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**NORTH CHINA AREA
OPERATIONS RECORD
JULY 1937 - MAY 1941**

PREPARED BY
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Preface

Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, 12 October 1945, subject: Institution for War Records Investigation, steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff. Upon dissolution of the War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, research and compilation continued and developed into a series of historical monographs.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids, rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable.

Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau, the basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. Translation was effected through the facilities of Military Intelligence Service Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command.

This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division, Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East and is based on the translation of the Japanese original.

FOREWORD

This monograph deals with military operations in North China from the time of the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937 to the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941.

As the basic Japanese document from which this monograph was written was prepared by Lieutenant General Takuma Shimoyama, former staff officer of the North China Area Army, Lieutenant General Gun Hashimoto, former chief of staff of the First Army and Lieutenant Colonel Heizo Ishiwari, former chief of the Military History Division, Army General Staff largely from memory, it was necessary for the Military History Section, HQ AFPE, to conduct extensive research in order to evaluate the information, check and correct facts and dates and, where necessary, to add further pertinent data and/or explanatory footnotes for clarity.

The writer was assisted in the research by Hachiro Tokunaga, formerly a lieutenant colonel in the Intelligence Section of Imperial General Headquarters.

The spelling of place names is that used in AMS 5301.

Additional monographs covering the operations of the Japanese Armed Forces in the China area are:

<u>Title</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Mono No</u>
China Area Operations Record, Vol. I	Jul 37 - Nov 41	70*
China Area Operations Record, Vol. II	Dec 41 - Dec 43	71
China Area Operations Record, Vol. III	Jan 44 - Aug 45	72
China Area Operations Record: Command of China Expeditionary Army	Aug 43 - Aug 45	129*
China Area Operations Record: Sixth Area Army Operations	May 44 - Aug 45	130*
Central China Area Operations Record, Vol. I	1937 - 1941	179
South China Area Operations Record, Vol. I	1937 - 1941	180
Operations in the Kun-lun-kuan Area	Dec 39 - Feb 40	74*
Ch'ang-sha Operations, 1st to 4th Period	Sep 38 - Aug 44	75

China Area Air Operations Record: China Incident and Greater East Asia War	Jul 37 - Aug 44	76
China Incident Naval Air Operations	Jul 37 - Nov 37	166

* Indicates: Edited and forwarded to OCMH

21 January 1955

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CHAPTER I

From the Outbreak of the China Incident to the Yangchu Operation

Outbreak and Spread of the China Incident

The Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident

On the night of 7 July 1937, while a company of the Japanese 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, stationed at Fengtai, was on night maneuvers at the drill ground north of Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), it was fired upon from the direction of the embankment of the Yungting Ho. The remaining companies of the 3d Battalion hastened to the scene, and, in self-defense, returned the fire of the hostile unit, which belonged to Sung Cheyuan's 29th Army. Both sides suffered some casualties during the engagement. This was the beginning of the China Incident.

At that time, Japan, in accordance with the terms of the Boxer Protocol of 1901, maintained a garrison in North China to protect the rights of its nationals living there and to guard lines of communications between Peiping and the harbors of North China. The strength of this garrison was approximately 3,000 men and was disposed as follows:

Headquarters, China Garrison Army	Tienching
(Commander: Lt Gen Tashiro) ¹	

1. Due to illness, General Tashiro was recalled to Tokyo on 11 July 1937. He died in Tienching on his way home. He was replaced, as commander of the China Garrison Army, by Lt. Gen Kiyoshi Katsuki.

Headquarters, Infantry Brigade	Peiping
1st Infantry Regiment	
Main Force	Peiping
One Battalion	Fengtai
One Battalion	Tienching
2d Infantry Regiment	
Main Force	Tienching
An element	Between Tienching and Shanhaikuan
Artillery Regiment	Tienching
Tank Unit	"
Cavalry Unit	"
Engineer Unit	"
Signal Unit	"

The Chinese strength comprised four divisions, two independent brigades, two cavalry divisions and one cavalry brigade. These units were placed under the 29th Army, commanded by Sung Cheyuan, a war lord from Chahar and Hopeh Provinces, and disposed as follows: the 37th Division under the command of Feng Chih-an, Governor of Hopeh Province, was stationed between Peiping and Chingyuan; the 38th Division, under the command of Chang Tzu-chung, mayor of Tienching, was stationed between Peiping and Tienching; the 132d Division, under the command of Chaotengyu was stationed in the southern part of Hopeh Province, and the 143d Division, under the command of Liu Juming, Governor of Chahar Province, was stationed in the Province of Chahar.²

At that time, even though Sung Cheyuan claimed to support the

2. Although all available Japanese sources have been explored, disposition of the two independent brigades, two cavalry divisions and one cavalry brigade is unknown.

same pro-Japanese principles as his predecessor, Feng Yu-hsiang,³ he was strongly influenced by the Nanching Government and the anti-Japanese sentiment which was fast gaining strength throughout China.⁴ Feng Chih-an, commander of the 37th Division, was strongly anti-Japanese.

The Japanese Government instructed the China Garrison Army to endeavor to settle the incident amicably and to do everything possible to prevent its spreading to other parts of China. At the same time, in order to be prepared should negotiations fail, the Central Authorities⁵ in Japan ordered the Kwantung Army to send

3. Feng Yu-hsiang, well known for his pro-Japanese principles, was appointed Vice Chief of the National Defense Council by Chiang Kaishek in 1935. On 17 July 1937 he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Chinese North China Area Army.

4. Although Sung Cheyuan had been appointed war lord of Chahar and Hopeh Provinces by Chiang Kaishek, his native home was in Leling in Shantung Province. Unwilling to participate in the cease fire negotiations with the Japanese, fearing loss of face, he went to Leling and allowed his subordinates to carry on the negotiations. At the request of his officers he returned and met with Lt Gen Katsuki, Japanese Army commander, in Tienching on the afternoon of 18 July. Sung admitted that the incident had been incited by Chinese acts and offered apologies, promising, at the same time, that he would punish the responsible officers. He also promised to fulfil Japanese demands in regard to the incident, the principal demand being the withdrawal of the 37th Division. The following day, 19 July, Sung returned to Peiping but was unable to control his subordinate officers and further incidents ensued.

5. Prior to 17 November 1937, when Imperial General Headquarters was established in Tokyo to cope with the situation in China, Central Authorities comprised the Army and Navy General Staffs and the War and Navy Ministries.

immediately to north China the 11th Independent Infantry Brigade, commanded by Maj Gen Shigeyasu Suzuki, which was stationed at Chengde, the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade, commanded by Maj Gen Koji Sakai, a motorized unit stationed at Kungchuling and one temporarily organized air unit.⁶ All units were instructed to retain their peacetime organization. The 20th Division, which was stationed in Korea under the command of Lt Gen Bunzaburo Kawagishi, also was ordered to north China.

With the exception of the disposition of the air unit at Tienching airfield and the movement of the main strength of the China Garrison Army to Tunghsien and Fengtai, all other troops were stationed some distance from Peiping and Tienching in an endeavor to prevent aggravation of the incident. In an effort to alleviate the situation, the Japanese Army requested the withdrawal of the China 37th Division from the area, but the Chinese refused to comply with this request and small units of both the Japanese and Chinese armies set up camps opposite each other north of Yuanping (Lukouchiao). There was a nightly exchange of fire caused by wanton firing by the Chinese troops. This

6. This air unit was composed of six squadrons, including reconnaissance, fighter and bomber squadrons and was commanded by Colonel Kamijyo. These squadrons were drawn from air units in Manchuria, under the command of the Kwantung Army.

eventually led to the Langfang and Kuanganmen Incidents.

Langfang and Kuanganmen Incidents

On 25 July, while a Japanese signal unit was repairing communication wires at the Langfang station, a Chinese unit belonging to the 38th Division, which was camped near the station, launched a surprise attack against the signal unit. An infantry company of the China Garrison Army stationed nearby to protect the railway successfully defended the station throughout the night but suffered severe casualties.

On 26 July, the China Garrison Army lodged a protest with the Chinese in regard to this incident and, at the same time, reiterated their demand that the 37th Division be withdrawn from the Lukouchiao area within 24 hours. In spite of this, on the same day (26 July), Chinese troops perpetrated another unprovoked attack. An infantry battalion of the China Garrison Army, which had been stationed near Fengtai, was returning to Peiping, according to orders, to protect Japanese nationals within the walled city. This move had been agreed to by the Chinese. About sunset, when about half the battalion had passed through the Kuanganmen Gate, the Chinese suddenly closed the gate and began firing on the Japanese troops from on top of the wall, inflicting heavy casualties.


By this time, anti-Japanese feeling had reached such a pitch in Peiping that the China Garrison Army found it difficult to protect

its nationals and maintain lines of communication. Therefore, on the evening of 26 July, the China Garrison Army commander decided that the situation had become so critical that it would be necessary to drive the 29th Chinese Army from the Peiping - Tienching area. The Central Authorities in Tokyo approved this decision.⁷

The Chinese 29th Army, which opposed the Japanese forces, had, in addition to its peacetime organization, the 132d Division and a cavalry division which had previously been stationed in the southern part of Hopeh Province. These forces had advanced northward and were concentrated at Nanyuan, the main camp of the 38th Division, which also included an airfield. The 37th Division was concentrated at Hsiyuan and in and around the walled city of Peiping. In addition, there were other troops not directly affiliated with the 29th Army in the northern part of Peiping.

In order to sweep this enemy force from the area, the commander of the China Garrison Army decided to direct the main attack against Nanyuan, where the main body of the enemy force was concentrated. He, therefore, issued an order late on the night of the 26th to attack Nanyuan at dawn of the 28th. According to the order, the 20th Division was to attack from the south, the Kawabe Group (commanded by Maj Gen Kawabe and composed of 2 infantry regiments, 1 cavalry unit, 1 tank unit, 1 engineer unit and 1 signal unit) from the west, and

7. The disposition of the China Garrison Army as of 26 July 1937 is shown on Map 1.



the main force of the 2d Infantry Regiment of the China Garrison Army from the east. The air unit was to give support wherever necessary. The order also provided that the Sakai and Suzuki Brigades would attack the enemy in the northern and western sectors of Peiping. No attack was contemplated against the enemy in the walled city of Peiping as it was considered that the walls would enable the enemy to resist. Also, an attack on the city might endanger the lives of Japanese nationals there and the maintenance of law and order would be affected by fighting within the city. Further measures were to be taken to induce the enemy to evacuate of their own accord through the good offices of the Minkai.⁸

The air unit used the Tienching airfield. The reconnaissance unit was engaged mainly in reconnoitering the situation in regard to the Chinese Kuomintang Army, which was advancing northward along the Peiping - Hankou railway.

In the early morning of 28 July, the attack on the Nanyuan sector was begun. Just before sunset, the enemy showed signs of wavering after a day-long fierce battle, and the tank unit of the Kawabe Group advanced to the northern part of Nanyuan, thus severing their retreat route. At sunset the enemy fled in confusion, leaving many dead, including the commander of the 132d Division.

8. A citizens' council composed of influential persons in Peiping.

The 1st Independent Mixed Brigade (Sakai Brigade with a strength of approximately 4,000 men) and the 11th Independent Infantry Brigade (Suzuki Brigade with a strength of approximately 3,000 men) attacked enemy units based in the villages north of Peiping, and, by evening, the Sakai Brigade had occupied Hsiyuan, and the Suzuki Brigade had reached a point near the northwest corner of the walled city of Peiping. On 29 July, the Sakai Brigade continued its pursuit of the enemy in the area north of Peiping, crossed Yungting Ho and captured a hill near Changhsintien. On 30 July, the 20th Division replaced the Sakai Brigade and occupied a range of hills in that area. The China Garrison Army massed the Sakai Brigade at Tunghsien, the Suzuki Brigade in the area north of Peiping, and the Kawabe Group near Fengtai.

On the evening of the 28th, the enemy in the vicinity of Peiping began to retreat southward and, by the 29th, had completely withdrawn from the left bank of the Yungting Ho. An element of the Chinese 38th Division which was south of Tienching, in concert with the Tienching Security Force, attacked the Japanese concession, the China Garrison Army Headquarters, the airfield and other installations in Tienching on the night of 28th, but, at dawn, on the 29th, after being counterattacked by the Japanese reserve force and bombed by its air unit, they retreated to the south bank of the Yungting Ho.

Reinforcement and disposition of the forces in North China

Soon after the outbreak of the China Incident, being aware of

the limited strength of the China Garrison Army and fearing that it might not be possible to localize the incident, the Central Authorities in Tokyo, began the mobilization of three divisions in Japan, to be sent as reinforcements to north China. These divisions were the 5th Division commanded by Lt Gen Seishiro Itagaki, the 6th Division commanded by Lt Gen Hsiao Tani, and the 10th Division commanded by Lt Gen Rensuke Isogai. In addition, the Provisional Air Corps commanded by Lt Gen Yoshitoshi Tokugawa was formed. These units, on arrival in north China, were to be placed under the command of the China Garrison Army commander. The Provisional Air Corps was scheduled to arrive during the latter part of July and the divisions were to arrive successively from about the middle of August until the middle of September.⁹

After the rout of the Chinese 29th Army, the China Garrison Army commander assumed responsibility for maintaining law and order, as well as the maintenance of lines of communication. The newly arrived reinforcements from Japan, together with the 20th Division, were disposed as follows:

The Provisional Air Corps was ordered to conduct reconnaissance

9. In order to expedite their arrival in North China, it was decided that their mobilization would be completed upon arrival at their assigned areas.

of the area.¹⁰ The 20th Division was to secure the area in the vicinity of Changhsintien and to protect the troops massing in that area, while the 5th Division was to assemble in and around Hsiyuan and the 6th Division in and around Huangtsun. The 10th Division was ordered to mass south of Tienching and to occupy the area in and around Machang.¹¹ The Suzuki Brigade was ordered to secure the Pataling area and the Sakai Brigade was returned to the Kwantung Army.

On 6 August, the Nanching Government began reinforcing its units in the Chahar and Hopeh Provinces, and, on 15 August, it issued a general mobilization order throughout China. By the middle of August, the Chinese had two divisions, commanded by Tang Enpo, in Chahar Province and three divisions advancing north through the mountainous region between Hopeh and Shansi Provinces. In addition, it was believed that they had a force of unknown size stationed near Chingyuan.

Early in August a Chinese infantry unit, together with a caval-

10. The temporarily organized air unit was returned to the Kwantung Army, when the main strength of the Provisional Air Corps formed in Japan arrived in Tienching via Manchuria on 27 July. Elements of this corps arrived in Chengteh on the same day.

11. The 5th and 6th Divisions arrived in the Tienching area from Japan via Korea about the middle of August. The 10th Division reached Tangku near Tienching about the same time from Japan. Concentration of these troops in the Tienching area was completed on 22 August. Advance elements of the 5th Division proceeded to the Nankou area immediately upon arrival in China in anticipation of operations in that area.

ry unit, occupied Nankou, and the Nationalist Army began to advance steadily into the Chahar Province where the 143d Division of the Chinese 29th Army was stationed. Realizing the necessity of occupying strategic points in the vicinity of Pataling, the China Garrison Army dispatched the Suzuki Brigade, with the Artillery Regiment attached, to attack the enemy in the vicinity of Nankou. However, not only had the Chinese greatly increased their strength but the terrain was rugged and the Suzuki Brigade's attack bogged down. Therefore, in order to make the assault more effective the China Garrison Army commander placed the Suzuki Brigade under the command of the commander of the 5th Division, who had just arrived in the area with advance echelons of his division. The Division commander continued the attack using the Suzuki Brigade and elements of the Division as they arrived in the area. Under unfavorable weather conditions and over rugged terrain the Division fought desperate battles for ten days before finally it was able to break through enemy positions on 23 August, occupy Chuyungkuan, and advance into the plains of Huailai. Here the Division prepared for the next operation and the Suzuki Brigade was returned to the Kwantung Army.¹²

Organization of the North China Area Army

On 31 August 1937, the Order of Battle of the North China Area Army, to include the 1st and 2d Armies, was published (Appendix 1). At the

12. In August, there was considerable rain in north China, rivers overflowed their banks and the low plains of Hopeh, especially the area along the Tienching - Pukou railway, became a sea of mud greatly hindering troop movements. The rains also had an adverse effect on subsequent operations.

same time, the commander of the North China Area Army received the following order from the Central Authorities in Japan:

The commander of the North China Area Army will secure the Peiping - Tienching area and other nearby strategic points and establish law and order in this area.

In addition, in order to break the enemy's will to fight and thereby hasten the conclusion of hostilities, the North China Area Army commander will destroy the enemy in central Hopeh Province without delay.

Preparations for Combat by North China Area Army

General Terauchi, commander of the North China Area Army, accompanied by his staff, left Tokyo by plane on 1 September, arriving in Tienching on 4 September.¹³ There he mapped out the following plan for the coming battle:

Over-all Tactical Plan of the North China Area Army.

1. Plan

The Chinese force which has advanced to the line connecting Chingyuan and Tsanghsien and vicinity will be trapped and destroyed. The decisive battle will be waged in the area along the Peiping - Hankou railway and the time for this operations will be early October.

2. General Plan

As soon as the 14th Division arrives, the 1st Army will promptly carry out, from the southeast, a large scale encirclement of the opposing enemy and will annihilate him.

After the 1st Army destroys the enemy's advance units, the North China Area Army's main force will advance to the line

13. Because of the bad condition of the airfield at Tienching, caused by weather, General Terauchi travelled with his staff from Tokyo via Seoul to Dairen by air, arriving in Dairen on 2 September. He left Dairen on the night of 3 September by destroyer, arriving in Tangku on the morning of 4 September, and, that same day, travelled from Tangku to Tienching by train.

connecting Ihsien, Paikouhochen, Pahsien and Machang by mid-September and then prepare for an attack on the enemy deployed along the line connecting Chingyuan and Tsanghsien. The boundary between the operational areas of the 1st and 2d Armies will be generally fixed by the river flowing through Hsitiien and Tungtien.

The 1st Army will direct its main effort toward the area west of the Peiping - Hankou railway, and surprise and penetrate enemy positions. Its mechanized units will strike swiftly and capture key points along roads and railways behind enemy positions to seal off the enemy's route of retreat. The 1st Army's main body will press the enemy in a generally easterly direction and, coordinating its drive with the westward drive of the 2d Army, will trap and destroy the enemy's main body in the area north of the Chengting - Tsanghsien road.

When the 16th Division arrives, the 2d Army will commence its drive just prior to the movement of the 1st Army. The 2d Army will first strive to advance as far south as possible and then by skillful maneuver break through the weak points between enemy units and drive a flying wedge to the Chulung Ho, thus severing the escape route of the enemy deployed on the main front. When necessary, the 108th Division may be used in the Tehsien area or the Peiping - Hankou railway area.

The 5th Division will rapidly advance to the vicinity of Yuhsien and Laiyuan, and sever the Peiping - Hankou railway south of Wangtu. Upon the 5th Division advancing to the Laiyuan area, the North China Area Army will open a supply route for the Division leading from the Peiping - Hankou railway area.

The 109th Division is to be used mainly in the Peiping - Hankou railway area, but, when the situation warrants it, an element of the Division may be committed to the Peiping - Suiyuan railway area.

If the enemy should retreat earlier than expected, our forces will make full use of supplies and ammunition thus unexpended and pursue the enemy to the line connecting Hsingtai and Tehsien without pausing, and trap and destroy him in the area north of the line.

The Provisional Air Corps will, at the outset, support the 1st Army in smashing enemy advance units, and the main strength of the air reconnaissance unit will scout the vicinity and rear areas of Chingyuan and Tsanghsien. When the battle reaches the decisive stage, the air units will strive to cut off the enemy's retreat and to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements. To this end, air units will, without delay, destroy railway bridges spanning the Huang Ho. Prompt action will be taken to expand and improve airfields in the Peiping - Tienching area.

Line of communication facilities will be strengthened

promptly; the repair of the Peiping - Hankou railway will be speeded up and lateral supply routes by waterways will be opened as the 2d Army advances westward.

On 4 September, the North China Area Army commander issued the following order in preparation for the next offensive:

The enemy force which has advanced into Central Hopeh Province numbers about 400,000. The enemy in the northern area, namely in and around Chingyuan and Tsanghsien, possess rather strong positions with outer trench defense works some 60 to 70 kilometers in length. In the vicinity of the lines connecting Chohsien - Kuan and Hsiunghsien - Machang, there are several powerful enemy groups. The 1st and 2d Armies will clash with them soon. The enemy's main force, which was in Chahar Province, was dealt a crushing blow by our 5th Division and is now retreating westward. The units of the Kwantung Army have captured strategic points around Wanchuan, and are preparing for the next operation. The boundary between operational areas of the North China Area Army and the Kwantung Army will be the line connecting Chinganpao, Hsiahuayuan and Paoan, plus the part of stream of the Sankan Ho above Paoan. The North China Area Army will be responsible for the area on the boundary.

The North China Area Army will rush its advance to the Ihsien - Tinghsing - Paikouhochen - Pahsien - Machang line in order to destroy the enemy on the Chingyuan - Tsanghsien line and will then prepare for the next operation.

The 5th Division will rush to the Yuhsien area close on the heels of the enemy and will then prepare for the operation on the Chingyuan Plain.

Upon arrival of the 14th Division, the 1st Army will advance to the line connecting Ihsien, Tinghsing, Paikouhochen and Pahsien (including its vicinity) and prepare for an assault against the enemy in and around Chingyuan.

Pending the arrival of the 2d Army commander, the 10th Division commander will command units assigned or attached to the 2d Army commander and will promptly advance to the Machang area and prepare for an attack against the enemy in and around Tsanghsien.

The boundary between the operational areas of the 1st and 2d Armies will be the line connecting Langfang and Pahsien; and the area on the boundary will be the 1st Army's area of responsibility.

The Provisional Air Corps will devote most of its effort to the support of the 1st Army and the 5th Division, and, in addition, will reconnoiter enemy positions in and around the line

connecting Chingyuan and Tsanghsien, as well as the forward and rear areas of the enemy and the movement of enemy forces in the mountainous district west of the Peiping - Hankou railway. The Provisional Air Corps will also support the 2d Army whenever necessary.

The rest of the units in North China, which are under the direct command of the North China Area Army, will carry on their previously assigned mission.

On 9 September, when the operational preparations of the 1st Army were well under way, the North China Area Army commander ordered the Provisional Air Corps to support the 1st Army with its main force and the 2d Army with an element. At the same time, the North China Area Army commander delegated to the 1st Army commander the power to deploy the North China Area Army's heavy artillery unit in the area around Lianghsiang to support the 1st Army's operation.

Chahar Operation

Prior to the organization of the North China Area Army the Central Authorities in Tokyo issued an order to the China Garrison Army commander to employ an element of his force to destroy the enemy forces east of Wanchuan. The Central Authorities also ordered the Kwantung Army commander to render assistance to the China Garrison Army from Jehol Province and Inner Mongolia in order to facilitate the Garrison Army's operations. These orders were issued as two hostile divisions of the Kuomintang Army had crossed the border of Chahar Province and captured Nankou and it was felt they were awaiting an opportunity to enter the Peiping - Tienching area.

In accordance with this order, the China Garrison Army commander

committed an element of his force to the operation in the middle of August.¹⁴ The Kwantung Army supported the China Garrison Army from Jehol Province and Inner Mongolia by committing an element of its force (three mixed brigades and seven infantry companies) to the operation. Towards the end of August, the China Garrison Army broke through the enemy positions on the border of Chahar Province near Pataling and the Kwantung Army penetrated their lines in the vicinity of Wanchuan on 27 August and continued in pursuit of the retreating enemy. The 5th Division captured Yuhsien mid-September.¹⁵ The 5th Division commander, in accordance with a subsequent order of the North China Area Army, then made preparations to transfer the main body of his division from Yuhsien to the Chingyuan Plain.¹⁶

However, upon receipt of information that the enemy was building up for an offensive in the border area of Chahar and Shansi Provinces, west of Yuhsien, he decided to destroy these forces prior to the transfer of the division to the Chingyuan Plain. This mission was successfully accomplished within a few days. In addition, a powerful element of the Division destroyed an enemy force near the

14. The 11th Independent Infantry Brigade, (Suzuki Brigade) later reinforced by the 5th Division. See page 11.

15. By that time, the 11th Independent Infantry Brigade had returned to the Kwantung Army.

16. The China Garrison Army was integrated into the North China Area Army on 31 August 1937, at which time the commander of the China Garrison Army became the commander of the 1st Army.

Inner Great Wall. In the latter part of September, however, this element was encircled by a superior enemy force and the situation deteriorated to such a degree that it became necessary for the main body of the Division to attack the encircling enemy. Fierce fighting ensued. The Chahar Detachment of the Kwantung Army, driving westward roughly along the Peiping - Suiyuan railway, captured Tatung in mid-September and proceeded to mop up hostile remnants in the area. Upon receipt of information that the 5th Division was fighting desperately against heavy odds, this detachment launched an attack from the north against the enemy forces disposed along the Inner Great Wall and destroyed them late in September. The Detachment then advanced westward in pursuit of the enemy along the Huto Ho, until it reached an area south of Taihsien early in October. After that, the main body of the Chahar Detachment was brought under the command of the 5th Division, and the Division commenced new operations to capture Yangchu.


During this period, an element of the Division, consisting of three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion, commanded by Maj Gen Kunisaki, was ordered by the Division commander to advance to the Chingyuan Plain via Laiyuan and left Yuhsein in mid-September, reaching the Chingyuan Plain early in October.

Also, in mid-October, a powerful element of the Chahar Detachment of the Kwantung Army, on orders from the Kwantung Army, captured Suiyuan and Paotou. (Map 2)

CHAHAR OPERATION

MID-AUGUST - MID-OCTOBER 1937

→ JAPANESE ARMY
⌒ CHINESE ARMY



35

MAP NO. 2


Chohsien - Chingyuan Operation

First Phase (14 - 17 September) (Map 3)

The enemy confronting the 1st Army¹⁷ in early September 1937 consisted of Sun Lien-chung's Army (about $3\frac{1}{2}$ divisions of the 30th Army under the indirect control of the Nationalist Army) disposed west of the Peiping - Hankou railway, and Feng Chan-hai's Army (about one division of the 63d Army of the former Northeastern Army), and Wan Fu-lin's Army (about 3 divisions of the 53d Army of the former Northeastern Army), both disposed east of the railway line. These forces had constructed positions along three lines: (1) a line running from the area north of Fangshan to the bank of the Yungting Ho (2) a line running from the vicinity of Chohsien to east and west of Liuchuanchen, and (3) a line running from the vicinity of Laishui via Kaopeitien to Hsinchiao and east and west of Niutochen. Since early September enemy troops had been advancing steadily overland from existing positions near Chingyuan to the vicinity of Chohsien.

Intending to commence an assault on or about 11 September, the 1st Army ordered its 20th Division, stationed in the Changhsintien district, to be deployed in the vicinity of Lianghsiang to prepare for an attack on Fangshan and the 6th Division, deployed along the Yungting Ho across from Kuan, to prepare to advance. However, the enemy's main strength in and around Chingyuan began advancing overland toward

17. Headquarters of the 1st Army was located at Fengtai, southwest of Peiping.



Chohsien and its vicinity, therefore, the 1st Army postponed its offensive for several days in order to deploy the 14th Division, which was due to arrive from Japan,¹⁸ between the 20th and 6th Divisions, and thereby facilitate the trapping and destroying of the enemy in and around Chohsien. The time of the offensive was announced as after sunset of the 14th. However, on the morning of 14 September, the 1st Army commander received the following report from the 14th Division¹⁹ commander:

On the night of the 13th, the Division received a small-scale enemy attack against its right flank but reconnaissance revealed that the enemy strength in the vicinity of Kuan has diminished considerably.

The 1st Army telephoned the 14th Division for confirmation of the report, and received an answer to the effect that on the night of the 13th, a small enemy unit on the opposite bank near Changancheng had directed fire against the Japanese unit stationed there, but no enemy troops had been seen in the vicinity of Hulin.

The 1st Army commander considered the possibility of the enemy having started to retreat, and ordered the 6th and 20th Divisions to submit a report on their respective fronts. The 20th Division re-

18. Advance echelons of the 14th Division landed at Tangku and proceeded to their assigned area west of Peiping on 3 September. However, concentration of the main strength in this area was not completed until 12 September.

19. At that time the 14th Division was preparing to advance in the area along the Yungting Ho near Hulin.

ported no change in the enemy situation, while the 6th Division reported that not only had the enemy shown no sign of withdrawal but, on the contrary, seemed to be increasing his strength.

Subsequently, the Army received a report from the 14th Division to the effect that although the division had sent patrols to the vicinity of Kuanchuang (approximately four kilometers north of Kuan) there were no signs of the enemy in the area. The Division, therefore, had ordered its front units to prepare to advance.

The Army commander, considering the reports of the enemy situation on the 6th and the 20th Division fronts, estimated that the forces opposing these divisions were still in their original positions and that only the troops confronting the 14th Division had been withdrawn wholly or partially or had made a change in disposition. However, he advised each division to take immediate counter-measures to cope with any change in the enemy situation.

At 1000 hours, 14 September, the 1st Army commander sent his Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Hashimoto, together with Colonel Isamu Kinoshita, to the 14th Division headquarters to observe the situation on the 14th Division's front. They arrived by air at the 14th Division headquarters at Tahuangfa at 1140 hours.

By this time, the 14th Division had completed preparations to advance and some elements had already moved forward. The Division commander explained that since there was no enemy confronting the Division, it had begun the river crossing operation in order to secure

a foothold on the opposite bank.

Colonel Kinoshita then sent a telegram to Lt Col Takeshi Mori, staff officer in charge of operations of the 1st Army at Fengtai, as follows:

Enemy troops operating in the Kuangchuang area on the 14th Division front are evidently spread thin. The main force may have retreated.

The main body of the 14th Division began moving at noon of the 14th and is now advancing toward the line connecting Mentsun, Tunghsu and Paitsun.

The Chief of Staff has approved this action.

About 1300 hours of the 14th, the Army received a telegram from the 14th Division which stated:

The Division started moving at 1200 hours. It has crossed the Yungting Ho and is now advancing to the line connecting Mentsun, Tunghsu and Kuangchuang. It will then advance beyond this line. The headquarters will advance to Hulin.

The Army commander, upon receipt of this report, disseminated the information immediately to the 6th and 20th Divisions.

At 1300 hours, the Chief of Staff left the 14th Division headquarters, and arrived at 6th Division headquarters at Nanssufa about 1530 hours to observe the situation in the 6th Division area.

About 1440 hours the 6th Division, in concert with the advance of the 14th Division, had launched an attack against the enemy.

The Chief of Staff, accompanied by the 6th Division commander, proceeded to the Peikoi command post to observe the actual combat situation and, after having affirmed the occupation of the opposite bank by the two flank units, returned to Army headquarters.

Prior to his return, the Chief of Staff sent the following telegram at 1600 hours to report on the situation to the Army commander:

Although there is no sign of a general retreat by the enemy in view of the advance made by the 6th and 14th Divisions, it is believed appropriate to advance X Day.²⁰

However, the telegram had not reached the Army headquarters at 1830 hours, when the Chief of Staff returned to headquarters.

At 1800 hours, the Army commander received from Colonel Kinoshita the following telegram:

The enemy troops confronting the 6th Division are still in their positions. The Division launched an attack at 1440 hours in concert with the drive of the 14th Division.

Although there is no sign of a general retreat by the enemy, since the 14th Division has begun its advance, it is believed advisable to advance the 20th Division's attack to X + 1 Day.²¹

Prior to this report, the Army commander had ordered the 20th Division to attack the enemy whenever the enemy showed signs of retreating. However, since the 14th and the 6th Divisions had begun their attack, he issued the following order to the 20th Division:

The 14th Division crossed the Yungting Ho at noon, has advanced to the sector northwest of Kuan, and is planning to advance to the Chuma Ho line tonight. The enemy on the division's front is retreating to the southwest. The 6th Division began an attack on its front at 1440 hours and is now pursuing the enemy.

The 20th Division will attack the opposing enemy troops as soon as preparations are completed.

20. A 1st Army order on 11 September had set X Day as 14 September with the advance of the 6th Divisions beginning at nightfall of that day. However, with the 14th Division beginning its advance at 1200 and the 6th Division advancing at 1440, the Chief of Staff considered the Army's operational tempo generally should be stepped up.

21. The attack by the 20th Division had been planned for X + 2 Day.

By sunset the 14th Division had advanced almost to Peikungyu while the 6th Division drove to the line connecting Nankoi and Tapingchuang. Both divisions continued to pursue the enemy southward.

The 1st Army's estimate of the enemy situation made on the night of the 14th was as follows:

It would appear that the hostile 30th Army, which is operating in our 20th Division area has received information that our main force is preparing to attack from the Kuan area, and elements of the 30th Army are now rushing the construction of positions in the area between Chohsien and Liuhoying in order to resist in the northeast area. Also, they are destroying bridges across the Chuma Ho to delay our advance. Moreover, the hostile 53d Army retreating from the banks of the Yungting Ho is attempting to join the 30th Army, when together they will resist from their prepared second and third positions.

The 20th Division will encounter stubborn resistance from the main body of the 30th Army on the 15th. The 14th Division will also encounter determined resistance at the Chuma Ho line and west, while the 6th Division will meet resistance in the Niutochen area. However, the 6th and 14th Divisions should be able to advance boldly and break through enemy positions on the Chuma Ho and in the areas west of the river, which are not yet fully fortified, and advance to the rear of the hostile 30th Army. No change in present policy relative to the employment of groups is necessary. All that is necessary is to advance.

In view of the situation on the 1st Army front, the North China Area Army commander dispatched Staff Officer Shimoyama to the 1st Army headquarters in Fengtai and Staff Officer Hanaya to the Provisional Air Corps headquarters in Nanyuan to obtain first-hand information on new developments.

Also on the 14th, the 4th Air Brigade headquarters and the 7th Air Battalion which had been incorporated into the Order of Battle of the North China Area Army, were placed under the Provisional Air

Corps.

On the morning of the 15th, the 1st Army commander went to the Lianghsiang command post to inspect the battle front of the 20th Division.

The 20th Division started its attack at 1140 hours, occupied the multi-trench positions north of Fangshan and continued to attack the stubbornly resisting enemy.

At dawn on that day, elements of the 14th Division, continuing their pursuit, had advanced to the left bank of the Chuma Ho and began to prepare to cross the river. Toward evening, the main force of the division advanced to the line connecting Hsitsaochuang and Kungtsunchen on the left bank of the Chuma Ho and prepared for a river crossing operation.

The situation on the 6th Division front was unknown due to a temporary break in the communication system.

The 1st Army commander, on the basis of the over-all situation, decided to pursue the enemy towards the area northwest of Chingyuan without slacking the offensive and, at 1340 hours, issued the following order:

The majority of the enemy has been put to rout by the heroic efforts of each group.

The Army will pursue the enemy toward the area northwest of Chingyuan without let up.

The 20th Division, in accordance with its original mission, will, without delay, pursue the enemy toward the vicinity of Ihsien. After the division has annihilated the enemy operating north of Chohsien, a force, built around three infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion, will be placed under

the direct control of the Army at Chohsien.

The 14th Division will pursue the enemy toward the area southwest of Ihsien.

The 6th Division will pursue the enemy toward the area north of Mancheng.

Operational boundaries will be extended as follows:

The boundary between the 20th and 14th Divisions: A line connecting Chohsien, Linchuang south of Laishui, and Kutsun approximately four kilometers south of Ihsien.

The boundary between the 14th and 6th Divisions: A line connecting Tinghsing, Mutsun (approximately 28 kilometers southwest of Tinghsing) and the bench mark on 415-meter Hill (about 15 kilometers north of Mancheng).

The area on the boundary will be the area of responsibility of the Division on the left. However, the road running from Chohsien through Sunglintien to Laishui, which is within the operational area of the 14th Division, may be used by heavy vehicles of the 20th Division.

Each division will be responsible for protecting railways within its own operational area.

The Army reserve unit (the 50th Infantry Regiment less one infantry battalion) will advance through the sector east of the Peiping - Hankou railway toward the vicinity of Chohsien to sever the retreat route of the enemy confronting the 20th Division. Upon advancing to Chohsien, the reserve unit will return to its original command.

The North China Area Army commander decided to exploit the success of the 1st Army and send it directly against Chingyuan without halting to prepare the line extending east and west from Tinghsing. Based on this plan, the Area Army commander ordered the Provisional Air Corps to support, with its main force, the 1st Army's pursuit of the enemy and the 5th Division's advance to the Chingyuan plain,²² and, with an element, to support the 2d Army's operation.²³

22. See pages 16 and 17.

23. On 11 September, the 2d Army had occupied Machang and by mid-September was north of Tsanghsien. It occupied Tsanghsien on 24 September.

Also, on the 15th, the 1st Army placed the newly-attached heavy artillery units under the control of the commander of China Garrison Artillery Regiment,²⁴ and issued the following order:

Colonel Nobuo Kobayashi, commander of the China Garrison Artillery Regiment will assume command of the 1st Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion, the 2d Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion, and the 1st Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battery,²⁵ in addition to the units now under his direct command (less the mountain artillery battalion). The units under Colonel Kobayashi's command will be attached to the 1st Army as the Army Heavy Artillery Unit.

The Army Heavy Artillery Unit will support the attack of the 20th Division.

The 20th Division will be responsible for providing quarters and supplies to the aforementioned Unit.

The Area Army commander also announced plans for the disposition of units which were due to arrive in the near future as follows: the 118th Infantry Brigade of the 109th Division was to detrain at Huangtsun and prepare to advance toward the area south of the Yungting Ho via Kuan, while the 6th Heavy Field Artillery Brigade was to enter the command of the 1st Army commander upon arrival at Fengtai.

On 16 September, the 20th Division unleashed its attack in the morning and advanced to the area southwest of Fangshan. It continued

24. On 15 September, the China Garrison Artillery Regiment, which was under the direct command of the North China Area Army, was attached to the 1st Army.

25. On 9 September, these heavy artillery units, which were under the direct command of the North China Area Army, were ordered to advance from the vicinity of Peiping to Lianghsiang and to prepare to support the 1st Army, whenever necessary. On 15 September, they were attached to the 1st Army.

its attack into the night in the sector south of Fangshan.

The 14th Division began to cross the Chuma Ho at a point near Hsitsaochuang on the night of the 15th, and, at 1400 hours of the 16th, after the main body of the Division had crossed the river, began to advance toward Sunglintien in pursuit of the enemy.

After crossing the Yungting Ho the 6th Division found its way blocked by a vast marshy area east of Niutochen. Unable for a time to make much headway, the Division finally passed through this area, and, crushing enemy resistance, advanced to the vicinity of Tachiangtsun by evening of the 16th.

On 13 September, the North China Area Army released from its direct control the 3d Battalion of the 59th Infantry Regiment, which had been stationed at Tangshan and which had been guarding the Peiping - Ninghai railway and its neighboring area, and ordered it to return to the 14th Division. On 15 September, the 1st Army ordered the battalion to proceed to Lianghsiang to serve as a reserve unit of the 1st Army. It arrived in Lianghsiang at 1530 on the 18th.

On the 17th, since enemy troops in the Chienchuntai area had withdrawn to the area west of the Tahanling and Hsiaohanling Mountain Ranges, the Army ordered the Chienchuntai Detachment²⁶ to leave one infantry battalion in the vicinity of Sanchiatien and advance with its remaining units to the vicinity of Kaopeitien and serve as the Army's

26. Strength: 23d Infantry Regiment (minus 1 battalion) and 2d Battalion of 45th Infantry Regiment as nucleus, commanded by Colonel Shizuomi Okamoto.

reserve.

The 20th Division, upon completion of a successful night attack southwest of Fangshan, commenced a pursuit action and advanced to the area west of Chohsien at sunset of the 17th. At the same time, the Army ordered the 3d Battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment, (minus two companies), which was at Lianghsiung as a reserve unit,²⁷ to advance toward Chohsien via the Peiping - Chingyuan road, in concert with the advance of the 20th Division.

The 1st Army, also ordered the Army Heavy Artillery, which had been deployed in the vicinity of Lianghsiung since the 15th but which it was found unnecessary to use in support of the 20th Division attack, to mass in the vicinity of Changhsintien and prepare to advance and support the attack on Chingyuan, if required.

The 14th Division advanced to the south of Chohsien at about 1000 hours of the 17th, and severed the Peiping - Hankou railway line, while an element of the Division pursued the enemy towards Laishui.

On the morning of the 17th, the 6th Division continued to mop up hostile remnants in the vicinity of Niutochen and, advancing westward, reached the left bank of the Taching Ho near Hsinchiao about sunset.

27. After this unit landed at Tanghu on 13 September, it assembled in the Lianghsiung area.

As the attack was generally successful on all fronts, the 1st Army commander decided to send elements as an advance force to Shihpanshan and to the heights on the northern bank of the Tacha Ho, north of Mancheng, to facilitate the forthcoming operation, and issued the following order:

The Army's attack is developing favorably.

The 6th and 14th Divisions will promptly send elements to the following points to facilitate the attack against Chingyuan.

Elements of the 14th Division: If possible to Shihpanshan; otherwise, to the heights north of Shihpanshan.

Elements of the 6th Division: To the heights on the northern bank of the Tacha Ho, north of Mancheng.

During this period, the main body of the Provisional Air Corps gave the 1st Army direct air cover to facilitate its operations, in addition to bombing Shihchiachuang, Chingyuan, and other places.

Second Phase (18 - 20 September) (Map 4)

The enemy force which had been routed from positions near Chohsien, was composed of the 53d Army (commanded by Wan Fulin and composed of the 116th, 119th and 130th Divisions), the 91st Division of the 63d Army commanded by Feng Chanhai, the 30th Army (commanded by Sun Lienchung and composed of the 27th, 30th and 31st Divisions), the 3d Army (commanded by Tseng Wanchung and composed of elements of the 7th and 12th Divisions) and elements of the 4th Cavalry Division, while retreating from the Chienchuntai area were elements of the 14th Army (commanded by Wei Lihuang and composed of the 10th, 83d and 85th Divisions).

The Japanese 20th Division, in spite of torrential rain, left

the vicinity of Peichengtsun and Lichungtsun at midnight of the 17th, and, dividing into two columns, continued the pursuit of the enemy through the night. They dislodged powerful enemy forces from the vicinity of Chenchiangying on the upper reaches of the Chuma Ho, and from Fangting and Nanchientou southwest of Chenchiangying on the afternoon of the 18th.

The 14th Division, upon advancing to the area east of Chohsien on the 17th, sent the Tachi Detachment (principally composed of three infantry battalions of the 27th Infantry Brigade and one field artillery battalion) to the Laishui area without delay, in order to seal the escape route of the enemy fleeing to the west of Chohsien and decided to continue pursuing the enemy with the main force of the division. On that day the right column (principally composed of two infantry battalions of the 59th Infantry Regiment and one field artillery battery) left Sunglintien for Yangweicheng via Chikou and Nanian, and the advance guard of the left column (principally composed of two infantry battalions of the 28th Infantry Brigade and two field artillery batteries) left Sunglintien for Chentsun via Kaopeitien, Nanhou and Kaolitien. The rest of the division, forming the main body of the left column, followed the advance guard. On the morning of 18 September, the right column advanced as scheduled and placed itself under the command of the Tachi Detachment commander. The Tachi Detachment, having incorporated the right column into its command, itself became the right

column. The vanguard of the left column reached the vicinity of Ihochuang at about 1300 hours on the 18th. Upon discovering that the enemy was occupying a position near Tsepantien, the vanguard unit lost no time in attacking.

On the night of 17 September, the 6th Division assembled troops on the bank of the Taching Ho near Mengliangying and Hsinchiao and prepared to cross the river. On the 18th, the division commander, in order to cross the Taching Ho as rapidly as possible and continue the pursuit of the enemy, and in order to occupy strategic areas north of Mancheng with an element of the division and thus facilitate the battle of Chingyuan, ordered the commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade, who was in command of the left pursuit unit, also to assume command of the right pursuit unit (the main body of the 47th Infantry Regiment), cross the Taching Ho and advance to the area north of Hsincheng. Further, he ordered the cavalry unit (with one infantry battalion attached) to rush to the hilly area north of Mancheng. On the morning of the 18th, the main body of the 47th Infantry Regiment, operating as the right pursuit unit, crossed the Taching Ho near Mengliangying by native boats. The 11th Infantry Brigade commander then ordered the 47th Infantry Regiment, to secure the bank opposite Hsinchiao and thereby provide cover to the main force of the brigade crossing the river near Mengliangying, where the crossing was easier. However, since the enemy had occupied positions extending from the vicinity of Tsangshang to the vicinity

of Hsiwuli, the covering force prepared for a night attack against the enemy.

On 18 September, the 1st Army commander directed the battle from the Lianghsiang Command Post and in the wake of the successful advance of the Japanese front line forces, he ordered an element of the 20th Division (approximately three infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion commanded by the 78th Infantry Regiment commander), which had been in the neighborhood of Chohsien to advance to the vicinity of Kaopeitien as the left flank detachment to protect the left flank of the Army. On the afternoon of the 18th, the enemy on the 1st Army's front began a general retreat. Thereupon, the 1st Army commander partially revised his operations plan. He decided to attack the prepared positions in and around Chingyuan, on the momentum of the present drive and pursue the enemy toward the sector west of Chingyuan and then to Shihchiachuang. He then issued the following order at 1800 hours:

The enemy is retreating in confusion to the south and west.

The 1st Army will continue to pursue the enemy toward the area west of Chingyuan, and then to Shihchiachuang.

The 20th Division will rush to Shihpanshan via Ihsien and then advance to the vicinity of the Fangshunchiao and sever the enemy's retreat route. At Ihsien, the 2d and 3d Field AAA Units of the 3d Division will be placed under the direct control of the Army.²⁸

The 14th Division will break through hostile positions near

28. On 11 September, these units had been attached to the 20th Division by a 1st Army order.

Mancheng, and advance to the area west of Chingyuan and destroy the enemy. The 3d Battalion of the 59th Infantry Regiment, which is held as the army reserve unit, will return to its original command at Sunqlintien.

The 6th Division will advance and attack the enemy from the direction of the Peipin - Hankou railway and thereafter will advance to the vicinity of Chingyuan and annihilate the enemy there. The division will send, without delay, a pursuit unit built around one infantry regiment and one field artillery battalion led by the infantry brigade commander, to pursue the enemy along the Peiping - Hankou railway toward Shihchiachuang. At Tinghsing, the 6th Heavy Field Artillery Brigade (less the 14th Regiment and half of the transport unit) will be attached to the division.

Each division will reorganize as soon as it has advanced to its objective and prepare to pursue the enemy towards Shihchia-chuang.

Operational boundaries will be extended as follows:

The boundary between the 20th and 14th Divisions: A line connecting Kutsun, 450-meter Hill, Paoyangshan (approximately 8 kilometers west of Mancheng) and Kanchiachuang.

The boundary between the 14th and 6th Divisions: A line connecting Mutsun, Chentailiu, the western gate of Chingyuan Fortress, the southern gate of the fortress and Chuchuang (about 8 kilometers south of Chingyuan).

Divisions on the left will be responsible for the areas on the boundaries. However, should the 14th Division advance to the vicinity of Mancheng, control of the route connecting Ihsien, Chingshan, Shihtoutsun, Mancheng and Wanhsien will be transferred without delay to the 20th Division.

No troops will be garrisoned within Chingyuan until further notice.

The left flank detachment will pursue the enemy toward Hsushui,

The former Chienchuntai Detachment and the 3d Battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment will remain at Kaopeitien as the reserve unit of the army.

Units under the command of the 118th Infantry Brigade commander upon arrival at Fengtai will mass at Chohsien.²⁹ The time will be set by a separate order.

The Army Heavy Artillery Unit will advance toward Tinghsing.

The 1st Army Signal Unit will continue its present assignment.

29. These units, which had recently arrived in Tienching and which were commanded by Maj Gen Honkawa, were ordered by the North China Area Army commander at 0900 hours of the 18th to be placed under the command of the 1st Army commander upon their arrival at Fengtai.

At 1200 hours on 18 September, the 1st Army commander received orders from the North China Area Army commander to pursue the enemy toward Chengting, after breaking through enemy positions in the vicinity of Chingyuan. The order also stated that the main force of the 2d Army (16th Division as a nucleus) would advance from Tsanghsien to Chengting and seal off the escape route of the enemy confronting the 1st Army. Further, while an element of the 5th Division was to support the advance of the Tojo Unit of the Kwantung Army, its main force was to advance to the Chingyuan area by way of Laiyuan and the Provisional Air Corp's main force was to cooperate with the 1st and 2d Armies in cutting off the enemy's escape route.

The 1st Army commander then placed one battalion of the 118th Infantry Brigade under the command of the Army Line of Communications Headquarters at Fengtai. Simultaneously, he ordered the main force of the unit to advance to the vicinity of Changhsintien to prepare for the coming operation.

On the 19th, the 1st Army commander, from information obtained through air reconnaissance made by army staff officers and the Provisional Air Corps, estimated the enemy situation as follows:

The enemy in the Peiping - Hankou railway area has abandoned his intention to resist earnestly in the vicinity of Chingyuan and will probably attempt resistance near Shihchiachuang on the right bank of the Hoto Ho.

Therefore, though the enemy probably will resist at Chingyuan, it will be only to cover his retreat.

The 1st Army commander dispatched his chief of staff to Liuliho

Command Post to direct the over-all pursuit action. Rail transportation was not satisfactory, especially as the repair of bridges over the Liuli Ho had not been completed. This lack of transportation began to seriously effect supplies to the front line troops. The Army commander, therefore, temporarily suspended the advance of the Army Heavy Artillery Unit, and also the newly attached 6th Heavy Field Artillery Brigade. At the same time, he strove to transport supplies to the front line by employing line of communications motor companies and, the same day, advanced the terminal point of the line of communications to Kaopeitien.

Near sunset of the 18th, the 20th Division advanced to the vicinity of Peihhsitsu with the main force of the right pursuit unit, and to Hsinchuangtou northeast of Laishui with the main force of the left pursuit unit. The Division prepared to attack the enemy position extending from a hill west of Weichiachuang to the vicinity of Laishui at dawn of the 19th, but, at dawn, the enemy had begun to retreat and the Division began to advance to the area east of Ihsien, close on the heels of the retreating enemy. Early on the morning of the 20th, the Division captured Ihsien without encountering much opposition. It then assembled its troops near there to prepare for further pursuit action. Later in the day an element of the Division occupied Tanghuchen.

On the evening of the 18th, the vanguard of the 14th Division's left column occupied Tsepantien. Around sunset of the same day, the

right column of the 14th Division had advanced to the vicinity of Tsaochiahuangwu and made preparations to attack enemy positions near Peilian and Nanian at dawn of the 19th. At dawn of the 19th, however, the enemy began to retreat and the column advanced toward the area southeast of Ihsien, closely pursuing the retreating enemy. On the 19th, the 14th Division commander decided to continue the pursuit of the enemy south of Ihsien. In accordance with this decision, the right column pursued the enemy south of Ihsien, while the vanguard of the left column advanced towards the vicinity of Peitanu via Kaopeitien, Nanhou and Kaolitien. The rest of the division, constituting the main body, followed the vanguard of the left column.

Around sunset of the 19th, having advanced to the vicinity of Nanhou, the 14th Division commander discovered that it would be difficult for the main body of the division to pursue the enemy further not only because of the condition of the roads but also because of the obstacle presented by an impassable unnamed river west of Nanhou. The commander assembled his troops northwest of Tinghsing and prepare for further pursuit action and ordered the right column to occupy immediately the hills west of Mutsun in order to facilitate the pursuit by the rest of the division. The vanguard of the left column was directed to construct a bridge near Nanhou and occupy Miaohou and vicinity, in order to protect the massing of the main body of the left column.

However, the construction of the bridge made little progress, so

the commander, believing it would be a waste of time to postpone the advance until the bridge was completed, decided to advance the main body of the left column on the 20th by a road which passed through Nanhou, Niehtsun (about two km northwest of Nanhou), Peilian and Yangweicheng.

On the 19th, the right column had advanced to the vicinity of Yangweicheng and the vanguard of the left column to Kaolitien.

Early on the morning of the 20th, the division commander personally led the main body of the left column and reached Nanchang about sunset.

The same day, the right column advanced to the vicinity of Tunlitsun, west of Mutsun and the vanguard of the left column to the vicinity of Mutsun.

At that time the rear motor transport unit of the 14th Division began to fail to keep pace with the frontline forces and supply problems began to crop up. Thus, each front line unit of the division had to depend largely on acquiring supplies from newly occupied areas.

By midnight of the 18th, the greater part of the main force of the 11th Infantry Brigade of the 6th Division completed crossing the Taching Ho and was preparing, together with the river-crossing cover force, to attack the enemy in the vicinity of Tsangshang and Hsiwuli. Around daybreak of the 19th, however, the enemy began to withdraw. The brigade pursued them and, on the afternoon of the same day,

advanced to a line connecting Makuantun and Hsiaoyuchih.

On the 19th, the 6th Division commander intending to pursue enemy troops from the direction of the Peiping - Hankou railway line and annihilate them in the vicinity of Chingyuan, ordered the pursuit unit commanded by the 11th Infantry Brigade commander to advance toward Peihotien along the Shihtzuchieh - Changtzuying - Peihotien road at first and then to pursue enemy troops toward Chingyuan along the Peiping - Hankou railway. On the 20th, the pursuit unit, in a dawn engagement near Peihotien, destroyed a powerful enemy force retiring from the north, before advancing southward. The unit destroyed another enemy force in the vicinity of Hsushui about sunset of the same day, and occupied the town.

The 1st Army commander, therefore, cancelled the pursuit action of the left flank detachment toward Hsushui and ordered this detachment to proceed to Tanghuchen promptly and return to its original command.

On the 20th, the Army obtained the following intelligence, and immediately transmitted it to the 20th Division:

Three enemy divisions, the 2d, the 17th and the 25th Division, are in positions near Chingyuan.

On the 18th, the 25th Division was ordered by the commander of the Chingyuan Defence Force to occupy the area between Tunghsientai, and Tunghuang with one brigade and the mountainous area northwest of this area with another brigade, also to dispose one artillery battalion, on the east side of Mancheng and another at Chingshan. Incidentally, the enemy 25th Division was badly mauled by our 8th Division at Kupeikou during the Manchurian Incident.

According to air reconnaissance the valley opening from Tanghuchen to Chingshan via Tunglungshan is very broad and the roads can be negotiated by heavy vehicles. The reconnaissance also showed that the terrain near Peitumen and Hsitumen approximately eight kilometers west of Shihpanshan, is composed of low hills, and, in general, would permit easy troop movement.

It seems that the sector north of Shihpanshan, which was neglected by the enemy in the beginning, has, since the 18th, been receiving enemy attention as they are now hastily preparing defensive positions in the area.


Your division will advance a part of its strength without delay as close as possible to Shihpanshan and secure a position in its vicinity in order to facilitate our subsequent attack. Your division, no doubt, will take such steps, but nevertheless we should like to remind you of the importance of your mission.

On the same day, an army staff officer was dispatched to the area to effect closer liaison with the 6th Division.

The Third Phase (21 - 24 September) (Map 5)

On 21 September the enemy continued to retreat in confusion, and the 1st Army relentlessly pursued it to the Tacha Ho line.³⁰ The 1st Army commander advanced his command post to Chohsien. At the same time, the 2d Army unleashed an assault on enemy positions around Tsanghsien, while the main force of the Provisional Air Corps supporting the 1st and 2d Armies bombed enemy positions in and around Chingyuan and Tsanghsien as well as key points behind the enemy's lines, in order to sever the enemy's retreat route. The North China Area Army commander also ordered the Provisional Air Corps to assign an element of its force to cooperate with the Kwantung Army's air force

30. This Japanese force comprised the main strength of the 14th Division, one infantry battalion of the 20th Division and the Cavalry Regiment and one infantry battalion of the 6th Division.



in destroying the enemy air force in Shansi Province.

The vanguard of the 20th Division pursued the enemy in the vicinity of Weichiachuang, and the main force of the Division, the enemy in the area around Tanghuchen and Shachiang. On the 22d, the 20th Division drove southward after breaking through enemy positions in the vicinity of Shihpanshan and, on the 23d, an element of the Division advanced to the vicinity of Fangshunchiao and cut off the enemy's line of retreat.

Meanwhile, the 14th Division launched daring night attacks in the vicinity of Tachaying and Tachucheng on the 21st, advanced to the Yehshan - Changchuang - Huangtsun line on the 22d and, about sunset that day, started a drive toward the sector southwest of Chingyuan to cut off the enemy's line of retreat, arriving in this sector on the 23d.

On the 21st, the main strength of the 6th Division advanced to the area round Hsushui. Later, on the same day, the Division advanced toward Kanfeng, intending to attack enemy positions near Peilou and Tungpaiting, on the 22d. However, because of the delay in artillery preparations, the attack was postponed until daybreak on the 23d, but, hearing of the success of the 14th Division, the time of the commencement of the attack was again stepped up to 1700 hours of the 22d. Around 1000 hours of the 23d, the 6th Division charged into the enemy's outer positions at Chingyuan, having first broken through enemy positions on the banks of the Tacha Ho, south of Kanfang. However, owing

to the delayed advance of artillery units, the necessary artillery support did not begin until dusk and the occupation of Chingyuan was correspondingly delayed.

On 21 September, the 108th Division upon arrival at Tienching from Japan, was placed under the direct command of the North China Area Army. It was disposed under the delegated command of the 1st Army to the sector south of Changhsintien along the Peiping - Hankou railway line. Accordingly, the 1st Army commander directed the division to mass between Lianghsiang, Sunglintien and Tinghsing (approximately eight kilometers southwest of Kaopeitien), and on 22 September issued the following order:

The 108th Division, which is under the direct control of the North China Area Army, will advance to Changhsintien and areas south thereof.

The units commanded by the 118th Infantry Brigade commander will proceed to Kaopeitien, and assume responsibility for maintaining public peace and order in the area and guarding the railways between Chohsien and Chingyuan, and between Kaopeitien and Ihsien.

Until the 108th Division troops arrive at Chohsien, an infantry battalion will remain at Chohsien and will be responsible for the maintenance of public peace there.

Since the railway bridge on the Liuli Ho had been repaired, the main strength of the 6th Heavy Artillery Brigade, which had been standing by between Lianghsiang and Toutienchen, was ordered to move to Hsushui on the night of the 22d, and place itself under the command of the 6th Division commander. The heavy artillery which was under the direct control of the Army also was ordered to proceed to Hsushui.

The 1st Army commander had ordered the former Chienchuntai Detachment to move to the vicinity of Kaopeitien, via Fengtai, by train and motor car and to remain as a reserve unit, but, on the 22d, the commander issued another order to the Detachment to move to Hsushui by train and return to its parent unit.

On the 23d, with the fall of Chingyuan imminent, the 1st Army commander decided that a part of the strength should pursue the enemy, and that the main strength should, after regrouping near Chingyuan, proceed immediately toward Shihchiachuang in pursuit of the enemy in that area. He, therefore, issued the following order at 1500:

Each unit's relentless attack has inflicted heavy losses on the enemy which was entrenched in the fixed positions around Chingyuan and is now fleeing in disorder to the south and southwest.

The Army will send an element to pursue the enemy to the south and southwest while the main force will be sent to Shihchiachuang in pursuit of the enemy in that area, as soon as the main force completes its grouping in the vicinity of Chingyuan.

All divisions will consolidate their organization promptly and prepare to advance toward Shihchiachuang in pursuit of the enemy. The time for the advance is set tentatively for the morning of 29 September, but definite orders will be issued later.

The pursuit unit of the 6th Division hereafter will be placed under the direct control of the 1st Army and shall be called the Army Pursuit Unit. The Army Pursuit Unit will proceed toward Shihchiachuang in pursuit of the enemy by taking the road running parallel to the Peiping - Hankou railway. The pursuit unit organized by the 20th Division, the 3d Battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment and a part of the motor transport unit, will be placed under the Army Pursuit Unit. At the same time staff officer Major Yanoi will be sent from Army headquarters to the Army Pursuit Unit to act as advisor to the commander of the unit.

The commander of the 20th Division will send a pursuit unit,

composed basically of an infantry regiment, (minus a battalion) and two field artillery batteries to Fangshunchiao, and place it under the command of the Army Pursuit Unit commander.

The 3d Battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment will advance to Chingyuan by train and will place itself under the command of the Army Pursuit Unit commander.

The commander of the 6th Division will return a company of the 4th Independent Engineer Regiment to its parent regiment at Chingyuan station.

The operational sector boundary for the pursuit of the enemy toward Shihchiachuang will be decided as follows:

The line connecting Paiyaochuang, Chuanlu, Hsiancheng and Nanwa will be the boundary dividing the operational areas of the 20th and 14th Divisions. The line connecting Kanchiachuang Station, Fangshunchiao Station, Wangtu Station, the northeastern end of Tinghsien, the southwestern end of Tinghsien, Chaihsitien Station, and Tungchangshou will be the boundary dividing the operational areas of the 14th and 6th Divisions. The areas on the boundary line will be the areas of responsibility of the division on the left.

The 5th Independent Machine Gun Battalion, the 1st Independent Light Armoured Car Company and the heavy artillery unit, under the direct control of the 1st Army, and the 6th and 13th Field Gas Platoons will proceed toward Chingyuan and place themselves under the delegated command of the 6th Division commander.

Field AAA units will be stationed as follows to provide air defense:

The 1st Field AAA Unit of the Guards Division will be stationed at Kaopeitien. The 2d Field AAA Unit of the Guards Division and the 1st, 2d and 3d Field AAA Units of the 3d Division will be stationed at Chingyuan under the delegated command of the senior commander.

The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment will continue its road repair work between Chingyuan and Shihchiachuang. A company attached to the 6th Division will be returned to its parent unit at Chingyuan Station.

The 1st Army Signal Unit will be responsible for maintaining liaison between Army headquarters, the division and the Army Pursuit Unit.

The commander will be at the Chohsien Command Post and will enter Chingyuan the day after tomorrow; namely, on the 25th.

At dawn of the 24th, the 6th Division commenced its attack under cover of artillery fire and, at 0840, had occupied part and later occupied the entire city of Chingyuan.

An element of the left pursuit unit of the 20th Division which was in close pursuit of the enemy towards Chengting, captured Wangtu on the 24th at 1310.

On the same day, the 2d Army, which had begun attacking enemy positions around Tsanghsien on 21 September, captured the town. An element of the Provisional Air Corps cooperated with the 2d Army in this operation.

After the fall of Chingyuan and Tsanghsien there was a marked decline in the enemy's fighting power and spirit. The North China Area Army commander, therefore, decided to seize this opportunity, use the main force of the 1st and 2d Armies to pursue the enemy relentlessly, and encircle and destroy him. To this end, at noon on the 24th he ordered the 1st Army to pursue the enemy to Chengting and the main force of the 2d Army to advance to the left bank of the Fuyang Ho and strike the enemy's main force from the rear in a coordinated attack with the 1st Army.

On the 24th, the 1st Army commander ordered the 108th Division³¹ to assume positions between Chohsien and Hsushui and to protect the railways north of Chingyuan, while preparing to advance to Shihchia-chuang. At the same time, the units commanded by the 118th Infantry Brigade commander were placed under the command of the 108th Division

31. The division was attached to the 1st Army by a North China Area Army order on 24 September.

commander.

The Fourth Phase (25 - 27 September) (Map 6)


Immediately after the occupation of Chingyuan on 24 September, the 1st Army commander left the Chohsien Command Post and entered Chingyuan at 1300 hours of the 25th.

On 25 September, the North China Area Army commander ordered the 1st Army commander to send the units commanded by the 118th Infantry Brigade commander to Tienching and place them under the command of the 2d Army.

The 1st Army lost no time in sending its pursuit unit after the enemy retiring towards Shihchiachuang, and assembled its main force in the vicinity of Chingyuan. In preparation for further pursuit, the 1st Army assembled the main force of the 20th Division near Wanhsien, the 14th Division west of Chingyuan, and the 6th Division southeast of Chingyuan.

The pursuit unit of the 1st Army left the vicinity of Chingyuan on the 25th and destroyed enemy forces wherever they were encountered. The unit's main body reached Hsinlo on the 27th. The railway pursuit unit of the 1st Army entered Hsinlo by train on the 26th and began repairing the railway bridge spanning the Sha Ho which had been destroyed by the enemy. The 1st Army commander ordered the pursuit unit to halt in the vicinity of Hsinlo to cover the advance of the main strength of the Army.

After 14 September, Japanese forces were successful in every en-



counter with an enemy of superior strength. The 1st Army had quickly occupied Chingyuan, thus denying the enemy the use of his strongly fortified positions near this town and the battle had ended in a rout for the enemy, who had suffered severe losses and was compelled to flee far to the south.

The 1st Army then reorganized its ranks in the vicinity of Chingyuan to prepare for its drive toward Shihchiachuang.

At the same time the 2d Army had advanced to the vicinity of Chiehtichen south of Tsanghsien with the 10th Division, to the northern area of Shahochiao with the 16th Division and to the eastern area of Tacheng with the 109th Division, while the main strength of the 5th Division supported by the Chahar Detachment of the Kwantung Army from the direction of Hunyuan and Yinghsien continued to attack the enemy around the Great Wall west of Lingchiu. (Map 7)


With the enemy retreating toward Shihchiachuang the North China Area Army began to prepare for operations in that area.

Operations in the Vicinity of Shihchiachuang and Fuyang Ho

Preparations for Combat by the 1st Army

From the 24 September, the 1st Army concentrated its main force in the vicinity of Chingyuan.

On 28 September, the 1st Army issued orders from Chingyuan for a drive to Shihchiachuang and vicinity to begin on 1 October. It ordered the Army Pursuit Unit at Hsinlo to protect the advance of the Army,



and ordered its divisions to start movement on 1 October and concentrate their forces in the following assigned areas by 9 October, to prepare for the coming drive.

The 20th Division was to advance through the area along the base of the mountains to the west of the Peiping - Hankou railway to the sector northwest of Lingshou. The 14th Division was to proceed through the area generally west of the Peiping - Hankou railway to the sector west of Chengting, and the 6th Division was to proceed through the area generally east of the Peiping - Hankou railway, to the sector northeast of Chengting.

The Army, at the same time, ordered the 108th Division which was placed under its command on 24 September, to proceed along the Chingyuan highway and concentrate in the sector north of Chengting and act as the Army's second line unit.

On 4 October, the Army assembled couriers from all subordinate units at Tingsien in order to disseminate orders for the attack against the enemy in and around Shihchiachuang.

A summary of the plan of attack was as follows:

On 9 October the Army will begin its attack on the enemy in the vicinity of Shihchiachuang.

If the enemy retreats, the Army will pursue him southward without let up and will destroy him in the area north of Hsingtai, together with the enemy located between the Huto Ho and the Fuyang Ho.

On 9 October, the 20th Division will launch its attack against the enemy along the banks of the Huto Ho and advance to the vicinity of Kaotsien south of Shihchiachuang so as to press the enemy into the southeastern sector and cut the route

of his retreat. During this time, the Division will send a powerful element in the direction of Yangchu on the road running parallel to the Shihchiachuang - Yangchu railway to secure the railway for as long a distance as possible.

On 10 October, the 14th Division will begin an attack on the enemy along the banks of the Huto Ho and advance to the area west of Shihchiachuang. The Division thereafter will quickly advance to the line running from east to west of Hsingtai in pursuit of the enemy along the Peiping - Hankou railway and on the roads parallel to it.

The 6th Division will, upon completion of preparations, capture Chengting, and then attack the enemy along the banks of the Huto Ho and advance to the sector southeast of Shihchiachuang. The Division will then advance its main force, without delay, to the vicinity of Chaohsien and an element to the vicinity of Ningchin and another to Paihsiang and vicinity, to cut the route of retreat of the enemy which is in the sector between Huto Ho and Fuyang Ho.

The plan to cross the Huto Ho will be issued later.

The 108th Division will first take up positions in the sector north of Chengting and, when units of the 6th Division cross the Huto Ho, it will follow up the crossing to exploit the 6th Division's assault and advance to the vicinity of Shulu and destroy the enemy there.

Actual Combat

On 6 October, the 20th, 14th and 6th Divisions of the 1st Army began to advance simultaneously from the line from Chuyang to Tinghsien.

On this day, the North China Area Army issued an order, the gist of which was as follows:

The North China Area Army will destroy in one blow the enemy on the Hopeh Province plain.

The 1st Army will launch an attack at the proper time and destroy the enemy before he has time to retreat. The main effort will be directed against Shihchiachuang and vicinity and, when the enemy line is breached, the enemy will be pursued relentlessly toward Hsingtai and vicinity. Furthermore, the Army will send an element to the strategic area west of Chinghsing to cut the enemy lines of communication to the Shansi Province area. The element will thereafter cooperate with the 5th Division.

At that time, the 5th Division, which had been ordered to capture Yangchu, was attacking Yuanpingchen. The main force of the 2d Army was advancing southwest along the Fuyang Ho, and the advance party of the 16th Division was believed to have reached the vicinity of Fanchiachuang, with the 109th Division in the vicinity of Shenhsien.

On 7 October, the Army commander advanced his command post to Hsinlo.

The 20th Division encountered about two enemy divisions moving northward in the vicinity of Lingshou and Tienyingchen and dealt them a crushing blow.

The 14th and 20th Divisions had advanced to the banks of the Huto Ho and were preparing for further attacks.

On 8 October, the 6th Division deployed siege guns³² and heavy field artillery pieces, and, receiving support from about 100 artillery pieces in all, stormed Chengting and generally completed mopping up resistance in the city by dawn of the 9th.

Subsequently, an element of the 20th Division succeeded in crossing the river in the vicinity of Tienhsing and pursued the enemy toward Chinghsing. The Division's main force then advanced.

The 14th Division, detecting signs of retreat by the enemy confronting it, advanced its river-crossing schedule and met so little

32. 24 cm to 30 cm howitzers, when employed in siege operations (against a fortress) were termed "siege guns." (KOJOHO)

resistance that the spearhead of the vanguard, by the afternoon, had entered Shihchiachuang.

Analyzing the situation, the 1st Army estimated that the enemy on the Huto Ho had begun retreating after suffering heavy losses in the 14th and 20th Division sectors. It, therefore, ordered the divisions under its command to pursue the enemy and advance immediately to designated positions, in order to exploit the success of the battle and destroy the enemy.

Earlier, since the boundary between the 1st Army's area and that of the 2d Army had been extended to the line connecting Suning, Shentse, Chihhsien and Chaohsien, the 1st Army ordered the drive of the 6th and 108th Divisions to halt at that line.

On the 11th, in order to avoid the danger of friendly troops accidentally firing upon each other when the 2d Army troops advanced to the Kaci area the 1st Army suggested to the Area Army that the boundary line between the 1st and 2d Army be extended further.

On the same day, the 20th Division advanced to the vicinity of Touyutsun, the pursuit unit of the 14th Division to the area north of Yuanshih, and the 6th Division reached Chaohsien.

The 1st Army, therefore, decided to reorganize without delay, after advancing to Hsingtai and Chaohsien and vicinity, and prepare for a further push to the south. It ordered the 20th Division to continue the original mission of its right flank detachment and to quickly reorganize its main force after arriving at the designated

position, in order to be ready to carry out the operation in the Yangchu area.

The 14th Division was ordered to send an element to pursue the enemy toward Hantan and to reorganize its main force in the vicinity of Hsingtai and prepare for a drive to Anyang.

The 6th Division was ordered to quickly reorganize its troops in the sector between Chaohsien and Luangcheng and be ready for movement to other areas when required.³³

The 108th Division was ordered to regroup without delay in the vicinity of Meihuachen and to prepare for a drive south through Chaohsien and Paihsiang, and siege guns and a portion of heavy field artillery pieces were ordered to assemble at Chengting and be ready for further action.

On the 12th, the pursuit unit of the 14th Division began attacking a powerful enemy position in the area north of Yuanshih, while the pursuit unit of the 6th Division dealt an annihilating blow to the fleeing enemy south of Chaohsien.

The Army, thereupon, ordered the 6th Division to send its pursuit unit which has reached Paihsiang to Neichiu and to halt the Division's main force at Chaohsien and prepare for further action.

On 12 October, the Area Army ordered the extension of the

33. The 6th Division had received an informal Area Army order to move to the Shanghai area.

operational sector boundary between the 1st and 2d Armies to the line connecting Chaohsien, Paihsiang and Nanho and ordered the 6th Division³⁴ to mass in the vicinity of Shihchiachuang.

On 15 October, the Army headquarters advanced to Shihchiachuang.

The 14th Division continued its pursuit with its mechanized and railway pursuit troops and captured Hantan on the 17th. It reached the Chang Ho line on the 18th.

The 14th Division then endeavored to establish a foothold on the south bank of Chang Ho, and, on about the 27th, built bridges in the vicinity of Fenglochen and near the Peiping - Hankou railway.

About the 27th, the main force of the 14th Division massed between Hsingtai and Hantan and prepared to cope with any emergency which might arise.

The pursuit unit of the 108th Division, which had been pursuing the enemy through Jenhsien, Hokuochen and Tangping captured a strong point for reconnaissance about the 19th in the vicinity of Feihsiang and, on the 23d, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in the surrounding area, as well as in the vicinity of Chengan on the 24th. Subsequently, the pursuit units began massing in the vicinity of Feihsiang and Chengan.

The main force of the 108th Division was located in the vicinity of Chaohsien as a unit under the direct control of the 1st Army and

34. On 12 October, the 6th Division was assigned to the 10th Army and later was transferred to the Shanghai area.

was responsible for maintaining peace and order in Chaohsien and vicinity. (Map 8)


Yangchu Operation

In accordance with the 1st Army order to attack enemy positions in the neighborhood of Shihchiachuang, on 4 October the 20th Division was ordered to attack the enemy on the banks of the Huto Ho. After that, the Division was to send a powerful element toward Yangchu on the road parallel to the Shihchiachuang - Yangchu railway in pursuit of the enemy and to dispose its troops so as to secure as much as possible of the railway.

On 6 October, the North China Area Army ordered the 1st Army to advance an element promptly to strategic points west of Chinghsing and cut off the enemy's line of communication to the Shansi Province area and, at the same time, to act in concert with the 5th Division to capture Yangchu.

The right flank detachment of the 20th Division crossed the Huto Ho and attacked and occupied Chinghsing on 13 October, while its Koito Unit reached Chiukuan, where the drive was slowed down because of a superior enemy force. On the night of the 14th, the 20th Division, dispatched an infantry battalion and a mountain artillery battery from the vicinity of Shihchiachuang to Chinghsing to reinforce the detachment.

On 14 October, the 1st Army ordered the 20th Division commander



to send three infantry battalions, the main force of the independent mountain artillery regiment and other necessary units as reinforcements to the 5th Division's right flank detachment on the Yangchuan plain to aid the 5th Division's drive on Yangchu. Incidentally, the 5th Division had attacked and occupied enemy positions in and around Hsinkouchen on the 13th.

In accordance with this order, the 20th Division reinforced the right flank detachment with two infantry battalions and an artillery battalion with 10 cm howitzers. These units left Chihchiachuang on the 17th and advanced westward. The area of Chiukuan was known to have been secured by the Koito Unit, but the situation in the Titou area was unknown. Later, a report was received from a staff officer of the 20th Division, who had been dispatched to the right flank detachment, that the detachment had advanced from Chinghsing toward the Hsinkuan area with the main force of the Koito Unit and toward the Niangtzukuan area with about half an infantry battalion by following the railway line. However, although very little resistance had been encountered by the Koito Unit and Chiukuan had been occupied on the 13th, along the railway line there had been heavy fighting with enemy troops entrenched in the hills west of Chinghsing and the Japanese forces had been unable to advance. The commander of the Koito Unit ordered the 3d Battalion to advance to Titou. The battalion, however, was encircled by a superior enemy force in the neighborhood of Titou on the 14th and suffered heavy casualties. It suc-

ceeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement and returned to Chiukuan. During this period, the main force of the Koito Unit had attacked the enemy north of Hsinkuan and advanced from the hills west of Chiukuan to Kantaoi and the hills southeast thereof, but remnants of the enemy were still manning positions dug in on hills flanking both sides of the Chiukuan - Chinghsing road.

On 17 October the Area Army issued the following order:

The 1st Army will rush a powerful element to the Shinchia-chuang - Yanchu railway area. The element will break through enemy positions there and advance to Yutzu and vicinity to facilitate the 5th Division's drive on Yangchu.

On the 18th, the right flank detachment of the 20th Division massed six infantry battalions, a mountain artillery regiment, an artillery battalion with howitzers of 10 cm caliber, a trench mortar battalion, a light armored company and an engineer company between Chinghsing and Chiukuan and, on the 19th, ordered the Koito Unit to continue the attack on Hsinkuan. Two infantry battalions, a mountain artillery battery, an artillery battalion with howitzers of 10 cm caliber and a trench mortar company, were dispatched to attack first the enemy on hills west of Chinghsing and then to attack enemy troops in the area of Niangtzukuan.

On the 19th, the right flank detachment attacked the enemy west of Chinghsing and advanced roughly to the line running north-south of Chuangtou.

The 5th Division continued to attack the enemy in the neighbor-

hood of Hsinkouchen, and the enemy began to erect fortifications along a line east and west of Hsinhsien and in the vicinity of Yangchu. In view of the shifting of enemy troops from the vicinity of Wutai to the Niangtzukuan area, the Army ordered the 20th Division to occupy the Yangchuan Plain.

In order to occupy the Yangchuan Plain, the 20th Division decided first to attack the enemy at the Great Wall near Niangtzukuan. On the 20th, therefore, it ordered the right column (formed around 6 infantry battalions, 2 field artillery battalions, 2 artillery companies with 15 cm guns, a mountain artillery battalion and 2 trench mortar companies) to attack the enemy in the Chinghsing - Hsinkuan - Shihmenkou road area and in areas north of the road. The left column (formed around 4 infantry battalions, a mountain artillery battalion and a trench mortar company) was ordered to destroy the enemy in the area along the Weishanchen - Tseyuchen - Shihmenkou road and then advance to the rear of the enemy confronting the right column, to facilitate the attack of that column. The remaining units were ordered to mass in the neighborhood of Chinghsing.

On the 21st, the Area Army ordered the 1st Army to employ a unit built around the 20th Division with an infantry brigade (minus a regiment), a mountain artillery battalion and an engineer company from the 109th Division³⁵ in a co-ordinated action with the 5th Division, to

35. These units of the 109th Division were attached to the 1st Army on 21 October 1937.

occupy the Yangchu Plain. At that time, the 5th Division was still fiercely attacking enemy positions in Hsinkouchen. The Area Army order also directed the 5th Division to begin the drive on Yangchu, after it had occupied enemy positions at Hsinkouchen, recouped its strength and made thorough preparations.

In accordance with the Area Army order, the 1st Army ordered the newly attached units of the 109th Division, which were named the Hsiyang Detachment, to attack Hsiyang from the direction of the Tsanhuang - Chiulungkuan - Hsiyang road. At that time, however, the 109th Division was massed in the vicinity of Tangshan and during the operations near the Fuyang Ho had lost a considerable number of horses. Consequently, although the organization of the Detachment was accelerated not only by drawing horses from within the Division, but also by obtaining a considerable number of horses from 1st Army Headquarters in order to prepare for the mountain operations, the early departure of the detachment was not possible.

The right column of the 20th Division advanced from the vicinity of Shihchiachuang on the 21st and successively occupied the hills southwest of Chuangtou. Also, after a pitched battle on the 24th, it occupied the 1066 meter hill southeast Hotaoyuan. On the same day, the advance force of the left column of the 20th Division surprised the enemy in the neighborhood of Chitoutsun and then advanced to Mashantsun.

The right column occupied Niangtzukuan on the 26th. On the same

day the left column destroyed about two divisions of the enemy in the vicinity of Sungkoutsun and then, advancing north, occupied the 1387 meter hill and Paimuching and pushed to the rear of the enemy in the Niangtzukuan area.

On the night of the 26th, the 20th Division commander designated the right column as the right pursuit unit and directed it to pursue the enemy to the Yangchuan Plain. At the same time, the left column was designated the left pursuit unit and ordered to pursue the enemy relentlessly to Pingting via Paimuching, and the main body of the Division was ordered to advance from Hsinkuan to Pingting.

The Army, in order to exploit the fall of Niangtzukuan and to occupy the Yangchu Plain on the momentum of its drive, ordered the 20th Division to continue its attack on the enemy and advance first to the area south of Yutzu and then to the Yangchu Plain. It also ordered the Hsiyang Detachment to place itself under the command of the 20th Division commander at Hsiyang. At the same time, the Army withdrew an artillery regiment with 15 cm howitzers, an artillery battalion with 10 cm cannons, two trench mortar companies and an engineer company from the area along the Peiping - Hankou railway to employ these units in the Shansi Operation.

The Koito Unit which had been in the Chiukuan area advanced to the attack during the morning and pursued the enemy toward Paimuching, after effecting a break-through in the vicinity of Hsinkuan.

An element of the right pursuit unit destroyed the enemy on the

hills northwest of Chuchengchen and the main force of the pursuit unit destroyed the enemy on the hills west of Shangpanshihtsun.

The left pursuit unit advanced to the vicinity of Hsiaochiaopao by evening and continued its attack into the night in the area south of Shihmenkou, finally destroying the enemy.

In accordance with the Area Army order, the 109th Division (minus the 118th Infantry Brigade and a cavalry battalion) was placed under the command of the 1st Army on the 26th, so that it might be employed promptly in the campaign to occupy the Yangchu Plain from the mountains west of the Peiping - Hankou railway line.

On the 28th, the Army ordered the newly attached 109th Division upon completion of its preparations to advance to Hsiyang along the Tsanhuang - Chiulungkuan - Hsiyang road, but since the Division had previously transferred its healthy horses to the Hsiyang Detachment, it was short of the necessary pack horses for operations in the mountainous area and was unable to depart from the vicinity of Tangshan until 1 November. Much time was spent and much trouble was experienced by the Division in organizing its pack horse unit, for horses had to be drawn from the Division's Transport Unit or captured Chinese horses obtained from the 1st Army and from other sources.

In accordance with the Army order to advance to the area south of Yutzu, the 20th Division resolved to pursue the enemy to the Yangchu Plain after occupying the Yangchuan Plain and replenishing its

supplies. It directed an element of the right pursuit unit to pursue the enemy toward Hsinhsingchen and an element of the left pursuit unit to pursue the enemy toward Mataoling. The remaining main force was ordered to mass near Yangchuan and Pingting.

On the 29th, the left pursuit unit of the Division, with the support of the divisional artillery's main force, began attacking an enemy force of about a division and a half, which was occupying positions near Hsiputsun, and captured Pingting.

In the Hsinkouchen area, there was no change in the situation as late as 2 November, but, on 3 November, the enemy in this area began a general retreat with the 5th Division in pursuit.

On 2 November, the 20th Division ordered the right pursuit unit to pursue the enemy relentlessly toward the vicinity of Mingchienchen and, on 3 November, ordered the left pursuit unit to depart from the neighborhood of Pingting and pursue the enemy toward the vicinity of Yutzu along the Mataoling - Sungtachen - Shiahu - Yutzu road, while the Division's main force was to leave Pingting on 4 November and advance toward Changchingchen in the wake of the right pursuit unit.

On 3 November, however, as the situation on the 5th Division's front had improved, the 20th Division attached the main force of the field artillery regiment to the right pursuit unit and ordered it to make an all-out pursuit of the enemy.

Occupation of Yangchu

On the night of 3 November, the Area Army ordered the 1st Army to occupy Yangchu and Yangchu Plain and, at the same time, placed the 5th Division under the 1st Army's tactical command.

To achieve its objective the 1st Army issued the following orders:

The 5th Division will attack Yangchu, while an element of the Division will advance toward Fenyang in pursuit of the enemy.

The 20th Division will advance an element to occupy the area northwest of Yutzu to keep watch on enemy positions southeast of Yangchu. The main force of the 20th Division will, after advancing to Yutzu, continue pursuit of the enemy toward Chiehhsiu

The 20th Division will advance the Hsiyang Detachment to Yutzu.

The 109th Division will depart from Yuanshih on 4 November and begin to advance toward Yutzu via Hsiyang.

Marked progress was made in the bold pursuit action of the 5th Division and its pursuit unit advanced to Yangchutu by the afternoon of 5 November. Between Mingchienchen and Wulitsun, the right pursuit unit of the 20th Division dealt a crushing blow to approximately two enemy divisions, which were advancing northward from the direction of Yutzu toward prepared enemy positions southeast of Yangchu, before advancing toward Hsiaotienchen.

On 6 November, the 5th Division advanced to the gates of Yangchu and prepared to attack. At the same time, the Division urged the enemy within the city to surrender.

In the vicinity of Hsiaotienchen, the right pursuit unit of the 20th Division attacked the enemy on the west bank of the Fen Ho, and subjected a retreating enemy force of not less than 10,000 to artillery fire, inflicting heavy losses.

In the Peiping - Hankou railway area, several divisions of Sung Cheyuan's Army had advanced to Taming and areas to the north and had assumed offensive positions. Therefore, the 1st Army decided to exploit its success on the Yangchu Plain and destroy the enemy in the Taming area.

To this end, the Army ordered the 20th Division to advance an element in pursuit of the enemy to Pingyao and to concentrate its main force in the area north of Taiku and prepare to advance to Shihchiachuang.

The capture of Yangchu already was certain, therefore, due to the situation in the area along the Peiping - Hankou railway, the 104th Brigade, the 15 cm howitzer unit, the special mountain artillery battalion, and the mortar battalion, which were massed near Chinghsing, were ordered to suspend their westward drive and change their course of advance toward the Peiping - Hankou railway area to assume new missions.

On 8 November, the 5th Division launched a general attack on Yangchu. It occupied the walls of the city at a little past 0900 hours and then proceeded to conduct mopping-up operations within the city. An element of the Division advanced to Chingyuan on 9 November. On 12 November, the Army, in accordance with the Area Army order, changed the direction of advance of the 5th Division to Shihchiachuang.

The left pursuit unit of the 20th Division continued in pursuit

of the enemy and occupied Pingyao on 10 November. The Hsiyang Detachment advanced to Hsiyang on 3 November and to Yutzu on 12 November.³⁶

The 109th Division arrived at Hsiyang on 9 November and, on the 12th, leaving behind a garrison unit built around one infantry battalion, the Division advanced westward and reached Yutzu on 16 November. (Map 9).

36. The original Japanese manuscript states that the Hsiyang Detachment advanced to Hsiyang on 12 November. Actually, it advanced to Hsiyang on the 3d and to Yutzu on the 12th.

CHAPTER II

Hopeh, Tungshan and Wuchang - Hankou Operations

General Situation Prior to the Hopeh Operation³⁷

Japanese Situation

On 18 December 1937, Imperial General Headquarters³⁸ ordered the North China Area Army commander to undertake operations in areas along the Chinan - Chingtao railway and along the left bank of the Huang Ho above Chinan. At the same time, Imperial General Headquarters stated that orders would be issued later in regard to operations around Chingtao and in southern Shansi Province. On 8 January 1938, it directed the North China Area Army to commence operations in these latter areas whenever the situation appeared favorable.

Accordingly, in mid-December the North China Area Army commander ordered the 1st Army to secure and hold its presently occupied areas and, at the same time, to prepare to advance south to the banks of the Huang Ho. Further, he ordered the 2d Army to occupy Chinan as quickly as possible.

37. Although this is known as the Hopeh Operation, actually it covers the North China Area Army's operations from mid-December 1937 to the end of March 1938 north of the Huang Ho and from mid-December 1937 to mid-January 1938 in the Shantung Province.

38. To deal with the situation in China, Imperial General Headquarters was established in the Imperial Palace in Tokyo on 17 November 1937.

The 1st Army commander, therefore, immediately assigned the defense of the Yangchu Plain area to the 20th and 109th Divisions (less the Honkawa Brigade) and that of the west Hopeh Province to the 14th and 108th Divisions.³⁹

On 10 January, the North China Area Army commander ordered the 1st Army to conduct operations in the area along the left bank of the Huang Ho, along the Peiping - Hankou railway front and in southern Shansi Province, the 2d Army to occupy Chingtao, and the Provisional Air Corps commander to support the 1st Army with its main strength while supporting the 2d Army with an element. The Provisional Air Corps was also ordered to destroy hostile air strength in the area along the Lunghai railway.

In the early part of January 1938, with the organization of the Mongolia Garrison Group,⁴⁰ the operational boundary between the Group and the 1st Army was established as the Inner Great Wall, west of

39. From late October, 1937, the main strength of the 14th Division had been stationed between Hsingtai and Hantan, while an element had been stationed at Taming. Also, from late October, the main strength of the 108th Division had been stationed around Chaohsien with elements near Feihsiang and Chengan.

40. The Order of Battle of the Mongolia Garrison Group was established on 4 January 1938 and Lt Gen Shigeru Hasunuma was appointed commander. The Group was built around the 26th Division as a nucleus. (The 11th Independent Infantry Brigade, which had participated in the early part of the China Incident was later expanded into the 26th Division.) The Group was placed under the direct command of Imperial General Headquarters and was assigned the mission of securing important points in Inner Mongolia and southern Chahar Province. Its headquarters was at Wanchuan. On 4 July 1938, the Order of Battle of the Mongolia Garrison Army was issued and the Group became the Army. On 7 July, the Army was assigned to the North China Area Army.

Tushancheng and the Great Wall, bordering the Suiyuan and Shensi Provinces. On 15 January, therefore, the 1st Army commander attached three second reserve infantry battalions⁴¹ and some cavalry and artillery companies⁴² to the 109th Division and assigned it to garrison duty in the area south of the Inner Great Wall, mainly to guard the railway connecting Yenmenkuan and Yangchu and line of communications installations, in addition to its existing duties.⁴³

Also on 15 January, the North China Area Army commander re-assigned the Honkawa Brigade,⁴⁴ which had previously been attached to the 2d Army, to the 109th Division. He also attached the 16th Division,⁴⁵ which had been returned from Central China, to the 1st

41. The term of service of the Japanese soldier was two years active service, five years and four months reserve service after completion of active service and ten years second reserve service after completion of reserve service. The soldier could be called up for active service whenever necessary during his reserve or second reserve service.

42. The North China Area Army had attached these units to the 1st Army, which had, prior to this date, used them as guard units in the logistical zone.

43. The 109th Division was already charged with the defense of the Yanchu area, and had been ordered to secure Chingyuan and Hsukou as strong points vital to the future offensive from this area.

44. This Brigade, composed mainly of three infantry battalions and one cavalry battalion, was commanded by Maj Gen Shozo Honkawa. (Note: The Japanese manuscript says one mountain artillery battalion. This is an error.) It had been attached to the 2d Army on 25 September 1937 but was returned to the 109th Division on 15 January 1938.

45. Originally, the 16th Division was assigned to the 2d Army. It was transferred to the Shanghai Expeditionary Army in late October 1937. On 15 January 1938, it was returned to the North China Area Army which, in turn, attached it to the 1st Army.

Army. These groups began arriving in the 1st Army's operational area in the latter part of January.

Following the invasion of Chinan late in December, the 2d Army, about the middle of January, occupied the areas along the Chinan - Chingtao railway, as well as the area between Chining and Mengyin.

In order to occupy Chingtao, the North China Area Army transferred the 5th Division from the 1st Army to the 2d Army, but before the division reached its objective, Japanese Navy troops occupied Chingtao on 10 January.

The 2d Army then began to consolidate in the occupied areas.

In the Central China area, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army,⁴⁶ after occupying Chuhsien late in December, advanced an element to the area along the Tienching - Pukou railway line. In early February this force advanced to Pangfou.

46. The Shanghai Expeditionary Army was dispatched from Japan on 15 August 1937, landing in Shanghai late in August. Its mission was to support the small Japanese Navy unit already fighting in that area. On 7 November, the Central China Area Army was organized and the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was assigned to the Area Army, continuing its operations under the control of the Area Army. The enemy around Shanghai began to retreat on 12 November. On 1 December, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Central China Area Army to attack Nanching and the Shanghai Expeditionary Army together with the 10th Army engaged in this operation. Nanching was captured on 13 December. On 20 December, an element of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army occupied Chuhsien. (Monograph 179, Central China Area Operations, Vol. 1). In late January 1938, an element of the 13th Division of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army began to attack the enemy south of Pangfou and, by the beginning of February, had occupied Pangfou. (Monograph 70, China Area Operations Record, Vol. 1.)

In general, the Army was responsible for air operations in the North China area, while the Navy was responsible for those in the Central and South China areas.


The Japanese Army's air strength in China from January to April 1938 consisted of 24 air squadrons, of which 14 (5 reconnaissance squadrons, 3 fighter squadrons, 3 light bomber squadrons and 3 heavy bomber squadrons) in addition, to one reconnaissance squadron organized locally for long-range reconnaissance, were stationed in north China, and 10 in central China. The Air Force in north China first used Yangchu, Shihchiachuang, Chinan, and then Anyang as base airfields, and, as the operations progressed, it used Linfen, Ani, Hsinhsiang and Lincheng as first-line airfields.

Enemy Situation

Chiang Kaishek established war sectors in accordance with the expanding battle areas. He appointed a commander to each sector who was responsible for the defense of that sector.⁴⁷

The main strength of the enemy in the Shansi Province area (the Second War Sector), commanded by Yen Hsishan, had retired to the southern part of the province after the loss of Yangchu, while the majority of the hostile force, commanded by Cheng Chien, in the area along the Peiping - Hankou railway (the First War Sector) fled to the right bank

47. Although the exact boundaries of these sectors are unknown, approximate areas are shown on Map 10.



of the Huang Ho. However, a powerful element of the enemy was still in the Hsinhsiang Plain. The enemy in these areas constructed strong positions and endeavored to check the Japanese advance by destroying roads between enemy positions and the Japanese Army. Hostile strength in late January was estimated at about twenty-seven divisions in the Second War Sector and thirty-six divisions in the First War Sector.

It was estimated that the enemy in the area along the Tienching - Pukou railway (the Fifth War Sector) was planning an attack against the Japanese 2d Army. In addition, Chinese communist forces in the mountainous area near Wutai, Yushe and Chinglo in Shansi Province were conducting guerrilla raids against the flanks and rear of the Japanese Army.

The number of enemy planes at the beginning of 1938 was estimated to be between 350 and 450, approximately half of which were of Soviet manufacture, with a monthly importation of planes from Russia between 70 and 80 planes. Although the enemy air force remained quiescent for a time after the fall of Nanching, it attempted raids against the Japanese occupied areas after the beginning of the year, and began using Lanchow, Changan, Hsiangyang, Hankou, Nanchang and Nancheng as third-line airfields (base airfields), Shanhsien, Hsinyang, and Yushan as second-line airfields (used as departure points by bomber units and as standby fields by the fighter units), and Loyang, Chouchiakou, Hofei, and Shehsien as first-line airfields. In addition, it used many advance fields in front of the first-line airfields.

Operational Plan of the 1st Army

The 1st Army commander, upon receiving informal instructions in December 1937 relative to operations in the area north of Huang Ho, had formulated an operational plan on 25 December, in general, as follows:

The 14th Division will commence action on 11 February and occupy the Hsinhsiang Plain. The 20th Division will commence action on 23 February and occupy the plains of Linfen and Yungchi. The operation will be completed on or about 10 March. When the operation is completed, four divisions⁴⁸ will be assigned to consolidate occupied areas.

The general course of action of each group was specified, but, in January 1938, as the 16th Division had been attached to the 1st Army and the Honkawa Brigade had been returned to the 109th Division, some changes were made in the plan, and, on 26 January 1938, the 1st Army commander issued an order relative to the mopping up operations north of the Huang Ho. The gist of this order was follows:

Chart: Table of Troop Distribution of 1st Army.

The 14th Division will advance steadily southward, leaving the vicinity of Anyang on 11 February and occupying the Hsinhsiang Plain. A powerful element of the Division will further pursue the enemy along the Chinyang - Chincheng - Chinshui - Icheng - Chuwu road and will advance into the Chuwu Plain. The unit to advance by way of the Taming - Puyang road will advance to the Chang Ho and south thereof before 11 February.

The 108th Division will follow the 14th Division, and advance southward. It will leave the Wuan - Shuiyehchen line on 13 February, and occupy the Changchih Plain before sending a powerful element in pursuit of the enemy by way of the Tunliu - Fuchengchen - Linfen road into the Linfen Plain. In addition, the Division will assign an element, composed principally of three infantry

48. These were the 14th, 20th, 108th and 109th Divisions.

Table of Troop Distribution of 1st Army

Force	Units Lacking	Attached Units					Air def Unit
		Inf & cav	HMG units	Mecz units	Arty and Trench mtr units	Engr units and supplies	
14th Div		2 inf bns.	1 HMG bn.	1 L armd car co, 1 Tank bn.	1 fld arty btry, 1 mt arty btry, one 15cm how brig (less 1 bn), one 10cm gun bn, 1 bln co.	2 brig mtl cos 30 collapsible boats	1 AAA Unit
108th Div	2 inf bns, 1 arty btry		1 HMG bn.		1 mt arty btry, one 15cm how bn, 1 L mtr bn.		"
16th Div*	1 inf bn.						"
20th Div**				1 L armd car co	1 mt arty regt, one 15cm how regt (less 1 btry), one 10cm gun bn, 1 L mtr bn.	1 ind engr regt, 1 brig mtl co, 30 collapsible boats	"
109th Div		2 2d res inf bns, 1 2d res cav co	1 HMG bn.		one 15cm how co, 1 2d res fld arty btry.		"
Shihchia-chuang Garrison Force		1 inf bn belonging to the 16th Div					
Force under direct control of the Army						1 sig unit	1 AAA Unit
Remarks	<p>The main body of the Provisional Air Corps, 2 squadrons each of recon planes and fighters, 3 squadrons each of light and heavy bombers will participate in this battle.</p> <p>* One inf bn will be deployed at Linching, one at Taming and one at Anyang. Two inf bns, one arty bn and one engr regt at Tzuhsien.</p> <p>** Two 15cm how btries will be transferred to the 109th Div after the breakthrough of enemy positions near Lingshih has been effected.</p>						

battalions, to garrison Yangchuan and Hsiyang.

The 20th Division will leave the vicinity of Chiehhsiu on 23 February, and will occupy the plains of Linfen and Yungchi. An element after skirting around enemy positions near Lingshih will, before the 23d, advance south beyond the line extending to the east and west of Chiehhsiu.

The 109th Division will destroy the enemy in and around Lishih and drive enemy remnants west across the Huang Ho.

The 16th Division will mass its strength between Kaoi and Hantan, and, at the same time, will assign an element to garrison Taming, Linching and Anyang. After 11 February, the Division will hold a force composed principally of two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one engineer regiment in Tzuhsien so that it will be available for the 1st Army when required.

As of 11 February, operational boundaries will be established as follows: (Map 11)

Boundary between the 14th and the 16th Divisions:

Line connecting Linhsien, Tangyin, Taokouchen, Changyuan and Lanfeng. The area on the boundary will be the area of responsibility of the 16th Division.

Boundary between the 14th and the 108th Divisions:

Line connecting Linhsien and Kaoping. The area on the boundary will be the area of responsibility of the 108th Division.

Boundary between the 108th and the 16th Divisions:

Line connecting Chiulungkuan, Huangyukuan, Matienchen, Shehsien and Linhsien. The area on the boundary will be the area of responsibility of the 108th Division.

Boundary between the 20th and the 109th Divisions:

Line connecting Chinyuan, Hohsien, Hsihsien and Yungho. The area on the boundary, except Chinyuan, will be the area of responsibility of the 20th Division; Chinyuan will be the responsibility of the 109th Division.

Boundary between the 109th and the 108th Divisions:


Line connecting Kengchiachuangchen, Shouyang, Mafangchen, Hsuanhengchen and Chinyuan. The area on the boundary will be the responsibility of the 109th Division.

Boundary between the 108th Division and the area defended by Line of Communications Command:

Line connecting Niangtzukuan and Chiulungkuan. The area on the boundary will be the responsibility of the 108th Division.

Boundary between the area defended by the Line of Communications Command and the operational area of the 16th Division:

Line connecting Chiulungkuan, Tsanhuang, Kaoi, Ningchin and Chihhsien. The area on the boundary, except Kaoi, will be the area defended by the Line of Communications Command; Kaoi will be the responsibility of the 16th Division.



Honan Province Operation North of the Huang Ho

Operation of the 14th Division

The Tachi Detachment (composed mainly of five infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion, one heavy field artillery battalion and one mountain artillery battery and commanded by Maj Gen Yoso Tachi) of the 14th Division left Taming on 7 February and, after destroying the enemy in and around Nanlo, Chingfeng and Puyang, occupied Changyuan on the 13th. The Detachment then advanced to the vicinity of Hsiaoichien on the 17th.

The 14th Division, massed its main strength at Anyang. On 11 February, it launched an assault with its right flank detachment, (composed principally of two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion and commanded by Colonel Toyama), its right wing unit (composed principally of four infantry battalions and one light armored car company and commanded by Maj Gen Sakai) and its left wing unit (composed principally of two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion and commanded by Colonel Ishiguro). It met with only slight opposition and successively occupied multiple enemy positions extending west and east of Weichiyang. On 13 February, it advanced to a line on the right bank of the Ching Ho and prepared to attack enemy positions in the area northwest of Chihsien.

On the afternoon of the 15th, the Division, with the right wing unit (organized around the former right flank detachment and one infantry battalion transferred from the former right wing unit and with

Maj Gen Sakai remaining as the right wing unit commander); the central unit (organized around two infantry battalions of the former left wing unit and commanded by Col Ishiguro), and the left wing unit (organized around three infantry battalions of the former right wing unit and commanded by Colonel Morita)⁴⁹ began an attack directed mainly against the plateau area west of the Peiping - Hankou railway. Huihsien was occupied on the 16th and Hsinhsiang on the 17th. Also on the 17th, the main body of the division left the area north of Hsinhsiang and, dividing into two columns on the 18th, pursued the enemy toward Chinyang. At the same time, the left pursuit unit (consisting of the former Tachi Detachment plus the former left wing unit) captured Hsiuwu. On the 20th, this unit captured Chincheng and, on the 21st, Menghsien. One infantry battalion and one artillery battalion of the unit remained at Menghsien while its main body was massed near Chinyang. The main body of the Division with the right pursuit unit (composed principally of four infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion, one mountain artillery battalion and one heavy field artillery battalion and commanded by Maj Gen Sakai) after skirting north of Hsiuwu and mopping up the remnants of the enemy in its path of advance, occupied Foai on the 20th, Chinyang on the 21st and Chiyuan on the 22d. Thus, the subjugation of the Peiping - Hankou railway area north of the Huang Ho generally was completed.

49. The light armored car company of the former right wing unit and the field artillery battalion of the former left wing unit were held in reserve.

In order to consolidate the occupied areas, the main body of the Division was massed at Chinyang until the 25th, when the main force moved to Poai, leaving an element at Chinyang. At the same time, in accordance with a 1st Army order, an element was sent to Shansi Province in pursuit of the retreating enemy, with orders to accomplish its mission in the following manner:

The Ishiguro Detachment (composed principally of two infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion and one heavy field artillery battalion and commanded by Colonel Ishiguro) was ordered to leave Chinyang on the 24th and to pursue the enemy into the Chuwu Plain by advancing along the Chinyang - Chincheng - Chinshui - Icheng - Chuwu road.

The Sakai Detachment (composed principally of three infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion, one mountain artillery battalion and one heavy field artillery battalion and commanded by Maj Gen Sakai) was ordered to leave Chiyuan on the 25th and pursue the enemy into the Chianghsien Plain by advancing along the Yuanchu - Chianghsien road.

The Ishiguro Detachment left Chinyang on the 24th, attacked the enemy entrenched in the rugged mountainous area and, on the 27th reached the Chin Ho line, west of Chincheng. The Sakai Detachment left Chiyuan on the 25th and, on the same day, advanced to the area east of Yuanchu. However, because of the extremely bad condition of the roads between Chiyuan and Yuanchu, one field artillery battalion and one heavy field

artillery battalion of the Sakai Detachment were compelled to return to Chiyuan.

Movement of the 16th Division

After 11 February, the 16th Division secured its operational area in accordance with the 1st Army order.

On the 16th, the 1st Army commander ordered the 16th Division to secure Kaoi, Anyang, Puyang and Linching and to keep watch on the Huang Ho line, also to send an element to Taokouchen to destroy the enemy in that area and to secure the Hsinhsiang - Chih sien railway and other line of communication facilities. He also stated that the unit massed at Tzuhsien was available to the Division.⁵⁰


Accordingly, the Ohno Detachment, (built around one infantry battalion and two field artillery batteries and commanded by Colonel Nobuaki Ohno) was sent to Hsinhsiang. It left Anyang on the 20th and, after mopping up the enemy forces in Chunhsien and Taokouchen, arrived at Hsinhsiang on the 26th. It then secured the left rear of the Army by garrisoning in the vicinity of Hsinhsiang. (Map 12)

Southern Shansi Province Operation

Operation of the 108th Division

On 13 February, an advance detachment of the 108th Division,

50. In accordance with a 1st Army order of 26 January 1938, the 16th Division commander, by 11 February, had assembled a force composed of two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one engineer regiment at Tzuhsien for use by the 1st Army, as desired.



(commanded by Maj Gen Shiro Tomabechi and consisting mainly of three infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion, two mountain artillery batteries and two heavy field artillery batteries) together with a unit of the right flank detachment, (commanded by Colonel Shizutaka Kudo and consisting mainly of five infantry companies and one mountain artillery battery) left the vicinity of Wuan, encircled and attacked the enemy positions in the mountain fastness of Tungyangkuan and put the enemy to flight. Immediately shifting to the pursuit, they captured Licheng on the evening of the 17th and Changchih at dawn of the 20th, thereby attaining the objective of the first phase of the operation.

The 108th Division, thereafter, ordered its main force to defend the vicinity of Changchih and to maintain peace and order in that district, while on the 25th the Linfen Detachment (commanded by Major General Tomabechi and consisting mainly of three infantry battalions, three mountain artillery batteries, one heavy field artillery battery and one mortar battalion, and reinforced by one infantry battalion and one field artillery battalion) was ordered to pursue the enemy in the direction of Linfen via Fuchengchen.

The Linfen Detachment left Changchih on the afternoon of the 21st, marched through steep and rugged mountain ranges in pursuit of the enemy and by the 26th had advanced to Chingpuyen on the outskirts of the Linfen Plain.

Operation of the 20th Division

On 11 February, the 20th Division launched an action from the vicinity of Taiku and Yutzu, advanced on the 13th to Pingyao, and, on the 16th, to the vicinity of Chiehhsiu and east of Hsiao. It then began to prepare for an attack on enemy positions around Lingshih.

On the 16th, the Division's right flank detachment, (commanded by Maj Gen Yoshito Takagi and consisting mainly of three infantry battalions, one field artillery battery and two mountain artillery batteries) captured enemy positions in the vicinity of Hsiao and, on the 17th, proceeded westward through Tamaichiaochen. After defeating an enemy force which counterattacked with several times the Japanese strength in the vicinity of Shihkouchen on the 21st, and again in the vicinity of Hsialitsun on the 24th, this detachment entered Hsihsien on the 26th. It immediately began to advance toward Linfen, leaving behind one infantry battalion and one mountain artillery battery at Puhsien.

On the 21st and 22d, the main force of the Division moved from the line connecting Hsiao and Chiehhsiu and, on the 23d, began attacking the enemy entrenched along a line running east and west through Jenichen. The Division carried out an encircling attack by the right wing unit, (commanded by Colonel Tsuneichi Kobayashi and consisting mainly of three infantry battalions, four field artillery batteries and two mountain artillery batteries) from the area west

of the Fen Ho, the center unit, (commanded by Major Goro Yamane and consisting mainly of about one infantry battalion) toward Lingshih and the left wing unit, (commanded by Maj Gen Yeshio Kozuki and consisting mainly of three infantry battalions, one field artillery battery and two mountain artillery batteries) from the area east of the Fen Ho. However, a large enemy force commanded by Yen Hsishan and with an estimated strength of about seven or eight divisions⁵¹ counterattacked along the entire front on the 23d, and, on the 24th, a fierce chaotic battle began which lasted for two days. The Japanese troops fought well, and, assisted by a maneuver by the right flank detachment from the area east of Linfen, the Division finally succeeded in putting the enemy to flight on the 26th. It then advanced to the vicinity of Hohsien and continued pursuing the retreating enemy toward Linfen.

Operation of the 109th Division

On 12 February, the 109th Division launched an action from the vicinity of Yangchu and Chingyuan. On the 16th, its advance detachment, (commanded by Maj Gen Nagahide Tanifuji, and consisting mainly of four infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion,)

51. At that time, the strength of a Chinese division was estimated at 10,000, whereas the main strength of the 20th Division was approximately 16,000. Yen Hsishan held a further four or five divisions in reserve in this area but apparently having received information that the Linfen Detachment was advancing from the east and the 14th Division was assembling around Chinyang, he decided to hold these divisions to protect southern Shansi Province.

captured Wenshui. The Sasaki Detachment, (consisting mainly of one and a half infantry battalions and two mountain artillery batteries) captured Tungshechen. On the 17th, the advance detachment occupied Fenyang. The Division then began to prepare for an operation in the direction of Lishih.

On the 21st and 22d, the Division advanced westward from the vicinity of Tungshechen and Fenyang in three columns - the Sasaki Detachment, the Tanifuji Detachment (consisting mainly of three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion under the command of Maj Gen Tanifuji) and the Honkawa Detachment (consisting mainly of two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion under the command of Maj Gen Honkawa) - and captured Lishih on the evening of the 24th. By the 27th, part of the Division had advanced to the banks of the Huang Ho.

The main force of the Division then returned to the Yangchu Plain and began mopping up enemy remnants which were creating disturbances at the rear of the Division.

Pursuit Operation in Southern Shansi Province

On the night of the 24th, the 1st Army, taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's main force in the Shansi Province was engaged along the 20th Division front, decided to encircle and destroy the enemy in the plains of southern Shansi Province. It, therefore, issued the following order:

The commander of the 20th Division will continue his present mission.

The commander of the 108th Division will rush the Linfen Detachment to Linfen.

The commander of the 14th Division will order the Ishiguro Detachment to advance to the Huang Ho ferry in the vicinity of Yumen, via Chuwu as speedily as possible, and simultaneously rush the Sakai Detachment to southern Shansi. An element of this detachment will advance to the Shanhsien ferry and the main force will advance to the Tungkuan ferry. All detachments are charged with the mission of cutting off the retreat route of the enemy's main force.

The 20th Division, continuing its pursuit of the enemy, reached Chaocheng on the 27th and the Linfen Detachment of the 108th Division captured Linfen on the same day. Also on the 27th, the Ishiguro and Sakai Detachments of the 14th Division advanced to the Chin Ho line and Yuanchu respectively.

In order to control the pursuit by the various groups in the southern Shansi Plain, the 1st Army commander issued further orders on the night of the 27th:

The commander of the 108th Division, after the Linfen Detachment attains its mission, will leave behind one infantry battalion and one artillery battery at Linfen to participate in the mopping-up operation under the command of the 20th Division commander, as well as to guard the rear of the 20th Division. The main force of the detachment will return to Changchih.

The commander of the 14th Division will place the Ishiguro and Sakai Detachments under the command of the 20th Division commander upon their arrival in the vicinity of Chinshui and Yuanchu, respectively.

Simultaneously with the issuance of this order, the 1st Army commander extended the operational boundaries between the various groups as follows:

Between the 20th and 108th Divisions: The line connecting Chinyuan, Fuchengchen and Chinshui. Jurisdiction over the area

on the line will be the responsibility of the 20th Division, except Chinyuan, which will be under the jurisdiction of the 108th Division.

Between the 108th and 14th Divisions: The line connecting Kaoping and Chinshui. Jurisdiction over the area on the line will be the responsibility of the 108th Division, except Chinshui, which will be under the control of the 20th Division.

Between the 20th and 14th Divisions: The line connecting Chinshui and Yuanchu. Jurisdiction over the area on the line will be the responsibility of the 20th Division.

On the 28th, the 20th Division arrived in the vicinity of Linfen.

It halted there for supplies and, on 4 March, left the line connecting Fencheng and Chuwu.

The commander of the Division then issued the following order:

The pursuit unit, commanded by Maj Gen Kozuki and consisting mainly of four infantry battalions, one light armored car company, two mountain artillery batteries, one 10cm gun battalion and 35 motor cars, will pursue the enemy toward Yungchi and the Tungkuan ferry.

The Hoching Detachment, commanded by Maj Gen Takagi and consisting mainly of three infantry battalions, one field artillery battery and two mountain artillery batteries, together with a cavalry unit, will advance toward the Yumen ferry in the vicinity of Hoching.

The Sakai Detachment⁵² will send its main force toward the Shanhsien ferry and an element toward the Juicheng ferry.

The Ishiguro Detachment will pursue the enemy toward Hoching after advancing to Chuwu.

A raiding party of the pursuit unit, commanded by Colonel Kyo Kanaoka, and consisting of half a motorized infantry battalion and one 10cm gun battalion, captured Yungchi on the 6th and the Tungkuan ferry on the 7th, while the main force of the pursuit unit advanced

52. This Detachment had advanced to Wenhsi on 3 March, but had been compelled to leave infantry regimental guns and an antitank unit together with one infantry battalion at Yuanchu, because of the extremely bad condition of the roads between Yuanchu and Wenhsi.

to Yungchi on the 8th.

The cavalry unit, together with an element of the Hoching Detachment, captured the Yumen ferry on the night of 6 March, while the main force of the Hoching Detachment, on the 6th and 7th, defeated about 10,000 enemy troops in positions in the mountainous region north of Hoching.

On the 8th, the Sakai Detachment captured Juicheng and Pinglu. Thus, all main ferry points along the Huang Ho in the southern Shansi Province were controlled by the Japanese Army.

The Ishiguro Detachment, after defeating the enemy on the right bank of the Chin Ho on 28 February, captured Chinshui on 2 March and arrived at Chuwu on the 6th. It then began regrouping there.

Leaving an element behind at Linfen, the main force of the Linfen Detachment left Linfen on the 3d, and upon arrival at Changchih returned to its parent organization, the 108th Division.

The 20th and 14th Divisions, after occupying the north bank of the Huang Ho, shelled the Lunghai railway on the opposite side of the river from the vicinity of Anho, Juicheng, Pinglu, Paipo and Wenhsien. (Map 13)

Air Operations During the Hopeh Operation

Based on orders, received from the North China Area commander on 10 January, the Provisional Air Corps commander directed the Nakahira Unit (composed of two reconnaissance squadrons) to continue to render support to the 2d Army; the Yamase Unit (commanded by Col Masao Yamase

and composed of three and a half squadrons including half a reconnaissance squadron, one fighter squadron, and two light bomber squadrons) to support, from the Yangchu airfield, divisions of the 1st Army in the Shansi Province areas; the Giga Air Brigade (commanded by Maj Gen Tetsuji Giga and composed of seven and a half squadrons including one and a half reconnaissance, two fighter, one light bomber, and three heavy bomber squadrons) to support, from Anyang and Hantan airfields, the 1st Army in the Peiping - Hankou railway area, and, at the same time, to destroy enemy air strength along the Lunghai railway.

Prior to the Hopeh Operation the Provisional Air Corps had been engaged chiefly in terrain reconnaissance and in reconnoitering the enemy situation for the 1st Army, but with the commencement of the Hopeh Operation, the Giga Air Brigade bombed strategic enemy rear targets, especially railway bridges across the Huang Ho, trains and convoys, in order to cut off enemy communications to the rear. At the same time, it supported the 14th Division and later the 108th Division. Subsequently, when the enemy was put to rout, the Brigade bombed enemy troops retreating from Linfen, and then bombed the enemy along the Tatung - Yungchi railway. The Yamase Unit supported the 20th and 109th Divisions.

Operation to Annihilate Enemy Air Strength

Although the enemy air force had not been active prior to the middle of January 1938, it became quite aggressive from that time

onward and a report was received to the effect that it was planning to attack Peiping on the lunar New Year's Day. Therefore, late in January, the Provisional Air Corps seized the initiative and attacked Loyang, Linfen, Tungshan and Shangchiu airfields. Especially noteworthy were the exploits of the Giga Air Brigade which engaged and destroyed enemy planes (12 planes shot down) at Loyang airfield on 30 January, causing the enemy to abandon its plan to attack Peiping. Although enemy planes became active again in this area from the middle of February, the Provisional Air Corps did not deliberately engage the enemy air force because the Corps was then busily engaged in supporting the Hopeh Operation. But by early March, when the Hopeh Operation began to draw to a close, the Provisional Air Corps was able to concentrate on destroying enemy air strength. It organized combined fighter - bomber attack units under its direct command (the 1st Air Unit commanded by Col Yamase and composed mainly of one fighter and two light bomber squadrons, and the 2d Air Unit commanded by Col Ryuichi Torita and composed mainly of two fighter and two heavy bomber squadrons) and attacked and inflicted severe damage on the Hsiangyang and Changan airfields on 8 March. The Provisional Air Corps at this time received a report that the enemy air unit was planning to abandon Changan airfield and, considering a strike before the enemy withdrew a necessity, it attacked Changan airfield on the 11th and again on the 14th with considerable success (5 enemy planes were destroyed on the 11th). As soon as the 4th Air Brigade Headquarters (commanded by

Maj Gen Tomo Fujita and attached to the Provisional Air Corps on 18 February) arrived at Anyang in mid-March, the Corps commander placed the attack units, which were under the direct command of the Corps, under the Fujita Air Brigade and ordered the Air Brigade to operate mainly from airfields in and around Anyang and destroy enemy air units wherever they could be found and, at the same time, to support the ground operation of friendly forces.

Situation after the Campaign

Although the main strength of the enemy had retreated to the south of the Huang Ho, a powerful element had retreated to the mountainous area of the Shansi Province. There it joined forces with the communist troops already entrenched in that area and proceeded to harass the Japanese troops. The 1st Army commander, therefore, decided that this force must be destroyed and, on 10 March, ordered the 20th Division to secure the southern Shansi Plains; the 14th Division, the Hsinhsiang Plain; the 16th Division, the area between Kaof, Anyang, Puyang and Linching; the 109th Division, the Yangchu Plain and the vicinity of Lishih, and the 108th Division, the Changchih Plain and the vicinity of Yangchuan and Hsiyang. The order further stated that these divisions would complete mopping-up operations by the end of April. This was accomplished in the following manner:

Wanchuan and vicinity - remnants of the enemy in this area were

put to flight by the 20th Division about mid-March.

Chihhsien - the enemy entrenched here was mopped up by the 20th Division during the latter part of March.

Shihlou, Yungho and vicinity - the enemy entrenched in the mountainous districts was mopped up by the 20th and 109th Division during the early part of April.

Taiku, Chihhsien and vicinity - remnants of the enemy in these area were mopped up by the 109th Division from 14 to 24 March.

Area north of Changchih - from 8 to 16 April, the 108th Division assisted by the 16th and 109th Divisions mopped up and completely uprooted the enemy in this area.

Antse, Chinyuan and vicinity - these areas were mopped up by the 20th Division from 2 to 26 April.

Area east of Chunhsien - the 16th Division conducted mopping up operations in this area from the latter part of March to the early part of April.

Tseyuchen and vicinity - mopping up operations, directed mainly against communist troops, were conducted by the Army Line of Communications force, the 108th Division and the Pingting Garrison from 27 to 29 March.

Although the enemy suffered heavy losses during these operations, the desired result was not achieved. Communist troops, particularly in the vicinity of Wutai and the area north of Changchih, were not

completely wiped out and powerful forces continued to roam the countryside harassing the Japanese rear. It was evident that the need existed for more aggressive campaigns and mopping-up operations in order to establish peace and order in the area. This was especially true as, with the withdrawal of various 1st Army units during the latter part of April for the Tungshan Operation, enemy guerrilla activity within the Army's jurisdictional area increased markedly.

Tungshan Operation

General Situation Prior to and During the Battle in the vicinity of Taierhchuang

After the Shantung Operation in January 1938, the enemy began harassing the Japanese forces in the occupied area with guerrilla warfare. These guerrillas were especially active in the 10th Division⁵³ and 13th Division areas.⁵⁴

The 13th Division began operations along the banks of the Huai Ho during the latter part of January and, by the early part of February, had overwhelmed and destroyed the guerrillas in that area. However, the enemy forces in the 10th Division's area of responsibility gradually increased in strength and from the early part of February became increasingly aggressive. About the middle of February

53.. The 10th Division was commanded by Lt Gen Rensuke Isogai, and was responsible for the security of Chinan, Tzuyang and vicinity.

54. The 13th Division was commanded by Lt Gen Rippei Ogisu and was garrisoned in the vicinity of Chuhsien and along the left bank of the Yangtzu River. This Division was under the command of the Central China Area Army.

they attacked the Japanese troops in the area west of Tzuyang with a large well-equipped force, compelling the Japanese troops to withdraw.

Mopping up Operations in the 2d Army Sector

Lt Gen Nishio, commander of the 2d Army, which was composed principally of the 10th and 5th Divisions, was responsible for security in the area along the right bank of the Huang Ho and areas along the Tienching - Pukou and Chingtao - Chinan railways in the Shantung Province. He considered a drive to the Lunghai railway necessary and, in December 1937, presented his views to the North China Area Army commander. The Area Army commander was in complete accord with the 2d Army commander's recommendations, but when the plan was submitted to Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo, it was disapproved.

Although from early February, the 2d Army continued to mop up enemy remnants in its occupied area, powerful enemy units immediately in front of the Army still constituted a direct threat. The 2d Army commander, therefore, decided to attack and smash this enemy force once and for all. He ordered the 10th Division to drive back the enemy in the vicinity of Wenshang and Chining to the west of the Tayun Ho and the 5th Division (commanded by Lt Gen Seishiro Itagaki and garrisoned along the eastern section of the Chingtao - Chinan railway) to advance an element toward Lini in order to facilitate the 10th Division's operation.

On the morning of 20 February, the 10th Division commander began

the operation with the Nagase Detachment, commanded by Maj Gen Takehira Nagase and composed mainly of four and a half infantry battalions and two field artillery battalions. This detachment defeated the enemy in the vicinity of Chining, and pursued it west beyond the Tayun Ho, finally occupying Chiahsiang on the 25th.

The 5th Division's Katano Detachment left Weihsien by motor vehicle on the 21st, broke through Chuhsien and Ishui, occupied Tangtouchen on 5 March, and then prepared to attack the enemy in the vicinity of Lini.⁵⁵

The 2d Army's Attack in the Vicinity of Tayun Ho

About this time there were approximately eleven enemy divisions active on the 2d Army front. These divisions were composed of three divisions of the Kuomintang Army, three divisions of the Shantung Army, four divisions of the Szechwan Army and one division of irregulars. Reports were received to the effect that about five of these divisions in the Tienching - Fukou railway area would conduct an offensive against the 10th Division around the middle of March.

In order to foil the enemy's plan to counterattack, the 2d Army

55. This detachment was originally commanded by Colonel Teiken Katano, and was composed mainly of one and a half infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battery. However, because the situation was deteriorating in the vicinity of Lini, the 5th Division commander decided to place the detachment under the command of the Brigade commander, Maj Gen Jun Sakamoto, and to increase its strength to two infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion and one mountain artillery battery. Therefore, on 23 February, the General together with the reinforcements, left Weihsien to join the Detachment. The Detachment then became known as the Sakamoto Detachment.

commander decided to attack first. On 13 March, he ordered the 10th Division to attack the enemy in the Tienching - Pukou railway area north of the Tayun Ho and the 5th Division to take Lini immediately and then to continue to advance toward the Ihsien area with an element in order to facilitate the 10th Division's operations. To maintain peace and order in the area, he further ordered the 10th Division, after it had destroyed the enemy north of Tayun Ho, to secure Ihsien and areas to the south.⁵⁶

The 10th Division commander assigned the Seya Detachment, commanded by Maj Gen Hajime Seya and built around four and a half infantry battalions (after the 15th, six battalions), approximately three field artillery battalions, one heavy field artillery battalion and one heavy field artillery battery, to carry out this mission.

On 14 March, the detachment left the area south of Tsouhsien. It broke through enemy positions in and around Chiehho and occupied Lincheng on the 17th and Tenghsien on the 18th. Its right pursuit unit, composed principally of one infantry battalion and one field artillery battery, occupied Hanchuang on the 19th. At the same time, its left pursuit unit, composed principally of one infantry battalion

56. Prior to this order, on 11 March, the North China Area Army commander, in order to give the 2d Army greater striking force, attached to it for one month a force from the 114th Division composed principally of three infantry battalions. This force was employed to secure the rear area of the 2d Army.

and one field artillery battery, occupied Ihsien. Then, in accordance with the Division's order that, "The Detachment will secure the Tayun Ho line in the vicinity of Hanchuang and Taierhchuang, garrison Lincheng and Ihsien with an element, and then rush to the Lini area as large a force as possible to support the 5th Division's operations," the Detachment commander, on the 23d, dispatched an element (the former left pursuit unit) to Taierhchuang, and massed the main force of his Detachment in the vicinity of Ihsien and Lincheng. He ordered the Lini Detachment composed principally of one infantry battalion, one light armored car company, one field artillery battery and one mountain artillery battery, to proceed from Lincheng to Lini.

On 25 March, the Lini Detachment was encircled by a superior enemy force in the neighborhood of Kuolichi. The Seya Detachment commander had planned to send his main strength against Taierhchuang, but was now compelled to use this force to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of Kuolichi. The unit dispatched to Taierhchuang succeeded in occupying one corner of the village of Taierhchuang on the 27th, but was unable to make any further progress because of the enemy's superior strength and strongly fortified positions. The enemy used 15cm howitzers for the first time in this battle. After repulsing the enemy in the hills north of Kuolichi with the Detachment's main strength on the 28th, the commander directed the entire strength of the Detachment in an assault against Taierhchuang on the 30th. It succeeded in reaching the Tayun Ho line near Taierhchuang, but by 5 April had not succeeded in occupying

the village of Taierhchuang.

Air Support of the 2d Army in the Vicinity of Tayun Ho

In the middle of March, when the 2d Army was about to begin its drive toward the Tayun Ho line the North China Area Army commander ordered the Provisional Air Corps commander to increase its air strength in the 2d Army area. The Corps commander, therefore, prepared the Tawenkou airfield and assigned four heavy bombers to the Nakahira Unit, and, as the enemy ground forces in the 2d Army area increased sharply, the commander sent a light bomber squadron and part of a fighter unit to this area in the latter part of March in order to render greater support to the 2d Army's operations.

Sakamoto Detachment's Battle near Taierhchuang

The 5th Division's Sakamoto Detachment (which was being gradually reinforced until by 17 March it was composed of approximately six infantry battalions, two field artillery battalions and one mountain artillery battery) attacked Lini on 14 March, but was unable to take the town. As the situation in the Seya Detachment area was critical, the Sakamoto Detachment commander decided to withdraw from the vicinity of Lini on the 29th, in order to go to the assistance of the Seya Detachment. On the 30th, the Sakamoto Detachment began to move toward Taierhchuang, and, overcoming enemy resistance on the way, arrived to the east of Taierhchuang at Puwang on 2 April.⁵⁷ It was surrounded

57. As the Detachment commander had left one element southwest of Lini and another at Hsiancheng in order to guard the Detachment's rear, the strength of the Detachment was reduced to approximately four infantry battalions and two artillery battalions.

by a superior enemy force in the neighborhood of Puwang and fierce fighting ensued. The battle raged until 5 April when the commander of the Detachment decided to withdraw. However, the position on the Seya Detachment front made him reverse this decision and he did not withdraw his force until 7 April.

Communications between the 5th Division headquarters at Chingtao and the 10th Division headquarters at Tzuyang and the Sakamoto and Seya Detachments were slow and often difficult. On 4 April, judging that the Seya Detachment would already have occupied Taierhchuang and that the Sakamoto Detachment's mission of supporting the Seya Detachment would be fulfilled, the 5th Division commander ordered the Sakamoto Detachment to change its course of advance and occupy Lini. Also, the Sakamoto Detachment commander judging that the Seya Detachment already would have occupied Taierhchuang notified the Seya Detachment on 5 April that he was planning to conduct a wheeling maneuver to attack the enemy in the vicinity of Lini. This report greatly shocked the Seya Detachment commander and, as a consequence, the Seya Detachment withdrew from the battlefield near Taierhchuang on 6 April. On the 6th, the Sakamoto Detachment commander learned that Taierhchuang had not been taken and informed the Seya Detachment commander that he would postpone the wheeling maneuver. However this information did not reach the Seya Detachment commander in time to prevent his withdrawal from the battlefield.

The Sakamoto Detachment withdrew from around Puwang on the evening

of the 7th. Although on the 7th, the 2d Army commander planned to have the two detachments continue their attacks, his orders did not reach them through the 5th and 10th Divisions in time, as both detachments were already on the move. On the 8th, the 2d Army commander ordered the 10th Division commander to coordinate the action of the two detachments and to destroy the enemy's resistance by establishing bases for an offensive roughly on a line in the vicinity of Ihsien.

The main force of the Seya Detachment massed near Ihsien on the evening of the 8th, and that of the Sakamoto Detachment near Kuolichi on the 9th. Also on the 9th, an element of the Seya Detachment occupied Hanchuang. The two detachments, under the direction of the 10th Division, then prepared for further operations along a line extending from the south of Ihsien to the northeast of Kuolichi. (Map 14)

Co-operation of the Provisional Air Corps at Taierhchuang

At the beginning of April, at the height of the battle near Taierhchuang, the commander of the North China Area Army ordered the commander of the Provisional Air Corps to reinforce that part of his strength cooperating with the 2d Army by diminishing the strength operating with the ground forces west of the Feiping - Hankou railway.

The Corps commander, therefore, ordered the Terakura Air Brigade (consisting of three reconnaissance squadrons, one fighter squadron and one light bomber squadron, commanded by Maj Gen Shozo Terakura,



TAIERHCHUANG OPERATION

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MAP NO. 14

who had succeeded Maj Gen Giga on 9 March) to remain in the Tienching - Pukou railway area and to support the 2d Army and also to cooperate with the Fujita Air Brigade in destroying enemy air strength advancing toward the Lunghai railway district east of and including Lanfeng. At the same time, the Corps commander ordered the Fujita Air Brigade (consisting of two reconnaissance squadrons, four fighter squadrons and two heavy bomber squadrons) to destroy the enemy air strength in the Peiping - Hankou railway area as well as to support the 1st Army (mainly the 14th Division) and, when necessary, to support the 2d Army.

The Terakura Air Brigade,⁵⁸ with its main body in the Tienching - Fukou railway zone (the main strength of this body was disposed at Tluyang) and the Fujita Air Brigade, with its main body in the Peiping - Hankou railway zone (the main strength of this body was disposed at Anyang) and an element (one fighter squadron) in Shansi Province, supported the Seya and Sakamoto Detachments and later cooperated with the adjustment of these fronts and the 2d Army's counter-offensive after 18 April. At the same time, the Fujita Brigade attacked the enemy air force near Changan destroying a number of enemy planes.⁵⁹

58. The 10th Air Regiment, dispatched from the Kwantung Army, reached Nanyuan on 15 April, and the commander of the Provisional Air Corps assigned it to the Terakura Air Brigade. At the end of June, this Regiment was returned to the Kwantung Army.

59. Although the exact number of planes destroyed at Changan is unknown, the total number destroyed from 4 April to 5 July was 34 planes shot down, and 4 destroyed on the ground. Planes destroyed at Changan were included in this report.

Tactical Command by Imperial General Headquarters

Judging that the Japanese forces were absorbed in the stabilization and pacification of the occupied areas and that they had exhausted their fighting strength and were unable to continue the offensive and believing that they (the Chinese) had won a signal victory in the battle near Taierhchuang, the morale of the enemy increased tremendously and they began to talk boastfully about destroying the Japanese forces. An extensive propaganda campaign was conducted in China and abroad which crystallized the anti-Japanese sentiments of the Chinese people and prompted positive action in the form of an "aid-to-Chiang" policy by powers friendly to the Chiang Kaishek regime.

Accordingly, Imperial General Headquarters decided on a new offensive campaign to deal a crushing blow to the Chinese forces concentrated in the Taierhchuang area, because such a blow would not only eradicate incessant nuisance actions on the front of the 2d Army but would also be highly effective as a morale factor.

Therefore, Imperial General Headquarters summoned to Tokyo the officers in charge of operations of the North China Area Army and the Central China Expeditionary Army,⁶⁰ and issued orders on 7 April

60. The Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army was published on 14 February 1938. At that time, the headquarters of the Central China Area Army, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army were deactivated and the headquarters personnel returned to Japan. All forces under these headquarters were placed under the command of the Central China Expeditionary Army.

stating:

Imperial General Headquarters plans to destroy the enemy forces in the vicinity of Tungshan.

The North China Area Army will destroy the enemy near Tungshan with a powerful element and occupy that sector north of the Lunghai railway which is east of Lanfeng.

The Central China Expeditionary Army will cooperate with the North China Area Army in the action near Tungshan by detailing an element to occupy the Tienching - Pukou railway south of but excluding Tungshan, as well as the area in the vicinity of Hofei.

Furthermore, the following directive was issued concerning the close liaison to be observed between the North China Area Army commander and the Central China Expeditionary Army commander during the campaign in the vicinity of Tungshan. This directive was named the "Essentials for the Tactical Guidance of the Operation in the Vicinity of Tungshan" and was to be used as a reference in carrying out liaison. Imperial General Headquarters, at the same time, ordered the lifting of restrictions in the employment of the 114th Division by the North China Area commander.⁶¹

Essentials for the Tactical Guidance of the Operation
in the Vicinity of Tungshan

Operational Plan.

A powerful element of the North China Area Army and an element of the Central China Expeditionary Army will defeat the enemy near Tungshan and will occupy the Tienching - Pukou

61. In mid-February 1938 when the 114th Division was transferred from Central China to the North China Area Army command, Imperial General Headquarters limited the employment of the 114th Division by the North China Area Army commander to the Peiping - Tienching sector.

railway area as well as the area in the vicinity of Hofei.⁶²

The operation is scheduled to be launched late in April.

Essentials.

1. The North China Area Army, with about four divisions, will assume the offensive against the Lunghai railway and will destroy the enemy in that area.

To attain this objective, it will advance its main force from the north to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of Tungshan, while an element of about one division will be dispatched from the vicinity northeast of Kaifeng towards the enemy's route of retreat in the vicinity of Shangchiu.

2. The Central China Expeditionary Army will use about two divisions (an element will be assigned to the rear guard) and move from the south to cooperate with the operation of the North China Area Army.

For this purpose, the attack will be launched from the sector along the Tienching - Pukou railway and special effort will be directed to intercepting the enemy's route of retreat.

3. The North China Area Army will seize the Tienching - Pukou railway north of Tungshan (to include Tungshan) and, after defeating the enemy, will occupy that sector north of the Lunghai railway, which is east of Kaifeng.

4. The Central China Expeditionary Army, after repelling the hostile forces, will occupy the Tienching - Pukou railway south of Tungshan (but to exclude Tungshan) as well as the area in the vicinity of Hofei.

5. After the termination of the above operation, the North China Area Army will dispose about three divisions in the area south of the Huang Ho while the Central China Expeditionary Army will dispose about two divisions along the Tienching - Pukou railway south of Tungshan (excluding Tungshan) as well as in the area in the vicinity of Hofei.

In order to carry out liaison between Imperial General Headquarters and the operational area during the Tungshan Operation, Imperial General

62. The occupation of the Hofei area was planned in view of the prospective operation against the enemy in the Wuchang - Hankou area.

Headquarters dispatched Maj Gen Gun Hashimoto and staff to the operational area for the period from mid-April to the end of May. This group was known as the Imperial General Headquarters Liaison Team.

Prior to the Tungshan Operation, the North China Area Army had completed the organization of the China Garrison Group and four independent mixed brigades. Imperial General Headquarters then assigned the China Garrison Group and three independent mixed brigades to the North China Area Army and one independent mixed brigade to the Mongolia Garrison Group.⁶³ The North China Area Army, in turn, attached two independent mixed brigades to the 1st Army and one independent mixed brigade to the 2d Army.

In view of the increased enemy fighting strength, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Kwantung Army on 10 May to dispatch two mixed brigades (each mainly composed of six infantry battalions and two field artillery battalions) to north China. Upon arrival they were attached to the North China Area Army.

In addition, the Imperial General Headquarters assigned the 10th Air Regiment from the Kwantung Army to the North China Area Army on 14 April.

On 15 May the Imperial General Headquarters specified that the

63. The basic manuscript states in error that the North China Area Army attached one independent mixed brigade to the Mongolia Garrison Group. At this time, the Mongolia Garrison Group was under the direct command of Imperial General Headquarters. It was not until 7 July 1938, after it had been re-designated the Mongolia Garrison Army, that it was assigned to the North China Area Army.

operational boundary between the North China Area Army and the Central China Expeditionary Army would be the Lunghai railway west of Tungshan and the Kuei Ho. However, on 30 May it was changed to the line connecting Founing, Ssusbien, Nanpingchi, Mengcheng, and Fouyang.

Operational Command of the North China Area Army

On 10 April the North China Area Army commander decided on the over-all plan for the operational command of the Tungshan Operation:

Operational Plan.

A great enemy force will be drawn into the Tungshan area and in the area east of the Tienching - Pukou railway. First, the route of retreat of this force will be cut by an enveloping movement west and southwest of Tungshan and later it will be destroyed and Tungshan will be occupied.

Essentials of Command.

The First Phase.

The 2d Army will be reinforced promptly with the 16th Division, the 2d Tank Battalion and one heavy field artillery battalion.⁶⁴ The 2d Army will contain the enemy primarily in the vicinity of the Hanchuang - Ihsien - Lini line. At the same time, it will prepare for future attacks.

An agreement will be made with the Central China Expeditionary Army to divert the enemy to the sector southeast of

64. The 114th Division had already been attached to the 2d Army on 8 April. In addition, the main units attached to the 2d Army by the North China Area Army during the engagement were as follows: (1) On 5 May, two infantry battalions were dispatched to Chinan from the China Garrison Group and placed under the direct command of the North China Area Army commander. Subsequently, reinforced by an infantry battalion and a mountain artillery battery, this unit was organized into the Hirayama Detachment on the 9th and attached to the 2d Army on the 10th. Later, the Army attached the Detachment to the 16th Division. (2) In accordance with Imperial General Headquarters orders of 10 May, two mixed brigades attached to the North China Area Army from the Kwantung Army were attached to the 2d Army on 11 May.

Tungshan by an element occupying the area northwest of Huaiyin.

The Second Phase.

With the completion of preparations by the 2d Army, offensive action in the form of a surprise attack will be launched in late April. A powerful group will advance southward from the western side of Weishan Hu to cut off the enemy's route of retreat in the sectors west and southwest of Tungshan. In co-operation with an element of the Central China Expeditionary Army, it will subsequently envelop Tungshan, completely occupy the town and annihilate the enemy. (Depending on the situation, the action from the west side of Weishan Hu may be suspended and the direct route to Tungshan taken when the enemy will be defeated in the area north of the prepared positions of Tungshan.)

About a division of the 1st Army, after crossing the Huang Ho between Lanfeng and Fanhsien shall defend the Lunghai railway east of Lanfeng and shall cooperate with the 2d Army. (If possible, the crossing should be carried out simultaneously with the attack of the main force of the 2d Army). A force formed around four infantry battalions, a field artillery battalion, and a 10cm howitzer battalion of the above division shall be transported to the Chining area by rail and assigned the task of covering the crossing of the river by the division's main force.

In order to contain the enemy west of Lanfeng, a show of strength will be made on the north bank of the Huang Ho, but no effort will be made to establish a foothold on the south bank of the river.⁶⁵

The operational boundary of the 1st and 2d Armies shall be along the line connecting Shouchang, Yuncheng and Shangchiu, while the area on the boundary shall be the responsibility of the 1st Army.

The main force of the Provisional Air Corps shall co-operate with the 2d Army.

The Third Phase.

Simultaneous with the capture of Tungshan, the 2d Army shall occupy the area east of Lanfeng near the Lunghai railway and prepare for future action.

65. This restriction was placed on the element on the north bank of the Huang Ho as the 1st Army had no reserve units to reinforce it and it was felt that it did not have sufficient strength to actually engage the enemy.

The Central China Expeditionary Army shall secure the area along the Tienching - Pukou railway south of Tungshan (excluding Tungshan).

According to the situation, the 1st Army may, by employing a part of the troops south of the Huang Ho, seize both Kaifeng and Chenghsien, but a separate order will be issued relative to such action.

The Provisional Air Corps' main strength shall attack key points at the enemy's rear and destroy his air force, while an element shall cooperate directly with each Army group.

Operational Command of the Central China Expeditionary Army

The Central China Expeditionary Army, which previously had drafted a plan for the operational command of the Tungshan Operation and which had been making preparations accordingly, worked out the following battle plan on 24 April:

Operational Plan.

In co-operation with the North China Area Army, the Central China Expeditionary Army shall contact and destroy the enemy west of Tungshan.

The time for the decisive battle is fixed tentatively for mid-May.

Essentials of Command.

The offensive by the Army is expected to commence about 5 May, but, depending on the situation, it may be launched about the end of April. The Army, disposing the 9th and 13th Divisions side by side, shall destroy the enemy to the front and advance rapidly to a line connecting Chaochiachi and Mengcheng.

At this juncture, the left division (13th Division) shall assume responsibility for the main attack and, after advancing to a line linking Chiachiachi and Mengcheng, the Army shall proceed to the Shangchiu - Pohsien area, the Tungshan - Yungcheng area, or to the Tungshan area, depending upon the enemy situation in the Tungshan area.

In any event, a part of the Army shall be employed to seize the vicinity of Suhsien.

Independently of this plan, the Army on 21 April ordered the 101st

Division to advance as many as possible of the troops stationed in the area north of the Yangtzu River (those employed in the occupation and garrisoning of Tungtai and Nantung) toward Founing in order to facilitate the Army's future operations.

Also, on 23 April, the Army ordered the 6th Division to employ a force built around four infantry battalions, to defeat the enemy near Hohsien and then conduct operations in the area along the Hohsien - Chaohsien - Hofei road in order to contain the enemy in the Hofei area and thus facilitate the operations of the Army.

Air Operational Areas

For the battle of Tungshan no boundary was stipulated between the operational areas of the Provisional Air Corps of the North China Area Army and the 3d Air Brigade of the Central China Expeditionary Army, but the reconnaissance areas were separated by the line connecting Tungshan, Shangchiu, Chouchiakou and Hsiyang.

Navy air units, according to an Army-Navy agreement, engaged in attacking the area along the Lunghai railway east of the line connecting Tancheng and Suchien, as well as the area south of a line connecting Pohsien and Chouchiakou, and airfields at Loyang, Chouchiakou, Hofei, Shehsien, Changan, Hsinyang and Tungshan. They were also used to reinforce units in the area along the Tienching - Pukou railway, when necessary. They were especially active in attacking the rear of the enemy.

Operation by the North China Area
Army (Map 15)

2d Army Operation to Contain the Main
Force of the Enemy

On 12 April, the North China Area Army commander ordered the 2d Army to put into operation the first phase of the plan for the Tungshan Operation.⁶⁶

After the battle at Taierhchuang, the 2d Army, employing the 10th Division (with the Sakamoto Detachment attached), occupied the area northeast of the line connecting Hanchuang, Ihsien and Kuolichi, and repelled repeated enemy attacks.

With the reinforcement of troops, the Army assumed the offensive on the 18th and advanced to the line connecting Nikou, Wanwangshan and Chenchiachang by the 26th, while an element seized Lini on the 19th and Tancheng on the 24th, before proceeding to the area north of Nanlaokou.

After 26 April, although the Army carried out vigorous attacks, little progress was made. Therefore, the Kusaba Detachment, (commanded by Maj Gen Tatsumi Kusaba, and composed mainly of three infantry battalions and a field artillery battalion, and stationed near Tsaochuang) of the 16th Division was attached to the 10th Division on 27 April, while the Katagiri Detachment (commanded by Col Katagiri and composed mainly of two infantry battalions and a field artillery battalion, and stationed

66. See page 100.

in the vicinity of Lanlingchen) of the 16th Division was attached to the 5th Division on 3 May, and the offensive was continued but still without obtaining the desired results.⁶⁷ The Army continued making preparations for the Tungshan Operation, while securing, until mid-May, the important line near the occupied areas and, at the same time, containing a superior enemy force of an estimated strength of over 40 divisions.

Disposition of the North China Area Army
for the Battle of Tungshan

The North China Area Army commander decided on 23 April to destroy the enemy in the Tungshan area and occupy the area east of Lanfeng and north of the Lunghai railway line. He, therefore, disposed the 2d Army so that it might, upon concentration of its troops, launch an offensive against the confronting enemy, force him into a major decisive battle west of Tungshan and finally capture Tungshan. He also disposed the 1st Army so that powerful elements⁶⁸ could cut the Lunghai railway line between Lanfeng and Shangchiu, after crossing the Huang Ho

67. The 114th Division and the 5th Independent Mixed Brigade, both attached to the 2d Army, were mainly employed in defending the rear of the Army.

In accordance with a 2d Army order of 6 May, the Sakamoto Detachment was detached from the 10th Division and returned to its parent unit as the 10th and 5th Divisions were both employed on the same battle line. Also, in accordance with an Army order, the Kusaba Detachment was returned to its parent unit on 9 May and the Katagiri Detachment on the 10th in order that they might participate in the second phase of the Tungshan Operation. Both units overtook the main force of the division in from 10 to 12 days.

68. The 1st Army employed the 14th Division for this operation.

under cover of an element to be sent by train to the vicinity of Chining, from where it could attack the enemy from the rear.

At the same time, the Area Army commander placed two infantry battalions of the China Garrison Group under the command of the 2d Army commander.⁶⁹

Outline of the Operational Progress
of the 2d Army

His Imperial Majesty appointed Lt Gen Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni as commander of the 2d Army on 3 April. At the end of April, the 2d Army began its operational preparations to capture Tungshan by destroying the enemy in the vicinity thereof. It planned to advance its main force from the area southwest of Nanyang Hu and Weishan Hu to the west of Tungshan and an element from the area east of Weishan Hu to the east of Tungshan.

The main force of the 16th Division completed the concentration of its troops in the vicinity of Chining on 8 May and, by order of the 2d Army, left there the following day. It advanced to a line connecting Chinghsiang and Yutai on the 14th, after breaking through a series of enemy positions. Its raiding force cut the Lunghai railway line east of Tangshan on the 15th

On the 14th, the 2d Army commander saw signs of preparation for

69. These two infantry battalions, which belonged to the 4th Independent Mixed Brigade, were originally attached to the 1st Army but were later temporarily attached to the China Garrison Group. On 23 April, they were attached to the 2d Army. These two infantry battalions are not those referred to in note 64.

action among the enemy troops in the Tungshan area and ordered the front line forces of the 10th Division west of Taierhchuang to turn over their defense mission to the 114th Division and then to advance quickly to the vicinity of Hochiachi and Hochai by crossing Weishan Hu near Hsiachen. He also ordered those units of the 10th Division (composed mainly of three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion) east of Taierhchuang be left behind and placed under the command of the 5th Division commander.

The gradual replacement of the 10th Division by about half the strength of the 114th Division began on the 14th. As the transfer made progress, the troops of the 10th Division, relieved from their defense duties, were assembled in the vicinity of Lincheng. At midnight, on the 15th, they began to cross the lake and some had successfully landed on the opposite shore before dawn the following morning.

On the 16th, the 2d Army commander believing that although the enemy had withdrawn, its greatest strength was still somewhere east of Tungshan, decided to advance the Army's main force to the area west of Tungshan as quickly as possible. He, therefore, ordered the 16th and 10th Divisions to rush their forces immediately to the line connecting Hsiehchang and Yuhuangling. The 16th Division captured Tangchai on the 17th and Chiulishan on the 19th, while elements advanced to the area east of Tungshan. The 10th Division launched an attack against the enemy in the vicinity of Peih sien on the 16th, but failed

to capture the town. Elements of the Division made a second attack on the 17th, and a third on the 18th, when the enemy began to withdraw to the southeast, pursued by the Japanese force. On the 19th, the main force of the Division advanced to the west of Yuhuangling. On the same day, the elements joined the main force of the division.

On the 15th, in the area east of Weishan Hu elements of the 114th Division replaced the 10th Division. By order of the 2d Army, the 114th Division pursued the enemy toward Tungshan on the 18th, and crossed the Tayun Ho west of Taierhchuang the following day.

The 5th Division, after absorbing elements of the 10th Division east of Taierhchuang, reached the Tayun Ho on the 15th and carried out a forced river crossing on the 17th. Its raiding force (composed of one infantry battalion, one field artillery battery, and one light armored car company) drove towards Suhsien, while the rest of the Division advanced to the vicinity of Shuangkou on the 19th.

Outline of the Operational Progress of the 1st Army

On 15 April, in accordance with a North China Area Army order, the 1st Army commander ordered the 14th Division which was then on garrison duty near Hsinhsiung and commanded by Lt Gen Kenji Doihara, to make preparations to advance to the vicinity of Lanfeng, by crossing the Huang Ho somewhere between Lanfeng and Fanhsien. As a result, the 14th Division was relieved from its garrison duty by the 108th Division and other units towards the end of April and completed the

concentration of its troops in the vicinity of Puhsien on 10 May. Meanwhile, the Division commander, by order of the 1st Army, ordered the Sakai Detachment (commanded by Maj Gen Takashi Sakai and composed principally of four infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion and one heavy field artillery battalion) to advance to Chining by train and to provide cover from the right bank of the Huang Ho for the river crossing by the main force of the Division. The Detachment assembled its troops at Chining on 8 May. The 1st Army commander received an order from the North China Area Army commander on 10 May to the effect that the Sakai Detachment was to be placed under the command of the 2d Army after capturing Yuncheng and that the main force of the 14th Division would cross the river without waiting for fire cover from the Sakai Detachment. Therefore, on the same day, he ordered the 14th Division to cross the Huang Ho at an appropriate time after finishing its preparations, so that it would cut the Lunghai railway line between Lanfeng and Shangchiu and also secure a strategic point near Lanfeng. The 14th Division crossed the river before day-break on the 12th and captured Kotse on the 15th. Also, on the 15th elements advanced in pursuit of the enemy and closed in upon Kaocheng, while the cavalry unit cut the Lunghai railway line. By order of the Area Army, the Sakai Detachment was brought back under the command of the Division the same day. The Division then concentrated its troops in the vicinity of Neihuang on the 19th.