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Book XI – The Re-conquest of Oudh

Chapter I – Preparations and Action in Bengal

State of affairs throughout India on the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell

Sir Colin Campbell had arrived in Calcutta on the 13th of August. At that moment affairs were seemingly at their worst. The North-west Provinces, Dehli, Rohilkhand, and Oudh were lost. The Panjab was fermenting. Central India was in a state of veiled rebellion. The very existence of the English in India was depending upon the early capture of Dehli, and Dehli still held out.

The latest accounts received from the districts occupied by the-rebels were far from reassuring. The British force before Dehli was believed to be more besieged than besieging. The British garrison in Agra was known to be isolated; cut off from communication with the outer world. All that men knew of Lakhnao was that the small British force there had sustained a defeat in the field, and was shut in an enclosure, not in a military point of view defensible, charged with the care of a large number of women and children; that Havelock, after two heroic efforts to relieve them, had been forced to fall back upon Kanhpur.

The British hold on the country decreasing every day

But, if these accounts were sufficient to dishearten, the private information received was scarcely calculated to console. Every day made the loyalty of the Sikhs more questionable. Every day increased the difficulty of Sindhia to restrain his troops from a movement against Agra, or, more to be dreaded still, upon Kanhpur. Every day relaxed our hold upon the princes of Rajputana and of Bundelkhand, whilst from the Western Presidency there came unmistakable symptoms that order in

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the southern Maratha country could be maintained only by a strong and vigorous hand.

Sir Colin finds that, though certain centres are held, there has been a great dissemination of troops east of Allahabad

What was Sir Colin Campbell’s position? What were his means? Thanks to the skill, the energy, the daring of a few men who had come to the front in the heart of the crisis – to Neill, to Frederick Gubbins, Vincent Eyre, and to William Tayler – the British held Allahabad and the important cities between that fortress and Calcutta, of Banaras, of Ghazipur, and of Patna. The occupation of these three salient points enabled them to hold four others of lesser though of great importance, and by their means to command the great river artery between Calcutta and Allahabad. But the holding of these posts involved the occupation of them by troops whose services were urgently needed in the field. This, too, at a moment when the reinforcements from England were only beginning to arrive.

He has no troops available for active purposes

The distance by river between Calcutta and Allahabad is eight hundred and nine miles. When Sir Colin Campbell arrived, no troops were available for active purposes. Two regiments indeed, the 5th and 90th, had been despatched to join Havelock’s force at Kanhpur. All the others were employed in keeping open the river communication between Calcutta and Allahabad.

Mr. Beadon’s line always, in danger of being broken

It is true there was the grand trunk road – Mr. Beadon’s famous line of six hundred miles, though in point of fact the distance was somewhat less. But along this road the railway extended only to Raniganj, a hundred and twenty miles. Thence it was necessary to march, and the route was not only long, but, as events proved, in spite of Mr. Beadon, it was liable to be traversed by the , rebels. The troops marching upon it, therefore,. might at any moment be diverted for other duties.

The results of Lord Canning’s refusal to disarm the Danapur native regiments still felt

The refusal of Lord Canning’s Government in the month of July to order the disarming of the native regiments at Danapur had added still further to the difficulties of the new Commander-in-Chief. Two regiments of foot and a battery of artillery were thus diverted from the general plan – the plan which had made Lakhnao the point at which the first great blow was to be dealt – in order to quell a rebellion which,

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had the members of the Government of India been unfettered by sophisms and theories, would never have occurred – the rebellion in western Bihar.

Want of foresight of the supreme Government

But, if Sir Colin Campbell had no men with whom to operate, it might be imagined that the Government had at least provided for him resources to be made available for the troops expected from China and from England. It was mainly for that object, it will be recollected, that Sir Patrick Grant had decided to remain at Calcutta. There could not be a greater delusion. Dreaming of reorganisation, sanguine that the coming troops would at once settle the business, Sir Patrick, and, following him, his colleagues, the members of the Government, had opened wide their mouths in expectancy. They had done but little, and that little had been almost forced upon them by the energy of the town-Major – Major Cavenagh68. Under his inspiration some arrangements had been made for the reception of the

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expected troops. But no means of transport had been prepared; no horses, either for cavalry or artillery, had been provided; Enfield rifle ammunition was deficient, and no effort had been made to supply the deficiency; flour was even running out, and nothing had been done to procure a fresh supply; guns, gun-carriages, and harness for field batteries were either unfit for service or did not exist; and, though the gun-foundry of Kasipur was at their door, no fresh orders had been given to the superintendent69.

Sir Colin Campbell has “to organise victory”

Sir Colin Campbell’s first care was to supply these deficiencies. He moved the Government to the purchase of horses on a large and necessarily an expensive scale; to indent on England for Enfield rifle ammunition whilst stimulating the manufacture of it on the spot; to procure flour from the Cape; to cast field guns at the Kasipur foundry; to manufacture tents; to make up harness. Before the end of August Sir Colin had quintupled the activity of the “departments,” and had infused even into the Government a portion of his own untiring energy.

He moves the Government to organise a bullock train to convey troops to Allahabad

Nor was his attention confined to the preparations necessary for the troops before they could stir one foot from Calcutta. Those troops were to move forward – but how? I have given a description, in outline, of the two routes which were open to them – the river train route and the land route. But useful, and in some respects superior, as the river route had been in the months of June, July, and August, Sir Colin could not but feel that, with the cessation of the rainy season, the river would fall, and the way by it would become tedious and uncertain. He therefore resolved to do all in his power to improve the land route and to quicken the means of transport. With this view, under his inspiring pressure, the Government established the bullock train. This train was composed of a number of covered waggons, in each of which a fixed number of European soldiers could sit at ease. To draw these, a proportionate number of bullocks were posted at stages all along the road. The starting-point of the bullock train was the railway terminus at Raniganj, a hundred and twenty miles from Calcutta. The soldiers, leaving the train, were supposed to enter the bullock carriages and to travel in them all night

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The scheme is soon brought to perfection.

and in the early hours of the morning and evening, resting for food during the heat of the day. This scheme was soon brought to perfection, and was made to work so as to land daily in Allahabad two hundred men fresh and fit for work, conveyed in the space of a fortnight from Calcutta.

Dangers which threatened the line to be traversed by the bullock train.

But, I have said, Mr. Beadon’s famous line of six hundred miles, once already rent in twain, was still far from safe. Constant revolts rendered it less and less so every day. The Ramgarh battalion, stationed at Ranchi, on the left of the road, had broken the bands of discipline, and menaced all the salient points within easy distance of that station. Similarly, on the right of the road, the remnants of the Danapur garrison, of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, and, subsequently, the mutinous portion of the 32nd Native Infantry, had joined the levies of Kunwar Singh, and had spread consternation along the central portion of the line. These mutinous bands constituted the great difficulty of Sir Colin Campbell. Not that they were sufficiently formidable to check a British force. Could they have been found collected, a regiment or two of Europeans would have annihilated them. But, spreading over a vast tract of country, they harassed every district and threatened every post.

Sir Colin orders patrol parties to secure it.

For the moment Sir Colin’s one care was to ensure the safety of the small parties travelling along the Trunk Road in the bullock train. To attain this end he formed movable columns, of about six hundred men each, infantry and artillery, to patrol the road. This measure, successful in so far that it secured the passage of the troops, was less so in another way.

The temptation thus afforded to the civil authorities to use these troops for local purposes sometimes irresistible

It afforded to the civil authorities the temptation of diverting. some of the troops to small and comparatively unimportant local operations on the flanks, “so that,” says a well-informed writer, “at one period, out of about two thousand four hundred men who were proceeding by the different routes to Allahabad, one thousand eight hundred were, on one pretence or another, laid hold of by the civil power, and employed for the time being in operations extraneous to the general plan of the campaign70.”

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Troops of the China Expedition reach Calcutta

The efforts initiated by Sir Colin Campbell to produce resources and to ensure the safety of the road were beginning to bear good fruit when most of the troops diverted by Lord Elgin from the China Expedition arrived. These consisted of the 93rd Highlanders, the 23rd Fusiliers, three companies of the 82nd Foot, two companies Royal Artillery, and one company of Sappers. About the same time also, that is during September and in the first week of October, there arrived from the Cape of Good Hope a company of Royal Artillery with fifty-eight horses and about five hundred of the 13th Light Infantry. To hurry forward these troops had now become a matter of the greatest necessity.

The gap left by the retention of Outram’s troops in Lakhnao

In the interval before their arrival Dehli had, it is true, fallen, but Lakhnao had not been relieved; so far from it, the British force that had reached our garrison in the Residency, besieged itself by the rebels, had been thus withdrawn from active operations, and had left a gap on which an enterprising enemy might act with fatal effect.

The rebel troops of Gwaliar were displaying unwonted activity, and it certainly was in their power at this particular period to cut the British line in two, and sever communications between Calcutta and Kanhpur.

necessitates prompt and active measures

To press on troops quickly to Allahabad, where equipments were being prepared, became then an imperative duty. To this end every exertion was made. Horses were taken sores. bodily from regiments which had mutinied, and were pressed into service. The Military Train Corps, composed to a great extent of old dragoons, was formed, by means of some of the horses thus become available, into a cavalry regiment, and they, too, were sent on with the rest.

The Shannon and Pearl

But before a single man of the China expeditionary Corps had left Calcutta, there had set out from that city, in river steamers, a gallant body of men, gallantly commanded, destined to cover themselves with glory in a series of actions for which they had no special training, In another part of this history I have alluded to the arrival in Calcutta of H.M.’s ships Shannon and Pearl, and of the offer made by Lord Elgin to place those vessels with their respective crews at the disposal of the Governor-General.

August 18

The offer was accepted, and, on the 18th August, Captain William Peel had started for Allahabad in the river

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steamer Chunar with a flat in tow, conveying four hundred and fifty men, six 65-cwt. 8-inch hollow shot or shell guns, two 24-pound howitzers, and two field-pieces. Captain Peel took with him also a launch and cutter belonging to the Shannon71.

Captain William Peel

Captain William Peel was a man who would have made his mark in any age and under any circumstances. To an energy that nothing could daunt, a power that seemed never to tire, he added a freshness of intellect, a fund of resource, which made him, in the expressive language of one of his officers, “the mainspring that worked the machinery.” Bright and joyous in the field, with a kind word for every comrade, he caused the sternest duty, ordered by him, to be looked upon as a pleasant pastime. “The greatness of our loss we shall in all probability never know,” wrote Dr. Russell, on learning of his untimely death from small-pox. And, in truth, that reflection of the genial correspondent represents the exact measure by which to gauge the value of Peel’s services. Starting from Calcutta on an expedition unprecedented in Indian warfare, he conquered every obstacle, he succeeded to the very utmost extent of the power to succeed. He showed eminently all the qualities of an organiser and a leader of men. Not one single speck of failure marred the brightness of his ermine. His remarkable success in a novel undertaking, on an untried field – a success apparently without an effort – was in itself a proof that, had he survived, his great powers might have been usefully employed in larger and more difficult undertakings. There must have been something very much above the common in the man who, not exercising supreme command, was able to stereotype his name in the history of his native land. Yet William Peel accomplished this. To the chaplets of fame placed by his father on the altar of his country, he, still young, added another not less immortal.

Peel reached Allahabad on the 2nd September. There he was joined on the 20th of the following month by the second party

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The Shannon brigade reaches Allahabad

from the Shannon72. By this junction the number of his brigade was brought to five hundred and twenty men, exclusive of officers. The Pearl brigade, of a hundred and fifty-five men, under Captain Sotheby, R.N., was shortly after placed at the disposal of the authorities of Patna.

September–October 26

More troops reach Calcutta

We left Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta engaged in “organising victory.” We have seen how in September and the first week of October he had been gladdened by the arrival of troops from China and the Cape, how he had at once sent them to the point of rendezvous in batches of two hundred daily. During the next fortnight there had arrived the remainder of the 82nd Foot, a hundred and ninety-eight men of the 38th, H.M.’s 34th, a hundred and forty-four men of the 42nd Highlanders, and a hundred and two recruits for the local European regiments. These were quickly followed by six hundred and twelve men of the Royal Artillery, nine hundred and three of the Rifle Brigade, 2nd and 3rd battalions, two hundred and ninety of the 42nd Highlanders, three hundred and fifty-two of the 54th Foot, six hundred and twenty-seven of the 88th, and eight hundred and eighty-three recruits. Having placed upon a thoroughly-well organised basis the scheme for despatching these reinforcements as expeditiously as possible to the front, Sir Colin Campbell, with the Army Head-quarters and Staff, set out, on the 27th October, by post for Allahabad.

The narrative clear the road behind Sir Colin Campbell

The operations of Sir Colin Campbell demand an entire chapter to themselves. It will be advisable that, before entering upon them, I should clear the road behind him, and place before the reader a general road behind view of the transactions in Bengal and Bihar since Vincent Eyre’s splendid gallantry had redeemed the mistakes of the Government in those important provinces.

Bhagalpur

The large division of Bhagalpur, comprising the districts of Bhagalpia, Munger73,. Purnia, and Santana, and the subdivision of Rajmahall, was governed by Mr.

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George Yule as Commissioner. The division constituted the eastern moiety of the province of Bihar. The headquarters were at the station of Bhagalpur, on the Ganges, two hundred and sixty-six miles westward of Calcutta.

Mr. George Yule

Mr. George Yule74 was a good specimen of a manly, true-hearted gentleman. He was essentially a man of action. His even-handed justice had gained for him – what was rare in those days – the confidence alike of the native raiyat and the European planter. Both classes alike trusted him, and both were prepared to obey his orders without hesitation or murmur.

The native troops in eastern Bihar

Up to the time when the native garrison of Danapur broke out into revolt, there had been no sians of disaffection in the Bhagalpur division. The troops quartered there – the 5th Irregular Cavalry, with their headquarters at Bhagalpur, the 32nd stationed at Bausi, and the 63rd at Barhampur, had, with the exception noted in the preceding volume75, displayed no inclination to follow the example of their mutinous brethren. The conduct of Major Macdonald on the occasion in question had greatly impressed the men of the 5th, and the strong will of that courageous man had repressed the smallest inclination on the part of his soldiers to manifest the sympathies which, subsequent experience proved, they held in secret. The men of the corps had, subsequently to the event of the 12th of June, been detached to various stations in the division, as well to divide them as to overawe the turbulent classes.

Mr. Yule, at the outset, tries to maintain order without European troops,

Although ruling over a native population numbering, besides the Santals, about six millions, Mr. Yule had considered it unnecessary to ask for, or to accept, the services of a European detachment, however small.

but the threatening aspect of affairs forces him to detain a few

He believed that, if the districts contiguous would but remain loyal, he would be able, with the help of his assistants and the planters, to maintain order in Bhagalpur. He did so, successfully, till the third week of July. But when, during that week, the mutiny of the 12th Irregular Cavalry and the native regiments quartered at Danapur threatened the loss of western Bihar, he deemed

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it prudent to detain at Bhagalpur ninety men of the 5th Fusiliers, then being towed up the river, and to despatch fifty men of the same regiment to garrison the important fortress of Munger.

Effect on eastern Bihar of the Danapur mutiny

The proceedings of the native soldiers of the Danapur garrison, almost invited to mutiny by the supine action of the Supreme Government, combined with the immediate rising of Kunwar Singh to render the mutiny. condition of eastern Bihar dangerous in the extreme. Not only was it impossible any longer to rely upon the native soldiers in that province, but it had become necessary, for the security of life and property, to prove to the disaffected that the head wielding executive power was thoroughly aware of the danger, and that the hand was thoroughly ready to meet it.

Mr. Yule, as a practical man, accustomed to command, was well aware that occasions may arise when an active demonstration is the best defence. Such an occasion had, in his opinion, arisen in eastern Bihar, and he prepared to act accordingly.

The securing of two salient points in his division assures the navigation of the Ganges

Fore-resolved, it was necessary to be fore-armed. His first act, then, had been to press into his service the detachment of the European troops passing by, and secure Bhagalpur and Munger. The importance of this precautionary measure can scarcely be overrated. The occupation of those two stations, both salient points on the Ganges, was absolutely essential to the free navigation of that river, and it must be remembered that in July, when Mr Beadon’s line of six hundred miles had been broken, the Ganges constituted the only safe highway between Calcutta and Allahabad.

and stops communication between eastern and western Bihar

Great as was the advantage thus gained, another, second only to it in importance, naturally followed. The native troops stationed at Barhampur had not, up to that time, thanks to the timid policy of the Government, been disarmed. Had Bhagalpur and Munger not been occupied by Europeans, the armed mutinous soldiers scattered over western Bihar would have held uninterrupted communication with their brethren on either side of them, and a general insurrection would probably have ensued.

But the occupation of those stations cowed the disaffected

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for the time.

who now wait for the result of the siege of Arah.

They were content to wait. The fate of eastern Bihar now depended on the result of the siege of Arah. To that spot the eyes of the natives were turned with an excitement daily increasing.

The natives not always inclined to trust the news they receive

One rather remarkable circumstance deserves to be noticed. Ill news generally, it is said, flies quickly. But it is a fact that, throughout the troubled times of the mutiny, news betokening evil to the rebels did not fly surely to their friends. It was not that the rebels failed to transmit to those friends a true record of events. But that record came, not written on paper, but by word of mouth. The result was that, when the news was bad, the men who received it, impatient of inaction, and confident of ultimate success, refused to believe it. Their sanguine natures induced them to imagine that the Europeans had invented the bad news and had caused it to be conveyed to them by men whom they had suborned. They proceeded to act then, in very many cases, as though the bearing of the news were exactly contrary to the actual meaning of the words in which it was conveyed.

The 5th Irregular Cavalry in eastern Bihar mutiny

So it happened on this occasion. The 5th Irregular Cavalry in the districts round Bhagalpur had, in common with the other native soldiers in the province, waited long for the result of the leaguer of Arab. Had, they not waited, but broken out, the difficulties of the British position in Bihar would have been enormously increased. But they delayed action until they should hear of its fall.

They try to reduce the 32nd

On the 14th August information reached the men of the 5th that Arah had been relieved by Eyre. They believed this story to be a weak invention of the enemy – that the contrary had happened. That night, therefore, they deserted, and pushed with all speed for Bausi, where the 32nd Native Infantry were stationed.

But, before the mutineers of the 5th Irregulars reached the 32nd Native Infantry, the men of that regiment had received positive proof of the utter and absolute defeat of their brethren at Arah and Jagdispur. Mr. Yule, too, with an energy worthy of the occasion, had despatched to their commandant, Colonel Burney, a special messenger, warning him of the departure in his direction of the 5th. Burney was a capable man, a

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splendid linguist, and thoroughly conversant with the native character.

who, under the influence of Colonel Burney , repel them

He harangued his men, and made it palpably clear to them that, whether they should march eastward or westward, they would march to destruction. He spoke eloquently, and with effect. When the 5th Irregulars, then, on the 16th, presented. themselves at Bausi, they were received by the 32nd with bullets and bayonets, The 5th, baffled in their hopes, continued their course via Rohni to Arah.

Chutia Nagpur

For the moment the active measures of Yule had conjured from eastern Bihar all danger. It was, however, otherwise in the neighbouring district of Chutia Nagpur. This mountainous district lies between southern Bihar, western Bengal, Orisa, and the Central Provinces. It is called Chutia Nagpur from Chutia near Ranchi, the residence of the Rajahs of Nagpur. It is chiefly inhabited by aboriginal tribes, such as Dols, Orions, Mundas, Bhumij, and Korwas. Its chief military stations were Hazaribagh, Ranchi, Chaibasa and Parfilia.

July

At Hazaribagh there was quartered in July 1857 a detachment of the 8th Native Infantry; at Ranchi, the headquarters and artillery of the local Ramgarh battalion; and at Chaibasa and Parulia, detachments of that battalion. The acting Commissioner of the district was Captain Dalton.

Effect in Chutia Nagpur of the mutiny at Danapur

The news of the mutiny of the native garrison at Danapur and of the rising of Kunwar Singh, reached Hazaribagh on the 30th July. The detachment of the 8th Native Infantry at once mutinied, and drove their officers and the civil authorities from the station.

The troops in the province generally mutiny

Those were still the days of confidence. Almost every officer of the native army, whilst admitting and deploring the disaffection of other regiments, believed implicitly in the loyalty of his own men. When, then, intelligence reached Doranda, the civil station adjoining Ranchi, that the troops at Hazaribagh, only sixty miles distant, were shaky, the officer commanding at that station despatched Lieutenant Graham with thirty horsemen of the Ramgarh Irregular Cavalry, two companies of the Ramgarh battalion, and two guns, to Hazaribagh, to disarm them. Graham marched, but he had not reached the second stage before Captain Oakes met him

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with the information that the detachment of the 8th Native, Infantry had mutinied the previous day. That same night his own infantry mutinied, seized, in spite of his protestations, the-guns and ammunition, as well as four elephants, the property of Captain Dalton, and marched back to Ranchi, breathing hostile imprecations against the Europeans there stationed. The cavalry remained staunch.

Captain Dalton abandons Ranchi and proceeds to Hazaribagh

Captain Dalton and a few European officers were at Ranchi. They received timely information of the revolt. The defence of the place was impossible. They remained there, however, till the latest safe moment,. and then proceeded to Hazaribagh, now abandoned by the rebels, and whither Lieutenant Graham with a few horsemen who had remained faithful had preceded. them.

The plunder of Ranchi and Doranda

The stations of Ranchi and Doranda fell into the hands of the rebels, who plundered the treasury, fired cannon at the church, released the prisoners, and destroyed private property.

Efficient measures taken by Dalton to restore order.

Meanwhile, Dalton, ably seconded by the officers of the Ramgarh battalion and the cavalry, by his own civil officers, Captains Davies and W. H. Oakes, was exerting himself to restore order in Hazaribagh. In this he was loyally assisted by the Rajah of Ramgarh. This petty chief placed at the Commissioner’s disposal some forty or fifty armed men. With the aid of these men, and of the few native horsemen and foot soldiers who had remained faithful, Dalton not only tranquillised Hazaribagh, but he recovered a large quantity of the property seized by the rebels, and captured many of them. In a few days he was able to re-open the courts, and to transact official business as usual.

Parulia and Chaibasa

At Parulia and at Chaibasa, the other posts in Chutia Nagpur occupied by native troops, scenes had taken place similar to those enacted at Ranchi and Hazaribagh. On the 5th August, the Sipahis of the Ramgarh battalion, stationed at those places, mutinied, plundered the treasury, released the prisoners, and sacked. the private houses of the Europeans. These, few in number, fell back upon Raniganj.

The Rajah of Ramgarh, at the time that he afforded to the Commissioner of Chutia Nagyar the aid in armed. men of which

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Loyal conduct of the Rajah of Ramgarh

I have spoken, had expressed his strong conviction that it would be difficult to hold Hazaribagh against the surging influences around it, unless European troops should be sent to occupy it. He had therefore. pressed upon Captain Dalton the necessity of asking at once for a European regiment.

Dalton applies for European troops.

Captain Dalton asked for a European regiment. It was but natural and proper that he should do so. But how was it possible for the Government to comply? Dehli had not fallen. The districts below Kanhpur were in the state which I have endeavoured to describe in the opening pages of this chapter.

None are available

Sir Colin Campbell had just arrived, but Sir Colin Campbell had not a soldier to dispose of. When an army was urgently required at Kanhpur, it was not in his power to do more than to organize transport for the troops which were to come, but which had not arrived.

Other resources at the disposal of the Government

It happened, however, that the Government had other resources at its disposal, and that it was possible to use these for the double purpose of tranquillising Chutia Nagpur and of then lending a hand to the force which was concentrating at Allahabad.

The Madras army

The native soldiers of the army of the Madras Presidency – those of one regiment, the 8th Light Cavalry, excepted – had not been tainted by the mutinous spirit which had disgraced their brethren in the Bengal army. Inheritors of the fame of the men who had fought the French soldiers of Lally, who had helped to wrest Southern India from the grasp of Haidar Ali, the Madras Sipahis had come forward, on the first bursting of the storm, to offer their services, had begged – to use their own touching language-- “to be granted an opportunity of proving their faithful attachment to the Government which had cherished them.” After some hesitation, the Government of India responded favourably to the request thus pressed upon them. On the 5th August, the 27th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, and a wing of the 17th Regiment Native Infantry, landed in Calcutta. They were speedily followed by the remaining wing of the 17th Regiment, some native artillerymen, a company of sappers, half of the E Troop Horse Artillery, and a little later by a Rifle battalion composed of the Rifle companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 36th, 49th, and 54th Regiments of

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Native Infantry, the whole under the command of Brigadier M. Carthew.

Brigadier Carthew

Of Brigadier Carthew I shall have to speak more in detail further on. It will suffice here to state that to a thorough knowledge of his profession he combined great quickness of military vision, the capacity and the nerve to strike at the right moment. All that he did, he did thoroughly and well. With larger opportunities it cannot be doubted that he would have achieved great things.

The Madras troops constitute the other resources at the disposal of the Government

Besides the troops of the Madras Army already enumerated, there were others marching by land from Katak in eastern Bengal. Among these was the 18th Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer. These Madras troops constituted the further resources at the disposal of the Government of India to which I have alluded, and which enabled them to give a satisfactory reply to Captain Dalton’s requisition for European troops.

Reply of the Government to Dalton’s requisitions

They pointed out to him, in effect, that the moment the artillery, then daily expected from Madras, should arrive, a considerable force would be sent to restore order; that one column would proceed along the grand trunk road to Barhi and Hazaribagh, the other direct to Parulia and Ranchi. The Government expressed a hope that until these reinforcements should arrive Captain Dalton would be able to maintain himself at Hazaribagh.

Difficulties of Dalton

But this was just what Captain Dalton could not at the moment do. Matters became so threatening that he, accompanied by his few adherents, was forced, on the 13th, to fall back on Bagoda. Here he remained for a few days, when he was joined by a hundred and fifty of Rattray’s Sikhs, under Lieutenant Earle. With these men, Dalton reoccupied Hazaribagh.

Difficulties of the Government

But the mutineers were still at large, and although the Government, grown wise by experience, had endeavoured to prevent any augmentation of their forces by the disarming, on the 2nd August, of the 63rd Native Infantry, the 11th Irregular Cavalry, and the troops of the Nawab Nazim at Barhampur, yet the presence of a considerable body of revolted soldiers of all arms in the vicinity of the grand trunk road – the line of six hundred

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miles – constituted a danger which it was necessary to meet, and meet quickly.

enhanced by further mutinies

The danger was increased by the sudden mutiny, accompanied by the murder of their officers, of two companies of the 32nd Native Infantry at Deogarh in the Santal districts.

Fischer is ordered to march direct on Hazaribagh

The Government therefore revised their plans. Renouncing their intention of working on two lines, they directed Colonel Fischer, commanding a detachment of Madras troops, to mass them, and march by way of Doranda on Hazaribagh.

Fischer received this message at Barhi on the night of the 13th September. He had with him his own regiment, a few Sikhs, a detachment of the 53rd Foot, and two guns.

Fischer despatches a detachment, 53rd, under English towards Doranda

Before the message arrived, he had ascertained that the mutineers had left Chutia Nagpur, probably for Rhotasgarh: he submitted that instead of marching on Hazaribagh, he should move to intercept them in, their retreat. This was agreed to in principle, but other contradictory telegrams from headquarters disarranged Fischer’s plans. When at length he received the orders to carry out his own ideas, he had already despatched Major English with a hundred and fifty men of the 53rd and a hundred and fifty Sikhs towards Doranda.

Fischer is directed to protect the trunk road

Whilst English was marching on Doranda, Rattray, with two hundred Sikhs, was intrenched at Dehri, and Fischer, with the main body, was moving towards Jalpa. No one knew where the enemy was. “It is incredible, but a fact,” wrote Colonel Fischer, on the 24th September, to the Chief of the staff at Calcutta, “that the Ramgarh mutineers, with their guns, are moving about in a small province, and not an official, civil or military, can tell where they are to be found.” A careful consideration of probabilities induced Fischer, however, to think that Chatra, a town in the Hazaribagh district, would prove to be their place of refuge. He reported the circumstances and his opinion to the Chief of the staff. The answer he received took the form of a direction to cease all operations against the insurgents and to confine himself to protecting the grand trunk road. The same post conveyed instructions to Major English to assume charge of the operations in Chutia Nagpur under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

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English to operate against the insurgents

English attacks the enemy at Chatra

Major English marched then on Chatra, reached that place at 9 o’clock on the morning of the 2nd October, and encamped on the west side of the town. That officer’s force now consisted of a hundred and eighty men of the 53rd Foot, a hundred and fifty Sikhs, and two guns, in all about three hundred and fifty men. The rebels amounted to three thousand.

and completely defeats them

Nothing daunted, English attacked them, and, after a resistance lasting over an hour, completely defeated them. The survivors fled in great disorder, hotly pursued for some distance, leaving in the hands of the victors four guns and waggons complete, forty carts laden with ammunition, ten elephants, twenty-nine pairs of ordnance bullocks, and several boxes of treasure. The loss of the British amounted to forty-two killed and wounded: that of the enemy was never accurately known.

The province is then left to the protection of Rattray

This action removed the greatest danger from the grand trunk road. Though English’s detachment, in the pressing circumstances of the times, was not allowed to remain in the province, Rattray’s Sikhs were left there, and these excellent soldiers, under the guidance of their active and energetic commander, proved themselves fully competent to make head against the insurgents in Chutia Nagpur and in the districts immediately to the north and east of it.

Footnotes

68. I regret that, in describing in the earlier editions, somewhat in detail, the stimulating effect on the provisions of means for the equipment and progress of the army produced by the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta in August 1857, I should have seemed to undervalue the services of a most distinguished officer, Major Orfeur Cavenagh. I take the earliest opportunity of endeavouring to supply the omission. The Government of India had not under its orders in Calcutta an officer more deserving, or who rendered in that city such excellent service as did Major Cavenagh. In the early stages of the mutiny, and before the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, it was Major Orfeur Cavenagh who, as town and fort-major of Fort William, had officially represented to the Government the necessity of being prepared to receive the expected reinforcements. He had suggested that he should be allowed an assistant who should superintend all disembarkations, render any assistance to commanding officers on their arrival, and have under his charge a staff of servants to be kept complete and allotted to troops on their arrival. As usual, Cavenagh’s suggestions were negatived, though permission was given him to entertain the servants should he consider it necessary to do so. On this permission he acted, and, throughout the mutiny, under his own superintendence, he kept up a body of native servants. Eventually a disembarkation officer was appointed, not, however, as assistant to the town-major. To enable this officer to carry out his duties successfully, Cavenagh directed his own subordinates to recognise him as his deputy, and afford him every aid as though he were his assistant. The only occasion on which Sir Colin did attempt to interfere with Cavenagh’s arrangements for the disposition of the troops in Calcutta was with respect to the Cavalry recruits. The result was so unsatisfactory that Cavenagh was not interfered with a second time. The sixth volume will contain in fuller detail the services rendered by this officer.

69. Blackwood’s Magazine, October 1858.

70. Blackwood’s Magazine, October 1858.

71. The following officers accompanied Captain Peel: Lieutenants Young, Wilson, Hay, and Salmon, R.N.; Captain Gray and Lieutenant Stirling, R M.; Lieutenant Lind of the Swedish Navy; the Rev. G. L. Bowman; Dr. Flanagan; Mr. Comerford, Assistant Paymaster; Messrs. M. Daniel, Garvey, E. Daniel, Lord Walter Kerr, Lord Arthur Clinton, and Mr. Church, midshipmen; Messrs. Brown, Bone, and Henri, engineers; Mr. Thompson, gunner; Mr. Bryce, carpenter; Mr. Stanton assistant-clerk; and Messrs. Watson and Lascelles, naval cadets. – The Shannon’s Brigade in India.

72. The second detachment from the Shannon consisted of a hundred and twenty men, under Lieutenants Vaughan and Wratislaw; Mr. E. H. Verney, mate; Mr. Way, midshipman; and Mr. Richards, naval cadet.

73. Munger, strangely transmogrified by the early English settlers into “Monghyr,” is a very ancient town, on the right bank of the Ganges, famous for its iron manufactories. It was made the capital of Bihar by Mir Kasim in 1760.

74. Afterwards Sir George Yule, K.C.S.I.

75. Vol. III. page 24.

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
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