitude of the dangers which threatened our Indian Empire in the Summer and Autumn of 1857, than the fact that at a time when the English held fast to the maxim, which Clive had enunciated nearly a century before, that “to stand still is danger, to recede is ruin,” the strong spirit of Sir John Lawrence counselled the abandonment of the frontier-station of Peshawar and the adjacent territory to the Afghans, who, not long before had been our enemies in the field. It must be admitted that, at the time, the weight of authority bore heavily against the proposal; and no man was more willing than Lawrence himself to acknowledge that a measure which met with strenuous opposition from such men as those who set their faces against it, was certainly a doubtful measure478. But time and maturity of

Page 467

reflection did not affect his original convictions. He remained steadfast to his first opinion; and years have rather increased than diminished the number of adherents to the policy which he enunciated when the crisis was upon us. Our larger and more accurate knowledge of the state of affairs, that existed in the Summer of 1857, has taught us better to understand the arguments by which the Chief Commissioner justified a proposal, by which alone he conceived that in the last resort he could secure the salvation of the empire. Those arguments, as more clearly discerned by the later light of history, may be thus briefly summarised:

The question reviewed

No one knew so well as John Lawrence what, in the months of June and July, was stirring the hearts of the English leaders at Dehli, for to no one did they write so frequently, so fully and so freely, to declare their wants and to describe their prospects. He knew that the thought of raising the siege was present to them; for it was before him in letters, some of which are quoted in these pages. He knew that all depended upon the support which he could give the besieging force. He did not disguise from himself for a moment the fact that the abandonment of Peshawar would be an immense evil; but those were times in which there was often only a choice of evils, and it seemed to Lawrence

Page 468

that, in a large imperial sense, the retirement of the British Army from Dehli would be the greater evil of the two. He stood pledged to the policy of regaining that great centre of Muhammadanism, and crushing the rebellion rampant there in the name of the King; for he had himself earnestly and energetically, and with an overpowering force of argument, urged upon General Anson, at the commencement of the crisis, the paramount necessity of an immediate advance upon Dehli, at a time when the chiefs of the Army Staff were representing the thing to be impossible. He was bound, therefore, in honour to do all that lay in his power to bring it to a successful issue. The policy which he had so stoutly advocated in May seemed still in June and July to be the policy which the national safety imperatively demanded; nay, every succeeding day had rendered it more apparent to him that our inability to “dispose of” Dehli was creating everywhere an impression of our weakness, which was encouraging our enemies and enervating our friends. All eyes were turned towards that great city, and as weeks passed, and still it seemed that the English, who had gone to besiege, had become the besieged, there was a growing mistrust as to the wisdom of holding fast to the English alliance, which would soon have rendered us a friendless and feeble few, to be easily mastered and destroyed. With this knowledge pressing hourly upon him, Sir John Lawrence, the more he thought, was the more convinced that, in the last extremity, if the paucity of British troops before Dehli should render its capture impossible, and necessitate the withdrawal of our Army, he would release the force posted in the Peshawar valley, and make over the territory to the Amir of Kabul.

But it was never intended that this should be a precipitate movement, or that we should prematurely anticipate an extremity which might never arise. It was his design, in the first instance, to move all our women and children to the Lahor side of the Indus, so that our troops might retain their grip of the country unencumbered to the last moment, and then move lightly and rapidly across the river. The cession, it was felt, would be a source of unbounded delight to Dost Muhammad, and it was believed that though it might not secure the permanent fidelity and friendship of the Afghans, it would, for a time at least, hold them in the bonds of a flattered and self-satisfied durance, and afford us the security of the forbearance which we desired.

Page 469

The Jhelam Mutiny

It has been said that there were increasing signs of general unrest in the Panjab. The most portentous of these were the mutinies at Jhelam and Sialkot.. The Jhelam cantonment lies on the bank of the river which bears that name. That the 14th Sipahi Regiment posted there was on the brink of mutiny was well known. Sir John Lawrence, therefore, despatched a force thither to disarm them – a small compact force consisting of some companies of the 24th Queen’s, some Horse Artillery guns, under Lieutenant Henry Cookes, and a party of Lind’s Multani Horse, the whole under the command of Colonel Ellice, of the 24th.

July 7

The Chief Commissioner had prepared a plan of operations for taking the Sipahis by surprise; but the Colonel, thinking that he knew better than any civilian how to manage an affair of this kind, departed from Lawrence’s views, and sketched out a plan of his own. There was, therefore, no surprise. When the Europeans were seen filing down the rising ground opposite the cantonment, the Sipahis knew what was coming479. Happening to be out on morning parade, they saw the English column advancing. Regardless of the orders and entreaties of their officers, they began at once to load their muskets. The officers saw that they had no longer any power over their men, and sought safety with the European troops. Then the Sipahis took up their main position in the quarter-guard. It was a strong brick building, with a battlemented roof, erected for purposes of defence by Sir Charles Napier, and afforded good cover to the insurgents, who threw out a party in advance to guard the approaches to it, whilst others took shelter in their Lines, the mud-huts of which had been loop-holed in expectation of the crisis. Our people were full of courage and enthusiasm, and they flung themselves headlong upon the enemy. Lind’s Multanis charged gallantly, but were met by a galling fire, which they could not resist. Cookes’ guns opened, but within too near a range, and the musketry of the enemy did better execution than our own Artillery at so short a distance. The Sipahis fired from behind the cover of their mud-walls, and our grape was comparatively harmless. But now the British Infantry came up with their intrepid.

Page 470

commander at their head, and advanced full upon the quarter-guard. The attack was a gallant and successful one; the quarter-guard was carried, and the Sipahis then vacated their huts and fell back upon the empty lines of the 39th, from which they were driven by the bursting of a well-directed shell to a village on the left of the cantonment.

By this time the noon-day sun was beating fiercely down upon our exhausted people. Colonel Ellice had been carried from the field dangerously wounded. Captain Spring had been shot dead480, and we had lost many men and many horses in the encounter. Our troops had been marching from the hour of midnight, and had been actively engaged since sunrise. Nature demanded rest; and it was sound discretion at such a time to pause in our offensive operations. It would have been well, perhaps, if the pause had been longer and the renewed operations more carefully matured. At four in the afternoon, when the heat was still great, an attack on the village was ordered. Colonel Gerrard, of the 14th, took command of the Force that went out to destroy the mutinous regiment, in whose fidelity he had once trusted. The result was disastrous. Again the Sipahis had good cover, and we found ourselves entangled in streets, in which we suffered much, but could do little. The guns were brought up within too short a range, and the musketry of the enemy told with deadly effect upon the gunners. The Europeans, partly from fatigue, and partly, perhaps, from the stimulants which they had taken to reinvigorate themselves and the effect of the slant rays of the afternoon sun, are said to have “staggered” up to the village, and to have been easily repulsed. The retreat was sounded, and our troops were with-drawn. Two guns were carried back, but a third, in spite of the gallant efforts of Lieutenant Battye, with a party of Mounted Police, fell into the hands of the enemy, and was turned against our retreating people.

July 8

Nothing more could be done on that evening. At dawn on the morrow the conflict was to be renewed. Both forces had bivouacked on the plain. But when , day broke it was found that the mutineers had evacuated their position and fled. Many had been killed in the two engagements;

Page 471

some were drowned in the Jhelam; others fell into the hands of our Police, or were subsequently given up by the Kashmir authorities, in whose country they had sought refuge, and thus surrendered, they were blown away from our guns. Very few of them ultimately escaped; but the manner in which the affair was managed greatly incensed the Chief Commissioner. For, in plain words, with Horse, Foot, and Artillery, we were beaten by part of a regiment of Sipahis. If we had quietly surrounded the village and attacked it in the cool of the evening, it is probable that not a man would ever have escaped from Jhelam.

Mutiny at Sialkot

When tidings of the sharp resistance of the 14th reached Sialkot, a still more disastrous state of things arose at that place. The station was commanded by Brigadier Frederick Brind, an Artillery officer of high repute – a man of lofty stature and large proportions, who had done good service in his time, and who was still amply endowed with physical and mental vigour. But seldom was man left by hard circumstances in a position which afforded so little scope for the display of his power. The cantonment had been stripped of European troops for the formation of the Movable Column, and there were nearly a thousand Native soldiers – Horse and Foot – all armed and ready for action481. In such circumstances a commanding officer has no choice to make – no discretion to exercise. He must appear to trust his men whether he does or not; for to betray suspicion is surely to precipitate the outbreak. So to all outward appearance Brind had full confidence in his men, and as time went on the quietude of their demeanour seemed to justify more than the pretence. But when, on the 8th of July, the Lines of Sialkot were all astir with the tidings that the 14th at Jhelam had been in action with the white troops, who had attempted to disarm them, it was felt by our people that the beginning of the end had come. And there was another source of excitement on that evening, for a messenger had come from Dehli, bringing a summons from the King commanding them to join the Royal Army. The night was, therefore, one

Page 472

of preparation. On the morning of the 9th everything was ready.

Sialkot was a large, and had been an important military station. In quiet times European troops had been stationed there in large numbers, with the usual results. There were good barracks and commodious houses and pleasant gardens, and more than the wonted number of English gentlewomen and young children. There were a church and a chapel, and other indications of the progress of western civilisation. When, therefore, the storm burst, there was much that lay at the mercy of the enemy, and on our side no possible means of defence.

July 6

Before the sound of the morning gun had been heard throughout the cantonment, and our people, according to their wont, had mounted their horses or entered their carriages, to proceed to their wonted duties, or to take the air before the sun was high above the horizon, the Sipahis had planted picquets all round the place, to prevent the escape of the Faringhis. And presently the din and uproar of rebellion announced to our people, just waking from their slumbers, that the Sipahis had risen. Our officers were soon mounted and on their way to the parade-ground. The truth was then only too apparent. The troopers of the 9th were already in their saddles, and the 46th were under arms. Our people were suddenly brought face to face with mutiny in its worst form. All circumstances and conditions were in the last degree unfavourable to the English. Sialkot was one of the great stations at which there had been a gathering of detachments from different regiments for the new rifle practice. and, therefore, great opportunities of conspiracy. It lay in proximity to the Jammu territory of the Maharajah of Kashmir, who the Sipahis believed, and our authorities feared, would, in the hour of danger, forsake his alliance; and it was utterly without any defence of European troops. So when the hour came to strike, the confidence and audacity of the enemy had everything to foster and encourage them.

As ever, the Cavalry were foremost in the work of mutiny – foremost in their greed for blood. Mounted on good chargers, they could ride with rapidity from place to place, and follow the white men on horseback or in their carriages, and shoot them down as they rode. For weeks the outburst had been expected, and every English inhabitant of Sialkot had thought painfully over the coming crisis, and had calculated the best means of

Page 473

escape.

July 9

The only place of safety for which they could make was the old Fort, once the stronghold of the Sikh Chief, Tej Singh, and to this, when they saw that nothing could be done to arrest the tide of rebellion, which was already at the flood, they endeavoured to make good their retreat. Some happily reached the Fort. Others perished on the way. A ball from the pistol of a mounted trooper entered , the broad back of the Brigadier, and he was carried to the Fort only to die. The Superintending Surgeon, Graham, was shot dead in his buggy, as his daughter sat by his side482. Another medical officer of the same name was “killed in his carriage among his children.” A Scotch missionary, named Hunter, on his way to the Fort in a carriage, with his wife and child, was attacked by some chaprasis of the gaol-guard, and all three were ruthlessly murdered. The Brigade-Major, Captain Bishop, was killed, in the presence of his family, under the very walls of the Fort. Some hid themselves during the day, and escaped discovery and death almost by a miracle. Some were preserved by their own men, and concealed till nightfall in the Lines. The officers of the 46th, who had remained with their men until the road between the Parade-ground and the Fort was closed by the enemy, rode off towards Gogranwala, and reached that place, scorched and weary – but not hungry and athirst, for the villagers fed them on the way – after a mid-day journey of some forty miles. The personal incidents of that 9th of July at Sialkot would fill an interesting and exciting chapter. But there is nothing stranger in the story than the fact that two of our field officers – one, Colonel of a regiment – were invited to take command of the mutineers, and to lead them to Dehli,

Page 474

with a promise of high pay, and a significant pledge, not perhaps without a touch of irony in it, that they might always spend the hot weather on the Hills.

Whilst our people were seeking safety within the walls of the old Fort, and securing their position by strengthening its defences, the Sipahi mutineers were revelling in the work of spoliation, with the congenial companionship of the criminal classes. The old story, so often already told, and still to be told again and again, was repeated here: the mutineers made for the Gaol, released the prisoners, plundered the Treasury, destroyed the Kachahri with all its records, blew up the magazines, and gutted the houses of the Christian inhabitants. If there were any special circumstance about the Sialkot insurrection, it was that the household servants of our English officers, generally faithful, or at least neutral, on these occasions, took an active part against their old masters. That they knew what was coming seems to be proved by the fact that the Brigadier’s sirdar-bearer, or chief body servant, an “old and favourite” domestic, took the caps off his master’s pistols in the night, as they lay beside him while he slept483. And how thoroughly they cast in their lot with the soldiery is demonstrated with equal distinctness by the fact that they afterwards fought against us, the Brigadier’s khansamah, or butler, taking an active part in operations which will be presently described. There seems to have been perfect cohesion between all classes of our enemies – the mutineers, the criminals from the gaols,

Page 475

the “Gujars” from the neighbouring villages, and the servants from the houses and bungalows of the English. From sunrise to sunset the work went on bravely. Everything that could be carried off by our enemies was seized and appropriated; even the old station-gun, which morning and evening had proclaimed the hours of uprising and down-setting. And nearly everything belonging to us, that could not be carried off, was destroyed and defaced, except – a strange and. unaccountable exception – the Church and Chapel, which the Christians had reared for the worshipping of the Christian’s God.

July 9–10

Before nightfall, all this rabble had made off for the Ravi river, on their way to Dehli, rejoicing in and excited by their day’s work. It was a delightful relief to the inmates of the decayed old Fort, who now thought that if the danger were not wholly past, at least the worst of it was over. It has been said that they “slept more soundly and fearlessly than they had slept for weeks before. The mine had exploded and they had escaped484.” It is often so; the agony of suspense is greater than that of the dreaded reality. But there was one there to whom no such relief was to be given. The Brigadier lay dying. A true soldier to the last, he had, whilst the death-pangs were upon him, issued his orders for the defence of the Fort, and for what little else could be done in that extremity. But the ball from the trooper’s pistol had done its work, and though Brind lingered through the night, he died before the sun had risen; and all felt that a brave man and a capable officer was lost to the country, which he had so well served.

Nicholson and the Movable Column

The triumph of the Sialkot Mutineers was but brief. Retribution followed closely on their victory. On the 22nd of June, Colonel John Nicholson, with the rank of Brigadier-General, had taken command of the Movable Column. That so young an officer should be appointed to such a command, in defiance of what were called the “claims” of many officers in the Division of longer standing and higher rank, was an innovation by no means grateful to the Departments or to the Seniority-mongers in the service, but it startled many with a pleasurable surprise, and to some it was a source of infinite rejoicing. Elderly men with elderly wives, who had never heard of such a thing before,

Page 476

affected to think that there was no great wisdom in the appointment, and showed their contempt by talking of Mister Nicholson.

June–July

Of this the young General could afford to speak tenderly. “I fear,” he wrote to Edwardes on the 17th of June, “that my nomination will give great offence to the senior Queen’s officers, but I shall do all in my power to get on well with them. I feel so sorry for the disappointment they must experience, that I think I shall be able to put up with a great deal of coldness without taking offence.” But among the younger officers of the Army, especially among those in the Movable Column, the selection was most popular. The exigencies of the General Staff having taken Chamberlain to Dehli, there was not a man in the Army whose selection would have been more welcome to those who meant work, and were resolute to do it. When Edwardes wrote to John Lawrence, saying, “You have been very vigorous in. pushing down reinforcements, and those appointments of Chamberlain and Nicholson are worth armies in this crisis. ... Amid the ruins of the Regular Army these two Irregular Pillars stand boldly up against the sky, and I hope the Tom-noddies will admire their architecture,” he expressed. the sentiments of all the bolder spirits in the Army, eager to be led, not by age and rank, but by lusty manhood in its prime, and who could see better hope for a glorious deliverance even in the rashness and audacity of youth than in the irresolution and inactivity of senile command. It was truly a great day for India, when it was decreed that Chamberlain should go down to Dehli and Nicholson place himself at the head of the Movable Column in the Panjab.

The force of which Brigadier-General Nicholson took command consisted of Her Majesty’s 52nd Light Infantry; a troop of European Horse Artillery, under Major Dawes, an excellent officer, who had done good service in the Afghan war; a Horse Battery, also European, under Major George Bourchier; the 33rd485 and 35th Sipahi Regiments; and a wing of the 9th Cavalry. He joined the force at Jalandhar, and moved thence to Philur, as though he had been marching down upon Dehli. Then some people shook their heads and wondered what he was doing in thus carrying down with him many hundreds of

Page 477

Sipahis, with rebellion in their hearts, only to swell the host of the enemy. What he was really doing was soon apparent. He was intent on disarming the Native regiments. But as this was to be best accomplished by secrecy and suddenness, he did not blazon his design about the Camp. But in good time, the necessary instructions were given.

Disarming of the 33rd and 35th Regiments

On the morning of the 25th of June, the Column was under the walls of the fort of Philur. The guns were drawn up on the road and unlimbered, the 52nd taking post on both flanks. The Sipahi Regiments marched on, little dreaming of what was to come. Nicholson had given orders to the Police that, on the first sound of firing, the bridge across the river should be cut away, so as to prevent all chance of escape if the Sipahis should break and fly with their arms in their hands. Leaning over one of Bourchier’s guns, he said to that officer, “If they bolt, you follow as hard as you can; the bridge will have been destroyed, and we shall have a second Sobraon on a small scale486.” But the Sipahis did not bolt. In the presence of those guns they felt that it would be madness to resist the order; so they sullenly piled their arms at the word of command.

Having disarmed the two Infantry regiments, Nicholson determined to retrace his steps from Philur, and to pitch his camp at Amritsar. On the 5th he was at that place, the central position of which recommended itself to him, as it enabled him to afford speedy aid, if required, either to Lahor or the Jalandhar Duab, while at the same time it overawed the Manjha, and rendered hopeless any attempt to mutiny on the part of the 59th Regiment stationed in the cantonment487. On the morning of the 7th, the stirring news of the mutiny of the 14th at Jhelam reached his Camp, and he hoped hour after hour to be comforted by the tidings that Colonel Ellice had defeated and destroyed them. But the day passed, and the night also was spent, and still the wished-for intelligence did not come, but in its place were ominous tidings of disaster; so on the morning of the 9th, Nicholson, with reluctance which he frankly expressed488,

Page 478

Disarming of the 59th

proceeded to disarm the 59th. There was a punishment parade that morning. A rebel or a deserter was to be executed, and all the troops, European and Native, were ordered out to witness the ceremony. The ground selected lay between the city and the fort, about a mile front the cantonment, and there the regiments and the guns were drawn up on parade, and the ghastly ceremony was duly performed. This done, the Sipahis of the 59th, who only the day before had been complimented on their loyalty, were ordered to lay down their arms. Though surprised and bewildered by the command, they obeyed without a murmur; and though many men of the Regiment were not present on parade, and, therefore, a quantity of arms were still left in possession of the Sipahis, they testified the sincerity of their obedience by afterwards voluntarily surrendering them.

Thus were the teeth of another Native regiment quietly drawn, and the danger glaring at us from the ranks of our own Sipahis was greatly diminished. Elsewhere the same process, as Nicholson now learnt, was going on with more or less success.

Disarming of the 58th

At Rawalpindi were the 58th Regiment and two companies of the 14th – the regiment which had fought so desperately at Jhelam. A letter from Sir John Lawrence announced that the business of disarming had been done, but in no very satisfactory manner. “We have disarmed,” the Chief Commissioner wrote to Nicholson on the 7th, “the seven companies of the 58th and the two companies of the 14th. We had three guns and two hundred and forty Europeans, and were very nearly having a fight. The main body broke and bolted to their lines, and we did not fire on them. After about an hour’s work, however, during which a good many loaded, we got all but about thirty to lay down their arms. The latter bolted, and about half were killed or taken by the Police Sawars. Miller was badly wounded a little above the right wrist; both bones were broken. He had a narrow escape. A Sipahi gave him a dig in the chest with his bayonet, but somehow or other the wound was slight.” At the same time Edwardes was reporting the entire success of his

Page 479

Disarming of the 24th

arrangement for the disarming of the Sipahis of the 24th at Fort Mackeson489. By the help of Brougham’s mountain guns and some detachments of the Panjab Irregular Force this was accomplished without a hindrance or a hitch; and the disarmed Sipahis were marched into Peshawar, escorted by Brougham’s guns, whilst the Fort was garrisoned by some Multani levies, horse and foot. Nothing could have been more adroitly managed than the whole affair.

But tidings more exciting than these were to reach the ears of the Commander of the Movable Column. The telegraph wires brought news from Lahor that Movements of the Sipahis at Sialkot had risen, and that rapine and murder were abroad in the place; another half-hour, and the story was confirmed by a musician of the 46th, who had ridden in with a few blurred lines from Assistant-Commissioner McMahon, begging him to bring the Force to their aid490. Nicholson could now no longer hesitate about disarming the wing of the 9th Cavalry attached to his column. He had hitherto abstained lest such an act should precipitate the rising at Sialkot, and now the wing at that place was in the fulness of rebellion. Their arms and horses, therefore, were now to be taken from them. The troopers felt that resistance could only bring destruction upon them, so they quietly gave up all that made them soldiers; and then Nicholson prepared himself to

Page 480

march. As the day wore on, fresh tidings of the movements of the Sialkot mutineers reached him. It was obvious that they were marching down on Gurdaspur, intent probably on stirring up the 2nd Irregular Cavalry stationed there, and, joined by them, on plundering the station. Thence Nicholson believed that they would make their way, by the route of Nurpur and Hoshiarpur – at which places they might reinforce themselves with Horse and Foot491 – to Jalandhar, and thence march, a strong body of mutineers, down to Dehli.

The March to Gurdaspur

To frustrate this expected movement was now the desire of the commander of the Movable Column, He was forty miles from Gurdaspur, and the Sipahis had two days’ start of him. But Nicholson was born to overcome difficulties which would have beaten down other men. He determined on a forced march to Gurdaspur, and went resolutely to work to accomplish it.

July 10

The July sun blazed down upon his camp with a ferocity more appalling than the malice of the enemy. But even that was to be disregarded. Whatsoever the country could yield in the shape of carriages, horses, and ponies was at once enlisted into the service of the Column492.

July 11

All possible advantage was taken of the coolness of the night; but when morning came they were still some fifteen or sixteen miles from Gurdaspur, with the prospect of a sultry march before them493. With all his care and labour, Nicholson had not even with the aid of

Page 481

the troop-horses of the 9th, been able to mount the whole of his force, and some weary foot-sore work was therefore a necessity of the conjuncture. So, many were struck down by the heat; yet, notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, they pushed forward in excellent spirits, and even with a strong enjoyable sense of the humorous side of the service they were performing494. It was not until the evening of the 11th that the whole of the force was assembled at Gurdaspur. There intelligence was received that the mutineers from Sialkot were then at Nurkot, some fifteen miles from the right hand of the Ravi. There were two courses then open to Nicholson. He might dispute the passage of the river, or he might draw them on towards him, by remaining inactive and keeping the enemy ignorant of his position.

July 12

He determined on the latter course, and, much to the perplexity of some and the dissatisfaction of others, remained quiescent at Gurdaspur till nine o’clock on the following morning. Then he learnt that the enemy were crossing the river by a ford. about nine miles distant, at a place known as the Trimu Ghaut; so he prepared at once to fling himself upon them.

The Trimu Ghaut affair

At noon he was in sight of his prey, about a mile from the river. The mutineers had crossed over with their baggage, and the grey jackets of the videttes of the 9th Cavalry were first seen flitting about in our front, and then the Infantry were observed drawn up in line, their right resting on a serai and a dismantled mud fort, and their left on a small village and cluster of trees, with parties of Cavalry on each flank. Nicholson now made his dispositions for the attack. Eager to get his guns within short

Page 482

range of the enemy, he masked his advancing batteries with bodies of mounted Police, and moved on to within six hundred yards of the mutineers, when the Cavalry, excited to the utmost by the artificial stimulant of bang, rushed furiously to the encounter, some shouting, some gnashing their teeth. On this Nicholson unmasked one of his batteries, and the maskers went rapidly to the rear495. It was a moment of doubt and anxiety, especially with the Artillery commanders, whose Native drivers might have deserted them at a critical moment, for they had been acquainted at Sialkot with the very Sipahis against whom they had now been brought. One half of the old Brigade was, indeed, fighting against the other. But the suspected men were as true to their salt in the Panjab as they were at Dehli496. The guns were brought into action without a hitch, and the enemy, though they fought steadily and well, and sent in a volley from the whole line with the precision of a parade, staggered beneath the fire of our batteries, upon which some of the men of the 46th flung themselves with heroic courage. The grape and shrapnel from our nine guns scattered death among the foremost of the mutineers; and presently the Enfield rifles of the 52nd began to give deadly proof that the smooth-bored muskets of the Sipahis were as playthings contending against them. Still there were some amongst them to be convinced only by the thrust of the bayonet. In truth, the enemy were terribly out-matched. With all their gallantry in doing and their fortitude in enduring, what could “Brown Bess” and the old station-gun do against our batteries and our rifles? The battle was soon over. The mutineers fell back upon the river, and Nicholson, whose want of Cavalry was severely felt, did all he could in pursuit; but could not inflict much damage upon them. It is said, however, that they had already left “between three and four hundred killed and wounded on the field.” And all their baggage fell into our hands – arms, ammunition,

Page 483

clothing, and other plundered property, public and private, the spoil of the Sialkot cantonment.

July 12–16

There was nothing more to be done that day. The mid-day heat had completely exhausted our European fighting men, so, whilst a party of Panjab Infantry was left to guard the ford and protect the baggage, the 52nd and the Artillery were marched back to Gurdaspur. But the day’s fighting had resulted in a “conclusion where nothing is concluded,” so conclusions were to be tried again. The Sipahi force was shattered, but not destroyed. Their fighting power was not yet gone. Perhaps the energy that sustained them was the energy of desperation; for to fall back was as perilous to them as to stand still. There was no security for them in any direction. They had not more than half the-number that first marched down to the Ravi; but they were brave and resolute men, and, even with such fearful odds against them, they did not shrink from another conflict. The river had risen, and that which had been a ford had now become an island. The old station-gun which they had brought from Sialkot was their sole piece of artillery, and they had no gunners with their force; but the Brigadier’s old “khansamah” had lived for too many years at Artillery stations not to have a shrewd conception of the manner of working ft gun. And, thus planted on the island in the middle of the Ravi, they thought that, for a time at least, they might defy us. The river had ceased to be fordable, and the civil authorities, as a precautionary measure, had sunk all the boats in the immediate neighbourhood. So, when Nicholson again advanced from Gurdaspur, he could do little more in the first instance than take up a position out of reach of the enemy’s one gun and send to a distance for some boats.

July 16

At daybreak on the morning of the 16th, the desired means of transport had been obtained, and he was prepared to attack the enemy on their insular stronghold. The Infantry crossed over one extremity of the island, a mile and a quarter from the enemy’s position, whilst the Artillery took post so as to cover the advance of the column and to play upon the hostile gun497. The Sipahis were taken by surprise. Not until a large part of

Page 484

the 52nd had formed upon the island did the mutineers know that we had even obtained a boat. The Assembly was then sounded; the black troops mustered in haste and moved round their gun to sweep our advancing column. But the piece had been elevated for service at a longer range, and in the hurry of the moment the amateur artillerymen had failed to depress the screw, which was old and rusty, and not easily to be worked; so the shot went harmlessly over the heads of our people. On went the British Infantry, with Nicholson at their head; and though some, stern and steadfast to the last, stood to be shot down or bayoneted at their gun, the rout soon became general. Many were killed on the island; many were drowned in the river; and a few who escaped were given up by the people of the surrounding villages. These were afterwards tried by Special Commissions, and paid the penalty of their crimes on the gibbet.

Nicholson at Lahor

The Movable Column then marched back to Amritsar; and Nicholson hastened to Lahor, whither Sir John Lawrence had already proceeded from Rawalpindi.

July 22

Reinforcements for Dehli

The General was there on the 21st of July; on the 22nd, the Chief Commissioner wrote, through his secretary, to the Commander of the Dehli Force, that “the following troops were on their way to Dehli, or would immediately march:” “The Kumaon Battalion, about four hundred strong, which has passed Lodiana, and ought to be at Dehli on the 4th or 5th of August; Her Majesty’s 52nd from the Movable Column, now at Amritsar, six hundred bayonets; Multani Horse, two hundred; and a nine-pounder battery. All these troops should be at Dehli by the 15th, and in an emergency might make double marches. General Nicholson command the force.” And then it was added: “The Chief Commissioner further proposes to despatch the troops marginally noted as quickly as possible, and all can be at Dehli by the end of August, some of them a good deal earlier. The 2nd Panjab Infantry and Wing of Her Majesty’s 61st ought to be there by the 15th proximo. The former is now on its way from Multan to Firuzpur, whence it will march on the arrival of the detachment of the Bombay Fusiliers, which left this place last night.

2nd Panjab Infantry 700
H.M.’s 61st (a wing) 400
Wing of Biluch Battalion 400
4th Panjab Infantry 600
Two Companies of H.M.’s 8th 200
Detachment of 4th Sikhs 100
Dawes’s Troop of H.A. 100
2500

Page 485

The wing of the Biluch Battalion has not yet left Multan; but orders for its march have been despatched. The 4th Panjab Regiment is at Peshawar, and will march in two or three days. It can hardly be at Dehli before the end. of August. The two Companies of Her Majesty’s 8th are holding Jalandhar and Philur, and cannot be spared until relieved by a detachment of Her Majesty’s 24th, now on its way from Rawalpindi. Rothney’s Sikhs are at Lodiana, and will join Brigadier-General Nicholson en route. Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes’s troop will be sent or not, as you may desire. It is believed that light guns are not required at Dehli. All these troops are of excellent quality, fully equal, if not superior, to any that the Insurgents can bring against them, and comprise a force of four thousand two hundred men.” Thus was Lawrence, who did all things on the grand Titanic scale, still sending down his reinforcements by thousands to Dehli – thousands of Europeans and trustworthy Sikhs, with a young General, whose personal presence alone was worth a Brigade of Horse, Foot, and Artillery.

July 24

The Column ordered to Dehli

On the 24th of July, Nicholson returned to Camp. His arrival had been anxiously awaited, for doubt and uncertainty were in all men’s minds. Speculation had been rife, and all sorts of rumours of the future movements of the force had been circulated among them. Few had ventured to hope that the order would be given to them to march down to Dehli; for the general feeling was that the Panjab had already been so stripped of European troops that it could not afford to divest itself of another regiment, or another battery. But Nicholson had returned to the column with the joyous tidings that they were to set their faces towards the scene of the great struggle. “Our only fear,” wrote an officer of the Force, “was that Dehli would fall before we could possibly arrive there,” But all felt that, if anyone could take them down in time to participate in the crowning operations of the siege, Nicholson was the man to do it, He was not one to lose an hour. On the following day the column crossed the Bias, moved down by forced marches to the Satlaj, and thence pushing on with all speed to the Jamnah. At Bara, on the 3rd of August, Nicholson received a letter from General Wilson, saying, “The enemy have re-established the bridge over the Najafgarh Canal (which we had destroyed) and

have established themselves in force there, with the intention of moving on Alipur and our communications to

Page 486

the rear. I, therefore, earnestly beg you to push forward with the utmost expedition in your power, both to drive these fellows from my rear, and to aid me in holding my position.”

August 6–7

On the 6th, Nicholson was at Ambalah, whence he wrote, “I am just starting post for Dehli by General Wilson’s desire. The column should be at Karnal the day after to-morrow, and I shall, perhaps, rejoin it at Panipat.”

Nicholson at Dehli

On the following day he stood upon the Dehli Ridge looking down at the great city, taking in all the wonderful suggestiveness of the scene with that quiet, thoughtful, self-contained solemnity of mien, which distinguished him from all his contemporaries. He had much then to think of in this little breathing-space – much of the past, much of the future. The time which had elapsed since his first appointment to the command of the Movable Column bad not been without certain personal annoyances, which even in the midst of the stirring work around him he had not been wholly able to brush aside. It was scarcely possible that, in the position in which he was placed, a man of Nicholson’s peculiar character should, on no occasion, give offence to higher authority. It was his nature to steer straight on to independent action; to “scorn the consequence and to do the thing.” And so it happened that those above him thought that he was taking too much upon himself, and that he was grievously deficient in those references and explanations which Officialism, in ordinary times, not improperly demands. Even Sir John Lawrence, most emphatically a man of action, was somewhat disturbed by the fact that Nicholson had disarmed the 33rd and 35th regiments without previously consulting the Chief-Commissioner, or very promptly explaining to him the “reason why.”

August 7

But afterwards, with the unfailing frankness which relieved all that was outwardly stern and harsh in his nature, he admitted that he “could not expect Nicholson, after knocking about in the sun all day, to write long yarns.” “On such occasions,” he added, “a line or two semi-officially will satisfy me, until I get your formal report; all I want to know is, what is done and the reason.” But no sooner had this little difference with the Commissioner been smoothed down, than another and more serious one arose between the Commander of the Movable Column and the General commanding the Division. Nicholson had taken upon himself to move troops, under the command of the latter, without consulting

Page 487

him, and had been so severely rebuked, that he declared that nothing but the thought of the public inconvenience, which might result from such a step, restrained him from throwing up his appointment. These wounds were still fresh, when he reached Dehli and asked himself whether it were likely that, in the work which lay before him, he would be able wholly to avoid collisions with his fellow-workmen. He felt that much had been done of which he could not approve, and that much had been left undone which he would have earnestly counselled; and he knew that all this might come over again, and that his resolute freedom of speech and independence of action might bring forth much that would be painful to himself and embarrassing to others. But he had written a few days before to Sir John Lawrence, saying: “I might have preserved silence, but when in a great crisis an officer holds a strong opinion on any matters of consequence, I think he fails in his duty if he does not speak it out, at whatever risk of giving offence498.” And now he was determined that, cost him what it might, he would suffer his convictions to declare themselves without restraint, regardless of everything. but the good of the Empire.

His coming had been eagerly looked for in Camp. As day after day tidings of the rapid approach of the Movable Column, under Nicholson, were brought in, men began to see clearly before them the consummation of the final assault, and their hearts were gladdened by the prospect. The approach of this column was, indeed, as the promise of a great deliverance; and

Page 488

when it was whispered through the Camp that Nicholson had already arrived, it was as a cordial to men’s souls, for a great reputation had preceded him, and it was felt among our people that a mighty warrior had come among them, who was destined to lead our troops into Dehli, and to crush the power of the Mughul. His personal presence did much to generate in men’s minds the sublime idea of a Hero – a King of Men; of the Megistos who was to reign among them. He had come on in advance, by Wilson’s request, to take counsel with him; and he was soon passing from picquet to picquet, taking in with a soldier’s eye all the points of our position, and looking down critically upon. the defences of the enemy. He did not at once make his way into the hearts of men, but he impressed all with a sense of power. On the evening of the 7th of August, on which day he arrived in. Camp, he dined at the Head-Quarters Mess, and the silent solemnity of his demeanour was unpleasantly apparent to men whose habitual cheerfulness, when they met together for the social meal, had been one of the sustaining influences of Camp Life, during all that long dreary season of waiting and watching. Next morning, accompanied by Norman, he visited the great position at Hindu Rao’s house, which for two long months had borne the brunt of the enemy’s attacks. Baird Smith at that time was in consultation with Reid499. The brave commander of the picquet, who had done such good service, could not help inwardly resenting Nicholson’s imperious manner. But when, after the visitor had passed on, Reid complained to his companion of Nicholson’s haughty, overbearing style of address, the Chief Engineer answered, “Yes, but that wears

Page 489

off; you will like him better when you have seen more of him.” And never were words of good omen more surely verified, for afterwards they became “the best friends” – bound together by an equal desire to do their duty to their country, and, if God willed it, to die the soldier’s death.

Eager to be at his work, Nicholson made ready offer of his column to perform any service that might be required on its first arrival. He saw at once that there was something to be done. The enemy had established themselves at, a place on the left of our position, known as Ludlow Castle, and had planted a battery there, from which they contrived greatly to harass our picquets, especially that known as the “Metcalfe Picquet;” and it was desirable in the extreme to dislodge them. This attack upon the enemy’s new position Nicholson would have gladly undertaken. But the activity of the mutineers was so great, and their fire was so annoying, that it was found to be inexpedient to wait for the arrival of the Movable Column. The work was to be done at once, and Brigadier Showers, a right good soldier, always cool and collected in the midst of danger and difficulty, was commissioned to do it.

August 12

Affair of Ludlow Castle

Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Showers led down his men, along the Flagstaff Road, upon Ludlow Castle. Covered by the darkness, they. marched quietly on, and took the enemy completely by surprise. A rattling fire of musketry roused them from their sleep, and numbers were shot down, scared and bewildered, before they could realise what was upon them. The Golandaz rushed confusedly to the battery; but our attack was so sudden and impetuous, that they could hardly fire a shot before the 1st Fusiliers were among them, bayoneting the brave fellows at their guns. Many, unable to work their pieces, drew their swords, and, with their backs against the wall, sold their lives as dearly as they could. Masters of the battery, our men pushed on, in the grey dawn of the morning, following the mutineers into the houses, where they had endeavoured to find shelter, and shot them down like beasts in a cage. Some cried for mercy, and were answered with a laugh and a bayonet-thrust. By sunrise the work had been done. The enemy had been driven from Ludlow Castle, and four of their six guns had been taken. The victory, however, had been dearly purchased. The intrepid leader of the assailing party had fallen severely wounded; and

Page 490

Coke, who had led the Panjabis to the attack, had shared the same fate. It was in the confusion attending the fall of Showers that two of the enemy’s guns were suffered to escape; and when Colonel Edward Greathed was afterwards sent to bring the force out of action, he did not know that these trophies of victory were to be recovered, or we may be sure that he would not have returned without them. Enough, however, had been gained to make the return to Camp a triumphal one. To secure the success of the surprise, the expedition had been rendered as secret as possible. When, therefore, the sound of the firing broke through the morning stillness the British Camp was aroused, and men wondered what was the meaning of it. The truth was soon apparent to them, and then numbers went out to meet the returning force, and welcomed them, as they came in with the captured guns, rejoicing exceedingly that so good a day’s work. had been done before the breaking of the morning’s fast500.

Arrival of the Movable Column

August 14

It may with truth, I think, be said, that at this point of the long and weary siege the great turning-point was attained. The siege-train, which was to remedy our deplorable want of heavy ordnance, was labouring down from Firuzpur; and on the 14th of August, Nicholson, who had ridden back to meet his column, marched into the Dehli Camp at the head of his men. It was a sight to stir the spirits of the whole Camp. Our people turned out joyously to welcome the arrival of the new comers; and the gladsome strains of our military bands floated down to the rebel city with a menace in every note. Braced with action, flushed with victory, Nicholson was eager for new exploits. And he did not wait long for an opportunity to demonstrate to the Dehli Force that they had not overestimated the great qualities of the Panjabi warrior. The enemy had gained tidings of the approach of our siege-train from Firuzpur, and they had determined to send out a strong force to intercept it. No more welcome task could have been assigned to Nicholson than that of cutting this force to pieces. A well-chosen, well-equipped force of all arms was told off for

Page 491

this service, under his command; and, with full assurance of victory, he prepared himself for the encounter.

August 25

Battle of Najafgarh

In the early morning of the 25th of August, amidst heavy rain, the force marched out of Camp, and took the road to Najafgarh, in which direction it was believed that the Bareli and Nimach Brigades of the Rebel Force had moved on the preceding day. It was a toilsome, and, for some time, a dispiriting march; for the road, little better than a bullock-track at best, was sometimes lost altogether in swamps and floods. At many points our gun-wheels sank in the mud up to their axles, and needed all the strength of the Artillerymen to extricate them from the slough. The Infantry, slipping and sliding on the slimy soil, could scarcely make good their footing, and toiled on laboriously, wet to the skin, and draggled with dirt; whilst the horses of the Cavalry struck up the mud blindingly into the troopers’ faces; and the camels, ever so serviceably adroit on arid soil, sprawled hopelessly in the mire, and often fell with their burdens by the way. Many a lusty oath was sworn on that morning; but, if temper was lost, hope and heart remained; and. when, after a halt, and some renovation of exhausted nature, news came that they were upon the track of the enemy, and would soon be amongst them, the difficulties of the road diminished, or appeared to diminish, and they moved on with cheerful eagerness. The sun was sinking when our leading column espied the enemy, and at the same time came, upon a stream, which the rains had flooded into the depth and dimension of a river. The mutineers were posted along the line of Nicholson’s advance, to the left. Divided into three bodies, they occupied two villages and a serai in front of them – all protected by guns. As our troops passed the ford – the water even there breast-high – the enemy opened upon the British column with a shower of shot and shell from the serai. But, advancing steadily under this fire, Nicholson took in the situation with his quick soldier’s eye, forecast the action in his mind, and, when his force had crossed the water, at once made his dispositions. The foremost point of attack, and the most perilous, was the sarai. Against this Nicholson determined to fling the strength of his European troops, whilst he provided for the attack of the villages by other components of his force. Then, having ordered the 61st and the Fusiliers to lie down, so as to be clear of the enemy’s fire, he drew himself up in his

Page 492

stirrups, and addressed his men. He told the 61st that they knew well what Sir Colin Campbell had said at Chilianwala, and what he had again told the Highland Brigade before the battle of the Alma. “I have now,” he said, “the same words to say to you, and to you, my friends of the Fusiliers. Hold your fire till you are within twenty or thirty yards of the enemy, then pour your volleys into them, give them a bayonet-charge, and the serai is yours.” Then Tombs and Remington opened a smart fire on the serai; and up the Infantry sprang with a ringing cheer, and, sinking ankle-deep in the swampy ground, steadily advanced, Nicholson at their head, in the face of a shower of grape and. musketry. Then holding back their fire – the hardest of all possible tasks – they carried the serai, and captured the guns501.

But the resistance was resolute, the conflict desperate. The heroism which was displayed by our people was emulated by the enemy. The Sipahis fought well, and sold their lives dearly. There was a sanguinary hand-to-hand encounter. Many of the gunners and the drivers were bayoneted, or cut down in the battery, and those who escaped limbered up and made, in hot haste, for the bridge crossing the Najafgarh Canal. But the attacking party pressed closely upon them. The swampy state of the ground was fatal to the retreat. The leading gun stuck fast in the morass, and impeded the advance of those in the rear. Then our pursuing force fell upon them, and before they had made good their retreat captured thirteen guns and killed eight hundred of their fighting men502.

In the meanwhile, the Panjabis, having swept on to the attack of the village on the right, and gallantly- cleared it, crossed over by the rear to do like service on the other village, against which a brisk fire of artillery had been directed; but here they met with a stubborn resistance. Lumsden, who led them to the attack, was shot down; and, not until a party of the 61st had been sent in support, were the despairing energies

Page 493

of the mutineers suppressed. Night had by this time fallen upon the scene. Nicholson was master of the Field, and the enemy were in panic-flight. But our circumstances were not cheering. Our baggage had not come up, and our people were compelled, hungry, weary, and soaked as they were, to bivouack in a morass, without food, or anything to console and sustain them, except the thought of the victory they had gained. Next morning, having collected their spoil, and blown up the Najafgarh bridge, they commenced their march back to Dehli, carrying their trophies with them. It was ascertained afterwards that it was the Nimach Brigade which Nicholson had thus routed. The Bareli Brigade had not come up to take part in the action. It was a mortifying reflection to the British leader that this information had not been communicated to him at an earlier period. “I do not exaggerate,” he wrote afterwards to Sir John Lawrence, “when I say that had I had decent political officer with me to get me a little information, I might have smashed the Bareli Brigade at Palam, the next day. As it was, I had no information – not even a guide that I did not pick up for myself on the road; and had I obeyed my instructions, and gone to Bahadurgarh, the expedition would have been a fruitless one. I feel very thankful for my success; for, had these two brigades succeeded in getting into our rear, they would undoubtedly have done much mischief.”

The news of the victory, first conveyed to Dehli by young Low, Nicholson’s aide-de-camp, who had ridden on in advance of the returning force, caused great rejoicing in Camp, and there was strong desire to give the victors an ovation as they marched in with their trophies. But Nicholson’s men were weary and in sorry plight for any needless spectacular display, so they made all haste to their quarters, and, as evening had closed in upon them before the whole force had arrived, the ovation would have been impossible, if they had been inclined to receive it. But there were hearty congratulations next day freely tendered to Nicholson, who had done his work right well, and secured the safe advance of the siege-train. It was believed, too, that he had weakened the enemy’s force, not merely to the number of those who were killed and wounded in action, for the whole brigade was broken and dispersed, and many never again showed their faces in Dehli503. Since the

Page 494

battle of Badli-ki-sarai on the 8th of June, the English at De had gained no such victory- as that which crowned the action at Najafgarh.

Congratulations upon this brilliant achievement poured in from all sides; but from none came they with greater heartiness and sincerity than from Sir John Lawrence, who wrote to him, saying: “Though sorely pressed with work, I write a line to congratulate you on your success. I wish I had the power of knighting you on the spot. It should be done. I hope you destroyed no end of villainous Pandis504.”

August 30

To this Nicholson replied, August 30, 1857: “Many thanks for your kind letter of the 27th. I would much rather earn the good opinion of my friends than any kind of honorary distinction. I enclose, for your perusal, and Edwardes’s, the rough draft of my report. The field was of such extent, that it was not easy to estimate the mutineers’ loss. I think, moreover, that they suffered more severely from the fire of our Artillery, after they had bolted across the bridge, than they did on the actual battle-field Except where poor Lumsden was killed, they made little attempt to stand. Most of the killed were Kotah Contingent men. We took the Nimach troop of artillery complete, three light field battery guns, and. four of the King’s Own. I wish sincerely that they had had as many more, as, after their flank was turned, they could not have used them, and must have lost them all.”

After this there was quiet for a little space in Camp. All men were looking eagerly for the arrival of the siege-train, and for those last reinforcements which. Lawrence was sending down from the Panjab. Reports were floating about to the effect that the Bareli Brigade was going out again, under Bakht Khan, to make another effort to intercept our convoys, but if this design were ever entertained it was soon abandoned, for it never developed into even the semblance of a fact; and all

Page 495

again was composure. There was not a soldier in camp who did not then feel that the time of waiting and watching had well-nigh passed – that we should soon assume the offensive in earnest, with ample means to secure success. Dehli now seemed to be in our grasp, and the spirits of men rose with the thought of the coming triumph. Then was it that the mess-tents of our officers rang with the loudest laughter; then was it that our military bands sent up their gayest music; then was it that the inactivity of a disheartened enemy gave unaccustomed repose to the besieging force; then the healthy could enjoy their books or games, and the sick and wounded could be brought to the doors of their tents to inhale the pleasant evening air, or take in the marvellous beauty of the “view from the Ridge.” For nearly three months the great city, with its wealth of ordnance, had defied the best courage and the best skill of the English nation. We had been beaten by the material resources of an enemy, whom, without such aids, we could have crushed in a day. But now, as our Engineers brought all the appliances of their craft to bear upon the strengthening and securing of our positions, as the space between our siege-works and the city-walls was narrowed by their efforts, and breaching-batteries were rising under their hands, no man doubted that the coming month would see Dehli prostrate at our feet, and the consummation of our hopes gloriously accomplished. Again the supremacy of the English race in India, obscured only for a little while, was to be re-asserted and re-established; and there was not a white man in camp who did not long, with a great hunger of the heart, for the day when the signal would be given, and it would be left for our English manhood to decide for itself whether any multitude of Natives of India, behind their walls of masonry, could deter our legions from a victorious entrance into the imperial city of the Mughul.

Footnotes

476. Colonel Edwardes to Sir John Lawrence, May 27. MS. Correspondence.

477. Captain James had up this time been appointed to succeed Colonel Nicholson as Deputy-Commissioner at Peshawar.

478. It ought always to be remembered that the strongest opponents of the measure were the chief Peshawar officers, whose tendency it naturally was to take a local view of the question. Lawrence, years afterwards, with characteristic frankness, wrote that “certainly, in having Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, and Sydney Cotton against me, it is clear that there was a great deal to be said on the other side.” Indeed, their arguments, as to the danger of abandoning Peshawar, were altogether unanswerable. But so also were the arguments as to the danger of withdrawing the Dehli Field Force. And this danger Sir John Lawrence was more capable of estimating aright than the little confederacy of military and political officers on the frontier. On the other band it is to be observed that Neville Chamberlain, who knew well how nearly the siege of Dehli had been raised, confessed after the capture of the place, that he concurred in the views which Lawrence had declared some months before. It was his belief that to retreat from Heidi would have been absolute ruin. “We should have lost all our heavy guns and matériel; our Native troops and our camp-followers would have deserted us; and our British force would have been worn down and destroyed. The Dehli Force could not have made good its retreat on the Panjab, and, in such circumstances, the Panjabi Force could not have maintained itself at Lahor. It was doubtful whether, with all its available means, it could have retreated on Multan.” It must be remembered, too, that Lord Canning, who took a very unfavourable view of Sir John Lawrence’s proposal, and attributed this policy to the failing health of the Chief Commissioner, had no accurate knowledge of the state of affairs at Dehli – between which place and Calcutta all communication was cut off, and the capture of which still seemed to be a proximate event of no sort of difficulty to the besieging Force. It should be added that the Lumsdens, who were at Kandahar at the time, looking at the question from the stand-point of Afghan politics, sent an urgent missive in cipher, urging him to hold on to the last. “If Peshawar and Kohat,” they said, “are given up at this moment, we shall have all Afghanistan down upon our backs, besides throwing open the gate of Afghanistan, the Khaibar, forever. ... Don’t give an inch of ground; but trust in Providence, fight it out, and recall us sharp to help you.” – MS. [The extracts preceding are from unpublished letters.]

479. Mr. Cooper (“Crisis in the Panjab”) says Colonel Gerrard, full of confidence in his men, had “informed them of the object of the European arrival.”

480. He had left as previously stated, with Baird Smith, on the 29th of June (ante, page 424), and had only just joined his regiment when his career was thus closed on the battle-field.

481. “Brigadier Brind protested against the European troops being entirely removed, and desired that two hundred and fifty should remain. In reply, he was requested to disarm. But, to the last, he shared in the belief (almost grievous) in the honour of the Sipahi.” – Cooper’s Crisis in the Panjab.

482. His daughter escaped. She was dragged to the Cavalry Guard, where she “found Colonel and Mrs. Lorne Campbell surrounded by a few faithful troopers, who conducted them in safety to the Fort.” – There is a significant commentary on this incident in one of Herbert Edwardes’s letters to John Lawrence: “These individual stories convey better notions than public despatches. In ordinary times India would have shuddered over Dr. Graham shot dead in his daughter’s arms. Now, all we say is, what a wonderful escape Miss Graham has had!’” Habituated, after two months of mutiny and massacre, to horrors of this kind, the recital of them had ceased to create the intense sensations which they bad once caused. And so, in this History, it will be observed, as it proceeds, that whilst the earlier tragedies, then novel and strange to the European mind, are dwelt upon in detail, some of the later ones are dismissed with the brevity of a telegraphic message. In this the narrative only reflects the varying temperature of the times.

483. This might be supposed to have arisen merely from the instinct of self-preservation if it had not been for the after-conduct of these domestics. It is certain that, in many parts of the country, the Native servants were in a state of deadly fear lest their enraged masters, seeking objects for their revenge, should turn upon them and kill them. There is an anecdote illustrative of this, almost too good to be an invention. It is said that a gentleman in Calcutta, observing one day a strange table-servant waiting at dinner, asked him who he was and how he came there. His answer was, “Ham badli hain, sahib” (“I am a substitute”); and he explained that he had come to take the place temporarily of a member of the establishment who was sick – a common practice in Anglo-Indian domestic life. A few days afterwards the old servant returned to his work, looking very sleek and well; and when his master questioned him as to the cause of his absence, he naively replied that he had received secret information that, on a given day just passed, the sahib-log intended to shoot all their Native servants, in the middle of dinner, and that, therefore, he had thought it prudent to send a “badli” to be shot in his place.

484. Cave-Browne’s “Panjab and Dehli.”

485. The 33rd, which had been stationed at Hoshiarpur, joined the column near Philur.

486. Bourchier’s Eight Months’ Campaign.

487. Brigadier-General Nicholson to the Adjutant-General of the Army, July 19, 1857.

488. “I feel bound to place on record my belief that both in conduct and feeling this regiment was quite an exceptional one. It had neither committed itself in any way, nor do I believe that up to the day it was disarmed it had any intention of committing itself; and I very deeply regret that even as a precautionary measure it should have become my duty to disarm it.” – Ibid.

489. “As day dawned, the two parties from north and south closed in upon the Fort, and threw a chain of horsemen round it, whilst Major Brougham drew up his guns so as to command the gateway. Major Shakespear, commanding the 24th Regiment, and Lieutenant Hovenden, of the Engineers, then rode into the Fort, and ordered the Sipahis to parade outside. They were much surprised and confused, but made no resistance, and when ordered by Major Shakespear, piled their arms and gave up their belts and pouches in an orderly manner.” – Edwardes to Cotton, July 8, 1837. MS. Correspondence.

490. The note, the original of which is before me, is significant in its brevity: “The troops here are in open mutiny. Jail broke. Brigadier wounded. Bishop killed. Many have escaped to the Fort. Bring the Movable Column at once, if possible. 6½ A.M., 9th July.” The name of the bearer of this chit ought not to be omitted. Mr. Cave-Browne says, “A young band-boy, named McDouglas, of the 46th, had galloped off from the Regimental parade-ground on a little tat (pony), and by dint of borrowing and seizing fresh ones in the villages as he passed through, he finished his ride of some eighty miles into Amritsar, and hastened to the General’s quarters just as the mail-cart brought in the message from Lahor.”

491. The 4th Native Infantry was at Nurpur. The 16th Irregular Cavalry at Hoshiarpur.

492. Great praise is due to the civil authorities for their activity in this conjuncture. Mr. Montgomery in his official report, says: “To the commercial men of Amritsar and Lahor the metalled road offers special advantages, for it enabled hundreds of native gigs or ekkas to fly unceasingly between the two cities. On the day I allude to the district officers of both places were ordered to seize every ekka, bylee, and pony that was to be seen, and to despatch them under police guards, to General Nicholson’s camp at Amritsar, on urgent public service. These vehicles, on their arrival there, were promptly loaded with British soldiers, and the force started at dusk for Gurdaspur, which is at a distance of forty-four miles from Amritsar, reaching it at three P.M. of July 11. It was joined at Battala by Mr. Roberts, Commissioner, and Captain Perkins, Assistant-Commissioner at Amritsar.”

493. Colonel Bourchier (“Eight Months’ Campaign”) says that they made twenty-six miles in the night, and had then eighteen miles before them. But General Nicholson, in his official report, says that the entire distance was “over forty-one miles,” some three miles lees than Bourchier’s computation.

494. Colonel Bourchier, in his narrative, gives the following amusing account of the humours of the march: “Yet, under these circumstances, trying as they were, the spirit of fun was not extinct. The Artillery made extemporary awnings of branches of trees over their gun-carriages and wagons, giving them the appearance of carts ‘got up’ for a day at Hampstead; officers, crowned with wreaths of green leaves, were ‘chaffed’ by their comrades for adopting head-dresses à la Norma. Here might be seen a soldier on a rampant pony, desiring his companion, on a similar beast, to keep behind and be his ‘edge de camp’; there a hero, mindful perhaps of Epping on Easter Monday, bellowing out his inquiries as to who had seen the fox (stag?). Privates, never intended for the mounted branch, here and there came to grief, and lay sprawling On mother-earth, while, ever and anon, some mighty Jehu in his ekka dashed to the front at a pace a Roman charioteer would have envied.”

495. Nicholson himself speaks very gently and forbearingly of this rearward movement of the Police Risalahs: “The Police,” he says, “being no longer useful as maskers, and seeming undesirous of engaging, were ordered to the rear.” Colonel Bourchier says that they ran away. “Away scampered the mounted levies back to Gurdaspur.”

496. Colonel Bourchier says: “I took the precaution to warn my European gunners to watch them. In the reply of my Farrier-Sergeant spoke the whole company: ‘If they only attempt to run, sir, we’ll cut off their heads.’ But in this case, as in every other, my Native drivers nobly did their duty.”

497. Colonel Bourchier says that “to silence it at such a distance (twelve hundred yards), whilst it was nearly concealed by grass and an earthen breastwork, was almost impossible.”

498. See the following extract from a letter written to Sir John Lawrence from Ambalah, August 6. Lawrence had written to Nicholson, saying, half-seriously, half-jestingly, that he was incorrigible, and suggesting that he might do more good by carrying others with him than by running counter to them. To this Nicholson had replied: “I am very sorry to hear that General Cowan has taken offence again. I don’t wish to ignore him or any other superior; I dislike offending anyone, and, except on principle, would never have a disagreement. You write as if I were in the habit of giving offence. Now I cannot call to mind that since my return to India, upwards of five years and a half ago, I have had any misunderstandings, except with ___ and ___. The former, I believe, is conscious that he did me wrong, and I trust the latter will eventually make the same admission. I fear that I must have given offence to you, too, on the Rawalpindi question, I can truly say that I opposed my opinion to yours with great reluctance, and, had the matter been of less importance, I might have preserved silence; but when in a great, crisis an officer holds a strong opinion on any matter of consequence, I think he fails in his duty if he does not speak it out, at whatever risk of giving offence.”

499. The following description is from the “History of the Siege of Dehli:” “About this time a stranger of very striking appearance was remarked visiting all our picquets, examining everything. and making most searching inquiries about their strength and history. His attire gave no clue to his rank; it evidently never cost the owner a thought. Moreover, in those anxious times everyone went as he pleased: perhaps no two officers were dressed alike. It was soon made out that this was General Nicholson, whose person was not yet known in Camp, and it was whispered, at the same time, that he was possessed of the most brilliant military genius. He was a man cast in a giant mould, with massive chest and powerful limbs, and an expression ardent and commanding, with a dash of roughness; features of stern beauty, a long black beard, and deep sonorous voice. There was something of immense strength, talent, and resolution in his whole gait and manner, and a power of ruling men on high occasions that no one could escape noticing.”

500. Hervey Greathed says, that on this occasion we lost nineteen men killed, and ninety-four wounded. He adds: “Nobody would have supposed the force had suffered at all, from the jolly way in which they marched back, except for seeing the litters.”

501. “Poor Gabbett of the 61st, a fine brave soldier, twenty yards in advance of his men, made a rush on one of the guns; his foot slipped, and he was bayoneted by a gigantic Pandi: but Captain Trench, of the 35th N.I., who was A.D.C. to General Nicholson (that moment rising from the ground, his worse having been shot under him), quickly avenged his death by bringing down the rebel with his revolver.” – Cave-Browne.

502. The enemy had four guns at the serai, three at each of the villages, and three at the bridge over the canal.

503. “According to all accounts, the Nimach Brigade (the one I dealt with) only numbers six hundred men now. Many of those who fled would appear never to have returned to Dehli. Most of the officers with me in the action rated them at six, seven, and eight thousand men. My own idea is, that they were between three thousand and four thousand.” – Nicholson to Lawrence, August 30, 1857.

504. In this letter Lawrence writes: “Don’t assault until you have given the mutineers all the powder and shot which the siege-train can spare, and then go in, and may God be with you all. I think, if all the troops were warned not to disperse, it might have an effect upon them.”

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
hosted by ibiblio Support Wikipedia