Objective, Policy, Mission, Circumstances:
Something Has Changed

In outlining the committee's concerns at the initial full committee hearing, prior to turning over to the investigations Subcommittee, the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services said in his opening statement, "Inevitably the security of the marines is tied to the mission that they are assigned to carry out and inevitably, therefore, we have to ask what are U.S. policy objectives in Lebanon and how does the marine mission contribute to those objectives."

The subcommittee, in this report, has extensively discussed the mission of the marines and how that mission was interpreted. However, because of the extensive time required to attempt to establish exactly what happened on October 23, and to assess whether precautions taken before then were adequate to meet security requirements, and because the broader question of overall U.S. policy objectives in lebanon goes beyond the purview of this committee, the subcommittee has not conducted an in-depth review of broad U.S. policy toward Lebanon and is not making detailed, specific findings or recommendations on that policy.

The subcommittee, however, feels constrained to make some comments.

It is worth recalling that when the marines first went into Beirut it was for a limited purpose. After successfully completing that mission--safeguarding the PLO withdrawal--the marines withdrew on September 10, 1982. When they were reinserted on September 29, 1982, following the assassination of Lebanon's President-elect Bashir Gemayel and the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, the President of the United States, in his notification to the Speaker of the House, under the War Powers Act, described the marine mission as follows:

To provide an interposition force at agreed locations and, thereby, provide multinational force presence requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

The mandate agreed upon by the nations making up the Multinational Force states:

The Multinational Forces are to assure the safety of persons in the area and to bring to an end the violence that has tragically recurred.

The mission statement issued by the military chain of command at the time set out the mission thusly:

To establish environment which will permit Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibility in Beirut area.

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According to testimony, that mission statement has never been changed and officials at various hearings went to considerable length to stress that the mission has not changed or, in some cases, that U.S. policy has not changed. Clearly, there are semantic difficulties with such an assertion.

It is well to remember that, when the MNF was first reintroduced into Beirut, there was no fighting taking place. The testimony of marine commanders emphasizes that, at the time, the mission required showing a presence and taking a neutral, even-handed approach with the various factions in lebanese society. Clearly, the marines believe they did this at first; clearly, they concede they are unable to show much visible presence now.

The method of carrying out the mission included frequent patrolling, participation in civil improvement programs, and helping rescue people trapped by a snow storm. Initially, the marines went to considerable length to avoid appearing too close to the Israelis.

The location of the marine position was chosen originally with regard to where the Israelis were, and taking in to account the "low order of threat" at the time.

Things changed. The beginning of fighting prevented patrolling. When the cease-fire came in late September, conditions did not allow resumption of patrolling or other peacekeeping activities. The Israelis are gone now from the Beirut area and the threat is certainly no longer of a low order.

When the marines began to return fire, that was a change of conditions--and, perhaps equally important in that complex part of the world, a change in perceptions.

In meetings with members of the committee before October 23, officers sent to exquisite length to point out that the Rules of Engagement were not changed to allow the naval gunfire of Suq el-Gharb. But an "interpretation" of the Rules of Engagement was approved consistent with the exigencies of the moment.

Semantics. Something changed. The use of U.S. firepower to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)--to save it, some maintained--was a profound change and obviously made a profound difference in the perception some religious factions had of the U.S. position.

The bombing of the embassy in April, the Gemayel government agreement with Israel in May, the assistance to the LAF, the outbreak of fighting in September, the use of offshore firepower--particularly, as mentioned, the naval gunfire in support of the LAF at Suq el-Gharb in September--all changed the perception of Moslem groups, and changed what the marines could do. Colonel Geraghty said the firing on Suq el-Gharb was "a departure from our neutral peacekeeping role."

There should be in the minds of policymakers a clear relationship between objectives, the policies designed to reach those objectives, the plans developed to implement the policies, the missions called for by those plans, and the method used to carry out a mission. And the relationship should be visible.

Good planning takes contingencies into account and is adaptable to changing conditions or unexpected developments.

We have a right to ask what contingency plans were developed at the time the marines were inserted into Beirut, and have they

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been of any use? If the marines were not there now, would they be inserted under present conditions? More to the point, would the decision to insert the marines still have been affirmative if the breakdown between religious factions had been anticipated?

The use of U.S. air and naval firepower, the exchange of fire with the Syrians, the new agreement for closer military cooperation with Israel, obviously, all contribute to altering the equation.

We should keep in mind that by law the deployment of the marines is limited to 18 months--until spring of 1985. Yet, administration spokesmen state that the marines will stay there until all foreign forces are out of Lebanon. Is there really strong belief among policymakers that the Syrians will be out of Lebanon in 18 months? Does such a hope justify almost certain further marine casualties?

One administration witness stated in the initial hearings of this inquiry that taking the marines out of Lebanon would mean the collapse of our entire Middle East policy. Does the success of our policy really depend on a deadly deployment of marines who weren't even there two years ago?

Sustained deployment of American personnel in a situation of certain further casualties is a grave, moral choice for policymakers: a choice in which the Congress must ultimately share. Such a choice should be made only if the policy objectives are visible, profoundly important and clearly obtainable.

Objectives, policy, mission, conditions--something ha changed. The subcommittee urges, in the strongest terms, that the administration seriously review the policy in Lebanon and the place of the marine mission in that policy. The failure of the administration to adequately reexamine its policy and relate it to present conditions will only mean that such reexamination will have to be done by the Congress.

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