Israeli Offer of Assistance

An offer of assistance from the government of Israel was contained in a message from the United States Defense Attache's Office in Tel Aviv. It stated in full:

Reference the attack on the BLT Hq at BIA (Beirut International Airport) this morning. Per telcon (telephone conversation) with Colonel Alter, Chief of External Relations IDF (Israeli Defense Forces). The GOI (Government of Israel) offers whatever assistance may be desired by the USG (U.S. Government) in the evacuation/medical treatment of casualties.

This offer of assistance was acknowledged by Captain France who responded to the Defense Attache in Tel Aviv: "Offer of assistance Ref A, sincerely appreciated. Currently have ample assistance en route to meet requirements."

The rejection of the Israeli offer has been the object of considerable congressional and new media interest. For that reason, the subcommittee examined closely the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the offer and its rejection.

The Defense Attach Office message bears a date-time group of 2307227 October 83. This means that its time of transmission was 9:22 a.m. Beirut time, or three after the 6:21 a.m. time of the bombing. The time of receipt is uncertain; however, Captain France testified that he did not see the message until approximately 10:30 a.m. when he left the Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) aboard the U.S.S. Iwo Jima and returned to his office. He testified that, at the same time, he also received offers of assistance from the French, the British and the Italians.

In explaining the rationale for his rejection of the Israeli offer, Captain France testified:

I made the decision because I had already made three other decisions. . . . I had four U.S. medevac aircraft in the group at that time. I had already alerted the British C-130 from Akrotiri and that was coming. . . . The basic decision regarding medevac had already been made. . . . I was expecting at that time the C-9 to land at 1030 (10:30 a.m.).

Captain France testified that the first aircraft did not, in fact, arrive at 10:30 a.m. because of a delay in getting a diplomatic clearance at its point of departure. Captain France further testified that, in addition to that aircraft, he had "a C-130 and another C-9 right behind it, and I had two more aircraft, 141s, en route or coming." He said the United States aircraft had been dispatched [in] response to a call his headquarters had made to Germany by 7 a.m. Beirut time. He said that the British aircraft had been requested

--(63)--

through the British liaison officer aboard the U.S.S. Iwo Jima: "Basically when I needed help I just turned to the liaison officer and he said they had an airplane. I said, okay, we will take it." Moreover, he said his medical officers had previously visited Akrotiri: "The doctors had been up there and it was a fine place to go, and they were talking about that."

Captain France testified he was not required to check his decision with anyone else as he had the sole command. In responding to a question whether there was any political consideration in his decision, he replied, "None whatever, not when it come to life." The subcommittee notes that Captain France did request the Israelis to supply body bags that were needed, refuting assertions that political considerations prevented the Navy from requesting any assistance from Israel. The Israelis complied with this request. Captain France further testified that he had not received any other messages concerning the Israeli offer of assistance and had not known of an offer from the Israeli Defense Minister to Secretary of State George Shultz and/or Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

Two medical officers aboard the U.S.S. Iwo Jima testified concerning the treatment of casualties and their evacuation. They testified they were not aware of the Israeli offer of assistance until the afternoon of October 23. They further testified that while, to their knowledge, none of the medical officers aboard the U.S.S. Iwo Jima had been consulted concerning the Israeli offer, they believed the decision to reject it was proper. They identified a number of problems that might have arisen if patients had been evacuated to Israel. Commander Richard Balzer, an anesthesiologist in charge of the surgery team aboard the U.S.S. Iwo Jima, said "We didn't know what they were offering, what capabilities they had. We did not have direct communications with them." He added, "We had used others previously. Those procedures had been set up previously." Lieutenant Frazer Henderson, the ship's medical officer, testified, "Israel was a totally unknown quantity. It made sense to transfer patients to those facilities with which we had experience. Akrotiri and AUB [American University Beirut] were such." He said they had, on several prior occasions, transferred patients to those hospitals and, "We personally knew the physicians and inspected the laboratories." Commander Balzer testified, "We had taken our very seriously ill patients the week before and we worked out the system at that time so we knew the system was functional. So we didn't have to go through logistics problems that we would have to go through with Israel." Conversely, they had never utilized any Israeli hospitals. The subcommittee was told that, since the bombing, U.S. military medical officers have conducted an examination of medical facilities in Israel with a view toward using them in future emergencies.

The doctors estimated that evacuation to Haifa, Israel, would have taken approximately 45 minutes. They estimated that evacuation to Akrotiri, Cyprus, could have been carried out in about the same time.

Captain France testified, "It was much quicker, an hour faster to get to Akrotiri by C-130, the British aircraft, than it was by helicopter to go down there." He described the flight to Tel Aviv as requiring

--(64)--

an hour and 30 minutes. He said, "It is required to stay out over water and it is a dog leg into Tel Aviv. That is the only clearance, or route that we have." Furthermore, the helicopter flight to Israel would have diverted helicopter resources from the task force--helicopters then being used in transporting wounded from the BLT to the U.S.S. Iwo Jima and back to the airport for evacuation--while the flight to Akrotiri was by RAF C-130 aircraft.

The doctors testified that about 9 a.m. they knew they would be evacuating patients to Germany and to Akrotiri and began preparing for that eventuality. According to them, it was 12:45 p.m. when the first C-9 medevac arrived, and the British C-130 from Akrotiri arrived about 10 minutes later. They said the immediate needs of the wounded were taken care of aboard the U.S.S. Iwo Jima, and after being stabilized, they were medevaced. Doctor Balzer testified:

Our job is to sort the patients out, to stabilize them fully, meaning if they had blood loss to make sure their bodies are capable o traveling and sustain themselves for a period of time. We had two patients who needed immediate surgery, which we carried out on board. The other individuals we stabilized and medevaced them out.

He added, "We judged it was reasonable to get them out of here as fast as possible to other facilities after we prepared them to make that transfer."

Perhaps the most significant medical comment was Doctor Balzer's response to the question of whether rejection of the Israeli offer had a detrimental effect on any of the wounded. He replied, "In my opinion it did not make any difference at all. I think the results speak for themselves."

On the basis of the sworn testimony, the subcommittee finds that the decision to reject the Israeli offer of assistance was solely that of the field commander, Captain France. It further finds that political considerations did not enter into his decision. Rather, the subcommittee finds that his decision appears to have been dictated solely by operational and medical considerations. he had ordered evacuation arrangements several hours previously and, at the time he declined the Israeli offer, believed that the first medevac aircraft would be arriving momentarily. The staff physicians, although they had not been consulted, endorsed the decision. They testified the wounded had been stabilized medically and were believed capable of traveling either to Cyprus or to Germany. The subcommittee found on evidence that the death of one man en route to Germany, or the deaths at the hospitals in Cyprus and Germany, could be attributed to the time required for the evacuation flights. Finally, Captain France's request for body bags from israel demonstrates that he had no reluctance to call on that nation for the support he required. Since he had no need for further medical or evacuation assistance, the subcommittee finds no error in his decision to decline the Israeli offer. To the contrary, the subcommittee believes that Captain France's decision was correct in that he declined to make abrupt changes to the plans worked out by his medical team.

In order to clarify the record, the subcommittee believes it essential to note that the message as relayed to Captain France did not

--(65)--

specify any particular hospital, treatment or mode of evacuation; rather it was phrased in general terms. Captain France also testified that, contrary to media reports, he never knew of any Israeli offer of air bags for lifting debris during rescue operations. If assistance were required, Captain France would have had to send another message, or messages, to Tel Aviv in order to determine the specific assistance being offered, i.e., evacuation/medical treatment. And as he noted, he had no direct communication with Israeli authorities.

The subcommittee also commends the medical team, from surgeons to medical corpsmen, for performing superbly in the face of a disaster of challenging proportions. They had planned and trained for large-scale casualties, stacked up on supplies and proved prepared to meet the challenge.

--(66)--

Table of Contents
Previous Section ** Next Section


Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation