JAPANESE MONOGRAPH NO. 24

History of the Southern Army, 1941-1945

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EXHIBIT B-1 Original translation of Japanese Monograph No. 24, Southern Army Operations Record.

Note that original translation contained approximately 94 pages and was expanded to 168 pages, in spite of the fact that much duplicating original material was eliminated by using footnote reference to direct the reader to other monographs in which the subject had already been covered (See pages 1, 2, 3, 5, 19, 26, 29, 34, 37, 41, etc.).

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PREFACE

Through Instruction No. 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for War Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff.* Upon the dissolution of the War Ministry and the General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. Detailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in Memoranda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories".

The basic material contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that the enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material was reconstructed from memory.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G-3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the Demobilization Bureau.

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* The action under this memorandum and incidental detailed instructions, which followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, charged with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945.

In order to protect the interest of the United States, in the exploitation of Japanese Military Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of enemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental Archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Government was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the entire program, including the establishment of a small historical research section within the ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.)

OPERATION RECORDS

OF THE

SOUTH ARMY

1st Demobilization Department
July, 1946

OPERATION RECORDS OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY

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Preface

1. The South Army gradually began the seizure of the BRITISH MALAYA and the PHILIPPINES, after December 8, 1941. The enemy was destroyed in all regions and in February SINGAPORE was captured. In the latter part of February they advanced to RANGOON in BURMA; and PALEMBANG of SUMATRA was seized. The operations on this side progressed satisfactorily but strategical operations in the PHILIPPINES didnot progress as was expected although the islands had been secured in first part of May.

The enemy on JAVA surrendered in the course of ten days after the landings on the head. In BURMA the strategic situation progressed favorably and in May, the south part was captured. Thereupon, the 1st step of the operational duties of the Southern Army was completed.

2. The Southern Army in June 1942 held and stabilized the important sections in the south and steadily proceeded to prepare for the next operation. During that time and after the summer of that year, the Southern Army force was sent to MANCHURIA and CHINA, in consideration ~~of the world situation. In view~~ of the situation in the southeast PACIFIC, ~~forces were diverted there also.~~

3. The Southern Army endeavored to develop the natural resources of the South ~~for a self-sufficient battle.~~ In order to strengthen the National Army, it became necessary to strengthen the defense of the areas that possess these resources. Because the strategic situations of the S.E. PACIFIC gradually became unfavorable, areas north of AUSTRALIA urgently needed defensive strengthening. At the same time forces at areas with essential resources began to strengthen their defenses, but in order to carry this out, diversion of troops were necessary. Changing the command system was one of the methods used to strengthen the defense. In BURMA, old positions were expanded, and important lines in the ARAKAN Mountain Range were captured. It was also very important to strengthen the area abundant in essential resources. After scrutinizing the situation, IMPAL Operation was begun in March, 1944.

At the beginning of this operation, situations were favorable, but the inferior airforce and the supplying difficulty had suspended this operation.

The decreasement of fighting power of the BURMA force in this operation was the cause of misfortune of the next operation.

4. After the spring of 1944 strategical situations became critical, the brunt of enemy operations were directed towards NEW GUINEA and PHILIPPINES. For this reason the command system of the South Army was changed. The South Army was to command the whole southern area. The South Army began strengthening the positions at PHILIPPINES with all its might. This was because the political and strategical battle on PHILIPPINES would decide the final victory of this war.

In the latter part of October, the enemy landed on LEYTE and then gradually advanced into PHILIPPINES.

The South Army fought with all their might but lack of preparations and inferior installations and facilities had forced them to give- up the decisive battle, in December.

5. After the failure of the decisive battle on PHILIPPINES, the South Army changed their tactics to those of defense. The communications between the homeland and the southern sphere were almost all cut off.

At this time, the South Army began sending essential materials back to the homeland. It was planned to strengthen the forces on the mainland in order to protect the South Army. In spring of 1945, the action of the BRITISH-INDIAN forces became intensive, and then later captured the southern part of BURMA.

6. After this, the South Army endeavored to maintain their self-supplying areas. Reformation of troops and installations were made, but in August the war ended. (end of Preface)

Chapter I. Situations Prior to the War

Section 1. Issuing of Orders and Combat Orders of the Southern Army

The mobilization order to the South Army General Headquarters was issued on November 6, 1941. The Commanding General was JUICHI TERAUCHI, and the Chief of General Staff was Lieut. Gen. KO TSUKADA.

On the same day a combat order was issued to the Southern Army and to the 14th, 15th, 16th and 25th Armies which were under its command. The time for its transfer to the Southern Army was 0000 November.

The combat order of the Southern Army was as follows:

Battle Order for the Southern Army

Southern Army Commander: Count, Army General JUICHI TERAUCHI
Southern Army General Headquarters
14th Army (16th Division, 48th Division, 65th ~~Independent~~ Mixed Brigade) nucleus
15th Army (33rd Division, 55th Division--part excluded)
16th Army (2nd Division, 56th ~~Independent~~ Mixed ~~Brigade~~--nucleus)
25th Army (Imperial Guard Division, 5th Division, 18th Division--nucleus)

Inf groups

4 2

21st Division
3rd Airforce Group (4th Fighter ~~Squadron~~ Regt, 3rd Light Bomber ~~squadron~~ Regt, 1st Reconnaissance Squadron--nucleus)
5th Airforce Group (2nd Fighter Squadron, 3rd Light Bomber squadron, 2 Heavy Bomber squadrons--nucleus)
21st Independent Air~~force~~ Regt
21st Independent Mixed Brigade
4th Independent Mixed Regiment
2nd Independent Engineer Company
3rd Rail Transportation Department (5th Railway Regiment, 9th Railway Regiment--nucleus)
South Army Signal Unit
2nd Field Provost Marshal Headquarters

Section 2. Order for the Determining of Strategy and Outline of the Operation.

On November 6, the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order and an outline of strategy (stated below) in the event that negotiations between UNITED STATES and JAPAN fell through.

Order

1. The Imperial Headquarters shall make preparations for the seizure of important areas to the south.

2. The commander of the Southern Army shall order the main force, cooperating with the navy, to assemble at INDO-CHINA, South-CHINA, FORMOSA, Southwest Islands, South Sea Islands and prepare for the seizure of important areas to the South.

3. The Southern Commander shall carry out a blockade against CHINA, formerly the duty of the 25th Army Commander.

4. Incase the Southern Army is attacked by either the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN or NETHERLAND Troops, the commander shall order an attack in self defense. It is hoped that the affair stated above can be settled within a limited area.

5. The General Commander of the expeditionary force to CHINA, the General Commander of Defense and the Commander of the FORMOSA Army shall assist strategical preparations of Paragraph No. 2.

The Outline of Operations of the Southern Army

The Outline of Operations issued by the General Imperial Headquarter is as follows:

Purpose of the Operation.

The operation against the PHILIPPINES, and BRITISH MALAYA shall commence simultaneously with the cooperation of the combined fleet.

Operation No. 1. The seizure of MALAYA, BRITISH-BORNEO, PHILIPPINES and North SUMATRA shall be executed.

Operation No. 2. The seizure of JAVA.

Operation No. 3. Will be that of cleaning up BURMA.

Section 3. The Draft of Strategical Plans

The strategical plans drafted by the Southern Army had followed the plans issued by the Imperial Headquarter quite closely.

The outline is as follows:

General Outline of the Strategic Plans of the Southern Army

1. Objective of the Operation

a. The objective of this operation is to destroy and seize the enemy strongholds of BRITAIN, UNITED STATES, and NETHERLAND in the southern area.

b. The sectors that are to be seized by the South Army are the PHILIPPINES, BRITISH-MALAYA, JAVA, SUMATRA, BORNEO and TIMOR, etc.

2. Purpose of the Operation

The South Army will cooperate with the combined fleet and commence operations against PHILIPPINES and BRITISH-MALAYA simultaneously. The objective of this operation shall be fulfilled in the shortest time possible.

3. Outline Directions for this Operation

Operations according to the above paragraph shall be directed as follows:

Operation No. 1.

1. This operation shall commence with the landing of the advanced force and an air raid on the PHILIPPINES. After the air corps has successfully played its part, the main force of each division shall land in the PHILIPPINES and BRITISH-MALAYA and capture enemy positions as quickly as possible.

2. An order shall be issued for the commencement of this operation. If the JAPAN-AMERICA negotiation is successful after the above order is issued, the operation shall be postponed.

3. After enemy positions in DUTCH BORNEO, MALAYA, and North SUMATRA have been seized, preparations for operations against JAVA will be made.

Operation No. 2.

In coordination with the preparations as stated above, the enemy air force in JAVA shall be put out of action and thus island will be seized.

1. Enemy air bases in southern BURMA will be captured during the 2nd Operation.

Operation No. 3 (3rd stage operation)

Occupied areas shall be stabilized and held. If possible, the BURMA area will be mopped up. An order for the commencement of this operation will be issued.

The Southern Army had sufficient self confidence for the operation after the landings were a success.

Section 4. Army and Navy Agreement

In TOKYO November 10, the General Commander of the South ern Army and the 2nd Fleet Commander who was in charge of the Southern Area made an agreement concerning the execution of landing operations. They arranged the time for its execution and the distribution of forces. The schedule stated above was the basis for the successive landing operation by the army and navy. There was not much discrepancy between the plan and the actual operation.

Necessary agreements were made by forces under the Southern Army command and related fleets, based on the above stated plan. (Listed below.)

Between the 14th Army, the 3rd Fleet and the 11th Air Group
Between the 16th Army, the 3rd Fleet and the 11th Air Group
Between the 25th Army, Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the 3rd Air Group

Section 5. Issuing of Orders for the Operation

On November 10, all Army Commanders (exluding the 15th Army Commander) gathered in TOKYO and received orders for strategical preparations. In the middle part of November, an order (stated as follows) was issued concerning the seizure areas to the south. On November 20th, an order was issued concerning the attack, but the order for the commencement of this attack was to be held until the results of the diplomatic negotiations at WASHINGTON were clear.

ORDER

1. The Imperial General Headquarter will seize important sectors to the south in order to insure existance and self defense, as well as to establish a new order in the greater east ASIA.

2. The General Commander of the Southern Army will cooperate with the navy and seize important areas to the south according to the following statement.

7

A. A separate order will be issued concerning the commencement of the attack.

B. Sectors to be occupied will be the PHILIPPINES, BRITISH-MALAYA, DUTCH INDIES and a part of BURMA.

C. Areas to be seized by each army, as decided on November 20th, are as follows. (The KAWAGUCHI Unit will be detached from the 25th Army but the combat order will not be much different.)

14th Army.....PHILIPPINES
25th Army.....MALAY
15th Army.....SIAM, (defend and establish)
KAWAGUCHI Detachment (Maj. Gen. KAWAGUCHI shall command one Regiment of the 18th Division as a nucleus).....BRITISH-BORNEO

D. The 3rd Air Group will cooperate in the operations of the 25th Army. The 5th Air Group will go under the command of the 14th Army Commander.

Section 6. Various Preparations Prior to the Battle

Various preparations prior to the battle were completed in a very short time, following the Central Orders. The essentials of this is as follows:

1. Establishment of air bases in South FRENCH-INDO-CHINA and FORMOSA.

2. The deployment and concentration of air and land forces.

On November 16, the General Imperial Headquarter had ordered the Ship Transportation Commander to act under the orders of the General Commander of the Southern Army. Therefore at the beginning of the war of the total tonnage of ships for the operation of 1,750,000 tons, 1,450,000 tons were used for military transportation.

500 ships, including large and small were used in this operation.

The establishment of airbases in FRENCH-INDO-CHINA and FORMOSA began in autumn of 1941 and the already completed airbases were expanded. A new airbase was established on FUKOK and TANI Island off FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, but this type of construction was delayed by bad weather, and could not be accomplished as had been hoped.

The concentration and deployment of units proceeded unfavorably, due to the limited amount of time, bad weather, and untrained long distant shipping overseas.

Furthermore various air materials were not assembled as scheduled. Lack of fuel was another problem.

The concentration and deployment of each army is outlined below.

14th Army.....Advanced Unit (FORMOSA, PALAO)
Main force (FORMOSA, AMAMIOSHIMA)
15th Army.....Main force of the Imperial Guard Division (South FRENCH-INDO-CHINA)
16th Army.....SAKAGUCHI Detachment (PALAO)
Others (South CHINA)
KAWAGUCHI Detachment (South CHINA)
3rd Air Group (about 430 planes) (FRENCH-INDO-CHINA)
5th Air Group (FORMOSA)

Some other units were put under the command of the South Army commander. The 56th Division (posted at north KYUSHU) was the main force of the diverted force.

On November 25, the General Commander departed from TOKYO and advanced to SAIGON on December 5 via FORMOSA.

Section 7. General Conditions Known by the Southern Army Prior to the Battle

Intelligence of enemy force as known by the Southern Army prior to the battle is as listed below.

A. BRITISH Force of MALAY Area

1. Army

CLASSIFICATION	CONSTITUTION	NUMBERS	TOTAL
REGULAR Army	BRITISH	30,000	About 80,000
	INDIAN	30,000--35,000	
	AUSTRALIAN	20,000--30,000	
	MALAYAN	Small number	
VOLUNTEER Army	Combined	20,000	20,000

2. Air Force

	TYPE	Number of Companies	Number of Planes	TOTAL	Name of the Main Planes
ARMY	Bombers	9	108	264	FLENHAIM 5 Comp. FAIRY BUFFALO 4 Comp.
	Fighters	9	108		BUFFALO
	Observation	4	48		?
NAVY	Seaplanes	3	18	66	?
	Torpedo Planes	4	48		

The main airbase was located at SINGAPORE. Others were at COTABAR and KEDA prefectures.

3. Navy

Type / Location	Battleships	Carriers	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarine	TOTAL
HONGKONG			1	3		4
SINGAPORE	2		5	9	6	22
West INDIA Sea		2	13	14		21--33
COLOMBO	2-4					5
AUSTRALIA			5			6
NEW ZEALAND			6			
TOTAL	4-4	2	30	26	6	68-70

B. BURMA Area

1. Army

Classification	Numbers	TOTAL
BRITISH	3,000	37,000
INDIAN	8,000	
BURMESE	2,600	
CHINESE	2,000	2,000

2. Air Force

Type of Planes	Number of Companies	Number of Planes	TOTAL	Chief Planes
Bombers	1	12	60	FLENHAIM One Comp.
Pursuit	4	48		

C. U. S. and FILIPINO Forces in the PHILIPPINES

1. Army

Classification	Qualities	Numbers	TOTAL
Regular Army	Officers 50% AMERICAN Enlisted 40%	44,000	169,000
PHILIPPINE Defense Army	Officers were AMERICANS and FILIPINOS. Enlistees: FILIPINOS	125,000	

1. It is expected that the PHILIPPINE Defense Army will complete the mobilization of 112,500 by the end of 1941.

2. The Regular Army has one Tank Battalion (54 tanks).

2. Navy

Type / Location	Battleships	Carriers	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines	TOTAL
MANILA		4	4	14	30	52
HAWAII Area	7	17	18	46	28	106
TOTAL	7	11	22	60	58	158

3. Air Force

	Type	Number of Companies	Number of Planes	TOTAL
ARMY Planes	Bombers	5	65	219 to 244
	Pursuits	4-5	100-125	
	Observation	1	18	
	Reconnaissance	2	36	
NAVY Planes	Sea Planes	36		66
	Reconnaissance	30		

D. DUTCH EAST INDIES.

1. Army

	Qualities	Numbers	Increase in Troops According to the New Conscription Law for Natives	TOTAL
Inner-Territory Army	European 30%	50,000	15,000	85,000
Outer-Territory Army	European 15%	20,000		

2. Navy

Location	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines	TOTAL
SURABAYA	5	5	14	24

3. Air Force

	Classification	Number of Companies	Number of Planes	TOTAL
Army Planes	Bombers	7	54	237
	Fighters	8	140	
	Reconnaissance	7	42	
Navy Planes	Sea Planes		40	75
	Others		35	

Incomplete investigation of the land and weather was the cause of lacking pertinent information to enable the Southern Army to carry out its operation. Especially does this apply to the situation in NEW GUINEA. Our maps were of small scale but larger maps had been taken from the enemy in the beginning of the war.

Chapter II. Offensive Operations from the Beginning of the War to May 1942

Section 1. Strategic Situation of December 1941

Part 1. Outline

The Southern Army now has had sufficient training for operations in view of the success of its landing operations. The advanced unit and the main force had executed their landing operations satisfactorily and the strategic situation thereafter progressed well. The number of ships lost was high. In December the number lost exceeded the anticipated figure.

Part.2. Offensive Operations in each Area

1. SIAM Area

8/8 Dec

The Imperial Guard Division, ~~formerly~~ under the command of the 15th Army commander, occupied SIAM without encountering resistance. The 55th Division formerly under the command of the 25th Army commander, landed on SIAM from the sea and captured air bases around that sector.

2. MALAY Area

On the 4th of December, the advanced unit of the 25th Army (Main force of the 5th Division, part of the 18th Division) deported ~~KAINANTO~~ HAINAN Island and sailed toward MALAY, but during this voyage they were discovered by a BRITISH sea plane. At dawn of December 8 the main force of the 5th Division landed near SHINKOBRA. The 18th Division with one element (1 Infantry Regiment, as a nucleus, commanded by TAKUMI (Maj. Gen.) landed on KOTABAR. At KOTABAR, this force incurred heavy damage from enemy planes.

The ~~3rd~~ 2d Ship Transportation Unit had assembled in ~~KAMURAN~~ Camranh Bay and ~~but~~ on December 13, departed ~~and~~ on the ~~20~~ 16 and around landed near SHINKOBURA and other areas.

The southward advance army didnot meet much enemy resistance, and enemy positions at PENANG Island on December 19 and IPO on the 28th were easily captured. The TAKUMI Detachment advanced southward along the east seashore line and captured KUWANTAN on the ~~30th~~ 31st December of ~~January~~.

3. PHILIPPINE Area

The attack against the PHILIPPINES differed from that on MALAY. First of all an attack on enemy air bases was executed. Then, depending upon the degree of success, an advanced unit was sent to seize the airfields.

The MIURA Detachment sailed together with the SAKAGUCHI Detachment of the 16th Army (one Regiment commanded by Maj. Gen. SAKAGUCHI) toward DAVAO and executed successful landings without meeting any resistance.

The 48th Division left FORMOSA and sailing through storms landed on LINGAYEN on December 22nd. The main force of the 16th Division left AMAMIOSHIMA and commended their landing operations from December 24th.

During the operations during the advance on MANILA, the main force met enemy resistance but continued their southward advance after destroying the enemy.

The 14th Army Headquarters received intelligence concerning the enemy escaping into BATAAN Peninsula, but this was not looked upon as having much importance. The was later the main cause of the difficulties encountered in capturing this peninsula.

The SAKAGUCHI Detachment, which is under the command of the 16th Army, after seizing DAVAO, changed their course and captured ~~NORO~~ JOLO Island on December the 25th.

4. BRITISH-BORNEO Area

On December 16th the KAWAGUCHI Detachment landed on MIRI Island and captured the oil fields of that sector. This detachment again changed its objective and on December 23, landed near KUCHING and captured airfields of that sector. This detachment later moved out from North KUCHIN and on December 31st seized BRUNEI.

5. FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Area

Since the Military Defense agreement between JAPAN and FRENCH-INDO-CHINA had been established, everything was quite stabilized and calm.

Section 2. Strategic Situations as of January 1942

Part 1. Outline

Srategic situations of most areas seemed to be quite favorable. In PHILIPPINES, MANILA was captured on January 2d. In MALAY, KWALALANPOOL was taken on January 11. The attack was continued until the end of January, when they reached JOHORE Channel. In BURMA, MORMEN was captured on January 30th. After the 1st step of the PHILIPPINE operation had been finished, the 48th Division and others were gradually transferred to the 16th Army for the 2nd stage of the operation. Later, the strategic situation on BATAAN did not progress satisfactorily and losses gradually increased.

The South Army commander, on January 22nd, received orders to capture important sectors of BURMA.

Part 2. Operations of Different Areas

1. BURMA and SIAM Area

The main force of the 55th Division, which is under the command of the 15th Army concentrated near RAHEN since the beginning of January.

The 33rd Division landed on BANYA and concentrated near RAHEN. One part of the 55th Division, which previously fought in TENACERIUM district captured DAVOY on January 19.

From January 20th, the main force of the 55th Division gradually corssed the BURMA-SIAM border and arrived at Moulmein on January 30th.

2. MALAY Area

The 5th Division of the 25th Army captured Kuala Lumpur on January 11. On the 24th, this division made a fast advance through KURUAN and arrived at JOHORE Channel on January 30th.

The main force of the Imperial Guard Division advanced on the west seashore line and blocked enemy counter attacks on the 26th, near BAHABAT, and arrived at JOHORE Channel on the 30th.

On the 26th of January air fuel and ammunition was unloaded near ENDAU after attacks from the air and sea had been supressed and proceeded with the reorganization of airfields near KURUAN and KAHAN.

The main force of the 3rd Air Group cooperated with the 25th Army, and one part of this force cooperated with the 15th Army. After the 12th of

January, this air group cooperating with the naval air force, executed air attacks on SINGAPORE with all its strength but the success of this attack was not as great as had been hoped. Enemy planes had escaped to SUMATRA Area and would continue attacks periodicaly.

3. PHILIPPINE Area

The 14th Army captured MANILA on January 2. This operation had proceeded favorably according to schedule; therefore, the Southern Army presumed that its next duties would be to transfer its operations to JAVA. According to the plan, the 5th Air Group was diverted to SIAM area. In conformance with changed of the combat order by the Imperial General Headquarters, the 48th Division and other units were put under the command of the 16th Army. An order was issued to the 16th Army to seize JAVA.

The situation was that difficulties would undoubtedly arise in the future in the PHILIPPINES but the South Army thought that this affair could be settled after having concluded the JAVA operation according to plan. The Central Headquarters, also with this in mind, executed a changes in the combat order.

The enemy escaped into the BATAAN Peninsula. The NARA Brigade interchanged with the 48th Division and began an attack on the enemy positions near ABUKAI incurring many losses. They barely captured this position on January 24th. This brigade was prepared chiefly for defense and was untrained for executing attacks. They possessed little power for the next operation.

One part of the 16th Division advanced southwards along the west shores of BATAAN, and another part of this landed on the south of BAGAK, from the sea, on January 23, but was enveloped by strong enemy forces. This sort of situation on BATAAN gradually increased the fears of the 14th Army.

4. BRITISH-BORNEO Area

The KAWAGUCHI Detachment seized LABUAN Island on the 1st and JESSELTON on the 3rd.

On the 6th, this detachment received orders to capture the airfield near BENKAYAN, so this detachment operated from land and sea and captured it on January 27th. One part of this detachment captured TAWAO on January 24th.

5. DUTCH-BORNEO Area

The SAKAGUCHI Detachment of the 16th Army, after a light battle, captured TARAKAN on the 11th, and BALIKPAPAN on the 24th.

The 38th Division which had been engaged in the operation at HONG KONG was put under the command of the 16th Army. One part of this division

(120th Infantry Regiment Commanded by Maj. Gen. ITO as nucleus) received orders to size ANBON. Therefore this unit left HONG KONG on January 12th and sailed towards DAVAO. The main force gradually concentrated at KAMURAN Bay in order to advance into JAVA.

The 48th Division which was stationed at PHILIPPINES was extracted from the 14th Army and put under the command of the 16th Army. This army, for this reason, became very busy preparing for the operation against JAVA.

The ITO Detachment left DAVAO on January 28th and seized ANBON on the 31st.

6. FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Area

The situations in FRENCH-INDO-CHINA was calm. The 21st Division gradually arrived at FRENCH-INDO-CHINA from the latter part of January to stabilize and hold FRENCH-INDO-CHINA.

Part 3. The Enemy Situation as Known in the Latter Part of January

1. BURMA Area

Since the 17th Division had newly arrived from INDIA, the main forces in BURMA would be the 1st BURMA Division, the 17th INDIA Division and the 13th INDIAN Independent Infantry Brigade.

5th and 6th Army were CHINA'S strategic Army which were to operate in BURMA and two Divisions were expected to enter BURMA in the near future but the whole force of 8 Divisions would take more than 2 months to concentrate their troops near MANDALAY.

Enemy air force incurred damages at the end of December but reinforcements had increased the number to about 50 planes.

2. MALAY Area

The 9th and 11th Divisions of the 3rd Army and the 45th Independent Brigade of INDIA received heavy damage and the 8th Division of AUSTRALIA was destroyed in JOHORE prefecture.

The air force has received quite a number of reinforcements. It is judged that there were about 200 planes including the ones in SUMATRA.

3. PHILIPPINE Area

The 21st, 41st, 51st and the 91st Divisions began construction of fortifications in the north part of BATAAN, and the 1st and 31st Divisions were in the south.

The 81st Division was stationed on CEBU Island, the 61st Division on PANAY Island, and the 101st Division on MINDANAO Island.

4. JAVA Area

It is estimated that there are about 13 Infantry Battalions and not more than one Battalion on DUTCH-BORNEO.

Section 3. Strategical Situations of February

Part 1. Outline

SINGAPORE had surrendered on February 15. An important step had been taken in the southern operation. The strategic situation as a whole progressed favorably. PALEMBAN, SUMATRA was captured; troops crossed the SITIAN River and advanced into RANGOON. The situation in the PHILIPPINES was not favorable. The forces there were reinforced by the 4th Division and other units in order to settle this affair.

The Imperial Headquarters issued an order for the capture of important areas in the ANDAMAN Islands and the commencement of the operation against TIMOR.

The ITO Detachment captured ANBON and landed on TIMOR Island at dawn of January 26th.

Part 2. Strategic Situation in each Area

1. BURMA Area

On February 9th, the 15th Army was ordered to destroy the enemy involved in the present operation and advance to the RANGOON sector covering as much land to the north as possible. They were also ordered to prepare for the attacks on MANDALY and ENANJON. The 55th Division of the 15th Army crossed the SARUIN River near MOORMEN, the 33rd Division crossed the same river in the north and continued its advance to the northwest. The enemy on the left bank of SITTAN River was destroyed. After they had prepared for the advance to RANGOON, the crossing of the SITTAN River began on Feburary 27th.

2. MALAY Area

The 25th Army, with its tank unit, commenced to advance from the east side of the wooden bridge of JOHORE Channel. The main force attacked from the district west of the wooden bridge. Speedy exploitations of successes were made and the enemy surrendered on February 15th.

On February 19th, the 25th Army commander received an order to capture important sectors of ANDAMAN and the middle and north SUMATRA.

3. PHILIPPINE Area

The NARA Brigade attacked enemy positions on the north slope of Mt. MARIVELES without success. According to the Army order issued on the 13th, this Brigade retreated to the district northwest of BALANGA, and reorganization was made after capturing the blockade position.

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Strategic situation of the 16th Division remained the same. One part of the force was enveloped by the enemy to the south of ABUKAI. Another unit was sent as reinforements from the sea but this unit was also enveloped. Rescue operations were already hopeless in the middle of February.

The Central ~~Headquarter~~ Command (GHQ) looked upon the critical sitation as of great importance and for the development of this situation the 4th Division was deployed to the PHILIPPINES. In order to settle the affairs stated above the Southern Army also put the 62nd Regiment of the 21st Division, which was en route FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, under the command of the 14th Army. The Central Headquarters also diverted heavy artillery and went so far as to change the ~~General~~ Staff ~~Prosident~~ Chief of officer of the 14th Army. from Canton

4. DUTCH-INDIES

The 3rd Air Group was successful in attacking PALENBAN and PAKANBAL on the 7th and 8th of February.

The 1st Attack Parachute Group, acting under the command of the 3rd Air Group, landed on PALENBAN on February 14th and seized oil refinery plants and airfields in the same area.

The main force of the 38th Division, covered by the 3rd Torpedo Combat Unit, sailed into MUNTOK. On 15th Feb This division immediately crossed MUSHI River on boats, and landed on PALENBAN on February 16th.

To capture PALENBAN before the fall of SINGAPORE was looked upon as having great importance, since the oil refineries had been taken in perfect condition.

One part of the 38th Division changed course from PALENBAN and advanced towards TANJONKARAN seizing the airfield in this place on February 20th. After this they deployed into positions favorable for the operations against JAVA.

~~The SAKAGUCHI Detachment advanced southward on land and sea and captured PANJIERUMASHIN.~~ BANDJERMASIN.

In this way the preparations for attack upon JAVA were gradually completed.

The main force made preparations for land operations against JAVA. The 48th Division left LINGAYEN on February 8th and assembled at HORO Island. The main force of the 2nd Division assembled in KAMURAN Bay. Both forces left at the same time and sailed on JAVA from the east and west. The convoy for the east was the 3rd Fleet and for the west the 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet.

Prior to this, the Army and Navy air forces had raided important sectors on JAVA.

One part of the 48th Division captured BALI Island on February 19th in order to secure enemy air fields.

On February 27th and 28th, a naval battle ensued between the enemy fleet and our fleet resulting in a victory for us.

Concerning operations against TIMOR, the ITO Detachment with a detachment left ANBON on February 17th, and the main force on the 18th. They were covered by the 2nd Torpedo Combat Unit. The main force landed on KUPAN on February 20th, the other part landed on DELI.

Section 4. Strategic Situations for March

Part 1. Outline

In the BURMA area the 15th Army captured RANGOON on March 8th and later prepared for the advance on central BURMA. With the transition of operations in BURMA, the necessity for constructing a railroad connecting BURMA and SIAM was recognized.

In order to lighten the heavy duties of the 15th Army, the SIAM area was put under the direct command of the Southern Army.

At that time one battalion of the 4th Independent Mixed Regiment was stationed at BANYA as well as the air force.

At JAVA, the 16th Army made successful landings on March 3rd. The DUTCH Army surrendered on March 9th.

The 2nd phase Operation was concluded to be successful. In the PHILIPPINES, attack preparations were made against enemy positions on BATAAN Peninsula.

Part 2. Operations of Each Areas

1. BURMA Area

The 15th Army crossed the SITTAN River on February 27th, and captured RANGOON on March 8th without encountering much resistance.

The main force of the 55th Division executed running attacks on TONGOO, and the 33rd Division on PROMU.

On March 3rd the 55th Division fought with CHIANG KAI SHEK'S 200th Division at TONGOO and this sector was captured after the battle. The 33rd Division advanced to a district near PROMU.

With the ending of the 2nd southern operation, forces were gradually put under the command of the 15th Army to increase its power. Under the assumption that this mop-up operation would end before the rainy season, the Imperial Headquarters, on the 4th, extrated the 18th Division, the 56th Division and other units from the order of battle of the 25th Army and enrolled it in the order of battle of the 15th Army.

The 56th Division was transported from KYUSHU directly to BURMA, and gradually executed landings beginning on March 26th. After landings at Rangoon

had been completed, this Division advanded on TONGOO.

The 18th Division, which was posted in Southern MALAY prepared for the advancements to BURMA.

As of March 18th the 7th and 12th Air ~~group~~ Brigades of the 3rd air ~~force~~ Group were added to the 5th air ~~force~~ Group which was supposed to cooperate with the 15th Army. Information on hand concerning the enemy situation in BURMA acquired in the latter part of March is listed below.

General CHIANG KAI SHEK'S Army entered BURMA in accordance with 5th and 6th Army order. The commander of the 6th Army was TA UNKI. The ~~Commander~~ headquaters of the 5th Army was SA JI.

The 49th Division, the 55th Division and the 93rd Division of the 6th Army were posted at MONPAN, ROYKAU and KENTONG.

The 200th Division, 96th Division and the 22nd Division of the 5th Army were posted, the latter two divisions at EDASE and PINMACHI and the 200th Division near TONGOO. The 200th Division received heavy damages at TONGOO.

General CHIANG KAI SHEK'S Divisions consist of about 8,000 to 9,000 personnel. The full strength in BURMA is about 45,000. The 17th Division in INDIA received heavy damage at PROMU and other places. This Division is at present located near ENANJON. Their equipment is fairly good, but their fighting power has decreased. The forces of General CHIANG KAI SHEK are gradually increasing but in estimating their speed of concentration, it is judged that the 15th Army can execute its operations in middle BURMA successfully.

2. MALAY Area Sumatra and Padang

The 5th Division took charge of keeping peace and order in MALAY. The Imperial Division landed on the S. E. district of MEDAN on March ~~20th~~ 12 and captured ~~BATAAN~~ on March 17th. The capture of North SUMATRA was almost completed. The 38th Division which was posted at south SUMATRA was put under the command of the 25th Army.

The 18th Division prpeared for an advance upon BURMA in southern MALAY. One part of this Division received orders to capture ANDAMAN, and on the 23rd, this unit landed on PORT PLEA without meeting any resistance.

3. PHILIPPINE Area

Additional forces and materials were freshly sent to the 4th Army above and beyond the 4th Division. Preparation for the attack against BATAAN was executed very carefully. One part of this Army captured SAN JOSE on MINDORO Island on March 16th.

Considering the situation in the PHILIPPINES an order was issued on the 10th, to the KAWAGUCHI Detachment which had previously carried out

operations on BORNEO, and the KAWAMURA Detachment (nucleus of one Infantry Regiment from the 5th Division of MALAY) to operate under the command of 14th Army commander. The accumulation of necessary military goods and materials for the new operation was practically completed by end of March.

4. EAST INDIES Area

During the voyage to JAVA, the 16th Army received an attack from the enemy fleet but the protection of the naval escort enabled them to reach their destination quite safely. The 2nd Division which is the nucleus of the main force landed near SURAN, located on the northwest end of JAVA. A force led by the 40th Division landed near RENBAN and the TOMIBAYASHI Detachment landed near KALIJACHI. After this the operations continued without meeting much resistance. The 2nd Division captured BATAVIA on March 5th and the 48th Division captured SURABAYA on the 7th. The DUTCH Army surrendered on the 9th. The JAVA operation was practically completed; the operations of the south, based on its plans, were almost accomplished.

During the operation against JAVA, the 3rd Air Force cooperated with the 16th Army from the beginning to the end. After the JAVA operation had been finished, many units from the 16th Army were diverted to the 15th Army in conformance with an order issued on March 18th and 20th.

Section 5. Strategic Situation in April

Part 1. Outline

The second stage of the operation, based on its plans, turned out successfully.

In April the third stage of the operation (Operation No. 2) was executed in order to clean-up BRITISH-INDIAN and CHIANG KAI SHEK'S Army and to cut off reinforcements from CHINA. Operations progressed moderately well. The general attitude of the civilians in BURMA was satisfactory.

In the PHILIPPINES, the attack on BATAAN commenced on April 3rd. The strategic situations progressed moderately well. The whole of BATAAN Peninsula was captured by April 9th. In other areas, each division was ordered to hold and stabilize their occupied areas. A ~~Defense~~ Garrison Army Headquarter was newly established on BORNEO. The commander was Lieut. Gen. MAEDA.

After April 3rd, the Navy will take over the duties of guarding ANDAMAN.

Part 2. Operations in Each Area

1. BURMA Area

The 15th Army ~~advanced to~~ was preparing for the northward advance at the TONGOO and PROMU line in the latter part of March, ~~They prepared for the northward advance which~~ commenced on April 1st.

~~20~~ 22

SALWEEN The newly arrived 56th Division advanced east from JONGOO along the ~~SARUI~~ River. The main force of the 55th Division advanced along the route to MANDALAY. The 33rd Division advanced along the ~~IRAWAI~~ IRRAWADDY River.

missing

After a light battle the 55th Division captured PINMANA on April 22nd.

The 56th Division continued their fast advance, and on April 22nd they arrived at TAUKIGI, on the 24th at ROYLEM and on the 29th at RASHIO.

The 55th Division was shipped from MALAY to RANGOON. After assembling near TONGOO on the 15th, this division advanced northward along the east side sector of MANDALAY Route. They arrived at YAMESEN on April 24th and in the district south of MANDALAY on the last day of April.

The 33rd Division commenced their attack on the enemy located near ENANJION on April 17th and destroyed them by the 24th. A part of CHIANG KAI SHEK'S Army had joined this battle. Later, this division advanced up stream on IRAWAI River by boats.

The 5th Air Force cooperated very closely with the 15th Army.

2. PHILIPPINE Area

After the 14th Army's long attack preparations against BATAAN were completed, on April 3rd the artillery units executed preparatory firings for attack, lasting several hours. After this event, the whole line commenced its advance. From that time the strategic situation progressed favorably. The whole peninsula was captured after the forces charged into MARIVELES on April 9th. The KAWAGUCHI Detachment was put under the command of the 14th Army commander in order to stabilize the VISAYA Islands.

This Detachment landed on CEBU on April 10th. Furthermore, this Detachment was ordered to redeploy to MINDANAO; it landed on KOTAPATO on April 29th. ~~The KAWAMURA Detachment landed on PATHEY Island on April 10th.~~ in order to stabilize this island.

Section 6. Strategic Situation in May

Part 1. Outline

The 3rd stage operation which took place in BURMA progressed favorably. This operation ended in May.

With the progress of the operation as mentioned above, a conference was held concerning the attack operations of the SIAM Army which conference decided to send this Army to operate at SHIAN prefecture east of the SARUIN River. This Army finally crossed the border but the rain and terrain conditions caused much difficulties. The progress of this operation was unfavorable. The rainy season had also caused great supply difficulties. It was hoped that a retreat back to their country would be executed.

At PHILIPPINES, the attack on CORREGIDOR commenced on May 5th.

On May 7th, AMERICAN and FILIPINO Armies surrendered.

The Southern Army accomplished its duties for the time being.

The Southern Army ordered each Army to hold and stabilize its occupied areas.

The NAKAHATA Detachment (main force ~~of~~ of 4th Independent Mixed Regiment) was ordered to defend BRITISH-BORNEO since the KAWAGUCHI Detachment had been diverted to the PHILIPPINES. On May 5th the BORNEO ~~Defense~~ Garrison Army Headquarter was established.

To take charge of Interception Operation against communication between U.S. and Australia

At that time, ~~the war situation in the SOLOMONS developed~~. On May 18th, a combat order for the 17th Army was issued. The ~~35th Infantry~~ KAWAGUCHI Detachment Brigade and ~~many~~ other units which were posted in the PHILIPPINES, were extracted from the Southern Army and put into the Order of Battle of the 17th Army.

After the Southern operation had been finished the Imperial Headquarters planned to extract more forces from the Southern Army and reinforce the KWANTUNG Army and others.

On May 19th, the Tank Regiment, the Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment, the Heavy Field Artillery Regiment and the Heavy Sieze Artillery Unit were extracted from the 14th Army.

The location of the General Headquarters for the defense and stabilization of the South was being studied. There were opinions that SAIGON would be adequate but Central Headquarters stated an opinion that SINGAPORE would be adequate. It was decided to establish Headquarters at SINGAPORE, after submitting the plan to the Central Headquarters.

~~On May 19th the Imperial Headquarters issued an order for the~~ establishment of a Southern Fuel Depot, in order to carry out various types of work relative to fuel.

List of our casulaties and captured arms from the beginning of the Southern operation till the end of the operation in the latter part of May.

1. Our Casualties

Dead	About	9,800
Injured	"	18,000
Hospitalized	"	20,000
Dead Horses	"	3,000

2. Captured Arms

Various guns and cannons	About	4,000
Machine guns	"	10,000
Tanks, etc	"	22,000

~~22~~

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Part. 2. Operations in Each Area

1. BURMA Area

The 56th Division continued their northward advance and destroyed the CHINESE Army which had entered BURMA. This division charged into UNAN on May 3rd and finally advanced to the SARUIN River line, which was the end of their operation.

One part of this Division advanced to BAHMO, and into MITOKINA on May 8th.

After the 18th Division captured MANDALAY on May 1st, they were ordered to destroy the CHINESE Army which would try to invade SHIAN Province. Therefore, this division advanced to the SARUIN River line.

The main force of the 65th Division advanced from MANDALAY towards MITOKINA along IRAWAJI River district. After the 33rd Division captured MANIWA on May 1st, they advanced along the railway line between MANDALAY and MITOKINA and met with one part of the 56th Division which was advancing southward from MITOKINA at NABA on May 15th. One part of the Division pursued the retreating BRITISH-INDIAN Army along CHINDOUIN River, and arrived at KALEWA on May 12th.

Another detachment, with the object of capturing AKYAP Airfield in mind, changed their course at PROMU and captured AKYAP on May 4th. In this way, CHINA'S 5th, 6th and the 66th Army, total of 9 Division received quite a heavy blow. The 6th Army retreated towards SHARI and FRENCH-INDO-CHINA Sea. Other Armies retreated to a district north of BURMA Route.

The BRITISH Army, after receiving heavy damages, retreated to INDIA. On May 18th, the Southern Army Headquarter issued an order to the 15th Army commander concerning the stabilization of important areas.

2. PHILIPPINE Area

On BATAAN, a force with the 4th Division as nucleus, made preparations for the attack against CORREGIDOR.

On the night of May 5th the attack commenced.

On May 7th, all of the enemy in the PHILIPPINE sector had surrendered.

The 14th Army planeed to occupy MINDANAO with the KAWAMURA Detachment which had previously occupied PANAY and the KAWAGUCHI Detachment which had previously occupied CEBU Island.

The KAWAGUCHI Detachment had already landed near KOTAPATO on April 29th, and the KAWAMURA Detachment landed near CAGAYAN on May 5th.

Both of these detachments and the MIURA Detachment coordinated in the mop-up operation on MINDANAO which was completed in early May.

The NARA Brigade executed mopping-up operations on North LUZON, and the 16th Division on South LUZON.

Part 3. Outline of Enemy Situation at the End of the Southern Army Operations in the South.

1. Southwest CHINA

During the latter part of the BURMA operation, the CHINESE force at KOMMEI were ordered to advance to the west, and two divisions were deployed from the BUNZAN sector to KOMMEI. For this reason small battles took place at TOETSU and RYURYO.

In the first part of June, the CHINESE forces were destroyed and forced back. From that time the situation was quite calm. CHINESE forces were diverted to the north at the district near the FRENCH-INDO-CHINA border.

2. INDIA

With the progress of our operation in BURMA, BRITAIN gradually strengthened the defense of INDIA.

AMERICAN reinforcements consisted of aircraft, mainly bombers. Forces which have arrived up to this time were not very large but it was expected that the numbers would increase in the future.

3. AUSTRALIA

Expeditionary forces were ordered back to the homeland, and forces were reorganized.

The prime interest seemed to be the defense of the homeland, and the strong point of the distribution, seemed to be on the east and the southeastern shores. The main body of the AMERICAN Army was the air force and was gradually distributed along northern AUSTRALIA. It seemed as though their mission were to execute attacks against NEW GUINEA and TIMOR.

Chapter III. Defensive operation during the period from June 1942 to June 1943.

Paragraph 1. Battle Situation on June 1942.

Although there were units operating for mopping up, of remaining enemies in all areas, the greater part of the army took charge of concentration of units, restoration of strength and training of troops. The general situation and military administration were also started satisfactory.

The General Imperial Headquarters successively withdrew forces from the Southern Army. On 10 June, the 10th Air Group and other air units were ordered to MANCHURIA. On the 12th, the 4th Division which engaged in the capturing of BATAAN Peninsula and CORREGIDOR Island returned to their homeland. On 29 June the Grand Imperial Headquarters called back the Chief of General Staff of the Southern Army to TOKYO and issued orders to the following effect indicating the subsequent measures to be taken in the entire area of the Southern Army. Based on this order, the Southern Army issued orders to each army group.

On the same day, the 14th Army was relieved from the command of the Southern Army. Thereafter, the PHILIPPINES came under the direct control of the Grand Imperial Headquarters with execution of military administration as the principal objective.

Orders

P.56 General

1. In order to carry out the Great East ASIA war, the Grand Imperial Headquarters will securely maintain important areas of Southern territory and establish a position of sure victory by self support and preparing for operation by keeping abreast with the general situation.

2. The commander in chief of the Southern Army will take charge of securing and maintaining the important southern areas and prepare for operation against outlying important areas based on the following in cooperation with the navy.

(1). Complete defense against BURMA, former BRITISH MALAY, SUMATRA, JAVA and former BRITISH BORNEO and quickly establish and complete military administration.

(2). Cooperate in the defense of THAI and INDO-CHINA.

(3). Continue pressure against CHUNGKING from the direction of BURMA, INDO-CHINA and THAI.

(4). Carry out air advance attack operation against INDIA and CHINA according to necessaty. Regarding land advance attack operation against the interior, definite orders will be issued.

(5). According to necessaty, it will assist in the defense of the area which the navy is in charge of military administration.

(6). Carry out necessary propaganda and fifth column activity in INDIA, AUSTRALIA and CHINA.

In order to give systematic assistance to INDIANS regarding liberation of INDIA, and thereby contributing to the execution of the war, a new HIKARI (光) organization was formed.

A group of INDIANS held a mass meeting in BANGKOK on 22 June and decided on the organization of (INDIA Independence League) aiming at the independence of INDIA and the organization of the INDIA National Army. They hoped for the assistahce of the JAPANESE Government.

Subsequently the INDIA Independence League made a favorable progress and organized its own army in MALAY.

With the temporary conclusion of the southern operation, air base establishments in the important southern area was ordered by central authority to complete air bases.

Paragraph II. Battle situation in July.

In July, many units of the Southern Army were transferred mainly to the MANCHURIA and the CHINA area.

The order of 10 July stated that the entire organization of the air units under direct control of the Southern Army battle order was dissolved and a new 3rd Air Army battle order was formed. It was assigned with the Southern Army battle order.

The 3rd Air Div. was then transferred to the CHINA Expeditionary Force. The 3rd Air Army was composed of 4 air groups with the 5th Air Div. as a nucleus and possessed 12 air regiments (5 fighter plane regts., 2 light bomber regts., 3 heavy bomber regts. and 2 reconnaissance plane regts.) as its actual strength. The main body of the army was disposed in the regions of BURMA and MALAY against the enemy in the INDIA area while a part of it was posted in the areas of JAVA and SUMATRA against the enemy in the direction of AUSTRALIA.

Necessary M.P. units and prisoner of war internment camps were organized and joined with the battle order of the Southern Army and all armies under its command on 20 July.

Next, on 31 July, the 3rd Field Railroad Headquarters and the Southern Army Signal Unit were organized and authorized to unify and command main railroad units and signal units in the various southern regions respectively.

Paragraph III. Battle situation in August .

The 5th Division was in charge of security at MALAY Peninsula since the capture of SINGAPORE on February of this year. They were supposed to return to their homeland but since there was a lack of shipping space this could not be accomplished. On 6 August the division received the order to return from the Grand Imperial Headquarters. The lack of shipping space made it impossible to carry out the order.

The general situation of the Southern Army was uninventful and the battle situation in the SOLOMON area became tense. For this reason, the 2nd Division at JAVA under the command of the 16th Army suddenly entered into the 17th Army

battle order by order of the Grand Imperial Headquarters on 29 August. They were extremely busy on account of changing direction towards RABAUL.

On this same day, the 9th Air Group and the 9th Air Sector Headquarters in MANCHURIA were ordered to enter into the 3rd Air Army battle order increasing the air strength in the SUNDA Isles area. About this time, units of various branches under the command of the command of the Southern Army were transferred to the CHINA area for a new campaign.

Paragraph IV. Battle situation in September.

Since the battle situation of the 17th Army at GUADALCANAL Island became more and more tense, the 38th Division which was in SUMATRA Island under the command of the 25th Army entered into the 17th Army battle order by the order of the Grand Imperial Headquarters on 17 September. The 38th Division hastely sailed from MEDAN and advanced to RABAUL.

In order to defend WAKE and GUAM Island, the 21st Independent Mixed Brigade (exeluding vehical unit) in FRENCH INDO-CHINA which was relieved from the control of the Southern Army came under direct control of the Grand Imperial Headquarters. It sailed from FRENCH INDO-CHINA. Organization of training institution for junior staff members were ordered and were entered under direct control of the Southern Army on 26 September. The Southern Army accordingly ordered the disposition of these training institutions to areas as follows: Southern Army candidates for reserve officers training unit (SUMARAN). Southern Army candidate for non-commission unit (MALACCA). Southern Army intendence training department (SINGAPORE). Southern Army sanitary training department (SINGAPORE).

Independent garrison units were organized in order to replenish strength in important southern area following successive transferring of each group engaged in southern operations. Upon completion, the independent garrison units were disposed as follows by the Grand Imperial Headquarters order of the 26th of September:

15th Army (BURMA) 42nd Independent Garrison Infantry Battalion.
16th Army (JAVA)13th Independent Garrison, 14th Independent Garrison.
25th Army (MALAY) 12th Independent Garrison.
(SUMATRA) 15th Independent Garrison, 17 Independent Garrison.
BORNEO Garrison Unit
40th Independent Garrison Infantry Battalion.
41st " " " .

Paragraph V. Battle situation in October.

The necessity of increasing defense of small SUNDA Isles area in view of enemy's counterattack from the direction of AUSTRALIA became more and more apparent. In October the 48th Division which were at Eastern JAVA were dispatched to the direction of TIMOR Island.

Paragraph VI. Strategic Situations of November

The INDO-CHINA Garrison Army Headquarters was formed and entered into the Southern Army battle order on 10 October in view of the impending battle. It was stationed in SAIGON.

The construction of a railroad connecting THAI with BURMA was in preparation since June. Since there was an increase in danger to sea transportation in the BURMA region, construction of a railroad was decided. Order to complete this railroad by the end of 1943 was issued by the Grand Imperial Headquarters. Difficult terrain and sickness made the prospect of the construction very difficult.

The battle situation in the SOLOMON and NEW GUINEA area became grave. The battle order of the 8th Army Group was issued on 16 November. The 21th Air Group (2 fighter regiments) and other units were transferred from the Southern Army to the 8th Army Group.

On 18 November the Southern Army was instructed to assist the Line of Communication of the 8th Army Group according to necessaty. This duty became a heavy burden to the Southern Army. In regards to the return of the 5th Division in MALAY to their homeland, an order for the 5th Division in MALAY to return home was issued on 6 August. This order could not be carried out on account of the lack of shipping space. The battle situation in the SOLOMON was getting critical. The need for a stronger defense of the Southern Army area caused the General Imperial Headquarters to suspend the return of the 5th Division. A part of the division (the 5th Engineer Regiment and 2 infantry battalions) were suddenly dispatched to the RABAUL area and entered under the command of the 8th Army Group. On 27 November another infantry battalion from the same division was transferred to the same area.

Paragraph VII. Battle Situation in December.

On 29 December, one heavy bomber regiment and others were transferred ffom the BURMA area and entered under the command of the 8th Army Group. At that time the battle situation of the same army group on GUADALCANAL became extremely perilous. On 4 January the Grand Imperial Headquarters at last ordered the evacuation of the Army group. The battle situation of the entire Southern area was still generally quiet. At the BURMA area the BRITISH-INDIAN troops started a drive in December to recapture AKYAB, drove away our first line unit in the vicinity of BTIDON and MONDO with a unit composed of the INDIAN 7th Div. as a nucleus.

The 15th Army attached great importance to this area as the front-line of defense of BURMA. The 55th Army counter-attacked and drove the enemy from the INDIA-BURMA boundary. Some of the CHINESE Army crossed the SARUIN River, penetrated into our area and small engagements took place.

In view of the general situation, it was urgent to strengthen our defense against the AMERICAN and BRITISH counter-attack from the area of AUSTRALIA.

Paragraph VIII. Battle Situation in January 1943.

The battle order of the 19th Army was issued on 7 January as a precaution. against aeBRITISH AndAMERICANattack on BUNDA. The main force of the 48th Division on TIMOR Island and the main force of the 5th Division on the way to BUNDA Sea area from MALAY and other units entered under the command of the 19th Army.

The boundary line of former DUTCH NEW GUINEA and BRITISH NEW GUINEA was fixed between the 19th Army and the 8th Army Group operating in the SOLOMON and NEW GUINEA area.

Area

Outline Map of the Deployment of the Southern
Expeditionary Group
(About the 1st Jan 1943)


OUTLINE MAP OF THE DEPLOYMENT
OF THE SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY GROUPS
(ABOUT THE 1st JAN. 1943)
NOTE
BLUE : GROUND GROUPS
RED : AIR GROUPS
N
10,000,000
LEGEND
ARMY H.Q.
BATTALION H.Q.
ARMY GROUP H.Q.
BURMA
MANDALAY
56th D.
55th D.
18th D.
33rd D.
AKYAB
RANGOON
5th A
4th FB
8th F (o)
50th F (1)
34th F (o)
THAILAND
BANGKOK
81st F (-)
21st D.
HANOI
5th F D
FRENCH INDO CHINA
INDO CHINA OCCUPATION ARMY
SAIGON
7th FB
98th F (1)
64th F (1)
12th F (•)
12th INDEPENDENT GARRISON
G L
5th D
15th INDEPENDENT GARRISON
SINGAPORE
3rd F A
SUMATRA
BORNEO GARRISON
BORNEO
CELLBES
16th INDEPENDENT GARRISON
21st F (1)
PALEMBANG
9th FB
61st F (•)
7th F (•)
16th A
BATAVIA
13th INDEPENDENT GARRISON
83rd F (o)
JAVA
14th INDEPENDENT GARRISON
48th D
3rd FB
57th F (1)
75th F (o)
SIGNAL CORPS
PHOTO
U S ARMY
STAT

In order to strengthen the defense in JAVA, the 26th Infantry Brigade was placed under the command of the 16th Army and transferred from the CHINA area. The Southern Army was ordered to form and supervise the headquarters of the THAI Garrison troops which was placed under the command of the Southern Army on 7 January. The Southern Army Field Ordnance Depot, the Southern Army Motor Transport Depot and the Southern Army Freight Depot, were ordered on 19 January to come under the command of the Southern Army.

On 30 January, the formation of the 7th Air Division (7th Air Group as the main body) was ordered and entered into the battle order of the 3rd Air Army. This unit was sent to the SUNDA Isles area. On the same day, the 8th Air Group (1 fighter battlaion and 2 heavy bomber battalions) was placed under the command of the 3rd Air Army.

The defensive strength at the important southern area was successively increased to counteract the menace of the Allied Army. The defense could not be perfected as expected. The battle situation in the SOLOMONS were not favorable. The 56th Division carried out mopping up operation against a part of the CHINESE Army (approximately one division) stationed along the banks of the SALWEEN in YUNAN province. In February it penetrated into the area north of TOETSU destroying enemy units in the main sector in about 2 weeks, and drove the main force to the east bank of the SALWEEN River.

The general situation of the Southern Army in the beginning of 1943 is on the appended chart 1.

Paragraph IX. Battle situation in February.

In the BURMA area, the 55th Div. concentrating its main force to the vicinity of AKYAB and then, assumed the offensive against the BRITISH-INDIAN Army which was attempting to recapture AKYAB.

The construction work of the THAI-BURMA railway was exceedingly difficult and disease was rampart. In view of the necessity of supplying BURMA, the Central Authority cut the completion date by 4 months and ordered its completion by the end of August. On 24 February, the formation of the Southern Army Railway Unit was ordered with a view of accelerating the construction work. It was entered into the battle order of the Southern Army. It was composed mainly of the former 2nd Railroad Inspectorate and the 5th and the 9th Railroad Regiments.

On the same date, in order to strengthen the L. of C. Unit in the BURMA area, the formation of the 5th Field Transport Unit (12 Independent Motor Transport Bn), the 16th L. of C. Sanitary Unit (3 L. of C. hospitals) and the 15th Sick Transport Unit (4 Sick Transport Platoons) was ordered and entered in the battle order of the 15th Army. Since the fall of 1942, the Southern Army studied the plan of operation, which will begin after the end of 1943, dealing with the enemy's counter-attacks against the southern territory. In the latter part of Feb., the Army gathered the plans together and reported its view to the Central Authority summarized as follow

Forces to be organized and reifforced:

Land groups - 2 Divs. and 1 Brigade (BURMA and MALAY).
AA defensive group - 2 (Parenban? and Bankalanbulantan?)
AAA Unit - 23 Bns.
Independent Eng. Regt. (A) - 2.
Shipping Eng. Regt. - 2 (1 in BUNDA Sea Area).
THAI and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Garrison Units

The Southern Army requested the reorganization of the 15th Army into an Army group and organize the army, which will operate westward in BURMA.

Paragraph X. The Battle Situation in March.

In the BURMA area, the counter-attack operation of the 15th Army in the AKYAB area progressed favorably and succeeded in driving the BRITISH-INDIAN troops, from BURMA. The Southern Army needed to strengthen the defense of the little SUNDA Island and meanwhile, the 45th Div. was being organized in the homeland. It was entered in the battle order of the 16th Army on the 1st of March and then transported.

The 26th Inf. Brigade was detached from the battle order of the 16th Army and entered in the battle order of the 15th Army.and transferred to BURMA.

The necessity of strengthening the defense of ~~PARENBAN~~ Palembang was apparent to the Southern Army since January. All the garrison units were unified and reorganized into the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Aerial Defense Regts. under the command of the PARENBAN Defense Headquarters. It was entered into the battle order of the 25th Army on 3 March.

The 31st Div. was entered under the command of the Army at the end of March to strengthen the 15th Army. It became necessary to strengthen the defense position in BURMA. The battle order of the BURMA Army Group was issued on 27 March.

The 25th Army was responsible to the defense of SUMATRA and MALAY. The defense area was divided and the 25th ~~Division~~ Army became responsible for the defense of SUMATRA. MALAY came under the direct control of the Southern Army.

The deployment of the 19th Army in the BANDA Sea Area did not proceed as expected because of the lack of shipping space and the activities of the enemy submarines and planes.

Paragraph XI. The Battle Situation in April.

The necessity of strengthening the defense of the Southern territories became apparent due to the intensification of the battle situation in the Southeastern PACIFIC area. The Southern Army made every effort to firmly hold the defense positions in BURMA and the region north of AUSTRALIA, but the shortage of shipping space and the raids of the enemy submarines and planes caused the breakdown of our transportation and supply system.

In the region north of AUSTRALIA, enemy submarines were especially active. The transportation of our forces and supplies of the 5th Div. was seriously hindered. In BURMA, the attacking enemy planes numbered about 1,000 every ten days in January of this year. At present, the attacking enemy planes increased to over 2,000 every ten days. Their sphere of activities was near the TONGUO-RANGOON line but now it extended to the vicinity of MELGY and DABOI. Supplying BURMA by ocean going ships became impossible. The necessity to complete the THAI-BURMA railroad became more urgent. The repair and improvements of the roads and highways came to the attention of our authorities.

In the region north of AUSTRALIA the boundary of the battle area of the Southern Army and the 8th Army Group was revised to Long. 140°E. To strengthen the defense of the INDIAN Ocean, especially PARENBAN, the necessity to occupy COCOS Islands had been discussed. The Southern Army negotiated with the Central Authority and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet but lack of shipping and naval strength, no practical plan could be formulated to capture COCOS Island.

At that time, the BRITISH Fleet in the INDIAN Ocean was estimated to consist of 5 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, and about 25 destroyers and reinforcements were continually coming in. The 3rd M.P. Unit, the Survey Unit and the Fortification Unit of the Southern Army, which was being organized, were entered in the battle order of the Southern Army on 12 April.

Paragraph XII. The battle situation in May.

Our forces in all the areas were striving to strengthen the defense. The 15th Army made special efforts to transport the units and to accumulate the operational materials by utilizing small boats but was unable to make progress as expected.

The units destined for BURMA advanced by using the road beds constructed for the THAI-BURMA railroad. Results were not satisfactory as shown by the following. April - 10,000 troops (7,000 INDIAN Army included). May - 3,000 troops. June - 4,000 troops.

The Southern Army, in its eagerness, to capture the COCOS Islands, continued negotiations with the Southern Expeditonary Fleet, but in view of the actual strength of both sides, the plan seemed futile.

Paragraph XIII. Battle Situation in June.

The battle situation in the South PACIFIC area became worse, and the main body of the Air. Div. was detached from the command of the Southern Army and placed under the command of the 8th Area Army.

The necessity of strengthening the defense of ANDAMAN Island and CARNICOBAR Island for the defense of the INDIAN Ocean became greater and the Southern Army negotiated with the navy about the plans.

Chapter IV. Defense operations during the period from July 1943 to March 1944.

Paragraph I. Summary

1. The principal duty in the operation of the Southern Army was to establish a defensive position to repel enemy attacks. Later by increasing their strength, they might be able to take the offensive. With the situation in the South PACIFIC area growing worse, the army put its supreme efforts in strengthening the defense of the region north of AUSTRALIA.

The initial operation plan of the army was as follows:

(1). The defense of the important resource areas of THAI, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and JAVA and the oil producing zones of SUMATRA will be the principle object. The anti-aircraft defense of PARENBAN will be increased.

(2). In order to achieve the said objective, the existing situation of the army in BURMA will be extended and the strategic line in the ARAKAN Mountains will be captured.

(3). Defense of the INDIAN Ocean will be strengthened so as to prevent the capturing of the air bases or the advancing of the enemy.

(4). Three objective had been generally achieved a formidable defense of the region north of AUSTRALIA will be carried out. Since the battle situation in the Southeastern PACIFIC area underwent an unexpected change, item 4 of this plan had to be carried out at the same time as the other items. The results were incomplete.

2. The general state of the Southern Army about August.

(1). The general situation.

Though the 8th Area Army made desperate efforts to recover its position since the failure of the GUADALCANAL operation, the battle situation was gradually growing worse. There was a great loss of strength and difficulty in obtaining supplies. The Southern Army could not count much on the 8th Area Army as a support in the eastern rear front. The battle strength of the AMERICANS and the BRITISH gradually increased.

GERMANY was weakening and Allied Units destined for EUROPE came to ASIA. After the spring of 1944, the Southern Army could expect an enemy attack from 3 directions, east, west and south.

(2). The position of the Southern Army.

The Southern Army seemed to have acquired an invincible position as a result of the initial battle. The strength of the army in the strategic front fell short due to the Empire's policy of detaching the pick troops from combat duty to occupation duty. The battle situation in the Southeast PACIFIC became worse. Present strength of the army is as follows:

BURMA - 4 Divs. (33rd, 18th, 55th & 56th).
In addition, the main force of the new 31st Div. was already entering BURMA, but the strength was not sufficient.
MALAY - 2 Garrison Units (5 Bns.)

SUMATRA - 1 Div. (GD) & 2 Garrison Units.
JAVA - 2 Garrison Units.
TIMOR Island, the BANDA Sea and East NEW GUINEA area - 2 Divs. (5th & 48th).
FRENCH INDO-CHINA - 1 Div. (21st).
THAI - 1 Battalion.
BORNEO - 1 Bn.

Total land strength of above - 9 Div. & 6 Garrison Units.
Air strength - 3rd Air Army (5 F.D. as nucleus).
Naval strength - 2 Southern Expeditionary Fleets.
1 Cruiser Div. (5 cruisers as nucleus).
1 Aircraft Carrier Div. (23 F).

The resources in the southwestern areas, especially the fuel oil are the backbone of the nation and the armed forces. The security of these areas and the maintenance of the communication line between the southwestern areas and the homeland is absolutely necessary for the continuation of the war. The measures to reinforce the defense of the southwestern areas are pressing and important. As a result of repeated negotiation with the Imperial Hdqtrs., the Southern Army planned on epoch making reinforcement of its strength. The aerial defense of the PARENBAN oil fields were to be perfected and all available defense measures will be taken.

Paragraph II. The Operation in the BURMA Area.

No. 1 Operation C (IMPHAL Operation).

Outline of circumstances before the preparation order was issued.

1. The view of the Southern Army for the strategical position of BURMA. (Malay, Sumatra, Java)

In order to secure the important resource areas, it is necessary to confine the enemy's advancing attack to the east. The 8th Area Army ~~must check the enemy~~ and must hold BURMA as a north wing key point of the Southern Army. The view of the BURMA Area Army is the same.

2. The operation plan of the 15th Army in about May.

The 15th Army underestimated the strength of the BRITISH-INDIAN Army. A division planned to advance to the central plateau of ASSAM Province (south of SILUGADO?) from the direction of the LEDO highway and from the direction of IMPHAL with another division. They were sent to capture the region east of PURAMABUTORA?. The army deemed it wise to devise the independence of INDIA by the means of both political and behind-the-line activities.

3. Directing of the 15th Army by the Southern Army.

The change of the Empire's war strength and the existing state of the East ASIA battle situation made the execution of the plan impossible. The operation could be carried out only after keenly scrutenizing the real strength of the both sides and affirming the chance of positive success. In regards to this, it was suggested to the BURMA Area Army to further study the battle situation and draw up a concrete plan of its operation.

The set back of the enveloping movement at JINZEIWA gave the enemy great confidence. In the engagement of IMPHAL, the enemy subbornly held out and made no attempt to withdraw. On the other hand, the enemy's small boat groups in December made frequent appearance on the outhwest coast and finally commenced to land on RAMREE Island. These landings were later reported to be patrols which soon withdrew, however, the Southern Army decided to increase the defense strength. In Dec. they hastily dispatched the 2nd Div. which was mostly concentrated in MALAY. The 2nd Div. was subsequently concentrated in the BASSEIN sector and completed its preparations at the end of February.

In order to unify the command of the various units in that area, the 28th Army was newly created in January.

3. The 15th Army's order to commence with Operation C.

The 15th Army ordered the commencement of Operation C generally in accord with the results of the final study of the operation. The date of the commencement of the operation was as follows:

Main force area - 8 March.
AKYAB area - 2 March.

4. Landing of the airborne raiding force.

The 18th Div. gradually pressed by the enemy was forced to retreat to the north of MOGAUNG at the beginning of March. The enemy apparently planned to destroy the same division by intercepting its line of retreat and to recapture North BURMA and immediately reopen the INDIA-CHINA land route. They landed the airborne raiding force on a sector of ROIBAU?, KATHA and MONIIN on 5 March.

The enemy airborne force immediately built an airfield and constructed a honeycomb positions around it. Its strength was estimated at more than 5,000. The BURMA Area Army was directed by the Southern Army to ddal with the enemy with the remaining force.

The BURMA Area Army first ordered the railroad unit to oppose the enemy airborne force and later attached 2 battalion of the 15th Army reserves. The Army further decided to reinforce with the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade (less 2 battalions). Later 5 battalions from the 28th Army came as reinforcements. Due to the extreme difficulty, communication, the reinforcements lost time. They had to join in the battle with no definite orders. The enemy could not now be destroyed. The Southern Army arranged to dispatch the 53rd Div., which was concentrated in MALAY. At the beginning of March, they were transferred and their new duty brought them into action against the enemy.

The enemy airborne raiding force resisted tenaciously, being supplied by air but at last retreated to the north of POPIN? before the advance of the 53rd Div. in the middle of April.

5. The main force of the 15th Army, in accordance with the prearranged plan, commenced crossing the CHINDWIN River at dawn on 8 March. This operation took the enemy by surprise and attained a success that might well be called a bloodless

4. The conduct of the BURMA Area Army.

The BURMA Area Army under the direction of the Southern Army rejected the Southern Army's conservative plan and planned an aggressive attack. At the end of June the BURMA Area Army studied with the representatives of the Imperial Hdqtrs. and the Southern Army, the plan of operations after the rainy season and of the IMPHAL operation. Its findings summarized as follows:

A. The advance attack against the central part of ASSAM Province will be too difficult for our troops.

B. IMPHAL operation must be carried out not only to the defensive position in BURMA but also to raise the morale of the people of the homeland.

The BURMA Area Army must be reinforced with 3 Divs, at least 1,000 trucks, ammunitions enough for 4 Divs, and some auxiliary units. To carry out the foregoing plan, the Southern Army communicated with the central authority at once to have the forces transferred and get the Imperial Headquarters' permission.

5. Vice-Chief of the General Staff INADA's trip to TOKYO to communicate with the Imperial Hdqtrs.

Vice-Chief of the General Staff INADA went to TOKYO in the middle of July and reported in detail the existing situation of the Southern Army to the Imperial Hdqtrs. He stressed the need of a new offensive operation in the BURMA area. He obtained the Imp. Hdqtrs.' consent to make preparation for the forthcoming operation. He further obtained the Hdqtrs.' consent on the dispatching of the units (15th Div., 54th Div., 24th M.B., Eng. Hdqtrs., Field Transport Hdqtrs., a number of T., etc.), the transporting and delivery of ammunition (enough for 4 Div.'s major engagement) and vehicle parts (for 1,000 trucks). All were necessary for the executing of the operation.

6. In regards to the execution of operation C, the Imp. H.Q. called for the Southern Army view on the following 4 items. The Southern Army answered that it was fully confident of its success. The operation plan was then approved by the Imp. H.Q.

(1). Can our army cope with the coming attack of the main force of the enemy from the direction of BENGAL Bay?

(2). Can our air force keep pace with the advance attack of the land operation?

(3). Can the supply keep up with the advance attack?

(4). Although it is planned to envelope and annihilate the enemy in the vicinities of IMPHAL and KOHIMA, is the operation involving a 300 Km. front and 250 Km. depth with the density of our forces really feasible?

7. The issuing of the order for the preparation of Operation C.

The results of the studies conducted by the Southern Army and its conclusion as follows:

A. Due to the insufficient enemy naval strength, particularly the air strength, there is little probability of the enemy attacking the mainland of MALAY and SUMATRA from the direction of the INDIAN Ocean. It is necessary to consider the chances of the enemy making an attack on the land front as well as the sea front (especially BASEIN? sector or RANGOON sector).

In determining the strength to be employed in the IMPHAL operation, it is imperative to have an emergency defensive force. Part of this force may be used to reinforce any part of the attacked sector.

B. The transportation of our forces and the materials for the rear will be finished about the end of October. Complications on account of the intensification of the enemy bombings, interruption of traffic, rainy season, etc., may cause the Southern Army to hold the execution of the operation and order it with due regards to the state of the progress of the preparations.

C. The 15th Army still adheres to the idea that they are meeting a army similar to the one they defeated in BURMA. The 15th Army desired to make a free and bold annihilating attack, and liaison with the rear were poorly established. The BURMA Area Army was to give the 15th Army careful and concrete directions and make clear the object of strengthening the defense.

D. The Southern Army directs only the general principle and leaves room for the BURMA Army to use its own discretion. The Southern Army designates the main offensive point, taking into consideration the army strength, sea front defense, terrains, transportation power, etc.

After negotiations with the BURMA Area Army, the Southern Army issued an order for preparation as follows:

The BURMA Area Army will prepare for an operation under the following principles.

1. The BURMA Area Army will assume the offensive in the INPARU area and hold in the other fronts. This operation will hereafter be called operation "C."

2. Operation C will be voluntarily carried out after the completion of the preparations. The main offensive front will be in the area west of the CHINDOWIN River. Though the starting time of the offensive is predesignated after October, it will be indicated in another order.

3. In the event that the enemy takes the offensive before us, we will break up the enemy in the positions where the offensive is being prepared and subsequently advance to the important line in the IMPHAL area.

4. In case the enemy starts a counter-attack in the sea front prior to the execution of Operation C, we will suspend Operation C. We will concentrate the main force of the BURMA Area Army to the said front and will destroy the enemy. The issuance of this order raised the morale of the soldiers in the BURMA Area Army and the 15th Army.

No. 2. Preparation for Operation C.

1. Increase in strength.

The strength was increased for the execution of Operation C. The other forces forces besides the BURMA Area Army's own force are as follows.

A. 31st Division.

It was composed of the 26th Infantry Group (Brigade) in MALAY as the nucleus. From about April, the heavy equipment units and freights entered BURMA by railroad transportation, while the main force advanced on foot on the road parallel to the THAI-BURMA railroad. The division was expected to be concentrated in the sector north of MANDALAY. The THAI-BURMA road was knee deep in mud during the rainy season. Cholera was also razing. The march was extremely difficult but generally proceeded satisfactorily.

B. 54th Division.

One third of this division had landed in JAVA about May but the plans were changed and they were to be used in the Southwest coast of BURMA. The sea transportation to BURMA proceeded favorably beyond expectation and the Div. was able to make preparations for action by about October.

C. 15th Division.

About May, the division was still scattered in a wide area of NANKING, SHANGHAI and HANGCHOW. From about August, it landed at SAIGON and at first concentrated in THAI. The reasons for first concentrating the division in THAI are as follows:

(a). Since the enemy's offense was still unknown, the central authority had anticipated a great possibility of an enemy action from the sea front. It was apparant that the BURMA Area Army would emply the division if it was left to their own discretion. It was necessary for the Southern Army to hold the division as a reserve against a possible enemy attack from the sea.

(b). Though the division is well accustomed to combat against the CHINESE Army, the division needed further training in tactics against the BRITISH Army.

(c). Communication lines were disrupted by the enemy and the communication system needed reorganization. The CHIENGMAI-TOUNGOO road was constructed by the division.

(d). It was more convenient to outfit the unit for jungle fighting in THAILAND. The BURMA Area Army saw the necessity of reinforcing the 15th Division with atleast one division to execute operation C. Its request for reinforcements were not acted on by the Southern Army.

The Southern Army wished to obtain the 2nd Division, which was in the midst of reorganization in the PHILIPPINES, to the central authorities. Getting the request approved, the Southern Army decided to attach the 15th Div. to the 15th Army. The 15th Div. started its movement about the middle of September and first concentrated its forces in the vicinity of SCHWEBO. The march of the division was carried out by foot and automobile on the CHIENGMAI-KENTAIN?-SCHWEBO-MANDALAY road since the railway was blocked. The road was mostly paved and winded through

unihabited high mountains and jungles. The distance was 1,200 Km. to MANDALAY. However, the division carried out the march in high spirit in spite of supply difficulties. The weak and the freights were transported by automobiles. They advanced to the vicinity of MANDALAY in far less time than expected. It was expected that its preparation will be completed by about the end of November. The bulk of the war materials brought from CHINA with great effort had to be left in THAI. These materials could have been used to a great advantage in supplementing the fighting strength.

D. The 2nd Div.

The division was used as a reserve for the Southern Army in MALAY and it was estimated that the movement will be completed by the middle of December.

E. 24th Independent Mixed Brigade.

It was to be enlarged to 4 battalions for the defense of TENASERIM(?).

F. RANGOON Defense Unit.

Reinforced.

G. 5th Engineer H.Q. and 2nd Field Transport H.Q.

These two headquarters were organized after the Southern Army repeatedly aired its views to the central authority. The engineers and transport unit needed unification in preparation for the coming operation.

H. Reinforcing of other principle units.

Independent rapid firing guns (changed to 4$ m.m.).
Field AA guns (Some organized by reorganizing mobile units).
Railway units (2nd Railroad Inspectorate was newly organized).
The railway regiments (2) were alloted to BURMA while the 5th Mobile Railway was assigned to the THAI-BURMA Railroad.
5th Guerrilla Unit H.Q. (Organized in December and sent to BURMA).
42nd L. of C. Sector Unit (reassigned to the defense of SHAN Province from guard duty of the THAI-BURMA Railroad).
Automobile Unit (part was transferred from SUMATRA, JAVA and MALAY).
Replenishment of Supply depot.
Organization of Field replacement Unit (organized at CHIENGMAI mainly for replacements in the BURMA area).

I. Air Units.

The 5th Air Div. was assigned to cooperate with the BURMA Area Army in Operation C. They were in combat continuously since the passing of the rainy season of last year and made a great contribution to land operations. They helped especially in the AKYAB Operation. They fought hard, used tact and initiative, and were daring. They achieved very satisfactory results. Since each unit sustained losses the main force of the div. devoted itself to reorganization. They also trained at bases in Central THAI and North MALAY in preparation for the next stage of operation.

A part of the div. was assigned to the aerial defense of RANGOON as well as the protection of the shipping group navigating on the west coast of MALAY.

At that time, the number of combatable planes of the 5th Air Div. was about 120. It was estimated that they will have about 250 planes by the end of the year.

Since the situation of the PACIFIC Ocean area turned for the worse in the subsequent course of the war, parts of the div. were repeatedly diverted to that area. The participation of the Division in Operation C was considerably decreased.

J. Naval strength.

The 13th Base Unit was so weakened that it was barely able to fulfill its duty of guarding the rivers near RANGOON and escorting the ships between MERGUI and RANGOON.

The increase in the defense of BASSEIN sector and the increase of the transportation off personnel and materials between TOUGAN and AKYAB became important to Operation C and to repel a possible enemy attack. The reinforcements came as follows:

Reinforcement of H.Q. (Special Base Unit was changed to Base Unit. Staff, etc. increased.)
Increase of guard units (One guard unit each at MOULMEIN and TOUGAN).
Increase of ships for coastal operation.

The naval air force was assigned to the security duty of the INDIAN Ocean area and Operation C.

2. Increasing of War Materials.

The mojor portion of the war materials is composed of ammunition and automobiles. Since the railway transportation is overloaded with troops, the major portion of the ammunition and automobiles must be transported by ships. Transportation by ships became dangerous because of enemy bombings and mines. Transportation must be completed by the rainy season. For this reason the air escort was reinforced by a squadron made up from air units at rest, under reorganization and training. Simultaneously, the 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet was instructed to dispatch the escort ships to strategic points. The RANGOON aerial defense and minesweeping forces were increased. Every precaution was taken for defensive measure. Troop transportation was strictly enforced as to allot one ton per man. The remaining were filled to capacity with war materials.

The landings and shelters at CAOFUAGE? MERUGUI and MOULMEIN were increased. The Southern Army encouraged all the units concerned with transportation to carry it on as their main operation during the rainy season. They were able to accomplish the greater part of the transportation with little loss.

The enemy air force made it impossible to use large ships on the south coast of MALAY. Operations in BURMA was able to be continued even after its isolation from the communication point of view. The Southern Army had supplies in preparation for

The manuever, showed that the execution of this operation contained various apprehensive points. In the course of study, there took place two arguments for and against the execution of this operation. Finally, Vice-Chief of the General Staff AYABE acknowledged that the strategic line connecting NAGA Hill, KOHIMA and the heights west of IMPHAL was an absolutely important line to secure the defense of BURMA from a strategical and tactical point of view. For this reason, itwas necessary to carry out Operation C, although it contained some faults. The attitude of the Southern Army was thus settled.

No. 3. The Execution of Operation C.

1. Early in February 1944, in accordance with the orders from the Imperial H.Q. the commander in chief of the Southern Army issued an order to the BURMA Area Army commander to commence with Operation C anytime after March with an objective of strengthening the defense of BURMA and at the same time strengthening the defense of the southwest coast of BURMA.

2. The morale of the BURMA Area Army and the troops under its command rose high when the order came. Preparation for the Operation began. The enemy in the INDIA area did not show any activities even after the passing of the rainy season. Action was first seen in the DOKO? area.

a. DOKO area.

The 56th Div. made BHAMO, TENGYUEH and RYURYO its 3 important key positions. It dispatched a part of the force to KUNRON to counter-attack the CHINESE Army which frequently penetrated into our territory. On each occassion it achieved great success. The result showed that our one battalion was generally sufficient to cope with the enemy's one division. The division was coping with the enemy, which penetrated into our area early in October, enveloping them everywhere. The DOKO area generally was not regarded as a menace during the execution of the Operation C.

b. TORIANGURU zone.

Since the beginning of October, the 18th Div. advanced toward the direction of LEDO and planned to check the enemy in the defiles but failed. It was again unsuccessful in its attempt to take advantage of the enemy's crossing of the big river north of MAINGKWAN. The division subsequently carried out in succession a difficult evacuation operation by rear action and was making every effort to hold out.

c. The area of the southwest coast of BURMA.

The enemy was active on the BUCHIDON? - MONDO? line and fequently penetrating into our area by breaking through the front line position of the 55th Div. We were opposing the enemy by daring infiltration tactics. The SAKURAI group (the infantry group of the 55th Div.) advanced to the rear of the enemy in the immediate front by filtering through the gap of the enemy groups. They enveloped a powerful enemy group at JINZEIWA? but due to insufficient strength and shortage of provision they finally stopped the seige and withdrew.

Operation C. The supplies kept the BURMA Area Army in condition for a few more months.

3. Completion of the communication roads.

a. Operational roads.

WUNTHO - YEU - SHITAN? road.
WUNTHO - YEU-MEMANCHE? road

The 15th Army concentrated all of its manpower in building this road. It traversed the almost impossible HUPEE Mountains, It was a great exploit of the 5th Engineer Unit. It is expected to be completed the first part of December.

MONYWA - KALEMYO - TAMYU road.

Expected to be completed by the end of December.

THAYETMYO - MINBUO - AKYAB road.

Expected to be completed by the end of December.

b. The rear road.

RAMPAN? - KENTAN - TAKAO road.

Expected to be completed by the end of December.

CHIENGMAI - TOUNGOO road.

Expected to be opened by the end of December.

RAHENG - MESODO road.

The THAI Garrison Army placed the THAI Government in charge of its construction but the time of the opening was not known.

c. THAI-BURMA Railroad.

Maintenance during the rainy season and the completion of its defensive installations against the enemy bombing after the rainy season was planndd.

d. TOUNGOO - AKYAB waterway maintenance.

Plan to increase shelter installations.

4. The final stage of Operation C.

The manuever as a final stage of the Operation C was conducted in accordance with the operational plan of the 15th Army at MAYMYO about 10 December in the presence of Vice-Chief of the General Staff AYABE and Chief of Staff NAKA of the BURMA Area Army.

river crossing. The offensive progressed favorably and generally as prearranged. The 31st Div. captured KOHIMA on 6 April and the main force of the 15th Div. advanced to the north of IMPHAL. A part of the 15th Div. intercepted the road between KOHIMA and IMPHAL. The 33rd Div. enveloped part of the BRITISH-INDIAN Army at CAICHIM? and TONZAN and succeeded in capturing 800 automobiles and a great quantity of munitions.

6. Altering of the supreme command system of the Southern Army.

The situation of the PACIFIC.

The defense of the PHILIPPINES needed strengthening. The Imperial H.Q. again planned to place the 14th Army under the command of the Southern Army. The Southern Army would be in charge of the operations of the entire PACIFIC areas. The defense of the PHILIPPINE area must be prepared by utilizing all the strong points such as aerial navigation, shipping and line of communication. Radical changes in the supreme command system of the Southern Army came about. A majority of the staff was transferred to the 7th Area Army, which was organized at SINGAPORE on 15 March. Consequently, the control of the operations in the BURMA area temporarily came to a halt. This move, though unavoidable, was most regretful.

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7. Cooperation of the INDIAN National Army and the BURMA National Army.

The head of the Provisional Government of free INDIA and the supreme commander of the INDIAN National Army, CHANDRA BOS, proceeded to RANGOON at the beginning of January and confidentially cooperated with the BURMA Area Army. The INDIAN National Army guerilla units advanced to AKYAB, HAKA and FAIAM areas and rendered distinguished services by collecting information and breakingup small enemy units. The INDIAN National Army was supposed to capture NAGA Hill after the capture of IMPHAL and carry on guerilla warfare, but it did not materialize. The fact, that the INDIAN National Army fought well as an auxiliary of the JAPANESE Army amid the difficult supply and incomplete rear organization, showed the leadership ability of BOS. The BURMA National Army was used for guard duty in the rear and discharged its duties in general.

Chandra Bose

Paragraph III. The situation in the area of the INDIAN Ocean.

No. 1. The state of defense in the INDIAN Ocean area prior to August.

1. Defense about May was all together in an open state as follows.

A. ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands.

Defenseless, except for Naval 12th Special Base Force (about 2,000) and 1 Bn. of 2nd Guard Div. garrisoned at PORT BLAIR.

B. MALAY.

The 18th Ind. Garrison Unit (2 battalions) at SINGAPORE. The 12th Ind. Garrison Unit (3 Bns.) was scattered around KUALA LUMPUR and IPOH as its center.

C. SUMATRA.

The main force of the 2nd Guard Div. was garrisoned at North SUMATRA and two Independent garrison units were garrisoned in Central SUMATRA and South SUMATRA.

2. With the decline of GERMANY, the diversion of the U.S. and BRITISH fleet to the INDIAN Ocean area, became possible. At the same time, the situation in THAI became delicate and its future was unknown. Under the dircumstances, the reinforcement of the defense of the INDIAN Ocean area became very urgent. There is a fear that the capturing of PALEMBANG by the enemy and the use of it as an advance base, may end the war in this theatre. The Southern Army, therefore, laid its views before the central authority and obtained their assistance and provided an emergency step for itself.

1. Measures provided by the central authority.

New formation of 24th Ind. Mixed Brig. (4 Bn.) for defense of TENASSERIM area.
New formation of 29th Ind. Mixed Brig. (5 Bn.)
This brigade is to defend THAI with its main force. VICTORIA Point and BAUKET will be defended with one Bn. each.
The above two brigades were expected to bring their strength into full play about October.

2. Arrangement by the Southern Army.

Dispatched 2 Bn. of the 2nd Guard Div. to Port BLAIR.
Dispatched 1 Bn. of 2nd Guard Div. to CARNICOBAR.

No 2

3. Reinforcement of the defanse of ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Island was carried out in August,

ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands are not only the relay bases between BURMA and SUMATRA but also the advance guard bases of MALAY Peninsula. Had they fallen into the enemy's hands, the defense of BURMA and SUMATRA would have become very difficult. Weak defense of MALAY Peninsula would have permitted the enemy to overrun the peninsula and furthermore PALEMBANG would have been exposed to the enemy air attack.

The Southern Army decided to securely hold the air bases and naval bases and naval bases at ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands. After constructing a reconnaissance of the actual areas it worked out a minimum plan for reinforcing the defense as follows:

PORT BLAIR - 4 Ind. Bns. (atleast 2 Bns.)
STEWARD SOUND - 1 Inf. Bn. (atleast 1 Co.)
GREAT COCO Island - 2 Inf. Bns. (atleast 1 Co.)
CAR NICOBAR - 4 Inf. Bns. (atleast 3 Co.)
TERESSA - 1 Inf. Bn. (atleast 1 Co.)
CHOURA? - 1 Inf. Company (atleast an observation bait)
CAMORTA - 3 Inf. Bn. (atleast 2 Bns.)

The central authority realizing the situation of the areas, decided to establish the 1st Southwest Garrison Unit (3 Bns) at PORT BLAIR and the 2nd Southwest Garrison Unit (2 Bns. at CAR NICOBAR). The garrison units will be composed of detachments from the 2nd Guard Div. as the nucleus and the deficient units of the 2nd Guard Div. be replenished at once.

No. 3. The MANILA Conferance.

In August a conference was held in MANILA to discuss the defense of the areas north of AUSTRALIA. The Southern Army set forth the following views to the Imperial H.Q.

PLAN FOR REINFORCING THE DEFENSE

OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA

I. General Plan

BURMA will be the base for the right flank. Northern SUMATRA will be the southern base while ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands will act as connecting bases. These bases must be secured firmly while the defenses on the MALAY Peninsula, PALEMBANG and BANGKALAND BLANGTAN will be strengthened.

Explanation

Taking into consideration the general situation, the enemy will probably attack through INDIA. Judging from the disposition of the enemy troops, her air strength and naval operations, attacks from AUSTRALIAN bases will not be likely this year.

The enemy naval strength in the Indian Ocean Area is as follows:

2 or 3 battleships
2 aircraft carriers
3 converted aircraft carriers
5 cruisers
20 destroyers
15 submarines
1,000,000 tons of transport ships

The present enemy strength does not warrant an immediate attack. However, the constant reinforcement of ships makes a counterattack on the isolated islands probable this year. Our defenses, therefore, must be strengthened immediately.

The enemy air strength in August is as follows:

1000 land base planes
400 naval aircraft and
a noticeable increase of heavy bombers entering INDIA

It is highly necessary that we strengthen our air defenses in the oil producing areas. The defenses in the ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands, too, must be reorganized and a definite decision as to the disposal of the COCOS Islands should be reached.

In defending the Indian Ocean area, we must depend on air and naval units. However, because it is impossible to reinforce the naval units, we must rely upon the air units. The land units should secure our air bases and at the same time must neutralize all enemy air bases. The enemy is expected to overlook the smaller islands and will directly attack SUMATRA and the MALAY Peninsula. Therefore, we cannot neglect defense in these areas.

II. Disposition of troops

1. ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands

a. ANDAMAN area (to be called "A" area)

The commander of the 12th Special Naval Base unit will be the commander-in-chief. The following will be under his command:

5 infantry battalions
2 artillery battalions
2 shipping engineer companies
1 tank battalion
10 bombers

b. NICOBAR area (to be called "B" area)

The head will be the army unit commander. The following units will be under his command:

3 infantry battalions
2 artillery battalions
1 tank battalion
1 shipping engineer company
1 bomber regiment

c. CAMORTA area (to be called "C" area)

The army unit commander will be in command. He will have the following:

3 infantry battalions
2 artillery companies
1 shipping engineer company

2. SUMATRA Area

The two garrisons will be reorganized into each respective independent mixed brigade (the nucleus of which will be: 4 infantry battalions, 2 artillery companies, and an engineer unit). In addition, one division will be created and two defense units for PALEMBANG and BANKALANG BLANGTAN will be newly organized.

Equipment for the defense units:

PALEMBANG: at least 150 anti-aircraft guns
at least 100 airplanes

BANKALANG BLANGTAN: at least 70 anti-aircraft guns
at least 50 airplanes

RENGAT: at least 20 anti-aircraft guns
at least 10 airplanes

3. MALAY Peninsula

The two garrisons will be reorganized into two independent mixed brigades and one division will be created. In addition, there will be one reserve army headquarters division.

III. Commanding system

The NICOBAR, ANDAMAN and SABANG Islands were under the jurisdiction of the navy and the 25th Army was only supporting the navy. In order to reinforce the isolated islands, it is impossible for the 25th Army to carry out satisfactory supplying and training. The creation of a commanding body for the ANDAMAN area will be convenient. In addition, it is necessary that another army be organized for the purpose of facilitating the defense of the MALAY Peninsula. One commanding headquarters will therefore be created in MALAY and all navy units in the isolated island area will be put under its command. According to the agreement of the MANILA meeting, the Central Headquarters was steadily proceeding with the execution of the plan.

The general process was as follows:

1. September

The Fourth Division was dispatched to SUMATRA and was put under the command of the 25th Army.

2. September

The two garrisons in SUMATRA were reorganized into the 27th Independent Mixed Brigade and 28th Independent Mixed Brigade, respectively.

3. November

The 53rd Division was put under the command of the Southern Area Army and advanced to MALAY.

4. January

The 29th Army Headquarters was created in MALAY and the 12th Special Naval Base unit was put under the command of the 29th Army commander, only in respect to the land defenses.

5. January

The 35th Independent Mixed Brigade was created in "A" area, the 36th Independent Mixed Brigade was created in "B" area and the 37th Independent Mixed Brigade was created in "C" area.

6. January

The PALEMBANG and BANKALANG BLANGTAN defense headquarters were created.

7. About January

The 9th Air Division advanced to SUMATRA

IV. The Defensive Situations in Each Area

The defense in the Indian Ocean Area proceeded steadily as mentioned before. In order to unify the general operations of each army, the Southern Area Army invited the chiefs-of-staff of each army and showed the defensive plans. According to this plan each army hastened reinfofcement for defense. The rough reinforcements were completed about March.

A. A, B, C areas

1. General plan

PORT BLAIR and CAR NICOBAR Island will be secured to the very last. We hope that the enemy will not use them.
other key sectors will be secured not permit the enemy to utilize them as possible.

2. Disposition of troops

a. The 35th Independent Mixed Brigade (defends the ANDAMAN area)

4 infantry battalions occupied the PORT BLAIR area.
2 infantry battalions occupied the large COCOS Island (In March they advanced by ship).
1 infantry battalion (lacking a company) occupied STEWART SOUND.
1 infantry company occupied LONG Island which was a connecting base.

b. The 36th Independent Mixed Brigade

This brigade consisted of 4 infantry battalions, most of which were located in the eastern area.

c. The 37th Independent Mixed Brigade

The main force of the three infantry battalions occupied CAMORTA.
One company occupied TRINKAT.
The main force of one infantry battalion occupied TERESSA Island.
One company occupied CHOWRA Island.

B. MALAY Peninsula

1. The operation area of the 29th Army was south of the line connecting Northern TAVOY Island and PRACHUABKIRIKANU which is north of CHUNPON.

2. The duties of the 29th Army were to secure MALAY, maintain peace and to defend Southern Thailand and Southern TENASSERIM in cooperation with the THAILAND Army.

MERGUI, VICTORIA POINT, and BHUKET were especially defended.

3. Disposition of troops

The army headquarters--TAIPING

MERGUI--One Infantry battalion of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade

VICTORIA POINT--One infantry battalion of the 29th Independent Mixed Brigade

BHUKET--One infantry battalion of the 29th Independent Mixed Brigade

JOHORE, SINGAPORE--Two infantry battalions of the 18th Independent Garrison

MALAY, excluding the above mentioned areas--three infantry battalions of the 12th Independent Garrison

Southern Army reserve unit--53rd Division--concentrated on MALACCA, KUALA LUMPUR and IPOH.

4. As mentioned before, the defense force of MALAY Peninsula was a combination of various units and because of the poor equipment, it was necessary to reorganize the force.

The 53rd Division arrived in MALAY to make up the required strength, but the Division was ordered into BURMA in March and the strength was again diminished.

Therefore in October, the Southern Area Army ordered the 7th Area Army ~~ordered~~ to organize a defense unit at SINGAPORE and also ordered the 18th Independent Garrison to advance to the CHUNPON area. Concerting with General Headquarters in Toklyo, the Southern Area Army ordered the 94th Division to go under the command of the 29th Army. Thus, the rough defensive preparations were barely completed.

C. SUMATRA

Northern SUMATRA was the strategic area for defense. PALEMBANG was the strategic point of the air defense. The reinforcement of the defense was intently hastened, putting an emphasis on fortification.

1. Disposition of troops

a. The 2nd Guard Division

They were in charge of the defense in AJEH, especially the strategic points at SABANG and the northern coast. Division headquarters was located at MEDAN.

b. 27th Independent Mixed Brigade

The main force occupied the state of TAPANEOLI.

One and a half battalion occupied NIAS Islands.
Half a battalion occupied SIMEULOEE Island.
The Brigade headquarters were located at SIBOLGA.

c. The 28th Independent Mixed Brigade

The 28th Independent Mixed Brigade was in charge of the defenses in the states of DALEMBANG AND BENKOELEN. The headquarters was located in RAHATA.

One battalion occupied ENGANO Island.

d. PALEMBANG Defense Unit was in charge of the air defense of PALENBANG.

e. PANGKALAN BULANGTAN Defense Unit was in charge of the air defense in PANGKALANBULANGTAN.

f. The 4th Division

Headquarters was located at PADANG.
Three infantry battalions were put in charge of the defense of the state of WESTKUST.
Small units were dispatched to PALAUTELO in BATU Islands, MUARASIBERUT on SIBERUT Island, and BAGAI Island

Section IV Situation of Sector North of AUSTRALIA

Part I Outline

As for the sector north of AUSTRALIA, our plan was to secure the strategic area from SOENDA Islands to MIMIKA as the first defensive line against enemy attacks on JAVA, CELEBES and the PHILIPPINES from AUSTRALIA, but because the Southern Area Army had adopted the plans to reinforce the BURMA defenses, the strength of this area was weakened. In May, only 2 divisions, two independent garrisons, and one independent garrison battalion were found in areas 4,000 kilometers south of JAVA. However, the main enemy force was in the SOLOMON area and only four or five divisions and about five hundred airplanes were found in Northern Australia and Western NEW GUINEA. The enemy force, therefore, did not appear strong enough to carry out an immediate attack on the BANDA sea area. As for our air force, the 7th Air Division (headquarters situated in MALANG) and the 23rd Naval Air Division (headquarters located in SOERABAJA), timely attacked the PORT DARWIN area and checked the enemy from gaining air superiority.

Though the 8th Area Army was forced to retreat gradually, it was calculated that the enemy attacks would be a year later. Therefore, the main force of our troops would devote their time to strengthening the air defense of the SUMATRA oil producing areas, and the defense of BURMA.

However, the enemy's unexpected speed of attack of the SOLOMON area and our defeat in the MARSHALLS darkened our future prospects. The Imperial Headquarters also acknowledged this, and in September ordered the Southern area army to construct bases for counter-attacks in the sector north of AUSTRALIA and to dispatch one or two divisions.

Therefore, the following plan was prepared for defending this sector.

> "GEELVINK Bay area will be the center of the left flank while TIMOR Island, the center of the front line. The AROE, KAI, and TANIMBAR Islands will be the first line of defense. CERAM Island will be the second line of defense. In case of failure, rear key positions will be constructed in JAVA, CELEBES and HALMAHERA".

In October, the Second Area Army was organized, and the area east of LOMBOK put under its control.

Part II East of TIMOR Island

1. Having completed its organization, the 19th Army advanced to AMBON in January and hastened the strengthening of the defenses in the east and south areas of BANDA Island. Though the troops dispatched were constantly attacked by enemy planes, our transports cooperated closely and harbor shelters were constructed. Convoy escorts and protecting air force were increased.

In August the following disposition was completed:

A. CERAM Island, AMBON--army headquarters

B. NEW GUINEA, BABO--Division headquarters and a half infantry battalion of the 5th Division

KAIMANA--One infantry battalion of the 5th Division

MIMIKA--One and a half infantry battalion of the 5th Division

C. Isolated Island area

AROE--Two infantry battalions of the 5th Division

TANIMBAR--Two infantry battalions of the 5th Division and one infantry battalion of the 18th Division.

KAI--One and a half infantry battalion of the 5th Division

D. TIMOR

48th Division headquarters, six infantry battalions and one tank regiment of the 48th Division.

E. SOEMBA Island

One infantry battalion of the 48th Division

F. FLORES Island

One infantry company of the 48th Division

G. SOEMBAWA Island

Half infantry battalion of the 48th Division

H. LOMBOK Island

One infantry company of the 48th Division

2. Change of Defensive Plans

In defending the BANDA sea area, we intended to defend the whole area at first, but intense attacks by enemy planes and increased submarine attacks, and a decrease of our transportation facilities made it impossible to carry out our intentions. We were thus forced to change our plans, that is, to secure only strategic points.

The orders and plans of the Imperial Headquarters reflected the fact that our airplane production was greatly increased at that time. It was the hope that the increased production would make it possible to counter-attack, so the army and navy closely cooperated in constructing air bases and strengthening their forces. Naturally, the land forces put emphasis on the occupation of the strategic bases before the occupation of bases for counter-attacks. Securing of these areas which were feared would be used as naval and air bases by the enemy in areas such as MIMIKA and TIMOR Islands.

3. Preparations for counter-attacks

The imminence of the situation in the south-east area forced the southern area Army which had been thinking only of the defense in the southern area, to rearrange its disposition in the eastern area immediately. Therefore, the following was decided.

(1) Southern area

a. Isolated islands area (including MIMIKA)

Almost all of the strength of the 5th Division will be deployed in this area. Division headquarters will be at TUAL, 3 infantry battalions on AROE Island, 3 infantry battalions on TANIMBAR Island, and 2 infantry battalions will be on KAI Island.

b. Timor Island

The main force of the 48th Division (consisting of 8 infantry battalions, 1 tank regiment, and light mortar battalion) will strengthen the defense of this island. Units now situated on SOENDA Island under the command of the 48th Division will be moved to this island.

c. Small SOENDA Island (under the control of the 16th Army)

The newly dispatched 46th Division (a part of which was sunk at sea). Its present strength being less than six infantry infantry battalions. It will take over the defense duties from the 48th Division. SOEMBA Island will be the main point of defense.

SOEMBA Island--three and a half infantry battalions chiefly in WAINGAPOE

FLORES Island--a half infantry battalion

SOEMBAWA Island--Division headquarters and one and a half infantry battalion

LOMBOK Island--half infantry battalion

(2) Eastern Area

Simultaneously, Army General Headquarters ordered all the gradually increasing groups to reinforce the defense of NEW GUINEA.

HOLLANDIA was decided to be the base for the advance. Bases for counter-attacks were to be constructed in the GEELVINK Bay Area. The rear bases for these bases were to be constructed in the SORONG and HALMAHERA area.

At first we had no defenses on HALMAHERA Island, but taking consideration of the probable future change of situation, the Southern Area Army felt the necessity for immediate fortification of this island as an intermediate base for the NEW GUINEA operation. In August, it dispatched a party from the 3rd Ship Transportation Unit and completed the preparation.

(3) Shift of Command

In order to proceed with the preparations for the counter-attack in the NEW GUINEA area, and also to secure the strategic area in the sector north of AUSTRALIA, the Imperial General Headquarters newly organized the 2nd Area Army in October. The Second Army and the 19th Army were put under the control of the 2nd Area Army.

The 2nd Area Army not only performed its original duties but also took over the defense of SOENDA Islands east of LOMBOK Strait from the 16th Army. The 2nd Area Army was put under the direct control of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, the area under the control of the 2nd Area Army was excluded from the command of the Southern Area Army.

(4) Co-operation with the Navy

At that time the Area east of BALI Island (including BALI) was under the command of the navy. The fact that the navy was in command, created many obstacles in strengthening the defense of this area. In order to remove the obstacles, it was decided that the land defense would be put under the control of the highest army commander of each respective area.

Part III JAVA Sector

JAVA, the base of line communication in the south, supplied the Southern Area Army and also helped to supply the 2nd and 8th Area Armies. The defense of JAVA was considered very important because of its great contribution. Reinforcements, however, were not sent to JAVA because of the serious situations in other areas. Though the Imperial General Headquarters sent the 54th Division to reinforce JAVA, the Southern Area Army sent this division to BURMA.

The gist of defense for JAVA in August.

1. General Plan

Working in close cooperation with the naval and air forces, we shall annihilate the enemy on the beach. The Main Point of defense will be in Eastern JAVA.

2. a. We shall annihilate the enemy on the ocean. Theeenemy will not be allowed to advance into the JAVA Sea.

b. Strong positions for counter-attacks will be constructed on strategic points on the southern coast of JAVA. Mobile forces will be concentrated to repel the enemy.

c. Even in worst cases SOERABAJA , MALANG, BATAVIA, JAKARTA and BANDOENG will be secured.

3. Disposition of Troops

Eastern JAVA (east of SOERABAJA and MALANG Area) One Independent Garrison. One unit, the nucleus of which will be one regiment of the 54th Division (Reserve for the mobile operation).

Central JAVA (SEMARANG JOKJAKALTA Area) Elements of an Independent

Garrison (lacking some elements)

4. Air Defense

We will chiefly defend SOERABAJA, CHEPUI oil fields, BANDOENG and JOKJAKALTA.

According to the above mentioned plan, the 16th Army proceeded to strengthen the defenses until March.

One unit of the 54th Division took over the Ichikari Regiment of the 2nd Division and the 3rd Battalion of the Ichikari Regiment was sent to BALI Island.

The CHRISTMAS Island was still under the command of the navy. One naval company guarded the island.

Part IV Northern BORNEO Sector

The Northern BORNEO

Garrison consisted of two battalions, one of which was sent to THAILAND. The one remaining battalion had to defend the vast area of northern BORNEO.

In August, the greater part of Northern BORNEO was quiet but area adjacent to PALAWANG and SULU Islands were disturbed by substantial entries of spies and subversive parties. Enemy raids were anticipated and with the change of the general situation. The maintenance of peace became very difficult. Our strength in BORNEO was not sufficient for defense so one battalion that had been previously sent to THAILAND was recalled to BORNEO.

Disturbances in Northeastern BORNEO increased. Sources were in TAWITAWI Island and PALAWAN Island but the 14th Army could not check these disturbances. The Borneo Garrison wanted to send expeditionary forces to these islands and also requested Imperial Headquarters through the Southern Area Army Headquarters. However, this request was not realized until March.

In order to meet the situation, headquarters considered moving to OBI. In May the 7th, the army carried out the plan.

Part V CELEBES and Southern BORNEO Sector.

In August the navy took charge of the defense of the CELEBES and Southern BORNEO but made no preparation for defense except in BALIKPAPAN.

The 22nd Naval Base Unit at MAKASSAR took charge of the defense of CELEBES. The defense force of Southern BORNEO was as follows:

BALIKPAPAN --- the 23rd Naval Base Unit
About 2,000 men
About 30 planes

SAMARINDA--one infantry company

BANJERMASIN--one infantry company

PANGKALANGBUN--one infantry platoon

PONTIANAK--one infantry company

There were no great changes until March

Section V Situation of THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA

Part I THAILAND

1. Situation in August

In spite of the situation in the south-eastern area, the successful occupation of BURMA secured the confidence of the people of THAILAND and made the maintenance of peace easy. The THAILAND Army organized an expeditionary force of 35,000 which occupied the area north of LAMPANG. The main force was situated in the state of KIANTUNG. They suffered from malaria and also during the rainy season, from food shortage. The main force, therefore, retreated to LAMPANG and CHIENGMAI areas for rest. In addition to them a force of about 40,000 was in the central area and of about 10,000 was in the central area. The total strength of the THAILAND Army was estimated at about 100,000, including the police force.

On the other hand, our strength was only one battalion of the 21st Division in the city of BANGKOK and one battalion (under the command of the BORNEO garrison) along the BURMA-THAILAND railroad. The army headquarters carried out the occupation in cooperation with the THAILAND Army and in general, the result was good.

2. The entrance of the 15th Division

Since the end of August the 15th Division gradually arrived in THAILAND from SHANGHAI. The division contributed in fostering the fighting power, serving as the general reserve for the Southern Area Army. Meanwhile, they constructed the CHIENGMAI--TOUNGOO Road. In September the division advanced to BURMA through KIANTUNG.

3. Establishment of the 29th Independent Mixed Brigade

In July the vice chief of the army general staff went to Tokyo to request reinforcements for the THAILAND Occupation. The request was granted and organization of the brigade began in September. It was completed in early October.

The Brigade was situated as follows:

2 infantry battalions defended the southern area in THAILAND and BHUKET--VICTORIA POINT area.

1 infantry battalion guarded the area along the BURMA-THAILAND railroad and the boundary between BURMA and THAILAND.

2 infantry battalions with the main force guarding the BANGKOK area.

4. The Advance of the 7th Field Replacement Unit

In November, the 7th Field Replacement Unit for Burma arrived in THAILAND and was temporarily situated in CHIENGMAI. They helped to strengthen the defense of NORTHERN THAILAND and it also served as a base for the advance to BURMA.

5. Construction of the BURMA-THAILAND Railroad.

In spite of Major-General TAKASAKI's determination (he later died of illness), the construction of the BURMA-THAILAND Railroad was delayed because of the rainy season and because of the violent spread of infectious diseases. It was feared that this delay would be a serious factor in the BURMA Operation. However, because of the newly appointed Major-General ISHIDA's persistent work, with the cooperation of the THAILAND Occupation force, the construction was completed in spite of unspeakable difficulties.

6. Performance of Duties for Line Communications

The THAILAND Occupation force which had been ordered to supply the BURMA area set up the base for line communications. They endeavored to obtain and manufacture light weapons, clothes, and food from local resources and contributed immensely.

Part II FRENCH INDO-CHINA Sector

1. In August, the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Occupation Force was situated as follows:

Headquarters at SAIGON
Liason office at HANOI
branch office at SHUHUA
The 21st Division (lacking a battalion)
The main force was situated in the HAIRONG area, especially guarding HAI-PONG, LAOKAI, HA-ZHIANY, KAO BANG, DONGDANG, MONGCAY, and SHUHUA.
Elements were situated in Southern FRENCH INDO-CHINA--one battalion at SAIGON, and one battalion at PNON-PENN.

2. Duties of the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Occupation Force--the Request for Reinforcements

The occupation force was ordered to defend FRENCH INDO-CHINA in cooperation with the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Government. They were also ordered to harass CHUNGKING. The existing strength, however, was not sufficient to carry out these duties, so they requested permission to organize a brigade in Southern FRENCH INDO-China in order to concentrate the entire strength of the 21st Division in northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The situations in other areas caused much delay in the relaying of the request.

The occupation force newly organized the South FRENCH INDO-CHINA Defense Unit. Surplus personnel of the 21st Division formed the nucleus. Later in January of 1946, this defense unit was reorganized into the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade. In January, the troops were situated as follows:

a. The 21st Division in Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA

1 regiment--the main force at TONG, and elements at MONGCAY, DONGDANG, and KAO BANG

1 regiment--the main force at FIJIEN, elements at HAZ[illegible] HIANY, LAOKAI and FUOL.

1 regiment--the main force at HAI-PHON and elements in the areas west and south of HAI-PHON.

b. The 34th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters was located in [illegible]URAN.

This brigade took charge of the defense of FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

c. The Defense Unit

Headquarters and main force at SAIGON

Elements at PNON-PENN.

Chapter V Decisive Battle Operations from April 1944 to December 1944

Section I New command of the Southern Area Army.

I According to the following Imperial General Headquarters order received on 27 March 1944, the Southern Area Army took over the command of the entire Southern area.

Gist of the Order.

a. The commander of the Southern Area Army will, in cooperation with the navy, rapidly proceed with preparations for battle. He will be in charge of securing and maintaining the peace in strategic areas in the south.

1. The army will secure ANDAMAN, NICOBAR Islands, MALAY, SUMATRA, JAVA, BORNEO, and the sector north of AUSTRALIA, and if necessary, repulse all enemy attacks. They will also maintain peace in BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and the PHILIPPINES and will work in conjuction with their respective governments.

2. Air operations will be timely carried out against INDIA, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, and NEW GUINEA. Land operations against the enemy hinter land will be carried out according to another order.

3. To meet any change in the situation, materials will have to be obtained from local resources.

4. The defense of important resource areas will be strengthened.

5. Military administration will be rapidly improved.

6. The Army will cooperate with the navy to protect sea transportation.

b. The boundary for the sector operation for the Southern Area Army and the 8th Area Army will be Long. 100 degrees 40 sec. E (The ADMIRALTY Islands will be included in the 8th Area Army Sector).

The boundary operations for the Southern Area Army and the FORMOSA Army will be Latitude 20 degrees 10 sec. N.

The PALAU Islands will be included in the 31st Army sector, while the ST. ANDREWS Islands will be included in the Southern Area Army sector.

II. The Southern Area Army put the above mentioned orders in action on the 15th of April.

Section II General situation of the South on April and May 1944

1. Western front

The BURMA Area Army secured the fronts of NU-KIANG and CHITTAGONOT while it continued the IMPHAL Operations with the 15th Army. Our Army gradually advanced to the IMPHAL Area but was brought to a stand still because of the difficulties of supplies. KOHIMA was temporarily occupied by our army but was soon recaptured by the enemy. Our attack on northern BURMA (carried out chiefly by the 18th Division) met a superior enemy and was gradually repelled to the KAMAING area. The main force of the 3rd Air Army worked in cooperation with the BURMA Area Army but their strength gradually waned.

In order to meet the situation, the Southern Area Army hastily dispatched the 33rd Army, a newly arrived division, and some air units there. Military materials, especially transportation materials were also sent. However, because of the weak reserve and because of the poor railroad transportation, the plans were not satisfactorily completed.

2. Eastern front

In early April the 2nd Area Army could do no more than to send the 2nd Army (consisting of one division as its nucleus) to OTEELVINK Bay Area (the main force of the 36th Division to SARMI and one regiment to BIAK Island) because of the delay of sea transportation in the western NEW GUINEA area. In the latter part of April, the enemy surprised HOLLANDIA, where none of our troops except air units and rear echelons were situated. HOLLANDIA was put under the command of the Southern Area Army only several days before (in compliance with the order for the change of the boundary for sector operations), but because they were unfamiliar with the area, they could take no direct defensive measures. In order to save HOLLANDIA, the 2nd Area Army commander angrily dispatched one detachment consisting of 1 infantry regiment and 1 mountain gun battalion from SARMMI.

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In order to meet the pressing situation, the Southern Area Army accelerated the delivery of troops and war materials for the 2nd Army. Meanwhile it advanced its commanding post to MANILA in the middle of May for the purpose of completing preparations for the battle of the Pacific Front. On the 2nd of May, the Southern Area Army was ordered to send the 18th Army to Western NEW GUINEA.

On May 17th, the enemy commenced landings in the SARMI area. The 2nd Area Army called back the HOLLANDIA reinforcement until at that time. Though the 36th Division defeated the enemy, the increase of enemy strength in June became so great that it was disadvantageous for us.

On the 27th of May, the enemy commenced landing on BIAK Island. The detachment on the island fought well and defeated the enemy at a cost. The difference of reinforcements between our force and the enemy force was so great that the enemy soon gained superiority and at the end of June the operation became a standstill. Previously, the Southern Area

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Army had decided to send the 2nd Sea Mobile Brigade, which was waiting at ZAMBOANGA, to BIAK Island by using navy ships but this plan was not carried out until June. Though we advanced to the vicinity of our destination in June, we returned to SORONOT because we came in contact with enemy planes. We should have taken advantage of the time when the enemy strength on BIAK Island was quite small.

The main points of defense in this area hitherto had been SARMI and BIAK, but in the short period of time from the end of April to early May, the Imperial General Headquarters changed the first line of defense three times--first to BIAK, then to MANOKWARI and at last to SORONG. In the meantime, the transportation of the 35th and 32nd Divisions was completed but there was some dispute as to the distribution of these divisions. It was finally ~~dec~~ decided to put them on SORONG and HALMAHERA in compliance with headquarters withdrawal plan.

It was impossible to change the disposition of troops and accumulated materials even if they wanted to because of the difficulties in navigation and especially because of the shortage of ships. Moreover, the arrival of new units was not expected in the near future. Imperial General Headquarters adhered to its plan and would not allow the change of the fixed destination. Therefore we could do no more then make future operation plans in strict accordance with the fixed plans.

Section III Outline of the Operation Plans

As soon as the Imperial General Headquarters' order was received, the Southern Area Army began to make operation plans and completed it at the end of April. A meeting of the army commanders was held on May 5 in SINGAPORE to give them a thorough knowledge of the plans and to instruct them.

Outline of the Southern Area Army Operation Plan

1. The line connecting BURMA, ANDAMAN-NICOBAR, SUMATRA, JAVA, SOENDA Islands, the Northern coast of NEW GUINEA west of SARMI HALMAHERA and the PHILIPPINES will be the main line of defense. The Southern Area Army, in cooperation with the navy, will fight the enemy in this line. The main decisive battle area will be the Pacific front and the BURMA front, while the PHILIPPINES will be the final decisive battle area.

   The main line of defense will be arranged in such a manner as to facilitate the concentration and operation of the air force, and to facilitate mobile operations for land units.

2. Working in cooperation with the navy and air forces, the BURMA Area Army, the 7th Area Army (ANDAMAN--NICOBAR, MALAY, SUMATRA, and JAVA), the 2nd Area Army (SOENDA Island, Western NEW GUINEA, HALMAHERA, and CELEBES) and the 14th Army (PHILIPPINES) will make preparations for operations, secure strategic areas in the main line of defense and defeat the enemy.

BURMA-PALEMBANG area and the "Square Fortress" (GEELVINK Bay, PALAU, HALMAHERA and MAINDANAO) will be especially secured. Mobile operations will be taken into special consideration in preparing for the defense in BURMA, and consideration for the final decisive battle will be given in preparing the defense for the PHILIPPINES. The BURMA Area Army will be responsible for cutting off enemy communication routes from INDIA to CHINA.

3. As for the Air forces, the operation area will be divided into two sectors. The 3rd Air Army will be in charge of the sector west of BORNEO (including BORNEO), while the 4th Air Army will be in charge of the sector east of BORNEO. The former will concentrate its entire strength in the Pacific Area while the latter will concentrate on the BURMA-PALEMBANG area. By timely moving their strength and by working in close cooperation with the navy and land force, they will defeat the enemy.

4. The THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Occupation forces will take charge of maintaining peace in their respective areas. The 7th Area Army will be in charge of line communications for the entire Southern area.

   All armies will endeavor to obtain necessary materials from local resources.

5. The present strategic disposition of the troops will not be changed, the BURMA Area Army, the 2nd Area Army, and the 14th Army will be reinforced in the near future with one division each. All armies will be reorganized (e. g. the 14th army will organize 4 mixed brigades). The air force will be gradually reinforced with new strength. Meanwhile the 4th Air Army will withdraw to the PHILIPPINES for recuperation.

6. Materials will be distributed according to its necessity. The Pacific and BURMA fronts being in urgent need will be supplied first. Priority will be given for supplies to the air force.

7. Generally speaking, the preparation for operation is insufficient in the Pacific front, especially in the PHILIPPINES area. In order to reinforce the strength, to increase the materials, and to strengthen the installations, the Southern Area Army will move to this area.

Section IV The Decisive Battle of the PHILIPPINES Area

Part I Gist

Originally, the PHILIPPINES was the center of the Great Eastern Co-prosperity ~~of the~~ Sphere. It was especially an important key position for the maintenance of transportation between Japan proper and the South. The final consequences of the Imperial warfare, therefore, depended on the decisive battle for the PHILIPPINES. Hitherto the PHILIPPINES had been utilized only as a base for line communications and was not considered a strategic area. Defensive preparations commenced only recently.

The Imperial Headquarters laid down its plans for the strengthening of the defense of the PHILIPPINES last autumn, but the plan was not carried out satisfactorily. Though the concrete plans for the fortification were finally completed this spring, it took an unexpectedly long time for it to reach the smaller units in remote areas, so actually there were no preparations. It was difficult to make these small units realize that they were no longer an occupation force but a fighting force.

In the meantime the speed of the enemy's counter-attacks were so rapid that our defense could not keep pace. In September, air attacks became especially fierce and in October, it not only wiped out our air force but also destroyed our transportation facilities.

In late October the enemy landed in the LEYTE area and we endeavored to defeat the enemy by sending as much strength as possible, but because of our inferior materials, equipment and strength, we were forced to give up the LEYTE Operation after two months.

Part II Preparation for the Decisive Battle

1. As the enemy's intention of attacking the PHILIPPINES became apparant, 2 headquarters reconnaisance regiments were put under the command of the Southern Area Army in the middle of May. The 2nd Air Division (7 fighter regiments, 3 assault regiments, and 5 heavy bomber regiments) and the 4th Air Division (consisting of the land service units of the air force) were put under the command of the Southern Area Army. In addition, the 25th Air Brigade (1 fighter regiment, 1 light bomber regiment, and one assault regiment) was placed under the command of the Southern Area Army in mid-June.

   The reorganization of the four mixed brigades in the PHILIPPINES was completed in the middle of June.

   All units gradually arrived in the PHILIPPINES in late May and devoted their time in training. All land and air units hurried the construction and fortification of air bases.

   The enemy's capture of MOROTAI and PALAU in July 1944 foretold attacks on the PHILIPPINES. The time of attack was expected to be in early autumn. From early September to the middle of that month, carrier-based planes carried out the first attacks on the PHILIPPINES.

   The enemy apparantly intended to wipe out our air force and simultaneously reconnoiter our area.

2. In July, the Imperial General Headquarters issued the order to prepare for the decisive battle in the PHILIPPINES. The Southern Area Army took immediate measures to speed up the defenses.

a. The Southern Area Army in early August issued the order to prepare for the "Sho no. 1 operation". The purpose was to unify the operations by the navy, 14th Area Army and the 4th Air Army.

b. On July 7, the 14th Army, which had hitherto occupied the PHILIPPINES, was reorganized into the 14th Area Army. At the same time, the 35th Army was organized to control units in central and southern PHILIPPINES. The 35th Area Army worked under the 14th Area Army. The 14th Area Army, in late August, ordered the prepapation for the "Sho no. 1 operation" and held a meeting of its commanders.

c. In July and in August, the Southern Area Army sent the chief of general staff and his party to speed up the operation.

d. The Southern Area Army general headquarters moved to the PHILIPPINES to promote the preparation for the "Sho no. 1 operation". Because of the complicated relationship with the 14th Area Army, the 4th Air Army, the Combined Fleet, and the 3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleet, it became disadvantageous for headquarters to stay there. The Southern Area Army thought it better to leave the operation in the hands of the 14th Area Army (putting the 4th Air Army under its control if necessary) and the 3rd Expeditionary Fleet. The Southern Area Army asked Imperial General Headquarters for its sanction in early August to move its headquarters to SINGAPORE or SAIGON sometime in early September, but was denied the request.

e. The Southern Area Army Headquarters advised Imperial General Headquarters to change the commander and staff officers of the 14th Area Army.

(Note)--According to the Imperial General Headquarters' order, the rough preparation for the "Sho no. 1 operation" was to be completed in late August but no unit arrived before the specified time. The completion of the preparations was not expected until the end of Oct.

In other words, units on isolated islands would not get a thorough knowledge of the order for about three months.

The 14th Area Army had been assigned as an occupational force and it was difficult to convert it into a combat force.

3. Because the Southern Area Army expected enemy attacks in the near future, they sent Colonel MIYAMA, chief of the planning section, to TOKYO to report on the first enemy air raid and to report on the progress of defenses for the PHILIPPINES. He also went there to talk over important operation plans.

The following important matters were presented to Imperial General Headquarters at that time.

a. "It is necessary to put the 'Sho no. 1 operation' in action at once and move the necessary troops. Since positive enemy attacks are expected in the very near future, the success of 'Sho no. 1 operation' relies on its timely commencement.

Because of the poor communication system, a quick decision is highly desirable.

As soon as the order is issued, the necessary strength for this operation, especially the air force, will be moved from the outside areas to the Southern area.

Much delay is expected because of difficult transportation, and it may be necessary for them to fight before they are thoroughly oriented with the situation. As a consequence, they may not be able to utilize their full power.

b. "The attack against the enemy task force by the air force must be approved.

Imperial General Headquarters wants to with-hold the air force in spite of the advance of the enemy task force until such time of the landing. This is disadvantageous for the 'Sho no. 1 Operation'.

If the enemy task force operation is checked in its early stage, we can freely carry out our future plans, at the same time, we would be disrupting the enemy's plans.

These facts were keenly realized after the first enemy air attack. If the preparation for the air operation is completed, if the air strength could be retained, and if it would be possible to timely counter-attack enemy landings, Imperial General Headquarters plans would be generally approved. However it is impossible to carry the plan out successfully under the present conditions of the preparation".

The Imperial General Headquarters replied as follows:

a. "As for the commencement of the 'Sho no. 1 Operation', we are doing our best to complete the preparations in the near future.

b. "The attacks against the enemy task force are not sure to succeed. Moreover, it may decrease our strength and may interfere with the combined operation at the time of enemy landings.

The attack against the enemy task force, therefore, cannot be approved. However, we have no objections if elements of the air force take opportune moments in carrying out attacks".

4. The Southern Area Army concluded the enemy's attack against the PHILIPPINES as follows:

Soon after the completion of the air bases in MOROTAI and PALAU, the enemy will attack the PHILIPPINES. The enemy will undoubtedly attack LUZON because of its political and strategic significance. It is expected that the enemy will attack central and southern PHILIPPINES first for the purpose of constructing air bases, and then attack LUZON.

It is also expected that the enemy will pass through SULU Sea (between PHILIPPINES AND BORNEO), the weakest point in our defense. Using southern MINDANAO, northern BORNEO and the islands in SULU Sea as bases they will attack the CHINA Sea, coast of LUZON.

MOROTAI and PALAU are too far from LUZON to be used as air bases and an immediate attack is not imminent. Attacks against LUZON probably will not be carried out until advanced air bases have been secured. In order to guard against such possibilities, we placed the 37th Army (which had been under the command of the 7th Area Army) under the direct control of the Southern Area Army. They were placed there to strengthen the SULU Sea defense.

5. Imperial General Headquarters and the Southern Area Army discussed the battle for the PHILIPPINES several times. Imperial General Headquarters held the opinion that:

> The decisive battle should be carried out in LUZON, while in other strategic areas only holding actions should be carried out.

On the other hand, the Southern Area Army held that:

> The success of the battle for LUZON can never be attained if other strategic areas, especially BISAYA, are left in the hands of the enemy. They may use these areas for air bases. Decisive battles should be carried whenever and wherever the enemy attacks.

It was agreed that the terrain in the PHILIPPINES made decisive battles in other areas disadvantageous because it created an obstacle in the rapid movement of the required strength. However, because of the fact that the PHILIPPINES Operation was to be carried out chiefly by the air force, the possibility of success in other areas was also great. Insufficient time for preparation caused the Southern Area Army to doubt the successes in these other areas.

6. The 14th Area Army commander was relieved of his past in early October and was replaced by General HOBUN YAMASHITA. The morale of the officers and men in the PHILIPPINES was greatly increased, but it was deeply regretted that his appointment was too late.

7. In summary, the "Sho no. 1 Operation" had to be commenced immediately, even though rough preparations had not been completed.

Part III The Battle of LEYTE

The Outline of its Progress

1. On September 22, Imperial General Headquarters decided to commence the preparation for the "Sho no. 1 Operation" and simultaneously sent the 1st Division, the 30th Bomber Air Group and other units to the PHILIPPINES.

   On October 18, the Southern Area Army commander advised Imperial General Headquarters to put the "Sho no. 1 Operation" in action when it saw signs of enemy landings. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the execution of the "Sho no. 1 Operation" that very day.

   Hereupon, the Southern Area Army commenced the Battle for LEYTE.

2. Outline of the Progress of the Battle for LEYTE

   a. Ever since early October, enemy planes fiercely attacked and annihilated our air forces in the PHILIPPINES. Approximately 500 to 1,000 planes attacked daily.

2. Details of the operation in the decisive battle for LEYTE.

At that time, the 14th Area Army did not have the same ideas concerning the the execution of the decisive battle for LEYTE. Namely in view of the then situation on LUZON, a certain victory on LEYTE could not be expected by throwing in men and materials; and this was not adviseable because it would reduce the strength on LUZON.

On the other hand, the plan of the Grand Imperial Headquarters concerning the execution of the LEYTE Battle was made estremely strong. The Southern Army held the same opinion as the Grand Imperial Headquarters.

The General Army conducted the LEYTE operation strongly on the assumption that it was possible to carry out the planned reinforcement of the infantry groups on LUZON.

3. The 14th Area Army and the 4th Air Army pushed forward in the execution of the LEYTE battle with their entire strength.

At that time the 4th Air Army had about 50 to 70 usable planes. The 2nd Air Division advanced its command post to BACOLOD on the 19th. The 30th Fighter Group also quickly advanced to BACOLOD in order to attack the enemy warships and vessels in the LEYTE Area and controlled the movements of the enemy planes.

The strength of the enemy landing in the LEYTE area on October 20 was approximately 3 divisions.

On the 21st, the 35th Army Commander detached approximately 6 battalions from the VISAYA and MINDANAO sectors for diversionary activity. This unit had been arriving at "ORMOK" since the 27th. However, the hoped for destruction of the enemy landing convoy by our air force before the commencement of operations was not achieved due to the delay in receiving information, loss of an opportunity to concentrate its battle strength, and incliment weather. Therefore, the failure of the first phase of planned action against the enemy landing convoy was unavoidable.

The air force had been arriving from the southern area since October 22; but due to the long range maneuver, the display of battle strength did not come up to expectations. Moreover, on the 24th, there were not more than 147 planes, of those which had arrived, that could be used in groups of twos and threes.

The 4th Air Army commander advanced the command post to BACOLOD on the 23rd. On the 27th, the 14th Area Army Commander placed the 1st Division, the 36th Division, and the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade under the command of the 35th Army Commander and planned to throw them into the LEYTE area.

The 1st Division entered the port of MANILA safely on the 27th and the morale was extremely high.

On October 28, the Southern Army diverted a part of the Fighter Squadron from the 3rd Air Army with the aim of protecting the Infantry Group, 1st Division, in the decisive battle in the LEYTE area.

4. Prior to this, the Southern Army together with the 14th Area Army had examined the battle strength to be thrown into the LEYTE area; and on the 30th it was decided to throw in the following infantry groups:

The 1st Division
The 26th Division
The 68th Independent Mixed Brigade
The 2nd Independent Anti-Tank Gun Battalion
2 Tank Companies
2½ Battalions of the 30th Division
3 Battalions of the 102nd Division

The 1st Division under the protection of the 4th Air Army and the Navy Air Force departed from the port of MANILA on the 31st and arrived safely in "ORMOK" on November 1.

5. At that time, the 4th Air Army planned to attack enemy warships and vessels in the LEYTE Bay area and to hinder the use of the air base with its main body. The climax of the air battles was reached about the end of October.

The BACOLOD air bases due to poor weather, the use of a new type of plane (Type 4 fighters), and the lack of maintenance strength of the unit, greatly restricted the movements of the planes. Of the 317 planes on the airfields, there were only about 140 planes which could be used.

6. Colonel HATTORI, chief of the military operations section of the Grand Imperial Headquarters, who was in the PHILIPPINES at that time, reported on October 31 that, in his opinion, the 23rd Division must be dispatched to the PHILIPPINE Island area immediately and must be supplied with 300 landing crafts.

7. The Southern Army, in view of the participation of the land infantry group in the LEYTE area and the great losses in the air, reported on the 30th that one to two infantry groups and 800 planes must be sent by November 6. Furthermore, it reported to the Grand Imperial Headquarters, on November 3, that it must be supplied with 80 planes per day for some time in order to succeed in it s air operations; but it received the reply that this was almost impossible.

At present, the result of the decisive battle for Leyte depends on the concentration of the battle strength in depth on LEYTE and the prevention of the enemy from reinforcing his troops.

At that time, the enemy force landing in the LEYTE area was estimated to be five divisions. The enemy seemed to be planning an advance to the "ORMOK" plain from the "KARIGALA" area with a powerful unit.

The general observation at the end of October is as follows:

(a) The enemy planned to reinforce its own force if it discovered our own troop reinforcements. It was estimated that the enemy will push its construction of the airfield with five or six divisions.

(b) Although there may be a new plan for the MINDANAO area, there are no indications at the present time that such is the case.

(c) There is a fear of a war of attrition, as a result of changing to airbase destructive warfare from naval air warfare.

8. The 35th Army Headquarters advanced its Command Post to "ORMOK" on November 2.

The advance of the 1st Division to "KARIKALA" area became difficult as indicated by the situation.

The plan for throwing in the infantry groups selected for the LEYTE battle in the above situation was generally as follows:

The 26th Division departed from MANILA on the morning of the 6th and reached "ORMOK" on the evening of the 7th.

The 68th Independent Mixed Brigade departed from MANILA on the 8th and arrived in "ORMOK" from the 9th to the 11th.

The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade departed from MANILA on the 17th and arrived in "CATBALOGAN" on the 20th.

The 16th Division was in a valiant battle in the LEYTE area; but considerable disorder was brought about by the surprise enemy landing. The force under the control of the Division Commander on the 22nd was approximately 2500.

The greatest loss in any one regiment up to the 27th was 85%; and there were only 4 guns in that regiment.

9. Our combined fleet destroyed the U. S. fleet commanded by Admiral HALSEY which was attacking in the sea east of LEYTE. Under the plan to facilitate the execution of the decisive battle for LEYTE, the 1st Fleet from the SAN BERNADINO Straits, the 2nd Fleet from the "SURIGAO" Straits, and the 3rd Fleet (with carriers as a nucleus) from the sea east of LUZON Island, all advanced for the attack to the area east of LEYTE.

Our fleet eliminated persistent enemy air and submarine attacks before reaching the area east of LEYTE, arriving at the battle area on the morning of the 25th when it participated in the fierce battle.

At that time, the information reaching the Headquarters was considerably good and there was a report that the enemy fleet received a great damaging blow.

Note: This report was incorrect and the result of the battle was not necessarily great. However, our losses were great and the enemy mobile force in the area west of the PHILIPPINES was then able to move freely.

10. In view of the present situation in the LEYTE area, the Southern Army reported the following on November 4:

(a) Until the completion of the decisive battle of LEYTE (at the earliest, the middle of December), the supply planes will be advanced in order to preserve the 200 usable planes of that time.

(b) About 30 speed boats will be quickly supplied, besides advancing the 100,000 total tonnage of shipping by November 15.

(c) One strategical infantry group and the 23rd Division will be advanced and the LEYTE area should be strenthened by at least two picked and replenished infantry groups.

There were about 300 planes by the addition of the airplanes arriving in the PHILIPPINES by the end of October to the unit supply planes.

The 23rd Division was included in the order of battle of the 14th Area Army on November 5. It was to arrive in the PHILIPPINES on about November 25 or 26 and was to participate in the LEYTE battle.

11. The Southern Army had gradually exhausted the units of the 4th Air Army and it recognized the necessity of restoring the latter's battle strength as soon as possible.

The four fighter regiments (on November 2), and the two fighter regiments, two attack regiments, two each of light and heavy bomber regiments (on the 8th) were to restore their battle strength in JAPAN and were ordered to return to JAPAN.

On November 8, the Southern Army asked the reinforcement of the strength of the four fighter regiments by about November 20 in order to carry out the battle of LEYTE and the sending of the 200 requested planes (50 fighters of Type 4, 50 fighters of Type 1, and 100 others) by the 20th in order to restore the strength in that area.

On the 28th, the 1st Raiding Group was included in the order of battle of the 4th Air Army. At this time, the Southern Army estimated the enemy airbases used in connection with the PHILIPPINES Operation as the following (in the LEYTE Operation, the decisive battle was predicted to continue for a long period):

(a) The air strength on LEYTE Island was 300—500 planes. It was approximately 500 planes after the latter part of November.

(b) Approximately 700 planes on the 8 airfields on MOROTAI.

(c) Approximately 250 planes on "PELIEU".

(d) 7 to 8 airfields in the MARIANAS.

12. The Southern Army decided to transfer to SAIGON in order to direct the general operations. On November 13, the commander-in-chief summoned the Area Army commander and the air army commander and explained the following decision:

(a) The LEYTE battle will be carried on as before and the use of bases by the enemy will be ~~su~~ prevented at all times.

(b) The armaments on LUZON Island will be sufficiently strengthened so that it will not obstruct the execution of the LEYTE battle.

(c) Other areas will not be abandoned immediately.

The commander-in-chief departed from MANILA on the 17th and transferred to SAIGON.

13. There was a report that the U.S. 6th Army commander had arrived in "TAKUROBAN" on the 19th. At that time, the mobile unit at its advance base of URUSHI carried out a very skillful recurrent attack.

After the LEYTE landing, the ~~mem~~ number of planes which came to attack the PHILIPPINES up to November 20 was 7426 (including 4183 carrier planes).

14. The amount of men and supply on LEYTE Island about the end of November was 48,000 men; 600 horses and 210 vehicles; a continuous daily provision of 6,000 kiloliters was required.

During the same period, the supplying of war materials in the LEYTE area with small vessels became very difficult due to the activity of the enemy air force and torpedo boats.

During November, the percentage of the 26,600 men and 14,200 tons (includes 5000 tons for units) of munitions transported to and actually reaching LEYTE was 45%.

15. The battle strength of the 1st Division gradually decreased. As soon as the advance to the "TAKUROBAN" plains from the "KARIKARA" area became difficult, it decided to advance in the direction of "BULAUEN" with the 26th Division. With the very close support of the 14th Area Army and the 4th Air Army, it decided on a plan to recapture the "BULAUEN" airfield.

On December 3, it decided to start this operation on the 6th. It temporarily recaptured the "BULAUEN" airfield; but, due to the bad roads and weather, reinforcements and supply were cut off.

Moreover, due to the enemy counter-landing in the "ORMOK" area, this

operation was necessarily suspended. The Area Army planned to make a strong counter-landing in "KARIKARA" Bay with a part of the force. The date of this move was designated as December 16 and preparations were being made; but, in view of the general situation in the LEYTE area, the preparations were not completed and the move was not executed.

16. The special-attack unit arrived in stages in the PHILIPPINES since the early part of November and obtained excellent results against the enemy fleet in the LEYTE area; but it could not change the war situation. The enemy advanced its base to MINDORO in the early part of December, and our air operation became more and more restricted. Moreover, the arrival of supply planes was also interrupted. Since December our air force was forced into hiding.

17. In view of the war situation in the LEYTE area, the Southern Army dispatched Chief of Staff IIMURA to MANILA in the middle of December. He communicated with the Chief of Operations of the Grand Imperial Headquarters who was there at that time and who was responsible for the direction of the operations in the LEYTE area.

At that time the southern Army maintained its former minimum battle strength. If it could not obtain the control of the PHILIPPINES waters it concluded that the LEYTE operation would be unsuccessful. The enemy firmly established its basic position for capturing LUZON by capturing the VISAYAN sector air bases. After the complete interruption of our southern communications, the enemy would probably attack LUZON; and the Area Army estimated that the time of attack would be the middle of January. The Area Army concluded that the continuation of the LEYTE battle would be disadvantageous to subsequent operations and thus suspended it on November 14. The Area Army ordered the 35th Army to continue its resistance alone and the 30th Division Commander, under a chain of command, to resist alone in the MINDANAO area.

At that time, the Southern Army was strongly in favor of continuing the LEYTE battle; but the report after the return of Chief of Staff IIMURA made clear that the area army had already given up the idea of continuing the battle. The Area Army was then given charge of its own actions.

During this period, the 19th Division was sent to the PHILIPPINES. Furthermore, the 10th Division arrived in LUZON in the period from December 20 to the end of the month.

Paragraph 5 Situation in the BURMA Area

1. The BURMA Area Army fought desperately in the IMPHAL sector; but, since it encountered strong enemy resistance and difficulty in supply and replacement, it had to suspend the "IMPHAL" battle in July 1944.

The power of each unit decreased considerably; but their strength was quickly restored to prepare for the next phase of operations.

The BURMA Area Army was carrying out a withdrawal operation facing the the banks of the IRRAWADDY River. However, on September 19 the Southern

Army in the BURMA area firmly secured the important areas of southern BURMA and formed a strong point in the north wing of the southern arc. During this period it received orders from the Grand Imperial Headquarters to block communication with INDIA as much as possible. It also changed the duty of the BURMA AREA ARMY.

2. Subsequently the retreat by the 15th Army towards the bank of the IRRAWADDY River was able to avoid the enemy's rapid pursuit and was carried out rather smoothly. It was able to maintain the expected conditions of the end of 1944. The fighting strength of the group was greatly decreased due to the long period of operation; its effective strength was approximately one division of 4,000 men.

Therefore, the rapid recovery of the fighting strength was necessary. For that reason, the Southern Army first placed the 49th Division and the 53rd Division under the BURMA Area Army, and the same time, threw in replacements to restore to bring it up to fighting strength.

3. Situation in the various areas.

(a) In the northern BURMA sector, the 33rd Army was fighting vigorously against the superior enemy force and was trying to cut the communications between INDIA and CHINA; but the enemy has increased its forces. The 33rd Army at the end of the year, was holding NANKAN and MONMIT securely.

(b) In the northwest sector of BURMA, the 15th Army consolidated its position on the left bank of the IRRAWADDY River; but its fighting strength has been greatly reduced. Judging from the situation at that time, they were expected to be able to stop the rush of the enemy only temporarily.

(c) On the southwest coast, the 28th Army was fighting satisfactorily, and there was no important change.

4. The 3rd Air Force closely cooperated in the BURMA operation with its 5th Air Division and facilitated the operation by good fighting with a small force.

Paragraph 6 War Situation in the Areas of Northern AUSTRALIA and NEW GUINEA

1. The 18th Army was put under the command of the Southern Army in the middle of November, but since the early summer of 1944, supplies were completely cut off and so it tried to effectuate a strategic stalemate.

The Southern Army, fearing the interruption of communication between the 18th Army and itself, succeeded in transporting communication materials by air by taking advantage of the darkness of an October night.

2. The North Australia Area

(a) The Second Area Army, upon discovering the enemy landing on BIAK Island, endeavored to annihilate this force by any and all means, but in vain (details were previously stated). Furthermore, the Second Area Army planned the destruction of the enemy which had attacked MOROTAI and continued the operation on the island under considerable difficulties. However, the plan could not be accomplished due to the lack of ships. The 7th Air ~~Regiment~~ with a small force, cooperated in the operation several times and obtained excellent results.

In the early part of October, the Southern Army in order to complete the LEYTE operations and in view of the necessity of controlling the enemy air bases located on MOROTAI, transferred a part of the air unit which had been in PALEMBANG to blockade the movements of the enemy and took action to speed the decisive fight in the PHILIPPINES AREA.

(b) Accompanying the enemy attack on MOROTAI, the 2nd Area Army thought that enemy attack against HALMAHERA and the northern CELEBES area was approaching and transferred its command post to MAKASSAR to direct the general operations, as well as strengthening its preparations for the battle.

(c) Upon the enemy attack in the PHILIPPINES area, the 2nd Area Army captured the MAL airfield and prepared to attack SAN SAHORE with the purpose of obstructing and controlling the enemy's rear.

Paragraph 7 Situation in the Other Areas

1. Southwest Area

In the southwest area, furious preparations were being made to meet an enemy attack against the ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands and northern SUMATRA. This attack may be carried out in conjunction with the attack of the ANGLO-INDIAN troops in the BURMA area.

Furthermore, the Army was organizing the 94th Division to strengthen the war preparations in northern MALAYA, especially the cervical region. This was completed on October 14 and it was included in the battle order of the 29th Army.

2. Borneo Area

In the BORNEO area as previously stated, disposition for the change in distribution was carried out in order to take immediate action against the enemy's plan to penetrate thru the SULU Sea; and the west coast and northern BORNEO were strengthened.

Paragraph 1 Principles

The decisive battle of the PHILIPPINES was not carried out according to plan in which all combat was to be executed by staking everything the Army's could muster; and the situation of the Southern Army was greatly changed. It now requires further operating orders for the purpose of facilitating the Army's operation against the enemy who would advance to the area of JAPAN Proper.

The Southern Army received the following order from the Grand Imperial Headquarters at the end of January and drew up an operational plan.

The Gist of the Order

The commander-in-chief of the Southern Army will destroy the attacking enemy and securely hold the important sectors to check the enemy advance towards JAPAN Proper or CHINA and ease the operation of the whole army. The Summary of the order is as follows:

(1) In the PHILIPPINES area, the important points in LUZON must be held securely and it must endeavor to destroy the attacking enemy.

(2) The important sectors in INDOCHINA, THAILAND, MALAYA and SUMATRA should be held securely because these regions are the pivots of the southern area.

(3) In the areas other than those mentioned in the previous two items, the army, from the viewpoint of politics and strategy, must endeavor to hold securely the important areas, especially the districts containing important materials and important bases which the enemy is planning to recapture.

(4) The aggressive destruction of the enemy's fighting strength is planned for every place.

(5) It will menace and disrupt the supply lines in the enemy's rear as much as possible in the areas near the sea and the continent.

(6) The various plans are especially adaptable to the situations for stopping important sea communications.

(7) The Army will endeavor to carry out the various military administrative plans adaptable to the war situation, and will also publicize JAPAN's true intentions to the various South Sea Natives.

The Southern Army planned to send the important materials to the homeland by penetrating the communication route which it was cutting to the best of its ability as well as endeavoring to maintain the

security in the center of the important areas; but, due to the fierce counter-attack of the English-Indian Army towards the BURMA area after April, the important areas of central and southern BURMA fell into enemy hands.

Paragraph 2 Drafting of the Operational Plans Accompanying the Failure in the Decisive Battle of the PHILIPPINES

As soon as the no. 1 operation failed in the end of 1944, the Southern Army began to map out the operational plan for the first half of 1945.

At that time, there was as yet no change in duty for the Southern Army by the Grand Imperial Headquarters. Therefore, the Southern Army drew up a draft of the operation plan during the middle of January 1945, based on the following estimate of the situation. The Chief of Staff NUMADA was ordered to present a report in TOKYO at the end of January.

Lt. General NUMADA received the Grand Imperial Headquarters Order and returned to SAIGON at the beginning of February. In the middle of February, he called a meeting of the chiefs of staff and secretly explained the outline of the operational plan as well as issuing the necessary orders.

On February 5, the 10th Area Fleet and the 4th Southern Task Force were placed under the commander-in-chief of the Southern Army. Therefore, the long pending problem of a unified command of the Army and Navy was finally effectuated.

Notes: Summary of the estimate of the situation by the Southern Army

1. Summary of the general estimate of situation

(a) In the eastern frontal area, the U. S. Army planned the mopping up of the entire PHILIPPINE Islands, in view of the island's political and strategical value, to make it the subsequent base of operations. After this, it was not known that the U. S. forces would advance to TAIWAN and the South Seas Islands to plan for the attack of JAPAN Proper or capture a base towards CHINA, or if they would land on the southeast coast of CHINA or the eastern coast of French INDO-CHINA, especially HAINAN Island in a decisive move for the maintenance of communication with CHINA. However, the date of the operation was estimated to be after the spring of 1944.

In regards to the plan for the cooperation in the capture of SINGAPORE with the BRITISH Army by the U. S. Army which advanced to the SINGAPORE area from BORNEO, it was thought that they would not adopt such a plan from the standpoint of English policy; and the English forces would help only in the BORNEO area with the AUSTRALIAN force.

(b) In the eastern frontal area, the BRITISH-INDIAN Army after our defeat in the IMPHAL operations successively advanced southward and planned for the capture of southern BURMA.

Although the fighting strength had decreased considerably and the BURMA Area Army had generally completed the adjustment of its positions on the banks of the IRRAWADDY River by the end of 1944, it was thought possible to hold this line securely till the rainy season if this fighting strength was quickly increased.

However, it was estimated that the time for the breaking of the southern circle after the capture of ANDAMAN, NIKOVAL, and the cervical region of MALAY would be after June.

It was extremely desirable to map up the CHINA area as quickly as possible, since there was great fear that the Greater East Asia defense circle would be cut in the north and south if the PHILLIPPINE Islands were captured. Especially the cutting of the communications with the homeland during the enemy's advance to the CHINA area would be inimical to the safety of the Southern Army. The Grand Imperial Headquarters planned on the mutual cooperation between the CHINA Task force and the Southern Army to carry out the operation toward the KUMMING and CHUNGKING areas. Moreover, since there was a great significance in this operation to delay the enemy's attack on the homeland, the Southern Army regarded this as important and also studied it carefully.

(c) The Southern Army, basing its action on the above estimation, quickly strengthened its positions on the INDO-CHINA Peninsula as well as quickly strengthening the positions in the cervical region of MALAY on the western front. The southern Army estimated that there was a necessity for facilitating the operation of the entire Army by checking the advance of the enemy towards CHINA or the homeland by destroying the attacking enemy.

It was not expected that the Southern Army would be able to completely hold the entire southern circle by itself if the PHILIPPINES were captured. The Southern Army reached the decision that it was very important to hold SINGAPORE, SAIGON, BANGKOK, and HANOI, and the supply points connecting these areas.

2. Estimate of the Situation in Each Area

(a) The PHILIPPINES area

In the LUZON area, it was hoped that the battle would be carried out to the very last man and that as many of the enemy as possible would be killed; because in the situation, we expected the rapid increase in enemy strength and also increasing difficulties in air operations and troop replacement.

(b) The BURMA area

The BURMA Area Army, since the suspension of the IMPHAL operation in July of the previous year, had taken steps toward a new disposition which progressed smoothly; and it was able to hold the expected positions securely at the end of 1944. However, the strength of the infantry group has been greatly reduced by the long period of operations. In the 15th Army, the effective strength of a division was approximately 4,000 men.

Moreover, the strength was greatly reduced by the transfer of the 2nd Division in order to strengthen the defense preparations on the INDO-CHINA peninsula. However, if the strength had been increased and adjusted, the firm hold on the bank of the IRRAWADDY River till the beginning of the rainy season would have been possible.

Situation in each area of BURMA

A. In the northern front, the 33rd Army was fighting bravely against a very superior enemy; but the cutting off of the INDIA-BURMA route had ~~been~~ become very difficult, and the only hope was the hindrance of transportation.

B. In the northwestern front, the 15th Army had transferred to the vicinity of MANDALAY; and the left bank of the IRRAWADDY River with its main force; but its strength had been greatly reduced. In view of the situation, its strength was limited, to temporarily checking the enemy rush. When the strength was increased and restored, it was expected to securely hold the line at the beginning of the rainy season.

C. In the southwestern coast area the 28th Army was fighting satisfactorily; and there no obstruction was expected in carrying out the next plan of operations.

3. North AUSTRALIA and NEW GUINEA Areas

There was a necessity of strategically assigning a permanent duty to the north AUSTRALIA sector, which did not have to be commanded during the height of the PHILIPPINES operation.

There was expected to be no immediate enemy attack in the North AUSTRALIA area, JAVA and the LESSER SUNDA Archipelago; and it was thought very appropriate to immediately transfer this strength to the central sector in the southern circle.

4. The BORNEO Area

In regards to the enemy plan to break through from the SULU sea area, the policy was to firmly hold the important areas of North BORNEO; but in view of the change in the war situation in the PHILIPPINES area, it was necessary to limit the areas to be held to the sector surrounding BRUNEI in western BORNEO and to the southern BORNEO sector. However, the change in disposition of the Infantry groups would take considerable time, and there would be many difficulties in transporting,

guarding, moving on land. If the enemy attack towards SINGAPORE were rapid, there would be a great probability that they would take advantage of our incompleted change in disposition.

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5. The INDIAN Ocean Area

In preparation for the enemy attack, the defenses on ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands and the northern SUMATRA sector were generally completed, but the main force of the 4th Division had been recently transferred to the FRENCH INDO-CHINA peninsula from SUMATRA; and the strength was probably unintentionally weakened.

There was a necessity of immediately strengthening the defenses in the cervical area of the MALAYS; since it was estimated that the enemy would make a decisive counter-attack on MALAYA by crossing the INDIAN Ocean or from the BURMA area.

6. The FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area

FRENCH INDO-CHINA was the eastern defense wall since the loss of the PHILIPPINES; and its operational value had greatly increased as a base of operations, since it faces the CHINA area. Therefore it had become necessary to strengthen the preparations for battle.

7. The THAILAND Area

In connection with the change in the situation, especially the change in the BURMA battle lines due to the enemy attacks in the FRENCH INDO-CHINA area and the MALAY area (cervical region), it had become most important to improve the cooperation between THAILAND and JAPAN. For that reason, it was necessary to strengthen the vicinity of BANGKOK as the pivot of the INDO-CHINA peninsula.

8. The 3rd Air Army

The strength of the 3rd Air Army had greatly decreased since the main force of the Fighter Unit had been transferred to the PHILIPPINE Islands, for the recent V operations took over its various missions with a very small force; in addition, it had to complete the important duties of training essential air personnel for the whole National Army.

Accompanying the gradual destruction of the 4th Air Army in the PHILIPPINES area, its operational area was extended; and it had to do its utmost to send raw materials back to the homeland.

Air operations were thereafter limited to very important and indispensable missions. Therefore the land unit encountered difficulties from lack of air support; and could expect only to carry out land operations without the cooperation of the air force.

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Paragraph 3 War Situation in the PHILIPPINES Area

1. The 14th Area Army ordered the 35th Army to carry out stalemate resistance by itself after the decisive battle for LEYTE. It also sent troops to obstruct the enemy's plans by holding the airbases of BACOLOD, CAGAYAN, and DAVAO in the central and southern PHILIPPINES. Its headquarters was moved to BAGIO on December 25, and the PHILIPPINE Government also moved to BAGIO on the same day.

   The Area Army resisted as long as possible by exploiting the terrain in the LUZON sector, since the complete hold on the MANILA and CLARK sector would have been difficult against the superior enemy. It tried to facilitate the general operation of the National Army by restricting the actions of as many of the enemy as possible.

   After the suspension of the LEYTE operation, the Southern Army on Jan. 1, 1945 placed the 4th Air Army under the command of the 14th Area Army Commander, because it would have been disadvantageous to ahve separate commanders using our strength for the LUZON operation.

   The Area Army Commander moved the Air Army to ECHAK on January 7.

2. The enemy landed on LINGAYEN BAY ON January 9.

   The 4th Air Army attacked the enemy warships and vessels between the 10th and the 14th with its entire LUZON air strength.

   The enemy started using the LINGAYEN airfield on the 15th. The 14th Area Army estimated that the enemy would suddenly advance to the CLARK area in a decisive move by penetrating our positions with reinforcement after first capturing bridgeheads in SAN FABIAN with its main body and in LINGAYEN and the western sector with another party.

   The Southern Army several times ordered the 14th Area Army to block this plan by destroying the enemy on the beach, taking advantage of his uncompleted bridgehead.

   The Grand Imperial Headquarters also directed this operation. The Area Army made preparations to carry it out, but due to the total air supremacy and the superior armored force of the enemy, its large-scale execution was difficult.

3. Furthermore, the 14th Area Army endeavored to carry out the plan for restricting and controlling the U. S. Army over a long period by trying every possible means to destroy and decrease the enemy strength and by securely maintaining the sector surrounding BAGIO WITH its main body (the 10th, 19th, and 23rd Divisions and the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade), sector west of CLARK (with 30,000 men commanded by the Raiding Group commander, and the sector east of MANILA (with the 8th Division) with parts of the unit.

Munitions are extremely important for the execution of an operation. Although it was planned to transfer the munitions depot from the MANILA sector to the northern LUZON sector immediately after the battle of LEYTE, it became increasingly difficult after the enemy landing on LINGAYEN on January 9.

The designated plan was only half completed. In order to increase its strength, the Southern Army frantically tried getting supplies by means of ships and air transportation; but this was almost impossible because of enemy air and submarine operations.

4. It was estimated that the enemy strength landed at the end of January was 8 divisions in the LINGAYEN area and 2 divisions in the frontal area of SUBIC Bay. The enemy planes sent to the PHILIPPINE Islands area were estimated to number 800 to 900.

A part of the enemy which landed in the LINGAYEN area penetrated to the MANILA area and entered one section on February 3. The enemy strength in the LINGAYEN area increased to 13 divisions by February 6. In the MANILA area, it captured the city of MANILA and crossed the PASIG River.

The Area Army then decided to conduct guerilla operations by firmly maintaining three strong points. Its general activities at the end of January were confined to raiding and infiltration operations with a small force. It decided to strengthen these within the middle of February. At the same time, the 14th Area Army estimates the enemy situation in the PHILIPPINES area as follows:

> In early March, the enemy strength used in attacking the strong points in Eastern MANILA were 6-7 divisions; 2 divisions attacking the strong point west of CLARK and 5-6 divisions in the capture of LUZON. The capture of northern LUZON was coordinated with the landing in the APARI area. It was thought that the enemy would use a Paratroop Unit in ECHAKE. The losses of the land unit in the LUZON area up to the end of February were as follows:

Killed and wounded	12591
Larger guns than the rapid firing gun	140
All kinds of tanks and vehicles	750

5. In the LEYTE area, the 35th Army decided on a plan to fight by itself and to minimize the enemy action byy guerilla warfare in the sector west of LEYTE and in the VISAYA sector. It disposed all units for diversion but it was estimated that this would require 3 months.

In the same area, the strength under the control of the army commander was approximately 15,000 at the end of January. The Army Headquarters arrived at TAHOGON on CEBU Island on March 18 and then moved to MINDANAO on April 11.

6. After its transfer to ECHAKE, the 4th Air ARmy found it increasingly difficult to conduct air operations. Its air strength was very small when MANILA and CLARK fell into enemy hands. The air force changed to land operations as well as transferring to TAIWAN for subsequent operations and for the recovery of its strength. There were about 80 planes and 120 men arriving in TAIWAN on February 11.

In view of this situation of the 4th Air Army, an order for the return of the 4th Air Army Headquarters was issued at the end of February. The 2nd and the 7th Air division were placed under the command of the 3rd Air Army and the 4th Air Division, under the command of the 14th Area Army. The air force was transferred to the homeland and other areas, mainly for the next phase of operations.

The 2nd Air Division was mainly responsible for strengthening the position of land defense in BACOLOD; but the Southern Army reported to the Grand Imperial Headquarters that the division must be transferred to strengthen FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The Grand Imperial Headquarters did not approve.

The 3rd Air Army issued an order to the division to return during the division's transfer to SINGAPORE in accordance with the change in command to the 3rd Air Army.

7. In March, the situation in each area became extremely fierce, especially in the strong point east of MANILA. The 41st Army was newly organized on March 30 by uniting the 8th Division and ~~took~~ other units in the same area.

In April, the losses of the 1st line were great. Moreover our strength decreased daily due only to difficulty in supply and to the increased activity of bandits.

The Area Army Headquarters was transferred to BAMBAN on April 19, and the command post was transferred to GYAGAN after May 16.

Liaison with the PHILIPPINE Island increased after the middle of June.

8. The enemy attacking the MINDANAO area was about 3 Divisions. It advanced to DAVAO.

Paragraph 4 The situation in the BURMA Area

1. In the northwestern sector of BURMA, the 15th Army planned to recover its fighting strength and prepared for the next phase of operations. However, the enemy stormed to the vicinity of MANDALAY and the IRRAWADDY River bank.

Therefore, the area army opened the IRRAWADDY campaign on January 17 and planned to destroy the enemy who was attacking in various places.

The Area Army placed the 53rd Division under the command of the 15th Army to increase the strength in that area.

In the middle of February, the enemy strength was 6 Divisions. The army fought valiantly to destroy the enemy by taking advantage of the enemy river crossing from the MINBU area.

2. In the northern BURMA sector, the 33rd Army counter-attacked the superior enemy who was penetrating at various places. It always gained successful results; but in the middle of February, the enemy expeditionary force was increased to 11 divisions. The 56th Division advanced to LASHIO with its main body and the 18th Division destroyed about 1 brigade after the fierce battle in the "MIYTSON" vicinity.

3. In the southwest coastal area, a part of the enemy force started landing at AKYAB on December 31 of last year and on RAMREE Island on January 21.

The 28th Army turned back the sharp attack of the enemy by fierce fighting in various places.

4. During this period, the 5th Air Division cooperated in the operations of each area several times with a small force. It obtained especially great results in the attacks against enemy convoys in the AKYAB-RAMREE Island area.

5. The southern Army sent the 2nd Division from the BURMA area in order to strengthen the positions on the INDO-CHINA Peninsula at the end of January; but in view of the situation in the MANDALAY area, the withdrawal of units other than one regiment and the division Headquarters were unavoidably delayed.

6. In March, the enemy on the bank of the IRRAWADDY River suddenly became active; and when it became obvious that the enemy would advance southward across the river, the BURMA area army decided to annihilate them on the bank of the IRRAWADDY River by a sudden move. Therefore, with the cooperation of the three armies, it carried out the "basin operation". At the end of March, a meeting of all chiefs-of-staff was held at MEKTICA; and the plan of the Area Army was presented.

Lt. Gen. NUMATA, the chief of staff who had attended the meeting, returned to SAIGON and reported that the fighting spirit of the area army was high and that they were certain of victory. That is, one division of the 33rd Army was ordered to cover the rear flank against the enemy crossing from the sector north of MANDALAY. The main body of the 15th Army was attacking the enemy from the rear by aggressively crossing the river from the direction of MANDALAY. During this period, the entire strength of the 28th Army was cooperating in the attack of the main body from the direction of "ENANJONG".

Although each army was steadily preparing for the major engagement, we could not open this engagement since the powerful enemy armored force which had advanced to MEKTILA at the beginning of ~~April~~ Feb by crossing the IRRAWADDY River was pressing the rear of the maind body of the Area Army.

7. The Area Army subsequently planned to destroy the enemy advancing in the direction of MEKTILA; but it could not destroy the enemy which relied upon supply from the air. It finally retreated and readjusted its battle lines.

Prior to this, on March 23, the strength of the National Army of BURMA was 8000. At that time, a part of the force was required to quell uprisings in various places.

In view of thesituation in the INDO-CHINA Peninsula and the MALAY area, the Southern Army changed the duty of the BURMA area army on April 7. The holding of the important areas surroungind RANGOON, TOUNGOO, and ROICO was assigned to it.

8. The enemy which was advancing towards MANDALAY and MEKTILA planned to advance southward along the MANDALAY highway and press on towards RANGOON in a decisive action.

The Area Army in order to facilitate the adjusting of battle lines of the main body and to check the enemy advance, ordered the 49th Division and other forces withdrawn from the 28th Army area to advance northward to deal with the situation; but it could not check the enemy advance. The ENANJONG oil fields area fell into enemy hands on April 22.

The 105th Brigade in RANGOON quickly advanced northward towards PEGU and prepared for the enemy advance southward. A part of the enemy made a surprise landing on the mouth of the RANGOON River on May 2 and finally captured RANGOON on the 3rd. At that time, there was no unit stationed in RANGOON to defend it; and the Area Army headquarters moved to MOULMEIN on the 2nd.

Therefore the Area Army decided to concentrate the main force in the sector west of the SITTANG River which extends from the vicinity of MOULMEIN to the vicinity of SITTANG. It disposed the troops accordingly. The effective strength of the BURMA area army around the end of October was about as follows:

15th Army	9000 men	13 cannons
33rd Army	3900 men	3 cannons
28th Army	16000 men	40 cannons
Ammunition	for ½ of a battle	
Rations	for 2 months	
Fuel	for 1 month	
Medical Supplies	for 1 month	

Paragraph 5 Situation in the Northern AUSTRALIA and NEW GUINEA Area

1. In the NEW GUINEA Area, a part of the enemy carried out a strong landing at "BUTSU" on March 17; and the 20th Division fiercely battled the enemy.

The northern AUSTRALIA area was then strategically a stalemate zone. The forces were to be withdrawn as much as possible and the positions in the vicinity of SINGAPORE be strengthened; at the same time, the immediate necessity of reorganizing the command system of the north AUSTRALIAN area had increased. These points were studied.

(1) Withdrawal of forces in the North Australia area.

In order to strengthen the positions in the SINGAPORE area, it was decided that a large force would be withdrawn and transferred from the North AUSTRALIA area. The plan was formulated in March, and the necessary orders were issued.

Approximately 21,000 men were to be withdrawn by the end of 1945.

For this purpose, the army-navy units in the CERAM sector and the CELEBES air sector unit were given first priority in view of the supply situation and the degree of preparedness. Meanwhile, the units in the "ARU", KAI, and TANIMBAR areas were to be concentrated in the CERAM sector at the first opportunity, and be subsequently transferred to the JAVA area.

Although this plan was carried out with the cooperation of the Army and Navy, when opportunities presented themselves, and satisfactory results were obtained, it could not be carried out as planned due to the unrestricted activities of enemy planes and submarines.

2. Reorganization of the command system in the NORTH AUSTRALIA Area

A reorganization in the command system was necessary due to the change in the operational positions in the North AUSTRALIA area. A study was made of the plan making JAVA the center of the ~~central~~ BORNEO and North AUSTRALIA area, by transferring the 2nd Area Army to JAVA and leaving one army in North AUSTRALIA; but this was abandoned in view of the relationship with the past command. It was suitable to return BORNEO to the 7th Area Army, since it was part of the defense circle with SINGAPORE as the center. There would be only one army in North AUSTRALIA and the others were to be returned.

The 2nd Army headquarters was first transferred to AMBON from KOCAS, and the 19th Army Headquarters was returned at the end of February. The 2nd Army was again transferred to MAKASSAR and the 2nd Area Army Headquarters was returned.

In connection with the above, the 48th Division was placed under the command of the 7th Area Army on May 31; and its operational zone was included in that of the area army.

Paragraph 6 Situation in the BORNEO Area

1. In the BORNEO area, as mentioned previously, its change in disposition was being rushed; but it was not progressing as expected. Moreover,

it was extremely difficult to carry heavy weapons over the bad road. The situation was such that many of the weapons had to be left in that area. Therefore, the strength also decreased considerably with the change in disposition.

2. In April, the activity of the AUSTRALIAN Army was shown, and a part of the enemy landed at TARAKAN on April 30. The enemy plan to recapture SINGAPORE by the the capture of the important area of BORNEO became more clear.

Paragraph 7 Situation in the Southwest Area

1. The SINGAPORE area had been weak in strength and lacked supplies, especially rations. Therefore it was necessary to construct positions to prepare for the enemy plan to cut the southern circle into north and south, by immediately throwing in the necessary force and rations.

2. The 46th Division was transferred from the north AUSTRALIA area in January to strengthen the positions in the sector surrounding SINGAPORE. The Area Army also withdrew a part of the force from the SUMATRA sector primarily to strengthen the positions around SINGAPORE Island.

   In the middle of April, the SINGAPORE defense unit was organized; and the positions on the island were strengthened.

   Furthermore, the Southern Army after further control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA by military forces, sent the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade to MALAYA and placed it under the command of the 7th Area Army commander.

3. The Area Army then planned to reinforce the preprations on SINGAPORE Island by mustering the Japanese in that area and the personnel withdrawn from the North AUSTRALIA area. In May, it planned to transfer a force (about 2 Battalions) from ANDAMAN and NICOBAR with naval ships with the close cooperation of the Navy and the Air Force; but this action was detected by the enemy, and the cruisers--ASHIGARA and HAGURO were lost. Thus, the plan ended in failure.

Paragraph 8 Situation in the THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA area

1. The operational position in the THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA sector had rapidly improved since the failure of the V no. 1 operation. The Southern Army since November of the previous year had carried out many studies on the preparations for the control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA by military forces to prepare for any unexpected move.

2. In the middle of January, the Southern Army diverted the 2nd and the 4th Divisions from BURMA and SUMATRA to THAILAND to reinforce the positions on the INDO-CHINA peninsula and also to strengthen the forces for control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA by military forces which had been predicted as a result of the present situation. The 2nd Division was then

transferred to FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

The Grand Imperial Headquarters ordered the 37th Division and then the 22nd Division to advance to the North FRENCH INDO-CHINA from the CHINA area at the end of January. They arrived separately by the end of February. The preparation for the military control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA was progressing steadily.

3. An order concerning the military control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA was issued on February 28 when it was expected that the enemy attack was approaching. The Southern Army assumed this control on March 9, and it was carried out very smoothly.

The objective in the first phase was achieved on March 10 in Central and Southern FRENCH INDO-CHINA. In the northern sector, the enemy defended a part of a fortification, but this was finally captured.

During this period, there was no special change in THAILAND.

4. The military control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA generally completed the campaign by the middle of May, but the situation in the BURMA area was rapidly growing worse; so that at the end of April, the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade was diverted to MALAY, the 22nd Division from the North FRENCH INDO-CHINA sector to BANGKOK, and the 37th Division immediately to BANGKOK.

The 39th Army decided to transfer the 4th Division to the North THAILAND sector, because of this situation.

Note: The increase of preparations on the INDO-CHINA Peninsula.

The war preparations on the INDO-CHINA peninsula had been diligently speeded up, since the beginning of the year; and the military control of FRENCH INDO-CHINA which was started on March 9 was ~~started~~ progressing smoothly. However, due to the BURMA operation and the transportation of important materials to the homeland, preparation did not progress as planned. THAILAND has natural features which enabled it to be used as a rear base for the BURMA area; but the war preparations were not begun.

Therefore it was necessary to send the forces of the FRENCH INDO-CHINA sector to the THAILAND sector and the unit which has been weakened was transferred to THAILAND to recover its strength.

That is, the 37th Division was immediately ordered to concentrate in BANGKOK. The 22nd Division was placed under the command of of the 39th Army in May; and then the 15th Army Headquarters and the 15th Division were transferred from the BURMA area and placed under the command of the 39th Army in June. A plan had to be formed to strengthen the positions in the vicinity of BANGKOK and in the North THAILAND sector.

Paragraph 9 Sending Important Materials to the Homeland.

On January 20, 1944 the Southern Army received the Grand Imperial Headquarters instruction concerning fuel and the fastest methods of transportation of important materials.

The commander-in-chief of the Southern Army strengthened the transport guard with 3 fighter regiments and an Air Training Unit.

Number one priority was given to aviation gasoline among the resources which were sent to the homeland. It was planned to send 120,000 kiloliters to JAPAN during January and February. The Southern Army earnestly endeavored to fulfill this quota; but due to the great losses in shipping from increased enemy air and submarine activity, only about half of this total was transported.

CHAPTER 7 The Sustained operation between the period of June 1945 to the conclusion of the war

Paragraph 1 Revision of the operational plan of the Southern Army after the capture of BURMA

1. Plan

In the past, BURMA had been regarded as the north wing strong point in the defense of the southern circle. Especially, after the failure of the V operation, its position had improved considerably for the preservation of the organic connection between the north and the south in the southern circle.

Consequently, the capture of BURMA seriously affected the subsequent tactical command of the Southern Army. It now lost the position of being the north wing strong point in the Southern circle and was changed to become the advance point of the INDO-CHINA peninsula.

The Southern Army then decided on the operational plan for the final half of 1945. A meeting of all chiefs of staff of the Area Armies was called in the latter part of May. The outline of the operational plan was shown and the necessary orders were issued.

In view of the prospects of the future operation as well as the drafting of the operational plans, the Southern Army decided on the operational (battle) regulations with an eye to the total enemy air supremacy and superior armored force. This was made the basis for training operations, and combat. Furthermore, it drew up and presented the plan to gradually rebuild the disorganized forces for fierce operations in all the former areas.

2. Estimate of the situation

(a) In the eastern frontal area the enemy attacked the OKINAWA area on April 1. It became more clear that the main attack of the enemy was towards the east coastal area of CHINA or to JAPAN IN

in a decisive move. The enemy was trying to cut off communications between JAPAN AND THE southern circle. Consequently, the operation towards the interior of CHINA to cooperate with the CHINA expeditionary force whose preparations were being studied by the Southern Army was abandoned. The southern army had to quickly complete its preparations for sustained resistance by its own actions only.

(b) In the BORNEO area, the strategic regions of Northern BORNEO all fill into the hand of the AUSTRALIAN Army. The plan to recapture SINGAPORE by the cooperation of ENGLISH-INDIAN and AUSTRALIAN troops became clearer. It was estimated that the time would be after early autumn of that year.

(c) In the west frontal area, the position of the area army completely collapsed after the capture of RANGOON in the early part of May. It was thought that the ENGLISH-INDIAN army would attack towards the cervical region of MALAYA and that the penetration of the THAILAND area would take place shortly.

(d) The transfer of men from the EUROPEAN Area after the collapse of GERMANY on May 1945 was expected to take place, and the enemy air force was being reinforced in the INDIA area.

(e) Based on the above estimation, the Southern Army strengthened its positions in the INDO-CHINA Peninsula and the strategical area surrounding SINGAPORE in order to destroy the attacking enemy; and, since this contributed to the general operation of our armies, it was made the basic of tactical command.

Paragraph 2. Situation in the INDO-CHINA Peninsula (Including BURMA) area.

1. In view of the general situation the southern army advanced its command post to DALOT on 5 June, as well as predicting future changes. PAKUSE was made a permanent command post location, and necessary preparations were pushed forward.

2. In view of the situation in the BURMA area, it was decided to reorganize the command system of the BURMA area army and the 39th army; and this decision was reported.

Note:

Details of the Reorganization of the command system in BURMA and THILAND.

The BURMA area army and the 39th army had previously had a very close connection. A study had been made since the beginning of the year on the reorganization of the command system. The plan gave the BURMA area army, which had lost the position of an area army after its collapse as the BURMA area army, the command of the 39th army. It was thought appropriate to reorganize the 39th army into the area army and have one army in the BURMA AREA as the advance guard in the THAILAND defense. Therefore the southern army issued the order on 7 July.

3. In the BURMA area, the concentration of the main force east of the SITTANG River was almost completed by the middle of June; but the 28th army was still fighting desperately by itself in enemy territory in the northern sector of RANGOON. At that time, because of the situation in the MALAY area, the southern army had charge of the area army, which was studying the operation to recapture RANGOON; but the 28th army gradually became short of rations.

The SITTANG River flooded when the rainy season set in and the river basin became a sea of mud. So operation was finally suspended, consequently, the area army concentrated the main body of the 28th army to the east of the SITTANG River and strengthened the position surrounding MOULMEIN in order to take up its task of being the vanguard in the defense of THAILAND, it also planned the SITTANG Battle.

The main body of the 33rd army crossed the SITTANG River south of SITTANG and occupied as many of the enemy as possible. During this period, the 28th army was ordered to cross the SITTANG River north of SITTANG and move to the sector east of the river. The date was set for 20 July.

4. The Southern army then decided to strengthen the positions in the MALAY-THAILAND, and FRENCH-INDO-CHINA areas by restoring the strength of an infantry group withdrawn from the BURMA area. In June the 56th Division was put under the command of the 39th army and the 55th Division, under the 38th army. In August, the 31st Division was put under the command of the 7th area army; and the 33rd Division, under the 18th area army.

Prior to this in June, the Grand Imperial Headquarters , the Southern Army and the 39th army did not agree on the means of using the 37th Division; but, in the middle of July was decided to transfer the division to MALAYA.
Note:
Details on the transfef of the 37th Division to MALAY. In view of the situation in the BURMA area after the adoption of military control of FRENCH-INDO-CHINA, the southern army planned to transfer the 37th in April to reinforce the positions in the cervical region of MALAYA. It was immediately transferred to BANGKOK and placed under the command of the 39th army.

In May, as the BURMA situation became critical, the problem arose as to whether the 37th Division should be stationed in THAILAND or to plan to recapture RANGOON by throwing the force into the BURMA area, or to sufficiently strengthen the MALAY positions, at that time the leading eche on of the 37th Division had arrived and was responsible for the strengthening of defenses surrounding BANGKOK; the rear echelon was still in Northern FRENCH-INDO-CHINA. In the southern sector of BANGKOK, transportation was at a standstill due to the shipping of rations to MALAYA and the transportation of the 70th Ind. Mixed Brigade to southern MALAY, as well as to the bombing and dammage by flood.

The 39th Army reported several time on the stationing of the 37th division in THAILAND. The Grand Imperial Headquarters also considered this; but in July after a careful examination, the southern army appointed the leading echelon to undertake the strengthening of defenses in the vicinity of BANGKOK, while under the command of the 39 army. Meanchile, the main body which was waiting for the arrival of the 22nd Division was to be transferred to northern MALAYA and to come under the command of the 7th area army. Its arrival in MALAYA was scheduled for about the end of August.

5. At the end of June, a staff officer was despatched from the Grand Imperial Headquarters. Confidential talks were carried out about the operational plan of the southern army and other important matters. At the end of July, Assistant Chief of Staff WACHI was dispatched to TOKYO in response to an order of the Grand Imperial Headquarters. He reported on the situation of the southern

army as well as important matters concerned with the operation. In particular liaison was ob tained, as well as a definite plan concerning the independence of the JAVA and SUMATRA AREAS and the reorganization of the positions. On 4 August the necessary order was issued but the war came to an end without its being carried out.

Paragraph 3 War Situation in the PHILIPPINE AREA.

Communication with the 14th area army was cut in the middle of June. The area army headquarters seemed to have transferred to FANDAN on 25 June.

Paragraph 4 Situation in the BORNEO AREA.

On 8 June, a part of the AUSTRALIAN ARMY landed at LABUAW Island and then at BALIK PAPAN on 1 July with approximately 5000 men. The 37th army close by cooperated with the army and navy; but it could not display any effective strength in its actions. The enemy air base in the BORNEO area was completed. Strict security was then required against the attack towards SINGAPORE.

Paragraph 5 Situation in the other areas.

1. In the North AUSTRALIAN area, the speedier withdrawal of troops was required; and the plan of withdrawing troops was changed in July. The area in which the withdrawal could be made easily was first decided, and the immediate reinforcement of the SINGAPORE area was planned.

2. The preparations on SINGAPORE Island became more urgent; artillery forces were transferred from the SUMATRA and JAVA areas for the reorganization of a division of the SINGAPORE defense unit.

Paragraph 6 The situation of the 3rd Air Army.

After the decisive battle of the PHILIPPINES, the 3rd Air Army was fighting heroicaly performing several duties at the same time. However, at the end of June, it received the order that its main body must be transferred to the TAIWAN area. It had been decided that 5 fighter regiments, 2 Ind. Companies, 1 light bomber regiment and 3 heavy bomber regiments would be withdrawn and transferred.

2. Conforming to the above mentioned order, the FORMOSAN army, the CHINA Expeditionary Force and the southern army completed their transfer with comparitively light losses.

3. Furthermore, the air strength of the southern army was greatly weakened; and any operation needing air support was not desirable.

Paragraph 7 Termination of the War.

The southern army conquered all difficulties in the forth of certain victory in the decisive battle of the homeland. The commander in Chief and his subordinate pressed the completion of the preparations for the defense of the homeland by strengthening the defenses on the INDO-CHINA peninsula and the strategic areas surrounding SINGAPORE. Then, it suddenly received an order on the termination of the war. All officers and men suspended their combat operations.

The situation at the end of the war and immediately afterward was generally as follows:

1. The southern army received reports about the Empire's ending of the war from about 10 August; but was not known whether it was true or not. In addition reports concerning the army were conflicting. However, on the 15th, the Imperial Rescript on the ending of the war was received. The commander in chief invited the 7th area army commander, the 3rd air army commander, the commander in chief of the 10th area Fleet and Chief of Staffs of each unit which were under the direct command of the General Headquarters at DARLOT. He stated that the southern army should receive the Imperial Rescript respectfully and should comply with His Majesty's wishes. He made the necessary arrangements to suspend operations. However, in the area engaged in battle, the situation was not easily controlled. Due to the necessity of negotiation to suspend operations in each sector, the southern army ordered on 22 August that each unit in each sector could negotiate with the frontal enemy concerning the steps.

2. The southern army, on 24 August, managed to place the 38th army north of Lat. 16 N. and the 14th area army under the direct command of the Commander in Chief of the CHINA Expeditionary Force and the Grand Imperial Headquarters.

On the 30th, the 18th Army was excluded from the Southern army battle order of the 8th area army.

3. On 21 August, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces demanded that immediate steps for surrender should be taken. He requested an interview with a plenipotentiary delegate on 23 August at RANGOON. The southern army delegate Chief of Staff NUMATA, departed from SAIGON on 25 August, and on the 26th met with representative BROWNING, the Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces, carried out the necessary talks with him and received a copy of the document for the surrender which would be signed later.

4. On 12 September, the Southern army representative, General ITAGAKI accompanied by General KIMURA, Lt. Gen. KINOSHIRA, Lt. Gen. NAKAMURA, Lt. Gen. SHIBATA placed his seal on the historical document of surrender to the Allied Force at the special City hall of SINGAPORE. The time was 1341 hours.

(The position of the southern army at the end of the war is shown in the inserted figure No. 2.)

Situation of the Southern Forces at the End of the War.


SITUATION OF THE SOUTHERN FORCES AT THE END OF THE WAR
(CHINA)
(SOUTH CHINA SEA)
(PHILIPPINE SEA)
(FRENCH INDO CHINA)
BORNEO
(SUMATRA)
(JAVA)
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TIMOR
(NEW GUINEA)
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
SITUATION OF THE SOUTHERN FORCES AT THE END OF THE WAR
APPENDANT
NOTE
L BLUE INDICATES LAND FORCES
RED INDICATES AIR FORCES
MOVEMENTS.
INDEX.
D - DIVISION
Bs - MIXED BRIGADE(IND)
TKD - TANK DIVISION
A - ARMY
HA - AREA ARMY
KBD - CAVALRY BRIGADE
- AREA ARMY HDQS.
- ARMY HDQS.
- ADVANCED HDQS.
FD - AIR DIVISION
FB - AIR BRIGADE/TERRIER
FF - AIR SQUADRON
- AIR ARMY HDQS.
- AIR DIVISION HDQS.
N
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(SOUTH CHINA SEA)
(PHILIPPINE)
(FRENCH INDO CHINA)
(HAINAN I.)
(CELEBES)
(JAVA)
(FLORES)
(NEW GUINEA)
BORNEO
14HA
17HA
7HA
3FA
37A
2A
16A
18A
21D
22D
34Bs
38A
55D
2D
5D
1FR(-)
58FR(-)
30FR(-)
109FR(-)
103D
14D
23D
58Bs
27TKD
100
165Bs
8A
16D
26D
68Bs
35A
100D
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