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Japanese Monograph No. 145



OUTLINE OF NAVAL ARMAMENT AND PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

Part I

PREPARED BY
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FOREWORD

This is the first of a series of six monographs in regard to Japan's naval armament in preparation for and during the Pacific War.

Additional monographs covering Japan's naval armament plans are:

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Preface

Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, 12 October 1945, subject: Institution for War Records Investigation, steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff. Upon dissolution of the War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, research and compilation continued and developed into a series of historical monographs.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparations of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable.

Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau, the basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. Translation was effected through the facilities of Allied Translators and Interpreters Service, G2, General Headquarters, Far East Command.

This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division, Military History Section, General Headquarters, Far East Command and is based on the translation of the Japanese original. Editorial corrections were limited to those necessary for coherence and accuracy.

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CHAPTER I

Period Between Washington Conference and First London Conference

The Washington Disarmament Treaty was concluded on 6 February 1922. It was foreseen that the effect of this pact would be to greatly weaken the Imperial Navy, consequently naval authorities mapped out plans to overcome these weaknesses by replenishing their strength with naval vessels outside treaty restrictions, as well as by building up air strength.

Each year the Navy submitted proposals and made requests for budgetary allocations. However, from 1922 to 1924, Japan, honoring the Washington Treaty, continued to scrap vessels and make the other modifications provided for in the treaty. At the same time, the Imperial Navy voluntarily undertook the reduction and modification of the auxiliary building program based on the 8-8 Fleet Plans (Plans to keep 8 BB and 8 BC as its fleet's nucleus.) Subsequently, because of the tremendous financial burden placed on the country by the Great Kanto earthquake, the Imperial Navy was forced to postpone the dates of completion of all armament plans. The long-term plan for naval shipbuilding extending from 1911 to 1927 was repeatedly reduced and postponed for financial reasons and rarely got past the planning stage. Naval air power also suffered a considerable setback because of the national trend toward financial retrenchment and disarmament.

During this period of inertia in naval rearmament even the number of cadets accepted for the Naval Academy was drastically reduced. In 1923 only one-sixth of the 300 students planned for under the 8-8 Fleet Plan were accepted.

Vessel Armament

The period from 1922 to 1924 was regarded as the readjustment period in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Disarmament Treaty.

The Washington Treaty referred to battleships and battle cruisers as capital ships and all other naval vessels as auxiliary ships. In regard to capital ships, ten were to be retained, while ten ships ranging in age from 10 to 20 years, together with six ships under construction and eight still in the planning stage were to be scrapped, disposed of, or maintained for noncombat purposes.

The tonnage of aircraft carriers was so far below the 81,000 maximum that the Kaga and the Akagi were to be reconstructed as aircraft carriers.

Since auxiliary ships were limited only in displacement tonnage and in the caliber of guns, the construction program for such craft was extended by constantly putting off prearranged plans. Naval strength at the end of 1924, when the readjustment and scrapping of vessels in accordance with the Washington Treaty was completed, was as shown in Chart 1.

Chart 1 -- Naval Strength at end of 1924

Classification	Number of Ships	Total Standard Displacement
Battleships	6	184,062 tons
Battle Cruisers	4	105,280 "
Total for Capital Ships	10	289,342 "
Aircraft Carriers	2	12,650 "
Second-class Cruisers	18	82,855 "
Destroyer Tenders	4	21,015 "
Mine Layers	3	17,960 "
First-class Coast Defense Ships	7	59,410 "
Second-class Coast Defense Ships	4	13,615 "
First-class Gunboats	4	4,393 "
Second-class Gunboats	9	2,915 "
First-class Destroyers	30	35,495 "
Second-class Destroyers	51	37,510 "
Third-class Destroyers	2	640 "
First-class Submarines	1	1,400 "
Second-class Submarines	39	30,842 "
Third-class Submarines	10	3,259 "
Special Service Ships	29	292,488 "
Total for Auxiliary Ships	213	616,447 "
GRAND TOTAL	223	905,789 tons

From 1925 until the London Disarmament Conference in 1930 it was possible to carry out only a minimum amount of construction. The armament program was constantly reduced and the established continuous building program was postponed due to financial difficulties. During this period no new replenishment program was approved by the Diet. Ships actually completed from 1925 to 1930 were as shown hereunder:

Year	Type	Name of Ships
1925	Cruisers Destroyers Submarines	Abukuma, Jintsu, Naka Yunagi, Oite, Satsuki, Kisaragi, Hayate Three ships
1926	Cruisers Destroyers Submarines	Furutake, Kako Mutsuki, Fumizuki, Yayoi, Uzuki, Kikuzuki Five ships
1927	Aircraft carrier Cruisers Destroyers Submarines	Akagi Aoba, Kinugasa Minatsuki, Nagatsuki, Mikazuki, Yuzuki, Nechizuki Seven ships
1928	Aircraft carrier Cruiser Destroyers Submarines	Kaga Nachi Isonami, Shinonome, Usugumo, Shirakumo, Fubuki, Shirayuki Four ships
1929	Cruisers Minelayers Gunboat Destroyers Submarines	Haguro, Myoko, Ashigara Shirataka, Itsukushima Atami Natsuyuki, Murakumo, Miyuki, Uranami, Shikinami Five ships
1930	Minelayer Gunboat Destroyers Submarines	Yaeyama Futami Ayanami, Asagiri, Amagiri, Yugiri Three ships

The strength of the Imperial Navy on 30 September 1930 was as shown on Chart 2.

The London Treaty for limitations of auxiliary naval vessels was signed on 22 April 1930 and ratified by the Emperor on 2 December 1930. As a result of this treaty, Japan agreed to limit her tonnage to:

A-class cruisers	108,400 tons
B-class cruisers	100,450 tons
Submarines	52,700 tons

The Japanese Navy decided that the obsolete auxiliary vessels, the Aso, Tokiwa, Asama, Yagumo, Izumo, Iwata, Kasuga and Yodo would be treated as special ships outside tonnage limitations, while the Hiei and three cruisers of the Kuma class would be retained as training vessels.

Air Armament

The Japanese Imperial Navy began using aircraft in 1912. However, in spite of their using aircraft aboard the Wakamiya Maru to great advantage in the invasion of Tsingtao during World War I, development of naval aviation was very slow. It was not until 1916 that, together with the organization of the Yokosuka Air Group, a plan for organizing three air units was approved by the Diet with the necessary appropriations. The Sasebo Air Group was established in 1918, and the same year a plan was formulated to add five more air units, bringing the total to eight

Chart 2 — Naval Strength — 30 September 1930

Classification	Number of Ships	Total Standard Displacement
Battleships	6	184,080 tons
Battle Cruisers	4	111,320 "
Total for Capital Ships	10	295,400 "
Aircraft Carriers	4	66,450 "
First-class Cruisers	8	68,400 "
Second-class Cruisers	21	98,415 "
Submarine Tenders	4	21,015 "
Mine Layers	5	21,275 "
First-class Coast Defense Ships	7	59,410 "
Second-class Coast Defense Ships	2	6,630 "
First-class Gunboats	2	2,045 "
Second-class Gunboats	11	3,255 "
First-class Destroyers	56	75,125 "
Second-class Destroyers	48	35,070 "
First-class Submarines	22	34,788 "
Second-class Submarines	45	36,185 "
Mine Sweepers	10	7,290 "
Special Service Ships	25	266,798 "
Total for auxiliary Ships	270	802,151 "
GRAND TOTAL	280	1,097,551 tons

units. In 1920, the plan was increased by a further nine air units, raising the total to 17 units.

The importance of aeronautics was recognized by the Japanese Imperial Navy in 1921 to the extent that upon the advice of a group of highly proficient aeromechanics from Great Britain, drastic changes were made in the method of developing aeronautical techniques. However, the organizational system and technical and military strength of aviation, as well as the over-all setup still failed to meet the requirements of the Navy's plans for building up its forces. Therefore, the execution of the plan for establishing the 17 air units, as well as replenishment of such forces, was delayed until 1930.

At the conclusion of the Washington Disarmament Treaty in 1922, the Imperial Navy was confronted with a situation wherein it was found necessary to reinforce its air strength and make qualitative improvement in armament, along with the replenishment of auxiliary vessels. It selected promising young men and made every effort to bring its air force up to full strength. It drew up and issued an order for the organization of naval air groups on 8 October 1924, to be effective on and after 1 November 1924 (See Chart 3).

In this way the ground work was laid for the building up of air power. The actual replenishment of the air forces, however, did not go beyond the stage of reinforcing and modifying its strength by one and a half units a year, due to the extremely low production of aircraft and the inferiority in techniques and performance, as well as

Chart 3 — Organization of Air Groups - 1 November 1942

Unit Designation	Classification of Aircraft			No of Air Units
Yokosuka Air Group	Airplanes	Seaplanes	Reconnaissance Planes	1.0
			Flying Boats	0.5
		Carrier Planes	Attack Planes	1.0
	Balloons			1.0
Total				3.5
Kasumigaura Air Group	Airplanes	Seaplanes	Reconnaissance Planes	1.0
			Training Planes	0.5
		Carrier Planes	Reconnaissance Planes	1.5
		Land Planes	Training Planes	2.0
		Research Planes		1.0
Dirigibles			1.0	
Total				7.0
Masebe Air Group	Airplanes	Seaplanes	Reconnaissance Planes	1.0
			Flying Boats	0.5
Total				1.5
Omura Air Group	Carrier Planes	Fighters		1.0
GRAND TOTAL				13.0

Composition of an air unit is fully described in Monograph

No. 169.

to the length of time necessary to train personnel.

By the end of 1930 seventeen units had been organized. These units were designated the "Old Aerial Armament Program" and came under a different classification from units under the first replenishment program. Disposition of these units was made as follows:

Type	Yokosuka	Kasumigaura	Tateyama	Sasebo	Omura	Total
Primary training planes		3.0				3.0
Carrier fighters	0.5		0.5		1.0	2.0
Carrier reconnaissance planes	0.5	1.5				2.0
Carrier attack planes	0.5		1.0		1.0	2.5
Reconnaissance seaplanes	0.5	1.5	1.0	1.5		4.5
Flying boats (small)	0.5		1.0	0.5		2.00
Research planes		1.0				1.0
Total	2.5	7.00	3.5	2.0	2.0	17.0

In addition, one dirigible unit was attached to the Kasumigaura Air Group. Considerable changes in the organization and distribution of aircraft was expected with the establishment of new air groups and the reinforcement of aircraft.

The total number of aircraft available in the 17 units was 284 planes, of which 109 were reserve planes.

CHAPTER II

First Naval Armament Replenishment Plan

As a result of the London Naval Disarmament Treaty, the Japanese Imperial Navy was permitted to have, in gross weight, almost as much tonnage as it had demanded from Great Britain and the United States. In substance, however, the "A" class cruisers were reduced to a tonnage of about ten percent less than its demand in ratio to the United States Navy, and the submarines were reduced to approximately 25,000 tons in absolute weight.

Having regard to these limitations, the Navy keenly felt the necessity to build the tonnage specified in the treaty as promptly as possible, and also to expand air armament beyond the limit of the treaty. On 7 October 1930, the Navy Minister presented the Prime Minister with a new plan for a complete readjustment and replenishment of major naval strength. The plan, slightly modified, received the approval of the Diet in 1931, and was known as the First Naval Armament Replenishment Plan, or simply as Plan 1. The budget for this plan passed the Diet for a period of six years from 1931 to 1936 totaling 424 million yen. (¥2.5 = \$1) (Details of the negotiations conducted between the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff regarding the First Naval Armament Replenishment Plan are shown in Appendix I.)

Vessel Armament

The First Naval Armament Replenishment Program included a plan

to construct 39 vessels with a total tonnage amounting to 72,905 tons, at an expenditure of 247,080,000 yen over six years from 1931 through 1936. (Chart 4) This plan was to be carried out through the redistribution over the six-year period of the budget originally allocated for the construction of auxiliary vessels under the continuous program. By the end of 1933, 25 vessels totaling 74,789 tons had been completed under this program. (Chart 5) Following the Tomozuru Incident in March 1934 and the 4th Fleet Incident in September 1935, it became necessary to make revisions in the designs of some of the vessels to improve their efficiency and strengthen their hulls. The completion of the plan, therefore, was delayed until the end of October 1937.

In 1933 a budget of 15,000,000 yen was passed for the plan known as the 1933 Program, apart from Program I, to construct the submarine tender Taigei and two Class "A" subchasers. Construction on the 10,000-ton tender Taigei was started in April 1933 and completed in March 1944, while construction on the two 300-ton subchasers was started in June 1933, and in March 1944 they too were completed.

Air Armament

In Plan I the Navy General Staff originally had asked for 28 air units. During the course of negotiations with the government, however, this was reduced to 16 units. Moreover, appropriations for this plan were made on the condition that the construction of two

Chart 4 — First Naval Armament Replacement Program
1931 Program

Category	Number	Tonnage per Vessel	Total Tonnage	Class of Vessel	Date of Commence- ment	Date of Comple- tion
2d Class Cruiser	4	8,500	34,000	Hogami Class	Oct 31	Oct 37
Destroyer	12	1,368	16,416	Hatsuharu Class 6 Shiratsuyu Class 6	May 31	Aug 37
Submarine	1	1,900		Long Cruis- ing Range	Jun 31	May 37
"	6	1,400		Large size	"	"
"	2	700	11,700	Medium size	"	"
Mineslayer	1	4,400	4,400	Okinoshima	Sep 34	Sep 36
Torpedo Boat	4	527	2,108	Chidori Class	Oct 31	Jul 34
Minesweeper	6	492	2,952	No. 13 Class	Dec 31	Apr 36
Auxiliary Mineslayer	3	443	1,329	Matsushima Class	Dec 31	Sep 34
TOTAL	39		72,905			

Chart 5 — Vessels Constructed from 1931 to 1933

Year	Name of Vessel	Displacement Tonnage	Commencement of Construction	Completion
1931	Sagiri	1,700 tons	28 Mar 29	31 Jan 31
	Akebano	1,700 "	25 Oct 29	31 Jul 31
	Oboro	1,700 "	29 Nov 29	31 Oct 31
	Hshio	1,700 "	24 Dec 29	14 Nov 31
1932	Takao	9,850 tons	28 Apr 27	31 May 32
	Atago	9,850 "	28 Apr 27	30 Mar 32
	Chokai	9,850 "	26 Mar 28	30 Jun 32
	Maya	9,850 "	4 Dec 28	30 Jun 32
	Yagami	1,135 "	2 Aug 30	31 Aug 32
	Ikasuchi	1,700 "	7 Mar 30	15 Aug 32
	Zasazami	1,700 "	21 Feb 30	19 May 32
	Akatsuki	1,700 "	27 Feb 30	30 Nov 32
	Inasumi	1,700 "	7 Mar 30	15 Nov 32
	Submarine I-5	1,950 "	30 Oct 29	31 Jul 32
	Submarine I-65	1,638 "	19 Dec 29	1 Dec 32
	Submarine I-66	1,638 "	8 Nov 29	10 Nov 32
Submarine I-67	1,638 "	14 Oct 29	8 Aug 32	
1933	Ryujo	7,400 "	26 Nov 29	9 May 33
	Hibiki	1,700 "	21 Feb 30	31 Mar 33
	Hatsuharu	1,368 "	14 May 31	30 Sep 33
	Nenohi	1,368 "	15 Dec 31	30 Sep 33
	Chidori	527 "	13 Oct 31	20 Nov 33
	Minesweeper 13	492 "	22 Dec 31	31 Aug 33
	Minesweeper 14	492 "	22 Dec 31	30 Sep 33
	Natsushin	443 "	24 Dec 31	31 Jul 33

air units be postponed until the 1938 fiscal year or later. This meant that only 14 units would actually be activated by the end of 1936. At that time demands for government appropriations for air armament were not made on the same concrete numerical basis as budgetary demands for the construction of vessels. Considerable difficulty was involved in obtaining aircraft equipment and in the improvement of necessary airfield facilities. The situation was such that even the drastically reduced plan was not completed until the end of October 1937.

The type of aircraft required under Plan I were:

Carrierborne fighters	2.0 units
Carrierborne attack planes	6.0 units
Reconnaissance seaplanes	1.5 units
Medium size flying boats	3.0 units
Large size flying boats	1.0 units
Test planes	0.5 units

Total	14.0 units
-------	------------

One hundred and seventy-six (176) planes were required, of which 46 were to be used as replacements.

Because of their frequent transfers, the distribution of the air units among the various air groups cannot be clearly stated. However, in view of the time of establishment, size of the airfields, and their convenience for training, Chart 6 is considered sufficiently correct to show the distribution of air strength in normal situations.

Chart 6 -- Plan 1: Distribution of Air Strength in Normal Situation

Type of Plane	Yokosuka	Kasumigaura	Tateyama	Yokohama	Ominato	Kure	Sasebo	Omura	Sasaki	Total	Old Program	Grand Total
Primary trainer										0	3.0	3.0
Carrier-borne fighter	0.5	0.5	0.5			0.5				2.0	2.0	4.0
Carrier-borne reconnaissance plane										0	2.0	2.0
Carrier-borne attack plane	2.0	0.5	1.0			0.5		0.5	1.5	6.0	2.5	8.5
Reconnaissance seaplane	0.5				0.5				0.5	1.5	4.5	6.0
Small-size flying boat										0	2.0	2.0
Medium-size flying boat			1.0			1.0	1.0			3.0		3.0
Large-size flying boat				1.0						1.0		1.0
Test plane	0.5									0.5	1.0	1.5
Total	3.5	1.0	2.5	1.0	0.5	2.0	1.0	0.5	2.0	14.0	/	/
Old Program	3.0	7.0	2.5		0.5		1.5	2.0	0.5	/	17.0	/
Grand Total	6.5	8.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	/	/	31.0

CHAPTER III

Second Naval Armament Replenishment Plan

Japan's foreign relations, which had been deteriorating since the Manchuria Incident, grew worse after her withdrawal from the League of Nations. In view of the forthcoming Disarmament Conference and the expected trend in international affairs, it seemed as though the security of the whole of East Asia would depend upon the real power of Japan. Moreover, with the huge increase in American naval forces, culminating with the first Vinson Program in March 1934, Japan felt a very urgent need to replenish her naval forces. Despite the fact, therefore, that Plan 1 was still in progress, it was decided to put into operation the Second Naval Replenishment Plan, called Plan 2, in order to replenish the naval forces up to the treaty limits at the earliest possible moment. This replenishment program was to be completed in four years from 1934 to 1937. The Navy Minister negotiated with the Finance Minister on several occasions concerning budgetary appropriations for the program, and finally the program was approved by the Cabinet and submitted to the Diet. The budget for the program was set at 477,127,300 yen (¥ 4 = \$1) of which 431,688,000 yen was to be used for ship construction, and 45,439,300 yen for creating eight air units. This received Diet approval and, with the Imperial Sanction, was published as law on 20 March 1934. (Appendix II shows communications between the Navy Minister and the Navy General Staff relative to Plan 2, and sets

forth the Navy General Staff's requirements to fulfil their proposed plan.)

Vessel Armament

In Plan 2 the Navy General Staff originally asked for an additional 87 ships with a total displacement of 159,370 tons, to include 22 ships of 63,200 tons under the treaty limitations. However, they could not win the full approval of the Finance Ministry in regard to the construction of vessels outside the treaty limitations, although the plan to bring up to maximum strength the vessels coming under the treaty limitations met with little objection from other government agencies.

After prolonged negotiations the Navy was forced to reduce this armament program to a four-year program, in which time they were to build 48 vessels with a total displacement of 137,350 tons. A budget amounting to 431,688,000 yen was finally passed by the Diet for this program. (Outline of the Second Naval Armament Replacement Program is shown in Appendix III.)

A number of ships scheduled in Plan 2 had their keels laid in the latter half of 1934, however, the construction of the Hiryu, Chikuma and Takasaki had to be postponed about one year, mainly because of a shortage of dockyards. This same difficulty was met in the case of destroyers, although the urgent necessity to improve their equipment was realized after the Tomozuru accident.

The tremendous damage suffered by the Fourth Fleet in a typhoon

in the fall of 1935 clearly showed the necessity for drastic improvement in the construction of all naval vessels. Not only were sweeping changes made in design of all ships under construction, but it was necessary to strengthen almost all ships already commissioned. This, coupled with the execution of the existing plan for remodeling capital ships, caused a rapid increase in naval construction, but at the same time, served to delay the completion of Plan 2 to a very great extent. (Chart 7)

Air Armament

With the completion of the aircraft carrier Ryujo in May 1933, in addition to the Hosho, Kaga and Akagi, the carrier-borne air force acquired great importance as the Navy's main offensive unit. At the same time, aircraft carried by battleships and cruisers also gained in importance as essential means of spotting, scouting and contact. This resulted in a revolutionary change in the concept of sea operations and, with the increasing cooperation of the land-based air force, sea operations in the form of patrol and attack sorties helped greatly to contribute to the idea that aircraft was of tremendous importance in carrying out such operations.

Plan 2 made provision for only eight new units, however, appropriations were made to carry out the reorganization of nine units, and also to move up the completion date of the ten Diet-approved units to the end of the 1936 fiscal year, which was the deadline for the completion of Plan 2. By the end of the 1936 fiscal year,

Chart 7 — Dates of Completion of Major Vessels
Built under Program 2

Type	Name	Date of Completion	Months Delayed	Remarks
Aircraft Carrier	SORYU	29 Dec 37		
"	HIRYU	5 Jul 39	16	
Cruiser	TONE	20 Nov 38	8	
"	CHIPYMA	20 May 39	14	
Destroyer	UNIKAGE Class: 4	31 Aug 37 last ship		
"	AGASHIO Class: 10	28 Jun 39 last ship	15	
Submarine	Cruising Submarines: 2	5 Dec 38 last ship	9	
"	Large Size: 2	18 Dec 38 last ship	9	
Seaplane Tender	CHITOSE Class: 2	15 Dec 38 last ship	9	
"	MIZUHO	25 Feb 39	11	
Submarine Tender	TSURUGI- ZAKI	15 Jan 39	10	Work for conversion into an aircraft carrier begun about Nov 40, finished Dec 41.
Submarine Tender (aircraft carrier)	TAKASAKI	27 Dec 40	33	In the course of building, this ship was converted into an aircraft carrier. Finished on 27 Dec 40.

therefore, the total number of units was to be 39. The eight new units would comprise:

Carrierborne fighters	3.0 units)	105 planes
Medium attack planes	2.5 units)	(including 25
Large attack planes	1.5 units)	planes for
Large flying boats	1.0 units)	replacement.)

The disposition of the air groups, upon the completion of Plan 2, was provisionally scheduled as shown in Appendix IV.

Only four of the eight land-air groups were completed by the end of the 1936 fiscal year. The completion of the four remaining groups was delayed more than a year. There was from one to two years' delay in the completion of the program for carrierborne and shipborne aircraft.

Due to the delay in obtaining aircraft material, two of the two and a half units of medium attack planes were not completed until the end of the 1937 fiscal year.

It was only with great effort that a half unit of the 1½ large attack-plane units was completed by the end of the 1936 fiscal year. The performance of this aircraft (Type 95 land-attack planes) was extremely low, and they were completely expended through mishaps during the China Incident before the tactical value of the unit could be shown. The production of this type of plane was discontinued, and, at the same time, an attempt was made to improve the performance of medium attack planes. The execution of the plan for armament of large attack planes was left in abeyance until the middle of World War II, when plans were made for the production of the "Renzan" bombers.

Despite the fact that the aircraft complement for a flying boat unit was only two aircraft per unit, the completion of one flying boat unit was delayed almost a year due to materiel shortages.

The delay in naval armament caused a delay in the equipment and organization of carrierborne and shipborne planes from one to two years. With the exception of the special cases stated above, Air Armament Plan 2 was completed by the end of the 1937 fiscal year — about one year after the specified date of completion. The total number of aircraft and personnel at the end of the 1936 and 1937 fiscal years was:

	1936 fiscal year		1937 fiscal year	
	Crews	Planes	Crews	Planes
Land air groups	1,620	519	1,810	563
Carrier-borne and ship-borne planes	701	261	901	332
TOTAL	2,321	780	2,711	895

Appendix I

Negotiations between the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff regarding the First Naval Armament Replenishment Plan

On 27 June 1930, the Chief of Naval General Staff sent the Navy Minister a note with basic recommendations on the replenishment of strength following the London Naval Treaty. Simultaneously, the Vice Chief conferred with the Vice Minister regarding details. On 8 July 1930, the Minister replied to the effect that he would endeavor to realize the complete adjustment and replenishment of strength as far as general conditions, especially the financial situation, would allow. On 11 September 1930, the Chief of the Navy General Staff forwarded to the Navy Minister, Navy General Staff, Secret Document No 176, stressing the need for naval strength. In response to this correspondence the Navy Minister pushed the study of the recommendations and at the same time carried out negotiations with the government in order to obtain the necessary appropriations. On 15 November 1930 the Navy General Staff received a reply from the Navy Ministry stating that owing to the unfavorable state of the national finances the appropriation requests had been cut. It also gave the appropriations to be made to the Navy, and the measures to be taken by the end of 1936 in order to minimize the shortage in strength after the treaty had gone into effect.

Navy General Staff Secret Document No 176

11 September 1930

From : Chief of the Navy General Staff, TANIGUCHI, Naomi
To : The Navy Minister, TAKARABE, Takeshi
Subject: Recommended plans for construction and replenishment of
naval vessels and for the replenishment and expansion
of air strength

The above mentioned plans, the contents of which are shown in the appended sheet, were drawn up by the Navy General Staff after careful study, with a view to minimizing tactical handicaps arising from the armed strength agreed upon in the London Naval Treaty. These plans, agreeing in principle with the Reply to the Throne made recently by the Supreme War Council, are absolutely indispensable from the standpoint of national defense and strategic operations. In the light of the strength of naval forces of the major powers subsequent to the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty, and in view of the current naval rearmament of the Empire and future developments, it is considered most imperative from the view of national defense to carry out the replenishment program recommended previously in Navy General Staff Secret Document No 116 of 1930. Such being the case, your efforts toward the completion of these plans upon the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty will be greatly appreciated.

The gist of the Appendix to Navy General
Staff Secret Document No 176:

The plan for construction and replenishment of naval vessels (abridged):

Most effective use is to be made of the forces which the Empire is permitted to retain under the new London Navy Treaty. Efforts are to be exerted toward replenishment of naval vessels not restricted by the treaty.

These plans are to be put into execution during the 1931 fiscal year and completed by the end of the 1936 fiscal year. The construction of ships begun about this time, and restricted by the treaty, is to be completed by the end of December 1936. However, the construction of those ships permitted by the treaty to be under construction at the end of 1936, as well the construction as those ships not restricted by the treaty, is to be begun in 1934 and completed by the end of the 1938 fiscal year.

Replenishment and construction of naval vessels

Ships Limited by Treaty

Category	Standard Displacement Tonnage	Number of Ships to be Constructed	Number of Ships to be Started in 1934
Cruisers	8,500	4	2
Aircraft Carrier	9,850	1	0
Destroyers	1,400	18	7
Submarines	1,900	1	2
	1,400	6	2
	700	2	0
Remarks	1,900 ton submarine is long cruising range type. 1,400 ton submarine is Navy-type large. 700 ton submarine is medium type.		

Ships Outside Treaty Limitation

Category	Standard Displacement Tonnage	Number of Ships to be Constructed	Number of Ships to be Started in 1934
*Coast-defense ships	1,200	4	0
Gunboats	900	2	0
	200	1	0
Mine Layers	5,000	2	0
	2,000	0	2
Auxiliary Mine Layers	600	5	3
Torpedo Boats	600	12	8
Mine Sweepers	600	6	6
Emergency-net Layer	2,000	0	1
Net Tenders	600	0	2
Submarine Chasers	300	2	4
	150	4	2
Repair Ship	10,000	1	0
Oil Tanker	17,000	1	0
Survey Ships	1,600	2	0
Submarine Tender	8,000	1	0
Collier	10,000	1	0
* Substitute for destroyer			

Twenty-eight additional air units were to be reinforced under the plan for the replenishment of air strength.

In response to the foregoing, Navy Ministry authorities pushed the study of the recommendations. At the same time, they carried out negotiations with the Government. As a result, the Ministry sent the following answer on 15 November 1930:

Secretariat Secret Document No 1090

15 November 1930

From : Navy Minister ABO, Kiyotane
To : Chief of the Navy General Staff, TANIGUCHI, Naomi
Subject: Readjustment and Replenishment of Major Naval Strength

Upon presentation to the Prime Minister of a request of 7 October in regard to the subject mentioned in your Navy General Staff Secret Documents Nos 176 and 116, conferences were held by the executives of this Ministry and the general staffs. (See Appendix I) Due to the unfavorable state of national finances, the requests were slashed. Efforts were made, thereafter, to realize your proposals through repeated negotiations with the state ministers concerned.

As a result of these negotiations, a decision was reached at a Cabinet Meeting on the eleventh of this month. (See Appendix 2)

Incidentally, I will confer with the Prime Minister on the replenishment of armament not approved at this Cabinet Conference.

Appendix No. 1

Secretariat Secret Document No 943

7 October 1930

From : Navy Minister Baron ABO, Kiyotane
To : Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI, Yuko
Subject: Communication with reference to readjustment and
Replenishment of Major Naval Strength

For various reasons not all of our recommendations were accepted at the London Naval Disarmament Conference. Therefore, it was anticipated that defects would appear in the forces which were to be used to carry out the naval operations program based upon the established national defense policy. This issue created a sensation across the length and breadth of the nation. Even in the Navy itself confusion arose over the issue and the situation was such that no one could foretell what the outcome would be. However, the fact that the situation appears to have settled outwardly is believed attributable to confidence felt in the sincerity of the government in naval rearmament matters.

I believe that the following are the principal causes contributing to the resolution of the issue.

When a Cabinet meeting was held on 1 April this year to discuss the instructions to be given to the Imperial Plenipotentiary, the Cabinet approved the Navy Vice-Minister's plan for easing difficulties expected in the strategic employment of forces for national defense as the result of the disarmament pact. Heated discussion ensued and

there appeared no end to the arguments during the unofficial meeting of the Supreme War Council held on 21 July to discuss whether the military strength authorized by treaty would hinder the strategic employment of forces for national defense, and the measures to be taken to correct the situation. On this occasion the Prime Minister, who had received situation reports from the ex-Minister of the Navy, declared that the government would, considering finances and other factors, make the utmost effort toward the realization of the rearmament program.

From this statement, the Supreme War Council understood the sincere attitude of the government and submitted a Reply to the Throne which was passed unanimously at the 23 July conference. The Prime Minister, shown the Reply by the Emperor, also replied to the Emperor, saying, "The reply of the Supreme War Council is just and right. I shall do my utmost to assist the Imperial Rule by carrying out the program, after careful deliberation with other cabinet ministers on the financial and other aspects of the program."

Needless to say, armament must be based upon national strength. Nevertheless, national defense is a matter which should be treated as a long-range policy of the nation, and at the same time the enhancement of national prestige and authority must be backed by powerful armament. For this reason, the greatest care should be exercised to see that the current financial hardships do not make one oblivious to the great necessity for rearmament. There is a danger that once rearmament is neglected, the day may come when a

regrettable situation could not be rectified. Considering the manner in which circumstances have developed to date, I firmly believe that from the standpoint of keeping the dignity of the government and exercising control over the Navy it is most imperative at this juncture to establish rearmament in line with the Reply to the Throne made by the Supreme War Council.

It is a cause of great anxiety to this minister that there are those who are apt to make light of rearmament, regarding the conclusion of the Disarmament Treaty as the advent of international peace. It is my belief that the United States will maintain a commanding position in the near future in naval armament. According to intelligence reports received to date, the program for auxiliary vessels proposed by the General Board, U.S. Navy, as shown in the appendix, aims at maximum buildup within limits of the treaty. In the case of capital ships, budgetary appropriations amounting to over 98,000,000 yen for remodeling ten dreadnaughts have already been approved by Congress, while the remaining capital ships are scheduled shortly to be modernized at the great cost of approximately 140,000,000 yen. Meanwhile, in the case of the air arm, U.S. Navy authorities are pressing for a goal of 1,000 aircraft as a second phase plan, in addition to the established program for the construction of 1,000 planes. From these facts one cannot help but conclude the disarmament treaty has not altered in the least the U.S. attitude toward naval rearmament.

Unless our country establishes and executes immediately a proper

naval armament replenishment program to cope with the situation, there is a likelihood that the gap in naval strength between Japan and the United States will widen increasingly, and our just and rightful contentions will not be accepted, and we will fall prey to an overwhelmingly superior force. So far as our country is concerned, the maximum strength permitted under the treaty is inadequate from the standpoint of strategic employment of forces. We should try, therefore, to make most effective use of forces permitted by the treaty. Not only that, but the shortage of submarines and 8-inch cruisers should be rectified. At the same time, air strength should be reinforced in order to meet the requirements of national defense.

In line with the foregoing the Navy General Staff, after careful deliberation, mapped out the plan mentioned below and communicated it to the Navy Ministry. After several exchanges of opinion between the Navy General Staff and the Navy Ministry, it was agreed that the plan was right in principle.

I should like to add that the plan in question was presented as explanatory data on the occasion of the Supreme War Council's meeting to discuss measures to cope with the Naval Disarmament Treaty.

It is estimated that the implementation of this plan will cost as much as ¥ 733,633,000 in extraordinary expenditures alone. However, by reason of the points cited in the foregoing, it is desired that consideration be given to and every effort exerted for the realization of the plan, despite the fact that the implementation

of the plan in the present financial condition of the nation and financial policies pursued by the government is difficult.

Extract from the Naval Rearmament Program

The following plans are scheduled to be put into effect during the period from the 1931 fiscal year to the 1936 fiscal year:

Item	Necessary Expenditure
Shipbuilding & replacement program	¥ 422,983,000
Air strength reinforcement program	131,508,456
Various kinds of improvement programs	179,142,101
Total (Extraordinary expenditure)	¥ 733,633,557

Shipbuilding and Replacement Program

In view of the appearance of numerous superior warships of modern design in the United States, efforts must be directed toward minimizing the actual lowered effectiveness of the naval forces at the disposal of the Empire. Every possible effort must be made to build up forces to the limits prescribed by the treaty. At the same time, individual naval craft should be brought to maximum effectiveness. Meanwhile, replenishment of naval vessels not limited by treaty should be effected with a view to offset the difficulties imposed upon our strategic employment of forces by the treaty.

This program will be launched in the 1931 fiscal year and accomplished by 31 December 1936. The program concerning warships limited by treaty is to be accomplished by the end of the 1936 fiscal year. The construction of naval vessels limited by treaty to be under construction at the end of 1936 as well as those vessels not limited by treaty but which require construction during the period in question, is to be initiated in 1934 and completed by the end of the 1938 fiscal year.

SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

Warships subject to the treaty limitation				
Category of Warship	Standard Displacement	Unit Construction Cost	Number of Vessels to be Constructed and Construction Cost	Number of Vessels Scheduled to be started in 1934 and completed after 1937, and Construction Cost
	Tons	£	£	£
Cruisers	8,500	26,141,000	(4) 104,564,000	(2) 52,282,000
Aircraft carriers	9,800	29,000,000	(1) 29,000,000	0
Destroyers	1,400	5,750,000	(8) 103,500,000	(7) 40,250,000
Submarines				
Large Cruising Range	1,900	8,686,000	(1) 8,686,000	(2) 17,372,000
Navy Type Large Size	1,400	6,764,000	(6) 40,584,000	(2) 13,528,000
Medium Size	700	4,372,000	(2) 8,744,000	0
Total		Tonnage Building Cost	Tons 80,700 £ 295,078,000	Tons 33,400 £ 123,432,000
Warships not limited by treaty				
Coast-defense Ships	900	2,347,000	9,388,000	0
Gun-boat				
Large	900	2,217,500	4,435,000	0
Small	200	707,000	707,000	0
Mine Layers	5,000	7,650,000	15,300,000	0
	2,000	4,709,700	0	9,419,400
Auxiliary Mine Layers	600	1,909,000	9,545,000	5,727,000
Torpedo boats	600	2,800,000	(12) 33,600,000	(8) 22,400,000
Mine sweepers	600	1,880,000	11,280,000	(6) 11,280,000
Emergency Net layers	2,000	4,176,900	0	(1) 4,176,900
Net layers	600	1,798,000	0	(2) 3,596,000
Submarine Chaser				
Large	300	1,600,000	(2) 3,200,000	(4) 6,400,000
Small	150	1,131,000	(4) 4,524,000	(2) 2,262,000

Shipbuilding Program
 Warships not limited by treaty - Cont'd

Category of Warship	Standard Displacement	Unit Construction Cost	Number of Vessels to be Constructed and Construction Cost	Number of Vessels Scheduled to be started in 1934 and completed after 1937, and Construction Cost
	Tons	£	£	
Repair Ships	10,000	6,900,000	(1) 6,900,000	0
Oil Tanker	17,000	9,246,000	(1) 9,246,000	0
Collier	10,000	4,080,000	(1) 4,080,000	0
Submarine Tender	8,000	10,500,000	(1) 10,500,000	0
Survey Ships	1,600	2,600,000	(2) 5,200,000	0
Total		Tonnage Construction Cost	Tons 78,000 £ 127,905,000	Tons 18,900 £ 65,261,000
Grand Total		Tonnage Construction Cost	Tons 159,000 £ 422,983,000	Tons 52,300 £ 188,693,300

Of the amount shown in the foregoing table 422,983,000 yen represents the construction cost for the warships to be constructed by the end of the 1936 fiscal year. The construction cost of the warships to be constructed during the period between 1934 and the fiscal year of 1938 is omitted, according to the existing precedent of the continuing expenditure program.

The estimated expenditure by fiscal year is as follows:

Fiscal year 1931	" 1932	" 1933	" 1934	" 1935	" 1936
20,000,000	67,000,000	90,000,000	90,000,000	83,000,000	72,983,000
Total 422,983,000					

In order to build the naval vessels allowed under the London Naval Treaty according to the standard ship age, the following average annual construction tonnage must be undertaken.

Category Auxiliary Ship	Tonnage permitted by Treaty	Ship Age for Replacement	Average Annual Tonnage Construction
8-in Cruisers	108,400 tons	20	5,420 tons
Light Cruisers	100,450 "	20	5,022 "
Destroyers	105,500 "	16	6,594 "
Submarines	52,700 "	13	4,054 "
Total	367,050 tons		21,091 tons

In addition to the above, there is need for the construction of

a large tonnage of replacement vessels in the categories of battleships, aircraft carriers and ships not restricted by treaty.

The number of the exempt ships to be constructed under the current program looms large compared with the annual construction of only 13,450 tons for auxiliary ships. Thus far, obsolete vessels have been used for defense and local operations, but since the London Treaty prohibits the possession of any vessel, even an obsolete vessel, in excess of limitations, it has become necessary to meet the depletion, as well as to construct new ships as replacements, so that normal peacetime duties may be carried out. The situation is such that it has become absolutely necessary to meet the shortage of submarines by use of certain vessels not limited by treaty. These points were taken into consideration when the program was formulated. To lower markedly our shipbuilding capacity and carry out a retrenchment of facilities and cut down personnel would not only be difficult but would prove highly disadvantageous in the event that the necessity should arise in later years to revise shipbuilding at a moment's notice.

Air Strength Reinforcement Program

Air units are to be increased by 16 units at a cost of 85,184,852 yen as a countermeasure to our limited naval strength, caused by the London Treaty.

Twelve air units at a cost of 46,323,604 yen are to be built, irrespective of the London Treaty, in view of the expansion of the US naval air force.

Various Plans for Replenishment

The following appropriations are considered necessary for vital programs and should be implemented at once and realized by the 1936 fiscal year:

Item	Amount
1. Expenditure for improvement and modernization of warships and equipment, and incidental expenses	88,933,474 yen
2. Expenditure for special ship repairs to prolong ship age and expenditure for ordnance repairs	33,560,000 yen
3. Expenditure for replenishment of air force	9,502,194 yen
4. Expenditure for increasing submarine force	6,125,500 yen
5. Expenditure for equipment of research agencies	7,330,358 yen
6. Increased expenditure for training and promotion of military effectiveness	6,690,575 yen
7. Expenditure for improvement of defense facilities	27,000,000 yen
Total	179,142,101 yen

In addition to the foregoing, about 40,000,000 yen is being requested as running expenses, mainly for further training of personnel (air maintenance cost not included).

Should it prove impossible to realize Program No. 1 mentioned above by the 1936 fiscal year, it is desired that approval be given

to the implementation of the subscribed program, and that items of the original program be enforced successively as the financial situation improves.

The urgent program for the replenishment of the Navy. (Extract)

It is planned that the following will be carried out during the period from the 1931 fiscal year to 1936 fiscal year.

Item	Necessary Expenses
Shipbuilding and replacement program	355,478,000 yen
Air strength reinforcement program	65,000,000 "
Various replenishment programs	80,000,000 "
Total (Extraordinary expenditure)	500,678,000 yen

Shipbuilding and replacement program

Category of warship		Standard displacement	Unit construction cost	No of ships to be constructed	Total cost	
Warships subject to the treaty limitation.	Cruisers	8,500 ^{tons}	26,141,000 ^{yen}	4	104,564,000 yen	
	Aircraft-carriers	9,800	29,000,000	1	29,000,000	
	Destroyers	1,400	5,750,000	18	103,500,000	
	Submarine-boats	Long cruising range type	1,900	8,686,000	1	8,686,000
		Navy type large size	1,400	6,764,000	6	40,584,000
		Medium size	700	4,372,000	2	8,744,000
	Total	Tonnage:	80,700 tons			295,078,000 yen
Warships on the exempt list	Coast-defense ship	900	2,100,000	1	2,100,000	
	Gun-boats	Large	900	2,000,000	1	2,000,000
		Small	200	600,000	1	600,000
	Mineslayer	3,500	5,000,000	1	5,000,000	
	Mineslayer	5,000	7,000,000	1	7,000,000	
	Light mineslayers.	600	1,700,000	5	8,500,000	
	Torpedo boats	600	2,800,000	8	20,800,000	
	Mine sweepers	600	1,700,000	6	10,200,000	
	Submarine chasers (small)	150	900,000	2	1,800,000	
	Survey ships	1,600	2,400,000	1	2,400,000	
Total	Tonnage:	23,800 tons			60,400,000 yen	
Grand Total	Tonnage:	104,500 tons			355,478,000 yen	
Annual average for six years	Tonnage:	17,412 tons			59,246,000 yen	

The estimated expenditure by fiscal year is as follows:

Fiscal year	"	"	"	"	"
1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936
yen 20,000,000	yen 75,000,000	yen 75,000,000	yen 75,000,000	yen 65,486,000	yen 44,992,000
Total		355,478,000 yen			

Air strength replenishment program

The 16 units program: 65,000,000 yen.

Various replenishment programs

Expenditure: 80,200,000 yen

Appendix No. 2

Cabinet Decision Concerning Increase and Replenishment of
Principal Naval Strength

11 November 1930

This program called for an expenditure of 424,000,000 yen, including 50,000,000 yen reserved for the construction and maintenance of two new air units in and after the 1938 fiscal year. 247,080,000 yen was to be appropriated over six consecutive fiscal years from 1931 through 1936, for the construction of 39 naval vessels with a total tonnage of 75,300 tons, comprising 25 ships of those types placed under treaty limitations and 14 of those types outside the limitation.

The details are shown in the following table:

Urgent Program Increase and Replenishment of Principal Naval Strength

Classification	Expenditure	Remarks
Naval Vessels Construction and Replacement Program	247,080,000 yen	In addition 50,000,000 yen appropriated for construction of 2 air units, their maintenance, etc.
Air Strength Increase Program	81,970,000	
Miscellaneous Replenishment Program	44,950,000	
Total	374,000,000	

For reference, the allocation of auxiliary naval vessels in total tonnage to Japan, Great Britain and the United States under the London Treaty is shown in the following comparison tables, (A) and (B), and the reply to the Throne made by naval members of the Supreme War Council upon the conclusion of said treaty is in (C).

(A) Comparative Table of Naval Craft Tonnage held by U.S.
and Japan

Type of Vessel	Tonnage held by U.S.	Tonnage claimed by Japan		Tonnage limit under treaty		Difference between claim and treaty tonnage
		Tonnage	Ratio (%)	Tonnage	Ratio (%)	
Class-A Cruisers	180,000	126,000	70.00	108,400	60.22	17,600 ton
Class-B Cruisers	143,500	164,498	56.05	100,450	70.00	41,452
Destroyers	150,000			105,500	70.33	
Submarines	52,700	77,842	Tonnage considered absolutely necessary	52,700	100.00	25,142
Total	526,200	368,340	70.00	367,050	69.75	1,290

(B) Comparative Table of Naval Craft Tonnage held by Great
Britain and Japan

Type of Vessel	Tonnage held by Britain	Tonnage claimed by Japan		Tonnage limit under treaty	
		Tonnage	Ratio (%)	Tonnage	Ratio (%)
Class-A Cruisers	146,800	126,000	85.83	108,400	73.84
Class-B Cruisers	192,200	164,498	48.07	100,450	52.26
Destroyers	150,000			105,500	70.33
Submarines	52,700	77,842	Tonnage considered absolutely necessary	52,700	100.00
Total	541,700	368,340	68.00	367,050	67.75

(C) Reply to Throne adopted at meeting of the Supreme War Council concerning national defense in connection with Japanese naval strength as stipulated in London Treaty of 1930.

On 23 July 1930, a meeting of navy members of the councillors which was held in the Imperial Court, unanimously passed the following reply to the Throne: (Those present: Fleet-Admiral Togo, His Imperial Highness, Prince Fushimi, Councillor Okada, Councillor Kato, Minister, Chief of Navy General Staff, Chief of Operational Bureau, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Sumiyama, Aide to His Majesty.)

Reply to the Throne

The national defense policy sanctioned by Your Majesty in 1923 is the best policy to meet the present situation of the Empire. However, the recently concluded London Treaty creates a shortage in our naval strength required for the maintenance and execution of naval operation plans according to the established policy.

Accordingly, in order to minimize the effect of this shortage in strength after the treaty has gone into effect, the following measures must be taken by the end of 1936:

1. The full realization of the tonnage quotas stipulated in the treaty, improvement in the maintenance and of the potentiality of the existing naval vessels, and the increase of craft of those types which are outside the treaty limitation.
2. The expansion of air strength to an extent necessary for

the execution of the operation plan.

3. The improvement of defense installations, the strengthening of experimental and research organs, the improvement of training facilities, the encouragement of maneuvers and exercises, the increase of personnel and materials, the completion of land and sea installations, and the strengthening of preparations for tactical operations.

The enforcement of these measures is considered almost sufficient under the present situation to secure national defense, despite the restrictions imposed by the treaty. Nevertheless, since the disposition of the military forces of one nation should be determined according to the nation's own estimate of the situation in view of the nature of preparedness, we see it highly disadvantageous from the standpoint of national defense to remain for a long time under the restrictions imposed by this treaty. For this reason, we believe that the Empire should renew its efforts, upon the expiration of the treaty, for the completion of its defense setup with whatever policy is considered to be the best.

We submit this reply with the utmost reverence and humility.

23 July 1930

Signed by the Supreme War
Councillors

Appendix II

Navy General Staff Secret Document No 154

6 May 1933

From : Navy General Staff
To : The Navy Minister
Subject: Replenishment of Armament during and after
the 1934 Fiscal Year

The international situation of the Empire has undergone unprecedented change since her withdrawal from the League of Nations, and the security of East Asia has come to depend entirely upon the actual power of the Empire.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese-American conflict of policies toward the Manchurian issue shows no sign of heading towards amicable settlement. Not only that but it appears that preparations for a solution by force of arms are being made in the United States. This is evidenced by the fact that her armament has steadily been increased since the Manchurian Incident and that her entire fleet has been concentrated on the Pacific coast, while air bases for use in time of war are being sought in central and southern China. Hereafter there may be some changes in the situation for better or for worse, but we must be prepared for the worst, as the general trend of affairs seems to be precipitating a crisis.

In view of the above-stated situation, it is deemed absolutely necessary that a national defense set-up strong enough to cope with

the crisis be created by supplementing, in the case of the Navy, the numerical inferiority of armament through the improvement of their quality, in addition to replenishment of air strength and warship construction during and after 1934 as envisaged in the communication, Navy General Staff Secret Document No 215 of 1932.

Your utmost efforts in the matter are hereby requested.

(Postscript)

1. As to the construction of warships and the replenishment of air strength, it is expected that subsequent developments may require some modification of plans, at which time it is hoped to make further recommendations.

2. It is the intention of the Navy General Staff to have the Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff confer with the Vice-Minister of the Navy on details of this communication.

Navy General Staff Secret Document No 199

14 June 1933

From : Chief of the Navy General Staff

To : Minister of the Navy

Subject: Construction and Replenishment of Naval Vessels
and Replenishment of Air Strength

Navy General Staff Secret Document No 154 was forwarded to you previously with a view to coping with the general trends of future affairs. The steps which should be taken during and after 1934 in replenishment of armament were set forth in that communication. In view of steps now being taken by the United States to meet the new

situation in the Far East, especially in the light of their plans to push the replenishment of naval forces, it was deemed necessary to modify a section of plans outlined in Navy General Staff Secret Document No 215 of 1932. After careful deliberations, a plan envisaging the construction and replenishment of naval vessels as well as the augmenting of aerial forces, as given in the appended sheet, was formulated in order to effect adequate national defense and meet the international defense situation faced by our nation.

Your utmost efforts toward the realization of this plan are hereby requested.

12 June 1933

From: Navy General Staff

Plan for Construction and Replenishment of Naval Vessels
and Increase of Air Strength

1. In view of the Empire's international situation, brought about by the Manchurian Incident, and in anticipation of the various complications likely to arise during the forthcoming Disarmament Conference and subsequent to the expiration of the period of our notification of intention to withdraw from the League of Nations, there is a strong likelihood that Japan will face a still graver situation around 1935. Therefore, there is urgent need to replenish and equip the absolutely necessary forces to cope with the situation and provide adequate national defense.

However, the equipment of such forces, at this juncture, is impossible to accomplish immediately due to restrictions set forth in the London Treaty. Therefore, wherever possible, the execution of operations is to be facilitated by countering US naval rearmament by replenishing our forces within treaty limits, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Reply to the Throne made by the Supreme War Council at the time of the conclusion of the treaty in question.

Moreover, plans are to be formulated to see that our carrier-borne aircraft will not be inferior to those of the US Navy.

2. In the event that the US Navy's ship construction volume exceeds current expectations prior to the expiration of the London

Treaty, reinforcement of emergency air units is to be effected, while construction of vessels which are placed outside the limits is to be increased.

3. The plan is to be set into operation in the 1934 fiscal year and accomplished by the end of the 1936 fiscal year. However, the construction of one aircraft carrier and such types of vessels on which construction can be started, but which are not permitted under the treaty to be completed until the end of 1936, are scheduled to be completed at the end of the 1937 fiscal year.

Plan for Construction and Replenishment of Naval Vessels

Construction of naval vessels of restricted categories is to be carried out up to the limits prescribed by the treaty.

In the construction of naval vessels outside treaty limits, priority is to be given to the build-up of first line combat units, while in the case of defensive units, replenishment is to be made by employing, for the time being, obsolete vessels. At the same time forces are to be maintained at the minimum required strength in anticipation of an outbreak of hostilities.

Efforts are to be directed toward reinforcing cruising range and maneuverability of first line combat units.

SHIPS TO BE CONSTRUCTED UNDER THE REPLENISHMENT PROGRAM

Ships Restricted by Treaty

Classification	Unit standard displacement Tonnage	Number of Ships	Maximum speed (knots)	Cruising Range	Standard Armament	Description
Aircraft Carriers	10,050 ton	2	36	10,000 nautical miles at 18 knots	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 20 cm guns 5 (equipped along center line) 2. 12.7 cm AA guns 20 3. Over 40 AA Machine guns 4. Aircraft (omitted) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Internal combustion engines are to be used if possible. 2. Number of planes that will be ready on the flight deck at any one time will consist of more than one half of the aircraft complement. Equipment will be so designed as to speed the take off and landing of the planes and also operation of the carrier. For this purpose, the number of planes in reserve may be decreased when necessary.
Craiser Class-B	8,450 ton	2	36	10,000 nautical miles at 18 knots	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 15.5 cm gun—triple mount 5 turrets 2. 12.7 cm AA guns—8 3. AA Machine guns—over 12 4. 61 cm Torpedoes—6 tubes mounts (broad-side, upper deck) 5. Catapults—2 6. Aircraft—4 	

Ships to be Constructed under the Replenishment Program
(Ships Restricted by Treaty) - Cont'd

Classification	Unit standard displacement Tonnage	Number of Ships	Maximum speed (knots)	Cruising Range	Standard Armament	Description
Destroyers	1,380 ton	14	over 36	4,500 nautical miles at 18 knots	1. 12.7 cm guns—6 2. Over 4 AA Machine guns 3. 61 cm Torpedoes—8 tubes mounts	
Submarines	1,900 ton	2	More than 21 on surface	14,000 nautical miles at 16 knots	1. 53 cm Torpedo tubes—4 (bow)—2 (stern) 2. 12.7 cm AA guns—2 3. Anti-aircraft Machine guns more than 2 4. Catapult—1 Reconnaissance plane—1	
	1,400 ton	2	Over 23 on surface	10,000 nautical miles at 16 knots	1. 53 cm Torpedo tubes—4 (bow)—2 (stern) 2. 10 cm AA guns—more than 2	

SHIPS NOT LIMITED BY TREATY

Classification	Unit standard displacement tonnage	Number of ships to be constructed	Maximum speed (knots)	Cruising range nautical miles	Description
Oil Tankers	10,000 ton	2	20	10,000 at 18 knots	Further Separate Communication
Seaplane Tender	9,000 "	3	20	8,000 at 16 knots	
Torpedo Boats	600 "	16	34	3,000 at 6 knots	1. 12.7 cm guns ----- 4 2. AA Machine guns ----- more than 2 3. 61 cm Torpedoes ----- 4 tubes mounts
Submarine-Chasers	300 "	6	20	1,500 at 14 knots	1. 40 mm automatic cannon --- 2 2. Depth charges, depth-charge projector --- (omitted)
	150 "	12	20	500 at 14 knots	1. 40 mm automatic cannon --- 1 2. Depth charges, depth-charge projector --- (omitted)
Gunboats	1,000 "	2	20	more than 2,500 at 14 knots	1. 15 cm guns ----- 2 2. 15 cm gun ----- 1 3. AAMG ----- 1 4. Internal-combustion engine used
	200 "	1	18	over 1,500 at 14 knots	1. 15 cm gun ----- 1 2. AA Machine guns ----- more than 2 3. Internal-combustion engine used
Mine layer	5,000 "	1	20	5,000 at 14 knots	1. 15 cm guns ----- 4 2. Mines ----- omitted 3. AAMG ----- more than 4

Ships not limited by Treaty - Cont 'd

Classification	Unit standard displacement tonnage	Number of ships to be constructed	Maximum speed (knots)	Cruising range nautical miles	Description
Repair ship	10,000 ton	1	18	8,000 at 14 knots	1. 12.7 cm AA guns _____ 4 2. AA Machine guns _____ more than 4
Emergency Net layer	2,000 "	1	20	2,000 at 14 knots	1. 12.7 cm antiaircraft guns _____ 3 2. Type 14 antisubmarine nets _____ (omitted) 3. AA Machine guns _____ as required 4. Depth-charge projectors _____ (omitted) 5. Depth-charge _____ as required
Coast-defense ship	1,200 "	4	20	more than 5,000 at 14 knots	1. 12.7 cm AA guns _____ 4 2. AA Machine guns _____ as required 3. Depth-charge projectors _____ (omitted) 4. Depth charges _____ as required
Minesweeper	600 "	6	more than 20	3,000 at 14 knots	1. 12.7 cm AA guns _____ 3 2. AA Machine guns _____ as required
Survey ships	1,600 "	2	20	5,000 at 14 knots	1. 12.7 cm AA guns _____ 4 2. AA Machine guns _____ as required
Mine layer	2,000 "	1	20	3,000 at 14 knots	1. 12.7 cm AA guns _____ 3 2. Mines _____ (omitted) 3. Depth-charge _____ (omitted) 4. Depth-charge projectors _____ (omitted) 5. AA Machine guns _____ as required
Auxiliary Mine layer	450 "	5	more than 20	1,500 at 14 knots	1. 40 mm automatic cannon _____ 2 2. Mines _____ (omitted) 3. Depth-charge projectors _____ (omitted) 4. Depth charges _____ as required

Ships not limited by Treaty - Cont'd

Classification	Unit standard displacement tonnage	Number of ships to be constructed	Maximum speed (knots)	Cruising range nautical miles	Description
Net Tender	600 ton	2	20	1,500 at 14 knots	1. 40 mm automatic cannon ——— 2 2. Nets ————— (omitted)

The plan for increasing air strength:

1. Purport

a. Aircraft carriers and plane-carrying ships (excluding escort carriers and converted vessels) are to be replenished so as to retain in peacetime all the crew which may be needed in wartime.

b. The replenishment and reinforcement of projected land-air groups is to be carried out so that air crew members will be available to man escort carriers, converted vessels and air groups (including specially established air groups) in the event of war.

c. Air reservists (including personnel in the first and second reserves) are to be replenished in addition to the rapid training of air crew members, should the occasion require, as no time is to be lost in augmenting the shortage of the crew which we might need in wartime.

2. (Omitted)

3. Land air groups

(First part omitted)

a. Nine understrength units among the existing air groups are to be reorganized.

b. Among the projected groups, $3\frac{1}{2}$ groups are scheduled for completion in the 1936 fiscal year.

c. Eight new groups are to be established.

d. The 21 existing groups, 10 projected groups, and eight groups to be reinforced, are to be equipped by the 1936 fiscal year.

4. Air reservists (including those in the first and second

reserves) who are subject to call in wartime and are capable of assuming various air duties after supplementary training of less than five months, are to be assigned to units cited in paragraph c, above.

OUTLINE OF SECOND NAVAL REPLENISHMENT PLAN

Category	Number of Vessels	Tonnage per Vessel	Total Tonnage	Class of Warship	Keel Laid	Completed
Aircraft carrier	2	10,050	20,100	Hirya Class	Nov 1934	Jul 1939
Light cruiser	2	8,500	17,000	Tone Class	Dec 1934	May 1939
Destroyer	14	1,368 (4) 1,500 (10)	20,472	Shiratsuyu Class (4) (Usikaze and others) Asashio Class (10)	May 1935	Jun 1939
Submarine	4	1,950 (2) 1,400 (2)	6,700	Large Cruising Type (2) Navy Type Large size (2)	Sep 1934	Dec 1938
Seaplane tender	3	9,000	27,000	Chitose Class and Mizuho	Nov 1934	Feb 1939
Submarine tender	2	12,000	24,000	Tsurugisaki Class (Takasaki was converted into an aircraft carrier in the course of building) Originally designed as tankers (9,500x2 = 19,000) converted into submarine tenders on 15 Sep 38	Jan 1938	Dec 1940 (Aircraft carriers)
Torpedo boat	16	595	9,520	Otori Class (8) Cancelled (8)	Nov 1934	Sep 1937
Submarine chaser	4	270 (1) 170 (3)	780	No. 1 Class (1) No. 51 Class (3)	Apr 1935	Jul 1939

Outline of Second Naval Replenishment Plan - Cont'd

Category	Number of Vessels	Tonnage per Vessel	Total Tonnage	Class of Warship	Keel Laid	Completed
Repair ship	1	9,000	9,000	Akashi	Jan 1937	Jul 1939
Total	48		134,572			

A four-year program with a budget of 431,688,000 yen was approved.

Appendix IV

Disposition of Air Units After Completion of Plan 2 - End of 1936

Program Location Type of aircraft	Old Program (17 units)								Program No. 1 (14 units)								Program No. 2 (8 units)						Grand Total	Number of units after reorganization	Description					
	Yokosuka	Tateyama	Kasumigaura	Sasebo	Onuma	Oninato	Yonaha	Maizuru	Chinkai	Total	Yokosuka	Tateyama	Kasumigaura	Yokohama	Oninato	Kure	Sasebo	Onuma	Total	Yokosuka	Yokohama	Kasumigaura				Oninato	Saeki	Onuma	Yonaha	Total
Land trainer	1	2							3										3								3	3	Reorganized and strengthened from 2 carrier-borne reconnaissance plane units, 1 carrier-borne attack plane unit & 1 small size flying boat unit.	
Sea trainer	1	2							3										3								3	3		
Carrier-borne fighter	1	1		1					2	1	1	1							2				1	1	1	1	2	6	6	
Carrier-borne bomber											1							1	1	1							2	2		
Carrier-borne attack plane				1					1	1	1	1			1				4								5	5		
Medium-size attack plane		1		1	1	1			2												1	(1)	(1)	(1)		1	3	5	Reorganized and added from 1 1/2 small-size flying boat units.	
Large-size attack plane																						1				1	1	1 1/2		
Reconnaissance seaplane	1	1	1	1			1	1	4	1			1	1					4								6	6		
Small-size flying boat	1								1																		1	1	1 1/2 units reorganized into medium-size attack plane units.	
Medium-size flying boat										1					1				2								3	3		
Large-size flying boat											1								1	(1)						(1)	1	2		
"Research"	1	1						1	1										1								1	1 1/2		
Total	3	2	6 1/2	1	2 1/2	1	1	1	17	3 1/2	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	14	1	(1)	1	(1)	1	(1)	1	4	35	39	

Note 1. 1/2 reconnaissance seaplane units each for Maizuru & Chinkai & 1/2 reconnaissance seaplane unit for Tateyama and Kure. Old Program column was changed in Program No. 2 to 1/2 reconnaissance seaplane unit for Tateyama and Kure.

Note 2. 1/2 medium-size attack plane each for Onuma, Oninato & Yonaha for Sasebo, Tateyama and Saeki after reorganization. Old Program column was changed from 1/2 small-size flying boat unit for Sasebo, Tateyama and Saeki after reorganization.

Note 3. Numbers of units in parenthesis in Program No. 2 column indicate units not yet organized as of end of fiscal year 1936.