Page 159

Chapter III – The Gwaliar Contingent and Windham at Kanhpur

Kanhpur

In the preceding chapter I mentioned that when, on the 9th November, Sir Colin left Kanhpur to join his army in the plain beyond Banni, he had left at that station about five hundred Europeans and a few Sikhs under the command of Major-General C. A. Windham.

Detailed instructions given to General Windham

On the 6th November, in a memorandum addressed to that officer, he had directed him to occupy and improve the intrenchment which had been constructed on the river; to keep a careful watch over the movements of the Gwaliar force; to send into Oudh, by detachments of wings, unless he should be seriously threatened, any European infantry that might arrive; but to detain, if he should think fit, the brigade of Madras native troops, expected the following day, until the intentions of the Gwaliar contingent, expected to given to arrive at Kalpi122 on the 9th, should become developed. In case of any pronounced movement towards Kanhpur on the part of that force, General Windham was directed to make as great a show as possible of the troops at his disposal by encamping them conspicuously and in extended order in advance of the intrenchment, which, however, was to be sufficiently guarded. On no account was he to move out to attack, unless compelled to do so by force of circumstances, in order to save the intrenchment from being bombarded.

Page 160

supplemented by a second memorandum still more in detail

It is a proof alike of the careful supervision which Sir Colin Campbell exercised over the generals subordinate to him, but placed in independent command, and of the anxious attention which he devoted to that particular position that, two days later, he sent to General Windham a second memorandum, in which he entered in full detail into the possibilities before that officer. Every movement of the Gwaliar troops was provided for; the corresponding action of General Windham was defined; and the retention of certain troops and the despatch into Oudh of others were again insisted on.

Windham takes steps to carry out Sir Colin’s orders

General Windham prepared at once to carry out the directions of the Commander-in-Chief in their most essential point. The rendering of the intrenchment secure against any attack was that point. The. intrenchment guarded, though it did not absolutely protect, the passage of the river, the commissariat stores, and two of the hospitals. Windham, then, at once took measures to clear the glacis and the country beyond it, to extend and strengthen the works, and to train men to work the guns.

Artillery at his disposal

For the intrenchment he had nine guns worked by a detachment of the Naval Brigade commanded by Lieutenant Hay, R.A. Six field guns would, he expected, arrive with the Madras force on the 10th. He had, besides, two 9-pounders and one 24-pounder howitzer, with ammunition in their waggons. But, there being no gunners attached to these guns, Windham set to work to train some Sikh soldiers for that purpose.

Tantia Topi arrives at Kalpi

Meanwhile, Tantia Topi was preparing to establish his claim to generalship. Well served by his agents, Tantia had received very minute and very timely information regarding the movements of Sir Colin Campbell. He arrived with the revolted Gwaliar contingent at Kalpi on the 9th November.

The country between Kalpi and Kanhpur

Kalpi lies on the right bank of the river Jamnah, forty-six miles south-west from Kanhpur. The direct road between the two places ran through the villages of Bhognipur and Suchandi. From Suchandi to Kanhpur the distance is fourteen miles, the road being intersected at the fourth mile-stone by the Pandu rivulet, at the eighth by the Ganges canal. Another line, which led to positions a little to the north-east of Kanhpur, must now be referred to.

Page 161

Leaving Kalpi, and passing through Bhognipur, this road, just about midway from the latter to Suchandi, branches off to Akbarpur. Thence, running nearly north, it touches the Pandu rivulet at Sheoli, and then, taking a turn to the northwest, crosses at a distance of four miles the Ganges canal, and, prolonging itself for two miles, reaches the village of Sheorajpur on the grand trunk road about three miles from . Sarai Ghat on the Ganges, and twenty-one miles north-west of Kanhpur.

Plans and hopes of the rebel commander

To march on Kanhpur, Tantia had first to cross the Jamnah. There was no one to oppose the passage. He had left at Jalaun his treasure and impedimenta. Kalpi he garrisoned with three thousand men and twenty guns. Then, on the 10th, he crossed the Jamnah, The passage effected, Tantia, determined not to make too decided a demonstration until Sir Colin Campbell should have absolutely committed himself to the relief of Lakhnao, and, hoping that the rebel troops there would find means to detain him at least the time necessary for the perfect carrying out of his own scheme, moved slowly forward with about six thousand men and eighteen guns to Bhognipur.

He occupies the salient points between Kanhpur and the Jamnah

Leaving here twelve hundred men and four guns, he advanced by Akbarpur to Sheoli and Sheorajpur, occupying the first-named place with two thousand men and six guns, Sheoli with the same number and four guns, and Sheorajpur with one thousand men and four guns. These operations, beginning about the 10th November, were completed about the 19th.

thus severing the communications between Kanhpur and its supply-country

Their effect was completely to sever the communications thus between Kanhpur and the west and north-west – the country on which it had been mainly dependent for its supplies.

Effect of Tantia Tope’s movements on Windham

Windham had been neither blind nor indifferent to the movements of the enemy. He was duly informed of the passage of the Jamnah and the occupation of positions reaching to the Ganges, some twenty miles to the north-west of his position.

He divines the reasons which actuate the rebel leader

What did this movement forebode? Some thought that the march on the Ganges at a prudent distance from Kanhpur indicated an intention to cross unmolested into Oudh to act there on the rear of Sir Colin

Page 162

Campbell. Windham was not of this opinion. Crediting Tantia Topi with merely natural acuteness, he could not believe that he had any other intention but that of taking advantage of Sir Colin’s absence to crush him at Kanhpur. He believed, in fact, that Tantia would act as a general in his position ought to act.

Communicates to Sir Colin the enemy’s movements

Yet, believing this, convinced of it, he had still those positive and reiterated orders of the Commander-in-Chief which required him to forward into Oudh by detachments of wings of regiments the European troops as they should arrive. General Windham, whilst obeying these instructions, made an urgent representation to Sir Colin Campbell, informing him of the disquieting reports he was daily receiving regarding the movements of the Gwaliar contingent, and requesting permission to retain such troops as he might consider absolutely necessary for the defence of the place. Pending a reply, he continued to forward the incoming detachments towards Lakhnao.

Receives permission to detain European troops

On the evening of the 14th November the required permission arrived.

Brigadier Carthew arrives

On the morning of that day the Madras brigade, commanded by Brigadier Carthew, had marched into Kanhpur. It was but a shadow of its former self. One of the regiments of which it had been composed, the 17th Native Infantry, had been left, by superior orders, at Fathpur, to maintain the communication between Allahabad and Kanhpur. Carthew brought with him, then, only the wing of one native regiment, the 27th, four 9-pounders, manned by natives, and two manned by Europeans.

is followed by detachments of European regiments

Between this date and the 26th the force was increased by successive companies or drafts of the 34th, 82nd, 88th Regiments, of the Rifle Brigade, and by the remaining wing of the 27th Madras Native Infantry. But the course of the narrative will show that not all of these were retained.

Windham Takes up a position west of the town

Windham was now more at ease. On the 17th, following the instructions he had received, he took up a position beyond and to the west of the town, near the junction of the Dehli and Kalpi roads, and encamped there. This camp, composed of detachments from the 34th, 82nd, 88th, and Rifle Brigade, and of the right wing

Page 163

of the Madras Native Regiment, the 27th, with six guns, was placed under the command of Brigadier Carthew.

and displays his troops

Windham thus entirely followed out his orders, making a show of his troops, encamping them conspicuously, at the same time that he covered the town and with it the buildings between the town and the intrenchment, some of which had been prepared for the reception of the Lakhnao ladies, and in others of which supplies had been stored.

Communication with the Commander-in-chief

Matters so continued till the 20th. On that date Windham had become aware of the movement of the Gwaliar contingent I have already described, and of their occupation of strong positions stretching from Kalpi to Sheorajpur. Nor was this all. Up to the 19th he had received intelligence of the successful attacks made by the Commander-in-Chief on the Sikandarbagh and the Shah Najaf.

Windham learns that the Banni bridge has been surprised

But from that date all communication from Lakhnao, even from the Alambagh, ceased; while, to add to his perplexity, he received, on the 22nd, information that the enemy had surprised and defeated the police force stationed guard the Banni bridge, on the high road to Lakhnao!

He dispatches troops to reoccupy that bridge

The occupation of the Banni bridge by the rebels might, if permitted to continue, lead to fatal consequences; for Windham could not know how, since the 19th, it had fared with Sir Colin Campbell. It was quite possible, with thirty thousand still unconquered rebels in Lakhnao, that he might yet have to fight hard for it. Under these circumstances the conduct of Windham was marked by great judgment and great self-denial. Not caring to consider, in the presence of this possibly great danger, that Tantia Topi and his trained soldiers were pressing upon him, he deliberately diminished his force to re-open the communications with Lakhnao. At 3 o’clock on the morning of the 23rd the right wing of the 27th Madras Native Infantry, with two 9-pounder guns manned by Europeans, marched by his orders, to re-occupy the Banni bridge.

Notwithstanding the permission he had received, and on which he had acted, to detain at Kanhpur the European troops who might arrive, Windham had felt from the first

Page 164

Windham is thoroughly aware of the difficulties and danger of his position.

that the showy position he had, in obedience to orders, taken up beyond the city, would in no way defend Kanhpur in case of a serious attack. Under no circumstances could he prevent the enemy from bombarding the bridge with their heavy guns. The extent of the position, too, would prevent its proper defence with even the larger number of troops at his disposal, while, in the event, almost certain were he attacked seriously, of having to fall back on the intrenchment, the city and the houses I have spoken of would fall into the enemy’s hands. With respect to the intrenchment, it should be borne in mind that, though Windham had done much to strengthen it, it was not, in a military sense,. defensible.

He transmits to Sir Colin a plan of aggressive defence

Windham was a brave and adventurous soldier. His position not being, in point of fact, defensible, he asked himself whether an aggressive defence might not present better chances of success. Thinking the matter over, he devised a scheme which. he was prepared to carry out, and, on the very day on which he had taken up the position at the junction of the Dehli and Kalpi roads – the 17th November – he transmitted this scheme to Lakhnao to obtain for its execution the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief.

Nature of the scheme

This scheme was based on the honoured principle of taking of the separation from each other of the enemy’s posts and of destroying them in detail. The enemy had taken up positions, as already stated, at Bhognipur, Akbarpur, Sheoli, and Sheorajpur. Between the two last-named villages at the distances of three miles and two miles flowed the Ganges canal. Windham conceived the idea of transporting twelve hundred men in the night by this canal, taking his guns along the towing-path, and falling upon one or other of the positions (Sheoli or Sheorajpur), overwhelming it, always able to fall back on Kanhpur before the enemy from Akbarpur could reach it.

Receiving no reply from Sir Colin

To the request containing this plan Windham received no answer. The roads were closed. Meanwhile he had simply maintained his position and had sent off troops, as already mentioned, to regain the Banni bridge. But he had every day fresh causes for disquietude. The very day that he had heard of the defeat of

Page 165

the police force at the Banni bridge information reached him that rebels were crossing over from Oudh to swell the ranks of Tantia Topi’s force. It was necessary to take some decisive step. He hesitated to attempt a plan so opposed to his instructions as the canal-plan without special sanction. But something must be done. Windham knew, from his reading, from his instincts, from conversation with officers experienced in Indian warfare, that the most certain mode of defeating an Asiatic enemy is to march straight against him.

he takes up a position on the Kalpi road

At half past 8 o’clock on the morning of the 24th, then, he broke up his camp, and, marching six miles south-westward, took up a position close to the bridge by which the road to Kalpi crosses the canal. The position was comparatively strong, for his entire front was covered by the canal, and he was still nearer to the intrenchment than the enemy.

The rebels accept his challenge and march to the Pandu

The Gwaliar troops, noting Windham’s forward movement, regarded it as a challenge. They accepted it. That very day the detachment at Akbarpur set out for Suchandi. Between this village and the canal, challenge, about midway, runs the Pandu rivulet. The rebels reached Suchandi on the 24th; the banks of the Pandit on the 25th. As soon as information of this movement reached Brigadier Carthew he despatched a special messenger with it to the General. Windham at once galloped to the camp, and reached Carthew’s tent a little after midnight – during the first hour of the 26th.

Windham prepares to attack them

Windham at once made his plans. Dividing his force into two brigades, he placed Carthew at the head of the first, composed of the 88th Connaught Rangers, four companies of the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, and four 6-pounder guns, manned by natives. The second brigade, consisting of the 34th Regiment, four companies of the 82nd, and four 9-pounder guns, drawn by bullocks and manned by Europeans and Sikhs, he gave to Colonel Kelly of the 34th. Windham had also at his disposal a hundred native troopers and ten men of the 9th Lancers. With this force he determined to take the initiative the following morning. His plan was to deal the most advanced division of the enemy a heavy blow; then, returning to his base, repeat, should occasion offer, the same tactics on another portion of their force.

Page 166

He reconnoitres

Before daylight of the 26th, Windham, having taken precautions to guard his baggage, to protect the canal bridge, and to observe the enemy on the side of Sheorajpur, rode forward to reconnoitre. He found the rebels posted beyond the Pandu rivulet, then nearly dry.

and advances to the attack

They numbered about two thousand five hundred infantry, five hundred cavalry, and they had six guns of large calibre. Windham at once sent back orders for his troops to advance. The order was forthwith obeyed.

Carthew silences the enemy’s fire

Carthew led forward his brigade from the right, the men of the Rifle Brigade leading in skirmishing order. The enemy were seen in masses in front of a large tope of trees, but as the skirmishers approached they moved to their right. This movement completed, their guns in the tope opened a very heavy fire. The balls passed over the skirmishers and fell right into the 88th, who were following them, knocking over many officers and men. Carthew brought his guns into position as quickly as possible, and, opening upon the enemy, silenced their fire,

and Kelly, pushing on the 34th, captures their guns

whereupon Kelly, from the position on the left, led the 34th at the guns, and captured three of them (two 8-inch iron howitzers and one 6-pounder gun). Such, in brief, was the story of the main fight. I may add that, prior to Colonel Kelly’s attack, a portion of his regiment had repulsed a charge of the enemy’s cavalry. These did not appear again until later in the day, but it will be seen that they then made their presence felt.

Windham marches back to the city, but, threatened by the enemy’s cavalry

The capture of the guns was followed by the flight of the enemy, who were pursued for some distance. Windham then drew off his troops and marched back towards the city. This retrograde movement inspired the enemy with courage, and their cavalry, coming to the front, became so insolent that Windham halted and deployed his troops. It was no part of the enemy’s game, however, to attack the British force in the open, so they again drew off.

takes up a new position across the Kalpi road

Windham then marched his force to a new position near the town across the Kalpi road, immediately in front of some brick-kilns. A letter from the Commander-in-Chief’s camp had reached him to the effect that all was well, and that the army was marching towards.

Page 167

Kanhpur. Windham hoped, then, that the blow he had inflicted that day might serve as a deterrent to the enemy at least till the Commander-in-Chief should arrive. Their loss had been severe; his own amounted to ninety-two killed and wounded.

But the leader of the rebel army was no fool. The blow dealt by Windham, far from frightening him, had disclosed to his astute mind the weakness of the British leader. A force, completely victorious, does not as a rule fall back beyond the position it had occupied before the action had commenced; nor, in falling back, does it allow itself to be threatened with impunity by the troops it had defeated.

Tantia Topi, perceiving Windham’s weakness, resolves to attack him

But, these things had happened to the little army of Windham. It had been victorious on the field – a fact proved by the capture of three of the enemy’s guns. But the necessities of his position had forced Windham, after his victory, to fall back, threatened by the enemy’s horse, to a position nearer to the city than that he had occupied before the battle. Tantia Topi read then the necessities of Windham’s position as he would have read an open book, and, with the instincts of a real general, he resolved to take advantage of them.

in front and in flank

Far, then, from allowing Windham the respite of twenty-four hours, which would, that General hoped, bring the Commander-in-Chief to his aid, Tantia Topi directed that portion of his force which had engaged at Suchandi the previous day to stand to their arms at daybreak, ready for a forward movement, but to withhold that movement until the detachments at Sheoli and Sheorajpur, which would march in the night, should open fire on the right flank of the British. That fire was to be the signal for a general attack.

Windham, standing on the defensive

Meanwhile, Windham, hoping much from the blow he had delivered the previous day, had not the less prepared for possible eventualities. His troops stood to their arms at daybreak. But, as there were neither signs of an enemy, nor any certain information as to his movements, they were dismissed, at 9 o’clock, to their breakfasts. The General, after partaking of his morning meal, ordered up two 24-pounder guns, drawn by bullocks, and manned by seamen of the Shannon, and then went to reconnoitre. The aspect of affairs evidently did not satisfy him, for

Page 168

at 11 o’clock he sent down to the camp an order for the whole force to stand to their arms.

is attacked at noon

An hour later, just as the British gun in the intrenchment fired the mid-day signal,. he rode into camp. He had scarcely arrived when a heavy cannonade was opened on the right flank of the British. Almost simultaneously a shell exploded over the trees in their front. It was evident that an attack in force had begun on all points.

Cool and prompt in action, Windham at once directed Brigadier Carthew, with the 34th, two companies of the 82nd, and four 6-pounder guns, to take up and hold a position on the right, defending the approaches to the town by the Bithur road.

He detaches Carthew to repulse the enemy on his right

Carthew at once moved off, detaching the 34th to occupy some gardens on the left of his position, throwing some fifty men of the 82nd into some ruined huts on its right, and covering the guns in the centre with the remainder of the two companies of that regiment. As his brigade, so to call it, was marching to the points indicated, the enemy opened fire upon it at a long range.

Carthew succeeds

But so effective was the reply from the 6-pounders and Enfields, so steady and continuous their fire, that the rebels ceased their attack on that side.

Windham’s front, or left, position

In the front, forming the extreme left of his position, Windham had not been so fortunate. He had there five companies of the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, the 88th Regiment, two 9-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder howitzers and two 24-pounder guns manned by seamen of the Shannon. To the right of this position, in a wood midway between it and that occupied by Carthew, was posted the main body of the 82nd.

Windham placed the guns in the centre of his position, supporting them by the Rifle Brigade and the 88th on either flank. Before the first gun had been fired, he proceeded himself to the right to watch the attack in that quarter, leaving the left brigade in charge of Colonel Walpole of the Rifle Brigade. The 24-pounder guns were then pushed to the front so within sight of the enemy123. The enemy, on sighting them, fired the first shot from a gun they had placed on the road. The British guns at once replied, but they had not fired two

Page 169

rounds when the rebels opened fire with grape and cannister from batteries in front and on the right flank of Windham’s position.

The great superiority of the rebels in artillery makes itself felt,

So superior, from their immense superiority in the number of guns, was their fire, that Windham, on his return, an hour later, from the right brigade, found that his men were getting all the worst of it124. The rebel leader, with great judgment, kept back his infantry, and fought Windham with his artillery alone. The advantage he derived from his greatly superior numbers was enormous, for those numbers enabled him to form a semicircle round the British position. Any attempt on the part of Windham to break through this semicircle at any point would have placed it in the power of the rebel leader to lap over and overwhelm his far inferior force.

Finding his position untenable, Windham falls back on the brick-kilns

Windham used all the means in his power to make head against the enemy. Their flanking fire he attempted to silence by turning upon it one of the 24-pounders worked by the men of the Shannon. But all would not do. The position was not tenable against an enemy superior in numbers and who fought only with their guns. To add to his misfortunes, the bullock-drivers, not liking the prospect, deserted as fast as they could, and, as a final blow, ammunition began to run short. Orders were accordingly given to fall back on the brick-kilns, a little to the left of the position Windham had taken up on the night of the 26th.

and orders Carthew to do the same

Windham at the same time sent for the 34th to reinforce him, and directed Carthew, by an order twice repeated, to fall back also on the brick-kilns125.

Before this, Windham had reinforced his left with the 34th, taken from Carthew

Carthew, meanwhile, had held the position on the right, and with the force at his disposal he could have continued to hold it. But, at this moment, Windham, to protect his retiring movement, sent for the bulk of the 34th. This regiment, which had covered itself with glory by its repulse of the enemy, was accordingly sent to reinforce the left brigade. It

Page 170

found that brigade in considerable disorder.

Windham falls back

The two big guns had been for the moment abandoned, and the men were falling back disheartened. The 34th came up in time to take the initiative in dashing at the big guns, and, with the aid of the sailors, in bringing them on with the retreating column.

The enemy follow

But the retiring movement had served as a signal for the enemy to advance. They crowded on in numbers, firing their guns. The English fell back, confused and in disorder, on the brick-kilns. Here it was hoped a stand might be made.

Windham gallops to the right

It was 5 o’clock, and Windham, thinking the position now reached might be held, and anxious for the condition of the right brigade, weakened by the withdrawal of the 34th, left General Dupuis, RA., in command, with orders to hold the brick-kilns, if possible, and galloped to the right.

Fatal effect of Windham’s reiterated order to Carthew to fall back

But before he could reach the right brigade the order to retire, which he had sent to it, had had its fatal effect. It is true that, weakened by the withdrawal of the 34th, the brigade could with difficulty hold its ground against the enemy pressing on it. But, coping bravely with the difficulty, Carthew did hold it. So convinced was he of the value of the position, that he did not act on the first order which he received. The second order was imperative. He was forced to obey his general, and he fell back126.

Great confusion at the brick-kilns

When Carthew .reached the brick-kilns, confusion seemed worse confounded. The carriage cattle had been driven off, whilst the tents of the encampment had been struck, and, with most of the heavy baggage, were lying in disorder on the earth. Just then, an order reached Dupuis to fall back on the intrenchment. Windham, as he was riding to look after his right brigade, had received intelligence that the rebels, turning the extreme right

Page 171

of his extended position, had occupied the lower part of the city, and were then attacking his last stronghold.

The rebels attack the intrenchment, but are driven back

Fortunately, at the moment a detachment of the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade arrived opportunely from Fathpur. Windham, placing himself at their head, drove the enemy from the lower part of the town, at the same time that he sent the order to Dupuis to fall back on the intrenchment.

Windham orders a retreat on the intrenchment but, directs Carthew to defend his right.

This movement had been just begun when Windham, riding towards the force after the exploit just recorded, personally directed Carthew to take two companies of the 88th and his four 6-pounders, to return to the position he had vacated on the right, and, on reaching the Bithur road, to fall back on and occupy the theatre. This building lay about a quarter of a mile south of the intrenchment, and was filled with stores and clothing for the troops.

Carthew moves to the right

Whilst the main body, abandoning tents and the soldiers’ kits, fell back on the intrenchment, “pursued by the enemy and harassed by musketry127,” Carthew moved to the right to execute Windham’s latest order. Between the suburb through which he had to pass and the Bithur road were the abandoned lines of a native regiment. On debauching from the suburb, he saw the enemy’s skirmishers feeling their way down the road toward the intrenchment.

and drives back the enemy

They were exposing their right flank to Carthew, but the moment they saw him they fell back in soldier-like style and occupied the abandoned lines I have spoken of. But Carthew, sending his men at them with the bayonet, drove them out in fine style, and as far as the Bithur road. Here he came upon their guns, which, at once unlimbered and opened fire. But Chamier’s four 6-pounders were at hand. They had had to make a short detour to avoid the narrow streets, but they came up with all possible haste, and, worked magnificently by the swarthy gunners of the Madras army, they silenced and drove back the guns of the enemy. Had Carthew had four companies instead of two, he would have captured the enemy’s guns. But it was

Page 172

growing dark, and his few men were dispersed in skirmishing order. He could not rally in time a sufficient number for a rush.

and occupies the theatre

Carthew had, however, completely fulfilled his instructions. I He had gained the Bithur road. Here he halted, alike to collect his men and show a front to the enemy. But the enemy had had enough of it. He then fell back, unmolested, on the theatre – the one officer in high command who had been victorious in every encounter on that eventful day!

He halts here for the night, barricading a bridge over a deep nullah in his front

The theatre constituted now the centre of a chain of outposts, forming a semicircle about a quarter of a mile in front of the intrenchment. The left of this semicircle rested on the canal, the right in an outwork on the river Ganges. This outwork was occupied by the 64th. Carthew’s small force, having just barricaded a bridge in their front over a narrow but deep nullah, bivouacked on the road near the theatre. The 88th occupied the road leading from the canal to the town. The remainder of the force and the guns were withdrawn within the intrenchment.

Remarks on the events of the day

The laurels of the day rested certainly with the rebels. They had driven back the British force, had compelled it to renounce the defence of the town. With a little more enterprise they might probably have cut it off altogether. The fact is, Windham occupied, with seventeen hundred men, a very extended position, and he attempted to defend this position against an enemy computed, erroneously, I think, at twenty-five thousand trained soldiers, but who probably numbered fourteen thousand. It is possible, however, that if he had been content with holding the position he had taken up on the night of the 26th, near the brick-kilns, he could have maintained it. For the right flank of that position was covered by Carthew’s brigade and by the linking detachments of the 82nd and 34th. But, by pushing his own brigade forward on the Kalpi road to a position in which its whole front and right flank were exposed to the enemy’s fire, he virtually invited defeat. When he at last ordered Dupuis to fall back on the brick-kilns it was too late. His ill-judged order to Carthew, resisted as long as possible by that officer, to abandon the position he had successfully defended, gave an opening to the enemy to penetrate on his right. When, after

Page 173

the evil had so far worked its effect as to necessitate the order to Dupuis to fall back, Windham attempted to repair it by sending back Carthew to his old position, Carthew did, indeed, by a display of skill and daring, prevent the mischief from becoming irremediable. But the position at the brick-kilns, which might have been maintained, had to be abandoned and the town to be sacrificed.

The night that followed

The night passed quietly. The British, that is to say, were not assailed. But the glare of the flames, and the tumult outside their position, proclaimed the triumph of the rebels. A great anxiety reigned within the British lines. Windham passed the night in consultation with the officers he most trusted. At one time he hoped to be able to redeem the past by a night attack on the rebels, but he could obtain no trustworthy information as to the locality of the enemy’s guns. Nothing remained to him, then, but to make the best preparations to repel the renewed attack to be expected on the morrow.

Windham issues instructions for the morrow

That night Windham issued to the senior officers of his force the instructions for carrying out the plan upon which, after mature consideration, he had decided.

Line of defence entrusted to Walpole, to Carthew, to Wilson, to Windham himself

To Colonel Walpole – commanding five companies of for the Rifle Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Woodford, the morrow. two companies of the 82nd Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, and four guns – two 9-pounders manned by Madras gunners, and two 24-pounder howitzers manned by Sikhs, under Lieutenant Green, R.A. – trusted to he confided the defence of the advanced portion of Walpole, the town on the left bank of the canal, that is, the portion in the left rear of the brick-kilns separated from them and from the rest of the town by the canal; to Brigadier Carthew – having under him the 34th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, the flank companies of the 82nd, and the four Madras 6-pounders under Lieutenant Chamier – the defence of the Bithur road, in a position more advanced than, and a little to the right of, that occupied the previous clay. The intrenchment was entrusted to the care of the 64th under Brigadier N. Wilson, who was also to guard against a turning movement on the right by establishing a post at the Baptist Chapel; whilst having under him the 88th Regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, should

Page 174

defend the portion of the town nearest the Ganges, on the left bank of the canal.

Disproportionate force allotted to guard the key of the position

Before the action has begun, the impartial reader cannot but be struck by the disproportionate force allotted to Brigadier Carthew. That officer had to defend the key of the position. He had proved his capacity the day before; and yet to him, occupying the post which was certain to draw upon him the weight of the enemy’s attack, a force was assigned not larger than that given to Walpole, whose position was far more defensible.

Carthew after advancing, is ordered to fall back and defend the bridge

At daylight on the 28th the several movements indicated took effect. Carthew pushed across the bridge he had barricaded the previous evening with the 34th and guns, covering his flanks with the two companies of the 82nd. He had just reached the point at which the road turned off to the position he was to occupy a little to the right, when the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain McCrea, brought him an order from the General to fall back on to the bridge. This position, then, Carthew took up, covering his left with two companies, occupying with three the ruined houses in the front and on the flanks of the bridge, and keeping the remainder at the bridge.

Captain Stewart

The detached party on the right consisted of one company of the 34th, commanded by Captain Stewart. The house it occupied was a lofty building with a flat roof, and from this roof Stewart noticed the advance of the enemy’s artillery to a position whence their guns could bear with decisive effect on the bridge. A zealous, intrepid officer, beloved by the regiment, Stewart posted his men in positions whence they could pick off the enemy’s gunners. They succeeded in this task _beyond their hopes, in spite of the grape and round shot which came pouring upon them.

Successful defence offered by Carthew

This state of things continued. for more than two hours, from half-past 9 o’clock till noon, the enemy pouring in shot and shell, the 34th and 82nd replying with musketry, and Chamier’s two small guns128 doing all the mischief of which they were capable. The enemy made no way, but their artillery fire

Page 175

did considerable execution, and though they, too, suffered severely from the British fire, their immense superiority in numbers enabled them to fill up vacancies as they occurred.

Success of Walpole on the left

This was the state of affairs on the right at 12 o’clock. On the left Walpole had received the attack of the enemy. But the enemy’s attack on the left bank of the canal, though made in force and with great resolution, was but the adjunct to his main attack on the right. The left advanced position was not the decisive point of the scene of action, yet on this point the British were posted in numbers sufficient to beat back the enemy; and, though Windham from his post to the rear of them sent and brought up supports, those supports were not required to ensure the repulse of the enemy, for Walpole had achieved that result without them129.

Criticisms of Windham’s conduct at this conjuncture

A real general having under his command in reserve a fine British Regiment such as was the 88th, seeing that Walpole was able to hold his own, would at once have hurried to the scene of action, which the lay of the ground and the importance of the position to be gained there must have shown him to be the decisive scene. The stores, clothing, and impedimenta of all sorts were on the side which Carthew was defending – not where Walpole was successfully fighting.

He sends an order to Carthew to advance, and to Wilson

But Windham did not possess the coup-d’oeil of a general. Instead of hurrying to the support of Carthew, despatched to him, at 12 o’clock, his Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain McCrea, to direct him to advance once again up the road, and promising him that the 64th Regiment under Brigadier N. Wilson would make a parallel advance on his right. To cover this movement of the 64th, McCrea. took with him, to strengthen that regiment, forty men of a company of the 82nd, till then under Carthew’s orders.

That the reader may more clearly comprehend the movements which followed, I may here state that after crossing

Page 176

The ground on which they were to act

the bridge the road runs up the centre of a parade-ground about six hundred yards long and two hundred yards wide, traversed by a watercourse, and having houses on both sides of it.

Carthew advances

On the advance being sounded, the three companies which till then had occupied the ruined buildings in front and on the flanks of the bridge pushed across the plain in skirmishing order, in spite of a continual shower of grape from three guns posted at the further end of it. When within about one hundred yards of these, Captain Stewart, who was leading his men in splendid style, was shot through the thigh. The adjutant of the 34th, Leeson, at once supplied his place, but the fire from the front and from the buildings on either side was so hot that it was impossible to reach the guns.

impossibility of further progress without cavalry

To gain breath, the men lay down in the water-course of which I have spoken, whilst Carthew, mounted, in the middle of the parade-ground, endeavoured to collect a sufficient number of men to make a rush at the enemy. But, crippled by the paucity of his numbers – a paucity caused by the necessity of guarding his left flank – his efforts in this respect were fruitless. He was more successful, however, in his attempt to bring Chamier’s two guns to the front. These, unlimbering, replied to the enemy’s fire; and, splendidly served by the Madras gunners, in the course of twenty minutes not only silenced it, but compelled the enemy to withdraw their pieces. Then was the chance if Carthew had but had one squadron of horse at his disposal. He had not a single trooper; and just at the moment he discovered that Wilson’s attack on his right had failed, and that his right rear was threatened by the rebels.

Wilson, being repulsed

Captain McCrea, taking with him forty men of the 82nd, had directed Brigadier Wilson to move to the front parallel with Carthew. The two companies covered the advance, harassed by a fire from six guns in position in their immediate front130. When within about a hundred.

Page 177

yards of these guns, the skirmishers charged them and for a few minutes had them in possession. Unfortunately the main body were too far behind, and the rebels, recovering from their first panic, came on in overwhelming numbers, and cut to pieces many of the heroic band of skirmishers. There fell here Brigadier Wilson, Captain McCrea, Captain Morphy, Major Sterling, Lieutenant McKenna, Lieutenant Gibbins, all nobly fighting. The supports came up only in time to cover the retreat of the few survivors.

Criticism on Windham conduct this conjuncture

Windham had thus engaged, without supports, his entire right wing on the decisive point of the scene of action. The available supports were in his own hand on a side part of action, never intended by the enemy to be the decisive point. The advance in parallel lines on the right, ordered by himself, had, owing to one of those accidents always likely to occur in war, failed. Carthew had indeed repulsed the enemy, but he had no men to follow him up. The 64th had been repulsed, and their repulse endangered Carthew’s right. Now was the moment when supports would have been invaluable. They might even have changed the face of the day.

Carthew falls back to his old position

His right rear threatened – for the 64th had been gradually forced back on the intrenchment – Carthew very gradually, and showing a bold front to the ever-increasing enemy, fell back on the bridge.

but which he still bravely defends

But how different was his position here to what it had been in the morning! Then, the bridge was the centre of a chain of posts, both flanks being guarded, and his front covered. Now, the flanking parties had fallen back and he was isolated.

Still, Carthew knew the importance of the position, and he resolved to hold it as long as he could. But the enemy’s attacks became more and more furious, the number of his guns increased and their fire became more concentrated. Still Carthew did not move. He had but two guns with which to reply, but the gallant Chamier and the sturdy Madrasis worked them with a will.

But every moment was pregnant with some new danger for him. The rebels, climbing to the roofs of the houses which the retirement of the 64th and of the detachment which connected

Page 178

Gallantry of the 34th

him with that regiment had left empty, poured upon the gallant soldiers of the 34th a stream of fire. But the unconquered soldiers of that splendid regiment still held on. Twice did they clear the streets in their front, twice the Church compound on their right.

and increasing numbers of the enemy

But the continuous stream of fire of which I have spoken would not allow them to hold the positions they had gained at the point of the bayonet. More than that, the enemy shifted their position so that Chamier’s guns could no longer bear on any vital point, whilst the fire from the roofs caused the defenders to drop fast.

A strong reinforcement might still have saved the position. Carthew sent for it. Pending its arrival this gallant leader went amongst the men, cheering them, and keeping them to their work.

In spite of Carthew’s splendid tenacity

Even when the position had become practically untenable, when the enemy had all but turned his flanks, and when the party he had sent under Colonel Simpson of the 34th to keep open his communications was forced back, he still held on. Still the reinforcements did not come.

he is at last compelled to fall back

At last, when it was absolutely certain that unless he were to retire he would be cut off, Carthew reluctantly gave the order – to give which when he could no longer hold out he had the authority of Windham – to fall back on the intrenchment131.

Carthew and Windham

All this time where was Windham? Windham was with the victorious left wing, where his presence was not needed. What he was precisely doing, or why he did not hasten to strengthen the key of his position,

Page 179

may never be known. He never attempted to explain his action. In his dispatch he endeavoured, in the most ungenerous manner, to cast, by implication, the blame of the defeat on Carthew. “Brigadier Carthew,” he wrote, “of the Madras Native Infantry, had a most severe and strong contest with the enemy from morning to night; but I regret to add that he felt himself obliged to retire at dark.” This passage conveyed to the mind of Sir Colin Campbell the impression that Brigadier Carthew had, at a critical period, retired from his post without orders; and, on the 9th December, he animadverted very severely in an official memorandum on such conduct. When Carthew received the memorandum he took it at once to Windham, who – it will scarcely be credited – advised him not to reply to it. But Carthew had too nice a sense of his own honour to act upon such advice. He not only replied to it, but forced from Windham an acknowledgment that he himself had given the Brigadier authority to retire when he could no longer maintain his position. Upon this, Sir Colin Campbell not only withdrew his censure, but expressed his regret that under an “erroneous impression” he should have given pain to a meritorious officer132.

But, – to return to the question, – where was Windham? I

Page 180

As he is falling back Carthew receives reinforcements

have already stated that Carthew had sent for reinforcements. He received them in the shape of two companies of the Rifle Brigade, as he was falling back, just in time to cover his retreat. Had Carthew not begun his retreat, the reinforcement was too small to be of much avail.

too few in number

Windham states that he himself took, down this reinforcement, and, returning, ordered up two companies of the 82nd.

too late in time

But it was too late – the mischief had been done; a strong reinforcement an hour earlier might have saved the position. It was not to be saved by sending on small supports in piecemeal. Under cover of the riflemen Carthew fell back in good order within the intrenchment. It was then quite dark.

Carthew, the 34th, and the rest of his brigade

He and his officers and men had been for thirty-six hours almost without food and sleep. He had exposed himself to the hottest fire throughout the day. His cool and calm courage had been the admiration of every one. His efforts had been splendidly supported by all under his command. In the 34th alone three officers had been killed and eight wounded. The total number of killed and wounded in Windham’s operations up to the night of the 28th amounted to three hundred and fifteen. Carthew brought back with him all his guns.

Windham’s aggressive defence probably saved Kanhpur

The plain account I have given of the day’s proceedings requires little comment. That Windham was justified in deciding to make an aggressive defence cannot, I think, be questioned. It is the opinion of those best qualified to form an opinion that, regard being had to the enormous superiority of the rebels in artillery, a purely defensive system would have ensured the destruction of his force, and the occupation of Kanhpur by the rebels, with consequences – Sir Colin and the women and children of the Lakhnao garrison being on the other side of the river – the evil extent of which it would be difficult to exaggerate. Windham, by his military instincts, saved the country from this disaster, and he is entitled to all the credit due to a daring initiative. That the action might have been more skilfully fought is certain; but the aphorism of Napoleon, that in war victory is to the general who makes the fewest mistakes, must never be forgotten. Mistakes will be made: and it should be remembered that this was the first time

Page 181

that Windham had held an independent command in the field.

Destruction consequent on the British defeat

Both wings fell back that evening into the intrenchment. The town of Kanhpur, the theatre and the houses, full of clothing and stores, or prepared for the reception of the Lakhnao ladies, fell into the hands of the rebels.

But before the right wing had reached the intrenchment, whilst Carthew, nobly daring, was still holding on to the Baptist Chapel, an event full of importance had occurred. Sir Colin Campbell had arrived, the precursor by a few hours of his army.

Footnotes

122. Kalpi lies on the right bank of the Zamnah in the Jalaun district. It was a place of great importance in the times of the Mughuls.

123. The Shannon Brigade in India, page 36.

124. The casualties had been severe. Amongst the officers, Lieut. Hay, R.N., commanding the detachment of the Shannon men, had been severely wounded. He was afterwards killed in New Zealand.

125. Windham stated subsequently that he afterwards countermanded that order, but the countermand never reached Carthew.

126. Captain Drury, who was Brigadier Carthew’s brigade-major on this occasion, thus described the situation in a letter to a friend at Madras: “The other position” (Windham’s) “of the force had not fared so well, and the General sent for the 34th to strengthen the encampment. Shortly afterwards we were ordered to return to the encampment and occupy some brick-kilns immediately in its rear. This order was repeated, and it was not until the second time that we commenced falling back to the place directed. This order was a grave error. General Windham says he sent a countermand afterwards. That never came.”

127. The Shannon Brigade in India, page 36. A private letter from a soldier of the 34th says: “They took all our kit and encampment, which we saw burning during the night.”

128. The other two had been withdrawn, most unnecessarily, to defend the Allahabad road.

129. “On the left advance, Colonel Walpole, with the Rifles, supported by Captain Greene’s battery, and part of the 82nd Regiment, achieved a complete victory over the enemy, and captured two 18-pounder guns. The glory of this well-contested fight belongs entirely to the above-named companies and artillery.” – General Windham’s Despatch, 30th November 1857. The italics are mine.

130. General Windham writes thus in his Despatch: “Brigader Wilson thought proper, promoted by his zeal for the service, to lead his regiment against four guns placed in front of Brigadier Carthew.” Brigadier Wilson did nothing of the sort. The guns upon which he advanced were nearly half a mile from the guns in front of Carthew’s troops. They were, as stated in the text, covering the line upon which Windham himself had, by the mouth of McCrea, ordered Wilson to advance.

131. “I have not the slightest hesitation,” wrote, on the 11th December 1857, Lieutenant-Colonel Simpson of the 34th to Brigader Carthew, “in giving my opinion about the brigade retiring from the position we held on the bridge on the evening of the 28th November. It is my firm conviction that you had no other alternative – that if you had not retired the brigade would have been cut off; as the enemy were completely outflanking us on our left. By your orders I sent round two companies of this regiment to check them, which they did for the moment, but could not make a stand, as they in turn were quite outflanked on their left. When the two officers commanding those companies (officers in whom I have the greatest confidence) came back and told me what was going on, and, from what I saw myself, I spoke to Colonel Kelly, Colonel Gwilt, and one or two more of the regiment, and I myself, and I think others, told you that if we did not retire we should be cut off. You then, reluctantly, gave the order to retire.”

132. Lieut. Charles Windham, R.N., wrote me in 1880, objecting to the account, as given in the text, of the events of the day, especially to the imputation of want of generosity on the part of General Windham towards Brigadier Carthew. Mr. Windham enclosed a pamphlet which his father had written on the subject, the perusal of which, before I had written my history, would, Mr. Windham wrote, have caused me to omit “all allusion to a circumstance which, whilst entirely beyond the control of the general in command, was the one which, above all others, contributed to that result,” viz. “the misfortune which befell the civil town – Kanhpur.” The pamphlet sent me by Lieut. Windham consists mainly of an attempt to cast the blame of the defeat upon an officer whose name is not mentioned. Having read it, and having with a view to this edition carefully re-read all the authorities upon which my account is based, I find no reason whatever to alter a single line of this narrative. It is supported in every particular by evidence which cannot be controverted. Before I published it, I sent the chapter in proof to more than one of the officers engaged in the battle upon whose judgment and fairness I could rely, and they testified, in letters I possess, to its absolute correctness. I believe I have rendered full justice to General Windham. To say that he committed one error is not a charge which affects his reputation as a gallant soldier who, on a day of great trial, did many things extremely well. It is pleasing to read that, in the pamphlet sent me, he writes thus of General Carthew: “No one at Cawnpore (Kanhpur) did better service than this officer.”

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
hosted by ibiblio Support Wikipedia