Additional Views of Hon. Richard Ray

The hearings by the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations was a painful assignment, but it was absolutely necessary.

The Subcommittee had an obligation, both on behalf of the families of the 240 Marines who lost their lives in the terrorist truck bomb attack, and on behalf of those presently serving, to determine if errors in judgment had been made which compromised the security of the Marine B.L.T.

The environment into which the Administration decided to send our Marines as a peacekeeping force was known for its violent hostilities which were a way of life in that part of the world:

The rules of engagement were specifically stated: to show the flag, to be as neutral as possible, but to defend themselves when fired upon.

The rules and regulations of the so-called "Marine Bible" are equally specific as to what steps should be undertaken when hostilities occur, providing in detail for the protection of our Marines.

My personal visit to the Marine B.L.T. on September 23rd, along with nine other members of the Armed Services Committee delegation, was disturbing.

Hostilities were evident. Shells were coming out of the Shouf Mountains, and exploding in the city a short distance away. Small arms fire apparently directed at the B.L.T. could be heard whistling over our heads.

Several hundred Marines were quartered in the headquarters building at the airport, which was a masonry structure. Other hundreds were encamped on the surrounding grounds in temporary tents and shelters. ,p. The Marine compound was exposed and not protected by heavy artillery. Gates were open and there were no deterrents such as stakes, tank traps, or concrete barriers. There were only Marine sentries standing guard with M-16 rifles.

One Congressman remarked that, "there wasn't enough security to keep a herd of cattle out."

--(73)--

It appeared that the danger and risk was not being treated as seriously as simple hindsight would have dictated, despite the fact that terrorists were or had been in the area.

More than 100 car-bomb threats had been received against the B.L.T. Several senior officers up the chain of command had visited and had not provided recommendations to strengthen security.

The Marine Commander himself had no restrictions on providing security needed and testified personally to this fact.

Subsequently, the success of the mission was jeopardized by the terrorist tragedy, which threw the mission into an escalated "fight back, retaliatory, posture" endangering the neutrality of the mission.

The five-ton Mercedes truck might not have penetrated double rows of concrete barriers, crawled out of a tank trap ditch or survived an anti-tank blast, had we used hindsight and foresight combined, to expect the unexpected.

If indeed Marine Commandant P.X. Kelley's observation, "nothing on God's earth could have stopped that truck" is true, all of our consciences would be easier today if it had run into at least the above-described obstacles before snuffing out the lives of 240 of America's finest.

I commend the Subcommittee on the difficult task which it was assigned, and I concur completely with the report and its findings.

Richard Ray.

--(74)--

Table of Contents
Previous Section ** Next Section


Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation