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Japanese Monograph No. 180



SOUTH CHINA AREA OPERATIONS RECORD

(1937-1941)

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PREFACE

This monograph is one of a series prepared under instructions from the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN No. 126, 12 Oct 1945). The series of studies covers the operations of the Japanese armed forces from 1922 until the surrender in 1945. The studies were written by former officers of the Japanese Army and Navy under the supervision of the Historical Records Sections of the First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureaus of the Japanese Government. The original manuscripts were translated by Military Intelligence Service Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command. Extensive editing was accomplished by the Japanese Research Division of the Office of the Military History Officer, Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army (Rear).

This monograph covers military operations in south China from early November 1937, when it became obvious that in order to cut Chiang Kai-shek's supply lines it would be necessary to expand the war into south China, until July 1941 when agreement was reached with the Vichy Government of France whereby Japanese troops would occupy French Indo-China. The basic manuscript was compiled by the Reports and Statistical Section of the Demobilization Bureau from documents in the possession of ex-Lt Col Heizo Ishiwari, Chief of the War History Compilation Bureau of the Army General Staff, and from other fragmentary information, however, it was necessary for the Japanese Research Division to conduct extensive research in order to evaluate the information, to check both facts and dates and to add pertinent data. In addition, as the manuscript was submitted without maps, this office prepared the many maps required to illustrate the text. Spelling of place names in this monograph is that used in AMS 5301.

The editor was assisted in research and in preparation of maps by Tadao Shudo, formerly a lieutenant colonel on the staff of the 11th Army in central China and later a member of the Army General Staff and Air Army General Staff.

Other monographs covering the operations of Japanese armed forces in the China area are:

<u>Mono No</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Period</u>
70*	China Area Operations Record, Vol. I	Jul 37 - Nov 41
71	China Area Operations Record, Vol. II	Dec 41 - Dec 43
72	China Area Operations Record, Vol. III	Jan 44 - Aug 45
74*	Operations in the Kun-lun-kuan Area	Dec 39 - Feb 40
76	China Area Air Operations Record: China Incident and Greater East Asia War	Jul 37 - Aug 44
129*	China Area Operations Record: Command of China Expeditionary Army	Aug 43 - Aug 45
130*	China Area Operations Record: Sixth Area Army Operations	May 44 - Aug 45
166	China Incident Naval Air Operations	Jul 37 - Nov 37
178*	North China Area Operations Record	Jul 37 - May 41
179*	Central China Area Operations Record	1937 - 1941

*Indicates edit completed.

Tokyo, Japan
9 March 1956

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CHAPTER I

Canton Operation

General Situation in South China Prior to the Commencement of the Operation


At the end of 1937 south China was very important to the Chinese as a means of maintaining contact with the outside world. Canton and Hongkong were particularly important as not only did they serve as vital centers for the transportation of supplies from abroad to the Chinese forces in the interior (approximately 80 per cent of the entire supplies for the interior passed through Canton) but they were also hotbeds of international plotters aiding Chiang Kai-shek. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, felt that to cut these links with Chungking would not only deprive the Chinese of essential war materiel but it would also seriously affect their power to continue the war. Operations in south China were under consideration for some time before the actual planning was begun in early November 1937. Following the Shanghai Operation (23 Aug - 24 Nov 37)¹ it was decided that the objectives of the South China Operations could be accomplished by seizing one section of Bias Bay and conducting air operations from there. For this purpose, in December 1937, the 5th Army was activated in Formosa with the 11th Division, the Formosa Mixed Brigade and the

1. Monograph No 179, Central China Area Operations Record, Vol. I, 1937-1941.


4th Air Brigade as its nucleus. Lt Gen Mikio Furusho was named commander of the Army. However, when the Army was about to launch its operation from Formosa, the action was suspended and the 5th Army deactivated. The Japanese Government desired to localize the incident and it was feared that with Bias Bay so close to Hongkong, if action were initiated from this area trouble might break out between Britain and Japan.

Although Imperial General Headquarters was making every effort to adhere to the so-called localization policy, in central China circumstances had forced the Headquarters to conduct the Tungshan and Wu-Han Operations.² Then, in June 1938, realizing that it was not possible to localize the fighting, Imperial General Headquarters reversed its policy and began to prepare plans to capture Canton in order to expedite the settlement of the China Incident. The Canton Operation was originally scheduled to be carried out one or two months after the capture of Hankou, but further plans were made so that, if necessary, this operation could be carried out either simultaneously with, or even prior to, the initiation of the Hankou Operation. With the development of the Hankou Operation, it was judged that it was both necessary and practical to execute the Canton Operation promptly and therefore on 7 September it was decided that the invasion of Canton would follow on the heels of the Hankou Operation.

2. Ibid



6



MAP NO. 1

10

Enemy Situation

Early in October 1938 the Chinese concentrated troops in the Wu-Han area and even pulled out troops from the Canton area to send north, thus indicating that they felt secure in south China. At that time the strength of the 4th War Sector Army which, under the command of Yu Hanmou was defending south China, was approximately 13 regular army divisions (about 110,000 troops). The main strength of the Army (eight divisions and two brigades of regular army troops, plus two militia divisions³) was deployed in the vicinity of Canton, while five divisions of regular army troops guarded Fukien Province and about five divisions of the Kwangsi militia were stationed in Kwangsi Province and on the southwestern coast of Kwangtung Province. Most of the regular army units in Kwangsi Province had moved northward to participate in the Wu-Han Operation.

The main strength of the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Canton was charged with the defense of the city itself and the sector east of the city, while elements defended the vicinity of Chaoan and the western part of Kwangtung Province. (Map 1)⁴

3. The militia divisions were composed of civilians recruited locally and used as security guards for the area. They were also used to transport supplies and to reconnoiter in areas familiar to them. When the Army moved on these units were disbanded and fresh units recruited in the new areas.

4. Map No 1: The details shown on this map were obtained from the Japanese History of the China Incident, No 12, which is the official record published by the General Staff Office of Imperial General Headquarters. The location of strength of the Kwangsi militia is approximate, with two divisions in the vicinity of Maoming,

Enemy installations to defend the vicinity of Canton included the Humen fortress (Bocca Tigris Fort) commanding the mouth of the Chu Chiang (Canton River), three lines of positions in the Bias Bay area and impregnable redoubts around Canton. (Map 2)

Japanese Naval Action

In the south China area the Japanese 5th Fleet's 10th Battleship Division blockaded and patrolled the coast between Haimenchen and Swatow and the 5th Destroyer Squadron patrolled the coastal area south of Swatow while the Fleet's 2d Special Naval Landing Force occupied Haimen and its neighboring islands in order to tighten the blockade.


Using Takao, Santseo Island and the carrier Kaga as its bases, the Navy Air Force blockaded the coast of south China and bombed the interior of China.

Canton Operation

On 19 September, Imperial General Headquarters issued orders mobilizing the 21st Army at Kurume, Kyushu, Japan. On the same day Lt Gen Mikio Furusho was appointed commander of the Army⁵ and an order was issued placing the 5th Division, 18th Division, 104th Division and the 4th Air Brigade under the 21st Army at the time of

4. (Cont'd) one division concentrated around Wuchow, one division between Kweilin and Liuchowhsien and one division in the vicinity of Nanning, Chihhsien and Hopu.

5. Although Lt Gen Mikio Furusho was appointed commander of the 21st Army, in order to conceal the preparations being made for the Canton Operation, he remained in Taipeh. When the subordinate units of his command assembled at Mako, he flew there from Taipei on 2 October 1938.



ENEMY DEFENSIVE
DEPLOYMENT
IN CANTON AREA
EARLY OCT 1938

0 5 10 20 30 40 50
KILOMETERS

MAP NO. 2

13

its departure from the port of embarkation.⁶ Also, on the 19th, Imperial General Headquarters issued the following orders to the commander of the 21st Army:

Imperial General Headquarters plans to occupy key points in the Canton area immediately after the capture of Hankou in order to deprive the enemy of his important bases in south China and to cut off his important overseas communication and supply routes.

The commander of the 21st Army shall, in co-operation with the naval forces, capture key points in the Canton area. Separate orders will be issued in regard to the area to be occupied after the capture of Canton.

The Formosa Army shall give logistical support to the 21st Army.

Instructions

The shipping schedule and landing points of the 21st Army shall be as follows:

<u>Designation of convoys</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Landing Point</u>	<u>Time of Landing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1st Convoy	About 400,000 tons	Coast of Bias Bay	Mid-Oct	
2d Convoy	About 200,000 tons	Coast of Bias Bay	Follow 1st Convoy	
3d Convoy	About 200,000 tons	Mouth of Chu Chiang	Late Oct	The main force will capture Humen Fortress

6. The 5th, 18th and 104th Divisions embarked at Tsingtao, Shanghai and Dairen respectively. (see page

7. The Formosa Army was located on Formosa with its headquarters at Taipei.

<u>Designation of Convoys</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Landing Point</u>	<u>Time of Landing</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Subsequent convoys		Bias Bay or the mouth of Chu Chiang depending on the situation		

In order to aid in landings and subsequent operations, the following "Outline of the Canton Operation" is published. In the joint operation with the Navy, the Army commander shall follow the "Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Canton Operation," and, when it does not apply, he shall work out the problem with the Commander in Chief, 5th Fleet.

Outline of Canton Operation

Summary:

The main strength of the Army will effect landings at Bias Bay and elements will land at the mouth of the Chu Chiang. After annihilating the enemy in front of them, the units will then capture Canton.

After the capture of Canton, the Army will strive to reduce and consolidate the occupied areas. At the same time, they will cut off the enemy's overseas communications and supply routes in the vicinity of Canton.

Outline of Operations:

A unit (consisting of the 18th Division, and, if possible, an element of the 104th Division or the 5th Division) will effect a landing at Bias Bay in mid-October and will quickly establish beachheads. The unit will then make preparations for subsequent offensives to be launched from the direction of Huiyang.

Depending on the situation, the unit may be required to occupy a fording point on the Tung Chiang (East River) in the Huiyang area.

Late in October the main force of the 5th Division will advance toward the Chu Chiang and capture the Humen Fortress. The unit will then advance from the sector along the Tung Chiang or, if the situation permits, advance from the sector along the Chu Chiang and will support the operation conducted by the main force of

the Army.

Simultaneously with the commencement of the Chu Chiang Operation (or, if the situation requires, prior to the commencement) the main force of the Army will launch an offensive from the area generally along the highway extending from Bias Bay, Huiyang and Tsengcheng to Canton and will capture the city of Canton.

The main battle is expected to take place in the area along the Tung Chiang.

After the capture of Canton the main force of the Army will be deployed in the vicinity of Canton with elements at Sanshui, Chiangtsun, Humen and Shihlung. If the situation requires, elements will be deployed along the coast of Bias Bay and in the sector west of the Chu Chiang when they will make plans to defend the area.

Furthermore, units will take appropriate counter-action against any enemy mass attack.

The Army will establish suitable air bases in the vicinity of Canton and, in cooperation with the Navy, will launch continuous air operations against the interior of south China.

Army-Navy Central Agreement on the Canton Operations.

Operational Strength:

Army

21st Army Headquarters (commander: Lt Gen
Mikio Furusho)

5th Division
18th Division
104th Division
4th Air Brigade
Logistical units

Navy

5th Fleet (C-in-C: Vice Admiral Koichi
Shiozawa)
9th Battleship Division (Flagship)
10th Battleship Division
8th Battleship Division
2d Destroyer Squadron
5th Destroyer Squadron
1st Carrier Division (about 40 planes)
2d Carrier Division (about 70 planes)
2d Base Force

14th Air Group (about 40 planes)
Takao Airfield Unit (about 12 land-based
medium bombers)
Chitose (Seaplane tender, carrying about
8 seaplanes)
Kanagawa Maru (Seaplane tender, carrying
about 8 seaplanes)
3d Destroyer Division
1st Gunboat Division
1st Combined Air Group (about 24 land-based
medium bombers) (Depending on the situation,
part or the entire Air Group will be in-
cluded.)

Chain of Command:

The commanders of the 21st Army and the 5th Fleet will cooperate with each other.

Convoy escort:

Shipment of Army units will be as shown on Charts 1 and 2.

The first-wave units scheduled to land at Bias Bay will assemble at Mako and advance toward Bias Bay under the protection of an escort ship unit. The first-wave units scheduled to land at the mouth of the Chu Chiang will assemble at Bias Bay and move toward the Chu Chiang under the protection of an escort ship unit. Unless it is considered absolutely necessary, other transports will not be escorted. If possible, part of the convoy will make a feint in the Swatow area.

Security and other matters:

The Army will be responsible for the security of the occupied land area, while the Navy will be responsible for the security of the sea and the Chu Chiang.

Wharf and port facilities will be controlled jointly by the Army and Navy.

Aviation:

Direct support will be given to the Army's operations mainly by the Army Air Force while other air operations will be carried out mainly by the Navy Air Force.

Landing Plan, 21st Army, Canton Operation

Date	Tonnage at Port of Embarkation	Landing Area	Estimated Number of Landing Craft Required
1 October	400,000 tons		
10 October	200,000 tons		80 large landing craft
20 October	200,000 tons	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> 1st wave on the beach of Bias Bay <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> Logistical units under Army's direct command	180 small landing craft
1 November	400,000 tons	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> 1st wave at the mouth of Chu Chiang	300 powered sampans
10 November	200,000 tons 200,000 tons	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> Coast of Bias Bay or mouth of Chu Chiang	250 lighters
20 November		<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> Coast of Bias Bay or mouth of Chu Chiang	200-250 sampans
1 December		<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> Coast of Bias Bay or mouth of Chu Chiang	20-25 sea trucks
			10 launches
			10 two boats

Landing Plan, 21st Army, Canton Operation

Tonnage	Convoy	How Conducted	Date of Assembly	Estimated Date of Landing
About 400,000 tons	<p>1st wave units: Half of the 18th and 104th Divisions: Unit built around 3 inf bns commanded by Inf Brig Commander: Elements of the units under the Army's direct command: Elements of the logistical units</p>	Forced landing operation	By 7 October	Mid-October
About 200,000 tons	<p>2d wave units: Half of 104th Division: Elements of the units under the Army's direct command: Main strength of the logistical units</p>	To follow the 1st wave		Late October
About 150,000 tons	<p>3d wave units: Main strength of 5th Division</p>	Forced landing operation	By 25 October	Late October
About 250,000 tons	<p>4th wave units: Remaining strength of the 5th Division: Remaining strength of the units under the Army's direct command: Remaining strength of the logistical units</p>	To follow the 3d wave		Late October

Navy aircraft will give the necessary protection to the convoys before and after their arrival at landing points. During the process of landing and until the main force of the Army Air Force completes its flight preparations, the Navy Air Force will be responsible for the direct support of the ground fighting.

The available air strength is as follows:

Army

One direct support plane unit	-----	4 planes
Two fighter squadrons	-----	24 planes
Three light bomber squadrons	-----	27 planes
Total	-----	55 planes

Navy

1st Carrier Div	-----	9 carrier fighters, 9 carrier bombers, and 12 carrier torpedo planes
-----------------	-------	--

2d Carrier Div	-----	18 carrier fighters, 30 carrier bombers, and 13 carrier torpedo planes
----------------	-------	--

14th Air Group	-----	12 carrier fighters, 6 carrier bombers, and 18 carrier torpedo planes
----------------	-------	---

Seaplane tender	-----	8 sea reconnaissance planes
-----------------	-------	--------------------------------

Takao Airfield Unit	---	9 land medium bombers
---------------------	-----	-----------------------

Total	-----	144 planes
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Grand Total	-----	199 planes
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Public Information:

For the proper conduct of war and particularly for security reasons, publication of any information concerning the operations in this area and the related enemy situation is prohibited unless it has first been released or cleared by Imperial General Headquarters.

Operational Plan of the 21st Army

The 21st Army, which had been studying the direction of operations

ever since its mobilization orders were issued on 19 September 1938, worked out an operational plan on 26 September in accordance with the orders and instructions given on 21 September by Imperial General Headquarters. The gist of this plan was as follows:

Plan:

The Army, in concert with the 5th Fleet, will land its main force at Bias Bay and invade Canton by way of the sector along the Tung Chiang.

Outline of Direction of Operations:

First Phase:

The landing of the main force of the Army will be carried out on 12 October.

After landing the main force of the Army will advance straight to a line on the eastern bank of the Tung Chiang in the vicinity of Henglihsu and Huiyang and prepare to engage the enemy on the banks of the Tung Chiang.

Second Phase:

Upon arrival of the second wave of the landing force, the main force of the Army will commence its attack. It will advance along the right bank of the Tung Chiang to the sector northeast of Canton and then invade Canton.



The decisive battle with the enemy field army is anticipated in the sector along the Tung Chiang.

On the 27th, the Army will direct one unit toward the Chu Chiang. This unit, in concert with the naval forces, will promptly capture Humen Fortress and then launch a surprise attack in the area along the Chu Chiang and its western course toward Canton so as to facilitate the operations of the main force of the Army.

After the occupation of the vicinity of Canton, the Army Air Force, in concert with the Navy Air Force, will attack the strategic points in south China incessantly.

After assembling at Mako, the 21st Army reconnoitered the land-

21ST ARMY LANDING AND INVASION AREA



MAP NO. 3

ing points and, on 4 October, in conjunction with the 5th Fleet, worked out a landing plan which it then disseminated to its subordinate units.

Landing Plan of the 21st Army

Plan:

The Army, in concert with the 5th Fleet, will land its main force in the vicinity of Bias Bay and an element at the mouth of the Chu Chiang.

It is desired that the landing at Bias Bay be a surprise attack but a forced landing is also anticipated.

The invasion and landing areas are as shown on Map 3. Classification of convoys and schedule of action are shown on Chart No 3.

Landing will commence on 12 October at approximately 0500 hours. The 18th Division commander will decide the exact time of landing of the 18th Division and the Oikawa Detachment, while the 21st Army commander will decide the time of landing of the 104th Division.

Unloading Operation:

Unloading parties and the principal landing craft to be assigned to the commander of the landing units in each sector during the unloading of the 1st wave of transports will be as shown on Chart No 4.

Unloading of units under the direct command of the Army and logistical units in the 1st, 2d, 4th and subsequent waves of transports will be conducted under the direction of the commander of the Army unloading party. The main strength of the landing force will disembark near Yentsaopei and an element at Fanhokang.

An element of the 1st wave of the landing force will make a diversionary movement toward Swatow to check the enemy in that area.

The diversionary force will leave Mako on the 11th and arrive in the vicinity of Swatow before daybreak on the 12th. It will continue diversionary actions until the 13th when it will leave Swatow and arrive at Bias Bay by 1200 hours on the 14th.

Naval fire to harass enemy units in the rear advancing toward the landing points and neutralization fire

Classification of Convoys and Schedule of Action

Order of Trans	Classification of Convoy	No of Vessels	Estimate of Strength	Naval Escort Force	Assembly Point	Assembly Time	Landing Beach	Landing Date	Remarks
1st Wave Convoys	Convoy A	About 19	18th Div Oikawa Det	1st Esct Force (8th Battleship Div)	Mako	By 8 Oct	Bias Bay	From 12 to 18 Oct	1 Will be esct'd 2 Forced landing will be excuted 3 Will include ammunition transports and some hospital ships
	Convoy B	About 15							
	Convoy C	About 13							
	Convoy D	About 24	104th Div (less element)	2d Esct Force (10th Battleship Div)					
	Convoy E-1	About 7	Units under direct cmd of the Army and logistical unit						
	Convoy E-2	About 7							
	Convoy F	About 8							
2d Wave Convoys		About 50	Elements of the 104th Div. Main strength of the unit under direct cmd of the Army and the main strength of logistical unit	Division Force (The Tama and others)			From 20 to 30 Oct	Will not be escorted	
3d Wave Convoys	Will be shown separately								
4th Wave Convoys		About 60							Will not be escorted
Remarks	Time of departure from Mako will be 1400 hours of the 9th								

26

Chart No. 3

Unloading of the 1st Wave Transports

Assignment	Designation of Unloading Party	Outline of Organization	Landing Craft
18th Division	Unloading Party A	Commander, Col Iijima Anchorage headquarters ... one Independent engineers one regt and one co Field land duty unit one co and one sqd Sea duty unit one co Construction duty unit ... one co (minus two sqds)	Large landing craft ... 50 Small landing craft ... 110 Armored boats 10 Speedboats A 2 Speedboats B 4
104th Division	Unloading Party B	Commander, Col Amatatsu Anchorage headquarters ... one Independent engineers one regt (minus one co) Field land duty unit one co Sea duty unit one co (minus one sqd) Construction duty unit ... one sqd	Large landing craft ... 20 Small landing craft ... 50 Special landing craft.. 2 Armored boats 5 Speedboats A 2 Speedboats B 4
Oikawa Detachment	Unloading Party C	Commander, Lt Col Matsuyama Anchorage headquarters ... one Independent engineers one co Field land duty unit one co (minus one sqd) Sea duty unit one sqd Construction unit one co	Large landing craft ... 15 Small landing craft ... 50 Special landing craft . 2 Armored boats 3 Speedboats A 1 Speedboats B 3

27

Chart No. 4

against the landing front will not be conducted until the commencement of the initial landing or even after the commencement of the landing. It will not be conducted before daybreak unless the enemy commences target illumination and fire or unless requested by the Army.

Supply depots will be established near Yentsaopei and at Fanhokang. Provisions stowed in the lower holds will be unloaded at each sector.

The Army commander will board the warship Yura and sail with the convoy. On the afternoon of the second day of landing he will land at Shiayunghsu.

Lt Gen Masatsugu Tajiri commander of the 1st Shipping Transport Unit,⁸ was charged with transporting the Army troops. In early September, he was informally instructed by Imperial General Headquarters to prepare sea transportation for the troops committed to this operation and, on 20 September, he received orders to prepare sea transportation for the 21st Army. The units were transported to their assembly points as shown on Chart No 5.

From the middle of June the 18th Division, under the command of the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, had been charged with the security of Shanghai and its vicinity. Late in September, after being relieved of this duty by the 22d and 17th Divisions, it assembled in the vicinity of Shanghai and rehearsed landings.

The 5th Division which, under the command of the North China Area Army commander, had been guarding the sector south of Tungshan,

8. The 1st Shipping Transport Unit was activated at Ujina, the harbor for Hiroshima.

Embarkation and Assembly Plan, 21st Army

Embarkation				
Unit	Port of Embarkation	Date of Embarkation	Date of Assembly at Mako	Note
Army Hq	Moji	29 September	2 October	Army commander arrived at Mako from Taipei
18th Div	Shanghai	From 30 September to 3 October	From 4 October to 7 October	
Oikawa Det	Tsingtao	From 28 Sep to 3 October	From 5 October to 6 October	Training was conducted at sea
104th Div	Dairen	From 29 Sep to 1 October	6 October	Training was conducted at sea
Remarks: The main strength of the naval escort force which had been in the South China Sea area successively moved from Maan and Wanshan Islands to Mako and completed its assembly there on 7 October.				

29

in the middle of September was relieved of this duty by the 21st Division. It then assembled at Tsingtao where it began training for landings and siege warfare.

The 104th Division, which had been combat ready from July 1938 as tactical reserves first in South Manchuria and subsequently in the border region of east Manchuria, under direct orders from Imperial General Headquarters, at the end of September assembled its main force at Dairen where it conducted training for landing attacks.

On 24 September, acting on instructions from the Chief of the Army General Staff, the commander of the 1st Shipping Transport Unit set up a command unit under the command of Maj Gen Rikutaro Sugimoto to assume responsibility for local shipping. This unit, together with the units under its command (three anchorage headquarters, five sea duty units, two construction units and others) was placed under the over-all command of the 21st Army commander. Further, on 25 September, 12 shipboard AA units were organized and assigned to air defense of the convoys.

When all forces were assembled at Mako, combined training of the Army and Navy forces was carried out.

Progress of Operation

Bias Bay Landing

As of 4 October the tactical organization of the 21st Army was

as shown on Chart No. 6. It was planned that the Army would land at Bias Bay and advance straight to the line of the Tung Chiang and there prepare for subsequent operations to capture Canton.

The main strength of the 5th Division was to assemble at Bias Bay. Immediately after the landing, the Oikawa Detachment was to raid the sector on the left bank of the Tung Chiang near Henglihsu from the direction of Pingshanhsu (about 30 km southeast of Huiyang) and to occupy the fords on the river in order to facilitate the crossing of the Army troops. The 18th Division was to advance immediately to the line of the Tung Chiang near Huiyang and to prepare to cross the river. At that time it was to leave a powerful element at Tanshui to support the left flank of the Army. The 104th Division was to break through the enemy on its front, advance to the left bank of the Tung Chiang along the Pinghai-Pingshanhsu road and to assemble its troops near Pingtanhsu. It was then to prepare to advance toward Henglihsu and Huiyang, while an element was to be sent to Chilunghsu to cover the right flank of the Army against the enemy at Haifeng.

The 104th Division, after advancing to Pingshanhsu was to give logistical support to the Oikawa Detachment. At the same time, the 21st Army commander ordered the commander of the 24th Transport Unit, in cooperation with the Navy, to make a display of force in the vicinity of Swatow in order to check the enemy in the Swatow area.

On 9 October, escorted by the 5th Fleet, the Army forces left

Tactical Organization, 21st Army, 4 October 1938

Units	Units Assigned						
	In-fantry	Heavy Mt	Motorized	Artillery	Engineers	Air Defense	Shipping Transport
Oikawa Det	3 bns		1 indep light armd veh co	1 mountain arty bn	1 engr co, 1 indep engr regt, 1 bridging mtl co, 1 river crossing mtl co		
18th Div (less 2 inf bns)		2 bns	2 indep light armd veh cos	1 mountain arty regt, 1 light trench mort bn, 1 mort bn	1 river crossing material co		
104th Div	2 bns	1 bn		1 fld arty bn, 1 mountain arty bn, 1 light trench mort co, 1 15cm cannon bn	1 bridging mtl bn		
5th Div (less Oikawa Det & 1 fld arty bn)				1 light trench mort co		1 AAA unit	
Unloading Party					2 indep engr regts & 1 co		3 anchorage hqs
Units under direct comd	Second reserve 2 bns			1 medium arty unit	3 bridging mtl cos	3 AAA units	3 land duty units, 2 sea duty units, 2 construction units

Chart No. 6

Mako and, having encountered no opposition from the enemy, on the 11th, arrived at the mouth of Bias Bay. The first transports carrying Army troops cast anchor at 2330 hours and by 0215 the following morning the berthing was completed.

At 0330 hours the Oikawa Detachment and the 18th Division began landing simultaneously.

The Army commander, upon observing the distant signal signifying the success of these landings, at 0430 hours ordered the landing of the 104th Division. This landing also was successful. Meanwhile, on the 10th, the diversionary unit, consisting of ten transports under the command of Col Karashima, and escorted by the 3d Destroyer Division, left Mako. It arrived at Chiwang Bay at daybreak on the 12th, and after a display of force, arrived at Bias Bay on the 14th.

The Chinese had about one division stationed in the vicinity of Bias Bay, their main force disposed at Huiyang and a small number of observation units along the beach and at various other strategic points.

Advance to and invasion of Canton

Having succeeded in landing, each unit continued to pursue the enemy toward the line of the Tung Chiang, despite the bad roads and extreme heat. On 14 October, the Oikawa Detachment and the 18th Division advanced to the Tung Chiang line with the Oikawa Detachment occupying Henglihsu on the same day. During this march, one infantry

battalion of the 18th Division was left at Tanshui. The 104th Division advanced toward Pingtanhsu, on the way dispatching one infantry battalion to the vicinity of Chilunghsu in order to cover the right flank of the Army. Meanwhile, the Air Force facilitated the operation of the Army by giving continuous support to the front-line units, thus obstructing the movement and concentration of the enemy force. As the 4th Air Brigade was committed to the Wu-Han operations until 14 October, it did not participate in this operation.⁹

In view of the progress of advance of each unit, the Army commander changed the previous plan of holding the units on the bank of the Tung Chiang in preparation for subsequent operations and decided to prepare to capture Canton by advancing the units to the sector on the right bank of the Tseng Chiang without giving the enemy time to perfect his defenses. Therefore, on the 14th he ordered the Oikawa Detachment to make a detour of the mountainous district far to the north, the 18th Division to turn to the sector along the Huiyang - Tsengcheng road and the 104th Division to follow the 18th Division, so that all units might assemble in the sector on the right bank of the Tseng Chiang.

On the 15th, the 18th Division occupied Huiyang and the 104th Division, Pingtanhsu.

9. Monograph No 179, Central China Operations Record, 1937-41.

On 16 October, each unit departed from the Tung Chiang line. The 18th Division mounted a surprise attack on Tsengcheng and on the 19th, an advance force of one infantry battalion, one cavalry battalion, two light armored car companies formed around one artillery battalion and commanded by Colonel Koike occupied the town. Also, on the 19th, the main force of the Division suddenly encountered an enemy division in the sector southeast of Futienhsu advancing from the Shihlung area. Overcoming this force, the 18th Division's main strength advanced to the vicinity of Tsengcheng on the same day.

The Oikawa Detachment occupied Lunghuahsu and Tsunghua on the 19th and 23 October respectively.

The Army commander, judging that the enemy forces on the right bank of the Tseng Chiang near Tsengcheng were disorganized and demoralized, without waiting to concentrate his forces, ordered them to pursue the Chinese to Canton. Having ordered the 104th Division to advance to Polo in the vicinity of Tsengcheng on the 19th, on the 21st he ordered this division to pursue the enemy toward Canton along the Tsengcheng - Fuhohsu - Pinghu - Canton road in order to cut the enemy's line of retreat. By 24 October the 104th Division had advanced to the north of Canton. Meanwhile, an element of the 5th Division went up the Lichi Hung waterway and, on 23 October, occupied Humen. On the 25th, it occupied Sanshui and blockaded the Hsi Chiang and the Pei Chiang. At the same time the

main force of the 5th Division advanced to the vicinity of Nanhai, removing enemy mines as it advanced. It completed its assembly at Nanhai on 2 November. (Map 4)

Situation after the Canton Operation

On 23 October, the 21st Army commander received new orders from Imperial General Headquarters reading:

The Army, in cooperation with the Navy, will occupy Humen, Shihlung, Canton and Sanshui and will cut off the enemy supply routes along the Canton-Hankou railway and the Chu Chiang.


However, this action had already been taken before receiving the orders from Imperial General Headquarters.

In early November the 21st Army assembled the 18th Division in the sector northeast of Canton, the 104th Division in the sector north of Canton and the 5th Division in the sector southwest of Canton.

Each unit deployed the necessary strength at key points along its front to meet any possible enemy counterattacks. (Map 5)

The 4th Air Brigade arrived at Bias Bay on 30 October and had assembled in the vicinity of Canton by mid-November. By 20 November the main strength of the Japanese air units had reached Canton from Formosa.

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MAP NO. 5

CHAPTER 2

Operations During 1939

Outline of Operations

After capturing Canton in the fall of 1938, the 21st Army was engaged in cutting the enemy supply route along the Canton - Hankou railway. Realizing the need for tighter control of enemy supply routes as war materials were still flowing into the enemy's hands, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to cut all other supply routes one by one. The 21st Army, therefore, occupied the northern part of Hainan Island and the western bank of the Hsi Chiang in February 1939, Swatow in June, Shenchuanhsu in August and Nanning in November, and succeeded in interrupting the enemy supply routes. The Army then stationed the necessary troops in strategic positions to continue to prevent supplies reaching the Chinese forces.

In south China as the enemy forces were located close to the Japanese occupied areas they continued to pose a threat to those areas making it necessary to carry out punitive expeditions incessantly just as in central and north China. Important operations of this nature during 1939 included the April Operation, the operation carried out in June in the vicinity of Huahsien, the Summer Operation conducted in August and the battle around Wengying in December.

To provide sufficient strength to carry out these operations, Imperial General Headquarters increased the forces in the south China area. Reinforcements received by the 21st Army during 1939

made possible the following changes in assignment and missions:

In late January the Iida Detachment was reorganized as the Formosa Mixed Brigade and participated in the invasion of north Hainan Island.

The 1st Independent Infantry Unit, composed of six battalions, was incorporated into the 21st Army during February. Headquarters and two battalions of this unit were assigned to the Nanhai Detachment and other elements to the Humen Guard Unit, the 104th Division and the Army Logistical Unit.

In late July the 21st Army activated the Hainan Island Expeditionary Force, composed mainly of four infantry battalions and one mountain gun battalion and ordered this force, under the command of Maj Gen Kyunosuke Mabuchi, to assume the security mission of the Formosa Mixed Brigade. The Brigade was then assigned the mission of guarding the vicinity of Nanhai.

In early October, the 5th and 38th Divisions were placed under the direct command of the 21st Army. The 5th Division and the Formosa Mixed Brigade were assigned the mission of invading Nanning, while the 38th Division was ordered to take over the security mission of the Formosa Mixed Brigade in the vicinity of Nanhai.

In mid-November, the Imperial Guard Mixed Brigade¹ was placed

1. In early November, the Imperial Guard Mixed Brigade was organized by the Imperial Guard Division commander in Tokyo. The Brigade, composed of two infantry regiments, one artillery battalion, one cavalry company, one engineer company and other supporting units, was commanded by Maj Gen Takeshi Sakurada.

under the direct command of the 21st Army.

In December, the 106th Division² was assigned to the 21st Army and assumed the security mission on the eastern front of Canton from the 18th Division, which had been withdrawn to participate in the battle of Pinyang.

Hainan Island Invasion

Hainan Island was important as an air base from which to cut off Chiang Kai-shek's supplies from French Indo-China and Burma and also to blockade the Chinese coast. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island in the vicinity of Haikoushih. The 21st Army commander, in turn, designated the Formosa Mixed Brigade to undertake this mission.³

At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, in close cooperation with naval units, effected a surprise landing on the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan Island. At 0430 hours, the right flank unit reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih and the left flank unit reached a point 2 kilometers south of Tienwei.

2. The 106th Division was stationed at Shanghai and was scheduled to return to Japan. It had been temporarily placed under the command of the 13th Army (Monograph 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 41)

3. It was estimated that the entire Chinese force on Hainan Island was approximately 3,600 troops.


At 0700, the right flank unit crushed slight enemy resistance in the vicinity of Yehli and occupied Chiungshan at 1200 hours. At that time there were about 1,000 enemy troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan. Approximately half of these troops were destroyed and the remainder fled to the hills south of Tengmai in complete disorder. At approximately 0830 hours on the same day the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and occupied Hsiuying Heights. At 1200 hours, it occupied Haikoushih.

Also on 10 February, the Brigade advanced and occupied Tingan. Wenchang was occupied on the 22d and Chinglan Port on the 23d.

The landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which in cooperation with the Army had occupied Haikoushih, commenced landing on the southern end of the island at daybreak on 14 February under the protection of ship and air units. Early the same morning the landing party occupied Sanya and by 1200 hours had captured Yulin Port. (Map No 6)

Hsi Chiang Coast Operation

After the fall of Canton, the Chinese not only smuggled munitions from the Hongkong area along the Macau - Chungshanhsien - Canton road but, using Hsinhui on the right bank of the Hsi Chiang as a base of operations, created disturbances and disorder in the Canton delta area. The 21st Army, therefore, planned to mop up the enemy in this area and, early in February, dispatched a force, composed mainly of two infantry battalions of the 1st Independent Infantry Unit from



Nanhai to Chiangmen to cut the Canton - Chiangmen - Chungshanhsien supply route.

On 27 March, the 1st Independent Infantry Unit commenced the operation but, while conducting a punitive campaign in the vicinity of Chiangmen and Hsinhui, was encircled by a large enemy force.⁴ The 21st Army hurriedly sent reinforcements⁵ to the area and finally succeeded in rescuing the 1st Independent Infantry Unit and repulsing the enemy. Later, the 21st Army deployed more troops in this sector and cut the enemy supply route.

April Operation

Estimating that the Chinese would attempt to recapture Canton by launching an offensive in April, the 21st Army planned operations based on the following policy:

If the Chinese launched localized attacks or units attacked separately, Japanese forces would immediately take the initiative and completely annihilate the attacking forces.

If the Chinese main force was employed in organized attacks, the main force of the 21st Army would immediately attack and destroy the enemy.

In accordance with this policy, the 21st Army began to concentrate

4. This enemy force was estimated to be between 6,000 and 7,000 guerrilla troops.

5. The reinforcements sent by the 21st Army were about three infantry battalions commanded by a brigade commander.

its troops but later changed its plan in order that it might destroy the enemy prior to completion of their preparations for attack. It ordered the 104th Division to crush the Chinese forces in the area north of Huahsien in the vicinity of Shihchiensih and the 18th Division to destroy the enemy in the area north and east of Tsengcheng. Furthermore, the 104th Division was ordered to recapture Chiangmen and to encircle and defeat the enemy assembling there.

On 4 April the Japanese forces began their attack, not only in the 18th and 104th Division areas but also in the 1st Independent Infantry Unit area and, supported by the 4th Air Brigade, wrested the initiative from the enemy. By 29 April they had defeated all Chinese forces in the area.

Invasion of Swatow and Chaoan

After the fall of Canton, Swatow was the key city through which the Chinese could maintain contact with the outside world. Not only were large quantities of munitions imported through this city to be transported to the interior over the Chaoshao road (the road connecting Chaoan and Shaochow) but enormous sums of money were received there from the Chinese in the southern area thus making the city an important source for strengthening the power to resist the Japanese Army. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, in order to tighten the blockade along the coast of south China and also to capture key positions used by overseas Chinese for their anti-

Japanese activities, ordered the 21st Army to capture Swatow. The 21st Army commander ordered the Goto Detachment (composed mainly of four infantry battalions and one mountain gun regiment minus one battalion, commanded by Maj Gen Goto)⁶ to capture Swatow and Chaoan. The enemy force in the vicinity of Swatow was believed to be composed of elements of the 9th Independent Brigade and about 1,000 troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade (militia)

At 0030 hours on 21 June 1939 the Goto Detachment, in close cooperation with the Navy, penetrated the Swatow anchorage. The left flank unit landed on the eastern coast of Tahao Island at 0220 hours and, after annihilating the enemy there, occupied Wutien. At 0530 hours, elements of the main force of the Detachment, after routing about one platoon of enemy troops, effected a landing in the vicinity of Hsintsin Port. At 0830 hours, the main force sailed up the Hsi Chi and landed near Outing. From there it advanced toward the rear of Swatow while its flanking unit, after occupying Anfou, cut off the enemy's route of retreat. The enemy retreated toward Chaoan without putting up much resistance.

6. Maj Gen Goto was the commander of the 132d Brigade of the 104th Division which was stationed at Nanhai. The strength of the Goto Detachment was drawn from the 104th Division which was stationed in the vicinity of Canton. This Division relieved the 5th Division of garrison duty in the Canton area when the 5th Division was assigned to the North China Area Army on 29 November 1938.

After completing the mopping-up operation in Swatow about midnight on 21 June, the Japanese force assembled in the sector north of Swatow and prepared for the next attack. Then, on the 27th, this force defeated the main strength of the Chinese 9th Independent Brigade near Fengchi and captured Chaoan.


The 31st Air Regiment (light bombers) in spite of rough weather, closely supported the ground forces. (Map 7)


Counterattacks around Huahsien

During the attacks on Swatow and Chaoan, the Chinese in the Canton area, taking advantage of the vacuum created when the Japanese troops were pulled out for the Swatow operation, penetrated the area around Huahsien and Hsinchiehhsu (about 12 km to the southwest of Huahsien) and it was estimated that they were preparing to launch a counteroffensive. The 21st Army, therefore, ordered the 104th Division to attack and destroy this enemy force. The Division attacked the enemy entrenched around Tsunghua and Huahsien and routed them.

Summer Operation

In late August 1939 it was estimated that about seven divisions of the 12th Army Group as well as other enemy troops were approaching close to the Japanese lines in the area extending from north of Tsengcheng to Huahsien. (Map 8) The 21st Army, therefore, ordered the 18th and 104th Divisions to consolidate their present line and





to concentrate troops to the rear of this line. It further ordered that the main attack be made in the right flank area of the 18th Division.

On 1 September, the 18th Division launched its attack and, crushing the enemy in the mountains east of Tsunghua, on the night of the 3d advanced to Tsunghua. On 2 September, while advancing toward Tsunghua, the 18th Division engaged and dealt a stunning blow to a force of approximately 4,000 Chinese troops⁷ in the vicinity of Yenfengting.

The Japanese force continued to pursue the enemy and, on 4 September, encountered a strong enemy force⁸ in the vicinity of Minlohsu and, aided by the Air Force, repulsed them. On the 5th, elements of the 18th Division crushed the Chinese 160th Division, which was advancing southward from the vicinity of Chinglungtou, northeast of Tsunghua, as well as about 2,000 troops near Hsialotung, southeast of Tsunghua.

On the night of 1 September, elements of the 104th Division destroyed an enemy force near Sanhuation, while the main strength of the Division repulsed the enemy around Huahsien and pursued the retreating Chinese troops in the direction of Lungtanhsu. They encountered stiff opposition from a force entrenched in positions in the sector about 3 km southwest of Aotahsu. Fierce fighting ensued

7. Believed to be troops from the 154th Division.

8. The actual strength of this force is not available but it was part of the 157th Division.


but the Japanese overcame the enemy and advanced to Lungtanhsu.


The main strength of the enemy retreated northward but elements hid in the mountains and conducted guerrilla warfare against the Japanese troops to the rear. However, since the objective of the operation was generally accomplished, on 6 and 7 September the 21st Army began to return to its previous station. The operation was completed on 9 September. (Map 9)

Attacks on Shenchuanhsu

Shenchuanhsu was located on the border of the British-leased territory and was an important center through which the Chinese could smuggle contraband of war. The 21st Army occupied Shenchuanhsu in late November 1938, after the capture of Canton, but fearing that there would be trouble with the British if Japanese forces garrisoned this area, all troops were withdrawn and the Chinese continued to use Shenchuanhsu as a center from which to smuggle supplies along the Hongkong - Shaochow road. Therefore, in 1939, in order to cut off the enemy supplies flowing along the Canton - Kowloon railway and the Chu Chiang the 21st Army directed elements of the 18th Division to attack and again occupy Shenchuanhsu and Shataokok.

The main strength of the 114th Infantry Regiment, one battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment and some artillery and engineer troops participated in this operation. On 13 August, the force embarked at Huangpu and, sailing down the Chu Chiang, assembled at Humen.





ATTACKS ON SHENCHUANHSU

13 - 28 AUG 1939

→ JAPANESE ARMY



MOPPING-UP OPERATION AROUND SHENCHUANHSU


30 SEP - 6 OCT 1939

→ JAPANESE ARMY

⇌ CHINESE ARMY



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MAP NO. 10

The 21st Army warned the British authorities not to interfere with the coming operations along the British-Chinese border area and not to permit the Chinese troops to use the British-leased territory. The British authorities in Hongkong complied with the Japanese requests and the operation progressed smoothly.

Leaving Humen on the night of the 13th, the invading force sailed down the river and, at dawn on the 14th, effected a landing near Paoan. Without meeting very strong opposition, this force immediately advanced to and captured Shenchuanhsu and, by the 15th, had occupied Shataokok.

It then stationed two infantry battalions at Shenchuanhsu and one infantry battalion at Shataokok. Later the force at Shenchuanhsu was reduced to the main strength of the battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment, while elements of this battalion replaced the force at Shataokok. The remaining units were ordered to rejoin the 18th Division.

This operation, which commenced on 13 August, was completed on 28 August. (Map 10)

Mopping-Up Operation around Shenchuanhsu

The Chinese 20th Independent Brigade began to attack Shenchuanhsu on 30 September 1939. Although the Japanese force stopped the enemy in front of their positions, the Chinese continued to attack. In order to relieve the situation, the 18th Division dispatched the 114th

Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion) to Shenchuanhsu. Leaving Huangpu at midnight on 1 October, the Regiment sailed down the river and, on 2 October, landed at Paoan. The Regiment left Paoan the same day, planning to attack the enemy from the rear by taking a circuitous route far to the north and then coming down the Paoan - Wushihsu - Pinghu - Shenchuanhsu road. On the 3d, the Regiment bivouacked at Kuanlanhsu. On the 4th, it routed about 800 Chinese troops in the vicinity of Tientangwei. On the 5th, it overcame enemy resistance in the vicinity of Pinghu and, on the 6th, reached Shenchuanhsu.. Then, together with the unit already in the town, the Regiment secured the area. (Map 10)

Mopping-Up Operations Around Chungshanhsien

Chungshanhsien, the birthplace of Dr Sun Yat Sen, was not only a sacred place for the Kuomintang Party but also was located on the enemy's principal supply route and was an important base of operations for Chinese guerrilla units.

As the Chinese were still attempting to bring in war materiel through the areas where Japanese troops were not deployed, the 21st Army considered that a successful attack on Chungshanhsien would not only help to cut this supply line but also would demoralize the enemy. On 6 October, therefore, it ordered the main strength of the 1st Independent Infantry Unit, in coordination with naval and air units, to commence operations.



**MOPPING-UP OPERATIONS AROUND
CHUNGSHANHSIEN**

6-8 OCT 1939

→ JAPANESE ARMY
→ CHINESE ARMY

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KILOMETERS

AREA SHOWN



The main strength of the 1st Independent Infantry Unit (two battalions) opened its attack on the afternoon of the 6th and, by midnight on the 6th, its left attack unit (two companies) had effected a landing near Tiehshih. At 2300 hours on 6 October, the central attack unit (one battalion) landed at Linchiayen and, in cooperation with the right attack unit (two companies), which landed near Shanchou, fought its way to Chungshanhsien. Then, at 1400 hours on the 7th, the central attack unit occupied the capital of Chungshanhsien. On the 8th, these units mopped up the remaining area within and around the city. Troops were then deployed in the area in order to prevent further enemy activity. (Map 11)

Invasion of Nanning

Situation Prior to the Operation

Although the Chinese had lost many important ports in south China, they were still receiving war materiel through French Indo-China and Burma. It was estimated that monthly between 4,000 and 6,000 tons of supplies passed over the Kwangsi Road, one of the principal Chinese supply routes. This represented approximately 30 per cent of the total imports to China.

Japan attempted to negotiate with England and France in an effort to prevent the importation of war materiel into China from abroad but without avail. In the fall of 1939, therefore, Imperial General Headquarters planned to cut the southwestern supply routes to China

and to capture Nanning in order to convert it into a base from which the Japanese Navy Air Force could launch an operation to cut the Haiphong - Yunnan Railway and the Burma - Yunnan Road. As these plans were made at the time of the Nomonhan Incident (May-September 1939)⁹ when troops not only from Japan but also from China were being used in Manchuria, it was found difficult to reinforce the China Expeditionary Force for the invasion of Nanning. Imperial General Headquarters decided to invade Nanning by employing available troops of the China Expeditionary Army plus the 5th Division¹⁰ and, on 16 October, issued the following orders:

Imperial General Headquarters desires to intensify operations to cut the Chinese southwestern supply routes.

The C in C, China Expeditionary Army will employ elements of his units, in coordination with the Navy, to cut the enemy supply routes along the Nanning - Lungchow road.

This operation will be confined generally to the area south of Nanning and Lungchow.

The same orders placed the 5th Division, three motor transport companies (270th, 271st and 306th), the 45th Reserve Field Hospital Section, three casualty evacuation sections (18th, 25th and 26th) and two water supply and purification sections (2d and 8th) under the direct command of the 21st Army. In addition, the following units

9. Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol XI

10. After the Canton Operation in September 1938, the 5th Division was transferred from the 21st Army to the 12th Army in North China. In July 1939 it was transferred to the Kwantung Army in Manchuria but reached there too late to take part in the Nomonhan Incident. It remained in Manchuria as a reserve unit under the direct command of Imperial General Headquarters until on 16 October 1939, it was returned to the 21st Army.

were attached to the 21st Army for this operation:

China Expeditionary Army:

61st Radio Communications Platoon
66th Radio Communications Platoon

North China Area Army:

5th Railway Regiment

11th Army:

5th Transport Unit (4th Division)
1st and 4th Water Transport Units (1st Division)
11th Field Well-Drilling Company

It was estimated that the Chinese had three or four divisions of the Kwangsi Army under the command of Hsiao Wei and some troops of the Peace Preservation Corps and Civil Defense Corps in the vicinity of Nanning.

Except for two lanes in the center, Chihhsien Bay was too shallow to be used by ships of any size. The water in front of Lungmen Island was fairly deep but the north bay was very shallow. Furthermore, it was believed that the Chinese had destroyed the Chihhsien - Nanning road. Land transportation, therefore, would be difficult as paddy fields were located along the sides of the road.

Operational Command

The following operational plan was published by the 21st Army:

Operational Policy:

The 21st Army, in coordination with the Navy, will effect a forced landing in the sector south of Chihhsien. It will rapidly advance to Chihhsien and Fangsheng, capture the

key positions in the vicinity of Nanning and hold this area. The Army will interrupt the enemy's main supply route passing through Nanning and, at the same time, will establish a base for the Navy Air Force so that air operations can be carried out against the interior of China.

Participating Units:

5th Division
Formosa Mixed Brigade

Supporting Units:

The 5th Fleet
1st and 2d Carrier Divisions

Operational Orders:

At dawn on 15 November 1939, the main strength of the advance detachment (two infantry battalions commanded by Maj Gen Oikawa) will effect a surprise landing in the vicinity of Tientangchiao. Upon completing the landing, the detachment will immediately advance toward Fangcheng and occupy the city. The detachment will then continue its advance toward Tatanghsu. An element of the detachment will occupy Lungmen Island in Chinh sien Bay.

On 16 November, the Formosa Mixed Brigade will land in the vicinity of Chinh sien and will occupy the area. Later, the Brigade will capture and hold the Chinh sien - Nanning road.¹¹

The main strength of the 5th Division will go up the Maoling Chiang and will land in the vicinity of the Chinning Road. From there it will advance toward Tatunghsu.

Progress of Operation

On 13 November, the convoy left the assembly point for the land-

11. The 21st Army activated the Mabuchi Detachment (composed of four infantry battalions) and, in August, ordered it to Hainan Island to relieve the Formosa Mixed Brigade. The Brigade was then assigned the mission of guarding the Nanhai sector. In early October the 38th Division arrived in Canton and was placed under the command of the 21st Army. At this time, the 38th Division relieved the Formosa Mixed Brigade of its mission in the Nanhai sector.

ing beach. Gradually the weather began to worsen and, by the time the convoy reached its anchorage, the waves ran two to three meters high with a wind velocity of 15 to 27 meters. On 15 November, despite the storm, the Oikawa Detachment, supported by the 5th Fleet, executed a forced landing in the vicinity of Tientangchiao and on the northern coast of Lungmen Island. On the same day, the main force of the Detachment advanced northwestward and, after defeating hostile elements along the coast, occupied Fangcheng. An element of the Detachment occupied Lungmen Island.

On the 16th, the Formosa Mixed Brigade landed south of Chihhsien and immediately occupied Chihhsien. Also, on the 16th, the main force of the 5th Division went up the Maoling Chiang in boats. It landed in the vicinity of the Chin-Ning Road and immediately began to advance northward.

On the 18th, the Oikawa Detachment, in cooperation with an element of the 5th Division attacked and occupied Tachihhsu. It continued its advance northward and, on the 19th, reached Tatanghsu where the 5th Division was concentrating its strength.¹² On the 21st, the 5th Division continued its advance northward. That night an advance

12. No mention of this action by the Oikawa Detachment is made in the basic manuscript but it is described in The China Incident, Kai-kosha-Kiji Journal (1940. No. 2) a Japanese Army Journal whose editorial staff was responsible to the Vice Minister for the Army.

unit of the Division reached Weilan and forced its way across the Yung Chiang in commandeered craft and, after beating back numerous counterattacks, this unit covered the advance of the main force.

The main force of the Division began to cross the Yung Chiang from the evening of the 23d and, although the enemy resisted stubbornly, by 1030 on the 24th, the Division had succeeded in partly occupying Nanning.


On 19 November, the Formosa Mixed Brigade advanced to the vicinity of Hsiaotungshu to guard the right flank of the Army and to secure the Chin-Ning Road.

With the occupation of Nanning, the Army concentrated the 5th Division in the Nanning area and the Formosa Mixed Brigade in the Chinhsien area and designated these forces temporarily as the Chin-Ning Group. Under the command of the 5th Division commander, Lt Gen Hitoshi Imamura, the Group secured the Chin-Ning area in an effort to cut off the enemy's main supply line.

After occupying Nanning, the 5th Division ordered the Nakamura Detachment (21st Infantry Brigade composed of two regiments and one artillery battalion) and the Cavalry Regiment to pursue the enemy along the Nanning - Pinyang Road and an element of the 11th Infantry Regiment to pursue the enemy to the west of the road.

The Division defeated the enemy at every turn and, by the 29th, had reached Patangshu where it encountered and defeated an element of the hostile 200th Division.

MAP NO. 12



In the Wuming area, the 5th Division attacked an enemy force which was holding positions on the southern side of Kaofengyai and, by 1 December, had destroyed this force. (Map 12)

Situation after the Occupation of Nanning

At the end of November, an element of the Nakamura Detachment together with the main force of the 5th Cavalry Regiment was assigned to garrison duty at Patanghsu. On 2 December an enemy force of about 1500, possessing armored cars and artillery, counterattacked this garrison force from the north and the main force of the Nakamura Detachment was rushed to the scene to reinforce the garrison. At 1630 hours on 3 December, the Detachment launched an offensive against enemy strongholds established in three lines between the sector north of Patanghsu and Kunlunkuan, broke through the positions one by one and, on 4 December, occupied Kunlunkuan. Thereafter, the 5th Cavalry Regiment, one infantry battalion and one battery were left to garrison this area. The main force of the Detachment wheeled round to mop up the enemy around Chitanghsu and, on the night of the 4th, returned to Nanning. The enemy force was believed to be the 188th and 200th Divisions, both of which were motorized.

In mid-December, the Chinese Army began a large-scale counter-offensive throughout China, part of this being an offensive in the Nanning area.

Originally, the Chinese force in the Nanning area consisted of

six divisions of the Kwangsi Army¹³ but, with the arrival of reinforcements from Hunan Province, its strength was built up to an estimated 10 divisions.

In the Pin-Ning Road area, simultaneously with the occupation of Nanning, the 21st Army assigned the 5th Division the mission of capturing Lungchow and destroying enemy supply bases in that area.

On 17 December, therefore, the 5th Division commander ordered the Oikawa Detachment (composed mainly of the 11th Infantry Regiment minus one battalion, under the command of Maj Gen Oikawa) to proceed to Lungchow.

On the same day, the Chinese in the Kunlunkuan area began to reinforce their strength and launched an offensive.

On the 18th, an enemy force about 600 strong launched an attack from the direction of the Pin-Ning road but was intercepted by the Japanese garrison units near Kunlunkuan. The enemy reinforced its strength and continued to attack. The 5th Division commander, therefore, transferred the 21st Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion and commanded by Colonel Miki) from Nanning to the Chiutanghsu area. On the 19th, the Chinese encircled and attacked Chiutanghsu from three directions but were resolutely repulsed by the Japanese

13. Kwangsi Province was the birthplace of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi Army, organized there, was composed of superior, regular army troops.

forces in the area. In the meantime, the Kunlunkuan Garrison Unit (about one infantry company) and one battalion of the 42d Infantry Regiment with one battery (which was garrisoned in the mountainous district east of Kunlunkuan) were attacked incessantly by an enemy possessing superior heavy artillery fire power and casualties mounted. The 21st Infantry Regiment, which had already advanced to Chiutanghsu, launched an offensive to break through the besiegers but was unable to prevent the enemy from overrunning the Japanese positions. The Kunlunkuan Garrison Unit was annihilated and the area occupied by the Chinese. The units stationed on the heights east of Kunlunkuan, unable to withstand the enemy assault were forced to bury their field artillery and infantry guns, and withdraw. The 21st Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Chiutanghsu although fiercely attacked, turned back the enemy, secured the area and managed to establish a foothold in preparation for the major offensive. On 20 December, in an effort to relieve the situation in the Chiutanghsu area, the Nakamura Detachment (about three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion) was dispatched from Nanning. On its way, the Detachment encountered an enemy force between Wutanghsu and Liutanghsu. Defeating this force, the Detachment continued to advance toward Liutanghsu. However, the Chinese rushed in reinforcements and, unable to break through, the Detachment turned toward Pingtien in an attempt to relieve the Japanese forces in that area. On the 21st, the Detachment

defeated a small enemy force in the Pingtien - Shapinghsu area. On the evening of the 22d, it overcame a hostile force in the defile north of Chitanghsu and, on the night of the 23d, it encountered and destroyed enemy troops in the mountainous district west of the Chitanghsu - Chiutanghsu road. By 0530 hours on the 24th, one-half the Detachment had advanced to the heights west of Shuiteng and from there attacked the enemy opposing the rear of the 21st Infantry Regiment. Also, on the 24th, the other half of the Detachment, advanced to Patanghsu and mopped up the hostile troops in that area.

The main force of the Formosa Mixed Brigade, which had been dispatched from Chinhsien and one battalion of the 41st Infantry Regiment, which had been garrisoning the Nanning area, together with one battalion of the 5th Field Artillery Regiment advanced from the sector south of the Pin-Ning road to the Chiutanghsu area and, on the 24th, defeated the hostile forces occupying positions in two sectors south of Liutanghsu and Chitanghsu. About 0600 hours on the 27th, these units continued their advance toward Patanghsu. On the 28th, they succeeded in breaking through the enemy lines and around 1400 hours on the same day reached Chiutanghsu, thus enabling the units to establish liaison with the Detachment commander, Colonel Sakata, who had replaced Maj Gen Nakamura. General Nakamura was killed in action. On the 29th, the 5th Division commander ordered the 1st and 2d Formosa Infantry Regiments to wheel round and mop up the enemy on both sides of the main road. The road between Chitanghsu and Patanghsu was opened


**PROGRESS OF BATTLE AFTER
OCCUPATION OF NANNING**

17-29 DEC 1939

→ JAPANESE ARMY
→ CHINESE ARMY



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MAP NO. 13

and, on the 30th, artillery units arrived in the vicinity of Chiutanghsu and gave effective support.

On 19 December, in the Wuming area, the Kaofengyai Garrison Unit encountered an enemy force of about 1,500 to 2,000. In order to relieve the Garrison Unit, the 5th Division commander dispatched two battalions commanded by Colonel Nomi, commander of the 41st Infantry Regiment. On the 20th, this force attacked and repulsed the enemy from three directions toward Wuming and, having relieved the pressure on the Garrison Unit, returned to Nanning on the same day.

After the occupation of Nanning, the 5th Division commander ordered the Oikawa Detachment to capture Lungchow and destroy the enemy supply bases there. On 17 December, the Detachment left Nanning and advanced westward, repairing damaged roads on the way. On the 21st, the Detachment captured Lungchow, and, on the 22d, Chennankuan. Then, in view of the tense situation in the Kunlunkuan area, the 5th Division commander ordered the Detachment to return to Nanning immediately. On 24 December, the Detachment turned back and on the 29th arrived at Nanning. (Map 13)¹⁴

The Weng - Ying (Wengyuan - Yingte) Operation

By the summer of 1939, the Chinese 4th Sector Army, which was attached to the 12th Army Group, and had a frontline strength of more

14. Monograph No 74, Operations in the Kunlunkuan Area.

than three armies, had advanced southward and posed a definite threat to the Japanese forces north of Canton. The 21st Army, therefore, decided to advance to the Wengyuan - Yingte line in an attempt to destroy this force. An outline of the Army's operational plan was as follows:

Plan:

The 21st Army will isolate and destroy the main force of the Chinese Army under the command of Yu Hanmou in the sector south of Wengyuan. This will cripple the entire enemy force at one stroke. To accomplish this, an element of the 21st Army will attack the enemy from the direction of the Canton - Hankou railway while its main force will attack from the direction of the Canton - Meikenghsu - Wengyuan road.¹⁵

Strength to be employed:

18th Division
104th Division (5th Railway Regiment attached)
Guards Mixed Brigade¹⁶ (Main force of the 2d Heavy
Field Artillery Brigade
attached)
21st Independent Air Unit

Direction of Combat:

At an early stage of the operation, one element of the 104th Division will advance to the Canton - Hankou railway line in order to cover the repair work being done to the railroad, especially tunnels, and will divert the enemy confronting the main force along the Canton - Hankou line.

With the arrival of the Guards Mixed Brigade at the

15. On 2 October the 38th Division was incorporated into the 21st Army. The Division arrived at Canton and relieved the Formosa Mixed Brigade of the mission of guarding the Nanhai area. During the Wengyuan - Yingte Operation, the 38th Division garrisoned the Canton area.

16. The Guards Mixed Brigade, which was assigned to the 21st Army on 15 November, arrived at Canton in mid-December.

combat zone, each force will successively assemble at the Yunghanhsu - Tsunghua - Yinchanao line.

On "X" Day, each force will leave the assembly point and will maneuver to encircle the enemy. The 18th Division will advance to Taipingshu, the Guards Mixed Brigade to Wengyuan through Lutienhsu and Meikenghsu and the 104th Division to Yingte.

After breaking through the enemy positions in the Liangkouhsu area, the motorized Guards Mixed Brigade (taking advantage of its mobility) will pursue the enemy to Wengyuan,¹⁷ although its line of march may cross that of the 18th Division.

The Guards Mixed Brigade will be responsible for the front extending about 5.5 kilometers along its line of march; the 18th Division will be responsible for the sector to the east and the 104th Division will be responsible for the sector to the west.

Preparations for the Operation:

For the purpose of making repairs on railroads and diverting the enemy confronting the main force of the 21st Army, on 20 November the Nishiyama Detachment (107th Infantry Regiment and one artillery battalion commanded by Maj Gen Fukutaro Nishiyama) of the 104th Division began to advance northward from Hsinchiehhsu. On the 21st, it defeated an element of the Chinese 152d Division in the area around Shihlinghsu and Chuntien and advanced to the Lianglungshu - Lungkang - Yinchanao line where it carried out railroad repair work. The Chinese counterattacked this line but the Detachment repulsed them and, on 6 December, again advanced northward. On 18 December, the Detachment

17. This was the first time during the China Incident that the troops of the Guards Mixed Brigade had been used in combat. Therefore, they were assigned the mission of attacking the very strong positions in the Liangkouhsu area and their frontage was narrowed in order to achieve the best results.

advanced to Yuantanhsu and made repairs to the railroad there, then on the 20th, it marched to the southern bank of the Pa Chiang.

Meanwhile, on 15 December, the 18th Division marched northward from Tsengcheng. On the 19th it occupied Yunghanhsu where it concentrated its main force. On the 22d, the Division again marched northward, and on the 23d arrived at Tsotanhsu.

Also on 15 December, the Guards Mixed Brigade completed the landing of its entire force near Huangpu and immediately concentrated its strength in the Tsunghua area. On the 23d it advanced to the area four kilometers southwest of Liangkouhsu and began preparations for an attack on enemy positions in that area. Meanwhile, on the evening of the 20th, the main force of the 104th Division advanced to Yuantanhsu.

Progress of Operation.

In view of the critical situation in the Nanning area and in order to divert its main force to that area immediately after the completion of the Wengyuan Operation, on 24 December, the 21st Army began to push the attack toward Wengyuan, two days earlier than the appointed date of the operation.

Smashing the enemy's counteroffensive at every turn, the 18th Division advanced northward. On 27 December, an element of the Division occupied Hsinfeng and its main force reached Meikenghsu.

On the morning of the 24th, the Guards Mixed Brigade fiercely attacked the Chinese positions southwest of Liangkouhsu. Its en-

veloping unit attacked the rear of the enemy from the east and by noon on the 26th, had advanced to the north of Liangkouhsu. On 27 December, it assembled at Lutienhsu.

With the unexpected swift advance of the 18th Division and estimating that it would take the Guards Mixed Brigade some time to break through the Chinese positions in the Liangkouhsu area, the 21st Army changed the original missions of these two units. It ordered the 18th Division to advance to Wengyuan and the Guards Mixed Brigade to Taipingsu.

The 18th Division continued to pursue the enemy and by 1600 hours on the 29th its advance unit had occupied Wengyuan. Its main force then began to assemble in this area. On the night of the 30th, an element (believed to be about two infantry battalions) made a surprise attack on Sanhuachen where the Chinese 12th Army Group Headquarters was located, and occupied the town.

The Guards Mixed Brigade assembled first at Lutienhsu on the 27th and on the 29th, advanced to Paisha and Taipingsu. It then began preparations to move to Fokang.

On 24 December, the 104th Division started to cross the Pa Chiang and, by the 27th, had crossed the Pei Chiang. Its main force then began to advance toward Kaotienhsu. At 1630 hours on the 30th, an element of the Division occupied Yingte and by noon on the 31st, its main force had assembled in this area. (Map 14)

When the Chinese forces launched their counteroffensive in an


effort to recapture Nanning, it became necessary to shift the main strength of the Army from the Canton area to the Nanning area. Therefore, with the main objectives of the Wengyuan - Yingte Operation generally completed with the occupation of Wengyuan and Yingte, on 1 January the main strength of the Army began to wheel around and take up its former positions.

On 1 January, the 18th Division began to move. After mopping up the enemy on the way, on the 3d it assembled its main force in the Lutienhsu area and by the evening of the 8th, it had completed assembly in the sector south of Tsunghua.

Also on 1 January, the Guards Mixed Brigade moved westward and, covered by the 104th Division, after 8 January was transported by train from Yuantanhsu along the Canton - Hankou railway to Huangpu.

On 3 January, the 104th Division started to wheel around from Yingte and, by the 8th, had assembled at Yuantanhsu. After covering the transportation of the Guards Mixed Brigade, it returned to its former position. (Map 15)

Repair work on the Canton - Hankou railway was completed up to Yuantanhsu but after the successful completion of the Wengyuan - Yingte Operation this railroad was no longer necessary and the material was stripped for use in the Nanning area.



CHAPTER 3

Operations in 1940

Pinyang Operation

Situation Before the Operation

Although the Nanning - Chiutanghsu road was opened during the latter part of December, the enemy succeeded in advancing to the mountainous district north of the Ssutanghsu - Chuitanghsu line and constructed strong positions there. Furthermore, to the east, west and north of the Chitanghsu - Patanghsu area, the Chinese had encircled the Japanese forces and constantly bombarded them from artillery positions set up in Kunlunkuan. Also they had established air bases in Liuchowhsien and Kweilin from which their air force cooperated with their ground offensive. Powerful enemy forces were assembled in the areas around Ssulunghsu, Pinyang, Wulinghsu and Kantanghsu and it was estimated that about two enemy divisions were stationed in the Wuning area and several divisions on both sides of the Nanning - Chihhsien road.

It was later ascertained that the enemy strength was 9 armies, with a total of 25 divisions, 5 heavy artillery battalions, 3 field artillery battalions and 7 mountain artillery battalions, most of which were highly trained troops under the command of the Chinese High Command.

Concentration of Japanese Forces

In order to launch a counteroffensive against the enemy to the

northeast of Nanning, the 21st Army planned to use the 18th Division and the Guards Mixed Brigade from the Canton area as well as the 5th Division and the Formosa Mixed Brigade already stationed in the Nanning area.

With the successful conclusion of the Wengyuan - Yingte Operation, on 1 January the 21st Army had begun its withdrawal to Nanning. The 18th Division first assembled in the Tsunghua area and about 11 January continued to Nanning by sea.¹ Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the 18th Division, the garrison unit was pulled out of the Shen-chuanhsu - Paoan area.

On 8 January, the Guards Mixed Brigade commenced embarkation at Huangpu and, on the 9th, landed near Chihhsien and from there, on the 12th, it headed for Nanning in four echelons. After mopping up the enemy in the sector along the Chin - Ning road, the Brigade pressed forward and, on the 18th, swept the Chinese forces from the vicinity of Tatumghsu. On 22 January it assembled in the Chitanghsu area.

On 13 January, just prior to the debarkation of the main force, the first echelon of the 18th Division debarked near Chihhsien. On the 17th, it occupied Niukanghsu and continued its advance north,

1. In December 1939, the 106th Division, which was stationed at Shanghai, was assigned to the 21st Army by order of the C in C, China Expeditionary Army. With the transfer of the 18th Division to Nanning, its mission of guarding and securing the area east of Canton (See Map 5) was assigned to the 106th Division. By 19 January, the main force of the 106th Division had been disposed to perform its new assignment.

overcoming the enemy on the way. By the 19th, it had assembled in the sector south of Nanning. On the 26th, the advance force defeated an enemy force of about 500 strong and occupied Liangchinghsu.

Operational Progress

The 21st Army planned to attack the enemy in the mountain area north of the Pinyang highway by deploying troops between Chiutanghsu and Ssutanghsu and using the reinforcements sent from Canton to launch an offensive against the enemy's left flank from the direction of Kantanghsu. The date of the commencement of the operation was fixed for as near 28 January as possible.

The 5th Division, deployed between Chiutanghsu and Wutanghsu, was ordered to rush toward Kunlunkuan after defeating the confronting enemy. The Formosa Mixed Brigade, deployed near Ssutanghsu, was to break through the hostile force stationed to the northeast and advance toward Ssulunghsu. After assembling in the Chitanghsu area, the Guards Mixed Brigade was to leave the left bank of the Yung Chiang and move toward Pinyang through the Shamaoling area. The 18th Division, assembled on the right bank of the Yung Chiang south of Nanning, was to advance eastward along the right bank and to cross the river near Yungshun. The Division was ordered to break through the enemy lines in the Kantanghsu area and dash to the sector north of Pinyang. An independent infantry unit was dispatched from the Canton area to reinforce elements of the 5th Division and the Formosa Mixed Brigade, which were charged with the security and guarding of the Chihhsien -

Nanning road.

On 28 January, an element of the 5th Division stationed at Wutanghsu and the Formosa Mixed Brigade from Ssutanghsu launched an offensive against the enemy's multiple trench positions on the heights west of the Pin-Ning road and captured them. At the same time, the 18th Division and the Guards Mixed Brigade started to move from the banks of the Yung Chiang and flanked the enemy positions.

On the 29th, the main force of the 5th Division stationed near Patanghsu shifted to the offensive and, in conjunction with an element of the Division which had advanced from the Wutanghsu area to the northeast, destroyed the enemy confronting it. On the 31st, this force fiercely attacked and routed a powerful enemy occupying Kunlunkuan, Tungtangling and Pafengling. On 2 February, the 5th Division together with the Formosa Mixed Brigade penetrated deep into the enemy positions. Then, in accordance with the 21st Army's order, on 3 February the 5th Division pursued the enemy toward Pinyang and the Formosa Mixed Brigade pressed forward toward Ssulunghsu.


Also on 28 January, the 18th Division and the Guards Mixed Brigade started to move from the banks of the Yung Chiang and flanked the Chinese positions. The 18th Division, having crossed the Yung Chiang near Yungshun, pressed forward and destroyed the enemy confronting it. It then attacked the Chinese forces in the areas around Kantanghsu and Shamaoling. Two enemy divisions to the north of Pinyang and three divisions from the Kunlunkuan area counterattacked the Guards

PINYANG OPERATION

28 JAN - 8 FEB 1940

→ JAPANESE ARMY

→ CHINESE ARMY



MAP NO. 16

Mixed Brigade and the 18th Division from the direction of Wulingsu. On 1 and 2 February, these two units repulsed the enemy's counter-attack and promptly launched a pursuit action. On 2 February, the Guards Mixed Brigade captured Pinyang. That night the 18th Division continued to pursue the enemy and, by the 3d, had advanced to the sector north of Pinyang, while some strength from the Division occupied the area in the vicinity of Tsouhsu.

After the 4th, an element of each force continued to pursue the enemy, destroying him at every turn. (Map 16)

Having frustrated the enemy's plan, the 21st Army decided to occupy the heights north of the Pin-Ning road with an element and concentrate its main force in the Nanning area. Around 8 February, each force commenced to withdraw and by the 13th, the movement was completed. The 18th Division returned to its home base by sea.

Situation after Pinyang Operation

Immediately after the Pinyang Operation, because of the wide area over which the Japanese troops were now deployed, Imperial General Headquarters reorganized the 21st Army into the South China Area Army. The Area Army was placed under the command of the C in C of the China Expeditionary Army and its mission was to defend south China. The units in Kwantung Province and the newly activated 22d Army were placed under its command.

The 22d Army with its headquarters in Nanning, was organized from

all forces (except the 18th Division)² which had participated in the Pinyang Operation and was assigned the mission of securing the Chihhsien - Nanning area. In order to destroy the enemy which was still threatening this area, in the spring the Army conducted the Kohoku Operation (north of the Yung Chiang), the Toro Operation (east of the Chihhsien - Nanning road) and two Seiro Operations (west of the Chihhsien - Nanning road) and in summer it carried out the Lungchow Operations in preparation for the occupation of French Indo-China.

In July 1940, the Chinese organized the 7th War Sector Army in south China and disposed it in Kwangtung Province and the 4th War Sector Army, which was already in south China, was disposed in Kwangsi Province.

Although the Japanese occupation of the Nanning area had cut the enemy's supply line from French Indo-China by way of the Nanning - Kweilin road, they still continued to import supplies through Paise and other northern points. In order to stop this inflow of supplies Imperial General Headquarters felt it necessary to occupy French Indo-China.

On 17 June 1940, France surrendered to Germany and, on 20 June, the French Indo-Chinese authorities submitted to Japan's demands to

2. The 18th Division remained under the direct command of the South China Area Army and, at the conclusion of the Pinyang Operation in early February, returned to its base in Canton. There it relieved the 106th Division which had been garrisoning the area during the 18th Division's participation in the Pinyang Operation. The 106th Division was scheduled to return to Japan.

ban the transit of supplies to Chiang's forces and agreed to the dispatch of a border surveillance committee under the leadership of Maj Gen Issaku Nishihara to investigate and supervise the actual transportation of supplies. In September agreement was reached whereby Japanese troops marched into French Indo-China.³

Since the advance of Japanese forces into northern French Indo-China completely stopped the flow of supplies into China from that area it was considered unnecessary for the 22d Army to continue to garrison the Nanning sector. In accordance with an Imperial General Headquarters' order it left this area in November and returned first to Canton and eventually to Japan.

During the year mopping-up operations in Kwangtung Province were conducted by division-size or smaller units to assure the cutting of the Chinese supply lines and to maintain order.

Operations in Areas Directly Controlled by the South China Area Army

Chungshanhsien Operation

In October 1939 the 21st Army after destroying the enemy in the vicinity of Chungshanhsien and cutting the supply lines which had been established under the protection of third powers, returned to its base. Later, the Chinese again advanced to the Chungshanhsien

3. For details of political strategy during the occupation of northern French Indo-China see Monograph No 146, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part II.


area, dug in there and by the beginning of 1940 had gradually built up their strength to a force of 6,000 to 7,000 men. The South China Area Army, therefore, planned to occupy the area and mop up the enemy located there. It ordered the 38th Division to undertake this operation.

On 5 February, the 38th Division landed the 228th Infantry Regiment (minus two companies and commanded by an infantry group commander) near Tangchia and Hsiangchou, north of Macau and ordered it to advance toward Chungshanhsien from the east. Four infantry battalions of the Division sailed down the Hsi Chiang and, on the night of the 6th, landed near Tiehshih. From there it immediately began to advance toward Chungshanhsien. On the 7th, it besieged the city and captured it the following morning. The opposing force, which had gradually withdrawn when it discovered the imminence of the attack, was believed to be a guerrilla unit of the Peace Preservation Corps (Militia) with an estimated strength of 2,000 men.

On the 17th, an element of the Division seized Hsiaolanchen and, the following day, mopped up the area around Haichou and Kuchenhsu, which lie west of Hsiaolanchen.

Upon the successful conclusion of this operation, the main strength of the Division returned to its former base, but one infantry battalion remained to occupy the Chungshanhsien area, one infantry company was stationed in the area around Hsiaolanchen and two infantry companies occupied the mountain district north of Macau.

MAP NO. 17



The security of these areas was assigned to approximately 3,000 Chinese under the command of Lt Gen Lu Chunjung, the military governor of Yuehnan, who supported the Wang Chingwei regime. (Map 17)

Mopping-up Operations on Hainan Island and in the Vicinity of Fengyang

After the conclusion of the Pinyang Operation in early February, the 18th Division was to return to Canton and the 106th Division, which had been garrisoning that area, was scheduled to return to Japan. The South China Area Army, however, ordered the 18th Division to delay its return in order to mop up the Chinese forces remaining on Hainan Island, and the 106th Division was directed to land at Swatow and to mop up the sector to the west of Chaoan.

On 4 March, therefore, the Hainan Island Detachment, reinforced by elements of the 18th Division, and in cooperation with the Navy, began to mop up the north-eastern section of the island. By the 14th, it had cleared the area in the vicinity of Chianshih and Nanlushih, approximately 80 kilometers south southwest of Haikoushih and completely destroyed this base of operation of enemy bandits.

On 7 March, the Swatow Detachment, reinforced by the 106th Division, began mopping-up operations against a hostile bandit group⁴ in the vicinity of Fengyang and, by the 17th, had succeeded in destroying this force.

4. It was estimated that this force was somewhere in the vicinity of 3,000 troops.

Then, in accordance with an Imperial General Headquarters order dated 9 March, the 106th Division returned to Japan.

Mopping-up Operation on the British-Chinese Border

The Japanese troops stationed in the vicinity of Shenchuanhsu had been withdrawn at the end of 1939 in order that they might participate in the Pinyang Operation. As a result, the Chinese located in this area not only continued to smuggle supplies in by way of the Hongkong - Shaochow route but dug in near the border and became very active. The South China Area Army, therefore, decided to reoccupy the area and directed the 18th Division to assign an element to undertake this operation.

At 0230 hours on 22 June, the Hara Detachment (approximately two infantry battalions and commanded by Colonel Hara) of the 18th Division made a surprise landing at a point south of Paoan and, after defeating hostile elements on the way, at 1630 hours captured Shenchuanhsu. On 24 June, the Detachment left Shenchuanhsu and mopped up Chinese troops in the vicinity of Hengkanghsu. On the 28th, it returned to Shenchuanhsu. Elements of the Detachment then occupied such key points as Shenchuanhsu, Paoan and Shataokok in order to suppress enemy activities.



In late July, Imperial General Headquarters assigned to the South China Area Army the 1st Artillery Unit composed mainly of one heavy artillery (24 cm howitzers) regiment and two independent heavy artillery (15 cm guns) battalions and commanded by Maj Gen Kitajima. The

**MOPPING-UP OPERATION ON THE
BRITISH - CHINESE BORDER**

22 JUN - 20 AUG 1940

→ JAPANESE ARMY
- - - → CHINESE ARMY

0 5 10 15
KILOMETERS



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MAP NO. 18

South China Area Army commander ordered this unit to be disposed in the Paoan - Shenchuanhsu sector in order to secure the area. Accordingly, about 20 August, the 1st Artillery Unit landed in the vicinity of Paoan and assumed responsibility for the security of this area. An infantry unit already stationed in the area was placed under the command of the Unit. (Map 18)

Liangkouhsu Operation

The Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army ordered that operations in south China be carried out in conjunction with the Ichang Operations⁵ scheduled to be conducted during May and June by the 11th Army. The South China Area Army commander, therefore, planned to check and destroy the enemy south of Hengyang in order to secure this area. It was planned that enemy key positions in the vicinity of Liangkouhsu would be captured and the enemy located in the sector along the right bank of the Liuchi Shui would be destroyed. The 38th Division was to form the main unit, while approximately three infantry battalions of the 18th Division would be disposed as the right flank unit and one infantry battalion of the 104th Division would form the left flank unit.

On 7 May, the 38th Division began to assemble in the vicinity of Pinghu and, on 10 May, ordered a detachment to advance from there.

5. Monograph No 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941.

This advance unit captured a hill northeast of Tsunghua without opposition and then continued advancing northward repelling small enemy units on the way.

The main body of the Division advanced northward along the Liuchi Shui while the left flank unit advanced through the west sector.⁶

By the 16th, the Division's main body had advanced to the vicinity of Tsunghua and an element had pushed back an enemy unit located near Shaokenghsu, east of Tsunghua. On the 18th, the main force of the Division advanced to the vicinity of Mipuhsu and, on the 22d, an element seized Liangkouhsu while the main force of the Division assembled in the vicinity of Shihlinghsu.

The enemy divisions (52d, 53d, 57th, 187th Divisions and others) which formed the backbone of the Chinese forces in Kwantung Province gradually advanced southward, overrunning the Japanese forces. They attacked not only the front but the flanks and rear of the Army. Against this overwhelming enemy, the 229th Infantry Regiment valiantly held Liangkouhsu. On the 28th, the Japanese Army shifted to the offensive and the main force of the 38th Division and elements of the 18th Division began their advance. The main force of the 38th Division assaulted the enemy north of Shihlinghsu while elements of

6. By order of the South China Area Army, this infantry battalion was later placed under the command of the 38th Division commander.




LIANGKOUHSU OPERATION

7 MAY - 12 JUN 1940

-  JAPANESE ARMY
-  CHINESE ARMY



AREA SHOWN



MAP NO. 19

the 18th and 38th Divisions attacked the enemy in the sector north of Liangkouhsu. On the evening of the 30th, after a fierce battle the Japanese forces broke through the Chinese lines and on the 31st while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, extended their front to the Niuchipei - Tungtung line.

On 3 June, the objective had been attained and the Army directed the troops to withdraw and break away from the enemy. The 38th Division gradually withdrew to the vicinity of Tsunghua and the units of the 18th and 104th Divisions returned to their respective bases.

On the evening of 3 June, the 38th Division assembled in the vicinity of Shihlingsu and the following day proceeded to Tsunghua. An element occupied a strategical point to the north of Tsunghua. Thus counteroffensive preparations were completed and the Japanese Army in south China was ready to check the enemy during the 11th Army's Ichang Operations in central China.

Judging the Japanese withdrawal to be a retreat, the Chinese units, reinforced by the 63d Army, attacked their flanks from various places to the east of Chilungkanghsu. On the morning of 7 June, the main strength of the 38th Division counterattacked and repelled the raiding units of the 63d Army in the Chaokenghsu and Chilungkanghsu areas and, on the afternoon of the 8th, began to assemble to the east of Tsunghua. Then, on 12 June, with the capture of Ichang accomplished by the 11th Army, the South China Area Army ordered the 38th Division to return to its base. (Map 19)

The Chinese, who had suffered heavy casualties during the Pinyang Operation, assembled their battered forces in the area to the north of the Wuhsuan - Chienchiang - Wuming line and on 15 or 16 February began to move more than ten divisions of their Central Army southward. However, a few days later they again turned northward.

An element, which had remained behind, about mid-February again began to move southward and advanced to the vicinity of Nanning.

In order to destroy these enemy forces, the Kohoku, Seiro and Toro Operations were undertaken.

Kohoku Operation


On 24 February, elements of the Japanese 5th Division began to attack the Chinese newly organized 33d Division and drove it back to the vicinity of Wutanghsu. The following day they assaulted approximately 1,000 enemy troops occupying the northern side of Chitanghsu and, after routing them that evening, advanced to a hill north of Chitanghsu. They mopped up the remaining troops and then returned to the vicinity of Nanning.

On 24 February, the Japanese forces routed an element of the Chinese 6th Army which had advanced southward from Wuming.

Toro and Second Seiro Operations⁷

In March, the enemy apparently planning to employ several di-

7. The first Seiro Operation was carried out in late February, by about one and a half infantry battalions of the Guards Mixed Brigade. It was a minor operation.



MAP NO. 20

visions from the Lingshan area and some elements from the Shangssu area in an attack on the Japanese sector between Chihhsien and Nanning, gradually began to intensify his activities to such an extent that the security of the Japanese lines of communication were threatened. In order to isolate and defeat the enemy in the Lingshan area, therefore, on 13 March the 22d Army initiated operations with the main strength of the Guards Mixed Brigade and elements of the 5th Division and, on the 14th, with elements of the Formosa Mixed Brigade. The elements of the 5th Division pushed forward from Nanning through a sector along the southern bank of the Yung Chiang. On the 15th, they advanced to Nanhsianghsu and on the 18th, to Fengtanghsu. The Guards Mixed Brigade advanced eastward from Tingtzuhsu. On the 15th, it passed through Taipingsu and on the 16th, reached Maochenhsu. On the 18th, the Brigade assembled in a sector on the western side of Lingshan. Elements of the Formosa Mixed Brigade proceeded from the vicinity of Tatunghsu, north of Chihhsien and, on the 17th, in coordination with the movement of the other two units, rushed to Lingshan. On the 19th, some elements advanced to Pingshanhsu. (Map 20)

Having routed the enemy forces, about 21 March, the South China Area Army ordered the units to withdraw to their previous stations, mopping up the remaining enemy on their way back.

During this operation, the enemy west of the Chihhsien - Nanning road, in cooperation with the Chinese forces located at Lingshan, took

the offensive. On 26 March, therefore, in order to counter this action, the Army executed the Second Seiro Operation. Elements of the 5th Division left Nanning, advanced through Funan and Hsichanghsu and, on 31 March, seized Ssulo. The main force of the Guards Mixed Brigade advanced from Tatunghsu while an element advanced from Hsiaotanghsu and, after defeating a stubbornly resisting enemy on the way, on 31 March reached Ssulo via Shangssu and Paifuhsu. The 5th Division unit then turned in three columns and mopped up the Chinese troops around Chungshan, Tsohsien and Tungcheng, while the main force of the Guards Mixed Brigade disposed in two columns, destroyed enemy bases along the right bank of the Ming Chiang between Ssulo and Shangssu and mopped up the enemy around Hachianghsu. By 5 April, all units had returned to their original stations. (Map 21)

Lungchow Operation

In an effort to prevent the inflow of supplies to Chiang Kai-shek from French Indo-China, Imperial General Headquarters opened negotiations with the Governor-General of French Indo-China in mid-June and, at the same time, ordered the South China Area Army to station troops in the border area to strengthen the Japanese positions there. The 22d Army, therefore, was ordered to dispose its forces in the border area.


Although in late May the Chinese forces along the Chinhsien - Nanning road had been mopped up, as the negotiations with French Indo-

SECOND SEIRO OPERATION

26 MAR - 5 APR 1940

→ JAPANESE ARMY

▬ CHINESE ARMY



MAP NO. 21

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China progressed, the enemy transferred his strength westward via north of Nanning and from late June to early July transferred his 54th Army to the Tsingsi - Tienpao area in a desperate effort to destroy the Lungchow road, strengthen his defense positions and disrupt the Japanese supply lines in the rear.

As the 5th Division had been in charge of security in the Nanning area, the 22d Army ordered an element of this Division to undertake the Lungchow Operation.

The 5th Division commander organized the Okamoto Detachment (9th Infantry Brigade (minus one regiment) and one mountain artillery battalion) for this purpose and the Detachment commenced operations on 17 June. After repairing the Lungchow road which had been destroyed by the enemy, the Detachment advanced along this road and, by 24 June, had reached the vicinity of Panchunghsu. On the 26th, its advance unit captured Mingchiang. The Detachment commander then organized the Lungchow Detachment and employed it to assault the Shangchin area east of Lungchow. The main force of the detachment proceeded toward Pinghsiang and, on 29 June, an advance unit captured the town. On the 30th, its main strength assembled there. Having sustained heavy losses, the enemy retreated to the north bank of the Li Chiang. Two regiments of the 151st Division and one regiment of the 188th Division were disposed along a line extending east and west from Shanglung while an element took up positions in a sector north of Shangchin.


Starting on the evening of 2 July, the Lungchow Detachment from the south bank of the Li Chiang northeast of Shangchin attacked, and subsequently defeated, the enemy on the opposite bank. After capturing Lungchow on 3 July, an advance unit of the Detachment defeated approximately 1,500 troops at a point 10 kilometers northwest of the town. The Detachment then assigned its main force to road repair work in order to insure supplies from the rear.

As Shuikoukuan was felt to be strategically important, on 25 July, the Detachment dispatched an element to this area. The element left Lungchow and, on the same evening, without encountering strong resistance, captured both Shuikoukuan and Hsipingsun.

Following the Japanese occupation of Lungchow, French Indo-China began to strengthen its border positions in the vicinity of Dongdang and Langson. Therefore, the 22d Army Commander assigned the security of Nanning to the Guards Division⁸ and directed the 5th Division to assemble its entire strength along the French Indo-China border. On 20 July, the Guards Division relieved the 5th Division of security duty and, by the 24th, the 5th Division had assembled in the sector west of Ningming as a bulwark against the French Indo-Chinese forces.

(Map 22)

8. In late June, the Guards Division entered the order of battle of the 22d Army and, by mid-July, had assembled in Nanning.



Occupation of Northern French Indo-China

After the 21st Army captured Nanning in the fall of 1939, the Chinese concentrated approximately 30 divisions in this area in an attempt to recapture the city. At the same time, assisted by French Indo-China, they strove to secure their supply line by opening a route from Haiphong to Paise. In June 1940, therefore, in order to stop these supplies reaching the Chinese Army, Imperial General Headquarters, with the concurrence of the French Vichy Government, dispatched a Border Surveillance Group, headed by Maj Gen Issaku Nishihara, to the area.

On 4 September, on the basis of the agreement concluded between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and French Ambassador Henri on 30 August 1940, a local agreement in regard to the dispatch of Japanese troops to northern French Indo-China was concluded. A supplementary provision in the agreement, however, stated the agreement would be nullified should the Japanese troops cross the border before the date fixed for occupation.⁹ It so happened that on 5 September elements of the Morimoto Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, stationed near Pinghsiang, reconnoitered the terrain on the border region near Dongdang. Although it was later proven that they did not cross the border, the French Indo-Chinese Government regarded this maneuver as

9. Monograph No 146, Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part II.

a border crossing and the violation was recognized by Battalion Commander Morimoto. As a result, the French Indo-Chinese Government declared the agreement void.¹⁰

With the abrogation of the first agreement, Imperial General Headquarters ordered Maj Gen Nishihara to reopen negotiations with the French Indo-Chinese Government for peaceful occupation of French Indo-China. Meanwhile, the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army, (composed of the 1st Guards Infantry Brigade (minus one regiment) and one infantry battalion of the Formosa Mixed Brigade and commanded by Maj Gen Nishimura) was organized by the South China Area Army for the occupation of French Indo-China. Preparations were made for the Expeditionary Army to sail from Chihnsien and for the 5th Division, which was then occupying the Lungchow area, to advance overland to French Indo-China. In both cases peaceful occupation was the primary objective, but in the event the negotiations should reach a deadlock, the Japanese were to occupy by force, should it be deemed necessary.

Occupation

The second on-the-spot negotiations continued to run into difficulties and the South China Area Army decided that if agreement was not reached by 0000¹¹ hours on 23 September, that it would enter

10. Monograph No 25, French Indo-China Area Operations Record.

11. Japanese Military orders use 0000 hours to designate the first moment of the day. In the case above (an ultimatum) an American military order would use 2400 hours, 22 September.

northern French Indo-China by force. At 1600 hours on 22 September, however, agreement was reached and the commander of the South China Area Army ordered his forces to occupy the area peacefully, but because of communication difficulties dissemination of the order was delayed. The 5th Division, which was scheduled to go by land, adhered to the principle of peaceful occupation but was so disposed as to be able to counter any armed resistance by the French Indo-Chinese forces. The 22d Army commander directed his chief of staff to deliver to the commander of the French Indo-Chinese Army, through Major Gireau, commander of the Dongdang Garrison, a notice asking him to remove obstacles along the route of advance and to make every effort to avoid conflicts due to mutual misunderstandings. However, neither this notice nor the conclusion of the local agreement was transmitted in time and as the 5th Division advanced toward Thatkæ and Dongdang, the French Indo-Chinese troops opened fire and fighting gradually spread along the entire front. In self-defense, the commander of the 5th Division felt it necessary to attack and overcome the French Indo-Chinese forces in the vicinity of Langson and on the afternoon of the 25th¹² began necessary offensive preparations. That evening, prior to the planned

12. This date is given as 23 Sept in both the basic manuscript of this monograph and in Monograph 25, French Indo-China Area Operations Record. However, as the date of 25 Sept, given by Lt Gen Akito Nakamura, commander 5th Division, in his personal history of the operation as published by the Japanese Security Forces, Historical Section, seemed a more logical date, it has been substituted here.

attack, the French Indo-Chinese Army surrendered and the Division occupied Langson. The 22d Army commander then ordered the 5th Division to assemble in the Langson area and prepare for further movement.


On 23 September, the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army¹³ landed without incident on the shore south of Doson and, on the 26th, completed its concentration near Haiphong. On 7 October, the main strength of the Expeditionary Army occupied Phulangthuong and an element occupied Hanoi.

On 5 October, the 21st Independent Air Unit arrived at Hanoi from Canton. (Map 23)

With the completion of the advance into northern French Indo-China, Imperial General Headquarters directed that the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army, the 21st Independent Air Unit and elements of the Shipping Unit be stationed in this area. The 5th Division, which had concentrated in the Langson area and was under the direct command of the Area Army, in November was placed under the direct command of Imperial General Headquarters and moved to Shanghai via Haiphong.

In January 1941, the 170th Infantry Regiment was placed under the command of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army and the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade returned to its original command.

13. The French Indo-China Expeditionary Army was composed of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade (minus one regiment) one infantry battalion of the Formosa Mixed Brigade and one artillery battalion.



CHAPTER 4

Operations in 1941

Operations to Cut Supply Lines

Following the Japanese occupation of northern French Indo-China the Chinese made desperate efforts to maintain the flow of munitions from abroad by establishing supply points along the coast of south and central China.

About mid-February 1941, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army and the commander of the South China Area Army to carry out blockade operations wherever necessary. It was planned, therefore, that elements of the China Expeditionary Army would blockade the coast north of and including Chekiang Province while elements of the South China Area Army would blockade the coast south of and including Fukien Province. Accordingly, the South China Area Army commander staged the following operations to destroy supply points and lines:

In February 1941, the Ko Detachment (three infantry battalions) landed on the shore of Bias Bay and, after seizing Tanshui and Shanyung, captured supplies earmarked by the Chinese for shipment to Shaochow from Hongkong. The Otsu Detachment (three infantry battalions) attacked Lungkanghsu from Shenchuanhsu.

The 1st Detachment (three Guards infantry battalions) landed in the vicinity of Kuanghaicheng and Toushan and in March, after occupying

Taishan, mopped up the surrounding area and the area around Chihchi.


In March, the 2d Detachment (three Guards infantry battalions) landed near Tashihkang and captured Yangchiang. Also, in March, the 3d Detachment (three Guards infantry battalions) landed and occupied the area around Shuitangshih and Tienpai, and the 4th Detachment (three infantry battalions of the 48th Division) landed near Haikang, while the 5th Detachment (three infantry battalions of the 48th Division) landed near Peihai.

The Yoshitake Detachment (three infantry battalions of the 38th Division) launched an attack from the vicinity of Hsinhui and, in cooperation with the 1st Detachment, captured and mopped up the area around Tanshuikou.

A unit composed mainly of three infantry battalions of the Guards Division landed in the vicinity of Shanwei. During March and April this unit occupied the area around Shanwei, Haifeng and Lufeng and captured quantities of supplies the Chinese were attempting to pass through this area.

During April and May, five infantry battalions of the 48th Division were employed to capture Fuchou. Also in May one infantry battalion of the 48th Division landed at Chiatzu Harbor and at Chiehshih and mopped up the enemy remaining in that area.

Despite these landing operations, however, and the fact that the Hongkong - Shaochow route had been cut, supplies from abroad still continued to reach the Chinese. (Map 24)



Change in Chain of Command in the South China Area

As it was felt urgently necessary to apply stronger pressure on Chungking from the south, in July 1941, the Japanese Government initiated negotiations with the Vichy Government of France in the interests of mutual defense and, on 24 July, agreement was reached whereby Japanese troops would occupy southern French Indo-China.

With the commencement of the Japanese-French Indo-Chinese Joint Defense negotiations, on 5 July, Imperial General Headquarters, in order to exercise tighter control over the forces in south China and Indo-China, deactivated the South China Area Army and organized locally the 23d and 25th Armies. The 23d Army assumed the mission of the South China Area Army in south China, while the 25th Army was employed as the French Indo-China Garrison Force.

The orders of battle of these two Armies were as follows:

The Order of Battle of the 23d Army:

- 23d Army, commanded by Lt Gen Hitoshi Imamura
- 23d Army Headquarters
- 18th Division
- 38th Division
- 48th Division
- 104th Division
- 19th Independent Mixed Brigade
- 1st Independent Infantry Unit Headquarters
- 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72d, 73d, 74th,
75th, 76th and 77th Independent Infantry Battalions
- 10th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment
- 20th Independent Mountain Artillery Battalion
- 21st Mortar Battalion
- 15th Independent Engineer Regiment (Ko)
- 19th and 20th Independent Engineer Regiments
- 14th Signal Regiment

Order of Battle of the 25th Army

25th Army, commanded by Lt Gen Shojiro Iida
25th Army Headquarters
Guards Division
21st Independent Mixed Brigade
14th Tank Regiment
21st Medium Artillery Battalion
23d AAA Regiment
21st Independent Air Unit (the 82d Independent Reconnaissance and 84th Independent Fighter Squadrons).

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