The Expanding Threat
PROBLEM MASKED BY EXPANSION OF THREAT One problem everyone had in Beirut was that the threat was generally expanding. It is useful to look at the MAU and the nature of the threats it faced and how they changed.
The marine have faced some kind of threat every since they arrived at the Beirut International Airport in September 1982. The nature of the threat has shifted dramatically and repeatedly in the brief span of time since then.
The subcommittee has identified a number of major changes in the threat:
On landing, the threat came from an unbelievable quantity of unexploded ordnance in the airport area. The first marine death came from such ordnance only days after the initial landing.
As the marines fanned out to occupy, thinly, an area that stretched from the seacoast to the foothills where the Israeli troops were located, the next "threat" involved a series of clashes with the Israelis. This threat was more political than military. In some respects it assumed the character of a public relations war. The marines met this threat by standing firm in a series of minor confrontations that at times had the odor of one proud military establishment testing another.
The next threat was far more serious: Artillery fire from the mountains that came crashing down with particular ferocity after the Israelis decided to withdraw south to the Awali River despite appeals from the United States that this would open a hornet's nest in the Shuf Mountains. Mobile radar units for tracking incoming artillery and pinpointing its origin were in place already. A small army unit of about two dozen men manned the radars for the marines. it proved especially helpful in this kind of war where the United States did not want to scatter artillery fire, but rather to tailor its response to the very artillery piece that had fired on the marines. With the counterbattery fire of the marines, the Naval Gun Fire Support (NGFS) provided by ships offshore, and the dramatic arrival of the battleship U.S.S. New Jersey and its 16-inch guns, the artillery threat from the mountains faded for the time being.
Nest came snipers. Unknown gunmen, suspected of having Iranian connections, set themselves up in villages to the east of the marines and started taking carefully aimed fire at exposed personnel. The marines responded with the same philosophy they had used in dealing with artillery fire. They did not escalate; they responded in kind--but with greater accuracy and skill. The marines formed their own coutnersnipers. They
massed them. They located sniper nests and eliminated them. The opposition snipers found their effort was too costly and disappeared. Thus, the marines defeated the opposition with the very ground rules it had adopted.
The next threat came from convoy attacks. The marines were moving through the city in large convoys for protection. Opposition elements detected that and planted a car bomb on the regular route used by the marines. A successful detonation resulted in marine casualties--and a change in marine policy that foiled the car bombers. The marines varied their convoy routes and used a larger number of small convoys so as not to provide an attractive target.
Along the way, there were hints and fears of a multitude of other threats.
The marines had their first taste of Beirut as the "car bomb capital of the world" in November 1982, when a car bomb was found at the airport, albeit far from the MAU compound. General Mead dismissed it as "sloppy and ineffective," which may have contributed to a mindset against looking for a very professional bomb threat such as the one that eventually leveled the BLT building.
Another threat was kidnapping. Two members of the Army assigned to Beirut made a wrong turn one day and ended up captives. They were quickly released but the embassy and MAU worried about an Iran-type hostage crisis.
The threat was not just to the MAU onshore. Long before the bombing of the BLT building, the Navy offshore was concerned about terrorist attacks on its ships from at least two different sources: a kamikaze aircraft attack, or a speedboat filled with explosives aimed at one of the ships.
The ships, which had been anchored offshore at one point, were subsequently kept underway at all times. Members of the Committee on Armed Services, who visited the marines and the ships offshore four weeks before the bombing, found the Navy very attuned to the terrorist threat. The main concern of the marines ashore, however, was artillery since they got a taste of that almost daily. Colonel Geraghty in his testimony referred repeatedly to artillery.
Asked why he didn't install tank traps or other such barricades, Colonel Geraghty said "A tank--an armored threat--was not the main threat we were dealing with. The main threat that I had to deal with in real life on a day-by-day basis was the increased shelling, which became very heavy, of multiple rocket launchers and heavy artillery, heavy mortars as well as small arms, antitank weapons, direct fire weapons--across the spectrum."
That does not mean he ignored other threats. He received a flood of reports on potential threats of all kins. The volume was incredible. But it was not always helpful because it was so general and unspecific. Without times and places, the American community would need to be on alert at all times to counter all threats--a physical impossibility. The result, according to one analyst, was that "people here probably become a little jaded. . . . There is so much intelligence on threats that people begin to say, 'Oh, geez, another threat.'"
In sum, while the marines can be faulted for missing the potential of a truck bomb, it must be remembered that there wasn't just
one threat. There were many threats--and their intensity shifted--and the total threat grew progressively. All this served to mask the threat that awaited the marines. [And, of course, misses the point that the opponents had free will. Had the BLT building been well protected against a truck bomb, they would almost certainly have searched for a different vulnerability to attack!--HyperWar]
AMERICANS AS THE FOCUS OF ANGER What went wrong? Why did the "local heroes" turn into targets?
General Mead testified, "I sense that the feeling of the Moslem section started to change around April when they started voting 28th 81mm mortars, 122 rockets, to say we really don't like something. And I sense the displeasure was a result of the lack of rebalance," referring to the failure of the political factions to reach a compromise on the future of Lebanon.
But that would not make the United States the focus of attention.
The subcommittee found several factors that put the Untied States at the center of opposition attention.
First, the United States showed its backing for the central government by starting a training and support program for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Many of the factions viewed the LAF as an arm of the rightwing Phalange since President Gemayel came from the Phalange. As one witness said, the U.S. link to the LAF was "perceived unfortunately as being pro-Christian."
Second, the U.S. Navy's shelling of the Suq el-Gharb area in September in support of the LAF units fighting the Druze militia and other elements. Again, it was perceived as evidence of a pro-Christian stance by the United States.
Third, we were welcomed by many Lebanese who saw us as a lever that would get the foreign occupying forces out of Lebanon. We sponsored the Lebanese/Israeli talks and sat in on all the meetings. But the talks dragged on interminably and, in the end, did not produce the desired result.
Fourth, the Israeli withdrawal south of the Awali River gave opposition elements the opportunity to target the marines more easily. When the marines moved into the airport, they did not take the high ground to the east--a site they would have preferred because no military force like to site at the foot of high ground. But the high ground was occupied by friendly forces--the Israelis. After the Israelis withdrew in September and the LAF was unable to secure the entire area, opposition groups had a clear bead on the marine encampment at the airport.
Fifth, some witnesses saw the "success" of the marine mission as the key factor in why the marines became a target. Ambassador Habib said, "I would argue the reason they object to the Multinational Force is they don't like the positive element that derives from the presence of the Multinational Force and maybe they want to weaken the position of the Lebanese authorities."
Clearly, we are seen as a major prop behind the central government. Elements that want to defeat the central government recognize that they cannot do that while we remain. They, therefore, have a desire to drive us out.
Colonel Geraghty said, "The current terrorist threat that we are under over there is, I feel, a direct result of that earlier success. . . I feel they are dedicated to our failure in the peacekeeping role."Sixth, another possible reason is provocation. Colonel Geraghty said, "I think a lot of the shelling and the casualties that we took there over the months were really bait to force us to take a large response into a village. And we didn't do that."
There is yet another reason the American marines find themselves in the bull's-eye. General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated it most clearly: "It is important for us to recognize most clearly that it is not where we are that makes us the targets, it is who we are. And that is a very key point. We are going to get shot at because we are the United States of America." In part, this is because we represent the status quo in the minds of many. Those who want change, don't want us.
As Colonel Geraghty said, "The people dedicated to our failure over there have done unfortunately a very good job at hitting us where we are most vulnerable. The 16-inch gun and the F-14, a lot of combat power inherent in the Navy and Marine Corps team, . . . is neutralized against this kind of threat."
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