

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CHINA
Incident (from July to Nov-
JAPANESE MONOGRAPH NO. 166

**CHINA INCIDENT
NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS
(JULY – NOVEMBER 1937)**

Compiled in May 1951 by
Liquidation Department
of the Second Demobil-
ization Bureau

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**History of Air Operations in
the First Phase of the China
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Remarks:

HISTORICAL PREFACE

This monograph was written by ex-Commander Hisasumi Tadao at the request of the Liquidation Department of the Second Demobilization Bureau and then compiled and addition and corrections made by the said Department of the said Bureau. between July 1937 and November 1937. While the primary area of operations was in and near Shanghai, the areas of North and Central China are also covered.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I. Air Strength, Operational Plan, Etc, at the Outbreak of the China Incident

Section 1. Comparison of Strength of the Japanese and Chinese Air Forces

Section 2. Air Operation Agreement Between the Army and Navy Concerning the North China Operations

Section 3. Operational Plan of the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet

Section 4. Deployment of Operational Strength

Section 5. Advance of Naval Air Strength

Chapter II. Operational Situation

Section 1. Situation at the Commencement of Overall Operations

Section 2. Situation from 18 Aug. 37 to the End of August 1937

Section 3. Situation in September 1937

Section 4. Situation in October 1937

Section 5. Situation in November 1937

Classification	Flight Crew	Number of Airplanes
Land-based air Unit	1,520	519

CHAPTER I

Air Strength, Operational Plan, Etc. at the Outbreak of China Incident

Section 1. Comparison of Strength of the Japanese and Chinese Air Forces.

I. The Japanese Air Forces

Just before the outbreak of the China Incident, the situation was generally as follows:

A. The Navy

Armament Plan No "2" was on the way to completion, viz., of all the land-based air units (TN presumably under the plan), three units of small-type airplanes, one-half unit of large-type attack planes, and another half unit of large-type flying boats were completed.

However, four units, two units of medium-type attack planes and one unit each of large-type attack planes and large-type flying boats were yet uncompleted.

Thus, 35 of the 39 units of the land-based air units to be completed, according to Plan No "2", were already completed. As for carrier-based planes, those called for in Plan to No. "1" were already completed, while those in No. "2" were being rushed to meet the date when the aircraft carriers Soryu and Hiryu were to be completed. The strength at that time was as follows:

Classification	Flight Crew	Number of Airplanes
Land-based air Unit	1,620	519
Carrier-based Planes	701	261
Total	2,321	780

B. The Army

The Army had 54 air companies, and the number of planes was somewhat less than the Navy. The condition of the Army air units was inferior to the Navy's in every essential point.

II. The Chinese Air Force

The establishment of the Chinese Air Force was greatly furthered through the help of various powers, especially the United States, Italy and Germany. Her strength at that time was as follows:

Airplanes	650-700
Flight Crews	968

The number of airplanes which China had as hand was almost the same as that of the Japanese Navy. However, her number of operational airplanes was less than one-third of that of the Japanese Navy. Also, the ability and skill the of Chinese Air Force were considered to be insignificant.

Section: 2. Air Operation Agreement Between the Army and Navy Concerning the North China Operations

On 11 July 1937, with the decision to dispatch troops to North China, an air agreement concerning air operations in North China was concluded between the Army and Navy General Staffs. The outline of the agreement is as follows:

Air Operations Agreement Between the Army and Navy Concerning the North China Operations:

A. The destroying of enemy air power in North China will be primarily the duty of the Army air force. However, the Navy will cooperate with the Army in the following instances:

1. In case the Navy has no need to conduct air operations outside North China and the need for support is urgent by the Army.

2. In situations other than the above, where an Army operation urgently needs support, and the reserve strength of the Navy air force is sufficient for the purpose.

B. The destroying of enemy air strength in Central and South China will be the duty of the Navy, while the Army will conduct only those operations necessary for self-defense.

C. The Navy air force will escort Army transport ships and will provide, if necessary, protection against enemy attacks from land and air, before and after arrival at the landing place.

D. During the landing period for Army troops, and before Army airplanes are ready for operations, the air duties of the Army will be executed by the Navy, if necessary.

E. The details about the division of duties and responsibilities of Army and Navy planes in the same district and the method of operation will be decided mutually by the expeditionary units.

F. Strength to be used.

1. The Army

a. Peking - Tientsin Area

- Air Corps Headquarters
- The 1st Air Brigade Headquarters
- Eight reconnaissance companies (66 airplanes)
- Seven fighter companies (74 airplanes)
- Four light bomber companies (36 airplanes)
- Ten heavy bomber companies (24 airplanes)

b. Tsingtao and Shanghai Area

- Two reconnaissance companies (18 airplanes)
- Two fighter companies (21 airplanes)

2. The Navy

a. North China Area

- The 2nd Combined Air Unit (24 fighters, 30 bombers, 12 attack planes).
- The 21st Air Unit (six reconnaissance seaplanes).

With the progress of the operation, the 2nd Combined Air Unit will take part in various engagements in Central China (Shanghai Area) and, depending on the situation, a unit will be composed of some of the ship-based airplanes (sea reconnaissance) of the 2nd Fleet to form reinforcement.

b. Central and South China

- The 1st Carrier Division (21 fighters 12 bombers and nine attack planes).
- The 2nd Carrier Division (12 fighters, 12 bombers and 18 attack planes).
- The 1st Combined Air Unit (38 land-based attack planes and 12 fighters).
- The 22nd Air Unit (six sea reconnaissance airplanes).

The 12th Cruiser Division (nine sea reconnaissance planes).

An element of the 1st Combined Air Unit (which was stationed at Cheju Do) will advance to the Shanghai Area, and airplanes of 1st and 2nd Carrier Divisions, in accordance with the situation will also land at bases in the Shanghai area.

G. Operating Plan and Equipment for Airfields

1. North China (and Kwantung) Area

The Navy

At the beginning of the campaign, the 2nd Combined Airfield Unit will use Ma-shui-tzu Airfield. Later, in accordance with the situation, an element of the same unit will use Ts'ang-K'ou Airfield, together with the Army.

The Army

In North China, the Army will use airfields in the vicinities of Shanhaikuan, Sui-chung and Tientsin. However, heavy bomber units may use Chou-shui-tzu airfield.

In the Shantung District, the Army will first use the Ts'ang-K'ou Airfield with the Navy, and later it will construct an airfield in a western district and will advance to the same.

The completion and maintenance of the Chou-shui-tzu Airfield will be the responsibility of the Army.

2. Central China.

a. Early Phase of the Campaign

The Kung-ta Airfield will be used jointly by the Army and Navy, and the Hongkow (#) Park Airfield will be used exclusively by the Navy. When the Tung-kou-tan Airfield is completed, Navy airplanes at the Kung-ta Airfield will move there.

The construction and maintenance of the Kung-ta, Hong-kow, and Tung-kou-tan Airfields will be the responsibility of the Navy.

b. Later phase of the Campaign

When the airfield for the exclusive use of the Army (which is expected to be built in the Kiangwan Area) is completed, the main body of Army airplanes will move there. The construction and maintenance of the airfield in Kiangwan Area will be the joint responsibility of the Army and Navy.

The Navy will also maintain and use the Takang Airfield.

As far as circumstances permit, the Army and Navy will occupy the Lung-hua Airfield and use it jointly.

H. Supply of Fuel, Bombs, etc.

The Army and Navy will furnish their own supplies.

When transit supply and refueling at Sinuiju, Pyongyang, Seoul and Taegu is necessary for air transport operations by Navy air units, the Army will aid the Navy by making available such supplies. However, when a supply of fuel adequate to meet the demands of many Navy airplanes is necessary at places either than Pyongyang, the fuel will be supplied by the Navy.

When transit supply and refueling for the transport planes of Army air units is to be done on Che-ju Do, the Navy will aid the Army when necessary, the fuel for this purpose will be supplied, if possible, by the Army.

I. Communication

Distinguishing of friendly planes (Portion omitted from document)

Section 3. Operational Plan of the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet

The 3rd Fleet drew up its operational plan on 29 July in accordance with a secret operational plan of the Naval General Staff. It differed from the operational plans of the Naval General Staff (concerning air operations) in the following respect:

A. Disposition of air units in the second phase of the operation.

The 1st Air Attack Force. (First Carrier Division).

1. Destruction of enemy air strength in Central China.
2. Destruction of important ground installations in Central China.
3. Destruction of enemy ships (when necessary).
4. Cooperation with land operations.
5. Air cover for Army expeditionary troops.

The 2nd Air Attack Force (2nd Carrier Division)

Same as 1st Air Attack Force.

The 3rd Air Attack Force (First Combined Carrier Division).

1. Destruction of enemy air strength in Central and South China.
2. Destruction of important ground installations in the interior of China.

The 4th Air Attack Force (12th Cruiser Division, 22nd Air Unit)

1. Destruction enemy air strength is South China.
2. Observation and destruction of enemy ships in the South China Area.
3. Advance to the Ma-an Islands (Sau-chiao-shan) and establish an air base there.

B. Activities of Air Raid Units.

1. At dawn of the first day of hostilities the entire air strength will be used against enemy air bases to destroy the enemy's air power. At this time, the movements of air units will be kept secret, and high altitudes and cloud formations will be used.

The objective of the first air attacks

The 1st Air Attack Force - Hangchow and Chienchiao. An element of the Force will attack Hungchiao. (#)

The 2nd Air Attack Force - Kuang-teh and Chu-jung, (and Nanking, depending on the situation).

The 3rd Air Attack Force

The Kisarazu Air Unit (based on Che-ju-Do) – Nanking.

The Kanoya Air Unit (based at Taipei) – Nan-chang

The 4th Air Attack Force - Canton.

2. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Air Attack Forces, as soon as possible after the first air attack is over, will proceed to advanced air base (the time for this movement will be given later) and mop up enemy remnants, destroy important enemy ground Installations and facilities, and (if necessary) sweep enemy ships. Moreover, they will cooperate with the Army in land operations and provide air cover, for the expeditionary troops.

a. Air attack objectives in and after the second phase operation.

(1) Important air installations

Important airfields which were not raided during the first air operation. Airplane factories at Nan-chang, Hangchow, and Shao-kuan. Oil storage dumps of Hangchow. Repair shops and warehouses at Nanking, Han-chang and Lo-yang.

(2) Important government offices

Important Government offices in Nanking.

(3) The Kiang-yin Battery, mine layers and speed boats.

(4) Important arsenals:

Arsenals at Nanking and Han-yang and factories of ammonium sulfate for national defense.

(5) Important transportation centers.

Pu-kou, Hsu-chou and Chu-chou.

b. Operational plan for advanced air bases.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Attack Forces: Shanghai (the Kianguan Race Track, Lung-hua Airfields, Yang-shu-pu Golf-links and reclaimed area, Yan-shu-pu Race Track, and Chung-min Island).

The 4th Air Attack Force:

Ma-an Island. (Ssu-chiao-shan).

On 4 August the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Fleet sent his opinion on the operation and the use of the strength to the General Staff in Tokyo. At the same time, he gave serious consideration to the conduct of the air operations.

A. Materials for a judgment of the Situation.

1. A rather heavy movement of Chinese airplanes to the north had been observed for the past few days, and, as of 2 August, there were, in the area north of the Lung-Yai Railway, 14 Curtiss Hawks, 16 Douglas, 26 Corsair airplanes, and four Savoia heavy bombers, totaling 62 planes. (sic)

Moreover, the construction of various airfields and the transportation of fuel and ammunition in North China were being carried out in a hurry. All these facts imply that a clash was imminent.

2. Enemy reconnaissance planes and transport planes are daily reconnoitering the movements of our ships in the areas near Shanghai and Ma-an Islands. Twenty five Northrop planes have been stationed at Kuang-to and five planes including Martins at Hungchiao to keep watch over the Shanghai Area, while nine Douglas' have been stationed at Hsiao-kan to keep watch over Hankow.

B. Demands of the 3rd Fleet

1. To secretly increase the marine unit strength in Shanghai.

The present strength in Shanghai is barely enough to occupy Kung-ta Airfield, and the realization of the occupation of Kinagwan and Lunghua Airfields, which are vital to the full utilization of the air strength, can hardly be realized with this strength. If these airfields are not occupied in the initial phases of the air operations, it is feared that aircraft carriers will be exposed to danger for a long time, and that the operations of land-based attack planes which have to fly over the water to attack the interior of China, will become difficult. Therefore, it is necessary that the minimum land combat strength be sufficient to seize the designated area of Kiang-wan Airfield be dispatched in advance.

2. The 1st Combined Air Unit will, from the beginning, be prepared to be used in central China, and its use in North China should be abandoned.

Section 4. Deployment of operational Strength

The Army and Navy, which had decided, by 12 July on an operation plan in event the situation deteriorated, were steadily pushing military preparations, despite the diplomatic negotiations being conducted.

On the 15th, the Army commanded the mobilization of the greater part of the air units in the homeland (totaling 18 air companies of various kinds of planes), and they were to advance to Shan-hai-kuan, Chin-chou and Dairen. It was decided that planes belonging to these units would arrive at their destinations by air flights via Korea, not later than the 23d or 24th. Together with the above decision of the Army, the Navy issued a command to commence the building of an air base at Chou-chui-tzu, so that the 2nd Combined Air Unit will be able to advance there when necessary.

In the meantime, an amicable settlement of the situation seemed possible

as a result of on-the-spot diplomatic negotiations, but on 20 July, the situation deteriorated again, and the Japanese Government, on the same day, decided to dispatch three divisions from the homeland to North China.

Section 5. Advance of Naval Air Strength

The organizing of the mobilized air units, according to the order of 11 July, was completed on 15 July, and training was conducted while waiting further orders.

Organization of the mobilized air units is as follows: [see charts at end of chapter]

The readying of the bases for these a mobilized air units was commenced on 11 July, and the base at Chou-chui-tzu was almost completed on 19 July, while these at Taipei and Che-Ju Do are completed on 7 August. Due to the above situation, these units are waiting for further orders, and on 6 August, the 2nd Combined Air Unit was ordered to advance because of the necessity to provide cover for Army transport operations in Tang-ku. The above unit began moving on 7 August, and by 11 August the whole unit had reached Chou-shui-tzu by air, via Korea.

The 21st Air Unit, which also was assigned the duty of providing cover was ordered to advance to Tao-chong Do off the west coast of Korea, and left Kure as 6 August aboard the carrier Maruto. The Air Unit arrived at Tae-chong Do on 9 August, but the above Island turned out to unsuitable for building a base, so a base was built in the vicinity of nearly Tae-dong Wan.

In the meantime, the situation in North China began spreading to Central and South China, so the 1st Combined Air Unit as ordered to be ready to advance. The Kisarazu Air Unit of the Combined Air Unit advanced to Omura on 8 August, and the Kanoya to Taipei on 9 August.

Name of Mobilized Air Unit	Kind and No. of Plane
Kisarazu Naval Air Unit	Type-96 land attack plane - 12
Kanoya Naval Air Unit	Type-96 land attack plane - 12 Type-95 carrier fighter - 24
The 12 th Air Unit	Type-94 carrier bomber - 12 (1) Type-92 carrier attack plane - 12 Type-93 carrier fighter - 9 (2) Type-95 carrier fighter - 6 (1)
The 13 th Air Unit	Type-94 carrier bomber - 12 (1) Type-90 carrier fighter - 6 (2) Type-90 carrier fighter - 6 (2)
The 13 th Air Unit	Land and transport plane - 1 unit

Name of Mobilized Air Unit		Organization and Strength			Date of Organization	Place of Waiting	Place of Preparation and Advancement
		Kind and Number Of Planes	Home Unit				
A-1	Kisarazu Naval Air Unit	Type-96 land-based attack plane – 20	Medium sized attack plane	Kisarazu Naval Air Unit - two units	13 July	Kisarazu	Omura, Cheju
	Kanoya Naval Air Unit	Type-96 land-based attack plane - 18 Type-95 carrier-based fighter – 14	Medium sized attack plane - 1 ½ units Carrier-based fighter – 1 unit	Kanoya Naval Air Unit		Kanoya	Tapu
A-2	The 12 th Air Unit	Type-94 carrier-based bomber – 12 (2) Type-92 carrier based attack plane – 12 (1) Type-90 carrier-based fighter – 6 (2) Type-95 carrier-based fighter – 6 (1)	Carrier-based bomber – 1 unit Carrier-based bomber – 1 unit Carrier-based fighter – 1 unit	Saheki Naval Air Unit	15 July	Saheki	Chou-sai
	The 13 th Air Unit	Type-96 carrier-based bomber – 18 (2) Type-90 carrier-based fighter – 6 (2) Type-96 carrier-based fighter – 6 (2)	Carrier-based bomber – 1 ½ units Carrier-based fighter – 1 unit	Omura Naval Air Unit		Omura	
		Lockheed transport Plane – 1 unit	Lockheed Transport plane - 1				

Name of Mobilized Air Unit	Organization and Strength			Date of Organization	Place of Waiting	Place of Prearranged Advance
	Kind and Number	Home Unit				
The 21 st Air Unit	Type-95 sea reconnaissance plane – 6	Sea reconnaissance plane – ½ unit	Kure Naval Air Unit	12 July	Kure	North China
The 22 nd Air Unit	Type-95 sea reconnaissance plane – 6	Sea reconnaissance plane - ½ unit	Sasebo	13 July	Sasebo	Central and South China
Remarks	Numerals in parentheses indicate number of reserve planes					

A-1 = The 1st Combined Air Unit
A-2 = The 2nd Combined Air Unit

Chapter II

Operational Situation

Section 1. Situation at the Commencement of Over-all Operations.

Part 1. General Situation

The situation in North China gradually spread to Central China, and there were increasing signs of disturbing actions and tendencies on the part of China. By 7 August, the evacuation of Japanese residents in China was almost complete. On the 9th, the Lt Oyama Incident broke out, and on the 11th, naval unit reinforcements were dispatched by the Japanese Navy, while hordes of Chinese troops invaded the neutral zone as a countermeasure to our increased naval forces. On the 13th, troops were dispatched to the Shanghai Area by the Japanese Government. Subsequently, on the 14th, it was decided to send reinforcements to the Tsingtao Area. Finally, the tense situation in Shanghai erupted into open hostilities on 13 August, when the Chinese forces surrounding the Japanese Marines commenced firing, and the hostilities began spreading to other parts of the city.

The disposition of the main naval forces, as of 13 August was as follows:

Unit	Movement and Location
Main Force	Covering the sea transportation of land forces in the south of Korea
North China Force	Directly escorting the transportation of the 10 th Division which left Moji on 10 August for North China, while the main force was in the Port Arthur Area.
A-1 Second Combined Air Unit	Patrol flying within a radius of 90 miles from Chou-shai-tzu Base, for the purpose of covering transportation activities.
Second Carrier Division	Although the Division was operating on the sea east of Che-ju Do providing air cover to sea transportation, it was incorporated under the command of the 3 rd Fleet commander in the early morning of the 13 th , and ordered to proceed to the Ma-an Islands. It arrived at the said Islands on the night of the same day.

Unit	Movement and Location	
21 st Air Unit	Based at Taedong Wan on the west coast of Korea, and patrolling the area within a radius of 80 miles from the Sochong Do Lighthouse.	
B-1 *	Izumo, 16 th Destroyer Div. 11 th Battleship Div.	Anchored at Shanghai.
	8 th Cruiser Div., 1 st Destroyer Squadron, 1 st Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force, 2 nd Kure Special Landing Force	Departed Sasebo on 10 August, and arrived at Shanghai the 11th.
	Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force	At Shanghai
	1 st Combined Air Unit	Kanoya Air Unit – at the Taipei Base. Kisarazu Air Unit at Omura.
	# 1 st Carrier Div.	Took off from the Sasebo Area for the Ma-an Islands on 12 August.
	12 th Sea-Plane Tender Div (minus the "Kamoi")	Took off from Sasebo for the Ma-an Islands on 11 August.

Unit		Movement and Location
	22 nd Air Unit	
	"Kamoi"	Took off from the Chushan Island 11 August to be incorporated in the 12 th Seaplane Tender Div.

A-1 = Combined Fleet
 B-1 = 3rd Fleet
 B-1* = Central China Force
 B-1# = Air Force

Part 2. Reconnaissance of the Shanghai and Hangchow Area by Kamoi-based planes

The 12th Seaplane Tender Division, composed of the seaplane tenders Kamoi and Okishima, assembled at Sasebo early in August to wait for further orders, but on 8 August, the Division received the following order from the 3rd Fleet Commander.

Dispatched at 1700 hours, 7 August from Hongkong:
 Classified telegram No. 447 from the 3rd Fleet:

"The Commander of the 12th Seaplane Tender Division shall dispatch the Kamoi and one warship of the 28th Destroyer Division to the Shanghai area as soon as possible, to carry out photographic reconnaissance during clear weather, in accordance with the following:

1. Targets:

The Hangchow Area (Chien-chao, Weng-chia-fou, Kao-ssu), the Hangchiao and Chu-chi Airfields and the Woosung Battery.

2. Vessels and aircraft shall conduct movements as secretly as possible, avoiding the regular routes of merchant vessels, and shall take advantage of the weather by using high altitudes.

3. Take-off and landing of aircraft will be carried out on the sea, east of 123 degrees 40 minutes east longitude, if possible, but otherwise on the Chiushan Islands or the Taichou Islands.

4. Aerial photographs will be sent, as soon as possible, by a ship of the 28th

Destroyer Division to Fleet Headquarters or the 1st and the 2nd Carrier Divisions and to the 1st Combined Air Unit.

5. Chinese aircraft are making daily reconnaissance flights over the Shanghai, Woosung, and the Ma-an Island Areas.”

In accordance with the above order, the Komoi and Asanagi left Sasebo at 1300 hours, 8 August and arrived at the Chiushan Islands at 1000 on the 10th. However, due to bad weather, the reconnaissance flight was postponed and the said vessels were temporarily anchored at the Chiushan Islands.

However, there was the suspicion that some of the lighthouses in the Choushan Islands might be equipped with wireless apparatus. Therefore, the 3rd Headquarters, fearing disclosure of our intention, sent a telegram to the said ships to the effect that “if there is no possibility of secret reconnaissance on the 11th, return to Sasebo”. But the Kamoi-based planes carried out reconnaissance flights as previously scheduled.

The planes used and the places reconnoitered are given as below:

Aircraft Used	Places reconnoitered
Type-94 Reconnaissance Seaplane (3 seater) - 1 Type-95 Reconnaissance Seaplane (2 seater) - 2	Hangchow, Chu-shi, Ningpo, Tung- kuan
Type-94 Reconnaissance Seaplane – 1 Type-95 Reconnaissance Seaplane – 2	Hungchiao, Lung-hua, Woosung

The results of the reconnaissance was immediately reported to the requesting quarters by the captain of the Kamoi.

Sent at 1700 hours, 11 August from Hongkong:
Classified telegram No 345 from the Kamoi (Summary)

“1. The Hungchiao and Lung-hua Airfields are practically the same as shown in the Chinese maps of the said airfields.

Four airplanes and one seaplane were observed at the Lung-hua Airfield.

No aircraft were found at the Hungchiao Airfield.

2. Among the airfields near Hangchow the Weng-chia-fou Airfield cannot be used because of muddy ground. The Kao-ssu Airfield has only one small hanger. The Chien-chiao Airfield is best equipped, with establishments believed to be a school and a plane factory nearby.

It appears that planes are kept in the hangers, and only one enemy plane was observed in the air.

3. One airplane was seen at the Chu-chi Airfield, and four planes at the Ming-po Airfield. Both airfields have small hangers. There is an airfield in the vicinity of Tung-kuan also.

4. The Woosung Battery which faces the Yangtze River is equipped with six guns, and it is well-equipped.

5. Two vessels, believed to be gunboats, are at anchor at Hsu-shan (Hangchow Bay) and Ting-hai respectively."

The above mentioned reconnaissance flight was detected by the Chinese Army because of our failure to keep our movements secret. As a result, it is believed that our intention has been disclosed.

This became known through special information obtained by the interception of wireless messages sent by the Chinese Army. According to the information, the Kamoi was detected before the commencement of the operation by a Chinese gunboat near the Chiushan Islands. It was also detected by a lookout of the Hua-tau-shan Observation Post in the Ma-an Islands. The reconnaissance planes of the Kamoi were detected and pursued by the planes of the Hangchow Flight School. When they were flying at a low altitude of 1,000 meters over Hangchow Bay, they were also detected by the enemy.

It is believed that our failure to carry out this resulted in a stiffening of the morale of the Chinese Army, and the determination to wage war. Moreover, the 3rd Fleet Headquarters acknowledge the fact that the Chinese forces' initial air raid on our vessels in the Shanghai Area, three days later, as partly due to this reconnaissance flight.

Part 3. Initial Air Raid by the Chinese Air Force on 14 August.

The information on the disposition of the Chinese Air Force obtained by the 3rd Fleet Headquarters at that time was as follows:

Location	Strength (Company number)	Remarks
Nanking	8, 4, 15, 16	
Chu-jung	7, 10, 17, 19, 30	10 th and 19 th Companies' planes at Nanchang and 30 th Company at Chi-an are preparing for bombing attacks.
Kuangte	9, 11, 14	
Soochow	3	
Nanchang	1, 2, 13, 21, 22	
Shanghai (Hungchiao)	4 planes (Name of unit unidentified)	
Hankow	27 planes (Name of unit unidentified)	
Hangchow	Hangchow Flight School planes (Number of planes unknown)	Gradually moving to to Hsiao-kan

On 13 August, street fighting commenced in Shanghai with firing begun by the Chinese troops. Thereupon, the 3rd Fleet Commander, in accordance with a previously arranged plan, attempted to take the initiative in air-raids on the Chinese Air Force, by employing all the air strength under his command, and at 2350 hours, 13 August, issued the following order to each air raid unit:

Gist of the order:

"When carrying out air raids tomorrow the 14th, each air raid unit is assigned the following duties:

1. Bombing targets:

The 2nd Air Raid Unit (2nd Carrier Division) – Nanking, Kuangte, Hangchow.

The 3rd Air Raid Unit (Taipei Unit) – Nanchang

The 8th and 10th Cruiser Divisions, and the 1st Destroyer Squadron

- Nanchang

In the event the 1st Air Attack Unit (the 1st Carrier Division) and the 3rd Air Raid Unit (the Omura Unit) are employed, further orders will be issued.

2. Special orders will be issued for the time of departure and attack.”

However, at that time there was a low pressure zone traveling north over the East China Sea with a central pressure of 720 mm.

The 1st Air Raid unit which was navigating in the path of the low pressure zone continued, despite the high waves, but lost all hopes of arriving at the designated point of departure for planes by early morning of the 14th. Although the 2nd Air Raid Unit arrived at the designated point, the take-off and landing of aircraft was impossible, due to the raging waves.

On the other had, it was considered difficult for the Omura Unit of the 3rd Air Field Unit to carry out an over-water bombing attack by braving the stormy weather.

Also in the Shanghai Area, because of the typhoon, the weather became worse and worse with clouds hanging low and the wind velocity rising to 22 meters.

Although it was to be the initial air raid at the outset of the battle which was begun the previous night by the Chinese forces, the air raid had to be cancelled, due to the stormy weather. Consequently, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued an order at 0530 hours of the 14th, to postpone the air-raid until the weather improved.

However, at 1050 hours of the same day, three enemy fighters and one attack plane raided the Shanghai Special Marine Force Headquarters.

Subsequently, at 1055 hours, five bombers bombed the 8th Carrier Division which was anchored off Woosung. Then at 1122 hours, three attack planes bombed the flagship, Izumo. However, none of the bombs scored any hits. The only damage was suffered by several crew members of the Okinawa Maru, who were killed or wounded by fragments of the bomb which was dropped close to the ship at the Woosang Anchorage.

Thus the Japanese Navy, thwarted from carrying out its design, was subjected to the enemy's air raid at the outset of the hostilities.

Thereupon, the 3rd Fleet Commander decided to commence air operations, using all the available air power, without waiting for a concentration of the air

strength, and an improvement in the weather.

Therefore, he ordered the carrier-based planes of the 8th Cruiser Division, the 1st Destroyer Division, and the Izumo, all at anchor at Shanghai, to take to the air, at the same time he ordered the Taipei Unit of the 3rd Air Raid Unit, and the 2nd Air Raid Unit (the 2nd Carrier Division) to commence their attacks.

Although the 8th Cruiser Division and the 2nd Carrier Division failed to launch any planes, owing to bad weather, one seaplane from the Izumo and one from the Kawauchi was launched, and they bombed the Hungchaio Airfield, enemy positions in the Cha-pei Area, and shot down two enemy planes.

The combat situation of the Taipei Unit of the 3rd Air Raid Unit is as given below:

1. Combat Progress

At 1450 hours, nine planes of the Kuang-te Air Raid Unit (commander - Lt Com Amano(#)), and nine planes of the Hangchow Air Raid Unit (commander - Lt Com Nitta) left the Taipei Base. At 1820 hours the Hangchow Air Raid Unit dropped four 250 kg bombs on the Chien-chiao Airfield from an altitude of 350 to 400 meters, and dropped six 250 kg bombs on the Chiao-ssu Airfield from an altitude of 800 meters.

At 1940 hours the Kuang-te Air Raid Unit dropped 16 - 250 kg bombs on the Kuang-te Airfield from an altitude of 500 meters. Furthermore, the said unit, on its return route, dropped two 250 kg bombs on the Chien-chiao Airfield in Hangchow from an altitude of 3,000 meters.

On this day the weather in the vicinity of the targets was very bad with the cloud height being 150 to 300 meters, and, moreover, visibility was very bad due to rain.

Note: Sunset was at 1942 hours (Hangchow)

The number of aircraft which safely returned from the bombing raid by 2300 hours was 15. One plane made a crashed landing Keelung post after its fuel tank had been hit by a shell.

2. Results

Bombing:

Chien-chiao Airfield - a hit scored on both the hanger and the arsenal workshop, workshop set on fire. Two hits scored on several aircraft outside the hanger.

Chiao-ssu Airfield - Two hits scored on both the hanger and the powder magazine, both set on fire. A hit each on two large aircraft outside the hanger.

Kuang-to Airfield - Three hits scored on two hangers, several hits on more than ten aircraft on the ground.

Air Combat:

Two planes of the Chien-chiao Air Raid Unit battled with ten odd hostile fighters. They shot down two of these and forced three planes down.

3. Losses

Prior to the bombing raid, communications with two planes of the Hangchow Air Raid Unit ceased after they became separated from the unit because of the bad weather.

The total number of Chinese aircraft which attacked the Shanghai Area, on this day, was approximately 40 fighters and bombers. Although they attacked six times, no damage was inflicted on us, excepting that on the above-mentioned Okinawa Maru. The bomb which was aimed at the Izumo fell into the city and killed and wounded several hundred Chinese and other nationals. On the other hand, our forces achieved good results by shooting down two enemy planes in air combat, and destroying one plane by ground fire.

Part 4. Air Combat until 17 August.

15 August

The 3rd Fleet Commander, who was forced to give up the initiative in air operations at the outset of the combat, due to the typhoon, and instead had the Chinese Air Force take the initiative, issued the following order at 1900 hours, 14 August:

“1. A surprise attack on the enemy air force will be carried out as early as possible tomorrow morning, employing all the available air strength in this area.

2. Attack targets:

The 2nd Air Raid Unit - Nanking, Kuang-to, Soochow.
The 3rd Air Raid Unit - Nan-chang (the Taipei Unit), Nanking (the Omura Unit).

The 4th Air Raid Unit - Hangchow.
Airplanes of the 4th Cruiser Division, the 10th Cruiser Division, and the 1st Destroyer Squadron - Hungchiao

In the event the 1st Air Raid Unit can be used, further orders will be issued."

At 1200 hours of the 15th, the center of the typhoon as located approximately 90 miles north of Shanghai, with the central pressure being 740 mm. It was advancing northeastward, and the wind velocity was gradually decreasing. However, the storm arm extended as far as 200 kilometers from the center, and included even the Nanking Area. Therefore, even the vicinity of Nanchang was affected by the typhoon.

A. Attack of the 1st Combined Air Unit

1. Battle Progress

At 0720 hours, 14 planes of the Kanoya Unit departed from the Taipei Base for Nanchang. Although they did not encounter bad weather on the way, they were confronted with low clouds and a heavy rain in the vicinity of Nanchang. However, due to a flood, it was difficult to distinguish terrain features.

Consequently, these planes separated and strived to find the airfield. This took one to two hours.

Thus, from 1040 to 1155 hours, eight airplanes attacked both the new and old Nanchang Airfields.

Fourteen 250 kg bombs were dropped (altitude 450 meters) on the old airfield, while two bombs of the same type were dropped (altitude 500 meters) on the new airfield. All of the said 14 aircraft returned to the Taipei Airfield at 1450 hours.

The 20 aircraft (commanded by Lt Con Hayashida) of the Kisarazu Unit at the Omura Base, departed at 0920 hours and crossed the East China Sea and the storm area before flying towards Nanking.

As they approached the Chinese mainland, the force of the wind from the southwest increased to more than 15 meters, and visibility was highly limited, due to heavy rains and low clouds. Each air company (consisting of four planes) was forced to act separately.

Although the air units encountered an attack of enemy fighters over Soochow, after passing over Shanghai, 16 planes of the said unit bombed the Nanking Airfield from an altitude of 200 to 500 meters, from 1450 to 1530 hours. Also, in the vicinity of Nanking, they were pursued by enemy fighters, but sixteen planes returned safely to the new base on Cheju Do by 2120 hours. However, four planes were shot down by enemy fighters.

2. Results

Nan-chang

Old airfield, nine hits scored on the hanger, command station, laboratory, powder magazine etc., causing a fair-sized fire. Besides, damages were inflicted on several airplanes outside the hanger.

New Airfield, two hits scored on the large hanger, causing a big fire.

Nanking

Ta-chiao-chang Airfield, Three hangers and two barracks destroyed. Also, some ten odd planes outside the hanger were destroyed.

Kakung Airfield: one hanger and several planes outside the hanger destroyed.

3. Aerial Combat

Nanchang Unit:

Although six planes of the unit met enemy fighters in aerial combat, none were shot down, and we suffered only slight damages.

Nanking Units:

The unit planes engaged eight hostile planes over Ta-hu and shot down four of them. On the other hand, they fought against approximately 40 airplanes over Nanking and shot down eight of these, but we also lost four planes east of Nanking. According to a survey, after their return, six out of the 16 planes were damaged by hostile firepower, but the damages were not serious.

B. Attack by the 2nd Carrier Division

The aircraft carrier Kaga launched 29 attack planes and 16 bombers from a position south of the Choushan Islands. At 0840 hours the carrier-based

attack plane unit, braving bad weather, bombed the Chien-chiao Airfield and its vicinity, inflicting damages to the airfield and the hanger. At 0900 hours, the carrier-based bomber unit bombed the Chiao-ssu and Shao-hsing Airfields (southern coast of Hangchow Bay) and destroyed six planes on the ground and also the hanger.

During this bombing attack, our planes also engaged numerous hostile aircraft and shot down nine enemy planes. We lost one carrier-based bomber and two carrier-based attack planes.

The elements of the attack unit which took off for Nanking failed to achieve their objective because of heavy clouds.

C. Air Combat by Seaplanes.

Nine Kamoi-based seaplanes, attached to the 4th Air Raid Unit, carried out an effective bombing of Hangchow at 1600 hours. The seaplanes of the Izumo, 8th Cruiser Division, and 1st Destroyer Squadron, cooperated in land combat after bombing the Hungchiao Airfield.

D. In the early morning of the 15th, the 1st Carrier Division received an order from the 3rd Fleet Commander to the effect that "as soon as the weather clears up and permits the operation of airplanes, the entire air strength shall be used to attack Hangchow (Chien-chiao), Soochow, and Hungchiao." Moreover, it was learned that the ground operations in the Shanghai area were facing great difficulties. Therefore, preparations for an attack with all available aircraft, were being made. However, since the weather became bad again, the unit was forced to give up the attack for the day.

The air attack on the day was the first "over water bombing." Moreover, it was an onslaught carried across the typhoon area. Therefore, irrespective of the results of the battle, the psychological impact of this bombing attack upon both hostile and friendly troops was great.

On the other hand, this combat revealed the weakness of the medium attack plane (lack of protection against fire), which constituted the main attack force, and it became vitally necessary to find a remedy for this development.

On 15 August, approximately 20 planes of the Chinese Air Force, including fighters, bombers and reconnaissance planes approached the Shanghai area and attacked the Izumo, 11th Battleship Division, 1st Destroyer Squadron, and Marine Headquarters, but no damage was inflicted on the Japanese forces, whereas one enemy reconnaissance plane was shot down by fire from the ground.

16 August

Although the typhoon had passed by the 16th, visibility in the Shanghai and Nanking Areas was still bad, due to low-hanging clouds.

On the 15th, at 2250 hours, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order concerning air operations to be carried out on the 16th.

1. Enemy Situation.
 - a. Enemy aircraft are reported concentrated in Soochow and Chia-hsing.
 - b. It seems that four large-type enemy attack planes landed on either the Lung-hua or the Hung-chiao Airfield this evening.
 - c. It also seems that enemy planes staged bombing attacks on Shanghai and surrounding areas.

2. Tomorrow, the 16th, air raid units will conduct the following operations:
 - a. The main strength of the 1st Air Attack Force will make a dawn attack against Chia-hsing while an element will attack Hung-chiao. (If large-type enemy aircraft are sighted at Lung-hua, they will also be attacked.) Upon completion of these operations, the Force will prepare for new attacks and cooperate with ground troops. In this case, the targets for attack will be as follows:
 - (1) Enemy artillery positions (located on the north side of Ta-cha-chen in the Kiang-wan Race Track and on the south side of the Municipal Government Office.
 - (2) Kun-San Railway Bridge, if circumstances permit, fighters will take charge of antiaircraft defense near the Izumo.
 - b. The 2nd Air Attack Force will attack Soochow at dawn and also carry out reconnaissance of enemy airfields in the Shanghai Area. Any enemy aircraft observed will be attacked.
 - c. The 3rd Air Attack Force will take off as soon as possible to carry out the following bombing attacks. The Kisarazu Air Unit will attack Nanking, and the Kanoya Air Unit will attack Chu-jung and Yang-chou.
 - d. The 4th Air attack Force, upon completion of secret reconnaissance of the Shanghai Area, with its main strength, will cooperate with ground troops in Shanghai at dawn. In this project, the targets for attack will be as follows:

(1) Transport troops

(2) Troop concentrations

3. Aircraft operating in the Shanghai Area will be careful not to operate near friendly vessels or the Shanghai Marine Unit. Meanwhile, the street fighting in Shanghai developed into a full-scale battle by the evening of 13 August. The Chinese offensive was most furious on the 15th, 16th, and 17th. Our marine unit, which totaled only 4,000 men, including reinforcements from the homeland, were besieged by an estimated 30,000 Chinese troops.

The biggest crisis on the Shanghai battlefield came on the morning of the 16th, at 0100 hours, when the Chinese launched an all-out offensive, throwing terrific pressure on our positions in the northern sector. Temporarily, our defenses were on the verge of crumbling, but owing to our stubborn resistance, and the timely arrival of marine reinforcements from the 8th Cruiser Division, and the 11th and 3rd Destroyer Squadrons, the enemy abandoned his offensive and withdrew after several hours of hard fighting.

Under such circumstances, our air forces finally got a chance to assist the ground troops. However, the enemy air force was also active during the day. In the morning and afternoon of the same day, a total of 25 enemy planes made six attacks against our marine unit headquarters and naval vessels at anchor, such as the Izumo. The anti-aircraft gun battery near the Izumo, the marine unit headquarters area, and part of our communication network were damaged by those attacks.

The assaults by various air raid units were as follows:

A. 1st Air Attack Forces (1st Carrier Division)

That day, the two aircraft carriers, Hosho and Ruyjo, operating near the Ma-an Islands, began to launch their planes early in the morning. Those carrier-based planes, despite their difficulty in taking-off, staged bombing with remarkable results against Chia-hsiang, Hung-chiao, Chiang-wan, and Ta-chang-chen. They destroyed ten enemy planes, one large hanger and nearby railroad, and also shot down two enemy planes in aerial engagements. Thus, they endeavored to maintain air supremacy over Shanghai.

B. 2nd Air Attack Force (2nd Carrier Division)

The same day, the 2nd Carrier Division, which was also operating near the Ma-an Islands, carried out an all-out air raid. Its assault destinations were Nan-hsiang, Chiang-wan, Soochow and Kun-shan. The results were three

enemy planes shot down, and enemy base installations and positions damaged seriously.

C. 3rd Air Attack Force (1st Combined Air Unit)

The 3rd Air Attack Forces, despite heavy losses in the trans-oceanic bombing attacks, conducted during the two previous days, still played a leading and active part in finding and assaulting enemy planes.

1. Progress of Operations

a. Kanoya Unit (based at Taipei)

Organization

Chu-Jung Assault Unit: Six medium attack planes
(led by Maj Nitta)

Yang-chou Assault Unit: Seven medium attack planes
(led by Capt Ishi)

The Chu-jung Assault Unit took off at 0800 hours and raided the Chu-jung Airfield between 1055 and 1058 hours. There was an engagement with over ten enemy fighters before and after the bombing. In a post-bombing aerial battle, two of our aircraft, including the command plane, disappeared. On the return route, three planes raided Nanking and Chia-hsing. One plane made a forced landing on Cheju Do because there was no fuel, and The remaining three planes returned to the Taipei Base.

The Yang-chou Assault Unit took off at 0840 hours, but the command plane turned back because of engine trouble, whereupon, Lt Umabayashi took command of the unit.

Between 1215 and 1230 hours, each flight approached the Yang-chou Airfield and staged solo bombing attacks. However, each plane was attacked by two to five enemy fighters before and after the bombing. About 1230 hours the command plans of Lt Umabayashi was shot down in flames. The remaining five planes returned to Taipei at 1500 hours.

b. Kisarazu Unit (based on Cheju Do)

Organization

Soochow Assault Unit: Nine medium attack planes
(led by Capt Takenaka)

The Kisarazu Air Unit received a telegraphic order from the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander, but it made an inquiry because there was some doubt concerning the assault objective. Upon receipt of instruction that the weather was bad in the Nanking Area, the assault objective was changed from Nanking to Soochow. The above telegraphic order was as follows:

From: 1st Combined Air Unit Commander

To: Kisarazu and Kanoya Air Unit Commanders.

“Today, as soon as possible, the Kisarazu Air Unit and the Kanoya Air Units will attack air bases and oil storage depots, the former at Nanking, and the latter at Chu-jung and Yang-chou.” The telegraphic inquiry was as follows:

From: Kisarazu Air Unit Commander

To: 1st Air Combined Air Group Commander

The location of the air base and oil tanks in Nanking is unknown.

“According to yesterday’s operations, there was considerable anti-aircraft fire near the Army Officer School and the Nationalist Government Office. Is it permissible to change our targets to the Army Officer School, Nationalist Government Office, and the powder magazine? Our raiding force is scheduled to take off at 1600 hours.”

Although no reply was given to this telegraphic inquiry, nine planes took off at 1710 hours, heading for Soochow.

About 2000 hours, approximately 20 minutes after sunset, all planes raided the Soochow Airfield and Fort. However, one of them, on its way home, was heavily damaged when it made a forced landing on the Korean coast, due to a thunderstorm raging near Cheju Do.

2. Results

Chu-jung: All unsheltered planes destroyed (12 to 13 fighters), eleven fighters shot down. (approximately 20 fighters engaged in aerial battle.)

Yang-chou: All unsheltered planes destroyed (three bombers and

six small planes), two fighters shot down (about five fighters engaged in aerial battle.)

Soochow: One fuel warehouse and one heavy bomber attacked.

3. Losses

Kanoya Unit: Three planes shot down (Ten others still suitable for operations)

Kisarazu Unit: One plane damaged seriously due to forced landing (Eight others still suitable for operations)

4. The number of our medium attack planes available for operations was halved by the three-day assault, for nine planes were missing (including those confirmed as shot down), two damaged due to forced landing and several others damaged by enemy gunfire. This is attributable to the fact that low-level attacks were carried out at daylight under adverse weather conditions. The intensity of this type of air operations is shown by the fact that losses increased in proportion to the results attained. This cast a shadow of uneasiness regarding future trans-oceanic bombing attacks.

The 1st Combined Air Unit Commander, in a detailed action report, expressed his feelings in this matter. He said, "In view of the pressing situation in the Shanghai Area, our air raids reminded me of that famous, costly assault against the 203-meter Hill". (TN Fierce battle for a hill in the Russo-Japanese War)

D. 4th Air Attack Force.

During the morning and afternoon of the 16th, a total of 16 planes based on the Kamoi cruising near the Ma-an Islands conducted reconnaissance and bombing missions against the Shanghai Area.

17 August

The crisis which had come over the Shanghai front on the 16th was over for the time being, and the build-up of marine strength was carried out, especially in reinforcing the north sector forces which bore the brunt of the enemy assault. Consequently, we were successful in repulsing persistent attacks by the enemy, thus forcing them to abandon their plan to break through our main position.

Moreover, the air cover given to the ground forces began to take effect gradually.

A. Assault by the 3rd Air Attack Force.

On the night of the 16th, the 3rd Air Attack Force received the following order from the 3rd Fleet Commander:

Tomorrow, the 17th, the 3rd Air Attack Force will carry out the following operations:

1. The Kisarazu Air Unit will deliver an all-out assault on Pang-fou.
2. The Kanoya Air Unit will conduct reconnaissance of the airfields in Chu-chi, Chien-to, Wuy-shing and Chang-hsiang, and attack any enemy aircraft, if found. In the event of bad weather, the commander will decide whether the mission should be carried out.

1. Progress of Operations

Kanoya Air Unit

Organization

Chu-chi and Chin-to Reconnaissance Assault Unit

Two medium attack planes (led by Lt Ishi)

Wu-shing and Chang-hsing Reconnaissance Assault Unit

Two medium attack planes (led by Lt (jg) Higure)

Although both units took off at 0710 hours, they were hindered by bad weather on the way. As they approached their destination, they found it difficult to conduct reconnaissance owing to low-hanging clouds and poor visibility. They barely managed to reconnoiter Wu-hsing, but had to abandon the reconnaissance of the other area. On their way back, they attacked four heavy bombers which were at the Hai-ning Airfield before returning to their base at 1400 hours.

Kisarazu Air Unit

Organization

Pang-fou Attack Unit: Eight medium attack planes
(led by Lt Commander Soga)

Huai-yin Attack Unit: Three medium attack planes
(led by Lt. Yoshida)

Both units took off at 1100 hours and arrived at their destinations about 1410 hours. At Pang-fou, that met no resistance except AAA fire. At Huai-yin, three enemy reconnaissance planes were in the air, but they retired, instead of putting up any resistance. Thus, both units returned to their base before 1810 hours, without suffering any damages.

2. Results

Hai-ning: Four heavy bombers destroyed

Pang-fou: Large hanger set on fire, airfield heavily damaged and three unsheltered planes destroyed.

Huai-yin: One plane and one warehouse destroyed.

B. Attack by Other Air Unit

Aircraft of the 1st and 2nd Air Attack Unit, 8th Cruiser Division, 1st Destroyer Squadron, and the Izumo performed their allotted tasks in supporting ground operations and in cutting off the enemy's troop transportation routes. The attack targets were as follows:

The enemy positions at Chiang-wan-chen, Lo-tien-chen, North Railway Station, Commercial Press Company, Pa-tzu-chiao, Te-chih University (all located in Northern Shanghai), Woosung, Pootung, and the railway bridge and tracks between Wu-hsi and Chang-chou.

The same day, the Kamoi was recalled from the Ma-an Islands to the Woosung Area to cover land operations and to protect the Izumo against enemy air raids.

C. Activities of the Chinese Air Force

On the 17th, a total of 40 enemy planes attacked five times in the daytime and once at night. This constituted the biggest number of sorties that had ever been made by the Chinese in one day.

They attacked our land positions, Yang-shu-pu Airfield construction site, the Izumo, and other naval vessels at anchor. As usual, however, they failed to inflict any damage on us. On the contrary, two enemy fighters were shot down during aerial engagements and four others by antiaircraft fire.

On the 17th, the land fighting in the Shanghai Area and the aerial warfare in Central China finally emerged from the confusion which had marked the early

stages of the incident. The general situation became rather calm.

Section 2. Situation from 18 August 1937 to the End of August 1937

Part 1. General Situation

Meanwhile, in North China, mopping-up operations in the Peiping-Tientsin Area was over, and the three divisions, which had been dispatched from the homeland, late in July, had almost completed their concentration in the vicinity of Tientsin, on 22 August. With the commencement of the Cha-ha-erh Operation in mid-August, and the arrival of reinforcements, the units stationed in the Peiping-Tientsin Area started preparations for a gradual southward drive.

In Central China, two homeland divisions arrived at the Shanghai battlefield to support the Japanese marines, which had managed, despite its numerical inferiority, to withstand the attacks of an overwhelmingly superior Chinese force. The 11th Division made a landing on the bank of the Yangtze River near Chuan-ho-chen, early on the morning of 23 August, while the 3rd Division landed in the Woosung Area on 23 and 24 August.

Thus, the incident was still limited to local conflicts, but by its very nature, aerial combat, especially an all-out air operation conducted by the Japanese Navy, could hardly be localized, so immediately after the outbreak of the incident, a bombing attack was made against the enemy's capital, Nanking. It was the first of a series of air attacks against major enemy air bases far in the interior of Continental China, such as Nan-chang and Pang-fou. Bombing attacks against Nanking were repeated, and late in August, even Nankow, Hsiao-kan, and Chiu-chang were attacked.

For this air operation, the Navy fully utilized the special capabilities of its Type-96 land-based medium attack planes. Strategically, it was a success, and those planes succeeded in checking the activities of the enemy air force, thus making an immense contribution to the favorable progress of ground operations in the Shanghai Area. However, this strategic bombing conducted throughout China stirred up the fighting spirit of the Chinese people to an unnecessary extent. It was one of the major factors responsible for the failure of the efforts made by the governments of the two nations to restrict and settle the incident locally.

This is a good example of the necessity for close liaison between air operations, especially strategic bombing of large cities, and ground operations.

Part 2. Summary of Air Operations.

During this period, our naval air operations were characterized by active air support given to ground operations, in connection with the landing operation of 23 August, and by furious air attacks conducted by our medium attack planes against massed enemy air strength based near Nanking.

18th: Attack against enemy air bases near Shanghai and support of land operations.

19th: Same as the previous day.
Air raid of Nanking by the 3rd Air attack Unit.

20th: Attack on enemy air bases near Shanghai and support of land operations. Bombing attack on Chiu-chiang by the 3rd Air Attack Unit.

21st: Attack on enemy air bases near Shanghai, and support of land operations. Bombing attack by the 3rd Air Attack Unit on Yang-chou, and Chiu-chiang.

22d: Continued support of land operations and attacks on enemy air bases. Night bombing attack on Nanking by the 3rd Air Attack Unit.

23d: Cooperation in the landing at Chuan-sha-kou and Woosung, and night bombing attack on Nanking.

24th: Support of land operations. Pre-dawn and night bombing attacks on Nanking by the Kisarazu Unit of the 3rd Air Attack Unit. Attack on Yen-chi and Ning-po by the Kanoya Unit of the same Unit.

25th: Support of land operations.

Aerial engagement over Woosung between three Hoshō-based fighters of the 1st Air Attack Unit, and a large number of enemy bombers and fighters. Three hostile Martins were shot down. Bombing attack on the Kiang-wan Doek by sea reconnaissance planes of the 3rd Air Attack Unit.

26th: Support of land operations. Dawn attack on Nan-Chang by the 3rd Air Attack Unit.

27th: Support of land operations. Night bombing attack on Nanking by the 3rd Air Attack Unit.

28th: Support of land operations and bombing attack on enemy positions on the bank of the Yangtze River at Lo-tien-chen and Woosung-chen by the 1st Air Attack Unit. Bombing attack on the Kun-shan Railway Bridge and other enemy rear lines of communications by the 2nd Air Attack Unit.

29th: Bombing attack on the Sung-chiang Railway Bridge and the Chien-chiao Airfield and patrol and landing points by the 1st Air Attack Unit. Bombing attack on the Pao-shan fort, the Woosung Battery and the Kuang-to Airfield by 2nd Air Attack Unit.

30th: Support of land operations by almost the full strength of the air force to help expedite the stagnant frontal operations of the Army. Counterattack against a series of enemy air raids on the Woosung Anchorage for transports and the Ssu-chiao-shan Base, resulting in one Hawk being shot down. Attack on Hsu-chou by the 3rd Air Attack Unit.

Our assault on the Nanking Area by medium attack planes was discontinued, and subsequent attacks were to be conducted by land based planes, upon the completion of land bases in the Shanghai area

From 31 August, the 3rd Air Attack Unit was assigned the duty of attacking the Canton Area, the details of which will be stated in the next chapter.

Part 3. Operations of the 1st Combined Air Unit.

18 August (bombing attack on railway bridges)

At 1130 hours on the 16th, the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Fleet obtained the following intelligence from foreign sources,

“In retaliation for the bombing attacks on Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek has decided to mass six division rapidly in Shanghai to destroy Japanese positions around Hang-kou, prior to the arrival of the Japanese Army.”

At 0130 hours on the 18th, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued an order to make air raids on the following objectives:

“Assault objective.

The 1st Air Attack Unit: Tai-tsang (ten nautical miles northeast of Kunshan) and enemy positions at Cha-peh.

The 2nd Air Attack Unit: Min-hang (17 nautical miles south of Shanghai and in the upper reaches of the Huang-pu, Chiang), and enemy positions east of the Woosung-Shanghai railroad, especially in the vicinity of Kung-tai.

The 3rd Air attack Unit: Kun-shan Railway Bridges and the railway bridges over the grand Canal of the Shanghai-Hangchou-Ningpo Railroad.”

In accordance with this order, the Kanoya Unit made two bombing attacks against a railway bridge on the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Line, approximately five nautical miles west of Sung-chiang. The first attack was made by six planes and the second attack by four. They successfully put the tracks out of use, but failed to destroy the railway bridge.

The attack on the Kan-shan Railway Bridge was conducted by the Kisarazu Unit. The first attack, staged by seven planes, produced little effect. Therefore, six planes made a second attack and scored two hits on the central part of the bridge, thus cutting off the railway.

The failure of these bombing attacks was due to the use of land bombs. It taught us a lesson that the use of ordinary bombs is necessary to destroy a railway bridge. However, in those days, there were no ordinary bombs available at the advance base for medium attack planes.

19 August (bombing attack on Nanking)

The Japanese Army succeeded in breaking part of the Chinese Air Force code. By this method it was possible to detect, rather rapidly and successfully, the movement and concentration of Chinese aircraft.

For instance, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order to the 3rd Air Attack Unit on 19 August,

Dispatched at 0235 hours, the 19th.

"1. Situation

a. Most of the enemy air forces has retreated to the interior, but elements still remain in the Shanghai Area, appearing frequently and conducting operations.

b. It seems that heavy bombers have been massed in Hangkow.

c. It also seems that the transfer of the planes from Hang-chou to Chia-hsing is being contemplated again.

d. The enemy has massed his fighters in the Nanking Area.

2. In accordance with instructions from the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander, the 3rd Air Attack Unit will conduct assaults at the appropriate time to spread confusion among the enemy's rear echelon troops. The attack will be conducted secretly and from a high altitude. However, if the weather is unfavor-

able, it will be called off.

Air raid objective: Hankow, Chin-chiang, Nanking and Hsu-chou.”

Upon receipt of this order, the 3rd Air Attack Unit decided to dispatch the full strength of the Kanoya and Kisarazu Units to attack Nanking. The Kanoya Unit was ordered to attack the ammunition depot at about 1500 hours, and the Kisarazu Unit was attack the Army Officers' School at sunset.

At approximately 1330 hours, eight planes of the Kanoya Unit dropped bombs on the ammunition depot and the arsenal in Nanking (from an altitude of 4,000 meters). This bombing attack caused a great fire in the target area. However, one of our planes was missing after an engagement with several enemy fighters, after the bombing attack.

The Kisarazu Unit dispatched a total of 14 planes. About 2000 hours, nine of them raided the Army Officer's School and the other five raided the Nationalist Government office, after causing a fire in many places, all the planes returned safely to their base.

During this period, our aircraft that made low-altitude daylight attacks on Nanking often suffered heavy losses owing to powerful anti-aircraft gun positions built in and around the city. For this reason it was decided, on 19 August, that bombing attacks be made from an altitude of more than 3,000 meters. Those planes of the Kisarazu Unit which made an air raid on Hankow 15 minutes after sunset that day, encountered no enemy fighters. This gave us a valuable suggestion concerning future operations.

20 August (bombing attack on Chiu-chiang)

At 1605 hours on the 19th, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following orders:

“1. It seems that the enemy has massed Martin bombers at either Hankow or Hsiao-kan, and is now preparing heavy bombs rapidly. It also seems that 20 fighters are in Hsiao-kan.

2. The 1st Combined Air Unit Commander will order the Kanoya Unit to attack the enemy heavy bomber unit immediately. On the heels of this order, the following order was issued by the same commander at 1725 hours the same day.

Unless otherwise ordered, the 3rd Air Attack Unit will assault enemy air bases, aircraft plants, major arsenals in the interior of China, important government

offices in Nanking, high-speed vessels and mine-layers anchored near Chiang-yin, in accordance with instructions from the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander.

In conducting this attack, utmost efforts will be made to maintain secrecy and suddenness. In case of bad weather, the attack will be called off."

The 1st Combined Air Group Commander, upon receipt of the above two orders, issued an order to the Kanoya Unit to make preparations for an air raid, either on Hankow or on Hsiao-kan. The order called for three planes as the first flight and six planes as the second flight, early on the morning of the 20th, after the departure of the first flight, an order was received from Fleet Headquarters rescinding the previous order issued at 1605 hours on the 19th. Therefore, the projected second flight was called off, while the first flight was allowed to continue its mission, since it had already left.

The three planes, on a night flight, were caught in a moonless, pre-dawn darkness and were not sure of their position. Although they reached the vicinity of Hankow, they wheeled round and raided Chin-chiang instead.

A suggestion as submitted by the Kanoya Unit, "Early-dawn bombing attacks in the basin of the Yangtze River are difficult, since the area is apt to be misty or foggy at that time of the day. Furthermore, during dawn hours, things on the ground are hardly visible from the sky, whereas, those in the sky can easily be recognized from the ground. Therefore, a secret dawn attack is only advantageous to the enemy.

An early dawn attack may prove profitable if, like a navel operation, it is not detected while on the way to the target. However, it is almost impossible to conduct a successful secret dawn attack against the interior of China because the raiding planes have to pass over many positions and the attack is thus liable to be detected. In this respect, it is suggested that a dusk attack will be more advantageous than a dawn attack."

21 August (bombing attack on Hankow, Hsiao-kan, Chiu-chiang, Chu-chou, and Yang-chou)

To the 1st Combined Air Unit, 21 August was an outstanding day, because the Unit was successful in its greatest long-range raid against Hsiao-kan. However, it was also a cursed day because one air company, composed of three medium attack aircraft of the Kisarazu Unit was annihilated after attacking Yang-chou.

At 1335 hours on the 20th, the 3d Fleet Chief of staff offered the following information based on radio intelligence:

“1. The enemy planes which fled to I-Chang yesterday, the 19th, were identified as six heavy bombers (three Martin and three Heinkels) and five bombers (all Northrops). The heavy bombers were ordered to fly back to Hankow.

2. It seems that light bombers (Douglas 9), and approximately 20 fighters are massing at Chu-chou (about 40 nautical miles northwest of Nanking).

3. It also seems that besides these planes, a considerable number of aircraft are massed at Lo-yang and Han-chang.”

At 1730 hours the same day, the following intelligence was received through the same channel.

1. According to intelligence reports approximately 20 enemy Hawks have been massed at Yang-chou where every effort is being made to repair the airfield.

2. The enemy is worried about the inadequate facilities for night flights. Tomorrow, the 21st, each unit will carry out bombing attacks as follows:

“1. Kisarazu Unit

Six planes will make a pre-dawn attack on the Yang-chou Airfield, and the remaining planes a dusk attack on the Chu-chou Airfield.

2. Kanoya Unit

Three planes will make a pre-dawn attack on the Chiu-chiang Airfield and the rest of the unit a dusk attack at the Hankow Airfield.”

However, at 2145 hours the same day, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order:

“The 3rd Air Attack Unit (the Kisarazu Unit) will conduct a secret assault on Yan-chou and Chu-chou immediately after daybreak tomorrow, the 21st.” Therefore, at 0000 hours on the 21st, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander revised his previous order as follows:

“Six planes of the Kisarazu Unit will raid Yang-chou and the other planes Chu-chou immediately after daybreak today”. Furthermore, at 0000 hours on the 21st, the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff dispatched the following radio message:

“This evening, our Hosho-based fighters sighted two Martin heavy bombers over the concession. However, bombers fled on a course of 260

degrees. In view of this fact, the enemy is likely to return to Hankow or Hsiao-kan tonight. Therefore, tomorrow dawn is believed to be the best time to attack him."

1. Assault on Hankow and Hsiao-kan

The Kanoya unit carried out a dusk attack on Hankow and Hsiao-kan.

The Hankow Assault Unit, composed of five planes (led by Lt Ishi), reached the vicinity of Hankow at about 2000 hours. (The sun had set at 1926 hours.) flying at altitudes of 3000 to 2000 meters, they conducted reconnaissance for about two hours, in search of the airfield, taking advantage of the bright moonlight. (The moon was 14 days old and nearly full). However, since a flood had hopelessly obscured topographical distinction, they gave up and returned to their base.

The Hsiao-kan Assault Unit, composed of three planes, raided the Hsiao-kan airfield at 2030 hours, destroying four enemy heavy bombers and two fighters. As the assault was well-timed to coincide with the dusk period, there was no resistance at all.

The failure of the Hankow Assault Unit to locate the target, despite such favorable conditions as a near full moon was due to reliance on a map, and to an unexpected flood. It taught as the necessity of pre-assault photographic reconnaissance.

2. Assault on Chiu-chiang

Three planes of the Kanoya Unit carried out a night attack on the Chin-chiang Airfield the same day.

They left Taipei after sunset on the 20th, and raided Chiu-chiang at 0027 hours on the 21st, a report said that they scored some hits on a group of fighters massed near the hanger.

3. Assault on Chu-chou and Yang-chou.

Fifteen planes from the Kizarazu Unit took part in this assault. The 1st Air Battalion, composed of nine planes (led by Lt Commander Hayashida), and the 2nd Air Battalion, composed of six planes (led by Lt Commander Soga), left for Chu-chou and Yang-chou, respectively.

The Cho-chou Assault Unit raided the airfield from an altitude of 3000 meters at 0645 hours. After destroying about ten planes, the hanger, and

the barracks, all the planes returned to their base. However, three planes of the Yang-chou Assault Unit failed to locate the target because of clouds, and dropped bombs on Pu-kou instead. En-route home, they located Yang-chou, where some enemy planes were seen burning due to the attack by the other three planes of the unit. Enemy fighter planes came up to meet them, and in the ensuing aerial engagement, they shot down one enemy fighter and forced down another, but we lost one plane, too.

No information was available about the other three planes (5th Air Company led by Lt Yoshida), because none of them returned home. It is believed that they wasted much time trying to locate their target, because of clouds and fog, and that they finally located and raided Yang-chou at about 0625 hour, but that on their way how they were all shot down by pursuing enemy fighters.

The heavy loss suffered in this assault was a great shock to the Japanese Navy at that time. The failure gave a graphic account of the disadvantage of dawn attacks made by this type of aircraft. A profound reconsideration was made in this respect.

22 August (night bombing attack on Nanking)

The following intelligence was issued by the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff the previous day:

- “1. Enemy planes are massed at Yang-chou, Yen-chi and Nanking.
2. Twelve Northrops and Hawks raided Shanghai this morning.
3. Caution is required, since the enemy seems to anticipate any projected air raid through our activities.

At 0930 hours on the 22d, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following attack order:

“1. Kisarazu Unit

Target, Koumintang Headquarters in Nanking. The time of the attack will be left to the discretion of the commander.

2. Kanoya Unit

Attack the Nan-chang Airfield at dusk.”

However, at 1400 hours on the same day, the following warning dispatch

was received from the Chief of the 1st Bureau, Navy General Staff:

“Since the Koumintang Headquarters in Nanking has moved somewhere else, and the heretofore known location of the said Headquarters is near foreign embassies and legations, be careful not to bomb the area”.

Therefore, at 1445 hours, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander immediately issued an order that the attack targets in Nanking be changed to either the arsenal or the new airfield.

In conducting night bombing attack, the Kisarazu Unit took advantage of the moonlight, and two flights, consisting of three planes each, took off. The first flight approached the Ta-chiao Navy Airfield in Nanking at 2130 hours, but failed to obtain an accurate sighting owing to enemy searchlights. The bombs dropped landed in the Yu-hua-tai area.

The second flight raided the same airfield at 0410 hours. However, it also had difficulty in bomb sighting, due to dazzling enemy searchlights.

The above two attacks were conducted at altitudes of 2,500 and 2,800 meters respectively. Despite intense anti-aircraft artillery and machine gun fire, we suffered no loss. All the planes returned to their base on Cheju Do.

Because of bad weather in the Taipei Base area, the Kanoya Unit called off its attack.

23 August (Night bombing attack on Nanking)

At 1800 hours on the 23d, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order,

“Three or four planes of each unit will carry out an air raid on Nanking tonight. Time and objectives will be as follows:

1. Kisarazu Unit

Attack the Security Headquarters (adjacent to the south side of the Army Officers' School) before 0200 hours.

2. Kanoya Unit

Attack the arsenal after 0300 hours.”

In accordance with this order, the Kisarazu Unit planned an assault by two flights, consisting of two planes each. However, only the first flight of the Kisarazu Unit actually left for Nanking. The second flight of the Kisarazu Unit and both flights of the Kanoya Unit was cancelled, since another order as received that night to the effect that Kuang-an and Yen-chi were to be attacked the following day. The two planes of the first flight completed their bombing mission at 0100 hours. However, owing to wrong sighting, bombs fell in the middle of Hsuan-wu Hu, instead of hitting the Security Headquarters as aimed.

24 August (Attack on Nanking, Yen-chi and Ning-po)

At 2100 hours on the 23d, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order:

“1. Enemy light bombers (Northrop) are being massed at Kuang-an (improvised airfield 40 nautical mass south of Kuang-to) and Yen-chi.”

2. Upon improvement of weather, the 1st Combined Air Unit will attack them. Therefore, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order at 2145 hours the same day:

“1. The air raid on Nanking, scheduled to be made by the Kanoya Unit tonight, is cancelled.

2. Tomorrow, the 24th, the Kanoya Unit will raid the following enemy air bases and destroy aircraft there.

Five planes will take-off at 0300 hours to attack Yen-chi, and six others at 0400 hours to attack Kuang-an.

3. All the planes of the Kisarazu Unit (except those to be employed for tonight's operation) will complete their flight preparations before 0400 hours.”

Until then, two 250 kg land bombs was the regular bomb load on a medium attack plane. However, from this time on, every aircraft of this type carried one 250 kg bomb and six 60 kg bombs.

Although the Kanoya Unit carried out its operations according to instructions, not a single enemy plane was to be found at Yen-chi Airfield. Therefore, bombs were dropped on the vital part of the airfield. Since no airfield could be found in Kuang-an, our planes raided the Ning-po Airfield, while in route home, though no planes were to be found there either.

The poor results of the days operations caused doubts as to the reliability of the intelligence reports.

However, at 1100 hours on the same day, the following intelligence was received from the Chief of the 3rd Bureau, Navy General Staff:

“The 8th Air Battalion Commander ordered the 10th and 19th Units to move to Nanking via Hankow tomorrow, the 24th.”

On the basis of this intelligence report, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander immediately issued the following order:

“1. The situation is the same as stated in the Navy General Staff dispatch.

2. Six planes of the Kisarazu Unit will carry out a dusk attack this evening against the airfield outside of the Nanking Fort to destroy enemy aircraft there.”

This order was accompanied by instructions to the effect that the Nanking dusk attack force should go straight south, via Hung-tse-Hu, avoiding Yang-chou and Chu-jung.

This raid was carried out smoothly. The six planes which left Cheju Do at 1800 hours reached the southeastern end of Hung-tse Hu at moonrise, where they veered to the south. After tightening the formation over the Yangtze River, they raided the Ta-chiao-chang Airfield in Nanking at 2130 hours. Taking a southward retirement course for cautions sake, they all returned safely to their base.

Inasmuch as they had already become accustomed to enemy searchlights, they made a skillful discovery of the airfield. All the bombs dropped hit the airfield. They also confirmed that many enemy planes were set on fire and that the entire airfield was turning into a sea of flame.

Meanwhile, they engaged in aerial combat with several enemy fighters and shot down one of these.

Although these was a moon that night, the fact that our raiding planes were attacked by enemy fighters was a surprise. Thus, it became necessary to improve the engine exhaust of the medium attack plane, so that flames shooting out of the exhaust would not become a conspicuous target at night.

26 August (Attack on Nan-chang)

At 0400 hours on the 21st, the following radio intelligence was received from the Chief of the 3rd Bureau, Navy General Staff:

"1. Five heavy bombers of the 8th Air Battalion arrived at Nan-chang for repairs at noon today, the 20th. They hope to return to Hankow upon the completion of repairs today.

2. The 1st General Depot in Nan-chang is still undamaged."

Became of the above intelligence, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander, felt the necessity of attacking Nan-chang, and issued the following order at 1120 hours on the 25th.

"Six planes of the Kanoya Unit will make an air raid on the Nan-chang Air Base tonight, taking advantage of the moonlight. Bombing objectives will be the building area of the new airfield."

The six planes of the Kanoya Unit, each carrying twelve 60 kg bombs, reached their destination at 0230 hours. However, the overcast weather made it difficult to locate the target. After an hour's search, they managed to locate it, and carried out an effective bombing attack. After our assault, two enemy fighters appeared, but there was no aerial engagement.

27 August (Attack on Nanking)

Earlier, a request for the creation of a sanctuary from air raids in Nanking City was made to the Japanese Government by the US Ambassador, in the name of the US, British, French, German, and Italian Ambassadors. A dispatch concerning this request, signed jointly by the Vice Minister of the Navy and the the Vice Minister of the Navy General Staff, was resolved at 2300 hours on 23 August.

The above dispatch was conveyed to each air unit the following day. It ran as follows:

"No bombs will be dropped on the following district in Nanking:

The district encircled by Han-shi-men, Hsin-chieh-kou circle, wall of the Pei-shi-ho, railroad pier facing the Yangtze River, Hsia-kuan (including the Yangtze River facing Hsia-kuan), and the San-cha-ho."

However, at 2100 hours on the 24th, the 3rd Chief of Staff made the following request:

"Information has been received to the effect that the uneasy Nanking Government is planning to move inland, so it is necessary to bomb Nanking thoroughly. It is requested that the ordnance depot and the military police headquarters also be included among the targets."

Thereupon, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order at 0200 hours on the 26th:

"All units will carry out a night raid according to the following schedule.

The raiding hour for the Kisarazu Unit will be before 0200 hours on the 27th, and that for the Kanoya Unit will be at 0300 hours on the same day.

(1) The Kisarazu Unit will use eight planes and raid the military Police Headquarters and the Aviation Office.

(2) The Kanoya Unit will use six planes, and raid the ordnance depot.

The Kisarazu Unit divided into two groups of four aircraft each, all reached Nanking at 0140 and 0220 hours, respectively and bombed the vicinity of the Military Police Headquarters, but no great results were confirmed.

One of the planes was pursued by enemy fighters and was shot down.

It was known from experience that the Type-96 medium attack plane had a vulnerable spot in its fuel tank which was apt to burst into flame, but against smaller caliber bullets it was fairly safe. However, it was feared that starting that night the enemy had begun to use either incendiary bullets or larger caliber machine gun bullets.

The Kanoya Unit's six aircraft conducted their raid at about 0400 hours and accomplished considerable results.

30 August (Attack on Hsu-chou)

On 27 August the Chief of the 1st Bureau of the Navy General Staff sent the following telegram to the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Fleet and to the Commander of the 1st Combined Air Unit:

"Concerning air attacks against the Nanking Area where enemy air defenses are strong, it is considered advantageous to attack the area with carrier-based bombers and fighters, after land bases have been completed. Therefore, it is requested that attacks by medium attack planes be kept to a minimum, as much as possible, unless it is unavoidably necessary or great results can be expected."

On the same day, the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Fleet also requested the cessation of attacks on Nanking, since considerable results had already been obtained.

Thereupon, on 19 August the 1st Combined Air Unit issued the following attack order, based on the general order given by the 3rd Fleet Commander.

“The Kisarazu Unit, with six planes, each carrying a bomb load of 250 kg bombs, will attack Hsu-chou Station on the Lung-Hai Line, on the 30th and the 31st.”

The Cheju-Do Air Base, which received this order, sent out six planes at 1530 hours on the 30th. They bombed Hsu-chou Station at 2000 hours, and considerable results were accomplished by a direct hit on the tracks and the station office, and four direct hits on freight cars in the railroad yard. On the way back, they were pursued by three enemy fighters south of Hsu-chou but succeeded in repulsing them.

31 August (Bombing of the Entire South China Area)

Refer to the following Section.

Part 4. Air Operations in Cooperation with land Combat.

The advance unit of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was scheduled to land in the vicinity of Chuan-ho-chen and Wusung-chen on 23 August. Therefore, the 3rd Fleet Commander ordered a Kamoi based plane, with an Army officer aboard, to make a photo reconnaissance of the landing points, on 20 and 21 August.

With the object of creating a diversion in the ground operations, the airplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division and the 1st Destroyer Squadron made reconnaissance flights over the various landing points on the northern shore of Hang-chow Bay, such as To-lin, Chin-shan, Cha-pu, and Hai-yen in cooperation with the naval vessels in Hung-chow Bay. Also, in the early morning of the 22d, the entire air strength made the following reconnaissance and attack raids, and inflicted great damages on enemy positions, troop concentrations and military vehicles.

A. The 1st Air Attack Unit (1st Carrier Division)

1. Reconnaissance and attack raids on Ta-chang-chen, Liu-ho, Nan-hsiang, Chia-ting, Tai-tsang.
2. Attack on batteries near Woosung and Pao-shan.
3. Air patrol over the concession and the Izumo (in the morning).
4. Diversion movement in the Chi-liao-kou Area.

B. The 2nd Air Attack Unit (the 2nd Carrier Division)

1. Reconnaissance and attack raids on Liu-ho-chen, Chen-JU, Woosung, and Pao shan.
2. Attack on anchored ships and land installations at Chiang-yin.
3. Air patrol over the concession and the Izumo (in the afternoon).

C. 4th Air Attack Unit

1. Air patrol over the anchorage of the Ma-an Islands.
2. Reconnaissance and attack on artillery positions in the Pootung district.

At about 1510 hours on the 22d, during this operation, four Ryujo-based fighters encountered nine enemy planes over Pao-shan, and destroyed five and damaged two before repulsing the rest.

Activities in support of the landing operation on 23 August were as follows:

A. The 1st Air Attack Unit (supporting the 3rd Division)

1. Attacked enemy positions, troop concentrations, railroad bridges, and military vehicles at Pao-shan, Chang-hsing-chen, Ta-cheng-chen, Chiang-wa-chen, Chen-ju, Nan-hsiang, Chia-ting and Tai-tsang, in the vicinity of the 3rd Division's landing point.
2. Four Ryujo-based fighters, which were covering the air over the Woosung Landing Force and transports, encountered 27 enemy fighters over Pao-shan at 0925 hours and destroyed nine of them.
3. At dusk on this same day, planes were sent out to find and attack a railway gun, which was said to have been observed in the vicinity of North Station, but they could not find it and bombed a railway junction west of the station.

B. The second Air Attack Unit (supporting the 11th Division)

1. Attacked enemy positions and military vehicles at Liu-ho, Lo-tien-chen, Tai-tsang, Chia-ting and Nanasiang in the vicinity of the 11th Division's landing point.
2. Reconitered and bombed Cha-pu, sections along the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad, Chia-hsing, Min-hsiag, Chang-jo Soochow and Kunshan.

3. Covered the air over the Chuan-she-kou landing force and transports.

C. The 4th Air Attack Unit

1. Patrolled the air over Shanghai and attacked enemy positions, troop concentrations, and armored cars in the vicinity of the Sino-Japanese Spinning Mill, Chin-chia-chiao, and Ta-chang-chiao.

2. Applied pressure on the Pootung district and reconnoitered enemy movements in front of the Army.

The first echelon of the Army spearhead landed at the designated landing point on 23 August, and engaged the confronting enemy. On the 24th, the second echelon, brought over by the 1st and 3rd Battleship Divisions, also made a landing.

The operations of each air attack unit, which covered the second echelon's landing on 24 August were as follows:

A. The 1st Air Attack Unit

1. Attack on the enemy Kiangwan City Government.

2. Demolition of a railroad bridge east of Kan-shan.

3. Attack on enemy positions in the vicinity of the Yung-an Spinning Mill.

4. Air patrol over Shanghai.

B. The 2nd and 3rd Air Attack Units.

1. Bombing of military vehicles on the road at Tai-tsang, Chia-ting, Nanasiang, and Kun-shan station and railroad east of it.

2. Attack on enemy positions in the vicinity of the Yung-an Spinning Mill in Woosung.

3. Direct cover and patrol of the air over the 11th Division's landing point.

C. The 4th Air Attack Unit

1. Air patrol over Shanghai and attack on enemy positions and cruisers.

2. Attack on enemy artillery positions in Pootung, which was shelling our

supply warehouse.

Part 5. Operations of Transport-based Airplanes

For the rapid transport of the divisions to be dispatched from Japan to the Shanghai Area, the main strength of the Combined Fleet was employed and the Organization of transport forces was as follows:

A. Transportation for Advance Army Units (first echelon)

9th Cruiser Division (Myoko and Tama), 5th Cruiser Division (Ashigara, Nachi, and Haguro), 2nd Destroyer Squadron (Maya, Isuzu, Oi, Itukushima, and Okhishima), 24th Destroyer Division (commanded by the 9th Cruiser Division Commander.)

B. Transportation of the Second echelon.

1st Battleship Division (Mutsu and Nagato), 3rd Battleship Division (Kirishima and Haruna) 8th Crusier Division (Kinu, Natori, and Yura), 1st Destroyer Squadron, and 1st Submarine Squadron.

The airplanes based on these vessels were organized into raiding units, and they participated in the Shanghai Area combat.

The airplanes of the 9th Cruiser Division and other vessels which transported the first echelon, scouted and attacked enemy positions and troop concentrations at Liu-ho-chen, Chia-ting and Woosung on 22 and 23 August and also maintained patrols over to anchorages of the Ma-an Islands and the Yangtze River.

The Combined Fleet, which was responsible for the transportation of the second echelon, participated in the operation from the mouth of the Yangtze River by flying 27 sorties with 12 Type-95 and two Type-94 sea reconnaissance planes of the 1st Battleship Division (minus the Hyuga) and the 3rd Battleship Division during the day of 22 August.

On the same day, the planes of the 1st Battleship Division bombed enemy positions in the Pootung Area, troop concentrations in the Ta-chang-chen Area, and a bridge on the Shanghi-Nanking Highway, while the airplanes of the 3rd Battleship Division bombed artillery positions in the Pootung Area, the Chiangnan Shipyard, and the Sam-pei(#) Shipyard. Some of the planes, however, were believed to have bombed a British spinning mill the Pootung District. Therefore, the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Fleet sent a telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet requesting that, in view of the tense international situation,

combat be avoided in the central part of Shanghai, as much as possible.

On the 23d, however, a total of 14 sorties by planes of the Combined Fleet continued to reconnoiter and attack Liu-ho, Chia-ting, Sung-chiang, Min-hsing, Chen-Ju, and Lo-tien-chen.

Part 6. Activities of the Chinese Air Force.

Since the night of 14 August, when the Chinese Air Force took the initiative in attacking the Japanese troops in the Shanghai Area, almost everyday more than 10 fighters and bombers continued to attack our ships in the Yangtze River, the Marine Headquarters, Marine Unit Positions, and the foreign concession. Probably due to the lack of training on the part of the Chinese, however, the damage inflicted on the Japanese was small. Also on the night of the 18th, enemy aircraft attacked with incendiary bombs in an attempt to cause confusion in the concession, but failed to inflict any serious damage.

Then enemy planes started to attack the Japanese naval base in the Ma-an Islands. Consequently, our aircraft carriers in that area, and other surface vessels for troop transporting which were active near the mouth of the Yangtze River, were faced with a situation which required caution.

After 24 August, however, the situation became such that attacks by enemy aircraft became very moderate, due to our repeated bombing of their air bases, the desperate struggle by our fighters to control the air, and the readiness of our anti-aircraft guns in the Shanghai Area. Furthermore, the enemy began to attack from a very high altitude with little practical damage inflicted upon us.

The attacks made by the Chinese Air Force during the month of August 1937 are as shown in the following table. (Page 50)

Part 7. Air operations of the Japanese Army.

The air force which operated at the beginning of the Incident was composed of elements (named a composite air brigade) of an air force, under the command of the Kwantung Army, and a temporary air group dispatched from the homeland.

The temporary air group was under the China Garrison Commander, while the composite air brigade, still attached to the Kwantung Army was placed under the unified command of the temporary air group commander, by order of the Army.

Advancing its main force to the Tientsin Airfield, this air strength contributed to the success of the overall operation by cooperating in mopping up the Peiping-Tientsin Area, of bombing Nan-yuang and Hsi-yuan.

Date	Day or Night	Type and Number of Attacking Planes	Place Attacked	Our Damage	Number of enemy aircraft shot down
14 Aug.	Day Approx. 6 times	Approx. 40 fighters and bombers	Izumo, 11 th Battleship Div. 1 st Des. Ron., 8 th Cruiser Div. Marine HQ., Kung-ta Area.	Izumo. However, a bomb at the Izumo hit the Cathay Hotel, inflicting heavy casualties among other nationals and Chinese. A bomb aimed 8 th Cruiser Div. fell near a British warship.	Air combat: 1 fighter 1 bomber AA gun 1 bomber
15 Aug.	Day	Approx. 20 fighters, bombers, and recon. planes.	Izumo, 11 th Battleship Div. 1 st Des. Ron., Marine HQ.	None	AA gun 1 recon. plane.
16 Aug.	Day approx. 6 times	Approx. 25 fighters, bombers, and recon. plane.	Same as on 15 Aug., plus 3 rd Des. Ron. and the Yasyama (off Woosung)	AA gun position in the vicinity of the Izumo was hit, with 4 dead and 6 wounded. The concession in the vicinity of the Marine Force hospital was hit.	AA gun 1 bomber 1 fighter
17 Aug.	Day Approx 6 times	Approx 40 fighters and bombers.	Marine HQ., Yang-shu-pu Chiang-wan-chen Area, Izumo 11 th Battleship Div., 1 st and 3 rd Des. Ron, 8 th Cruiser Div.	None	Air Combat 1 fighter AA gun 1 fighter
18 Aug.	Day 2 times Night 1 time	Approx 14 fighters and bombers	Marine HQ., Army officers quarters, Izumo, 11 th Battleship Div., 3 rd Des. Ron., Tung-chou Channel.	None	None

The air force also participated in the Chahar Operation, which broke out in August, and played an important role in it. The main body of this air force was first based at the Cheng-to Airfield, and assigned to attack enemy positions in the vicinity of the provincial border between Hopeh and Chahar, and also to supply provisions and ammunition to isolated friendly troops. With the improvement in the battle situation, the air force attempted to achieve greater results by using the advance Chang-chia-kou Airfield and the Man-yuan Airfield.

Later, the air unit dispatched from the Kwantung Army was returned to its original organization. Then the Kwantung Army and the China Garrison Army carried out their air operations independently with the Great Wall as the operational boundary and gradually advanced operation bases as far as the Te-lin and Chang-pei Airfields.

At first Chinese aircraft appeared in the Laug-hai Railroad zone, but after the outbreak of hostilities in Central China, in mid-August, their main strength moved southward to Central China thereby leaving North China to the Japanese Army planes.

Section 3. Situation in September 1937

Part 1. General War Situation.

Of the Army units that landed on the Yangtze River bank on 23 and 24 August, the 11th Division which landed at Chuan-sha-kou advanced without much trouble up to Lo-tien-chen, but the 3rd Division which landed at Woosung suffered heavy casualties and was confined in a small area, making an advance extremely difficult. However, an offensive in the Woosung Area was so urgent that elements of the 11th Division (the Asama Detachment) and the Amadani Detachment, which had been standing by for diversion to the Tsing-tao Area, were sent to the Woosung Area and by early September the situation improved enough to enable land communications between the 11th Division and the 3rd Division.

On the other hand, the airfield under construction in the Kung-ta Sector could not be completed and used, as it was threatened by the enemy entrenched in the area. Thereupon, on 6 September, elements of the 3d Division (the Iida Detachment, one infantry battalion, one tank platoon, one mountain artillery company) executed a landing operation. However, the battle was bitterly fought and even the detachment commander was killed in action, but with the close cooperation given by the marine unit, they finally succeeded in routing the enemy from the north side of the airfield, which was finally put to operational use on 8 September.

In early September, in view of the bitter fighting by the Army expeditionary

divisions, the Army General Staff decided to reinforce the expeditionary force by dispatching the Shigeto Detachment (with five infantry battalions as its nucleus) from Formosa, and the 9th, 13th, and 101st Divisions from the homeland.

The 101st Division, which arrived first, landed at a point between Woosung and Shanghai on 22 September, and advanced along the left flank of the 3rd Division.

The 9th and 13th Divisions landed between Woosung and Shanghai on 27 September and 1 October, respectively.

Because of such an adverse situation, the Shanghai front was advanced during September only to the line connecting Lotienchen, Chu-chih-cha, and the city government.

In the North China theater, the Chahar Operation was completed by the end of August, with the capture of Kalgan and efforts were being made to stabilize this area. On 31 August, the Central Command ordered the commander of the North China Area Army to occupy and secure the Peiping-Tientsin Area and other strategic areas in the vicinity, and also to destroy the enemy in central Hopeh Province, quickly shatter the enemy's fighting morale, and thus create a favorable opportunity to terminate the hostilities.

Thereupon, the Area Army planned an operation to encounter and destroy the enemy's main force in the vicinity of Pao-ting, and accordingly, started moving in early September. The 1st Army advanced southward from the Shui-ting-ho line along the Peiping-Hankow Railroad. The 2nd Army advanced southward from Tientsin along the Tientsin-Pukou Railroad for some time before turning westward in order to encircle the enemy.

The operation was started on 14 September, on a full scale, and progressed smoothly. On 24 September the 1st Army occupied Pao-ting while the 2nd Army occupied Tsang-hsien.

In the meantime, the Kwantung Army group, sent to Chahar attacked the enemy stationed along the Peping-Suiyuan Railroad in the west, immediately after occupying Kalgan in late August, and captured Ta-tung and other strategic areas in the vicinity, in mid-September.

In late September, the group penetrated to the inner Great Wall and advanced to a sector south of Tai-hsien (about 100 kilometers south southwest of Ta-tung).

Part 2. Operations of the 1st Combined Air Unit.

This air force which had been operating solely in Central China during August, turned to South China in September and changing its operations, fully displayed its ability as a strategic bombing force.

Below are the circumstances leading to this unit's shift to South China:

On 22 August the 3rd Bureau Chief of the Navy General Staff gave the following information.

"The enemy at Foochow Airfield sent a telegram to the Air Commission at 1900 hours on the 21st, to the effect that there is one air regiment at Karenko and another at Heito in Formosa, and seaplanes at Taipei, and also requested a map of Fu-kien and three detailed maps of Formosa. (Navy General Staff's Secret Dispatch No. 660.)"

Upon receiving this information, the 1st Combined Air Unit exchanged the following wires with the Commander of the 3rd Fleet on 23 August:

"In view of the situation revealed by Navy General Staff's Secret Dispatch No 660, we think it necessary to bomb and destroy enemy air bases in South China for our own self-defense. We request advice."

3rd Fleet Chief of Staff (the 25th).

"From the viewpoint of the over-all operation, It is believed that an attack on South China in the immediate future is not pressing.

However, it is my personal opinion that if you think it absolutely necessary to attack it from your operational viewpoint, then go ahead."

At that time there will still some Japanese civilians left at Amoy in South China, and their evacuation was being hurried.

Then on the night of the 25th, the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Fleet made clear a plan to attack South China:

"Air attacks against the South China Area shall be directed primarily against enemy air power in the Canton Area, the Shao-kuan Aircraft Mfg. Plant, and the Canton-Hankow Railroads and it is requested that the air strength from the Central China Area operation be employed for the moment when success seems most certain."

South China Attack on 31 August.

On 27 August, when preparations were being made for the attack on South China, a dispatch came from the 1st Bureau Chief of the Navy General Staff requesting a suspension of the attack on Nanking (see Part 13, Section 3, Chapter 4). Thereupon, the Commander of the 1st Combined Air Unit, made up his mind to attack South China. First of all, he sent six medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit from its Cheju-do Base to the Taipei Base to enter the Command of the Kanoya Unit. At the same time, he made the following report of his scheduled attack on South China to the Commander of the 3rd Fleet:

"Our Kanoya Unit at Taipei is scheduled to launch simultaneous air attacks on such air bases in South China as Canton, Chieh-yang, Chang-chow, Mei-hsien, Lung-yen and Foochow in the early morning of the 29th."

Since the six planes of the Kisarazu Unit arrived at Taipei on the afternoon of the 26th and the evacuation of the remaining Japanese civilians at Amoy was completed, the following order was issued:

"The Kanoya Unit (including the temporarily attached six planes of the Kisarazu Unit) will attack air bases and aircraft plants in South China in the early morning of the 29th, according to the following plan:

12 planes - Canton Airfields (Tien-ho, Pai-un).

Three planes - Shao-kuan Aircraft plant.

Four planes - Chang-chou Airfield.

Two planes - Swatow Airfield."

At the time when this order was issued, the 1st Combined Air Unit had the following attack plan: (See chart page 55)

Furthermore, in conjunction with this air raid, the 5th Destroyer Squadron which was patrolling the South China Sea was requested to supply air patrol and arrangements were also made to dispatch one of its destroyers to a point 50 kilometers south of Hongkong, for the purpose of air patrol and weather observation.

However, due to bad weather in south China on the 29th, this air raid was postponed, and later carried out on the 31st.

A. Attack on Canton.

1. Organization.

Commanding Officer: Lt Com Nagaishi. 13 medium attack planes were organized into four flights.

Air Base	Strength Stationed	Estimated Distance	Attacking Strength (one way)	Bomb	Time of Departure
Canton	Tien-ho	540 nautical miles	9	250 kg x 2	0300 hours
	Pai-un		3		
Mei-hsien	Unknown	340 "	2	60 kg x 12	0445 hours
Swatow (Chieh-yang)		300 "			
Lung-yen		270 "			
Chang-chou	7 Bombers 14 Recon. planes (Information given by the 5 th Des. Ron)	220 "	4	60 kg x 12	0500 hours
Shao-huan		460 "	3	250 kg x 2	0400 hours

Bombing Targets:

1. Airplanes (hangers)
2. Base installations such as office building and billets. If no target is available, bombs are to be brought back (no bombing of airfields)

References: Sunrise: Formosa 0631 hours, Canton 0707 hours. Moon age: 22.5 days.

2. Progress of Operation

0300 hours, left Taipei Base

0700 hours, six planes bombed Tien-ho Airfield.

0705 hours, three planes bombed the same airfield.

0709 hours, three planes bombed Pai-un Airfield.

0720 hours, one medium attack plane set afire and lost in day fight with enemy fighters.

1115 hours, 11 planes returned.

3. Results.

Tien-ho Airfield: Eight hangers destroyed and two airplanes destroyed outside the hangers.

Pai-un Airfield: Six hangers set afire.

4. Air combat.

In aerial combat with more than 10 enemy fighters, four of them were shot down and one of our planes was set afire and lost.

Since there was no coordination between each flight, bombing was carried out independently by the flights. Consequently, the last three planes received the concentrated attack of enemy fighters and one of them was shot down.

B. Changchou Attack

1. Organization.

Commanding officer, Lt Com Hiramoto. Six medium attack planes were organized into two air companies, and the four-plane air company were dispatched to Changchou, while the two-plane air company as sent to Swatow Airfield.

2. Progress of Operation.

Changchou Unit departed from Taipei at 0500 hours and bombed the Changchou Airfield between 0640 and 0658 hours.

No direct hits are scored on hangers, and because of predawn darkness, the unit bombed 27 dummy airplanes on the airfield, believing them to be real ones.

At 0900 hours all planes returned.

The Swatow Unit reconnoitered Swatow, Chieh-yang, Mei-hsien and Changchou, but no enemy planes are sighted. At 0912 hours the unit dropped bombs aimed at the hangers of the Changchou Airfield, but they fell on the airfield. At 1110 hours, all the planes returned.

C. Shou-kuan Raid .

1. Organization.

Commanding officer, Lt Mori, three medium attack planes (two 250 kg bombs).

2. Progress of Operation

0353 hours Departure.

0700 hours Raid.

1015 hours All planes returned safely.

3. Results.

Bombs were scattered over the areas one hitting a hanger and setting it afire while another hit an aircraft plant.

D. Kieno Attack.

At 0805 hours one medium attack plane departed to reconnoiter and attack Foochow, but no enemy planes were sighted on Foochow Airfield. At 1020 hours it discovered the Kieno emergency landing field, but as it was recognized to be out of use, the planes bombed a powder magazine which was located at the eastern edge of the city .

4 September (Hai-chow attack, South China attack temporarily cancelled.)

At 1130 hours on 3 September the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order:

“On the 4th, each unit will attack according to the following plan:

A. Kisarazu Unit.

Attack the Hai-chow barracks (a military airfield) with six planes. Bombing time will be determined by the unit commander.

B. Kanoya Unit.

Attack the Amoy Naval Headquarters and neighboring barracks with six planes early in the morning.

That night, however, the 1st Bureau Chief of the Navy General Staff again expressed his opposition to the South China attack by sending the following telegram:

“Since it is desirable that air attack against the South China coast be turned over to naval units, it is requested that attacks by medium attack planes be suspended for a while, unless the concentration of enemy air power is believed to be in progress.”

Upon receiving this telegram, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander stopped the Amoy air attack which was scheduled to be carried out on the 4th. Moreover, air operations against South China scheduled for the first half of September were suspended.

The six plane Kirasazu Unit scheduled to raid Hai-chou took off at sundown as planned, but three of the planes were unable to find their targets, while the other planes unloaded their bombs on troop barracks and returned.

15 September (Canton attack).

Since 25 August the Japanese fleet was carrying out a peacetime blockade of South China. However, the enemy planes increased in number in the South China Area, and from early September, they started flying over our blockade fleet. On 14 September three enemy Northrops attacked the 29th Destroyer Division which was on blockade duty in the vicinity of Ta-chan Island off Canton, and the flagship Yubari was also bombed on the same day.

That day the commander of the blockading unit forwarded the following suggestion:

“In view of the increase in enemy planes in Canton and the poor anti-air defense of the 29th Destroyer Division, it is requested that the blockade line be temporarily moved southward from the vicinity of Ta-chen Island. It is deemed necessary to destroy the enemy air force as quickly as possible.”

Upon hearing this, the Commander of the 3rd Combined Fleet issued the following order at 1200 hours on the 15th:

“The 3rd Air Attack Unit will immediately carry out night raids against the Canton Area.”

The six Canton (Tienho) attack planes of the Kanoya Unit which departed from the Taipei Base at 2000 hours, on the 15th, were unable to find their targets even after one hour and a half of search. This was due to bad weather in the target area (There were several layers of broken clouds at 500 meters and above, and thunderstorms at some points).

Therefore, they dropped two 250 kg bombs on what they believed to be blacked out Canton, and all the planes returned safely by the next morning.

16 September - Attack on Canton, Chao-Choo, and Chieh-Yang.

When the Canton air raid of the 15th failed, due to bad weather, the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff sent the following telegram to Taipei:

“Knowing how chagrined they must feel, I sincerely sympathize with the crew members who made the long flight to Canton, only to turn back without accomplishing their mission because of bad weather. I wish them a speedy success. By order of commanding officer.”

On the other hand, at 0930 hours on the 15th, the Destroyer Kuretake was on blockade duty at Swatow, was attacked by six enemy Northrop planes, and bombed five times, for approximately 30 minutes.

This aggressive action by the enemy necessitated the bombing of air bases in the Chieh-yang and Chao-choo areas from the viewpoint of the self-defense of Taipei Base.

At 1100 hours on the 16th, the 1st Combined Air unit Commander issued the following order:

“Today the Kanoya Unit will make a reconnaissance and attack flight according to the following plan:

a. Chieh-uang - Chao-chou Area

Three medium attack planes will depart at 1200 hours.

b. Canton (Tier-ho).

Six medium attack planes will depart at 1600 hours.

Three planes of the Chieh-yang-Chao-chou attack unit, which left the Taipei Base at 1200 hours on the 16th, did not locate any enemy planes on the airfields in the target area, therefore, after bombing buildings which were believed to be

military establishments in Chieh-yang and Chao-chou, all returned at 1740 hours.

All of the six planes of the Tien-ho (Canton) airfield attack unit succeeded in bombing the airfield at approximately 2020 hours, bombing and setting afire two hangers.

On that day also there were thick clouds at an altitude of approximately 1,000 meters over Canton. When they came out of the clouds, and immediately before they commenced bombing they were attacked by five enemy fighters, but after a 20 minute battle, they were able to repel them.

22 September (attack on Canton under cover provided by land-based fighters)

Because the 2nd Combined Air Unit advanced to Kung-ta Airfield (Shanghai), which was put in operational use from about 10 September, and started operations, there came a turning point in the air force operations in the Central China Area. Therefore, on the 14th, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following new order for air operations in Central and South China:

"The air attack force will strive to annihilate the remnants of the enemy with one stroke, according to the following plan:

a. The 2nd, 4th and 5th Air Attack Units will once again commence operations against Nanking after 16 September, and attack the enemy air forces, military establishments, and main governmental buildings which are concentrated in that area.

b. The 1st Air Attack Unit will advance to the Canton Area as quickly as possible, upon completion of preparations and, in accordance with the instruction of the 1st Carrier Division Commander, attack enemy forces and military establishments in that area.

c. Taking advantage of the confusion created in the enemy's disposition by the two above-mentioned attacks the 3rd Air Attack Unit will attack air bases and military establishments in the interior of China, such as Hankow and Nan-Chang in accordance with Instructions of the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander (3rd Fleet Secret Dispatch No. 347)."

Concerning this order, the 1st Bureau Chief of the Navy General Staff expressed his opinion as follows:

"Since it is believed necessary to terminate the operation of the 1st Carrier Division in the Canton Area as soon as possible, it is hoped that the 1st Combined Air Unit will join in the attack against the said area to obtain the maximum results

at one blow.”

At 1100 hours on the 15th, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order:

“a. The 1st Air Attack Force operating in the Canton Area shall cooperate in the operation of the South China Unit, in compliance with the request of the South China Unit Commander.

b. The South China Unit will support the 1st Air Attack Unit while the latter is operating in the Canton Area.

c. A part of the 3rd Air Attack Unit will cooperate with the 1st Air Attack Unit in its attack against the South China Area.”

Also, at 1800 hours on the 15th, the 1st Carrier Division Commander notified the units concerned of the Canton Area attack plan:

a. First attack (dawn attack): 15 attack planes and bombers and fighters of our division will make an attack upon the Tien-ho and Pai-un Airfields at dawn.

b. Second attack (in cooperation with the 1st Combined Air Unit): The same number of planes as in the first attack will be used. But nine fighters will cover the 1st Combined Air Unit, taking off between 1100 and 1200 hours. (Planes of the 1st Combined Air Unit will assemble in the air over the 1st Carrier Division, targets of attack by the 1st Combined Air Unit will be the Tien-ho and Pai-un Airfields and the Shih-ching Ordnance Arsenal, and the target of attack by the 1st Carrier Division, the Cha-ton-ling Infantry Power Depot.

c. Third attack (Twilight attack) 10 carrier-based attack planes and bombers will be used. The target will be the Tien-ho Airfield.

d. Fourth attack (Night attack). Six carrier-based attack planes will be used, and the target will be the Pai-un airfield.

Thereupon, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander ordered 18 medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit stationed at the Cheju-do Base, to assemble at Taipei. Their movement was completed by 1330 hours on the 17th.

The 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order at 0930 hours on the 19th:

“a. Tomorrow, the 20th, each unit will cooperate with the 1st Air Attack Unit by supplying medium attack planes and carrying out an air raid upon the Canton Area.

b. Organization and target:

1st Air Attack Unit, composed of 12 planes of the Kanoya unit.

Target: Tieh-ho Airfield 2nd Air Attack unit, composed of six planes of the Kisarazu Unit

Target: Pai-un Airfield

c. The air attack units will leave the Taipei Base at 0800 hours, reach the air over the 1st Air Raid Force at approximately 1200 hours, and advance under cover of the fighters of said unit (five planes to the 1st Air Attack unit and four planes to the 2nd Air Attack unit)."

However on the scheduled day, the 20th, the attack on the Canton Area was cancelled due to bad weather. Though the attack unit departed on the 21st, the medium attack plane unit turned back at the half way point due to bad weather, but the 1st Carrier Division carried out the first and second attacks on this day

On the evening of the 21st, the 1st Carrier Division Commander notified the 1st Combined Air unit of the attack plan for the 22d:

"The attack plan for tomorrow will be as follows:

a. Third attack Departure: 0700 hours.

Planes to be used: 28

Target: Tien-ho Airfield.

b. Fourth attack: Eighteen planes of the 1st Combined Air Unit to leave the air above this unit at 1300 hours covered by 12 fighters of this unit.

Targets: Tien-ho and Pai-un Airfields"

Later it was learned that the attack on the 21st by carrier-based planes of the 1st Carrier Division did a great deal of damage to the Tien-ho and Pai-un Airfields, destroying most of the establishments at the airfields, and shooting down or destroying more than 10 fighters on the ground and more than 10 other types of planes. Though there seemed to be several planes still remaining, it was believed that they could be destroyed in an attack by the 1st Carrier Division in the morning of the 22d, so the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander revised the above order as follow:

“a. Time for departure will be changed to 0900 hours. (Join the fighters from the 1st Carrier Division at 1300.)

b. Bombing targets

His-tsun heavy industry area, to be bombed by six planes of Kanoya Unit, 2nd Ammunition Depot, by six planes of the Kanoya Unit, Shih-ching Ordnance Arsenal, by six planes of the Kisarazu Unit.

c. Three or four fighters will be assigned to provide air cover to each plane group.”

At 0910 hours on the 22d, 18 medium attack planes of the 1st Combined Air Unit left the Tapei Base, passed over Ma-kung, joined the fighters over the ocean 40 nautical miles southwest of the Wan-shan Islands (70 nautical miles south of Canton), and carried out an effective bombing raid (250 kg bombs used) around 1400 hours. During the attack, they met heavy ground fire, but sighted no enemy fighters, and returned safely at 1840 hours. The results of this bombing are as follows:

Tien-ho Airfield - two remaining hangers set afire, 1st Ammunition Depot – hit and set afire by two or three bombs. Large factory at Hsitsun – hit and destroyed by six bombs.

Shih-ching Ordnance Arsenal – hit and destroyed by 11 bombs.

The round trip for this bombing raid was 600 nautical miles, and was the longest attack made by medium attack planes, but each plane had, on the average, fuel left for six more hours of flight. This fact proved that if the Type-3 medium attack planes, used in this attack, were to fly at cruising speed, it would be possible to attack targets within a 750 nautical mile zone.

23 September (Nan-chang Attack)

In accordance with the order of the 3rd Fleet Commander concerning air operations in Central and South China, mentioned above (3rd Fleet Secret Dispatch No. 347), the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order at 1015 hours on the 22d:

“The Kanoya Unit will depart at 1630 hours today, the 22d, with six medium attack planes, and in the twilight, bomb the new Nan-chang airfield (hangers).”

However, this attack was called off due to bad weather, and the 1st Combined

Air Unit Commander forwarded his opinion to the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff, by sending the following telegram:

"I should like to temporarily cancel the air attacks on the Canton Area partly because of moonlight conditions, and according to 3rd Fleet Secret Dispatch No. 347, conduct air attacks against the Hankow and Nan-chang Areas in full force, after tomorrow, the 23d and cooperate with the 1st Carrier Division after the 27th, when it will again attempt air-raids against the Canton Area."

The 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff immediately sent the following telegram to the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander concerning an estimate of the situation.

"It is believed that the Chinese Government is contemplating moving to Hankow, and it is also concentrating large-type planes there. Therefore, it is considered necessary to carry out attacks against Hankow as soon as possible."

Thereupon, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order:

"Tomorrow, the 23rd, each unit will attack the Hankow and Nan-chang Areas with medium planes, according to the following plan:

a. Organization and bombing targets.

(1) Hankow Air Raid Unit

(Kisarazu Unit), composed of eight planes of the 1st Plane Unit (Target: airfield), and six planes of the 2nd Plane Unit (Target: arsenal)

(2) Nan-chang Air Raid Unit (Kanoya Unit), composed at 15 planes of the 3rd Plane Unit (Target: airfield).

b. Operation

The Hankow Air Raid Unit and Nan-chang Air Raid Unit will depart at 1430 and 1600 hour, respectively, and carry out bombing at about sunset."

However, since it was learned in the afternoon of the 23d, that the weather over the Hankow Area was bad, the 1st Combined Air Unit cancelled the above Hankow air raid, and reorganized the Nan-chang Air Raid Unit as follows:

1st Plane Unit composed of nine planes of the Kisarazu Unit, 2nd Plane Unit composed of six planes of the Kanoya Unit.

Of the 12 planes of the Nan-chang Air Raid Unit that left the Taipei Base

(Three planes did not participate due to mechanical trouble) at 1600 hours on the 23d, three planes spotted the new airfield and bombed it at 1905 hours, while the other planes made a wrong estimate of the terrain because of a flood, and were unable to locate the airfield so they had to turn back.

The result of the bombing was three hits on three buildings, believed to be repair plants which were set afire. During the attack on this day, five enemy fighters came up, but no air combat took place on 24 September (Hankow and Nan-chang attack).

Since the attack of the previous day was not satisfactory, a plan was made to bomb Hankow and Nan-chang on the 24th.

The 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order at 1000 hours on the 24th.

“Today, the 24th, each unit will attack the Nan-chang and Hankow Areas in full force with medium attack planes, according to the following plan:

a. Organization and bombing targets

(1) Nan-chang Air Raid Unit composed of 15 planes of the Kanoya Unit.

Targets: 12 planes for the new airfield, and three planes for the old airfield.

(2) Hankow Air Raid Unit composed of 14 planes of the Kisarazu Unit Targets: eight planes for the airfield, three planes for the ordnance arsenal and three planes for the ammunition depot.

b. Operation

The Nan-chang and Hankow Air Raid Units will leave the Taipei base at 1600 and 1400 hours, respectively, and carry out bombing at about sunset.”

At that time, the Nan-chang Airfield was the foremost Chinese airfield with facilities far superior to even those of the famous Tien-ho airfield in Canton.

Although there were far less anti-aircraft guns there than in Nanking or Canton, it was known that there were several fighters which belonged to the 25th Unit. Also it was reported that there seemed to be approximately ten or more planes in Hankow, including about six heavy bombers as the nucleus, but that there were

no fighters there.

It was planned that this day's attack would be aimed at hangers and aircraft plants, and bombing was to be completed without fail by 10 minutes after sunset. Furthermore, night landing facilities were also prepared at the Taichu Base for any emergency landing.

The situation of that day's, attack was as follows:

1. Nan-chang Air Raid Unit.

Leaving the Taipei Base at 1610 hours (in accordance with the organization order), it carried out a very effective bombing raid at 1915 hours and all planes returned at 2240 hours.

As a result of the bombing, five of the eight hangers at the new Nan-chang Airfield were hit by one of two 250 kg bombs, and four of them were set afire. Also, five fighters preparing to take off in front of the hangers were destroyed (several set afire), and a building believed to be a repair shop suffered a direct hit and was set afire. At the old airfield, a group of barracks were set afire and one hanger also sustained a direct hit. In this raid, though we were attacked by two fighters and received ground fire, no damages were suffered.

2. Hankow Air Raid Unit.

This unit left the Tapei Base at 1400 hours, but one plane turned back at the half way point, and the 13 planes which continued on to Hankow, in spite of bad weather, were intercepted by enemy fighters even from the vicinity of Wu-chang. Since they could not locate the airfield, due to thick clouds over Hankow, they bombed a steel mill and an ordnance arsenal. When they reached the air over Hankow Airfield, after conducting the above bombing, they spotted approximately 20 enemy planes on the ground, but having no bombs left, they were unable to take advantage of this good opportunity to destroy a large number of enemy planes.

Results of this raid are as follows:

Steel mill and large adjoining factories destroyed and set afire

Ordnance arsenal - destroyed and set afire

Two fighters - shot down

On their way back too, they were pursued by enemy fighters, but all the planes returned safely at 2200 hours.

Attack on Railroad (Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad on 26 September, and Canton-Hankow Railroad on 27 September).

On 31 August, the Japanese Navy Central Command felt that third countries might unite and protest the destruction of the Canton-Hankow Railroad by Japan so it gave instructions to the 3rd Fleet to destroy the railroad immediately.

Thereupon, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order to the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander:

"There is a plan to prevent the destruction of the Canton-Hankow Railroad through the intervention of third powers, therefore, you will destroy the said railroad between Lo-chang and I-chang and railway bridges in the vicinity of Hang-yang, (However, do not bomb trains)."

The 1st Combined Air Unit which received this order postponed this attack because of bad weather, and on 2 September submitted the following opinion to the 3rd Fleet Commander:

"Now that the enemy had disposed its fighters at Hen-yang, Shao-Kuan and Chi-an, any raids against South China would be at the cost of considerable sacrifice, in as much as attacks, at present, must be carried out at low altitudes especially during the day.

In view of this fact, it is believed appropriate to temporarily carry out attacks (bombing at night or dusk, or from high altitudes) against the Central China Area, especially the capital, to check further disposition of fighters in South China. Moreover, the Canton-Hankow Railroad should be bombed when the right moment comes."

Upon receiving this message, the 3rd Fleet sent the following telegram in the name of the Chief of Staff:

"It is desired that attacks against the Canton-Hankow Railroad be carried out at an opportune moment."

1. Attack on the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad on 26 August.

The 1st Combined Air Unit, which was waiting for an opportunity to strike, tried to destroy the railroad with the strength left after the attacks against Nankow and Nan-chang.

However, at that time, the Japanese Government had prohibited the bombing of the Canton-Hankow Railroad because of the evacuation of

Americans from the Hankow Area to Canton.

Therefore, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander inquired of the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff if it were permissible to bomb the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad (between Hangchow and Chang-sha.). The 3rd Fleet replied that it was permissible to bomb both the said railroad and any trains on it.

The 1st Combined Air Group, thereupon, issued the following order at 1700 hours on the 25th:

"a. Tomorrow, the 26th, the Kanoya Unit will bomb transportation facilities with 12 medium attack planes according to the following plan.

b. Depart at 0900 hours, forming air sections, each composed of three planes, and bomb locomotive sheds at railway stations, such as Chin-hua, Chu Hsien, Shangjao (or Yu-shan), and Yu-chiang and military trains in the vicinity."

This attack was carried out smoothly. The attack unit, which consisted of four air sections composed of three planes each, dropped two 250 kg bombs from each plane on the designated targets.

Results of the bombing

Chin-Hua: Railroad hit by two bombs and destroyed several freight cars destroyed.

Chu Hsien: Railroad, station, and more than 10 freight cars hit by six bombs and destroyed.

Kuang-hsin: Locomotive shed and approximately 10 freight cars hit by two bombs and destroyed.

Yu-chiang: Railway and several freight cars by three bombs.

2. Attack against the Canton-Hankow Railroad on 27 September.

Attacks on the Canton-Hankow Railroad were prohibited until 26 September, but the 1st Combined Air Unit, which received the following telegram from the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff on the 25th carried out an attack on the said railroad between Lo-chang and I-chang on the 27th.

"Due to the extreme delay of trains on the Canton-Hankow Railroad, the arrival at Canton of American refugees from Hankow on the 24th will be delayed considerably, therefore, it is desired that attacks on trains be postponed a few

days, even after the 27th, and that attacks be limited to the railway stations and locomotive sheds."

Six planes of the Canton-Hankow Railroad Bombing Unit from the Kanoya Unit left Taipei Base at 0920 hours on the 27th, skillfully carried out the bombing around 1400 hours, in spite of bad weather clouds covering the mountain tops and difficult geographical conditions near the target area, and five of them returned safely at 1700 hours. The results of this bombing were as follows:

a. Vicinity of Ling-too:

One direct hit destroyed the railway. One bomb hit the railroad bank facing the river and destroyed the railway. One bomb hit the railroad bank facing the river and destroyed the railroad embankment. Both hits were very effective.

b. Vicinity of Shih-ku-Hang

One bomb hit the railroad bank facing the river and destroyed the embankment. The hit was effective.

During the attack while our planes were engaged by two enemy fighters, one of our planes disappeared. However, it was reported that the plane was believed to have crashed into a mountain while in combat to avoid being shot down by enemy fighters.

3. 30 September Hangchow Raid.

On 28 September, the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff sent the following telegrams:

"It is requested that the raid by the 1st Combined Air Force be carried out as follows:

(a) Target of the raids strategic points of railroads:

i. Canton-Hankow Railroad (Railroad stations and locomotive sheds at Chuchou and Hungyang, and railroad tracks and locomotive sheds between Ichang, Pingshih, Lochang).

ii. Chekiang-Liangsi Railroad (Hangchow, Kueichi and Nanchang Stations, and the Chanshuchen Railroad Bridge.)

iii. Pangpu Station.

iv. Yuchhi-Wuhu Railroad (Ho-fei Station, etc.)

v. Peiping-Hankow Line (Hsin-yang and Hsiaokan Stations, etc.)

(b) Memorandum in the Execution of the Raid:

The bombing of the strategic points on the above railroads shall be repeated occasionally.”

According to this order, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following orders to the Kisarazu Air Unit Commander:

“(a) Kisarazu Unit will bomb the following strategic railroad points with medium attack planes for the time being, in accordance with the details of the order:

Railroad stations and locomotive sheds at Pangpu, Hofei (on the Yuchi-Wuhu Railroad), and Hangchow.

(b) The bombing of strategic railroad points shall be repeated occasionally in order to achieve the desired objective of disrupting communications.”

Upon receiving this order, the Kisarazu Unit carried out an attack on Hanchow Station and the locomotive sheds on the 30th.

The three participating planes (each carrying twelve 60 kg. bombs) departed from the Cheju-do Base at 0855 hours and at about 1215 hours bombed the water gates, locomotive sheds and freight cars, and, after obtaining highly satisfactory results, all planes returned to Cheju-do at 1445 hours.

Cooperation with the Army in Land Operations in the Shanghai Area.
Movement of a large attacking unit on 30 September

Since enemy fighter planes disappeared about 10 September from the vicinity of Shanghai when air supremacy was obtained through the activities of the fighter planes of the 1st and 2nd Air Raid Units, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander sent a telegram to the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff on 10 September, and advised him of the necessity of showing the enemy our power, and to apply pressure on the enemy by carrying out daylight bombing raids near the front line, in large formations with all the planes of the 1st Combined Air Unit.

On 12 September, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued an order to the 1st Combined Air Unit to transfer half of the Kisarazu Naval Air Unit's large attack planes (Type-95 land-based attack planes) to the Cheju-do Base. On 14 September,

half of the large attack-plane unit moved to the Cheju-do Base. Thereupon, on 21 September, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander submitted the following opinion to the 3rd Fleet Commander:

"At this time when air supremacy over the Nanking area has been secured by successful air raids, it is believed necessary to display our power by using the large attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit against strategic enemy points behind the Shanghai front. It is also necessary to consider raising the morale of the said air unit."

On 23 September, the 3rd Fleet Chief of Staff sent the following:

"Due to bad weather and low clouds in this area, we are hesitant to use the large attack-planes in view of the losses which might be inflicted by enemy anti-aircraft guns, but we are considering using them as soon as the weather improves."

On 28 September the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order:

"Tomorrow, 29 September, between 1000 to 1200 hours, attack Nansiangchen and the western half of Chiangwanchen with large attack planes, according to the following plans:

- i. Altitudes 2000 meters.
- ii. In flying over Shanghai always stay in formation with other planes.
- iii. Air route: Fly directly to Chiangwanchen, passing SE of Berubui."

However, due to bad weather on the 29th, the first air raid by large attack-planes was postponed for one day, and carried out on the 30th

These Type-95 heavy land bombers (TN Presumably large attack planes.) whose reliability and speed were inferior to the medium attack planes showed their characteristics in their loading capacity, by carrying five 250 kg bombs (two for medium attack planes), or twenty 60 kg bombs (12 for medium attack planes).

On this day, the total bombs carried by six planes was twenty 250 kg bombs and forty 60 kg bombs.

At 0725 hours, the planes departed from Cheju-do and broke formation in the vicinity of Yusan Tao at 1035 hours, and headed for the target area singly. However, due to low clouds and intermittent rains, only one plane was able to bomb Chiangwanchen, while two planes were able to bomb Nangsiachen.

All the rest of the planes returned without dropping any bombs.

On the return trip, due to dense clouds, the planes were unable to rendezvous therefore each plane flew its own course and all returned to the base at 1545 hours.

In this raid only half of the bombs were dropped but the result against the villages was tremendous and complete.

Part 3. Operations of the 2nd Combined Air Unit

The 2nd Combined Air Unit, which had advanced to the Choushuitzu Base in Kwangtung Province at the beginning of the China Incident, and was engaged in escorting ships transporting army troops, could not be immediately diverted to the Shanghai Area due to land base considerations, although the necessity of such a diversion was keenly felt. However, since the utilization of the Kingta Base, which was under construction, became possible as a result of the arrival of troops, the 2nd Combined Air Unit moved to this base on 10 September.

However, the air force could not sufficiently display its fighting power immediately after moving to this base because of the poor facilities on the base and exposure to the threat of enemy attacks. Airfield personnel worked day and night to repair the runways which had turned into a quagmire because of bad weather. However, the situation was such that during the first ten days about eleven Type-96 ship-borne fighters suffered medium to heavy damages when taking off and landing. Also enemy air attacks against this base were frequent. Most of the attacks were made during the night, except for the first one or two raids which were carried out at dusk, so no damages were inflicted. Also, the enemy frequently bombarded this base from nearby positions, the bombardments soon ceased when we began to counter-attack. Those ten days were the critical period for this unit, but fortunately the enemy did not take advantage of the unit's weakness and gave it enough time to prepare for the first Nanking air raid on 19 September.

The big operation which took place after the 2nd Combined Air Unit moved to Shanghai was the Nanking air raid. The Nanking air raids that started on 19 September, and continued until 25 September consisted of eleven attacks, and were the most notable among the air combats in the China Incident. As a result at this decisive air battle over Nanking, Japan gained complete supremacy of the air, and attained a great achievement for the subsequent progress of the overall operation.

I. 9 to 19 September-Cooperation with Army in Land Combat, and mopping up Operations in the Vicinity.

On 9 September the Air Unit soon after its arrival, bombed enemy positions in Pootung, which were threatening the airfield, and repeated the bombing attack against the same positions on the 10th. During this time, on the night of the 9th, enemy planes raided the airfield twice, and during the night of the 10th, the enemy fired twenty rounds of field artillery shells onto the airfield, however, fortunately, no losses were inflicted on personnel or equipment. From the 11th the operation began in earnest.

A summary is shown in the following table:

Date	No of planes	Remarks
10 September	Carrier-based fighters 3	Attack on enemy field artillery positions on Pootung side of river.
	Carrier-based bombers 3	
	Carrier-based bombers 15	Bomb attack on large enemy unit on the Hangchow Road.
11 September	Carrier-based fighters 6	Bomb attack on field artillery positions near the City Government Offices and Liaotung Race Track.
	Carrier-based fighters	Air cover
	Carrier-based bombers 4 Carrier-based fighters 4	Reconnaissance of Hainan, Tungchou, Soochow, Kahsing, Chiangchiao.
12 September	Carrier-based fighters and carrier-based bombers total 12	Bomb attack on large enemy units at Tachangchen and Liuchiahsing.
	Carrier-based fighters	Air cover
	Carrier-based bombers total 10	Bomb attack on the munitions plant opposite the Kiangnan Dockyard.
13 September	Carrier-based bombers 8	Cooperation in the land combat between Tachangchen and Nansiang, and attacks on enemy troops in retreat.
	Carrier-based fighters 10	
	Carrier-based bombers 3 Carrier-based fighters 5	Reconnaissance of Hanchow Area.

Date	No. of planes	Remarks
	Carrier-based fighters	Air cover
17 September	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bombers 9	Cooperation in land combat in Lotienchen and Liuchiahsing Areas.
	Carrier-based fighters	Air cover the whole day
18 September	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bombers 4	Attack on enemy positions on on Pootung side. Bomb attack on Chiangchiao Airfield
	Carrier-based fighters	Special emphasis on air cover in five to ten plane patrol flights.
19 September	Carrier-based attackers 6 Carrier-based fighters 3	Bomb attack on Soochow Railroad Station and nearby supply depot.
	Carrier-based fighters	Patrol flying

II. 19 September-25 September-Nanking Air Attack

A. Plan.

On 14 September, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order:

“The air attack unit should strive to annihilate the enemy at one blow, in accordance with the following:

The Nanking Attack Unit will be composed of the 2nd, the 4th and the 5th Air Attack Units.

After 16 September, Nanking shall be repeatedly attacked, and the attack shall be primarily against the enemy air force, military establishments, and important government office buildings concentrated in the area. Organization of the Nanking Attack Unit:

1. Commander: 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander.

2. Strength: 2nd Air Attack Unit - six Type-96 carrier based fighters and 12 Type-96 carrier-based attack planes (To advance to the Kung-ta Base by the 15th.

4th Air Attack unit - 12 Type-95 reconnaissance seaplanes.

5th Air Attack Unit - 12 Type-96 fighters and 30 Type-96 and -94 carrier-based bombers. However, Type-96 carrier-based attack planes and Type-94 carrier-based bombers shall be used after enemy fighter planes in the area have been destroyed.

3. Details in carrying out the above order will be decided by the 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander."

The 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander who was designated as the Commander of the Nanking Attack Unit by the fleet order issued the following order:

"Secret: Nanking Attack Unit Operation Order No. 1 14 Sep. 37, Shanghai, Kung-ta.

Nanking Attack Unit Order

1. Owing to the desperate struggle by our air force units, the enemy has already lost the majority of his air strength and there has been a marked decline in his fighting spirit, but in the Nanking area there are still 50 aircraft (mainly fighters), and strong anti-aircraft gun positions for the purpose of defense.

2. The Air Attack Unit shall repeatedly attack the enemy's military, political and economic agencies in Nanking with its air units after air supremacy has been gained by the air control unit which will be built around 18 Type-96 carrier-based fighters including carrier bombers and reconnaissance seaplanes, and which will engage the enemy over Nanking and destroy his air strength. (In case the enemy does not challenge the raids, then destroy his planes with bombs.)

The air attack is scheduled to begin on 16 September.

3. The organization of the Air Attack Unit is as follows:

a. Air Control Unit (1st Phase)

Commander: Wada, 13th Air Unit Commander

Strength: 18 Type-96 carrier-based fighters (13th Air Unit & 2nd

Carrier Division)

18 Type-96 carrier-based bombers (13th Air Unit)

12 Type-95 reconnaissance seaplanes (undecided)

b. Air Attack Unit (2d Phase & Later)

(1) 1st Air Attack Unit

Commander: Wada, 13th Air Unit Commander

Strength: 18 Type-96 carrier-based bombers (13th Air Unit)
Six or 12 Type-96 carrier-based fighters (13th Air

Unit)

(2) 2nd Air Attack Unit

Commander: Tanaka, 12th Air Unit Commander

Strength: 12 Type-94 carrier-based bombers (12th Air unit)
Six Type-96 carrier-based fighters (13th Air Unit)

(3) 3rd Air Attack Unit

Commander: Kaga, Air Unit Commander

Strength: 12 Type-96 carrier-based attack planes (2nd Carrier

Division)

Six Type-96 carrier-based fighters. (2nd Carrier

Division)

4. Mission and Movement at Air Attack Force

a. Air Control Unit

At 0800, carrier fighters and bombers will depart from the Kung-ta Base and join the reconnaissance seaplanes over the Kuei-yao-wan Base and attack Nanking, according to the order of the commander. The carrier-based fighters should strive to destroy any enemy planes sighted, regardless of the movements of the bombers, while the reconnaissance seaplanes shall provide direct cover to the bombers at all time throughout the combat. In case no enemy planes are sighted in Nanking, the bombers shall raid the Pan-chiao-chan Airfield

b. Air Attack Unit

To be decided later.

The 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander, Rear Admiral Minabe, who issued the above order, completed the transfer of his unit to the Kung-ta Base. On 17 September, he spoke to all commanding officers and explained the existing situation. He stated that the Chinese Army was trying to convince the Chinese people of China's victory, by concentrating many fighter planes at Nanking, and explained the significance of this decisive air battle over the enemy capital which was to be an air battle as never seen before in history, and expressed his aims regarding operation policy, as follows:

"For this air raid, the reason for deciding on a decisive air battle with the enemy air force over his capital, without counting on the surprise element, is due to the fact that I believe in the superior characteristics of our Type-96 carrier-based fighters and the superior marksmanship of our naval air gunners in combat. I wish that every member of the fighter plane unit will go forth to battle, convinced of victory, and will destroy every enemy plane in sight, and display the glory of our navy to the rest of the world."

At the same time, the memorandum on the details of the operation, which was planned by a staff officer of the 2nd Combined Air Unit, stressed the following points (summary):

"a. Since the principal mission of the air control unit is to contact and destroy enemy fighter units, its movement shall be based on that of fighter planes.

b. In the air raid, the surprise element is not planned, the main effort is to operate over the enemy at altitudes above the range of their anti-aircraft fire, and thus induce enemy fighter planes to take to the air. Then, taking advantage of this, attack and destroy the enemy planes with our powerful fighter planes. Therefore, carrier bombers and sea reconnaissance planes will fly at altitudes of 3,000 to 4,000 meters, and proceed in full view of the enemy, but fighter planes shall exert every effort to conceal their locations, in order to induce enemy fighter planes to take to the air to give combat. (During this period, enemy planes tried to avoid, as much as possible, any encounter with our Type-96 fighter planes.)

c. Since the sea reconnaissance planes will be the direct escort force for the bomber unit, they should not neglect their primary mission by becoming engaged in attacking enemy planes.

d. Since three Type-96 carrier fighters do not have extra fuel tanks and their flying time is very limited, special attention must be paid to their use. (The

combat time limit of these fighter is only 15 minutes, and after that it is necessary that they be evacuated under escort of the reconnaissance seaplanes). However, fighter planes, other than these three, must strive to obtain decisive results by remaining in the battle area until the end.

e. It is not necessary to make direct hits on the targets. The main aim is to frighten the enemy, so bombs should be dropped in one bombing run from altitudes of 2,000 to 3,000 meters to avoid any possible damage from enemy anti-aircraft fire.

f. In aerial combat, even bombers should challenge enemy planes and never retreat. Even if the ammunition is exhausted, the bombers should chase the enemy. (There is a precedent in which the use of this tactic, forced an enemy pilot to lose control and crash to the ground.)

g. Two gun boats will be deployed in the vicinity of the Tung-chaou Channel as patrol boats."

B. Summary of Battle Progress

In accordance with the above plan, the first Nanking air raid was carried out on 19 September, and the second and third were carried out in rapid succession, and by the 25th, concentrated attacks were made. As a result, a majority of the enemy fighter planes in the Nanking Area were destroyed, and air supremacy was established

The raids were carried out as follows:

- 19 September - 1st & 2nd raids
- 20 September - 3d and 4th raids.
- 22 September - 5th, 6th & 7th raids
- 25 September - 8th, 9th, 10th & 11th raids.

The following is a detailed action report of each raid.

The First Raid (19 September)

The organization of the air control unit which left Kung-ta Base at 0755 hours on the 19th, is as follows: [See chart on following page]

Second Raid (19 September)

Lt. Commander		Yura Air Unit Commander	
Commander	Wada	Lt. Yamashita	Lt. Nambu
Type of unit	Carrier-borne bomber unit	Carrier-borne fighter unit	Reconnaissance seaplane unit
STRENGTH			
Unit to which attached	13 th Air Unit	13 th Air Unit	Kaga
		Kamoi	22 nd Air Unit
			8 th Cruiser Div.
			1 st Seaplane Tender Unit
Type of Plane	Type-96 Carrier-borne bomber	Type-96 Carrier-borne fighter	Type-95 Reconnaissance seaplane
Number of Planes	17	11	1
Mission	To destroy enemy planes on ground & to lure them to take to the air.	To destroy enemy planes in air combat.	Direct escort of carrier-borne assault unit

A formation of 45 planes encountered about 12 enemy fighters (Curtiss-Hawk) and about six fighters (Boeing) in the vicinity of Chu-Jung at about 0950 hours. At that time, our carrier bombers were flying at an altitude of about 3,000 meters, followed by reconnaissance seaplanes, while the carrier-borne fighters followed at an altitude of about 4,000 meters.

Our four reconnaissance seaplanes engaged the enemy in air combat over Chu-Jung, and after a furious battle shot down four enemy planes and lost one.

More than 20 enemy fighters were waiting for us over Nanking, and our carrier-borne fighters and reconnaissance seaplanes individually engaged enemy planes. At about 1000 hours, an air battle on a large scale commenced in the sky over Nanking. The result of this air battle was as follows:

By carrier-borne fighters - about 21 shot down (14 confirmed).

By Lamoi Reconnaissance Seaplane Unit - 4 planes.

By 22nd Air Unit. Reconnaissance Seaplane Unit - 3 planes.

Total, 28 planes (22 confirmed).

Furthermore, we suffered no losses, and the result was so tremendous that enemy planes disappeared from the skies over Nanking during the period of 1015 hours to 1030 hours. During this period, the carrier bomber units bombed the Ta-chiao-chang Airfield and the arsenal, at about 1010 hours (34-60 kg bombs were dropped). On the airfield, about 20 planes were dispersed on the edge of the field, and considerable damage was inflicted on hanger and planes on the ground.

On the night before, we lost three carrier bombers.

In this battle, we lost one reconnaissance seaplane and three carrier bombers however, on the other band, we shot down 33 enemy planes (27 confirmed). which constituted almost the entire enemy fighter strength, and the future of air operations was decided in this combat, when this unprecedented result was obtained.

On the way back, one reconnaissance seaplane of the Kamoi Reconnaissance Seaplane Unit made a forced landing on the water in the vicinity of Chen-Chaing. However, due to appropriate measures by the 3rd Carrier Division, its crew members were rescued in view of the enemy.

Second Raid (19 September)

In the first raid, the majority of the enemy fighter planes were destroyed,

but it was noted that over 10 enemy planes were still in operation, so at 1500 hours on the same day, the second air attack force as sent out. The organization of the second was the same as the first except for the following.

13 th Air Unit	Carrier bombers	11
	Carrier-borne fighters	7
Kaga	Carrier-borne fighters	3
22 nd Air Unit	Reconnaissance Seaplanes	4
8 th Cruiser Division	"	2
Kamoi	"	5
Total		32

Our air units arrived over Nanking at about 1615 hours, and were intercepted by at least nine enemy planes (three Boeings and the rest Hawks), at a point five nautical miles east of Nanking.

The enemy planes intentionally avoided our carrier-based fighters, and pursued the carrier bombers. The altitude of our carrier-based fighters was so high that they were unable to meet the enemy's attack immediately. However, three enemy fighters were driven back by our carrier-based fighters, and four by our reconnaissance seaplanes. Meanwhile, our carrier bomber bombed the Military Police Headquarters and Security Force Headquarters, at about 1620 hours (with 22 60 kg bombs). The carrier-based fighter unit remained over Nanking for 30 minutes after 1625 hours, but no enemy planes appeared. In this second raid, no damage was suffered on our side.

Third Raid (20 September)

The third air attack unit commanded by Lt Takahashi (12 carrier bombers and four carrier-based fighters of the 13th Air Unit) departed from the Kung-ta Base at 1005 hours on the 20th, and arrived over Nanking at about 1200 hours. They bombed the National Government's General Staff Headquarters and the Central Wireless Communications Office (three direct hits were scored with 250 kg bombs and great damage was inflicted). In this raid, one carrier bomber was missing in action.

In addition, the carrier bomber unit was pursued by two fighter planes (Boeing) on the way back, but repelled them. No other enemy plane was sighted during this operation.

Fourth Raid (20 September)

The fourth air attack unit left the Kung-ta Base at 1130 hours on the 20th, and raided Nanking at about 1300 hours. The organization and mission were as follows.

Commander	Lt. Com- Kusumoto	Kamoi Air Unit				
	Lt Sakinaga	Lt Igarashi	Lt. jg Nishihata	Lt Setoyama		
STRENGTH						
<u>3rd Air Raid Unit</u>						
Type of unit	Carrier Torpedo bomber	Carrier bomber unit	Carrier-borne fighter unit	5 th Air Raid Unit		
Unit to which attached	Kaga		Kamoi	22 nd Air Unit	8 th Cruiser Division (Yura & Kinu)	
Type of plane	Type-96 carrier torpedo bomber	Type-96 & 94 carrier bombers	Type-96 carrier-borne fighter	Type-95 Reconnaissance Seaplane		
Number of planes	11	15	2	7	4	2
Mission	Bombing of Yu-hua-tai and Fu-kuei-shan Forts.	Bombing of Ta-chiao-chaing Airfield and providing cover	Escorting 3 rd Air Raid Unit			

Prior to the arrival over Nanking, the air attack unit was attacked by about seven enemy fighters which were already waiting for us in the air. Enemy fighters concentrated their attack on carrier-based attack planes and bombers.

The carrier attack plane unit which had bombed the batteries scored numerous hits on both the Yu-hua-tai and Fu-kuei-schan batteries and set a part of them on fire. At almost the same time as this bombing, two carrier attack planes fought against one enemy fighter and shot it down. The carrier bomber

unit which had bombed the Ta-hsiao-chang Airfield also seriously damaged various installations and destroyed some planes dispersed on the airfield.

After the bombing, the carrier bomber unit also fought against enemy fighters of the Curtiss-Hawk type. One of our aircrew was killed in action, but one enemy plane was pursued from an altitude of 2,000 meters to 300 meters before finally being shot down.

One carrier fighter fought against three enemy fighters and definitely shot down two of them. The reconnaissance seaplane unit pursued the enemy, but the enemy aircraft flew away, showing no intention to fight.

Fifth Raid (22 September)

The fifth air unit (12 carrier bombers of the 12th Air Unit), Commanded by Lt Tanaka and escorted by four carrier fighters of the Kisarazu Air Unit (Commander-Lt Nango), and seven Kamoi-borne reconnaissance seaplanes (Type 95) (Commander-Lt Nambu), left Kung-ta Base at 1005 hours on the 22d and raided Nanking at about 1205 hours. Half of them bombed the Aviation Bureau while the rest bombed the Air Defense Committee. Among the 24-60 kg bombs dropped, several of them hit the targets. Some of them struck the nearby city and started fires at two places.

During this raid, the Kamoi-borne reconnaissance seaplanes fought against three to four Boeing type fighters and one Northrop type above Nanking, and when the first blow was given, the enemy descended to a lower altitude and withdrew from the battle.

Sixth Raid (22 September)

The majority of the sixth air raid unit (14 carrier bombers and four carrier fighters of the 13th Air Unit), commanded by Lt Shiraso, bombed the Central Nationalist Party Headquarters, while an element bombed the City Hall of Nanking, between 1210 hours and 1215 hours, on the 22d. Among the 26-60 kg bombs dropped, several of them hit the Central Party Headquarters, while the rest dropped in the adjacent area.

During this raid, at least five enemy planes (One Boeing and four Hawks) were sighted, and almost half of our carrier bombers fought against them. One of our bombers was lost in action after the combat.

Our carrier fighters engaged enemy fighters and shot down four of them. During this combat, Petty Officer (1st Class) Koga shot down two enemy planes (he had also shot down two enemy planes during the first air raid) and Petty

Officer (1st Class) Torakuma was attacked by an enemy fighter and the fuselage of his plane was hit with over ten bullets, but he immediately counter-attacked and shot down his opponent.

Seventh Raid (22 September)

The seventh air raid unit (six attack planes and four bombers from the Carrier Kaga), commanded by Lt Iguchi and escorted by three Kaga-borne fighters (commander- Lt Jg Shindo), two reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division, Commander-Petty Officer (1st Class) Funatsu, and five reconnaissance seaplanes of the 22nd Air Unit (commander-Lt Jg Nishihata), bombed the Nanking Railroad Station and nearby warehouses at about 1500 hours on the 22d. Most of the eight 250 kg bombs and 20-60 kg bombs dropped hit the North Station and the Chiang-pien Railway Depot, as well as nearby warehouses, and some of them were seen burning. Enemy planes did not appear during this raid.

Eighth Raid (25 September)

The eighth air raid unit attacked Nanking at about 1100 hours on the 25th.

1. Eleven carrier bombers of the 12th Air Unit, commanded by Lt Tanaka and escorted by four carrier fighters the 13th Air Unit (commander Lt Nango), carried out despite terrific anti-aircraft fire, low altitude bombing against the Metropolitan Power Plant in Hsia-kuan, and almost all of the 22-60 kg bombs dropped hit the said company, and fire and smoke were definitely observed rising from the company.

It was believed that the greater part of power source in Nanking was lost by this bombing.

During this raid, one carrier bomber was shot down by ground fire above Nanking, while another made a forced landing about 10 nautical miles upstream of Chiangyin, but its crew members were rescued by a reconnaissance seaplane.

2. Twelve carrier bombers of the 13th Air Unit, commanded by Lt Takahashi and escorted by four carrier fighters of the 13th Air Unit (commander-Lt Jg Suganami) bombed, under terrific anti-aircraft fire, the City Hall and the City Nationalist Party Headquarters. Among 24-60 kg bombs dropped, several of them hit the targets and destroyed them, while the rest hit the adjacent city areas. One carrier bomber was shot down by ground fire, but no enemy plane was seen in the air.

Ninth Raid (25 September)

The ninth air raid unit (10 carrier-based attack planes and nine carrier-based bombers of the Kaga), commanded by Lt Sakinaga, raided Nanking at about 1355 hours on the 25th, under the escort of four carrier-based fighters of the Kaga (Commander Lt Jg Shingo), 22nd Air Unit, and six reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division (Commander, Lt Commander Iwao). (One 500 kg bomb, one 300 kg bomb, 15-250 kg bombs, and 33-60kg bombs were dropped). Four carrier based attack planes and five carrier-based bombers bombed the Central Radio Broadcasting Station and destroyed the greater part of it, and also set a part of it afire. Meanwhile, carrier-based attack planes and four carrier-band bombers bombed the Ministry of Finance and hit it with one 500 kg bomb, two 250 kg bombs and three 60 kg bombs and later bombed the vicinities of the Military Medical Bureau and the Naval Construction Bureau which were east of the Finance Ministry. No enemy plane was in sight during this raid.

Tenth Raid (25 September)

A formation of six reconnaissance seaplanes of the Kamoi, commanded by Lt Nambu, took off at 1315 hours and bombed the Nanking Arsenal. Twelve 30 kg bombs were dropped and half of them scored direct hits.

Three enemy planes were sighted during this raid, but they soon disappeared into the clouds.

Eleventh Raid (25 September)

The eleventh air raid unit (11 carrier-based bombers of the 12th Air Unit and nine from the 13th Air Unit) raided Nanking at about 1700 hours on the 25th, under escort of eight carrier-based fighters of the 13th Air Unit (Commander Lt Yamashita).

1. The carrier-based bomber unit of the 12th Air Unit, commanded by Lt Tanaka, bombed the Pei-chi-chan Antiaircraft Control Station and communications troop group. The number of bombs dropped upon the targets was 22-60 kg bombs, of which three or four were direct hits. Close to the Poi-Chi-Chin Building was the Belgian Embassy, but it was not damaged at all.

2. The carrier-based bomber unit of the 13th Air Unit, commanded by Lt Commander Wada, bombed the Chiang-pei Station, nearby warehouses, and the Ministry of War (nine 250 kg bombs were dropped). The warehouses were set afire and the station was seriously destroyed, while two 250 kg bombs hit the Ministry. Special attention was paid to bombing this Ministry, as it stood only 300 or 400 meters away from the British and French Embassies.

3. No enemy plane was sighted during this operation.

C. Results and Losses

The total number of planes taking part in the attack on Nanking in the eleven raids was 291, and a total of 48 enemy planes were shot down. (Confirmed 42). A detailed account is given in the following table:

Name of units	Number of participating planes	Number of enemy planes shot down	Damage
12 th Air Unit	34	0	Carrier-based bombers: 2 (one crewman rescued)
13 th Air Unit	130	23 (Confirmed: 18)	Carrier-based bombers: 6
Kaga	59	9 (Confirmed: 8)	Killed in action on the plane: 1
Kamoi	33	5	Reconnaissance plane: 1 (Crewman rescued)
8 th Cruiser Division	13	7	None
1 st Seaplane Tender Division	1	Unknown	Reconnaissance seaplane: 1
22 nd Air Unit	21	4	None
Total	291	48 (Confirmed: 42) Number of planes shot down on the first day. (1st & 2d raid) is 40.	Killed in battle or missing: 18 Number of planes lost: 10

The greatest success in this operation was gaining air supremacy. In the first air-raid, the enemy sent at least 40 fighters in the air from Chu-Jung to Nanking, and aggressively challenged us, but our carrier-based fighters (Type-96) and carrier-based reconnaissance seaplanes (Type 95) fought back well, and

shot down most of them in a single battle. As a result, the number of enemy planes in the air suddenly decreased after the second air raid, and by the seventh raid not a single plane appeared over Nanking. Moreover, the enemy seemed to have lost his fighting spirit.

Such being the case, the three enemy fighters sighted by our reconnaissance seaplanes in the 10th raid flew away, and, by the latter part of this operation, the air over Nanking was in our hands.

Another great success was achieved in the bombing, with the result that 355 bombs, totaling 32.3 tons, were dropped on 19 places.

D. Lessons Learned from the Nanking Air Raids

1. Use of Fighter Plane Units

Up to that time, the use of fighter planes had been generally passive, and they were employed mainly for tasks such as patrol, escort, etc., but in these Nanking air raids, fighter planes played the leading part in carrying out offensive operations. From the viewpoint of tactics during this period, this was an epoch-making development.

Our combat method was to advance powerful fighter plane units into the air over strategic enemy area and fight a decisive battle with the enemy relying upon our superior fighting strength. This was carried out with great success, because, fortunately, our air combat power was actually far superior to that of the enemy. Not only that, the psychological effect of this operation was immense because it was carried out over the enemy's capital city. Through repeated attacks by the 1st Combined Air Unit, it was shown that as long as the enemy possesses a powerful force of interceptor fighters, an effective strategic bombing would be difficult unless such a combat method was taken.

This operation set a precedence to subsequent continental air operations, while giving an impetus to the steady improvement of supplies and equipment for this type of operation.

2. Supplies and Equipment

The participation of fighter planes in this operation was rendered possible by the use of auxiliary tanks. Nevertheless, there was still anxiety regarding their cruising power, and the need was to further increase the cruising range.

Furthermore, from the precious lesson derived from this opera-

tion, it became known that the cruising speeds of escort fighters and bombers needed to be coordinated. It was these demands that gave impetus to the creation of the Zero fighters.

Furthermore, during the sixth air raid, when the carrier-based fighter (Type-96), piloted by Petty Officer First Class Torakuma of the 13th Air Unit, was on the return flight, it was suddenly attacked by enemy plane and about 20 bullets of 13 and 7.7 mm calibers hit the fuselage, but most of them did not penetrate the fuselage and ricocheted instead. The pilot was not even slightly wounded but instead counter attacked and shot the enemy down.

This combat lesson revealed that the monocoque body of the plane was effective in frustrating pursuing fire, but at the same time, it became known that fighter planes should be armed with guns of larger caliber.

III. 22 September - 25 September – Attacks on Enemy Shipping in Chiang-Yin Area

A. Situation

Ever since the start of hostilities in Central China, the Chinese Navy had stationed its main strength near the Chiang-yin Fortress. Not only did the two powerful vessels, Ping-hai and Ning-hai constitute a threat to Japanese air operations in the Nanking area, but also their very presence threatened the small ships of the Japanese Navy operating in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Consequently, it became necessary to annihilate the main force of the Chinese Navy.

B. Plan

At first, a plan was formulated to sink the Ping-hai and the Ning-hai, etc., simultaneously with an attack on ground batteries, by employing the entire strength of the 2nd Combined Air Unit after the above mentioned Nanking Air Raids and preparations to this end were progressing steadily, but the situation did not permit this so the plan was changed. It was decided to carry out attacks against the enemy ships with an element of our air force while using the rest of the force against Nanking.

At 1900 hours, 20 September, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order:

“The 2nd and the 5th Air Attack units will attack enemy ships (especially the Ping-hai and Ning-hai) in the Chiang-yin Area after 1200 hours tomorrow, 21 September, according to the orders of their respective commanders. In doing so

special attention must be paid to enemy antiaircraft fire.”

According to the above order, the 2nd Combined Air Unit (the 5th Air Attack Unit) decided to carry out a separate attack against the enemy ships with 12 carrier-based attack planes and six carrier-based fighters of the 12th Air Unit, at almost the same time as the air attack unit of the 2nd Carrier Division (2nd Air Attack Unit). In connection with this attack, the 2nd Carrier Division and the 2nd Combined Air Unit concluded the following simple arrangement:

At 2300 hours, 21 September

To: The 2nd Combined Air Unit Staff Officer

From: The 2nd Carrier Division Staff Officer

“I believe that the Chiang-Yin raid should be carried out as soon as weather permits. The 2nd Carrier Division intends to carry out the raid with about 10 carrier-based attack planes, at about 1130 hours tomorrow morning. If the result of the first attack is unsatisfactory, the Carrier Division will repeat the raid after the attack planes return to their base.”

C. Progress of Operation

First Attack

This was scheduled to take place on 21 September, but because of bad weather the attack was carried out in the morning of 22 September. The first attack unit, composed of 12 Type-92 carrier-based attack planes (carrying six 60 kg standard bombs on each plane) and six Type-95 carrier-based fighters of the 12th Air Unit took off from Kung-ta Base at 1120 hours. They were commanded by the 12th Air Unit Flying Unit Commander, Lt Commander Otsuka and they stormed over Chiang-yin at 1200 hours.

Arriving over Chiang-yin, the air attack unit met extremely heavy antiaircraft fire from ground batteries and ships on the Yangtze River.

Moreover, visibility was poor because of a drizzle. However, each unit maintained close liaison and carried out two level bombing runs between 1215 and 1230 hours, at an altitude of 2,500 meters, and scored two direct hits and two effective underwater hits on the side of the Ping-hai. They also scored three effective underwater hits on the side of the Ning-hai.

During this time, six Type-95 fighters (commanded by Lt Naoki) patrolled the combat area against the appearance of any enemy planes, but none appeared.

Second Attack

Since the first attack was unsatisfactory, a second attack was carried out on the same day by six Type-92 carrier-based attack planes (each carrying one 250 kg standard bomb) and three Type-95 carrier-based fighters of the 12th Air Unit.

The second attack unit departed from Kung-ta Base at 1705 hours, commanded by Lt Jg Nishioka of the 12th Air Unit, and stormed over Chiang-yon at 1815 hours. Defying enemy antiaircraft fire which was as heavy as in the first attack, the attack unit shifted to attack upon sighting a vessel of the Ning-hai Class. However, since the cloud ceiling over the ship was 700 to 1,000 meters and it was impossible for our planes to look down upon the ship, the unit was compelled to shift the target to a vessel of the Ying-jui Class, and all planes conducted level bombing between 1815 and 1825 hours, an altitude of 2,500 meters.

In this attack, our planes failed to score direct hits, but two effective near hits were made near the enemy ship. No enemy plane was sighted by our carrier-based fighter unit.

Third Attack

Since the ratio of direct hits was bad in the two attacks, because of heavy fire by antiaircraft units, and the high altitude level bombing by our planes, it was decided to deal a death blow to enemy antiaircraft batteries on 23 September, and to hit the remaining vessels, at the same time, by low-level bombing, utilizing the whole strength of the 2nd Combined Air Unit.

Strength Used

Twelve carrier-based bombers, nine carrier-based attack planes, and three carrier-based fighters of the 12th Air Unit

Fourteen carrier-based-bombers of the 13th Air Unit

This attack was carried out in three stages.

In the first step, nine carrier-based attack planes of the 12th Air Unit (each carrying six 60 kg standard bombs), which had the mission of neutralizing enemy antiaircraft batteries, left the Kung-ta Base, commanded by Lieutenant Jg Kokura at 1425 hours on 23 September. They were under the escort of three carrier-based fighters of the 12th Air Unit, and arrived over Chiang-yin at 1545 hours and defying heavy enemy antiaircraft fire, our planes ascertained the position of enemy batteries by the flashes of the enemy guns, and continued the neutralization for about 50 minutes, until 1625 hours, by carrying out the attack in three

3-plane formations. During this time, our planes destroyed two anti-aircraft guns, and set barracks afire, thus facilitating the attack by our carrier-based bombers by diverting enemy gunfire.

At 1635 hours, after confirming the completion of the attack by our carrier-based bombers, three carrier-based attack planes, which still had some bombs, bombed the Ping-hai on their own accord and scored one direct hit and one effective underwater near hit. No enemy plane was sighted.

In the second stage, 14 Type-96 carrier-based bombers of the 13th Air Unit (each carrying two 60 kg standard bombs) departed from Kung-ta Base at 1445 hours, commanded by Air Unit Commander, Major Shimoda and arrived over Chiang-yin at 1530 hours and, storming in from the east, each unit completed dive-bombing on the Ping-hai and Ning-hai by 1535 hours, from an altitude of 2,000 to 2,500 meters.

Four effective underwater hits were scored near the side of the Ping-hai, and there were two direct hits on the Ning-hai.

With this attack, the Ning-hai was forced to leave her anchorage and escape toward the upper reaches of the river.

The third attack was carried out by twelve Type-94 carrier-based bombers of the 12th Air Unit (each carrying two 60 kg standard bombs) which was commanded by Air Unit Commander, Lt Tanaka. The unit left Kung-ta Base at 1415 hours and concentrated its attack on the Ping-hai at 1530 hours, in cooperation with the assault by the carrier-based bomber unit of the 13th Air Unit. Dive-bombing was carried out by each unit from an altitude of 2,500 meters, and the attack was completed by 1535 hours.

In this attack, two direct hits and four underwater effective hits were scored near the Ping-hai.

Fourth Attack

On receiving information that the remaining enemy ships, which had suffered heavy damages in the 23 September bombing, were concentrated in the vicinity of Mu-yu-chou, upstream from Chiang-yin, our planes carried out this fourth attack on the morning of 25 September.

The fourth attack unit, composed of six Type-92 carrier based attack planes (each carrying six 60 kg standard bombs) and three Type-95 carrier-based fighters of the 12th Air Unit, departed from Lung-ta Base at 0815 hours, 25 September, under the command of Lt Maki, and, flying along the Yangtze River

seeking the enemy discovered, at 0915 hours, one cruiser of the Yat-sen Class which was going up the river between Chiang-yin and Mu-yu-chou at low speed and taking evasive action.

An attack was made and five effective underwater near hits were scored.

Subsequent Attacks

1. On 25 September, two Type 92 carrier-based attack planes of the 12th Air Unit which had left in search of a crashed plane of the Hsia-kuan Electric Power Plant Unit of the Nanking Air Attack Unit sighted one enemy cruiser (probably the Ning-hai), in the vicinity of Ma-yu-chou, after reporting the discovery of the crashed plane, and attacked the said enemy cruiser.

Two direct hits and two effective underwater near hits were scored with 60 kg standard bombs.

2. On the same day, one carrier-based bomber of the 12th Air Unit, which had participated in the Nanking raids, had one remaining bomb and used it to bomb an enemy naval vessel (Yat-sen Class) which was sighted going upstream at a point about two nautical miles above Chiang-yin. A direct hit was scored with one 60 kg standard bomb in the center of the ship, and finally sank it

D. Results

As a result of repeated attacks by aircraft of the 2nd Combined Air Unit and other units, enemy ships and small craft in the Chiang-yin Area were all sunk, seriously damaged, or disabled. Moreover, the remaining naval guns were removed from the ships and used on the land.

Damage inflicted upon each ship was as follows:

The Ping-hai, six direct hits by 60 kg bombs and ten effective underwater near hits were scored, in addition to attacks by the carrier-based Attack Plane Unit of the 2nd Carrier Division, sunk

The Ning-hai, four direct hits by 60 kg bombs and five effective underwater near hits were scored, fires started and the ship showed a great list, losing its fighting ability, departed anchorage to seek refuge upstream but finally sunk.

The Ying-jui, struck by two 250 kg general purpose bombs, damaged seriously, and finally became inoperative.

The Yat-sen, one direct hit by 60 kg bomb and five underwater near hits

were scored, disabled and sunk.

During this attack, the ratio of direct hits scored by the carrier-based attack plane unit and the carrier-based bomber unit (the 2nd Combined Air Unit only) is as follows:

	Dive Bombing	Level bombing (Altitude 2,500 meters- 3,000 meters)	Average
Direct Hits	10%	4.6%	6.2%
Underwater effective near hits	16%	10.9%	12.3%
Total	26%	15.5%	18.5%

E. Damage

Four planes were hit by antiaircraft fragments, but minor repairs to each was sufficient to put them into operational condition.

F. Lesson

The bombing accuracy in this raid fell to one half of the accuracy obtained during normal training because of antiaircraft fire.

(Note) The operational situation of the 1st and the 2nd Carrier Divisions, as well as the seaplane unit, during this period is unknown because there is no data available.

Part 4. Air Operations by the Japanese Army

The Provisional Air Brigade, under the tactical control of the Kwantung Army's Chahar Expeditionary Force cooperated in the attack operations against Tien-chen, Chu-lo-pao, and Taotung (all in the northern part of Shansi Province) which were conducted from the beginning to the middle of September. At first, Kalgan Airfield was used to carry out reconnaissance and bombing, but with the advance of ground forces, the base was moved forward to Yang-kao. The Chinese Air Force, which had disappeared from the North China front in the middle of August, reappeared in the front in northern Shansi Province at the end of September.

The above Chinese Air Force was based in Tai-yuan, and carried out counter-attacks against the Japanese ground forces. The Provisional Air Brigade, therefore, immediately advanced to northern Shansi Province and Tai-yuan, and in the subsequent air combat, the first in north China, shot down 17 enemy planes.

In the latter part of September, the Army ordered the above Provisional Air Brigade to withdraw to its home base to be replaced, thereafter, by a Provisional Air Unit consisting of two air companies.

The Provisional Air Corps, attached to the North China Area Army, was based at Nan-yuan and Tientsin Airfield, and cooperated with the 1st and 2nd Armies' Hopeh Province Operations. With the outbreak of hostilities in the Shanghai Area, the above mentioned Provisional Air Corps first transferred one air company, and later in mid-September, the 4th Air Brigade Headquarters and two air companies to the Central China Area.

One army reconnaissance air company, which was transferred from China, reached Shanghai in early September, and, with the occupation of Kung-ta Airfield, used this airfield, from September, jointly with the Navy, to cooperate with the operation of the front line group.

In mid-September, the 3rd Air Brigade Headquarters and two air companies were assigned to the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces and, in addition, in mid-October, the Force was reinforced with two air companies.

At first Kung-ta Airfield was used by the Army, but at the end of September, after the completion of Wang-pin Airfield, it was put to the Army's exclusive use.

Section 4. Situation in October 1937,

In air combat during September the Japanese forces, which had succeeded in destroying the main body of the Chinese Air Force based in Nanking and Canton, after October, concentrated the main effort of air force activity in the front in Central China and Shanghai. Accordingly the 2nd Combined Air Unit at Kung-ta Base made every possible effort to cooperate in the said area, while the 1st Combined Air Unit based in Taipei and Cheju.(?) They also directed the emphasis of its operations to cooperating with land combat, while also carrying out the task of demolishing transportation routes and of neutralizing enemy air bases in the rear.

Part 1. General Situation

In October, marked activity and expansion was observed as each battlefield on the Chinese mainland. The situation was generally as follows:

I. Shanghai Front

The Shanghai front had been in a stalemate after the arrival of three reinforcement divisions (the 9th, 13th, 101st) in the Shanghai area at the end of September. Their participation in the battles gradually began to develop, and on 23 October the entire front of the Chinese force showed signs of retreat. The Japanese force occupied Tachangchen on the 26th and the whole force reached the line of the Suchou River on the 27th, while the Japanese marine corps also occupied the whole Chapei Area on the same day, and by 31 October completed the mopping-up of the vicinity.

II. Hopeh Front.

The 1st Army, which had occupied Paoting in September, decided, on 28 September, to march against Shihchiachuang and started action on 1 October.

At that time the Japanese force, knowing of the outbreak of cholera among the Chinese troop in the vicinity of Shihchiachuang, halted movement for two or three days to inoculate all personnel with anti-cholera vaccine, and on 6 October, all divisions marched simultaneously from the Tinghsien-Chuyang line, and on the 8th, occupied Chengtingcheng, and entered Shihchiachuang on the 11th.

Subsequently, the Japanese force, pursuing the retreating enemy, occupied Shunte on the 15th, Hanten on the 17th, and on the 18th, finally reached the line of the Changho on the border of Honan Province.

Another element of the strength, pursuing the enemy along the Shihchia-chuang-Taiyuan Railroad, fought a pitched battle near the border of Shansi Province on the 14th, and gradually moved toward participating in the Taiyuan Operation.

On the other hand, the main strength of the 2nd Army, which had begun a southward movement along the Tientsin-Pukou Railroad, marched westward, and in the middle of October reached Ningchin (about 63 km south-east of Shihchiachuang), and thenceforth moving parallel to the 1st Army, pursued the enemy toward Kwangping through the eastern sector of the Peking-Hankow Railroad, and occupied Pingyuau on the Tientsin-Pukou Railroad (about 30 km south of Tehsien, Shantung Province) in the middle of October.

III. Taiyuan Operation

The Central Supreme Command decided, in the beginning of October to attack and occupy Taiyuan, and ordered the North China Area Army Commander to conduct operations in northern Shansi Province with part of his strength to

occupy Taiyuan, and also ordered the Kwantung Army Commander to place a part of his strength under the command of the North China Area Army Commander in order to assist the latter in the Taiyuan operation.

The North China Area Army Commander, in conformity with this order, directed the 5th Division Commander, who was moving southward after breaking through the Inner Great Wall line from Tatung, to occupy Taiyuan, and placed the Kwantung Army units south of the Inner Great Wall line under the command of the 5th Division Commander.

The 5th Division begun attacking strong enemy positions near Hsinkouchen (about 70 km south of Taihsien) in the middle of October, but the battle did not progress as desired.

Thereupon, the Area Army Commander on 17 October ordered the 1st Army Commander to break through enemy position in the area of the Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan Railroad with a powerful element of his strength and march toward Yutsu (about 26 km south-east of Taiyuan) to cooperate in the 5th Division's operation. The 1st Army Commander first dispatched a part of the 20th Division to the Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan Railroad area, but stubborn enemy resistance was encountered near Chinghsing and the battle did not progress as desired.

Whereupon, 21 October, the Area Army Commander directed the 1st Army Commander to order the whole strength of the 20th Division and a part of the 109th Division to participate in the combat, and again on the 27th, made the 1st Army Commander pour the main strength of the 109th Division into the fray.

The 20th Division broke through the border of Shansi Province on 24 October, occupied Niangtsukuan on the 26th, and pursued the enemy along the Shihchiachuang-Taiyuan Railroad, while the 5th Division also broke through enemy positions near Hsinkouchen, and arrived at Taiyuan in early November,

IV. Suipao Operations.

At the beginning of October, the total strength of the Chinese Army within Suiyuan Province was approximately 12,000 men, and they were temporarily concentrated west of Suiyuan after retreating from the Chahaerh Area. Ma Chan-span, who had the duty of bolstering the discouraging situation, commanded the Suiyuan Raiding Unit (approximately 7,000 men) and sallied forth near Chihsiyangtsu. On 6 October he engaged the Inner Mongolian Army which had a secret understanding with Japanese Army: To meet this attack, the Japanese Army decided to occupy the Saiyuan and Paotou Area with the 26th Division, which was to be organized primarily around the 11th Composite Brigade. This newly

organized division and an attached provisional air brigade were to act in concert with the Inner Mongolian Army.

The fighting between the Inner Mongolian Army and Ma Chan-shan's force had come to a stalemate when the 26th Division started moving in mid-October, and, marching along the railroad, reached the line of the Taheiho on the 12th, and occupied Suituan and Kueihuacheng on the 14th. A part of the division further pursued the enemy westward, passed through Salachi on the 16th, and occupied Paotou on the 17th.

Driven by this excess energy, the Japanese Army pursued the enemy and showed sufficient endurance and morale to be able to march as far as Wuyan.

On the other hand, the Inner Mongolian Army, which was at Chihsiayingtev, in concert with the Japanese Army marched northward and occupied Wuchuan together with a friendly force. (TN Wang's detached force) which was moving southward from Wulanhua (about 70 km north of Suiyuan), and, still marching westward, occupied Paotou and Kuyang before advancing to Wuyuan.

Part 2. Operations of the First Combined Air Unit

I. Summary:

Date	Target of attack	Number or participating planes	Remarks
1 October	Nanchang	12 medium attack planes	Airfield
	Kuanghsin	3 medium attack planes	Locomotive shed
	Pangfou	3 medium attack planes	Railway station
2 October	Tchangchen	6 medium attack planes	Town, military positions
	"	6 large attack planes	
3 October	Yenchi	6 medium attack planes	Airfield, escorted by 4 carrier-based fighters of the 2 nd Combined Unit.
	Changshuchen	4 medium attack planes	Railway bridge

Date	Target of attack	Number of participating planes	Remarks
3 October (cont)	Nanhsiang	6 large attack planes	Town, military positions
4 October	Nanhsiang	6 large attack planes	Town, military positions
		13 medium attack planes	Town, military positions
6 October	Nenchi	10 medium attack planes	Airfield, escorted by 5 fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit
	Chiangwanchen	5 large attack planes	Area bombing
7 October	Canton-Hankow Railroad	8 medium attack planes	Between Lochang & Ichang in cooperation with the Shaokuan attack, by planes of the 2 nd Carrier Division
8 October	Chuchou	11 medium attack planes	Railway bridge, railroad, industrial plants
11 October	Chiating, Taitsang	6 large attack planes	Town, military positions
	Chehiang-Kiangsi Railroad	6 medium attack planes	Railway station, railway bridges
	Nanchang	14 medium attack planes	Airfield, railway station
12 October	Chiating, Changshu	4 large attack planes	Town, military positions

Date	Target of attack	Number of participating planes	Remarks
12 October (cont)	Nanking	9 medium attack planes	Airfield and ammunition depot, escorted by 11 fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit.
	Canton-Hankow Railroad	6 medium attack planes	Lochang locomotive shed Pikiang Railway bridge
13 October	Nanshiang	5 large attack planes	Town, rolling-stock railroad tracks
	Hengyang	6 medium attack planes	Locomotive shed
	Hofei	5 medium attack planes	Airfield
14 October	Pangfou	6 medium attack planes	Airfield, railway station
15 October	Hangchou	6 medium attack planes	Railroad
16 October	Chiating	5 large attack planes	Town, large industrial plants
	Hofei	5 medium attack planes	Town, railway station
17 October	Suchou-Kashing Railroad	9 medium attack planes	Railway tracks, stations, locomotive sheds
	Soochow	3 large attack planes	Station, railroad, escorted by 3 fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit
18 October	Hankow	12 medium attack planes	Airfield
19 October	Nanking (Pukou)	16 medium attack planes	Airfield railway station
	Wuhsi	3 large attack planes	Railway station

Date	Target of attack	Number of participating planes	Remarks
20 October	Hengyang	5 medium attack planes	Railway station
	Nanking	Medium planes number unknown	Airfield, escorted by 9 fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit
	Nanchang	14 medium attack planes	Airfield, airplane repair shop, Engineer School
21 October	Kunshan	4 large attack planes	Town, military positions
	Nanking	24 medium attack planes	Airfield, ammunition depot, zinc sulfate depot, escorted by 3 fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit
22 October	Hangzhou	6 medium attack planes	Railway station
	Wuhsi, Changcou, Wuchiang Chiating	3 large attack planes, 6 medium attack planes	Railway stations, warehouses, etc.
23 October	Nanchang	6 medium attack planes	Railway station
	Nanking	9 medium attack planes	Airfield, escorted by 3 fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit
24 October	Hankow	8 medium attack planes	Airfield
	Nanking	9 medium attack planes	Airfield, escorted by 6 fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit
	Nanhsiang	12 medium attack planes	Town, military positions

Date	Target of attack	Number of participating planes	Remarks
25 October	Chenjuchen	21 medium attack planes	Town, military positions
	Yangkaichiao	16 medium attack planes	Village, military positions
26 October	Chiangchiao-chen, Shih-chiao, Chiwang-miaochen(#)	9 medium attack planes	Towns, military positions
	Maluchen	5 medium attack planes	Town, military positions
	Nanhsiangchen	12 medium attack planes	Town, military positions
27 October	Chenjuchen	9 medium attack planes	Town, military positions
	Huangtuchen, Chiwangchiao-chen, Paiaochiangchen	14 medium attack planes	Towns, military positions
	Nanhsiangchen, Peihsinching	8 medium attack planes	Towns, military positions
28 October	Huangtuchen	8 medium attack planes	Town, military positions
	Soochow Kunshan	11 medium attack planes	Railway stations
	Changchou Wuhsi	12 medium attack planes	Railway stations
29 October	Wantaichen Huangtuchen	1 large attack plane	Towns, military positions
	Sungchaing	24 medium attack planes	Town, military positions
30 October	Chingpuchen	1 large attack plane	Warehouses
	Soochow	9 medium attack planes	No bombing

Date	Target of attack	Number of participating planes	Remarks
30 October (cont)	Kunshan	12 medium attack planes	Town, railway station, barracks

II. Attacks on Airfields

1 October - Attack on Nan-Ch'ang

On 28 September, the 3rd Fleet disseminated the following information:

"According to intelligence reports, the Nan-Ch'ang Aircraft Plant has not yet suffered any damage." Upon receipt of this information, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander ordered the Kanoya Unit to attack the new Nan-Ch'ang Airfield (primarily the aircraft repair shop) with 15 medium attack planes (including six planes from the Kisarazu Unit).

Twelve medium attack planes, each carrying two 250 kg land bombs, departed from Taipei at 1530 hours on the 1st, and bombed the new airfield at 1905 hours (sundown was at 1904 hours). All the bombs hit the barracks and the repair shop, and set them afire.

3 October - Attack on Yen-Ch'i

At 1200 hours on 2 October, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order,

"1. Approximately seven enemy Northrops are at Yen-Ch'i.

2. On the 3d, the 1st Combined Air Unit will launch a surprise attack against Yen-Ch'i with medium attack planes.

3. The 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander, in cooperation with the commander of the 1st Combined Air Unit will cover the latter's medium attack planes with carrier-based Type-96 fighters."

This attack was assigned to the Kisarazu Unit, which was to be covered by four carrier-based Type-96 fighters of the 2nd Combined Air Unit.

Six medium attack planes (each carrying nine 60 kg bombs) started from Cheju-Do at 1020 hours, met the escort fighter over Kung-ta base at 1230 hours, and, after flying directly to Yen-Ch'i, bombed the airfield. They destroyed, by fire,

two of the three airplanes out on the airfield and also damaged the hangers.

6 October - Attack on Yenohi

At 2358 hours on the 5th the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order:

"1. Starting as early as possible after 0600 hours on the 6th, the Kisarazu Unit will attack Yen-Ch'i with many medium attack planes.

The 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander, in cooperation with the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander, will provide fighter escort for the medium attack plane unit.

2. The 2nd Combined Air Unit will search for and attack enemy airplanes at Nanking and Wu-Hu."

Ten medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit departed at 0810 hours, and, after meeting five fighters from the 2nd Combined Air Unit, braved rough weather, and attacked the Yen-Ch'i Airfield at 1224 hours. They dropped 117 50 kg land bombs, scoring three direct hits on hangers and 40 near misses. Our planes suffered no damage.

On the way home, the planes sighted 11 Northrops at Kuang-te Airfield.

11 October - Attack on Nan-chang

At 2100 hours on the 8th, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander ordered the Kanoya Unit to attack the old Nan-Chang Airfield at sundown on the 9th, by employing 12 medium attack planes (including four planes from the Kisarazu Air Unit). Due to bad weather in the Nan-Ch'ang Area on the 9th and 10th, the attack was carried out on the 11th.

Fourteen medium attack planes (including six planes from the Kisarazu Unit) started from the Taipei Base at 1514 hours on the 11th, and despite the bad weather, carried out bombing at 1915 hours (20 minutes after sundown).

Fires were started in the hangers and barracks on the old airfield and also in the warehouses of Nan-Ch'ang Station.

12 October - Attack on Nanking

At 2000 hours on the 9th, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following attack order:

"1. The 2nd Combined Air Unit will raid Nanking on the 10th, by employing

the bulk of the carrier-based Type-96 fighters and a part of the carrier-based Type-96 bombers, according to the following plan:

Targets, enemy air power and ammunition depots.

Details will be determined by the 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander.

2. If the weather is favorable, this attack unit will be joined by elements of the medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Air Unit. The medium attack planes unit will complete attack preparations and be ready by 0600 hours.

3. If the medium attack plane unit is employed, it will be directly escorted by carrier-based Type-96 fighters."

On the basis of this order, the 1st Combined Air Unit conferred with the 2nd Combined Air Unit and decided on the following items:

A. Attack targets:

First: Air base.

Secondly: Ammunition depot.

B. Escort fighters:

Six fighters for direct escort of the medium attack units. Three fighters for direct escort of the carrier-based bomber unit. Five fighters for indirect escort.

C. The cruising air speed of the combined air raid units: 120 knots

Due to rainy weather, however, the attack scheduled for the 10th and 11th was postponed to the 12th.

Nine medium attack planes, which took off from the Cheju-do Base at 1400 hours on the 12th, met 11 fighters over Shanghai, and six medium attack planes bombed six enemy planes on Ta-chiao-ch'ang Airfield, while the other three planes bombed the Nanking Ammunition Depot. Since the enemy planes were dispersed around the runway and sheltered by revetments, only two of them were damaged, but the ammunition depot was set afire and destroyed my direct hits.

Several enemy fighters were seen taking off from the Ta-chiao-ch'ang Airfield, but they did not offer any resistance. All our planes returned safely, although two of them were hit by accurate antiaircraft fire.

13 October - Attack on Hofei.

Since the beginning of October, plans had been made to attack the Hofei Airfield, but due to bad weather and the necessity of cooperating with ground operations, it was not carried out until the 13th, when the attack was launched by six medium attack planes based at Cheju- Do. It was a twilight attack, and six enemy airplanes dispersed on the airfield were bombed at 1755 hours. The destruction of two of the planes was confirmed.

14 October - Attack on Pangfou

Six medium attack planes (based at Cheju-Do) reached Pang-Fou at 1730 hours. Unable to locate the airfield, three of the planes attacked the railroad station. The other three planes, seeing enemy airplanes taking to the air, dropped bombs at the hangers, but instead hit the station. The enemy planes flew away.

18 October – Attack on Hankow

The following was the information the Japanese had obtained, at that time, concerning the movements of the Chinese Air Force in the Hankow Areas:

“1. Strength disposed at Hankow as of 1 October,

Four Martin bombers, three Heinkels or Boeings, five Northrops, approximately 20 Douglasses, and approximately 30 training planes and others.

2. Navy General Staff's Intelligence (radio intelligence) on 2 October.

The Wu-han Airfield seems to have initiated anti-aircraft defense preparedness from predawn until night.

3. 3rd Fleet's Intelligence on the 4th.

According to the situation in Hankow was as follows:

A. Number of airplanes as of the 4th,

Eleven large planes (four of them under repair), 15 reconnaissance planes, 16 fighters.

B. Air patrol over Wu-han Airfield is maintained from 0530 till 1830 hours.

C. Since it is difficult to locate the airfield because it is surrounded by ponds, it is advisable to follow the levee of the main river in approaching the airfield."

On 28 September, the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Fleet requested the 1st Combined Air Unit as follows:

"In view of the fact that there is still a considerable number of enemy fighters in the Hankow Area, it is my personal request that any attack be avoided in the daytime, and that attacks be launched when the transfer of enemy strength provides a good chance for us, or when a high altitude secret approach to the enemy is possible."

Thereupon, the 1st Combined Air Unit ordered 12 medium attack planes of the Kanoya Unit to attack Hankow at dusk on the 15th. Due to bad weather in the Hankow Area on the 15th, 16th, and 17th the attack was postponed until the 18th.

The 12 airplanes took off from Taipei at 1430 hours on the 18th. Flying at an altitude of 4,000 to 4,500 meters, and taking a false route, they headed for the southwest of Hankow by way of Ch'ing-Chiang and Chung-Tung, and then penetrated into Hankow with the sun at the back. It was a complete surprise attack, because enemy fighters patrolling the air had been decoyed to the southeast of Hankow.

Without being detected by the enemy prior to the bombing, the medium attack plane unit carried out an easy and effective bombing.

On the airfield, there were 11 large planes and approximately 20 small planes out in the open, and since almost all the bombs scored hits, nine large planes were destroyed by fire (confirmed) and most of the small planes were also enveloped by black smoke and destroyed.

After the bombing, the unit engaged six enemy fighters in aerial combat and shot down two of them. Our planes all returned safely without suffering any damage.

19 October - Night Attack on Nanking

Before dawn on the 19th, taking advantage of the moonlight, elements of the medium attack plane unit attacked Nanking. This was the first night air raid since 26 August. The participating aircraft were eight airplanes based at Cheju-Do. They each carried 12 60 kg land bombs and operated in two waves, each consisting of four planes. The first wave at 0325 hours, and the 2d wave at

about 0450 hours, bombed the Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield, hitting hangers and revetments, and burning one enemy plane.

During this raid, each of the waves was attacked by several enemy fighters, but succeeded in repulsing them.

19 October - Daylight Attack on Nanking

During that same day, eight medium attack planes of the Kanoya Unit attacked Nanking.

At 1200 hours, this attack unit was joined by six carrier-based Type-96 planes of the 2nd Combined Air Unit, over Kung-ta Base, and at 1340 hours, six planes bombed the Ta-chiao-ch'ang Airfield while the other two bombed P'ie-k'ou(##) station.

During this attack, photo reconnaissance was also made. This provided valuable data for subsequent operations, as it made clear the details of the Ta-chiao-ch'ang Airfield. It was confirmed that there were bomb-proof revetments around the airfield, and that they numbered approximately 22, running from the south to the east and west, and were believed to be considerably effective for defense purposes.

This line of revetments was hit by several bombs, in the raid on this day, but the results were unknown. It was also learned that the hangers and other buildings had not been damaged seriously in the bombings to date.

20 October - Attack on Nanking

As a result of the photo reconnaissance made on the previous day, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander felt it necessary to further attack Nanking and suggested it to the 3rd Fleet Commander, who, on the same day, issued the following order:

“1. The medium attack plane unit of the Kisarazu Air Unit will attack the enemy air strength in the Nanking Area with its full force.

2. (Omitted from document)

3. Nine carrier based Type-96 fighters of the 2nd Combined Air Unit will escort the medium attack plane unit of the Kisarazu Air Unit.”

The nine medium attack planes, which took off from the Cheju-do Base at 1000 hours on the 20th, were joined by nine escort fighters over Shanghai, and

headed for Nanking via P'iao-Shui, and bombed the Ta-chiao-ch'ang Airfield, scoring many direct hits on hangers and barracks.

During this attack, close observation as well as photo reconnaissance made of the airfield revetments revealed that nearly 10 enemy planes were cleverly concealed in the revetments.

20 October - Attack on Nan-Ch'ang

Although the Nan-Ch'ang Airfield had been attacked twice, on 1 and 11 October, later information revealed that its aircraft repair shop was still operating.

Thereupon, on the 20th, 14 medium attack planes (including six planes from the Kisarazu Air Unit) of the Kanoya Unit carried out a twilight attack.

Bombs hit the Nan-Ch'ang Aircraft Repair Depot, an engine school, hangers, and barracks. The repair depot and the engine school suffered great damage, and the hangers which had survived the previous bombings, were all destroyed.

Just before the bombing, our planes engaged two enemy fighters and shot down one of them. It was reported that almost all of the installations at Nan-Ch'ang had been destroyed by a series of attacks ending this day.

21 October - Attack on Nanking

At 1800 hours on the 20th, the 3rd Fleet Commander issued the following order:

"1. On the following day, the 21st, the medium attack plane unit of the 1st Combined Air Unit will attack the Nanking Area with its main strength.

Targets: Ammunition depot, arsenal, Pi'e-k'ou(#) Station, National Defense Zinc Sulfate Depot, and enemy air strength.

2. The carrier based Type-96 fighter unit of the 2nd Combined Air Unit will escort the attack unit with its full strength." This air raid was carried out by employing the maximum strength available at that time, and was participated in by 12 planes each from the Kanoya and Kisarazu Units, and three escort fighters from the 2nd Combined Air Unit.

Six planes of the Kanoya Unit bombed enemy planes in revetments on the Ta-chiao-ch'ang Airfield, and burned four of them. The other six planes of the unit bombed the arsenal and the ammunition depot, and destroyed them.

The 12 planes of the Kisarazu Unit bombed P'o-k'ou (#) Station and the National Defense Zinc Sulphate Depot.

On the way home, one airplane of the Kanoya Unit developed engine trouble and made an emergency landing at Pao-shan Base, but it was able to return to Taipei soon thereafter.

23 October - Attack on Nanking and Tonohi

On the 21st at 1800 hours the 3rd Fleet Information Section gave the following information, "Four enemy planes belonging to a Northrop air company, the whereabouts of which have been unknown since their reported arrival in Nanking, have just reached Yenchi from Chi-Ning."

Thereupon, the China Area Fleet Commander ordered 12 medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Air Unit to wait for further orders for 30 minutes from 0600 of the 23d.

On the 22nd, at 2315 hours, the 3rd Fleet Information Section disseminated another piece of intelligence.

"On the afternoon of the 22d, two Heinkel bombers and one Boeing fighter left Hankow for Nanking. On the morning of the 22d, two Northrop bombers and one Douglas transport plane reached Yenchi from Nanking. The number of Northrop bombers at Yenchi now total six. At 1520 hours, the second in command of the air battalion took four of them to Nanking."

The Signal and Information Agency had been able to obtain detailed data concerning enemy plane movements.

Thereupon, the China Area Fleet Commander issued the following command on the 23d at 0700 hours:

"The medium attack plane unit of the Kisarazu Air Unit will depart at once, and at the Kung-ta Air Base combine with six Type-96 carrier-based fighters of 2nd Combined Air Unit to attack enemy planes at Nanking and Yenchi."

Soon after this, the following intelligence was received:

"There are now, in Nanking, one Martin bomber, two Heinkel bombers, and four Northrop bombers, and at Yenchi three Northrop bombers. However, the four Northrop bombers in Nanking appear to have moved to Yenchi. There are also several small-sized planes in addition to the above."

The six medium sized attack planes of the Yenchi Raiding Unit met two fighters above Shanghai at 1118 hours, and reconnoitered the Yenchi Airfield. Though they did not find any planes there, they dropped half of the bombs they were carrying. At this time, observing that a small low-winged monoplane was approaching, the medium attack planes, mistaking it for an enemy plane, fired upon it. However, this small plane soon joined a formation of friendly escorting planes, so they stopped firing. Meanwhile, three medium planes, other than the above, seeing the increased group of escorting planes and taking them for enemy Northrop planes, retreated from them while continuing to maintain fire on them. Thus, communications were out between the medium attack plane units.

During this time, a medium attack unit reconnoitered Ch'ang-hsing, Kuang-to, Wu-hu, Li-yang, and other places, but, sighting no enemy planes, they bombed Ta-chiao-chang Airfield and Chang-chou station with the remaining bombs, and returned to the base.

The Nanking Raiding Unit consisted of five planes because one plane had to return because of engine trouble. These planes were unable to meet the escorting planes over Shanghai, so they went on and bombed Ta-chiao-chang Airfield in Nanking by themselves.

The bombing was aimed at revetments and considerable good results were obtained.

24 October - Attack on Hankow

The information obtained by the China Area Fleet Headquarters, on the 23d, showed the number of airplanes left at Hankow Airfield as follows:

Six Heinkel planes, two Curtiss fighters, two Fiat fighters, one Heinkel bomber.

The first wave of three planes and the second wave of five planes left the Taipei Air base to night bomb Hankow Airfield at 2300 hours on the 23d, and at 0015 on the 24th, respectively.

Hankow Airfield was bombed at 0445 hours by the 2d wave of five planes, and at 0505 by the first wave because the latter wasted some time in searching for the targets. The bombing was effective, two hangers set afire and destroyed, fires broke out at two points in the vicinity of the airfield (planes on fire), bombs also fall on the airfield, and objects resembling airplanes were seen burning at three points.

24 October - Attack on Nanking

At midnight of the 23d the China Area Fleet Commander issued the following commands:

“On the 24th nine medium attack planes belonging to the Kisarazu Air Unit of the 1st Combined Air Unit and six carrier-based fighters of the 2nd Combined Air unit will be employed to destroy the enemy's air strength in the Nanking Area.”

The nine medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Air Unit, upon receiving the above command, left Che-ju Do Base at 0940 hours, and, at 1105 hours, joined six escort fighter planes over Shanghai. At 1210 hours, they bombed rows of plane revetments on the east, south, and west sides of Ta-chiao-chang Airfield at Nanking. Three enemy planes were set afire and one destroyed in this bombing.

III. Destruction of Communication Routes

On 27 September, the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Fleet dispatched the following telegram to the 1st Combined Air Unit regarding operational instructions:

“It is desired that planes belonging to the 1st Combined Air Unit of the South China Force carry out operations as follows:

1. Attack Objective

A. Air and sea strength in Central and South China

B. Various installations on airfields in Central and South China

C. Aircraft factories, repair shops, and material depots in Nan-Ch'ang and Shao-kuan

D. Arsenals in Hankow, P'a-chiang, Nan-chang, and Chu-chou

E. Railway key points

1. Canton-Hankow Railway (Stations and roundhouses at Chu-chou and Hengchow, railway connecting I-chang, Ping-shih and Lo-ch'ang, and roundhouses at these points)

2. Hangchow-Nan-chang Railway (Stations of Hangahow, Kuei-ch'ih, and Nan-chang, and a railway bridge at Chang-shu-chen)

3. Pang-fou Station

4. Ma-tou-Tien-chia Railway (Ho-fei Station, etc.)

5. Peiping-Hankow Railway (Hsing-yang and Hsiao-kan Stations, etc.)

2. Matters

Demanding special attention when executing attacks: bombing of important railway points shall be repeated from time to time.

Targets for bombing will be limited to enemy military strength, military installations, and signal and communications facilities for military purposes. Bombing will be made after definitely identifying the targets, and every discretion is necessary so that no lives or property of third nationals and general non-combatants are harmed or damaged."

Under this command, the destruction of communication routes became the sole operation of the 1st Combined Air Unit:

1 October - Attack on Hangchow-Nan-chang Railway

Three planes of the Kanoya Air Unit left the Taipei Air Base on the 1st at 1200 hours, and carried out the dual mission of attacking Kueichih(#) Station and making weather reconnaissance at Nan-chang, which was to be attacked at dusk of the same day.

However, as Kuei-ch'ih(#) Station was very small and not worthy of bombing, they changed their target to Kuang-hsing Station in the east, and destroyed a (?) roundhouse there.

1 October - Attack on Pang-fou Station on Tientsin-pvkou(#) Railway

On 28 September, the Kisarazu Air Unit received an order from the 1st Combined Air Unit to repeat the bombing of stations, roundhouses, and other important railway points at Pang-fou, Ho-fei and Hangchow with the intent of disrupting transportation.

At 1500 hours, three medium attack planes left Che-ju Do and invaded Pang-fou at dusk. They bombed Pang-fou Station, railway sidings, interchange points, and other railway facilities there. However, they did not achieve great success, except for the destruction of the station building.

3 October - Attack on Changshu-Chen (Railway bridge)

The bombing was carried out by four planes belonging to the Taipei Exped-

itionary Air Unit of Kisarazu Air Unit. At 1808 hours, the Chong-shu-chen Railway Bridge was bombed, and three direct hits were made on the bridge (with 250 kg land bombs). Nevertheless, they learned by air reconnaissance, immediately after the bombing, that good results cannot be obtained with land bombs on railway bridges.

7 October - Bombing of the Canton-Hankow Railroad.

The Canton-Hankow Railroad between Lo-chang and I-chang was laid through rugged mountain regions, and had great strategic bombing value because long drawn out reconstruction work would be necessary to put the line back into operation. The attack here recorded is the second one following the first air-raid carried out against the same railroad on 27 September.

At that time, two or three enemy fighters were assigned in Shaokuan, near the bombing target.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Carrier Division was scheduled to attack the Canton Area, after advancing into the South China Sea on 6 October.

In this connection, at 2130 hours on the 5th, the Commander in Chief of the 1st Combined Air Unit issued the following order to the Kanoya Unit:

"1. The 2nd Carrier Division is to attack the Shaokuan Aircraft Arsenal at approximately 1000 hours on the 6th.

2. In concert therewith, the Kanoya Unit, with its eight medium attack planes, shall make an air raid against the Canton-Hankow Railroad (between Lo-chang to I-chang), at approximately 1030 hours, leaving its base at 0645 hours on the 6th."

However, this attack was postponed to the 7th, owing to inclement weather.

Under extremely difficult conditions, due to low-hanging clouds over the mountains near the target, the eight medium attack planes of the Bombing Unit, after taking off from Taipei at 1005 hours, launched the attack at 1420 hours, and succeeded in making two direct hits on the railroad, approximately two kilometers east of Ping-shih. All the planes returned safely.

8 October - Bombing of Chu-cbou

The Commander in Chief of the 1st Combined Air Unit issued the following order on 4 October:

"The Kanoya Unit, with 13 Type-4 medium attack planes including five planes dispatched from the Kisarazu Unit, shall attack Chu-chou, after leaving the base at 1030 hours.

The bombing targets are:

Arsenal with eight planes.

Railway station with five planes.

However, this attack was postponed to the 8th, owing to inclement weather on the 5th and the 6th over the target area, and to the aerial attack of the 7th against the Canton-Hankow Railroad.

Leaving the base at Taipei at 0940 hours on the 8th, the Kanoya Unit, for the bombing of Chu-chou, consisted of 11 bombers, including four planes from the Kisarazu Unit, and carried out the attack at approximately 1345 hours, despite inclement weather over the objective. However, it became known that the scheduled objective had no value as a bombing target, so a change in the plans was made, and the Lukou Railway Bridge (located 15 kilometers south of Chu-chou), and adjacent railway, which were parts of the Canton-Hankow Railroad, and an industrial plant three kilometers north of Chu-chou were designated as the new bombing targets.

Consequently, one direct hit was made on the middle pier of the bridge, and on the adjacent railway, while three direct hits were made on other sections of the railroad.

11 October – Bombing of the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad

The Kanoya Unit was ordered to bomb the main facilities or military freight cars on the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad with six medium attack planes. It was planned to use three planes to attack the section from Chin-hua to Yu-shan, and the other three to attack the Yu-shan to Kuei-chi section.

After leaving Taipei at 1230 hours, three of the six planes of the Bombing Unit, assigned to attack the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad, bombed Yu-shan Station and the neighboring railway bridge, while the other three planes bombed the Ahin-hua Station.

A direct hit was made on the railroad in the Yu-shan Station vicinity, and two direct hits were made on the pier of the neighboring railway bridge, causing considerable damage thereto.

As for the attack against Chin-hua Station, one direct hit was made on the

railroad in the station yard, and on the adjoining building.

12 October-Aerial attack against the Canton-Hankow Railroad.

The Kanoya Unit was directed by a 1st Combined Air Unit order, received at 2130 hours, the 11th, to attack the Lo-chang locomotive shed, with five or six medium attack planes, but the target was changed to Hengyang on the 12th due to inclement weather over the Lo-chang Area.

However, owing to unfavorable weather on the way to Hengyang that day, the Bombing Unit of six planes was obliged to change its primary objective to Lo-chang.

The weather there was also bad, and only three of them succeeded in locating Lo-chang. They attacked the locomotive shed, while the other three planes bombed the railway bridge about two kilometers north of Pa-chiang. All of them returned safely to the base.

The results obtained were as follows:

“1. Lo-chang. Direct hits were made on two out of the four locomotive sheds, totally destroying one of them. The interchange point of a railway siding also suffered a direct hit.

2. The railway bridge near Pao-chiang. Two direct hits were made on the middle pier, smashing it to pieces.

13 October – Attack on Heng-yang

The attack against Heng-yang which was cancelled because of bad weather on the 12th, was carried out on the following day.

At 2030 hours on the 12th the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander ordered six medium attack planes of the Kanoya Unit to bomb the roundhouse in Heng-yang.

The six planes of the Heng-yang Attack Unit which departed from the Taipei Base had to fly above dense clouds as far as the destination, but because of favorable weather over the destination, all planes carried out effective bombing against the roundhouse.

In Chu-chou and Lo-chang, where the railroad had been attacked previously, there was some rolling stock left, but the greater part of the rolling stock on the Canton-Hankow Railway was believed to be concentrated in Heng-yang, and

about 300 freight cars were assembled near the roundhouse.

This bombing produced the most satisfactory result in all the attacks against railroads which had been conducted up to that time. Two large roundhouses were set afire and destroyed, while about four-fifths of the freight cars were overturned and destroyed.

15 October - Attack on Hangchow

Six medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit attacked Hangchow Station at 1250 hours. Two bombs hit the station and set it on fire, one bomb hit a camouflaged train and blasted several of the cars, and seven bombs hit the warehouses of Chankow Station and the railroad tracks, and destroyed them.

16 October - Attack on Ho-fei

At 1810 hours, on the 16th, five medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit attacked Ho-fei, but on the airfield there were only two planes which had been destroyed in the raid on the 13th and which had been left abandoned. They changed the target to the station. The bomb, however, fell into the city and hardly any damages were inflicted on the station.

17 October - Attack against the Suchow-chiahhsing Railroad

On the 17th, in view of the land combat situation, the large attack plane unit and the medium attack plane unit of the Kisarazu Unit were ordered to destroy Suchow Station and the railroad connecting Suchow, Wu-chiang, Ping-Wang-chen, and Chia-hsing.

On this day, escort fighters were especially assigned to the large attack plane unit.

Nine planes of the medium attack plane unit carried out bombing at about 1100 hours, and scored one hit on the railroad track connecting Ping-wang-chen and Chia-hsing, two at the roundhouse at Chia-hsing Station and one on the railroad siding, but the results were unsatisfactory.

Three planes of the large attack plane unit, escorted by three fighters of the 2nd Combined Air Unit from Shanghai, bombed Suchow Station and the nearby railroad tracks at about 1045 hours, and damaged warehouses and standing locomotives near the station.

19 October - Attack against Wu-shi

Three Cheju-do based large attack planes, escorted by three fighters of the 2nd Combined Air Unit, bombed Wu-shi Station and nearby warehouses, but the results were not satisfactory.

20 October - Attack against Heng-yang

Five medium attack planes of the Kanoya Unit, which left Taipei Base at 0900 hours, bombed Heng-yang Station at about 1300 hours.

The bombing resulted in one hit on the main tracks, three hits on the railroad siding, and damaged them considerably, besides overturning and destroying several freight cars.

20 October - Attack against Hangchow

Six planes of the Kisarazu Unit which had been sent to the Taipei Base were ordered to return to their parent unit on 22d, and they bombed Hangchow Station on the way back to their parent unit.

Two direct hits were scored on the roundhouse and a freighter (2,300 tons) moored at the bank of Chisn-tang-chiang was hit and sunk.

22 October - Attack against Wu-hei, Chang-chou, Wu-chiang and Chia-ting

Three planes of the large attack plane unit attacked freight cars in the yard of Woosung Station, and destroyed several of them. Six planes of the medium attack plane unit bombed Wu-hsi Station and Chang-chou Station, and destroyed railroad station installations and several freight cars.

23 October - Attack against Nan-hsun Railroad

The six medium attack planes of the Kanoya Unit, which departed from Taipei at 1515 hours, bombed Nan-chang Station on the Nan-hsun Railroad, at dusk. For about 25 minutes throughout the bombing, our aircraft were attacked by two enemy fighters, three of our planes were hit by a considerable number of bullets, but all planes returned safely to the home base.

As a result of the bombing, the station and most of the warehouses were hit and some of them were set afire, while the railway bridge over Kanchiang was damaged considerably.

IV. Cooperation in Land Combat

During the early and middle parts of October, primarily large attack planes

cooperated in land combat, but on 24 October, the greater part of the large attack planes were lost in a fire at the Cheju Do Base.

Just at that time, the Chinese forces on the Shanghai front began a general retreat, so the medium attack plane unit began attacking the enemy with its entire strength.

The total number of large and medium attack planes of the 1st Combined Air Unit cooperating in land combat in October was 267 and the gross weight of aerial bombs dropped was 194.750 tons.

Part 3. Operations of the 2nd Combined Air Unit

A. Cooperation in Land Combat (From 1 to 27 October).

1. Plan

After the 2nd Combined Air Unit had advanced to Shanghai, on 10 September, it cooperated in land combat, as ordered by the 3rd Fleet, but during September, it could not afford to spare sufficient strength for organized cooperation, due to air operations in the Nanking Area. However, on 25 September, when the 11th Nanking Air raid was completed, the Nanking Air Attack Unit was disbanded and for two days, the 27th and 28th, the 2nd Combined Air Unit bombed Nanking alone with its own strength thus bringing to an end the operations for the Nanking Area. They had sufficient strength left for cooperation in land combat, so on the 29th, a general agreement was made between the 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander and the Shanghai Expeditionary Force Chief of Staff concerning a policy for cooperation in land combat. On the 30th, details concerning cooperation in land combat were discussed between staff officers of the 2nd Combined Air Unit, Shanghai Expeditionary Army, and the 3rd Air Brigade. Thus, on 1 October, the bulk of the 2nd Combined Air Unit strength was committed to positive cooperation with the Army's operations.

Agreements on orders to be issued regarding cooperation in the Army's operations were as follows, and the main duties of the 2nd Combined Air Unit were to give direct cooperation to the front of the 3rd and 9th Divisions, and also to bomb the enemy's rear along the whole frontline and destroy his transportation and lines of communication.

It was first agreed that direct cooperation on the battle line by Navy planes be conducted until the arrival of Army bombers, but later with the progress of the operation, it was altered so that cooperation would be continued until the Army had advanced to the line of Soochow Creek.

Date	Participating Planes	Attack Objectives	Note
2 October	Medium attack planes 9	Tang-chang-chen	18 bombs (250 kg) were dropped, all hit the city, destroying and burning numerous houses
	Large attack planes 6		20 bombs (250 kg) and 40 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, hitting massed houses with great results
3 "	Large attack planes 6	Nan-hsiang-chen	24 bombs (250 kg) and 40 bombs (50 kg) were dropped, hitting massed houses with great effect
4 "	Medium attack planes 13	Nan-hsiang-chen	35 bombs (60 kg) and 120 bombs (50 kg) were dropped, bombing the city and outskirts with great results
	Large attack planes 6		24 bombs (250 kg) and 40 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, bombing the city outskirts with great results
6 "	Large attack planes 5	Ching-wan-chen	24 bombs (250 kg) and 20 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, bombing enemy positions
11 "	Large attack planes 6	Gates and fort of Chia-ting and Ta-tsang	24 bombs (250 kg) and 20 bombs (50 kg) were dropped, bombing the gates and fort with great results
12 "	Large attack planes 4	Chia-ting and Chang-shu	12 bombs (250 kg) and 40 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, bombing massed houses with great results
13 "	Large attack planes 5	Nan-hsiang-chen	18 bombs (250 kg) and 40 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, bombing massed houses, the station, ground troops, etc.
16 "	Large attack planes 5	Chin-ting	12 bombs (200 kg), 6 bombs (150 kg) and 46 bombs (50 kg) were dropped the southeast section with great results

Date	Participating planes	Attack Objectives	Note
21 October	Large attack planes 4	Kun-shan	10 bombs (250 kg), 20 bombs (60 kg) and 20 bombs (50 kg) were dropped, bombing and destroying the enemy headquarters in the northeast corner of Kun-shan.
24 "	Medium attack planes 12	Nan-hsiang-chen	144 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, all hitting the city and causing fires in several places. 1. On this day, fuel leaking from a large attack plane at the Che-ju Do Base was ignited and caused a fire which destroyed four planes. 2. All the Chinese forces on the Shanghai front began retreating and pursuit action was commenced.
25 "	Medium attack planes 21	Chen-ju-chen and Nan-hsiang-chen	240 bombs (60 kg) and 2 bombs (250 kg) were dropped, all hitting the cities and 6 of the planes advanced to the Wang-pin Base.
	Medium attack planes 28	Yang-chia-chiao and Nan-hsiang-chen	288 bombs (50 kg), 36 bombs (60 kg) and 2 bombs (250 kg) were dropped in four raids, and great results were obtained.
26 "	Medium attack planes 9	Chiang-chiao-chen Shih-chiao and Chi-wang-miao-chen	108 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, all hitting the villages with great results
	Medium attack planes 5	Na-lu-chen	60 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, all hitting the town with great results
	Medium attack planes 12	Nan-hsiang-chen	144 bombs (50 kg) were dropped, bombing enemy positions with great results
	Medium attack planes 9	Chen-ju-chen	108 bombs (50 kg) were dropped, bombing the town and enemy positions great results.

Date	Participating Planes	Attack Objectives	Note
27 October	Medium attack planes 14	Huang-tu-chen, Chi-wang-miao-chen and Pai-hao-chaing-chen	168 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, all hitting the villages
	Medium attack planes 8	Pei-hsin-ching and Nan-hsiang-chen	32 bombs (350 kg) were dropped, bombing the village and enemy positions with great results.
	Medium attack planes 8	Nuang-tu-chen(#)	
28 "	Medium attack planes 11	Soochow and Kun-shan	99 bombs (80 kg) were dropped, bombing the station, warehouses, freight cars, supply dumps, etc. , with great results
	Medium attack planes 12	Chang-chou and Wu-hsi	108 bombs (60 kg) and 36 bombs (50 kg) were dropped, bombing the station warehouses, freight cars, etc.
	Medium attack planes 3	Wan-tai-chen and Huang-tu-chen	9 bombs (250 kg) and 18 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, bombing massed houses. Wang-pin Airfield was used.
29 "	Medium attack planes 24	Sung-chiang	170 bombs (50 kg) and 118 bombs (60 kg) were dropped, bombing the whole town with great results.
	Large attack plane 1	Ching-pu-chen	The plane was hit by anti-aircraft guns on the way, and a fire caused it to make a reverse turn, barely managing to return to Wang-pin Airfield.
30 "	Medium attack planes 9	Soochow (Ning-po)	Owing to bad weather, the planes desisted from bombing Soochow and instead, bombed the Ning-po Airfield.
	Medium attack planes 9	Kun-shan and Soochow	24 bombs (250 kg) were dropped, bombing the station and other military installations

Also, Army planes were to assume the responsibility for direct air-ground cooperation on the front of the 101st Division, but due to a lack of Army planes, a part of the task was taken over by the 2nd Coordinated Air Unit.

The following are agreements and orders concerning cooperation in land combat.

Copy of 30 September Deputy Chief of Staff Memorandum No. 519.

To: Army Chief of Staff

From: Deputy Chief of Staff.

"By order of the Superior Commander, I beg to inform you that, together with the dispatch of Army bomber units, the Central Command has made the followings stipulations regarding Army and Navy air cooperation.

The policy for the use of the Army and Navy air forces remains unchanged from the former decisions of the Central Command, and the task of Army planes is limited to direct cooperation with land combat, while Navy planes will engage enemy fighters and with land combat.

Moreover, local agreements in the use of airfields will be made so that Army planes will take care not to hinder the operations of the main strength of Navy planes."

Inquiry About Matters Concerning Cooperation with land Combat by the 2nd Combined Air Unit 30 September.

To: 3d Fleet Chief of Staff.

From: Shanghai Expeditionary Army Chief of Staff

It is requested that you order the 2nd Combined Air Unit, which had already been giving assistance, to cooperate also in land combat during the present attack upon the vicinity of Ta-Ch'ang-Chen. This request is forwarded to you in accordance with the 30 September Deputy Chief of Staff Memorandum No. 519.

As for the essentials of assistance, I beg to inform you that the 3rd Air Brigade Commander has been directed to work out the details."

Local Army and Navy Air Agreement in the Shanghai Battle, No 5. (At the time when the vicinity of Ta-Ch'ang-Chen was being attacked), 30 September.

3rd Air Brigade Headquarters.

2nd Combined Air Unit Headquarters.

"a. Purport

(1) This is an agreement, made locally, regarding cooperation in land combat, in accordance with article 4 of the Central Command Agreement, dated 11 July, and it stipulates the essentials regarding cooperation during the Army's preparations for an attack upon the enemy in the vicinity of Ta-Ch'ang-Chen, and also during the period of said attack.

b. Essentials

(1) During the first period the front line divisions will arrive at Yun-Tsao-Pin Creak, Lu-Chia-T'un (1.5 kilometers southwest of Liu-Chia-Hang), which is west of the Creek, and the vicinity of Hsin-mu-Ch'iao (3 kilometers west southwest of Liu-Chia-Hang). In this period, the force will mainly engage in reconnaissance and attacks on enemy positions, and disruption of transportation at strategic points in the enemy's rear, as well as cooperating in the attacks of the 3rd, 9th, and 101st Divisions.

(2) In the second period, the Yun-Tsao-Pin creek will be crossed, and the effort will be concentrated in destroying the enemy on the opposite bank, particularly his artillery. Assistance will be especially given to the 3rd and 101st Divisions.

(3) Attacks upon Ta-Ch'ang-Chen and the western area will be carried out in the third period.

During this period efforts will be devoted to destroying, with the main strength, enemy positions and artillery, and at the same time, cooperating with the front line division.

(4) In an advance, the destruction of the enemy will be planned by carrying out attacks against the enemy.

(5) Throughout the above periods, precautions must be taken against enemy attacks from the direction of Chia-Ting.

(6) It is requested again, just for clarity, that the front line of the enemy must be thoroughly destroyed. Bombing of the battlefield consists mainly of the repeated destruction of villages located approximately 700 meters from our front line up to a point approximately 2,000 meters toward the enemy (2,700 meters from our front line).

c. Assignment of Duties

(1) 3rd Air Brigade

The 3rd Air Brigade will, with its elements, cooperate directly with the 3rd, 101st, 9th, and 11th Divisions, and the Army artillery, and also reconnoiter at all times, with a part of its strength, the whole situation, and maintain liaison with the Naval air unit.

The fighter units will mainly engage in controlling the air over the battlefield, and its vicinity, and, if necessary, provide cover for reconnaissance planes. Furthermore, until the arrival of bomber units, the fighter units will carry out bombing of the battlefield, in accordance with the Army order and the attack plans of each division.

(As a rule, until the bomber unit arrives, the enemy confronting the 3rd and 9th Divisions will be bombed by Navy planes, while the enemy confronting the 11th and 101st Divisions will be bombed by Army reconnaissance planes.)

(2) 2nd Combined Air Unit

(a) Bombing of the Battlefield

Generally speaking, the bombing by Army planes will be followed, but in the beginning, liaison personnel will be sent to the 3rd and 9th Divisions and clearly learn the targets, before bombing the enemy confronting these divisions. For this purpose, an element of Army planes will be used to maintain constant liaison.

After the Army bomber unit arrives, only important targets in the enemy's position will be attacked.


(b) Bombing of the Rear

The bombing of enemy rear areas will be carried out chiefly in the first period, when necessary, and the following places which are believed to be the positions of enemy headquarters will be bombed:

K'un-Shan
Ta-Ts'ang
Chia-Ting
Nan-Hsiang
Ta-Ch'ang-Chen.

7th Combined (a) Disrupting Transportation

Disruption of transportation will be effected at the proper time, chiefly in the first period, with the following important traffic points as bombing targets: Railway bridge southeast of K'un-Shan Bridges at Wai-Kan-Chen (west of Chia-Ting) and at Huang-Tu-Chen, and, if necessary Ch'eng-Ch'iao-Chen, Chiang-P'u, and Pei-Hsin-Chiang.



[NOTE: The units shown on the original chart are shown on the reproduction. Whether they relate to the airfield shown or to the telephone or to both, is not explained in the original text.]

D. Signal Communication

(1) Signal communication shall be maintained in accordance with the following regulations:

“(a) In the first period, wire telephone will be mainly used. For supplementary communication, use the radio which will accompany the Division.

(b) Regulations covering communications in the middle and later

periods will be decided later”

Secret: 2nd Combined Air Unit Operational Order No. 8

30 Sept. 37, Kungta Airfield, Shanghai

2nd Combined Air Unit Commander Minabe Teizo

2nd Combined Air Unit Order

“a. The enemy air force has lost the majority of his strength, and the air supremacy over this area is definitely in our hand.

b. No great change has taken place on the front of the Army and the marine units. The Army is now planning an operation against Ta-Chang-Chen, and for this purpose the 3rd and 9th Divisions are preparing for an advance to the southwest.

c. The 2nd Combined Air Unit, after tomorrow, 1 October, intends to support with its main force the operations of the 3rd and 9th Divisions.

d. Each unit, in accordance with the orders of their respective commanders in addition to the following orders, will cooperate in land combat by maintaining close liaison with Division headquarters and the 3rd Air Brigade (especially the Kawamura Unit).

(1) The 12th Air Unit will cooperate with the 3rd Division and the 13th Air Unit will support the 9th Division.

(2) Each unit will send one flight unit commander to be assigned to a Division as a liaison officer, with the special duty, beside liaison work, of definitely learning the extent of the frontline of friendly troops.

(3) Unless ordered otherwise, the attack will be commenced at 0800 hours.

(4) The number of aircraft to cooperate in the land combat will be as follows: The 12th Air Unit---not more than 12 carrier-based attack planes and carrier-based bombers. The 13th Air Unit---not more than nine carrier-based bombers.

The remaining airplanes will be held in readiness for two hours, and shall, if necessary, attack specified objects.

(5) The targets shall not be more than 700 meters beyond the frontline of friendly troops.

According to the situation, guidance to indicate the target for bomb-

2. Progress of Operation

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
1 October	Bombing enemy's rear	Tchangchen, Waikangchen, Maluchen, Chiating Headquarters	Carrier-based attack planes 30, Carrier-based bombers 30	14,980 kg	Waikangchen and Chiating were bombed as location of enemy headquarters according to special intelligence
	Direct cooperation with 101 st Div.	Chunghsinchai	Carrier-based attack planes 4	1,440 kg	
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	8 villages in front of the Div.	Carrier-based bombers 31	3,720 kg	At the beginning of the operation, the battle line was the line of Lotienchen-Liuchiahang Road and Tiching Creek, but toward evening, the 9 th Division advanced to the line of Wuchiachiao, Chouchia and Laochai, the 3 rd Division to the line of Chuchai, Peiwuting and Chenchiachai breaking through Tiching and the left wing occupied Liuchiahang.
	Bombing enemy's rear	Enemy headquarters in Nanhsiung Area	Carrier-based bombers 10	1,200 kg	According to special intelligence.
2 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div	19 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 12 Carrier-based bombers 25	7,320 kg	Towards the evening the 3 rd Division advanced to the line of Wanchiachai, Chiangchiachai and Paiyangchai
	Bombing enemy's rear	Nanmatou, Miaohangchen, Chenchishang, Peihsinching, Machiaochai, Chiangwanchen, Tchangchen	Carrier-based attack planes 7, Carrier-based bombers 22	5,160 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
2 October	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div. and 101 st Div.	Kuangfu, Hsinmuchiao, Chenchiahang, Miaohangchen	Carrier-based bombers 21	2,520 kg	One plane crashed; towards evening the 9 th Division advanced to the line of Pai-chao, Chaochiachai, and Changchiachai; enemy active in movement westwards.
	Bombing enemy's rear	Kunshan, Nanmatou(#)	Carrier-based bombers 15	1,800 kg	Bombed enemy headquarters according to special intelligence
3 October	Direct cooperation with the 3 rd Div.	15 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 12 Carrier-based bombers 9	5,040 kg	Towards evening, the 3 rd Division advanced to the line of Ssuehuanerh(#) and Tangchiao, and planned the night crossing of Wentsao creek.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	8 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based bombers 22	2,640 kg	Towards evening, the 9 th Division advanced to the line of Nanmeichai(#), Yaochiachai, Laochai, and Luchiachai.
	Bombing enemy's rear	Nanhsiangchen, Nanhsiang Station, Toumenchiao(#)	Carrier-based attack planes 7 Carrier-based bombers 11 Carrier-based fighters 3	3,600 kg	
4 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	12 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 4 Carrier-based bombers 10	2,640 kg	Consolidation of battle line
	Direct cooperation with the 9 th Div.	6 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based bombers 6	1,560 kg	Advanced to the line Hsinmuchiao, Lukangwan, Machiaotou, Yangchiachai, Tientu and Taichiahsiang.

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
4 October	Bombing enemy's rear	Troop concentration between Tachangchen and Nanhsiang, heavy artillery positions in Chiating	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bombers 18 Carrier-based fighters 12	5,760 kg	In accordance with army plane information and special intelligence
5 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	Enemy positions in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 8 Carrier-based bombers 25	4,440 kg	The result of the attack was extremely great and the division, immediately after the bombing, began to cross the river.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	7 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based bombers 19	2,280 kg	One carrier-based bomber crashed.
	Bombing enemy's rear	Peihsinching, Nanhsiangshen	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bomber 1	2,140 kg	
6 October	Direct cooperation with 101 st Div.	Enemy trenches and field artillery positions between Miaohangchen and Lichialou	Carrier-based planes 3	1,080 kg	
	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	Enemy positions in front of the division attack	Carrier-based planes 7 Carrier-based bombers 12	3,960 kg	The right wing of the 3 rd Division advanced to the line of Chiangmentou and Hailiufang
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	Enemy positions in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 8	2,880 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
6 October	Bombing enemy's rear	Enemy artillery positions in Chiangwan and vicinity	Carrier-based attack planes 20 Carrier-based fighters 8	7,800 kg	One plane crashed towards evening the 9 th Division advanced to the line of Pafangchao, Chaochiachai, and Chanyichiao. enemy active in government westwards
7 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	Enemy positions in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 4 Carrier-based bombers 9 Carrier-based fighters 4	3,000 kg	Occupied Chiangmentou and Hsiliufang
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	Chenchishang, Shengchai	Carrier-based attack planes 3 Carrier-based planes 3	1,350 kg	Occupied Tunyinchiao, Tingchai, and Chuchai
8 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	Enemy positions in front of the division	Carrier-based bombers 6 Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based fighters 2	2,940 kg	Due to rain, few planes participated; the 3 rd Division occupied Pafangchao.
	Bombing enemy's rear	Enemy artillery position in the vicinity of Chiangwanchen	Carrier-based attack planes 8	1,560 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	11 villages in front of the division near Chénia; warehouse at Feihsiang.	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bombers 12 Carrier-based fighters 4	3,060 kg	During the last two days, flying was impossible due to continuous rain; the 3 rd Division occupied, on the 9th, Tungshih-chaochiachiao, Chenchai, Wuchiacha, and on the 10th Tienpeichai, Tsochai, and Wuchiani; the 9 th Division occupied, on the 9th, Husuchai and Shengchai north of Chenchiahang; the 3 rd Division occupied on the 11th, the north part of Chashih-chiao and Haichai. The Tangchiaochen Electric Power Co. on the Poontung side was attacked as it was believed to be a meeting place of top officers of the Chinese Army according to special intelligence, and next day it was known that over 50 top officers were killed.
11 October	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	3 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack plane 1 Carrier-based bombers 5	960 kg	
	Direct cooperation with 101 st Div.	Massed enemy units counter-attacking Chiangwanchen Area	Carrier-based bombers 6	720 kg	
	Bombing enemy's rear	Road between Chiangwanchen Tachangchen and Nanhsiang, Poontung Electric Power Co.	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bombers 6 Carrier-based fighters 2	1,080 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
12 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	13 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 9 Carrier-based bombers 18	4,560 kg	The battle line was stalemated.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	2 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based bombers 3	360 kg	
	Bombing enemy's rear	Chiangwan, Fangpin Huangtuchen, Nanhsiang south of Tachangchen	Carrier-based attack planes 9 Carrier-based bombers 3 Carrier-based fighters 5	2,200 kg	
13 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	13 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based bombers 3 Carrier-based attack planes (?)	3,620 kg	Most of the villages in front of the 3 rd and 9 th Divisions were greatly destroyed by several days of continuous attacks, but because the enemy resisted stubbornly, the battle line did not develop favorably and as the enemy was located only a very short distance away, it became difficult display the power of bombing.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	6 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based bombers 9	1,080 kg	
13 October	Direct cooperation with 101 st Div.	3 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based bombers	900 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
13 October	Bombing enemy's rear	Enemy field artillery positions near Chiangwan, trains between Huangru and Kunshan; tanks near Chenju; warehouses near Chingpu, enemy concentration at Peihsinching	Carrier-based attack planes 9 Carrier-based bombers 19	3,038 kg	The 3 rd Division occupied Hsiang-shai and Hsiangshiangyochai
14 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div. and 101 st Div.	Enemy positions on flank of the 3 rd Division and in front of the 101 st Division.	Carrier-based attack planes 12 Carrier-based bombers 12	5,760 kg	The battle line was stalemated.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	3 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 5 Carrier-based bombers 5	2,680 kg	
	Bombing enemy's rear	Artillery position at Tachangchen, Nanshiang, and Chiangwan; mortar positions in front of 3 rd Div.; military trains between Kunshan and Soochow; warehouses in Chingpu; groups of junks near Nanshih.	Carrier-based attack planes 13 Carrier-based bombers 18	7,230 kg	
15 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div. and 101 st Div.	Enemy positions on flank of 3 rd Div. and in front 101 st Div.	Carrier-based attack planes 11	3,960 kg	The battle line was stalemated.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.		Carrier-based attack planes 4	1,440 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
15 October	Bombing enemy's rear	Tchangchen, Chiating; Huangtuchen	Carrier-based attack planes 7 Carrier-based bombers 7	3,860 kg	
16 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	5 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 8 Carrier-based bombers 9	4,500 kg	There was no change in the battle line.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	3 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bombers 6	3,660 kg	
	Bombing enemy's rear	Chiangwanchen, artillery positions in Nanhsiang; Peihsinching, Yangchiachiao; Huangtuchen	Carrier-based attack planes 5 Carrier-based bombers 5	2,400 kg	
17 October	Bombing enemy's rear	Maluchen; artillery positions in Chapei; trains between Huangtuchen, Sungchang and Shanghai, Chuyaochen, Chenjuchen; enemy troop concentrations	Carrier-based attack planes 15	9,440 kg	Since this day, the 12 th Air Unit began attacking enemy artillery positions and the 9 th Divisions against the enemy confronting these divisions. The mission of the 13 th Air Unit was changed to attacking the line of communication in the rear of the enemy.

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
20 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	5 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 7 Carrier-based bombers 2	3,020 kg	The 3 rd Division occupied Hukichai and Huanghsiangyuchai
30 October	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	3 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bombers 6 Carrier-based fighters 3	1,330 kg	
18 October	Bombing enemy's rear	5 artillery positions, trains (about 60 cars)	Carrier-based attack planes 8 Carrier-based bombers 15 Carrier-based fighters 2	5,320 kg	The 3 rd Division occupied Huangchai
26 October	Attacks against rear communication lines	Sungchiangpier and groups of junks, Chenju Radio Station, enemy troop concentrations, groups of junks in Hungchiao.	Carrier-based bombers 13	1,560 kg	
19 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	14 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 13 Carrier-based bombers 13 Carrier-based fighters 5	7,320 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
15 October	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	2 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 5 Carrier-based bombers 2	2,040 kg	The 9 th Division occupied Peitaotupin.
	Bombing of field artillery positions		Carrier-based attack planes 14 Carrier-based bombers 8	1,300 kg	
19 October	Night neutralization bombing	Tachangchen	Carrier-based bombers 3	750 kg	There was no change in the battle line.
	Attacks against rear communication lines	Enemy troop concentration and munitions at Sungchiang Station, Chiapaochen, Hung-chiaochen, Chiwangmiaochen and Loyangchen, automobiles and tanks in the vicinity of Nanhsiang	Carrier-based attack planes 6 Carrier-based bombers 12	3,600 kg	One of the carrier-based bombers crashed near Nanhsiang
	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	13 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 20 Carrier-based bombers 19	10,080 kg	Attacking enemy artillery positions and the 8 th Division against the enemy occupying these divisions. The mission of the 13 th Air Unit was changed to attack the line of communication in the rear.
20 October	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	2 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 3 Carrier-based bombers 2	1,320 kg	There was no change in the battle line.

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
20 October	Attacks against rear artillery positions	4 places	Carrier-based attack planes 6	2,160 kg	
	Night neutralization bombing	Tachangchen	Carrier-based bombers 4	480 kg	
	Destruction of rear communication lines	Junks in vicinities of Nanhsiangchen and Chiwangmiaochen, bridges at Huangtuchen and Chipaochen	Carrier-based attack planes 4 Carrier-based bombers 6	3,030 kg	
21 October	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	6 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 5 Carrier-based bombers 10	3,000 kg	Due to several days of continuous bombing, Japanese flight crews had become accustomed to the terrain and their accuracy increased permitting effective bombing against the enemy located only a short distance away from friendly forces. Towards evening, there was observed movement of large enemy groups westward.
	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	11 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 16 Carrier-based bombers 22	8,960 kg	
	Artillery positions	2 places	Carrier-based attack planes	2,080 kg	
	Rear communication lines and troop concentrations	Groups of junks at Huachuangchen, bridges near Hungchiao-chen, and concentrations of retreating troops	Carrier-based attack planes 5 Carrier-based bombers 15	3,600 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
22 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	21 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 11 Carrier-based bombers 14 Carrier-based fighters 3	7,520 kg	The 3 rd Division occupied Chenchai and Chuchai south of Wuchiayuan.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	6 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 9 Carrier-based bombers 3 Carrier-based fighters 3	4,940 kg	The 9 th Division occupied Chuchai south of Tingchiachiaochai.
	Attacks against artillery positions	Chiangwanchen	Carrier-based attack planes 5	900 kg	
	Bombing enemy's rear	Enemy headquarters, bridge at Peihsinching, Maluchen	Carrier-based attack planes 3 Carrier-based bombers 15	2,160 kg	
23 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	16 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 19 Carrier-based bombers 21	3,550 kg	Since morning, the enemy's rear was observed to be wavering. By evening the 9 th Division had advanced to the line of Luchai, Wangchiachai, Touchaichai, Louchiachai, Hsuchiachai, Pafangchai, Hsuchiahsiang, and Mantungchai. The 3 rd Division had occupied Chihkouchai and Lichiachai. The 101 st Division had occupied Kaochialiu. In every division, fighting developed advantageously.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	6 villages in front of the division	Carrier-based attack planes 9 Carrier-based bombers 9		

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
23 October	Bombing of artillery positions	Artillery positions in Hungchia-chao	Carrier-based bombers 3	360 kg	
	Attacks against rear communication	Groups of junks, enemy headquarters, munitions, retreating enemy	Carrier-based attack planes 5 Carrier-based bombers 13	3,360 kg	
24 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div and 9 th Div.	Enemy troop concentrations retreating in front of friendly forces.	Carrier-based attack planes 20 Carrier-based bombers 41	12,450 kg	Put enemy units in confusion and endeavored to aid the advance of friendly units.
	Bombing enemy's rear	13 important points in the rear	Carrier-based attack planes 40 Carrier-based bombers 18	15,150 kg	Attacked the enemy's retreat routes.
25 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	Attacks against enemy positions in front of the division, covering of stream crossing by friendly forces, attacks against retreating enemies.	Carrier-based attack planes 9 Carrier-based bombers 13 Carrier-based fighters 4	5,280 kg	The 3 rd and 9 th Divisions, which had been covered, since morning by the shelling and bombing crossed the Tsoumatang Creek at noon and began advancing. The combat situation suddenly developed favorably.
	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	The same as above	Carrier-based attack planes 12 Carrier-based bombers 7 Carrier-based fighters 2	5,400 kg	

Date	Mission	Objective of attack	Total number of planes used	Bombs Dropped	Remarks
25 October	Bombing enemy's rear	9 important points in the rear	Carrier-based attack planes 11 Carrier-based bombers 18	8,900 kg	
26 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div. and 9 th Div.	Enemies about 2,000 meters away from the front line of friendly forces.	Carrier-based attack planes 21 Carrier-based bombers 17 Carrier-based fighters 6	10,080 kg	The divisions occupied Tachangchen at 1700 hours, without serious enemy resistance.
	Bombing enemy's rear	Important points in the rear, villages .	Carrier-based bombers 30	3,600 kg	Every village into which enemy troop concentrations retreated was bombed and the enemy put into confusion.
27 October	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div. and 9 th Div.	1.5 kilometers forward from the markers in the front line of friendly forces.	Carrier-based attack planes 4 Carrier-based bombers 5 Carrier-based fighters 3	2,400 kg	As friendly forces advanced too rapidly and the enemy number was small, bombing was stopped. One friendly plane crashed.
	Bombing enemy's rear	Troop concentrations in rear, junks, important points in rear (12 villages)	Carrier-based attack planes 30 Carrier-based bombers 35	6,000 kg	One plane collided with a friendly reconnaissance seaplane and crashed.

During the above period in cooperation with army operations, the total number of planes uses was as shown in the following table.

Unit	Direct cooperation with 3 rd Div.	Direct cooperation with 9 th Div.	Direct cooperation with 101 st Div.	Bombing enemy's rear	Total
12 th Air Unit	587	213	15	384	1,199
13 th Air Unit	0	97	15	357	469
Total	587	310	30	741	1,668

The amount of bombs used in this operation was as follows:

Size of Bomb	330 kg	300 kg	250 kg	240 kg	60 kg	50 kg	35 kg	30 kg	Total
Number	18	20	194	0	4,904	42	244	56	5,478*

NOTE: Original document shows this figure to be 5,267.

3. Results

At about the time the planes of the 2nd Combined Air Unit began cooperating with the ground forces on 1 October, the front line of the 3rd and the 9th Divisions were halted along the line of the Lotienchen-Linchiahang Road and Jiching Creek. However, taking advantage of the wavering caused among the Chinese, through the fierce bombing by our planes, our army stormed to the line of Hsinmuchiao, Likangwan, Mochiaotou, Tsaichiachai, Tsaichiahsi, Liufang, and Tangchiao on 4 October, and further on to the line of Chusanfang, Tunwukuochai, and Chiangmentou on the 6th.

However, because of low-hanging clouds, and the deteriorating weather from the afternoon of the 4th, our planes were hindered from free action, and when the rain began to fall at last, on the 7th, their use had to be suspended until the 10th. During this period, our army was slowed down by knee-deep mud, and the enemy gained time to strengthen his defenses. For instance, it appeared that he had constructed basements in the villages, in preparation for possible air raids by our planes. Such being the case, our bombing attacks, which were resumed from November, were not as effective as before. Moreover, no active development could be observed in our line, though the villages on our front had mostly been destroyed.

However, it cannot be denied that, during this period, the Chinese Army suffered great losses along its troops in the rear, as well as at the front, through our bombing attacks. Enemy casualties, as reported by prisoners of war, reached some 2,000 during the two days of air raids against Machiaochai around the 16th, and moreover, dead Chinese numbering 600 to 800 were discovered in villages subsequently occupied by our army, though they had not been shelled by artillery. Indeed, all these facts clearly indicated the success of the bombing attacks.

What was better, our air crew members became so well-versed in the geographical features, and accustomed to their bombing duties through repeated raids from day to day that their bombing abilities gradually improved, and consequently, they were finally able to attack enemy positions very near to our front line with large bombs. Thus, the effect of the bombing was much better.

The occupation of Chenchiahang, which had greatly troubled the 9th Division, was one of the eloquent examples.

As a result of successive bombing attacks against the same village, when our ground forces were halted at the same battle line for half a month, the village was destroyed so thoroughly that its original features were hardly retained.

It is not an exaggeration to say that one of the reasons which enabled our army to break through the difficult geographical features, as well as the strong enemy positions was our aerial attacks which were carried out under complete control of air. This is especially so in view of the fact that we had no remarkable superiority regarding equipment and numerical strength when compared with the Chinese Army.

D. Damages Suffered

Five carrier-based bombers were shot down during the bombing of enemy positions. One carrier-based bomber crashed after a collision in mid-air with a friendly sea reconnaissance plane.

E. 26 September to 31 October-Mopping up Operations Against the Enemy Air Force.

1. Outline of Progress of Operations

After eleven successive raids on Nanking, the enemy air force, consisting only of a few planes, frequently changed its location from Nanking to Wuhu, and then to Yenchi, and sometimes dropped bombs on Shanghai in night raids. However, no actual damage was caused, due to their inaccurate bombing.

Even after the Nanking Air Attack Unit had been disbanded, frequent attacks against Nanking and other enemy air bases were made by our air force from the latter part of September to the middle of October, during which period our Type-96 carrier-based fighters actually displayed their unrivalled superiority, and none of them suffered any damages. However, when 13 carrier fighters escorting medium attack planes from the Kisarazu Unit were just over the city of Nanking on 12 October, seven enemy fighters blazed into an attack against our fighters which had separated from one another, and worse still, some of our fighters broke from the lead plane, and the wing planes alone took part in the fighting. Although about five enemy planes were shot down, three of our fighters were also found missing when the battle was over. It was indeed a matter of great regret that this disgraceful affair had spoiled the glorious war history of our Type-96 carrier fighters. Accordingly, our carrier fighter unit, under the command of Lt Nango, so completely blasted the enemy fighters from the skies over Nanking on the 14th and the 15th, that none of them dared to accept our challenge after that.

Meanwhile, a few enemy bombers, including the Northrop bombers, were protected from our bombing attacks by revetments constructed around the airbase and by fierce anti-aircraft fire. They were moved and dispersed in the

Nanking Area, and sometimes sallied forth to the Shanghai Area. It was difficult for our air force to destroy these planes on the ground by means of bombing attacks.

2. Results (Including those achieved by the Nanking Air Attack Unit):

a. Total number of planes used:

Type of Plane Parent Unit	Carrier fighter	Carrier bomber	Carrier attack plane	Carrier reconnaissance plane	Total
12 th Air Unit	18	27	9	3	57
13 th Air Unit	172	148	14		334
Total	190	175	23	3	391

b. Total number of attacks 38

c. Total days of attacks 24

d. Total number of enemy planes attacked:

174 (Includes 104 planes in the air, and about 70 planes on the ground).

e. Results

Enemy planes shot down in air battles 45

Enemy planes destroyed by bombing 21

Total 66 planes

3. Damages suffered

Planes shot down 11.

Type of plane Shot down by	Carrier bomber	Carrier fighter	Total
Air battles	4	3	7
Antiaircraft fire	4		4

4. Details of Progress of Operation

26 September-Reconnaissance and attack against the Luangte-Hangchow Area.

Despite dense clouds, two Type-97 carrier-based reconnaissance planes effectively performed their duties with extreme boldness.

They made a bombing attack against one Northrop bomber on the ground at Kuangte, and also made an extremely low-level reconnaissance flight over the three airfields in Hangchow, and verified that there were no enemy planes there. In the same way, they reconnoitered Chuchi and Ningpo, destroying one complete hanger, by bombing, at Ningpo.

28 September-Aerial Attack Against Kuangte Airfield.

Having received a special report that several Northrop bombers had arrived in Luangte on the previous night, six carrier-based bombers and four carrier-based fighters carried out a dawn attack, and bombed only the hanger and barracks, as not a plane was to be found on the new base or the old.

28 September-Aerial Attack Against Wuhu Airfield.

Informed by a special report of the previous night that Douglas transport planes were in Wuhu, eight carrier-based bombers and five carrier-based fighters carried out an aerial attack in the daytime.

On their way to the destination, they met a Curtiss-Hawk fighter cruising eastward and shot it down. Arriving over the airfield, they found six Douglas transport planes and one Curtiss-Hawk fighter, all on the ground. Four of them were set afire, while another was seriously damaged through the low-level bombing from a minimum altitude of 300 meters.

28 September-Bombing of Nanking and Chujung.

Twelve carrier-based bombers and five carrier-based fighters carried out an attack that afternoon. As there were no enemy planes over, nor on the airfield, half of the bombers bombed the hanger while the other planes attacked Chutung on their way back, destroying the hanger and two planes on the ground outside the hanger.

Witnessing five Curtiss-Hawk fighters during the action, our planes challenged, attacked, and shot down one of the fighters.

3 October - Cover for the Yen-ch'i Bombing Attack Unit.

Four fighters provided direct cover for medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit.

Morning of 6 October-Air raid on Wu-Hu and Nanking.

Since approximately nine hostile Northrops had made an air raid on Shanghai the previous night, the 3rd Fleet Commander ordered the medium attack planes of the 1st Combined Air Unit to attack Yen-Ch'i, and the 2nd Combined Air Unit to attack Nanking and Wu-Hu.

The attack on Wu-Hu was conducted by five carrier-based bombers and three carrier-based fighters. They dropped bombs on the hanger, because no enemy planes were to be seen on the airfield.

The attack on Nanking was also conducted by five carrier based bombers and three carrier-based fighters.

They located three or four small planes and six or seven medium planes on the airfield, and assaulted the massed medium planes, overturning one of them and inflicting damages on three or four others.

In the sky, there were some eleven enemy fighters flying in formation. However, two of them were shot down (one confirmed) by Warrant Officer (Flight) Mochizuki, who commanded our fighter unit, after a furious aerial battle. Another enemy plane was shot down.

However, the enemy's ground fire was extremely furious, and one of our carrier-based bombers was lost to antiaircraft fire.

Besides the above operations, five fighters provided close cover for the medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit which made a bombing attack on Yen-Ch'i.

Afternoon of 6 October-Destruction of Enemy Air Force in Nanking and Reconnaissance and Attack on Hung-Ch'iao and Kuang-Te.

The air raid conducted against Nanking in the morning disclosed that enemy fighters were numerous there, so a second attack was carried out immediately against the city, mainly by our carrier-based fighters.

Seven carrier-based fighters and three carrier-based bombers took off at 1445 hours, and reached their destination at 1610 hours. In the ensuing aerial engagement with approximately twelve enemy fighters, they shot down light (sic)-three by First-class Petty Officer (Flight) Koga, two by First Class Seamen (Flight)

Nakajima, and one each by First-class Petty Officer (Flight) Torakuma and First class Seamen (Flight) Mida. Meanwhile, we learned from a special intelligence report that four of the Northrops which had raided Shanghai the previous night had made a landing at Hung-Ch'iao. Four carrier-based bombers and six carrier-based fighters conducted a reconnaissance flight on Hung-Ch'io Airfield, but failed to locate a single enemy plane there. There was another intelligence report that now Northrops were at Kuang-Te. This information was based on the reconnaissance conducted by medium attack planes in the morning, but the Kuang-Te Airfield Attack Force, which was composed of four carrier-based bombers and two carrier-based fighters, found only dummy planes on the airfield.

12 October-Cover for the Nanking Air Raid Unit, and Reconnaissance and Attack on Kuang-te and Wu-Hu.

Twelve fighters provided cover for medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Air Unit. Some of these fighters, which operating out of formation, had an engagement with seven enemy fighters, and probably shot down five of them. However, we also lost three fighters in this aerial combat. It seems that they mistook hostile Breda fighters for our Type-96 carrier-based fighters, because of a striking resemblance between the two, and that they did not find out their mistake until they were actually shot down. From the fact that two of the three planes shot down were manned by those who had no experience in aerial combat, it was concluded that the loss of the above three planes was due to inadequate observation on the part of the pilots.

It must also be pointed out that elements of our fighter unit had separated into two formations, and were attacked separately. Moreover, the planes of the formation which was attacked, broke formation and conducted individual plane air combat.

Besides the above operation, six carrier-based bombers and three carrier-based fighters carried out reconnaissance and an attack against Kuang-Te and Wu-Hu, but failed to locate any enemy planes. They returned home, after dropping bombs on a brush-covered hanger at Wu-Hu.

13 October-Destruction of Enemy Air Strength in Nanking

In view of the situation of the previous day, the destruction of the enemy air force, mainly by carrier-based fighters, was attempted again. For this purpose, nine fighters and three bombers took off. However, the latter turned back at the halfway point due to low clouds. The former continued, but found no enemy planes in the target area and returned home without having engaged any enemy planes.

Morning of 14 October-Destruction of Enemy Air Strength in Nanking.

The operation for the destruction of enemy air strength in Nanking, which had been hampered by bad weather the previous day, was again carried out by an attack unit of the same organization.

The raiding planes reached Nanking about 1030 hours, and, sighting eleven enemy fighters (two of them Boeings and the rest Hawks) flying at an altitude of 4,800 meters, gave pursuit and shot down three of them. (two confirmed).

One of the above three was chased by our fighters to an altitude of about 20 meters and it crashed into the ground.

Afternoon of 14 October-Bombing Attack on Nanking.

In accordance with a special intelligence report that three Martins and six Heinkels had left Hankow and reached Nanking, four bombers and six fighters departed for a dusk bombing attack against the Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield.

These raiding planes reached the airfield at about 1740 hours. Upon discovery of a few enemy planes on the ground, they dropped bombs and scored some near hits. It is believed that this attack caused some loss to the enemy air force, for the following day a special intelligence report was received to the effect that only three of the six enemy planes that had advanced to Nanking had flown back to Hankow. However, there still was an enemy air raid on Shanghai that night.

Planes taking part in the above bombing attack on Nanking had to make a night landing. Despite an announcement to this effect, the Japanese units stationed near the airfield where the above planes were to land commenced heavy antiaircraft fire. Consequently, one fighter was forced to land in the water, three others were pierced by bullets and four bombers were damaged slightly at the time of landing.

16 October-Bombing Attack on Nanking.

Six bombers, three attack planes and six fighters made an attack on Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield in the afternoon. They found about 30 revetments around the airfield, and about three planes between them. They dropped bombs without scoring any hits. The carrier-based attack planes raided the hanger. No enemy fighters were seen flying in the sky.

15 October (Sic)-Attack on Ch'u-hsien Airfield.

This attack was conducted by five bombers, three attack planes, and eight fighters and in spite of bad weather, they successfully reached Ch'u-hsien. Since no enemy planes were to be found there, they dropped bombs and the barracks. On their way home, they also raided a hanger at Chu-Tung.

18 October-Bombing Attack on Nanking.

About 1610 hours, six bombers, one attack plane, and six fighters carried out an air assault against Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield.

They dropped bombs on an estimated 15 enemy planes seen in the revetments, but failed to score any direct hits. The hanger was also bombed.

After the bombing attack, our fighters maintained patrol over Nanking, for a time, with ought discovering any hostile planes.

19 October-Cover for the Nanking Air Attack Unit.

Six fighters provided direct cover for medium attack planes of the Kanoya Unit.

20 October-Reconnaissance and Attack on Hung-ch'iao Airfield and cover for the Nanking Air Attack Unit.

An intelligence report was received to the effect that the enemy air raid conducted on Shanghai the previous night, was by Hung-ch'iao-based planes. Therefore, three carrier-based fighters took off before dawn for the purpose of reconnoitering Hung-Ch'iao Airfield. However, there were no traces that the airfield had been used for some time. Nor was there any sign of human habitation, even when the airfield office was bombed.

Besides the above attack and reconnaissance, nine carrier based fighters provided close cover for the medium attack planes of the Kizarazu Unit raiding Nanking. However these fighters saw no enemy planes flying in the sky or likely to come up and fight.

21 October-Cover for the Nanking Air Attack Unit.

Seven carrier-based fighters provided direct cover for the medium attack planes of the 1st Combined Air Unit raiding Nanking, but met no enemy fighters.

22 October-Bombing attack on Nanking and Yen-Ch'i.

Three attack planes and three fighters, staged an attack on Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield in Nanking, inflicting damages upon the hanger and barracks,

Meanwhile, one attack plane and three fighters made a bombing attack against Yen-ch'i Airfield, and dropped bombs on one large plane and one small plane on the ground, destroying the former.

23 October-Cover for the Nanking and Yen-ch'i Bombing Attack Force

Six fighters took off on the mission of providing direct cover by these fighters for the Nanking and Yen-ch'i Air Attack Units. Both units were composed of medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit. However, the three fighters heading for Nanking failed to join the medium attack planes which they were expected to cover. Consequently they arrived separately at Nanking and patrolled over the city for half an hour. No enemy planes were observed at Nanking or Yen-ch'i.

24 October- Cover for the Nanking Air Attack Unit.

Six carrier-based fighters departed to provide direct cover for medium attack planes of the 1st Combined Air Unit raiding Nanking. There were no enemy planes flying over Nanking. Lt Nango, who commanded the fighter unit, descended alone to an altitude of 700 meters, and conducted an accurate reconnaissance of the airfield.

Our fighters, while patrolling over the city, sighted one Northrop approaching from the Wu-Hu Area, and shot it down. Subsequent special intelligence disclosed that the pilot of this downed Northrop was the 11th Unit Commander, a Chinese air officer of outstanding ability.

26 October-Reconnaissance and Attack on Hang-Chow, Kuang-Ti and Chu-Jung.

Two attack planes, one reconnaissance plane, and five fighters took part in this operation. However, there were no enemy planes on any airfield. The raiding planes destroyed a hanger at Chu-Jung.

29 October-Reconnaissance and Attack on the Chien-te Airfield.

By order of the Commander in chief of the China Area fleet, four attack planes and three fighters, all carrier-based, reconnoitered the Chien-te, Lan-

ch'i and Hang-chow Airfields. However, since no enemy planes were found on these airfields, they returned home.

(Note) Operations conducted by the 1st and 2nd Carrier Divisions and seaplane units during the above period are unknown, for there is no data available.

Part 4.

Japanese Army's Aerial Operations

In the Hopeh Operation, (the Shih-chia-chung—Fu-yang-ho Battle) executed in October 1937, the Provisional Air Group advanced its main body to the North and South Paoting Airfields, and commanded the 1st Air Brigade and the 4th Air Brigade to cooperate with the 1st Army and the 2nd Army respectively. At the same time, the heavy bomber units belonging to both air brigades were put under the direct command of the Air Group, and assigned to hamper the enemy's retreat, to bomb the Sha-ho Railway Bridge, the Shun-te and Chang-te Stations, Yuan-Shih, Kao-i, and Nei-Ti, and to cooperate with the ground forces' pursuit.

In the middle part of October, after the T'ai-yuan Campaign had begun, the Provisional Air Group advanced its main body to Yang-kao Airfield and Shih-Chia-Cuang, to cooperate in the above campaign.

They left an element at Tientsin Airfield to cooperate with the 1st Army's operation.

At the time of the 5th Army's campaign against Hsin-Kou-Chen, elements of the 1st Air Brigade, one from Yang-kao Airfield and another from Yang-min-pao Airfield, cooperated in the campaign. The main body of the Air Brigade cooperated with the 20th Division from the Shih-chia-chuang Airfield, by bombing Nian-Tzu-Kuan and contributing towards the favorable development of the situation in that area.

Enemy air strength in the vicinity of T'ai-Yuan, which had been destroyed by the Provisional Air Brigade of the Kwantung Army in the latter part of September, gradually regained its strength, and began to frequently bomb the area along the Peiping-Hankow Railway, and the area occupied by the 5th Division (the northern part of Shansi Province). Therefore, the Provisional Air Group, in the latter part of October, attacked the Fen-yang Airfield and destroyed two enemy planes with bombs, and, at the end of October, not only shot down an enemy plane over T'ai-yuan, but destroyed eight planes on the ground.

In Central China, the 3rd Air Brigade, in cooperation with naval air units, participated in operations in the vicinity of Wen-tsao-pin and Ta-ch'ang-chen, and was

engaged in reconnoitering, bombing enemy positions and his rear, and maintaining liaison between the groups.

Situation in November 1937

By the latter part of October, the battle on the Shanghai front was almost settled, and the Chinese forces were put to westward flight. But, the Japanese Army, in order to expand its gains and to drive the enemy away with one effort, decided to make a landing at Hang-Chow Bay to attack, from the rear, the enemy surrounded Shanghai. This action was started in the early part of November. Therefore, the emphasis of aerial operations in Central China, in November, shifted to the Hang-chow area, and the naval air units used their main strength to cooperate in the combat in this area.

In the latter part of November, an element of a medium attack plane unit, advancing its base to the Nanyuan Airfield in Peiping, North China, commenced operations to win air supremacy to the interior of North China, and, with the special cruising power of its planes, attacked even the remote areas of Loyang and Hsi-an.

Part 1.

General Situation

A. Central China Front.

Several units belonging to the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, having reached the line of Soochow Creek by the end of October, continued in pursuit of the enemy. In the meantime, the newly organized 10th Army, having landed at Hang-Chow Bay on 5 November, and, sweeping away the enemy in its path, reached the line of the Jhangpoo River,

The Central China Expeditionary Army was organized from the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, and the 10th Army, according to an order dated 7 November. On the same day, the Supreme Command in Tokyo instructed the Area Army Commander to limit his operational area, generally, to the area east of the line connecting Soochow and Chia-Hsing.

Meanwhile, as the enemy in and around Shanghai began to retreat westward on a full-scale on the night of the 11th, all units began to move forward in unison. In addition, the landing operation near Phi-mao-kou on the bank of the Yangtze River, which was to be made on the 16th, was advanced, and on the 13th the 16th Division, which had been diverted from North China, landed at the above place.

On the 14th, the Area Army Commander commanded the occupation of the line connecting Fu-Shan, Soochow, and Chiahsing.

The 6th Division, which had landed at Hang-Chow Bay, made a mighty drive and occupied Kunshan on the 15th, while on the 14th, its detachment occupied Pingwangchen. On the 19th the 10th Army's main body occupied Chiahsing.

The 9th Division, advancing westward from the Shanghai front, arrived in Kunshan on the 15th, and occupied Soochow on the 19th. On the 19th, the 11th Division intercepted the route between Chang-shu and Soochow, while the 16th Division occupied Changshu.

Thus, the Central China Area Army had advanced to the line connecting Chang-shu, Soochow, and Chia-hsing by 19 November, and as prearranged, the first line units made further preparations for the pursuit of the enemy toward the Wuhai and Huchou Areas.

Now, the Supreme Command in Tokyo, which had restricted the operational area of the Area Army to the sector east of the line connecting Soochow and Chia-shing, considering the war situation and especially first line units' advancement, removed the restrictions on 24 November.

Then it admitted that a part of the strength might advance west of Wuhsi, in the district north of Tai-hu, and also gave secret instructions that the battle-front must not be expanded to the west beyond Huchou in the district south of Taihu.

The Shanghai Expeditionary Army's main body occupied Wuhsi on 25 November, advanced further westward, and on the 29th arrived at Chang-chou.

In the meantime, on 18 November, the Commander of the 10th Army considering the general situation to be most opportune for a drive to Nanking, deployed units under his command for an offensive, and presented to the Imperial General Headquarters his plan. However, on the 22d he received, from the Area Army Commander, the following order: "Cease to pursue the enemy towards Nanking, but an advance party may be dispatched from Huohou." Thereupon, the 10th Army Commander organized elite units around three infantry battalions in each division to pursue the enemy. The main body of the Army occupied Huchou on the 24th, and on the 25th reached Changhsing. The elite units of each division continued forward, and on the 28th, occupied I-hsing and on the 30th, Kuangte.

B. North China Front

The fighting in the Shansi Province Area, which was at its most furious peak during the month of October, became somewhat calm with the retreat of the enemy forces in Hsinkouchen, in November, and with the occupation of Taiyuancheng on the 9th, and later of Fenyang and Yutsu.

The 2nd Army, which had advanced into the Shansi Area, executed, in the middle part of November, mopping-up operations on the northern banks of the Yellow River, and also made preparations for the Shantung Campaign.

C. Operations in the First Half of November.

The main objective of operations in the first half of November was to cooperate with the ground fighting in both the Hangchou Bay Landing Operation and the Paimaokou Landing Operation. The total number of planes put into action was 248, and the gross weight of aerial bombs used was about 14 tons.

In addition during this period, two attacks on the Canton-Hankow Railroad Area by 18 planes (total), and three attacks on Nanking Airfield by 15 planes were the only other operations besides the above.

1. Attack on the Canton-Hankow Railroad.

On 1 November nine medium attack planes of the Kanoya Air Unit took off to attack Hengyang, but gave up the bombing because low clouds covered the target area. Again on the 3d, nine medium attack planes of the Kanoya Unit took off, but due to bad weather in the vicinity of Hengyang, the primary target, and Ichang, the secondary target, they bombed two freight trains (approximately 40 cars) instead, which were at a halt about 10 nautical miles north of Chengsien, located halfway between the two target areas, and destroyed one locomotive and several freight cars.

2. Attack on Nanking.

Despite severe bombing during the past two or more months, the Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield at Nanking still remained in operational condition, and with airplanes dispersed in the revetments, it was active as a frontline base for the Chinese Air Force. In November, the 1st Air Unit attacked Nanking several times by employing its Shanghai Detachment.

On 10 and 15 November, three medium attack planes from the Shanghai Detachment of the Kisarazu Air Unit, in cooperation with an air unit of the 2nd Combined Air Unit, bombed Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield, but no great results were achieved on either occasion.

A. General Situation

Date	Attack Objectives	Number of Participating Planes	Remarks
1 Nov.	Heng-yang	Medium attack planes 9	No bombing was carried out, due to bad weather.
2 Nov.	Sung-chiang	Medium attack planes 9	Attack on the city
3 Nov.	Canton-Hankow Railroad	Medium attack planes 9	Attack on a group of freight cars
5 Nov.	Cha-pil and Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad	Medium attack planes 23	Beginning of the Hangchow Bay Landing Operation ("N" Operation)
6 Nov.	Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad and the Grand Canal	Medium attack planes 24	
7 Nov.	Ching-pu	Medium attack planes 3	Attack on the city
8 Nov.	Chia-shan and Kun-shan(#)	Medium attack planes 9	Attack on the cities
9 Nov.	Soochow, Chia-chan, etc.	Medium attack planes 34	Attack on the cities
10 Nov.	Soochow, Kan-shan and Wu-hai	Medium attack planes 30	Attack on the cities
	Nanking	Medium attack planes 3	Attack on Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield, under escort of 9 carrier-based fighters of 2 nd Combined Air Unit
11 Nov.	Nanking	Medium attack planes	Attack on Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield under escort of 9 carrier-based fighters of 2 nd Combined Air Unit.

Date	Attack Objectives	Number of Participating Planes		Remarks
11 Nov.	Kun-shan, Chia-ting, etc	Medium attack planes	9	
		Large attack planes	3	
12 Nov.	Ning-po and Chia-shing	Medium attack planes	12	1 st Combined Air Unit (exclusive of the Kisarazu Air Unit's Shanghai Expeditionary Unit and the Kanoya Air Group) was placed under tactical command of the 2 nd Fleet Commander in Chief.
	Chia-ting and Tai-tsang	Medium attack planes	10	
		Large attack planes	4	
13 Nov.	Pai-mao-kou(#)	Medium attack planes	12	Beginning the Pai-mao-kou(#) Landing Operation ("K" Operation)
		Large attack planes	6	
14 Nov.	Chang-shu and Soochow	Medium attack planes	15	
	Nanking	Medium attack planes	3	Attack on Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield with 6 carrier-based attack planes and 9 carrier-based fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit.
15 Nov.	Soochow	Medium attack planes	12	
	Fu-shan-chen, etc.	Medium attack planes	3	Cooperation with land combat.
		Large attack planes	2	
16 Nov.	1 st Combined Air Unit Headquarters moved to the Che-ju Do Base from Taipei.			
19 Nov.	1 st Combined Air Unit Commander, leading 18 medium attack planes of the Kisarazu Unit, advanced to Nan-yuan.			
20 Nov.	1 st Combined Air Unit (exclusive of the Kisarazu Air Unit's Shanghai Expeditionary Unit and the Kanoya Unit) was placed under the tactical command of the 4 th Fleet Commander in Chief.			
21 Nov.	Chou-chia-kou	Medium attack planes	10	Attack on the airfield.

Date	Attack Objectives	Number of Participating Planes	Remarks
22 Nov.	Chou-chia-kou	Medium attack planes 11	Attack on the airfield.
23 Nov.	I-hsing	Medium attack planes 6 Large attack plane 1	Attack on the city.
24 Nov.	Lo-yang	Medium attack planes 11	Attack on the airfield, under escort of fighters.
	Chang-sha	Medium attack planes 5	Attack on the airfield.
	Nanking	Medium attack planes 2	Attack on the Nanking Telephone Exchange Office, in cooperation with 6 carrier-based bombers and 9 carrier-based fighters of the 2 nd Combined Air Unit.
	Chang-chou	Large attack planes 4	Attack on the city
25 Nov.	Chang chou, I-hsing	Medium attack planes 6 Large attack planes 2	Attack on the cities
	Lo-yang(#)	Medium attack planes 12	Escorted by 3 army fighters.
	I-hsing	Medium attack planes	
26 Nov.	Ning-kou	Medium attack planes 6 Large attack planes 2	
27 Nov.	Ning-kou	Medium attack planes 4 Large attack planes 2	Escorted by 6 fighters

Date	Attack Objective	Number of Participating Planes	Remarks
27 Nov.	Hsi-an	Medium attack planes 12	Attack on the airfield.
	Tan-yang	Medium attack planes 10	Attack in combination with the 2 nd Combined Air Unit.
28 Nov.	Kung Hsien	Medium attack planes 12	Attack on the arsenal.
	Chen-chiang	Medium attack planes 2 Large attack planes 12	
29 Nov.	Lo-yang	Medium attack planes 12	Attack on the airfield.
	Piao-shui	Medium attack planes 2 Large attack planes 2	Attack in combination with the 2 nd Combined Air Unit.
30 Nov.	Hsiao-shan(#)	Medium attack planes 2	
		Large attack planes 3	

On the 11th, nine medium attack planes of the Kanoya Unit, joined by nine fighters of the 2nd Combined Air Unit, bombed Ta-Chiao-Ch'ang Airfield in Nanking. This bombing was successful, with more than 10 direct hits scored upon revetments on the south side of the field, containing five medium planes. During this attack, one of our medium attack planes was hit by antiaircraft fire over Nanking, and crashed in flames.

3. Support of Ground Operations.

Ground operations were initiated on 5 November, when the Hangchow Bay Landing Operation ("N" Operation) was carried out, and the following was the plan of air cooperation with this operation:

a. First Day.

Attack and neutralization of Cha-p'u Fortress.

(1). Strength to be employed and time for attacks

First wave: Kisarazu Unit's six to nine planes...0700 to 0730 hours.

Second wave: Kanoya Unit's six planes...0730 to 0800 hours.

Third wave: Kisarazu Units six planes...0800 to 0830 hours

Fourth wave: Kanoya Units six planes...0830 to 0900 hours.

(2). Attack targets:

Target 5: east of the battery for the Kisarazu Unit.

Target 6: west of the battery for the Kanoya Unit.

Prevention of movement or concentration of enemy strength.

(1). Strength to be employed and time for attack.

First wave: Kanoya Unit's four to six planes... 1000 to 1100 hours.

Second wave: Kisarazu Unit's six planes... 1530 to 1630 planes.

Third wave: Kanoya Unit's six planes... attack on key points of road at about 1800 hours.

(2) Reconnaissance and patrol will be continued by the battery attack unit for about half an hour after the attack, and by the first and second waves of the unit to prevent enemy movement and concentration for the designated hour over the assigned areas and walled towns.

(3) On the way to and from the target area, the Kanoya planes will operate over Chen-hai in order to check enemy troops in that area.

b. Second Day and Afterwards.

The movement and concentration of enemy strength will be prevented as much as possible, according to the following plan:

Areas assigned to units.

Kisarazu Unit. Area north of the Grand Canal (including the canal) to the Area south of the Grand Canal to the Kanoya Unit.

Principles in checking the enemy.

Each unit will fly three planes at every odd hour from 0500 to 1500 hours. After reaching their destination, the planes will be assigned to checking and neutralizing enemy movements for about one hour (even after a bombing). But the last wave of planes starting at 1500 hours will bomb important points on the road

In case one unit cannot employ its planes, due to unfavorable weather conditions, etc., the area assigned to the unit will be taken over by another unit.

5 November - First day of "H" Operation

As scheduled, the Kanoya Unit flew 12 planes to attack the Cha-p'u-chen Fortress, and 11 planes to prevent movement and concentration of enemy troops, but due to bad weather in the target areas, the planes failed to fulfill their missions.

Kisarazu Units

A total of 20 planes took off in four waves. However, they found it difficult to locate the targets, as the target areas were all covered with fog and clouds, but they bombed the Cha-p'u Battery at four points, and a freight train near Hsien-chiao-chen.

6 November - Second day of "H" Operation.

The 10th Army's Hang-chow Bay Landing Operation was progressing smoothly, and the landed troops more hurriedly advancing northwards. Since the weather in the target area was still bad on this day, four of the 12 planes of the Kanoya Unit returned home without bombing, while the other eight planes could bomb only through breaks in the clouds.

The Kisarazu Unit dispatched eight planes, but due to bad weather the planes could not penetrate the northern sector over the Grand Canal and, instead, bombed the southern sector before returning.

The Kanoya Unit bombed railway installations of the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad at Chia-hsing, Su-shan, She-hsing-chen, and Hangchow, and roads and fortresses at Chang-an-chon, Haining, and Chiao-ssu-chen.

The Kisarazu Unit bombed a group of junks on the Grand Canal, and Chang-an and Chia-k'ou Stations, and achieved considerable results.

However, at 2230 hours on 6 November, the commander in chief of the China Area Fleet issued the following order:

"1. Enemy troops are moving southward toward Ch'ingp'u from the K'unshan-chiating Area.

2. The spearhead of the 10th Army had already crossed the Whangpoo River, and is heading of Sung-chiang.

3. On the following day each air attack unit will operating according to the following plan:

- a. The 1st and 4th Air Attack Units will continue their present missions.
- b. The 3rd Air Attack Unit will be relieved of the mission to prevent the movement of enemy troops, and, with its main strength, will attack Chia-shan (primary target) and Ch'ing-p'u (secondary target)."

Third day of November "H" Operation

Six attack planes of the Kanoya Unit started for Chia-shan, but on the way they were caught in very bad weather in the vicinity of the T'ai-chou Islands and, as their formation was broken up, they were ordered back. It was the season when weather conditions between the northern part of Formosa and the Chushan

Archipelago was especially bad, often making flight difficult.

Three medium attack planes from the Kisarazu Unit located Ch'ing-pu with great difficulty and bombed the city, but the other six planes of the same unit returned without being able to find their target.

8 November - Fourth day of "H" Operation

Since the spearhead of the 10th Army had advanced so fast that the commander in chief of the China Area Fleet could not locate its position on the evening of the 7th, he cancelled the scheduled air support of ground operation for the following day, and ordered the 3rd Air Attack Unit to attack Chia-shan (primary target) and Chia-hsing (secondary target) again.

On the basis of this order, nine medium attack planes from the Kisarazu Unit took off to attack Chia-shan on the 8th, but on the way four of the planes received orders to change their target and bombed K'un-shan.

This day it was confirmed that friendly ground troops had advanced as far as Tee-chin-chen.

At this time, due to a long spell of rain in Taipei, the maintenance of aircraft became difficult, and trouble developed in one plane after another.

9 November - 5th day of "H" Operation, Pursuit attack launched

Although the Shanghai-Hangchow Railroad was cut off west of Sung-chiang by the 10th Army on the 8th, enemy movement became active in the area southwest of Shanghai, and many freight trains were coming to Soochow. On the 9th the commander in chief of the China Area Fleet ordered the 3rd Air Attack Unit to attack freight trains, stations, and warehouses in the vicinities of Soochow and K'un-shan.

On the basis of this order, 12 medium attack planes from the Kanoya Unit attacked the vicinity of Soochow, and six medium attack planes from the Kisarazu Unit attacked the vicinity of K'un-shan. However, on receipt of intelligence reports that the enemy was in a general rout, more aircraft were immediately sent out, namely, four Kanoya planes and 12 Kisarazu planes. They attacked such areas as K'un-shan, Soochow, and Chia-sha, and inflicted great damages on concentrations of trains and trucks in those areas.

10, 11, and 12 November - Pursuit attack

As the enemy was still retreating in confusion to the west, our bombing in that

area continued for three days.

In other words, on the 10th, 18 Kanoya planes took off, one after another, and bombed railroad stations and freight trains at Soochow and Wu-hsi, and 12 planes from the Kisarazu Unit took to the air in three waves and attacked railroad stations and military installations at K'un-shan and Wu-hsi.

From the 11th on, three medium attack planes and one large attack plane from the Shanghai Detachment of the Kisarazu Air Unit participated in the operation. This day the medium attack planes flew three times (a total of nine sorties) and the large attack plane flew three sorties, and bombed the area bordering the railroad between Nan-hsing and K'un-shan.

By an order effective the 12th, the Kisarazu Air Unit was to be employed in the operations in the North China Area, and the Kanoya Unit and the Shanghai Detachment of the Kisarazu Unit alone were to be employed in air operations in Central China.

On the 12th, 12 medium attack planes from the Kanoya Unit took off to attack Wu-hsi, but due to bad weather they bombed the vicinity of Ning-do instead, and inflicted considerable damage upon railroad installations.

13 November - First day of "K" Operation

The Kanoya Unit sent six planes to attack Mei-li-chen, and another six to Chin-tang-chen, while the Shanghai Detachment made a total of 14 sorties, six by large attack planes and eight by medium attack planes, and bombed Mei-li-chen, Chih-t'ang-chen, Pai-mao-hsin-shah, Ku-li-ts'un, and Hsieh-chia-chiao-chen. Both units achieved substantial results.

14 November - Second day of "K" Operation

The Changshu Attack Unit, consisting of six planes, and the Soochow Attack Unit consisting of six planes were sent out by the Kanoya Unit. The Changshu Attack Unit, landing on the Wangpin Airfield, planned a second attack but, due to the muddy condition of the airfield, only three of the planes barely succeeded in loading bombs, and they carried out the second attack against Changsha. Grati-fying results were obtained by both Attack Units when they bombed their respective towns.

The Shanghai Unit also attacked Changshu with six sorties by medium attack planes and five sorties by large-type attack planes.

15 November - Third day of "K" Operation.

The Kanoya Unit, dividing 12 medium attack planes into two flights carried out attacks against Siochou, causing fires in three quarters of the city.

The Shanghai Unit bombed Fushanchen and Yangchienchen with three medium attack planes and two sorties by large-type attack planes on this day.

C. Operations in the Latter Half of November

This was an important period and marked a new epoch in the history of aerial operations in the China Incident when aerial operations in the Central China Area had come to an end and the main force of the Kisarazu Unit, which had advanced into the North China Area, began successful bombing attacks against Chouchiakou, Hsian, and Loyang.

At the beginning of October, the 3rd Fleet Headquarters keenly felt the necessity of attacking the Lanchow and Hsian Areas for the purpose of interrupting the concentration of Chinese planes and, especially, the transport of weapons from the Soviet Union. This was suggested to the Central Command. In response thereto, the Navy General Staff expressed its intention of dispatching the medium attack planes from the Kisarazu Unit to the North China Area for a short period to carry out surprise attacks against the Lanchow and Hsian Areas, and suggested that an investigation be made on bases in the North China Area.

According to an actual survey conducted by members of the Kisarazu Unit, it became known that Nanyuan, despite some defects, could be used as a strategic base in the North China Area, and that the Yanghao Airfield entirely lacked quarters and complete security and guard, though seemingly available for the landing and taking-off of planes. As for the Jaturg Airfield, it proved to be unsuitable for the landing and taking-off of heavy planes. Accordingly, necessary preparations were being made to use Nanyuan as an advanced base, and Yangkao as a supply base. However, toward the middle of October, the advance into the North China Area by the Kisarazu Unit was postponed for the time being.

However, when this problem again came to the fore in November, the Hanton and the Jaiyuan Airfields, due to the progress of ground operations, were considered as possible air bases for future air operations. Furthermore, the use of carrier-based fighters was also under consideration.

On 12 November, the 1st Combined Air Unit (excluding the Kanoya Unit and the Shanghai Detachment of the Kisarazu Unit) was placed under the tactical command of the 2nd Fleet Commander, in connection with operations.

The Kisarazu Unit commenced the transfer movement to its new base immediately, and some 200 advance troops left Cheju-do on two destroyers, and

completed setting up their new base on Nanyuan Airfield by the 16th (About five tons of supplies and equipment were brought along at the time of transfer).

The 1st Combined Air Unit Headquarters moved from Taipei to Cheju-do on 16 November, and 18 medium attack planes from the Kisarazu Unit, led by the unit commander, advanced to Nanyuan on the 19th.

The Nanyuan Advanced Unit, which was placed under the tactical command of the newly organized 4th Fleet, on 20 November, in connection with operations, received the following order on that day:

"a. The 1st Combined Air Unit Commander, using Nanyuan as a base, shall blast military facilities, as well as the enemy's air strength along the Lunghai Railroad west of Loyang (inclusive), and then attack the Lanchow Area after making necessary investigations and establishing an advanced bases and advancing air strength to raid base.(?)

b. Main bombing targets:

The Hsian Airfield and its General Air Supply Department, the Loyang Airfield (two fields), the Branch Flight School and the Aircraft Repair Section, the Lanchow Airfield and its Air Supply Department, other airfields in the above mentioned area, and locomotive sheds and interchange points of main railway stations.

c. Attacks should be made only against enemy troops and military facilities, paying special care not to infringe on the rights of any third nationals."

1. Attack Against Chouchiakou (21-22 November)

The following is the special information obtained from the Information Section:

"16 November-Nineteen enemy planes of various types at Loyang moved to Chouchiakou.

17 November-The Chouchiakou Airfield had been under construction for enlargement from 16 October, and was completed on 15 November. As many as 19 planes arrived there from Loyang on the previous day.

20 November - The airfields of Chouchiakou, Yangnhou, and Hsiangyang are not operational due to rainfall."

Putting these together, the chief of Staff of the China Area Fleet issued the following information:

“According to reliable information, the Chouchiakou Airfield is not operational due to a long spell of heavy rainfall. There are 19 planes at the Airfield.”

On the basis of this information, the 1st Combined Air Unit Commander decided to strike the unit's first blow against Chouchiakou Airfield after moving to North China and ordered 12 medium attack planes to make a bombing attack on the 21st.

However, the number of planes which could actually take part in the bombing attack was 10, owing to engine trouble, in the other planes on that day. The bombing unit, commanded by Lt Irisa, left Nanyuan at 1015 hours, and made a surprise attack against Chouchiakou Airfield at approximately 1245 hours.

Having observed one large-type plane and about 20 small planes on the ground, the bombing unit bombed the planes and hanger also, scoring 60 direct hits or near misses with 60 kilogram bombs on the planes outside the hanger, definitely blasting and destroying one large type plane and about 10 small-type planes, and starting fires at several points. One direct hit was also made on a building, seemingly a warehouse.

The second attack against Chouchiakou was on the 22d. At that time, there were several enemy planes which had escaped the attack of the previous day, and some other planes supposedly not seriously damaged, and several planes, were observed on the adjacent Taikang Airfield, so a plan to destroy the remaining air strength was planned.

After leaving Nanyuan at 0900 hours, 11 medium attack planes led by Lt Commander Sugahisa reached Chouchiakou Airfield at approximately 1150 hours, by way of the Taikang Airfield.

Five enemy fighters, two of which had taken off from the airfield just before the bombing attack and three planes which had been waiting in the air for our arrival, attacked our medium attack plane unit, which nevertheless carried out their bombing mission while fighting the attacking planes.

As a result of air combat, one medium attack plane was shot down, but the bombing was carried out effectively. Of one large plane and 14 small planes (excluding the fighters in the air) which were on the ground, one large plane and approximately 10 small ones were bombed, and fires were started at several places. One small plane which was about to take-off was badly damaged by the blast of a bomb.

During this bombing, we engaged five enemy fighters and lost one plane,

as mentioned above, but could not shoot down any of the enemy fighters.

As can be seen from the two-day attack upon Chouchiakou, the main body of Chinese air strength in the North China Area had apparently been concentrated at Chouchiakou at that time and had been destroyed by this two-day attack.

The fighters which engaged us on the 22d were two Curtiss Hawks, and three low-wing monoplanes, with retractable landing gear. The latter were believed to be Soviet I-16's.

Comparatively few planes participated in this operation due to the many plane accidents which had occurred because of the unaccustomed cold.

2. Attack on Lo-yang (24, 25, and 29 November)

The following special intelligence was received, confirming the strategic value of Lo-yang.

Report of 7 November by the 7th Battalion Commander in Lo-yang.

"Of the present strength (16 Curtiss planes), seven are operational and two are under examination."

Report of 13 November: "Important centers of air traffic in the early part of November (excluding the movement of training planes) are as follows:

Hsi-an: 34 movements of planes

Lan-chow: 28 "

Lo-yang: 23 "

Nanking: 15 "

Hankow: 13 "

This shows that Lo-yang is third in the traffic handled among Chinese airfields."

Report of 15 November:

The North Front Army headquarters in Lin-fan moved to Lo-yang on the 11th.

Report of 21 November:

Early in October, the Curtiss plane unit and the S (TN, unknown) Unit concentrated at T'ai-yuan and its vicinity, and frequently took the offensive

against our North China Army, but with the fall of T'ai-yuan on 8 November, almost all of the remaining enemy planes concentrated at Lo-yang.

On 22 November an Army plane unit reconnoitered Lo-yang, and reported that there were 13 medium planes at the Lo-yang Airfield.

Also since Lo-yang was located within the operational sphere of Army fighters based at Chang-to, and agreement was made with the Army, on 23 November, so that the Lo-yang attack by the Navy would be assisted by Army fighters.

On the 24th, 11 medium attack plane (commanded by Lt Col Hayasida) left Nan-yuan at 1115 hours, and, after meeting four Army fighters over Chang-te at 1330 hours, headed for Lo-yang. Though they sighted three planes on the Lo-yang Airfield, including medium and small ones in front of hangers, and 24 planes in revetments around the airfield, they did not meet any counterattack from enemy planes and ground fire.

Six planes (two of which were set afire) were definitely bombed and destroyed in this raid, two planes were considerable damaged, and hangers and barracks were also hit.

On the following day, the 25th, 12 medium attack planes took off to destroy any enemy planes still intact after the previous day's attack. As on the day before, they incorporated three Army fighters over Chang-te and advanced together. On the ground they sighted a large plane and approximately eight small ones in revetments, and bombed them, causing considerable damage to the large planes and also heavy damage to the hangers.

Immediately before the bombing raid, several small planes took off, and escaped without fighting.

Later, on 28 November, Army plane reconnaissance of Lo-yang revealed that there were still several small planes left, therefore, the third Lo-yang attack was carried out on the 29th.

On this day 12 planes (commanded by Lt Irisa) met three Army fighters over Chang-te, as in the previous raids, and effectively bombed the airfield at 1405 hours. Though they sighted a medium plane and three small ones in revetments, they could not distinguish if they were whole or damaged planes.

After inflicting heavy losses on hangers, barracks, and airfield, they returned without meeting any enemy counterattack.

Attack on Hsian (27 November)

The 7th Repair Arsenal had been newly built at Hsian, and, according to special intelligence, it ranked first among the airfields throughout China in the amount of air traffic handled, with 34 plane movements in early November. Moreover, it was also reported that traffic of Soviet planes became suddenly active recently, and the air force radio station which had previously been located at Kuwo, Shansi Province was moved to Hsian.

According to an arrangement that a blow shall be delivered to Hsian, after the first and second Lo-yang attacks had been completed, 12 medium attack planes (Commanded by Lt Col Sugahisa) carried out a dawn attack on the 27th.

They departed at 0500 hours, and carried out bombing at 0905 hours (time of sunrise, 0828 hours) despite unfavorable weather conditions with the range of vision being a low as 500 meters, due to snow in the vicinity of target.

They sighted only two small planes outside the hangers, and inflicted considerable damage on hangers and barracks without meeting any ground fire, but the results could hardly be termed satisfactory.

4. Attack on Kung-hsien (28 November)

Rumor had it that there was at Kung-hsien, which lies between Lo-yang and Cheng-chou, an arsenal with 7,000 workers, manufacturing guns, machine guns, and aircraft parts. Accordingly, since it was judged that this arsenal must be important to China since its arsenals in Nanking and Canton had been damaged, an attack upon Kung-hsien was planned.

Though the 4th Fleet Commander ordered this attack to be carried out after conferring with the Army, the Army Air Force had never made any attack nor had they any attack plan for one in the near future either. Therefore, it was decided that the Navy should carry out the attack.

This attack was carried out in three assaults, but only the first one (the 28th) was carried out in November.

On 28 November, 12 medium attack planes from the first Kung-hsien arsenal attack unit (commanded by Lt Kotani) carried out a very effective bombing at about 1310 hours, despite heavy anti-aircraft fire.

Almost all of the 24-250 kilogram bombs hit the installation, starting fires in various places and doing very serious damage.

5. Attack on Ch'ang-sha (24 November)

On 23 November the China Area Fleet Chief of Staff sent the following instructions to the Kanoya Unit:

“Until enemy air strength in Hankow is destroyed, the secondary bombing targets of the 3rd Air Attack Unit will be as follows

Second target-Ch'ang-sha Station and roundhouse

Third target-A building believed to be a repair-shop in the vicinity of the Man-ch'ang Airfield.

Fourth target-Strategic points along the Canton-Hankow Railroad.”

Therefore, it was decided that six medium attack planes from the Kanoya Unit were to attack Changsha on the following day, the 24th. However after they took off, two of them turned back, due to some trouble, while the other four continued on.

At 1555 hours, they bombed Changsha Station and the roundhouse, as scheduled, but immediately after the bombing they sighted five medium and three small planes on an airfield north of the town. One of the planes took off to engage us, but fled after five minutes. The bombing set fire to the roundhouse.

6. Bombing the vicinity of Nanking and Shanghai

The Kisarazu Air Unit's Shanghai Detachment, which had been temporarily inactivated due to stormy weather and the muddy condition of the airfield, commenced operations again on the 23d, conducting operations daily until the end of the month.

In order to cooperate in the intense attack by the ground forces, bombing was carried out first against I-hsing on the 23d, Ch'ang-chou do the 24th, and were gradually moved westward to such places as Ning-kuo, Yuan-yang, Chen-chiang, P'iao-shui, and Hsiao-shan but the raiding in the vicinity of Nanking was carried out in the form of a joint operation with the 2nd Combined Air Unit.

The Kanoya Unit based at Taipei also bombed I-hsing on the 25th, Yuan-yang on the 27th, and P'iao-shui on the 29th.

Part 3. Operations of the 2nd Combined Air Unit

A. From 29 October to 4 November - Cooperation in the Soochow Creek Crossing Operation.

The 2nd Combined Air Unit, which had been confined in October to cooperate daily with the land operations which were deadlocked in northern Shanghai, launched active operations together with a change in the tactical situation.

The general situation was as shown in the charts starting on page 173.

B. From 5 to 12 November - Cooperation in Hangchow Bay

Landing Operation

1. Plan

In order to support the Hangchow Bay Landing operation, the 2nd Combined Air Unit Commander issued the following order on 4 November. (Extract)

"a. Each unit will act in accordance with the following, unless otherwise ordered.

(1) The 12th Air Unit

(a) From 0630 to 0700 hours, six carrier-based attack planes (carrying 60 kg bombs) will attack enemy troops stationed at the southeastern wall of Chin-shan-wei Fortress.

(b) At 1700 hours, eight carrier-based bombers (carrying 250 kg bombs) will destroy the northwestern wall of Chin-shan-wei Fortress to open a path for the assaulting party. Upon blasting open the wall, friendly forces will be notified by banking maneuvers.

(c) Subsequent to 0630 hours, carrier-based attack planes (bombers) in several waves each consisting of three planes, will depart at intervals of approximately 30 minutes, until the right flank detachment of the 6th Division reaches the line of Ta-shih-t'ou, and thereafter, almost every hour, to provide cover and direct support of the landing of the right flank detachment of the 6th Division and the main force of the 18th Division.

(d) From 0715 hours until sunset, two carrier-based fighters (carrying bombs) will patrol over the landing forces and the transport convoy, and cooperate directly in operations in the front of the 6th Division at the opportune time.

Date	Operational Objective	Attack Target	Number of Participating Aircraft	Total weight of bombs dropped	Remarks
29 Oct	Direct cooperation with 3 rd , 9 th , 11 th and 13 th Divisions	Confronting enemy positions	Carrier-based bombers 7 Carrier-based attack planes 10	4,500 kg	
	Attacking enemy's rear	Pooting artillery positions	Carrier-based bomber 1		
	Engaging and attacking hostile air forces.	Nanking	Carrier-based reconnaissance planes 1 Carrier-based fighters 3		Turned back due to bad weather.
	Same as above	Chien to, Ran-chi Hangchow	Carrier based attack planes 4 Carrier-based fighters 3		No enemy plane was seen.
30 Oct	Direct cooperation with 3 rd and 9 th Divs.	Position on the south bank of Soochow Creek	Carrier-based bombers 36 Carrier-based attack-planes 8	10,090 kg	
	Attacking enemy rear	Pooting artillery positions	Carrier-based attack planes 2		

Date	Operational Objective	Attack target	Number of Participating Aircraft	Total weight of bombs dropped	Remarks
1 Nov.	Direct cooperation with 3 rd and 9 th Divs.	Position on the south bank of Soochow Creek	Carrier-based fighters 6 Carrier-based attack planes 11 Carrier-based bombers 12	6,040 kg	In the evening, the enemy was retreating along the Hunchiao Road.
	Attacking enemy's rear	Pooting artillery positions	Carrier based bombers 5		
2 Nov.	Direct cooperation with 3 rd and 9 th Divs.	Covering river crossing	Carrier-based fighters 5 Carrier-based bombers 24 Carrier-based attack planes 21	14,940 kg	
3 Nov.	Direct cooperation with 3 rd and 9 th Divs.	Confronting enemy positions	Carrier-based bombers 9	1,080 kg	19 planes started out, but failed to carry out mission because of bad weather.

(2) The 13th Air Unit carrier-based attack planes, in several waves, each consisting of three planes, will depart at intervals of approximately 30 minutes, from 0645 hours until the left flank detachment of the 6th Division reaches the line of San-t'ang-kou, but subsequently almost every hour in order to cooperate directly in the front of the left flank detachments of the 18th and 6th Divisions.

b. The gist of carrying out direct cooperation with land forces is as given below:

(1) Plane units assigned to give direct support to land forces will operate in the vicinity of the most forward front line, and will bomb hostile troop concentrations, and positions, while covering the advance of friendly forces.

Relief of duty, change of shift will be carried out in the sky over the front line.

(2) The most advanced front line will be designated by the use of white signal panels, and four Japanese flags joined together.

Request for signal markers to designate the front line will be made by pitching flying maneuvers and the release of red parachute flares.

(3) Priority of attack targets will be as follows:

- (a) Hostile troop concentrations moving southward.
- (b) Hostile units indicated by land forces (indicated by arrow sign).
- (c) Enemy positions confronting our foremost front line.
- (d) Enemy troops threatening our troops."

2. Progress

5 November

Although the 10th Army (D Group) anchored at 0330 hours and started landing operations at 0530 hours, as scheduled, the weather deteriorated at Kungta Base from midnight, with thick fogs prevailing. The sky cleared up for a while at about 0600 hours, but was soon fogged over again.

The Fleet Weather Observation Party predicted an improvement in the weather, so six carrier-based attack planes from the 12th Air Unit departed at 0550 hours, while eight carrier-based attack planes of the same unit departed at 0625 hours, despite the light fog, to bomb the Chin-shan-wei Fortress. However, they had difficulty in flying through the thick fog immediately after departure.

At this time one carrier-based bomber crashed at Pootung.

In view of the above situation, the departure of subsequent aircraft was cancelled.

6 November

Although the landing force could not obtain the cooperation of aircraft on the previous day, it made a rapid advance northwards without confronting any firm resistance from the enemy, and was conducting operations on schedule. In as much as the advance of the landing face was so rapid, even Army Headquarters and Division Headquarters did not definitely know the location of each unit.

Thereupon, in the morning, reconnaissance flights were carried out despite the bad weather, and general information on the disposition of our troops and the enemy's situation was finally obtained and reported to the said Headquarters.

In the afternoon, upon receipt of information that enemy troops would advance eastwards by motorcar from the direction of Chiahsing and Pingwu, one carrier-based bomber and six carrier-based attack planes of the 13th Air Unit bombed Fang-ching-chen towards evening, while nine carrier-based attack planes bombed Pingwu.

Total number of aircraft used

12 th Air Unit	41
13 th Air Unit	22
Total:	63

Bombs dropped:

240 kg.	-- 6
250 kg.	-- 6
60 kg.	--70

7 November

It was impossible to fly due to rain throughout the day, and the overall situation again became unknown.

8 November

Since the weather had improved, eight carrier-based fighters departed at daybreak to reconnoiter the battlefront area, and reported the results of recon-

naissance to friendly forces. Thereafter, some of the carrier-based fighters and bombers took over the above mission.

Keeping up with the advance of the landing forces, the air units bombed strategic points such as Feng-ching-chen, Sungchiang, the southern sector, and also Ch'ing-p'u, Chia-shan, and Chin-shan. Furthermore, they carried out effective bombing and strafing of retiring enemy troops on the road between Sung-chiang and Ch'ing-p'u, and between Ch'ing-p'u and K'un-shan.

Total number of aircraft used on this day:

12 th Air Unit	35
13 th Air Unit	44
Total:	79

Bombs dropped:

250 kg.	-- 11
60 kg	--180

9 November

Taking advantage of the clear weather from the morning, the air force launched operations to support the landing party, but upon receipt of information to the effect that the enemy confronting the 3rd Division in the northern section of Shanghai was making a general retreat, some planes were assigned to pursue and attack the retreating enemy.

The 10th Army was confronted with comparatively low enemy resistance, and the demand for direct air support was not pressing. On the other hand, the pursuit and attack of the enemy retreating from the front of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was extremely effective in extending war results, and indirectly contributed to the advance of the 6th Division.

At about 1100 hours, the 2nd Combined Air Unit was detached from the escort fleet ("H" Operation) by a telegram from the China Area Fleet, and commanded to attack with its main force, the retreating enemy, while directly supporting the 10th Army with its elements.

On this day, 26 planes were assigned for the direct support of the 10th Army, but both Divisions were advancing without meeting any strong enemy resistance.

Forty-eight planes were assigned to pursue the retreating enemy at Shanghai, and heavy tangible and intangible losses were inflicted on the enemy through

aggressive strafing and bombing attacks.

About noon information was received that a train of approximately 15 cars carrying enemy troops to full capacity had departed from Soochow for Chiahsing. Thereupon, 13 carrier-based attack planes and bombers departed to attack the said train, but did not sight any enemy moving southward, except several empty trains here and there. The attack unit, therefore, bombed those trains and the railways.

Total member of aircraft used on the day:

12 th Air Unit	51
13 th Air Unit	43

Bombs dropped,

250 kg --	10
240 kg --	4
60 kg --	256

Air reconnaissance conducted early in the morning disclosed that the enemy opposing the 6th Division was still falling back in complete rout, and that the 6th Division was pursuing the enemy south of Ching-pu.

Meanwhile, the 18th Division was confronted with another enemy force southwest of Fen-ching-chen.

The whole strength of the 13th Air Unit provided close cover for the advancing 10th Army. However, air-ground communications with the 18th Division, especially the indication of the extreme front line, was not satisfactory. This caused difficulties in bombing.

The 12th Air Unit pursued those enemy troops retreating in a rout, north of the 6th Divisions front, and inflicted a staggering blow to them.

Besides the above, a part of the air unit (or a total of 14 planes) conducted reconnaissance of the railroads in the Soochow-Hangchow Area, and destroyed some trains and tracks at Hsia-shih-chen Station and other points thus trying to remove the threat to the western flank of the 10th Army.

The number of sorties flown by the air force during the day totaled 71-45 by the 12th Air Unit, and 26 by the 13th Air Unit.

Bombs dropped were 16-250 kg bombs, 164-60 kg bombs.

11 November

According to air reconnaissance conducted early in the morning the 6th Division was still advancing rapidly, pressing close to the area just south of Pai-Hao-Chiang-chen. However, the 18th Division was still locked in combat with the enemy occupying strong positions along a creek east of Chia-Shan.

A total of 21 planes flew over the 6th Division's front, and a total of 23 planes over the 18th Division's. However, since the indication of the extreme front line of the 18th Division was still ambiguous, there were difficulties in bombing

Besides the above, a part of the air unit conducted reconnaissance of the possible movement of enemy troops from the Hang-Chou and the Wuhsing-Chang-hsing Areas. However, no movement was discovered. Therefore, our planes destroyed the railroad.

The number of sorties flown during the day totaled 53-27 by the 12th Air Unit, and 26 by the 13th Air Unit. Bombs dropped were nine 250 kg bombs, 108-60 kg bombs, and 12-35 kg bombs.

12 November

The situation on the 18th Division's front revealed little progress, as the Division was still pitted against the enemy occupying positions along the creek northeast of Chia-Shan.

In the morning, 13 carrier-based bombers gave support to the 18th Division, and attacked several pillboxes, inflicting considerable damage. Also, they dropped an aerial photograph of the area to the Division Headquarters.

The 56th Regiment, after a northward flanking drive, succeeded in crossing the creek at noon, and advanced to the area north of Chia-Shan.

The number of planes used during the day totaled eleven (TN Sic) (all by the 13th Air Unit)

Bombs dropped were 16-60 kg bombs.

3. Results and losses

- a. Total number of sorties: 373
- b. Total number of bombs dropped: 880
- Total of weight of the above: 63.9 tons

c. Losses:

One carrier-based bomber shot down.
One carrier-based fighter missing

Unit	Carrier-based fighters	Carrier-based bombers	Carrier-based attack planes	Total
12 th Air Unit	75	58	71	204
13 th Air Unit	9	95	65	169
Total	84	153	136	373

C. Subsequent Air Operations

13 November.

An all-out support was given to land operations by 18 bombers, 20 attack planes, and four fighters - all carrier-based.

In the morning, they supported the 18th and the 114th Divisions in the Chia-Shan Area. The main force of the 18th Division had already crossed the creek, and was encircling Chia-Shan. In the afternoon, information was received that enemy forces in the Nun-shan Area were in full retreat. Accordingly, the air force delivered a large-scale assault on troop concentration and junk groups.

14 November.

A total of 46 planes supported the operations of the 6th Division. They included 14 fighters, one reconnaissance plane, 14 bombers, and 17 attack planes - all carrier-based. These planes conducted bombing and strafing attacks on enemy positions between Kun-Shan and Soochow, on hostile troop concentrations withdrawing along roads and creeks near Soochow, and on villages where enemy troops had taken shelter. The attacks caused heavy losses to the enemy.

In addition, a total of 32 carrier-based planes - 12 bombers, 14 attack planes, and six fighters - supported the 18th and 140th (TN Sic) Divisions by carrying out bombing and strafing attacks against Tu-Shan, Chia-Shan, etc.

15 November

A total of 31 Carrier-based planes - 14 bombers, 14 attack planes, 1 reconnaissance plane, and 2 fighters - made a bombing attack against the area

between Kun-Shan and Soochow to cover the action of the 6th Division. They also attacked the Ping-wang-chen Area, in cooperation with friendly troops which had advanced to there.

Eight bomber and eight attack planes, or a total of 16, attacked enemy positions in and around Chia-hsing, and junks swarming nearby in order to support the actions of the 18th Division.

Ten carrier-based bombers, supporting the 14th Division, made a bombing attack on Ping-Hu-Chen, as well as on enemy positions facing the above Division.

Besides these operations, nine fighters and three attack planes of the 13th Air Unit, by order of the Commander in Chief of the China Area Fleet, raided Yang-Chou, but sighted no enemy planes, and instead bombed Wu-Hsion on the return route.

We lost one carrier-based bomber and one carrier-based fighter on this day.

20 November

After several days of inactivity, due to inclement weather, the air force was finally able to make some sorties with some elements in the afternoon of 20 November, and the weather had improved sufficiently to permit air operations.

Two bombers and four attack planes staged a bombing attack on junks and troop concentrations fleeing between Soochow and Wu-Hai. Another assault unit, composed of two bombers and three attack planes operated in the Hu-Chou, Chia-Hsing, and Hsin-Cheng-Chen Areas. Besides, at the request of the Expeditionary Army Headquarters, medical supplies were dropped on friendly ground troops at Hsin-Chang-Chen and Ping-wang-chen.

22 November

Five fighters, 22 bombers, and 25 attack planes, or a total of 52 planes supported the pursuit action of the Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army.

Major operations conducted by these planes were as follows:

Attack on enemy forces confronting the Expeditionary Army.

Bombing attack on Wu-Hsi, Fu-Shan, Meng-Li, and Yang-She, attack on junks and troop concentrations fleeing between Wu-Hai, Chang-Chou and Yuan-Yang (TN Presumably mistaken for Tan-Yang).

Attacks on enemy forces confronting the 10th Army.

Bombing attack on hostile batteries and positions east of Hu-Chou.

In addition to the above operations, two attack planes and six fighters, conducted in accordance with orders of the Fleet, reconnaissance of hostile naval vessels operating near and above Nanking. In aerial combat over Nanking with six enemy monoplane fighters (Three of them equipped with retractable landing gear), our planes shot down three planes. (two confirmed)

There were five vessels near Hsia-Kuan, which is situated on the Yangtze River. They included three neutral vessels. One hostile gunboat was found going down the river near Pan-Chiao-Chen. Our planes dropped bombs on this gunboat without scoring any hits. On their way home, they dropped the remaining bombs on I-hsing.

During this operation, a message addressed to Chiang Kai-shek from the 10th Army Headquarters was also dropped on Nanking.

After the aerial battle over Nanking, one of our carrier-based fighters was found missing.

23 November

(No data available)

24 November

By order of the Fleet, nine carrier-based fighters and six carrier-based bombers of the 13th Air Unit, and two attack planes of the detachment of the 1st Combined Air Unit made an air raid on Nanking at 1420 hours.

They found six enemy fighters (low-wing monoplane, equipped with retractable landing gear) over Nanking and definitely shot down three of them.

There were four medium planes and five small planes on Ta-chiao-chang Airfield, and two medium planes were destroyed by our bombers.

Our medium attack planes dropped bombs on the telephone office, causing heavy damage.

Besides the above, five fighters, 20 bombers, and 19 attack planes, or a total of 44 planes supported the operations of the Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army.

They attacked Wu-Hsi, Chang-Chou, Meng-Li-Che, and other points held by the enemy confronting the Expeditionary Army. On the 10th Army front, our planes made a bombing attack against Hu-Chou and its vicinity, Chang-Hsing, and enemy troops fleeing between Hu-Chou and Tang-Chia-Tsun.

25 November

Nine carrier-based fighters and five carrier-based bombers of the 13th Air Unit carried out an air raid on Nanking at 1440 hours and bombed 13 medium and small planes at Ta-chiao-chang Airfield, but the results were unknown.

Although our fighters remained over Nanking for about 30 minutes after the bombing attack, they sighted no enemy planes.

Besides the above, two fighters, 16 bombers, and 21 attack planes, or a total of 39 planes, supported the operations of the Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army.

They focused their attack on Chang-chou, Yang-lin-chen, Wu-hsi, and Chiang-yin on the Expeditionary Army front, and on the Chang-hsing Area on the 10th Army front.

26 November

Army reconnaissance planes reported that a large number of enemy troops were moving eastward between Ning-kuo and Kuang-te. On the basis of this information, a total of 57 planes took off on the mission of attacking the enemy. They consisted of 15 fighters, 15 bombers, 20 attack planes, one reconnaissance plane, four medium attack planes, and two large attack planes. As stated in the reconnaissance report, a large navy troop concentration and motorcar group were sighted in the Ningkuo-Kuangte Area. Our planes bombed and strafed these targets, dealing a heavy blow to the enemy. The results were brilliant. Bombs were dropped on neighboring villages, too.

(No data available concerning air operations conducted on and after 27 November)

Note: Because of a lack of data, the operations conducted by the 1st and 2nd Carrier Divisions and seaplane units during the above period, are unknown.

Part 4. Air Operations of the Japanese Army

In North China, the battle of Tai-yuan was at its height early in November. The main force of the Provisional Air Group raided Fen-yang Airfield late in October,

and checked the advance of the enemy air force. At the same time, it made a series of bombing attacks against the Tai-yuan Area.

After Tai-yuan had been captured, two new heavy bombers (Type-97 bombers whose radius of action was approximately 1500 km) were assigned to the air force in North China. On 11 November, these heavy bombers carried out a surprise attack on Lo-yang Airfield, shooting down one enemy plane and damaging several others on the ground.

Subsequently, an operational agreement was concluded between the Medium Attack Plane Unit of the Navy, which had advanced to Peiping and Provisional Air Groups. Under this agreement, the Navy was responsible for bombing attacks on the Lung-hai Railroad and such places as Hsi-an, Lo-yang and Chou-chia-kou. So the Air Group called off further attacks in that area.

In Central China, Japanese troops made a landing on Hang-chou Bay early in November. This landing operation was covered by one air company of the 3rd Air Brigade. This air company was later attached to the 10th Army.

During the month of November, the above air company was based at Wang-pin Airfield, but, with the development of the situation, its base was advanced to Chang-hsiang Airfield on 1 December. From there it provided cover for the frontline forces of the 10th Army in the drive toward Nanking.