INTRODUCTION

At about 6:21 on the morning of Sunday, October 23, 1983, a heavy truck, loaded with explosives, entered a parking lot at Beirut International Airport, adjacent to the U.S. Marine Corps compound. The truck came within a few feet of a concertina wire barrier, which divided the public portion of the lot from the marine compound, before it was observed by a surprised sentry. It crashed through the wire, across the marine portion of the parking lot, through an open gate in a fence and traveled about 450 feet before it rammed into the building that housed the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU). During those few second, the sentries, whose weapons were not loaded, were unable to take any action to stop the truck. The truck detonated immediately. The building was destroyed and 220 U.S. marines, 18 sailors and 3 soldiers housed there were killed in the ensuing explosion.

On November 1 the Committee on Armed Services initiated hearings to examine the disaster at Beirut. The purposes of that examination, as outlined in the statement of the chairman, were to determine: (1) what are the U.S. policy objectives in Lebanon; (2) how does the marine mission contribute to those objectives; and (3) whether the risks to the marines were adequately assessed and whether adequate precautions were taken to counter them.

The full committee held two days of hearings during which it heard from the Honorable G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery; General Paul X. Kelley, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, accompanied by Brigadier General James Mead and Captain Lewis Mantel, U.S. Navy; Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, accompanied by Robert Dillon, former Ambassador to Lebanon; and Gordon E. Harvey, Deputy Director, Office of Security, Department of State. At the conclusion of those hearings, the chairman directed the Investigations Subcommittee to complete the inquiry.

On November 10 a delegation from the Investigations Subcommittee proceeded to Beirut to examine the scene and to take testimony from witnesses who survived the explosion. In two days of hearings aboard the U.S.S. Iwo Jima, the delegation took testimony from Captain Morgan France, USN, Commander Task Force 61, which consists of Navy elements and the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit; Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, Commander, 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (also referred to as Task Force 62); Alan O. Bigler, Security Officer, U.S. Embassy, Beirut; Commander Richard Balzer, USN, Medical COrps, and Lieutenant Frazer Henderson, USN, Medical Corps, medical officers, U.S.S. Iwo Jima; Corporal Kenneth Farnan, USMC; Lance Corporal Henry Linkkila, USMC;

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Lance Corporal Eddie DiFranco, USMC; Lance Corporal John W. Berthiaume, USMC; Corpsman Michael Arau, USN; and Corpsman Donald Davidson, USN.

On December 8 and 9 the Investigations Subcommittee held additional hearings in Washington, D.C. The witnesses during those hearings were: Honorable Philip Habib, former Special Envoy to the Middle East; Honorable Robert S. Dillon, former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon; four witnesses from the National Security Agency; Mr. John W. Hicks, Section Chief, Scientific Analysis Section, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Mr. Jack Perkins, Legislative Counsel, Officer of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice; Lance Corporal Robert Calhoun, USMC; Lance Corporal Burnham Matthews, USMC; Corporal Joseph Martucci, USMC; Brigadier General James M. Mead, former Commanding Officer, 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit, USMC; and 1st Lieutenant Greg Balzer, USMC.

On December 14 and 15, the subcommittee took testimony from: Aviation Electronics Technician Talmadge Edward Lea, U.S. Navy; 1st Leiutenant Glenn L. Wagner, U.S. Marine Corps; Captain France, Colonel Geraghty, Petty Officer Kenneth Wayne Densmore, U.S. Navy; General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General Bernard Rogers, USA, Commander in Chief, European Command.

All witnesses who testified during the subcommittee hearings provided sworn testimony.

On the basis of the hearings, the subcommittee submits the following report.

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Figure 1
  1. Battalion Landing Team building (BLT)

  2. Marine Amphibious Unit headquarters (MAU)

  3. Marine Service Support Group (MSSG)

  4. Airport Access Highway

  5. LAF checkpoint

  6. Bomber's possible route, according to Col. Geraghty

  7. Trans Mediterranean Airlines (TMA)

  8. TMA access road

  9. Guard Posts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5A, 6 & 7 numbered counterclockwise starting with post to northeast of MAU

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