Report of the
DoD Commission on Beirut
International Airport
Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983

20 December 1983

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( B L A N K )

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PREFACE 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
FOREWORD 16
I. THE REPORT 16
  A. ORGANIZATION 16
  B. PHILOSOPHY 17
II. THE COMMISSION 19
  A. CHARTER 19
  B. MEMBERS 20
  C. METHODOLOGY 21
BACKGROUND 24
I. LEBANON OVERVIEW 24
  A. GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY 24
  B. RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FACTIONS 25
II. MAJOR EVENTS 29
  A. JUNE 1982 -- OCTOBER 1983 29
  B. 23 OCTOBER 1983 32
  C. 24 OCTOBER -- 30 NOVEMBER 1983 33

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PART ONE -- THE MILITARY MISSION 35
I. MISSION DEVELOPMENT 35
II. CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 40
III. THE EXPANDING MILITARY ROLE 43
PART TWO -- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 46
I. ROE DEVELOPMENT 46
II. ROE IMPLEMENTATION 50
PART THREE -- THE CHAIN OF COMMAND 55
I. EXERCISE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY BY THE CHAIN OF COMMAND 55
PART FOUR -- INTELLIGENCE 59
I. THE THREAT 59
II. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 65
PART FIVE -- PRE-ATTACK SECURITY 69
I. 24TH MAU/BLT 1-8 HEADQUARTERS COMPOUND 69

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II. BLT HEADQUARTERS BUILDING 71
III. BLT HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS AND SECURITY 75
IV. SECURITY GUARD ORGANIZATION AND EXECUTION 78
V. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE 24TH MAU AND BLT 1/8 PRIOR TO 23 OCTOBER 1983 81
PART SIX -- 23 OCTOBER 1983 84
I. THE TERRORIST ATTACK 84
II. THE AFTERMATH 87
PART SEVEN -- POST-ATTACK SECURITY 89
I. REDEPLOYMENT, DISPERSAL AND PHYSICAL BARRIERS 89
PART EIGHT -- CASUALTY HANDLING 93
I. INTRODUCTION 93
II. ON-SCENE MEDICAL CARE 95
III. AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION/CASUALTY DISTRIBUTION 99
IV. DEFINITIVE MEDICAL CARE 103

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V. ISRAELI OFFER OF ASSISTANCE 105
VI. IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEAD 108
PART NINE -- TERRORISM 111
I. 23 OCTOBER 1983 -- A TERRORIST ACT 111
II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 114
III. TERRORISM AS A MODE OF WARFARE 116
IV. MILITARY PREPAREDNESS 119
PART TEN -- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 122

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PREFACE

On 23 October 1983, a truck laden with the equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed through the perimeter of the compound of the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force at Beirut International Airport, Beirut, Lebanon, penetrated the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters building and detonated. The force of the explosion destroyed the building resulting in the deaths of 241 U.S. military personnel. This report examines the circumstances of that terrorist attack and its immediate aftermath.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport (BIA) Terrorist Act of 23 October 1983 was convened by the Secretary of Defense on 7 November 1983 to conduct an independent inquiry into the 23 October 1983 terrorist attack on the Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon. The Commission examined the mission of the U.S. marines assigned to the Multinational Force, the rules of engagement governing their conduct, the responsiveness of the chain of command, the intelligence support, the security measures in place before and after the attack, the attack itself, and the adequacy of casualty handling procedures.

The Commission traveled to Lebanon, Israel, Spain, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, interviewed over 125 witnesses ranging from national policy makers to Lebanese Armed Forces privates, and reviewed extensive documentation from Washington agencies, including the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as all echelons of the operational chain of command and certain elements of the Department of the Navy administrative chain of command.

The Commission focused on the security of the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force through 30 November 1983. Although briefed on some security aspects of other U.S. military elements in Lebanon, the Commission came to no definitive conclusions or recommendations as to those elements.

The Commission was composed of Admiral Robert L.J. Long, USN (Ret), Chairman; the Honorable Robert J. Murray; Lieutenant General Lawrence F. Snowden, USMC, (Ret), Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr, USAF, (Ret), and Lieutenant General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr, USA.

Background

U.S. military forces were inserted into Lebanon on 29 September 1982 as part of a Multinational Force composed of U.S., French, Italian and, somewhat later, British Forces. The mission of the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force (USMNF) was to establish an environment that would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese Government and the

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Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in establishing sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area. Initially, the USMNF was warmly welcomed by the local populace. The environment was essentially benign and continued that way into the spring of 1983. The operation was intended to be of short duration.

The destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983 was indicative of the extent of the deterioration of the political/military situation in Lebanon that had occurred since the arrival of the USMNF. By August 1983, the LAF were engaged in direct conflict with factional militias and USMNF positions at Beirut International Airport began receiving hostile fire. Attacks against the Multinational Force in the form of car bombs and sniper fire increase din frequency. By September, the LAF were locked in combat for control of the high ground overlooking Beirut International Airport and U.S. Naval gunfire was used in support of the LAF at Suq-Al-Gharb after determination by the National Security Council that LAF retention of Suq-Al-Gharb was essential to the security of USMNF positions at Beirut International Airport.

Intelligence support for the USMNF provided a broad spectrum of coverage of possible threats. Between May and November 1983, over 100 intelligence reports warning of terrorist car bomb attacks were received by the USMNF. Those warnings provided little specific information on how and when a threat might be carried out. From August 1983 to the 23 October attack, the USMNF was virtually flooded with terrorist attack warnings.

On 23 October 1983, a large truck laden with the explosive equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed through the perimeter of the USMNF compound at Beirut International Airport, penetrated the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters building and detonated. The force of the explosion destroyed the building, resulting in the deaths of 241 U.S. military personnel.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Forensic Laboratory described the terrorist bomb as the largest conventional blast ever seen by the FBI's forensic explosive experts. Based upon the FBI analysis of the bomb that destroyed the U.S. Embassy on 18 April 1983, and the FBI preliminary findings on the bomb used on 23 October 1983, the Commission believes that the explosive equivalent of the latter device was of such magnitude that major damage to the

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Battalion Landing Team Headquarters building and significant casualties would probably have resulted even if the terrorist truck had not penetrated the USMNF defensive perimeter but had detonated in the roadway some 330 feet from the building.

Summary of General Observations.

1. Terrorism.

The Commission believes that the most important message it can bring to the Secretary of Defense is that the 23 October 1983 attack on the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters in Beirut was tantamount to an act of war using the medium of terrorism. Terrorist warfare, sponsored by sovereign states or organized political entities to achieve political objectives, is a threat to the United States that is increasing at an alarming rate. The 23 October catastrophe underscores the fact that terrorist warfare can have significant political impact and demonstrates that the United States, and specifically the Department of Defense, is inadequately prepared to deal with this threat. much needs to be done, on an urgent basis, to prepare U.S. military forces to defend against and counter terrorist warfare.

2. Performance of the USMNF.

The USMNF was assigned the unique and difficult task of maintaining a peaceful presence in an increasingly hostile environment. United States military personnel assigned or attached to the USMNF performed superbly, incurring great personal risk to accomplish their assigned tasks. in the aftermath of the attack of 23 October 1983, U.S. military personnel performed selfless and often heroic acts to assist in the extraction of their wounded and dead comrades from the rubble and to evacuate the injured. The Commission has the highest admiration for the manner in which U.S. military personnel responded to this catastrophe.

3. Security following the 23 October 1983 Attack.

The security posture of the USMNF subsequent to the 23 October 1983 attack was examined closely by the Commission. A series of actions was initiated by the chain of command to enhance the security of the USMNF, and reduce the vulnerability of the USMNF to further catastrophic losses. However, the security measures implemented or planned for implementation as of 30 November 1983 were not adequate to

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prevent continuing significant attrition of USMNF personnel.

4. Intelligence Support.

Even the best of intelligence will not guarantee the security of any military position. However, specific data on the terrorist threats to the USMNF, data which could best be provided by carefully trained intelligence agents, could have enabled the USMNF Commander to better prepare his force and facilities to blunt the effectiveness of a suicidal vehicle attack of great explosive force.

The USMNF commander did not have effective U.S. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) support. The paucity of U.S. controlled HUMINT is partly due to U.S. policy decisions to reduce HUMINT collection worldwide. The U.S. has a HUMINT capability commensurate with the resources ad time that has been spent to acquire it. The lesson of Beirut is that we must have better HUMINT to support military planning and operations. We see here a critical repetition of a long line of similar lessons learned during crisis situations in many other parts of the world.

5. Casualty Handling Procedures.

The Commission examined the adequacy of casualty handling procedures, with the advice and support of professional medical staff.

The Commission found that, following the initial, understandable confusion, the response of the U.S., Lebanese and Italian personnel in providing immediate on-scene medical care was professional and, indeed, heroic. The CTF 61/62 Mass Casualty Plan was quickly implemented: triage and treatment sites were established ashore, and medical support from afloat units was transported to the scene. Evacuation aircraft were requested.

Within thirty minutes of the explosion the British offered the use of their hospital at the Royal Air Force Base in Akrotiri, Cyprus, and this offer was accepted by CTF 61. The additional British offer of medical evacuation aircraft was also accepted. Both offers proved invaluable.

Offers of medical assistance from France and Israel were subsequently received but were deemed unnecessary because the medical capabilities organic to CTF 61 were already operational and functioning adequately, the hospital at Akrotiri was by then mobilized and ready, and sufficient U.S. and Royal Air Force medical evacuation aircraft were

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enroute. The Commission found no evidence to indicate any considerations but the desire to provide immediate, professional treatment for the wounded influenced decisions regarding these offers to outside assistance.

The Commission found no evidence to indicate that deaths among the wounded in action resulted from inadequate or inappropriate care during evacuation to hospitals.

The Commission did find several serious problem areas in the evacuation of casualties to U.S. military hospitals in Germany. Actions were taken that resulted in some seriously wounded patients being delayed about four hours in arriving at hospital facilities. The Commission believes that these actions warrant further investigation. The Commission found no evidence, however, that any patient was adversely affected by these delays.

6. Accountability.

The Commission holds the view that military commanders are responsible for the performance of their subordinates. The commander can delegate some or all of his authority to his subordinates, but he cannot delegate his responsibility for the performance of the forces he commands. In that sense, the responsibility of military commands is absolute. This view of command authority and responsibility guided the Commission in its analysis of the effectiveness of the exercise of command authority and responsibility of the chain of command charged with the security and performance of the USMNF.

The Commission found that the combination of a large volume of unfulfilled threat warnings and perceived and real pressure to accomplish a unique and difficult mission contributed significantly to the decisions of the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Commanders regarding the security of their force. nevertheless, the Commission found that the security measures in effect in the MAU compound were neither commensurate with the increasing level of threat confronting the UMSNF nor sufficient to preclude catastrophic losses such as those that were suffered on the morning of 23 October 1983. The Commission further found that while it may have appeared to be an appropriate response to the indirect fire being received, the decision to billet approximately one-quarter of the BLT in a single structure contributed to the catastrophic loss of life.

The Commission found that the BLT Commander must take

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responsibility for the concentration of approximately 350 members of his command in the BLT Headquarters building thereby providing a lucrative target for attack. Further, the BLT Commander modified prescribed alert procedures, thereby degrading security of the compound.

The Commission also found that the MAU Commander shares the responsibility for the catastrophic losses in that he condoned the concentration of personnel in the BLT Headquarters building, concurred in the relaxation of prescribed alert procedures, and emphasized safety over security in directing that sentries on Posts 4, 5, 6, and 7 would not load their weapons.

The Commission found further that the USCINCEUR operational chain of command shares in the responsibility for the events of 23 October 1983.

Having reached the foregoing conclusions, the Commission further notes that although it found the entire USCINCEUR chain of command, down to and including the BLT Commander, to be at fault, it also found that there was a series of circumstances beyond the control of these commanders that influenced their judgement and their actions relating to the security of the USMNF.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

All conclusions and recommendations of the Commission from each substantial part of this report are presented below.

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Transcribed for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation
22 October 2001