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Japanese Monograph No. 179



CENTRAL CHINA AREA OPERATIONS RECORD

1937 - 1941

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PREFACE

This monograph is one of a series prepared under instructions from the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN No. 126, 12 Oct 1945). The series of studies covers the operations of the Japanese armed forces from 1931 until the surrender in 1945. The studies were written by former officers of the Japanese Army and Navy under the supervision of the Historical Records Sections of the First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureaus of the Japanese Government. The original manuscripts were translated by U.S. Army translation service. Extensive editing was accomplished by the Japanese Research Division of the Office of the Military History Officer, Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army (Rear).

In the preparation of these monographs the writers were handicapped by the non-availability of many operational records which are normally employed as source material in this type of study. Many official orders, plans, and unit journals were lost during field operations or bombing raids. A particular handicap has been a lack of strength reports. However, most of the important orders and other information sources have been reconstructed from memory and while not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be accurate and reliable.

This monograph covers military operations in central China from the China Incident in July 1937 to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 and includes that part of Monograph No. 75 which dealt with the 1st Changsha Operation.* As the basic document was compiled largely from the memory of Lt. Col. Heizo Ishihara, Chief of the War Records Department, General Staff Headquarters, extensive research was necessary in order to evaluate the information, to check both facts and dates, and to add pertinent data. In addition, as both basic documents were submitted without maps, this office prepared the many maps required to illustrate the text. Spelling of place names on maps, as well as in the text, is that used in AMS 5301.

* The 1st Changsha Operation, September and October 1941, which was originally described in Monograph No. 75, "Changsha Operation, Sep 38 - Aug 44", (also the work of Lt. Col. Ishihara) has been added to Chapter V of this monograph since the operation was a very definite part of the operations of the 11th Army in central China during the period covered by this study. The 2d and 3d Changsha Operations, also described in Monograph No. 75 will be absorbed into Monograph Nos. 71 and 72, respectively.

The editor was assisted in research and in preparation of maps by Tadao Shudo, formerly a lieutenant colonel on the staff of the 11th Army in central China and later a member of the Army General Staff and Air Army General Staff.

Other monographs covering the operations of Japanese armed forces in the China area are:

<u>Mono No</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Period</u>
70*	China Area Operations Record	Jul 37 - Nov 41
71	Army Operations in China	Dec 41 - Dec 43
72	Army Operations in China	Jan 44 - Aug 45
129*	China Area Operations Record: Command of China Expeditionary Army	Aug 43 - Aug 45
130*	China Area Operations Record: Sixth Area Army Operations	May 44 - Aug 45
178*	North China Area Operations Record	Jul 37 - May 41
180	South China Area Operations Record	1937 - 1941
74*	Operations in the Kun-lun-kuan Area	Dec 39 - Feb 40
76	China Area Air Operations Record: China Incident and Greater East Asia War	Jul 37 - Aug 44
166	China Incident Naval Air Operations	Jul 37 - Nov 37

*Indicates edit completed.

Tokyo, Japan
21 December 1955

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CHAPTER I

From the outbreak of the China Incident to the Capture of Nanching

Shanghai Operation

After the Oyama Incident in Shanghai on 9 August 1937,¹ the relationship between the Naval Special Landing Party (approximately 4,000 men) charged with the protection of Japanese residents in that area, and the powerful Chinese Army (approximately 50,000 strong) which had invaded the west suburb (the unarmed zone) of Shanghai, daily became more tense. By 13 August a state of war existed. On the 15th, the Central Authorities² decided to send the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, the main force of which consisted of the 3d and 11th Divisions, to assist the naval unit in protecting the Japanese residents by clearing the enemy from the area. The substance of the orders issued by the Central Authorities to cover this mission was as follows:

The Shanghai Expeditionary Army shall be dispatched to Shanghai.

In cooperation with the Navy, the commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army shall suppress the enemy

1. Lt Isao Oyama, commander of the 1st Company of the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force and 1st Seaman Yozo Saito were killed by members of the Chinese Safety Unit on Monument Road in the extension of the common concession at about 1830 on 9 August 1937.

2. Prior to 17 November 1937, when Imperial General Headquarters was established in Tokyo to cope with the situation in China, Central Authorities comprising the Army and Navy General Staffs and the War and Navy Ministries, directed Japanese operations in China.

in the vicinity of Shanghai, occupy strategic positions in Shanghai and in districts to the north thereof, and protect Japanese residents.

The commander of the China Garrison Army³ shall dispatch the 6th Independent Air Company of the Provisional Air Corps to the vicinity of Shanghai and place it under the command of the commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army.

Units destined to join the Shanghai Expeditionary Army shall be considered to be under the command of the Army as of the time of their departure from Japanese harbors.

The 6th Independent Air Company shall come under the command of the commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army as of the time of its arrival in the vicinity of Shanghai.

Appendix

Composition of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army (Outline)

Shanghai Expeditionary Army Headquarters

3d Division

11th Division (minus the Amaya Detachment)⁴

7th Independent Machine Gun Battalion

5th Tank Battalion

8th Independent Light Armored Car Company

10th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment (minus one battalion and one-half of the ammunition train of the regiment)

5th Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion⁵

4th Trench Mortar Battalion

3. The headquarters of the China Garrison Army was in Tienching. (Monograph No 178, North China Area Army Operations Record, Vol I.)

4. Fearing there would be incidents similar to the Shanghai Incident in the Chingtao area where there were many Japanese cotton mills, on 15 August, Central Authorities ordered the Amaya Detachment (composed of one infantry regiment and one mountain artillery battalion as a nucleus and commanded by the brigade commander) to Dairen so that it could be moved quickly to Chingtao should it be required to protect the Japanese residents there. On 25 August, the Japanese Government ordered a general withdrawal of Japanese residents from Shantung Province and, on 1 September, the Amaya Detachment was ordered to rejoin the 11th Division in Shanghai.

5. 24cm and 30cm howitzers, when employed in siege operations against a fortress were termed "siege guns." (KOJOHO)

5th to the 10th Field Antiaircraft Gun Units (inclusive)
16th Division⁶ (OTSU)⁷
7th to the 9th Field Searchlight Units (inclusive) 3d
Division
8th Independent Engineer Regiment (KO)⁸
6th Independent Air Company
Headquarters of the Signal Unit of the Shanghai
Expeditionary Army
11th Field Signal Company
40th Radio Platoon
50th to the 52d Radio Platoons (inclusive)
4th Fixed Radio Platoon

On 23 August, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army landed at the mouth of the Huangpu River and in the area northwest thereof, destroyed the enemy stationed there and advanced to Tachangchen. It then attacked the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Shanghai but was unable to advance both because of difficult terrain and the enormous strength of the enemy.⁹

On 1 September, the Amaya Detachment was ordered to return to its original unit and, on 11 September, the following units arrived

6. These antiaircraft units were not part of the 16th Division in north China. They were organized in Kyoto, Japan by the 16th Division commander (later by the 16th Reserve Division commander) as air defense units for the Shanghai area. Upon completion of their organization they were placed under the command of the Central Authorities. At the time of their departure from Japan they were placed under the command of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army commander.

7. "OTSU" signified "B" class antiaircraft units or units which had no mobility.

8. The classifications for an engineer regiment were KO - General Purpose; OTSU - Tunnel construction; HEI - Heavy bridge; TEI - Landing and Shipping; BO - River Crossing; KI - Electric.

9. On 20 August, it was estimated that there were approximately 14 or 15 Chinese divisions in the area and thereafter one or two divisions were added each day until, toward the end of the Shanghai Incident, there were 85 Chinese divisions in this area.

from Japan to reinforce the Shanghai Expeditionary Army:

- 9th Division
- 101st Division
- 13th Division
- 1st and 2d Independent Machine Gun Battalions
- 5th Heavy Field Artillery Brigade
- 15th Independent Heavy Field Artillery Regiment
- 1st Trench Mortar Battalion
- 1st to 4th Field Searchlight Units (inclusive) of the Imperial Guards Division
- 12th Independent Engineer Regiment (BO)
- Headquarters, 3d Air Brigade
- 29th Field Signal Company
- 44th Field Signal Company
- 31 to 37th Radio Platoons (inclusive)

At the beginning of October, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army again took the offensive but was unable, at first, to make any progress. Toward the end of the month, however, it started to break through enemy positions and pursued the enemy toward the Suchou Ho. There the Chinese forces made a stand at prepared positions but the Japanese forces attacked fiercely and put the enemy to flight. On 12 November, the Expeditionary Army began a full-scale pursuit and cleared Shanghai and its vicinity of Chinese troops.

Earlier, on 20 October, in order to envelop and destroy the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Shanghai, Central Authorities ordered the 10th Army to land its main strength at Hangchow Bay and attack the right rear flank of the enemy, and at the same time, to land a force of more than division strength in the vicinity of Paimaokou to attack the enemy's left rear flank. For this purpose, Central Authorities dispatched the 6th and 16th Divisions¹⁰ and the

10. The 16th Division was assigned to the Shanghai Expeditionary Army on 30 October 1937.

Kunisaki Detachment¹¹ from north China, the 18th Division¹² from Manchuria and the 114th Division¹³ from Japan. The Order of Battle of the 10th Army then was as follows:

Army Commander - Lt Gen Heisuke Yanagawa

- 10th Army Headquarters
- 6th Division
- 18th Division
- 114th Division
- Kunisaki Detachment
- One Independent Machine Gun Battalion
- One Independent Light Armored Car Company
- Eight Field Antiaircraft Artillery Units
- Three Field Searchlight Units
- Two Independent Engineer Units (one each KO and BO)

On 7 November, the Central Authorities organized the Central China Area Army with the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army as its main force.¹⁴ The Area Army was commanded by General

11. The main force of the Kunisaki Detachment was the 9th Infantry Brigade (minus the 11th Infantry Regiment) and the 3d Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment (minus the 2d Battalion and one-half of the ammunition train of the regiment.) It was commanded by the 9th Infantry Brigade commander.

12. The 18th Division was sent to Manchuria on 11 September as a strategic reserve for north China. At that time it was under the direct command of Central Authorities, but with its transfer south for participation in the Shanghai Operation, it was assigned to the 10th Army.

13. The original manuscript stated that two divisions (18th and 114th) were sent from Japan. This is incorrect.

14. The headquarters of the Central China Area Army was organized temporarily on 7 November to control the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army. General Iwane Matsui, commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, became the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army and Lt Gen Yasuhiko Asaka was appointed commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. At this time, Central Authorities hoped to destroy the enemy around Shanghai and thereby hasten the conclusion of hostilities, but, not wishing to adversely influence public opinion abroad, it did not issue the

Iwane Matsui.¹⁵ Its mission, in cooperation with the Navy, was to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of Shanghai.


As soon as the 10th Army landed in the vicinity of Hangchow Bay on 5 November one element was ordered to advance toward Kunshan and strike directly at the right rear flank of the enemy facing the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, while the main force was ordered to march first toward Chiahsing and then to advance toward Wuchin.

The first line units acted in accordance with this plan but the Chinese began a general retreat on 12 November and the Shanghai Expeditionary Army pursued them along and to the north of the Nanching - Shanghai railway. As a result of the Chinese retreat, the Japanese unit (the 16th Division and an element of the Shigeto Detachment¹⁶) which was scheduled to land in the vicinity of Paimaokou on 16 November, landed on the 13th. It encountered very little opposition and advanced to within ten kilometers east of Changshu the

14. (cont'd) Order of Battle of the Central China Area Army. The Order of Battle was issued on 1 December when it was realized the conflict could not be localized and the decision was made to capture Nanching, the capital of China.

15. On 22 December 1948, General Matsui was executed at the Sugamo Prison in Tokyo as a war criminal.

16. The Shigeto Detachment, which was attached to the Shanghai Expeditionary Army on 7 September 1937, was commanded by Lt Gen Chiaki Shigeto, commander of the Formosa Army Garrison Unit. It was composed mainly of the Formosa Garrison Unit Headquarters, the 1st and 2d Formosa Infantry Regiments, the Formosa Army Mountain Artillery Regiment, the Formosa 1st and 2d Medical Units, Formosa Provisional Transport Unit and the Formosa 1st and 2d Convoy Units. On 7 December 1937 it was assigned to the 5th Army to take part in the Bias Bay Operation (Monograph No. 180, South China Area Operations Record, Vol I) and was transferred to Formosa on 22 December 1937.



same day. Under these favorable conditions, the Central China Area Army advanced to the line connecting Changshu, Suchou and Chiahsing on 19 November but failed to contact the main force of the retreating enemy.

Imperial General Headquarters, at first, had hoped that the objectives of the Shanghai Operation would be achieved when the Chinese were driven from the area around Shanghai and, at that time, had decided that the pursuit boundary would be the line connecting Suchou and Chiahsing. However, the general war condition toward the end of November, especially the active pursuit conducted by the first line units, caused the Japanese forces to go beyond this boundary. Hence, on the 24th, the pursuit boundary was extended to the line connecting Chingyangchen, Wuhsi and Wuhsing. (Map 1)

Nanching Operation

In view of the general war situation, Imperial General Headquarters decided that it was necessary to capture Nanching and, on 1 December, ordered the commander of the Central China Area Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to prepare to capture the city. At the same time, it granted permission to the Area Army to conduct limited operations, which were necessary to attain its objective, in strategic areas along the left bank of the Yangtze River.¹⁷ At that


17. At this time, Imperial General Headquarters had restricted the operations of the Central China Area Army to the right bank of the Yangtze River in an endeavor to prevent the spread of the incident.

time, the main strength of the enemy was retreating far to the west, leaving only part of its force (approximately 100,000 men) in the vicinity of Nanching.

On 7 December, Imperial General Headquarters removed the 3d Air Brigade from the command of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and placed it under the direct command of the Central China Area Army. It also removed the 3d Air Battalion, the 8th Air Battalion and the 2d Air Company of the 5th Air Battalion from the command of the Provisional Air Corps of the North China Area Army and assigned them to the 3d Air Brigade of the Central China Area Army.

On the same day, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Area Army commander, in cooperation with the Navy, first to capture Nanching and then to secure the strategic areas along the right bank of the Yangtze to the north of and including Hangchou, Hsuancheng and Wuhu. Also the Area Army was ordered to continue its air attacks against strategic areas in enemy-held territory and, in accordance with the changes in the situation, to concentrate and build up reserves for future use by Imperial General Headquarters.

The Area Army thereupon ordered the Shanghai Expeditionary Army (organized around the 9th, 101st, 13th and 16th Divisions and the Shigeto Detachment) to capture eastern Nanching with its main strength and the fortifications along the banks of the Yangtze River with an element. It was then to sever the Tayun Ho north of the Yangtze River and, after crossing to the left bank of the Yangtze River, to



cut the Tienching - Pukou railway. In order to cut off the enemy's retreat, the Area Army ordered the main strength of the 10th Army to proceed to southern Nanching, an element to Wuhu through the area along the road linking Kuangte, Hsuancheng and Wuhu and another element to Pukou on the opposite bank from Nanching by crossing the Yangtze in the vicinity of Tangtu. Front line units advanced straight toward Nanching and occupied the city on 13 December. Elements of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army occupied Chiangtu on the left bank of the Yangtze River on the 14th and Chuhsien on the 20th, thereby cutting vital enemy communication routes to the north of the river. Early in December, the Area Army commander had ordered the 10th Army commander to capture Hangchou. After the capture of Nanching, the Army started a drive from the Kuangte - Wuhsing - Chiahhsing line with about two divisions and, without meeting much resistance, captured Hangchou on 24 December. (Map 2)

On 31 December 1937, the Kunisaki Detachment was returned to the command of the North China Area Army commander and, on 15 January and 10 February 1938, the 16th and 114th Divisions were returned to their original command - the North China Area Army.

Organization of the Central China Expeditionary Army

On 14 February 1938, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the deactivation of the Central China Area Army, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army. At the same time, it ordered the organization of the Central China Expeditionary Army with the newly appointed com-

mander, General Shunroku Hata¹⁸ being assigned the following mission:

The Central China Expeditionary Army shall secure the strategic areas on the right bank of the Yangtze River north of and including Hangchou, Hsuancheng and Wuhu. Also it shall continue air attacks upon strategic areas in enemy territory.

By the same order, General Iwane Matsui, commander of the Central China Area Army with certain of his staff,¹⁹ as well as the commanders of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army with their respective staffs, was ordered back to Japan. Upon arrival in Japan, these headquarters were disbanded.

On the 15th, the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army was ordered to return the following units to Japan:

- 2d Independent Heavy Field Artillery Battalion
- 3d Independent Heavy Field Artillery Battalion
- 4th Independent Heavy Field Artillery Battalion
- Shanghai Expeditionary Army Artillery Intelligence Unit
- 9th Independent Engineer Regiment (OTSU)
- 5th Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion
- Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Unit
- 1st Second Reserve Infantry Group Headquarters²⁰
- 3d Division's 1st and 2d Second Reserve Infantry Battalions

18. General Hata was promoted to Field Marshal on 2 June 1944. On 30 October 1954 he was released on parole from Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, where he had been serving a life sentence as a war criminal.

19. Some staff of the Central China Area Army remained in China as members of the Central China Expeditionary Army headquarters.

20. The basic Japanese manuscript omits all second reserve units from the Orders of Battle of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army as these units were guard units in the logistical zone. The term of service of the Japanese soldier was two years active service, five years and four months reserve service after completion of active service and ten years second reserve service after completion of his reserve service. He could be called back to service any time within this period.

2d Second Reserve Infantry Group Headquarters
3d Division's 3d and 4th Second Reserve Infantry Battalions
6th Division's 1st and 2d Second Reserve Field Artillery
Batteries
11th Division's 1st Second Reserve Mountain Artillery Battery
12th Division's 1st and 2d Second Reserve Mountain Artillery
Batteries

CHAPTER II

Wu-Han (Wuchang - Hankou - Hanyang) Operation

General Situation after the Tungshan Operation²¹

Enemy Situation

After the Tungshan Operation the enemy withdrew its 1st War Sector Army to the west of the Peiping - Hankou railway and disposed the 5th War Sector Army, which had been defeated in the Tungshan Operation, in the vicinity of the Tapieshan Mountain Range, north of Wu-Han. About the middle of June, the Chinese organized the 9th War Sector Army and gradually assembled it in the vicinity of Wu-Han. By the middle of July, the combined strength of the 5th and 9th War Sector Armies was estimated at more than 60 divisions. At this time, the 3d War Sector Army was still located in the area south of the Yangtze River below Hankou and was seriously threatening the Japanese rear lines of communication.

In order to defend the Wu-Han area, the Chinese built strong fortifications at strategic points along the Tapieshan Mountain Range, along a line running north and south of Juichang and on the banks of the Yangtze River.

North China Area Army Situation

After the Tungshan Operation, the 14th and 16th Divisions of

21. Details of the Tungshan Operation are given in Monograph 178, North China Area Operations Record, Vol I.

the 2d Army, pursued the enemy to the west, and, early in June, massed their forces in the vicinity of Chungmou and Lushih.²² On the 14th, the 2d Army commander ordered the 16th Division to mass its forces to the east of the area which had been flooded when the enemy had cut the dikes of the Huang Ho. Although the division was confronted with the difficulty of crossing the flooded area and was harassed by the enemy, it succeeded in concentrating its strength along the line connecting Kaifeng and Chihhsien by 7 July.

With the transfer of the 2d Army to the command of the Central China Expeditionary Army in July, the North China Area Army commander divided the area formerly garrisoned by the 2d Army, as well as the area directly under the control of the Area Army into three defense districts, Ko, Otsu and Hei. The Ko defense district (Peiping - Tienching area) was placed under the control of the China Garrison Group, the Otsu defense district (Shantung Province and the southern areas along the Tienching - Pukou railway) under the 114th and 5th Divisions and the 5th Independent Mixed Brigade and the Hei defense district (the district to the east of the new Huang Ho) under the 16th Division, which was later relieved by the Cavalry Group.

From early June, the 10th Division had concentrated its strength

22. On 13 June, the 14th Division was returned to the command of the 1st Army.

near Hsiai and Yungcheng and, in compliance with an Area Army order, about mid-July, began to assemble its force in the vicinity of Hofei.²³

In July, the 110th Division, which had arrived from Japan in late June, was sent to north China and, about mid-July, relieved the China Garrison Group in guarding the Peiping - Tienching area.²⁴

Central China Expeditionary Army Situation

From early June, the 3d,²⁵ 6th and 13th Divisions and the Hata Detachment²⁶ of the Central China Expeditionary Army had been trying to gain a foothold in the west in preparation for the Wu-Han Operation.

The 106th and 116th Divisions were dispatched from Japan in June. The former division was first assigned to guard Wuhu and, toward the end of June, was assigned guard duty along the upper

23. On 4 July, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the transfer of the 2d Army to the Central China Expeditionary Army and, by the same order, attached the 10th and 16th Divisions to the North China Area Army until the Area Army had completed its new disposition for defense. Actually, the 2d Army was transferred on 7 July. The 10th and 16th Divisions were returned to the 2d Army on 12 and 26 July respectively.

24. On 15 July, the China Garrison Group was expanded into the 27th Division and transferred to the 11th Army. The 11th Army was organized to conduct the Wu-Han Operation.

25. The main strength of the 3d Division was returned to Nanching in late June and assigned guard duty there.

26. This Detachment was transferred from the Formosa Army and assigned to the China Expeditionary Army on 22 February 1938. The composition of this detachment was the same as the Shigeto Detachment, which was attached to the Shanghai Expeditionary Army from 7 September to 7 December. Its designation was changed when Maj Gen Juichi Hata relieved Maj Gen Chiaki Shigeto as commander.

reaches of the Yangtze River. Early in July the 116th Division relieved the 18th Division in guarding the vicinity of Hangchou, while toward mid-July the 18th Division relieved the 101st Division in guarding the Shanghai district. After the Tungshan Operation, the 9th Division guarded Suchou and its vicinity and, after the departure of the Hata Detachment on 7 June, it also undertook the responsibility of guarding Chenchiang. (Map 3)


Preparations for Wu-Han Operation

After the occupation of Nanching, Imperial General Headquarters began planning the Wu-Han Operation, and, with the favorable conclusion of the Tungshan Operation, it immediately began preparations for this operation. It published the outline of tactical command with the objective of occupying Hankou during the autumn and driving Chiang's administration out of Central China as quickly as possible. After occupying Hankou, Canton was to be seized in order to cut the Chinese supply route. The general plan was published as follows:

In order to occupy Hankou and destroy as many of the enemy as possible, the Central China Expeditionary Army shall advance one Army through the district along the Huai Ho and another through the district along the Yangtze River.²⁷

Prior to the attack by the Central China Expeditionary

27. The Chinese broke the dikes of the Huang Ho in mid-June and caused the flood of the new Huang Ho. Consequently, the plan to advance the 2d Army by using the Huai Ho was revised and the 2d Army moved south of the river. As a result, the Central China Expeditionary Army's main battle area became the Yangtze River area.



Army, an element of the North China Area Army shall occupy the Chenghsien sector.

Outline of Central China Expeditionary
Army's Tactical Command

Although by early June, the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army had completed plans for directing operations, in mid-August, because of the flooding of the Huai Ho, it became necessary for him to draw up new plans, based on the master plan of Imperial General Headquarters, as follows:

Policy

The Central China Expeditionary Army shall advance one Army through the district along the Yangtze River and another Army through the district to the north of Tapihshan Mountains. These Armies shall occupy strategic points in the Wu-Han district and deal the severest possible blow to the enemy in order to crush his will to continue the war.

The main objective of this operation shall be the occupation of Hankou. In consideration of our insufficient strength and past experiences, contacting and annihilating the enemy shall be a secondary objective of this operation.

Preparations

The 11th Army shall occupy the area in the vicinity of Hsiaoehkhau and prepare for future operations.

The 2d Army, if necessary, shall seize an opportunity to occupy the area in the vicinity of Liuan and prepare for future operations.

The main supply route shall be the Yangtze River. An overland supply route with its base in the vicinity of Hofei or Liuan shall be opened to supply the 2d Army.

The Offensive

The offensive shall be launched in early September by which time both Armies shall have completed their concentrations.

The 2d Army shall commence action in early September and crush the enemy along the western Liuan front. It shall

first advance to the vicinity of Huangchuan and Kuangshan and then toward either Hsinyang or Hankou, depending upon how the situation develops.

The 11th Army shall commence action in early September. It shall order one element on the north bank of the Yangtze River to advance directly toward Hankou in cooperation with the 2d Army. Meanwhile, its main force shall advance along the south bank of the Yangtze River toward Wuchang. Depending upon the situation, the 11th Army may order another element to advance toward Hsinyang with the objective of contacting the enemy in front of the 2d Army.

Outline of Tactical Organization

2d Army: 3d, 10th, 13th and 16th Divisions

11th Army: 6th, 9th, 27th, 101st and 106th Divisions
and Hata Detachment

Forces under the direct command of the Central China Expeditionary Army

Strategic reserves: 116th and 18th Divisions

Rear Reserves: 15th, 17th and 22d Divisions

Operational Preparations

Based upon the outline of tactical command for the Wu-Han Operations, Imperial General Headquarters published the following plan for operational preparations:

The Central China Expeditionary Army shall occupy Huaining between the middle and latter part of June and prepare for future operations.

After the occupation of Huaining, the 11th Army shall be organized under the command of the Central China Expeditionary Army and shall be charged with the mission of conducting operations along the Yangtze River.

In the meantime, the Central China Expeditionary Army shall direct the 13th Division to occupy the vicinity of Shouhsien, Chenyangkuan and Liuan and prepare for future operations.

By the end of June, the 2d Army (about two divisions will remain under the command of the North China Area Army until the end of July) shall be placed under the command of the Central China Expeditionary Army and, together with the 13th Division, shall operate along the Huai Ho.

The Central China Expeditionary Army shall construct

air bases for the Air Brigade cooperating with both front line armies and for the bomber forces in the Huaining - Shouhsien area and the Pangfou - Hofei area.

The Central China Expeditionary Army shall set up supply points near Huaining and Shouhsien for the benefit of both front-line armies.

Operations in Preparation for the
Wu-Han Operation

Imperial General Headquarters, when deciding upon the Tungshan Operation in April, planned to seize air bases and occupy strategic points vital to the advance up the Yangtze and Huai Rivers, in preparation for the Wu-Han Operation. In late April, therefore, it ordered an element of the Central China Area Army to occupy Hofei and the units under the command of the Central China Area Army which had participated in the Tungshan Operation to be concentrated on the banks of the Huai Ho. It also ordered that Shouhsien and Huaining be occupied during the latter part of May.

On 26 May, the Central China Expeditionary Army commander so disposed his forces that the 13th and 3d Division would attack Shouhsien, Chengyangkuan and the Huainan Coalmine, while the 6th Division, advancing overland from Hofei, would attack Huaining at the same time as the Hata Detachment, in cooperation with the Navy, would strike from the direction of the Yangtze River.

The 13th Division started action from the vicinity of Mengcheng on 2 June, captured Fengtai on the 4th and Chengyangkuan on the 5th, while the main force of the 3d Division, starting action from near Huaiyuan on 30 May, occupied the Huainan Coalmine on 3 June and

Shouhsien on the 5th. However, because of the diversion of the Huang Ho, the Expeditionary Army was forced to give up its plan to go up the Huai Ho and, as the flood waters rose higher each day near Shouhsien and Chengyangkuan, in accordance with Army orders, the 3d Division moved to the vicinity of Pangfou on 19 June and the 13th Division to the vicinity of Hofei on 21 June.²⁸


Leaving Chengchiang on 7 June, the Hata Detachment sailed up the Yangtze River and occupied Huaining on the 12th.

The main force of the 6th Division began to concentrate at Hofei on 3 June. The Sakai Detachment had already taken up positions at Hofei.²⁹ An advance unit left Hofei on 6 June, occupied Shucheng on the 8th and Tungcheng on the 13th. On the same day, it left for Chienshan and occupied that town on the 18th.

On 18 June, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Central China Expeditionary Army to gradually establish bases to the west of the Yangtze and Huai Rivers toward the Wu-Han sector in preparation for future operations. Separate orders were issued for the attack on Hsiaoehihkou following the occupation of Hukou as it was

28. At first, the 3d Division garrisoned the area along the Tienching - Pukou railway as far north as Pangfou and in the vicinity of Tingyuan, Kuchen and Hohsien in the sector north of the Yangtze River, and in the vicinity of Nanching in the southern sector. Later an element of this force was detached to replace the 106th Division in garrisoning Wuhu and Hsuancheng and the vicinity.

29. Details are given in Monograph No 178, North China Area Operations Record, Vol I.



felt that particular attention should be given to preparations for this operation as the enemy could easily concentrate its troops by rail to reinforce the area.

An element (having two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battery as its nucleus) of the Hata Detachment sailed from Huaining on 22 June, occupied Hsiangkou on the 24th and Matang Fortress on the 26th. In the meantime, the main force of the detachment, which remained in Huaining with plans to sail up the Yangtze River to Hukou, changed its plan, which called for the clearance of the water route between Hsiangkou and Hukou by the Navy, and decided to land in the vicinity of Hsiangkou and from there to advance overland to capture Hukou. It left Huaining on the 27th, landed in the vicinity of Hsiangkou on the 28th and, overcoming enemy resistance, occupied Pengtse on 29 June and Hukou on 4 July.

Since the Hata Detachment had advanced by land to Hukou, the Expeditionary Army ordered the main force of the 106th Division to sail up the Yangtze River behind the Hata Detachment and concentrate in the vicinity of Pengtse, in order to secure the rear of the detachment.

After 3 July, the 106th Division gradually landed near Hsiangkou and, destroying the enemy who had cut the supply route, cleared the route by 11 July. (Map 4)

Order of Battle

The Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army

originally consisted of the 3d, 6th, 9th, 13th, 18th and 101st Divisions and the Hata Detachment, and, on 20 May, the 106th and 116th Divisions were added. The Orders of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army and the 2d Army (formerly composed of the 5th and 10th Divisions) were revised and the Order of Battle of the 11th Army was issued on 4 July. The outline of these Orders of Battle and the later transfers were as shown on Chart 1. Commanders of the 2d and 11th Armies took over the command of their assigned units at Nanching on 15 July.

Disposition of the Central China Expeditionary Army

On 15 July, in order to prepare for the capture of Hankou, the Central China Expeditionary Army ordered the 2d Army gradually to concentrate its strength near Hofei and to occupy Liuan and Hoshan at an opportune time. It was then to prepare for subsequent operations along the northern foothills of the Tapihshan Mountains. The 11th Army was ordered to capture Huangmei and Hsiao-chih-kou, occupy the Juchang - Tean line and then to concentrate its strength and prepare for subsequent operations against Hankou and the areas to the south.

On 6 August, the Expeditionary Army commander summoned the staffs in charge of railway and sea transportation to Nanching to study the disposition of the troops and transportation problems.

On the basis of this study, the 2d Army formulated a rough plan to concentrate most of the first-line units under its command, as

well as the main force of the line of communication unit, by early September. The 11th Army's plan was to concentrate its first-line units by early September; the units under its direct command by mid-September and the line of communication units by late September. The Air Group planned to complete preparations by late August.

Concentration of 2d Army

On 26 July, the 2d Army ordered the main strength of the 10th and 16th Divisions to concentrate at Hofei, the former by marching overland and the latter by employing the Lunghai and Tienching - Pukou railways. An element of each division (artillery and transportation troops) was to proceed to Lienyun, from where it was to be transported by sea to Huaining. From Huaining these troops were to march overland to Hofei.

The main force of the 10th Division (its headquarters had been in Checheng) began its concentration movement in early August. As the bridge across the Huai Ho had been carried away by the floods on 13 July, this force was compelled to cross the river near Pangfou by ferry boat. Although this slowed down their progress, concentration near Hofei was completed by 26 August.

In late July, the 16th Division (its headquarters had been in Kaifeng) transferred its garrison duty there to the 2d Reserve Unit of the 1st Army and initiated its concentration movement at the beginning of August. It began to concentrate near Hofei from mid-August and completed concentration of its main strength by the end

Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army,
2d Army and 11th Army

4 July 1938

Area Army	Army	Division	Remark
Central China Expedi- tionary Army Commander: Gen Shunroku Hata	2d Army Commander: Prince Naruhiko	10th Division Commander: Lt Gen Yoshio Shinozuka	Temp placed under the cmd of the North China Area Army but returned to parent orgn on 4 July
		13th Division Commander: Lt Gen Rippei Ogisu	Temporarily placed under the command of the North China Area Army but returned to parent organization on 26 July
		16th Division Commander: Lt Gen Kesago Nakajima; re- placed by Lt Gen Keisuke Fujie after 26 July	
	11th Army Commander: Lt Gen Yasuji Okamura	6th Division Commander: Lt Gen Shiro Inaba	
		101st Division Commander: Lt Gen Masaki Ito	
		106th Division Commander: Lt Gen Junrokuro Matsuura	
		Hata Detachment Commander: Juichi Hata	
	Units Under Direct Com- mand of the Expedi- tionary Army	3d Division Commander: Lt Gen Susumu Fujita	Placed in the Order of Battle of the 2d Army on 1 August
		9th Division Commander: Lt Gen Ryosuke Yoshizumi	Placed in the Order of Battle of the 11th Army on 1 August
		18th Division Commander: Lt Gen Sadao Ushijima	Transferred to the Order of Battle of the 21st Army on 19 September
		116th Division Commander: Lt Gen Kiju Shimizu	

Chart No. 1

Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army,
2d Army and 11th Army (Cont'd)

- Note:
1. The 27th Division commanded by Lt Gen Masaharu Homma placed in the Order of Battle of the 11th Army on 15 July.
 2. The 15th Division commanded by Lt Gen Yoshio Iwamatsu, 17th Division commanded by Lt Gen Takichi Hirono and 22d Division commanded by Lt Gen Ichiji Dobashi placed in the Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army on 15 July.
 3. The Air Group commanded by Lt Gen Baron Yoshitoshi Tokugawa placed in the Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army on 2 August.
 4. The 4th Cavalry Brigade commanded by Lt Gen Yoshizo Kojima placed in the Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army from that of the North China Area Army on 11 October. Later, it was assigned to the 2d Army.

of the month.

The seaborne units of the two divisions landed at Huaining and, as directed, marched to Hofei, arriving there during the latter part of August.

The 13th Division began massing near Taochichen from 10 July and completed concentration of its forces by the 16th.

The 3d Division,³⁰ which had been relieved of garrison duty in the vicinity of Nanching and Wuhu on 23 August by the 15th Division completed concentration of its main strength near Hofei on 10 September. (Map 5)


11th Army's Battle to Secure its Area and
its Subsequent Concentration

On 19 July, the 11th Army commander planned to capture Huangmei and Hsiaoehikou. He ordered the 6th Division to capture Huangmei immediately and the Hata Detachment to land near Kutang on 23 July and capture Hsiaoehikou. The 106th Division was ordered to land near Kutang, following the Hata Detachment, and to advance to the area south of Chili Hu. The 101st Division was ordered to assume garrison duty along the river between Hukou and Hsiangkou.

The 6th Division left Chienshan on 24 July, and, overcoming enemy resistance on the way, occupied Huangmei on 2 August.

At daybreak on 23 July the Hata Detachment landed north of

30. The 3d Division was placed under the command of the 2d Army on 1 August.



Kutang in the face of enemy fire and, after destroying this forward unit, on the 26th advanced to Hsiaoehihkou.³¹

The 106th Division, following the Hata Detachment, landed on the right bank of the Yangtze River and on 30 July advanced to the sector south of Chili Hu. From 4 August, in order to capture the key points near Maanshan, the division attacked the strongly constructed enemy positions in this area but was unable to make any progress. This stalemate continued for about a month.³²

After the middle of July, the main force of the 101st Division guarded the river bank between Hukou and Pengtse. The Sato Detachment of the 101st Division (commanded by Maj Gen Sato and with two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion as its nucleus) landed in the area east of Hsiaoehihkou in mid-August and concentrated on the eastern side of Lushan Mountain. The Division commander ordered the detachment to capture Hsingtzu and to continue to advance to the area near Yaikouchieh, in accordance with the Army's order. The Sato Detachment captured Hsingtzu on 21 August and then attacked enemy positions at the southern foot of Lushan Mountain but the enemy resisted stubbornly. Later, the main force of the Division (the Saeda Detachment composed of three infantry battalions and two field

31. Hsiaoehihkou had already been occupied by a naval landing party on 25 July.

32. The 101st and 106th Division were both reserve divisions and had not the training, combat experience or equipment of the 6th, 9th and 27th Divisions of the 11th Army.

artillery batteries as its nucleus and commanded by Maj Gen Saeda) which had previously been left to guard the area between Hukou and Fengtse, participated in the battle but were unable to vanquish the Chinese forces. This stalemate continued for two months.³³

In accordance with Expeditionary Army orders, on 8 August, the 9th Division was relieved of its garrison duty at Wuchin and Suchou by the 17th Division. On the 11th, the 9th Division embarked at Chenchiang and, on the 16th, landed and concentrated its force near Hsiaoehikou. The 27th Division³⁴ was transported by ship from Tangku in mid-July and landed at Nanching around 9 August. Because of the shortage of shipping, it was delayed there and finally left Nanching on 27 August, landing in the area east of Hsiaoehikou several days later. It concentrated on the eastern side of Lushan Mountain and began preparations for concentration in the vicinity of Tean. (Map 6)

Concentration of Groups under Direct
Command of the Expeditionary Army

During the first part of July, the 116th Division relieved the 18th Division and assumed garrison duty near Hangchou. During the latter part of August, an element of the 116th Division assumed guard duty in the area along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River in the

33. Both the 101st and 106th Divisions were forced to make frontal attacks and were restricted in regard to enveloping actions - the 101st by the Poyang Hu and Lushan Mountain and the 106th by Lushan Mountain and the Sai Hu. In general, the Chinese Army stubbornly resisted frontal attacks.


34. On 24 July 1937, the China Garrison Group was reorganized into the 27th Division.

CONCENTRATION OF 11th ARMY

23 JUL - 31 AUG 1938

→ JAPANESE ARMY

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MILES



TEAN

vicinity of Wuhu, while the main strength of the Division, after being relieved of its garrison duty in the Hangchow district by the 22d Division concentrated near Nanching as a general reserve for the Expeditionary Army. However, as the enemy along the right bank of the Yangtze River was continuously firing on Japanese transport vessels using the waterway, in mid September, the Army ordered the main strength of the Division to assume garrison duty along the river banks between Hukou and Wuhu. The Division relieved the Saeda Detachment of the 101st Division of garrison duty in the area between Hukou and Pengtse on 20 September. The Saeda Detachment later concentrated at Hsiaoehihkou and was placed under the direct command of the 11th Army.

During mid-July, the 18th Division relieved the 101st Division of its garrison duty near Shanghai and, in early August, ordered an element to relieve the Iizuka Detachment of the 101st Division of its garrison duty near Nantung. At the same time, it conducted training in landing under enemy fire. On 19 September, this division entered the Order of Battle of the 21st Army and between 19 and 25 September it was relieved of its garrison duty in Shanghai and Nantung by the 22d and 17th Divisions, respectively, in order that it might prepare for the Canton Operation.³⁵

35. The 18th Division embarked at Shanghai between 30 September and 3 October for Mako, Pescadore Island, Formosa, the assembly area of the 21st Army for the Canton Operation. The 21st Army landed at Bias Bay on 12 October 1938 and captured Canton on 21 October. (Monograph No 180, South China Area Operations Record, Vol I)

The newly organized 15th, 17th and 22d Divisions arrived in Shanghai between early and mid-August.³⁶ The 17th Division assumed garrison duty in the Suchou and Wuchin sectors on 8 August (Nantung was added on 25 September); the 15th Division in the Nanching, Wuhu and Chiangtu sectors after 23 August and the 22d Division in the Hangchou sector after 28 August (Shanghai sector was added 19 September). (Map 7)

The Air Group, which had been transferred from North China, completed the concentration of its main strength and deployment of its remaining air units by the end of August.³⁷

Summary of Operational Progress

On 22 August, Imperial General Headquarters issued Army Order No. 188 in regard to the Hankou invasion, which read as follows:

The Central China Expeditionary Army, in cooperation with the Navy, shall invade and occupy key points in the vicinity of Hankou. During this time, it shall destroy as many of the enemy as possible.

The North China Area Army, simultaneous with the operation of the Central China Expeditionary Army, shall commence diversionary actions.


36. On 8 April 1938, the 15th, 17th and 22d Divisions were organized at Nagoya, Himeji and Utsunomiya, Japan, respectively. On 15 July they were assigned to the Central China Expeditionary Army and entered its Order of Battle at the time of their departure from Japan.

37. The Provisional Air Group became the Air Group in late July 1938. The Air Group was assigned to the Central China Expeditionary Army on 2 August, becoming effective on 6 August. The units were deployed as follows: Headquarters and 18th Independent Reconnaissance Company to Nanching on 23 July; 1st Air Brigade to Hofei on 25 August, 3d Air Brigade to Huaining and Pengtse on 26 August and 4th Air Brigade to Nanching and Hangchou on 29 August. (Monograph No. 76, China Area Air Operations Record).

CONCENTRATION OF UNITS UNDER DIRECT COMMAND OF CENTRAL CHINA EXPEDITIONARY ARMY

EARLY AUG - 25 SEP 1938

→ JAPANESE ARMY



Detailed directives will be issued by the Chief of the General Staff.

22 August 1938

By Imperial Command:

Prince Kotohito
Chief, General Staff

To: Shunroku Hata, Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army
Count Hisaichi Terauchi, Commander of the North China Area Army

At the same time, Imperial General Headquarters issued Army Directive No. 250, which read:

The following is directed in pursuance of Imperial General Headquarters Army Department Order No. 188:

An Army-Navy Agreement shall be drawn up directly between the units concerned.

The operation of the Central China Expeditionary Army advancing toward Hankou shall not be carried out beyond the line connecting Hsinyang, Yoyang and Nanchang.

The operation of the North China Area Army shall not be carried out south of the Huang Ho and its inundated area.

A special directive shall be published in regard to the area of occupation after the invasion of Hankou.

22 August 1938

By Imperial Command:

Prince Kotohito
Chief, General Staff

To: Shunroku Hata, Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army
Count Hisaichi Terauchi, Commander of the North China Area Army

Attack by Central China Expeditionary
Army on Wuhan Defense Positions

In accordance with orders from Imperial General Headquarters,

the Central China Area Army commander made preparations first to gain and then to extend a foothold westward in the northern foothills of the Tapieshan Mountains and along the northern bank of the Yangtze River. He then planned, by concentrating his strength in the southwestern sector of Hsiaoehkou, south of the Yangtze River, to cut the Peiping - Hankou and Canton - Hankou railways and capture Wuhan. He, therefore, ordered the 2d Army to initiate movement from its present concentration area in late August, destroy the opposing enemy and advance to the Huangchuan - Shangcheng line and then prepare to advance further toward Hsinyang and the northern sector of Hankou. The 11th Army was ordered to seize and gradually extend a foothold westward from the Yangtze River and its northern bank sector and, after destroying the opposing enemy, to assemble generally along the Juichang - Tean line. It was then to occupy Yungshiu at an opportune time and prepare to advance toward Wu-Han and the Hankou - Canton railway south of Wu-Han about mid-September.

In order to strengthen the fighting power of his Army, the Expeditionary Army commander decided to reinforce it with elements of the guard divisions under his direct command as shown on Chart 2.

Tapieshan Assault Operation

The roads between Liuan and Hoshan had been destroyed, however, the roads west of Liuan and Hoshan were still intact and this, together with the fact that there was a marked reduction in the number of enemy troops in the northern foothills of the Tapieshan Mountains

Table of Organization of Provisional Detachment

Division	Expedition Order	Detachment Designation	Commander	Composition	Point and Date of Arrival	Remark
17th Div	4 October	Suzuki Det	Maj Gen Harumatsu Suzuki	Three inf bns & two fld arty btrys	Hsiaoohihkou on 10 October	
15th Div	30 September	Takashina Det	Col Takeshi Takashina	Two and one-half inf bns and one fld arty btry	Panpi Shan between 8-10 October	
116th Div	30 September	Shima Det	Col Genkichi Shima	Two inf bns & one fld arty bn	Tienchiachen on 3 October	The det will wait at Hsiaoohihkou from late September
	9 October	Ishihara Det	Maj Gen Tsunetaro Ishihara	Shima Det reinf'd with two inf bns	Chichun on 13 October	
<p>Note: Although the 116th Division was ordered to dispatch its main force, the division commander was unable to withdraw it from the frontline due to vigorous guerrilla activities. Therefore, he dispatched two infantry battalions, together with the Shima Detachment, under the command of Maj Gen Ishihara.</p>						

as they were being gradually transferred to the Yangtze River area, caused the 2d Army commander to change his plans from occupying and concentrating his troops at the Liuan - Hoshan line to advancing from the presently-held line to the Huangchuan - Shangcheng line, in order to prevent the enemy from destroying the roads west of Liuan. The 2d Army commander, therefore, issued the following order on August,³⁸

The 10th Division shall destroy the enemy in the vicinity of Liuan, advance immediately to the vicinity of Huangchuan and there make preparations for an operation against Hsinyang.

The 13th Division shall destroy the opposing enemy, especially in the vicinity of Hoshan, advance immediately to the vicinity of Shangcheng and there make preparations for an operation against the northern sector of Hankou.

The 16th Division shall assign an element to guard the key points on the main traffic routes extending eastward from Kushi and Yehchiachi to Hofei and its vicinity. At the same time, the division shall advance gradually to the vicinity of Kushi. A unit, with approximately two infantry battalions as its nucleus, shall be dispatched to relieve the troops of the 13th Division stationed at Shucheng and Tungcheng and to secure the lines of communication between Shucheng and Tungcheng. In addition, this unit shall relieve the 13th Division of guard duty in the vicinity of Hoshan.

On 23 August, the 3d Division shall move to the north of the Yangtze River and concentrate its troops in the vicinity of Hofei and Taochichen. Also it shall be responsible for the district along the Tienching - Pukou railway, north of the Yangtze River.

The 2d Army commander ordered the 10th and 13th Divisions to initiate movement from their assembly areas on 27 August. Accordingly, both divisions launched attacks. The 10th Division occupied Liuan on the 28th, while the 13th Division occupied Hoshan on the 29th and

38. This order was issued two days prior to the Central China Expeditionary Army's order to permit the forces under the 2d Army commander to prepare to advance. This procedure was approved by the Expeditionary Army.

Yehchiachi on 2 September. The 13th Division then made a surprise crossing of the Shih Ho during the night. There it was confronted by several Nationalist Government divisions³⁹ which resisted stubbornly and prevented the 13th Division from advancing any further.

On 7 September the 10th Division occupied Kushi and, on the same day, the Army commander dispatched the Seya Detachment (a detachment with three infantry battalions as its nucleus and commanded by Maj Gen Kei Seya) of the 10th Division, together with several small units under his direct command, to reinforce the 13th Division. The Seya Detachment met and engaged two or three enemy divisions in the vicinity of Changpailing but the battle became a stalemate. Therefore, on 9 September, the 2d Army commander ordered the 16th Division upon its arrival at Yehchiachi to advance toward Shangcheng from the north side of the road linking Yehchiachi, Fangchi and Shangcheng in order to cut the enemy's route of retreat. At the same time, he assigned the Seya Detachment and one field artillery battalion to the 16th Division.

On the 12th, the 13th Division destroyed the confronting enemy and began to advance toward Shangcheng. On the same day, the 16th Division launched a successful attack from Yehchiachi. By the 16th the two divisions (13th and 16th) had occupied Shangcheng. At this time, the divisions returned the Seya Detachment, together with the

39. Nationalist Government divisions were better trained and equipped than those divisions supplied by the local war lords.

other units, to their parent organizations.

On the 17th, after overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, the 10th Division occupied Huangchuan.


As soon as the 2d Army advanced to the line linking Huangchuan and Shangcheng, it detached an element from each division and ordered these elements to occupy key points in the forward area. The Okada Detachment (a detachment with four infantry battalions and one mountain gun battalion as its nucleus and commanded by Maj Gen Tasuku Okada) of the 10th Division occupied Loshan on 21 September; the Shinohara Detachment (a detachment with three infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion as its nucleus and commanded by Maj Gen Jiro Shinohara) of the 16th Division occupied the sector south of Shawo on the 16th; and the Numata Detachment (a detachment with three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battery as its nucleus and commanded by Maj Gen Shigenori Numata) of the 13th Division occupied the sector north of Hsintien on the 21st.

(Map 8)

Assault on Hankou

Previous to this, in early September, in view of the fact that both the 2d Army's advance in the northern foothills of Tapihshan Mountains and the battle situation in the 11th Army's area were progressing favorably, the Central China Expeditionary Army commander decided to carry out the Hankou Assault Operation.

He ordered the 2d Army to continue its advance at an opportune time from the line linking Huangchuan and Shangcheng. An element



was ordered to break through the Tapieshan Mountain Range and, in cooperation with the Yangtze River North Bank Unit of the 11th Army, was to advance to the sector north of Hankou, while the main force was to advance toward Hsinyang, attack and destroy the enemy and cut the Peiping - Hankou railway.

Penetration of the Tapieshan Mountain Range

2d Army's Operation:

On 19 September, the 2d Army commander ordered the 13th and 16th Divisions to leave the vicinity of Shangcheng at an appropriate time after 22 September, break through the Tapieshan Mountain Range and advance to the Paikao and Sungfou sectors respectively. He ordered the 10th Division to leave Huangchuan at an opportune time and capture Hsinyang and the 3d Division to push its force to the vicinity of Loshan and, when required, participate in the fighting there.⁴⁰

On 28 September, the main force of the 10th Division left

40. Earlier, the Army had planned to employ the 13th Division alone in the Macheng sector, but because of the decrease in the fighting power of this division, it was considered necessary to employ the 16th Division (less one infantry regiment) also, to give added breakthrough power. The 13th Division had suffered heavy casualties in its attack against a stubbornly resisting enemy on the left bank of the Shih Ho, and again during a night attack on 2 September while crossing the Shih Ho. Also malarial fever had taken a heavy toll of this division after the Tungshan Operation. In the Hsinyang sector, the full strength of the 3d Division, together with the tactical units under the direct command of the Army, was to be employed as the Army's main force. (In the Japanese Army, units below the designation of Brigade, which were under the direct command of the Army, were referred to as "tactical units.") Later this plan was revised as described above.

Huangchuan and, by conducting a flanking movement from the south against the enemy enveloping both flanks of the Okada Detachment, advanced to the vicinity of Loshan. On the 30th, the Division advanced to the southwest. After destroying the opposing enemy, it cut the Peiping - Hankou railway and arrived in the sector southwest of Hsinyang on 10 October.

With the successful development of the flanking movement conducted by the main force of the Division, the enemy in front of the Okada Detachment began to withdraw after 6 October. The Detachment then advanced westward, destroying the enemy in its way.

Prior to this, on 2 October, the Army commander had decided to seize Hsinyang by advancing the 3d Division westward from the sector north of the road linking Loshan and Hsinyang.

On the 4th, the 3d Division launched an attack from the sector north of Loshan, destroyed the opposing enemy and advanced to the sector northwest of Hsinyang on the 24th. In the meantime, the Okada Detachment, which together with one tank regiment had been attached to the 3d Division on 6 October, advanced westward on the road linking Loshan and Hsinyang and occupied Hsinyang on the 12th. Immediately after the occupation of Hsinyang, the Okada Detachment was returned to its parent organization, the 10th Division.

As soon as the 2d Army commander received an order from the Expeditionary Army commander on the 12th that, "After destroying the enemy in the vicinity of Hsinyang, one element shall secure this area. The remaining force shall advance from the Peiping - Hankou

railway sector to the sector northwest of Hankou, destroying the opposing enemy north of the river and capture Hankou and Hanyang in concert with the units advancing toward the Macheng sector," he ordered the 10th Division to push immediately toward the Anlu sector, west of the Peiping - Hankou railway and the 3d Division to secure the vicinity of Hsinyang.

However, since the main force of the 10th Division required time to replenish its fighting power, on the 17th, the Army commander ordered the Uemura Detachment (with three infantry battalions and one artillery battery as its nucleus and commanded by Maj Gen Mikio Uemura) of the 3d Division to advance toward Yingshan through the valley west of Pingchingkuan, and to cooperate with the 10th Division in breaking through the mountains surrounding Pingchingkuan. This detachment, together with the Okada Detachment of the 10th Division, overcoming the steep terrain, broke through the provincial borders of Honan and Hupeh Provinces at a point west of Pingchingkuan on the 21st and 22d respectively.

On the 24th, the Army commander ordered the main force of the 13th Division to advance toward the sector north of Huangpei and the main force of the 16th Division to advance toward Hokouchen at the same time destroying the enemy in their respective sectors.

After crossing the provincial border, both divisions began their pursuit of the enemy. The 16th Division broke through to Macheng on the 25th and advanced to the sector west of Sungfou on

the 26th. The 13th Division destroyed the enemy confronting it and advanced an element to the sector east of Macheng on the 26th.


Also on 26 October, the Army commander ordered one tank regiment, which was attached to the 3d Division, to advance toward Hwayuan through Hsuanhuatien. On the 27th, the regiment left Tungchung. It occupied Hsuanhuatien on the 28th, and advanced to Hwayuan on the 29th. (Map 9)

11th Army Operation

With a view to acquiring a foothold in the west, the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, on 22 August, issued the following order to the 11th Army:

The 11th Army shall successively acquire footholds to the west along the Yangtze River, as well as in the sector to the north of the river. At the same time, it shall continue to concentrate along the line linking Juichang and Tean by destroying the enemy confronting it. At the first opportunity, it shall occupy the vicinity of Yunghsiu and prepare to launch an attack against the Wu-Han area and the Canton - Hankou railway to the south, about mid-September.

Prior to this, the commander of the 11th Army had planned to destroy the enemy in the western foothills of Mt Lushan. Accordingly, on 21 August, he ordered the Hata Detachment to advance to the sector northwest of Juichang to facilitate the 9th Division's advance to that sector. The 9th Division was ordered to advance to the sector north of Tean by way of the Juichang sector with a force consisting of approximately five infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion and thereby cut off the enemy retreating along the western foothills of Mt Lushan.



On the 23d, the 11th Army commander ordered the 6th Division to leave the vicinity of Huangmei by 31 August and from there to advance to the vicinity of Kuangchi. Upon arrival at Kuangchi, it was to advance a strong element to the vicinity of Tienchiachen, in order to facilitate navigation of the river.

The Hata Detachment, which had already left Hsiaoehikou on 19 August, occupied a strategic point east of Juichang on the 21st. The 9th Division's Maruyama Detachment (with four infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion as a nucleus and commanded by Maj Gen Masao Maruyama) left Hsiaoehikou on the 21st and, in conjunction with the Hata Detachment, occupied Juichang on the 24th. Subsequently, the Maruyama Detachment continued its southward advance and, in conjunction with the 106th Division, occupied Mahuiling on 3 September.

Then, in accordance with 11th Army orders, the Maruyama Detachment returned to Juichang on the 8th, while the 106th Division massed its forces in the vicinity of Mahuiling.

In the sector north of the Yangtze River, the 6th Division launched an attack on 31 August from the vicinity of Huangmei, systematically destroyed a superior enemy which offered stubborn resistance from prepared positions in depth, and occupied Kuangchi on 6 September. The Division subsequently defended the sector approximately 30 kilometers in length between Kuangchi and Huangmei and, although surrounded by superior enemy forces and subjected to

persistent counterattacks, continued to successfully repulse the enemy. At the end of September it still held its ground. Meanwhile, the divisional commander ordered the Imamura Detachment (with at first three infantry battalions and four mountain artillery companies as its nucleus, later two more infantry battalions were added, and commanded by Maj Gen Katsuji Imamura) to attack the Tienchiachen fortress. The Detachment left the vicinity of Kuangchi on 15 September, and after destroying a superior enemy force on the 29th, occupied the fortress. On 3 October, after being replaced by the Shima Detachment of the 116th Division, the Imamura Detachment returned to Kuangchi, arriving there on 5 October. (Map 10)

Occupation of the Wu-Han Sector

11th Army's Disposition

Although the concentration of the 27th Division was completed east of Mt Lushan on 10 September, the Expeditionary Army commander decided to discard the plan to assemble it at Tean in order that it might advance to the vicinity of Jochi, along the road connecting Hsiaoehinkou, Juichang and Wuning and head westward, as the 101st Division was having difficulty in breaking through enemy positions south of Mt Lushan. Therefore, on 12 September, he ordered the 11th Army to advance an element from the Yangtze River area and the sector to its north and its main force from the sector south of the river in order to capture strategic positions in the Wu-Han area and to advance to the Canton - Hankou railway line in the vicinity of

TAPIEHSAN MOUNTAINS PENETRATION OPERATIONS


11th ARMY

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Hsienning and Fuchi. He also ordered the 11th Army to cover the left flank of the Expeditionary Army by throwing one element against the enemy in the Nanchang - Hsiaochihkou railway area.

As enemy counterattacks had gradually diminished after the occupation of Tienchiachen late in September, the 6th Division was engaged in rebuilding its fighting potential.⁴¹

The Shima Detachment, which had been engaged in guarding the Tienchiachen Fortress after 3 October, captured Chichun on 8 October. On the 13th, Maj Gen Ishihara arrived with two additional infantry battalions and took command of the Shima Detachment.

The Takashina Detachment⁴² arrived in the vicinity of Panpishan from the 8th to the 10th.

Attack From the Northern Sector

In accordance with an agreement reached on 7 October between the Army and Navy that, "The Army will detail one element to the sector along both banks of the Yangtze River, where it will cooperate directly with the Navy in clearing the river, and, at the same time, advance the necessary units to the sector bordering the waterway and occupy strategic positions in the Wu-Han area," the Army disposed the Ishihara and Takashina Detachments so as to enable them to advance along both banks of the Yangtze River in cooperation with the Navy.

41. This was accomplished by replenishing personnel and horses as well as munitions; evacuating patients; repairing ordnance and by further training of personnel.

42. See Chart 2, page 59

In accordance with the Army's order, from 17 October, the 6th Division pursued the retreating enemy in the direction of Huangpei, while the Ishihara Detachment pursued the enemy along the left bank of the Yangtze River by land and by sea. Both groups struck at the fleeing enemy at will. The 6th Division, after occupying Huangpei on the 24th, partially occupied Hankou on the 25th, while the Ishihara Detachment occupied Yanglo on the same day.

The Takashina Detachment left the vicinity of Panpishan on the 12th, advanced northward along the right bank of the Yangtze River by land and by barge and occupied strategic positions along the banks of the river. Later, travelling by land, it occupied Shihhuiyao on the 17th and Ocheng on the 22d. At Ocheng, in accordance with Army orders, the Detachment was attached to the Hata Detachment, and together they advanced northward.

Westward Advance of Main Force of the 11th Army

In the sector south of the Yangtze River, the 11th Army planned to advance its main force westward from the vicinity of Juichang. On 7 September, therefore, in an attempt to destroy the enemy in the sector northwest of Juichang, it ordered the Hata Detachment and the 9th Division, beginning on the 11th, to attack the enemy in this area.

On the 11th, in order to neutralize Jochi, a strategic point to the rear of the enemy, it ordered the 27th Division to leave its assembly area on the 12th and 13th, advance first to the vicinity of Juichang and then to the vicinity of Jochi, through the sector along

the road linking Juichang and Wuning.

The Hata Detachment and the 9th Division launched their attacks on the 11th, advanced to the vicinity of a line running through Laowuko from north to south on the 15th, and continued in pursuit of the enemy. The 27th Division reached the vicinity of Juichang on the 14th and launched an offensive from that area on the 16th

While the various units continued their westward advance, the 9th Division crossed the Fu Shui in the vicinity of Paishih on and after 7 October. The Hata Detachment crossed the Fu Shui behind the 9th Division and the 27th Division (to which the Saeda Detachment was attached after 25 September) occupied Jochi on 5 October.

The Hata Detachment occupied Yanghsin on 18 October and Tayeh on the 21st. On 23 October, it reached Ocheng (at which time the Takashina Detachment was placed under its command) and, on the 25th, it occupied Kotien.

The 9th Division advanced to Sanchikou on the 16th and the 27th Divisions to Hsintanpu on the 18th. They then planned to continue to advance in the direction of Chinniu and Tungshan respectively. However, since the enemy had established his defense in depth in the mountainous region west of Sanchikou and Hsintanpu, the Army commander decided to cut off the enemy's retreat route to the Canton - Hankou railway immediately and ordered both divisions to make a detour to the north and advance to the Canton - Hakou railway by way of Chinniu.


Both divisions commenced their move on the 22d. The 9th Division attacked enemy positions in the vicinity of Chinniu from the 24th, broke through on the 26th, and, on the 27th, advanced to Hoshengchiaochen and cut the Canton - Hankou railway. On the same day the 27th Division cut the Canton - Hankou railway at a point east of Hsianning.

On the 24th, the Army commander decided to enter the Wu-Han sector and to cut off the enemy retreat in the sectors north and south of the Yangtze River. He ordered the 6th Division to intercept the enemy retreating westward from the Tapieshan Mountains by rushing a strong element to Hokouchen as soon as it entered Hankou. He also ordered the Hata Detachment to advance to Hanyang, following its entry into Wuchang. Furthermore, he decided to attack the rear of the enemy in the vicinity of Chinniu by rushing a strong element to Hoshengchiaochen on the 26th. An element of the 6th Division reached Hokouchen on the 27th, while the main strength of the Hata Detachment reached Hanyang on the 27th and an element of the Detachment reached Hoshengchiaochen on the 28th. (Map 11)

Teian Operation

106th Division's Flanking Operation

After advancing to Mahuiling early in September, the 106th Division endeavored to rebuild its fighting potential. On 20 September, with a view to destroying the enemy in the vicinity of



Tea, the 11th Army commander ordered the division to start operations at an opportune time, break through enemy positions in the vicinity of Wutailing, advance promptly to the sector southwest of Tea and attack the enemy around Tea from the side and rear.

Although the division left the vicinity of Mahuling on 25 September, it found it extremely difficult to maintain close control of its units because of bad roads, the lack of maps, poor communication facilities and also the inferior quality of the personnel of the 106th Division.⁴³ After 6 October the division was surrounded by a superior enemy force in the vicinity of Leimingkuli and suffered heavy casualties. Provisions and ammunition grew scarcer each day and the position began to look desperate. Therefore, the Army commander ordered the 27th Division, which was preparing to advance westward from Jochi, to attack the rear of the enemy in the vicinity of Kanmukuan with a force of approximately three infantry battalions and the 17th Division's Suzuki Detachment, which was expected to arrive at Hsiao-chih-kou on the 10th, to rush to the area. Upon arrival, the Suzuki Detachment was to assume command of the 27th Division's unit and to attack the flanks and rear of the enemy in the front of the 106th Division.⁴⁴

43. Most of the personnel of the 106th Division were reservists, and many of the officers, particularly company grade officers, had received very little training.

44. The strength of the unit under the command of the Suzuki Detachment was: Suzuki Detachment, 3 infantry battalions, two field artillery batteries; Saeda Detachment, 3 infantry battalions, two field artillery batteries; 27th Division, 1 infantry battalion; and approximately 1,300 reserve troops of the 106th Division.

The 27th Division dispatched the Saeda Detachment,⁴⁵ to which was attached one infantry battalion of the 27th Division, to the area. From about 9 October, this detachment had been engaged in driving off and destroying the enemy along the road linking Jochi and Yunghsiu. Upon arrival of the Suzuki Detachment on the 13th, the two detachments attacked and destroyed the enemy in the vicinity of Chutouchang and established contact with the 106th Division on the 17th. The 106th Division then assembled in the vicinity of Kanmukuan and endeavored to rebuild its fighting potential, while the Suzuki Detachment stood by to protect the Division.

On 23 October, in accordance with an Army order the Suzuki Detachment transferred the Saeda Detachment to the 106th Division. On 26 October, it (Suzuki Detachment) left Kanmukuan and reached the vicinity of Hsintanpu on the 28th where it prepared to advance to the Tungshan area.

101st Division's occupation of Tean

The 101st Division, which had been attacking enemy positions along the southern foothills of Mt Lushan from the latter part of August, occupied Yaikouchieh on 9 October and captured Tean on the 27th. (Map 12)

Containing Operation by the North China Area Army

On 9 August, the commander of the North China Area Army planned

45. The Saeda Detachment was originally part of the 101st Division but was attached to the 27th Division on 25 September on the way to Jochi.


TEAN OPERATION

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to support the Wu-Han Operations with an element and, at the same time, contain the enemy to the north. He ordered the 1st Army to wipe out the enemy scattered along the left bank of the Huang Ho as quickly as possible, secure strategic points along the bank of the river with an element and, during early September, contain the enemy by means of a feint. He ordered the Cavalry Group (commanded by Lt Gen Shoichi Naito and with two cavalry brigades as a nucleus) which had been guarding the Hei sector, to assign a strong element to operate in the vicinity of the flooded area of the Huang Ho and to endeavor to contain the enemy by means of a feint.

On 27 September, he ordered the 12th Air Regiment to sever rail lines at points south of the Peiping - Hankou railway and north of Hsinyang (excluding Hsinyang) and west of the Lunghai railway and to bomb strategic points along these railways in order to contain the enemy to the north.⁴⁶

In the 1st Army sector, the 14th, 20th and 109th Divisions attacked and destroyed the enemy on their respective fronts on the left bank of the Huang Ho and launched a feint, principally by artillery bombardment, against the enemy on the opposite bank. The 14th Division operated in the Peiping - Hankou railway area from late August to early October, the 20th Division in Southern Shansi

46. As the North China Area Army had no heavy bomber units, on 22 September the 15th Air Regiment (2 reconnaissance companies) the 12th Air Regiment (2 heavy bomber companies) and two airfield battalions were transferred from the Kwantung Army and attached to the North China Area Army.

Province area after completing its clean-up mission until late October and the 109th Division in the sector west of Lishih from early until mid-September.

The Cavalry Group occupied Taikang and Huaiyang early in September, advanced to the line on the east bank of the New Huang Ho and made a river-crossing feint. During the latter part of September, one element did cross the river and, in early October, another element attacked the north and east sides of Chouchiakou. However, on 14 October, the 4th Cavalry Brigade was transferred to the Central China Expeditionary Army and, on the 25th, in accordance with North China Area Army orders, the feint was discontinued.⁴⁷


The 12th Air Regiment, operating from Anyang airfield, bombed strategic points and lines of communications between Chenghsien and Chuehshan, as well as at Loyang and Nanyang from the end of September until 20 October. (Map 13)

Pursuit

Disposition of the Central China Expeditionary Army

With the capture of Wuchang and Hankou, Imperial General Headquarters, on 25 October, ordered the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army to limit the pursuit to the general vicinity of Hsinyang, Yoyang and Tean. The Expeditionary Army commander, there-

47. Support by the North China Area Army is more fully described in Monograph 178, North China Area Army Operations Record, Vol I.



fore, issued the following order:

The 2d Army shall destroy the defeated enemy north of the Yangtze River in the area east of the vicinity of Anlu and Yingcheng and shall contain Han Chiang's forces in the vicinity of Yuehkoushih. The Ishihara Detachment⁴⁸ shall be attached to the 2d Army.

The 11th Army shall pursue the enemy and invade Yoyang. It shall then advance powerful elements to the vicinity of Yoyang.

Pursuit by the 2d Army

On 27 October, the commander of the 2d Army decided to advance an element along the main highway in order to destroy the remaining enemy along either side of the highway and, at the same time, to use his main force to mop up the defeated enemy on the plains north of the Yangtze River. Accordingly, he ordered the 13th Division to use its main force to destroy the enemy in the Paikao area using Sungfou as its base and to advance an element toward the Peiping - Hankou railway in the vicinity of Siaokan. The 16th Division was ordered to use an element to strike toward the Peiping - Hankou railway in the vicinity of Hwayuan and its main force to destroy the enemy in the vicinity of Lishan and Hsuanhuatien, using Huanggan as its base. The Ishihara Detachment was ordered to capture such strategic points as Tsaitien, Hanchuan and Huanglingchi.

On 26 October, the Okada Detachment of the 10th Division,⁴⁹ acting as an advance echelon, had advanced to Anlu and struck a heavy

48. The Ishihara Detachment of the 116th Division was originally attached to the 11th Army. While under the command of the 11th Army, it had advanced along the left bank of the Yangtze River, occupying Chichun on 8 October and Yanglo on the 25th.

49. The order for the Okada Detachment to advance toward Anlu was issued on 12 October. See page 67

blow at the enemy escaping westward. It continued its advance and, on the 30th, it reached Yingcheng where, in cooperation with an element of the 13th Division, which had advanced to the vicinity of Siaokan, and an element of the 3d Division, which had advanced southward from Hwayuan, it destroyed the retreating enemy.

The rear units of the 10th and 3d Divisions reached Pingchingkuan on 28 October and, as ordered by the Army, advanced southward.

The main forces of the 16th and 13th Divisions concentrated at Huangang and Sungfou on the 26th and 30th respectively and from there dispatched elements of their forces to mop up the remaining enemy. The Ishihara Detachment concentrated at Hanyang on 31 October and, on 2 November, occupied Hanchuan and Huanglingchi.


Pursuit by the 11th Army

The commander of the 11th Army, in order to pursue the enemy along the Canton - Hankou railway with its main force and to advance to the line connecting Yoyang and Chungyang, successively made the following dispositions:

On 27 October, the 27th Division was ordered to advance to the Hsienning area and the 9th Division to concentrate in the vicinity of Hoshengchiaochen and to prepare to advance south immediately.

On 29 October, the 6th Division was ordered to dispatch a unit composed of four infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion (designated the Imamura Detachment) up the Yangtze River. In cooperation with the Navy, this unit was to capture Yoyang.

On 30 October, the 9th Division was ordered to advance toward



Yoyang.

On 30 October, in order to repulse the enemy in the Nanchang - Hsiaoehihkou railway area in the sector south of the Hsiu Shui, the 101st and 106th Divisions were ordered to pursue the enemy toward the vicinity of Chiuchingshih and Yunghsiu and the vicinity of Chiuchingshih respectively.

On 6 November, the 27th Division was ordered to advance toward Tungcheng immediately after it had captured Chungyang. Prior to this, on 4 November, the Suzuki Detachment of the 17th Division, which had advanced westward from the vicinity of Hsintanpu, was attached to the 27th Division.

The advance unit of the 9th Division (chiefly composed of four infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion) advanced toward Yoyang from Hoshengchiaochen on 31 October with the main force of the Division following on 1 November. The Imamura Detachment advanced toward Yoyang from Hankou on 4 November. The 9th Division occupied Puchi on 2 November, and, on the 11th, in cooperation with the Imamura Detachment, occupied Yoyang. After the capture of Hsienning on 28 October, the 27th Division continued to pursue the enemy and captured Chungyang on 6 November and Tungcheng on the 9th.

After the enemy's retreat, the 101st Division launched its pursuit action on 31 October, and the 106th Division on 1 November. On the latter date, the two divisions advanced to the bank of the Hsiu Shui. (Map 14)

Situation after Wu-Han Operation

The enemy, defeated in the Wu-Han sector and at Canton, retreated to a line connecting Nanyang, Hsiangyang, Ichang, Changsha and Nanchang and later to the hinterlands of Siking, Lanchou, Szechwan, Kweichow and Kwangsi Provinces.

Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Central China Expeditionary Army commander to continue mopping-up operations in the Wu-Han sector and, at the same time, to concentrate the Hata Detachment and two divisions in the vicinity of Nanching by the middle of December for subsequent employment by Imperial General Headquarters.

On 3 November, in order to secure the occupied area of Wu-Han and to destroy the enemy remaining in the area, the Central China Expeditionary Army commander ordered the following disposition of his troops:

The 2d Army was ordered to dispose its forces in the sector between Hsinyang, the mouth of the Pa Ho and Yuehkoushih and to destroy the enemy advancing from Chuehshan, Nanyang and Hsiangyang at an appropriate time. An element of the 2d Army was to guard Hofei and the Huainan railway south of Hofei.

With the capture of Yoyang on 11 November, the 11th Army was ordered to dispose its troops in the sector around Yoyang, Wuchang, Hsiaoehihkou and Yungshiu and destroy the enemy advancing from Changsha and Nanchang at an appropriate time.

The 2d and 11th Armies ended their pursuit operations about 3 and 11 November respectively and began reorganizing. From the begin-

ning of November, the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army ordered the return of provisional detachments dispatched from divisions under its direct command to their parent organizations. Also, in accordance with orders from Imperial General Headquarters, the Iida Detachment⁵⁰ as well as the 10th and 27th Divisions successively sailed down to Nanching from the latter part of November to the end of December.


On 15 December, all organic units of the 2d Army were assigned to the 11th Army, while the 2d Army Headquarters was ordered home and was demobilized immediately after its arrival in Japan. The Saeda Detachment assigned to the 106th Division late in October was returned to the command of the 101st Division early in December. When the 4th Cavalry Brigade, assigned to the 2d Army in October, reached Loshan in the middle of November, the 2d Army ordered it to advance to the vicinity of Hwayuan, where it was attached to the 10th Division. After the transfer of the 10th Division on 29 November,⁵¹ the brigade was assigned garrison duty at Hwayuan. The line of communications unit of the 2d Army in the northern foothills of the Tapieshan Mountains was withdrawn late in November.

After 15 December, the 11th Army assumed control of the Wu-Han sector. North of the Yangtze River, it assigned garrison duty to the

50. The Hata Detachment was designated the Iida Detachment after 19 November when Maj Gen Shojiro Iida replaced Maj Gen Juichi Hata as commander of the detachment.

51. The 10th Division, together with the 27th Division, was assigned to the North China Area Army on 29 November.

13th Division in the vicinity of Huangpei; the 16th Division, the vicinity of Huangan; the 3d Division, the vicinity of Hsinyang and Yingshan, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade, the vicinity of Hwanyuan. South of the Yangtze River, it assigned the 9th Division the area along the Canton - Hankou railway; the 6th Division, Wuchang and the area east of Wuchang; the 106th Division, the vicinity of Tean and the 101st Division the vicinity of Yunghsui. (Map 15)



CHAPTER III

Operations During 1939

General Situation

In the downstream area of the Yangtze River, the Chinese 3d War Sector Army, occupying the right bank of the Chientang Chiang, the vicinity of Hsuancheng and the southern bank of the Yangtze River above Wuhu, was actively engaged in guerrilla warfare, while in the Wu-Han sector, the Chinese 9th and 5th War Sector Armies to the north and south of the Yangtze River were constructing positions near the Japanese lines and disturbing the occupied area by taking advantage of the Japanese shortage of strength to guard the vast area under occupation. In order to combat this situation, Japanese units constantly carried out punitive expeditions against the enemy guerrillas.

In the middle of January, the Central China Expeditionary Army in order to maintain public peace in the area under its direct control ordered the commanders of the 15th, 17th and 22d Divisions to be prepared each to dispatch a half infantry company within 12 hours and about two infantry companies and the main strength of a reconnaissance regiment within 24 hours after they received orders to rush troops into the garrison areas of the other divisions. In mid-January, the 11th, 12th and 13th Independent Mixed Brigades were placed under the direct control of the Expeditionary Army and the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade was entered in the Order of Battle of the 11th Army. The Expeditionary Army attached the 11th and 12th Independent Mixed

Brigades to the 15th and 22d Divisions respectively and assigned the 13th Independent Mixed Brigade to garrison duty along the railway line connecting Shanghai, Nanching and Wanchihchen. The 11th Army disposed its attached brigade in the vicinity of Hsiaoehihkou.

In early February, the Expeditionary Army planned the invasion of Nanchang and ordered the 11th Army to carry out the campaign. Before invading Nanchang, the 11th Army occupied Chunghsiang. In late March, it completed the occupation of Nanchang and secured the strategic lines south of the city.

As remnants of the defeated enemy still held their ground at Mt Lushan in April, after the occupation of Nanchang, and continued to create disturbances, the 11th Army ordered the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade to clear them out. The Brigade initiated action on 17 April and cleaned up the area by the 22d.

The 33d and 34th Divisions, which were assigned to the 11th Army on 15 March, arrived in the Wu-Han sector in April.⁵² As the 9th and 16th Divisions had already been alerted for their return to Japan, the 11th Army assigned the 34th and 33d Divisions garrison duty in the northern sector of the Yangtze River, east of the Peiping - Hankou railway and the southern sector of the river in the vicinity of Hsienning, Tayeh and Yanghsin respectively. The 11th Army also order-

52. On 7 February, 1939 the 33d and 34th Divisions were organized in Sendai and Osaka, Japan, respectively, and were assigned to the 11th Army on 15 March.

ed the 6th and 13th Divisions to establish themselves in the vicinity of Puchi and in the sector east of Anlu and Yingcheng respectively, in order to take over the garrison duty of the 9th and 16th Divisions. ⁵³

During the latter part of March, there were strong indications that the Chinese Army would launch a general counteroffensive during April, particularly in the 5th War Sector Army sector. The 11th Army, therefore, acting on orders from the Expeditionary Army, contacted and destroyed the enemy in the area south of Tang Ho.

Although the Chinese assumed local offensives in mid-April against the Canton - Hankou railway area, garrisoned by the 9th Division, each time they were beaten back. They again launched a counteroffensive against the area east of Chungyang at the end of April, but were repulsed by elements of the 6th and 9th Divisions. The results of the over-all counteroffensive by the Chinese Army during April were generally disastrous. They were as follows:

War Sector Army	Area	Progress
8th	Chahar-Suiyan	Between 10 April and 31 May, the 8th War Sector Army was defeated by the Japanese Mongolia Garrison Army
1st	North China	Only part of the 1st War Sector Army crossed the New Huang Ho. It attacked Kaifeng, but without success.

53. The 9th Division was returned to Japan on 5 June and the 16th Division was returned on 11 July, 1939.


9th	Central China	In March the 9th War Sector Army was defeated in the Nanchang Operation by the 11th Army
5th	Central China	This Army took the offensive twice, the first time in early April and the second time in mid-April but both times failed to attain its objective.
4th	South China	This Army took the offensive in order to capture Canton but were defeated by the Japanese 21st Army between 4 and 29 April.

With the transfer of garrison duty from the 9th to the 6th Division, the 11th Army ordered the 9th Division to destroy the enemy which had advanced to the sector north of the Hsinchiang Ho. The Division carried out punitive operations against the enemy from 21 to 24 May and advanced the front line of its garrison forces to the Hsinchiang Ho.

After the battle of Hsiangtung, the Army ordered the 13th Division to assume the garrison duty of the 16th Division and transferred the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the 13th Division. The 9th and 16th Divisions returned to Japan on 5 June and 11 July, 1939 respectively and the 4th Cavalry Brigade was returned to the North China Area Army in early September, 1939.⁵⁴

As the Chinese 9th War Sector Army in the area south of the Yangtze River continued to create disturbances during September, the

⁵⁴. This brigade had been transferred from the North China Area Army to the Central China Expeditionary Army on 4 October 1938.



11th Army planned to destroy it in the mountains along the northern border of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces in a operation to be carried out from mid-September to mid-October.

In the area under the direct control of the Expeditionary Army the garrison duty of the 15th Division in Chenchiang and Tanyang was transferred to the 12th Independent Mixed Brigade and, at the same time, garrison duty in the area along the Nanching - Hsuancheng railway south of Wuhu was transferred from the Brigade to the 15th Division.

On 23 September, the Central China Expeditionary Army was deactivated, Orders of Battle for the China Expeditionary Army and the 13th Army were published and the Order of Battle of the 11th Army was revised. Following this, on 29 September, the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, together with his headquarters, returned to Japan.

On 2 October, the 39th and 40th Divisions were entered in the Order of Battle of the 11th Army. (Chart 3) The commander of the 11th Army then ordered the 39th and 40th Divisions to relieve the 34th and 33d Divisions of garrison duty and the 33d and 34th Divisions, in turn, to relieve the 106th and 101st Divisions respectively.

In early November, the 101st and 106th Divisions were removed from the Order of Battle of the 11th Army and were placed temporarily under the command of the 13th Army commander.

In mid-November, the 17th and 18th Independent Mixed Brigades were entered in the Orders of Battle of the 13th and 11th Armies respectively. The 13th Army disposed the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade in the vicinity of Shanghai and the 11th Army disposed the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade in the vicinity of Jochi and Wuning, south of the Yangtze River.

In mid-December, the enemy launched its winter offensive along the entire battlefront of the 11th Army and in the Tatungchen area, which was garrisoned by the 13th Army. As the Japanese Army had no mobile troops, it merely took emergency steps against the enemy. However each small group resisted the enemy attack effectively and in some cases, even delivered counterattacks, and, by 20 January 1940, the enemy had ceased all activity in this area.

Maintenance of Public Peace

In mid-January 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a directive in regard to the maintenance of public peace to the commanders of all strategical units under its direct control disposed in the downstream area of the Yangtze River, the commander of the Special Service Agency and the Military Police commandant, the guiding essentials of which were as follows:

The Japanese troops shall play an active part in the maintenance of public peace by destroying enemy bandits. Both the Japanese and Chinese public agencies shall cooperate with the Japanese Army in its campaign, while concentrating their main efforts on strengthening the peace preservation organizations of the new regime, winning popularity and stabilizing the people by reforming

the general administration. This shall be accomplished by the following methods:

The Japanese Army shall eliminate enemy activities by constant positive action, while continuing its strict garrisoning of the area.

The Special Service Agency shall endeavor to induce the armed guerrillas to surrender through a propaganda operation conducted in conjunction with the punitive expeditions carried out by the Japanese Army.

It shall also strengthen the self-defense capacity of towns and villages by encouraging the Chinese authorities to popularize the Mutual Guarantee System⁵⁵ and by organizing and training anti-communistic youth corps. At the same time, the Chinese authorities shall reorganize the police force. The Japanese Military Police shall direct the Chinese police on police affairs.

The supreme advisers to the Reformation Government⁵⁶ shall advise the Reformation Government to organize a Pacification Unit, which shall maintain public peace. The Japanese Army shall give positive aid to the Reformation Government in organizing and training the Pacification Unit.

A Public Peace Commission shall be established for the purpose of improving mutual cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese agencies.

Although this directive, in regard to the maintenance of public

55. The Mutual Guarantee System was a system first devised in Formosa during the time Formosa was under Chinese rule. This system was formally regulated and was promulgated as the Chia Pao Regulations in 1898. (Chia means 10 families and Pao means 100 families) Under this system local inhabitants voluntarily maintained public peace and order. Each Chia and Pao appointed its own chief and maintained a small unit to safeguard its community against bandits, fight fires and generally govern its own village. It meted out punishment under the supervision of government officials.

56. The China Reformation Government was established at Nanching on 28 March 1938 under the guidance of the Japanese Army. This political puppet government nominally governed the Central China area under Japanese occupation. In addition, the China Provisional Government and the Mongolia Federal Autonomous Government had been established at Peiping on 14 December 1937 and at Wanchuan on 4 September 1937 respectively. These governments remained in existence until the China National Government was established at Nanching on 30 March 1940 by Wang Chingwei.

peace, was carried out for the most part, the punitive expeditions for mopping up enemy guerrillas failed to neutralize their activities completely, particularly in North China, because of their skill in conducting underground activities.

As the Central China Expeditionary Army attached considerable importance to the maintenance of communication routes in connection with the execution of the punitive expeditions for mopping-up the enemy, it ordered the units under its direct control to repair the following routes:

Road connecting Shanghai, Taitsang, Kunshan, Suchou, Wuhsi, Chiangyin, Wuchin, Chenchiang, Chujung, Nanching and Wuhu.

Road connecting Shanghai, Sungchiang, Chiahsing and Hangchou.

Waterway connecting Shanghai, Suchou, Tanyang and Chenchiang.

Waterway connecting Shanghai, Chiahsing and Hangchou.

In addition, each unit undertook the construction or repair of routes of communication for garrison use within its garrison area. However, both because of shortage of materials and sabotage by enemy guerrillas, it was found difficult to complete and maintain these routes.


Operations in the Wu-Han Area Nanchang Operation

Situation Before Operation

The Central China Expeditionary Army had, at first, intended to capture Nanchang during the Wu-Han Operation, but since the general

ENEMY DISPOSITION BEFORE NANCHANG OPERATIONS

JAN — FEB 1939



situation did not permit this, preparations were made for the capture of Nanchang after the conclusion of the Wu-Han Operation.

The Chinese in the Central China area at that time had disposed approximately 18 divisions of the 3d War Sector Army along the right bank of the Yangtze River below Poyang Hu and about 74 divisions of the 9th War Sector Army between Poyang Hu and Tungting Hu in the upper reaches of the river. Of the 74 divisions of the 9th War Sector Army, approximately 12 divisions under the tactical command of Lo Fu-Ying, commander of the 1st Army Group, were disposed in Nanchang and its vicinity and had taken up positions constructed in depth along the banks of the Hsiu Shui.

In the area north of the Yangtze River approximately 30 divisions of the 5th War Sector Army were disposed along the western front confronting the Japanese 11th Army and approximately 8 divisions under the tactical command of Chang Tzu-Chung, commander of the right flank group, in the vicinity of Chunghsiang and in the downstream area of Han Chiang confronting the 16th Division. (Map 16)⁵⁷

In early February, the Central China Expeditionary Army planned to capture Nanchang in March. It ordered the 11th Army to capture Nanchang, and the Air Corps to support the operation while, at the

57. Chiang Kaishek established war sectors in accordance with the expanding battle areas and appointed a commander to each sector who was responsible for the defense of that sector. Although the exact boundaries of these sectors are unknown, approximate areas as well as approximate strengths during January and February 1939 are shown on Map 16.

same time, continuing its present mission of bombing inland targets.

The objective of the operation was to cut the Chekiang - Kiangsi railway by capturing Nanchang and to interrupt the enemy's main lines of communication to Anhwei and Chekiang Provinces, south of the Yangtze River.

Operations Plan

The operations plan published on 6 February 1939, stated:

The 11th Army in a single move will raid and break through enemy positions and capture Nanchang from the sector along the Hsiaoohikou - Nanchang railway and thereby isolate and crush the enemy stationed along the Chekiang - Kiangsi railway. The Army may advance one element from the Poyang Hu area to facilitate the operations of the main force. Simultaneously, the 11th Army will occupy the area extending from the vicinity of Chunghsiang southward to the Han Chiang for the purpose of concealing the intent of this operation and to protect the valley of the river.

The main force of the Air Corps will support this operation and, if necessary, some units under the command of the Central China Water Transport commandant, may be employed.

Forces under the direct command of the Expeditionary Army will conduct the necessary containing and feint maneuvers.

After capturing the vicinity of Nanchang, the Army will generally secure the key points south of Nanchang.

The operation is scheduled for early March in order to complete it before the rainy season.

The Navy will participate in the operation.

The memorandum concerning the operation, which was exchanged between the commanders of the China Expeditionary Army and the China Area Fleet, contained the following instructions in regard to the Navy:

Participating units under the China Area Fleet:

Ships and seaplane units commanded by the 1st Base Force Commander.

Necessary elements of the shipping unit of the 3d Fleet.

2d Combined Air Group

The Navy will call upon the major part of its air strength in Central China to destroy the enemy's fighting potential and support the operations of the Army.

The ships on the river will strive to open the waterway leading to Nanchang and to protect the Army's supply route.

The operational period will be early March and the first day of the attack will be fixed by the commander of the 11th Army.

Details on the employment of air units will be agreed upon separately.

Both the Army and Navy air units will strive to keep the operation secret before the initiation of the attack.

Prior to the commencement of the operation, the Navy will carry out diversionary attacks and feints along the coast of Chekiang Province by ships and aircraft. Air units will attack inland targets in central and south China.

The maintenance and use of Nanchang airfield will be agreed upon between the Army and Navy officers concerned.

To aid the Nanchang Operation, the Central China Expeditionary Army in late February ordered the 116th Division to mop up the enemy along the east shore of the Poyang Hu in early March in order to render the waterway safe. In early March, it ordered the 22d Division to contain the enemy in the Chientang Chiang area on X Day (to be fixed by the 11th Army). At the same time, the Expeditionary Army Headquarters temporarily established a command post in Hangchou a little before X Day in order to mislead the enemy.

11th Army's Direction of Operations

Based on the Central China Expeditionary Army's outline of operations to "attack the Nanchang area with the main force and the Wuning area with an element," the 11th Army changed each unit's operational

zone boundary by mid-February, in order to concentrate its main force in the sector south of Tean and elements in the vicinity of Jochi by the end of the month. The Army instructed all units to operate at night in order to conceal their movements, as far as possible, from the enemy.

Thereafter, on 11 February, the Army ordered the 16th Division to start action in late February and capture the area extending from the vicinity of Chungsiang southward to the left bank of the Han Chiang and the 9th Division to conduct a feint against the area along the Canton - Hankou railway in late February in order to contain the enemy in that area.

The 11th Army decided on the tactical command for the Nanchang Operation and a schedule of movement of the various units as shown on Chart No 4.

In mid-February, the Army concentrated the 101st and 106th Divisions and the Army Artillery Unit in the sector south of Tean and ordered them to prepare for an attack on enemy positions south of Hsiu Shui. Meanwhile, it concentrated the Tank Unit in the sector north of Tean.

On 20 February, the Army ordered the 6th Division to break through enemy positions in the vicinity of Jochi, capture Tuning and prepare to advance further westward. The Division made operational preparations so that after breaking through enemy positions in the vicinity of Jochi, it would be able to advance a detachment (consisting of three infantry

Tactical Organization

Area of Employment	Unit	Less	Inf	Attached Unit				
				MG Unit	Mecz Unit	Arty & Trench Mort	Engr Units	Line of Comm Trans
Wuning	6th Div	1 inf regt (less 1 bn)		1 bn	1 light armd car co	1 mt arty bn 1 heavy fld arty regt	1 ind engr regt (KO) 1 res engrs co 1 bridge co	1 Hqs 6 cos
Area extending from Hsiu Shui bank toward Nanchang	106th Div	1 inf regt 1 fld arty btry		1 bn (less 1 co)		1 mt arty bn 1 trench mort bn	1 ind engr regt (BO) 2 bridge cos	1 Hqs 5 cos 3 mtr trans cos
	101st Div	1/2 inf bn 1 fld arty plat		1 bn	1 light armd car co	1 mt arty regt 1 trench mort bn	1 ind engr regt (BO) 1 bridge co 1 pontoon bridge co	1 Hqs 1 co 1 mtr trans co
	Army Arty Unit					3 heavy fld arty regts, 1 ind arty fld heavy regt, 1 ind heavy siege arty bn, 1 tractor unit, 1 baloon co		
	Tank Unit		1 bn		1 tank bn (KO) 1 tank regt 1 light armd car co		1/2 ind engr co	
	3 Ind Engr Regt	1/2 co					1 bridge co	
Poyang Hu	Murai Bn		1/2 bn			1 fld arty plat	1 ind engr regt (TEI) (less 1 element), 50 large landing barges, 30 small landing barges, 1 anchorage Hqs	
Area reserve			2 regts (less 1 bn respectively)					

battalions and two mountain artillery batteries) toward Fenghsin by way of the Jochi - Miaochienchieh - Chingan road and cut off the rear of the enemy's main force located on the bank of the Hsiu Shui.

On 25 February, the Inoue Detachment (later renamed the Murai Detachment) assigned one of its elements to cooperate with the 116th Division in mopping-up operations against the key points along the east coast of the Poyang Hu. With the opening of the Poyang Hu waterway, the main force of the detachment cooperated with the 1st Naval Base Force in its operation between Wucheng and Nanchang.

On 23 February, the 11th Army published the following plan to capture enemy positions along the southern bank of the Hsiu Shui:

The Army will make thorough preparations to attack and break through the enemy positions extending generally from the opposite bank of the river southeast of Chiuchingshih to the area southeast of Yungshiu. Its main force will then advance in a single sweep to the Anshih - Mayuan line and thereafter proceed without delay toward Nanchang by way of Ani and Fenghsin.

Accordingly, the two front-line divisions (101st and 106th) will complete secretly their deployment and river-crossing preparations, in general, by X-4 Day and complete them in full by approximately X-1 Day. On the afternoon of X Day, after an artillery bombardment, the infantry of the two divisions will cross the Hsiu Shui and seize positions on the opposite bank by taking advantage of the semi-darkness and, at daybreak on X+1 Day, break through the main enemy positions under cover of artillery fire, thereby expanding the attack to the southwest.

The tank unit will first cooperate with the 106th Division's attack on the main enemy positions and then advance rapidly toward Ani in order to smash and cut off the rear of the enemy force.

As the fighting moves forward, the 11th Field Transport Unit will quickly develop the Chiuchingshih - Changkungtu - Wanchiafou road into an automobile road to be used as a supply route.

The long rainy season, with its destruction of roads, made the operational preparations of the units difficult but by mid-March preparations were generally completed.

On 9 March, the Army announced the first day of operations (X Day) as 20 March.

Summary of Progress of Operations

In the area north of the Yangtze River, in late February prior to the attack on Nanchang, an element of the 16th Division, plus the 4th Cavalry Brigade, attacked the vicinity of Tienmen and the main force gained a foothold in Anlu, Yingcheng and Tsaoshih. On 25 February, the division advanced toward the Han Chiang line in three columns, destroyed the enemy stationed there and arrived at the line linking Changshoutien, Chunghsiung and Chiukouchen in early March. The enemy was taken by surprise but immediately sent troops northward to rescue its powerful force south of the Yangtze River. Thus, the Japanese forces achieved their objective of containing the enemy.

In the area south of the Yangtze River, powerful elements of the 101st Division crossed a tributary of the Hsiu Shui on 17 March and, after light skirmishes, advanced to the north bank of the main stream. Meanwhile, the river-crossing preparations of the 106th Division, the Army artillery unit and the tank unit were completed on 19 March.

Due to the heavy rains at this time, the Hsiu Shui had swollen to a width of about 300 meters and its waterline was three meters above the normal rise of the river. In consequence, enemy positions


on the river bank were inundated and large quantities of equipment destroyed.

On the evening of 20 March, under cover of artillery fire, which lasted for three hours, by more than 200 light and heavy guns all units of the 106th and 101st Divisions crossed the Hsiu Shui and launched an attack. During the night the enemy offered only sporadic resistance and, by dawn of the 21st, the divisions had broken through the three-line enemy defense and the enemy had begun to retreat. The divisions continued in pursuit of the enemy.

On the 21st, the tank unit crossed the Hsiu Shui and supported the attack of the 106th Division. Subsequently, it captured Fenghsin by way of Ani on the 22d, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy while breaking through his disordered positions. However, it was forced to stop on the left bank of the Kan Ho, west of Nanchang, as the Chinese had destroyed the bridge.

Following their breakthrough of the enemy positions, the 106th and 101st Divisions continued to advance rapidly in several columns. As soon as they reached the bank of the Kan Ho, south of Nanchang, by way of Ani and Fenghsin and along the Hsiaoehinkou - Nanchang railway, they crossed the river (which at this point was approximately 1,000 meters wide) by using whatever civilian craft was available. On the 27th, the 106th Division cut the Chekiang - Kiangsi railway to the south of Nanchang, while the 101st Division occupied Nanchang.

Earlier, on the 25th, when the 106th Division started from-



Fenghsin, it ordered an element (two infantry battalions) to capture Kaoan. On the 29th, the Division commander dispatched one infantry regiment and two heavy field artillery batteries, commanded by the 111th Brigade commander, to the assistance of this unit. Kaoan was occupied on 2 April.

After supporting the mopping-up operation of the 116th Division on the east bank of the Poyang Hu waterway in mid-March, the Murai Detachment left Hsingtzu on 18 March and, in cooperation with the Navy, landed in the vicinity of Wucheng. After overcoming enemy resistance, on 23 March it occupied Wucheng and thereafter cleared the Kan Ho and Hsiu Shui.

On 20 March, the 6th Division, which had advanced toward Wuning, mounted a successful attack from the vicinity of Jochi against the enemy on the high ground west of the city. Then, in accordance with an 11th Army order, the 6th Division ordered the Inoue Detachment to advance to the area west of Wuning from the sector along the Chingan - Shankou - Mingchouchiang road and attack the enemy from the rear. By the same Army order, two infantry battalions, which had been held as an Army reserve unit near Tean, were returned to the 6th Division.

The Inoue Detachment, which entered Chingan on 27 March began to advance along the designated road from the 28th, destroying the enemy en route. It arrived in the area south of Wuning on 3 April. In the meantime, on 29 March, the 6th Division occupied the vicinity of Wuning. (Map 17)

Operations of Forces under Direct Command
of the Central China Expeditionary Army

In accordance with orders received from the Central China Expeditionary Army, the 116th Division ordered the Ishihara Detachment to destroy the enemy on the east bank sector of the Poyang Hu waterway. A unit of the Detachment, composed of five infantry battalions and commanded by Colonel Shima, left Hukou aboard a naval vessel on 12 March, and, in cooperation with the 1st Naval Base Force and the Murai Detachment, began the operation of clearing the Poyang Hu waterway. On 13 March, the unit landed without enemy opposition on the shore of the lake north of Hsuchiashan. It completed mopping-up operations by the 15th, and, in order to render the waterway safe, assigned the necessary strength to key points.

Feint by 22d Division

In order to contain the enemy on the south bank of the Chientang Chiang, on 20 March in the face of enemy resistance the 22d Division stationed at Hangchou landed two infantry companies commanded by a regimental commander on Changsha Island and had approximately two infantry companies cruise in Hangchou Bay to sink enemy ships. In addition, the Division destroyed by artillery fire the enemy positions on the south bank of the river and neutralized enemy artillery in the vicinity of Hangchou. Thus the Division achieved the desired result and the Chinese reinforced the area with a considerably larger force. The Division then concluded the operation and ordered all units

back to their respective stations.

The Central China Expeditionary Army, during the diversionary operation, established its command post at Hangchou from 19 to 23 March.

Hsiangtung Operation⁵⁸

Situation Prior to Operation

In the latter part of March, Chiang Kaishek proclaimed his "April Offensive" and there were signs of an over-all offensive being launched. The two armies (six divisions) composing the 31st Army Group, commanded by General Tang En-Po,⁵⁹ which as a rule was used by the Nationalist Party's Supreme Command for operations of its own planning, was moved from the south to the north of the river and, as of the 18th, gradually began to concentrate its forces in the region south of Tsaoyang. Concentration was completed approximately on the 25th. It was estimated that he would mount an offensive from the vicinity of Tsaoyang toward the vicinity of Suihsien, while directing the resistance of the 1st and 5th War Sectors.

58. "Hsiangtung" is not the name of a specific geographical location. "Hsiang" is translated as Han Chiang or Hsiang Ho and "tung" as east. "Hsiangtung" was used to designate the operation conducted in the eastern sector of the Han Chiang.

59. General Tang En-Po was one of Chiang Kaishek's most trusted generals. Born at Tangtsunchen, Chekiang Province in 1901, he specialized in politics and economics at Meiji University in Japan 1921-23 and studied at the Military Academy of Japan 1924-25. From 1926 to 1936 he distinguished himself in the war against the Communist Army. Later, Chiang Kaishek used him to direct all the more important operations during the China Incident. He died in Japan on 29 July 1954.

In early April, facing the Japanese 3d Division in the area north of Hsinyang were Sung Che-Yang's two divisions and guerrilla units, and in the vicinity of Suihsien, the 5th Sector Left Wing Corps' three divisions. The Japanese 16th Division was confronted by approximately twelve divisions of the 5th Sector Right Wing Corps, located in the district north of Chunghsiang and on the south bank of the Han Chiang. Advancing between the two corps were two Chinese auxiliary divisions. In mid-April, Chiang Kaishek again called for an over-all offensive, but it proved small and ineffective and ended in failure.

In the latter part of March, immediately after the occupation of Nanchang, the 11th Army made preparations to carry out the Hsiangtung Operation.

The 3d Division's front was a line connecting Yanghochen, Chang-taikuan, Hsinchi, Lototien, Hsuchiatien and Chehoshih. The 16th Division had established its front line through Huangchiachi and Yangtzuchen and occupied strategic points on the left bank of the Han Chiang. At that time, both divisions were engaged in repulsing local resistance offered by the enemy.

Direction of the Operation

On 22 March, the 11th Army learned of the enemy's projected "April Offensive" and of the progress of the concentration of the 31st Army Group in the region south of Tsaoyang. Therefore, in order to "seize the opportunity created by the movement of the enemy 5th Sector Army and complete preparations quickly and secretly and to

destroy the enemy's fighting potential," the 11th Army, on the 28th, moved the units under its direct command to the north of the river so that they could be used for operations there immediately after the fall of Manchang. Furthermore, in view of the Hsiangtung Operation in mid-April, the Army reassigned the garrison sectors and issued the following order: "Seizing the opportunity offered by the enemy's maneuver for an offensive, our forces will annihilate in a single stroke the enemy in the sectors around Tsaoyang, thereby crushing their will to fight and promoting security and stability in the Army's operational zone."

On 18 April, the Central China Expeditionary Army commander received the following instructions from Imperial General Headquarters: "In order to carry out your present mission, your Army is authorized to operate temporarily beyond the operational zone in the districts northwest of Hankou during April and May." Based on this authority, on 21 April, the Expeditionary Army ordered the 11th Army to "seize a favorable opportunity and attack the enemy on the northwestern front of Hankou during April and May; attack him roughly within the districts south of the Tang Ho so as to crush his will to fight. After attaining your objective, return as quickly as possible to the region roughly south of the line connecting Hsinyang, Suihsien and Chunghsiung." Simultaneously, it ordered the Air Corps to endeavor to reinforce its strategical bombing units but, at the same time, to assign an element to support the 11th Army's oper-

ations.⁶⁰

On 23 April, the 11th Army commander published the following plan:

Three divisions and one cavalry brigade will be used. The 3d Division, advancing ahead of the main force,⁶¹ will attack the enemy in the district north of the Yun Shui so as to contain the enemy in the mountainous northeastern district. The main force will rush north along the left bank of the Han Chiang to the Kun Ho line, striking from the vicinity of Chunghsiang on 6 May. The 4th Cavalry Brigade will advance by the side of the Front Left Wing Group. Later, it will pass the Group and push forward northeast from the right bank of the Pai Ho. Thus the Army will surround and destroy the enemy's main force in the northeastern district of Tsaoyang:

The following strength will be used for this operation:

Tactical Organization

3d Division

Attached Units:

One infantry regiment (less one and one-half battalions)

One machine gun battalion

One tank battalion

Two light armored car companies

One mountain artillery battalion

Two heavy artillery regiments

One mortar battalion

One balloon company

One independent engineer regiment

60. The Air Corps (consisting of the 1st and 3d Air Brigades and the 12th and 59th Air Regiments) had been given the mission of bombing strategical centers around Chungking in Szechwan Province and destroying the Chinese Air Force in the hinterland with its main strength, while cooperating with the ground forces in Central China with an element.

61. The main force was composed of the 13th and 16th Divisions.

Less: One infantry regiment (less one battalion)
and one cavalry battalion

Attached units:

One mortar company
One independent engineer company

16th Division

Less: One cavalry regiment

Attached units:

One independent infantry battalion
One light armored car company
One mountain artillery battalion
One heavy field artillery regiment
One independent engineer regiment (less one
company and one platoon)

4th Cavalry Brigade

Less: The independent infantry battalion and
and tank unit

The 3d Division, while securing the line linking Hochiatien, Hsuehchiatien and Chehoshih in general, will make preparations by approximately the end of April to launch a surprise attack on the enemy's left flank at the beginning of May, prior to the initiation of the offensive by the Army's main force. It will advance westward deeply into the sector along the road connecting Hochiatien, Kaocheng and Tanghsienchen and contain the enemy's main strength on the Division's front. At the same time, by a feint, it will contain the enemy in the Hsinyang and Chehoshih areas. If the situation permits, in the Hsinyang area it will prepare to launch an attack against the Tungpai area in order to intercept the northward route of retreat of the enemy force on the Suihsien front.

With the advance to the vicinity of Yingcheng, the 13th Division will prepare to concentrate its main force in the sector south of Huangchiachi by about 5 May, while securing the vicinity of Pingpachen and Sanyangtien with an element. It will then advance to the sector west of Tahungshan to the line linking

Liangchiapu and Chuchiawan after destroying the opposing enemy by a surprise attack.

The 16th Division will prepare to cover the Army's left flank against Chang Paichung's force, while securing the key points in the left bank sector of the Han Chiang south of Chunghsiang with an element. It will concentrate its main force in the sector south of Yangtzuchen by about 5 May and will then launch a surprise attack against enemy positions in the vicinity of Changshoutien and destroy the enemy advancing to the line linking Changchiachi and Shuangkouchen in order to intercept the route of retreat of the enemy's main force toward the Hsiangyang area.

The 4th Cavalry Brigade will prepare to concentrate its force in the vicinity of Yuchiachi and Chengchiapu by 5 May. It will pass through the mountainous area east of Icheng, following hard on the heels of the 16th Division's offensive drive, and as soon as the 16th Division passes through the mountainous area east of Icheng, it will overtake it and take up a position on the right bank of the Pai Ho in the vicinity of Shuangkouchen. Thereafter it will advance northeastward in order to intercept the northwestward route of retreat of the enemy's main force.

On 26 April, the 11th Army ordered the 3d Division to launch an attack on 1 May.

While the Army was preparing for the operation, the Air Corps endeavored to keep the plan secret by bombing the Ichang area while, at the same time, checking the activities of the enemy on the right bank of the Han Chiang.

On 28 April, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the removal of the Air Corps from the Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army.⁶² After reorganization, the Air Corps was assigned

62. Prior to 28 April, in Central China the Air Corps consisted of the Headquarters, 1st and 3d Air Brigades and 12th and 59th Air

to the North China Area Army and the 3d Air Brigade to the Central China Expeditionary Army.

The 3d Air Brigade was composed of:

- 3d Air Brigade Headquarters
- 17th Independent Air Company (KO)
- 18th Independent Air Company (KO)
- 77th Air Regiment (OTSU)
- 45th Air Regiment (HEI)
- 75th Air Regiment (HEI)
- 16th Air Sector Command
- 35th Airfield Battalion
- 40th Airfield Battalion
- 57th Airfield Battalion
- 2d Airfield Company
- One element of the 15th Air Signal Unit
- 16th Air Intelligence Unit
- 3d Field Airfield Construction Unit
- 9th and 10th Field AAA Unit (OTSU) of the 1st Division

The 3d Division completed its preparations on 29 April and the other units on approximately 2 May.

Summary of Operational Progress

On 1 May, the 3d Division launched a containing action. It first attacked advanced enemy positions on the west bank of the Chiangchia Ho. seized a foothold and gradually extended westward. On 5 May it attacked the main enemy positions at Kaocheng and partially occupied the town on the 6th.

62. (Cont'd) Regiments. In North China, the North China Air Force consisted of the 7th Air Brigade Headquarters, 27th Air Regiment (minus 1st Company), 90th Air Regiment and the 3d Company, 64th Air Regiment. After 28 April, the 3d Air Brigade remained in Central China and the other air units were reorganized into the Air Corps and assigned to the North China Area Army.

At first, the enemy's resistance was weak, but as the situation developed the entire 31st Army Group advanced southeastward and resisted stubbornly.

Taking advantage of the retreating enemy, the 13th and 16th Divisions advanced on 5 May and simultaneously broke through the main positions east and west of Changshoutien, destroyed the opposing enemy and advanced to the north.

Since the key positions of both flanks of the enemy had collapsed, the 11th Army commander planned to capture the 31st Army Group in the mountainous area northeast of Tsaoyang by means of a double envelopment. Therefore, on the 6th, he ordered the main force of the 3d Division to advance along the road linking Hsihsinchi and Huyangchen and the main force of the Hsinyang Force⁶³ to capture Tungpai. On the 7th, the commander ordered the main force of the 11th Army to form several echelons and circle northeastward along the left bank of the Tang Ho to cut the westward advance of the enemy. He also ordered the 4th Cavalry Brigade to rush toward Tangho by passing through the sector along the road linking Hsiangyang, Hsinyeh and Tangho in order to intercept the enemy's route of retreat.

The main force of the 3d Division advanced toward enemy positions

63. The 34th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Division was known as the Hsinyang Force. When the regiment advanced to Tungpai, the regimental commander, Col Teiji Suzuki, left approximately half his force in Hsinyang to garrison the city and to protect it from the enemy in the north.

in the vicinity of Kaocheng, however, when the Okido Detachment⁶⁴ attempted to advance toward Hoho, it was counterattacked by the reinforced 31st Army Group. The Detachment then wheeled toward Yinchiatien where it successfully routed the enemy, which retreated to the southwest. The Suzuki Unit (approximately one and a half infantry battalions under the command of the 34th Infantry Regiment commander) then in Hsinyang, advanced westward and occupied Tungpai on the 10th.

The 13th and 16th Divisions from the night of the 7th maintained a left forward echelon formation and advanced to the Kun Ho line where it circled northeastward and, after the arrival of an element of the 16th Division at Huhochen, routed nine enemy divisions.

The 4th Cavalry Brigade destroyed the enemy in the vicinity of Hsinyeh on the 10th and then turned southeastward. On the 11th, in the vicinity of Houchuang, it attacked and destroyed an enemy group attempting to flee to the north.

Contracting the Envelopment

As it was estimated that the main force of the Chinese 31st Army Group still remained in the mountainous area north of Tanghsienchen, the 11th Army ordered the main force of the 3d Division to advance toward Hsinhsinchi, the 13th Division to advance along the right bank


64. The Okido Detachment was commanded by Maj Gen Sanji Okido, commander of the 29th Infantry Brigade. The Detachment had as its nucleus the 18th Infantry Regiment and one battalion of the 3d Field Artillery Regiment.

of the Sha Ho toward Chienkang and the 16th Division to advance along the left bank of the Tang Ho toward Shuanhochan in order to contract the envelopment and capture the enemy in the sector northwest of the Tapieshan Mountain Range.

In order to avoid crowding the troops as a result of the contraction of the envelopment and also to facilitate the subsequent employment of troops, the 11th Army, on the 11th, ordered the main force of the 13th Division in the central position to concentrate in the sector between Sanhotien and Lutouchen. On the 11th and 12th, each group struck heavy blows against the retreating enemy in the sector north of Hsihsinchi and in the vicinity of Tangho. (Map 18)

On 12 May, having accomplished the mission of destroying the forces under the direct command of the Chinese Central Government, the 11th Army prepared to return to its base of operations to draw up plans for the destruction of the miscellaneous enemy troops remaining in the sector northeast of Tahungshan Mountains. It ordered the 3d and 13th Divisions to turn back and mop up the enemy on both banks of the Kun Ho, south of Tsaoyang, and also in the sector southeast of Lishanchen and Taerhwan. At the same time, it ordered the 16th Division to assemble in the vicinity of Tsaoyang and prepare to advance southeastward at an opportune time. The 4th Cavalry Brigade was ordered to advance southward along the left banks of the Tang Ho and Han Chiang, in general following the previous route of advance.

Accordingly, from the 12th to the 14th, the units began their



movements and advanced southward destroying strong enemy remnants on the way. (Map 19) By the 21st and 22d they had assembled in their new garrison areas. (Map 20)

During this action approximately thirty enemy divisions were engaged. Although the ten divisions on the flanks escaped with light casualties, a heavy blow was struck against the remaining twenty divisions. This caused the Chinese to abandon the sector east of the Han Chiang and greatly reduced their fighting spirit.

Kiangsi - Hunan Operation⁶⁵

Enemy Situation

After the abandonment of the Wu-Han sector, the enemy disposed a large Army force mainly composed of the reorganized Central Government Army,⁶⁶ in the 9th War Sector, which they now regarded as the most important area to be defended. Using this sector as the main base of operations and taking advantage of the gaps created by the

65. This operation was known to the Japanese as the Kiangsi - Hunan Operation but to the Chinese as the 1st Changsha Operation. In consequence, the operation designated the 1st Changsha Operation by the Japanese became the 2d Changsha Operation to the Chinese, the Japanese 2d Changsha Operation was known as the 3d Changsha Operation to the Chinese and the Japanese 3d Changsha Operation was the 4th Changsha Operation to the Chinese.

66. The Central Government Army top level commanders were educated at the Huangpu Military Academy, which had been established by Chiang Kaishek in order to train officers for the National Revolutionary Army. This army was a highly trained, disciplined, well equipped force, completely under the control of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kaishek endeavored to preserve it and, for the most part, used it as a supervisory army. However, in critical situations, it was thrown in to prevent the collapse of other troops.

wide deployment of the Japanese Army, the Chinese continued to harass the Japanese forces.


The total strength of the 9th War Sector Army was estimated to be approximately 50 divisions, consisting of 16 divisions of the Central Government Army, 13 divisions of the Centralized Collateral Army⁶⁷ and 21 divisions of local troops.⁶⁸


Japanese Situation

On 5 June 1939, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 9th Division of the 11th Army to return to Japan. Subsequently, it assigned to the organization of the 3d Air Brigade under the command of the Central China Expeditionary Army commander, the 59th Air Regiment (OTSU) and the 41st Airfield Battalion on 9 June and the 44th Air Regiment (KO) on 3 July. On 11 July it removed the 16th Division from the Order of Battle of the Central China Expeditionary Army and ordered it returned to Japan. In early September the 4th Cavalry Brigade was returned to the North China Area Army.

67. In October 1929, after the revolutionary war, Chiang Kaishek held the Sishan Conference in the suburbs of Nanching. At this conference some local war lords swore allegiance to Chiang Kaishek. Later, at the Nanyueh (Hunan Province) Conference held in 1935, those local war lords who had proved faithful to Chiang Kaishek were appointed commanders of the armies they had raised and trained. However, they were controlled by Chiang Kaishek. This force was known as the Centralized Collateral Army.

68. These troops had been organized locally to maintain peace and order and were commanded by the chief of the prefectural government or some other local influential person. They were equipped and fed from local taxes and were neither well trained nor well equipped.





Preparations for Battle

In August 1939, Japan decided to take advantage of the fact that the European countries were occupied with the deteriorating situation in Europe and attempt to end the China Incident by establishing a new Central Government in China.⁶⁹ Accordingly, the 11th Army published the following outline of directions of operations and, on this basis, speeded up its various preparations.

The 11th Army will destroy the main strength of the present Central Army in the 9th War Sector, especially along the Canton - Hankou railway line. It will accelerate the crushing of the fighting spirit of the Chiang Kaishek's Army by taking advantage of the present situation and, at the same time, strengthen security within the Army's operational area.

It ordered that preparations be made secretly from late August, while publicizing the planned capture of Ichang. Surprise attacks were to be initiated from mid-September by the 106th Division from Fenghsin and by the main strength of the 11th Army from the Canton - Hankou line. It further planned that the main strength of the 9th War Sector Army would be seized and destroyed by a rapid maneuver in the mountains along the northern border of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces.

On the basis of this policy, the following preparations were

69. On 29 December 1938, Wang Chingwei, former Vice President of the Chinese Nationalist Party, had begun peace negotiations with the Japanese Government. After consultation with the Japanese Central Authorities, on 8 May 1939, he went to Shanghai, where he prepared to establish a new Central Government. On 30 March 1940, the new Central Government was established in Nanching.

made:

In late August, the 33d and 101st Divisions took over the operational area near Chungyang and Tungcheng and the operational area south of the Leiwangtien and Sungfou line from the 6th and 106th Divisions respectively, in order to lighten their rear garrison duty.

In late August, the Uemura Detachment of the 3d Division and the Nara Detachment of the 13th Division were placed under the direct command of the 11th Army and the Saeda Detachment of the 101st Division was assigned to the 106th Division.

The composition of the groups which participated in the Kiangsi - Hunan Battle were as shown in Chart No. 5.

In order to conceal the battle plan, propaganda was spread by newspapers and radio that an operation to advance toward Ichang and the Fukien Province areas would shortly be carried out.

In accordance with an 11th Army order dated 1 September, each participating group concentrated and made preparations for attack as follows:

In order to isolate the enemy from the rear, the Uemura Detachment concentrated near Linhsiang and Chenglingchi and prepared for a landing near Yingtien. On 12 and 17 September, in cooperation with the Navy, an element of the Detachment made a feint toward the Chienli area in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River.

The 6th Division concentrated most of its strength near Hsinkaitang

Composition of Groups Participating in Kiangsi-Hunan Operation

Group	Str for garrison	Attached Unit							
		Inf & Cav	MG	Mtzd	Arty & Mort	Engr	Med & Fld Hosp	Trans	Coord Unit
Uemura Det 3d Div		4 inf bns, 1 cav plat			1 mt gun bn	1 engr regt (less 2 plats), 1 indpt engr regt (landing, shipping), 1 Indpt engr co	1/3 med unit 1/2 fld hosp	2 div trans cos	Upper Yangtze Patrol Unit & 2 landing parties
6th Div	7 inf cos, main str of cav unit, 3 fld arty cos, 2 trans cos		1 bn	3 L armd car cos	3 mt gun bns, 1 mort bn	1 indpt engr regt, 2 brg mtl cos		2 line of comms trans cos	
Nara Det 13th Div		3 inf bns 1 cav plat			1 mt gun bn (less 1 btry)	1 engr co	1/3 med unit 1 fld hosp	2 div trans cos	
33d Div	11 inf cos, 2 recon cos, 2 1/2 mt gun cos, 1 engr co		1 bn	1 tank regt (less 1 co), 1 L armed car co	1 hv arty bn and 1 btry, 1 mt gun bn	1 engr co		1 line of comms trans co, 1 mtr trans bn	
106th Div	4 inf bns, 2 fld arty cos	4 inf bns	1 bn	1 L armd car co	1 fld arty bn, 1 mort bn	1 indpt engr regt (river crossing)	1/3 med unit 1 fld hosp	1 divnl trans co, 1 line of comms trans co, 4 mtr trans cos	

and prepared for a surprise attack against the enemy position on the south bank of the Hsinchiang Ho on 18 September.

The Nara Detachment concentrated near the area south of Taolin and prepared for a surprise attack against the enemy in the area south of the Shachiang Ho on 17 September.

The 33d Division concentrated near Tungcheng and prepared for a surprise attack against enemy positions southeast of Tungcheng on 19 September.

The 106th Division completed concentration of its strength near Fenghsin and Kanchou and prepared for a surprise attack on 13 September against the enemy positions facing these towns.

Operational preparations progressed as planned and the 11th Army commander scheduled the initiation of the attack by the main strength for the latter part of September. On 10 September, he ordered the 106th Division to initiate its attack from 15 September and after making a surprise attack and breaking through the left flank of enemy positions northwest of Fenghsin to proceed deep into the rear area and seize and destroy the opposing enemy in the area northwest of Kaoan. On the 11th, he ordered the Uemura Detachment to prepare to land at Yingtien at daybreak on 23 September.

For the purpose of proceeding to the lower reaches of the Ku Shui, in order to seize and destroy the enemy's 15th Army Group at Pingchiang, on 18 September, the Army ordered each group to advance at daybreak on 23 September and initiate the following action:

The 6th Division was to break through the enemy positions in the area west of the Hsinchiang Ho and proceed to the heights south of the Ku Shui.

The Nara Detachment was to break through the enemy positions in the area west of Yanglinchieh on the southern bank of the Shachiang Ho and to rush to the Tzuchiang - Ku Shui line.

The 33d Division was to conduct a surprise attack and break through enemy positions near the Yuehmatu Ho valley and Maishih southeast of Tungcheng and then to proceed as quickly as possible to the Chachingchen area to cut the enemy's major lines of communication.

The Uemura Detachment, which had been collecting data on navigation and landing, estimated that carrying out the landing at the appointed time would be difficult, but possible. Therefore, on 20 September, the 11th Army ordered the Detachment to conduct a surprise landing near Yingtien at daybreak on 23 September and to dispatch an element to capture the Ku Shui crossing point near Kuei and Hsinshih and cut the enemy's route of retreat along the Canton - Hankou railway. At the same time, the main strength of the Detachment was ordered to proceed as quickly as possible in the direction of Kaochiao, along the Yingtien - Taniangchiao - Lichia - Kaochiao Road and cut the Pingchiang - Changsha Road.

The organization of the 3d Air Brigade under the command of the Expeditionary Army was revised on 1 September as follows:

3d Air Brigade Headquarters
 17th Independent Air Battery (KO)
 44th Air Regiment (KO)
 59th Air Regiment (OTSU)
 75th Air Regiment (HEI)
 16th Air Sector Command
 35th Airfield Battalion
 41st Airfield Battalion
 57th Airfield Battalion
 2d Airfield Company
 69th Airfield Company
 An element of the 15th Air Signal Unit
 16th Air Intelligence Unit
 3d Field Airfield Construction Unit
 9th and 10th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Unit
 (OTSU) of the 1st Division 6th Field Searchlight
 Unit, of the Guard Divisions

The 77th Air Regiment and the 40th Airfield Battalion, which
 had been assigned to the Kwantung Army, remained under the command
 of the Central China Expeditionary Army commander. (Map 21)

Summary of Operational Progress

On the night of 14 September, the 106th Division advanced to the
 vicinity of Fukuan with its main force and then turned to the north-
 west of Kaoan, striking the enemy at will as it advanced. On the 18th
 and 19th, the Division contacted and struck severe blows at the flee-
 ing enemy in the area west of Kaoan. Meanwhile, the Saeda Detachment
 destroyed the massed enemy in the Chihntienchang area and, on the 18th,
 advanced to the vicinity of Kaoan.

On 20 September, the 11th Army issued the following order to
 the 106th Division:


The Division shall first destroy the enemy in the vi-
 cinity of Kaoan. An element shall then cover the left
 rear of the Division against the enemy located in the vi-
 cinity of Shangkao while, about the 23d, the main force of

KIANGSI-HUNAN BATTLE PLAN

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→ JAPANESE ARMY

▬ CHINESE ARMY



the Division shall proceed from the vicinity of Shangfu, cross the Chiulingshan Mountains in the area east of the road connecting Kanfang and Hochiatsui, advance to the vicinity of Hsiushui and Santu and then cut off the rear of Wan Ling-Chi's and Fan Fu's Army Group.

Accordingly, the 106th Division disposed the Saeda Detachment in the area southwest of Fenghsin to protect its left flank and rear, while the main force of the division was concentrated on the banks of the Liao Shui in preparation for its advance toward the lower reaches of the Hsiu Shui.

The Uemura Detachment formed two echelons on the evening of 22 September and sailed from Yoyang and, at dawn on the 23d, landed in the vicinity of Yingtien in a blaze of enemy fire. The Detachment successively dislodged the stubborn enemy from his several defense lines. At the same time, a part of its force had sailed up the Ku Shui and, on the 25th, intercepted the enemy's retreat from the area along the Canton - Hankou railway in the vicinity of Kueii.

The 6th Division, the Nara Detachment and the 33d Division captured the enemy's advanced positions on their respective fronts and then completed preparations for the attack against the main enemy positions. At dawn on the 23d they began the attack and successively broke through a series of enemy defense positions. On the 24th, the 6th Division and the Nara Detachment continued to advance and, on the 25th, had reached the area to the north of Hsinshih, Changlochieh and Miaowanli. After breaking through the enemy's main positions, the 33d Division attacked and destroyed an

enemy force, which had resisted stubbornly, in the mountainous district in the vicinity of Nanlouling and, on the 25th, it advanced to the area south of Taoshuchiang. It then attacked and destroyed the enemy in the vicinity of Fushihling.

The 11th Naval Squadron preceded the Uemura Detachment and cleared the course for the Detachment with its gun boat units. Then, on the 24th, it landed a naval landing party in the vicinity of Luchiao and captured the enemy's positions on the shores of the lake.

Since the enemy, which had withdrawn under the Japanese attack, seemed to be planning to join its second line troops and put up resistance from prepared positions, the Army decided to concentrate a force in the vicinity of Hsinshih and destroy the enemy before he could complete his preparations and dispose his troops. Therefore, on the 26th, the 6th Division was ordered to destroy the enemy in the area south of Hsinshih and the Uemura Detachment to destroy the enemy facing it and then to advance toward Lichia, while the Nara Detachment was ordered to change direction and advance toward Hsinshih.

The Uemura Detachment, which since the 25th had been surrounded by a mass of retreating and newly arrived troops,⁷⁰ on the 27th broke

70. The "newly arrived" troops were reinforcements drawn from the other fronts not being attacked by the Japanese and were thrown in to defend the second line of defense.

through and destroyed the forces in the vicinity of Taniangchiao. Prior to this, on the morning of the 25th, the 6th Division had advanced to the left bank of the Ku Shui and was preparing to attack enemy positions on the bank of the river. The Nara Detachment reached the vicinity of Tzuchiang on the 26th.

Due to the speedy movement of the Japanese forces, the Chinese were unable to reform their lines or occupy new positions.

The 11th Army decided to turn eastward with its main force⁷¹ and, in the vicinity of Pingchiang, to destroy those enemy groups which were expected to withdraw southward from the area south of Tungcheng. On the 27th, it ordered the Uemura Detachment, the 6th Division and the Nara Detachment to advance toward Pingchiang and the area southwest of Pingchiang. Each group advanced as directed, destroying the enemy at will, and by the 30th had reached the line connecting Malinshih, Chinchung and Hsienchung.

The 33d Division, which broke through enemy positions in the vicinity of Fushihling on the 27th, rushed toward Hsienchung and, on the 30th, established contact with an advance unit of the Nara Detachment.

On the 23d, the 106th Division in concert with the advance toward the Ku Shui by the Army's main force, crossed the steep Chiulingshan Mountains in the face of strong enemy resistance. Between the 27th and 30th, the Division advanced to Huangshachiao

71. The Army's main force was composed of the 6th and 33d Divisions and the Nara Detachment.


and northwest of Kanfang. It took five days of fierce fighting to capture enemy positions to the west of Kanfang.

The greater part of the enemy force retreated to the south of Changsha, however, elements moved southward from Hsiushui and reinforced the force in front of the left column of the 106th Division. The 11th Army, therefore, diverted the 33d Division to the lower reaches of the Hsiu Shui in order to contact the enemy there and turned the main force to sweep away the remaining enemy units to the north of the Ku Shui.

From the end of September through early October, groups from the main force of the 11th Army, having reversed their direction, mopped up the enemy. They returned to the area north of the Hsinchiang Ho between 7 and 9 October. On 2 October, the 33d Division left the vicinity of Changshouchieh and advanced toward Hsiu Shui. It reached Santu on the 6th, destroying an enemy element on the way, then, after establishing contact with the 106th Division, turned toward Tungcheng, reaching there on the 11th.

The 106th Division advanced to the line connecting Santu and Shihchieh on 4 October, but, in accordance with the Army's recall order, the main force of the Division began to withdraw on the 6th, reaching the vicinity of Fenghsin on the 9th. An element of the Division returned to Wuning about the middle of October after destroying an enemy force which had attacked in the vicinity of Santu.

During this operation the Army Air Force reconnoitered the enemy



situation and supported the 11th Army operation, particularly the 6th Division, the Nara Detachment and the 33d Division. The Navy Air Force supported the landing operations of the Uemura Detachment and the operations of the 106th Division.

The Navy Landing Party captured Luchiao on the 24th and Leishihshan on the 26th. (Map 22)

In this operation the Japanese forces inflicted heavy casualties on approximately 10 of the 30 enemy divisions in the area. However, as it was estimated that the 9th War Sector Army was composed of approximately 50 divisions⁷² it was felt that the objective of breaking the enemy's will to fight was still far from being achieved. At the same time, it was recognized that more could not have been expected of the approximately four Japanese divisions which had participated in the battle. The remainder of the 11th Army's strength (approximately four divisions) was on guard duty in the northern sector of the Yangtze River with the exception of the 101st Division and the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade which were guarding the southern sector of the Yangtze River.

72. At the end of the Kiangsi - Hunan Operation the Japanese estimate of the strength of the 9th War Sector Army was 50 divisions. This estimate was arrived at through ground and aerial reconnaissance and espionage. However, when confronted by this Army during the 1st Changsha Operation (called 2d Changsha Operation by the Chinese) it was found that although the Chinese had restored the strength of the ten divisions which had been greatly decimated during the Kiangsi - Hunan Operation, its strength was not 50 but 30 divisions.

On 7 November, the 101st and 106th Division were removed from the Order of Battle of the 11th Army and ordered to return to Japan. On the same day, the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade was assigned to the 11th Army's command.⁷³

Winter Operations

General Situation

From June, the enemy conducted a reorganization and training program and, upon its completion in November, it appeared that they were prepared to launch an offensive along the entire front. It was estimated that the 3d War Sector Army would be used as the main force for the winter offensive, but based on the April offensive, Japan judged that the enemy operation would not be a large one and that their morale was low.

At this time, Japanese first-line troops were deployed over a wide area (a division front averaged 150 kilometers with only simple fortifications and very few reserves). With the exception of the 101st and 106th Divisions, which had been temporarily placed under the command of the 13th Army and were sailing down the Yangtze River to return to Japan Proper, there were no mobile Japanese forces in the area.

⁷³. This Brigade was organized in Central China under the supervision of the China Expeditionary Army commander and was assigned to the 11th Army on 7 November.

At the end of November, Chiang Kaishek made the following statement to his troops:

As a result of the expansion of its front, the Japanese Army has shifted from the offensive to the defensive and has discontinued large-scale advances. The reorganization of the Chinese Army is practically completed and rapid strides have been made in training. Now is the time to attack the enemy.

On 12 December, the 5th and 9th War Sector Armies launched their attacks while, on 16 December, the 3d War Sector Army launched its offensive.

Outline of 11th Army's Operations

Opening with an attack against Hokouchen in the 39th Division area on 7 December, the enemy forces shifted to the offensive throughout the entire 11th Army front by 12 December. It appeared that the main effort was to be on the 13th Division front where the enemy launched persistent attacks with a powerful force of about four divisions in the area between Wanchialing (in the sector northeast of Chungshiang) and Yangtzuchen and between Lohanssushih and Niehchiachang. The Division decided to strike first the enemy to the south and, on the 14th after having gradually augmented its strength with forces brought from other battle fronts of the Division or sent by the Army, began attacking the force surrounding the Japanese garrison units in the Lohanssushih and Niehchiachang areas.


Since the 11th Army had at first planned to clean out the enemy forces in the 40th and 3d Divisions' operational zones, it reinforced these divisions with elements transferred from other groups. However,

when the situation cleared about the 15th or 16th, and particularly when it was obvious that the enemy had launched its major offensive against the 13th Division front, the Army gradually reinforced the 13th Division. By the 22d, the Division had been reinforced by three infantry battalions and several artillery and tank units.

Due to persistent enemy attacks, some positions on the left flank of the 13th Division were lost to the enemy but, with the aid of supporting units, the Division succeeded in holding its first-line positions. On the 22d, the enemy retreated to the sector on the left bank of the Han Chiang, and, on the front northeast of Chunghsiang, in spite of repeated enemy attacks day after day, a small element of the Division stood its ground. (Map 23)

On 12 December, in the area along the Canton - Hankou railway, the Chinese invaded the gaps in the Japanese lines in the Yangloussu, Chungyang, Tashaping and Tungcheng areas with a force of about seven divisions and attacked the garrison units at various places. The Japanese 6th Division, which had been reinforced in the area southwest of Yangloussu, took the counteroffensive on the 14th.

On the 18th, the Army ordered the 40th Division to transfer some of its powerful elements to the Paiichiao area immediately and to advance to the Tashaping area and destroy the enemy there. Accordingly, the 40th Division ordered the Ishimoto Detachment (at first composed of three infantry battalions but later reinforced by two additional infantry battalions) to start action in the vicinity of




WINTER OPERATION 6TH DIVISION

12 DEC 1939 - 23 JAN 1940

- 1ST PHASE } JAPANESE ARMY
- - -→ 2D PHASE }
- 1ST PHASE } CHINESE ARMY
- - -→ 2D PHASE }

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Paichiao. Cooperating with elements of the 6th Division, on the 21st the Detachment began to advance to the sector east of the road connecting Chungyang and Tashaping.

On the 24th, the various units which had advanced and destroyed the enemy established contact with the garrison unit at Tashaping and, in cooperation with a force of about five infantry companies advancing from Yoyang and another of about two infantry companies advancing from Tungcheng, destroyed the enemy in the sector southwest of Tashaping. (Map 24)

On the 3d Division's front, the enemy launched an attack on the 12th. The Division decided to beat back the enemy first by directing its main attack in the Hsinyang area where it (the Division) planned to reinforce its units. However, the sector commander, without waiting for reinforcements, attacked the enemy in the Yuho area with a force of approximately two infantry battalions and five artillery batteries and broke the Chinese drive. Then, on the 17th, the sector units together with the reinforcements, destroyed the enemy south of Changtaikuan and chased him north. On the 19th, the 3d Division commander received orders from the 11th Army to dispatch the Takano Detachment (composed of about three infantry battalions), which was under his tactical command, to relieve the 13th Division. He, therefore, discontinued the attack.

In the 3d Division sector north of Yingshan, the Division was attacked by about ten enemy divisions on the 12th. The first-line

garrison unit in that area held its position well and repulsed repeated enemy attacks. However, as the enemy continued its attacks through late December, the Division prepared to counterattack in early January. (Map 25)

On 16 December, in the 33d Division sector south of the Yangtze River, the Division was attacked in the vicinity of Fenghsin and Ani simultaneously. On the 18th, the Division routed the enemy by executing an enveloping action with a force consisting of three and a half infantry battalions and five mountain artillery batteries.


In the 34th Division area, the enemy attacked the Division on the 19th but was repulsed.

In the Yingshan, Chunghsiang and Tungcheng areas, the enemy was still active in January 1940.

On 21 December, Chiang Kaishek had issued a directive in which he stated that "judging from the results so far obtained, some reinforcements will be furnished to the 5th War Sector to exploit the success obtained there." Chinese first-line units continued to attack locally and it was estimated that it was planned to continue the offensive.

Sun Lien-Chung's Army Group on the front west of Hsinyang was still very active and by early January Tang En-Po's Army Group began to approach the sector northwest of Yingshan.

The Japanese 3d Division decided to envelop these two Army Groups from the east and west and destroy them by first attacking Sun Lien-



Chung's Army Group in the sector northwest of Hsinyang and then, taking advantage of this Army's retreat, to attack Tang En-Po's Army Group in the sector north of Yingshan and Chehoshih.

On 28 December, the 11th Army ordered the return of the Takano Detachment from the 13th Division to the 3d Division and, at the same time, assigned elements of the tank and heavy field artillery units to the 3d Division. In January, three infantry companies and one artillery battery from the 39th Division were attached to the 3d Division and, following this, approximately two infantry battalions of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade were also attached to the Division.

On 5 January, the 3d Division mounted an attack against the enemy west of Changtaikuan with a force consisting of five infantry battalions, under the command of the 29th Infantry Brigade commander. Destroying the enemy on the way, this force advanced to the vicinity of Hsiao-lintien on the 7th. The enemy fled to the west and northwest without offering resistance.

On 15 January, the Division ordered a force (consisting of eight infantry battalions and three artillery battalions as a nucleus and commanded by the 5th Infantry Brigade commander) to advance to the vicinity of Yinchiatien by way of Kaocheng. It also ordered the 68th Infantry Regiment (less one infantry battalion but with one field artillery battalion attached) to advance in the direction of Yinchiatien by way of Chuankoutien.

The 5th Infantry Brigade, after destroying the enemy forces which

had resisted from a series of defense lines, advanced to Kaocheng on 16 January and to the vicinity of Yinchiatien on the 19th. Bitter battles were fought with Tang En-Po's forces from the 18th to the 21st when the enemy fled to the north. The Matono Unit,⁷⁴ in cooperation with the 5th Infantry Brigade, destroyed the enemy in the vicinity of Hochiatien on the 15th, captured a corner of Hsiaoyuhuangting on the 18th and, after advancing to the hill west of Tayuhuangting on the 21st, continued to pursue the enemy to the north.

About 22 January, the 3d Division began to turn back in order to resume its garrison duty. (Map 25)

In the 13th Division sector, seven or eight enemy divisions located north of Chunghsiang became active again about 3 January when they attacked the Japanese garrison forces in the Huangchiachi and Wangchialing areas. On the 5th, they attacked strategic points on the road connecting Kingshan and Huangchiachi.

Between 6 and 8 January, with the aid of two infantry battalions and two mountain artillery batteries brought in from other areas, the Division destroyed the enemy in the area along the road connecting Kingshan and Huangchiachi. Being further reinforced by a force consisting of approximately five infantry battalions and five mountain artillery batteries, the Division launched an attack against the enemy

74. As the 68th Infantry Regiment was commanded by Colonel Kenzaburo Matono, it was sometimes referred to as the Matono Unit.

positions in the sector northeast of Yangtzuchen on the 10th, broke through on the 13th and continued to pursue the enemy to the north. At the same time, it mopped up the remnants of the defeated enemy in the vicinity of Mt Changling and then assembled its force in the vicinity of Yangtzuchen on the 14th. (Map 23)

The 6th Division decided to launch a major attack against the enemy in the vicinity of Tashaping and Tungcheng in early January.

On 2 January, the 11th Army attached the Ishimoto Detachment (composed of three infantry battalions) of the 40th Division and one mountain artillery battalion of the Army Artillery to the 6th Division. On the 10th, it attached a tank company to the Division.

The Yoyang Sector Garrison Unit (composed of about eight infantry companies) of the 6th Division conducted a punitive operation against the enemy in the Yunchi and Taolin areas from 1 to 4 January. Following the completion of this action, the Division conducted a second punitive operation with a force of about seven infantry battalions against the enemy around Chungyang and Tashaping, inflicting heavy casualties. Later, as there were indications that the remnants of the defeated Tang En-Po's Army (most of which had fled into the mountains) were preparing to launch an attack, the Division continued mopping-up operations until 23 January. (Map 24)

Outline of the 13th Army's Operation

The 13th Army estimated that the 116th Division front would bear the brunt of the winter offensive of the enemy 3d War Sector Army.

The 13th Army, therefore, planned to counteract the enemy's offensive by taking the initiative in the battle and on 12 December ordered the disposition of its units generally as follows:

The 116th Division shall take the offensive in the Tatungchen area at the proper time and endeavor to counteract the enemy's offensive.

The 15th Division shall advance part of its strength promptly to the Fanchang area and contain the enemy there in order to facilitate the operations of the 116th Division.

The 106th Division⁷⁵ shall dispatch two infantry battalions to the vicinity of Huaining as quickly as possible where they will be placed under the tactical command of the commander of the 116th Division.

About 15 December, the 22d Division shall dispatch one mountain artillery battalion from Shanghai to Tatungchen. Upon arrival at Tatungchen, it shall be placed under the command of the 116th Division commander temporarily.⁷⁶

The 13th Army also reassigned one infantry battalion of the 17th Division to the 116th Division on 15 December. With its increase in strength in the vicinity of Tatungchen, the 116th Division prepared to launch an offensive about 20 December. However, an enemy force of about four divisions launched an attack in the vicinity of Tatungchen on the morning of the 16th, directing its main effort against the Japanese positions northwest of Chingyang and, on the 17th, captured the positions. The Army then placed an infantry battalion of the 15th Division under the tactical command of the 116th Division

75. On 7 November, the 106th Division had been ordered back to Japan and was, at this time, being concentrated at Hsiao-chih-kou. It expected to board ship on 22 or 23 December for Nanching and Shanghai on the first leg of its trip home.


76. The battalion was expected to arrive at Tatungchen on 18 December.

WINTER OPERATION 13TH ARMY

16 - 23 DEC 1939

→ JAPANESE ARMY
→ CHINESE ARMY

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commander. The 116th Division attacked the lost positions and from the 19th the situation gradually turned in favor of the Japanese forces. By the 20th, they had generally recaptured their positions. The enemy discontinued the offensive throughout the entire front as of that day and retreated.

About 21 December, elements of the 106th Division, which had been ordered to reinforce the 116th Division, joined the Division. The 116th Division shifted to the offensive in the Chingyang area after the 23d and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.

In this operation the Army and Navy Air Forces by supporting the ground action and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, facilitated the defense and pursuit actions of the ground units. (Map 26)

CHAPTER IV

Operations During 1940

Mopping-Up Operations in the Lower Reaches of the Yangtze River

Chientang Chiang Operation


The Chinese 3d War Sector Army occupied the area extending from Poyang Hu eastward along the southern bank of the Yangtze River. Its forces on the right bank of the Chientang Chiang in the vicinity of Hangchou were constantly disrupting the peace of Shanghai and, in conjunction with the enemy still hiding within the Shanghai settlements, they attempted to bring in supplies and munitions. Although the Japanese strength in the area was not sufficient to completely destroy these enemy forces, it was imperative that the right bank of the Chientang Chiang be occupied in order to cut the enemy lines of communication to Shanghai. For political reasons also it was necessary to destroy the 3d War Sector Army's contact with Shanghai, as the Japanese planned to establish the new Wang Government in that city in March.

The 13th Army, therefore, ordered the 22d Division, which was charged with guarding the vicinity of Hangchou, to cross the Chientang Chiang and attack and occupy the vicinity of Hsiaoshan. On the morning of 22 January, the main strength of the Division carried out a surprise crossing of the Chientang Chiang south of Hangchou forcing the enemy to retreat to the area south of Linpuchen. By the evening of

the 26th, the Division had concentrated near Hsiaoshan, when elements occupied this area while the main strength of the Division returned to its home base.

In early February, having been reinforced by the 79th and 140th Divisions of the Chinese 1st Army as well as by elements of motor vehicle units of the Central Headquarters,⁷⁷ the enemy under the command of the 10th Army Group commander, Liu Chien Hsu, attempted to recapture Hsiaoshan. As the first line of the enemy gradually approached the vicinity of Hsiaoshan, the Japanese 13th Army decided to counterattack. At daybreak of 15 February, in cooperation with an element which had landed near the mouth of the Puyang Chiang on the night of the 14th, the main strength of the 22d Division initiated an envelopment movement from the vicinity of Kanshanchen against the flanks of the enemy in the area south of Hsiaoshan. The main strength of the Division defeated the enemy in the area east of Kanshanchen and pursued him in the direction of Kochiaochen, while an element defeated the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Ichiaochen and pursued them toward the area south of Linpuchen. The flanks of the Chinese forces began to retreat, but the central force (about a regiment in strength) continued to resist stubbornly. On the 18th, the Division's main strength routed the enemy in the vicinity of Chiangtang, forcing him to retreat to the southwest. The Division then concentrated near Chiangtang on the 19th. Although the enemy

77. The Chinese strength was estimated to be approximately four or five divisions.



gradually rallied its forces near Chuchi, since the Japanese Army had achieved its initial objective of striking a blow to the main strength of the Chinese forces, after mopping up enemy remnants, it returned to Hangchou from about 21 February. (Map 27)

Spring Operations in Southern Anhwei Province

After the winter offensive at the end of the previous year, the enemy in Anhwei Province south of the Yangtze River, particularly the 23d Army Group (commanded by Tang Shin Tsun) of the 3d War Sector Army, conducted special training at the rear of their main positions. It was learned that they had made elaborate plans to intercept navigation on the Yangtze River by conducting guerrilla operations in conjunction with the fortress units along the banks of the river, so that Japanese ships sailing on the Yangtze River would be persistently subjected to artillery fire and floating mines. Enemy action became increasingly active about the time of the establishment of the Wang Government in Nanching in March 1940. Enemy strength was estimated to be about five divisions occupying positions south of the river, extending from the vicinity of Fanchang to the vicinity of Hukou; about two divisions stationed in the vicinity of Shehsien and approximately one division stationed in the vicinity of Fuliang.


In view of the above situation and the possibility of a Chinese offensive following their autumn troop reorganization and training program, the Japanese 13th Army planned to forestall the enemy and attack their forces in the sector south of the upper reaches of the

Yangtze River from Yinchiahui and Wanchihchen and to seize and destroy them in the sector to the south of Chingyang, thereby securing the safe navigation of the Yangtze River. On 22 April, therefore, the 13th Army ordered the 15th and 116th Divisions to launch attacks simultaneously from the east and west toward the south of Chingyang. The 15th Division was ordered to attack from the Fanchang and Nanling areas and the 116th Division from Yinchiahui. On 20 April, the 13th Army established its command post at Wuhu.

On 22 April, the main strength of the 116th Division (consisting of approximately six infantry battalions and two field artillery battalions) broke through enemy positions in the vicinity of Yinchiahui and advanced to Miaochien via Paiyangkou, destroying the enemy on the way. It reached Miaochien on the 26th. Also, on the 22d, one element of the Division (approximately two infantry battalions) left Kueichih, destroyed the enemy in the vicinity of Paiyang and proceeded to Miaochien while another element (approximately one infantry battalion) left Kueichih on the same day and advanced toward Miaochien through the area to the north of Paiyang. Both elements reached Miaochien on 26 April.⁷⁸ A further element (one infantry battalion) was ordered to guard the areas in the vicinity of Kuanchien, Tatungchen

78. No mention of the action of the two elements is made in the basic manuscript but it is described in "The China Incident", Kaikoshakiji Journal (1940 No. 9) a Japanese Army journal whose editorial staff was responsible to the Vice Minister for the Army.

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and Shunan and to prepare to advance to the vicinity of Chingyang in concert with the movement of the Division's main strength.

The enemy began to withdraw to the south and the main strength of the Division continued pursuit in an endeavor to cut off the retreat by circling from the west of Chiuhuashan Range to Lingyangchen. After crossing the steep mountain range, extending about 30 kilometers, the Division advanced and defeated a strong enemy force fighting from prepared positions. On the 28th, the main strength of the Division arrived near Lingyangchen where it caught and destroyed approximately 2,000 enemy troops who were retreating from the north.

Meanwhile, on 22 April, the main strength of the 15th Division, consisting of nine infantry battalions and supporting technical units, commenced action from Wanchihchen and destroyed the enemy's 108th Division. Then, in cooperation with an element of the Division, (consisting of three infantry battalions and supporting units) which had advanced south from Wuhu it encircled and destroyed the enemy's 52d Division from north, east and south Nanling, thereafter, it advanced toward Chingyang where, in cooperation with the 116th Division, it destroyed the enemy's 25th Army. (Map 28)⁷⁹

On 20 April, the 17th and 22d Divisions launched feints in the

79. As this was a minor operation and most of the commanders are now dead, it has not been possible to obtain more specific details, particularly in regard to dates.

sectors south of Ho Hu and southwest of Tai Hu respectively and, on the morning of the 26th, the 13th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked and occupied Hohsien.

Three River Operation⁸⁰

From the spring to the summer of 1940, the 11th Army carried out the large-scale Ichang Operation.⁸¹ In order to reinforce the 11th Army for this operation, the 13th Army sent a unit from the 22d Division composed of approximately three infantry battalions, and a unit from the 15th Division, composed of approximately one infantry regiment. Thus, with its diminished strength, the 13th Army was unable to take any positive action other than to secure already occupied areas, and taking advantage of this situation, the 3d War Sector Army had become very active in the sector confronting the occupied areas. In the area north of the Yangtze River, particularly the area between the Tienching - Pukou railway, the Tayun Ho, the New Huang Ho and the Yangtze River, communist guerrillas were very active and although the necessity for destroying these forces was fully recognized, the 13th Army in its weakened condition was unable to undertake the operation. However, about the middle of July, with the return of the units which had participated in the Ichang Operation, the Army began preparations for the destruction of

80. As this operation was planned to destroy the enemy in the area between the Yangtze River, the New Huang Ho and the Tayun Ho, it was known as the "Three Rivers Operation."

81. See pages 191 - 219 (inclusive).

these forces.

The Japanese units used were the 12th Independent Mixed Brigade and one infantry regiment of the 15th Division located in the area north of the Yangtze River, supported by an element of the naval unit stationed in the vicinity of Kaoyu.

The 12th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 60th Infantry Regiment of the 15th Division, having assembled in the vicinity of Chiangtu and Liuho respectively, began moving out on 4 September, and advanced toward Hsuitai in several columns. The naval unit left Kaoyu by boat on the same day and, after repulsing small enemy forces, occupied Hsuitai. After destroying the enemy in the area, it returned to its home base by 17 September.

Operation in the Area South of the Yangtze River

Although the 13th Army had planned for some time to attack the enemy in the delta zone in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, it was only after the conclusion of the Ichang Operation and the return of its units which had participated in this operation that the Army could initiate action. The 13th Army aimed at securing the delta zone and accelerating the collapse of the enemy's 3d War Sector Army by dealing a crushing blow to this Army in the downstream area of the Yangtze and in the sector south of the Yangtze River.

An outline of its operations plan was as follows:

Policy:

The main force of the Army will attack the enemy to

the north of a line between Wanchihchen and Tai Hu and annihilate it by trapping it in the area between the first line and the main force.

Troop Strength to be Employed:

- Main force of the 15th Division
- Main force of the 17th Division
- Main force of the 22d Division
- One element of the 116th Division
- Main force of the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade

Supporting Unit:

- One element of the 3d Air Group

Outline of Tactical Command:

The 15th Division will assemble ahead of the other groups in the vicinity of Tichiang and, by the evening of 7 October, will advance to the vicinity of Nanling. Also, on the 7th, the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade will assemble in the vicinity of Changhsing and both the 17th and 22d Divisions will assemble in the sector northwest of Hangchou.

From about 8 October the first phase operations will be launched. At that time the 15th and 17th Divisions and the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade will advance to the line linking Langchi, Kuangte and Ssuanchen. After breaking through the enemy line, the 22d Division will advance to Fuyang. After occupying Ssuanchen, the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade will again assemble at Changhsing.

The second phase operations will begin about 13 October. The 15th and 17th Divisions and the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade will advance toward the Sanchoushan Mountain Range and destroy the enemy in the vicinity of this mountain range.

The 22d Division will advance toward Chuchi.

Thereafter, the third phase operations will begin. Both the 15th and 17th Division will destroy the enemy on the perimeter of the Army area while the 22d Division, with the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade under its command, will occupy Shaohsing.

The main force of the 15th Division went by sea to Tichiang and began its advance from there on 5 October. After breaking through

enemy positions in the vicinity of Fanchang, it advanced to a hill south of Nanling on the evening of the 7th and assembled there in readiness for the first phase operations to be launched the following day. During this time, an element of the Division advanced from Wanchihchen toward Henglangshan, while elements of the 116th Division advanced to the sector west of Taichiahui from the vicinity of Tichiang and Tatungchen in order to support the 15th Division's attack.

The 11th Independent Mixed Brigade assembled in the vicinity of Changhsing by 7 October.

The 17th and 22d Divisions assembled in the sector east of Yuhang by the 7th.

The 13th Army ordered the 15th and 17th Divisions and the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade to advance to the line linking Langchi, Kuangte and Ssuanchen and the main force of the 22d Division to turn southward and advance to Fuyang after destroying the enemy in the vicinity of Linan.

The main force of the 15th Division left Nanling on 8 October for Chinghsien. There it was surrounded by the enemy's powerful 25th Army and its new 4th Army. However, after a severe two-day engagement it succeeded in disengaging itself and proceeded to Hsuancheng where it assembled in preparation for the second phase of the operation.

On 8 October, the 17th and 22d Divisions broke through enemy lines in the sector northwest of Hangchow. The 17th Division then

advanced toward Kuangte and occupied that town on the 12th. The 22d Division occupied Fuyang on the evening of the same day.


The 11th Independent Mixed Brigade broke through the enemy lines from the vicinity of Changhsing on the 8th and advanced to the vicinity of Anchi by way of Ssuanchen, thereby facilitating the development of the 17th Division's operations.

By the 12th, as the Japanese forces had advanced to the rear of the enemy's front line positions, the first-phase operations were completed and, on the 13th, the 13th Army launched the second-phase operations.

The Army ordered the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 17th and 15th Divisions to advance toward Changchuchen, Taifou, Chouchengchen and Yachichiang. After destroying the enemy forces which offered stubborn resistance in the Sanchoushan Mountain Range, the Japanese forces reached their designated positions on the 17th.

In the meantime, before dawn on the 13th, the 22d Division crossed the river in front of the enemy (after destroying the forces which stubbornly opposed them in the mountains) and occupied Chuchi on the 17th. During this operation, the 22d Division seized a large quantity of munitions.

The Army then ordered the third phase of the operations to be launched on 18 October. The 15th and 17th Divisions wiped out the enemy in front of their positions, while the 22d Division, with the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade under its command, advanced toward



Shaohsing. It occupied this town on the 22d. Then, in accordance with Army orders, the 22d Division returned to Hsiaoshan on 1 November. (Map 29)

Although this operation had been conceived on a grand scale, and it appeared as though the Japanese troops had surrounded and destroyed the enemy, the results were far from satisfactory as the 13th Army had been forced to carry out its operations over a vast area with an extremely small force. In fact, the Chinese claimed that they had contained the Japanese 15th Division in the vicinity of Chinghsien and destroyed it.

Ichang Operation

The Chinese, believing that their winter offensive had severely damaged the Japanese forces, widely publicized their victories in order to obtain foreign credit and raise the national morale. At the same time, they undertook their third reorganization and training program in preparation for their next counterattack. In the spring of 1940 it was estimated that the Chinese had 260 divisions with approximately 2,000,000 men. Moreover, it was believed that during the reorganization and training period, which was expected to finish between June and August 1940, they would organize an additional 80 divisions.

The main Chinese forces were in Hupeh and Hunan Provinces surrounding the Japanese occupied area. They were drawn up close to the Japanese positions and were continually strengthening their defense.

At the same time, they sought to disrupt the Japanese rear area and to undermine the authority of the Wang Government.

After the winter offensive there appeared to be a great deal of movement of the enemy forces, but by early March it appeared that their preparations were completed. The 31st Army Group (Tang En Po's Army), which had reinforced the 5th War Sector in front of the Japanese 11th Army, was deployed in the Nanyang - Tenghsien - Hsinyeh sector; the 32d Army Group was deployed in the area west of Han Chiang and the 11th Army Group in the area east of Han Chiang.

As the strong enemy winter offensive had shown the Japanese Army the defects in its defenses, it made very effort to strengthen its fortifications and communications in order to secure the occupied area.

Although the Japanese Army generally had driven the enemy back during its winter offensive, both sides had suffered heavy casualties. It had also been necessary for the Japanese forces to be spread over a wide area, therefore some of the first-line units had been thrown into disorder. This gave the enemy a sense of victory and strengthened their morale, whereas it had an adverse effect upon the Japanese Army. In order to counteract this, the 11th Army considered it necessary to strike a severe blow to the enemy and drafted plans immediately after the winter offensive to conduct operations against the 5th War Sector Army before the rainy season commenced. These plans were approved by the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army who, in turn, submitted them to Imperial General Headquarters. They

were approved and, in order to facilitate the carrying out of the plans, Imperial General Headquarters issued the following order:

In order to accomplish his current mission, the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army is authorized temporarily to conduct operations beyond his operational zone in the central and south China areas during May and June.

The China Expeditionary Army, therefore, ordered the 11th Army to conduct the operation. At the same time, it ordered two detachments of the 13th Army to participate in the operation and the 3d Air Group to support it. Accordingly, the commander of the 3d Air Group ordered the 3d Air Brigade stationed at Hankou to support the operation.

The 11th Army's operations plan was as follows:

Policy:

All plans will be kept secret and preparations completed so that the Army may begin action in early May. It will first destroy the main strength of the enemy 5th War Sector Army in the sector north of the line connecting Suihsien and Hsiangyang and then destroy the enemy on the right bank of the Han Chiang, after cornering him in the vicinity of Icheng.

Participating Units:

3d Division
13th Division
39th Division

The Ikeda Detachment with three infantry battalions of the 6th Division as its nucleus

The Ishimoto Detachment with three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion of the 40th Division as its nucleus.

With the commencement of the second phase operations, the main strength of the 40th Division (Division headquarters and three infantry battalions as its nucleus) will be brought in as reinforcements.

Reinforcements from the 13th Army

The Kurahashi Detachment with three infantry battalions of the 15th Division as its nucleus.

The Matsui Detachment with the infantry group headquarters and three infantry battalions of the 22d Division as its nucleus.

Units under the Direct Command of the Army

One Tank Regiment
One Heavy Field Artillery Brigade
Army Engineers

Supporting Units

3d Air Brigade

One element of the China Expeditionary Fleet (to co-operate during the second phase operations)

The core of the 17th Anchorage Headquarters (the Han Chiang Detachment)

Concentration:

In order to promote peace and order within its sector and thus increase the striking strength of the attacking force, each division will first conduct suppressive operations within and without its sector.

All forces in the area north of the Yangtze River and powerful units in the area south of the river will complete their concentration by the end of April.

As far as possible, the concentration of all units will be carried out at night and, in order to maintain an element of surprise, the movement of units in the area south of the river will be delayed as long as such delays do not hamper operations.

The concentration areas are:

The 3d Division will concentrate at Hsinyang and the sector to its north.

The Ishimoto Detachment will concentrate in the sector northwest of Hsinyang.

The 39th Division will concentrate in the sector northeast of Suihsien, not to include Suihsien.

The Ikeda Detachment will concentrate in the vicinity of Suihsien.

The 13th Division will concentrate in the vicinity of Chunghsiang.

Outline of Tactical Command:

First Phase

The 3d Division and Ishimoto Detachment will leave their assembly areas on X Day. The 3d Division will strike at the enemy from north of the Yuho - Tungpai - Hsihsinchi road. It will advance quickly to the vicinity of Hsiangyang in order to cut off the retreating enemy. It will then contact the enemy's main strength as soon as possible.

The Ishimoto Detachment will advance along the same road to the area east of Hsiangyang repulsing the enemy. It will attack the enemy's left rear. Depending upon the development of the situation, the Detachment may advance from the vicinity of Tungpai to the sector west of Kaocheng.

On X + Y Day, the 39th Division and the Ikeda Detachment will deploy across the widest possible front and induce the enemy confronting them to join action from its fixed positions. They will then seize the opportunity to advance to the area southeast of Hsiangyang and cooperate in the destruction of the enemy's main force.

An element of the 13th Division will guard its front while the main force will break through the Tahungshan Mountain Range and support the operation against the enemy's main force by completing a double envelopment in concert with the 3d Division.

All forces upon arrival in the vicinity of Hsiangyang will assemble their main forces to prepare for an attack upon the enemy.

Prior to the commencement of the operation, a diversionary attack will be conducted in the area south of the Yangtze River.

Second Phase

The 3d Division will cross the Han Chiang at its bend between Hsiangyang and Icheng and advance to Tangyang in order to cut the enemy's line of retreat.

The Ishimoto Detachment (plus an independent infantry battalion, a tank unit and the cavalry regiments of the 3d and 39th Divisions) will take up positions near Hsiangyang and protect the right rear of the Army.

The 39th Division will cross the river near Icheng and advance to Kingmen, while the 13th Division will cross the river near Shayangchen and advance to the vicinity of

Hoyangchen via the vicinity of Shihlipu.

The Ikeda Detachment may cross the Han Chiang in the vicinity of Chiukouchen or, depending upon the situation, may execute a surface maneuver.

Ichang will be captured at a favorable time.

Third Phase

Depending upon the situation, the 3d Division will cross the Han Chiang at Chunghsiang, and the 39th and 13th Divisions at the sector south of Chunghsiang. During this operation the 3d Air Brigade, the Naval Air Group and the Fleet will support the crossing.

Supply

Terminal points of the lines of communication will be placed near Changtaikuan and Yuho in the Hsinyang area, near Suihsien and Maping in the Suihsien area and near Chunghsiang in the 13th Division area. In each area supply points will be located in areas that are accessible to motor vehicles. The main line of communications will be over the Suihsien - Tsaoyang road.

Five to ten per cent of the ammunition requirements will be stockpiled at each terminal point.

Forage and provisions will be procured locally as far as possible.

Communications

In the operational preparation period, chiefly wire communication will be employed and the use of radio communication will be restricted.

The command post of the Army will be located at Yingshan and, at the same time, divisional telephone lines will be installed.

Two radio sets each will be allotted to the 3d and 13th Divisions and one to each of the other groups.

After the second phase operation, radio communication will be employed.

Communication with the 3d Air Brigade will be made via Army Headquarters.

Propaganda Strategy

Prior to the initiation of the operation by the Army, the forces south of the Yangtze River will attack the enemy

in their vicinity and the air brigades will start action in that area.

A propaganda movement will be initiated to induce Tang En Po's Army to go south.

Propaganda to the effect that the forces will return to their home base after the operation in the area east of the Han Chiang will be launched.

False orders will be published by the Army and distributed.

Rumors to the effect that the forces will be redeployed will be circulated at the time of concentration.

Action of Army Headquarters

During the progress of the operations, the command post will be located at Yingshan during the first phase operations and at Yingcheng during the second phase operations.

First Phase Operation

The 11th Army troops which participated in the first phase operations were as follows:

3d Division

Attached Units

- 1st Independent Machine Gun Battalion
- 1st Mortar Battalion
- 3d Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment
- 8th Independent Engineer Regiment

Ishimoto Detachment

Three battalions of the 40th Division as its nucleus

39th Division

Attached Units

- 2d Tank Regiment
- 1st Mountain Artillery Battalion
- 2d Heavy Field Artillery Regiment
- 2d Independent Engineer Regiment
- One and a half independent infantry battalions

Ikeda Detachment

Three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion of the 6th Division as its nucleus

13th Division

Attached units

One Independent Machine Gun Battalion
One Mortar Battalion
1st Heavy Field Artillery Regiment
1st Independent Engineer Regiment

Late in April, the Army completed its preparations for the operations and established its command post at Yingshan.

In order to secure the rear of these forces during the operation a feint was carried out in the area south of the Yangtze River. Spearheaded by the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade which commenced a mopping-up operation in the sector west of Hsiao-chih-kou on 23 April, various groups (14th Independent Mixed Brigade, 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, 34th Division, 33d Division, 6th Division and 40th Division) in the area south of the Yangtze River commenced attacking the enemy on their respective fronts from the 26th. Also, about the 20th, naval craft carried out a feint in the Tungting Hu and Poyang Hu areas. In addition, the Naval Air Group bombed strategic points in the enemy's 9th War Sector area from the 23d.

On 26 April, the Army dispatched summary orders concerning the outline of the operations plan for the first phase operation to the 3d Division, the Ishimoto Detachment, the 39th Division, the Ikeda Detachment and the 13th Division. At the same time, it ordered

the Ogawa Detachment (an independent infantry battalion of the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade), upon its arrival at Yingshan, to join the 3d Division and the Matsui and Kurahashi Detachments, which were scheduled to be dispatched from the 13th Army immediately upon their arrival at Hankou, to advance to Chungsiang.

The units began their offensive between 1 and 4 May and the operation progressed smoothly. The 3d Division occupied Piyang on 4 May. On the same day, the 13th Division broke through the Tahungshan Mountain Range and advanced to the northern foothills of the range. The 39th Division commenced its offensive early that morning and, after dispersing the enemy confronting it, advanced northward. At that time, the 11th Army received information that the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang En Po, had begun to advance southward simultaneously with the commencement of the Japanese first phase operations and that a powerful Chinese unit had reached the sector north of Piyang on the 4th where it was threatening the right flank and rear of the 3d Division. It, therefore, ordered the Division to cut the retreat route of the enemy's main force to the north.

On 5 May, the 3d Division suspended its advance to Tangho, and prepared defense positions in an intermediate section between the two towns for a counterattack. Tang En Po's forces did not attack and the 3d Division occupied Tangho on the 8th.

Meanwhile, the 39th Division and the Ikeda Detachment captured

Tsaoyang on the 6th, then pursued the enemy to the banks of the Tang Ho in a parallel operation with the 13th Division and routed the enemy in that area northwestward.

The 3d Division commenced an immediate southward advance in several columns and closed in upon the enemy's flank in an attempt to cut off his retreat to the north. About 10 May in concert with the other units, it endeavored to capture enemy troops on the banks of the Tang Ho and Pai Ho. Although some results were achieved, the enemy's main force escaped in the direction of Nanyang and Tenghsien.

About this time, several enemy divisions of the 9th War Sector Army in the area south of the Yangtze River advanced northward toward Hsiangyang and the enemy forces located in Hsianghsi area along the west bank area of the Han Chiang also became active. Several divisions of the enemy's 33d Army Group crossed the Han Chiang, infiltrated into the area guarded by the 13th Division and advanced northward along the north side of Yingcheng. After a sharp engagement with the Matsui Detachment between Yingcheng and Chunghsiang, the Chinese forces continued to advance northward. They crossed the road linking Yingshan and Tsaoyang on the 12th or 13th and entered Tungpaishan. Consequently, the Japanese main force's line of communication (the road linking Yingshan and Tsaoyang) was cut for several days after 13 May.

In an attempt to advance to the second phase operations following the engagement in the vicinity of the Pai Ho, on 12 May, the

11th Army ordered the 3d Division, the 39th Division, the Ikeda Detachment and the 13th Division to withdraw to the sector north of Tsaoyang, the bank of the Tang Ho tributary located south of the river and the area south of Chunghsiang respectively. After the 11th, each unit began moving toward the vicinity of the Han Chiang crossing point.

About this time, the 11th Army received information that among the enemy forces swarming against the Japanese Army was the 55th Army Group, which had crossed the Han Chiang in the Hsianghsi area and was advancing toward Tsaoyang by way of the northern foothills of the Tahungshan Mountain Range. The Army decided to contact and destroy this force and ordered the 39th Division to advance rapidly to the northern foothills of the Tahungshan Mountain Range. At the same time, it directed the 13th Division to temporarily discontinue its southward advance and, in cooperation with the 39th Division, to execute a pincer movement against the enemy. On 15 May, the two divisions encircled the enemy in the northern foothills of the range and inflicted heavy casualties on his main force. The 55th Army commander and many of his officers were killed.

As the 11th Army withdrew from the west bank sector of the Pai Ho, approximately 30 enemy divisions (composing their front-line strength) pursued it toward Tsaoyang. Although the 55th Army Group, which had constituted the south wing of the enemy, had been destroyed, the Japanese 3d Division was encircled and attacked by a superior enemy

force in the vicinity of Luyeni and Sanhochon and sustained heavy casualties.

The 11th Army reasoned that since the enemy appeared to estimate that the Japanese forces were returning to their original positions and as they (the enemy) were massed on a comparatively narrow front and pursuing the Japanese forces, that it would be a good time to counterattack. Therefore, the Army decided to suspend temporarily its preparations for crossing the Han Chiang and instead to draw in and intercept the enemy. On 15 May, it issued the following orders:


Discontinuing its movement to the Han Chiang line east of Fancheng, the 3d Division shall secretly deploy in the area extending from the northwestern part of Tsaoyang to the sector northeast of the town and prepare to attack the enemy to the northwest.

The 39th Division shall secretly deploy on the southern side of the Han Chiang tributary located east of Icheng and prepare to attack to the northwest.

The 13th Division shall suspend its withdrawal to the Chunghsiang area immediately and turn back to the north. It shall prepare to attack to the northwest from the rear and between the 3d and 39th Divisions.

On 16 May, in compliance with these orders, each division began to move to its designated area while the enemy continued to come closer and closer. On the same day, on the northern wing especially, elements of Tang En-Po's Army launched a fierce attack against the Ishimoto Detachment and, on the 17th, Japanese troops clashed with the enemy throughout the entire front.

On 18 May, the Army ordered an offensive and, on the 19th, all forces simultaneously launched a fierce attack and the enemy retreat-



ed to the west and northwest. The Japanese forces pursued them inflicting heavy losses on the enemy along the banks of the Tang Ho. The Japanese forces continued the pursuit. About the 21st, the 3d Division arrived in Tenghsien, elements of the 13th Division in the area approximately ten kilometers east of Laohokou and the 39th Division in the sector northwest of Fancheng.

On the 22d, the Army suspended the offensive and ordered all forces to return to their bases in order to prepare to cross the Han Chiang. (Map 30)

Second Phase Operation

The main objectives of the second-phase operation were the mopping up of the remaining enemy in the Tahungshan Mountain Range, the invasion of Ichang and the securing of the Hsianghsi sector.


Mopping-up Operation: It was estimated that the enemy's 44th and 92d Armies, which had hidden in the Tahungshan and Tapihshan Mountain Ranges during the Japanese counterattacks in the vicinity of the Tang Ho and Pai Ho, and the 45th Army, which had infiltrated the Japanese zone of operations by crossing the Han Chiang, planned to cut the Japanese lines of communication in the vicinity of Lishanchen and Tanghsienchen and to advance to the vicinity of Tsaoyang. As their movements became increasingly active, the Japanese 11th Army decided to smash the enemy located in the Tahungshan Mountain Range prior to its attack against the right bank of the Han Chiang. Therefore, on 24 May, it ordered the 40th

Division to open the Suihsien - Tsaoyang highway. On 25 May, it ordered elements of the 40th Division, together with the main force of the 13th Division⁸² and the Kurahashi Detachment to attack the enemy located in the Tahungshan Mountain Range. Upon completion of their mission, the elements of the 40th Division were to return to their parent organization, the 13th Division was to be redeployed in the vicinity of Chiukouchen and the Kurahashi Detachment was to advance to the river-crossing point of the 3d Division. This operation was successfully carried out. The enemy's 92d and 45th Armies sustained heavy losses and retreated in confusion to the southeast.

Toward the end of May, the Ishimoto Detachment was returned to the 40th Division. The Division then covered the right rear of the Army by securing the Suihsien - Tsaoyang highway. As a result, the Suihsien - Tsaoyang highway was opened permitting the transportation of the additional river-crossing material required by the 3d Division.

Meanwhile, the 3d and 39th Divisions concentrated in the vicinity of Menchiachuang and Chuchiawan respectively and prepared to cross the Han Chiang. The Ogawa Detachment covered the river crossing of the Army's main force. As its lines of communication were becoming too long, following the 3d and 39th Divisions' crossing

82. When the main force of the 13th Division advanced to the north, an element remained in the vicinity of Chunghsiung to protect the rear of the division and to garrison the area.



of the Han Chiang, the Army discontinued its supply route over the Suhsien - Tsaoyang highway. At the same time, it ordered the 40th Division again to launch an attack from this highway against the enemy located in the Tahungshan Mountain Range and then to assemble in the Chunghsiang area. As the 40th Division met with stiff resistance, the Army reinforced it with troops of the 13th Division stationed in the vicinity of Chunghsiang and ordered the 3d Air Brigade to support the operation. Helped by these reinforcements the 40th Division succeeded in destroying the enemy and assembled in the vicinity of Kingshan on 20 June. (Map 31 A & B)

Invasion of Ichang: The Chinese on the right bank of the Han Chiang, in order to defend the Ichang area, disposed the 39th, 41st, 53d, 55th, 77th and 26th Armies from north to south in existing positions along the bank of the river and, in addition, brought up part of their strength from the 9th War Sector area.

On 28 May, in order to cross the Han Chiang, the 11th Army issued the following orders:

At midnight on 31 May, the 3d Division shall conduct a surprise crossing of the Han Chiang in the downstream sector near Hsiangyang and, after destroying the enemy, shall occupy Hsiangyang and make preparations for an advance south toward Ichang.

At midnight on 31 May, the 39th Division shall conduct a surprise crossing of the Han Chiang to the bank of the river opposite the north side of Ichang and safeguard the rear of the 3d Division during its invasion of Hsiangyang by securing strategic points along the bank. It shall then make preparations for an advance south toward the Kingmen area.

Disregarding Army orders, the 39th Division bombarded the enemy

on the evening of 31 May and conducted a forced river crossing while the 3d Division crossed the river secretly at midnight. Despite the fact that the movement of both divisions was not coordinated, most of their combat units succeeded in crossing the river by dawn of 1 June without being subjected to large-scale resistance by the enemy. Later, the same day, the 3d Division occupied Hsiangyang.

The Army then ordered the 3d and 39th Divisions to advance south in parallel lines. The 3d Division was to advance to the sector west of Tangyang by way of Nanchang and Yuanan and the 39th Division to Tangyang by way of Icheng and Kingmen. After 2 June, in accordance with Army orders, both divisions continued their advance south, driving the enemy before them.

The Army then issued the following orders to the other units in the area:

From 3 June, rear units shall use the more direct lines of communication.

Bridge materials shall be transported to Chunghsiang down the Han Chiang.

The main strength of the 40th Division shall withdraw from the vicinity of Tsaoyang to Chunghsiang, while clearing out the remnants of the defeated enemy from the Tahungshan Mountains.

On 4 June, 11th Army Headquarters shall transfer its command post from Yingshan to Yingcheng.

As the 3d and 39th Divisions advanced south to the vicinity of the battlelines east and west of Icheng, the Chinese forces lost contact with each other and were forced to engage the Japanese divisions separately. In consequence, the Chinese were defeated and

routed to the vicinity of the mountainous district to the west.

The Chungking Regime sent Chen Cheng⁸³ to Ichang in haste to unify the armies.

With the favorable development of the 3d and 39th Divisions' operations, the 11th Army ordered the 13th Division to cross the Han Chiang in the sector south of Chiukouchen on 4 June, rush toward Ichang, and then, in cooperation with those groups advancing south, to destroy the opposing enemy. The Army also ordered the Ikeda Detachment of the 6th Division to cross the Han Chiang in the vicinity of the bank opposite Chienchiang. The vanguard of the 13th Division reached the vicinity of Shihlipu on the morning of 7 June and the Ikeda Detachment occupied Chiangling and Shashih on the 8th. Simultaneously with the crossing of the river by the Ikeda Detachment, the Han Chiang Detachment⁸⁴ also crossed the lower reaches of the river and proceeded to Shashih to cooperate with the Army's main force.

On 6 June, the 3d and 39th Divisions occupied Kuanyinssu and Kingmen respectively. Then, as the whole mountainous district in the vicinity of Hsiakou was occupied by powerful enemy forces, the 3d Division attacked this sector from the 8th but was met by stub-

83. Chen Cheng was Commander in Chief of the 5th War Sector Army and was, at that time, in Chungking.

84. This Detachment was composed of the core of the 17th Anchorage Headquarters.

born resistance and, on the 11th, had progressed only as far as Yuanan.

The Army then ordered each division⁸⁵ to rush a unit composed of three infantry battalions to Ichang. These units penetrated Ichang on 12 June and cleared its vicinity of enemy troops.

Upon arrival of the Matsui Detachment at Chunghsiang on 9 June, the Army ordered the Kurahashi and Ogawa Detachments attached to it. It then ordered the Matsui Detachment with its reinforcements to the sector north of Kingmen to guard the right rear flank of the Army against the enemy in the north. The Detachment crossed the Han Chiang on the 10th and arrived at the sector west of Lihokou on the 11th. There it assumed garrison duty.

On 6 June, under the direction of the engineer commander, the necessary bridge materials were transported down the Han Chiang from the river-crossing points. They arrived at Chunghsiang on the 9th. On the way, the Kurahashi and Ogawa Detachments, which had been assigned to escort duty, changed direction to the sector north of Kingmen, where they placed themselves under the command of the Matsui Detachment, as instructed.

With the occupation of Ichang, the Army ordered the 13th, 3d and 39th Divisions to garrison the vicinity of Ichang, Tangyang and Kingmen respectively.

85. The 3d, 39th and 13th Divisions. A unit from each division was taken for morale purposes. As Ichang was a large and important centre, it was felt that its capture would boost the morale of the forces participating in its capture.

In accordance with 11th Army orders, after having withdrawn its long line of communications, the 40th Division endeavored to clear the enemy from the Tahungshan Mountain Range. However, the enemy took full advantage of the terrain and fought back stubbornly and the Division made very little progress. The Army, therefore, ordered the 3d Air Brigade, which had participated in the Ichang Operation, to cooperate with the Division. At the same time, it dispatched an element of the 13th Division, and heavy field and anti-aircraft artillery units, concentrated in the vicinity of Chunghsiang, to reinforce the 40th Division. Assisted by these reinforcements, the Division finally broke through the enemy positions on 19 June and advanced to the vicinity of Kingshan on the 20th.

The commander of the 40th Division was wounded during this operation.

Security of Hsianghsi Sector: With the fall of Ichang, the main strength of the enemy's 33d Army Group in the Hsianghsi sector fled into the mountains north of Ichang, while elements took refuge in the mountains west of Yuanan. As the objective of the Ichang Operation had been accomplished, the 11th Army decided to return its units to their original stations and ordered the following disposition:

The 3d and 39th Divisions shall occupy the vicinity of Tangyang and Kingmen respectively in order to cover the withdrawal of the 13th Division from Ichang against enemy attack from the north.

The 13th Division shall withdraw from midnight of 16 June.

In view of a possible enemy disturbance in the sector


along the Canton - Hankou railway, the Ikeda Detachment shall return to the 6th Division.

With the occupation of the vicinity of Kingmen by the 39th Division, the Matsui Detachment shall return to its original station.

At that time, Imperial General Headquarters decided that the continued occupation of Ichang was necessary, not only as a base from which Chungking and other inland cities could be bombed, but also for the propaganda effect it would have on foreign nations. On 16 June, therefore, it ordered the China Expeditionary Army to secure the city. Accordingly, the 11th Army ordered the 13th Division to secure Ichang. However, this order was not received by the 13th Division until dawn the following day due to a breakdown in radio communications. In the meantime, on the evening of the 16th, the 13th Division had begun to withdraw from the city and by 0100 on the 17th had withdrawn from the vicinity of Ichang. Upon receiving the 11th Army's order at dawn, however, it turned back immediately and re-occupied the city, after driving out the enemy which had begun to return.

As the Ichang Airfield was threatened by enemy occupying the hill overlooking the airfield from the southern bank of the Yangtze River, the Army ordered the 13th Division to occupy this hill. On 29 June, the Division crossed the river at a point on the east side of Ichang, overcame the enemy and occupied the hill. (Map 32)

On 1 July, the 4th Division, which had been scheduled to return to Japan from Manchuria was placed under the command of the 11th Army.



Upon the arrival of this division in the vicinity of Chunghsiang, the Kurahashi and Ogawa Detachments, as well as other units in the area, were ordered to return to their original stations. At the same time, the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, which had been on garrison duty in the vicinity of Jochi, was assigned to garrison duty in the vicinity of Kouchihoshih.

Actions North and South of the Yangtze River: During the Ichang Operation, the enemy had conducted local attacks against garrison areas but had been held in check by the small garrison units.

Although there had been very little disturbance in the area south of the Yangtze River during April, the enemy became more aggressive about mid-May.

In the 6th Division's area of responsibility the enemy frequently obstructed the traffic along the Canton - Hankou railway forcing the division to conduct frequent all-out punitive expeditions in this area. The 40th Division repulsed the enemy attacking from Tungshan and its northeastern sectors and routed him on 19 May. On 10 May, the 34th Division cleared the enemy from the area southwest of Nanchang while the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade mopped-up the enemy invading Wuning from 15 to 19 May and the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked and routed about 3,000 enemy troops which had invaded the sector southwest of Juichang from 13 to 18 May.

In the area north of the Yangtze River, the Chinese began to conduct guerrilla actions against the Japanese rear about mid-May.

The 68th Army, which had regrouped in the Chuehshan area and the 171st Division in the Tapieshan Mountains launched persistent attacks against Hsinyang, while the 45th Army attempted to invade the sector north of Suihsien. However, the units of the 3d Division guarding the rear successfully repulsed the numerically superior enemy.

In view of this situation, the 11th Army dispatched the Sazawa Battalion of the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade to the Hsinyang sector where it successfully counterattacked and destroyed the enemy.

The enemy strength during the Ichang Operation was estimated at approximately 81 divisions with 350,000 troops,⁸⁶ with casualties estimated at over 60,000. Captured materiel consisted of 26 field and mountain guns, two automatic cannons, 55 mortars, 3 antiaircraft machine guns, 145 heavy machine guns, 577 light machine guns, 12,557 rifles, ammunition, and other combat materiel.

The Japanese casualties were 2,700 troops killed and 7,800 wounded.

The occupation of Ichang not only strengthened Japanese pressure against the inland district of Szechwan and cut off communication between the Chinese 5th and 9th War Sectors but also gave the Japanese an advantageous base for air attacks against Chungking. - Further, it undoubtedly dealt a considerable blow to the morale and fighting

86. Many of these divisions were under strength. In fact, some were able to put only a detachment in the field.

capacity of the Chinese as no large-scale offensive was mounted after this operation. However, it was not sufficient to destroy the Chungking regime and the Japanese garrison strength was severely depleted.

CHAPTER V

Operations During 1941

Chin Chiang Operation

In view of the light troop disposition in north China at the beginning of 1941, the China Expeditionary Army decided to transfer the 17th Division (under the command of the 13th Army) and the 33d Division (under the command of the 11th Army) from central China to north China and issued orders accordingly in mid-March 1941.

The 11th Army, therefore, decided to strike the enemy located west and southwest of Fenghsin prior to the transfer of the 33d Division and ordered the 33d and 34th Divisions, stationed in the vicinity of Ani and Nanchang respectively, to undertake this operation jointly.

After breaking through the enemy's front line on 15 March, the 33d Division destroyed the enemy located to the west of Fenghsin and, on 22 March, returned to its starting point.

The 34th Division began to advance on 15 March and broke through and destroyed the enemy's front line force. It then advanced toward Shangkao and attacked enemy positions in that area on the 20th. However, there it was subjected to an unexpected counterattack by a superior enemy (approximately eight divisions) and practically put to rout.

In order to rescue the 34th Division, the 11th Army commander ordered the 3d Air Brigade to support it and rushed the 33d Division

toward Tangpu.

The 33d Division began its advance toward Tangpu on 23 March. There it destroyed the enemy and advanced to the vicinity of Shangkao on the 28th. Supported by the 3d Air Brigade, it rescued the 34th Division. Both divisions returned to their original stations on 2 April. (Map 33)

This operation not only delayed the transfer of the 33d Division to north China, but during the fighting the division received about 400 casualties. It arrived in north China the day before the commencement of the Chungyuan Operation and immediately had to begin the difficult operation without preparation.⁸⁷

Diversionsary Operation to assist the
Chungyuan Operation


In early May 1941, in order to assist the Chungyuan Operation which it was planned to launch in north China, the 11th Army commander, Lt Gen. Korechika Anami, decided to destroy the enemy forces operating in the key sector north of the Yangtze River. He therefore, published the following operational plan:

Policy:

The 11th Army shall mount a series of attacks beginning 5 May. Each force shall independently attack its confronting enemy.

The operational period shall be from seven to ten days.

87. Monograph No 178, North China Area Operations, Vol I.



Units to be Employed:

3d Division (consisting of 11 infantry battalions, one tank regiment and two mountain artillery battalions as its nucleus and commanded by Lt Gen Teshima.)

39th Division (consisting of seven infantry battalions as its nucleus and commanded by Lt Gen Murakami.)

4th Division (consisting of four infantry battalions as its nucleus and commanded by Lt Gen Kitano.)

18th Independent Mixed Brigade (consisting of five infantry battalions as its nucleus and commanded by Maj Gen Tsutsumi.)

Principles of Tactical Command:

On 22 April the 3d Division shall launch a feint against the area north of Hsinyang. Thereafter, on or about 5 May, it shall mount an attack against the enemy on the Suhsien front.

The 39th Division shall initiate an attack on or about 8 May and destroy the enemy located north of Kingmen.

The 18th Independent Mixed Brigade shall launch an attack on or about 8 May and destroy the enemy north of Tangyang.

The operational period for each force mentioned above shall be from seven to ten days.

The 4th Division shall execute a feint against the Loyangtien, Pingpachen and Chunghsiung areas from 7 to 12 May in order to facilitate the operations of the 3d and 39th Divisions.

Summary of Progress

The main force of the 3d Division left the vicinity of Hochiatien, its assembly area, on 5 May and advanced, destroying the enemy on the way. However, the enemy started a general retreat about 7 May and, on the 10th, the 3d Division tightened its encirclement to the periphery of Huantanchen.

The Division occupied Huantanchen until 13 May. It began to move again on the evening of that day in order to engage and destroy

the main force of the 22d Army Group. It penetrated Tsaoyang on the 15th and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. It commenced to move again on the 16th, and, on the 17th, dealt a severe blow to the 29th Army in the vicinity of Hsiaopanchia. On the 21st, in cooperation with the rear echelon stationed at Hsinyang, it destroyed elements of the 55th Army in that area. From the 20th to the 22d, it returned to its original station.

On 8 May, the 39th Division departed from Kingmen and the assembly points to the north thereof. On the 9th, it attacked strong enemy positions to the north and, on the 10th, broke through and assembled to the rear of the enemy positions. One of its elements then pursued the enemy toward Anchiachi while the main force returned to its home base.

The 18th Independent Mixed Brigade departed from its assembly area on the night of 7 May and arrived in the valley of the Chiuchiang Ho, north of Yuanan on the 9th. On the 10th, it began to move eastward in order to attack the enemy located at Kuanyinssu. It captured Kuanyinssu on the 12th and then, in compliance with Army orders, returned to its original station.

On 8 May, the 4th Division, which had been ordered to carry out a feint, began to advance toward Sanlikang and Liushuikou and on the 10th arrived at these two towns without encountering any strong enemy opposition. The Division then ordered the element occupying Sanlikang to carry out a feint toward Loyantien. The unit left Sanlikang on the

5 - 22 MAY 1941

 CHINESE ARMY



24

HAN CHIANG

ANCHIACHI •

ELM  39

CHIUCHIANG
HO'

10 MAY.

12 MAY.

MAY.

KUANYINSSU

◦ KINGMEN

18 IND MIX

• TANGYANG

16 MAY.

22

• TSAOYANG

← 15 MAY.

17 MAY.

XXXX

7 MAY.

SANLIKANG

10 MAY.

10-13 MAY.

• HUANTANCHEN

SUIHSIEN®

5 MAY.

YINGSHAN®

14 MAY.

8 MAY.

ELM 4 DIV.

22 APR.

21 MAY.

22 MAY.

ELM  3 DIV.

ELM 55

21 MAY.

• HOCHIATIEN

22 MAY.

AREA SHOWN

HSINYANG

SHANGHAI

ANKΟΥ

CANTON 6

MAP NO. 34

12th and, after passing through Loyangtien, arrived at Anlu on the 14th. (Map 34)

Although the 11th Army fought against seventeen divisions during this operation, it did not succeed in inflicting very heavy damage to them. Moreover, the distance between the scene of this operation and the Chungyuan Operation was between 300 and 400 kilometers, therefore, it was felt that it had had very little direct influence on the Chungyuan Operation. However, the 11th Army's attack on the 5th War Sector Army, did prevent that Army from reinforcing the Chinese forces in the Shansi Province area.

1st Changsha Operation⁸⁸

General Situation before the Operation

The Chinese 9th War Sector Army had not been employed in battle since the fall of 1939 and during the following two years had concentrated on restoring its strength until, in the fall of 1941, it numbered approximately 30 divisions of well trained and well equipped troops.

Its main force was drawn up along the Canton - Hankou railway. Defenses in depth had been constructed in areas between the Hsinchiang Ho and the southern bank of the Liuyang Ho and also in the coastal area along the Tungting Hu where they were prepared to

88. This operation was designated "1st Changsha Operation" by the Japanese, but was known as the "2d Changsha Operation" by the Chinese. (See footnote 65.)

defend the Changsha district against any possible attack from the Japanese forces.

The organization of the 9th War Sector Army about the beginning of September 1941 was as follows:⁸⁹

Commander of the 9th War Sector Army - General Pi Yueh⁹⁰

74th Army: 51st, 57th and 58th Divisions

3d Army*: 12th Division* and 183d Division

58th Army: 10th* and 11th* Divisions

72d Army: 14th* and 15th* Divisions

78th Army: 13th* and 16th* Divisions

20th Army: 133d and 134th Divisions

4th Army: 59th, 90th and 102d Divisions

37th Army: 60th, 95th and 140th Divisions

99th Army: 92d, 99th and 197th Divisions


26th Army: 32d, 41st and 44th Divisions

* - newly activated

The 11th Army had occupied the Wuchang - Hankou area since the

89. Although it is known that the strength of the 9th War Sector Army at this time was 30 divisions, it has been possible to obtain the designations of only 25 of these divisions.

90. General Pi Yueh was appointed commander of the 1st Division under the direct command of the Central Government in 1926. In 1934 he was promoted to the rank of General. In 1935 he was appointed commander of the Chinese 2d Army and in 1939 commander of the 9th War Sector Army. Although in 1949 he was appointed Governor of Kwangtung Province (where he was born in 1896) he remained in Formosa where he is still living.



end of 1938 with the mission of destroying the enemy and crushing his will to continue the war. The operational strength of the Army as of September 1941 was seven divisions (the 3d, 4th, 6th, 13th, 34th, 39th and 40th Divisions) and two mixed brigades (the 14th and 18th Independent Mixed Brigades.)

The disposition of the both the Japanese 11th Army and the Chinese forces was as shown on Map 35.

During this period, besides garrisoning the occupied areas against the confronting enemy, the 11th Army had taken the offensive both whenever the enemy appeared to be preparing to counterattack and also in order to destroy the enemy's fighting power.

The Chinese had destroyed all vehicle roads in the area and there remained only the ridges between the ricefields as a means of transportation. Although the necessity for constructing new highways to permit the smooth execution of future operations was recognized, due to the topographical features of the country it was impossible to construct vehicle roads that could stand up during the rainy season.

Operational Command

In order to crush the 9th War Sector Army, the 11th Army considered it necessary to conduct an operation against the Changsha area. The China Expeditionary Army agreed that this was necessary and submitted its plan to Imperial General Headquarters and, on 26 August 1941, the commander of the China Expeditionary Army received permission from Imperial General Headquarters to carry out operations.

in districts beyond his operational area in Central China during the summer and autumn. He, therefore, ordered the 11th Army to carry out the 1st Changsha Operation and, when its mission was achieved, to return to its original station. The 3d Air Group was ordered to cooperate in the operation with an element. At the same time, three infantry battalions (one battalion from each the 17th, 32d and 116th Divisions) were dispatched to Yoyang and placed under the tactical command of the commander of the 11th Army.

At the end of September, the China Expeditionary Army asked Imperial General Headquarters for permission to operate, if necessary, beyond the Huang Ho in the Chenghsien area. This permission was granted.

About the middle of September, as the 11th Army had decided to take the offensive against the western sector of the 9th War Sector Army, it published the following plan:⁹¹

Purpose of the Operation:

To deal a severe blow to the western sector of the 9th War Sector Army so as to crush any enemy attempt to resist.

Outline of Operational Command

On 18 September the Army will open the offensive. First, the Army after conquering enemy troops in the area between

91. This plan was obtained from a manuscript written by General Korechika Anami who was commander of the 11th Army during this operation. At that time his rank was Lt General. He was later promoted to General. At the end of World War II he was Minister of War. On 15 August 1945, he committed hara kiri.

the Hsinchiang Ho and the Ku Shui, will advance to the right bank of the Ku Shui below Changlochieh. There it will prepare for the next attack. It will then attack the enemy's 4th and 99th Armies on the left bank of the Ku Shui and penetrate the enemy lines in the district along the Hsinshih - Lichiao road. The main force will encircle and annihilate the enemy in the area extending from the west of the Hsinshih - Lichiao road to the Hsiang Chiang. Meanwhile, an element (the 6th and 40th Divisions) will destroy hostile troops in the hilly district near Putang, ten kilometers west-southwest of Pingchiang.

The date for commencing the attack against the enemy on the left bank of the Ku Shui will be 23 September and, by the end of September, the operational mission should be achieved.

Prior to this, during the last phase of the concentration of the 11th Army troops, an element in cooperation with a naval support force, will conduct a feint toward Changte.

The garrison unit in the Nanchang - Hsiaoehikou railway area will carry out attacks at the proper time in order to check the 9th War Sector Army to their front.

Outline of Troops to be Used in the Changsha Operation:

The 3d Division with four mountain artillery battalions attached.

4th Division with two mountain artillery battalions and one trench mortar battalion attached.

6th Division with two mountain artillery battalions and one trench mortar battalion attached.

40th Division with one mountain artillery battalion attached.

Hayabuchi Detachment - four infantry battalions and two mountain artillery battalions of the 13th Division as its nucleus plus other minor units.

Araki Detachment - three infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion of the 39th Division as its nucleus plus other minor units.

Hirano Detachment - one infantry battalion and one mountain artillery company of the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade as its nucleus plus other minor units.

Eto Detachment - one infantry battalion of the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade as its nucleus plus other minor units.

13th Tank Regiment with two light armored vehicle companies attached.

14th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment

1st Battalion of the 15th Independent Heavy Field Artillery Regiment.

Army Engineer Unit - three independent engineer regiments and eight bridging material companies as its nucleus plus other minor units.

Line of Communication Sector Unit - eight motor transport companies and nine transport companies as its nucleus plus other minor units.

Total: 45 infantry battalions and 27 artillery battalions

Cooperation Unit

1st Air Brigade composed of three army reconnaissance squadrons and three direct cooperation units.

3d Air Brigade composed of one headquarters reconnaissance plane squadron, two fighter squadrons and three light bomber squadrons.⁹²

Concentration of 11th Army:⁹³

At the end of August, in order to facilitate the concentration of the Army and its subsequent operations, the Army ordered the 6th Division, which had been garrisoning the area along the Canton - Hankou railway to subjugate the hostile troops on the left bank of the Yangtze River, north of Yoyang and in the vicinity of Mt Tayunshan, 45 kilometers east-southeast of Yoyang.

At the end of August, an element of the division cleared the vicinity of Niehchiaho, 10 kilometers west of Linhsiang, and Chihpakou, 22 kilometers north-northwest of Yoyang of enemy troops. On 5 September the main force of the division opened an offensive on Mt Tayunshan and destroyed the enemy's 4th Army. At the same time it

92. This brigade participated in the latter part of the operation only.

93. This information was obtained from a manuscript written by General Anami.

neutralized enemy strongholds near the mountain on the right bank of the Shachiang Ho.

In the middle of August, the Army commenced its concentration. This was achieved by ships, trains and by marching. In order to keep the movement secret from the enemy many of the troops were debarked at Chiayu and from there marched to their destination.

An outline of the concentration of each group was as follows:

On 30 August, the 4th Division departed from its station for the area south of Yoyang and assembled in the vicinity of Lichiawan, 6 kilometers northeast of Hsinchiang.

On 4 September, the 3d Division left its station for the district south of Yoyang and assembled in the vicinity of Kengkou, 4 kilometers east of Lichiawan.

After the mopping-up campaign in the Mt Tayunshan area, the 6th Division advanced to the area south of Yoyang and concentrated in the vicinity of Houtanghsia, 6 kilometers east-southeast of Kengkou. There the Eto Detachment was attached to the Division.

On 7 September, the 40th Division left Hsienning and, marching at night in order to conceal their movement from the enemy, first assembled temporarily on the 10th at Taolin, 30 kilometers east of Yoyang, then reassembled near Siaotang, 4 kilometers east-southeast of Houtanghsia.

Toward the end of August the Hayabuchi Detachment left Ichang and concentrated its forces at the rear of the Army's right flank.

The Hirano Detachment assembled in the vicinity of Chenglingchi where it made preparations for a surface maneuver.

These forces then completed their concentration in secrecy by 17 September.⁹⁴

About the beginning of September, after the Tayunshan Operation by the 6th Division, the enemy attempted a counterattack with approximately three armies (58th, 4th and 37th Armies) from the upper reaches of the Shachiang Ho against the Japanese 40th Division, which was assembling in the vicinity of Paiyangtien, 7 kilometers north of Siaotang, and Tienlan, 4 kilometers northeast of Siaotang. In order to avert an enemy threat to the division's rear flank, the 11th Army rushed the Araki Detachment to the area and attached it provisionally to the division. The Detachment repulsed the enemy. (Map 36)


Outline of Progress of the 11th Army Operation:

Battle in the area between the Ku Shui and Hsinchiang Ho.

Based on the operational plan, the commander of the 11th Army assigned to his subordinate groups the following missions:

At dawn on 18 September, the 4th Division was to break through enemy positions on the banks of the Hsinchiang Ho and the main force was then to advance to the Canton - Hankou railway area. After co-operating in the mopping-up operation of the Hayabuchi Detachment

94. Although all available sources have been explored it has not been possible to ascertain the exact date these forces reached their assembly points.



there, the Division was to advance to the left bank of the Ku Shui as quickly as possible.

At dawn on the 18th, the 3d Division was to overcome the enemy on the right bank of the Shachiang Ho and then to advance, as swiftly as possible, to the right bank of the Ku Shui near Hsinshih.

At daybreak on the 18th, the 6th Division was to overrun the enemy positions on the southern bank of the Shachiang Ho and then to advance swiftly to the Ku Shui near Changlochieh.

Also on the 18th, the 40th Division was to break through the enemy positions in the highlands northwest of Yanglinchieh and then to advance toward Pingchiang.

The Hayabuchi Detachment, following the advance of the 4th Division and simultaneously with the commencement of the Army actions, was to drive toward Luchiao through the district south of Hsinchiang and then clean up the enemy on the left bank of the Hsinchiang Ho. Thereafter, the Detachment was to advance to the Ku Shui.

By the night of 17 September, the 11th Army had completed its deployment along the lower reaches of the Shachiang Ho below Yanglinchieh and, at dawn of the 18th, opened the offensive. After breaking through the positions of the Chinese 4th Army on the southern bank of the Shachiang Ho, the 11th Army's main force pursued the retreating enemy toward the Ku Shui.

On 18 September, the Hayabuchi Detachment rushed westward in the direction of Luchiao through the districts south of Hsinchiang,

simultaneously with the opening of the offensive. After mopping up the hostile troops on the left bank of the Hsinchiang Ho, on the 21st, the Detachment marched swiftly toward the Ku Shui. On the 22d, in accordance with an 11th Army order, the Detachment was placed under the tactical command of the 4th Division.

The 4th Division, after overrunning enemy positions on the banks of the Hsinchiang Ho, advanced to the vicinity of Tungpenchung, Liuchiachung and Huangshachieh. It then cooperated with the Hayabuchi Detachment in the mopping-up operation in this sector by intercepting the retreating enemy. At dawn on the 19th, the 4th Division reopened its southward drive and, by dawn of the 20th, had assembled its main forces near Shih-toupu on the right bank of the Ku Shui.

At dawn of the 18th, the 3d Division destroyed the hostile force occupying the tableland on the southern bank of the Shachiang Ho and, by dusk, had advanced to a line east and west of Tachingchieh. They continued a running encounter during the night, but by about 1500 on the 19th, occupied the right bank of the Ku Shui. By daybreak the following morning, an element of the Division had established a beachhead on the left bank of the river in the vicinity of Hsinshih.

Also at dawn of the 18th, the 6th Division broke through the enemy positions on the southern bank of the Shachiang Ho and pursued the routed enemy to the vicinity of Changlochieh, while an element advanced to the left bank of the Ku Shui.

During its concentration, the 40th Division had been attacked

persistently by the Chinese 58th Army from the eastern hills. The Araki Detachment was employed to meet these attacks. On the night of the 17th an element of the Division occupied the highlands around Changssuming. The next morning, it overran the enemy positions on the highlands northwest of Yanglinchieh and by that evening had reached Wangfutai and the district to the north thereof. On the 19th, the main force of the Division attacked the Chinese 59th Division of the 4th Army, on the highlands lying east and west of Tenglungchiao, dispersing this force by 1400. It then rushed to the southern district of Kuanwangchiao and attacked the enemy in the hilly region west of Chukungchiao to pave the way for the drive to the Pingchiang area. On the 21st, after again overrunning the enemy, the 40th Division stationed the Eto Detachment in the vicinity of Shetsui to protect the left flank and rear of the 11th Army and the Division's main force moved toward Tzuchiang.

At dawn on the 18th, simultaneously with the opening of the attack by the 11th Army's main force, the Hirano Detachment landed at Hsiahusan, 20 kilometers north-northwest of Hsiangyin, supported by the 1st China Expeditionary Fleet. On September 19 the Detachment, after defeating the hostile troops in that area, occupied Yenliaoshan, southeast of Shangchingshan, and on the 21st moved into Lulintan, ten kilometers south of Shangchingshan, and Toumitsui, two kilometers southeast of Lulintan.

The 1st China Expeditionary Fleet occupied Yingtien and Mt

Leishihshan to protect the lower reaches of the Hsiang Chiang.

Battles in the area between the Ku Shui and Laotao Ho.

On 19 September, after the main force of the 11th Army had reached the Ku Shui, an element of the 6th Division occupied key positions on the left bank of the river near Tienchingmiao, seven kilometers south of Changlochieh. It then advanced gradually to the Wukou area where it established a foothold in preparation for a new offensive on the left bank of the Ku Shui.

At that time it was known that the Chinese 37th Army was occupying positions between Lichiatuan and Mafengtsui and that their 26th Army was assembling in the vicinity of Chinching in order to launch a flank attack from the east of the Japanese forces marching south from the Changlochieh area. The 11th Army, therefore, decided to annihilate this force by encircling them in the area north of Shangshashih.

It ordered the 6th Division to rush toward the Wengchiang area where it was to prepare to attack the rear flank of the 26th Army near Chinching. At the same time, the 3d and 4th Divisions were to transfer to the operational areas of the 6th and 3d Divisions respectively. Preparations for the attack were to be completed by sunset of 22 September.

On the 21st, the main force of the 6th Division advanced to Wengchiang and, on the 22d, an element (three infantry battalions under the command of Colonel Takehara) advanced to Sanchiaotang. Also on the 21st, the 4th Division left its concentration site near

Shihtoupu and advanced to the district south of Hsinshih and the 3d Division transferred to the left bank of the Ku Shui south of Chanlochieh.

On the morning of the 22d, Japanese reconnaissance planes reported that there were several long columns of enemy troops marching toward Chinchung from Changsha and that the enemy 74th Army, which had been near Wantsai, 130 kilometers southeast of Pingchiang, was moving toward Liuyang.

As the 11th Army felt it was urgently necessary to attack the enemy on their direct front before the arrival of reinforcements, the 4th, 3d and 6th Divisions were ordered to commence their attacks immediately. The 40th Division, which had been slowed up in its advance, was relieved from its mission of occupying Pingchiang and changed its course to Wengchiang in order to attack the hostile troops along the Wengchiang - Chinchung road about midway between the 3d and 6th Divisions.

On the 23d, while the main force of the 6th Division was detouring the enemy outer wing, an element, advancing across steep mountains, reached Sankoushiang and rushed into Chinchung that night. The Division's main force advanced to Shuangchiangkou on the same day and, on the 24th, intercepted the rear line of communications of the enemy in the hilly region west of Putang at Ssulungtuan.

On the 24th, the main forces of the 4th and 3d Divisions executed a pincer movement and attacking the 37th Army destroyed them around

their positions.

The 29th Infantry Brigade of the 3d Division which had broken through the enemy positions in the mountains near Lishutan and advanced to the rear of the 140th Division of the Chinese 37th Army, by the morning of the 24th, in collaboration with the penetration of the enemy front by an element, wiped out this hostile division. Thereafter, it was estimated that during their advance toward Chinching, they destroyed about one half of the enemy 10th Army.

Following this action contact was established with the 6th Division in the western district of Chinching, thereby achieving the encirclement of the main force of the enemy 26th Army.

As the Army anticipated that the 40th Division would be in position to attack the enemy in the Wengchiang district on the 25th, on the night of the 24th, it issued an order to annihilate the encircled enemy with elements of the 3d and 6th Divisions and the entire force of the 40th Division on the 25th and thereafter to drive toward Changsha en masse.

The advance of the 40th Division in the district south of Wengchiang did not progress smoothly due to the steep and difficult terrain and, in consequence, the main force of the Chinese 26th Army managed to evade it and the 40th Division encountered only minor groups en route to Chinching.

Since the opening of the attack on the Chinese 37th Army on the 22d, the 4th Division had attacked them from the front and left rear

flank and had succeeded in delivering a hard blow to their 95th Division. Marching southward on the 25th, the Division routed the enemy and occupied their positions on a line east and west of Lichiao and, that same evening, defeated the enemy near Chingshanshih. On the 27th, they attacked the enemy 10th Army near Ansha. These actions slowed down the Division's progress in comparison with the advances made on the other fronts.

In the hilly district to the left of the 11th Army, the enemy 4th and 58th Armies occupied strong positions and, about the 22d, they were reinforced by the 20th Army, thus increasing the pressure on the left rear flank of the 11th Army.

Having dispatched the Araki Detachment on the 21st and the 40th Division on the 22d to the main operational area, the 11th Army had only the Eto Detachment near Shetsui to protect its left rear flank. With this growing enemy threat, on the 24th, the 40th Division dispatched one infantry battalion to Kuanwangchiao to be placed under the tactical command of the commander of the Eto Detachment and personnel of the heavy artillery and tank units, which had become immobile due to bad road conditions, were mobilized to guard the lines of communications.

On the 24th, the 11th Army issued orders for an element to annihilate the Chinese 26th Army, which had been forced into a pocket near Putang, and for the main force to pursue the enemy toward Changsha. At the same time, it planned to destroy the cream of the

Chinese forces, the 74th Army,⁹⁵ which had been advancing from the Liuyang district.

It was planned that the 4th Division was to advance to the mouth of the Liuyang Ho by way of Chuchiahu, the 3d Division to the southern district of Changsha through Chintan and the 6th Division to the valley of the Laotao Ho near Peishengtseng. From these positions they were to launch an attack to destroy the 74th Army. At the same time, the 40th Division and the Araki Detachment were to assemble their forces in the vicinity of Chinchung and prepare for a subsequent running battle to annihilate the 26th Army.

Based on an air intelligence report that the 74th Army was advancing toward Yunganshih, at 1300 on the 25th, the Army ordered the 6th and 3d Divisions into immediate action against this enemy force.

Soon after the 74th Army reached the line of the Laotao Ho on the 26th, both divisions were in contact with it. The 3d Division encircled the enemy's left wing south of Chunhuashan and the 6th Division its right wing in the district north of Tungyangshih. The two divisions attacked and dealt the enemy a severe blow. On the 27th, both divisions advanced to the line of the Liuyang Ho.

In order to intercept the routed 74th Army retreating toward Liuyang, the Army dispatched the 40th Division to occupy Mt Shihshingshan. However, on the 28th, when the Division arrived there, they found only

95. The 74th Army was part of the Central Government Army.

minor groups of the retreating enemy in the vicinity.

Although the 4th Division's advance was slowed down, the Hayabuchi Detachment, which was attached to the Division, overran enemy positions near Lichiao on the 25th and then advanced toward Changsha. The Detachment rushed through the valley of the Paisho Ho and, in the face of strong enemy resistance, crossed the Laotao Ho in the vicinity of Lohanchuang on the night of the 26th. At dawn on the 27th, the Detachment, supported by air units, broke through enemy positions on the southern bank of the Liuyang Ho. Utilizing materials in the area, they crossed the river at a point northeast of Changsha and rushed to Changsha the same day. On the 28th, they had occupied the entire city.

The main force of the 4th Division, after defeating the enemy in the northern district of Ansha, on the 28th advanced to the Liuyang Ho in the vicinity of Langlishih and, on the 29th, assembled at Changsha and its environs.

Inasmuch as the Army had achieved its operational mission to crush the enemy strength by destroying the 74th Army and with Changsha now in its hands, the Army decided to prepare for a turning operation by concentrating its main force on the river site of the Liuyang Ho between Changsha and Chentoushih. On the 28th it issued an order to this effect.

However, on the 28th, the commander of the 11th Army received a dispatch from the commander of the 3d Division to the effect that the Division's first-line units were carrying out a running fight in


the district about midway between Chintan and Chuchou and he requested permission to pursue the routed enemy toward Chuchou with his main force, returning to Chintan at an appropriate time. The Army commander approved this request on condition that the Division return to Chintan by the 30th.

The 3d Division continued to advance and, on the morning of the 29th, an element of the Division occupied Chuchou while the main force destroyed enemy military installations around that area. In accordance with orders from the 11th Army commander, the Division then re-assembled in the vicinity of Chintan toward noon on the 30th.

(Map 37)

Turning Operation

With a view to destroying the enemy forces that remained in the areas to the rear of the Army flanks (especially the main force of the 99th Army which had been in the Tamoshan Mountain Range) and also in order to facilitate the turning operation, the 11th Army, prior to the evacuation of its main force, dispatched the Araki Detachment and the Morita Detachment (two infantry battalions of the 4th Division) to the east of Hsiangyin and to the northern foothills of the Shentingshan Mountain, a hilly region 12 kilometers south-southwest of Hsinshih, to prepare for the attack on Mt Tamoshan. Also the Hirano Detachment was ordered to occupy Hsiangyin on or about 3 October as a preliminary procedure. After taking these steps, at dusk on 1 October, the main force of the 11th Army commenced its



turning operation.

The 40th and 6th Divisions evacuated along the road through Yunganshih, Mafengtsui and Changlochieh; the 4th Division through the district along the Changsha - Hsiangyin Road and the 3d Division through the district between these two roads.

The Araki Detachment was put under the tactical command of the commander of the 4th Division on 3 October when it reached Hsinkaishih, 12 kilometers south of Kueii. There it cooperated with the Hirano Detachment in an attack on Hsiangyin. After occupying Hsiangyin on the 4th, the two detachments began to withdraw, following the rear of the 4th Division.

The Morita Detachment having advanced to Hsiawuchang on the 3d, undertook the task of securing the lines of communication between Changlochieh and Hsinchiang in compliance with Army orders. After completing this mission, it returned to its original assignment at Hsinchiang.

Since 22 October, the Eto Detachment had been protecting the Army's rear flank by occupying the Shetsui area. There it had repulsed repeated counterattacks by a powerful enemy force, however, after the 6th Division passed through on 6 October the Detachment evacuated the area.

The Hirano Detachment landed secretly on the coast of the Paini Hu, north of Hsiangyin, on 3 October and, in cooperation with the Araki Detachment, occupied this sector. On 4 October, it evacuated

by water.


At dusk on 1 October, the main force of the 11th Army commenced to withdraw. Having defeated enemy remnants on the way, it reached the Ku Shui by the 5th and, by the 7th, had returned to the Japanese occupied area north of the Hsinchiang Ho. (Map 38)

Operational Roads and Lines of Communication

Since all roads in the operational area had been destroyed by the Chinese, the Japanese forces constructed 97 kilometers of roads in ten days, employing four engineer regiments. However, due to continuous rain prior to the battle on the left bank of the Ku Shui, the repaired roads were often impassable making it impossible for heavy artillery and tanks to participate in this operation.

Supplies for the operation were convoyed by establishing one main line of communication in conjunction with the progress of construction of the vehicle road. They were then transported to each group by animals.

This system proved effective in the control of supplies and the security of the lines of communication, as well as for the evacuation of casualties. Furthermore, the abundant supply of foodstuffs in the area and the munitions left by the enemy on the battlefields made it comparatively easy to fulfil the mission of supply in spite of unfavorable road conditions and topographical features in that region.



Diversiory Operation against the eastern part of
the 9th War Sector Army and Enemy Counterattacks
to the north of the Yangtze River

The eastern part of the 9th War Sector Army was composed of four armies - the 72d, 74th and 78th Armies and the 3d (newly activated) Army - in all ten divisions and five militia groups.⁹⁶ Of these armies it was estimated that the 74th and 72d Armies would be transferred to the Changsha area.

The 11th Army ordered the 34th Division and the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade, which had been garrisoning the area along the Nanchang - Hsiaoehikou railway, to attack the enemy directly in front of them simultaneously with the opening of the Changsha Operation by the Army's main force.

On 25 September, the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade began to drive toward Wuning and, after overrunning several lines of enemy positions, on 3 October, occupied the northern highland of Wuning. They held this position until 5 October and then returned to their former station.

On 27 September, the 34th Division, having defeated the enemy on the northern bank of the Chin Chiang with an element, assembled its forces in the Fenghsin area. The Division, in concert with

96. These militia groups were composed of civilians recruited locally and used as security guards for the area. They were also used to transport supplies and to reconnoiter in areas familiar to them. When the army moved on the groups were disbanded and fresh groups recruited in the new areas.


another element from the Ani district, then attacked the enemy's 3d Army south of Fenghsin in a pincer movement. They also dispatched another element to assault the hostile troops on the south bank of the Chin Chiang. On 7 October, they returned to their original positions. (Map 39)

These diversionary attacks, however, did not prevent the Chinese from sending their two armies to the main operational area as reinforcements.

At this time, the enemy forces around the Japanese 11th Army in the area along the north bank of the Yangtze River were divided into two War Sector Armies, the 5th to the north and the 6th to the west, about 25 divisions in all. A line running west of Yuanan formed the operational boundary between the two armies.

On 23 September, Chiang Kaishek ordered these War Sector Armies to carry out counterattacks in order to divert the Japanese forces participating in the Changsha Operation. Toward the end of the month, the enemy force to the north of the Yangtze River opened its offensive against the Japanese forces in the Hsinyang, Suihsien, Chunghsi and Hsianghsi district, the district around Kingmen, west of the Han Chiang, Ichang and Shashih. However, the morale of the Chinese force was low and the attacks ended in total failure.

Later, when the enemy learned the operational strength of the Japanese being used in the Changsha Operation, they decided that the force remaining north of the Yangtze River had been greatly



reduced and, on 2 October, Chiang Kaishek ordered Chen Cheng to recapture Ichang within three days, regardless of the cost.

The enemy 33d Army Group in the area north of Kingmen, having been forestalled by an attack by the Japanese 39th Division, had been frustrated in their attempt to counterattack. The enemy forces on the other fronts, however, particularly the approximately 13 divisions around Ichang, after repeated stubborn attacks, gradually penetrated the Japanese positions. By 6 October, about three enemy divisions had penetrated the east side of Ichang and, in the districts south of Shashih and Shayangchen, another three divisions had infiltrated deep into the Japanese positions and were attempting to cut the lines of communication.

In anticipation of a strong enemy counterattack to the north of the Yangtze River during the Changsha Operation, the 11th Army had reinforced the Hsinyang area with the 20th Independent Mixed Brigade and had ordered each group to prepare against any such attacks. At the end of September, however, the 20th Independent Mixed Brigade was reassigned to the 13th Army by order of Imperial General Headquarters. Therefore, the Army again reinforced this region with two infantry battalions which had been provisionally attached to the Army and with replenishment personnel of the 4th Division. About 28 September, the enemy opened its grand offensive, but, as mentioned above, the first attackswere successfully beaten off.

In view of the persistent activity of the enemy forces around

Ichang, however, the Army decided to eliminate this threat by transferring its main force, which had been used in the Changsha Operation, to the north of the Yangtze River. On 5 October, the Hayabuchi Detachment of the 13th Division, on its way back from Changsha, was hurriedly dispatched to the Hsianghsi area. The Army then ordered the 3d Division to concentrate at Siaokan and the 4th Division near Shayangchen. Meanwhile, the 39th Division was ordered to muster as great a force as possible and attack Ichang. The 3d Air Brigade stationed at Hankou advanced its full force to Kingmen and attacked the enemy in the outskirts of Ichang.

The 13th Division in the Ichang area strove to consolidate its present line and also to prepare for an offensive by mustering troops from the area not being subjected to enemy attacks. After the completion of its deployment, the 13th Division began its attack toward the east of Ichang in concert with the 39th Division's attack from Tangyang. It became evident during this attack that the enemy had been retreating since the night of the 11th. Mopping-up of occupied districts was started on 12 October and completed on the 13th.

With this favorable turn of events, the 3d Division, which had completed its concentration near Siaokan was ordered to return to its original station.

At the end of October, elements of both the 4th and 39th Divisions mopped up part of the enemy force in the Hohsueh district, 44 kilometers southeast of Shashih. (Map 40)


ENEMY COUNTERATTACKS IN
THE NORTH YANGTZE RIVER
SECTOR

28 SEP - LATE OCT 1941

→ JAPANESE ARMY

→ CHINESE ARMY

0 10 20 30 40 50
MILES



Results of Changsha Operation

The majority of the enemy forces in the main operational area of the Changsha Operation were well equipped, had high morale and were under the direct command of the China Central Government. The enemy's effort to concentrate fighting strength in this operation surpassed all previous operations. However, the operational mission of the 11th Army was easily achieved. The contribution of the air units during this operation was considered a major factor as it resulted in the 11th Army having timely and complete knowledge of enemy movements whereas the enemy was totally ignorant of the location of the Japanese forces.

The enemy force which participated in the Changsha Operation numbered 30 divisions with 631 pieces of artillery while the Japanese force consisted of 46 infantry battalions with 326 pieces of artillery. This ratio of approximately one enemy division to the Japanese one and a half battalions was the average throughout the China Incident.

Japanese losses during this operation were:

Dead	1,670
Wounded	5,184
Missing	14
Horses killed	1,168
Horses wounded	1,092

Diversionary Operations in other Areas

The Chenghsien Operation by the North China Area Army:

The North China Area Army carried out the Chenghsien Operation

with the main force of the 35th Division (eight infantry battalions) which had been garrisoning northern Honan Province.

It was planned that the Koito Unit, with five infantry battalions as its nucleus, would cross the new Huang Ho near Yangchiao, at the fork of the river eight kilometers east of Chingshuichen; the Koike Detachment, composed of one infantry battalion and a cavalry regiment, would cross near Tungchai, six kilometers southeast of Chungmou, and the Yuguchi Detachment, composed of two infantry battalions, would cross near the Peiping - Hankou railway bridge. They were then to push forward toward Chenghsien, defeating the main force of the enemy's 3d Army Group on the way. At the same time, strong fortifications were to be constructed on the highland south of the railway bridge and around Chungmou.

When the strategic time occurred, the Japanese force, after securing Chenghsien was to attack in the south to divert the attention of the enemy along the Peiping - Hankou railway to the north and thereby indirectly assist the operations of the 11th Army.

The main force of the 3d Army group, under the command of Sun Tunghsuan, and an element of the 4th Army Group, under the command of Sun Weiju, defended the Chenghsien area from behind established bulwarks.

Due to the delay in preparing river-crossing materials, the attack of the 35th Division was not commenced until 2 October. However between 0400 and 0500 on 2 October, each unit of the Division

successfully carried out its first river-crossing and caught the enemy unawares.

At 0530 on 3 October, the Koike Detachment captured Chungmou. At dawn on the 4th, the Koito Unit started its offensive from the Chialu Ho line and, after overcoming enemy troops on the way, occupied Chenghsien by 1030. At 2000 on the same day, the Yuguchi Detachment seized Chiu Jungtse.

All three units then began the construction of scheduled fortifications in order to cope with any possible enemy counterattacks and also to deal with enemy guerrilla attacks from the rear.

During this operation one direct cooperation plane squadron of the 3d Air Group worked with the ground force. Three squadrons each of heavy bombers and light bombers launched occasional attacks on enemy strategic points, including Chenghsien.

On the night of 31 October, the 35th Division began its withdrawal from Chenghsien, with the main force accomplishing its recrossing of the river on 3 November. (Map 41)

By order of the Area Army, the Division then posted approximately two infantry battalions near the highlands south of the railway bridge for future operations.


Japanese casualties during this operation were: dead - 19; wounded - 53.

Diversionsary Operation by the 23d
Army in South China

With the progress of the Changsha Operation, it became obvious

that the Chinese 2d and 65th Armies (newly activated) were going to make a strategic move to the Hunan area. Consequently, in order to cooperate with the Changsha Operation, on 25 September, the 23d Army launched a diversionary attack against the Chinese 2d Army with approximately six infantry battalions from the 104th Division. The Japanese troops pushed toward Chingyuan along the Pei Chiang and through Lupaohsu, completing their operation on 3 October.

Although during the Changsha Operation the enemy mustered more troops from other operational sectors than had been expected, they were unable to send troops from the Canton area. It was felt, therefore, that the occupation of Changsha and Chuchou and the following withdrawal operation were greatly facilitated by the successful diversionary operation of the 23d Army.



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