

Japanese Monograph No.11




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PHILIPPINES AIR OPERATIONS RECORD

PHASE ONE

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
FOREWORD

This monograph covers the plans and operations of Japanese air units during the 1st Philippines Operation and was compiled to supplement the monographs covering Navy and ground operations. This record was compiled partially from records prepared by the War History Compilations Section, Army General Staff, and partially from the recollections and personal papers of Col Monjiro Akiyama, former senior staff officer, 14th Army, Air Section; and Col Susumu Ishikawa, senior staff officer (Operations), 5th Air Group.

Additional monographs covering the operations of the Japanese Armed Forces in the Philippines during Phase One are as follows:

<u>Title</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Mono No</u>
Philippine Operations Record, Phase One	Dec 41 - Jun 42	1
Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, Supplement	Dec 41 - Jun 42	2
Operational Situation of the Japanese Navy in Philippines Invasion Operations	Dec 41 - Jan 42	80
Jolo Island Invasion Operations	Dec 41	27
Southern Army Operations Record	Dec 41 - Aug 45	24
Southern Area Air Operations Record	Dec 41 - Aug 45	31
General Summary of Naval Operations: Southern Force	Nov 41 - Apr 42	105

1 February 1952



Preface

Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, 12 October 1945, subject: Institution for War Records Investigation, steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff. Upon dissolution of the War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, research and compilation continued and developed into a series of historical monographs.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparations of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable.

Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau, the basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. Translation was effected through the facilities of Allied Translators and Interpreters Service, G2, General Headquarters, Far East Command.

This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division, Military History Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command and is based on the translation of the Japanese original. Editorial corrections were limited to those necessary for coherence and accuracy.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

		<u>Page</u>
Chapter I	The First Air Operations Against the Philippines.....	1
	The Operational Plan.....	2
	Details of the Plan of Attack.....	4
	Concentration and Deployment.....	7
	The Initial Operations.....	8
	Support of the Main Landing and Subsequent Operations.....	25
Chapter II	First Operations on Bataan Peninsula.....	41
	Second Bataan Offensive.....	46
	Air Operations in the Capture of Corregidor.....	61
	Operations in Other Philippine Island Areas.....	65
	Conclusion.....	68

CHARTS

<u>No.</u>		
1.	Distribution of Attack of the 5th Air Group on 15 December.....	17
2.	5th Air Group Plan for Direct Support of Land Operations	21
3.	Casualties Suffered by the 5th Air Group (8 Dec - 7 Jan).....	35
4.	Damage Inflicted on Enemy Aircraft (10 Dec - 6 Jan).....	37
5.	Battle Order 197.....	49

6.	Organization of the 22d Air Brigade.....	57
7.	Air Operations During the Period 1 - 11 April 1942.....	59
8.	Air Operations During the Attack on Corregidor (29 April - 6 May).....	65

CHAPTER I

The First Air Operations Against the Philippines

In 1940, as the international situation grew worse, the American forces in the Philippines, especially the air and mechanized units, had been increased from approximately 12,000 to about 22,000. In addition, the Philippine National Defense Army and its patrol unit had been placed under the command of the American Far Eastern Army.

Air units in the Philippines were of three different commands, Army, Navy and Philippine Defense Army. Their strength was estimated as follows:

ARMY (200 aircraft formed in one air brigade)
Pursuit, one regiment, four squadrons, totaling 108 aircraft
Bombers, one regiment, three bomber squadrons and one (pursuit) squadron, totaling 70 aircraft
Reconnaissance, two squadrons of 20 aircraft

NAVY (70 aircraft)
At Olongapo, 20 patrol planes
At Cavite, 50 patrol and carrier borne pursuit planes used as patrol planes for the flagship, aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders

NATIONAL DEFENSE ARMY (40 training planes)

The existence of fighting strength in depth (air supply and repair depots) had not been reported, but it was believed that it was limited and there were no large installations. More than one hundred airfields were reported to be in the Philippines but, with the exception of Nichols Field, Stotsenburg, and those south of Aparri, it was believed they could not be used by large type aircraft.

With the objective of destroying the enemy in the Philippines and capturing the enemy's principal base of operations, the 14th Army, in coordination with the Navy, was to land on Luzon, destroy the enemy and quickly capture Manila. Subsequently, the Army would occupy important places in the Philippines. The initial strength, composition and disposition of the 14th Army was as follows:

- 48th Division (Formosa and Hainan Island)
- 16th Division (Kyoto, Japan)
- 68th Brigade (Three infantry regiments as a nucleus, Japan)
- Other units directly under the control of Fourteenth Army
- 5th Air Group (Composed of mainly one air brigade, one independent air unit, and one fighter regiment; to assemble on Formosa from northern Manchuria)

The Operational Plan

The main force of the 14th Army was to assemble on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, while the elements of the advance force which were to attack the Philippines, would assemble on Mako and Palau. While this concentration was taking place every effort was made to conceal the plan. In the event of enemy attack, in the course of preparation for the operations, the closest unit was to take the initiative and ambush the enemy. If, however, negotiations between the United States and Japan were successful, all forces were to cease operations immediately.

The operation would begin with a series of air attacks against the Philippines, followed by the landing of small army detachments with the mission of quickly capturing air base primarily on northern Luzon. The Army main force would then land on Luzon, quickly

capture Manila, and successively occupy important areas within the Philippines. It was expected that landing operations would be made in the face of enemy fire after neutralizing the enemy's air and sea power.

The 5th Air Group was to deploy from northern Manchuria, assemble on Formosa and, in coordination with the Naval air units deployed on Formosa and Palau Islands, would begin the operation with attacks on the enemy air forces in the Philippines and annihilate them. The 5th Air Group would establish an airfield on Batan Island (220 kilometers north of Aparri), which the Navy was to capture in the opening battle. On the evening of the day prior to the first air attack the "A", "B", and "C" Detachments were to start from the assembly point. "A" Detachment landing on Aparri, "B" and "C" Detachment at Vigan, ("C" Detachment was to subsequently land at Laoag). These units, operating under 14th Army control, were to quickly eliminate enemy forces and capture and maintain airfields in the vicinity of the landing points. The "D" and "E" Detachments were to depart from the assembly point (Palau) on the same day, "D" Detachment to land at Legaspi and "E" Detachment, under the control of the Sakaguchi Detachment of the 16th Army, to land at Davao, quickly eliminate enemy forces, capture and in coordination with the Navy equip air bases in the vicinity of the landings. The main force of the 5th Air Group

was to support the operations of the "A", "B" and "C" Detachments while the Naval air units were to support the operations of the "D" and "E" Detachments. During this period the Army and Navy Air units would work in close coordination during the landing operations. The 48th Division was to land at Lingayen Gulf, destroy the enemy on Central Luzon and capture Manila, while the 16th Division, landing at Lamon Bay and coordinating with the main force of the Army, was to destroy the enemy on southern Luzon and participate in the capture of Manila.

If the objective of the operation was accomplished, the main force of the Army with the 48th Division as the nucleus was to assemble and make preparation for redeployment to the Dutch East Indies, and the main force of the 5th Air Group was to prepare for redeployment to Malaya.

Details of the Plan of Attack

The commanders of the 11th Air Fleet, 14th Army, and 5th Air Group met at Iwakuni Naval Air Base in Japan during the middle of November and, based on the Central Army-Navy Agreement regarding air operations, prepared plans for the coordination of Army and Navy air units in the field operations. These plans called for the Navy, with a strength of approximately 250 aircraft (21st and 23d Air Flotillas) based at Takao, Tainan, Taichu, Kagi and Palau to attack the Philippines in the area south of 16 degrees

latitude and the Army, with a strength of approximately 200 aircraft, based at Heito, Choshu, Kato and Koshun, to attack the Philippines in the area north of that latitude. For the landing on northern Luzon the Navy was charged with the protection of the convoys to the landing areas and the Army and the Navy had dual responsibility for the protection and support of the operations during the landing. The Army was charged with the support of subsequent land operations. The landing operations at Lamon Bay and in the vicinity of Legaspi and Davao were the sole responsibility of the Navy. A carrier striking task force, built around the 4th Carrier Division (24 planes), was scheduled to support these operations.

The 14th Army commander, at Taihoku, was charged with the preparations for operations and during the period 24-27 November issued the following directives:

The 14th Army will coordinate with the Navy and start the operations with an air strike. The main force of the Army will land at Lingayen Gulf on the 15th day of operations and swiftly destroy the enemy in the Philippines and capture the capital, Manila, in one blow. With the opening of battle our Navy will annihilate enemy ships and small craft in the Philippines and will support the landing of the Army's main effort with an element of its air unit. Definite orders will be issued at a later date concerning the time for commencement of military operations.

The 5th Air Group was charged with the destruction of enemy air power in the Philippines, protection of the convoy carrying the main force of the Army, and the support of the landing of the Army's main force. An element of the Army's ground force (main

strength of one airfield battalion) was to depart from Takao on 7 December and assist the Navy in the capture of the airfield on Batan Island. When this field was operationally usable, the 5th Air Group was to use the field and continue operations. On the third day of operations the "A", "B" and "C" Detachments, with the cooperation of the Navy, were to land on the northern coast of Luzon in the vicinity of Aparri, Vigan and Laoag, occupy and prepare for operational use airfields in the vicinity of the landing points. It is extremely important that the occupation and completion of these airfields be accomplished with utmost swiftness. When the capture and repair of the Vigan and Laoag airfields and the Airfields south of Aparri had been completed the main force of the 5th Air Group was to deploy to these fields as swiftly as possible and continue the air operations.

During the concentration of forces at Takao, Mako, and Kiirun (Keelung), the 5th Air Group in cooperation with the 4th Air Regiment (Formosa Army) was charged with the protection of these ports. In the event of air attack on Formosa, aircraft and not anti-aircraft was to be used in breaking up the attack. During this build-up of forces the 5th Air Group was directed to attach air ground units to the "A", "B" and "C" Detachments as well as attachment of the main strength of the 24th Airfield Battalion to the Naval force charged with the capture of Batan Island.

Concentration and Deployment

Although the 5th Air Group was stationed at Tsitsihar in northern Manchuria, redeployment to southern Formosa by land and air began during the middle of November and was completed by 7 December. The composition and deployment of the 5th Air Group under the command of Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata as of 7 December was as follows:

- 5th Air Group Headquarters (at Heito)
 - 4th Air Brigade
 - Headquarters (at Heito)
 - 8th Air Regiment (light bombers) (at Kato)
 - 14th Air Regiment (heavy bombers) (at Choshu)
 - 16th Air Regiment (light bombers) (at Kato)
 - 50th Air Regiment (fighters) (at Koshun)
 - 24th Air Regiments (fighters) (at Heito and Choshu)
 - 10th Independent Air Unit
 - Headquarters (at Tainan)
 - 52d Independent (Army reconnaissance) Squadron (at Heito)
 - 74th Independent (Observation) Squadron (at Heito)
 - 76th Independent (Hqs. reconnaissance) Squadron (at Heito)
 - 11th Air Transport Squadron (at Taichu)
 - 4th Air Sector Command
 - 11th Air Sector Command
 - 18th Airfield Battalion
 - 24th Airfield Battalion
 - 28th Airfield Battalion
 - 48th Airfield Battalion
 - 13th Airfield Company
 - 32nd Airfield Company
 - 1st Air Communication Regiment
 - 3d Air Intelligence Unit
 - 2d Field Meteorological Battalion Hq.
 - 3d Meteorological Company
 - 4th Meteorological Company
 - 4th Field Airfield Construction Unit
 - 9th Field Airfield Construction Unit
 - 297th Independent Motor Transport Company
 - 298th Independent Motor Transport Company
 - 111th Land Duty Company
 - 123d Land Duty Company
 - 56th Construction Duty Company
 - 40th Field Antiaircraft Battalion

The 8th, 14th, and 50th Air Regiments were training units changed to field units and had as a part of the regiment an airfield battalion. The 16th and 24th Air Regiments and the 52d, 74th, and 76th Independent Squadrons were field units and did not have their own airfield battalions. The number and type of aircraft in each unit were as follows:

UNIT	ORGANIZATION	TYPE AND NUMBER OF PLANES
8th	One Hq. Reconnaissance Squadron Three light bomber Squadrons	9, Model 97 Hq. Recon. 27, Model 99 twin engine bombers
14th	Three heavy bomber Squadrons	27, Model 97 heavy bombers
50th	Three fighter Squadrons	36, Model 97 fighters
16th	Three light bomber Squadrons	27, Model 97 light bombers
24th	Three fighter Squadrons	36, Model 97 fighters
52d	One Army Reconnaissance Squadron	9, Model 97 Army Recon.
74th	One Observation Squadron	12, Model 98 observation
76th	One Hq. Reconnaissance Squadron	9, Model 97 Hq. Recon.

The Initial Operations

All was now in readiness; the operational plans had been made, the units to participate in the operation had been assembled and only awaited the day and hour of departure. On the evening of December 7th, the Tanaka and Kanno Detachments, the advance units

of the 14th Army, boarded ship at Mako and sailed for their invasion points. The Kimura Detachments boarding ship at Palau was navigating toward Legaspi under Naval escort. The operations had begun.

At dawn of 8 December the 5th Air Group commenced operations. The 8th Air Regiment, with twenty-five aircraft, took off from Kato and the 14th Air Regiment, with eighteen aircraft, took off from Choshu for their objectives in the Philippines and arrived over their targets at about 0800 without sighting any enemy aircraft. The 8th bombed and strafed Tuguegarao Airfield, while the 14th attacked the Baguio Barracks. All aircraft returned to their bases about noon. The Naval air unit, whose take-off had been delayed about five hours by dense fog, attacked Iba and Clark Airfields at about 1330 hours. Twenty-five enemy aircraft were reported shot down and seventy-five (forty-five large and medium) aircraft were reported damaged. Meanwhile, the 24th Air Regiment, flying twenty-five sorties, and the 50th Air Regiment, flying twenty-two sorties, were on convoy protection and did not sight any enemy aircraft. The 24th Airfield Battalion, which had departed from Takao on the 7th, in cooperation with the Navy landed on Batan Island in vicinity of Basco at dawn on the 8th, and by evening had seized the Basco Airfield. Elements of the 52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron and 74th Observation Squadron landed on the Basco Airfield immediately after the occupation and, according

to their reconnaissance reports, the airfield could be used operationally by only fighters and reconnaissance planes.

On 9 December fighters of the 24th and 50th Air Regiments, operating from the Basco Airfield, provided air cover for the Tanaka and Kanno Detachments. Reconnaissance of northern Luzon to determine the enemy situation and made by the Group headquarters reconnaissance planes. Enemy bombers were patrolling the shores of Luzon Island but their actions were not positive. On the evening of the 9th, the 5th Air Group commander issued orders (5th Air Group Operational Order, A, No. 136) which in substance were as follows:

On 10 December, the 10th Independent Air Unit will carry out photographic reconnaissance of the various landing points in Lingayen Gulf and the vicinity of San Fabian and Pozorrubio and the road between Pugo and Rosario. The 24th Air Regiment will support the landing of the Kanno Detachment. In the event that the capture of Vigan Airfield is successful, elements of the 24th may use this airfield. The 4th Air Brigade commander will direct the 16th and 50th Air Regiments to support the anchorage and landing of the Tanaka Detachment and the 8th Air Regiment to support the landing at the Kanno Detachment. In addition the Brigade commander will direct the 14th Air Regiment to attack Clark Field (secondary target, Del Carmen Airfield) at 1100.

At 0510 on the 10th, the Kanno Detachment landed in the vicinity of Vigan, without enemy resistance, and immediately occupied Vigan Airfield. Six enemy four-engine planes attacked and bombed the convoy and region of the landing point at about 0830 and subsequently several attacks were made by enemy aircraft and some damage

was inflicted on the transports. Meanwhile at 0550, the Tanaka Detachment landed in the eastern sector of Aparri without enemy resistance and advanced toward the Aparri airfield, occupying the airfield at 1430. Some casualties were received during the attack on the enemy bomber base. Elements of the 5th Air Group, as directed by the orders of the previous day, were providing active support to these operations. The 24th Air Regiment, now operating from the Basco Airfield, flew six missions in support of the Kanno Detachment landing at Vigan. Two enemy fighters were encountered but no damage was inflicted. At the same time the 8th Air Regiment, operating from Kato, flew three missions in support of the Kanno Detachment in its battle in the vicinity of Vigan. They dive-bombed and strafed enemy vehicles in the vicinity of Santiago, destroying approximately thirty armored cars and motor trucks of those moving north of the road Vigan and San Fernando. In the air they engaged approximately twenty enemy fighters, shooting down four with the loss of only one of their aircraft. Meanwhile, the 16th and 50th Air Regiments gave support to the Tanaka Detachment in its battle for Aparri and bombed the roads from Aparri to Tuguegarao, but did not encounter any enemy aircraft. As directed by the 5th Air Group Order, the 14th Air Regiment took off to attack Clark Field but could not attack due to the dense clouds in the area; therefore, it attacked Iba Airfield causing considerable damage. The reported results on Naval air activity on the 10th were fifty enemy aircraft (seven large type) shot

down and fifty-three enemy aircraft (twelve large type) damaged.

Due to bad flying weather on the 11th, flying activity was limited to covering the Vigan anchorage by an element of the 24th Air Regiment and the movement to Vigan of those elements of the 24th Air Regiment still stationed at Choshu under the Air Regiment commander. In addition, the 4th Air Brigade, twenty-two sorties by the 8th Air Regiment, supported the ground action of the Kanno Detachment. Also on the 11th, the 5th Air Group commander issued 5th Air Group Operations Order A, No. 139, which directed the successive displacement to northern Luzon of elements of the 5th Air Group during the period 12-19 December. The plan was essentially as follows:

The 4th Air Brigade Headquarters from Heito to Aparri 14-15, 8th Air Regiment from Kato to Aparri, the 3 light bomber squadrons to make the move during the period 15-16 and the Headquarters reconnaissance squadron to move during the period 18-19, 14th Air Regiment from Choshu to Aparri 18-19, 16th Air Regiment after moving to Aparri on the 12th and 13th, was to move to Vigan on the 16th and 17th and the 50th Air Regiment after moving to Aparri on the 12th and 13th, was to advance to Vigan on the 15th and 16th. The 24th Air Regiment was to move to Vigan on the 12th. The 52d Air Squadron after moving to Vigan on the 13th was to advance to Laoag on the 15th, 16th and the 74th Air Squadron was to move to Vigan on the 15th and 16th.

At 0240 on 12 December, the Kimura Detachment landed in the vicinity of Legaspi and by 0900 of the same day had occupied Daraga Airfield. Meanwhile, the Tanaka Detachment commander, having found that the Aparri Airfield was unexpectedly small, ordered the siezing of Tuguegarao Airfield. By 0530 the airfield had been occupied

without meeting enemy resistance. At 0800 elements of the Kanno Detachment occupied and prepared for operational use, the Laoag Airfield. All advance airfields were now occupied, therefore, the air force ground units attached to the Tanaka and Kanno Detachments returned to Group control. The main force of the 50th Air Regiment having moved to Aparri Airfield as directed by the group order of the previous day was attacked by one enemy fighter which destroyed two aircraft. During this period, Naval air units attacked Batangas, Iba, Olongapo and Clark Fields shooting down eight aircraft and damaging about thirty-four. At 1800, 12 December, the 5th Air Group commander issued 5th Air Group Operational Order A, No. 141 covering the air activities of the group for the following day. The order called for the protection of the Tanaka and Kanno Detachments and the advance airfields and ordered the annihilation of the remaining enemy aircraft by repeated attacks on enemy airfields with a few picked aircraft.

On the 13th, the 5th Air Group, put into effect the operations outlined in the order of the previous day. Eight aircraft of the 24th Air Regiment attacked Del Carmen Airfield at daybreak, destroying on the ground four medium type enemy aircraft. At 1030 nine aircraft of the 5th Air Regiment attacked Clark Field, strafing ten or more small enemy aircraft on the field with unknown results. At 1300, ten aircraft from the same regiment attacked Cabanatuan Airfield but did not encounter any enemy aircraft. Following those

attacks, the 24th Air Regiment attacked Clark Field at 1100 with six aircraft and Cabanatuan Airfield at 1400 with nine aircraft encountering no enemy aircraft. At 1130 bombers of the 14th Air Regiment attacked Clark Field, from an altitude of 4,000 meters. Sixty Model 94 50kg instantaneous bombs were dropped, destroying five large type and approximately twenty small type aircraft on the ground. In addition, one enemy fighter was shot down while attempting to intercept the flight. The 14th Air Regiment again bombed Clark Field at 1430, destroying runways and other facilities. In the above attacks some aircraft were hit by antiaircraft fire, but all returned to their base safely. Seventeen bombers of the 8th Air Regiment took off from Kato at 0900, bombed Tarlac barracks and the enemy headquarters at Baguio about 1100, and returned to their base at 1400. The action radius of this regiment was about 800 kilometers, generally considered the maximum for Model 99 twin engine light bombers. Other air activity consisted of coverage of the Vigan anchorage by twenty-four sorties from the 52d and 74th Air Squadrons and Naval air attacks on Nichols, Del Carmen, and Cabanatuan Airfields, resulting in one enemy aircraft shot down and 200 destroyed since the opening of operations on the 13th.

Eleven aircraft of the 50th Air Regiment and six aircraft from the 14th Air Regiment attacked Del Carmen Airfield on the 14th, sighting no enemy aircraft. On the same day the Headquarters and one squadron of the 16th Air Regiment deployed to Aparri Airfield as

directed by the 5th Air Group order of the 11th. Aparri was found to be so small that it was difficult for one light bomber regiment to use it. Our air attacks since the commencement of operations had destroyed the greater part of the enemy's air power, the remaining aircraft were being moved from one airfield to avoid our air attacks but were making periodic surprise attacks using a few aircraft. As of the 14th there seemed to be three large type aircraft undamaged at Clark Field and five at Del Carmen Field. At 1400 hours on the 14th, the Group commander issued 5th Air Group Operational Order A, No. 144, (Chart 1) calling for attacks in waves on Del Carmen Airfield by all units.

On the 15th, twenty-three sorties by the 24th Air Regiment and eighteen by the 14th Air Regiments were flown in attacking the northern part of Del Carmen Airfield three times. The 14th Air Regiment dropped sixty rounds of model 94 50kg bombs (instantaneous) at a height of about 4,000 meters destroying about ten small type aircraft concealed on the field and other facilities.

On the same day eleven sorties by the 16th Air Regiment and eighteen by the 50th Air Regiment were mounted in attacks on Del Carmen and Clark Field. The 16th Air Regiment dropped twenty rounds of 50kg bombs (instantaneous) on Del Carment Field at a height of about 1,500 meters destroying four small and one medium type aircraft and in a dive bombing attack on Clark Field twenty-four rounds





Chart--1 DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACK OF THE 5TH AIR GROUP ON 15 DECEMBER

UNIT	AIRFIELD	MISSION	TIME	STRENGTH	REMARKS
2 ^d Air Regiment (of 5th Air Group)	Vigan	1st attack Del Carmen Airfield 2nd attack Del Carmen Airfield 3rd attack Clark Field	1030 1200 1330	One squadron in each attack	Coordinate with the 14th Air Regiment
50th Air Regiment (of 4th Air Brig.)	Aparri	Coordinated attack with the 16th Air Regiment	0900 1500	One squadron in each attack	Fuel can be acquired at Tuguegarao and Vigan
16th Air Regiment (of 4th Air Brig.)	Aparri	1st attack Del Carmen Field 2nd attack Clark Field	0900 1500	One squadron	
8th Air Regiment (of 4th Air Brig.)	Kato	Tariac and Baguio	1400	One squadron	
14th Air Regiment (of 4th Air Brigade)	Chosha	1st attack Del Carmen Field 2nd attack Del Carmen Field 3rd attack Clark Field	1030 1200 1330	One squadron in each attack	Attack artillery posi- tions or installations at Clark Field
76th Independent Air Squadron (Attached to 10th Indep. Air Unit)	Heito	Reconnaissance of Results of attacks on Del Carmen and Clark Field and the enemy situation at Iba.	Around 1430	One aircraft each area	



of 50kg bombs (instantaneous) were dropped destroying three aircraft.

On the 16th, the 5th Air Group, while preparing for the attack on Manila, supported the Tanaka Detachment in its advance south of Vigan and planes of the headquarters reconnaissance squadron reconnoitered enemy positions and movement around Manila. On this day the 14th Air Regiment was ordered to support the 23rd Army in its attack on Hongkong. The regiment advanced to Canton on the 16th and after attacks on Hongkong on the 17th and 18th, which destroyed batteries and other military installations, returned to Choshu on the 22nd.

Due to unfavorable weather on the 17th, the plan for a full-scale attack on the airfields surrounding Manila to complete the annihilation of enemy air power had to be postponed. Reconnaissance planes reported four large planes at Nichols Field, two on Nielson Field and two on Clark Field, but the situation at other fields was unknown. As covered in a previously issued air force plan, the Tanaka Detachment in its advance on Vigan, left one company at Tuguegarao Airfield and one platoon at Aparri. These units were to come under the command of the 5th Air Group which was responsible for the defense of the airfields.

At 1300 on the 18th, the 16th Air Regiment attacked Nichols and Zablan Airfields with ten aircraft destroying four large and four other aircraft. The 8th Air Regiment attacked Camp Murphy Airfield at 1410 with five aircraft, destroying four large and

three small aircraft, while six aircraft attacked Tarlac Barracks. Elements of the 50th Air Regiment flew fighter cover for these attacks. The 24th Air Regiment moved from Vigan to Laoag and also provided air cover to Vigan anchorage. As a result of the battle situation and additional information on the condition of airfields, the 5th Air Group commander issued, in the evening of this day, 5th Air Group Operational Order A, No. 151, which outlined the mission and movements of the Group in the covering of landing and support of subsequent operations of the 48th Division from "Z" Day (22 December) to Z plus 20. (Chart 2) As protection for the anchorage the following plan (A, No. 157) was to be put into effect: ON Z Day minus 1, one aircraft of the 52d Air Regiment would fly reconnaissance of the convoy position at 0700. From 0700 to 1200, two formations from the 24th Air Regiment also operating from Laoag Airfield would provide air cover for the convoy and from 1200 to 1800, two formations from the 50th Air Regiment flying from Vigan Airfield would take over that mission. After Z Day air cover for the convoy position would be provided by one squadron of the 50th Air Regiment from 0730 to 1200 and one squadron from the 24th Air Regiment from 1200 to 1830. The plan called for this protection to continue until Z plus 5 depending upon the situation; operations on Z Day were to be covered in a separate order.


Although most of the enemy's air power had been destroyed, enemy aircraft were still attacking the anchorages; therefore, the

Chart--2 5th Air Group Plan for Direct Support of Land Operations

Time	Mission and Movements of Air Units
Pre-landing Phase Z minus 2 to Z minus 1	Reconnaissance by the 10th Independent Air Unit of the Agoe and Caba landing points and along Lingayen, San Fabian and Posorrubio as well as the rear of those positions.
Z Day (22 December)	The 10th Independent Air Unit and 16th Air Regiment will give direct support to the landing operations and the 8th and 14th Air Regiments will attack targets in the rear areas.
First Phase Z Day to Z plus 3	The main force of the 10th Independent Air Unit will advance as soon as possible to Naguilian Airfield and will continue to support the landing units. The 16th Air Regiment will attack the enemy's front lines while the other bomber unit will attack enemy units operating on the flank and the rear area. As soon as Rinalonan Airfield is occupied it will be put into operating condition.
Second Phase Z plus 3 to Z plus 10	10th Independent Air Unit will reconnoiter enemy positions expected to be on the hill east of Candaba Swamps. Bomber units will attack the enemy at Tarlac and Cabanatuan which is expected to be on our flanks. Fighters and Bombers will cooperate to annihilate the remaining enemy aircraft and bomb the rear areas. Cabanatuan and Bongabon Airfields will be occupied and placed in operations as soon as possible.
Third Phase Z plus 10 to Z plus 15	10th Independent Air Unit will continue reconnaissance of enemy position. The main force of the bomber units will attack the enemy positions and after penetration of the enemy positions by our ground units our light bombers shall harass the retreating enemy.
Fourth Phase Z plus 15 to Z plus 20	Attacks on positions around Manila and completion of an airfield along the Angat River. Manila will not be bombed without orders.

Note:

The main mission of the 52nd Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron will be reconnaissance of enemy positions, while the main mission of the heavy bombers will be the destruction of enemy air power.



Group commander, while preparing for the landing of the main force of the 14th Army, decided to destroy the remaining enemy air power, north of Manila. At 1400 on the 19th, 5th Air Group Operational Order A, No. 153, was issued and ordered the 4th Air Brigade, with one squadron of the 24th Air Regiment attached, to attack, on the following day, the main enemy airfields in and to the north of Manila.

On the 20th, the 4th Air Brigade, consisting of ten aircraft of the 50th Air Regiment, six aircraft of the 24th Air Regiment, twelve aircraft from the 8th Air Regiment and two squadrons from the 16th Air Regiment, attacked Nichols, Del Carmen, Iba and Cabanatuan Airfields at 1300; only four aircraft were sighted (on Nichols Field) and these were destroyed. At 1130 on this day, the Group commander being informed of thirty small aircraft based at Limay, ordered fourteen aircraft of the 24th Air Regiment to attack. However, no planes were sighted on the ground or in the air so all aircraft returned. 5th Air Group Operational Order A, No. 155, was issued on this day calling for diversionary attacks on the military installations in Baler Bay and Subic Bay Areas by bombers of the 4th Air Brigade in an attempt to conceal the real landing point at Lingayen.

On 21 December, twenty planes of the 24th Air Regiment and twenty-four planes from the 50th Air Regiment provided air cover for the 14th Army convoy. As diversionary attacks, to deceive the

enemy as to our actual landing point, one squadron (six aircraft) of the 8th Air Regiment attacked Nichols Field, destroying three large and five small aircraft, while another squadron (six aircraft) dive-bombed the fortresses at the mouth of Subic Bay and on Grande Island destroying four gun emplacements and some barracks. In addition, six aircraft from two squadrons of the 16th Air Regiment attacked Baler destroying the wireless station. Reconnaissance reports indicated that thirty enemy fighters and ten large aircraft were hiding and operating from the airfield in and around Manila. Limay airfield seemed to be the most used field. At 0900 the 5th Air Group commander issued Operational Order A, No. 157, covering operations on "Z" Day and supplementing the directives of Operational Order A, No. 151. This order directed the 76th Independent Air Squadron to make a reconnaissance at 0800 on the 22nd, of the Lamon landing and enemy situation in the vicinity of Lamon Bay and Manila. On that day one squadron of the 50th Air Regiment was to cover the anchorage from 0700 to 0830 and from 0930 to 1530, while the 24th Air Regiment was to cover the anchorage with 2 squadrons from 0830 to 1030 and with one squadron from 1030 to 1130 and from 1530 to 1830. All aircraft were to be over the anchorage five minutes prior to the given time to prevent gaps. The 8th Air Regiment was to attack Clark Field and other airfields in the vicinity of Manila. The 14th Air Regiment was to come under direct Group control after the 22nd and was to dispatch one squadron to Tuguegarao while the

main force was to remain at Choshu prepared to support the Army landing at any time.

Support of the Main Landing and Subsequent Operations

At 0400 on the 22nd of December the first elements of the 48th Division began landing at Lingayen Gulf and the 5th Air Group commenced operations under the plans prepared and issued in advance. Forty-four sorties by the 50th Air Regiment and twenty-seven sorties by the 24th Air Regiment covered the landing operations throughout the day. The 50th Air Regiment's fighters shot down two enemy aircraft attacking the landing area. The 10th Independent Air Unit and thirty-three sorties by the 16th Air Regiment gave support to the operations of the 48th Division by attacking enemy tank and armored units between Rabon and San Fabian. Fourteen fighters of the 8th Air Regiment bombed Nichols Field at 0730 from an altitude of 5,000 meters destroying five large, two medium, and five small aircraft. Fifteen fighters from the same regiment, operating again from 5,000 meters, bombed Camp Murphy and Limay Airfields at about 1330, destroying eleven planes on the ground. 5th Air Group Operational Order 158 issued at noon on the 22nd instructed all units to continue the operations as planned, ordered the 74th Observation Squadron to move to Naguilian Airfield as soon as it was operationally possible, the 16th Air Regiment to use Bantay airfield in the vicinity of Vigan, and the 8th Air Regiment to use San Nicholas Airfield in the

vicinity of Laoag. It also instructed the 14th Air Regiment (returned to Formosa from Canton on that day) to attack the airfield at Limay and the airfields in the vicinity of Manila, with its main strength. It also directed the 14th Air Regiment, whose home base was Choshu, to use Tuguegarao and San Nicholas Fields as advance bases.

On the 23rd, thirty-one fighters of the 24th Air Regiment assisted by thirty-three sorties flown by the 50th Air Regiment covered the landing area throughout the day. Four large aircraft were sighted by the fighters from the 50th Air Regiment who gave chase but could not over take them. Sixteen fighters of the 8th Air Regiment attacked Clark, Del Carmen, and Batangas Airfields at 1030, destroying four large and three small aircraft at Clark Field and seven large and three medium planes at Del Carmen Field. Two aircraft of this regiment supported ground operations and destroyed six of a group of ten tanks that were moving north in the vicinity of San Jose. Twenty-one sorties by the 16th Air Regiment, supporting ground operations, attacked enemy positions and armored car units in the southern sector destroying twenty-one cars. On this day elements of the 14th Air Regiment moved to Tuguegarao from Choshu. 5th Air Group Operational Order A, No.160, issued on this day, placed the 14th Air Regiment under Group control and instructed the Regiment to prepare for the attack on the airfields in the vicinity of Manila scheduled for the following day.

Units of the 5th Air Group continued operations on the 24th as previously planned. The 76th Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron

flew reconnaissance missions in the vicinity of Lamon Bay and the airfields at Limay, Clark and Del Carmen. Twenty-six sorties by the 50th and thirty-one sorties by the 24th Air Regiment covered the landing area throughout the day. Eleven sorties by the 8th and fourteen sorties by the 16th Air Regiments supported the 48th Division and destroyed fifty vehicles in the vicinity of Cabanatuan and the 10th Independent Air Unit also supported the 48th Division on this day. Three aircraft of the 8th Air Regiment flew missions in support of the 16th Division, destroying ten enemy vehicles in the vicinity of Pagbilao. In addition, four aircraft from the same regiment bombed Clark Field at 1200 from an altitude of 6,000 meters, destroying seven large and four small aircraft concealed in the forest. The 8th Air Regiment lost one plane in this day of action. Seventeen sorties by the 14th Air Regiment were flown in attacking Limay and Camp Murphy destroying six large and three small enemy planes on the Camp Murphy field.

On the 25th, nine fighters of the 16th Air Regiment continued to cover the landing area. Three fighters from the 8th Regiment attacked the vicinity of Tarlac, destroying approximately 100 freight cars while, six fighters from the same regiment, in support of the 16th Division, destroyed approximately fifty trucks in the vicinity of San Pablo. On the 26th, the 5th Air Group continued to cover the landing area and support the land operations as outlined in previous plans. In addition, four planes from the 8th Air Regiment bombed Nichols Field, destroying four large planes, and nine planes from the same regiment bombed an enemy convoy in the western waters

of Limay, sinking one ship.

On the 27th, in addition to supporting the Army's ground operations, elements of the Group (seven fighters of the 8th and four fighters from the 14th Air Regiments) attacked Nichols Field destroying five large planes and one small one. In covering the landing area, fighters of the 50th Air Regiment shot down two enemy fighters in the skies above the port. On this day the Group issued directives for the gradual forward deployment of units in this area. A typhoon, originating in the Palau vicinity and sweeping the central part of the Philippines, restricted the air activities of the Group on the 28th and halted the movement of the Group's main force. In accordance with Army orders calling for the full-scale attack on Corregidor the following day, the 29th, the Group commander issued 5th Air Group operations Order A, No. 171. The order was as follows:

1. According to our information the Headquarters of the American Far Eastern Army seems to have withdrawn to Corregidor.
2. The 5th Air Group will attack Corregidor at 1200 tomorrow, the 29th, with its full strength and destroy the center of the American Far Eastern Army Command. Following our attack, between 1300-1430, the full strength of the navy's land based aircraft will attack the fortress and shipping in the vicinity.
3. Each air unit will attack Corregidor according to the following plan:

PLAN OF ATTACK ON CORREGIDOR

UNIT	TIME OF ATTACK	OBJECTIVE	OUTLINE OF EXECUTION OF ATTACK
24th Air Regiment	1200-1300	Corregidor	One squadron will control the air below 4,000 meters in coordination with 50th Regiment.
50th Air Regiment of 4th Air Brigade	1200-1300	Corregidor	One squadron will control the air below 4,000 meters in coordination with the 24th Regiment.
14th Air Regiment	1200-1220	Command Post and important military installations in the central area.	Bomb by squadrons, with as short an interval as possible between squadrons. Bomb simultaneously with fighter units.
8th Air Regiment of 4th Air Brigade	1220-1240	Command Post and other important military installations in the central area.	do
16th Air Regiment of 4th Air Brigade	1240-1300	Electric power plant, fuel ammunition and power store houses in the central area.	do

4. In case of bad weather special orders will be issued.

Units not covered on the above plan will continue their present mission.

5. I (Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata) will depart from Aparri by plane at 0900 for Tuguegarao and, after issuing combat instruction there, I will move to the Vigan Combat Command Post about 1600 and thereafter can be located there.

Note:

1. One squadron of heavy bombers will use 250kg bombs and the other heavy bomber squadron and the light bombers will use 50 to

100kg bombs. The light bombers will use incendiary bombs.

2. At 1300 the naval units will take up the attack on Corregidor.

3. Aircraft of the 14th Air Regiment flying from Choshu will land at Tuguegarao after the attack.

At 1200 on the 29th, the 5th Air Group, leaving one unit to cover the anchorage, attacked Corregidor with its full bomber strength. Braving fierce enemy antiaircraft fire all units attacked as planned, inflicting enormous damage. The attack commenced at 1200 when eighteen fighters of the 14th Air Regiment operating at an altitude of 5,000 meters dropped thirty-five 100kg and twelve 250kg delayed action bombs on the central area destroying many barracks and the fortress headquarters. At 1230, twenty-two fighters of the 8th Air Regiment, flying at 5,000 meters, dropped sixty-six 100kg delayed action bombs, while eighteen fighters of the 16th Air Regiment, dive bombing from an altitude of 1,000 meters, dropped 108 50kg delayed action bombs, on the central area, setting fire to the wireless station, electric power plant, barracks and the fortress headquarters. Nineteen fighters of the 50th Air Regiment provided air cover for the operation. During the day the Group combat command post was advanced to Vigan and the 10th Independent Air Unit moved to the newly completed Del Carmen Airfield.

On the 30th, fifteen aircraft of the 14th Air Regiment, flying from Choshu, attacked Mariveles destroying military installations there. The main force of the 5th Air Group supported ground opera-

tions throughout the day. The Army commander, knowing that the enemy was making a general retreat to the Bataan area from the Manila, Tarlac, and Cabanatuan areas, ordered the 5th Air Group commander to harass the enemy's retreat and to destroy bridges in the area west of Lubao.

On the 31st, the 8th Air Regiment, in three dive-bombing attacks on enemy vehicles in the Dinalupihan and Orani areas, destroyed over ten vehicles while twenty-four sorties by the 16th Air Regiment carried out eight dive-bombing attacks on enemy motorized units moving northwest on the San Fernando-Calumpit-Manila road destroying fifty-nine vehicles and sixty-five freight cars in the San Fernando station.

In addition to supporting ground troops on the 1st of January, units of the 5th Air Group carried out attacks on the enemy withdrawing to Bataan. Sixteen sorties by the 8th Air Regiment resulted in six bombing attacks on enemy motor units moving between Dinalupihan and Cabcaben, destroying ninety vehicles; twenty-four sorties were flown by the 16th Air Regiment in dive-bombing Calumpit, San Fernando, Limay, Orani and Balanga, destroying twenty railroad cars and thirteen vehicles; and eighteen fighters of the 14th Air Regiment bombed Dinalupihan and Balanga from 6,000 meters destroying approximately thirty vehicles and key positions on the line of retreat. At this time reconnaissance indicated that the remaining enemy air force lacked the power to attack and consisted of only five or six small planes based at Iba and Limay.

Nine fighters of the 8th Air Regiment attacked Limay and Cabcabén on the 2nd, while the 16th Air Regiment made nine attacks on enemy motor convoys and rail movement, between San Fernando and Limay, destroyed seven trucks and five railroad cars. In addition, aircraft of the 16th Air Regiment attacked a 3,000-ton ship in the entrance to Manila Bay, scoring a near miss. On this date, the 122d Infantry Regiment (minus two battalions) was placed under the control of the 5th Air Group and directed to relieve the 2d Formosa Infantry Regiment in the defense of Vigan, Laoag, and Tuguegarao. The 2d Formosa Regiment was to return to the control of its original unit. With the occupation of Manila on the 2nd, the Army commander decided to press the attack on the enemy retreating to Bataan with his main force, while securing key points in the Manila area with elements of the 16th Division. At 2000 on this day, the Army commander instructed the 5th Air Group to provide one unit as air support for the Takahashi Detachment's operations in the Dinalupihan area and support for the 16th and 48th Divisions, while the main force of the Group was to continue the attack on the retreating enemy.

Due to bad flying weather on the 3rd, the air activity of the Group was limited to protection of the port area and an attack on Samari by six planes of the 16th Air Regiment which started fires in various streets. On the 4th, the 5th Air Group continued the support of the ground operation and harassing of the retreating enemy. Nine planes of the 8th Air Regiment attacked Mariveles destroying barracks and over ten trucks, and twenty-eight sorties by

the 16th Air Regiment destroyed barracks and fifteen vehicles in the Subic area.

On the 5th, having received information that enemy planes were concealed on the Limay Airfield, the 5th Air Group with three planes of the 8th, three planes of the 14th, and fifteen planes of the 16th Air Regiments, attacked the field shooting down one enemy fighter, destroying three planes on the ground, twenty vehicles, and demolishing the airfield. The Group, having received a warning order on this day to move to Burma, began preparations for the move.

On 1 January, the commander of the Southern Army ordered the 14th Army commander to effect the transfer of the 5th Air Group to Southern Army control immediately after the capture of Manila. In accordance with these instructions the 14th Army commander on the 5th ordered the 5th Air Group, less certain elements, to prepare for the move to central Thailand. The elements not making the move, 10th Independent Air Unit, 16th Air Regiment, 3d Squadron of 50th Air Regiment, 11th Air Sector Command Headquarters and the 18th and 48th Airfield Battalions, were to be transferred to 14th Army control and remain in the Philippines. Upon receipt of these instructions the 5th Air Group commander at Vigan issued 5th Air Group Operational Order A, No. 188. Essentials of the order were as follows:

The movement was to be made in 2 echelons with the first echelon tentatively scheduled to embark about 15 January and the second echelon to embark 23 January. Units of the First echelon who were on Formosa were to assemble by the 10th and units on Luzon were to assemble by the 13th. Units to assemble at Heito, were elements




Chart--3

Casualties Suffered by the 5th Air Group (8 Dec - 7 Jan)

	Strength		Killed		Wounded	
	Officers	WCO's and EM	Officers	WCO's and EM	Officers	WCO's and EM
5th Air Group Headquarters	38	208				
10th Independent Air Unit Hq.	7	16				
76th Independent Air Squadron	15	39				
74th Independent Air Squadron	20	68	1	1		
52d Independent Air Squadron	16	56				
4th Air Brigade Hq.	10	55				
8th Air Regiment	56	553	1	15	2	13b
14th Air Regiment	48	475				1
16th Air Regiment	27	268				
50th Air Regiment	39	340	1	3	3a	3
24th Air Regiment	27	216	1			1
4th Air Sector Command Hq.	10	102				
32d Airfield Co.	7	283		1		
1st Air Communication Regiment	28	957		2		2
3d Air Intel. Unit	4	182				
11th Air Transport Squadron	5	75				
2d Field Meteorological Bn. Hq.	13	117				
3d Meteorological Co.	12	275				4
4th Meteorological Co.	12	274				
11th Air Sector Command Hq.	8	101		2		
18th Airfield Battalion	27	608		3	2	7
24th Airfield Battalion	22	592		2		2
28th Airfield Battalion	25	613		1		
48th Airfield Battalion	42	642			2	1
13th Airfield Co.	8	285				1
9th Field Air Depot.	2	56				
4th Airfield Construction Unit	6	74				1
40th Field Antiaircraft Bn.	20	504				1
9th Airfield Construction Unit	6	108				
297th Ind. Motor Co.	5	178				
298th Ind. Motor Co.	5	178				
111th Land Duty Co.	4	506				
123d Land Duty Co.	4	516				
56th Construction Duty Co.	5	175		1		
TOTAL	583	9,695	4	31	9	37

a -- includes 2 missing

b -- includes 4 missing

Aircraft Damage Suffered by the 5th Air Group* (8 Dec - 7 Jan)

	Hq. Recon.	Army Recon.	Observation	Fighter	Light Bomber	2 Engines Bomber	Heavy Bomber
74th Air Squadron			4				
52d Air Squadron		5					
8th Air Regiment	1					8	
50th Air Regiment				12			
14th Air Regiment							3
16th Air Regiment					1		
24th Air Regiment				4			
TOTAL	1	5	4	16	1	8	3

* Degree of damage unknown





Chart -- 4


Damage Inflicted on Enemy Aircraft
(December 10th to January 6th)

TYPE	CLASSIFICATION	DATE	DECEMBER												JANUARY		TOTAL												
			10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23		24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2		
Large	On the ground	Burned											2	2		1	2	1									8		
		Heavily Damaged												7	2		4	3		3	20	7	8	2	5			51	
		Slightly Damaged															2		1		2							5	
	Shot Down in the Sky																											1	
Medium	On the ground	Burned																										0	
		Heavily Damaged																							3			3	
		Slightly Damaged																										2	
	Shot Down in the Sky																											0	
Small	On the ground	Burned																								1	1	5	
		Heavily Damaged																										72	
		Slightly Damaged																										8	
	Shot Down in the Sky	Certain																									1	1	1
Uncertain																											1	1	1
TOTAL													7	46	19		15	4	9	22	17	12	2	8	3	5	169		



of the 5th Air Group Headquarters, elements of the 1st Air Communications Regiment, elements of the 3d Air Intelligence Unit; at Koshun, elements of the 50th Air Regiments airfield battalion; at Kato, elements of the 8th Air Regiments airfield battalions; at Choshu, the main force of the 14th Air Regiments airfield battalion and at Kagi, 1 element of the 14th Air Regiment's airfield battalion. Units now on Luzon were, by the 13th, to assemble as follows: at Vigan, main force of the 5th Air Group Headquarters (less air transports) main force of the 4th Air Brigade (less air transports) main force of the 50th Air Regiments airfield battalion, main force of the 1st Air Communications Regiment, main force of the meteorological company and elements of the 11th Air Transport squadron's ground crew; at Laoag elements of the 8th Air Regiment's ground crew, elements of the 14th Air Regiment's ground crew and the 4th Field Airfield Construction Unit; at Aparri, elements of the 5th Air Group Headquarters (less air transport) elements of the 4th Air Brigade Headquarters (less air transport) main force of the 8th Air Regiments airfield battalion, elements of the 1st Air Communication Regiment and elements of the Meteorological company. Concentration of the second echelon was to be by separate orders. The Group commander ordered the 4th Air Brigade (including the 14th Air Regiment which was to return to Brigade control as of that day) to return to its original bases to Taiwan beginning the 7th and the 24th Air Regiment was also to return to its base at Choshu commencing the 9th. The 24th Air Regiment then returned to the control of the Kwantung Army but prior to its departure released to the 5th Air Group the equivalent of 3 squadrons of fighter planes.

About the 14th the flying units of the 5th Air Group moved by air to Siam while the ground units moved by ship.



CHAPTER II

First Operations on Bataan Peninsula

With the enemy army now bottled up on Bataan and the enemy air power completely destroyed, except for a few aircraft hiding on Limay airstrip, the first operations for the capture of Bataan were about to begin. It was estimated that the enemy ground strength was about 65,000 men and 200 or more cannons on Bataan and over 10,000 men in the fortress in Manila Bay. Our forces consisted of the 65th Brigade, which had relieved the 48th Division, and elements of the 5th Air Group that were not re-deployed. In preparation for the coming operations the Army commander organized the remaining air elements into the Army Air Unit and placed them under the command of Col. Hoshi. The organizations of the 6th was as follows:

UNIT	STATION	NUMBER AND TYPE OF PLANES
Army Air Unit (Col. Hoshi)		
10th Independent Air Unit (Col Hoshi)		
52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron	Del Carmen	9 Reconnaissance
74th Observation Squadron	Cabanatuan	5 Observation
76th Hq. Reconnaissance Squadron	Tuguegarao	7 Hq. Recon
	Elements-Vigan	
16th Air Regiment	Vigan	36 Light Bombers
3d Squadron, 50th Air Regiment	Vigan	11 Fighters
Elements of 1st Air Comm. Regt		
11th Air Sector Unit (Col Tanaka)		
11th Air Sector Hq.	Vigan	
48th Airfield Battalion	Main Force-Aparri	
	Elements-Vigan	
18th Airfield Battalion	Main Force-Vigan	
	Elements-Clark Field	
13th Airfield Company	Carmen	
32d Airfield Company	Southern Formosa	
1st Mobile Air Repair Section	Vigan	
297th Ind. Motor Company	Vigan	
40th Field A.A.A. Battalion	Main force-Aparri	
	Elements-Vigan, Tuguegarao	
111th Land Duty Company	Del Carmen	
56th Airfield Const. Company	Aparri	

His forces now organized, the commander of the Army Air Unit decided to use his main force in attacking the remaining enemy air facilities on Bataan, while elements of his command supported the attack of the 65th Brigade. The first air operations in the capture of Bataan began on the 10th, when the main strength of the 52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron and the 16th Air Regiment bombed the Balanga Airfield and military installations near Bagac. On the 11th, planes of the 16th Air Regiment bombed the Limay airstrip, the artillery positions north of Abucay and an enemy motor transport unit, destroying one small plane, 18 vehicles and three cannons. On that day the 16th Air Regiment, 74th Observation Squadron and the main force of the 3d Squadron, 50th Air Regiment advanced to Stotsenburg Airfield.

During the first offensive on Bataan (14 January to 15 March), the aircraft of the Army Air Unit were in operations daily. Their main mission during this period was the support of the 65th Brigade and the Kimura Detachment. The results of these attacks were as follows:

Vehicles destroyed	about 120
Tanks destroyed.....	7
Airplanes destroyed on the ground....	9
Airplanes shot down.....	9

Our losses were two aircraft missing.

Our first offensive for the capture of Bataan having met with only limited success, it was decided that prior to the opening of the second offensive the Army and Army Air Unit must be reinforced.

Therefore, the 60th Air Regiment (headquarters and three heavy bomber squadrons) and the 62d Air Regiment (headquarters, three heavy bomber squadrons and one airfield battalion) were assigned to the Army Air Unit on 14 March, arriving on Luzon on the 16th of March. The Army ground forces also received substantial reinforcement by Imperial General Headquarters and Southern Army orders. On the 21st of March, Army and Navy staff members of squadron commander rank and above assembled to develop the plan for air support of the offensive. Essentials of the plan were as follows:

The Mission

The main strength of the Army Air Unit shall support the attack on Bataan Peninsula and bomb Corregidor and the other fortresses in Manila Bay. Elements of the Army Air Unit will support the Army's operations against the Visaya Islands and Mindanao.

The General Plan

Prior to the opening of the general offensive by our ground forces, the Army Air Unit shall make reconnaissance of the enemy positions and select targets for bombing. During these reconnaissance missions, our aircraft shall attack enemy strong points, enemy aircraft and airfields in order to stop enemy air activity and also to prevent the escape of any officers.

With the opening of the general offensive, the main strength of the Army Air Unit will be used in direct support of the ground force while the reconnaissance units will be used in mopping-up operations on the Visaya Islands and Mindanao, although a small force of bombers and fighters may be called upon to support these operations if necessary.

Operations on Bataan shall be carried out in close cooperation with the Navy.

Details of the Plan

A. Prior to the General Offensive

1. Reconnaissance

Aircraft of the 74th Observation Squadron shall make reconnaissance of enemy movement, installations and movement between the enemy first and second defense lines, while the 52d Reconnaissance Squadron will reconnoiter the enemy's second line of defense. The 76th Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron will reconnoiter the enemy airfields and the movement of enemy warships and other vessels.

The 52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron shall take aerial photographs (stereoscopic) of the entire depth of the enemy position in the main attack area and shall examine these photographs critically. Photographs of other important positions shall be taken by the units concerned as deemed necessary and field intelligence shall be used as much as possible.

2. Bombing

The main mission of the light bombers (16th Air Regiment) will be support of the army ground forces and will attack targets, particularly artillery and anti-aircraft artillery positions, between the enemy's first and second defense lines. Heavy bomber units (60th and 62d Air Regiments) will attack Corregidor fortress, airfields and other important targets in the rear. Attacks on targets in the rear area will be made to destroy enemy strong points and to demoralize the enemy. The target shall be limited strictly to Command Posts, billeting areas (particularly Americans), warehouses, quartermaster areas, communication roads and other vital points.

As the occasion demands, light bombers will be used to attack enemy mobile targets in the rear areas and heavy bombers may be used to bomb targets (artillery, etc.) directly behind the enemy's first line of defense.

3. Demoralizing Raids.

Throughout the operation harassing raids will be carried out in order to demoralize the enemy and to boost the fighting spirit of our army. As many planes as possible shall participate in these raids or on occasions a small number of planes shall continue to attack day and night.

B. Direct Cooperation on Ground Operation

1. Reconnaissance Units.

The main strength of the 74th Observation Squadron will support the operation of the 4th Division and shall observe fire for the artillery. If necessary, 1 section (about 3 planes) shall support the Nagano Detachment and at the end of operations a section may be used in the Mindanao area.

The main strength of the 52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron shall reconnoiter targets in the enemy's rear area, while a section of the Squadron may be used in the Visaya Island area.

The 76th Army Reconnaissance Squadron shall keep constant watch on enemy airfields and the movement of enemy warships and other vessels. When necessary it will operate with the bomber units or perform reconnaissance for enemy vehicular movement along the eastern and western coastal roads.

During the course of the operations reconnaissance and observation squadrons will maintain close liaison with the bomber units.

2. Bomber Units.

The main force of the bomber units will be used to support the attack of the ground force by attacking targets along the enemy's first line of defense directly in front of our attack while elements of the bomber force will attack targets to the rear and on the flanks. A small force of light bombers shall be designated to attack enemy artillery positions, thereby decreasing the volume of enemy artillery fire. After penetration of the enemy first line of defense, by our ground units, the bomber unit shall attack the second line of defense to soften it up for our attack. Artillery positions, flank positions and retreating enemy or reinforcements moving up shall be particular targets. Bombing of the rear area shall be continued with particular attention being paid to movement of enemy troops. The summit of Mt. Mariveles shall be kept under observation and bombed if targets appear.

Attacks on the enemy shipping will normally be performed by the Navy, however, depending on the progress of the Bataan operations, the Army Air Unit may be called to participate in these attacks.

Additional Details

Unit commander shall make every attempt to acquire sufficient bombs and ammunition for 60 sorties per aircraft. It is realized that due to unpredictable circumstances that this may not be possible, however, sufficient bombs and ammunition will be stored for a minimum of 40 sorties per aircraft.

During the coming operation, units will use the airfields they are now operating from, but some units in the central and southern Philippine Islands may be advanced for this operation, as the occasion may demand.

Time of attack, strength of unit and targets are given in battle order No. 197 (Chart 5)

Second Bataan Offensive

During the day of the 24th of March, twenty-six bombers of the 60th and nineteen heavy bombers of the 62d Air Regiments, alternating their attacks with Naval Air Units, bombed Corregidor and several other points. A total of fifty-four sorties were flown by the light bombers of the 16th Air Regiment against enemy positions in front of the 16th Division and the 65th Brigade. During the day eighteen heavy bombers of the 60th Air Regiment bombed the Limay Airfield and that night three bombers from the same regiment bombed Corregidor again. Total bombs dropped during the day were as follows:

	On Corregidor	On Limay Airfield	Enemy Positions on Bataan
60th Air Regiment	500kg..... 6	250kg..... 18	
	250kg.....36	100kg..... 98	
	100kg.....87		
62d Air Regiment	250kg.....18		
	100kg.....88		
16th Air Regiment		50kg.....323

Note: All bombs were delayed action.

During the day of the 25th, the 16th Air Regiment flew fifty-seven sorties in direct support of the ground forces, concentrating their attack on enemy artillery positions. The 60th Air Regiment bombed Corregidor with eighteen heavy bombers and Cabucari Airfield with nine heavy bombers. Fourteen heavy bombers of the 62d Air Regiment bombed Mariveles Airfield during the day and that night three heavy bombers of that regiment made three consecutive attacks on Corregidor. Although the enemy seemed to suffer heavy damage from the raids of the 24th and 25th they were still delivering a heavy volume of artillery fire on our positions between each of our raids and on Corregidor over twenty antiaircraft guns were still in operation.

The air activity of the Army Air Unit on 26th continued to follow the plan. Twenty-seven sorties by the light bombers of the 16th Air Regiment were flown in bombing enemy positions and artillery targets in front of the 65th Brigade. Twenty-seven sorties by the heavy bombers of the 60th Air Regiment were used to bomb the Panikyan area, several warehouses and one 300-ton ship. The 62d Air Regiment also attacked the Panikyan area flying nineteen sorties. Nine harassing sorties were flown on Corregidor during the night by one plane from each of the three bomber squadrons making three consecutive raids. In spite of poor flying weather on the 27th, bombers of the 16th Air Regiment flew twenty-seven sorties, bombing enemy positions and artillery installations on Bataan





Chart -- 5 BATTLE ORDER 197

March	TIME	60TH AIR REGIMENT		62D AIR REGIMENT		16TH AIR REGIMENT		NAVAL AIR FORCE	
		Number of Squadrons	Target	Number of Squadrons	Target	Number of Squadrons	Target (S. Betan)	Number of Squadrons	Target
24	Dawn to 1100	3	Corregidor	3	Corregidor			2	Corregidor
	1100 to 1500	2	Limay (Afd)			3	West Coast	2	Corregidor (Afd)
	1500 to Dusk At Night	1	Corregidor	3	(in Reserve)	3	East Coast		
25	Dawn to 1100							2	Corregidor
	1100 to 1500	2	Corregidor			3	East Coast		
	1500 to Dusk At Night	1	Cabacaban (Afd)	2	Mariveles	3	West Coast	1	Corregidor
26	Dawn to 1100	3	Corregidor					1	Corregidor
	1100 to 1500			1	Corregidor	2	East Coast		
	1500 to Dusk At Night			2	Penikyan	1	West Coast	2	Corregidor
27	Dawn to 1100			1	Corregidor				
	1100 to 1500			2	Mariveles (Afd)				
	1500 to Dusk	2	Corregidor			2	West Coast	2	Corregidor (Afd)
28	Dawn to 1100			3	Corregidor	1	East Coast		
	1100 to 1500	2	Corregidor			2	East Coast	2	Corregidor
	1500 to Dusk At Night	1	Luzon (City)	2	Corregidor	1	West Coast		
				1	West Coast (Roads)			1	Corregidor



Peninsula. Thirty-five sorties were flown by the 62d Air Regiment against Corregidor and Mariveles Airfield. On this day the Army Air Unit commander announced the Army-Navy agreement on the strategy to be used in the reduction of Corregidor. The strategy called for a small number of planes to continue the harassing raids and the destruction of strong points. Although the main target was to be Corregidor, enemy positions on the southern tip of Bataan were to be attacked also. One to three planes were to attack the Fortress every two or three hours throughout the day and night. One squadron of the 60th Air Regiment was to perform the day and night interdiction of Corregidor on the 28th and one squadron of the 62d was to take over that mission on the 29th and 30th. In addition, the 60th Air Regiment was to attack Lamac City and the enemy Command Post on the 28th, with one squadron on each target and the 62d Air Regiment was to attack the enemy Command Post on the 29th with one squadron, and Artillery Point on Corregidor with one squadron on the 30th.

Squadrons of the Army Air Unit continued to hammer the enemy defense positions on the 28th. Thirty-three sorties were flown by the 16th Air Regiment against artillery positions on Bataan and six planes attacked the enemy's first line of defense in front of the 65th Brigade. Heavy bombers of the 60th Air Regiment flew twenty-seven sorties in attacks on Corregidor, Lamac City, and

Cabcaben Airfield, while the 62d Air Regiment flew twenty-two sorties in attacks on the Mariveles and Cabcaben areas. During the day only four enemy antiaircraft guns on Corregidor seemed to be active and hardly any enemy vehicles were seen on the move. However, during the lulls between our raids the enemy artillery remained quite active and the repair work on the Mariveles and Corregidor Airfields was going strong. Also on this day the Army Air Unit commander received the Army order (Operational Order A, No. 377) outlining the mission of the Army Air Unit in support of the general offensive which was to commence on the 3rd of April. The essentials of the plan were as follows: Until 3 April the Army Air Unit shall continue its mission as planned and shall continue to observe the enemy's movement in the rear areas. Until the preliminary artillery preparation is over on the 3rd, the main strength of the observation squadron shall continue to observe for the Army artillery and a minor element shall observe for the artillery of the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade. On the 3rd, the main strength of the Army Air Unit, in coordination with the preliminary artillery fire, shall attack the enemy's first line of defense confronting the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade and support the advance of the ground forces, and on the 4th of April the mission for the Army Air unit shall be the same. On and after the 5th, the main strength of the air unit shall support the 4th Division in breaking through the enemy's first line of

defense. On and after the 3rd, elements of the Army Air Unit shall attack active enemy artillery day and night.

Continuing the air operations according to plan the 16th Air Regiment flew thirty-one sorties on the 29th against the enemy positions and artillery installations in front of the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade while twenty-one sorties were flown by the 62d Air Regiment in attacks on the southern tip of Bataan and Corregidor Fortress. During the day the Army Air Unit commander issued Air Operations Order of Battle No. 216. This order stated that between 31 March and 2 April the 16th Air Regiment would give direct support to all units in our front line while the main strength of the 60th and 62d Air Regiments was to attack enemy positions and strong points in the rear areas and while elements of these Regiments continued the interdiction of Corregidor. On 3 April the entire strength of the Army Air Force was to be in direct support of the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade and would attack enemy positions in the rear.

During the day of the 30th, light bombers of the 16th Air Regiment flew thirty sorties, attacking artillery positions on Bataan, while heavy bombers of the 62d Air Regiment flew twelve sorties against Corregidor and fourteen sorties in the Panikiyan and Limay. The 62d Air Regiment lost one aircraft due to enemy antiaircraft fire during a mission over Corregidor. During the night one aircraft from the 16th Air Regiment and one aircraft from the 62d Air Regiment flew four consecutive raids on Corregidor.

The air activity in the 31st was as planned with the 16th Air Regiment flying thirty sorties on enemy positions and artillery installations in front of the 4th and 16th Divisions and the 60th Air Regiment flew eighteen sorties in the vicinity of Limay and Lamao. That night two planes of the 60th Air Regiment made three raids on Corregidor. On the 1st Day of April the 16th Air Regiment flew twenty-one sorties and on the 2nd, fifty-five sorties in support of the 16th Division and the 65th Brigade, attacking artillery and enemy positions. The 60th Air Regiment on the 1st, bombed enemy positions on Mt. Orion with eighteen planes and on the 2nd, flew twenty-seven sorties against Mt. Samat. On the night of the 1st one plane from each of these units, each made three raids on Mariveles and Corregidor.

During the period 28 March - 2 April, the reconnaissance and observation squadrons were engaged in daily reconnaissance of enemy positions, photographic reconnaissance, artillery spotting and liaison with the ground elements. The fighter squadron flew occasional missions over the battle area but failed to contact any enemy aircraft. The heavy bombing by our air units seemed to have caused heavy damage for the major portion of the enemy artillery and all of the anti-aircraft had been silenced. Therefore, on the 29th the Army Air Unit commander issued his plan based on Army Operational Order A No. 377 issued on 28 March, for the air support

of the general offensive. This plan called for the full strength of the air unit to support the ground operations with heavy emphasis on silencing the enemy artillery.

During the period 19 March - 2 April, the 10th Independent Air Unit which was the nucleus of the 14th Army Air Unit, was activating the 22d Air Brigade. The organization of the brigade was finally completed on the 2nd and on the 3rd it replaced the Army Air Unit. The organization of the brigade (Chart 6) was no more than a change of designation, for the 22d Air Brigade absorbed all of the units of the Army Air Unit.

At about 1000 on the 3rd, the 22d Air Brigade, in conjunction with our artillery, opened the preparatory fire on the enemy positions in front of the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade. Throughout the period 3 April - 9 April, the full power of the brigade made continuous attacks on enemy positions and in general support of the offensive (Chart 7). At 1500 hours the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade launched their attack with the full support of the 22d Air Brigade. Fifty-nine sorties were flown by the 16th Air Regiment in twelve attacks on enemy positions facing the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade, and fifty-four sorties were flown by the 60th Air Regiment in six attacks on the same area. The 62d Air Regiment flew thirty-four sorties in six attacks on the enemy positions in front of the 4th Division.




Chart--6 ORGANIZATION OF THE 22d AIR BRIGADE
(Major General Mikami Commanding)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>
22d Air Brigade	
Headquarters	Clark Field
10th Independent Air Unit	
Headquarters	
52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron	Nielson
74th Direct Support Squadron	Zablan
76th Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron	Nichols Field
16th Air Regiment (Light Bombers)	Nichols
11th Air Sector Unit	
Headquarters	Clark Field
48th Airfield Battalion	
Main Force	Nichols
Elements	Damortis and Zablan
18th Airfield Battalion	
Main force	Nichols Field
Elements	Clark Field, Davao, Ligaspi & Vigan
13th Airfield Squadron	
Main Force	Nielson Field
Elements	San Jose and Iloilo
32d Airfield Squadron	
Main force	Zablan
Elements	Cebu
*8th Airfield Squadron	
1st Mobile Air Repair Unit	Clark Field

ATTACHED UNITS

60th Air Regiment (Heavy bombers)	Clark Field
62d Air Regiment (Heavy bombers)	Clark Field
**84th Independent Air Squadron (Fighters)	
3d Squadron, 50th Air Regiment (Fighters)	Zablan
96th Airfield Battalion	Clark Field
2d Meteorological Battalion Headquarters	Nichols Field
3d Meteorological Company	Clark Field
40th Field Antiaircraft Battalion	
297th Independent Motor Company	
Main Force	Saromoc (phonetic spelling)
Elements	Mckinley
111th Land Duty Company	
Main force	Mckinley
Elements	Clark Field and Tarlac
56th Construction Duty Company	
Main Force	Mckinley
Elements	Clark Field

* Organized and transferred to the 22d Air Brigade 5 April.

** Arrived Luzon in early April from French Indo-China and assigned to the 22d Air Brigade.





Chart --7 Air Operation During the Period 1 - 11 April 1942

DATE	UNIT	SORTIES	NO. ATTACKS	TARGETS	NUMBER OF BOMBS DROPPED
1 Apr	16th	21		Support of the 65th Brigade	
	60th	18		Enemy installations on Mt. Orion	
	night	16th	3	Corregidor and Mariveles	
	60th	3	3	do	
2 Apr	16th	55		Support of the 65th Brigade	
	60th	27		Mt. Samat	
3 Apr	16th	59	12	Enemy first line of defense	34 50Kg
	60th	54	6	do	18 500, 108 250 and 53 100Kg
	62d	34	6	do	24 250, and 200 100Kg
4 Apr	16th	54	12	do	55 100 and 281 50Kg
	60th	45	5	Mt. Orion and Mt. Samat	2 500, 18 250 and 286 100Kg
	62d	34	5	Support of the 4th Division	24 250 and 198 100Kg
		16th	56		Support of the 4th Division and 65th Brigade
5 Apr	62d	36	5	Mt. Orion	44 250 and 145 100Kg
	60th	45	5	Mt. Samat	14 500, 90 250 and 208 100Kg
	16th	61	17	Vicinity of Limay	84 100, 186 50 and 8 15Kg
6 Apr	60th	45	5	do	14 500, 24 250 and 170 100Kg
	62d	37	5	Mt. Orion	41 250 and 170 100Kg
	16th	78	20	Enemy vehicles	198 100, 278 50 and 28 15Kg
7 Apr	60th	47	6	Mt. Limay	15 500, 97 250 and 42 100Kg
	62d	44	3	Artillery positions at Cabaoben	14 500, 27 250 and 135 100Kg
	16th	73		Enemy vehicles and retreating enemy	198 100, 281 50 and 10 15Kg
8 Apr	60th	42	5	Vicinity of Cabaoben	15 500 and 92 250Kg
	62d	28		Panikian and Lanza	1 500, 75 250 and 2 100Kg
	16th	49		Retreating enemy	98 100, 124 50 and 60 15Kg
9 Apr	60th	44		Corregidor and the vicinity of Saisman	10 500 and 109 250Kg
	62d	34		Mariveles and Corregidor	108 250Kg
	60th	72		Corregidor	Total for both units: 60 500, 272
10 & 11	62d	65		do	250 and 16 100Kg



The 22d Air Brigade continued to support the offensive on the 4th, and provided air cover for the break through of the enemy's first line of defense. The 16th Air Regiment flew fifty-four sorties in twelve attacks on enemy positions opposing the 4th Division while the 60th Air Regiment flew forty-five sorties in five attacks on enemy entrenchments on Mt. Orion and Mt. Samat. The 62d Air Regiment flew thirty-four sorties in five attacks on enemy positions in front of the attacking 4th Division. On the following day the 16th Air Regiment flew fifty-six sorties in support of the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade concentrated attacks on enemy artillery. On the same day thirty-six sorties were flown by the 62d Air Regiment in five attacks on enemy entrenchments and artillery positions in the vicinity of Mt. Orion. Also on the 5th the Nagano Detachment joined the left wing of the 4th Division and the Army ordered a light bomber unit to support the advance of these units.

On the 6th, 22d Air Brigade concentrated on the enemy artillery positions and succeeded in silencing the enemy artillery in the vicinity of Limay and Mt. Orion. Sixty-one sorties were flown by the 16th Air Regiment in seventeen attacks on artillery positions in the vicinity of Limay while the 60th Air Regiment flew forty-five sorties in five attacks on enemy entrenchments in the same vicinity, and the 62d Air Regiment concentrated their attacks on the enemy artillery in the vicinity of Mt. Orion, flying thirty-seven sorties

in five attacks. On the following day, 7 April, light bombers of the 16th Air Regiment concentrated their attacks on enemy armored and vehicular traffic, flying seventy-eight sorties in twenty attacks and destroying three tanks and forty-three other vehicles. On the same day the 60th Air Regiment flew forty-seven missions in six attacks on enemy positions in the vicinity of Limay while the 62d Air Regiment flew forty-four sorties in nine attacks, during the day and night, on enemy positions and artillery installations in the vicinity of Cabcaben. During the day the above unit suffered medium damage on four aircraft and slight damage on thirteen aircraft from the enemy's intense antiaircraft fire. On the 8th, units of the 22d concentrated their attacks on the retreating enemy and supporting the attacks of our forward units. In seventy-three sorties the 16th Air Regiment destroyed twenty-one vehicles. The 60th Air Regiment flew forty two sorties in five attacks in the vicinity of Cabcaben and the 62d Air Regiment flew twenty-eight sorties in attacks on Panikiyan and Lamao.

On the 9th, the 16th Air Regiment flew forty-nine sorties in continuous attacks on the retreating enemy, the heavy bombers of the 60th Air Regiment flew forty-four sorties against Corregidor and the vicinity of Sisinan and the 62d Air Regiment flew thirty-five sorties against Mariveles and Corregidor. On the morning of the 9th, Major General King, commander of the forces on Bataan, surrendered to our forces. Thereafter, our forces completed the seizure of Bataan

Peninsula on the 11th. With the surrender of enemy forces on Bataan, the 22d Air Brigade commenced the air operations for the capture of Corregidor.

Air Operations in the Capture of Corregidor

With the fall of Bataan and the capitulation of the enemy forces, the 14th Army commander made preparation for the capture of Corregidor and the island fortresses at the mouth of Manila Bay. It was estimated that the remaining enemy strength was about 10,000 men under the command of Lt. General Wainwright. There was little danger of attack on our aircraft by the enemy airforce which now consisted of only one or two fighters; however, there were thirty or more antiaircraft guns still active on Corregidor Fortress alone. The Army commander had directed that the assault on Corregidor, scheduled for 6 May, would be in three phases and that the 22d Air Brigade's activities during these periods would be as follows:

First period (12 April - 28 April)

The main force of the Air Brigade will prepare for the operations to come while elements of the brigade will continue reconnaissance, particularly of enemy shipping in the gulf of Manila, and the air defense of Manila. The brigade shall also assist in mopping-up operations on Bataan Peninsula and heavy bombers will be used to attack the artillery positions on the fortresses in Manila Bay.

Second Period (29 April - 5 May)

During this period there will be close cooperation, with the Army artillery units in destroying targets designated by the landing units. Reconnaissance units of the Brigade shall continue the operations of the first period and shall perform observation missions for the artillery. The light bomber units shall concentrate

their main force on key targets on Corregidor and the other fortresses and shall attack enemy shipping attempting to flee. The heavy bomber units will attack Corregidor and Caballo, concentrating their attacks on the enemy counterbattery and shore batteries facing north. Third Period (After the night of 5 May)

Reconnaissance units were to cooperate directly with the artillery, the light bombers to support the landing of the troops and the heavy bombers to attack the installations of Corregidor. All possible aircraft were to participate.

Units of the 22d Air Brigade were in action almost every day during the first period in carrying out the preparations for the assault on the Manila Fortresses. In addition to preparing for the operations to come, the 16th Air Regiment flew thirty-three sorties, dropping 36 100kg and 125 50kg bombs, the 60th Air Regiment flew sixty-eight sorties, dropping 390 100kg bombs, and the 62d Air Regiment flew sixty-five sorties, dropping 206 250kg bombs causing enormous damage to enemy installations. During this period the 62d Air Regiment was transferred to Nanking and placed under Southern Army control as of the 25th.


On the 29th, the preliminary preparations having been completed and all air units in excellent condition, the 22d Air Brigade commenced the second phase of operations. During the period of the second phase the fortresses in Manila Bay were under almost continuous attack (Chart 8). The air strikes were concentrated on enemy counter batteries, shore batteries and antiaircraft guns. Reconnaissance aircraft of the Brigade worked in close cooperation with the Army artillery and acted as observation and spotter aircraft. Due to the incessant bombing and strafing by our aircraft

Chart --8 Air Operations During the Attack on Corregidor (29 April-6 May)

DATE	UNIT	SORTIES	NO. ATTACKS	TARGETS	NUMBER OF BOMBS DROPPED
29 Apr	16th	33	6	Antiaircraft position on Corregidor	198 50Kg
	60th	50	6	do	16 500, 30 250 and 211 100Kg
30 Apr	16th	16		Corregidor and Caballo	total for both units: 12 500, 36 250,
	60th	35		do	145 100 and 45 50Kg
1 May	16th	23		Corregidor and Fraile Is.	total for both units: 15 500, 60 250,
	60th	45		do	180 100 and 36 5Kg
2 May	16th	20		Corregidor and Caballo	total for both units: 12 500, 45 250
	60th	35		do	and 159 100Kg
3 May	16th	16		Corregidor	total for both units: 15 500, 57 250
	60th	44		do	and 178 100Kg
4 May	16th	25		do	total for both units: 11 500, 48 250,
	60th	36		do	95 100 and 74 30Kg
5 May	16th	25		do	total for both units: 15 500, 56 250
	60th	45		do	and 195 100Kg
6 May	16th	87		Corregidor, Caballo and Fraile Is.	about 88 tons 25 500, 53 250, 50 100
	60th	83		Support of the 4th Division	and 225 50Kg

Chart --8 Air Operations During the Attack on Corregidor (29 April-6 May)

DATE	UNIT	SORTIES	NO. ATTACKS	TARGETS	NUMBER OF BOMBS DROPPED
29 Apr	16th	33	6	Antiaircraft position on Corregidor	198 50Kg
	60th	50	6	do	16 500, 30 250 and 211 100Kg
30 Apr	16th	16		Corregidor and Caballo	total for both units: 12 500, 36 250,
	60th	35		do	145 100 and 45 50Kg
1 May	16th	23		Corregidor and Fraile Is.	total for both units: 15 500, 60 250,
	60th	45		do	180 100 and 36 5Kg
2 May	16th	20		Corregidor and Caballo	total for both units: 12 500, 45 250
	60th	35		do	and 159 100Kg
3 May	16th	16		Corregidor	total for both units: 15 500, 57 250
	60th	44		do	and 178 100Kg
4 May	16th	25		do	total for both units: 11 500, 48 250,
	60th	36		do	95 100 and 74 30Kg
5 May	16th	25		do	total for both units: 15 500, 56 250
	60th	45		do	and 195 100Kg
6 May	16th	87		Corregidor, Caballo and Fraile Is.	about 88 tons 25 500, 53 250, 50 100
	60th	83		Support of the 4th Division	and 225 50Kg



the enemy batteries could scarcely return the fire, and only one aircraft of the 16th Air Regiment was heavily damaged (29 April) by antiaircraft fire. By the evening of the 5th it was felt that our ground units could capture the Fortress of Corregidor with ease. On that evening all units of the Air Brigade were instructed to prepare for a maximum effort in support of the landing to be made on the following day. The third phase of operations, the landing of troops on Corregidor, was about to begin.

On the 6th, the 22d Air Brigade supported the operations of the landing units with its full strength, attacking targets on Corregidor, Caballo and El Fraile Islands. With the surrender of these fortresses on the 7th, the Air Brigade returned to its base to prepare for future operations.

Operations in Other Philippine Island Areas

During the second battle for the capture of Bataan Peninsula the enemy forces, which had centered their resistance in the Mt. Mariveles area and on the fortresses in Manila Bay, had been receiving supplies from Mindanao and the Visayan Islands. Although our forces had siezed Davao, on Mindanao, the capture of the entire island had not as yet been completed. The enemy still had about ten airfields on the island and seemed to be in contact with Australia. In the Visayan Islands there were enemy troops on Cebu, Panay and Los Negros Islands and there were about twenty

airfields still in enemy hands. Some aircraft seemed to be using these fields. When the 14th Army received additional troops to aid in the capture of Bataan, additional troops were also allocated to complete the capture of the Visayan and Mindanao Islands. The 22d Air Brigade, ordered to provide air elements to assist the operations, placed all units participating in these operations under the control of the commander of the 52d Independent Army Reconnaissance Squadron.

On April 5th, the 124th Infantry Regiment sailed from Lingayen Gulf under naval escort and landed on Cebu Island in the vicinity of Argao without meeting enemy resistance. Three aircraft from the 52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron and three light bombers from the 16th Air Regiment provided air cover for the landing and also bombed Cebu City. The ground forces advanced rapidly capturing Cebu City on the evening of the 11th and completed the capture and mopping-up of the island by the 19th. The 52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron advanced to Cebu Airfield on the 18th and on the 14th, four light bombers were attached to the Squadron to support further operations.

On the 12th, the 40th Infantry Regiment sailed from Lingayen Gulf under naval escort and on the 16th landed without resistance on Panay Island in the vicinity of Iloilo. Aircraft from the 52d Squadron and the attached bombers provided air cover for the landing and support for the subsequent operations. Occupation of the

island was completed on about the 20th. The 52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron was ordered to return to Luzon on the 22d where they proceeded to aid in the reduction of Corregidor.

Operation on the smaller islands having been completed the conquest of Mindanao was begun. On April 23rd, the Army ordered the commander of the 10th Independent Air Unit to assume command of six planes of the 84th Independent Fighter Squadron and twelve planes (one squadron) of the 16th Air Regiment (light bombers) in addition to the planes of his own unit. The same orders directed him to deploy his forces on the airfields at Davao and Cebu, by the 28th, and support the ground forces in the operations against Mindanao. On the 26th, the 124th Infantry Regiment sailed from Cebu under naval escort and landed without resistance on Mindanao in the vicinity of Parang at dawn on the 29th. Observation planes covered the landing while fighters and light bombers attacked the enemy fields on Bohol and Negros Islands. On April 30th and May 1st, the 10th Independent Air Unit supported the operations of the 124th Infantry with half of its force while the other half was deploying forward from Cebu to the airfield at Davao. On the 2nd, the Miura Detachment (one infantry battalion of the 16th Division), which had been occupying Davao, started their advance toward Malaybalay under air support of fighters and light bombers. Meanwhile, on May 1st, the 40th Infantry Regiment sailed from Panay under naval escort and landed on Mindanao on 3 May. The landing was made in

the vicinity of Cagayan, against fierce enemy fire, and under air support they advanced toward Malaybalay. On the 4th, the 124th Infantry, which after landing had advanced rapidly brushing aside light resistance, captured Dansalan. During the period between the 5th and the 10th, the day that Major General Sharp surrendered the forces on Mindanao the air units provided constant air cover and support to the ground units. On the 22nd, in compliance with Brigade orders, the air units returned to Manila leaving only one squadron on Mindanao.

Conclusion

The occupation of the islands in the Philippine group was now completed and as the islands were of great importance in carrying out air operations in the Greater East Asia Area, the 14th Army made plans to prepare them as a base of operations. At that time the air power in the Philippines consisted of the 22d Air Brigade organized and deployed as follows:

22d Air Brigade	Manila
10th Independent Air Unit (Headquarters)	Manila
52d Army Reconnaissance Squadron	Nielson
74th Observation Squadron	Zablan
76th Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron	Nichols
84th Fighter Squadron	Zablan
16th Air Regiment (light bombers)	Nichols
60th Air Regiment (heavy bombers)	Clark
11th Air Sector (Headquarters)	Manila
1st Air Mobile Repair Section	Clark

The plan of commencing the operations in the Philippines with a surprise attack on the enemy airbases and the annihilation of

the enemy's air power had worked with surprising success. The losses suffered by our air force was extremely low while the damage inflicted on the enemy was truly enormous. Although the ground operations had taken longer than planned, the conquest of the Philippines had been completed with relatively small losses.