Dissenting and Additional Views of
Hon. Rob Stump, Hon. Daniel B. Crane and Hon. David O'B. Martin

The presence of the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) in Lebanon as part of a Multinational Force with the French, Italian and the British might be one of the most difficult assignments the Marine Corps, or any other military unit, has been given.

The mission was, and continues to be, presence, notwithstanding that it has been described in varying ways by many news reports and individuals including the President of the United States.

The mission of the American contingent as part of the Multinational Force was described by the President of the United States as follows in his notification to the Speaker of the House under the War Powers Act:

To provide an interposition force at agreed locations and, thereby, provide multinational force presence requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

We say it might well be one of the most difficult assignments because, in performing the mission, the MAU commander constantly had to weigh the method of accomplishing the mission (presence) with the threats that were perceived or became apparent since September, 1982. Those threats changed significantly over the 13 months preceding the bombing of October 23, 1983, WHILE THE MISSION REMAINED PRECISELY THE SAME.

The Investigations Subcommittee report accurately, and in chronological order, states the threats to the MAU and how each threat was neutralized, from the series of clashes with the Israelis to the artillery fire from the mountains, to the snipers, and to the car bomb attacks on the American convoys and patrols. The crux of the investigation was to find the facts surrounding the tragic terrorist attack on the compound October 23, 1983, and to affix culpability, if any, for the incident. We dissent from the majority in affixing culpability to the MAU and amphibious operation commanders.

We agree that all in the chain of command must be held responsible. By definition, commanders are responsible for all that occurs or fails to occur in their command. In fact, all of those in the chain of command who gave testimony, from Colonel Geraghty up through General Rogers, concede their responsibility and accept it. Culpability is quite another matter. To determine culpability one must first keep in mind the mission given the American contingent and, in the interest of simply fairness, also keep in mind that the commanders on the scene, in the days leading up to October 23, did not have the benefit of 20-20 hindsight or the luxury of Monday morning quarterbacking.

--(76)--

Only with hindsight do we feel the field commanders can be faulted for failing to perceive and protect against a threat of the nature and magnitude of the successful terrorist attack of October 23rd.

Just prior the terrorist attack, the prime threat the unit focused on was the continuous bombardment by artillery, rockets and mortars upon the Marine positions. The field commanders had taken precautions guarding against casualties from this threat, including billeting the marines, soldiers and sailors in the BLT building, which the evidence supports was the most protective structure in the area of responsibility assigned to and available to them.

There is little doubt in our minds that, had the ground commanders dispersed their troops as much as possible and suffered the almost inevitable casualties that would have resulted from the threat perceived as primary at the time (artillery, etc.), in retrospect some would have faulted the commander for failure to use the BLT to safeguard the troops. It appears the ground commanders were in a "damned if they do, damned if they don't," Catch-22 position.

In 20-20 hindsight, some have argued the marines ought to have anticipated the kind of attack that was carried out on October 23 and prepared adequate defenses against it. Others point out that the marines were on a diplomatic mission rather than a combat mission and also point out that the intelligence reports did not provide specific warnings of possible terrorist attacks of this origin or magnitude. The 20-20 hindsight condemnation of the marines' security is not so clear when viewed in conjunction with the successful terrorist attack on the Israeli position in Tyre, Lebanon, on November 4, 1983, just 10 days after the attacks on the French and the Americans a few miles north in Beirut on October 23.

The Israelis are not, nor have they been, limited in their preparedness or actions by a mission described as "presence." In fact, the Israeli's very existence has been challenged and their country and forces in the Middle East attacked and continually terrorized. The concentration by the Israelis on intelligence in that part of the world is necessary for their survival on a day-to-day basis. Yet--given the experience of the Israelis in dealing with terrorist threats over the years, their extensive intelligence capabilities and many of the same defenses which the marines, in retrospect, were criticized for not having--on November 4, 10 days after the American and French attacks, a carbon copy attack was successfully carried out against the Israelis.

We seek in no way to minimize or remove from the shoulders of all the commanders in the chain of command the responsibility they have for all that occurs or fails to occur within their respective commands. However, to assign culpability,k for not defending against this specific type of attack, to those who did not have the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, while remembering that the mission had not changed although the conditions had changed drastically, is unfair. It is admittedly difficult, if not impossible, to carry out the mission of presence as assigned without exposing the force to significant danger of casualties. The record is replete with efforts by the commanders to alter methods of operation to provide safety for those in their command while still attempting to perform the mission assigned which was, and is, presence.

--(77)--

Much ahs been said both in the hearing and in the media concerning the fact that sentries on duty in the compound, while having ammunition with them, did not have magazines in their weapons. A great deal of testimony was taken in this regard concerning the efforts of the commanders to balance the need for security with the danger of accidental discharge of weapons causing injuries to marines and innocent bystanders. Indeed, the testimony shows numerous injures suffered by marines from accidental discharges--injuries to friendly forces--and, subsequent to October 23, the accidental discharge of an antitank weapon into the Beirut airport tower, as well as an incident where innocent press members were fired upon and injured by marine guards.

Notwithstanding the obvious danger, we feel that weapons of the sentries on duty should be loaded at all times. We make this criticism knowing that, in the future, whether in Lebanon or elsewhere, there will be injuries to friendlies as a result of this policy and that in so stating, we will have to share the responsibility for such accidental injuries. But, the security of American forces, wherever they are, must be paramount. Also, in making this criticism, we take no consolation in the fact that none of the testimony given would indicate, nor in conversation with other members of the committee ha it been suggested, that had the sentries' weapons been loaded as were the Israelis', the result would probably have been the same, given the size and speed of the vehicle, the determination of the suicidal driver and the enormous power of the bomb.

We feel another point must be made. Terrorist attacks of the kind the Multinational Force suffered on October 23 in Beirut and other attacks of the recent past--most noteworthy, those at the embassy in Kuwait, the busy department store in London, the Navy recruiting center on Long Island, and the Capitol in Washington, D.C.--will continue throughout the world until such time as the leaders of the civilized world put aside their differences and act in a unified and effective way to curb terrorism. It is impossible to secure our persons and property against individual wanton acts, but we must insure that severe sanctions will be directed at the sources of terrorism.

David O'B. Martin.
Bob Stump.

--(78)--

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