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SOUTH AREA ARMY AIR OPERATION

Sec. 1. Strategic Preparations

Chap. 1. Enemy Situations

I. Enemy Air Strength within the area of the South Army Operations at about November 1941 is as listed below.

1. PHILIPPINE Area

a. The strength of the UNITED STATES Army and Navy Airforce in PHILIPPINES totals about 150 to 200 planes. The PHILIPPINE Army has about 50 planes in all. All the planes in the whole PHILIPPINE Area should be about 200 to 250 planes. The types of these planes, excluding the B 17's are rumors that in the near future Navy planes will be increased in number.

b. The planes mentioned above are based at MANILA, CLARK, and CAVITE; and the repairing facilities at these air bases are quite good. There are no other large air bases or airfields besides these.

2. MALAYA Area

a. The total strength of the RAF and BRITISH Navy Airforce is about 250 to 300 planes. One-third of these are the Navy's Reconnaissance bomber which are second-rate planes; but it seems that the HAWKER HURRICANES have arrived at the front.

b. The largest air base is located at SINGAPORE; others are located at (KWALALANPOOL) KETA and KOTABAR.

Recently the enemy has been constructing an air base near SIAM, and the east shore line.

c. There is a large repair factory at SINGAPORE air base which is able to make a complete repair of planes.

The above statements are characteristic of the general enemy position, including the Native Army; actually its fighting power seems lower than its strength.

3. JAVA. SUMATRA

a. The total strength of the Army and Navy Airforce is about 200. The majority of these planes, belonging to the Navy, are second-rate made aircraft.

b. There are fairly large bases at BANDON, MALAN, SURABAYA, and MACCASSAR; at present they are constructing an airfield in BORNEO and CELEBES. The enemy has airfields at PALEMBAN, JAMBI, and MEDAN of SUMATRA; but permanent troops are not stationed there.

#### 4. BURMA

The BRITISH air force has about 100 aircraft based at RANGOON. At present they are constructing about 10 airfields in the BURMA-SIAM border area and construction of the airfield at HSIAN is progressing rapidly.

In case of an emergency, it is expected that about 250 aircraft will be sent from INDIA.

#### 5. SIAM

The air force in SIAM has about 100 aircraft distributed between DOMUAN, ROBURY and PLACRAPUKIRIKAN. These planes are mainly old fighters and trainers.

#### 6. FRENCH INDO-CHINA

The aircraft total about 100 which are stationed at KHUACHI and SAIGON. The main body of this force is composed of fighters; the type is rather old, except for about 10 corsairs.

II. The enemy situations in each area were viewed as stated above; but since the occupation by our troops of FRENCH INDO-CHINA, the BRITISH, AMERICAN and DUTCH Armies will co-operate more closely; and in case war breaks out, the air forces of these areas will operate as one body.

It is expected that within the time of the operation the enemy will gradually increase the number of his planes; but, of course, it all depends upon the strategic situation in EUROPE. Therefore, it is believed that he will not increase it very much until 1 or 2 months after the beginning of the war.

### Sec. 2. Outline of the Strategic Plan of the South Army Air Force

#### No. 1. Purpose

1. First of all, the South Army air force will co-operate with the Navy air force and destroy the enemy airforces in the PHILIPPINES and MALAYA. After this, they will co-operate closely in the operations of the 14th, 15th, 16th, and the 25th Armies.

#### No. 2. Outline of Directions

2. The South Army Airforce will be concentrated in FORMOSA and north FRENCH INDO-CHINA; and, prior to the outbreak of the war, the main force will deploy one part to south FRENCH INDO-CHINA and one part to FORMOSA.

3. The south Army Airforce will co-operate with the Navy's by covering the transports during voyage and concentration.

4. The Army Airforce will co-operate with the Navy Airforce to destroy the enemy airforce at MALAYA and PHILIPPINES. The Army Airforce will advance their bases to MALAYA and PHILIPPINES as soon as possible.



During this period an element will retain the SIAMSESE Army.

5. Concerning the landings of the 14th and the 25th Armies and also the battles after the landing operation, the Army air force will cooperate closely with the landing and land operations, while at the same time destroying the enemy air force.

6. After the PHILIPPINE campaign is almost completed (seizure of MANILA), the air force of this area will be diverted to SIAM or MALAYA.

Actions after diversion will be decided according to the situations at that time.

7. (Same as above.)

No. 3. Concentration, Deployment, and Transportation (Shipping)

8. The main force of the air unit ground crew, and the district unit ground crew shall complete their deployment one week before the out break of war.

9. Immediately after the out break of war, one part of the ground crew and district unit shall await to board the 1st shipping convey to the PHILIPPINES and MANILA.

The district air unit which is to be shipped to SUMATRA and JAVA will sail in the 16th Army's 1st shipping convey. The above unit will be assembled from the PHILIPPINES and south FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

No. 4. Distribution of Troops

10. The formation of units is as follows:

1. 3rd Air Force (group)

Air Group Headquarter.....	4
Air Combat Unit.....	14
Independent Air Unit.....	1
Independent Air Company.....	
District Headquarter.....	5
Airfield Battalion.....	14
Airfield Company.....	6
Air Signal Unit.....	2
Air Intelligence Unit.....	2
AA Cannon Unit.....	3
Field Airfield Establishment Unit.....	5
Field Air Depot.....	2
Line of Communication Motorized Unit.....	4
Independent Line of Communication Motorized Unit.....	2
Ground Crew Company.....	5
Construction Company.....	1

2. 5th Air Force

Air Group Headquarter.....	1
Air Combat Unit.....	4
Independent Air Unit.....	1
District Headquarter.....	1
Airfield Battalion.....	7
Airfield Company.....	3
Air Signal Unit.....	1
A-A Cannon Unit.....	1
Airfield Construction Unit.....	2
Aircraft Repair Unit.....	2
Independent Line of Communication	
Motorised Company.....	2
Ground Duty Company.....	2
Building Duty Company.....	1
Weather Battalion.....	1

3. Air Group under the Direct Command of the Army

Independent Air Unit.....	2
Airfield Battalion.....	1
Air Transport Unit.....	3
Field Replacement Air Unit.....	1
Raid Group.....	1
Air and Shipping Depot.....	2
Field Air Depot.....	2
Field Weather Battalion.....	2

No. 1. Duties

1. The 3rd Air Force will deploy in south FRENCH INDO-CHINA; they will cover the shipping convoys during the 1st stage of the war, and will destroy the enemy air force at MALAYA. After this, the main force will cover the landings of the 25th Army, and co-operate in its advance. One part will co-operate with the operations of the 15th Army.

2. The 5th Air Force will deploy at FORMOSA and will protect convoys in port. At the beginning of the war they will destroy the enemy air force in the PHILIPPINES, after which they will cover the landing operation of the 14th Army and co-operate with its land operations.

During this operation this air force shall be put under the command of the 14th Army.

3. The 21st Independent Air Group will deploy into north-central FRENCH INDO-CHINA, and it will cover our convoys during their voyage. After the out break of war, this air force will gradually destroy the CHINESE Air Force near KONGKI.

Sec. 3. Strengthening of Air Bases

No. 1. The establishment and strengthening of air bases began in the



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autumn of 1941, according to the plans of the Imperial Headquarters. In November the South Army completed this work, but the work in FORMOSA was still being done by the Imperial Headquarters.

In FORMOSA a new airfield was established at CHOUSSHU, while completed airfields were expanded or strengthened.

New airfields were established at FUKOK Island and TANI; others which were previously used by the Army were strengthened and expanded.

The rainy season in southern FRENCH INDO-CHINA ended much later than usual making it very difficult to establish the airfields. That at TANI was almost unusable.

No. 2. The deployment of land crews and the accumulation of material were both planned by the Imperial Headquarters and carried out by the FORMOSAN Army and the 15th Army, which almost completed it by December 12.

The stock-piles of the No. 1 drop-tanks and machine-cannon shells was very small; therefore, it was feared that the long range fighters would not be able to accomplish their missions.

The Army had decided to sacrifice one bomber unit, but this was not done.

## Sec. II. Operations between December 1941 and May 1942

### Chap. I. Directions of the Whole Operation

#### Part 1. The Special Features of This Operation

No. 1. This period is called the period on seizure operations of the Greater East Asia war.

This involved a daring attack-and-holding operation. Its speed depended upon obtaining the air power, which, in turn, depended upon establishing air bases. This strategy was conceived by the Navy; the object was to advance the ships after destroying the enemy air force. For instance, the schedule for capturing enemy positions was delayed because the Navy had delayed in preparing the airfield at LEDO and KWANTAN; and the slow JAVA operations caused the advance of bases to East BORNEO, TARAKAN and BAIKBPAN to be impeded.

For this reason the South Army assisted the Navy in preparing bases and transporting air materials. It also, loaned some airfields to the Navy, though this tended to restrict the 3rd Air Force to some extent. In this way the air force was able to expand its combat area.

No. 2. During this operation the South Army General Headquarters acted as Air Force Headquarters and commanded the air operation. In other words, the South Army Headquarters commanded the 3rd, 5th and 21st Independent Air Forces in the way the Air Force General Headquarters would. The South Army Headquarters had ordered these air forces to co-operate with the

14th, 15th, 16th and the 25th Armies; but was remiss in its duty to supply them in continuous operations.

## Part 2. The Outline of Troop Disposition during This Operation

No. 1. From the beginning, the 83rd Independent Air Unit and one part of the 27th Air Combat Unit will be attached to the 25th Army. The place for concentration will be central FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is feared that this force and the force which deploys to the south will be confused.

The 25th Army asked that the 3rd Air Force be put under its command after landing operations were completed. It proved impossible to do this; therefore, the order for the diversion of the 83rd Independent Air Unit was issued earlier than scheduled.

Furthermore, it was decided that the 83rd Independent Air Unit, which was posted at FORMOSA, would delay its advance to MALAYA; by the time this air force arrived in MALAYA, one company of the 27th Air Combat Unit would be put under the command of the 25th Army.

## No. 2. The Diversion of the Main Force of the 5th Air Force

This plan called for the 5th Air Force to be diverted to the South Army after the seizure of MANILA in the early part of January 1942.

After this, it was thought that if the necessary strength remained to carry out the rest of the operation, it would be sufficient. It was decided that the 10th Independent Air Unit and the 16th Air Combat Unit should remain.

The district air unit was distributed as though to operate with the 16th Army; and the 5th Air Force began its movement to SIAM in latter part of January.

During the movement to north FRENCH INDO-CHINA, this airforce was ordered to make attacks on KOMMEI, because the CHUNGKING reinforcement army was advancing into BURMA from the south.

A question arose as to whether the 5th Air Force should be diverted to MALAYA or to BURMA; but, since the 3rd air force in MALAYA was in high spirits and required little reinforcement, it was decided that the 5th Air Force should be diverted to BURMA where the land forces were being impeded by enemy air attacks.

## No. 3. 10th Air Group Returns to Its Former Attachment

At the beginning of the war, the 10th Air group was under the command of the 3rd Group and co-operated with the 10th Air Force. When the 3rd Air Force Headquarters moved to MALAYA from south FRENCH INDO-CHINA, the 10th Air Group was to be taken from the 3rd Air Force and put under the command of the South Army. But since the enemy air force in BURMA needed to be destroyed, fighter and bomber units of the 3rd Air Force



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were sent to SIAM; therefore this diversion was extended. But with the arrival of the 5th Air Group commander, the 10th Air group was returned to its former air unit.

No. 4. Distribution of Troops in the South SUMATRA Operation District

One part of the weather unit, 2 airfield companies and units of the 16th Army were taken from the FRENCH INDO-CHINA district in the middle of June and sent to await shipping at KAWURAN.

No. 5. Draft of Essential Reorganization of the South Army Air Forces with the Progress Made

In the present war situation RUSSIA seems to have connections with the movements of AMERICA in the PACIFIC; therefore, RUSSIA'S attitude will also require constant watching.

The National Army will prepare for a long war and strengthen the expanded area of operations. It has become necessary to increase the strength of the air force.

On 3 February, a draft of the essential reorganization plan of the South Army, with the progress made, was drawn up; this is shown on appended sheet No. 1. Air Forces in the BURMA, JAVA, and SUMATRA areas also made distributions based on this plan.

No. 6. A Notice from the Imperial Headquarters Concerning the Employment of Troops

A notice was issued by the Imperial Headquarters on 15 February. Outline as follows:

1. It is planned that the following units will be diverted to MANCHURIA in the latter part of March:

The 15th, 16th Air Combat Units, the 36th Airfield Battalion, 1st and 3rd Air Intelligence Unit and the 70th Ground Crew Unit.

2. The 14th Air Combat Unit will return to JAPAN in April to change the type of its planes.

The 50th Air Combat Unit will begin to change its planes after April.

3. It is expected that the 62nd Air Combat Unit will be diverted from the PHILIPPINES.

4. It is expected that in the future the 10th Air Group will take over the command of the 27th Air Combat Unit and become a Bomber Group.

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No. 7. The Air Force Distribution in the PHILIPPINES, JAVA and BURMA

In preparation for the expected BURMA air operation, the necessary diversion of units was made in mid-March. Also necessary diversion of district units was made for the JAVA air operation. Bombers were diverted to join the seizure operation of BATAAN. Preparations for this began on 16 February, and the planes took off from SINGAPORE in early March.

No. 8. Draft of Air Unit Distribution in the South Area Planned by the Imperial Headquarters

The draft of the air unit distribution of the South Army air force, which was planned by the Imperial Headquarters, is shown on annexed sheet No. 2.

No. 9. Change of Directions of the 60th and 62nd Air Combat Unit

It was expected that the 62nd Air Combat Unit would be diverted in order to assist in the operations at CORREGIDOR and BATAAN; but since the planned navy reinforcements were delayed, the 60th Air Combat Unit was sent. An order for this was issued on 17 March.

No. 10. The Main Force of the 3rd Air Force Joins the BURMA Operation

After the JAVA operation was concluded the 12th and 7th Air Groups of the 3rd Air Force immediately organized their facilities. In order to have it co-operate with the 15th Army's mopping-up operation of the whole BURMA area, the above unit was put under the command of the 5th Air Force.

No. 11. Employment of the 1st Raid Group

The 1st Raid Group was put under the command of the 3rd Air Force in the latter part of January in order to join the PALEMBAN operation, after which it was put under the command of the South Army. In early March, this group was again put under the 5th Air Force in order to join the BURMA operation.

Since bad weather caused it from joining the latter campaign, it was ordered to return to the Homeland in the middle of May.

No. 12. Formation of the 22nd Air Group

On March 24th an order was issued to form a 22nd Air group as follows:

22nd Air Group Headquarters

- 10th Independent Air Unit
  - 52nd Independent Air Unit (Army Reconnaissance)
  - 74th Air Company (Directly co-operating planes)
  - 76th Air Company (Headquarter Reconnaissance)
  - 16th Air Combat Unit (Light Bomber)
  - 11th Air District Headquarters
  - 18th and 48th Airfield Battalion
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8th, 13th, 32nd Airfield Companies  
1st Mobile Repair Squad

No. 13. Distribution of the South Army Air Force in middle April. This is shown on appended sheet No. 3.

The 47th Independent Air Company and the 90th Air Combat Unit were diverted to JAPAN and CHINA in the latter part of April.

No. 14. Change in Air Force Distribution at the Conclusion of the BURMA Operation

Before the completion of the air operations in BURMA, the rainy season had caused their suspension; and since instruments and facilities could not be preserved, units under the 3rd Air Force command were either diverted to MALAYA or returned home to change planes. The 10th Air Group was also to return to MANCHURIA shortly after.

Part III. Supplementary Operation Plan and Enemy Strength

No. 1. From the out break of war to December 12th, the enemy air strength was reduced to below two-thirds in MALAYA and one-half in the PHILIPPINES; and it is judged that its numbers are gradually decreasing with each operation. But on the other hand, intelligence received by the Imperial Headquarters about the increase of enemy air strength in the latter part of January is as follows:

a. Already increased:

BURMA Area.....	100	) total 320 planes
MALAYA Area.....	110	
DUTCH INDIES Area.....	10	
INDIA Area.....	100	

b. Increase Possible:

INDIA to BURMA.....	40
DUTCH INDIES to MALAYA.....	40
AUSTRALIA to MALAYA.....	50
AUSTRALIA to DUTCH INDIES...	30

c. Increase in the near future:

From BRITAIN and EGYPT Area.....	240 (64 bombers, 181 fighters)
From AMERICA to DUTCH INDIES....	40
From BRITAIN to EGYPT.....	240

At present the South Army still has (superior) air power in the southern area; but as time goes on operations will become difficult.

No. 2. The air operations of the South Army were planned up to the end of the PHILIPPINE campaign; future action would be determined by pre-

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vailing conditions. Therefore the following supplemental plan of the South Army's Air operations was drafted in mid-January:

PURPOSE

The air force will co-operate with the 25th, 15th and 16th Army and destroy the enemy in order to achieve the objective of the South Army's operation. The Army air force will co-operate with the Navy air force very closely.

Outline of Directions

1. In order to cut off the enemy, the operation against south SUMATRA will commence before the fall of SINGAPORE.
2. When conquering SINGAPORE, if necessary, one heavy bomber reinforcement unit will be dispatched from the units which are now operating in the BURMA area.
3. Immediately after capturing the air bases in southern SUMATRA, the air unit should be advanced there to take the leadership in air operations.  
  
The south SUMATRA airfields would be a much more valuable objective than the oil plants, because half of the oil fields are already damaged.
4. In the BURMA area, the main purpose in the 1st stage is to co-operate with the 15th Army's operation. Before the beginning of the main operation by the 15th Army, which is to be completed before the rainy season, a strong force from the 3rd Air Force will be diverted for this operation; and with one blow they will destroy the enemy air force.
5. In the PHILIPPINE area one heavy bomber squad should be dispatched as soon the time is ripe, in order to capture BATAAN Peninsula.
6. As the campaign progresses, reorganization should be made for the purpose of holding operation. Above all, since the BURMA campaign is expected to continue severe, advantage should be taken of the rainy season. The Army air force should willingly help the Navy air force in order to extend the flight radius, and complete active operations.



## Chapter II. MALAYA Operation.

A. The 3rd Air Group were responsible for Air operations in MALAYA. It received its general orders from the Southern Expeditionary Army. The 3rd Air Group planned detailed operations with the 25th Army. The Commander of the Southern Expeditionary Army deployed his ground forces and built up his reserve supplies to assist the 3rd Air Group. The 3rd Air Group brought about closer cooperation between the Naval Air Forces and the 25th Army.

B. Fuel and Ammunition supplies to Northern MALAYA and the KWANTAN operations.

(1) On 14th December the Southern Expeditionary Army restricted the operations of the heavy bomber unit of the 3rd Air Force. There was a fuel shortage in FRENCH INDO CHINA. The BRITISH far Eastern Navy Units interrupted the flow of supplies from Northern MALAYA. The advance units at SINGAPORE could not be supplied. Trucks were used to land supplies in Southern FRENCH INDO CHINA. Since it was hard to send supplies to KETA from SINGAPORE, the army ordered the heavy bomber units of the 3rd Air Group to KOTABARU and the other units to the KETA State.

(2) The air battle above KUAMPLAPOO on the 23rd of January gave our army air supremacy over MALAYA Peninsula. The enemy, with about 100 planes based at SINGAPORE made guerilla attacks. Lack of airfields on MALAYA made fighter and bomber attacks on SINGAPORE impossible. KWANTAN airfield must be occupied. General of the army conferred with the Navy on 15th December concerning the occupation of KWANTAN. The Navy refused. Later, an agreement was reached between the 3rd Air Group and the 22nd Air Unit. The Navy proposed to give up the plan since not enough army planes were being used for this operation. The "Seventh" Detachment landed at KOTABARU about 90 Kilometers north of KWANTAN. There was no need for the KWANTAN operation and it was suspended. Fuel and ammunition supplies to KWANTAN were moved by two amphibious trucks under the command of Lt. Col. SUZUKI, staff officer of the Southern Expeditionary Forces. In early January the 12th Air unit replaced the Seventh Detachment at KWANTAN.

(3) Operation of the Air Units just before the occupation of SINGAPORE. The Air Forces in Southern SUMATRA should cooperate in defensive and offensive fighting. The greater part of the 25th Army will be moved into position just before the invasion of the main objective, SINGAPORE. The heavy bomber unit, raiding force and Naval Air Unit from BURMA cannot be transferred because of the airfield situation. The decrease of Air Units in the SINGAPORE operation was anticipated. However, the Southern Expeditionary Forces carried out the prepared operation.

(4) The cooperation between the 25th army and the 3rd Air Group. The 25th Army and the 3rd Air Group had a few disagreements during the MALAYA operation. The 25th Army considered the occupation of SINGAPORE as the ultimate objective of the operation; the 3rd Air Group considered the Southern SUMATRA and the JAVA areas as the ultimate objectives. Each unit insisted upon its own objective. The Army GHQ tried its utmost to bring closer cooperation. The 25th Army will accumulate necessary materiel for the SINGAPORE operation while the 3rd Air Group should accumulate materiel for the SINGAPORE invasion and the Southern SUMATRA area. The Army arranged for the use of the mobile transport company and the traverse railway in MALAYA.

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### Chapter III. SUMATRA Operation.

A. Operation in Southern Sumatra. The occupation of Southern SUMATRA was planned by the South Expeditionary Forces. Its purpose was to cut off MALAYA and JAVA from SINGAPORE. Airfields were constructed at KUCHIN, western extremity of BORNEO and at KURIHAN and KAMAN in MALAYA Peninsula to facilitate operations. On the 20th of January, the Navy proposed a 16 day post-ponement of the operation because of the incompleting airfield at KUCHIN. On 24th January, the Army GHQ agreed that the airfields at KOTABARU, SUNSEBATANII, KWANTAN and KAMAN in MALAYA could be used by the Navy in case the airfields at KUCHIN and LEDO could not be used. On the 4th of February, the navy proposed a 2 day delay in the operation because of the insufficient deployment of the Naval Air Units.

On the 6th of February, the navy again proposed the delay of the operation because of the difficulty in accumulating fuel at LEDO airfield and the necessity of clearing the airfield at KWANTAN. An agreement was made that the navy could use the airfields in MALAYA. The navy did not carry out their part of the agreement and the army GHQ sent engineers and explosives by plane to assist the Navy. On 25th February, the landing operation was finally carried out.

For three days beginning on the 7th of February, the 3rd Air Group carried out attacks to destroy the enemy air force in Southern SUMATRA. Twenty-eight planes were shot down and 39 planes were destroyed on the ground. The Naval Air Group destroyed the enemy air forces in Western JAVA.

1. The employment of a Raiding Group. The Army GHQ contemplated using the 1st Raiding Group in the Palembang Operation. On its way to Southern INDO CHINA the leading unit was attacked by enemy submarines and a greater part of the equipment was lost. The relieving units have therefore been obliged to carry out the PALEMBANG operation. The Raiding Groups invading strength arrived at the operational area and had a range of less than 600 Kilometers. The training of the Air Unit within the Raiding Group was not satisfactory. The 1st Raiding Group should be used against BOUGANVILLE AND JANPI as PALEMBANG was quite far away.

On the 30th of January, the army GHQ issued an order stating that the chief aim of the Raiding Group was to occupy air fields, and not to occupy oil wells to make the SUMATRA and JAVA operation easier.

B. The Operation In Northern SUMATRA. The 25th Army made preparations for the invasion of Northern SUMATRA. The 7th Air Group will take part in the operation. In the early and middle part of March, the main force of the 3rd Air Group, without its heavy bomber unit, may be used in the JAVA operation. In the latter part of March, it probably would be moved to the BURMA area to continue air operations. The plan to employ the remaining part of the 1st Raiding Group for the occupation of the oil fields in Northern SUMATRA and SABAN Fortress was investigated. It was suspended because photographs showed that 80% of the oil installations was ascertained to have been destroyed.

### Chapter IV. JAVA Operation.

1. The 16th Army was expected to cause considerable destruction and make encircling movements by landing simultaneously at SURABAYA and BATAVIN. The Air Groups cooperated with the operation from MALAYA and SUMATRA areas. The Navy was to prevent the enemy air force from retreating to AUSTRALIA by operating from Eastern BORNEO and the CELIBES.

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The Ground Service Unit for the Army Air Forces was prepared to accompany the 16th Army's landing group. These for occupational and subsequent operations started from SINGAPORE in the early part of March. They were taken from the MALAYA Peninsula occupation army.

2. The completion of the air basis in Southern SUMATRA was carried out. The 1st Raiding Group had completely occupied the PALEMBANG airfield. A section of the 16th Army has rapidly established airfields at KOTABAMU. The 3rd and 12th Air Brigade of the 3rd Air Group destroyed the enemy air force 3 days before March 1st, the date for the landing. Fifty planes were burnt down and 37 planes destroyed. By February 26th, the enemy air force was considered to be less than 20.

3. The 16th Army stated that the 1st Raiding Group should advance to CHALUP since the enemy retreated from there. It was rejected since the air base situation was bad. The reasons of rejection are as follows:

(a) Establishment of an airfield, capable of accomodating 40 heavy transport planes and fighter planes. An airbase within 600 km from the objective is necessary.

(b) Accumilation of considerable quantity of fuel was necessary.

(c) The rapid preperation of materials might be impossible in Southern SUMATRA.

#### Chapter V. PHILLIPINE Operation.

1. The 5th Air Division was attached to the 14th Army in the Air operation in the PHILLIPINES. GHQ of the Southern Expeditionary Forces had scarcely taken any part in this operation all the orders were issued by the 14th Army. The 23rd Army sufficed because of the lack of air cooperation at the start of the HONG KONG Campaign. The 14th air unit, under the command of the 5th Air Group stationed in FORMOSA could not advance since the airfields were narrow. On the 15th of December the Army GHQ ordered the 14th Air Regiment cooperate with the 23rd Army in the occupation of HONG KONG.

2. The date of transferring the main force of the 5th Air Group to the PHILLIPINES was expected to be on the date of the occupation of MANILA. The enemy air force has been practically destroyed. The enemy gave up MANILA AND retreated to BATAAN. Our Air Group were then transferred. Immediately after the transfer of the 5th Air Group, the Army GHQ requested to the Imperial HQ the establishment of a section of combat and Hq. reconnaissance Units. A Hq. of Air Brigade should be established to supervise the air units. The 16th Air Regiment remained in the PHILLIPINES. At the end of March, orders to organize the 22nd Air Brigade were issued.

3. At the end of January the transfer of a heavy bomber unit for the BATAAN operation was considered. The air fuel and explosive stock in the PHILLIPINES gave rise to discussion. The materials accumulated were enough for 30 attacks each by 2 heavy bomber units. The 60th Air Unit was also transferred. This unit was unofficially ordered to be transferred to the north as soon as their duties were performed. This plan was suspended until the occupation of CORRECIDOR Fortress.

Chapter VI. Operation in THAILAND and BURMA.

A. Policy Towards THAILAND. The policy towards THAILAND was to use any military force except when challenged by the THAI Army. The 10th Air Group, at the initial stage of the war, guarded against the THAI Air Force by deploying along the Southern frontier of FRENCH INDO CHINA and occasionally cooperating with the 15th Army in the occupation of THAILAND.

On the 8th of December the fighting units belonging to the air Brigade shot down several THAI planes. They were reconnoitering the THAI Air Force. The THAI Air Force has remained friendly and cooperative.



Section II BURMA Operations

1. The aerial operations in BURMA can be classified into two distinct phases. The first phase covered the period up to the end of February 1942 including the operations of our Southern Area Army units with their airbases located in SIAM, which was merely an area of supporting operations. The second phase covered the period after March 1942 with our airforce unit acting as the main support from its advanced airfield in BURMA.

The first phase of the operations was characterized by very many disadvantages and inconveniences, since the unit was a secondary element; that is, it had no independence insofar as directly receiving intelligence reports, communications, supplies from the rear, etc. was concerned.

2. The 10th Air Brigade, under the command of the 3rd Air Corps, while neutralizing the enemy air forces in the BURMA area, cooperated with the 15th Army's operations.

At the end of February the 10th Air Brigade received a notice to refrain from bombing the big cities in BURMA, and the 3rd Air Corps' 7th Air Brigade was temporarily dispatched to BANGKOK, where in cooperation with the 10th Air Brigade, it was to destroy the enemy airforce in the vicinity of RANGOON. The 3rd Air Corps gave instructions to minimize the use of heavy bombers in their attack on the enemy airforce in RANGOON.

The reasons for this were that the enemy's main air unit consisted of only fighter planes, and that heavy bombers were required for the supporting operations in SINGAPORE. However, since the opportunity to dispatch staff officers was lost, these instructions were unheeded.

3. At the end of December the Grand Imperial Headquarters desired to conclude actual operations in BURMA by the end of the following April (the dry season), because they had to cut the CHINESE supply routes.

4. The 5th Air Division was transferred from the PHILIPPINES to SIAM. The following report was sent to SAIGON:

a. The destroying of the enemy airforce.

The main point is to destroy the enemy airforce in direct cooperation with the 15th Army. In the BURMA area the enemy airforce withdrew in the face of our fighter strength, but it fiercely attacked when our heavy bombers were present. Therefore, methods of destructive operations with our heavy bombers must be studied.

b. Cooperation with the 15th Army.

It is very difficult to advance our air bases to BURMA; therefore, airfield preparations for the majority of our air units will be made in Northern SIAM. It is especially necessary to construct air bases before the rainy season sets in. It will not be possible to attack line of communications vehicles until after the occupation of SINGAPORE.

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Furthermore, relations between the 10th Air Brigade and the 15th Army have been intimate and cordial, and it is vital that this be maintained.

The bombing of temples and villages in our attacks in BURMA as well as the oil refineries in RANGOON must be avoided.

c. The cutting of the YUNNAN-BURMA highway.

1). Time of attack.

Because of the rainy season after April it is not necessary to attack sooner than this date.

It is best that the HSIAO KUO and HUI TUNG bridges be destroyed, but it is also best that the enemy's accumulated supplies at the CHINESE-BURMESE boundary be destroyed.

d. Attack against enemy convoys in the ADAMAN Sea.

For a one week interval, from 20 January to 30 January, the navy will attack enemy convoys with its medium attack planes with BANGKOK as its base; consequently, it must make preparations for quarters and provisions. The attack by the army will follow that by the navy.

e. The controlling of Army Groups.

In the attacks on SINGAPORE between the end of January and the beginning of February the heavy bombers will cooperate with the attacking forces; and, after the conclusion of the JAVA operations, the main force of the 3rd Air Brigade will be transferred to the BURMA Area.

When the 5th Air Brigade enters BURMA and when it is operating in the northeastern area of BURMA, the 21st Independent Air Unit will operate under its command.

5. The whole army was worried in transferring the 5th Air Corps base to BURMA because of the dangers involved, especially in the supplying of fuel and ammunition to BURMA. To transport these supplies from the sea was virtually impossible. Consequently, the advance of the 5th Air Corps would be retarded.

Fortunately, we were substantially aided in the construction of the base by the excellent cooperation of the 5th Air Corps of the 15th Army. A sizeable quantity of fuel was obtained when we occupied the airfields at TAVOY and MOULMEIN; and, as a result, the operations became more feasible. Furthermore, the capture of SINGAPORE was scheduled; therefore, the supplying of fuel and ammunition by sea was not difficult during the first part of March.

6. The main force of the 3rd Air Corps was gradually put under the control of the 5th Air Corps commander to facilitate its plan to have the 5th Air Corps destroy the enemy airforce at one blow during the latter part of March.

The development of the air sector unit in BURMA was half completed about

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10 March. The Corps commander was confident of destroying the enemy airforce with the cooperation of the 15th Army and the aforementioned reinforcements. The enemy airforce was mostly destroyed, and air control was attained in the 3 days after the 21st of March, as scheduled. After this, the 55th Division with the cooperation of the 4th Air Brigade, and the 33rd Division, with the cooperation of the 10th Air Brigade, directly worked together in battle.

7. After the completion of the primary air operations over PALEMBANG, the 1st Air Raiding Group studied the secondary objectives. First of all, the fortresses at SABANG, CHILACHAP, the island of ANDAMAN, and the towns of PANGKALANG, BRANDAN and YEWANGYAUNG and others were selected. Reconnaissance showed that an attack on these places would be impractical and valueless. In the end, the 1st Air Raiding Group was used in intercepting the enemy's route of retreat in the destroying operations of the 15th Army. Of this, the 1st Air Raiding Group came under command of the 5th Air Corps commander on 17 April. The target of this unit was definitely indicated as the vicinity of LASHIO.

This unit started operations at LASHIO on 29 April; however, operations were called off due to inclement weather, and the unit returned.

On the same day the 56th Division was only a day's march from LASHIO; and it was unfortunate that this opportunity was lost.

8. The enemy airforce in INDIA was estimated at 330 planes (including 30 AMERICAN planes) in the first part of May. Air operations were not suitable during the rainy season; therefore, the 4th Air Brigade and one fighter unit of Type 1 fighter remained. The 12th Air Brigade returned to the homeland for remodeling and the others retreated to SIAM and MALAYA for the purpose of strengthening the airforces there.

The air strength in BURMA during the middle part of April is shown in separate sheet No. 3, and the air strength during the rainy season is in separate sheet No. 4.

## Chapter 7 YUNNAN Operations.

1. The greater part of the YUNNAN operations were demonstrative feinting operations and there were no actual air battles.

One of the duties of the 21st Independent Air Unit in the northern part of FRENCH INDO-CHINA at the end of November 1941 was the watching of CHINA as far as the YUNNAN operations were concerned. The advance to KUNMING was one of the operations. Based on this, the 21st Independent Unit planned to attack KUNMING before the 3rd Air Corps developed in Southern FRENCH INDO-CHINA. This was done in order to keep the general plan a secret. The 3rd Air Corps planned to attack KUNMING sometime around the end of November or the beginning of December, but owing to inclement weather, this opportunity was lost. The 21st Independent Air Unit waited for better weather and attacked KUNMING on 21st of December. However, we suffered great losses from enemy fighters. The existence of large planes at KUNMING would exert a strong influence on the disposition of our airforces in Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA and CANTON. Therefore, a Headquarters reconnaissance plane of the 3rd Air Corps was ordered to reconnoiter that area.

2. During the advance of the 5th Air Corps from the PHILIPPINES to SIAM, the 5th Air Corps was to continue operations against KUNMING in cooperation with the land groups in Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA, and was to check the reinforcement of the YUNNAN forces. For this purpose the 14th Air Regiment suddenly attacked, on 18 January, without first obtaining intelligence reports; this attack did not have results. The 64th Air Regiment, which made a surprise attack on YUNNAN station in the middle of March from its base in Northern SIAM, was successful in that action.

3. In the first part of April the CHINA Expeditionary Force dispatched parts of the Headquarters Reconnaissance planes, fighters and direct cooperation air units, to CANTON, and planned the air defense of HONGKONG and CANTON together with the probable advance to KUNMING when an opportunity presented itself.

The 21st Independent Air Unit attacked MENGZU on 5 April in cooperation with the units dispatched to CANTON, but failed in its mission.

### Part 3 Operations from June 1942 to April 1944.

#### Chapter I Characteristics of these operations.

1. These operations were some of the so-called sustaining operations, after one of the attacks that occurred in the Greater East ASIA War.

The summary of the plan of operations of the airforce unit of the Southern Army is as follows:

"It will cooperate with the land group in the maintenance and stabilization of the southern strategical areas; in order to cooperate, it will attack in INDIA and CHINA at the proper time to check the increasing power of the enemy airforce and also cooperate in the defense of various land groups."

The Southern Army strengthened airforce establishments and improved the airforce repairing and equipping facilities, strengthened such things as the air defense of strategic areas and also made preparations for offensive operations in CHINA and INDIA for the purpose of the stabilization and maintenance of southern strategical areas immediately after the offensive.

2. During this interval the Grand Imperial Headquarters planned operations against CHINA. On the other hand, UNITED STATES forces began counter-attacking in the Southeastern PACIFIC Area. As a result, the transferring of naval airforces located at the Southern Army's strategical operations area started immediately. The army took over the duties of the navy, and the transfer of army units increased. With the JAPANESE Army as a whole, this became a so-called frontal sustaining operation. This whole army came under direct control of central authority; and although it had its own plans, it was inevitable that they relinquish them.

3. The instructions of the air operation of the Southern Army were transferred to the newly organized 3rd Air Army Headquarters, which was organized in the latter part of July. The General Headquarters of the Southern Army only performed such duties as planning general air operations, cooperation between the army and navy,



and the coordination of land and air operations.

Accordingly, these operation details became the war history of the 3rd Air Army.

Chapter 2 An outline of the transfer of air strength and changing of air equipment of the Southern Army during this period.

1. 1942.

a. Order issued on 12 June to transfer the 10th Air Brigade to MANCHURIA.

b. Order issued on 12 July detaching the 22nd Air Brigade from the 15th Army and putting it under the command of the 14th Army. Order also issued for the sector units such as the 15th Air Signal Unit and lesser units to transfer to CHINA.

c. Order issued on 17 July for their transfer and disposition, based on the order of battle of the 3rd Air Army.

Order also issued for the movement of the 3rd Air Corps Headquarters and the 16th Air Regiment to CHINA.

d. The disposition of the air units of the Southern Army on 1 August is noted in separate sheet No. 4.

e. The Grand Imperial Headquarters unofficially announced, on 27 August, the transfer of 6 Line of Communications vehicles, 3 companies of Land Service units and 3 Wireless platoons to CHINA.

f. The 9th Air Brigade will come under the order of battle of the 3rd Air Army on 29 August.

g. The 12th Air Brigade will be transferred to the southeastern area in November.

h. The 14th Air Regiment will be transferred to the southeastern area in December.

2. 1943.

a. In January the 7th Air Division will be organized and will be responsible for the operations in the BANDA Sea area. The 8th Air Brigade will be dispatched to MANCHURIA and will come under command of the 3rd Air Army.

b. In June the 8th Air Brigade will come under command of the CHINA Expeditionary Force.

The main force of the 7th Air Division will come under command of the 8th Area Army and will be transferred to the southeastern area.

- c. The 106th Air Training Brigade will be organized in August.
- d. The 8th Air Brigade of the CHINA Expeditionary Force will return to its original unit in September.
- e. The 1st Air Raiding Groups, the 77th and 204th Air Regiments will be reinforced; and the main force of the 7th Air Division will return north of AUSTRALIA and come under command of the 2nd Area Army in October.
- f. In December the 9th Air Division Headquarters will be organized, and it will be responsible for the air defense of PALEMBANG.

3. 1944.

a. In January the 7th and 98th Air Regiments will be transferred to the homeland for torpedo attack training. The 8th Air Brigade will come under command of the 2nd Area Army.

b. Orders will be issued for the organization of the 106th Air Training Regiment in March. The 4th Air Army will be organized under the Southern Army. The 2nd Area Army and the 14th Army will be organized under the Southern Army, and the command of the Southern Army will be unified.

c. In April those airforce units that were under the command of the 2nd Area Army and that were not attached to the Southern Army will come under its command.

Chapter 3 The Strengthening of Airforce Establishments.

1. The whole army has determined the future disposition of air units that will be used for the maintenance and stability of strategic southern areas immediately after the end of the JAVA operations. It will gather the main force of the army air strength at the proper places and establishments where it is found necessary to station it, and will stipulate bases for air operations. It has started preliminary investigations; and, during the middle of May, head construction engineers from each army were assembled, and construction was started after an understanding with the central authority. Each army in its respective zones will be responsible for its allotted construction. It is especially noted that the 3rd Air Corps will the whole army will be in direct charge of this construction.

A separate summarization of each zone is as follows:

2. SIAM, BURMA and Northern SUMATRA Areas.

a. During the development of the BURMA operations in April 1942, the construction of rain-proof shelters and anti-rain emplacements for airplanes were commenced in preparation for the coming rainy season.

However, the minimum strength was kept in BURMA during the rainy season.

b. In order to cope with the plan of the ENGLISH Army to attack along the shores of the INDIAN Ocean, and because the plan to attack INDIA in the autumn after



the rainy season had become known, the strengthening of airfield establishments in BURMA, the ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands, Northern SUMATRA, and SIAM was started in the early summer of 1943.

As the result of experience gained in the INDIAN and AUSTRALIAN theatres, where simple airfields could not cope with a superior enemy, the area army intended to construct fortified airfields with several runways. The Grand Imperial Headquarters had a parallel plan which it continuously tried to implement. Although these fortified airfields were almost all completed by the end of 1943, they were not completely finished owing to the lack of necessary machinery and poor transportation facilities.

3. The BANDA and FLORES Sea Areas.

The whole army started to prepare air bases for defensive purposes, since PORT DARWIN was humming with enemy activity around the end of 1942.

Since they had two-motored light bombers in the fixed strength to participate in this attack, and since a shorter operating radius was necessary, it was decided to build airbases on an island closer to the enemy. TIMOR Island was first considered, but AVIS was chosen. They started construction in the spring of 1943 and completed it in early summer.

Besides the island of TIMOR, there was a possibility of constructing airbases at AROE, KAI and TANIMBAR Islands as the navy demanded. They were completed during the second half of 1943.

4. Establishment of Air Search Radar.

The adoption of air search radar was the best means of compensating for the shortage of patrol and air defense strength. The whole army proposed its use; but the central authority objected, and only two sets arrived in this area in August 1942. These sets arrived in increasing numbers but the total was far less than demanded. Therefore, the whole army consulted with the navy so that these sets would not duplicate each other's work. Consequently, the whole army was momentarily relieved.

Chapter 4 The Improvement of Repairing Facilities.

It was obvious from past experience that supplies would rapidly diminish without adequate maintenance and repairing facilities in the airforce.

Consideration was given to sending suitable repair units to the airforce at the start of the southern operations. However, the continuous operations resulted in great losses in May 1942.

The whole army prepared for the coming holding operations and concluded that supplies would not arrive as anticipated because of a greater distance from the homeland. It was known that the repairing facilities would not be completed until six months after the stationing of troops. For this reason, the adjustment of repair and supply units was made; and after their positions were selected, work commenced on the construction of various establishments.

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a. Adjustment of repair and supply units.

The 9th, 12th and 19th Field Air Repair Depots and the 15th and 16th Field Air Depots were organized under the 16th and 19th Field Air Depots.

b. Fixing of units.

The 16th Field Air Depot was established in MALAYA, JAVA and SUMATRA, and the 19th Field Air Depot was established in FRENCH INDO-CHINA, SIAM and BURMA. Furthermore, the building of various factories was started about May 1942.

Looking into the future the self-manufacture of various parts was encouraged for self-support. During the latter part of 1943 a great production capacity was attained. Consequently, it met the requirements of the 9th Air Division and the Air Training Brigade in their advance toward the southern areas.

Chapter 5 INDIA and CHINA Operations.

I. Operations between June 1942 and July 1943.

1. The strength of the enemy airforce in INDIA was estimated at 330 front line planes (including about 30 AMERICAN planes) in the first part of May 1942. By the first part of July of the same year the enemy planes had increased to 450 (including 350 ENGLISH planes - 150 fighters, 140 bombers and 60 others - and 100 AMERICAN planes, one half of which were fighters). It became more and more evident that the enemy planes were gradually increasing.

The situation resulted in the monthly increase of sporadic air attacks by the enemy in BURMA during the rainy season.

The army there was to attack CALCUTTA when the rainy season ended to check the increase of the enemy airforce. It ordered the 3rd Air Army to make preparations for this attack.

The Air Army was to assemble subordinate unit commanders in RANGOON during the first part of September for the purpose of studying methods of attack. They were gradually making preparations but orders were received on 21 September to disregard the CALCUTTA attack.

2. The whole army anticipated probable success in the attack on CALCUTTA with the existing air strength. As the days elapsed, the operations gradually became difficult and an attempt was made to rescind the orders stopping the CALCUTTA attack; but permission was refused.

Under these circumstances the 3rd Air Army not only cooperated in the land operations in BURMA but also made frequent reconnaissance of the CALCUTTA area until the spring of 1943.

The 3rd Air Army made night attacks on the CALCUTTA area with selected heavy bombers, since there were no restrictions in the bombing of the inland part of INDIA with a part of the force. The docks and other important establishments were bombed several times. These attacks temporarily deceived the enemy, and our

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losses were at a minimum with favorable results. However, with the use of radar and the growth of the enemy's night fighter strength, along with the lack of exhaust dampers in our heavy bombers, our attacks gradually became more difficult; and in the end they were given up.

## II. Operations between August 1943 and April 1944.

1. About the middle of 1943 the planes were principally AMERICAN, and control of the air went into their hands. Daylight troop movements, especially supply movements on both land and sea became difficult. Eventually we could not cope with the steady increase of the enemy's air power; and, for this reason, direct cooperation with the land forces became difficult.

The whole army resorted to the handling of manpower, communications, intelligence reports, construction of air bases and educational training, etc. It endeavored to gain the maximum force but these results were not attained as anticipated.

For this reason the Air Army assembled the subordinate unit commanders for the purpose of studying combat tactics to cope with a superior enemy.

The subordinate units concentrated on their corresponding type of training at the war games.

The whole army considered it very necessary that the fighter strength be increased in order to accomplish its mission. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff of the whole army was dispatched to the homeland with the following proposals in the first part of September:

"The main force of the heavy bomber unit will be temporarily reorganized under the fighter unit (until the appearance of new heavy bombers).

Moreover, the air service personnel of the light bomber reconnaissance unit will be transferred to the fighter unit."

The reasons for this were that the heavy bomber units were comparatively numerous and offensive and defensive power was weak. Furthermore, there was scarcity of heavy bomber escorts.

However, the central authority did not favor our proposal and supplied us with only a few fighter units.

2. Immediately after the rainy season the whole army utilized the 3rd Air Army to cooperate with the land group in opening operations against IMPHAL. Simultaneously, the Grand Imperial Headquarters lifted the non-bombing restriction in the interior of INDIA.

However, it became necessary for us to mass a sizeable strength and also make preparations for a large scale attack against the reinforced enemy air power in INDIA. Then in the first part of December we attacked CALCUTTA in cooperation with the navy.

## III. YUNNAN Operations.

15th Army

(RANGOON)(YENANGYANG)(BAWDVI)

16th Army

(BATAVIA)(SURABAYA) TJEPOE

BORNEO Garrison Army

MILI  
LUTONG  
SELIA

5th Air Corps

(MINGALODON)(TOUNGOO)(MERGUI)(AKYAB)

Other than these, the Navy, at its own discretion, was responsible for vital areas within its administrative area.

2. The PALEMBANG Air Defense Headquarters was organized at the end of 1942 at PALEMBANG with all land air defense units under its command. Air units of appropriate strength were cooperating with the Air Defense Headquarters. During the end of 1943, the 9th Air Division was organized. It in turn unified both the land and air forces in existence at that time, and the overall command was entrusted to the 3rd Air Army Headquarters commander as one great air defense force.

The reason for this was that although the 25th Army had desired to place the 9th Air Division under its command because the 25th Army was responsible for the defense of all SUMATRA at that time, the Southern Army, besides making a careful study on the problem, guessed the plans of Grand Imperial Headquarters and decided on its after having considered the advantages of a unified command under the Air Army.

Ordinarily, the strength of the air units for the defense of PALEMBANG was determined by central authority; therefore, the whole army could not handle this matter independently. The central authority's plan had its disadvantages, one of them being the restriction on the handling of air strength by the Southern Army. On the other hand, this plan had the advantage of concentration on preparations and training which was characteristic of these air defense operations. Exercises were conducted several times; the central authority dispatched a specialist on air defense, and gradually the air defense strength increased.

3. From the autumn of 1943 in the BURMA area, together with the gradual increase of the enemy's combat air strength, the defense of strategic areas and battle field air defense became similar. Therefore, the BURMA Area Army eagerly desired the 5th Air Division to come under its control for the prosecution of an united air defense. However, it could not definitely fix its mobile combat strength; and from the standpoint of aerial operations, such as the concentration diffusion and mutual exchange of combat strength, the 5th Air Division was not put under command of the BURMA Area Army.

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1. In the YUNNAN area operations, the whole army made it a principle to exchange intelligence reports with the CHINA Expeditionary Force. They operated independently of each other, using each others intelligence. In the autumn of 1943 the CHINA Expeditionary Force dispatched some units to FRENCH INDO-CHINA to participate in the attack in Southwestern CHINA. Since the Southern Army was engaged in the INDIA operations at this time, it merely aided in the rear supply preparations, and they both used the air bases together.

2. The 3rd Air Army was assigned to intercept the INDO-CHINESE air routes. It attacked the KUNMING area in April 1943 and attacked enemy transport planes at the northern part of MYITKYINA City after October, gaining successes at both of these places.

#### Chapter 6 Operations against AUSTRALIA.

The enemy's air strength in AUSTRALIA during July 1942 was estimated to be 650 planes (including 240 AMERICAN planes).

About the end of 1942 the arrival of enemy convoys at PORT DARWIN became more and more frequent. Thereby, the whole army, firmly convinced that attacks in self defense were not contrary to the central authority's restriction, ordered the 3rd Air Army to make preparations for attacks at any suitable time.

Simultaneously, the air units located in that area utilized the minimum of planes as the nucleus of each fighter unit of two-motored and light fighters under the command of the commander of the 3rd Air Brigade. Even if the equipment of these fighter planes were improved the acting radius would still be less than 1,000 kilometers. Inevitably, air bases were established in Eastern TIMOR; the first attack was made in June 1943; and in the autumn of the same year it cooperated with the Naval Airforce and made attacks on secondary objectives in Northern AUSTRALIA with good results.

#### Chapter 7 Protection of Convoys and Air Defense of Strategic Areas.

1. The study of air defense was started in the beginning of May 1942. At this moment the point of issue was PALEMBANG. PALEMBANG was partially destroyed by enemy planes immediately after its capture; and, as a result, there was a dire necessity for its air defense. It made studies to determine which of the two units, the 3rd Air Corps or the 25th Army, should be responsible for its air defense. However, the responsibility was temporarily given to the 25th Army because of the unit's anti-aircraft guns and air defense intelligence network.

After a temporary lull in the BURMA operations in the latter part of May the most important air defense zones in the entire southern area were determined as follows: and to the zones enclosed in parenthesis, anti-aircraft guns were allocated:

25th Army

(SINGAPORE)(PALEMBANG)(BATANG)(PANGKALANG BRANDAN)(SABANG)(KUTARAJA) PENANG

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## II. Protection of Convoys.

1. The protection of convoys by submarines was the primary duty of the navy; but conditions warranted the army's responsibility on this matter, because of the expansion of the navy's zone of protection as well as its decreased air strength. The Southern Army first provided this protection by sending 3 light bombers to MIRI, BORNEO in March 1942.

As 1943 approached the attacks by enemy submarines became fiercer; and we suffered heavy losses. The central authority dispatched a training group of bombers for use against shipping and in mid-spring selected personnel of each unit were forced to take necessary practical training in cooperation with the navy. In the summer of 1943 both the army and navy went to great lengths to overcome the bottleneck in ship sea transportation caused by the incessant attacks by enemy submarines.

The convoys carried out group movements as much as possible, and the air units squeezed out the maximum strength allowable.

Considering the seriousness of shipping supplies to RANGOON and the transportation to the BANDA Sea Area, the Air Army made the greatest possible efforts to these matters.

### Chapter 8 Cooperation with the Naval Air Units.

1. The naval air units stationed in the Southern Army operational zone were constantly transferred to the SOLOMON and NEW GUINEA areas because of the growing fierceness of enemy attacks. Because of this fact, it was unavoidable that the army assume the duties of the navy; and the agreement between the army and navy regarding air operations was revised frequently.

The first example was the central authority's agreement, on 10 September 1942, between the army and navy concerning operations in Eastern NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMAN Islands and the following instructions were given in connection with the air operations of the Southern Army:

"For these operations the army air units will be responsible for our security; and the attacking of enemy warships (excluding submarines) in the sea areas of MALAYA and SUMATRA until a lull in these operations. If the defense of TIMOR becomes necessary during this period, the army air units will cooperate with the navy."

After this, there was a change in the allotment of duties concerning the transfer of Navy Airforce strength.



II. Due to the decreasing strength of the Army and Navy Air Corps, closer cooperation became necessary between the two forces. As mentioned before, the coordinated operations against CALCUTTA and AUSTRALIA were carried out only temporarily. Because of the great difference in education, training and equipment between the two forces, it was impossible to carry out the operation smoothly.

Chapter IX. NEW GUINEA Operation.

I. During the middle part of 1943, conditions in the NEW GUINEA area became serious. The counter-attack of the AMERICAN Army was along the northern coast of NEW GUINEA and believed heading westward towards BORNEO or the PHILIPPINES. The 17th Area Army strengthened its forces for the expected attack. The 7th Air Division, which had been engaged in combat in the southern and southeastern areas until that time, gradually prepared for combat in the eastern area. In June 1943, the main force of the 7th Air Division came under the command of the 8th Army, for the NEW GUINEA operation. In the same area the 4th Air Force was organized and included in the order of battle. In October of the same year, when the 2nd Army was organized in North AUSTRALIA, the 7th Air Division was sent back there under the command of the 2nd Army.

II. In March 1944, the 4th Air Force was included in the order of battle of the 2nd Army, principally to take command of the NEW GUINEA operation. In the latter part of March, when the 4th Air Force was included in the order of battle of the Southern Army, the 7th Air Division was put under its command.

Part A. Operations between May 1944 and August 1945.

Chap. I. Outline on the Changes and Movements of Equipment and Personnel of the Air Corps and Outstanding Characteristics of the Operation.

A. This period of operation can be summarized as "a final stand against the AMERICANS counter-attack and a prolongation of the battle."

It was decided that the 4th Air Force would be the deciding strength of the air operation and the army gave maximum air support to the Southern Army. The purpose of this operation was to simplify matters. The LEYTE campaign was not progressing satisfactorily and a delaying action on LUZON was planned. The plan of the army was to delay action and become self supporting if communication was cut off with JAPAN.

B. Outline of the movement and changes of air force personnel and equipment during this operational period.

In May 1944, the 2nd Air Division was attached to the Southern Area Army and the 4th Air Division was included in the order of battle of the 4th Air Force. The 108th and 109th Air Training Forces were organized and placed in the PHILIPPINES.

June: the 8th Air Corps Headquarters was transferred to the CHINA area; and the 1st Air Reconnaissance Unit, 5th, 10th, 14th, 29th and 60th Air Units were transferred to JAPAN and FORMOSA.

August: the 6th Air Division Headquarters, 30th Air Corps Headquarters, 14th Air Group, 63rd and 248th Air Units were returned to JAPAN.

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September: the 2nd Air Division was placed under the command of the 4th Air Force.

October: the 30th Fighter Group was organized and placed under the 4th Air Force together with the 2nd Air Reconnaissance Unit. The Air Training Corps was transferred from the PHILIPPINES to the Southwest PACIFIC. The Independent Air Corps Headquarters was organized and station in Northern BORNEO. To recover from combat damages, the 13th, 15th and 61st Air Units were sent back to JAPAN. To strengthen the air forces in the PHILIPPINES, the 3rd, 14th and 20th Air Units were sent from FORMOSA.

November: the following units were returned to JAPAN to recover from combat damages: 12th and 16th Air Corps, 3rd, 14th, 19th, 26th, 30th, 62nd, 65th, 66th, 75th and 204th Air Units.

The following units were sent to strengthen the air force in the PHILIPPINES: 18th, 32nd and 55th Air Units, 21st Air Corps and the 1st Air Reconnaissance Group.

December: the 22nd and 246th Air Units were returned to JAPAN. The 17th, 20th, 24th and 29th Air Units were sent to FORMOSA.

January 1945: the 3rd Air Corps Headquarters was transferred to CHINA; the 9th Air Corps Headquarters to the Southwest PACIFIC; and the 7th Air Corps Headquarters to JAPAN. The 21st Air Corps, the 18th, 55th, 54th and 106th Air Units were returned to their former units in JAPAN.

February: the 4th Air Force Headquarters, returned to JAPAN; the 30th Fighter Group Headquarters, the 6th Air Corps, the 2nd, 27th, 200th and 208th Air Units were transferred to JAPAN; the 22nd to FORMOSA and the 75th Air Unit, to CHINA.

June: to participate in the battle of JAPAN the following units will first of all be dispatched to FORMOSA under the command of the 8th Air Division: 25th Air Corps H.Q., 8th, 12th, 13th, 21st, 26th, 50th, 58th, 61st and 204th Air Units and the 24th and 71st Independent Air Company.

## Chapter II. Preparation for the PHILIPPINE Campaign.

### Sec. A. Plan of the Air Operation.

#### 1. Plan of the Air Operation of the Southern Army in May 1944.

##### a. Purpose.

The army will closely cooperate with the navy in destroying the enemy. For this, the battle area is planned to be the southern part of the Central PHILIPPINES; the time of the battle is expected to be after August.

##### b. Outline of the Plan.

1. The preparation for the PHILIPPINE campaign will be completed by the latter part of August. If necessary, one part of the air unit will be sent to Western NEW GUINEA or MALMAHERA to repel enemy attacks.



- 2. If the PHILIPPINES are attacked, personnel and planes from the 3rd Air Force will be put under the 4th Air Force and, at the same time, will attack enemy shipping.
- 3. Transport ships will be the principal targets.
- 4. While the planes and personnel are being transferred, the 3rd Air Force is planning a delayed action battle and will be strengthening air bases in FRENCH INDO-CHINA. They also plan to maintain the line of communication between JAPAN and the Southwest PACIFIC.

1. Problems confronting the air operation.

a. Battle Ground.

In the early part of 1944 the army in Western NEW GUINEA and the HALMAHERA area strengthened its air forces as ordered by the Imperial Headquarters. It was planned to hold the defensive zone of the Southern Army - SINDA Islands from Western NEW GUINEA and PALAU Island - by the combined forces of the air and ground units. The air bases in Western NEW GUINEA and HALMAHERA were almost completed in April. In the last 10 days of April, due to enemy landings on HOLLANDIA, the 4th Air Force in this area suffered heavy losses. The 7th Air Division in North AUSTRALIA was able to recover from the damages inflicted on them in the NEW GUINEA campaign.

The 4th Air Force was put under the command of the army, and the 7th Air Division, under the 4th Air Force. The 7th Air Division was used to repel the enemy in Western NEW GUINEA, but the unit was so weak that it was useless. In the middle part of May the 4th Air Division was put under the 4th Air Force, and the 2nd Air Division was put under the army.

In the latter part of May the enemy landed on BIAK. At that time it had not yet decided whether the newly arrived 2nd Air Division would go immediately into action in HALMAHERA or wait until they were better prepared. After some consultation, it was decided that the battle ground would be the Southern part of the Central PHILIPPINES for the following reasons: first, the 2nd Air Division as a decisive force would not be strong enough until August; second, the strength of the air force in the previous battle proved it was not ready for another battle as soon; and, lastly, judging from the speed of the enemy's progress, it would be better to wait.

b. The strategic value of HALMAHERA needs no explanation. Because of the value of this position, if conditions permit, the army will inaugurate plans to concentrate the air force there to repel enemy attack to maintain HALMAHERA and Western NEW GUINEA as key points.

c. Targets were to be limited to transport ships. The desire of the Imperial Headquarters until now had been to transport air power, to destroy enemy air power and to have cooperation between air and ground forces. It was regrettable that the Headquarters did not give any thought to destroying ships attacking our defensive positions.

III. In July, during the PHILIPPINE campaign, Imperial Headquarters secretly ordered the main units of the air forces to the southern area, to be attached to the 4th Air Force. The army discussed plans on how to use the selected units of the 3rd Air Force.

It was decided to use the Air Defense Unit in the PHILIPPINES, since the Southern Army had no value other than supporting the units there.

**Section b. Preparation for Establishing Air Bases.**

1. Preparation for establishing air bases in North AUSTRALIA were started after the 7th Air Division came to the area in 1943. They were almost completed by the end of the year; and, in 1944, by order of the Imperial Headquarters, the 2nd Army prepared air bases in the Western NEW GUINEA, HALMAHERA and MAINADO areas; by the end of April they were almost completed. However, before our air forces could use the bases, the enemy attacked and captured them. Since the Imperial Headquarters did not want a recurrence of such incidents, it ordered the ground forces in the respective areas to be prepared to destroy the air bases if necessary.

2. Until now, there was a scarcity of men in the PHILIPPINES, and establishing air bases was difficult. There were only a few key bases to supply NEW GUINEA and North AUSTRALIA; and, it was important to establish new air bases in this area to carry out the operation. The Imperial Headquarters, looking to the construction of new air bases, issued "preparation for battle order no. 11" which it communicated to the army, who ordered that the necessary units for establishing air bases be attached to the 14th Area Army.

3. The field of operation of the 3rd and 4th Air Forces was divided by BARA, MACASSAR and LOMBOK Straits. To facilitate the north and south movement of the troops in North AUSTRALIA, the air bases in North BORNEO had to be strengthened. Because of the lack of depth of air bases in this area, North BORNEO was included in the field of operation of the 4th Air Force under the Security Army of North BORNEO. The 3rd Air Force was to be used to help the 4th Air Force.

**Section c. Rear Echelon Preparation of the 4th Air Force.**

1. When the 4th Air Force hastily withdrew from NEW GUINEA, it had only the 21st Ground Crew Unit in HALMAHERA and WASHILE. Due to the lack of ground crews, it was difficult to keep up maintenance in the 7th Air Division; therefore, the ground crew of the 3rd Air Force in JAVA was sent to help out.

2. The ground crews which were sent from JAPAN and MANCHURIA were to be put under the 4th Air Force; but the greater part of the convey was damaged and could not be used. The MANILA Air Depot was the only unit attached to the Headquarters that could be used in preparing for the operation. The latter was asked to put the MANILA Air Depot under the 4th Air Force in the Southern Army.

3. Until now the air materials were supplied from MANILA to North AUSTRALIA, but due to the complications in the SULU and CELEBES Seas, the 3rd Air Force was ordered to supply them from the JAVA area.

4. The Air Training Corps in the PHILIPPINES under the 4th Air Force was primarily put there to strengthen the front line forces; but, because of raids by enemy planes in the middle part of September, they could not carry out the training program. After that it was thought necessary that the troops be self supporting. The Imperial Headquarters ordered the Air Training Corps to the JAVA and FRENCH INDO-CHINA area under the 3rd Air Force.



**Section d. HALMAHERA Operation and the Strengthening of Anti-Aircraft Defense in MANILA.**

1. The view of the Southern Army was the same as before on operations and defensive problems. If the enemy suddenly captured HALMAHERA and make use of our air bases, our preparation for the PHILIPPINES operation would be delayed and our use of the eastern seas beyond BORNEO would become impossible. It was planned that if there was an enemy landing on HALMAHERA, the combined forces of the 2nd Area Army and the 4th Air Force would be used. Due to an erroneous report of enemy landings in DAVAO, the transporting of air troops was delayed; and the 4th Air Force and the 7th Air Division missed an opportunity to crush the enemy.
2. From the middle of September enemy planes frequently bombed the PHILIPPINES and caused much damage to the 4th Air Force. The fighter planes which were expected from JAPAN in the latter part of September had not yet arrived. For these reasons, to protect the transports in the area, the anti-aircraft defense in MANILA had to be strengthened; also, enemy attacks on the PHILIPPINES were expected shortly. The army in the early part of October, ordered the 26th and 204th Air Units from the 3rd Air Force to be placed under the 4th Air Force.

**Section e. Operations in Other Areas.**

A coordinated attack by AMERICAN Forces from the East and BRITISH Forces from the South and West were expected. The army ordered the 3rd Air Force to take strict precaution. In case of war in the PHILIPPINES, the communications in the SOUTH Sea area were to be strengthened; and the protection of the air lines route between JAPAN and the Southern Area via FRENCH INDO-CHINA was also to be strengthened. The 25th Air Corps Headquarters, which was supposed to be under the 4th Air Force, was dispatched to Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA to strengthen the air bases there.

**Chapter III. PHILIPPINES Operation.**

**Section a. LEYTE Campaign.**

1. 17 Oct. - A report received that a unit of the enemy forces had landed on SURAN Island, mouth of LEYTE Bay. The army ordered the 4th Air Force to report on enemy conditions; but, due to bad weather a thorough check could not be made. From the report of the navy and other sources it was clear that the enemy had made the landings. The army advised the Imperial Headquarters to put into effect orders "She" No. 1 and on the evening of 18th orders to that effect came from the Imperial Headquarters. The army ordered the 4th Air Force to attack in full strength, and the 3rd Air Force to prepare for the transport of forces as secretly ordered before.
2. Because of poor weather conditions, the concentration of the 4th Air Force did not run smoothly. The plans had been used sparingly up to then when attacking, but the army ordered it to concentrate its full strength from then on. The main force of the navy planned to attack the enemy fleet on the eastern coast of the PHILIPPINES. The 4th Air Force planned to cooperate with the navy in the offensive; but, due to the delay in gathering the forces, the attack was postponed till 24 October.
3. The army ordered the 14th Area Army to help reinforce LEYTE and to attack and destroy the enemy, and ordered the air force to cooperate in the attack. The 4th Air Force, after several days of battle, suffered heavy losses as did the navy.



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The necessity of closer cooperation between the army and naval air forces became evident. On 28 October, the "point of cooperation between the Army and Naval Air Forces in the LEYTE Campaign," as stated in appended paper no. 5, was agreed upon by the army in that the 4th Air Force should cooperate with the Southwest Fleet.

#### Section b. LUZON Operation.

1. With the increasing strength of the enemy air power, reinforcing of troops in LEYTE by the 14th Area Army became difficult; however, landings of troops were made. Due to bad conditions, supplying of munitions and equipment did not run smoothly. The 4th Air Force, with the cooperation of the Air Reconnaissance Corps, began the attack on 7 Dec. On the morning of the same day, part of the enemy force landed in ORMOG Bay, so the 14th Army stopped its operation and sent its forces toward ORMOC. With this, the LEYTE Campaign was over. With the enemy landing in MINDORO, the 14th Army changed its plan to challenge the enemy on the coast for a delaying action in the LUZON Hills. But the army revoked the 14th Army's change of plans and issued orders to carry out the original plan ("Sho" no. 1). In the latter part of December all staff officers were sent to MANILA, but the 14th Army had already begun the fight in LUZON. The air units changed their plans to assist the 14th Army in the operation.

2. To have the operation run smoothly, the 14th Army in LUZON and the 4th Air Force combined their forces. On 1 January 1945 the 4th Air Force was placed under the 14th Army; and, at the same time, the 7th Air Division, which had no direct relation to the 4th Air Force in the operation, and air units which were taken from the 3rd Air Force to help out in other operations were returned and replaced in the 3rd Air Force.

3. In December the AMERICAN Army made landings on MINDORO and inflicted heavy damages. The 2nd Air Division in PAGODORO had only 10 to 15 planes left; and, because of the damages inflicted by enemy planes, the air bases could not be used. The army planned to transfer the 2nd Air Division Headquarters to FRENCH INDO-CHINA to prepare for the operation in that area. The 4th Air Force also was ordered to prepare for this transfer, but the Imperial Headquarters ordered it to stay in the PHILIPPINES.

#### Chapter IV. Delayed Action Operation in the Southern Area.

##### Section a. The Return of the 4th Air Force.

1. In the early part of January, AMERICAN Landing Forces on LUZON were attacked by the main strength of the 4th Air Force; but, the landing could not be checked. The 4th Air Force planned to retreat to Southern FORMOSA to recover from its losses, to establish air bases there, and also to establish advance bases in GAGAYAN Valley in LUZON and cooperated with the 14th Army in the operation. The headquarters was changed to HEITO (FORMOSA). Due to heavy losses, the army, in the latter part of January, advised the Imperial Headquarters that the headquarters of the 4th Air Force was not needed and that it be returned home. In the latter part of January orders to that effect were issued; all units under the 4th Air Force were transferred to the 3rd Air Force and other forces. The following units were included in the order of battle of the 3rd Air Force: 2nd Air Division Headquarters, 13th Air Brigade Headquarters, 15th, 30th and 31st Air Regiments, 9th Air Division Headquarters, 70th Air Corps, 13th and 24th Air Regiments, 10th Independent Air Brigade Headquarters, 67th



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Remarks:

1. Units within squares will be sent to other operational areas after the Burma operation is completed.

2. In the event it is impossible to form the (x) new units as specified the equivalent strength will be substituted in its place.

3. If necessary increase the number of headquarters reconnaissance planes of the newly established units and organize the headquarters reconnaissance planes after the completion of the BURMA operation with the (x) newly established fighter unit in MALAY and the 41st Air Company as the basis.

Units under the direct control of the  
Southern Army

Suma

Java

13th Special Air Transport Bn Hdq. 1st & 2nd Co.	3rd Air Brigade Hdq.	4th Airfield Brigade Hdq.
12th Air Transport Co.	59th Air Regiment	24th Airfield Bn.
1st Raiding Group	75th Air Regiment	28th Airfield Bn.
16th Field Air Dept.	27th Air Regiment	Part - 1st Air Signal Unit
25th Air Sub-depot	73rd Air Co.	9th Airfield Construction Unit
19th Air Repair Unit	81st Air Regt. (1)	Part - 9th Airfield Construction Unit
20th Air Supply Unit	7th Air Transp. Unit. 1st & 2nd Co.	4th Balloon Unit
1st Air Route Regt.	3rd Ind Air Brig. Hdq	23rd Special Truck Unit
25th Field Balloon Unit	even air regt	123rd Special Detail Unit
Air Technical Unit	75th Air Regt	1 Co. - 34th Airfield Bn.
1st Field Air Replacement Unit	1st Co. 81st Air Regt	41st Airfield Bn.
	73rd Air Co.	35th Airfield Bn.
		1/2 82nd Airfield Bn.
		1st Truck Unit
		28th Air Signal Unit
		18th Shipping Air Depot
		93rd Airfield Bn.
		33rd Airfield Co.
		7th Airfield Co.

13th Special Air Transport Bn Hdq.  
1st and 2nd Co.

3 Ind. Air Brig Hdq

4th Airfield Brig Hdq

15th Special Air Transp. Bn Hdq.

even air regt

123rd Special Detail Unit



## Malaya

## Burma

## Thailand

3rd Air Div Hdq	5th Airfield Co.	5th Air Div Hdq	7th Airfield Brig Hdq
12th Air Brig Hdq	84th Airfield Bn(-)	4th Air Brig Hdq	40th Airfield Bn
11th Air Regt.	15th Air Sig Unit	50th Air Regt	97th Airfield Bn
10th Air Regt	17th Air Intell Unit	8th Air Regt	13th Airfield Bn
1 Co 81st Air Regt	6th Field Airfield Construction Unit	14th Air Regt	9th Airfield Bn
63rd Air Bn Hdq	7th Field Airfield Construction Unit	10th Air Bn Hdq	29th Airfield Co
15th Spec Air Transp Bn Hdq	Parts of 12th & 15th Air Repair Unit	77th Air Regt	1st Air Coms Unit (lack com)
1st & 2nd Co	20th A A Unit	78th Air Regt	3rd Intell (H/S FN)
48th Guard Unit	2nd Spec Transp Unit	31st Air Regt	4th Airfield Const Unit
2nd Balloon Co		62nd Air Regt	34th Air Unit
17th Shipping Air Depot	86th Truck Unit	11th Air Trans Co	190th Truck Unit
15th Airfield Brig Hdq	160th Truck Unit	7th Air Brig Hdq	80th Ground Detail Unit
19th Airfield Brig Hdq	167th Truck Unit	64th Air Regt	275th Special Truck Unit
92nd Airfield Bn	184th Truck Unit	12th, 98th & 7th Air Regt	12th Airfield Bn Hdq
96th Airfield Bn	68th Ground Detail Unit	47th Air Co	1 Co 84th Airfield Bn
82nd Airfield Bn (-)	69th Ground Detail Unit	71st Air Co	94th, 17th & 23rd Airfield Bn
	43rd Guard Unit	8th Field Airfield Construction Unit	35th Truck Bn
8th Airfield Const Unit	90th Air Regt	16th Air Intell Unit	6th Ground Detail Unit
15th Indep Air Bn Hdq	50th Air Co	1st Indep. Air Intell Unit	32nd & 36th AA Unit
70th Ground Detail Unit	57th Air Co		
21st Airfield Bn	22nd Airfield Bn		
36th Airfield Bn	91st Airfield Bn		
27th Airfield Bn			
81st Air Regt (-1)	48th Guard Unit	3rd Air Div Hdq	Air Army Hdq (newly formed)
X Air Regt (newly formed (-))	86th Truck Unit	4th Air Brig Hdq	7th Airfield Brig Hdq

French - Indochina

Philippine

- |                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1st Airfield Brig Hdq                 | (x) Indep Air Brig Hdq                          |
| 33rd Airfield Co                      | (x) Air Co. (Both newly formed, above included) |
| 35th Airfield Co                      | 52nd Air Co                                     |
| 3rd Airfield Co                       | 16th Air Regt                                   |
| 6th Airfield Co                       | (x) Air Co (newly formed)                       |
| 12th Airfield Co                      | 11th Airfield Brig Hdq                          |
| 261st Spec Truck Unit                 | 32nd Airfield Co                                |
| 81st Ground Detail Unit               | 13th Airfield Co                                |
| 21st Indep Air Bn Hdq                 | 16th Airfield Bn                                |
| 64th Air Co                           | 297th Spec Truck Unit                           |
| 82nd Air Co                           | 1st Ground Detail Unit                          |
| (x) Air Co (2)<br>(newly established) | 56th Guard Unit                                 |
|                                       | 1st Mobile Repair Unit                          |
|                                       | 2nd Balloon Bn Hdq                              |
|                                       | 3rd Balloon Co                                  |

Estimated strength and disposition

Time:

Aim: To facilitate the holding of important Southern Areas

the disposition of Air Forces in Southern and

Situation during the

Strength that can be used for other operations

Appendix

Outline Chart of the organization of the

- 10th Indep Air Bn Hdq
- 76th Air Co
- 74th Air Co
- 48th Airfield Bn
- 40th AA Unit

Indep Air Bn Hdq (x) Air Brig Hdq

1e 2e 3e 4e 5e 6e 7e 8e 9e 10e



13th Special Air Transport Bn Hdq.  
1st and 2nd Co.

3 Ind. Air Brig Hdq

4th Airfield Brig Hdq

15th Special Air Transp. Bn Hdq.  
1st & 2nd Co.

11th Air Transp. Co.

75th Air Regt,

35th Airfield Bn.

12th Air Transp. Co.

1st Co. 81st Air Regt & 82nd Airfield Bn

16th Field Air Depot

81st Air Regt.

1 Co. 84th Airfield Bn

19th Field Air Repair Unit

73rd Air Co.

33rd Airfield Co.

20th Field Air Supply Unit

7th Airfield Company

25th Air Sub-depot

25th Air Signal Unit

1st Raiding Group

9th Airfield Construction  
Unit

25th Field Balloon Unit

298th Special Truck Unit

Air Technical Dept

1st Truck Unit

1st Field Airfield Construction Unit

123 Ground Detail Unit

17th Shipping Air Depot

Part - 9th Field Air  
Repair Unit

18th Shipping Air Depot

4th Balloon Co.

87th Airfield Bn

81st Air Regt (-1)	48th Guard Unit	3rd Air Div Hdq	Air Army Hdq (newly formed)
X Air Regt (newly)	66th Truck Unit	4th Air Brig Hdq	7th Airfield Brig Hdq
Part 12th Field Air Repair Depot	160th Truck Unit	5th Air Regt	1 Co 84th Airfield Bn
82nd Air Bn	68th Ground Detail Unit	6th Air Regt	15th Airfield Bn
89th Air Co	69th Ground Detail Unit	7th Air Regt.	9th Airfield Co
Part 15th Field Air Repair Depot	7th Field Airfield Construction Unit	8th Air Co	29th Airfield Co
1st Balloon Bn Hdq	2nd Balloon Co		16th Air Intell Unit
1st Balloon Co	20th AA unit		1st Indep Air Intell Unit
15th Airfield Brig Hdq	5th Airfield Co		18th Air Communication Unit (portion missing)
82nd Airfield Bn (-1/2)	96th Airfield Bn		36th AA Unit
92nd Airfield Bn	17th Air Intell Unit		32nd AA Unit
84th Airfield Bn (-2/3)			43rd Guard Unit
15th Air Signal Unit (portion missing)	<del>78th</del>		4th Field Airfield Construction Unit
6th Field Airfield Construction Unit			5th Field Airfield Construction Unit
			3-5th Spec Truck Bn
			275th Truck Unit
			80th Ground Detail Unit
			67th Ground Detail Unit
			190th Truck Unit



the Army Air Forces according to the progress of operations. and the air operations of the holding operations, the disposition other areas will be completed.

the latter part of March

other Estimated strength and disposition at the end of the Burma Campaign

1st Indus Air Bn Hdq	(x) Air Brig Hdq
82nd Air Co	(x) Air Co
84th Air Co	52nd Air Co
(x) Air Co (Newly formed)	(x) Air Co
85th Airfield Co.	16th Air Regt
88th Airfield Co	11th Airfield Bn Hdq
1st Airfield Brig Hdq	32nd Airfield Co
2nd Airfield Co	13th Airfield Co
6th Airfield Co.	18th Airfield Bn
12th Airfield Co	297th Spec Truck Unit
281st Spec Truck Unit	111th Ground Detail Unit
31st Ground Detail Unit	56th Guard Unit
	7th Mobile Repair Unit
	2nd Balloon Bn Hdq
	3rd Balloon Co

Imperial General Headquarters' plan for the disposition of Southern Area Air Units  
(7 March)

Area	End of April	End of 1942	1st Part of 1943
Philippine Island	22nd Air Brigade Hdq. 10th Indep. Air Bn. Hdq 52nd Air Co. 74th Air Co. 16th Air Regt.  Part 50th Air Unit 62nd Air Regt.	22nd. Air Brigade Hdq. 10th Indep. Air Bn Hdq. 74th Air Co. 76th Air Co. (X) Air Co (newly formed) 16th Air Regt.	22nd Air Brigade Hdq. 10th Indep. Air Unit 74th Air Co. 76th Air Co. 16th Air Regt  (X) Air Regt (newly formed)
French Indo-China	21st Indep. Air Bn Hdq 84th Air Co. 82nd Air Co.	21st Indep Air Bn Hdq 84th Air Co. 82nd Air Co. (X) Air Co. (newly formed)	
Thailand	5th Air Division Hdq. 4th Air Brigade		4th Air Brigade
Burma	47th Air Co. 50th Air Regt 8th Air Regt		50th Air Unit 8th Air Unit (X) Air Regt (newly formed)
Malaya	14th Air Regt  7th Air Brigade 64th Air Regt. 12th Air Regt 98th Air Regt 1 Co 81st Air Regt.  10th Air Brig. 77th Air Regt 27th Air Regt 31st. Air Regt 70th Air Co 83rd Indep. Air Unit 71st Air Co 89th Air Co.		(X) Air Co.(newly formed) 83rd Indep. Air Unit 71st Air Co 89th Air Co 73rd Air Unit  47th Air Regt.
Java	3rd Air Brigade 59th Air Regiment 75th Air Regiment 1 Co. 81st Air Regt. 73rd Air Co.	3rd Air Brigade 59th Air Regiment 75th Air Regiment 81st Air Regiment	3rd Air Brigade 59th Air Regiment 75th Air Regiment 81st Air Regiment
Sumatra			

21st Air Bn Hdq } newly formed  
 84th Air Co }  
 82nd Air Co }  
 (X) Air Co }  
 73rd Air Unit }  
 83rd Indep. Air Unit }  
 71st Air Co }  
 89th Air Co }  
 77th Air Regt }  
 27th Air Regt }  
 31st. Air Regt }  
 70th Air Co }  
 83rd Indep. Air Unit }  
 71st Air Co }  
 89th Air Co }  
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Units that can be used for other operations	3 Air Div. HQ 15th Indep. Air Unit 50th Air Co. 51st Air Co. 60th & 90th Air Regt <small>12th Air Regt 13th Air Regt 11th Air Regt</small>	5th Air Div. HQ 52nd Air Co. 62nd Air Regt. 10th Air Brigade 77,27, 31 Air Regt	7th Air Brigade 70th Air Co. 64th Air Regt. 12th Air Regt 98th Air Regt
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## Disposition of Southern Army Air Force

17 April

Distribution of troops	Units directly attached to Southern Army	Units under the command of 3rd Air group	Units under the command of 5th Air group
Phillipines (units under the command of 14 Army Hdq)	22nd Air Brigade Hdq. 10th Indep. Air Bn Hdq. 76th Air Co. 52nd & 74th Air Co. 16th Air Regt. 11th Airfield Brig. Hdq. 48th & 18th Bn. 13th, 32nd & 8th Co. 1st Mobile Air Repair Unit Part of 84th Air Co 2nd Balloon Bn Hdq 3rd Balloon Co.	60th Air Regt. 96th Airfield Bn.	62nd Air Regt 297th Special Truck Unit 111th Ground Detail Unit 56th Guard Unit 40 Anti-Aircraft Unit
French-Indo (Directly attached to Southern Army)	21st Indep. Air Bn. Hdq 84th & 82nd Air Co. 85th & 88th Airfield Co. 13th Special Air Transp. Unit 15th Special Air Transp. Unit 25th Air Sub-depot 25th Field Balloons 1st Air Route Regt 1st Field Replacement Unit	1st Airfield Bn. Hdq 6 Airfield Co. 281st Special Truck Unit 81st Ground Detail Unit	
Thailand-Burma Units under command of 5th Air Div. Hdq	1st Raiding Group 47th Air Co. 7th Air Transp. Unit 19th Field Air Repair Unit Under command of 3rd Air Div 35th Truck Bn 190th Truck Unit 275th Special Truck Unit 62nd Guard Unit Command of 15th Army Hdq 83rd Indep Air Unit (less 73rd Air Co. & 1 Co of 84th Airfield Bn)	7th Air Brig Hdq 64, 12th & 98th Air Regt 12th Air Brigade 1st & 11th(-1/3) Air Regt. 1st Co. 81 Air Regt 27th Air Regt 7th Airfield Bn Hdq 18th " " " 15th " " " 9th " " Co 29th " " " 5th " " " 1/2 82nd Airfield Bn 1 Co. 92nd Airfield Bn 2 " 94th " " 17th Airfield Bn (- 1 Co) 23rd " " " " Parts of 12th & 15th Air Repair Unit 20th & 36th AA Unit 16th Air Intel. Unit (minus a part) 280th Spec. Truck Unit 80th & 67th Ground Detail Unit 8th Field Airfield Const. Unit 12th Airfield Co. (Attached directly	5th Air Div. Hdq 4th Air Brig Hdq 50,8,14th Air Regt 10th Air Brig. Hdq 70th Air Co. 77 & 31 Air Regt 40th Airfield Bn 97th Airfield Bn 1st Air Communication Unit (less part) 4th Field Airfield Construction Unit 11th Air Transp Co

## 8th Field Airfield Const.

## Unit

12th Airfield Co.  
(Attached directly  
to Southern Army)

Malaya  
Under command of  
3rd Air Div Hdq

1st Balloon Bn Hdq  
1st Balloon Co.  
2nd Balloon Co.  
Directly attached to Southern  
Army  
Southern Air Tech. Dept  
20th Field Air Supply Depot  
16th Field Air Repair Depot  
Command of 3rd Air Div Hdq  
160th Truck Unit  
Command of 16th Field Air  
Depot  
184th Truck Unit

3rd Air Div Hdq  
90th Air Regt  
15th Airfield Bn Hdq  
12th " " "  
21st " " "  
22nd " " "  
27th " " "  
92nd " " "  
93rd " " (less 1 Co)  
91st " " "  
1 Co. 17th Airfield Bn.  
" " 23rd " "  
" " 94th " "  
15th Air Comm. Unit, less part  
5th, 6th & 7th Field  
Airfield Const. Unit  
Part 15th Field Air Depot  
32nd HA Unit  
86th Truck Unit  
1st Truck Unit  
68th & 69th Ground  
Detail Unit  
48th Guard Unit  
12th Air Transp. Unit  
Command 16th Field Air  
Depot  
43rd Guard Unit

Java-Sumatra  
(Units under the  
command of 3rd  
Air Div Hdq)

18th Shipping Air Depot  
4th Balloon Co.  
Under command of 16th Army Hdq  
73rd Air Co  
1 Co. 84th Airfield Bn  
167th Truck Unit

3 Air Brig. Hdq  
59th Air Regt  
75th Air Regt  
81st Air Regt (-1 Co)  
1 Co. 11th Air Regt  
33rd Airfield Co.  
7th Airfield Co.  
41st Airfield Bn  
35th " "  
82nd " " (-1)  
25th Air Comm. Unit  
Part 16th Air Instal.  
Unit  
Part 15th Air Depot  
4th Airfield Bn Hdq  
24th Airfield Bn  
28th Airfield Bn  
Part 1st Air Com-  
munication Unit  
9th Field Airfield  
Const. Unit  
Part 9th Field Air  
Repair Unit  
298th Special Truck  
Unit  
123rd Ground Detail  
Unit



## DISPOSITION OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY'S AIR FORCE

( 1st August )

Order of Battle	Distribution of troops	Units under the Command of 3rd Army Air Force				Units under the command of the Army Air Force	
		Units under the direct control of the Southern Army	Directly attached	3rd Air Brigade	12th Air Brigade		5th Air Division
FRENCH INDO CHINA	Directly attached to the Army Air Force	1st Air Transport Unit 2nd Air Transport Unit	1st Field Air Replacement Unit part of 1st Air Route Regt. 1st and 2nd Bns. of 19th Field Air Supply Depot 25 Field Meteorological Unit (less an element)			Brigade headquarters 1st Airfield Bn. part of 12th Airfield Company. 21st Special Truck Unit 81st Guard Unit	
	21st Independent Air Unit		21st Independent Air Bn. HQ 84th Air Co. 82nd Air Co. 88th Airfield Company 85th Airfield Company			9th Ground Detail Unit of 8th Division	
THAILAND	DIVISION	Directly attached to the Army Air Force	Part of 1st Air Route Regiment. 3rd Bn. HQ of 19th Field Air Repair Depot. 1st & 2nd Bns. of 20th Field Air Supply Depot 1 part of 25th Field Meteorological Unit.		12th Airfield Unit	(portion missing)	
		5th AIR	83th Independent Air Bn. HQ. 71st Air Co. 89th Air Co. 91st Air Co. 84th Airfield Battalion (less 1 company) 11th Air Transport Co. 4th Airfield Company part of 23rd A.A. Unit.		5th Air Division HQ 4th Air Brig. HQ. 8th Air Regt. 64th Air Regt. 81st Air Regt. 7th Airfield Brigade HQ. 82nd Airfield Bn. 2 Co. of 94th	17th Shipping Air Depot 18th Shipping Air Depot (Now in JAPAN Proper)	
BUKA	5th AIR		5th Radio Platoon 8th Radio Platoon 46th Fixed Radio Platoon		Airfield Bn. 5th Airfield Bn. 9th Airfield Bn.	1st Air Signal Unit (less a portion) 16th Air Intell. Unit (less a portion) 17th Air Intell. Unit. 4th Airfield Construction Unit 8th Airfield Const. Unit. 20th A.A. Unit 3rd A.A. Unit 36th A.A. Unit 28th Special Truck Unit 86th Truck Unit 6th Ground Detail Unit 8th Ground Regt.	29th Truck Unit 27th Special Unit 35th Special Truck Bn. 62nd Guard Unit.
		Directly attached to the Army Air Force	South Air Technical Department. 13th Special Air Transport Unit 15th Special Air Transport Unit	1st Air Route Regt. (main force) Bn. HQ. (main force) 12th Air Transport Co. part of 1st Field Air replacement unit 1st Bn. HQ. of Field Air Repair Depot 20th Field Air Supply Depot Bn. HQ. 1st Field Meteorological Bn. HQ. 1st Airfield Bn.	43rd Guard Unit	5th Airfield Brig. HQ. 14th Airfield Bn. 27th Airfield Const. Unit. 1st Airfield Const. Unit. 9th Ground Detail Unit 48th Guard Unit part of 1st Air Signal Unit. 7th Airfield Company	184th Truck Unit 15th Air Signal Unit (less a portion)

		46th Fixed Radio Platoon		4th Airfield Construction Unit 8th Airf. Const. Un. 20th A.A. Unit 33rd A.A. Unit 34th A.A. Unit 20th Spe. Truck Un. 8th Truck Unit 6th Gr. Detl Unit 8th Gr. Detl Unit	62nd Guard Unit.
MALAY	Directly attached to the Army Air Force	South Air Technical Department. 13th Special Air Transport Unit 15th Special Air Transport Unit	1st Air Route Regt. (main force) Bn. HQ. (main force) 12th Air Transport Co. part of 1st Field Air replacement unit 1st Bn. HQ. of Field Air Repair Depot 20th Field Air Supply Depot Bn. HQ. 1st Field Meteorological Bn. HQ. 1st Airfield Bn.	43rd Guard Unit	50th Airfield Brig. HQ. 14th Airfield Bn. 27th Airfield Const. Un. 1st Airfield Const. Un. 9th Gr. Detail Unit 48th Guard Unit part of 1st Air Signal Unit. 7th Airfield Company 184th Truck Unit 15th Air Signal Unit (less a portion)
					14th Air Regt. 7th Air Brigade HQ. 12th Air Regiment 98th Air Regiment 9th Airfield Battalion (less 2 companies) 17th Airfield Battalion 23rd Airfield Battalion 97th Airfield Battalion
JAVA	Directly attached to the Army Air Force	15th Air Signal Unit 2nd Bn. of 16th Field Air Repair Depot. 4th Bn. of 20th Field Air Supply Depot. 2nd Airfield Bn.			
	3rd Air Brigade	73rd Air Company	3rd Air Brigade HQ. 59th Air Regiment 75th Air Regiment 70th Air Co. 4th Airfield Brigade HQ 24th Airfield Battalion 41st Airfield Battalion 35th Airfield Battalion 28th Airfield Battalion 29th Airfield Company 9th Airfield Construc- tion Unit 296th Special Truck Unit 123rd Ground Detail Unit.		167th Truck Unit
	Directly attached to the Army Air Force	3rd Bn. of 16th Field Air Repair Depot Agency of 20th Field Air Supply Unit.		12th Airfield Brig. HQ. 21st Airfield Bn. 22nd Airfield Bn. 33rd Airfield Company 6th Airfield Construction Unit. 68th Ground Detail Unit	part of 15th Air Signal Unit.
SUMATRA	12th Air Brigade	18th A.A. Artillery Brigade HQ. 16th A.A. Unit 23rd A.A. Unit (less a portion) 34th A.A. Unit 40th A.A. Unit		12th Air Brigade HQ. 1st Air Regiment 11th Air Regiment	Part of 1st Air Signal Unit. Part of 16th Air Intelligence Unit 160th Truck Unit



Appended Sheet No. 1

Outline Chart of the Organization of the Army Air  
Force According to the Progress of operations. 35

Appended Sheet No. 2

Imperial General Headquarter's Plan for the Dispo-  
sition of Southern Area Air Units. (7 March) 36

Appended Sheet No. 3

Disposition of Southern Army Air Force

Appended Sheet No. 4

Disposition of Southern Army Air Force (1 Aug) 37

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Air Regiment and the 45th Air Corps.

**Section b. Self Maintaining Battle.**

If the enemy lands on LUZON, it was expected that communication between JAPAN and the Southern Army would become difficult. It would necessitate a delaying action, and that army would have to be self maintaining. From the middle of January all planes and materials in FORMOSA which were to be sent to LUZON were to be shipped to the 3rd Air Force. Orders were issued that after that preparations should be made to have smaller planes self maintaining.

**Section c. Transfer of Forces for the Battle of JAPAN.**

If the enemy were to land on OKINAWA, it was expected that the battle of JAPAN would be near. The Imperial Headquarters ordered all air forces in the Southern Army to return to JAPAN. This began in the early part of July, the planes going by way of FORMOSA; and, by the latter part of the same month the movement was completed.

**Appended Sheet No. 5**

**LEYTE Campaign**

**Outline of the Cooperation of Army and Naval Air Forces.**

(28 Oct. 1944 Southern Army Southwestern Fleet).

**I. Purpose.**

a. The principal objective of the Army and Naval Air Force is rapidly to gain command of the air and sea around LEYTE by close cooperation.

**II. Outline of the Plans.**

a. The time of the Concentration of Forces for the Campaign.

The key points of the plan includes the blockade of the enemy air bases in TACLOBAN and the destruction of the enemy fleet in LEYTE Bay.

**1. Blockading of Enemy Air Bases and Destruction of the Fleet.**

The army will continue to use the main strength of the 4th Air Force for this operation. The navy is to destroy the enemy fleet. If opportunity permits, blockade the enemy air bases; close cooperation between the navy and air force will be required to reach the objective.

**2. Destruction of the Remaining Enemy Carriers.**

The navy has the duty of patrolling the area, and the army is to cooperate when necessary. The navy will have one powerful force ready to attack at all times. The above mentioned force and the "TO" Unit of the army will be used in attacking. If some unforeseen circumstance arises, the navy will concentrate its forces and the army will cooperate with the necessary units.



3. Neutralization of Enemy Air Bases in MOLOTAI.

The army will be in charge of the reconnaissance. The selected units of the army and navy will carry out attacks at any opportune time. The "GI" Unit of the army will make raids when opportunity permits.

4. Maintaining the Command of the CAMOTES Sea.

The navy with the help of the air unit, will drive out the enemy from the inland seas west of SAN BERNADINO, LEYTE and SURAGAO Straits and also isolate the inland seas. The Army Air Force will cooperate with the navy.

5. Defense of Troop Transports.

The army will directly protect the selected units from PARAMBAN (32d Air Regiment, 24th Independent Air Company); about 40 planes could be used. If the navy can strengthen its air force a part of it will be used to protect transports.

III. Air Cooperation with the Ground Forces during the Offensive.

Will be decided later.

IV. Details of the Operation will be decided by the 4th Air Force and the Combined Air Group Force.

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