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Chapter II – Kunwar Singh and Lord Mark Kerr

Retrospect of western Bihar

Taking the reader with me north-westward, I propose to narrate now the state of affairs in western Bihar; to explain how the communications between Kanhpur and Allahabad had been preserved; then, proceeding to the Azamgarh districts, to show how insurrection triumphed there for a moment, only to be driven back to seek a refuge, destined to be of long duration, in the districts and jungles which owned the authority of the remarkable landowner, Kunwar Singh.

I have told in the third volume how the important division of western Bihar, saved by Mr. William Tayler during the dark and terrible days of June and July 1857, then exposed, by the wilful blindness of the Government, to dangers more acute, more vivid, more active than those which he, single-handed, had overcome, had been preserved from immediate destruction by the gallantry of Vicars Boyle, of Wake, of Colvin, and their companions, and, finally, completely rescued by the splendid daring of Vincent Eyre. I have recorded the ingratitude with which one of these gentlemen, Mr. William Tayler, had been treated by the Government he had served with an energy all-absorbing and a success most signal, and how the other principal actor in the drama, Vincent Eyre, after storming the stronghold of Kunwar Singh, had been ordered to join the avenging army of Outram. From the hour of their departure a new era was inaugurated in western Bihar – an era in which truckling took the place of independence, and a desire to discover mistakes in Mr. Tayler’s administration superseded the determination to suppress, before all, the dangers threatening the State.

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Patna under Mr. Tayler’s successor

For some weeks after his departure the effect of Eyre’s victories continued to be felt in western Bihar. The Government, alive at last, after one revolt had been quelled, to the advisability of preventing another, had placed under the orders of Mr. Samuells, the successor of Mr. Tayler, two hundred Europeans, for the safeguard of Patna, and had despatched a gun-boat, under the orders of the Magistrate of Chapra, to patrol the banks of the Ghaghra. But, as time went on, the misguided spirits in the province began to be sensible that Eyre had left them, and that the spirit of William Tayler no longer inspired the administration. Though Patna, thanks to the presence of British troops, was reported to be quiet, strong precautionary measures were not the less taken. The opium godown was fortified, six guns were placed in position bearing on the town, and the most stringent measures were taken to avert a collision between the townspeople and the Europeans.

The aspect in the district way even less assuring. Kunwar Singh, with a thousand men, had taken up a position on the Son river, and it became known that dangerous and discontented characters, such men as his brother Amar Singh, Nisban Singh, and Juban Singh, were flocking to his standard. At the same time, the 5th Irregular Cavalry, whose disarming Mr. Tayler had before ineffectually recommended, and whose mutiny in eastern Bihar I have already recorded202, were allowed to spread over the districts in the western province, and to plunder with impunity.

The difficulties in western Bihar aggravated by risings elsewhere

The difficulties of the position in western Bihar were greatly aggravated by the evacuation of Gorakhpur by the British civil authorities, one alone excepted203, on the 13th August, and subsequently by all; by the consequent pressure of rebels into British districts from Oudh; and by the exposure of the districts of Chapra, Champaran, and Muzaffarpur to the incursions of the leader of the Oudh rebels, Mehndi Husen.

The mutinous 5th Irregulars approach Gaya

These difficulties soon came to a head. The mutinous 5th Irregulars, finding no one to oppose their course, destroyed the public buildings at Nawada, and marched in the direction of Gaya.

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Rattray marches to meet them and is defeated

Rattray, with a small force of Sikhs and Europeans, numbering about two hundred, had been posted to protect Gaya. But, learning that the rebels were approaching that place, he, acting on the strongly pressed advice of Mr. Alonzo Money, marched out on the 8th September to attack them. But the rebels, almost all mounted204, took advantage of Rattray’s advance from his base to go round his position – inflicting upon him, in his vain attempts to hinder them, a loss of twenty wounded – and to reach Gaya some hours before he could fall back. Arrived at Gaya, they liberated four hundred prisoners from the gaol, and attacked the fortified house which the residents had prepared as a place of refuge. But in this attempt they were repulsed, owing mainly to the spirited conduct of Mr. Skipwith Tayler, son of the late Commissioner of Patna.

Two companies of the 32nd Infantry

The disorder was subsequently further aggravated by the mutiny, on the 9th October, of two companies of the 32nd Native Infantry at Deogarh and by threatened movements on the part of Kunwar Singh.

Forces at the disposal of the Commissioner

The Commissioner had at his disposal Rattray’s Sikhs, a portion of the Naval Brigade, under Captain Sotheby. Colonel Fischer’s brigade of Madras troops entered the western Bihar districts early in October. Besides which Lieutenant Stanton of the Engineers was at Sasaram and its vicinity, and the energy, the zeal, and the activity of this officer compensated to a very great extent for the paucity of fighting men.

Rattray was the first to come in contact with the rebellious Sipahis. This officer had avenged his disaster of the 8th September by defeating a body of rebels on the 7th of the following month at Akbarpur, and he now went in pursuit of the mutinous 32nd. On the 6th November he caught them at the village of Danchua. The numbers on both sides were equal, and the contest was severe. Night fell whilst the combat was raging: then covered by darkness, the rebels effected a retreat.

The events which followed each other in western Bihar until the formation of Colonel Rowcroft’s force in November, present

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a constant succession of skirmishes, of movements against petty forts, and similar occurrences of a purely local character. To Rowcroft I shall return shortly.

The road between Kanhpur and Allahabad

But before doing so it seems incumbent upon me, for the clearness of the subsequent narrative, to describe, as concisely as may be, the occurrences in the districts and on the grand trunk road between Allahabad and Kanhpur during the period intervening between Sir Colin Campbell’s battle of Kanhpur and the final fall of Lakhnao.

Carthew at Fathpur

After the battle of Kanhpur, Brigadier Carthew was detached, with the Madras Brigade, to command at Fathpur. The command was an important one, as Fathpur was exposed to attacks from the districts south-west of Kanhpur – from Kalpi, from Jhansi, from Bundelkhand. Fathpur, moreover, faced – a narrow strip of lane on the right bank of the Ganges alone intervening – the south-western frontier of Oudh, and was at any moment liable to incursions from flying parties of rebels. It devolved, therefore, upon Carthew, not only to thrust back attacks from these opposite quarters, but to guard intact the trunk road – the line of communication between Kanhpur and Allahabad.

The task which devolved upon him

The fact that troops and well-guarded convoys were constantly marching up the road doubtless facilitated his task, and enabled him to employ advantageously such passing troops to aid him in clearing the districts lining the road.

Campbell at Allahabad

The duties devolving upon the officer commanding at the south-eastern end of the line of which I am writing – the station of Allahabad – were of not less importance. Situated at the confluence of the great rivers the Jamnah and the Ganges, abutting alike on Bundelkhand, on Oudh, and on the disturbed districts of Azamgarh and Jaunpur, Allahabad was a place always threatened, and yet to be preserved at all risks. Allahabad was, in fact, at once the outlying frontier fortress of the province of Bihar and its key.

At the time of which I am writing, December 1857 and January 1858, the officer commanding at Allahabad was Brigadier Campbell.

Fathpur

Carthew took up his command at Fathpur on the 19th December. Just before he arrived (11th December) a small party under Colonel Barker, R.A., had made a raid amongst the disaffected villages in the district, had

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burned some, and had expelled the turbulent villagers from others. In this way the district had been purged of its disloyal citizens. The revenue returns and the supply of provisions to the headquarters proved, almost at once, how very beneficial had been these domiciliary visits.

The rebels assemble on the right bank of the Jamnah

The expelled villagers had fled across the Jamnah, and it was on the right bank of this river, from Kalpi down to Bandah, that mutineers from Gwaliar, Jhansi, and Bundelkhand, even fugitives from Fathgarh, now began to assemble. Amongst them were the Rajah of Charkhari and a brother and nephew of Nana Sahib; some accounts even spoke of Nana Sahib himself. Certain it is that the rebel leaders who had their headquarters at Jalalpur on the Betwah, near Kalpi, exercised the right of sovereignty by calling upon the landowners west of the Jamnah to furnish money and recruits for the service of the representative of the Peshwa.

Carthew clears the country on the left bank.

Across the Jamnah it was not possible to act. The Commander-in-Chief, however, deemed it especially advisable that the districts to the east of that river should be kept clear of the mutineers. In accordance, then, with instructions which he issued, Carthew marched on the 10th January with a small force (two horse artillery guns, four companies Rifle Brigade, two hundred 17th Madras Native Infantry) along the Kanhpur road. On reaching Jahanabad, he turned westward towards Kalpi, communicated with the 34th Regiment, sent from Kanhpur to co-operate with him, and then moved on to Bhognipur. The occupation of this place, the locality of which has already been indicated205, forced the several rebel parties who had come over from Kalpi to recross the Jamnah. Carthew then in compliance with an order received from Brigadier Inglis, pushed on to Sikandra, and then returned leisurely, via Kanhpur, to Fathpur. He had thoroughly purged the district of rebels.

Brigadier Campbell clears the country across the Ganges

About the same time (5th January) Brigadier Campbell, with a brigade composed of the 79th Highlanders, a regiment of the Rifle Brigade, some foot and horse artillery, and a newly-raised cavalry levy, the Banaras Horse, effectually cleared the districts near Allahabad, on the left bank of the Ganges. His

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operations were in every respect successful, and in three encounters which he had with the rebels the latter admitted a considerable loss.

Movable columns patrol the district

But the efforts of these columns occasionally despatched into the districts could not prevent a fresh appearance of the enemy after their departure. It was natural that so long as the Lakhnao question remained unsolved, the delta west of Kanhpur, that is the narrow strip lying between the two great arteries the Ganges and the Jamnah, should be constantly threatened, and almost as constantly invaded. It was necessary, therefore, to patrol the entire district. In March a movable column206, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Christie, engaged in this work, moved down to the village of Mai* near the left bank of the Jamnah, to prevent a threatened passage of the river at that point. Christie found the enemy occupying Sirauli, a town in the Hamirpur district, on the right bank opposite Dhana, and engaged in firing on that village. By a judicious advance of his artillery, he drove the enemy from Sirauli, and set fire to the town, but the want of boats prevented him from crossing in pursuit.

Effect on the district of the fall of Lakhnao

Occasional raids still continued. On the 26th March a corps of rebels crossed the Jamnah near Hamirpur, plundered and burned the village of Ghatampur, and then returned. But this was an expiring effort. The fall of Lakhnao placed an overwhelming force at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, whilst, on the western side of the Jamnah, another active leader, whose name will occupy a most prominent part in the succeeding volume, was pressing, with all the decision and enterprise of a great commander, the chiefs and leaders whose troops had so long been attempting to harass the British line of communications. It was just after the fall of Lakhnao that the action of Sir Hugh Rose and General Whitlock began to make itself felt. Just then, too, Sir Colin Campbell despatched a small force, under Colonel Maxwell, to Kalpi. The proceedings of these several forces will be narrated in their due course. Meanwhile it may be stated that the work of supervision and control exercised by Brigadier Carthew bad been eminently useful to the Commander-in-Chief.

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Rowcroft and Sotheby

What Rowcroft and Sotheby had effected with their brigades up to the time of their occupation of Gorakhpur, I and have already narrated207. I propose now to take up the story of their action from the point where I left them, and to show how it was that the Azamgarh and Jaunpur districts fell again into extraordinary confusion.

Sotheby defeats the rebels at Chandipur

Rowcroft, arriving at Gorakhpur on the 19th February, had defeated the rebels on the 20th, and on the 25th had been left, by the departure towards Lakhnao of the Nipalese, in command at Gorakhpur. Two days prior to his arrival, Captain Sotheby, R.N., of the Naval Brigade, who was escorting boats up the river Gaghra with a force of a hundred and thirty men of that brigade, thirty-five Sikhs, and sixty Nipalese, had attacked and captured the fort of Chandipur208, garrisoned by three hundred men. This fort was situated on the left bank of the river, in the midst of a dense bamboo jungle. Yet so well planned was Captain Sotheby’s attack, that the capture of the fort and the guns and the property it contained cost his force a loss of only four wounded! Amongst these was Captain Charles Weston, of the 36th Native Infantry, a very gallant officer. It is due to add that the attack was most efficiently aided by the guns of a river steamer – the Jamnah.

The intrenched camp of the rebels at Belwa

Within the British district of Gorakhpur, sixty-eight miles to the west of it, and nine miles east of Faizabad in Oudh, is the town of Amorha. Thither Rowcroft now marched, and on the 4th March took up a position not far from the intrenched camp of Belwa, then occupied by a large rebel force. The rebel force alluded to was composed of upwards of fourteen thousand men, led by the pseudo-Nazim Mehndi Husen, the Rajahs of Gondah and Chardah, and other disaffected chiefs. Included in their ranks were two thousand five hundred trained Sipahis, composed of the 1st, 10th, and 53rd Native Infantry, recently completed to five hundred men each, seven hundred men of the 2nd Oudh Police, and about three hundred of the 5th Regiment Gwaliar contingent.

The approach of Rowcroft disconcerted the hopes which these rebel chieftains had entertained of taking advantage

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of the concentration of the main British army before Lakhnao to make a raid down into Azamgarh and Jaunpur districts, and possibly to reach Banaras.

They march to attack Rowcroft

But there was, it seemed to them, one mode – and a very certain mode – whereby to rid themselves of Rowcroft and his following, and then to prosecute their intentions. This was to attack him, with the vastly superior force at their disposal, as he lay at Amorha.

and are totally defeated

Thus thinking, they acted. Early on the morning of the 5th March they marched towards the British camp, distant from them some seven miles. They had approached at half-past 8 within a mile of it when. they were met by Rowcroft and Sotheby and Richardson. A severe contest ensued. The trained Sipahis of the rebel force fought with great courage and determination, but they lacked the cool leading of the European officer, which, under other circumstances, had so often gained them victory. Sotheby’s Naval Brigade greatly distinguished itself.

The charge of the Yeomanry cavalry

The enemy were already shaken when Richardson ordered the Yeomanry Cavalry to charge. The first charge caused the enemy to waver, the second compelled them to give ground, a third drove them in headlong flight from the field. They were then pursued to their intrenchments at Belwa, losing between four and five hundred killed and wounded, and abandoning eight guns on the field. The intrenchments at Belwa gave them a safe refuge, for the cavalry could not penetrate within them.

Rowcroft remains at Amorha

Rowcroft remained at Amorha, waiting for reinforcements to enable him to attack the strong position of the rebels. Subsequently, on the 17th April, and again on the 25th, he met and defeated them in the plain between the two positions; but before this had happened events had occurred in the districts to his left rear – the districts of Azamgarh and Jaunpur – which compel me to return thither.

Kunwar Singh in western Bihar

I have already related how Kunwar Singh, after his expulsion by Vincent Eyre from Jagdispur, had hung about the districts of western Bihar to the terror of the successor of Mr. William Tayler and of the Government of Bengal. One of the three natives of India thrown up to the surface by the mutiny, who showed

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any pretensions to the character of a strategist – the others being Tantia Topi and the Oudh Maulavi – Kunwar Singh had carefully forborne to risk the fortunes of his diminished party by engaging in a conflict which, however favourable might be its commencement, must certainly end in his complete defeat.

His policy

Shahabad, though the region of his birth, the district in which lay his confiscated estates, was too carefully watched, he felt, to present the chances which would alone justify in his eyes a departure from his system of reserve.

His force

His actual force was small. He had with him about twelve hundred Sipahis, trained in the Indian army, and a few hundreds of untrained adherents, dependents of himself, his brother, and other discontented landowners of the province. With such a force he could not hope to make a serious impression.

He resolves to make a diversion in eastern Oudh

But when he saw how British troops were being hurried up from every quarter to take part in the attack on Lakhnao, when he heard that the Nipalese and Franks had pushed on for that city, leaving the western frontier of the British provinces bordering Oudh comparatively denuded of troops, then he saw his opportunity, then he resolved to make a push for eastern Oudh, and, combining with the numberless rebels still at large in that part, to make a dash on Azamgarh, and, if successful there, to avenge the storming of Jagdispur by a dash on Allahabad or Banaras.

Fortune greatly favoured him. At the moment when he crossed into Oudh, Rowcroft at Amorha was confronting the intrenched camp of the rebels at Belwa. His inability to storm that position had singularly encouraged the enemy. They, too, like Kunwar Singh, had designs on Azamgarh, and, though their main plan had been for the moment baffled by the defeat inflicted upon their attacking columns on the 5th March, yet Rowcroft’s inability to follow up his victory had incited them to pursue their original design by other means. Still holding the camp at Belwa, they detached then a considerable force to the south-east, and this force, during its march, attracted to itself many detachments which had escaped the bayonets and horsemen of the victorious Franks. With these troops, Kunwar Singh succeeded in effecting a junction at Atraulia on the 17th or 18th March.

The Azamgarh district was then guarded by a small British force consisting of two hundred and six men of the 37th

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Regiment; sixty Madras Cavalry, the 4th; and two light guns, under the command of Colonel Milman of the 37th. At the time when Kunwar Singh and his rebel allies took up their position at Atraulia, Milman was encamped in the district at Koilsa, not far from Azamgarh.

Atraulia

The distance between Azamgarh and Atraulia is twenty-five miles. The reader will recollect that Atraulia is the fortress which, on the 9th November preceding, had been captured by Colonel Longden, and by him partially burnt and destroyed. Dependent upon it was a small fort, comparatively insignificant. The fortress itself covered a number of strong buildings, all loop-holed. The outer wall was fifteen feet high.

Milman beats the enemy near Atraulia

On the afternoon of the 21st March, Milman received from Mr. Davies, magistrate of Azamgarh, the intelligence of the vicinity of the rebels. He at once broke up his camp, marched all night, and, at daybreak on the 22nd, came upon the advanced guard of the enemy’s force, not occupying the forts, but posted in three or four mango-groves, contiguous to each other. Without giving them time to recover from their surprise, he attacked and defeated them, the 4th Madras Cavalry behaving with great dash and resolution.

then halts for breakfast

The enemy being dispersed, Milman determined, before advancing further, to give the men their breakfasts. He accordingly halted in the mango-groves whence he had expelled the rebels, and his men, piling their arms, prepared to enjoy the matutinal meal.

when the rebels march on him

But the cup was dashed to the ground just as the hand was about to raise it to the lips. The breakfast was almost ready when information was suddenly brought to Milman that the enemy were advancing in great force!

Milman’s position as Kunwar Singh pictured it

It was too true. At last the opportunity for which Kunwar Singh had longed through so many dreary months had come to him. An enemy, though European, yet vastly inferior in numbers; an enemy worn out by a long march, by deprivation of sleep, by fasting; an enemy twenty-five miles from his base and with no supports! What more could a general long for? Everything was in his favour. Kunwar Singh, then, marched to a victory which he deemed assured. The imagination can almost picture him making to the confidant by his side an exclamation near akin to that which burst from the lips of Wellington when

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he noticed the false movement of Marmont which brought on the battle of Salamanca209!

Milman endeavours to check the advance of the rebels

Yes, Milman was lost. Galloping forward, followed by some skirmishers, as soon as he received the news of which I have spoken, the English leader beheld the enemy in great strength, some covered by a mud wall, others in fields of sugar-cane and in topes of trees. Still, hoping that a daring movement on his part would check their further progress, he ordered an advance. But the numbers of the enemy exceeded his in the proportion of eight to one. Outflanked, it was impossible to advance. Forced back, he at least maintained a bold front. The enemy, never attempting to charge, contented themselves with a steady advance and a steady musketry fire.

He falls back on Koilsa

Once, indeed, as the British troops neared the camp at Koilsa, which they had quitted the previous evening, the rebels made a desperate effort to outflank them. But a timely charge of the 4th Madras Cavalry, which had shown remarkable steadiness, frustrated this movement. Then it was that, tired, worn out, wearied, having lost many men in killed and wounded, the survivors found their way into the encamping ground of Koilsa.

Thence on Azamgarh, whence he despatches messengers for aid

Not, however, to discover a refuge there. The rumour of their mishap had preceded them. A panic had seized the camp-followers, most of whom had fled, taking their bullocks with them. The foe was still near; the camp was not defensible; there was no food. Milman, then, abandoning the camp equipage, continued his retreat to Azamgarh. He reached that place the same day, and, whilst making every preparation to defend it in case it should be attacked, sent off expresses to Banaras, Allahabad, and Lakhnao for assistance.

Some reinforcements reach Azamgarh

The express despatched to Banaras reached that station on the 24th March. Forty-six men of the Madras Rifles were instantly despatched to Azamgarh. The following day a hundred and fifty men of the 37th Regiment from Ghazipur, and two days later a hundred and thirty of the same regiment, reached Azamgarh, and penetrated within the intrenchment before it had been attacked by the rebels. Colonel Dames of the 37th then

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assumed the command. On the 27th he attempted a sortie with two hundred Europeans, two guns, and sixty Madras Cavalry, and, though successful at first, was repulsed with the loss of one officer and eleven men killed and wounded. He then retreated into the intrenchment, and thenceforward acted on the defensive.

Lord Canning hears of Milman’s disaster

The express despatched to Allahabad reached that place on the 27th. Lord Canning was at Allahabad. The news caused him anxiety.

and at once realises its magnitude

Knowing what sort of a man Kunwar Singh was, that he possessed audacity and courage, and that he knew the value of time in military operations, he realised at once the danger of the situation. He saw how possible it was for the Jagdispur chieftain, reinforced as he daily was by troops who had escaped from Lakhnao, to overwhelm Milman at Azamgarh, and then, rapidly traversing the eighty-one miles which separated that place from Banaras then almost ungarrisoned, to seize that important city, and thus sever the communications between Calcutta on the one side and the Governor-General of India at Allahabad and the Commander-in-Chief of the army at Lakhnao on the other.

He orders Lord Mark Kerr to push on to Azamgarh

Just then the headquarters and right wing of the 13th Light Infantry happened to be at Allahabad. The officer commanding that regiment was Colonel Lord Mark Kerr. For the moment that officer and the wing he Kerr to push commanded constituted the only means upon which Lord Canning could depend to conjure away the danger. Lord Canning sent for Lord Mark, and explained to him the position. Lord Mark comprehended it on the instant. That same evening he set off for Banaras with the wing of his regiment, and, having full powers to pick up and take with him whatever troops he might meet, to push on with all speed to Azamgarh.

For the required service there was not in the British army an officer better qualified than Lord Mark Kerr. Spare of body, active, a splendid horseman, inured to fatigue, endowed with a courage and coolness which shone with greater lustre in the presence of danger, he was the type of the daring and resolute British officer. He had commanded his regiment in the Crimea. In India he had excited the wonder of his comrades, those especially of the Indian service, by the immunity with which, bareheaded, he was able to dare the rays of the powerful Indian

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sun. A stern disciplinarian, he was just, and, being just as well as stern, he was beloved by his men. He appreciated even the many good qualities of the natives of India whom he was combating, and advocated the policy of mercy after repression. But that he was resolved to repress he showed by the eagerness with which he set out on the mission confided to him by the Governor-General.

Lord Mark Kerr, and the wing of his regiment, three hundred and ninety-one strong, including nineteen officers, then set out that same evening, reached Banaras on the 31st March, picked up there a troop – fifty-five men and two officers – of the Queen’s Bays, seventeen gunners and one officer, with two 6-pounder guns and two 5½-inch mortars, and started thence for Azamgarh at ten o’clock on the night of the 2nd April. His entire force consisted, then, of twenty-two officers and four hundred and forty-four men.

Lord Mark Kerr arrives within eight miles of Azamgarh and halts for the dawn

Marching with all speed, Lord Mark Kerr reached Sarsana, eight miles from Azamgarh, the evening of the 5th. There he received, and during the night continued to receive, most pressing letters from the staff officer at Azamgarh, begging him to push on without a moment’s delay. But hurriedly to march a force of four hundred and forty-four men, tired from a long journey, across a country utterly unknown to any of them, to relieve a place besieged by an army whose numbers certainly exceeded five thousand, and might amount to fifteen thousand, was an idea not to be entertained by a prudent commander. Defeat would but precipitate the evil he had been sent to avert. Lord Mark Kerr, then, wisely resolved to defer his march till the dawn of day should approach.

He marches on the 6th and comes on the rebels

He set out at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 6th – Good Friday – a reconnoitring party of the Bays, with whom was Lord Mark, leading the way. After a march of two hours, one of the Queen’s Bays pointed out to Lord Mark that the banked ditches to the right and left were crowded with armed men, lying in ambush and evidently on the look-out for him. His mind was instantly made up. Pretending not to observe these, he dismounted himself and made his cavalry dismount, and kept them halted till his train of elephants, camels, and carts, two miles in length, should close up. This continued for an hour or more, the enemy thinking all the time that he had the British relieving

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force secure in his grasp. As soon as they arrived on the spot, he despatched a company of the 13th to the right front to clear the ditches of the enemy.

and fights them

In this he so far succeeded, that the rebels fell back on their left, but almost at the same time a heavy fire opened from the buildings and the mango groves of which I have spoken, and which, on the left of the road from the British advancing line, constituted the enemy’s right. Lord Mark threw out his men in skirmishing order and brought up the guns, which, at a distance of five hundred yards, began to throw shrapnel on to the enemy’s threatening left, where Kunwar Singh was conspicuous on a white charger. The enemy’s infantry, however, were so numerous that they were able to spread out all round him, on his rear as well as on his flanks, and it required all the soldierly skill of the British leader to keep them at a distance.

Great difficulties of his position

Lord Mark’s position was complicated by the necessity of defending the large train of animals accompanying the force, and the capture of which would, naturally, be a special object of the rebels. These animals, when the action had begun, had turned round with fright and bolted to the rear, the mahouts clinging to the elephants, whilst the drivers, descending from the carts, had run off, calling upon the trees and bushes to cover them. Everything now depended upon Lord Mark’s ability to make head against the enemy. Up to this time, when the fight had lasted an hour, though he still held the position he had taken up, he had made no impression upon them; and just at the moment he could discern in rear of their skirmishers their reserves forming up in quarter-distance column, whilst a large body was being detached with the evident purpose of penetrating between him and the baggage animals. In this, before long, the rebels partly succeeded; for they set fire to many of the carts.

Critical situation of Lord Mark

The situation was now very critical. Lord Mark, whilst trying to defend his flanks and his rear, had gradually pushed on the two 6-pounders already mentioned to within sixty yards of the main building, but their fire still produced but little effect on its walls. He had been anxious to try the effect of shelling, but the two mortars had been halted in a very disadvantageous position for that purpose, and to move them, so that they would be brought to bear with effect it was now necessary to draw

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them back a short distance.

The slightest hesitation would have lost him

But this could not be done. The movement to the rear was interpreted as a retreat, and the enemy advanced with loud shouts. He felt the main building was the key of the enemy’s position, and must be carried at any price. At last the two 6-pounders succeeded in effecting a small breach in its outer wall, and, the volunteers being called for, some thirty or forty men rushed to the storm. They found the breach not quite practicable; but, far from falling back, they set to work vigorously to enlarge it. Their labours disclosed an inner wall as yet uninjured.

His splendid perseverance

Upon this Lord Mark ordered them to set fire to the roof and wooden portions of the building, then to fall back. They obeyed this order with alacrity and effect.

is crowned with success

It was a splendid piece of work, for, shortly after they had fallen back, and the firing had recommenced from one gun – the other being used to prevent the enemy from pressing too closely on the British rear – the flames from the fire the stormers had kindled forced the enemy to evacuate the building. Instantly, Lord Mark, who had just organised a second assault, sent the Bays to the front. The rebels did not await the shock of their charge, and space was at once cleared for a further advance.

The rebels are repulsed in an attack made, meanwhile, on the baggage

But, while the position of the enemy in front was being thus forced, they had completed the circle, and were now attacking the rear of Lord Mark’s small force. In this part of the field a high embankment crossed the road. This embankment the enemy now seized and opened from it a heavy musketry fire. Captain Wilson Jones of the 13th, commanding the company of that regiment which formed the rear guard, at once faced about and charged them. He drove the enemy back, but lost his own life.

Lord Mark leaves the baggage with Major Tyler

Lord Mark’s position was now peculiar. He had pierced the enemy’s centre; the way to Azamgarh lay open to him; on his left, the rebels, terrified by the defeat in the centre, were rapidly falling back; but, on the right, they still menaced him, whilst in his rear the flight of the carmen and drivers had left the baggage exposed. Under these circumstances, Lord Mark, bearing in mind the great object of his expedition, resolved to leave a sufficient force to hold front to the right, whilst he should push on with the

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main body to Azamgarh, rally to himself, and return with any loyal sipahis he might find there, believing that these, on a pinch, would drive the carts.

and moves on Azamgarh

He probably calculated that the enemy, believing themselves threatened by the movement, would be glad to retreat while they could. Sending, then, Major Tyler of the 13th, a cool and capable officer, to command the rear and baggage guards, he pushed forward on the Azamgarh road.

His anticipations were almost immediately realised. The enemy’s left wing, frightened by his forward movement, beat a hasty retreat.

He is rejoined en route by Major Tyler

Then, as if by magic, many of the carters and drivers and mahouts reappeared, and Major Tyler pushed on rapidly after his chief. No further opposition was offered to Lord Mark. A village which had to be traversed, and which might have been easily defended with a few men, was abandoned.

and reaches Azamgarh

The stone bridge across the river leading to the intrenchment was reached at 11 o’clock. This bridge had been rendered impassable by the rebels, and after their flight they still continued to maintain a heavy fire on it. It was repaired under this fire by Lieutenant Colomb, RA., acting under the orders of Lord Mark. As soon as it had been rendered serviceable, Lord Mark sent for the Madras Rifles from the intrenchment, and despatched them to aid in escorting the carts and elephants. They accomplished this task without opposition, and the baggage was brought in in safety.

Credit due to Lord Mark Kerr

This gallant action reflects the greatest credit on the troops and the commander. Lord Mark was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Longden of the 10th Foot and Mr. Venables, the daring indigo-planter, whose previous gallant achievements have brought him more than once before the reader; and no doubt the previous experience of these two gallant men was useful to him. But he was the leader; upon him it depended whether to advance against numbers or to retreat before numbers. Upon his shoulders rested the responsibility, and to him must be accorded the praise. When it was urged upon him by these brave men to abandon the convoy and to make for the intrenchment, he merely replied “Wait a bit: we’ll win yet,” and persevered. The number against whom he contended did not, at the lowest computation, fall short of four thousand men, and probably greatly exceeded it. Against these, deducting his baggage guards, he

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could not put in line more than three hundred men. In the daring, the conduct, and the success of the achievement, Lord Mark Kerr’s relief of Azamgarh may be classed with Vincent Eyre’s relief of Arah.

His prudence equalled his daring

Nor, whilst awarding Lord Mark Kerr this high praise for his daring, can History deny him the not inferior merit of military prudence. The imploring letters he received for immediate aid on his arrival at Sarsana might have induced a less prudent commander to start that night on an errand, the accomplishment of which successfully might well be supposed to depend on the most absolute promptitude. There can be no more tormenting pressure on the mind of a commander than the knowledge that his countrymen within a few miles of him may perish for want of immediate relief; that the few hours of the night, well employed, would bring them that relief; but that prudential considerations compel him not to use those hours. Lord Mark Kerr felt that pressure, and yet had the wisdom to resist it.

State of affairs in Azamgarh

The state of affairs at Azamgarh was bad indeed. Milman’s force, after its precipitate and disastrous retreat, had marched straight into the intrenchments within the gaol, leaving the town to the mercy of the rebels. But these moved so cautiously that the reinforcements of which I have spoken210 were able to enter. Two days later, the rebels occupied the town and beleagured the gaol. Fortunately, this was surrounded by a deep ditch, and Kunwar Singh did not care to risk an assault. He invested the place, and trusted to the effects of famine and an unremitting fire. He even had it in contemplation to blockade the gaol and to march on Banaras, and there cau be no doubt that this programme would have been carried out but for the splendid achievement of Lord Mark Kerr.

Defects in Kunwar Singh’s tactics

The action fought by Lord Mark had cost the British a casualty list large in proportion to the number engaged, eight officers and men being killed and thirty-four severely or dangerously wounded. At such a price the defeat of Kunwar Singh was cheaply purchased. That leader had showed himself greater as a strategist than a tactician. His plan of campaign was admirable,

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but in carrying it into execution he committed many serious errors. Milman gave him a great, an unexpected opportunity. He had that officer at his mercy. When Milman’s men were waiting for their breakfast in the mango grove near Atraulia, it was in the power of Kunwar Singh to cut them off from Azamgarh. He preferred to attack them in front. Then, when he had forced him to fall back, he did not press the pursuit with sufficient vigour. A capable commander would still have cut them off.

Probable cause of his false tactics

Once having seen them housed in Azamgarh, he should have left a portion of his force to blockade them, pressed on with the remainder towards Banaras, and occupied a position in which he could have engaged Lord Mark Kerr with advantage. He had at his disposal, it subsequently transpired, about twelve thousand men. To oppose these the few men led by Lord Mark were alone available. Everything was within his grasp had he dared to stretch out his hand. The chances are that, capable man as he was, he saw all this. But he was not supreme master of the situation. Every petty leader who had brought his contingent to serve under him wished to dictate a programme. The counsels of the rebels tended, then, almost always to a compromise.

I have now recorded the result of the message sent from Azamgarh to Banaras and Allahabad. Another result was produced by the message despatched to Lakhnao. What that was will be narrated when I return to the army still massed in the conquered city.

Footnotes

202. Vide page 94.

203. The exception was Mr. F. M. Bird, the joint magistrate. The circumstances connected with the stay of this gentleman in Gorakhpur will be recorded in the sixth volume.

204. They consisted of the 5th Irregulars and other horsemen who had mutinied, amounting to six hundred. Accompanying them was a large party of marauders, some mounted on ponies, some on foot.

205. Vide page 160.

206. One 12-pounder howitzer, one 6-pounder gun; seventy men, 8th Irregular Cavalry; two hundred and forty-four men, 80th Foot; two hundred and fifty-seven, 17th Madras Native Infantry.

207. Pages 225-8.

208. Chandipur is forty miles to the south-east of Faizabad.

209. “Mon cher Alava, Marmont est perdu.”

210. Vide page 320-1.

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
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