Visibility Versus Security

THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION

The marine units at the Beirut International Airport interpreted their mission of "presence" to require "visibility"--high visibility--and they felt that "security"--their security--often conflicted with the requirement for visibility.

This conflict lay at the center of many of the decisions made by the marine that led to inadequate security and laid the marine compound open to the kamikaze attack that was to come on October 23, 1983.

The origin of this attitude that visibility took precedence over security remains obscure. The subcommittee did establish that the attitude was not forced on the marines by the embassy in Beirut.

The MAU commanders--General James Mead at the beginning of the mission and Colonel Timothy Geraghty at the time of the bombing--did not argue that the attitude was forced upon them. In fact, they argued forcefully on behalf of high visibility even now. It appears that the marine commanders, recognizing correctly that their mission was primarily political and not a traditional military one, determined to be more diplomatic than the diplomats.

General Mead, the commander of the first MAU in Beirut, made the point before the subcommittee. he said, "I am concerned if you go into a mole-like atmosphere and dig deep and don't go out amongst the population, I am concerned about morale and concerned about the accomplishment of the mission."

When Representative Ray indicated he did not understand why the marines did not assume the worst, given the volatile environment in Beirut, General Mead replied, "Because you cannot go accomplish your mission."

Asked directly if visibility and security conflicted, General Mead responded, "Yes, they are extremely difficult at times. They can tend to be mutually exclusive."

He argued, however, that there was no absolute level of security granted the mission; rather security needed to be adjusted in light of the changing threat. "Now, it is obvious to say, is there too much visibility? In light of what? The increased artillery threat, increased terrorism threat? Now you start moderating it. So, you have to look at it by snapshots and various elements of time."

Colonel Geraghty made the same point. "It is a balance of carrying out the mission at the same time as providing the security. And that is what you are constantly weighing."

His concern was that the marines appear neither fearful for their safety nor like an occupation force lording it over the natives. Colonel Geraghty testified that he was concerned not to give an impression "that we were cowering, particularly with the shelling. I was very adamant that we maintain our visibility."

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In response to a question a to why he did not put up berms (barriers of dirt) or take other major security precautions, Colonel Geraghty said, "It was a balance really in judgment on what we could do, what we should do, and at the same time not giving the appearance of being an occupation force."

It is obvious from their testimony that the commanders were concerned not to project the image of a combat force on a combat mission. As General Mead said, "You were told to create an environment. You know, obviously you had to be seen to do that, because the people had to have the feeling of well-being with which they would not use their arms and their militia." He believed the increased visibility of the marines increased the perception of the Moslem population that the force was pro-Lebanese rather than pro-Christian, and thus had the effect of reducing the amount of fire from that quarter. On the other hand, he thought that if he wanted physical security "in the realm of dirt and bunkers, to stay away from them, you will get physical security in that, but probably get increased fire."

ISSUE OF INTERFERENCE

While the marines always had to be conscious of the political and diplomatic nature of their mission, there was no evidence that anybody, either on the military side or the diplomatic side, interfered with any security measures they wished to take.

The diplomatic witnesses were emphatic in testifying that the political nature of the mission had not placed any constraints on the mission in establishing security measures. Ambassador Habib said, "I never had a discussion with any marine commander, at any level, in which he said to me our security is threatened by virtue of political requirements on us."

Asked if he thought the marine mission would be harmed by higher security, Habib testified, "As far as I would argue, or be aware, it would not have impaired the diplomatic mission. I was very careful about two things when I was in that part of the world. I didn't try to be a general--not even a colonel--and I didn't try to be the ambassador to Lebanon. I was very careful to know where my turf was."

Asked specifically if a tank ditch would "send a signal" that the marine presence had changed, Habib said, "Not that I am aware of."

Ambassador Dillon, the American envoy to Lebanon, reacted similarly. Asked if he ever vetoed any security requests from the Marines, he answered flatly, "No."

Representative Mavroules then asked him, "Do you have any idea of where the sense on the part of the marines that to hunker down or put up dirt barricades or various tank traps--where the idea came that somehow that conflicted with or somehow eroded the mission?" [HyperWar: Note that nowhere have the subcommittee's investigators produced any claim of interference. What motivates this effort to disprove a proposition never introduced? God forbid the Marines should be able to see the obvious for themselves!]

Ambassador Dillon replied, "I say, honestly, I am surprised at that. Maybe this is something I simply missed, but I don't know where that came from. I feel sure it never came up in any of my conversations with senior marine officers." At another time he

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said, "I do not think it (high visibility) really had a bearing on their posture." [Hmmmmm. "Invisible presence" having such an obvious utility...]

General Bernard Rogers, commander-in-chief of the European command, also said he knew of no instance where any request of the marines for improvement of their security at the airport had been overruled by any superior headquarters in the chain of command. He added that he was also unaware of any political constraints or restraints that might have been imposed on the marines.

In tipping the scales in favor of visible presence, the ground commanders were remiss in carrying out an aspect of their mission: "Be prepared to protect U.S. forces." General Rogers testified that the construction of berms, tank ditches and other protective measures would not have been inconsistent with the presence mission. He emphasized that the responsibility of the commander to protect his troops "was not only implicit in this mission, but was spelled out in the Rules of Engagement to ensure that there was no question about it."

The marines were provided with a broad mission statement and were allowed considerable latitude in their interpretation of it. The subcommittee found no evidence to suggest that they requested any assistance, either from their military superiors, or the diplomatic service, in determining precisely what the mission required. They acted as though they understood it fully and also appeared to have no doubt that they were executing it properly.

The subcommittee found that the marine commandant, General P.X. Kelley, who testified that the presence mission "militated against" the tactical deployment of the marines in Beirut, as well as the two ground commanders who testified, considered the prime requirement of the mission was a demonstration of visible presence.

While that decision might have been valid during the early months in Beirut, circumstances had changed and the atmosphere became more hostile. The bombing of the U.S. embassy on April 18, 1983, should have given warning that terrorism directed at the United States was a fully emerged threat. Likewise, the outbreak of hostilities at Suq el-Gharb in September 1983 should have dictated a review of the visibility requirement and the adequacy of previous measures for security of the battalion. The several actions of the United States, which were perceived by Moslems as a shift to a pro-Christian stance, should also have dictated a reassessment of the visibility posture, which should have been determined by those who made the decisions at all levels. (Refer to later section on the chain of command for more details.)

Despite those signals of a rapidly deteriorating situation, the commanders on the scene failed to tilt the balance in favor of increased security. [HyperWar: And, of course, the Congressmen and women, who visited the Marines in Beirut on a regular basis, were on top of this; as well as requiring an updated mission statement from the President (who had promised in the beginning that the Marines would not engage in combat!)]

THE PROBLEM OF GEOGRAPHY

One problem the marines faced was the result of their being in the middle of an operating airport. They were in the middle of a triangle with buildings used by the airport on two sides; only the third side was clear. The airport access highway ran down one side

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of their compound, just 100 feet from the side of the BLT building. Another road through the north end of their encampment was needed by employees of one firm to reach their hangers and offices.

Colonel Geraghty pointed to the geography as a second reason--beyond the conflict between security and visibility--for the level of security at the marine compound. "I dare say that if I put a barricade of the nature to stop around the complex there at BIA (Beirut International Airport), you are talking about a major construction job to isolate yourself in that kind of location, which was virtually impossible."

The subcommittee found problems with the logic of this. To begin with, there was no requirement that the force remain in the buildings in the middle of the airport. General Mead testified that he picked those building--at a time when there was a minimal threat--simply because they were available.

Colonel Geraghty himself said there was no requirement to remain in those buildings and that "it would reduce the vulnerability for us to move south of the terminal."

[HyperWar: The simple existence of the "increased threat" changed the nature of the mission. Recall that, when they first landed, the Marines were welcomed by all factions as neutral peacekeepers. Over time, the Administration abandoned that position to side exclusively with the so-called government of Lebanon in a civil war; arming the LAF, resupplying them with munitions during offensives against Shiite areas, and, by the time of the bombing, supplying artillery and naval gunfire support. Why does this "investigation" not include testimony from Congressional policy-makers and the National Command Authority explaining why the Marines were still anywhere in Lebanon--north, south, or east of the airport?.

EMBASSY SECURITY VERSUS MARINE SECURITY

More to the point, however, was the dramatic difference between security at the interim U.S. embassy in downtown Beirut and security at the MAU compound at the airport. After the kamikaze car bombing at the U.S. embassy, major changes were made in security. Marines from the MAU were rotated to the embassy to provide perimeter security. A new set of Rules of Engagement expressly for the embassy were written at the request of the ambassador and approved by the chain of command. The rules were much more military that the rules that applied at the marine compound. But the message detailing them expressly stated twice: "The following modifications apply only to embassy security functions." The subcommittee highlights three differences:

  1. At the MAU, the marines assigned to guard posts in the parking lot did not have magazines in their rifles because Colonel Geraghty was fearful of accidental discharge in the direction of the airport terminal. (Six of his own men had been wounded by accidental discharges.) By contrast, the marine sentries at the interim embassy had loaded weapons, despite the fact that civilian buildings were all around them.

  2. At the embassy, half of the Corniche--the major Beirut city highway that runs along the seafront--was partly closed (the west-bound lanes closest were blocked.) No similar action was taken with the airport access highway that ran beside the BLT building with only a commercial fence of iron stakes intervening. (After the BLT bombing, the northbound lanes closest to the no-longer existing BLT building were closed, while at the embassy the entire Corniche in front of the complex was closed to traffic.)

  3. At the MAU compound, vehicles that once used to block the gate between the parking lot and the BLT building had been removed. At the embassy amphibious assault vehicles with machine-guns were installed in May to block anyone trying to make a run for the building.

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The subcommittee was disturbed to find more intensive security measures at the embassy than at the airport. In fairness, there is a judgment call here. General Mead, asked specifically if security at the embassy was not greater than at the MAU, answered flatly, "No. sir."

Colonel Geraghty, however, indicated that he recognized that security was greater at the embassy:

The difference is that, when we talk about the U.S. Embassy or the Duraffourd Building (another structure used by the embassy), you are talking about a seige structure where we can take and put formidable barricades, and we did put armored vehicles around there to close half the Corniche. But we are talking about a relatively small area.

Later he contrasted the embassy with the airport complex:

We are talking of an area of approaching vehicles, thousands of meters, of which I had forces stretched all around, compounded by the problem of a very large civilian traffic in that proximity.

The subcommittee understands that the MAU compound was somewhat larger than the embassy compound, but the arguments about the volume of traffic (a) apply identically at the embassy, and (b) were precisely the reason security was beefed up at the embassy.

Furthermore, antitank weapons were available at the embassy, but not to the sentrys at the MAU compound. Asked why, Colonel Geraghty replied, "I have to go back to the mission and where we were located. You can't really use sophisticated antitank weapons in an urban environment." The colonel repeatedly defined the airport complex as an "urban" environment.

The subcommittee cannot agree that the MAU compound was in a more urban environment than the embassy. The subcommittee does understand, however, that what was at work here was a response to an obvious threat. The embassy had been the victim of a car bomb. It was especially attuned to that threat and willing to take extraordinary measures to prevent a recurrence. The MAU did not enjoy, or suffer from, the victim reaction syndrome. Still, the threat was by no means unique. The kamikaze attack on the U.S. embassy was the second and perhaps the third such bombing in Lebanon. The Iraqi embassy had been hit in December 1981 by a suicide bomber and an Israeli headquarters in southern Lebanon was widely believed to have been so attacked in November 1982, although the Israeli military later said the building was leveled by an explosive resulting from a gas leak. There was, thus, more than a little warning.

LINE FROM VISIBILITY TO BOMBING

The issue is not what the marines could do. The issue is the limitations allegedly intrinsic to the mission. General Mead said he had "full authority" to take any security precautions he chose. [HyperWar: Including withdrawing from this war-torn country where there was no peace to keep?] "I could have put tanks in there, .50 calibers in there. And if I needed more weaponry, it would have been flown out from the states . . . If I was more concerned or completely, inordinately concerned

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about the safety of the marines, such that I didn't want to risk at all, I could have thrown up tremendous barriers--minefields."

He didn't--nor did Colonel Geraghty--because of the mission.

The subcommittee finds a direct line from interpretation of the mission to the truck that crashed into the BLT building.

The marine mission never required that the compound avoid security precautions. The ambassador wanted a fortress for his embassy. The British ambassador also wanted a fortress. The president of Lebanon lived in a fortress. The U.S. Army training mission lived in a fortress. Only the MAU thought that it had to keep a high profile. That was not just the interpretation of Colonel Geraghty; it predated his arrival on the scene. The subcommittee could not pinpoint the origin of that mindset. The origin will likely remain obscure. [HyperWar has no such difficulty. The Marines were ordered into Lebanon as part of a Multi-National Force (not a strictly U.S. military operation) to perform a quasi-diplomatic role: i.e., provide psychological reassurance to the Lebanese population. What part of this role could have been accomplished by a visibly heavily-armed battalion hunkered down behind a fortified perimeter of minefields, wire, and armor? That would have represented simply one more foreign invader occupying Lebanese soil. If the Marine compound was no longer secure, the Marine mission no longer made sense. The National Command Authority should have made a choice: terminate the "presence" mission and withdraw the Marines, or change the mission and order the Marines to join the LAF in destroying the Shiite militias. The subcommittee seems to think the Marines should have made the decision to abort the "presence" mission on their own, and settled into "Fort Apache" until withdrawn. I suppose that beats having Congressmen earn their paychecks by actually exercising their Constitutional responsibilities...]

The mindset may have led to the curious refusal of anti-terrorist assistance. General Rogers testified that his command offered the marines anti-terrorist training in November 1982, the month General MEad left for a few months and was replaced by Colonel T.M. Stokes. General Rogers said the offer was turned down "in view of the training that the marines are provided before they are deployed, plus the training they get there, plus their coordination with the Lebanese."

The subcommittee concludes that the MAU received insufficient direction from above on how to interpret its mission.

Before the delegation traveled to Beirut, there were suspicions that the MAU might have been the victim of embassy interference, with diplomats directing the Marines to show more visibility and less security. We found on evidence of that at all.

From the message traffic the subcommittee obtained in Beirut, it appears, instead, that only very general directions were given to the MAU about how it should go about performing its task. The entire "mission" statement is but one paragraph long. Yet, the marine assignment is primarily political, no military. That fact was recognized, and emphasized, by every responsible official heard by the subcommittee. Though such a political mission is not unprecedented, it si by no means what the marines are trained for; their doctrinal and training manuals give little guidance on how to conduct such an assignment.

In the end, we fear that the MAU pinioned itself between its own justifiable concern for security and its perceived need to maintain high visibility. Regrettably, the MAU came down in favor of visibility to the detriment of its own security.

The subcommittee does not find a truly consistent philosophy. Unfortunately, the MAU was bending over backwards not to be too military when it came to security. Did the effort to avoid the appearance of a combat role mean the marines could not put up berms and take other visible protective measures, but could cary rifles and mount jeep patrols with helmeted personnel?

If visibility was important when it came to running patrols, why was it important to have low visibility when it came to guarding the entrance to the parking lot adjacent to the Marine compound, an entrance that was simply uncovered. Was visibility really helped by leaving open the gate on the other side of the parking lot, invitingly? How was the absence of dirt barriers around the

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Marine area at the airport complementary to the mission? After all, the area wasn't open to the public and few would know what was behind all the dirt barriers. How would tank traps that could possibly have stopped a truck attack convey a "fortress mentality" in a way that a quarter-million sandbags did not?

The subcommittee is pleased that Ambassador Habib "didn't try to be a general--not even a colonel." The subcommittee feels it would be better if the generals and colonels weren't expected to be diplomats.

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