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OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS OF THE NAVY'S SOUTH SEAS FORCE  
(from December 1941 to March 1942)  
and GENERAL SITUATION OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(Translation)

MONOGRAPH NO 139

Memo 139

Outline of Operations of the Navy's South Seas Force  
(from December 1941 to March 1942)  
and General Situation of Military Installations

Prepared by

Remaining Business Liquidation Division  
2d Demobilization Bureau

July 1949

I. Outline of Operations of the South Seas Force  
from December 1941 to March 1942

A. General War Situation

Immediately after the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War on 8 December 1941, the Fourth Fleet, in accordance with the established operations plan, undertook the defense of the extensive Inner South Seas covering an area 2500 nautical miles wide and 1200 nautical miles long. At the same time, it conducted surprise attacks on enemy air bases on Guam, Wake and Howland Islands by committing the total air strength under its command. Later, it executed repeated attacks and foiled the enemy's plan to conduct raids from these bases. On the other hand, in coordination with the Army's South Seas Detachment, it captured Guam. Furthermore, the Navy singlehandedly occupied Wake Island after fierce fighting and captured the northern section of the Gilbert Islands. After establishing bases in these areas, it strengthened its eastern defense and made preparations for a diversion operation. Subsequently, in coordination with the Army forces which had been transferred from Guam, it occupied such strategic points in the South Seas as Rabaul and Kavieng and checked the enemy activities in this area. At the same time, it dispatched an element of its air strength and mopped up the enemy air strength in British New Guinea and the Solomons.

Thus, it conducted the operation to capture the key points in the above areas. In the Wake Island Invasion Operation and the Rabaul Area Operation, it received the support of an element and a main body of the task force, respectively, and it was able to destroy the bulk of the enemy air strength in those areas.

In the initial stage of the war, only a very few enemy submarines appeared near the islands, and they were all neutralized through the timely action of the defense units. Moreover, in Palau and the Marshalls, our converted vessels sank several enemy submarines. Besides, several British and Dutch aircraft conducted small scale sneak attacks on Tokobe and Greenwich Islands, but the local forces fought bravely and repulsed them. Our forces suffered very slight losses. From February, enemy activities in the said area were slightly intensified, and on 1 February an enemy task force with an aircraft carrier and heavy cruisers as its nucleus conducted air strikes on all the Marshall Islands. On 20 February, the enemy task force appeared off the Solomons, and on 24 February it conducted a raid on Wake Island, but as a result of the determined fight of our local defense unit and air strength, it suffered heavy losses and was repulsed.

- Although the fleet was located in the hot and humid area along the equator, the officers and men were imbued with fighting spirit and the operations were progressing very smoothly.

## B. Outline of Operations Undertaken after the Outbreak of the War.

### 1. Guam Island Invasion Operations

The Guam Island Invasion Operation was undertaken by an invasion force composed mainly of the 5th Base Force plus the Tsugaru, the Oboro, the 23d Destroyer Division and the Kiyokawa Maru in coordination with the Army's South Seas Detachment and supported by the 6th Cruiser Division. From the day of the

outbreak of the war, the 17th Air Group and the aircraft of the Kiyokawa Maru conducted daily bombings of the island. They sank the patrol craft Penguin and destroyed the principal military installations.

Under the escort of the invasion force, a convoy departed from Hahajima Island on 4 December 1941 and, through close coordination, it effected a surprise landing on the northwestern and eastern shores of Guam at dawn of 10 December. Without encountering any heavy resistance, it accepted the surrender of Governor, Captain McMillin of the said island and his defense force and succeeded in effecting a bloodless occupation of the island. In this operation, 330 officers and men including Governor Capt McMillin were taken prisoner and the 3000-ton oil tanker Barnes, other vessels, guns, ammunition and a large amount of other military supplies were captured.

## 2. Howland Island Destruction Operation

On 9 December 1941, the main body of the Yokohama Air Group conducted a raid on Howland Island and bombed and destroyed such strategic installations as the airfield and communication station. In addition, with the support of the 19th Minesweeper Division (less the Tsugaru and the Tokiwa), the Asanagi and the Yunagi, Makin and Tarawa Islands in the northern section of the Gilbert Islands were occupied on 10 December, and, dispatching the Nagata Maru of the 8th Gunboat Division, an advance air base was established on Makin Island.

As a result of the attack conducted on 9 December, the military installations on Howland Island were almost completely neutralized and it was estimated that the island could not be used by the enemy. Thus, on 11 December, the 33d Submarine Division reconnoitered and shelled the remaining installations. With this, the attack was temporarily suspended.

### 3. Wake Island Invasion Operation

The first operation for the invasion of Wake Island was undertaken by a landing force composed of the Special Naval Landing Force (Uchida Force) of the Flut Headquarters and Land Combat Unit (Takano Unit) dispatched from the 6th Base Force and an invasion force composed of the 6th Destroyer Squadron (less the Asenagi and Yunagi), Kihryu Maru Kongo Maru and patrol boats No 32 and No 33. It was conducted under the cover of a support force consisting of the 18th Cruiser Division and air and submarine units.

At the outset of the war, the total strength of the attack planes of the Chitose Air Group conducted the first raid on Wake Island and set fire to eight enemy fighter planes and the ground. Later, it conducted daily raids and destroyed the principal military installations. Furthermore, the 27th Submarine Division conducted reconnaissance operations and was on the lookout for enemy reinforcements.

At dawn of 10 December 1941, the invasion force approached Wake Island and planned to conduct a surprise landing. However, although the large landing barges of patrol boats No 32 and No 33 could easily be launched from the stern, those of the Kongo Maru and Kinryu Maru could not be launched in the dark because of the strong wind and heavy seavells. Consequently, it was decided to wait until daybreak and effect a forced landing. While the invasion force was engaged in neutralizing the shore batteries by approaching near the shore, it was subjected to a heavy counterattack by the remaining aircraft and guns. Particularly, because of the repeated bombing and strafing attacks by two or three enemy fighters, the Hayate and Kisaragi were sunk and other vessels suffered some damage. As the force was unable to destroy these enemy fighters, it was estimated that the execution of a forced landing under the situation would bring about a considerable

loss of vessels. Thus, the operation was temporarily suspended and the force withdrew from the island.

After reinforcing the land combat unit and adding the 6th Cruiser Division which had completed its assignment in the Guam Operation to the support force, the new battle formation was made and study and training for the Wake invasion were undertaken. Thus, on 20 December, with the firm determination of all officers and men for a sure victory, the force departed from Roi Island for the Second Wake Island Invasion Operation.

Prior to this, the bulk of the attack plane unit and flying boat unit of the air force conducted daily round-the-clock bombings and from 21 December, in coordination with the 8th Cruiser Division and the 2d Carrier Division which were homeward bound from Hawaii, it succeeded in destroying the remaining aircraft.

About midnight of 22 December, the invasion force approached Wake Island, but the storm was still heavy and again the large landing barges of the Kinryu Maru could not be launched in the dark. Consequently, with grim resolution the commander ordered Patrol Boats No 32 and No 33 to run aground at the southern shore of Wake Island and land the bulk of the land combat unit which was on board directly from these vessels. Furthermore, he ordered the remainder of the land combat unit to land at the southern shore of Wilkes Island by utilizing the two large landing barges which were launched from Patrol Boats No 32 and No 33.

Being aware of our plan to capture the island, the enemy expected us to strike again. Furthermore, the enemy set up very many gun positions and strengthened the defenses along the southern shore of the island, being fully aware that because of the weather condition of that time, an attack would be feasible only from the south.

All the vessels anchored at the prearranged spot facing the enemy batteries and one of the large landing barges landed at

the planned spot on the southern shore of Wilkes Island. However, the other large landing barge lost its course because of a searchlight attack and landed near the westernmost point in the southern part of Wake Island. Despite the intense enemy counterattacks, all men approached the shore calmly in the planned formation by crawling over the reefs and opening fire at the right moment. In this way, they conducted an unprecedented, daring forced landing and after engaging in fierce hand-to-hand battle throughout Wake and Wilkes Islands, a battle which lasted several hours, the ranking officer Commander Cunningham was taken prisoner and the surrender of the enemy force was accepted. Thus, on the same day, the force succeeded in securing all the islands. During this time, the submarine divisions of the 7th Submarine Squadron undertook the watch of Wake Island alternately and, at the time of the landing, the division guided the invasion force toward the shore in the dark and fully accomplished their mission.

It was very regrettable that in the first attack both the Kisaragi and Hayate with most of their crews were lost and, in the second attack, both the patrol boats, No 32 and No 33, had to be grounded and numerous casualties, including the commander of the Uchida Force, were sustained. However, in this operation, besides shorting down or damaging 11 enemy aircraft, 470 men including Commander Cunningham were taken prisoner, about 1300 American construction workers were interned, and one fighter, 18 guns, 46 machine guns, a large amount of rifles, ammunition, motor vehicles, vessels and other military supplies were captured.

#### 4. Rabaul and Kavieng Invasion Operations.

With the end of the Wake Operation, the force disposition was subject to change. The 15th Minesweeper Division (less the Tokiwa), 6th Destroyer Squadron, 5th Gunboat Division, Kongo Maru and Kinryu Maru constituted the main body of the invasion force and it was

ordered to depart from Guam Island and to undertake the Rabaul Operation in coordination with the Army's South Seas Detachment. Furthermore, the 18th Cruiser Division, 23d Destroyer Division, and the Kinryu Maru were reinforced with the 2d Special Naval Landing Force of the Maizuru Naval Station and the land combat unit from the light cruiser Kashima, and was designated as the detachment of the invasion force. It was ordered to depart from Truk and undertake the Kavieng Invasion Operation. Furthermore, the 6th Cruiser Division, the land based air strength and submarine units were ordered to support the above detachment. Consequently, from early January 1942, about half of the air strength was transferred to the advanced bases at Truk and Greenwich Islands and raids on air bases in the Rabaul area and reconnaissance and attack of the Solomon Islands area were conducted. Moreover, from 20 January, with the support of the task force, the bulk of the enemy air strength and gun positions in the northeastern part of British New Guinea was destroyed.

With close coordination, both the main body and detachment of the invasion force effected simultaneous surprise landings at Rabaul and Kavieng, respectively, at dawn of 23 January. At Rabaul, the enemy had constructed strong positions and had been striving to defend the area, but our landing took the enemy by complete surprise, and, having been unable to launch a counterattack, he retired to the rear. Furthermore, at Kavieng the enemy also offered no great resistance and both the areas were successfully secured. Air bases were hurriedly established and mopping-up operation of the remaining enemy troops who had taken refuge in the nearby islands and forests was conducted. By early February, about 300 enemy dead were counted and about 600 prisoners were taken (later, with the addition of prisoners from adjacent areas, the figure mounted to about 1000) and the operation was brought to an end.

Leaving an element, the detachment of the invasion force which had occupied Kavieng was transferred to the Rabaul area and had been cooperating in the operation in the said area, but at dawn of 9 February, its element effected a surprise landing at Surumi, a key point in the central sector of New Britain Island. It mopped up and secured the entire adjacent area and established an advance air bases.

Moreover, after the occupation of Rabaul, enemy planes conducted night raids almost every other day but through the quick action of the fighters of the land based air units plus the cooperation of ground fire and antiaircraft fire of vessels, they were repulsed and several enemy planes were shot down. Our losses sustained through these raids were extremely slight.

#### 5. Battles with Enemy Task Forces during February 1942.

##### a. The battle in the Marshalls on 1 February

Enemy submarines had been somewhat active in the Marshalls since late January and there were strong indications of an enemy offensive. At dawn of 1 February, two groups of an enemy task force built around one aircraft carrier and several cruisers, accompanied by many destroyers, attacked the northern and southern Marshalls in close coordination with each other. The enemy conducted air strikes on Kwajalein, Roi, Wotje, Taroa, Jaluit, Mille, and Makin. In short, he attacked the entire Marshalls. Furthermore, an element of enemy cruisers and destroyers shelled Wotje and Taroa.

Our local defense units immediately counterattacked the enemy with both surface and shore batteries. Our base air forces also intercepted him in coordination with these defense units. They shot down more than 20 enemy aircraft and repulsed one heavy cruiser which was set afire as a result of direct bomb hits. Prior to this, the search planes of the Yokohama Air Group and the 19th Air Group had sighted an enemy carrier in the vicinity

of Mejit Island and had contacted it. The lookout station at Mejit Island also reported sighting an enemy carrier. Despite heavy damages, our attack plane unit which had just completed assaults on the enemy cruisers, immediately launched the second assault. Sweeping away many enemy fighters, it attacked the enemy carrier through the intense barrage. However, it failed to destroy the carrier with very close misses.

At dawn of the same day, the converted subchaser Shonan Maru No 10 sighted the enemy while on patrol off the harbor of Wotje. Finding itself unable to make a getaway, it launched a fierce attack upon the enemy, but upon receiving concentrated fire, it sank. The converted gunboat Toyotsu Maru and the converted net tender Kashima Maru in the same harbor also engaged an enemy heavy cruiser single handedly. They were heavily damaged. However, they fought to the last by intentionally running aground. Thus, both our defense units and base air forces bravely engaged the far superior enemy and succeeded in repulsing him. Nevertheless, our losses were heavy: more than 100 men including Commander Admiral Yashiro were killed, four aircraft failed to return and many vessels and shore installations were damaged.

Upon receiving the report of the enemy attack, the main body of the 24th Air Flotilla, which was concentrated in the Truk area for the Rabaul invasion, was immediately ordered to Roi. Furthermore, the 6th Cruiser Division operating in the Rabaul area, the submarines of the Sixth Fleet at Kwajalein and the task force at Truk were rushed to pursue the enemy in close coordination. However, they failed to contact the enemy who had retired in the distance.

b. The battle off the Solomons on 20 February.

About the middle of February, there was another indication of activities of the enemy task force. On 20 February, our

flying boat on patrol reported sighting an enemy task force consisting of two to three carriers, two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and several destroyers heading northward about 450 miles from the Solomons.

The base air force, which had been in the Rabaul area until that night, was ordered to maintain contact with the enemy. This force conducted repeated air attacks. The 6th and the 18th Cruiser Divisions, the 6th Destroyer Squadron and the 23d Destroyer Division in the Truk and Rabaul areas, the Shoho which was headed for Palau, and other vessels were ordered to concentrate without delay along the expected course of the enemy to annihilate him through night and daylight engagements. The flying boat which had sighted the enemy endeavored to maintain contact with him in coordination with friendly planes in the midst of fierce counterattacks by enemy fighters and gun fire. It was not long, however, before they lost contact with the enemy.

As a result of the daring search and contact by other flying boats and Kiyokawa Maru seaplanes, the enemy position was located by the evening of that day. On the other hand, 17 land attack planes of the 4th Air Group which <sup>had</sup> ~~had~~ immediately taken off from the Rabaul base were able to contact the enemy who had a strict ring protective screen. They delivered suicidal bombing attacks upon him in the midst of intensive antiaircraft fire and attacks by enemy fighters. As a result, one medium class enemy carrier and one unidentified vessel were sunk and one ship was set afire by a crash attack. Furthermore, at least, five enemy fighters were shot down. However, we sustained the following losses:

Missing or lost by crash diving:

13 land attack planes

Three large flying boats

One reconnaissance seaplane of the Kiyokawa Maru

Forced landing:

One land attack plane

One large flying boat

One reconnaissance seaplane of the Kiyokawa Maru

Thus, we lost contact with the enemy after sunset. The search was continued by the 6th Cruiser Division and other Navy vessels with the hope of locating him. Preparations for the following day's attack were made by transferring the land attack units from the Marshalls to the Rabaul area.

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Because of our attack of February, the enemy apparently retired by reversing course after that night and abandoning his plan. That is why we were unable to obtain subsequent information about the enemy.

In spite of the fact that the 4th Air Group had been activated only shortly before this battle, it was recognized that it had accomplished its mission and that it had gained great combat success in close coordination with the fighting of other air units and the local base force. In this connection, it must not be overlooked that the Nankai Detachment contributed much to the air operations with its logistical support to the base.

c. The battle off Wake Island on 24 February.

At dawn of 24 February, right after the battle off the Solomons, the enemy task force consisting of one aircraft carrier, two heavy cruisers and some destroyers bombed and shelled Wake Island. The Wake Island Defense Unit immediately counterattacked and repulsed the enemy by shooting down two aircraft and inflicting direct hits on the cruiser and destroyer after engaging him for about one and a half. On the other hand, the flying boats on this island at once secured contact with the enemy. The Chitose ~~ix~~ Air Group Attack Plane Unit took off from Roi and

pursued the enemy and with bomb hits forced a cruiser to break formation. Furthermore, it searched in an effort to attack the enemy carrier. However, the search was unsuccessful because of nightfall.

One seaplane striving to contact the enemy during this combat failed to return. While on patrol in the vicinity of the island, converted picket boats Fuku Maru No 5 and Kempo Maru No 1 engaged the enemy separately. After sending tragic messages, they made a suicide assault. However, our loss was very slight.

#### 6. Salamaua and Lae Invasion Operation.

When the operation in the Rabaul area came to an end and the air bases were completed, elements of the newly reinforced 4th and 2d Air Groups were ordered forward. Since 24 February, they had made repeated attacks on Port Moresby, the enemy key base in British New Guinea. They destroyed almost all the enemy aircraft and the airfield and other military installations there. Furthermore, they endeavored to destroy the remaining enemy aircraft in British New Guinea by searching for and attacking every scattered enemy airfield.

On the other hand, an invasion force was organized with the 6th Destroyer Squadron, Kongo Maru, Kinryu Maru, Kiyokawa Maru and others. At dawn of 8 March, the force succeeded in surprise landings at Salamaua and Lae, key points of British New Guinea, with the support of the 6th Cruiser Division, 18th Cruiser Division and others and in coordination with the Army. The Army forces and the land combat unit advanced to Salamaua and Lae respectively. They succeeded in capturing these two key points after overcoming light resistance. Construction units commenced immediate repairs of the Lae Airfield. The airfield was, in general, available for use on 10 March, and this made it possible for the air force to move the Army forces

and land combat units mopped up the vicinities of Salamaua and Lae, respectively. They captured native soldiers and a few machine guns and other weapons.

On 10 March, there was fighting with the enemy task force as described later. However, our land forces suffered hardly any losses. On 12 March, the mopping-up and the unloading of the necessary materiel were nearly completed. Leaving, therefore, the land defense to the land combat units, the Army forces returned to Rabaul. Our surface units also withdrew gradually to the Rabaul area. Thus, the invasion operation came to an end on 17 March.

#### 7. The Raiding Operation on Hawaii

In late February, two Type 2 flying boats were assigned to this force. They were ordered to raid Pearl Harbor with the support of submarines assigned to the Sixth Fleet. Operational preparations were made in utmost secrecy. On 4 March, they took off from a base at Wotje. At dusk of that day they succeeded in secretly refueling from a submarine in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. About 2115 hours of the same day, taking advantage of the moonlight, they raided and bombed the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor with considerable success and returned safely on the following day, 5 March.

#### 8. Engagement with the Enemy Task Force at Salamaua and Lae.

Since the capture of Salamaua and Lae on 8 March 1942, air bases had been under construction and the mop-up operation in progress. Then, between 0710 hours and 0945 hours of 10 March, about 50 enemy carrier planes and more than 10 heavy attack planes raided the Salamaua and Lae areas and attacked our nearby surface craft. About 10 enemy carrier planes were shot down as a result of the coordination of Kiyokawa Maru seaplanes on patrol and surface and land units. Thus, the enemy was repulsed. However, we lost one plane of the Kiyokawa Maru the Kongo Maru, Tenyo Maru, Tama Maru No 2, and Yokohama Maru and an Army transport were sunk by torpedoes

and bombs, the Tsugaru, Yubari, Oikaze, Asanagi, Yunagi, Kiyokawa Maru, and Kokai Maru received several hits and other ships received some damage.

On the other hand, immediately after receiving the message about the enemy carrier attack, our air unit searched for the enemy. On the afternoon of the same day it sighted the enemy task force comprised of one Saratoga class aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and five destroyers steaming southeastward off Port Moresby. During the early hours of the following day, our entire air strength in the Rabaul area endeavored to search out and attack the enemy. However, we were unsuccessful in this search and thus missed the chance.

The emergency repairs of all damaged ships had already been completed. Except for a few ships which required repairs in Japan, the others were ready for combat.

#### 9. Aerial Supremacy Combat Engagements in New Guinea, the Solomons and Northeastern Australia.

Immediately after the completion of the Lae Airfield, an element of our air strength was advanced to this airfield to support the defense unit there. On the other hand, the 1st Air Group, the 4th Air Group and the Yokohama Air Group in the Rabaul and Lae areas conducted aerial supremacy combat engagements as follows: With considerable success they attacked Port Moresby on 11 and 13 March, Horn Island on 14 March, Horn Island and Tulagi on 18 March, Port Moresby on 19, 22, 23, and 24 March. In the air strike on Horn Island on 14 March in particular, there was an intense air engagement between our planes and more than 10 counterattacking enemy fighters. In this engagement, nine enemy fighters were shot down and three heavy enemy planes were burned on the ground. Furthermore, in the air raid on Port Moresby on 23 March, nine enemy planes were burned or destroyed on the ground. The attacks were very successful while our losses were very slight.

During this time, on 21 March our planes succeeded in the long range secret reconnaissance of Cooktown and Townsville and obtained important operational information. On the other hand, enemy planes struck Rabaul on 13, 18, 20, and 21 March and Lee on 19 and 22 March. Before 21 March, all enemy air attacks were guerrilla raids by a few heavy aircraft. Therefore, we suffered almost no losses. We repulsed him with counterattacks each time he struck. Furthermore, we shot down several enemy planes. On 22 March, however, six to nine enemy Hurricane fighters raided Lee and burned six of our aircraft on the ground and damaged several to the extent of requiring repairs, although our patrol fighters and land units coordinated to counterattack and shot down three enemy planes.

#### 10. Reconnaissance of Midway and Johnston Islands

In view of the various situations, another air raid was not made by the Type 2 flying boats which had conducted a surprise attack on Hawaii. Instead, daylight reconnaissance of Midway Island and Johnston Island was performed by these planes from Wotje. On the night of 10 March, they took off from Wotje and on the following day reached Johnston Island and Midway Island, respectively. One flying boat returned with important operational data from Johnston Island. Apparently, the other was lost in combat with enemy fighters at Midway Island. Its radio was heard about the time it reached the vicinity of the island.

## II. General Situation of the

### South Seas Force

#### A. Personnel

There were about 68,000 men under the fleet command, and about 8,800 in all were transferred from the forces to the South Seas Force in accordance with the force disposition. Since the outbreak of the war, about 960 men had been killed in action and about 1,800 had become ill or been wounded.

B. Military Discipline

Military discipline was strict and well observed.

C. Conditions of Ship Hulls, Armament, Machinery and Munitions

1. Conditions of ship hulls, armament and machinery

Many of the vessels of the fleet were obsolescent.

Therefore, all-out efforts were exerted to repair them in order to effectively display full fighting power in the operation.

Vessels which were due for special repairs were: the Tatsuta and vessels of the 29th and 30th Destroyer Divisions and 26th and 33d Submarine Divisions.

Vessels which were damaged and needed urgent repair: Tokiwa, Nagata Maru and Shonan Maru No 11.

Vessels whose engineering works were directed by the Navy Minister: Each vessel.

Vessel whose generators and shafting required repairs: Yubari.

Vessels whose turbine vanes required replacement: All vessels of the 6th Cruiser Division.

Vessels whose secondary batteries required replacement: Vessels of the 33d Submarine Division.

Vessels whose hulls required repairs: Vessels of the 26th Submarine Division.

Vessels which required periodical docking for repairs: All vessels.

There were many vessels which had to be returned to the Japanese homeland for urgent repairs. Therefore, they were expected to be repaired gradually at the earliest opportunity.

## Reference

	Rated Horse power	Designed maximum horse power	Total
Tenryu and Tatsuta	35,000	50,000	About 29 knots
Yubari	52,100	58,000	30.7 "
29th Destroyer Div	34,500	38,500	30.7 "
26th Submarine Div	2,368	2,960	13.1 "

### 2. Munitions

In general, the transportation of munitions was effected smoothly and exerted very little influence upon the operation. However, even the supply of the minimum demand was difficult because of insufficient transports, incomplete harbor facilities and a shortage of stevedores and barges. Great difficulty was being experienced in the transportation of fuel, fresh provisions, bombs and aviation fuel to the front line bases. In order to meet the possible expansion of the operational area in the future, it was necessary to effect urgent completion of supply and transportation facilities.

### D. Medical Situation.

1. Before the outbreak of the war, the monthly rate of fleet patients receiving medical treatment, was about 33.5 for each 1,000. There was, however, a marked decrease after the outbreak of the war as a result of the attention of each officer and men. In other words, the rate decreased to about 23.4 each 1,000.

2. The sicknesses in this area were, in the order of prevalence, dengue fever, acute enteritis, dental treatment, acute pharyngitis, and acute bronchitis. However, special precaution had to be taken ~~against~~ against tubercular respiratory sickness because there were 498 patients suffering from it in 1941. Then, too, the bulk of the patients evacuated were those suffering from this sickness.

3. The only contagious disease was dysentery while dengue fever was the only endemic. Since the military strength was greatly affected by these disease, a plan was underway to jointly ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup> organize epidemic prevention corps/the Navy, government and civilians to eradicate these diseases. Furthermore, there was a strong possibility of an outbreak of malaria because the war was being fought beyond the equator. Therefore, utmost efforts were being exerted to prevent its outbreak.

4. With each base force taking the lead, civilian first aid personnel were trained to give first aid to civilians and fill the shortage of hands in the Navy. After the outbreak of the war, considerable results were obtained from this training in each locality.

5. Patients were evacuated principally by the hospital ship Hikawa Maru. Also, the Kensho Maru, the Kaihei Maru and requisitioned ships were utilized for that evacuation. Thus, the evacuation was very smoothly conducted.

6. Before the outbreak of the war, a medical supply center was established at both Truk and Saipan to supply medical needs to each surface unit. The supply was being smoothly conducted.

#### E. Accounts and Supply

1. Accounts and supply were being smoothly conducted.
2. Supply of Provisions.

The Japanese homeland had to be depended upon for the staple foods. However, strenuous efforts were being exerted to increase the production of fresh vegetables on farms of the Nanyo Development Company on Saipan, Tinian, Rota and Kusaie and on farms of the Nanyo Colonization Company on Ponape, Dublon and Moen. Therefore, it was expected that supply from the Japanese homeland could be gradually reduced. Efforts were also being exerted to become self-sufficient in fish and meat. With the

objective of making the Bismarck Archipelago self-sufficient, the Nanyo Trading Company and the Nanko Marine Product Company were designated, and preparations were underway.

### III. Facilities in the Area Assigned to the South Seas Force

The urgent construction of various facilities in the area assigned to the fleet was commenced in 1940, and, in general, its favorable progress was able to meet the needs of the operation. However, personnel and equipment had to be supplied from the Japanese homeland and transportation took much time because of the distance and the shortage of ships. Therefore, great difficulty was being experienced. The construction of these facilities was being conducted by the 4th Civil Engineering Department with about 35,000 conscript laborers (12,200 Koreans, about 500 prisoners and about 7,000 natives and others), about 1,400 workers, and about 840 clerical workers. In the Rabaul area and the occupied southern area, the urgent construction of facilities was conducted by the construction unit of the 4th Civil Engineering Department and the 7th and 10th Construction Units. Urgent construction was made to contribute to the progress of the operation. The outline of the condition of facilities in these areas is as shown in the appendix.

Appendix

Outline of the Situation of the Various Installations  
in the South Seas

1. Air Bases

a. Generally completed and available for use:

Saipan (seaplane base and airfield)

Truk (seaplane base and airfield)

Palau (Seaplane base and airfield)

Wotje (seaplane base and airfield)

Ebijie (seaplane base)

Emidj (seaplane base)

Roi (seaplane base)

Taroa (airfield)

Tinian (airfield)

Ponape (airfield)

Pagan (airfield)

b. Under construction but almost completed:

Ponape (seaplane base)

c. Rushing urgent construction and work already started,

construction conducted so as to put a section into use by late

April 1942:

Dublon in Truk Islands (Seaplane base and airfield)

Milli (airfield)

Eniwetok (seaplane base and airfield)

Woleai (airfield)

Palau (Aimionsu\* seaplane base)

Majuro (seaplane base)

Nomoi (seaplane base)

d. As for air bases at Wake, Rabaul and occupied areas

of the South Seas, the existing airfields were, in general, being  
used after speedy repairs and expansion.

e. Air Depots

Air depots at Palau (104th Air Depot) and Saipan (105th Air Depot) were, generally speaking, completed. Branch depots were being prepared at Truk and Wotje.

2. Gun Batteries

Antiaircraft batteries for existing air bases and others were, in general, completed, but those for newly established air bases required considerable strengthening. Some of the shore batteries on Truk required a change to a large caliber. Therefore, the mounted guns were scheduled for removal to the front at opportune moments.

3. Repair and Dock Repair Facilities.

a. The Fourth Repair and Construction Depot was being established. An element of personnel had already arrived and had commenced work. Furthermore, a floating dock had been being used effectively since December.

b. Branch depots were being established at Kwajalein and Palau.

c. Because of a considerable amount of existing repair and construction facilities at Guam and Rabaul, consideration was being given to man and use them for the time being.

4. Harbor Facilities

a. There were many places at Truk, Saipan, Palau, et cetera that required dredging and demolition of reefs. The harbor at Saipan was being dredged while at Ponape and Truk reef demolition work was being performed.

b. Although either supply jetties or piers were being constructed at each air base and other installations, difficulty was being experienced in loading and unloading operation because of lack of necessary cranes.

5. Oil Storage and Refueling Facilities

a. In general, the heavy oil tanks were bullet-proof and were

either of dirt covered or underground construction. However, the tanks under construction at Ponape and Angar were of cave type construction. Tanks at Saipan, Palau and Jaluit were either roughly completed or were scheduled for completion shortly. Others were either for from being complete or had not been started at all.

b. Gasoline was stored in tanks or storerooms which were of bulletproof underground or cave type construction.

c. 10,000 metric ton class supply pier or wharves were under construction as refueling facilities at Palau, Saipan and Truk. Construction had not been started at other islands.

#### 6. Refrigeration Facilities

Refrigeration facilities were under construction at Palau, Saipan, Kwajalein and Wotje. Civilian facilities were under construction at five places namely, Palau, Saipan, Truk, Ponape and Kusaie. Upon completion of construction, there was capacity to store 20 day's supply for 68,000 men.

#### 7. Communication Facilities

In general, communications were being conducted at each place with either permanent facilities or temporary facilities. Immediate work was expected to be commenced on bulletproof construction of the 6th Communications Unit and radio station (6th Base Headquarters Operations Center included) at Kusaie and the Wake Air Base communications facilities.

#### 8. Medical Facilities

a. By about March defense unit infirmaries were equipped as follows:

Saipan	150 beds
Palau	100 beds
Kwajalein	100 beds
Truk	150 beds

b. Construction of a high altitude sanitarium at Tolenot Peak to accommodate 20 persons was planned.

#### 9. Water Supply

a. Civilian facilities were being used as much as possible for increased supply. At Saipan, facilities were completed to supply approximately 3,000 tons daily during the dry season. Water supply facilities were partly completed on Ponape.

b. Facilities on Palau (daily supply of 4,800 tons) and Truk (daily supply of 1,000 tons) were being expanded or newly constructed. New construction (daily supply of 1,000 tons) was projected at Kusaie, and, depending upon the situation at Kusaie, it was planned to make Ponape the water supply base for the Marshalls.

c. At each air base, paved airfields and facilities to collect and filter rain water were under construction.

#### 10. Submarine Base Facilities

New bases were planned at Kwajalein, Truk, Ponape and Rebaul. Of these, the base at Kwajalein was roughly completed while the one at Truk was under construction. The base at Ponape was suspended temporarily.

#### 11. Facilities of Base Forces and Defense Units

Main construction of the base force headquarters at Palau (3d Base Force), Saipan (5th Base Force) and Kwajalein (6th Base Force) was completed. Main construction at Truk was underway. As for defense unit facilities, all facilities with the exception of Truk (4th Defense Unit) were completed. Construction was still underway on Truk.

#### 12. Welfare Facilities

In consideration of the special geographical condition, there was a demand for the establishment of considerable number of clubhouses at Truk, Kwajalein, Rebaul, Saipan, Ponape, Palau and Wake for officers and men. However, no construction had been started.