The Expanding Threat

PROBLEM MASKED BY EXPANSION OF THREAT

One problem everyone had in Beirut was that the threat was generally expanding. It is useful to look at the MAU and the nature of the threats it faced and how they changed.

The marine have faced some kind of threat every since they arrived at the Beirut International Airport in September 1982. The nature of the threat has shifted dramatically and repeatedly in the brief span of time since then.

The subcommittee has identified a number of major changes in the threat:

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one threat. There were many threats--and their intensity shifted--and the total threat grew progressively. All this served to mask the threat that awaited the marines. [And, of course, misses the point that the opponents had free will. Had the BLT building been well protected against a truck bomb, they would almost certainly have searched for a different vulnerability to attack!--HyperWar]

AMERICANS AS THE FOCUS OF ANGER

What went wrong? Why did the "local heroes" turn into targets?

General Mead testified, "I sense that the feeling of the Moslem section started to change around April when they started voting 28th 81mm mortars, 122 rockets, to say we really don't like something. And I sense the displeasure was a result of the lack of rebalance," referring to the failure of the political factions to reach a compromise on the future of Lebanon.

But that would not make the United States the focus of attention.

The subcommittee found several factors that put the Untied States at the center of opposition attention.

First, the United States showed its backing for the central government by starting a training and support program for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Many of the factions viewed the LAF as an arm of the rightwing Phalange since President Gemayel came from the Phalange. As one witness said, the U.S. link to the LAF was "perceived unfortunately as being pro-Christian."

Second, the U.S. Navy's shelling of the Suq el-Gharb area in September in support of the LAF units fighting the Druze militia and other elements. Again, it was perceived as evidence of a pro-Christian stance by the United States.

Third, we were welcomed by many Lebanese who saw us as a lever that would get the foreign occupying forces out of Lebanon. We sponsored the Lebanese/Israeli talks and sat in on all the meetings. But the talks dragged on interminably and, in the end, did not produce the desired result.

Fourth, the Israeli withdrawal south of the Awali River gave opposition elements the opportunity to target the marines more easily. When the marines moved into the airport, they did not take the high ground to the east--a site they would have preferred because no military force like to site at the foot of high ground. But the high ground was occupied by friendly forces--the Israelis. After the Israelis withdrew in September and the LAF was unable to secure the entire area, opposition groups had a clear bead on the marine encampment at the airport.

Fifth, some witnesses saw the "success" of the marine mission as the key factor in why the marines became a target. Ambassador Habib said, "I would argue the reason they object to the Multinational Force is they don't like the positive element that derives from the presence of the Multinational Force and maybe they want to weaken the position of the Lebanese authorities."

Clearly, we are seen as a major prop behind the central government. Elements that want to defeat the central government recognize that they cannot do that while we remain. They, therefore, have a desire to drive us out.

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Colonel Geraghty said, "The current terrorist threat that we are under over there is, I feel, a direct result of that earlier success. . . I feel they are dedicated to our failure in the peacekeeping role."

Sixth, another possible reason is provocation. Colonel Geraghty said, "I think a lot of the shelling and the casualties that we took there over the months were really bait to force us to take a large response into a village. And we didn't do that."

There is yet another reason the American marines find themselves in the bull's-eye. General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated it most clearly: "It is important for us to recognize most clearly that it is not where we are that makes us the targets, it is who we are. And that is a very key point. We are going to get shot at because we are the United States of America." In part, this is because we represent the status quo in the minds of many. Those who want change, don't want us.

As Colonel Geraghty said, "The people dedicated to our failure over there have done unfortunately a very good job at hitting us where we are most vulnerable. The 16-inch gun and the F-14, a lot of combat power inherent in the Navy and Marine Corps team, . . . is neutralized against this kind of threat."

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Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation