The Military Chain of Command

THE LINKS IN THE CHAIN

By law, the military chain of command extends from the President as commander-in-chief to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commander. In the case of the marine deployment in Lebanon, the responsible unified commander is the U.S. European Commander. By Pentagon directive, the link to the unified commander from the Secretary of Defense is routed through the Joints Chiefs of Staff.

In Europe, the military chain of command extends from the European commander (USCINCEUR) to the commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) to the senior operational commander responsible for Lebanon, who is the U.S. Sixth Fleet commander in the Mediterranean. Two of these officers are high level NATO commanders. Their dual responsibilities complicate the picture. USCINCEUR is also the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; his NATO headquarters is outside of Mons, Belgium. The day-to-day exercise of his authority as a U.S. commander has been delegated to the deputy U.S. commander in Europe who is located at U.S. European headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Likewise, CINCUSNAVEUR is also the NATO southern commander; in that capacity, his headquarters is in Naples, Italy. His U.S. command responsibilities are routinely exercised by his deputy at the U.S. Naval headquarters for Europe located in London, England.

A consequence of this sequence of delegations is that the chain of military commanders with cognizance over the Beirut deployment extends from Washington to Mons, Belgium, to Stuttgart, West Germany, to Naples, Italy, and to London, England, before finally reaching an operational commander, the Sixth Fleet commander.

The basic military chain for operational commanders responsible for the Lebanese deployment extends from the Sixth Fleet commander to the Amphibious Task Force Commander (ATF), on board a ship off Beirut, to the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) commander at the Beirut airport. This arrangement has been modified, however, to include a direct command link from the Sixth Fleet commander to the MAU commander for Multinational Force matters. The rationale for this second operational command linkage is that the marine ground force commander is also the commander of the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force in Lebanon. On October 23, 1983, the Amphibious Task Force Commander (Task Force 61) was Captain France, USN, and the Marine Amphibious Unit Commander (Task Force 62) and Multinational Force Commander was Colonel Geraghty, USMC.

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THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The President, as commander-in-chief, bears the ultimate responsibility for employing U.S. military forces. In fulfilling their military responsibility the President and his Secretary of Defense normally rely heavily on the advice of the professional officers whose counsel derives from years of military experience and training (and who, represented by the JCS, are by law the principal advisers to the President on national security matters).

The subcommittee has found nothing to indicate that the civilian leadership had failed to provide for the well-being of the marines in Lebanon.

There have been consistent reports in the media that the prudence of including U.S. forces in a Multinational Force in Lebanon was strongly questioned at the outset by the U.S. military leadership. The civilian leadership appears to have paid insufficient attention to the difficulties of the mission it assigned. By placing a small, relatively isolated force on the ground in Lebanon, the United States has voluntarily fielded a military unit with which opponents can content. Hence, the marine presence in Lebanon represents a continuing invitation to attack by hostile elements.

THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE

Captain France described his place in the chain of command as being in "what we call the CATF relationship." CATF stands for Commander, Amphibious Task Force. A joint service document, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, is the authoritative Department of Defense publication that sets out the command relationship to which Captain France referred. Following are excerpts from the manual and related comments based on Captain France's testimony.

Captain France acknowledged his overall responsibility several times during the hearings. At one point he said:

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I was the senior commander under that relationship. . . . In an amphibious organization, which we were, the Navy, the amphibious task force commander, assumes the senior commander position as a matter of course in an amphibious operation because of the fact that when the landing force goes ashore at any time the landing force could be put in a position whereby they would have to withdraw and therefore I maintain a duplication of all his communications and everything else and as the overall commander I can pick up what he is doing and, of course, make an evacuation.

In further elaboration, Captain France stated:

As the commander of the amphibious task force, I was also responsible within the chain of command for the security both ashore and afloat a was my immediate commander responsible for the security of our task force and the Marines ashore as a fleet commander.

When asked to discuss what he understood the ground command responsibilities of his subordinate, Colonel Geraghty, to be "with particular responsibility in regard to security," Captain France answered:

Well, basically the responsibilities that he would have with regard to security were the responsibilities ashore for his particular troops. . . .

As the commander of the landing force in traditional amphibious deployment, when he goes ashore he assumes command of his troops ashore and is responsible for the security of those particular troops while he is in that area as that commander and of course that goes right down the chain. In other words the battalion commander would be responsible for the battalion and the MSSG (Marine Service Support Group) would be responsible under him for their security. He would be overall on the beach as far as security was concerned.

It is apparent that Captain France understood the chain of command relationship set out in the doctrine for amphibious operations. It is also apparent that he acted in accordance with the doctrine. He testified that he visited the MAU an average of three times a week. He and Colonel Geraghty were in constant communication concerning developments. He was intimately familiar with political, military and diplomatic events as they unfolded, and attempted to discern their implications for his forces at sea and ashore.

Captain France was understandably less knowledgeable of the specific security arrangements for protecting the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) headquarters. He believed the gate might have deterred a truck. He was not aware that it was always open. He believed the pipes in front of the BLT to have been much more formidable that they were. He thought they were two feet in diameter, wheres they were half that size; he thought they blocked the way into the building whereas there was a gap. Captain France, as a senior commander with an intervening subordinate ground commander,

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cannot be held accountable for lack of intimate familiarity with every detail of the MAU security posture.

But Captain France can be faulted for uncritically accepting the premises on which his subordinate based his security posture. As the situation worsened in August and September, he continued to accept the proposition that the presence mission required the marines to be visible to the detriment of their safety. He accepted the assessment that the increased threat of artillery and sniper fire justified concentrating more marines in the BLT building at a time when the vehicular terrorist threat remained high and undiminished. (He, as did other, identified the vehicular threat exclusively with a car bomb.) He testified that "from the known threat, as far as I could see, the BLT in my mind was probably the safest place we had. . . ." Possibly most important, Captain France accepted Colonel Geraghty's determination "not to over-impose upon the (Lebanese) government" by establishing "permanently defacing" defenses at the airport. Thus he concurred in temporary defenses such as sandbag bunkers, pipe barriers, and concertina wire as opposed to more substantial structures such as dirt berms, trenches, cement bunkers, et cetera.

Captain France was asked "where would the responsibility lie" for inadequate security if the subcommittee determined that there was some negligence involved. He answered:

I would say if it was a matter of negligence based on known information of the threat, I would say that the commanders in the field who lived with that threat should be. But I don't believe that is a statement that reflects the situation that was there.

Notwithstanding the palpable difficulties faced by Captain France and his command, the subcommittee believes that he erred by failing to reassess the situation as it deteriorated and, thus, failed to reevaluate the security posture of the marine ground force and take appropriate action for their protection.

THE MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (MAU)

Colonel Geraghty was the commander of the MAU when its BLT building was leveled.

Command is the authority which a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over his subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

The commander is responsible for everything the regiment does or fails to do. He meets his responsibilities by sound planning, by making timely decisions, by issuing effective orders, and by personal supervision and leadership. His duties require a thorough understanding of the tactical and technical employment, the capabilities and the

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limitations of all organic units, and of the units which may be attached to or in support of the regiment.

When Chairman Nichols read the above definition from a marine field manual and asked whether Colonel Geraghty agreed "that the commander, then, is responsible for everything, everything the command does in the final analysis, or fails to do," he replied, "I do, sir."

Since the subcommittee has concluded that the security posture of the BLT headquarters was inadequate, Colonel Geraghty must bear the principal responsibility for that condition. The subcommittee also recognizes that commanders subordinate to Colonel Geraghty are responsible for the security lapses of their individual units.

Colonel Geraghty is a dedicated and talented officer who was given a difficult mission that, as he interpreted it, became increasingly more difficult to perform without exposing the marines under his command to significant death or injury. This is not a case of dereliction of duty, or of neglect. But it is a case of misjudgment with the most serious consequences.

Colonel Geraghty testified that the mission had not changed since September 1982 when the marines returned for the second time. His interpretation of the mission precluded construction of substantial barriers, digging trenches, dispersing personnel in cement bunkers because, in Colonel Geraghty's judgment, such actions would amount to adopting a "fortress mentality." Further, more stringent security measures would disrupt a busty international airport, thus countering the goodwill that the presence mission sought to foster. Although this was his own interpretation of what "presence" meant, as he freely acknowledged in the testimony, Colonel Geraghty determinedly stuck to it after the marines began to come under periodic attack and take casualties. In fact, General Rogers, the European commander, testified that the MAU maintained its concept of the presence mission even after the BLT bombing until he took a direct hand and ordered dispersal, construction of more permanent fortifications and other protective measures.

To protect against incoming artillery,m rocket and mortar rounds, more and more marines were housed in the few buildings assigned to the MAU at the airport. These buildings, especially the BLT headquarters, were believed to provide the best protection against artillery. The flaw in further concentrating the MAU was that the terrorist threat had not abated. The apparent immediacy of escaping the shelling, however, caused the terrorist threat to be given a lower priority. Thus, actions intended to decrease vulnerability to one type of threat increased the value of the BLT building as a terrorist target.

Colonel Geraghty stated that he was aware of and concerned about the approximately 100 car bomb threats that had been brought to his attention in the few months since his unit arrived in Beirut. He testified that he had focused on small vehicles--cars, light trucks and vans. Why heavier vehicles were excluded from the range of possible attacks in unknown.

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The subcommittee further questions whether the defense erected would have been adequate to repel the car bomb threat for which they were allegedly intended.

Representative Daniel, during Colonel Geraghty's appearance before the subcommittee, stated, "Colonel, when an officer accepts command of troops, he accepts not only the responsibility of accomplishing a mission, but the guardianship of those who serve under his command." Representative Daniel told the subcommittee, "The military hierarchy exists and can function because enlisted personnel entrust their well-being and their lives to those with command authority. When those in command either abdicate that authority or neglect that guardianship, more is lost than lives. Lost also is the trust that enables those who follow to follow those who lead."

THE MILITARY CHAIN OF CoMMAND ABOVE THE ATF/MAU

The subcommittee did not receive testimony from all of the officers in the military chain of command. Nevertheless, a number of issues concerning the performance of the chain of command were raised in the testimony and merit comment.

Support for the ATF/MAU. Both Colonel Geraghty and Captain France indicated that their superiors in the chain of command were very responsive to their needs. Colonel Geraghty was asked whether he discussed important decisions with Admiral Edward Martin, the Sixth Fleet Commander. He answered:

Oh, yes sire, in quite considerable detail, sir. Any evolution in our rules of engagement, anticipating what if, looking down the line in our planning, I was talking with Admiral Martin's staff--a lot with the Fleet Marine Officer on Admiral Martin's staff on their operations side--and we would make proposals, recommendations.

For instance, we initiated--Commodore France and I, our staffs together--initiated alert conditions that would complement the total defense of the ships afloat as well as the forces ashore, . . . And in taking actions--the threat analysis--all of our actions to improve the defenses, to review the threat assessments, all these were joint assessments by both the Commodore's staff and mine, and the proposed changes, recommendations, went to the Commander of the 6th Fleet as joint CTF, Commander Task Force 61-62, messages. Because it is what we call a Navy-Marine Corps team, and this is the way we do business. We worked quite hard at that, talked quite frequently addressing all these threats.

The testimony also indicates that Admiral Martin visited the ATF/MAU on numerous occasions.

That conclusion is also true of the commanders above Admiral Martin. Most have visited the MAU and familiarized themselves with the operation. (General Rogers, the European Commander, has not visited the MAU. The subcommittee recognizes that his positions as NATO commander may have precluded such a visit.)

General Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that he know of nothing on which the JCS has met more

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often than Lebanon. He added that security has always been an issue:

I have personally inquired at every occasion when it has come to me. Is there anything that is needed? What more is needed? What has been asked for that has not been provided? So that we can get that. And I haven't received any lists of things that have not been provided for. Now, the other question that comes from that is, Did the people ask for what they needed? And that is a clear question that has to be wrestled with here as we go through these investigations.

Colonel Geraghty confirmed the responsiveness of his superiors with regard to security when he testified that he had never sought approval for greater security measures and been refused.

Oversight of the MAU by higher level commanders. Responsiveness to a subordinate's requests for support is one thing. oversight and evaluation of the subordinate's actions are another. The subcommittee found very little to indicate that higher level commanders had inspected the MAU during their visits or otherwise independently evaluated Colonel Geraghty's handling of the situation.

The following excerpts from Colonel Geraghty's testimony indicate the absence of independent oversight and evaluation by higher level commanders.

Mr. NICHOLS. Captain France testified this morning that he came ashore possibly twice a week the last few months. Did he at any time, or anybody in his command, challenge any of the security measures that you might have had in place there?

Colonel GERAGHTY. No, sir. We discussed in some detail, as matter of course, re-evaluated the security ashore as well as the security on the ships. . . .

Mr. NICHOLS. You had some other people, I presume, that visited you down there. How about Admiral Martin with the 6th Fleet? Did he ever come ashore?

Colonel GERAGHTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Did he question any of the security measures?

Colonel GERAGHTY. No, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. What about Admiral Staser Holcomb, [deputy commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe], from London? DId he ever visit you?

Colonel GERAGHTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Did he ever question the security measures?

Colonel GERAGHTY. No, sir. Just in briefing. I just briefed them all.

Mr. NICHOLS. How about Admiral [Richard N.] Small [commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe] from Naples. He came and visited you?

Colonel GERAGHTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. DId he question any of the security measures?

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Colonel GERAGHTY. When you say question, I was briefing them on the security situation. There were some changes that came down, as far as some traffic from time to time through the chain.

Mr. NICHOLS. How about General [Richard L.] Lawson [USAF, deputy commander, U.S. Forces, Europe]? He was in the chain of command grom Germany. Did he ever visit you?

Colonel GERAGHTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. All these VIPs, they visited you during your command there. I believe you said specifically none of them pointed out and said you ought to do this or you ought to do that, or beef this up, is that correct

Colonel GERAGHTY. No, sir, they didn't make specific recommendations. They didn't come up with anything unique.

General Kelley, the Marine Corps commandant, visited the MAU after [the] bombing and later testified that he made a number of recommendations to improve security. He had visited in September, however, just a few weeks before the bombing and had no suggestions:

Mrs. BYRON. When the commandant visited in September, which I believe was about two weeks before the bombing, though he was not in the chain of command, as he has stated numerous times before this committee, would you have listened had he made suggestions for changes in security or areas that he was would be a potential problem even though he was not in the chain of command?

Colonel GERAGHTY. Oh, yes, ma'am, and I might add, with all the visitors that we had out there as a matter of course in our continuous evaluation of our own security, we task our counterintelligence types to do exactly that, to look at the holes in our defense, to look at our weak points.

Mrs. BYRON. When General Kelley was there in September, do you recall him making any suggestions for security changes or recommendations for the security around the BLT, or any specific recommendations to you as far as positioning of your men, or any recommendations whatever?

Colonel GERAGHTY. No ma'am, I don't recall that.

Captain France replied similarly with regard to higher level visits.

Mr. RAY. Two or three questions. What generally is the approach of commanders during the visits--do they do in and just look things over, or make recommendations, or what?

Captain FRANCE. The usual procedure was that they would come aboard, other than the Sixth Fleet, who was there numbers of times--the commander would come aboard and get a briefing from myself on the flagship. He would then normally visit a couple of ships of interest. Then he would get equal time, or less, on the beach, where he would proceed to get a briefing from Tim Geraghty.

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And then, depending upon the conditions, he would begin a tour of the MAU area or something like that.

Mr. RAY. Do these visits generally result in evaluations of any problems or action which might follow those problems to alleviate them?

Captain FRANCE. The question is usually asked: do you have any problems? Some people would give a recommendation, as per one of the briefings, of what your were doing--procedures of this nature--ask questions of that nature.

Mr. RAY. Would independent assessments ever be made by you or those visiting people?

Captain FRANCE. Usually the assessments were made. It was usually a comment on how well you were doing your job as far as how your forces look, these types of things.

Mr. RAY. As a result of that did you occasionally get some sort of a written recommendation to you from a higher up that things ought to be corrected or suggestions made that things ought to take place?

Captain France. Normally most of these visits were informative type visits and they would walk around, get the briefing, thank us very much for what they saw, sometimes there would be a recommendation--normally most of it was pretty complimentary--and then they would depart. I never received any "better get hot the next time I am here" or things like that.

Mr. RAY. General Kelley visited a couple of times?

Captain FRANCE. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. After the tragedy and before the tragedy?

Captain FRANCE. Yes, sir.

General Rogers, the European commander, expressed a decided aversion to "second-guessing" the local commander. With regard to the MAU, he said that "it is impossible for (the JCS chairman) to command from Washington, it is impossible for me to command from Belgium, it is impossible for my deputy to command from Stuttgart. . . ." He believes that "when you get so far away from a battalion you should let the people on the ground command it, supervised by the next echelon of command."

Nevertheless, several weeks after the bombing, General Rogers took action when he determined that the MAU security posture was not being modified adequately to respond to the threat. He found that too many people were still being housed in a single building and directed that they be dispersed.

The above excerpts from the testimony reveal that although the MAU received a great deal of high level interest before the bombing, it was in the nature of "familiarization" visits by senior commanders or responses to requirements set out by the MAU commander. Only after the bombing disaster did responsible higher echelon commanders begin to evaluate independently the security posture established by the ground force commander. All during the period in which the situation was deteriorating, however, the higher command levels had access to the same intelligence Colonel Geraghty received. Their headquarters received, or had the capability

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to receive, complete information on the situation of the MAU and the actions taken on the ground. The higher commanders were familiar with the interpretation of the mission which, as Colonel Geraghty testified, had not changed since the marines entered Lebanon in September 1982, despite the worsening situation. Moreover, they were aware, or should have been, that the marines were concentrated in a few buildings within a confined area.

[All of which is true for the Administration, the Congress, and this Committee--none of which took action in their respective spheres to address the problem. HyperWar]

The subcommittee is startled that higher level commanders did not reevaluate the MAU security posture in light of the increasing vulnerability of the unit in the weeks before the bombing. A delegation of members from the Committee on Armed Services headed by Representative Stratton visited Lebanon on September 24 and 25. In its report, the Stratton delegation noted that the marines have been introduced into hostilities, are exposed, and "serious risks are involved." Moreover, the report pointed out that "in military terms, our position on flat land, immobilized at the base of a high mountain range, is clearly unsatisfactory."

Representative Stratton and several other members of the delegation--Representatives Nichols, Daniel and Byron--met with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to express their concern on October 20k three days before the bombing. Representatives Sonny Montgomery, a member of the Committee on Armed Services, and John P. Murtha also attended the meeting.

Confusion Concerning the Chain of Command. At the beginning of the mission, the amphibious task force commander was designated as the on-scene commander.

Representative Ray, a member of Representative Stratton's delegation, reported to the subcommittee that Admiral Martin, the Sixth Fleet Commander, explained the chain of command as follows:

My job over here is Commander of the Sixth Fleet. Colonel Geraghty is commander of the marines and the Marine Amphibious Unit ashore, and Commodore France is the senior military officer on the scene in this part of the world in a command function. And Colonel Geraghty reports to him on the one hand, and on the other hand he is independent from him. So both of them work for me, and of course I am responsible for the support that is out here.

Colonel Geraghty was asked during the hearings, "Who is y our boss? Who did you report to?" He answered, "Sir, my immediate boss was the Commander, Sixth Fleet, Admiral Martin."

At another point in the hearings, Representative Ray asked Colonel Geraghty to comment on Admiral Martin's description of the chain of command. Colonel Geraghty said, "That is essentially true, and the way the situation is, I am separate. As the marine commander of forces ashore, I am a separate task force

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commander--62--really co-equal with the commander of task force 61, the commodore."

In his testimony, Captain France, who held the title of commodore while commanding Task Force 61, indicated that he was the senior commander under the amphibious task force relationship. However, he confirmed that Colonel Geraghty "did have a direct line to Sixth Fleet, as Commander of the U.S. Multinational Force." He further referred to Colonel Geraghty as "being equivalent task force commander" in that regard.

The above would seem to indicate that (1) the U.S. Multinational Force command slot, originally assigned to the amphibious task force commander, Captain France, had been reassigned to the MAU commander, Colonel Geraghty; (2) two chains of command had been established: the traditional chain according to amphibious doctrine from the MAU commander to the ATF commander to the Sixth Fleet commander; and a direct link for Multinational Force matters from the MAU commander to the Sixth Fleet commander.

If that is an accurate description of how the military operation in Lebanon is being handled in the field, it has not been made known to the JCS chairman, Marine Corps headquarters, or the European commander, as indicated by the following excerpts from the testimony of General Vessey and General Rogers.

Mr. NICHOLS. Let me ask, as a joint question, if the two of you would discuss the responsibilities of each level of the chain of command with respect to the supporting operations of the Marine unit at the airport level. The reason I ask you this is that there seems to be some confusion in the chain of command that exists from the ground commander, Colonel Geraghty, in that sometimes he reported to the commander of the amphibious task force, Captain France, and at other times he reported to the commander of the Sixth Fleet, Admiral Martin.

If you would explain to us under what conditions this ground commander reports to the Commodore and Sixth Fleet Commander and when he reports to the---

General VESSEY. I would defer to General Rogers. That is solely within his province.

General ROGERS. I am surprised to learn that he felt that he reported to Commander, SIxth Fleet. I am not sure of the conditions under which that would occur because the chain of command is from me to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, then down to the Commander, 6th Fleet, then to the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force, which is CTF-61, then to the ground commander, CTF-62, which was Colonel Geraghty, at the time he was there. And so his immediate superior in the chain of command was the commander of the Amphibious Task Force, the Commander of Task Force 61, and that man's superior was the Commander of the Sixth Fleet.

Later in the hearing General Rogers indicated that the direct MAU-to-Sixth-Fleet linkage might be non-operational, a support tie: "That would be the only reason why he would go, would be for

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that kind of support that Admiral Martin mentioned that he was giving, would be logistics and administrative."

General Vessey later briefly explained amphibious doctrine and concludes that the MAU commander "is still under the command of the task force commander." He called upon Colonel John Grinalds, USMC, for a fuller explanation:

Colonel GRINALDS. general Vessey is exactly correct, sir. The commander of the landing force, in this case, Colonel Geraghty, would come under the commander of the amphibious task force until such time as operations ashore would pass to a supreme commander ashore. . . . That has never happened. Or until such time as the landing force re-embarks aboard ship and goes back into a non-operational mode.

In addition, sir, Captain France's CTF-61 was designated the U.S. Multinational Force Commander, and under him, Colonel Geraghty commanded the ground element of the U.S. National Force. (Emphasis added.)

The subcommittee is at a loss to sort out the conflicts in the above testimony. Inquiries of the Department of Defense after the hearing failed to elicit a satisfactory explanation. Although the subcommittee cannot point to any impairment of performance because of the confusion over the actual chain of command, the potential exists. The confusion may be one more indication of the failure of higher echelons to exercise sufficient supervision and oversight of lower command levels. Moreover, the subcommittee believes that lack of clarity in the chain of command might contribute to an inability to fix responsibility and authority.

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