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Central Pacific Operations Record, Vol II

The Palau Operations

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Central PACIFIC Area Operation Record - Vol. II

Compiled by the First Demobilization Bureau - September 1946

851-2

Note: - This record was drawn up by the former chief of staff of the 14th Division, Colonel TADA, with the assistance of former staff officer, Colonel NAKAGAWA. Diaries and memorandums of both officers plus other materials were used as references for the drafting of this record.

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Outline of the Battle in the PALAU Area

Chapter I. Details Concerning the Dispatching of the 14th Division to PALAU.

After The 14th Division had been ~~stationed~~ moved to in MANCHURIA since September 1939, and it had exerted ~~its~~ efforts ~~in~~ molding itself into a well-trained unit at TSITSIHAR. On 31 January 1944, it received a confidential order concerning the reorganization of the division, after returning some units to their original units, and the departure of the division to the West NEW GUINEA area. They started preparations on 1 March and, with the exdeption of some units, completed these preparations on 5 March as expected. Following this, the division, after 10 March, gradually advanced to PORT ARTHUR for its final training before going to the front. On 26 March, the 31st Army Commander decided the disposition of troops, according to the plan of the Imperial General H.Q., which is as follows:

In the vicinity of SAIPAN - the 14th Division and part of the 29th Division.

In the vicinity of GUAM and PAGAN - the main force of the 29th Division and the 5th and 6th Expeditionary Units.

At PALAU - the 35th Division.

At YAP - the 4th Expeditionary Unit.

On 28 March, the 14th Div. left the port of DAIREN for SAIPAN, aboard the transports, ASOSAN MARU, NOTO MARU and TOZAN MARU, under the protection of several coast defense vessels, and following the route along the west coast of KOREA and the SETO Inland Sea, first headed for YOKOHAMA. During the latter part of March, when the above convoy was still sailing for YOKOHAMA, PALAU was attacked by an enemy task force consisting of ten aircraft carriers and eight battleships, and the important supply base of the JAPANESE Southern Army in The South + No. Australia opns was severely damaged. Consequently, the Imperial General Headquarters and the 31st Army redisposed its units as follows:

The 14th Div., which was sailing for SAIPAN, was transferred to the PALAU area. The 35th Div. which was sailing for PALAU was

transferred to MANOKWARI, BIAK and NOEMFOOR in the NEW GUINEA area.

On 6 April, after the 14th Division had left TATEYAMA for PALAU and were off the coast of IWOJIMA, there were indications that PALAU and TRUK were being attacked by the AMERICAN Task Force. Therefore, in order to avoid the enemy task force, the Commander of the escort vessels decided to take refuge at the CHICHIJIMA port and changed the course of the convoy. The convoy stayed in the CHICHIJIMA port for about ten days from 10 April. However, after leaving the CHICHIJIMA port, and with perfect protection against enemy submarine and air attacks, the convoy finally reached PALAU on 24 April.

Prior to this, in compliance with the Army order issued on 11 April, the 4th and 9th Expeditionary Forces, the 1st Sea Mobile Brigade and the Sea Transport Units were placed under the command of the 14th Division. The 14th Division Commander, as the Army Group Commander, was held responsible for the firm maintenance of strategic points on the PALAU and YAP Islands.

The gist of the Army order is as follows:

The 31st Army Order - 11 April, 1200 hours (SAIPAN).

a. The order of battle will be changed as follows:

(1). The following units will be included in the order of battle of the 31st Army: the 14th Division (excluding the Sea Transport Units); the 9th Expeditionary Unit.

(2). The following units will be excluded from the order of battle of the 31st Army: the 35th Division; the 14th Division Sea Transport Units; the 26th Anti-Aircraft Anti-Tank Machine-Cannon Company.

The time that the above units will be included or excluded from the order of battle of the 31st Army will depend upon the departure of these units from the ports in MANCHURIA, KOREA and CHINA. However, the 14th Division Sea Transport Units will be excluded from the order of battle of the 31st Army on 1 April. The 35th Division will be excluded from the order of battle of the 31st Army upon the departure

of its first transport units from TOKYO Bay.

b. The Army will quickly complete the defense preparations in the PALAU area.

c. The 14th Division Commander is appointed Commander of the Army Group in the PALAU area as of this date and will be responsible for the firm maintenance of the strategic points on the PALAU Islands (including ANGAUR) and on YAP Island.

(1). The air bases on PELELIU, ~~ANGAUR~~ ANGAUR, PALAU and YAP Islands will be firmly secured at all costs.

For this purpose, within one month of the arrival of the aforementioned units, the field positions will be completed within the two months after this, the field positions will be strengthened with fortified points.

(2). The 14th Div. Commander will establish close communications with the units of the 35th Div. in the ST. ANDOLO (TN. ?) Islands and units of the 2nd Area Army (commanded by Major-General YAMAGUCHI) in PALAU.

(3). The 14th Div. Commander will cooperate with the Navy in defending ULTHI and FAIS Islands which are included in the group of islands surrounding YAP, and obstruct the enemy's utilization of these islands.

(4). The 14th Div. Commander will immediately make preparations against the enemy's sea maneuvers by disposing one infantry battalion at strategic points on PALAU Island.

The following units will be placed under the command of the 14th Division:

The 4th Expeditionary Unit (including one company of the 52nd Anti-Aircraft Battalion).

The 9th Expeditonary Unit.

(This will become effective upon the arrival of these units at YAP).

The 1st Sea Mobile Brigade and the main force of the Sea Transport Units which were stationed at PALAU.

(This will become effective upon the arrival of the

Division Commander at PALAU).

d. The 4th Expeditionary Unit (including one company of the 52nd Anti-Aircraft Battalion) and the 9th Expeditionary Unit will be placed under the command of the 14th Division upon their arrival at YAP.

The movements of the units upon their arrival at YAP will be as follows:

(1). Part of the 4th Expeditionary Unit will be disposed near the airfields and at the vulnerable points along the east coast of YAP Island and the west coast of LIKUAN (TN ?). The main force of the 4th Expeditionary Unit will occupy the port of YAP and be prepared to maneuver whenever the circumstances necessitate it and will also control the entrance to the port in order to cover the landing of the 9th Expeditionary Unit.

Should the enemy attack the port of YAP before the 9th Expeditionary Unit arrives, the main strength of the 4th Expeditionary Unit will annihilate the enemy on the shores.

In the event that the aforementioned movements cannot be carried out, due to unavoidable circumstances, the 4th Expeditionary Unit will firmly secure the airfields and the port of YAP and hold out against the enemy until the arrival of the 9th Expeditionary Unit.

(2). Upon the arrival of the 9th Expeditionary Unit at YAP, it will take over the defense tasks of the 4th Expeditionary Unit the Eastern YAP area. Consequently, the 4th Expeditionary Unit will be placed under the command of the 9th Expeditionary Unit.

(3). The debarkation of both these Expeditionary Units will be completed as soon as possible and also, the unloaded materials will be promptly disposed and concealed as a precaution against enemy bombardments. In the event that the 9th Expeditionary Unit arrives at YAP before the 4th Expeditionary Unit, the 9th Expeditionary Unit will be responsible for carrying out the movements of the 4th Expeditionary Unit.

e. The Commander of the 31st Army will be at the Army Headquarters at SAIPAN.

Chapter II - The Disposition of Groups in the PALAU Area.

A. Plans for the Debarkation of the 14th Division at PALAU.

1. Outline.

a. Upon its arrival at the anchorage, the Division with the cooperation of the local administration, will commence debarkation. Troops and munitions will first disembark at the main island of PALAU and then the ships will proceed to the various units to unload other war materials.

b. The Division will exert its utmost to try and complete the debarkation within fifty hours.

The 14th Division Commander will confer with the head of the PALAU branch office of the 4th Shipping Transport Unit and decide what to do in case the debarkation is not completed within fifty hours. In the event that there is an enemy air or naval attack while debarking troops, counter-measures will be taken to force the debarkation. However, in the event that there is an enemy air or naval attack while debarking munitions, it will be decided according to the situation. In the event that there are signs of enemy landings simultaneously with the landing of the JAPANESE Forces, it will be decided on that occassion.

2. The landing points and the allotment of space.

The landing points and the alloted space is as shown in the appended chart.

3. Outline of debarkation.

a. The order of debarkation is as follows:

(1). Cargo crafts.

(2). Troops (equiped with complete pack and four days ration).

(3). Cannons (including reserve ammunition), tanks and trunks.

(4).Important communication materials, medical supplies, and water-proof coverings.

(5).Ammunition and fuel.

(6).Important self-supporting materials.

(7).Fortification materials.

(8).Provisions and forage.

(9).Other materials.

The above order of debarkation will be determined according to the order in which the cargo was loaded. Minute details will be decided by the Commanding Officer of the landing units or by the Commander of the transport vessels in a conference with the Commanding Officer of the debarkation working party.

4. Protection against enemy air and submarine attacks during debarkation.

a. Protection against air attacks will be as follows:

(1). After the convoy arrives at the anchorage, the anti-aircraft units on each ship will be responsible for the protection against air attacks.

(2). Each ship will be equiped with light machine-guns as protection against air attacks but definite orders will be given in accordance with the situation. The above protection units will be drawn from the landing units and placed under the command of the debarkation working party Commander.

(3). The landing units in the staging area will quickly dispose anti-aircraft units and watching parties. In the event of an enemy air attack the already landed troops will discontinue their work and repulse this attack. In order to keep the losses at a minimum, the troops not engaged in repulsing the air attack will take refuge in slit-trenches.

(4). In order to keep losses at a minimum, landed troops and munitions will be perfectly distributed and concealed.

b. Protection against enemy submarines (and speedboats) will be as follows:

(1). Anti-submarine operations will not be carried

on by the transport vessels. The transport vessels will fire upon enemy speedboats only during the day upon the orders of the transport Commander. However, this must not interrupt the movements of the escorting fleet.

(2). Some ships will be equipped with radio firing guns and automatic guns but definite orders will be given in accordance to the situation. The troops manning these guns will be drawn from the landing units.

5. Signal communications.

a. The 14th Division Commander will land with the first wave of troops and proceed to the command post on KOROL (TN. ?) Island.

b. The Division Commander will be responsible for the establishing of wireless communications between the command post and the liaison officers of each military billet and also, by utilizing boats, establish communications between liaison officers and the transport vessels.

6. Supplies.

a. Each member of the landing units will carry rations for two meals (including salt or two pickked plums) on the day of debarkation. From the second day of landing, troops still remaining on the ships will eat on the ships while the landed troops will eat in their respective units. The 59th Infantry Regiment will be responsible for the supplying of food to the debarkation working party.

7. Rescue work.

a. According to the plans of the debarkation working party, each transport vessel will be equipped with one lifeboat.

b. All patients will be taken to the relief post on land. For this purpose, relief posts will be established at the landing point (KOROL - TN ? - Pier) by the YAMADA UNit of the AKATSUKI Unit and also, relief posts will be established on each ship by its Commanding Officer.

8. Miscellaneous.

a. Commanding Officers of units larger than a battalion will, with the aid of their subordinates, ~~strictly~~ supervise the

transportation, concealment and distribution of munitions. One officer with the rank of Battalion Commander will be left aboard each ship to govern affairs within the ship until the landing is completed. The position of the debarkation officer will be clearly marked.

b. When unloading important munitions, a director will be alloted to each cargo craft in order to prevent mixture or loss of munitions.

Appended Map

The landing point and the alloted space:



The anchorage will be GARETSU Strait (TN ?). The TERU Unit is aboard Ships A, B and C. After munitions have been unloaded and accumulated at Points A, B and C, they will be distributed and concealed on PALAU Island and KOROR (TN ?) Is.

Outline of Debarkation

1. Troops.

a. The Division Commander will debart aboard the craft (HAYABUSA).

b. The Infantry Regiments, Regimental colors and the Regimental Headquarters will land in the first wave and rest at

the YAMADA Unit, stationed in the vicinity of the pier. They will then proceed on foot to their billets escorted by the company in charge of the colors.

c. Billet construction troops and message couriers will also land in the first wave.

2. Trucks and Tanks.

Trucks and tanks will be unloaded on large landing barges and landed on KOROR ~~(TN-1)~~ Island and ~~They~~ will ~~then be~~ immediately be put into use.

3. Cannons, ammunition and other material.

Cannons, ammunition and other material will quickly be distributed, concealed and covered with water-proof coverings after being unloaded.

4. Five hundred men from each ship, totaling one thousand five hundred men, will engage in the debarkation work while another five hundred men will be left on each ship to work aboard the ships until debarkation is completed.

5. The troops engaged in debarkation work will be equipped with picks, shovels, saws, hatchets, sickles, etc.

6. The plans for the execution of the landing is as shown on Separate Sheet No. 1.

B. Defense and Fortification Plans of the Army Group in the PALAU Area at the Time of the 14th Division's Arrival at PALAU.

1. Outline.

a. Anticipating an enemy attack, the Army Group will complete the deployment of troops as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the Army and Naval Units, excluding air units, responsible for the defensive preparations in the PALAU area (including the other islands of the PALAU group and YAP Island) will informaly be commanded by the Army Group and the basic preparations will be completed as soon as possible. The Army Group will establish close communications and cooperation with the units under the command of the 2nd and 8th Area Armies.

b. After the gradual deployment of the units, defense and fortification works will be established in order to annihilate any enemy landing force at the beaches. These defense and

fortification works will be gradually strengthened and the group of air bases firmly secured. For this purpose , the units will complete their field positions, with established key points, not later than one month after their deployment. Following this, the field positions will be strengthened and the key positions will be heavily fortified. The field positions will be completely fortifield within two months after the debarkation of the main force.

c. Concerning the basic defense preparations, the Army Group will have to consider the Navy's situation and establish close communication with them in order to bring about the full utilization of the combined fighting power.

2. Disposition and Preparation of Operations.

a. The disposition of troops in the PALAU area will be as follows:

Army Group Commander - the 14th Div. Commander.

The ANGAUR Detachment - two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion of the 14th Division, and the 42nd Independent Anti-Aircraft Regiment.

The PELELIU Detachment - three or four infantry battalions, one artillery battalion of the 14th Division, and the 43rd Anti-Aircraft Regiment.

The main island of PALAU and KOROR ~~(TN-4)~~ Island - Division Headquarters, three or four infantry battalions of the 14th Division, one company of the 52nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment, the 1st Sea Mobile Brigade, and the Sea Transport Units.

The YAP Detachment - the 4th Heavy Artillery Regiment, the 9th Heavy Artillery Regiment and one company of the 52nd Anti-Aircraft Regt.

b. The advanced troops will closely cooperate with the Army and Naval Units already stationed on the various islands,

and the officers and men of these advanced units will do their utmost to complete the distribution, concealment and protection of the ships and materials as a precaution against enemy air-raids.

The Commanding Officer of each island will be specially responsible for the carrying out of this work.

c. After debarkation, the various units will occupy positions at strategic points and make preparations for the annihilation of the enemy on the beaches.

In the event that the above positions cannot be occupied, due to a shortage of troops, these units will make preparations for the final positions at strategic points in the interior of the islands. Even if part of the enemy force succeeds in landing, these units will firmly secure the air bases and prevent them from being utilized by the enemy. They will also protect the landing operations of the rear units.

d. These advanced units will establish fortifications, communications, munition dumps and shelters for cargo crafts.

The units will utilize local houses as billets since new billets will not be constructed for awhile. In constructing the military installations, the most important factors to be taken into consideration are the selection of safe positions, and the strength of such installations against the intense enemy bombardments. Also the thorough placement, camouflage and concealment of such installation are vitally important. In regard to the storing of munitions, special care will be given to prevent ~~rotting~~ moisture due to tropical climate, ~~or becoming unusable.~~

e. The various units will receive training for island operations and quickly form a strong unification of spirit. All Commanding Officers will improve their commanding ability and fully cultivate the fighting power in order to be ready for any enemy attack. The 15th Regimental Command will cooperate with the 1st Sea Mobile Brigade, the Sea Transport Units and, if necessary, the PALAU branch of the 4th Shipping Transport Headquarters for the training in counter-landing operations. ALSO One

infantry battalion will be trained for this operation and a means of maneuvering among the strategic points in the PALAU Islands will be prepared.

In regard to other military education and training, instructions will be given according to the situation.

f. The various units will closely cooperate with the Naval Units already stationed on the islands, in making preparations for the operations and especially, in regard to the establishment of air bases, give whole-hearted assistance, even at the sacrifice of discontinuing part of their own construction works.

The units will utilize local materials and labor in making preparations for the operations.

g. The Army and Navy will ~~smoothly~~ cooperate in all matters, but the unification of defense preparations will be decided by the Central PACIFIC Area Fleet as shown on Separate Sheet No. 1 (Instructions for the defense unification for the land group operations of the Central PACIFIC Area Fleet).

3. Outline of Further Battle Instructions.

a. Strategic points in the PALAU area and especially the group of air bases, will be firmly secured in order to allow the air force to easily annihilate the enemy forces at sea. The most important factor is th prevent the enemy's occupation of the air bases and to annihilate them on the beaches.

b. In regard to the firm securing of air bases, already constructed airfields and sights of future airfields will be strongly defended, and occupation of these airfields by the enemy will be prevented as much as possible.

c. The combined forces of the Army and Naval garrison units will annihilate the enemy landing force on the beaches.

For this purpose, the defense positions on each island will be strongly fortified and the Army Group on each island will independently carry out their sea maneuvers. Part of the force will launch a surprise attack on the enemy landing

preparation off the islands. Thus in this way, the defensive campaign will be brought to a positive conclusion. Against attacking enemy planes, the units will utilize all effective weapons in their already prepared anti-aircraft positions and repulse the air attack.

d. The outline of battle instructions is as follows:

(1). The PALAU Islands -

The PALAU Islands will be firmly secured as the final position against the enemy's PACIFIC penetrations operations. PELELIU and ANGAUR Islands will be strongly fortified as important air bases. The strategic points and especially the airfields on the main island of PALAU will be firmly secured while at the same time, sea movements will be prepared for the PELELIU, ANGAUR and YAP areas.

(2). YAP Island, included in the group of air bases in the PALAU area, will be the second defensive line for MELEYON (TN ?) and will be firmly secured. ULITHI Islands and FAIS Islands, which are included in the groups of islands surrounding YAP Island, will be carefully guarded with the aid of the Navy to prevent the enemy's utilization of these islands.

e. The Garrison Commander (or Detachment Commander) of each island will make an investigation of all islands where no troops are disposed for the purpose of uncovering any enemy airfields or secret installations. In the event that there are islands which might be utilized by the enemy in such a way, the Commander will dispose a unit on these islands as a precautionary measure.

f. The minute details of the Army Group's plan of operations following the completion of the basic defense measures will be decided later.

4. Fortifications.

a. In regard to the establishment of fortifications, positions (including anti-aircraft positions) for the purpose of annihilating the enemy on the beaches and installations for keeping

losses, inflicted by the intense enemy bombardments, of men and materials, at a minimum, will first be constructed. These positions will then be quickly strengthened and deepened. In this way the islands will gradually be strengthened into impregnable fortresses. Minute plans for fortifications will be decided separately.

5. Air Defense Measures.

a. The Commander of the Naval Unit stationed on each island will be responsible for the issuance of air raid warnings. The Army Units will respond to the air raid orders of the Naval Unit Commanders. In order to transmit the air raid warnings as quickly as possible, the Army and Naval Units on each island will make necessary arrangements.

The Commanderof the Naval Unit stationed on each island will be responsible for the improvement of civil air defense.

b. The Navy will be responsible for the air defense of the entire area of the islands and especially the airfields. However, the air defense of the islands on which Army air defense units are disposed, will be conducted by both Army and Naval air defense units working in close cooperation.

c. Dugouts will be constructed for the Headquarters and main signal units in order that they may carry out their duties even under the severest bombardments. Slit-trenches will be constructed for the individual troops.

d. Classification of precautionary measures will be as follows:

(1). The "A" precautionary measure will be issued when an enemy attack is anticipated and the garrison troops will take to their positions and be prepared for the attack.

(2). The "B" precautionary measure will be issued when there exists a great possibility of an enemy attack and the guards will be strengthened and the garrison troops will be prepared to enter their positions on a moment's notice. ~~Also~~, the anti-aircraft units will also complete their preparations.

(3). The "C" precautionary measure will be issued when the situation is not critical and the anti-aircraft units will

will be in readiness at their positions while other important positions will be guarded by the other units. Although the defense precautions has been decided upon as shown above, the Garrison Commander (or Detachment Commander) on each island will take into consideration the present defense regulations of the stationed Naval Units and minute regulations will be decided according to the situation on the islands. The Army and Navy Commanding Officers in charge of the defense of the islands (including atolls) will be responsible for the issuance of the precautionary measures. Minute details will be decided separately. The general anti-aircraft preparations will be completed one hour before dawn on each occasion.

6. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence.

a. The most important items in collecting information is the knowledge of the enemys' counter-attack plans, especially the time, direction and scale of the counter-attack. Also, the obtaining of exact information concerning geographical conditions in order that the Army may facilitate its operations and preparations without difficulty.

b. In collecting information for the operations, the units will closely cooperate with the Navy and always watch the situations in the southeastern areas. They will, especially, give great consideration to the reports received from the air signal units concerning the activities of the enemy fleet.

c. The Army units will summarize and complete the data concerning geographical conditions and quickly clarify the situation of the islands on which no troops are stationed, especially, those islands which possess a great possibility of being utilized by the enemy. Furthermore, the strategic value and situations of the beaches and atolls will be thoroughly investigated.

d. The chief principles of counter-intelligence are to keep information, concerning the deployment of troops and

preparations of operations, from the enemy and also to prevent and uncover all enemy spy activities. For this purpose, the Army will keep close contact with the Navy in order to plan thorough counter-intelligence activities in each unit and prevent any enemy activities on the islands unihhabited by either natives or troops.

e. The intelligence service regulations, information collecting plans (including investigation of geographical conditions) and the counter-intelligence regulations of the Army Group in the PALAU area will be decided separately. ~~decided~~.

7. Supply Ships and Sanitation.

a. Since it is difficult to continue transporting supplies from the homeland over a long period of time, the Army units will conserve munitions and materials and perfect a means of self-supporting.

b. In regard to supply and demand, the Army units, ~~in view~~ because of the shipping difficulties will anticipate future situations (atleast two months in advance) and make a request for the necessary amount of supplies. The 30th Naval Munitions Department will be responsible for supplying the PALAU main islands, the other islands of the PALAU group (including ANGAUR) and YAP Island.

c. Directions for accumulating important munitions will be as follows:

(1). The units responsible for beach defense will not only completely equip themselves but will also retain ammunition for one engagement (for three engagements in case of ammunition for anti-aircraft guns and machine cannons), three months supply of motor fuel and about one years supply of provisions and forage (at present, only six months supply). However, garrison troops on ~~islanded~~ the islands will accumulate as much munitions as possible in addition to the above mentioned supplies.

(2). The distribution in depth of materials will be based upon the execution of beach engagements and with consideration to its protection. The following accumulation ratio will be considered as standard:

(a). Infantry ammunition (including AM? and MAM?). (int. arty. amm.) (mortar amm ?)

Company ammunition - 60%.

Battalion and Regiment ammunition - 40%.

(b). Artillery ammunition.

Emergency ammunition - Light guns (approx. 200 rounds). Heavy guns (approx. 100 rounds). The rest of the ammunition will be accumulated at convenient and safe places.

(3). Three or four days supply of provisions will be stored at the beach positions while a weeks supply of provisions will be stored at the place of readiness of each company and platoon or near the anti-aircraft positions. The remainder of the provisions will be distributed and stored at safe places in the interior of the islands.

(4). In storing munitions, especially in its distribution, concealment and prevention from ~~rotting~~ moisture, one kind of munitions will not be stored all in one spot but will be mixed with other munitions and stored in various places. The position of the dumps containing explosives and inflammables will be decided with great care.

(5). Thorough instructions concerning the protection and conservation of munitions will be given to each soldier.

d. All units will try to obtain and utilize, not only provisions for self support but also weapons and other general materials, from local sources. The units will develop and cultivate the raw materials and produce their own goods. In carrying out such work, the units will closely cooperate with the Naval plants and work in unison with them.

e. The Navy will be responsible for all shipping (including local shipping) and the loading and unloading of munitions but the Army Commander of each island must cooperate with the Navy in order to complete the work at the earliest possible time. Upon the unloading of munitions, the Army units will immediately distribute and conceal them, in order to keep the losses from air attacks at a minimum.

f. Landing craft shelters and landing craft maneuver bases will be temporarily constructed. as quickly as possible ~~After that,~~

~~they will be quickly completed and ready for utilization.~~ Upon the arrival of a supply of landing crafts, the units will ~~completely~~ equip ~~them~~ the crafts and receive education and training concerning these crafts to such an extent that the sea maneuvers will be executed smoothly.

g. Concerning sanitation, emphasis will be placed on maintaining healthy soldiers and preventing epidemics and local diseases from spreading. As a result, the units will be able to maintain their fighting power and vigorously participate in the operations.

h. Patients will, as much as possible, be treated on the islands but patients whose ailments will take a long peridd of time, to cure, according to its degree, will be sent to the nearest Naval hospital as soon as possible.

i. The evacuation of patients will be conducted by Naval hospital (patient) ships and the movements of these ships will be decided on each occasion.

8. Signal Communications.

a. The Army, based upon the communication regulations of the Central PACIFIC Fleet, will keep in close contact with the SOUTH SEA Governments and other concerning organizations and will immediately establish a temporary wireless network.

b. Communication installations will be constructed in such a way that, even under the severest bombardments, communications ~~will~~ can be carried ~~onto the last moment~~.

c. Wire communications will be established with the present communication wires and from materials possessed by the units.

d. The regulations for the communication system of the Army Group will be separately decided.

Separate Sheet No. 1

Instructions for the Defense Unification for the Land Operations of the Central PACIFIC Area Fleet

1. The Commander of the 31st Army will be responsible for the unification of defense plans and preparations for the land operations (excluding anti-aircraft and air operations) of the Naval

and Army Units on the various islands maintained by the 31st Army.

2. The Commander of the Area Army Group will be responsible for the unification of defense plans and preparations for the land operations of the Army and Naval Units in the eastern part of the MARIANAS Islands and the CAROLINE Islands (including islands east of MELEYON (TN ?) and west of PONAPE, the West CAROLINE Islands (including YAP and ANGAUR Islands) and the OGASAWARA Islands.

3. The Army and Navy Commander on each island (excluding Air Units Commanders) will be responsible for the unity of control in relation to defense preparations for the land operations on each island.

4. Defense preparations for the land operations as mentioned above include the establishing of point-blank firing and the following elements: disposition, fortifications, establishment of obstacles, observation and communication. The movements of air units and anti-aircraft matters for air operations will be excluded from the above mentioned defense preparations.

Transportation and Supplies

1. The Army will be chiefly responsible for the transportation ~~in the dispatching~~ of the 31st Army, including munitions and materials (at least three months supply) carried by the 31st Army on that occasion. After the 31st Army arrives at its destination, the Navy will be responsible for the transportation of further supplies (and replacements), the transportation of munitions and materials from the homeland, and the evacuation of patients.

2. The Navy will be responsible for the loading and unloading of Army munitions and also local transportation but the Army will render necessary means in cooperating with this work such as: transporting motor boats and shipping troops from the Army transport vessels convoy and disposing anchorage headquarters at main ports and bays. The loading and unloading work will be carried on by the combined efforts of the Army and Navy.

The Navy will be responsible for the supplying of necessary munitions and materials to the Army Units but the Army will be

responsible for equiping its units with weapons (excluding fuel), clothing and other special Army munitions. Furthermore, the Army will be responsible for supplying materials to the 31st Army and the OGASAWARA Area Army Group.

In addition to the above mentioned factors, islands which cannot be supplied by the Army will be supplied by the Navy.

3. The fundamental principles of the supply system for the 31st Army is as shown in the appended table.

Signal Communications

1. Communications, within the Army Units, and between the 31st Army Headquarters, the Army Department of the Imperial General Headquarters, and other neighboring Army Units will be established not only by utilizing Army communication facilities but also Naval communication facilities. In the event that communications are suspended, the Army and Navy will mutually accommodate each other. They may also utilize preferentially, the communication facilities of the SOUTH SEA Government.

2. The control of communications in the Combined Fleet area will be determined by the Fleet Commander.

3. The Army units will mutually exchange all information,

4. In commanding and contacting Army units, signal equipment and airplanes will be utilized when necessary and the Navy will render assistance in such matters.

5. The Army signal code will be utilized in communications between and within the Army units. The Navy signal code will be used in communication between the Army and Navy. The Army signal code will be used only upon the direct instructions of the Army Department of the Imperial General Headquarters.

6. The postal service of the Army units will be handled by the Navy postal facilities.

Billets, Fortifications and Sanitation

1. The Navy will render assistance in supplying the Army units with billets and billeting materials (these materials will not be sent from the homeland) and also fortification materials.

Supply System for Army Units in the Central PACIFIC Area



Legend:

——————— Requests for Supplies.

- - - - - - Communications.

~~~~~~~~~~ Distribution of Transportation.

═══════ Orders for Supplies.

Reference:

1. The plans for the transportation of supplies were prepared by the Navy Transportation Headquarters at the Transportation Conference which it supervised.

2. Requests for supplies in the OGASAWARA area were made by the 31st Army Commander directly to the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters. The Army took the responsibility for its fulfillment.
~~~~~~~~~~

2. In the event that Army sanitation facilities are lacking and its establishments are insufficient, Army patients will be treated by Naval facilities. In this case, the Army units will, as much as possible, dispatch medical personnel to assist the Navy.

Utilization of Local Materials

Local labor and ~~materials~~ materiel on each island will be controlled by an officer appointed by the Navy and Army Commanders or by the senior commanding officer.

Requisitions, for the present, will be carried out according to the regulations of the requisition order and also with the close cooperation of the officials and the people.

Separate Volume

Instructions for the Establishment of Fortifications

1. Outline of the organization and establishment of positions.

a. Beach defense positions.

(1). The vulnerable points on the beaches will be guarded by one company or platoon of infantry troops disposed in independent posts established at intervals of several hundred meters to one kilometer apart. The majority of heavy weapons will be used to concentrate fire to the front and in the area between the posts. Light machine-guns, heavy grenade launchers and rifles will be used chiefly for concentrated frontal and flanking fire. Although intense enemy pressure ~~is~~ may be placed upon these posts, they will continue their concentrated fire ~~for~~ as the strong flank defense points laid with heavy weapons will become the basis for the counter-attack. These positions will, by taking advantage of topographical conditions, be strongly constructed to withstand the enemy bombardments. In order to be prepared for a sudden change of situations, several positions will be constructed. Anti-tank trenches will be dug around the strong points to further strengthen them.

(2). Night defense positions, strong key points for counter-attacks, and dummy strong points to mislead the enemy, will if necessary, be constructed in the area between the posts.

(3). In the rear of the beach positions, the second

line intermediate position will, by cleverly topographical conditions, be constructed to prevent the complete destruction of the beach positions and ~~also it~~ will also serve as the basis of the counter-attack of the reserve troops. Instructions for the organization and establishment of the intermediate positions are the same as those of the beach defense positions. However, many positions and firm gun (and rifle) shelters will be established between the intermediate positions and the beach in order to be able to lay a sudden concentrated fire. Maneuvering routes for counter-attacks will also be completed.

Many dummy positions and installations will be constructed in the gaps of the positions for the purpose of misleading the enemy and drawing the enemys' fire on the dummies.

(4). At beaches where landing would be difficult, due to cliffs, ravines and mountainous waves, one platoon or squad of infantry troops will ~~will~~ be disposed at the constructed posts along the length of the beach in order to prevent any enemy landings. At times, according to the situation, only observation troops will be disposed while the main troops will be placed in readiness for maneuvering. At the same time, many dummy positions will be constructed to mislead the enemy into thinking that ~~they~~ the beaches are firmly defended.

(5). The artillery will be used chiefly to concentrate oblique and flanking fire near the beaches and to destroy enemy ships and tanks. Also, in the event that a beach position is on the verge of being occupied by the enemy, the artillery will be used to concentrate fire upon that position. It will be necessary to dispose fire power at the key points on the atolls in order to prevent the advance of the enemy landing crafts. The majority of the weapons will be placed in the strong flank defense points which will, by taking advantage of the topographical conditions, be constructed in well concealed places of the beach positions and the intermediate positions. The rest of the weapons will be placed in the many positions conveniently located near the gun (and rifle) shelter and many other positions will be prepared in order to keep the damage from enemy fire at a minimum.

At the same time, many dummy positions and dummy forts will be constructed to draw the enemy fire.

Cannons for frontal fire will be used for short and sudden firing and they will often change their positions in order to prevent detection.

(6). The Naval flat trajectory guns will, due to their ineffective range, be placed in flank defense positions for use only in beach battles, For this purpose these guns will be well concealed to avoid destruction by the enemy bombardments and also, many flank defense positions will be ~~prepared~~ established cannons used for the destruction of enemy transport vessels will be placed in wide range are firing frontal positions and will be well camouflaged and protected against enemy bombardments. Already constructed forts which are vulnerable to enemy bombardments will be gradually strengthened according to the above mentioned instructions.

(7). The beaches will be temporarily laid with small mines and land mines but with the progress in the construction of the positions, various other types of obstacles will be laid on the beaches and in the water. Furthermore, anti-personnel and anti-tank obstackes will be constructed around the posts and in the gaps of the positions. These will then be gradually strengthened. Much consideration should be given in the construction of these obstacles lest they be destroyed by enemy air raids.

b. Air defense positions.

Anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft gunhine cannons and guns will be chiefly disposed at airfields, ports and harbors, and strategic positions. The positions of these guns will be constructed in such a way that the guns will be able to not only send up a perfect protecting screen, but will be able to also participate in the sea and land engagements.

Many positions for the motorized artillery will be constructed and frequent changes of positions will be made in

order to avoid destruction by enemy fire.

The light and heavy machine-guns, which are used chiefly for land battles, will be used against low swooping enemy planes. Consequently, several anti-aircraft shelters will be constructed near the positions.

c. Rear positions (final positions).

The sector units, by firmly securing the strategic points within the area, will prevent the enemy utilization of the airfields at all costs. If time permits, the sector units will prepare rear positions in order to join the counter-attack of the rear [redacted] bring about a quick annihilation of the enemy. The independent nature of the rear positions will be especially strengthened and the preparations for counter-attacks will be completed.

2. Outline of temporary installations for keeping losses at a minimum.

Counter measures will be taken against the intense enemy bombardments in order to keep losses of troops, weapons, ammunition and provisions at a minimum and also to maintain the fighting power. For this purpose, the following measures will be quickly carried out.

(1). In addition to individual air raid trenches for all troops, air raid shelters will be constructed near assembling places and will be clearly marked.

(2). Men and motorized weapons on the beaches and in positions exposed to the enemy, will be placed in protective shelters by utilizing terrain features. Observation and communication installations will be completed in order to facilitate immediate movements of men and motorized guns in the event of an enemy landing.

(3). To ~~avoid~~ keep losses from enemy fire at a minimum, shelters and covers for weapons, carts, machinery and tools will be constructed.

(4). Two thirds of the ammunition, provisions, fuel, clothing and other munitions will be distributed and stored in protective shelters near the main positions while the remaining one third will be placed in the rear position.

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(5). The amount of materials accumulated in one spot will not exceed ~~then~~ ten cubic meters. The distance between ammunition dumps and fuel dumps will be at least one hundred meters. The distances between storing places of other materials will be fifty meters.

(6). As wooden buildings are easily destroyed and burned by the bombardments, it will be advisable not to use such structures. Soon after landing, wooden buildings may be used as shelters against the rain but the materials must be transferred to better shelters as soon as possible.

(7). In the distribution and storing of materials, dampness and ventilation will be greatly considered in order to prevent losses.

3. Degree of the establishment of fortifications and the quality of the fortifications.

(1). Concerning the establishment of fortifications, many installations will be prepared to meet the change of situation brought about by damages inflicted by enemy fire and with consideration to the putting up of stubborn resistence from the positions in depth. For this purpose, the number of fortifications will be several times greater than the number of units in comparism to standard fortifications. Furthermore, the quality of gun shelters will exceed normal standards. In addition, to these, many dummy positions and installations will be constructed.

(2). At first, the temporary beach defense positions will be simple and will be well placed and concealed in order to keep losses at a minimum but the framework of the positions which are the shelters for the flank defense weapons, gun (and rifle) shelters, and the commanding posts, will be greatly strengthened.

(3). The quality of the fortifications will be based upon the field fortification manual but ~~the~~ caves, cliffs and steep hills on the islands will be utilized to the greatest extent. In this way, materials and labor will be greatly economized.

(4). When materials for permanent positions are obtained, the shelters for important weapons, gun shelters, command posts and signal stations will be greatly strengthened and constituted into permanent fortifications. Furthermore, if the terrain permits it, many cave shelters will quickly be constructed by blowing out holes in the mountains with explosives. The quality of permanent fortifications will be indicated separately.

4. Instructions for the establishment of installations.

(1). The garrison units at each area will, upon landing immediately begin their work. Within one week, they will have almost complete the beach defense positions and the protective installations. Within one month, they will complete the field positions and within two months, will complete the firm field positions containing strong points. These positions will then be further strengthened and fortified. For this purpose, the units will bivouac in the field and whole heartedly engage in the construction of these positions. Billets will not be constructed until the work is completed.

(2). Concerning the establishment of fortifications, the officers and men in charge of fortifications in each area will be responsible for its general plans and control and also for the supplying and distribution of materials.

(3). The degree of importance of the positions will be decided in constructing fortifications in order to be prepared for any enemy attack.

(4). Installations will be well concealed from air and sea observations and trees will not be cut down unnecessarily. Furthermore, transportation routes, concentrations of materials and fresh earth will be perfectly camouflaged.

5. Materials for fortifications.

Materials for temporary fortifications will be obtained from local sources while special materials will be supplied separately. The distribution of materials for permanent fortifications will be indicated separately.

6. The results of the fortifications will be occasionally investigated by air and sea observations to determine their perfection.

Fortification Plans of the Army Group in the PALAU Area

1. Instructions.

a. The Army Group will, first of all, complete important installations for the prevention of any enemy landings and for the protection of men and materials from the intense enemy bombardments. In strengthening these positions, local materials will be cleverly utilized and the islands will be developed into invulnerable fortresses by the middle of October of this year at the latest.

2. Outline of the organization and establishment of fortifications.

a. The instructions for the organization and establishment of fortifications will be based upon the instructions for the establishment of fortifications contained in the Separate Volume, "Defense Plans of the Army Group in the PALAU Area."

3. Chief factors concerning the organization and establishment of fortifications.

a. In order to greatly strengthen the fortification on PELELIU and ANGAUR Islands, reinforced concrete and rocks will be used to increase the quality of the positions. Furthermore, underground installations will be constructed to withstand the intense enemy bombardments and also beach obstacles will be increased.

b. The Army Group will utilize local materials and the terrain as much as possible on PALAU Island and YAP Areas and will increase the degree of strength of the fortifications. The degree of strength of the fortifications in each area ~~will be~~ are illustrated in appended Table No. 1.

4. Degree of the establishment of fortifications.

a. The degree of the establishment of fortifications will differ according to the main factors of the fortifications, the organization and equipment of the garrison unit, the terrain and the nature of soil. However, the degree will be increased as much as possible by making the most of what materials, military

strength and time is available. The degree of the establishment of fortifications will be illustrated in Appended Table No. 2.

5. Quality for fortifications.

a. The degree of quality will be determined by the importance of the fortifications.

(1). The degree of quality of the fortifications containing protective shelters is classified as follows:

(a). Contained after chart.

Classification of Fortifications	Degree of Resistence	Degree of Thickness				Remarks
		Reinforced Concrete	Coral Reefs or Ordinary Rocks	Rock or Concrete Coverings	Soil Coverings	
Special "A"	Resists direct hits from 1 Ton bombs and 40 Cm. Artillery shells	3 Meters	5 Meters			Underground positions will be constructed mainly in cliffs, rocks and slopes of steep hills
Special "B"	Resists direct hits from 200 Kg. bombs & 20 Cm. Artillery shells	1.5 Meters	2.5 Meters		15 Meters	
"A"	Resists direct hits from 100 Kg. bombs and 15 Cm. Artillery shells	1 to 0.80 Meters	1.5 Meters	2 Meters	8 Meters	These positions will be constructed mainly with reinforced concrete, rocks and hard wood
"B"	Resists direct hits from 50 Kg. bombs & 8 Cm. Artillery shells	0.50 Meters	0.80 Meters	1.2 Meters	5 Meters	
"C"	Resists direct hits from 15 Kg. bombs & 2 Cm. Artillery shells & Large shrapnels.	0.30 Meters	0.50 Meters	0.70 Meters	2 Meters	
"D"	Resists bullets of 1.3. Cm. Machine-guns or Smaller guns & Small shrapnels.	0,10 to 0.08 Meters	0.20 Meters	0.20 Meters	1 Meters	

The application of the contents of the table is as follows:

(a). Special "A" and Special "B" fortifications.

Shelters and gun shelters in cliffs, racks and steep hills will be constructed in cave types (gallery types) of at least Special "B" quality. Specially important installations (Command posts, observation stations and wireless communication stations) will be constructed of Special "A" quality. On pebble beaches, the especially important gun shelter and command posts that are exposed to concentrated enemy fire will be constructed of Special "B" quality with reinforced concrete.

(b). "A" Fortification.

Important gun shelters, command posts and observations posts for commanding officers, important wireless communication stations and shelters accommodating more than twenty troops and other important weapons and ammunition, will be constructed of "A" quality.

(c). "B" fortifications.

Gun shelters, shelters for troops, weapons and ammunition, command posts and observation posts constructed in relatively favorable terrain will be of "B" quality.

(d). "C" and "D" fortifications.

Heavy weapon shelters, reserve positions, front line machine gun positions, watch posts, shelters accommodating several men and small quantities of weapons and ammunition, shelters for provisions and water, and semi-underground living quarters will be constructed of "C" and "D" quality.

(2). Anti-tank and anti-landing craft obstacles.

(a). Anti-tank obstacles.

Anti-tank obstacles will be classified in the following categories:

1). For destroying tanks.

2). For preventing the advance of enemy tanks.

3). For slowing up the advance of enemy tanks.

Anti-tank trenches for resisting medium tanks will be strengthened with dirt, concrete and rocks (see Table six on Page 221 of fortification manual Part 1) and the depth of the trench will be more than 1.5 meters for "B" trenches and more than 50 centimeters for "C" trenches.

(b). Beach obstacles.

"A" obstacles used for destruction purposes will include small mines and sea mines. "B" obstacles used for preventive purposes will include small landing crafts and amphibious tanks. "C" obstacles used for forestalling purposes will be constructed to prevent direct enemy advances. However, they will be constructed with the least materials and labor necessary.

These obstacles will, ~~as much as possible,~~ be placed about one meter below the surface of the sea. In constructing beach obstacles, numerous dummy obstacles will, first of all, be constructed to mislead any enemy air or submarine reconnaissance.

b. Quality of field fortifications.

The quality of field positions will be based upon the field fortification manual. However, in order to retain its durability, fortification materials will be perfectly protected against rain, dampness and heat.

c. Permanent fortifications.

The quality of permanent positions will be designed and established with the following considerations:

(1). In constructing permanent fortifications, local durable materials will be utilized as much as possible. For this purpose, cave type fortifications will be constructed in cliffs, rocks and steep hills will be used to strengthen the flank positions. Dome type shelters will also be constructed from rocks. In areas, where such durable wood such as TEAK, RAWAN and MANGROVE are easily obtained, these will be used to reinforce the inside of the fortification. Rock barriers will be constructed around the fortifications.

(2). In areas where durable materials are scarce, concrete or reinforced concrete will be used to increase the necessary degree of strength of the fortifications. However, even in such cases, local materials, especially rock (coral) will be used as much as possible to economize on reinforced concrete.

(3). Local terrain and nature of soil will be thoroughly investigated in order that installations may be cleverly adjusted to them. Terrain will be utilized to the extent where the highest quality of fortifications can be attained with the least amount of materials and labor.

(4). Trees on the islands will be used in constructing anti-personnel obstacles such as tree barriers, abatises and vine and wire entaglements. Various kinds of simple obstacles will be

installed on cliffs and in the water and jungles. Strong obstacles will be created and established by utilizing local materials. Movable obstacles will be constructed on the beaches in order to prevent them from being destroyed and washed away by large waves.

(5). Anti-tank obstacles.

If large scale slowing up obstacles for landing crafts and amphibious tanks are placed on coral zones located about one meter below the surface of the water, the annihilation of the enemy on the beaches will become much easier. Therefore, extensive study and planning of the quality of the obstacles will be made and establishment of these obstacles will be carried out at all costs. A means of increasing the quality of anti-tank obstacles by utilizing stones, rocks, cliffs, steep hills and trees will be studied.

(6). Numerous dummy works, positions and installations will be constructed to mislead and draw the enemy fire.

6. Instructions for the establishing of fortifications.

a. Each sector unit will, at all costs, complete its permanent fortifications by 20 August 1944. For this reason, a system foreestablishing fortifications will quickly be fixed. Furthermore, the progress of work and the effective management of men and materials will be based upon minute and accurate working plans. Divisional fortification technicians will on necessary occasions be attached to the sector units for aid and guidance in carrying out this work.

b. Fortification work will be divided into three periods and, according to the gradual progress method, the fortifications will be gradually strengthened in each period. The instructions are as follows:

(1). First period (about one month immediately after landing).

(a). Beach defense positions.

Beach defense positions will be constructed similar to field fortifications. Shelter for heavy weapons, watch posts, observation posts and other important areas will be protected

by light and medium coverings. Natural terrain features, especially cliffs and caves will be utilized as much as possible to increase the degree of strength. Ordinary obstacles will be placed on beaches and around important strong points while anti-tank obstacles will be placed on areas most apt to be attacked by enemy tanks. Key points (key positions and posts) will be surrounded by obstacles and heavy guns will be placed at these points. In the event that this cannot be accomplished, shelters from which hand grenades can be thrown will be constructed.

(b). Installations for keeping losses at a minimum.

Utilizing the terrain, a small number of simple installations will be constructed and concealed in wide areas and when materials and labor are available, large protective shelters will be constructed. A thorough investigation of the island will be made and natural caves will be utilized as much as possible.

(c). Working order.

In each area, the core of the most important positions will first of all be completed. For this reason, fire positions, observation posts and communication stations will be constructed and materials will be distributed and concealed. Communication obstacles will then be constructed. However, the sector units will be always prepared for any enemy air raids.

(2). The second period. (Two months following the first peridd).

The installations constructed during the first period will be supplimented and strengthened as field and permanent fortifications. Positions will then be deepened, dummy positions will be increased and communication obstacles, water obstacles and other obstacles will be newly established and strengthend. Important gun shelters, command posts and other shelters which are constructed of concrete and rocks will be gradually established as a permanent fortifications so as to be prepared for any enemy attacks. Cave type positions will be constructed in rocks and and cliffs will be strengthened to increase the degree of strength of a fortifications.

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(3). The third period (till the middle of October 1944).

Important shelters and covers will be constructed with reinforced concrete and rocks or in caves. Important parts of the positions, and dummy works (guns, soldiers, obstacles and strong points) will be ~~thoroughly~~ constructed on a large scale.

Beach obstacles, anti-tank obstacles, dummy positions and dummy works (guns, soldiers, obstacles, and strong points) will be ~~thoroughly~~ constructed on a large scale.

The degree of the establishment of fortifications in each period is illustrated in Appended Table No. 2.

c. The establishment of fortifications will be based on the engineer training manual, field fortification manual, encampment communication manual and the gas protection manual but the following matters will be taken into consideration.

General matters.

(1). The order of works will be based upon the estimation of the enemys' situation and the present situation of men and materials. The order of works will be fixed in such a way that the sector units can always retain its maximum fighting power.

(2). As it is understood that construction work will be carried on only in the absense of enemy bombardments and reconnaissance, the sector units will adapt themselves to both situations (working and fighting) and be prepared for any enemy attacks. Furthermore, the sector units will pay special attention to camouflage and concealment and the skillful placement of installations.

(3). Established fortifications will be examined and tested and all defective parts will be mended or newly constructed in order to meet necessary battle situations.

(4). Distribution of fortification materials will be changed according to the situation but the sector units will endeavor to complete the fortifications as quickly as possible by utilizing local materials and by changing working positions and methods.

(5). Each commanding officer, will have a knowledge of the ~~realizing~~ present situation and will properly supervise the work and establish strict working discipline. Consequently, the fortification will be completed quickly and efficiently.

(6). The field of fire of positions will be camouflaged against enemy air, land and sea observation and these positions will be constructed in tunnel type.

(7). A drainage system will be installed in all installations and damp-proof systems will be established in ammunition and provision warehouses.

(8). Materials for reinforcing concrete will be produced earlier and the framework of the fortifications will be completed by the end of September.

(9). Important communication lines and lines exposed to enemy fire will be established in ditches to minimize losses. When necessary, line maintenance posts with necessary materials will be established between the fortifications.

(10). Water supplying facilities are vitally necessary and will be perfectly established. In the event that springs are located when constructing cave type installations, the water from these springs will be directed into water storages. Water tanks or wells will be established in the shelters to supply water to the key positions and independent posts. A water system will be improvised to facilitate easier supplying of water to all positions.

(11). Lighting systems, anti-gas measures, sanitary measures, sound-proof systems, ventilation systems and protective measures against accidents and injuries will be established in all installations.

PELELIU and ANGAUR Areas

(1). As the nature of soil in these areas is chiefly coral reefs, hard coral will be utilized in constructing installations.

(2). As elevated arch-formed fire positions are easily noticed on flat terrain, they will be used only for flank defense.

Strong gun (and rifle) shelters and light shelters will be used for frontal defense. Flank defense arch-formed positions will be eappcially well camouflaged.

(3). Shallow approach trenches will be gradually deependd and drainage will be considered in constructing these trenches.

(4). When the drainage system in the installations is poor, water will be drained by hand.

(5). Natural caves will be utilized for storing weapons, ammunition and provisions. However, when natural caves are unavailable, cave type shelters will be constructed with concrete.

(6). Water tanks will be full at all times.

(7). Beach obstacles will be constructed on a large scale and they will be firmly established especially on coral reefs. On important fronts, obstacles will be constructed in depth. The following illustration is an example.

(a). An example of fire obstacles disposed in the water off the beaches.

Note: 1 - ● represents floating drums containing benzine and heavy oil mixed at a ratio of four to five. These drums are placed about fifty meters apart just before the enemy landing.

2 - When the enemy landing crafts approach these drums, the heavy machine guns on the beaches will open fire on these drums and explode them. The contents of these drum will ignite and spread a sea of flame around the enemy. In this way, the enemy, especially amphibious tanks, will be annihilated.

(b). An example of the disposition of landing craft obstacles.



Note: ○ represents wooden poles pounded into the sea.

represnents wire entanglements or durable wines.

represnets rocks or barriers.

These will be disposed in depth three hundred meters off the beach.

(8). The Commanderof the sector units in the PELELIU area will construct the Army Group command post of Special "A" or Special "B" quality near the sector unit command post.

Main Island of PALAU and YAP Island

(1). Concrete will be used in strengthening the flank defense arch-formed gun and rifle shelters in the beach positions. However, other protective installations, command posts, observation posts, and signal communication stations will be constructed in cave type.

(2). The water supply will chiefly be obtained from wells which will have been dug in the early stages of fortification construction.

7. Fortification materials.

a. The materials for the establishment of fortifications during the first period will be those possessed by each unit besides otherlocal materials. In the event that materials for permanent fortifications cannot be obtained from local sources, materials will be sent from the homeland and distributed.

8. Reports.

a. Each sector unit Commander will immediately submit maps showing the organization of positions and also the plans for establishing fortifications.

b. Reports on present working conditions and the degree of progress will be made according to the fortification manual No. 8 of the TERU Unit StaffCorps.

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Appended Chart No. 1

Strength Standard for the Construction of Forts

District			Strength	Construction Outline	Quality		Ratio of Alloted Materials from JAPAN
					Principal Section	Average	
PALAU	PALAU Island	PALAU Island	OTSU	The strength was increased by using caves. However, materials from JAPAN were used in certain areas.	Special KO Special OTSU	OTSU	7
		PELELIU Island	KO	The construction of strong forts by using natural land obstacles and a strong cave system was attempted. Other materials were utilized to give it a strength classified higher than KO. The coastal defense was especially constructed on a large scale.	Special KO	KO	
		ANGAUR Island					
	YAP		OTSU	Local land obstacles were used as much as p possible in order to give it more strength. However, materials from JAPAN were used in certain areas.	Special OTSU		5
Reference			1. See No. 5 of the main volume for the explanation of strength, special, special OTSU, KO, and OTSU. 2. The allotment ratio of materials from JAPAN is based upon one infantry battalion. 3. The strength of the main sections of PALAU Island is special KO.				

Appended Chart No. 2

Construction Standard of Forts during Each Period

Preparations	1st Period	2nd Period	3rd Period
Firing Equipments	Rifles, light machine guns, and grenade launchers were placed mainly in the open. Several positions were prepared for each weapon. Light shelters important in protecting the flanks were provided for each light machine gun emplacement. Heavy machine guns, rapid-fire guns and field and mountain artillery pieces protecting the flanks had light or medium shelters. Several open air positions were constructed for each gun. Separate anti-aircraft positions were prepared for each heavy machine gun. When necessary, shelters (light and medium shelters and caves) were prepared for other heavy weapons. Numerous open air positions were placed in their vicinity. When necessary, the field of fire was cleared. Areas that could be cleared easily were left in their original state in order to keep the shelters hidden. Preparations were made for night firing and a fire control observation post.	The open air shelters were of double strength. The rock section of the heavy reserve gun shelters were of the cave type and had a strength greater than special "OTSU". By using stones and concrete, other shelters were given a strength of "KO" or "OTSU" and defensive preparations were made. When necessary, permanent forts and shelters for large type guns were constructed.	The rock section and gun shelter sides were of the cave type and were reinforced. The remaining sections of the shelter were constructed from concrete and rocks which gave it a strength of "OTSU". Shelters classified as "HEI" and "TEI" were used as shelters for the light machine gun emplacements and the main heavy gun open air positions. Firing and defensive preparations were made complying with the changes in the situation. Approximately 10 shelters were constructed for each gun.
Obstacles	Natural obstacles were used as much as possible and these with the addition of human effort were reinforced. At least one line of anti-personnel obstacles was constructed along the coast and other important areas. Preparations were made to allow for the quick placement of small mines, if an emergency arises. In important areas, they were placed at all times. In important areas, at least one anti-tank obstacle with a strength classified as "HEI" was constructed.	Various types of anti-personnel obstacles for one battalion extended about 10,000 meters. Materials obtained from local sources were mainly used. Two lines of anti-tank obstacles, one of "OTSU" standard and one of "HEI" standard, were constructed in areas adapted for a tank attack. Along coast lines in front of important areas, the utmost efforts were made to construct underwater obstacles of the "OTSU" standard.	Preparations were made as much as the supply of materials would permit. This, especially, applies to the underwater obstacles. For one battalion: The length of anti-personnel obstacles--approximately 20,000 meters. The length of anti-tank obstacles-- "OTSU"--approximately 5,000 meters. "HEI"--approximately 5,000 meters. The standard of underwater obstacles-- "OTSU"--approximately 2,000 meters. "HEI"--approximately 2,000 meters.

Transportation Facilities	Communication between squads and the main heavy gun positions and within the squad and independent defense unit was carried out by the use of trenches. The depth of this trench was equivalent to a man's height.	At least two lines of communication trenches were constructed crosswise in the company position, the main sections of which were organized and camouflaged. Caves were dug in order to connect the important sections. Transportation routes for the movement of rear units and the counter attacking force were established.	The trenches of the 2nd period were reinforced and strengthened, simultaneously with the organization of a strong underground road to the center. Preparations were completed for the camouflaged sections of the road to be used in troop movements and counter attacks.
Shelters	A simple air raid shelter was constructed by using the natural features of the land. It accommodated the entire personnel. Light shelters were constructed in the important sections of the coastal positions. Ammunition, fire arms, and food supplies were piled in an area of several square meters and approximately 50 meters apart. These piles were camouflaged and gradually transferred to trenches for better protection. Caves were also dug in the coral reefs for protection. At least 10 days' supply of ammunition, food and medical supplies were accumulated at these points. Whenever possible, a month's supply was accumulated.	The shelters for the front line units were of the "HEI" or "TEI" standard. The shelters for the reserve troops could accommodate 10 to 15 persons and were of the "KO" or "OTSU" standard. The sides and rock sections were of the cave type. Food supplies for at least one month and ammunition for half an engagement were accumulated within these shelters. Measures were taken to hide and protect boats.	The shelters could accomodate the entire personnel, entire weapons, ammunition for one engagement, at least 3 month's food supply, and one month's supply of drinking water. The perpendicular rock sections were of the cave type. The remaining sections were constructed from concrete, wood, and rocks and it was intended to be a permanent shelter. The average strength was about "HEI" or "TEI". They will accommodate several persons or a small amount of supplies. However, shelters for essential supplies were of a greater strength.
Camouflage and Construction of Dummy Positions	Various equipments were camouflaged simply by using trees, wood, and other materials. Dummy positions were constructed to an extent permitted by their military strength in important areas and between positions.	The main section of the positions were camouflaged from the time of its construction. Dummy positions were constructed in a wide area in order to spread the enemy fire.	Preparations were completed for a permanent camouflage. Dummy positions were constructed on a large scale.
Gas Defense		Preparation of materials against contamination and toxity of gases were made in important areas.	The command post and signal post shelters were supplied with anti-gas equipment. The others were prepared for individual protection. However, the shelters were constructed with air tight compartments. One or more decontamination post was established in each battalion area. They were equipped with materials for anti-gas warfare.

Observation Post Command Post Signal Post	The important observation posts and lookout posts were equipped with light shelters. The others were of the open air type. Due to the importance of command posts, they were equipped with light or medium shelters.	Important lookout posts were equipped with permanent shelters of the "HEI" or "TEI" standard. Command posts and lookout posts which would probably receive concentrated enemy fire were of the cave type or constructed with concrete. This gave them a strength of about "KO" or "OTSU". It is the same with important signal posts. Communication wires were laid in trenches.	The majority of the lookout posts, command posts and observation posts were of a permanent construction with greater strength and absolute secrecy. The communication system was protected by various methods.

C. Defensive Plans of the Sector Units in the PELELIU Islands

I. Plan

(1) In anticipating the expected enemy landing, the Sector Unit, working in close co-operation with the naval units in that area, will deploy its force and establish defensive positions.

(2) The Sector Units will construct strong defensive positions in ample depth, along the shores and strategic points. The enemy will be met ~~by~~ with heavy fire and fierce counter attacks when ~~it~~ they make the landing.

For that reason, the Sector Unit will complete the key defensive positions at strategic points. After a month, the units will be deployed. Later, the strategic points will be permanently fortified and within two months, will be completed as field positions. They will be continuously strengthened.

II. Outline of Battle Instructions

(3) The southern and northern part of the island (including GADOBUSU Island) will be the key points for the troops deployment to meet the enemy landing.

(4) Secret and surprise attacks will be carried out by small boats, rafts, etc., when the enemy landing crafts approach.

In this case, sea obstacles will be utilized as much as possible.

(5) When the enemy tries to establish a beach head, counter attacks will be carried out during the night.

(6) If the enemy tries to land in a certain area, parts of the units from the other sectors will be deployed to engage the enemy.

(7) If the enemy tries to land at all the points simultaneously, each sector unit will meet the enemy respectively. If the enemy manages to establish a beach head, the reserves will carry out the counter attacks from the western sector to drive the enemy back into the sea.

(8) In co-operation with the naval land units, the Sector Units will use guerilla warfare and will intercept the enemy at all cost in order to prevent the enemy from constructing an air base.

III. Deployment and Duties in the Sector Zones

(9) Sector zones and deployment of strength is shown in supplementary chart No. 1.

(10) The Southern Sector Unit will occupy a strong key point south of the airfield to protect it and to repulse the enemy landing.

If the enemy advances to the airfield, the unit will, in co-operation with the Western Sector Unit, carry out the counter attacks.

The unit will firmly hold this point and will prevent the enemy from using the airfield. The unit will, by all means, intercept the enemy and make this point as the base for the counter attacks.

Constant liaison must be maintained between the Sector Unit and the naval land units. In order to defend the flanks of the west and east coast, a gun will be deployed at KOJIMA and a mountain gun in the vicinity of NAKASAKI. A part of the artillery will make preparations to neutralize the airfield.

(11) The west Sector Unit will occupy the strong points west and north of the airfield to protect it and to repulse the enemy landing.

When the enemy advances to the airfield, this unit, in co-operation with the South Sector Unit, will engage them.

The unit must maintain the northern strong point of the airfield at all cost in order to prevent the enemy advance and to use this point as a base for counter attacks.

A part of the heavy gun unit will be deployed to defend the flanks of the South and North Sectors.

A position will be established between the north and the South Sector Units.

(12) A powerful section of the North Sector Unit will advance to the strategic points on GADOBUSU Island and another section to the vicinity of the harbor to meet the enemy landing.

An infantry platoon will occupy ANGAUR Island to maintain the island and to protect ~~GADOBUSU~~ NGESEBUS Island. Furthermore, an infantry platoon will be dispatched to GANILISHU Island to ~~make a feint.~~ fool the enemy.

In order to protect the airfield at ~~GADOBUSU~~ NGESEBUS Island, counter attacks and reinforcements by boats will be ~~prepared.~~ made.

A powerful gun unit will be deployed to prevent the enemy from using the airfield in ~~GADOBUSU.~~ NGESEBUS

A part of the Artillery Unit will be ~~directed~~ dispatched to the west coast

of the Western Sector. At the same time, a machine gun section will be sent to the Eastern Sector.

(13) The Eastern Sector Unit will command the strategic points of ICHINOJI peninsula (especially in the middle and southern area). At the same time, a section of the unit will occupy GALUTOLOLOKO harbor and the northern part of the island.

In order to prevent the enemy from advancing to the Southern Sector Area and to make this point a base for counter-attack, the unit must, at all cost, maintain the strategic points in the ICHINOJI peninsula and the vicinity of GALUTOLOLOKO.

A section of the artillery will be ~~directed~~ dispatched to the east coast of the South Sector and at the same time, a section of the machine gun unit will be deployed to the east coast of the North Sector.

(14) The following strength will be ~~squeezed~~ taken out of each sector and placed ~~to be~~ under the Whole Sector Unit Commander:

West Sector Unit--about 2 companies
South " " -- " 1 company
North " " -- " 1 "
East " " -- " 1 "

(15) The Division Tank Unit will primarily participate in repulsing the enemy landing on the South and West Sector area and also to co-operate with the Whole Sector Unit for the counter-attack.

The unit will construct tank positions along the shores of the North Sector and the spaces between every strong point.

(16) The artillery unit will occupy the positions north of ASHIYASU (TN ?) area to direct their fire against the enemy landing.

In order to co-operate with the Whole Sector Unit, this unit will prepare ~~concentrated fire~~ for the counter-attack.

This unit will also ~~prepare to~~ construct the positions for the mobile force in order to (so that the force will be able) take part in the battle for the ~~GABOBUSU~~ NGESEBUS airfield area.

(17) A part of the Engineer Company will train and make preparations for sea guerilla warfare. The main force will operate together with the sector reserves. By the order of the Sector Unit Commander, the company

will engage in close quarter combat when the enemy lands. The company will be responsible for the destruction of important roads and to prepare for the destruction of obstacles.

(18) The reserves will be prepared to reinforce each sector at any time and when the enemy establishes a beach head, it will, by order of the Whole Sector Unit Commander, carry out the counter-attack.

The 9th Company of the 15th Regiment will ~~prepare~~ organize a mobile sea force and a section ~~will also prepare~~ for guerilla warfare.

(19) The Supply Company commander will ~~be responsible for the~~ supply ~~of~~ ammunition and provisions to each sector. At the same time, he will assist in the transfer of troops and shifting of artillery positions ~~by~~ with trucks.

(20) The Signal Company will ~~prepare to maintain~~ establish communication system between the Division and each Sector Unit under any circumstances.

(21) The Medical Unit will deploy at any time in any sector to collect casualties and to send them to the rear.

(22) The Field Hospital will ~~be responsible to~~ attend and treat all casualties.

(23) During combat, the collection of casualties will be planned separately.

(24) Reserve units of each area will ~~prepare~~ organize raiding forces (on land and sea) which will be led by an officer or a non-commissioned officer and which will engage in severe guerilla warfare training.

IV. Co-operation of Naval Air and Ground Forces

(25) The Sector Unit will co-operate with the Naval Ground Forces in the construction and expansion of the air bases and in the maintenance of planes. The naval air force will furnish air reconnaissance and air photographic intelligence.

For this purpose, our liaison officer will always be with the naval air force.

(26) The unit will ~~closely~~ co-operate with the naval ground forces (AA Unit) in the defense of the air bases.

When the naval air force ground crew was converted into a ground fighting unit, army and naval forces were combined as one and every effort

was made to function smoothly and to maintain the bases.

V. Military Preparations

Changing of Positions and Their Degrees According to Existing Conditions

(27) In accordance with the change of situations, the following preparations were made:

a. The First Preparation

~~In the case of the anticipated~~ When is anticipated enemy attack, the unit will be in their defensive positions.

b. The Second Preparation

In case of probable enemy attacks, positions will be strictly guarded and the unit will be ready to man their defensive positions at all times.

c. The Third Preparation

In case that the enemy is not expected to attack immediately, the AA Unit will be on the alert while other units will be semi-alerted.

d. The Fourth Preparation

The AA preparations will be generally completed an hour before dawn.

(28) If the main force of the enemy tries to land on the west coast, the unit will engage the enemy on the sea. If the enemy manages to establish a beach head, the reserves, a section of the East Sector Unit, (main force if necessary) and the tank unit will meet the enemy at the landing point.

If the enemy tries to land on the East Coast, a part of the West Sector Unit and the tank unit will engage the enemy at the landing point.

(29) If the enemy main force tries to land in the North Sector, especially at ~~GADCBUSU~~ NGESEBUS Island, the main force of the Artillery Unit will engage them on the sea. If the enemy tries to establish a beach head, the reserves and a section of the East Sector Unit will meet the enemy in co-operation with the main force of the North Sector Unit.

(30) If the enemy main force tries to land in the East Sector, the main force of the artillery unit and the South Sector Artillery Unit will engage the enemy on the sea. If the enemy establishes a beach head, the reserves will carry out the counter-attack.

If the enemy lands at all points simultaneously, our units will maintain the point of counter-attack points and with the combined army and navy units, will carry out counter-attacks, raids, surprise attacks and ambushes.

(31) In case our Sea Mobile Force succeeds in its counter-landing, the Sector Unit will immediately carry out the counter-attack.

For this purpose, course marks, land marks, counter-attack points and other necessary details will be prepared. At the same time, the Sector Unit will closely co-operate with the Sea Mobile Force.

VI. Fortifications

(32) The fortifications will be established consist of positions (including AA firing arrangements) at the landing point and safety precautions will also be taken to minimize the loss of personnel and material against enemy bombardments. The fortifications will be rapidly constructed and will be strengthened continuously in depth and quality.

(33) The following items will be taken into consideration in of the construction of shore defensive positions:

(a) Independent strong points will be constructed on the shores of possible landing points. These points will be manned by an units not larger than an infantry company and not less than a platoon.

(b) The majority of the heavy guns will defend the front and flanks of the adjourning points. Light machine guns, heavy grenades and rifles will be set up to form a final protective line to cover the spaces not covered by the heavy guns. When the enemy advances, the light weapons will be responsible for protecting the points and to make the points a base for counter-attacks.

(c) The pill boxes of the heavy weapons will be shell proof and their positions will be placed so as to be protected against enemy bombardment. Several substitute positions will be prepared in case of emergency.

(d) Anti-tank obstacles will be constructed around each point to make it independent.

(e) Supplementary positions for the deployment at night and bases for counter-attack or dummy pill boxes will be constructed in the spaces between strong points.

(3ϕ) Making use of the ground conditions terrain features, a second line will be

constructed to the rear of the shore positions to repulse the advance of the enemy in case of a break through. The details of the second line will be similar to those of the shore defense. Many positions and strong rifle shelters will be constructed to form a protective line in the space between the shore and the rear positions. The roads for the mobile attack will also be constructed.

Dummy positions will be constructed between every space and depth.

(35) On the shore where the enemy landing will be restricted due to the cliffs, ground obstacles and sea conditions, strong points will be manned by 1 platoon or 1 squad. According to the situation, only a guard will be deployed to this area while the main force will be on the alert in the rear. At the same time, many dummy positions will be constructed to fool the enemy.

(36) Field guns will primarily be deployed to ~~attack~~ fire on the enemy landing crafts and tanks at the landing point. Preparation will be made to repulse the enemy when the shore positions are penetrated. Strategic points in the atoll reef will be provided with the necessary guns.

The majority of the guns will be installed in strong pill boxes constructed in the shore positions and the second line. To avoid damage from the enemy bombardment, many supplementary positions will be constructed. Dummy positions and batteries will be constructed to disperse the enemy bombardment.

(37) For the time being, mines will be utilized as shore obstacles. As soon as the positions are completed, shore and water obstacles will be installed and gradually reinforced. However, necessary precautions will be ~~prepared~~ made against the cleaning out of these obstacles by the enemy.

(38) Positions to the rear will be constructed when circumstances allow.

Independance will be emphasized in the construction of positions. Complete arrangements for counter-attacks will be ~~prepared~~ made.

(39) Emergency arrangements for minimizing the damage from the enemy attacks will be in accordance with the following items:

(a) The individual slit trenches will be dug first and then an air raid trench (dug out) will be constructed for all personnel.

(b) Dug outs will be provided for the men in positions exposed to the enemy and which are located near the shore.

(c) Gun parts and carriages will be dispersed among the shelters built to counter the enemy attack. For this purpose, trenches and dug outs will be constructed.

(d) Two thirds of the ammunitions, provisions, fuel and other supplies will be stored in the vicinity of the forward positions and the remaining third will be dispersed in the rear areas. Shelters and dug outs will be constructed for this purpose.

(e) The amount of supplies to be stored in one place will be less than 10 cubic meters and the dispersing distance will be 100 meters for ammunitions and fuels, 50 meters for others.

(f) The use of wooden buildings will be generally avoided.

(40) The construction work will proceed as follows:

(a) Shore defenses and the arrangements for minimizing damages will be completed within a week. After the Sector Units deploy and the field positions will be completed within a month. Pill boxes will be prepared in the field positions within two months. These will be reinforced later.

For this reason, the Sector Units will bivouac in order to construct the positions using all personnel. No barracks will be built.

(b) The construction work will be concealed as much as possible against sea and air observation. No trees will be cut down unnecessarily. Transportation roads, depots and freshly dug earth will be completely camouflaged.

(c) The method of construction and its order will be determined according to the genral situation.

(d) A fortification officer will be appointed in each Sector Unit to take charge of the plan and distribution of materials for the sector positions.

Chief of Fortifications--Chief Sector Defense Officer

Superintendent of Fortifications--Engineer Company Commander

Fortification Officer--an officer attached to the Sector Unit Headquarters

Fortification Officer--an engineer company officer

(e) Each Sector Unit will appoint suitable subordinates to assist the fortification officers.

(41) Emergency materials for the fortifications will be obtained from local sources but special materials will be supplied separately.

The allotment of materials for permanent fortifications will be decided separately.

(42) The progress of the fortification works will be observed frequently from the air and sea to judge its appearance. The air observation will be carried out by the naval air units which will be accompanied by the Sector officers. The observations will be planned by the entire Sector Unit Headquarters.

(43) Each week, each Sector Unit will report to the Entire Sector Unit concerning the progress of the fortification works.

(44) The plan of the fortifications will be decided separately.

VII. Information, Security and Counter-Intelligence

(45) The aim of collecting information will be to obtain an outline of the enemy attacks, especially its time, direction, scale, etc. It will also be to clarify the topographic data in the defense area so as to enable the Sector Units to make the necessary preparations before hand.

(46) Information of the operation will be in accordance with the information collected by the local naval units and ~~will be collected~~ from the superior officers and ~~adjourning~~ adjoining Sector Units ~~as much as possible.~~

The collection of information concerning the whole Sector Unit will be planned separately.

(47) The existing topographic data will be rapidly adjusted and prepared to clarify the conditions of the islands where our troops have not yet been deployed. At the same time, the conditions and the value of shore reefs and atoll reefs will be throughly investigated.

The investigation of topographic data will be planned separately.

(48) Each Sector Unit will be responsible for its own security. Some patrols, directly attached to the Whole Sector Unit, will be dispatched to the islands where no troops have yet been deployed, or a certain Sector Unit will be ordered to send out patrols if necessary.

(49) To maintain continuous security, observation posts, directly attached to each Sector Unit Commander, will be established at the strategic points and islands in each respective sector.

The locations of the observation posts will be determined by the Entire Sector Unit Commander.

Each observation post will be provided with the necessary alarm and liaison facilities.

(50) The aim of our counter-intelligence will be to conceal our troop movements, especially the strength, equipment and fortifications. It will also be to prevent the enemy counter-intelligence action in the defensive sectors.

For this reason, the sector unit will closely co-operate with the local naval units to carry out its counter-defense and to continue the investigation of the islands not yet deployed by our troops.

The counter-intelligence regulations will be drawn up separately.

VIII. Anti-Aircraft Defenses

(51) The naval air unit commander will be responsible for giving the air raid alarm and the all-clear signal, ~~according to which the Sector Units will give their necessary warnings.~~

The method and details will be explained in a separate sheet.

(52) The naval air defense units will be responsible for the anti-aircraft defense of this island, especially the airfields. The Sector Units will closely co-operate in order to develop an efficient united system for an ideal defense.

(53) In case of low altitude enemy air attacks, the Sector Units will engage the enemy but will not fire in case of high altitude attacks.

(54) As an anti-aircraft weapon unit, the reserves of the artillery battalion of each Sector will command one machine gun platoon and the whole mountain artillery within its sector.

IX. Communication and Liaison

(55) Communication systems will be installed so as to be in working condition despite heavy enemy bombardments.

(56) Aside from wire and radio communication equipment, each sector will be provided with dogs, carrier pidgeons, semaphore flags, heliographs

and signal flares.

The communication and liaison net works of the Sector Units will be described in a separate chart.

(57) Each Sector Unit will dispatch a liaison officer to the 61st Air Unit Headquarters and to the Army Group Headquarters.

X. Supplies and Sanitation

(58) Considering the difficulty of maintaining perishable provisions and their replacements, the supplies will be stored and protected with care. Therefore, self support from local sources will be carried out extensively.

(59) For the time being, local self support will be taken care of by the intendance section attached to the Whole Sector Unit. However, after the completion of the fortifications, each Sector Unit will carry out its own self-support.

(60) Ammunition will be supplied for about 2 engagements aside from the regular allowance, motor fuel for about 3 months, provisions for about a year (six months for the time being).

(61) The distribution of ammunition in depth will be chiefly for the enemy landing operation and will be deployed in the following manner:

A. Infantry Ammunition

Company ammunition--60%

Regiment and battalion ammunition--40%

B. Artillery Ammunition

For immediate use--200 rounds

Greater part dispersed in the rear

(62) 3 to 4 days provisions will be alloted to the shore positions and one week of reserve supplies will be stored at the alerted points (company or platoon) or anti-aircraft positions in the rear. The greater part of the provisions will be dispersed and stored in the shelters. (note: The 1 week reserve supplies are to be used only by the troops in the shore positions.)

(63) Drinking water will be stored in each position.

(64) The supplies will be dispersed and stored in sheltered places to prevent them from spoiling and mixed storage will be carried out instead of storing a certain supply in one place. However, serious

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consideration will be given when explosives are to be stored with other dangerous supplies.

(65) Intensive precaution will be carried out by every individual concerning the protection and consumption of the supplies.

(66) In order to maintain our fighting ability, sanitation and health will be given serious consideration. Epidemics and local disease will be prevented at all cost.

(67) Casualties will be treated locally but in the event of serious wounds, they will be sent to the nearby naval hospital.

XI. Education

(68) For the time being, all officers and men will concentrate on the construction of positions. However, each Sector Unit, will give education in accordance with the following schedule:

a. Classes will be held twice a week but this number will be gradually increased.

b. Classes will be held on the defensive warfare for the front line units and counter-attack, raids and surprise attacks for the reserves.

c. Realistic maneuvers will be carried out.

d. Morale education will be given to every individual to cultivate a firm conviction of final victory.

(69) Each branch unit commander will be responsible for the original and special training of their respective branch. However, for the time being, each Sector Unit will carry out these trainings with the assistance of the Branch Unit commander.

(70) The Whole Sector Unit will draw up the monthly training schedule.

XII. The Native Policy

(71) The native policy will be carried out after consultation with the local naval units and local administrative agencies.

(72) JAPANESE in these islands will co-operate with the Sector Units in supplying labor; in developing the self-support resources; in joining the construction work or to act as "pease-makers" between the Sector Units and the natives. JAPANESE reservists will participate in the battles when the enemy attacks.

These JAPANESE will be well protected during enemy attacks.

(73) Natives will be trained and directed to supply labor for military purposes.

(74) Natives will not be employed without the consent of the whole Sector Unit Headquarters.

D. The Defense Plans of the ANGAUR Island Sector Units

I. Plan

The Sector Units will firmly occupy the ANGAUR Island and will engage the enemy with heavy fire, guerilla attacks and counter-attacks when they land.

II. Outline of Battle Instructions

(1) The unit will rapidly occupy the strategic points on the coast and will commence constructing the necessary constructions. The field positions will be constructed at the strategic points within a month. Pill boxes will be completed in these field positions within two months. These will be reinforced continuously.

(2) If the enemy establishes a beach head, the reserves, co-operating with a force taken out of the Sector Units, will carry out the counter-attacks. At the same time, a section of the Sector Unit will carry on Mobile Sea warfare.

(3) Double bulkhead positions will not be constructed, however, to prevent the enemy from constructing an airfield, the Sector Unit will hold the area north of a line drawn from the lighthouse, through the north pond to FUJIMI point.

III. Deployment and Duties of the Sector Zones

(1) The South Sector Unit (1st Infantry Battalion and 1 platoon of a field artillery battalion battery, 2 field artillery batterins, 1/4 of an engineer company ~~with one section (T.N.)~~) will be responsible for the defense of the area south of a line drawn from TOMOYE point through the north end of the swamp to the north end of MOSU beach.

(2) The North Sector Unit (3rd Battalion, (T.N. faded) minus one platoon section, 1/4 of an engineer company minus 1 section) will be responsible for the defense of the area north of a line drawn from TOMOYE point through the

54


DISPOSITION SKETCH OF
PELELIU DISTRICT COMMAND
1/15000
NGESEBUS IS.
NGEMILIS ARCHIPELAGO
BAKASERU IS.
Northern Sector
Northern Sector Unit
I 1st Bn.
IA (1st Artillery Bn)
1 truck
S Elements consisting of 1 observation bearing platoon and 1 Field AA Unit
Western Sector Unit
II - 2nd Bn.
1/2 2A(- 1/4) (Section of 2nd Artillery Bty. less 1 end section)
(- 4 MA) 1 Truck
Additional Arms
1 47mm TA
2 37mm TA
7 LG
7 MA
Additional Arms
47mm TA 2
37mm TA 2
LG 6 6
MA 4 4
NOTE: Dotted lines denotes dummy portion.
MCARGESIUL IS.
Eastern Sector
Eastern Sector Unit
III (-7) 3rd Bn less the 7th Co.
1/2 8A/15i 4 Bn. (Section of Regiment Artillery of the 81st Inf. Div.)
1 truck
S - 1 Field AA Unit Collecting Unit
Additional Arms
6 iA 1
37 TA 1
LG 2
MA 3
Units Under Direct Control
Southern Sector
Southern Sector Unit
District Reserve Unit
7 7th and 9th Co's of the 14th Regt.
1/15i
Additional Arms
47mm TA
MA

INSERT MAP NO. 1

DISPOSITION OF PELELIU DISTRICT COMMAND.

DIAGRAM OF COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK



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DIAGRAM OF COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

Disposition of Defence Units on ANGUAR



north end of the swamp to NGSU beach. Also, in order to enable us to move out at anytime, a company will be directly attached to the garrison commander. Furthermore, one company will prepare to carry out guerilla attacks.

(3) One field artillery ~~battery~~ (En minus section) and 1 platoon will occupy the positions in the vicinity of NANSHIRYO to support the South area with its main force ~~and to~~ co-operate with the north sector with a part of its force, and ~~One field artillery battery minus 1 platoon~~ will prepare to set up mobile firing positions if necessary.

(4) One half of an engineer company will assist in the construction of the South Sector Unit and will later prepare to carry out sea guerilla warfare.

(5) The Infantry Regimental Signal Unit will establish a communication net work in accordance with the attached separate chart.

(6) Under the delegated command of the Signal Unit Commander, the Division Signal Unit will be responsible for liaison between the Army Group Headquarters and Sector Unit.

(7) For the time being, the supply company will dispense with provisions and ammunition but will later be responsible for supplying the front line troops. The company will also organize a transportation unit to transport ammunitions, provisions and other supplies from the main PALAU Island to this island.

(8) The medical unit will be stationed at NANSHIRYO to treat casualties and during the enemy attack, will organize rescue squads to cover the front line.

(9) The intendance section will assist each Sector Unit in building up local self-supporting resources.

IV. Training

(1) The Sector Units will carry out realistic training in order to form a smoothly functioning fighter unit and will improve its command and control of the troops. It will also see to ~~improving~~ IT THAT the conditions of the troops are improved both physically and mentally.

(2) The essential points of training will be as follows:

a. The morale training will be emphasized to overcome the intense heat, disease and starvation in this isolated outpost.

(b) Details of Training

1. Fundamental training (every warfare)

2. Enemy landing (especially shore defense warfare)--(close quarter combat)

3. Infiltration

4. Surprise attacks by small units at night, dawn and early evening

5. Night attacks

6. Anti-aircraft defense

7. In case staff officers are killed

In case of heavy casualties

In case of heavy loss in weapons

8. Infantry close combat training and engineer training

(c) Further details of the training will be given separately.

V. Information and Counter-Intelligence

1. In order to enable the Sector Unit to make necessary defense preparations, collection of information concerning the enemy attacks, especially the time, direction and strength, will be the main objective.

2. To gain information for the coming operation, the general situation of the movements of the enemy air force, communication and ships in the southeastern area will be seriously considered.

3. The following topographic data will be corrected and adjusted:

(a) ground conditions

(b) traffic

(c) communications

(d) natives

(e) weather conditions

(f) sea conditions

(g) sanitation

(h) military supply

(i) local

resources

self support

4. The main object of our counter-intelligence will be to conceal our troop movements and preparations. It will also be to prevent the enemy

counter-intelligence activities in our defense area. For this purpose, the local government and the people will be properly trained and directed to carry out our counter-intelligence.

5. The regulations of the ANGAUR defense unit intelligence service, and the gathering of information and counter-intelligence, will be determined separately.

VI. Fortifications and Communications

1. The fortifications will consist of positions (including anti-aircraft positions) along the coast and necessary safety precautions will be taken in order to minimize our loss in personnel and materials. These will be rapidly constructed and later will be reinforced in depth and quality.

2. Routes of communiction will be prepared first followed by the roads for troop movements, military supply and for the carrying of casualties.

3. The fortification plans will be decided separately.

The details of the fortifications will be in accordance with, "The Details of the Fortifications" which has been distributed to each Sector Unit.

VII. Anti-Aircraft Defense

1. The air raid alarm (all-clear signal) will be in accordance with the order of the Defense Commander.

2. All headquarters and communication centers will be protected against enemy bombardment.

Individual slit trenches will be dug.

3. Air defense preparations will be as follows:

a. The First Preparation

When the enemy attack is known beforehand, the troops will be deployed to man their defensive positions.

b. The Second Preparation

When the enemy attack is anticipated, the troops will be alerted and the air defense unit will man their positions.

c. The Third Preparation

When enemy attack is not impending, the air defense unit will be alerted and the other units semi-alerted.

Communication Network on ANGAUR ISLAND
(When possibilities of an enemy invasion are small)



Remarks: Black indicates the wire used by the Southern Colonization Company. Red indicates the newly planned line.

INSERT MAP NO. 3

DISPOSITION OF DEFENSE UNITS ON ANGUAR.

DIAGRAM OF THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK ON ANGUAR ISLAND
(CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY ATTACK)

NOTES

1. WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE PLANS FOR DEFENSE, A PARTIAL REVISION OF THIS COMMUNICATION NETWORK WILL BE MADE.

2: A PERMANENT LINE WILL BE CONSTRUCTED, AND STANDARD EQUIPMENT WILL BE KEPT IN RESERVE.

3: RADIO WILL BE USED AS AN AUXILIARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION. THERE SETS WILL BE USED TO COLLECT INFORMATION AND ALSO AS A RESERVE.

4: A PIGEON LOFT WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS AND WILL BE USED FOR DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE THE PIGEON POSTS AND MAIN HEADQUARTERS.

5: ONE PART OF THE DOG UNIT WILL BE USED BETWEEN REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION (TN ?) HEADQUARTERS. THE REST WILL BE KEPT IN RESERVE.

6: THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN THE RETRENCHMENT POSITIONS WILL BE PLANNED SEPARATELY.

POLICY

BASED UPON THE PLAN OF DEFENSE, THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK WILL BE CONSTRUCTED AS SHOWN IN THE DIAGRAM, FOR THE PURPOSE OF COLLECTING INFORMATION AND CO-ORDINATING COMMAND. THEREFORE, THE MAIN LINES OF COMMUNICATION WILL BE WIRE, WITH AUXILIARY LINES UTILIZING WIRELESS, CARRIER PIGEONS & DOGS. THE WIRE LINES WILL BE CONTRUCTED FIRMLY AS A PROTECTION AGAINST ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT.



INSERT ~~MAP NO. 4.~~ DIAGRAM NO. 1

COMMUNICATION NETWORK ON ANGUAR ISLAND.

4. When the enemy attacks, each plane will be fired upon, however, in order to prevent unnecessary firing, each unit commander will control the fire.

5. Air-Raid Alarm (See Chart)

VIII. Gas Defense

1. In order to maintain our fighting force against enemy gas attacks, the main subject of gas defense will be any gas, especially persistent gas (by means of spraying).

2. Special Precautions against Gas Defense

A. Considering the present condition of our anti-chemical equipment, gas shelters will be built from local materials.

B. The anti-chemical shelters will be built within the fortifications and frequent inspections will be carried out during and after the construction.

C. A temporary decontaminating section will be organized in each Sector Unit to neutralize the contaminated areas if necessary.

Details of this unit will be determined separately.

IX. Adjustment and Storage of Ammunition and Supplies

1. Ammunition will be economized as much as possible by strict discipline and through training.

Especially, unnecessary firing will be avoided by the anti-aircraft units.

2. The supply of ammunition will be shown in the next chart.

3. The use of the present ammunition will be in accordance with the following precautions:

a. Because the allotment of ammunition is low, type 92 heavy machine gun tracer bullets will be substantially used for night fire.

b. Type 99 light machine gun bullets are packed water-proof, therefore, these will be reserved as much as possible. When the ammunition is being used for type 92 heavy machine gun, the ammunition belt must be used.

c. Each Sector Unit will carefully train its troops as to the method of using the alloted ammunitions, especially, anti-tank mines, MOLOTOV cocktail and hand grenades.

4. Ammunitions and supplies will be stored according to the

Appended Chart

Allotment of Ammunition

Type of Shells / Unit	Regimental Headquarters	Infantry Battalion Headquarters	Artillery Battalion Headquarters	Infantry Company	Infantry Artillery	Engineer Company	Signal Unit	Medical Unit	Supply Company	Rounds Per Box	Summary
Ball Ammunition for Type 99 Rifle	(2)	I II 5 (2) III 49 (2)	(2)	12 (8)	1	(5)	(3)	(1)	(2)	1,380	
Ball Ammunition for Type 99 Light Machine Gun	110	60								370	
Regular Ball Ammunition for Type 92 Heavy Machine Gun	100	90		14 (21)						600	
Tracer Bullet for Type 92 Heavy Machine Gun	554 4	1								600	
Armor Piercing Bullet for Type 92 Heavy Machine Gun	167 9	9		2						600	
Types 91 and 97 Hand Grenade	600	153 (6	41	40 (10	8 (6	16 (16	13 (12)	18 (18	16 (10	20	Allotment of the Regimental Headquarters include boxes of 50
Type 99 Hand Grenade	60	60	10							20	
Type 89 Heavy Trench Mortar Shell	(2,400	(3,560		(192						20 40	
Type 92 Howitzer Shell	(1,000				I (1,204) II III (1,202					8 6 3	

Armor Piercing Shell for Type 94 Anti-Tank Gun	60				100					10	
Shell for Type 94 Anti-Tank Gun	Boxes of 12 55				Boxes of 10 90					12	
Type 99 Smoke Shell	3	2								20	
Small Smoke Candle		I II 5 III 4								30	
Substitute Smoke Candle		I II 5 III 4								60	
Large Smoke Candle	20	20								1	
Floating Smoke Candle	(17)									5	
Armor Piercing Mine	(63)									20 15	
Anti-Tank Mine	9	18								20	
MOLOTOV Cocktail Incendiary Bomb	6	4								30	

Signal Shells	Dragon (RYU)	Yellow	34	26	27								
		Black	33	23	21								
		Red	5	3	6								
	Hanging Star (TSURI DOSEI)	Red	20	15	15								
		Green	18	11	12								
		White	33	25	24								
	Star (HOSHI)	Red 1	2	2	2								
		Red 2	5	4	3								
		Red 3	3	4	3								
		Green 1	4	4	4								
		Green 3	19	15	12								
		White 1	4	4	4								
		White 2	4	4	4								
		White 3	14	10	9								
Flare for Light Trench Mortar			10	12									

Reference:

1. This chart shows only the ammunition used by the infantry. The allotment of ammunition for the artillery and engineer units is same as before.
2. The numbers in parenthesis indicate the ammunition already distributed and loaded on ships.
3. The numbers indicate the amount of boxes. The numbers in the cornered brackets indicate the amount of shells.
4. In the signal shell section, the numbers indicate the amount of shells.
5. In addition to the ones listed on this chart, the Artillery Battalion Headquarters will carry 15 boxes of ball ammunition for the Type 38 rifle.
6. A large portion of the explosives other than those listed on this chart will be distributed to the Engineer Company.

bulletin, "Precautions of Handling Ammunition in the Tropical Zones". Also, the following items:

(a) The distance between the tops of the dispersed ammunition will not be less than 50 meters and the quantity will be less than 50 cases.

(b) If depots are located in salient positions and at the foot of the mountain, dug outs will be constructed to store ammunitions. In these cases, ventilation and drainage will be taken into consideration.

(c) When ammunition is stored near weapons, bunkers will be built to separate ~~each other~~ these. Also, to avoid from induced explosions.

(d) Parapets will be dug around the depots.

(e) The spaces between ammunitions and coverings will be at least 50 mm.

(f) Each Sector Unit Commander will know the situation of the ammunition and direct his subordinates ~~concerning~~ IN the use and control of the ammunitions. During the hottest period of each day, he will make regular inspections.

(g) Moisture absorbing agents will be used in accordance with "The Direction for Handling Moisture Absorbing Agent". Considering the weather conditions, necessary precautions will be taken to guard against moisture.

5. Each unit (battalion and company) will repair their own damaged weapons and supplies. However, the Headquarters Ordnance Section will organise a special mobile repair unit with the necessary parts and personnel.

X. The Use, Storage and Replacement of Supplies

1. ~~It will not be expected that~~ Supplies will NOT EXPECTED TO BE be replaced, therefore, local self-support will be carried out. At the same time food will be reserved as in case of emergency.

2. Provisions and supplies will be dispersed in the Headquarters area and each sector area. (The ratio will be 2 for headquarters and 1 for each sector.) Also, a part of the reserved provisions and supplies will be ~~squeezed out in case of emergency~~ KEPT FOR SITUATION.

3. The supply depot will be built rapidly, however, immediately

after unloading the supplies, they will be covered to prevent spoiling.

XI. Local Self-Support

1. The local self-support will be carried out as soon as military preparations are completed. Substitutes will be cultivated and the necessary seeds, fertilizers and insecticides will be prepared.

2. Fish and salt production will be carried out.

3. The details for local self-support will be planned separately.

XII. Sanitation

Main Subject

The prevention of infectious diseases, first aid in the battle-field, and sanitation facilities will be improved to maintain fighting strength. The details of this will be determined separately.

XIII. Administrative Duties

1. A well organized administrative system will be necessary for final victory. For this reason, the administration will continue to function smoothly despite enemy attacks.

2. Its details will be in accordance with, "The Unit Administrative Regulation". However, each Sector Unit commander and Independent Unit commander, will take morning and evening roll calls and report any unusual happenings to the garrison commander.

3. The daily routine time table will be as follows:

Morning roll call.....0600

Breakfast.....0730

Lunch.....1200

Rest.....2 hours after lunch

Report.....1500

Supper.....1800

Evening roll call.....2000

4. Each Unit commander will make a report concerning the defense and fortifications. (The time will be advised when necessary.)

XIV Native Policy

1. The natives will be trained and directed to be true JAPANESE soldiers, ~~having an ardent self-consciousness and obligation.~~

2. The JAPANESE on this island, excluding the young and the old, will

Rs- translation of pp. 72-74, 31st Divisional Opns

P. 72

A. ADOPTION OF PLANS FOR STRENGTHENING THE SHORE DEFENSE SYSTEM

The Group originally deployed a unit consisting of 3 Infantry Battalions to Peleliu and a unit consisting of 2 Infantry Battalions to Angaur. The defense of the islands was the responsibility of the commanders of the 2d Infantry and 59 th Infantry Regiments, respectively. (T.N. In other words, the 2d Inf. went to Peleliu and the 59th Inf went to Angaur.) Maj. Gen. Yamaguchi, commanding a division and various other army and navy units inthe area, was responsible for the defense of Koror, Malakal, Arakabesan and Babelthaup. A battalion of the 59th Inf. Regiment and the Sea transport unit of the 1st Amphibious Brigade were under the command of the 15th Inf. Reg. and constructed operations bases in the Babelthaup - Malakal area. These units were deployed at strategic points to conduct night reconnaissance and repulse the planned enemy landings by effecting counter-landings.

In early May, the Army commander arrived in Palau (TN Obata) and was apprised of the steps taken to strengthen defenses. In accordance with his orders, a battalion of the 15th Inf. was dispatched to reinforce the Peleliu Sector Unit and the remaining battalion of the 59th Inf. was dispatched to reinforce Angaur. For the time being, the main force remaining of the 15th Inf was to cooperate in the construction of fortifications in the Peleliu sector.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE 53d and 49th INDEPENDENT MIXED BRIGADES AND THEIR INCORPORATION INTO THE PALAU SECTOR GROUP COMMAND

P. 73

On 30 May, orders were issued to form an Independent Mixed Brigade consisting of 6 infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and one engineer company from replacements and casuals units in Palau. The organization was completed on 13 June. One battalion of the IMB wad dispatched to reinforce the Peleliu Sector Unit , while the main force wad deployed on Babelthaup. On 2 July, the 4th Yap Detached Unit and the Kozakura Battalion, (sent to Yap from Babelthaup in the latter part of June) were formed into the 49th Independent Mixed Brigade and came under the command of the Palau Sector Group.

C. TRANSFER OF VARIOUS PALAU UNITS TO THE PALAU SECTOR GROUP

On 25 June, by which time the fate of Saipan was decided and Palau was in imminent danger, units of the 31st Army, the South Seas Military Police Unit, the 42d Independent Motor Battalion, the Palau Branch of the 3d Shipping and Transportation Headquarters and its attached units, the 53d Communication Sector Unit, the 23d Communication Hospital and soldiers and civilians employed on Palau were alerted and trasferred to the Palau Sector Group.

D. (OK as is)

E. CHANGES IN DEPLOYMENT IN LATE JULY

P.74

In view of the situation on Saipan and the impending battle for Palau, the group became concerned with the lack of strength. On 19 July, the orders to reinforce the Angaur garrison and transfer the 330 Ind. Inf. Bn.(on Koror I.) to Yap were rescinded. At 1500 20 July, the following orders were issued:

1. The commanders of the 59th Inf. will advance with his main force to the Ailai sector of Babelthaup, leaving one Inf. Bn. (one mtn atty. btty., a section of the signal unit, a section of supply coy, a section of the medical unit, a radio squad of Div. Signal Unit, a section of the intendance unit, 1/6 of the field hospital staff and the majority of spare weapons) to take over the duties of the Angaur Sector Unit.

2. Major Goto, commanding the 1st. Bn of the 59th Inf. will command the above unit. This unit will become the new Angaur Sector Unit, taking over the duties of the previous unit.

be responsible for the defense of the homeland.

They will co-operate with the Sector Unit in supplying labor, developing local self-support resources, in participating in the construction of military projects ~~and in participating in the construction of military~~ projects and in participating in the air defense service. The reservists will act as the nucleas among them and will be called upon to take an active part when the enemy attacks.

These JAPANESE will be protected during enemy attacks.

3. The natives will be directed to supply labor for the air defense and military projects.

4. The natives will be treated at the field hospital if necessary.

5. No counter-intelligence action will be allowed on this island.

Chapter 3. The Situation from the End of April until the beginning of September

A. Adoption of the Shore Defense System

The Army Group at first deployed a unit (with 3 infantry battalions as a nucleas) to PELELIU Island and another unit (with 2 infantry battalions as the nucleas) to ANGAUR Island. These two units were commanded by the commanders of the 2nd and 59th Infantry Regiments respectively. Major General YAMAGUCHI was responsible for the defense of KOROR, MALAKAL, ARAKABESAN and the main PALAU island (with a regiment and other army and naval units under his direct and delegated command.) A battalion of the 59th Infantry Regiment and a sea transport unit of the 1st Sea Mabile Brigade were under the Command of the 15th Infantry Regiment ~~and were to~~ participated in the construction of Mobile Bases in the vicinity of the main PALAU and MALAKAL islands. These units were to carried out night guerilla warfare and counter-landings and deployed their forces in the strategic points.

In the beginning of May, the army commander arrived at PALAU island and took further steps toward strengthening the defense, A battalion from the 15th Infantry Regiment was despatched to reinforce the PELELIU Sector Units and a battalion from the 59th Infantry Regiment was dispatched to ANGAUR For the time being the main force of the 15th Infantry Regiment was to cooperate with the PELELIU Sector Units in the construction of fortifications.

B. The Organizations of the 53rd and 49th Independent Mixed Brigade UNDER THE Command of the PALAU Sector Group.

On the 30th of May, an order was issued to organize an Independent Mixed Brigade ~~which~~ this was completed by the I3th of June. This Brigade was composed of 6 infantry battalions, I artillery battalion and I Engineer company with replacement units in PALAU. The main force of this unit was stationed in PALAU except for I battalion which was dispatched to reinforce the PELELIU Sector Units.

On the 2nd of July, the 49th Independent Mobile Brigade, composed of the Ist JAP Detached Unit and the KOZAKURA battlalion (which was dispatched to JAP island from PALAU in the beginning of June), was organized. This brigade was placed under the command of the PALAU Sector Group.

C. The Transfer of the PALAU Units and the Commander of the PALAU Sector Group.

On the 25th of June, when the fate of SAIPAN island was about to be decided and the PALAU Sector was in danger, Units of the 3Ist Army, the South Sea Military Police Unit, the 42nd Independent ~~Mortar~~ Motor Battalion, the PALAU Branch of the 3rd Shipping and Transportation Headquarters and its attached units, the 53rd Communication Sector Unit, the 23rd Communication hospital, and soldiers and civilians employed in PALAU island, were alerted and transferred to the PALAU Sector Group.

D. The Original Tactics for Decisive Defense.

Considering the recent experiences especially, those in the SAIPAN operation, the enemy will probably carry out fierce air attacks before initially landing and will make the landing under the protection of an air and sea cover. When the enemy carrys out its main attack with barrages from ships, planes and armored forces, such a force as ours, with limited strength in this isolated island and not expecting reinforcements and replacements of supplies, under ordinary circumstances will have a very slim chance of survival.

Therefore the Army Group ~~had planned the unusual~~ drew up tactics/plans which were completed on the beginning of July and which were issued on the IIth.

The Sector Units carried out training and made every preparations in accordance with the plan.

E. The Change in Deployment Plans at the end of July.

~~According to~~ Because of the results of the SAIPAN operation and ~~considering~~ the impending battle for PALAU island, the Army Group was worried about the

la ck of defensive strength. On I9 July, the following orders were cancelled:

(a) The ANGAUR garrison will be reinforced until it is approximately the size of an infantry battalion.

(b) The 330 Independent Infantry Battalion (now in KOROR island) will be transferred to JAP island.

~~According~~ Adhering to the afore mentioned plans, at the following orders were issued by the Army Group at I500 hours on the 20th of July.

The Outline of the Orders for the PALAU Sector Group at I500 hourrs on 20th of July, at KOROR island.

I. The commander of the 59th Infantry Regiment with the main force, will advance to AILAI sector of the main PALAU island, leaving I infantry battalion (a mountain artillery battery, an engineer platoon, a section of the signal unit, a section of the supply company, a section of the medical unit, a radio squad of the Division signal unit, a section of the intendance unit, I/6 of the field hospital staff, and also the greater part of the ~~reinforced~~ weapons to take over the duties of the ANGAUR Sector Unit.

The duties after the transfer and the transportation for the transfer will be ordered separately.

2. Major GOTO, the commander of the Ist Battalion of the 59th Infantry Regiment, will command the above mentioned units which will become the new ANGAUR Sector Unit and which will take over the duties of the former unit.

3. When the first transportation unit leaves ANGAUR island, the duties will change hands.

4. The PALAU Branch Commander of the 3rd Shipping and Transportation Headquarters will be responsible for the sea transportation of the main 59th Infantry Regiment between ANGAUR and PALAU islands. This transfer was to be carried out during the impending situation despite the bad sea conditions. Therefore, there were close cooperation among all the units concerned. ~~Because of the super-human efforts and despite the 3 day attacks by~~ Enemy carrier-borne planes attacked our unit for 3 days. beginning from the 25th of July.

F. Enemy Air Attacks During July

1. From Since the beginning of July, the enemy repeatedly attacked PELELIU, KOROR and JAP islands with a small number of bombers.

2. On the 25th of July

a. According to the naval reports, an enemy Mobile force (2 carriers, 2 battleships, six cruisers and 10 destroyers) was observed 150 nautical miles and 160 degree off JAP island. Several other Mobile forces were ^also believed ~~likely~~ to be operating in that area.

b. ~~Two times~~ Twice between 1420 and 1630 hours, about 25 planes, (SB2C), in formation from the direction of GARASUMAO and the main PALAU islands, continiously dive-bombed AILAI airfield, MALAKAL port, AMYONS sea plane base and ARMATEN Naval Battery.

c. From 1410 to 1600 a total of 60 planes in several formations of 4 to 8 planes, attacked PELELIU island and dive-bombed the airfield and Northeast coast.

d. From 1400 to 1515, 37 planes, in four formations, attacked JAP island and bombed the 1st and 2nd airfields, BARABAT and MAP. Our coastal positions were also strafed.

3. On the 26th of July

a. PALAUisland

Four times between 0620 and 1150 hours, about 45 TBD and SB2C planes bombed and strafed the AILAI airfield, AMIONS seaplane base, MALAICAL pier, the Army Group Headquarters, the 30th Sector Unit Headquarters, anti-aircraft positions in KOROR, and the ARMATEN Naval batteries at 1300 hours, about 35 carrierborne planes again attacked the same targets and KOROR city. The planes were mostly SB2C, ~~including~~ the others were TBD?TBF AND P-38's

The results were 12 enemy planes shot down (including 2 probables), 3 of our officers, 3 non-commissioned officers and 21 men were killed, ~~while~~ and 46 men were wounded. Furthermore, a great part of KOROR city was burnt down. On this day, the enemy bombed our line of communication hospital ~~with~~ which was clearly marked with a ^Red Cross Marking and two of the buildings were destroyed.

b. ~~PALAUisland~~ PELELIU island

From 0600 to 0710 a total of ~~30~~ 90 carrier-borne bombers attacked from the east and bombed our airfields.

Five times between 0850 and 1300 a total of 111 bombers bombed

and strafed our airfields.

At about the same time, three enemy cruisers, two destroyers ~~and two destroyers~~, and two submarines were observed about 10 kilometers east of the island.

c. ANGAUR island

Seven times between 0654 and 0704, 16 carrier-borne bombers bombed and strafed our positions.

From 0850 to 1100 and 1215 to 1535 hours, 48 type F4F planes ~~and 35 planes of the same type respectively~~ bombed and strafed our positions. Three enemy planes were shot down.

d. YAP island

During the following hours the enemy bombed and strafed the TOMIR airfield, radio stations in BARABAT and KORONEY, anti-aircraft positions and the Ist airfield.

0620-0650 hours 100 carrier-borne bombers and 9 large type planes.

0920-1020 hours 90 carrier-borne bombers and 9 large type planes.

1120-1205 hours 103 carrier-borne planes.

1240-1410 hours 104 carrier-borne planes.

A total of 6 enemy planes were shot down.

4. 27 July

a. PALAU island

From 0550 to 1455, not less than 40 enemy planes bombed and strafed our defensive positions, main buildings left in the cities, harbor installations and supply depots. ~~Due to~~ Because of this attack, KOROR city was almost completely demolished. Seven enemy planes were shot down.

b. PELELIU and ANGAUR islands

Several times between 0530 and 0850 hours, a small number of enemy planes attacked but caused little damage

c. JAP island

From 0955 to 1115, 111 carrier-borne planes bombed and strafed the Ist airfield and our defensive positions. 3 enemy planes were shot down.

5. The anticipated enemy air attack due to the air actions between the 25th and 27th of July.

a. It is to be anticipated that the enemy will try to intercept our air reinforcements to GUAM. At the same time, will evaluate our defensive situation by carrying out feint attacks in PALAY archepelago(including ANGAUR island). This will enable the enemy to base their time of attack and their method of attack (strength to be employed, direction and landing tactics) upon the information obtained.

b. The enemy losses during these 3 days were not less than 40 carrier-borne bombers. According to the superior air actions carried out on the 26th and 27th the enemy personnel must have had a lot of training, for this reason the personnel shot down must have been a severe loss to the enemy.

c. Our artillery, especially the anti-aircraft guns (particularly machine guns) succeeded in keeping up a persistant defense fire which must have caught the enemy unexpectedly (with a conservative use of ammunition). Our losses during these 3 days of fighting were only 3 officers, 5 non-commissioned officers and 42 men killed, when the individual slit trenches were used, men and officers were convinced that if offered complete protection against enemy air raids, despite the fact that our losses were so small, the enemy loss in personnel was not less than 100. Therefore our troops were convinced that the war was progressing in our favor.

d. Because of the unique value of the PALAU archepelago as an advance base against the PHILLIPINES, especially its location, anchorage and air bases, the enemy will probably try to occupy it in the near future, at which time, the forces of Admiral NIMITZ and General MAC ARTHUR will cooperate closely. However, this operation will depend upon the outcome of the GUAM AND TINIAN operations.

CHAPTER 4- The Battle of PALAU with PELELIU and ANGAUR or the center of Battle.

A. The general situation prior to battle.

1. During the middle part of July, the enemy had continuously bombed and bombarded GUAM with planes and Naval gunfire, and on the 21st of July, the enemy was finally able to make a successful landing,

Our forces which were engaged in the defense of GUAM, under the direct command of the 31st Army were unsuccessful in their defense against the enemy, even though they had put their dying effort in the battle. Day by day our forces weakened, and around the 10th of Auguat, they were finally cut off from all communications.

2. ~~Due to~~ Because of the fact that the 31st Army had been abruptly cut off from operations, the PALAU Area Group was detached from the 31st Army Command and was ordered by the Southern Army to take direct orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet.

3. The enemy following ~~his~~ their afrial attacks of July in the PALAU Area, had been making bombing raidswith on or two planes every nighton PELELIU, KOROR and ARAKABESAN. Along with these raids, ten or so larger type enemy bombers ~~were sent out on bombing missions to~~ bombed the airfield and various positions of YAP Island during the day time. From August 24th, the enemy ~~had~~ began ~~to make~~ making bombing raids on PALAU. With a formation of B-24's, which first started with 2 or 3 planes, but ended up with approximately 50 planes, their objective was mainly the PELELIU sector and the airfields of KOROR, MALAKAL, ARAKABESAN and AIRAI.

On the third of September, we received a wire from the Commander-in-Chief of the Souther Army, stating that the enemy would commence ~~his~~ their large scale operation within a few days. The objective of the operation being HALMERERA and PALAU. The PALAU Group Headquarters notified all the forces under its command, that the awaited opportunity to annihilate the enemy

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was about to come.

"This is the only chance to repay our Imperial Benevolence and save our countyy from a critical situation. Therefore, officers, and men will devote their lives to winning the decisive battle."

(This does not appear in Japse text) p. 110

On the 5th of Sept. we removed the "Nanyo Shrine" to YAMAMOTOMURA, which is located on the center of PALAU'S Proper Island, ~~where a shrine had already been constructed.~~

4. On September 6th, ~~it seemed as if~~ 2 separate powerful carrier task forces ~~had appeared~~ appeared off the northeastern coast of PALAU. Then at approximately at 1400 hours, ~~of~~ September 6th, YAP and Palau areas weee attackdd by enemy carrier planes. Detail of the attack ~~are~~ was as follows:

(a) PALAU Area.

1400 - 1500, 6th September, 130 enemy carrier planes (F4F) straffed and bombed the various positions in the area of PALALU Proper Islands such as: "AIRAI" airfield, "MELEKEIOK", SHIMIZU Village, "ARUMATEN (TN-?), ~~"KARASUMAO (TN-?),~~ NGANDMAL "KARAMADO Bay" ~~(TN-?)~~, AIMIREBKI (TN-?) warf, and other seaside villages and boats located along those places. On KORORO Island, the Anti-Aircraft gun position along the slopes of "HODAIYAMA" (T.N. Japse for "Emplacement Hill") were the main objectives.

(b) PELELIU Area.

At 1350 on 6th September, the enemy planes consisting of approximately 80 (F4F) and 8 (SB2C) approached from the south and southeast part of PELELIU, straffing and bombing the airfields of PELELIU and ~~"KADOBUSU" (TN-?)~~ NGESEBUS and areas thereabouts, continuously.

(c) ANGUAR Area.

1440 - 1545 6 September, apemy planes approached from the southeastern coast of ANGAUR, straffing and bombing our positions and then departing to the southeast. These attacks were repeated constantly within this hour.

(d) YAP Apeal

1410 - 1547 6 September, approximately 35

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carrier planes (F4F) repeatedly straffed our airfields and beach positions, then departing to the southeast.

Note: On the evening of 6 September the Group Headquarters established its command posts on Mt. ARRRRKOKKU (TN-?) and to the north of "AIRAI Airfield", as had been previously planned.

5. (a) On the 7th and the 8th of September, the attack of the enemy planes through out PALAU were about as fierce as that of the 6th.

(b) At 0530, the enemy carrier task force consisting of 3 carriers, 1 battleship, 1 large type cruiser, and 11 destroyers, appeared along the horizon surrounding YAP. Between the hours of 0811 - 0840, the task force fired upon the airfield and the port of YAP. After the Naval attack, the enemy disappeared to the east.

6. The estimates of the situation up to the 8th of September are as follows:

Judging from the situation since the 6th of September, the enemy's attack on this area must be a feint. The Group Headquarters estimated that the main objective of the enemy must be pointed at other areas, although, Headquarters does not know where the other objective is as yet. However the entire Group will prepare for the enemy's stronger attack, and find a way to break the deadlock of this difficult phase of war, besides waiting for the right time to annihilate the enemy.

7. September 9th, our forces did not encounter any aerial attacks from the enemy. However from 0700 of 10 September, PALAU Proper Island, KOROR, MAUKAL (MALAKAL?), ARAKABESA N, PELELIU, and ANGAUR were all assaulted again by enemy carrier planes, and on the 11th PELELIU and ANGAUR were assaulted by naval gunfire.

In view of such a critical situation, the Group Commander dispatched instructions by wire to the PELELIU garrison and ANGAUR garrision starting the following. "It appears that the enemy forces are determined to make a landing on PALAU.

This battle may have a part in the decisive turn of tide in breaking the deadlock of the "Great ASIATIC War" (JAPANESE Greater East Asia rendered name for the Pacific conflict) the entire army and people of JAPAN are expecting us to win this battle. There will never be another chance as these few existing days for the people living in the empire to repay the emperor's benevolence again. Rouse yourselves for the sake of your country! Officers and men, you will devote your life to the winning of This battle, and attaining of your long cherished desire of annihilating the enemy".

B. Progress of the first ten days of Battle (September 11-20)

A . 1. The intelligence report.

a. Situation of the Enemy ships. (cf. appended map#1)

(1) The main force of the carrier task force located off the coast of PALAU and YAP (Consisting mainly of over 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleship, ten or so cruisers, and about 30 destroyers) steamed westward on the afternoon of September 8th, and approached MINDANAO Island from the east. From the morning of the 9th to the afternoon of the 10th, approximately 500 carrier planes attacked the various airfields around DAVAO, CAGAYAN, and SURIGAO, returning to the southeast later. However, on the 12th and 13th they again made attacks on the TACLOBAN Area (LEYTE Island). There on the afternoon of the 14th, the task force moved southward. On the 15th, the enemy attacked MANADO and HALMAHERA, probably for the purpose of helping out the landing operations on MOROTAI Island.

(2) Scouting results about HOLLANDIA on the 11th of September are as follows:

(a) In HUMBOLDT Bay:

Aircraft Carrier	2
Battleship	2
Cruiser of destroyer	8
Large transport	40
Medium & Small transport	70

(b) No enemy ships were sighted in

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8/

TANAHMERAH Bay nor ~~none~~ 200 Kilometer to the east or 100 Kilometers to the west of HOLLANDIA.

(3) Considering other reports and that of the scouting report of the SOLOMONIslands, it is quite obvious that the enemy's sizable unit which was considered to have been laying in anchorage near GUADAL CANAL since the beginning of June, had lifted anchor on the 11th of the morning of the 12th, and was now headed for NEW GUINIA.

(4) Enemy ships were increasing in number all along the northern coast of NEW GUINEA. The enemy hardly used ~~his~~ their wireless for intra-communications. Considering the fact that the enemy had changed ~~his~~ their method of communication from wireless, our units began to minimize the usage of wireless for sending out orders as much as possible. ~~since he attempting to keep the radio is silent.~~

(5) Following are Scouting results obtained of the ~~around~~ LORENGAU AREA ~~observed~~ From ~~by~~ 2 Zero type fighter planes. ~~are as follows:~~

(a) Ships in LORENGAU Bay.

Aircraft Carriers	4
Battleships	10
Cruisers	7 or 8
Destroyers	8
Large & Medium type transports	50
Small transports	30

(b) Outside of LORENGAU Bay

4 Cruisers and 16 large & medium type transports sailing northward.

(c) In the waters 15 miles due south of HAIN (TN-?) airfield, 4 destroyers were seem heading eastward and 1 large Aircraft Carrier and 3 destroyers heading westward.

HAIN (TN-?) airfield -nspotted 60 bombers.

LOS NEGROS airfield - spotted 30 small planes (type UNKnown)

ENIRO (TN-?) airfield - spotted 20 or 30 small planes.

(6) According to radio Intellegence, since the

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18th of September, enemy ships in the waters surrounding the ADMIRALITY Islands were in active movement. Also the enemy ships in the waters surrounding the MARSHALL Islands were ready for movement, which was expected to commence from the 19th or 20th of September. After these dates, the previously mentioned enemy ships are expected to advance towards the PALAU Area together.

(7) The enemy submarines which appeared in the waters surrounding HALMAHERA and MOROTAI Islands are boldly and persistently attempting to make reconnaissance in force. Approximately 50 enemy submarines are now starting to concentrate south of FORMOSA, for the purpose of ~~attempting to cut~~ CUTTING off our supply lines.

b. The situation of the enemy airforces.

(cf. appended map # 1)

(1) All of the enemy forces situated due west of HOLLANDIA amounts to approximately 900 planes. However, the probable reason for this is due to the advance of the 5th and 15th Air Divisions main forces.

NOEMFOOR	50 planes
BIAK	250 planes
OUI(TN-?) OWI	150 planes
WAKDE	150 planes
HOLLANDIA	200 planes

Up to the 24th of September an the average of 300 planes made daily attacks on HALMAHERA. However, since then, there has been only 20 planes or so mainly for reconnaissance purposes. After the 15th of September their main objective was to bomb CERAM Island.

The mass bombing of DAVAO and MANADO became very severe. The enemy air forces were ~~doing~~ SENDING reconnaissance flights up to SANDAKAN, the northern point of BORNEO.

(2) The enemy's bombing mission over the "BABO" (TN-?) area became frequent and severe, and along with this the enemy's reconnaissance flights over the flat area of the BONBERAI (TN-?) peninsula became precise. Therefore, it ~~may be~~ is probable that the enemy

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forces are planning to use airborne tropps in this area.

(3) Since the beginning of September, ~~enemy formations consisting of~~ 30 enemy fighters and bombers have been making extensive attacks in the CERAM and AMBOINA areas daily, especially on NANGAN airfield. (a JAPANESE rendered name for an airfield on the southern coast of either CERAM or AMBOINA)

c. Other reports on the enemy.

It has been repoted that the commander of the landing forces on MORTAI was JULIAN SMITH (the Commander of the 2nd Marine Division that landed on SAIPAN), although it was not confirmed,

According to the AUSTRALIAN broadcast, General MAC ARTHHR inspected MORTAI Island after the ~~enemy~~ landing.

d. The Group situation on the front.

(1) PELELIU Area (cf. appended chart # 1 & appended Map # 2).

For the past 10 days the enemy has been persistently straffing and bombing our forces. After the 12th the enemy again o commenced Naval gun-fire, and ~~at last~~ on the 15th began to land.

(a) Situation of 15 September

1) 50 enemy transports approached up to 13 kilometers off the southeast coast of PELELIU, and at 0700 hours, approximately 300 landing bages had reached the reefs off the southwestern coast of PELELIU under ~~bombing~~ air and ~~shelling~~ artillery protection. However, some of these barges were blown-up and sunk by mines which were carefully pre-laid. The enemy, nevertheless, readjusted their formations, and ggain attempted the daring task of landing, with the protective aid of the smoke shells, ~~bombing~~ air and ~~shelling~~ artillery fire.

The TOKMITA Battalion had destroyed over 60 of the enemy barges since morning. The CHIAKE Battalion fought desperately with the enemy, standing up against the severe pounding of the enemy shells and bombs. However, the artillery units were especially successful in inflecting heavy damages to the enemy

tanks, and by 1000 hours, our forces successfully put the enemy to rout.

2) At 1420 hours, the enemy again attempted to make the perilous landing on the southwestern part of our coastline. The unit in that sector repulsed the daring counter-attack, and put the enemy to rout once more. However in another sector of the coastline near AYAME ~~(2N*?)~~ THE enemy position with the aid of several tanks ~~was~~ were successfully in landing, although they were encountering heavy losses inflicted by our forces. Nevertheless, after receiving reinforcements, the enemy forces wefe successful in making their landing, and were able to make secure their position. ~~since~~ Our tank unit attacked the enemy with such a cat-like spring at dusk, that they were able to inflict heavy damages on the enemy in the northwest and western area of the airfield.

3) The [southwestern] sector unit with its main forces made a couter-attack on the enemy, while the ICHIOKA Battalion (2 Infantry companies) made a surprise attack on the enemy, which had advanced up to the east end of the airfield. From there, penetrating the enemy ~~beach head~~ positions at the south east end of the airfield, they were able to throw the enemy into confusion with a severe blow. However, our forces were unable to make this the decisive blow.

4) The enemy losses

Landing barges --------- approximataly 60.
M 3 tanks and amphibious tank ---Approximataly 50.
Countless namber of personnel.

b). The stuation on 16 September

1) 1000 hours: On the South west coast of the airfield. The enemy began to unload landing reinfereements of personnel and tanks under protection of heavy naval gun fire and bombs. At last with 4 tanks and one

Infantry Company they advanced to the northend of the airfield.

2) The OBA Company of the TOMITA Battalion made a night attack on the enemy which had advanced up to their sector and held fast the position in "ISHIMATSU"(~~TN-?~~) against the enemy. However, as yet, detail reports has not been received.

3) The southwest sector unit, having readjusted the situation on the hill area around OYAMA, was again engaged in close quarter and marauding combat. Finally they were able to throw the enemy into comfusion after damaging 100 of the enemy tanks and rendefing heavy casualties to enemy personnel.

(c) The situation of 17 September.

1) 0700 hours - The enemy with 2 Infantry Companies and 7 tanks approached the TENZAN and NAKAYAMA zone, after severe straffing and bombing on the TENZAN and OYAMA area. (note: TENZAN, OYAMA, NAKAYAMA, are names rendered by the JAPANESE on these respective hills) However, the garrision unit stationed there drove the enemy back, with extensive efforts from the artillery.

2) The enemy forces who are facing our west area's front lines are still in a statedof confusion after having received heavy damages from our forces. As yet the enemy has not advanced sihce last night. As for the south and east dectors, detailed reports have not been ~~made~~ received out as yet. However, MINAMI JIMA and NAKAZAKI are still in our hand.

In the meantime, it seems as if the enemy ~~was~~ were unloading its field artillery, ~~and other~~ materials and equipments.

3) Our losses up to the 17th of September: TOMITA Battalion and ICHIOKA Battalion lost about 50% of their strength. The losses for the CHIAKI Battalion and Tank Unit have not been reported yet. Losses for the other units were slight.

(d) The situation of 18 September.

1) The enemy began to attack our lines along the hills of TENZAN and NAKAYAMA. At about 0900 they

approached the east side of NAKAYAMA, but were repulsed by our timely firing. However at 1300 hours, under the protection of heavy Naval gunfire, ~~the~~ an enemy unit composed of 2 tanks and approximately 2 Infantry Companies, ~~was at last able to~~ successfully advanced up to a high spot on the east side of NAKA YAMA.

2) 1400 hours -- The enemy continued to pound our lines on KANSOKUYAMA (JAPANESE rendered name for a hill whose a JAPANESE observation unit had been located) with heavy ~~shelling from the Navy.~~ NAVAL GUN FIRE However, the enemies next attack, composed of 8 - 10 tanks, and approximately 30 Infantry men, was cut-off by our artillery and regimental guns timely ~~shelling~~ FIRING. ~~The attack was repulsed, leaving losses of~~ IN this the enemy lost 5 OF THEIR tanks. ~~which were burnt.~~

3) What may be observed of the surviving enemy forces are 16 tanks, 30 alligators, 2 Infantry Regiments, and 30 artillery pieces. However, on the south-west side of the airfield 50 or 60 small barges were seen unloading.

4) The PELELIU sector unit infiltrated, approximately 10 close quarter combat parties (party consisting of 2 or 3 men) into the enemy lines, ~~which~~ and were quite successful in throwing the enemy into confusion. A patrol of 7 men killed 27 of the enemy, and other such patrols returned safely after inflicting heavy casualties to the enemy.

(e) The Situation of 19 September.

1) The enemy force consisting of 8 tanks and approximately 1 Infantry Battalion advanced to our lines around TENZAN and NAKAYAMA, attempting to attack HIGASHIYAMA with part of its strength, ~~with~~ while the other part attacked KANSOKUYAMA. However, this was repulsed by our forces, rendering heavy casualties to the enemy.

2) The enemy front line stretched from east to west with the following points along the line: A public school, NAKAYAMA Radio detector post, and "MOMI[illegible](TN-?)". In the area south of the airfield, the enemy has established a beachhead with artillery and tanks as the main body, and were ready for

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any emergency that may arise. From this day on, the enemy tanks were more careful in their manuvenrs, for already too many tanks had been destroyed.

On the airfield was an enemy fighter in the midst of landing tests.

3) Although our 10 centimeter Howitzer has been put out of action, the PELELIU Sector Units are rendering heavy casualties to the enemy with just their infantry weapons such as rifles, machine guns, mortars and etc.

(f) The situation of 20 September.

1) Since dawn, the enemy has been concentrating their forces on KANSOKUYAMA, vainly trying to approach HIGASHIYAMA and KANSOKUYAMA with 14 tanks and one infantry battalion under the powerful aid of ~~shelling~~ air and ~~bombing~~ artillery fire. However, they were again put to rout receiving heavy losses.

2) Nevertheless, one platoon reached the northern area of TENZAN ~~but~~ but aside from this there were no ~~any~~ real changes in the front.

The concentrated enemy fire on the area west of the island was extremely severe.

3) The PELELIU Sector Unit inflected severe blows on the enemy by attacking with a night close quarters patrol.

4) Naval reconnaissance seaplanes made a successful night attack on the enemy.

(2) The ANGAUR Area (cf. appended chart #1, appended map #3)

For the past 10 days the enemy continuously straffed and bombed our forces with carrier planes. From 12 September the enemy resumed naval gun fire on our positions. Finally on 17 September, the enem y began ~~his~~ their landing operations.

(a) The situation of 17 September.

1) Under the protection of bombing, straffing, and Naval gun-fire, enemy craft including battleships approached as close as 100 meters off the coast and commenced

firing) ~~which had~~ this has been going on since dawn, the enemy launched a landing party of 30 barges at 0800 along our northeaster coast line. However, the ANGAUR Unit was able to put the enemy to rout and start a state of confusion with the aid of the guns which had been planted there.

2) However, another enemy landing party from the direction of PELELIU, composed of landing barges with Naval escorts approached our coast line. After breaking through our lines ~~counter-attack~~, at 0900 hours, part of the enemy party was able to take up its positions on land. The strength of the enemy forces which ~~had~~ landed ~~by enemy~~ were approximately, 2000 ~~personnel~~ accompanied by a large group of tanks.

3) All day long the ANGAUR Area Unit fought very close to the enemy line, in an attempt to get away from the enemy shelling straffing and bombing.

4) Confirmed enemy losses up to 1900 hours.

Barges blown up and sunk ----------	30
Barges destroyed ----------	20
Tanks destroyed ----------	15

(b) Results of the night attack on the 17th, and the battle on the 18th have not been reported yet.

(c) The situation of the 19th and 20th of September.

1) The enemy following its establishment of a beachhead on the northeastern point of ANGAUR, on the 19th advanced up to approximately 1000 meters southeast of SAIPAN ~~(TN-?)~~, which was a strategical point in the midwest of ANGAUR. Moreover, they began to move south and north.

2) On the 19th the ANGAUR Area Unit, completing the readjustment of its situation on the northwestern heights area of the island, made vigorous counter-attacks on the advance enemy who was west of the light-house hill and put them to rout. Even After the 20th of September, the strategic area in the northwestern heights was still in our hands. The enemy, who attempted to advance during the daytime under heavy Naval gun-

fire anf bombing protection, was repulsed and drive back with heavy casualties. The close-quarters combat carried out by our forces each night kept the enemy restless and on edge.

3) The enemy losses for the night of the 19th and the day of 20th ~~are~~ were as follows:

tanks put out of action ---------- 5 or 6

landing barges (large and small) ----approximately 30

Heavy weapons ---------- 3

mortars ---------- 3

casualties ---------- approximately 300

4) Our losses amounted to about 50% of our strength. Nevertheless, the morale of our garrison Commander and men ~~is~~ were still high.

(3) PALAU Proper Island and KOROR Island area. (cf. fppended chart #1 and #2)

(a) For the past 10 days up to the 15th, the enemy carrier planes continued to attack daily. However, from the 15th, the enemy assault started to slow down.

(b) Since the 13th, the enemy has been mine-sweeping in the "KOSSOL" anchorage north of PALAU Proper Island. On the 20th 1 Battleship, 2 cruisers, 9 cruisers or destroyers, 3 sub-chasers, 14 transports, 4 flying boat carriers, 2 unknown type ships, and 30 large flying boats wefe observed in anchorage.

(c) Our Naval reconnaissance planes have made night attacks on PELELIU and KOSSOL. The ~~situation~~ result of the attack ~~is~~ was as follows:

Date	No. of planes used	OBJECTIVE	RESULTS
18	2	Ships surrounding PELELIU	1 Cruiser destroyed by fire.
19	1	Enemy position in PELELIU	One part on fire
19	1	"KOSSOL" anchorage	Near misses against ships
20	1	Enemy positions	Results unknown - heavy blows may have been inflicted

(4) The YAP Area

All is ~~quite~~ quiet, and no changes has been recognized.

2. Estimation of the situation concerning the enemy.

a. estimation of the enemy situation concerning the entire battle.

We ~~figure~~ estimated that the reason for the enemy's rush in attempting ~~the occupation of~~ to occupy MOROTAI and PALAU is in order to make the two islands the advance bases for the PHILIPPINE operation, which is a part of the large scale operations preparation.

b. The estimation of the situation concerning the enemy opposing the PALAU Islands Area Unit, immediately following the first 10 days of battle.

The landed enemy forces probably ~~consist of~~ a division, attacked with a powerful force. It seems as if they had been planning on taking up their positions in KORORU and PALAU Proper Island following the main forces occupation of PELELIU Island.

However, the enemy was unable to withdraw its main forces from PELELIU, ~~BECAUSE THEY HAD RECEIVED~~ HEavy losses there. Also, they were constantly harassed by the danger of being attacked by our aggressive artillery from ANGAUR, and by the counter-landing on PELELIU which may be staged by our ANGUAR forces. ~~Due to~~ Because ~~all~~ of these facts the enemy was compelled to change ~~his~~ their plan and land its reserve forces on ANGAUR.

At present the situation of the enemy seems quite weak, due to the loss of a large part of ~~his~~ their forces. However, judging from the strategic value of the PALAU Proper Islands and KOSSOL anchorage, which the enemy is now attempting to obtain, it is quite obvious that the enemy is most likely to reinforce ~~his~~ their strength ~~with power~~, in order to save PELELIU from the present crisis and establish bases on the PALAUN Islands.

APPENDED 1

INSERT MAP NO. 6

SITUATION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND PLANES

SITUATION OF ENEMY SHIPS & PLANES

APPENDED MAP NO. 1



THE MAIN FORCES OF THE 8TH AND 15TH AIR DIVISIONS SEEM TO HAVE ADVANCED TO THE AREA WEST OF HOLLANDIA	SHIPNAME	
	MITTLEBURG	100
	NEONFOOR	50
	DTAK	250
	AWEK (TN-?)	150
	WAKDE	150
	HOLLANDIA	200
	TOTAL	900

ALONG WITH THE CONTINUED ATTACKS ON PALAU AND THE PHILIPPINE AREAS WITH A LARGE CARRIER TASK FORCE DURING THE LAST TEN DAYS, THE ENEMY, HAVING MADE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ON HIS PREPARATION ON THE NORTHERN COAST OF NEW GUINEA, ON THE 15TH MADE STRONG LANDINGS SIMULTANEOUSLY ON PALAU AND AT PORT MORESBY.
THE ENEMY SHIPS ARE STILL CONCENTRATING IN THE NEW GUINEA AREA AND A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF SHIPS SEEM TO BE ANCHORED THERE.

A OVER 6
B 2
C 10 OR MORE } AS NUCLEUS
D APPROX 30

RESULTS OF RECONAISSANCE ON THE 11TH

A-2	
B-2	
C 8	
T-10	

RESULTS OF RECONAISSANCE ON THE 15TH

A-5	
B-10	
C-11-12	
D 15	
T 16	

SYMBOLS

- ◎ - HEAVY BOMBER BASE
- Ⓐ - SHIPS
- K.D.B - NAVAL TASK FORCE

REFERENCE

- A - AIRCRAFT CARRIER
- B - BATTLESHIP
- C - CRUISER
- D - DESTROYER
- T - TRANSPORT
- SHIMA OR JIMA - ISLAND

APPENDED
INSERT MAP NO. 2

CHART ON PROGRESS OF BATTLE
ON PELELIU ISLAND.
(11 to 29 Sept.)


CHART OF THE PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE
ON PELELIU ISLAND
FROM 11 TO 20 SEPT.
DIAGRAM NO. 2
AKALOKUL PASSAGE
AKALOKUL WHARF
PHOSPHATE REFINERY
MINAMIYO VILLAGE
RADAR HILL
NORTH BEACH
HAMAKAIDO (ROAD)
URAKAIDO (ROAD)
UCHI BAY
NAKA HILL
MT. SUIFU
MT.
ASIAS WHARF
RADAR STATION
TOKAIDO (ROAD)
ICHINOJI PENINSULA
EAST BEACH
WEST POINT
WEST BEACH
TAKASAKI BAY
CENTRAL POINT
SOUTH BAY
MINAMIJIMA PENINSULA
LEGEND
1ST BN 2ND INF REGT
1 INF BN
TANK UNIT
SMALL BOATS
1 INF CO

APPENDED
INSERT MAP NO. 3

PROGRESS OF BATTLE ON ANGUR ISLAND (11 to 20 Sept.)

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE OF ANGUAR ISLAND

FROM 11 SEPT. TO 20 SEPT.



ANGUAR ISLAND



Enemy Ships Sighted in the Vicinity of PALAU (Middle of September)

Classification / Date	Situation in the KOSSOL Passage (Within the Anchorage)	Total	Situation in the Vicinity of PALAU Islands As Seen by the Naked Eye
11			1 Submarine sighted outside of MALAKAL Channel at approximately 1600. Heading South. (Probably to rescue the crew of a crashed plane. 1st Observation Post
12			At 0840, 4 large aircraft carriers and 2 destroyers sighted in the southeast. Distance--60,000 meters. Course--heading South. At At 1050, 1 battleship and 1 destroyer sailing at 230°, sighted. Distance--70,000 meters. At 1530, 4 battleship (COLORADO and ARKANSAS type), 2 cruisers, 3 or 4 large destroyers and 2 or 3 submarines (on surface) sighted. Heading North. 1st Observation Post
13	1 Cruiser 5 Destroyers After firing 27 shells during 1020 and 1040 hours, 2 destroyers, while patrolling the east entrance of the passage, exploded 2 mines.	6	At 0530, 3 aircraft carriers and 2 destroyers sighted at 180° and 140°. Distance--3,500 meters. Heading South. MELEKEIOK Radar Post At 0540, 5 destroyers sighted heading South. GLITTOR (?) Radar Post At 1250, sighted 1 aircraft carrier traveling at 270° and 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, and 4 destroyers at 170°. URUKTHAPEL Observation Post
14	2 Destroyers At 1835, 2 destroyers, with searchlights on, fired over the surface of the sea.	2	At 1650, 4 aircraft carriers and 5 destroyers appeared at 200° at a distance of 50,000 meters. Patrolling the vicinity. OLOPSHEKAL (?) Observation Post

15	2 Cruisers 13 Destroyers 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers patrolled the vicinity of the east passage entrance.	15	At 0645, a total of 62 ships including 3 carriers, 10 destroyers, 15 chasers, 15 large transports and 19 small transports were sighted patrolling this area. 1st Observation Post At 1300, 4 carriers and 5 cruisers sighted at 350°. Distance--40,000 meters. Heading South. ALMATEN (?) Observation Post
16	3 Cruisers 7 Destroyers 2 Transports 27 ships including 3 cruisers, 21 destroyers and 3 large transports were concentrating off ARUKORUN. The landing boats were prepared with derricks.	12	Between 1420 and 1500, 18 transports and 4 destroyers sighted on the East sea. Heading North. At 1530, heading northeast at 40°. Distance--8,000 meters. Bombarded MELEKEIOK with approximately 40 shells. MELEKEIOK Observation Post
17	3 Cruisers 10 Destroyers 16 Sub-Chasers 2 Motor Boats (51) Seaplanes 27 ships still concentrated and anchored off ARUKORUN.	31 (51)	At 1700, 3 battleships, 5 cruisers, 15 large transports, and 20 medium transports sighted. Traveling between 50° and 90°. A group of 10 light cruisers and 15 destroyers also sighted. URUKTHAPEL Observation Post
18	3 Cruisers 17 Destroyers 17 Sub-Chasers 2 Motor Boats (35) Seaplanes Armored cars appeared to be loaded on the small ships.	39 (35)	At 1605, 35 ships including 7 carriers, 18 destroyers and 10 mine sweepers anchored off ARUKORUN. A portion of the mine sweepers operated within KOSSOL Passage. ARUKORUN Observation Post

19	2 Cruisers 7 Destroyers 13 Sub-Chasers 2 Motor Boats (32) Seaplanes	24 (32)	At 1030, 47 ships including 7 carriers, 3 battleships, 4 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 5 minesweepers and 7 large transports sighted. Traveling between 60° and 180°. Distance--20 to 40 kilometers. URUKTHAPEL Observation Post
20	3 Battleships 2 Cruisers 6 Destroyers 10 Sub-Chasers 15 Transports 2 Motor Boats (35) Seaplanes	38 (35)	At 0630, 5 battleships and 4 destroyers sighted. Traveling east of KOSNOR (?). MALKOLON (?) Observation Post At 0730, sighted 2 mine sweepers clearing mines outside of the reef off MANIYAL (?). 1st Observation Post

1. The situation of enemy ships within the KOSSOL Passage is given at 1800 daily.

2. The enemy ships listed were sighted by the various observation posts.

Appended Graph No. 2

ENEMY AIR RAIDS ON EACH DISTRICT

Date	Place	Time	Type of Plane	Number	Altitude	Direction of Attack	Direction of Retreat	Targets	Enemy Losses	JAPANESE Casualties	Summary
11th	PALAU Is. KOROR	0700 - 1620	F4F SB2C	35	South East	South East	South East	Anti-aircraft gun emplacements, main buildings, and the AIRAI (?) Airfield	5 shot down 2 damaged		
	PELELIU	0635 - 1530	F4F SB2C	117				Positions in the vicinity of airfields	2 shot down		At 0810, one submarine surfaced in the western sea area and submerged at 1600
	ANGAUR	0645 - 1450	F4F SB2C	135		North	North	The entire island			
	YAP	1427	B24	1	1500 - 2000	East	South East	Piers, positions, etc.			
12th	PALAU Is. KOROR	0730 - 1700	F4F SB2C	150				Anti-aircraft gun emplacements, main buildings, and the AIRAI Airfield			
	PELELIU	0520 - 1730	F4F SB2C	250				Front line positions and machine gun emplacements	5 shot down 2 damaged 1 mine sweeper sunk	1 N.C.O. and 5 soldiers killed. 4 soldiers wounded	Between 0530 and 1630, 36 ships including 3 carriers, 5 battleships, 11 cruisers and 17 destroyers bombarded mainly anti-aircraft gun emplacements with 22,200 shells
	ANGAUR	0530 - 1730	F4F SB2C	200				The entire island		1 soldier killed	A portion of the above mentioned task force fired approximately 1,500 shells
	YAP										

13	PALAU Is. KOROR		F4F SB2C	Approx. 15				Buildings in KOROR City, anti-aircraft gun emplacements, and the AIRAI Airfield			At 0607, enemy ships appeared in the eastern sea area moving towards the KOSSOL passage between 1020 and 1040, 27 shells were fired and 2 mines were exploded. The enemy lowered small boats to clear the mines. They entered the passage but were later lost.
	PELELIU	0550 - 1550	F4F	300				Positions in the southwest district anti-aircraft gun emplacements, machine gun emplacements and searchlights	12 shot down	1 W.C.O. and 12 soldiers killed.	4 carriers, 2 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 13 destroyers carried out bombardment. At 1530, moved beyond the range of visibility.
	ANGAUR	0550 - 1750	F4F SB2C	50				The entire island	1 destroyer sunk	1 soldier killed 1 soldier seriously wounded	At 0430, 4 battleships and 2 destroyers fired approximately 1,000 shells. Patrolled this area.
	YAP										
14th	PALAU Is. KOROR	0610 - 1800	F4F SB2C TBF	87	2,000 -			ALMIS Transportation Route, MALAKAL Positions, and the KOROR Batteries			Utilizing motor boats, the enemy cleared the KOSSOL Passage of mines for use as an anchorage. At night, searchlights were used to enable them to continue work.
	PELELIU	1730 - 1750	F4F SB2C	250				Front line positions near OYAMA	1 submarine sunk	4 soldiers killed 6 wounded	38 ships were within the range of visibility (Included 4 carriers.

14th (cont.)	ANGAUR	1730 - 1750	F4F SB2C	150				2nd line positions (northern district)	1 small boat sunk 10 persons killed	6 soldiers killed 1 seriously wounded	Between 0600 and 1700, 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 1 carrier executed bombardments and at 1800 retreated to the South.
	YAP										
15th	PALAU Is. KOROR		F4F SB2C	20							At 0645, 62 ships including 3 carriers, 10 destroyers, 15 sub chasers, 15 large transports and 19 small transports came within sight.
	PELELIU	End of the Day	F4F SB2C	300					1/2 of enemy landing crafts were sunk. Approximately 50 M-3 tanks and landing tanks were destroyed or damaged. Also, high casualties were inflicted upon enemy troops.		At 0420, 40 transports and 5 landing crafts were sighted at 270°. At 1000, 300 landing crafts commenced the landing operation but were repelled. At 1420 a portion landed in the western district and the troops were gradually reinforced.
	ANGAUR	End of the day	F4F SB2C	300					4 shot down		Received bombardments from 0550 to the end of the day.
	YAP										

	PALAU Is. KOROR	1035 - 1200	F4F	19				GARASUMAO Aluminum Factory, vicinity of the GASPAN wireless station, and the CAISHAR port.			Between 1420 and 1500, 18 transports and 4 destroyers sighted in the eastern sea area. Heading North. At 1530 headed northeast at 40. Distance 8 kilometers. Bombarded MELEKEIOK with approximately 40 shells.
16th	PELELIU								100 tanks destroyed or damaged. Many troops killed.		Received bombardments both from sea and air.
	ANGAUR	1200 - 1730	F4F SB2C	50				Coastal positions between SHO Point and TOHOKU (north east) Harbor.			At 0730, approximately 1,000 shells fired during bombardment. 2 battleships, 5 cruisers, 7 destroyers and 3 transports located in this area.
	YAP										
	PALAU Is. KOROR	0520 - 0910	F4F	30		West	South	Houses in GASPAN, YAMATO, & ASAHI, Ports, and Anti-aircraft gun positions.			
17th	PELELIU										
	ANGAUR										At 0800, the enemy Task Force including battleships bombarded the northern section of the eastern coast. At 0800 30 landing crafts attempted to make a landing but were repelled.

17th (cont.)	YAP										At 0900, the enemy landed in the northeastern area. (approximately 40 landing craft)
18th	PALAU Is.	0638 - 0705	F4F	30		West	West	Houses in MELEKEIOK and YAMATO Harbors.			At 1800, sighted 2 cruisers and 9 destroyers within KOSSOL Passage.
	KOROR										
	PELELIU										
	ANGAUR										
	YAP										
19th	PALAU Is.	0620 - 1716	F4F TBF	20				Airfields, ports, buildings, and dummy positions.			At 0600, sighted 2 battleships, 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 2 aircraft carriers, and 36 seaplanes within the KOSSOL anchorage.
	KOROR										
	PELELIU										
	ANGAUR										
	YAP										

20th	PALAU Is. / KOROR		F4F SB2C	69				AILAI Airfield, KOROR City, and buildings in MELEKEIOK, KALANUMAO, etc.			At 0630, sighted 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer, 7 sub-chasers, 21 [illegible] ports, 6 small carriers and one torpedo boat within the KOSSOL anchorage.
	PELELIU										
	ANGAUR										
	YAP										

Reference:

1. Since communication with YAP Island was cut off, the details are not clear.
2. The air raid situation after the 16th on PELELIU and ANGAUR was the 2 or 3 planes usually remained in the air to assist the naval bombardment by strafing and bombing.

C. Progress on the second 10 days of battle (21 - 30 September)

1. Summary of the general situation.

a. It is our belief, that our forces which were on GUAM and TINIAN, have been completely wiped out by the 27th September, having fought heroically to the last man.

b. The enemy forces are now, probably, pre paring for their next period operation, simultaneously, continuing the PALAU and MOROTAI operation. Furthermore, its seems as if the enemy task-forces that had been operating in the PHILIPPINE Area until the 24th has returned to the MARIANAS, on or about the 28th, for readjustment.

c. On the 26th enemy B-29's attacked our Southern MANCHURIA Area, having taken off from airbases established in CHINA. Our air forces not only counter-attacked the B-29's, but furthermore, pursued them as far as CHENGTU, inflicting heavy blows. Meanwhile, our Armies in Central and Southern CHINA Area are at present advancing to the KWEILIN and LUNGCHOW Area, driving forward from the north and south.

d. Depending on their abundance of material, the enemy continued, persistently to attack the front lines of our PALAU Area Group, in order to occupy PELELIU and ANGUAR. However, the constant, close quarter combat tactics used by our forces, having inflicted heavy damages and casualties to the enemy.

2. Intelligence Report

a. The situation of enemy ships. (cf, appended map #1)

(1) The enemy ships are still, actively, gathering together off the west coast of NEW GUINEA. It is probable that they are reinforcing and sending supplies to the PALAU and MOROTAI area. According to radio intellegence on the 26th a new and powerful enemy force arrived in the PALAU Area (unconfirmed) It is necessary for us to take notice that practically identical code messages have been flashing back and forth between the AMERICAN and BRITISH Forces to the allied Air Force Commander. According to some of the messages that have been intercepted, from the enemy's NEW GUINEA Base, there is an implication,

that the enemy has already sent supplies to HALMAHERA Area from HOLLANDIA.

(2) It seems that the enemy task forces that had been operating against our PHILIPPINE Areas till the 24th, have returned to the MARIANAS for readjustment on the 28th.

b. The situation of the enemy Air Forces.

(cf. appended map #1)

(1) The enemy carrier planes activity on the PHILIPPINE Area.

(a) Situation of the 21st.

(morning)

1) MANILA Area 0925 - 1055

Approximately 150 planes in all, which had been separated into 3 different groups, made 3 major attacks on our airfields and ships.

2) CLARK Area from 0920 hours.

Approximately 100 planes attacked our airfields as its main objective.

3) Accompanying the Naval planes our 22nd Air Group sent out 40 planes to meet and couter-attack the enemy over MANILA and CLARK.

The enmmy losses:

1- 7 planes shot down in air combat, however 4 are unconfirmed.

2- 18 planes brought down by ground weapons. However 2 are unconfirmed.

3- Results of Naval planes and unknown

Our losses:

1- Planes missing - 2

2- Destroyed planes - approximately 50. (Includes planes in for repair)

(afternoon)

1) MANILA Area 1450 - 1625

Approximately 150 planes divided into 3 different groups mainly attacked our airfields and ships.

2) CLARK Field Area, at about the same hour as MANILA. Approximately 80 planes made attacks.

3) "DIPA" (TN-?) Area from 1630

Approximately 60 planes ~~made attacks.~~ attacked.

(b) Situation on the 22nd

1) MANILA Area, 0740 - 0950

3 group of planes amounting to 150 planes made 3 separate assaults.

2) CLARK Field Area - same hour as MANILA .

Aproximately 50 planes made attacks.

3) Each time the enemy Air Force ~~would carry out his~~ attacked with the main force, by first putting our airfield out of action, inorder to stop our planes from ~~going~~ forcing up. After ~~taking care of the~~ damaging oor airfield they would followup by attacking our ships, wharves, and anti-aircraft positions.

4) The enemy losses:

2 planes shot down thru aerial combat.

15 planes shot down by ground positons.

However, 6 planes are unconfirmed.

Our losses

1 ship sunk, 1 ship burnt

1 plane shot down, some casualties to personnel, a wharf and ground equipment destroyed.

(c) Situation on the 25th

Enemy planes between the hours of 0900-1600 made continuous attacks on the central PHILIPPINE Area with small groups of planes which totalled to 350-400 planes. T

The enemies main objectives were as follows:

1) LUZON Area.

"LEGASPI" was attacked by approximately 20 planes. Other positions along the east coast were also approached by enemy aircraft.

2) Central PHILIPPINE Area.

TACLOBAN, 50 planes - CEBU 130;

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BACOLOD, 40; CORON, "BINTAN" (TN-?) Islands, 120; ILOILO, 20; CATANDUANES, 20: (NOTE:numerals indicates the approximate number of enemy planes which attacked)

3) The enemy aircraft carriers are believed to be approximately 100 kilometers off the north or northeast coast of SAMAR Island.

(2) The enemy planes from the NEW GUINEA Bases are still continuing their persistent attacks in the northern areas of AUSTRALIA.

c. Other reports concerning the enemy.

(1) The enemy situation in the MOROTAI Area cleared up by the 24th.

(a) The enemy forces that had landed on GIRA (TN-?) point, (south end of MOROTAI) consists of one division, including 7 Infantry Battalions. Strong positions have been constructed with numerous obstacles as protection around the "DAHRUBA GOTARARAMU" (TN-?) airfield.

(b) The enemy front line stretches from BAROE the 150 meter hill, 20 meter hill, and up to MOMOEDJOE. It ~~seems~~ was ~~as if the~~ believed that the enemy ~~strength~~ force at MOMOEDJOE's composed of one Infantry Battalion equipped with Anti-tank guns.

d. The situation of the enemy opposing the PALAU Area group's front line.

(1) PELELIU Area (cf. appended chart #1,2; appended map #2) The enemy depending on their abundant supplies continued their persistent attacks with the aid of planes and Naval gun-fire. Our garrison ~~had~~ unit inflicted heavy casualties ~~in~~ on the enemy by their constant close quarter combat.

(a) Situation on the 21st.

1) Since morning, the enemy ~~shelling~~ air and ~~bombing~~ artillery has quieted down. It is beleived the reason for this is due to the attack of our reconnaissance seaplanes and close quarter combat tactics. The morale of the enemy is beginning to dwindle, and now; even the tanks are trying to retreat.

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2) No remarkable change has been recognized in the front, except for an enemy unit, about the size of a company, which has advanced to the northern area of NAKAYAMA and TENZAN.

The enemy's front line stretches from the public school to the MOSH (TN-?) position. A part of the enemy artillery (equipped with 4 guns) advanced to within 500 meters east of the publicschool.

3) At 1500 hours, approximately 15 enemy transports ~~left towards the east.~~ sailed eastward.

4) The enemy's strength

Infantry -------- 4-5 Battalions

Ordanance--- approximately 10 (detailunknown)

Tanks ------approximately 10

Alligators -----approximately 20

5) The strength of our force (only combatant) Army, 1300; Navy, 500; Artillery guns, 4 located in the northern PELELIU Area. ~~These being~~ Unmovable guns, are being utilized in there permanent positions. Regimental gun,1; Anti-tank gun, 7; (3 of which are located in the northern area of the island); Battalion guns, 5.

6) 1 enemy transport was observed burning, however the cause was unknown.

(b) The situation on the 22nd.

1) This afternoon, the enemy attempted to demolish our positions around KANSOKUYAMA, HIGASHIYAMA and SUIFUZAN. However, the attempt was unsuccessful and only a part of the enemy advanced to a hill, west of KANSOKUYAMA.

2) No enemy personnel has advanced into the northern area of the island, and thus the back roads are still in our hand.

3) Enemy's total losses (except for those lost during landing operations)

Casualties to the personnel ---- at least over 5000

Tanks including alligators ---------- over 120

Artillery guns---------- approximately 15

Mine sweepers ---------- sunk 1

Submarine ----------blown up and sunk 1

Transport ---------- by fire 3

Large landing barge (500 ton size) --- sunk 1

Large landing barge (500 ton size) --- bombed 2

(c) Situation on the 23rd.

1) Although the advance detachment (a part of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment) of the reinforcement forces which left PALAU Proper Island on the night of the 22nd, received severe enemy air and artillery fire at a point 2 kilometers off the coast, they made a successful landing at 0520 hours under the command of 1st Lt. MURAHORI.

2) 6 enemy tanks were in action on the hill west of KANSOKUYAMA, but our supply company put 4 of them out of action and put the others to flight. There were no other changes on the front.

3) At 1430 hours, 5 alligators landed on RUBY (TN-?) Island, however no others followed.

4) The large number of enemy ships, which were visible off the coast of PELELIU Island, have now been cut down in number to merely 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 3 transports, 1 hospital ship, and 5-6 landing barges.

5) 5 small-type planes have landed on the airfield.

6) In the eastern area of the island, the enemy vehicles are busily being utilized for transportation.

(d) The situation on the 24th.

1) The main body of our reinforcement force (main body of the 2nd! Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment) left the PALAU Proper Islands on the night of the 23rd. 9 of our landing barges arrived safely, but 6 of them were shelled and burned when taking the wrong landing route. However, most of the personnel in those 6 barges were able to land by walking in the shallows.

2) In a small scale combat in the west

area of the command post, our supply company put 2 tanks out of action. The enemy attacks quieted down in general on the western area of the command post.

3) The enemy force has probably advanced near our Anti-aircraft gun positions and Radar Direction Finder Stations in the eastern area of the island, and a number of transports are probably unloading on the east coast. Strong forces seem to be located near TOMITAMA (Tomitama) or TOMISAWA. However detailed facts are unknown.

4) The enemy artillery has disposed 12 of our guns southwest of the airfield, 2 guns near the public school, 4 guns near our Anti-Aircraft gun position in the eastern area, and 2-3 guns northeast of the airfield. However, our forces ~~are~~ were unable to put these enemy guns out of action, due to the shortage of ordnance and ammunitions.

5) The enemy is still reconstructing the airfield, and the trucks are busily ~~being~~ utilized in the northeastern area for transportation.

(e) The situation on the 25th.

1) All the enemy's attacks on the strategical points such as KANSOKUYAMA, HIGASHIYAMA, Command Post, etc. were unsuccessful. However, the enemy is still, persistently, attempting to find our vulnerable positons in order to penetrate our lines.

2) Early in the morning, approximately 20 large type landing barges (500 ton class) and 6 ships, which seemed to be oil tankers, appeared on the eastern sea, and they are now in the midst of disembarking. ~~Probably,~~ The enemy has probably completed ~~his~~ their reinforcing task, for ~~his~~ their movements are graduallly, beginning to get active again.

3) Although, no remarkable change has been recognised in the front, the aggressiveness of the enemy in the west is getting stronger and stronger. On SUIFUZAN a small battle took place. This afternoon, 2 enemy infantry companies whose main force was composed of 20 M-3 type tanks and alligators, advanced to the northern area along the seaside road.

4) A part of the IIDA Battalion is still outside of our command. At about 2200 dome shaped fires were observed near DENGEBU (~~TN-?~~) channel and 15 ~~K.M.~~ KM east of PELELIU. However details are unknown.

(f) The situation on the 26th.

1) 7 enemy tanks and approximately 2 infantry companies made an attack on SUIFUZAN. However, ~~they were repulsed after receiving~~ this force withdrew after having received heavy damages.

2) The enemy force near our radio transmitter station in the northern area, consists of 4 tanks, 1 alligator and approximately 1 infantry company. Our force seems to have encountered this particular enemy force in a severe battle. ~~Out~~ The details are unknown.

3) Since morning, 35 of the large enemy landing barges, transports and freighters which ~~are~~ were off our eastern and southern coast have been busily engaged in embarking and debarking duties, ~~Everyday~~, enemy hospital ships have been coming and going daily.

4) Our constant, night close-quarters combat tactics have inflicted heavy blows on the enemy. The enemy losses confimed after the 23rd are 5 tanks destroyed, and an average of at least 200 casualties daily.

(g) The situation on the 27th.

1) The enemy again made a drive on SUIFUZAN, ~~which was~~ but were completely repulsed. Due to bad radio conditions, the progress of the northern area battle is unknown. The southern areas are still under our garrison. The enemy ~~shelling~~ air and ~~bombing~~ artillery fire on the ~~GUADO BUZU (TN-?)~~ NGESEBUS Island was very severe.

2) 1 or 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 25 sub-chasers, and 1 hospital ship were sighted off the eastern coast. They are probably debarking.

3) The enemy force is doing its best to reconstruct the airfield, and a large number of trucks are running about busily. Approximately 20 GRUMAN fighters are being assembled. Around this area, quite a number of camps have sprung up.

///

4) The enemy began its propaganda drive with leafleta and microphones. The battalion Headquarters under the command of Major IIDA and also 6th Company 6 are still unable to join the main body due to traffic communications difficulties.

(h) The situation on the 28th.

1) ~~Since~~ From morning, after the severe ~~shelling of~~ FIRING SUIFUZAN and KANSOKUYAMA, the enemy had attempted to approach SUIFUZAN. However, the attack was again, completely repulsed. 20 alligators, 4 artillery guns, and a number of small type trucks advanced northward along the seaside road. In the northern area, a fierce battle is ~~most likely going on~~ probably taking place between our forces and the enemy. However, details are unknown. The severe ~~shelling~~ air and ~~bombing~~ artillery fire on ~~GUADOZUSU (TN-7)~~ NGESEBUS Island lasted all day long.

2) The enemy is strengthening its positions near the public school and at the foot hills found in front of the northern area, and is carrying out propaganda tactics.

3) 9 cruisers, approximately 10 transports, approximately 60 landing barges, and 1 hospital ship are all anchored off the eastern and northern coast.

4) On the airfield 20 planes ~~are~~ were sighted, and vehicles ~~are~~ were running about busily.

5) The enemy strength consists of: 1 1/2 Battalion in the front of the NORTH AND WEST AREAS; approximately 1 Battalion ~~to~~ IN the east area; and a reserved force of approximately 2 1/2 Battalions. They will most likely block off and observe the range of our main force, and then commence to attack in their usual tactical procedure.

6) Our PELELIU Area Units main force is about the size of 2 1/2 Battalions put together. While in the northern area, the main body is the size of approximately 1 Battalion along with a few Naval personnel. The main body of the 2nd and Bn of the 2d Inf Regt and part of the 2d Bn of the 15th Inf. Regt are not yet under our ~~15th Infantry Regiment respective 2nd Battalion has not as yet been able to join the main force.~~ control. (note: The 2d Bn of the ~~2nd Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion~~ 2d Inf. Regt. is now equivalent to 1 company) (180 men of the 6th

Company, 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment are in the north area.) communication with our forces found in the north area was not carried on as will as we had hoped for. Nevertheless, we are putting our effort into the task of improving the combat situation with our close-quarter combat tactics, enlarging and strengthening our positions in the north area, and by readjusting and controlling our forces. After the previously mentioned 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment and the 1/2 Battalion of Navy personnel had become familiar with the topagraphical and combat situation, they were now able to do a better job of fighting.

(i) The situation on the 29th.

1) In the north area enemy of unknown strength landed on NGESEBUS ~~SUADOBUSU (TN-?)~~ Island, and a fierce battle is going on there. The enemy approached our positions near SUIFUZAN from NANKOMURA and south of our positions to attack. However, they were driven back. On the front line, where our main-forces are facing the enemy's main force, all is quiet. infact, even some of our forces there are helping out in the battle taking place in the north area of PELELIU.

2) 2 to 3 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 10 transports, 12 oil-tankers, and 5-6 sub-chasers are unloading freight off the eastern and southern coast of PELELIU. Aside from the above mentioned ships 3 Aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers or destroyers, and 1 hospital ship are heading south.

3) Approximately 20 small type planes and 2 transport planes were observed in the southeastern, and southwestern part of the airfield.

4) Our constant night close-quarter combat tactics are still effective against the enemy. An enemy plane was shot down today.

(j) The situation on the 30th.

1) The enemy diverted some of its forces located near the airfield to attack our position in the north area. After a fierce battle, the enemy was finally successful in occupying the area. Our surviving fordes are attempting to dash southward

cutting through the enemy inorder to join the main force. In the ~~GUADOBUSU (TN:?)~~ NGESEBUS Island, a fierce battle is ~~being engaged~~ taking place.

2) On the front line of our main forces, ~~a few of the enemy~~ an enemy unit made an attack on SUIFUZAN. But still, there is very little change. The enemy in the meantime is still continuing its propaganda tactics, as well as preparing for the attack against our main positions.

3) The PELELIU Area Unit has completed the readjustment of its forces for the sake of reconstructing the main defense line (~~concerning~~ there are no reports of the survivors of the 2nd Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion, ~~there are no reports or news~~) We are attempting to defeat the enemy by using our close-quarter combat tactics to the utmost. Last night two close-quarter combat units from the 15th Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion put 70 enemy personnel on the casualty list! The enemy's total loss for for last night's attack was one hundred and scores of casualties, and a great deal of provisions and ammunition was captured. Besides this, enemy losses may be greater for 10 close-quarter combat parties are still ~~hiding~~ den in enemy territory.

4) The enemy movements became very inactive after receiving heavy losses thru our close-quarter combat parties. However, our own losses such as amunition, weapons, and casualty ~~lists are getting heavier~~ ies are surmounting. However, the provision problem is well in hand. ~~As a consequence,~~ Because of this our daily progress of battle does not warrant optimistic views.

(k) The contents of the enemy propaganda.

1) Propaganda leaflet No. 1.

Soldiers of the JAPANESE EMPIRE!

It is now clear, that this battle will end victoriously for the U.S. Army. We, the U.S. Army, were certainly amazed by your wonderful courage and tactics. However, our weaponsand strength, assure us that weashall be the final victors. We are indded sorry that you, who have fought so courageously until now, must in the end, be killed fighting. From the standpoint of mutual regard between soldiers, we advise you to stop resistance. If you were to do that , we will treat you in the best manner possible.

We are sufficiently equipped to give you enough food and rest. If you were to come out into the backroad with this leaflet beween the hours of 1200-2200 tomarrow, we will ~~acknowledge~~ KNOW that you have accepted our proposition. We again advise each and everyone of you to stop fighting. We will receive you when you come out to the nearest command post, tomarrow afternoon with this leaflet.

2) Propaganda leaflet No. 2.

Brave officers and men of JAPAN, on the 18th, the JAPANESE Army, Navy, and Airforces made various attempts in sending reinforcements to this island. However, a large amount of these shipments were sunk by large AMERICAN task force. Already, AMERICAN troops have occupied a quarter part of this island and its airfield, and we are now ready to began annihilating the remaining JAPANESE Forces. Nevertheless, we admire your fine and courageous fighting spirit. Officers and men of the Empire, now is the time when you must decide upon one of the greatest problems that has ever confronted you.

It is, indeed, a brave gesture to heroically die fighting. However, is it not your responsibility to rebuild your JAPAN after this war? If any of you have desires of rebuilding JAPAN, rather than to die fighting in vain, come out to the back road with your hands in the air and un-armed. If you will do this, we will permit you to enter our AMERICAN front line and receive you at the rest home, where food, drinks, and clothing will be sufficiently provided for.

3) The summary of the enemy's broadcast No. 1.

a) JAPANESE soldiers, all of JAPANIS mandated islands have been occupied by AMERICAN Forces.

b) Soldiers of JAPANfighting is foolish, shall we stop fighting with each other?

c) The U.S. Fleet and the JAPANESE Fleet are now engaged in a decisive battle, and the JAPANESE Fleet is on the verge of annihilation.

d) JAPANESE Soldiers, ~~aren't you~~ ISN'T fighting out here far from home, making it impossible for you

to see your parents and loved ones? Therefore, lets stop this fighting and talk this thing over.

e) You had better think this over in the next five minutes.

4) Summary of the enemy's broadcast# 2

a) We now have the disposition map of the JAPANESE Forces throughout the Pacific Area.

b) Unreliable JAPANESE Navy, and the good for nothing JAPANESE Airforces.

c) JAPANESE Soldiers, please bear in mind that the U.S. Forces will not use rifles and guns.

d) The good-for-nothing JAPANESE Naval Airforces have been driven to FORMOSA, and are now objectives of our bombing.

e) Soldiers of JAPAN, we are now returning to our position, and our broadcasting station will be situated near the school grounds. There, members of our broadcasting crew will conduct broadcast with microphones attached to automobiles.

(2) The ANGAUR Area.

(cf. appended chart # 1, # 2; appended map # 3)

Since the first ten days, the enemy continued to attack the northwestern hill of ANGAUR, with the aid ~~of shelling and bombing.~~ FROM THE air and artillery. The ANGAUR Area Units were able to hold their positions in the northwestern hill area from the enemy attacks, inflicting severe casualties ~~to~~ ON the enemy forces by the surprise night attacks. However, since the 22nd, the communication with the ANGAUR Units has ceased, and therefore other details of the battle areaunknown.

(a) The situation on the 21st.

1) 1300 hours, an enemy force of one company along with 10 tanks attempted to occupy the northwestern hill. However, the attack was repulsed, ~~leaving~~ AFTER INFLICTING severe damages to the enemy.

2) The enemy loses for the night

attack of the 20th and those incountered during the battle of the 21st.

Medium tanks put out of action ---------- 10

Heavy machine guns ---------- 4

Dead enemy personnel left on the battlefield -- 30

Meacelaneous amount of vehicles destroyed.

(b) Since the 22nd all communications have ceased, and the situation following is unkown.

(3) The PALAU Proper Island, KORORU Island (cf. appended chart # 1)

(a) Although the enemy carrier planes continued there attacks, they were not as active as before.

(b) The enemy in the KOSSOL anchorage, north of PALAU Proper, has been very active.

(c) The MURAHORI Company (that is the advance detachment of the 15th Regiment, 2nd Battalion, which was ordered to ~~be a reingorcement for~~ reinforce the PELELIU Area) crossed ARIMIZU (TN-?) Channel at 2230 on the 22nd and the remaining 2nd Battalion left AIMIREEKI (TN-?), ARAGABASAN (~~TN-?~~) and ARIMIZU (TN-?) at 2030 on the 23rd inorder to land on PELELIU. There, they were able to joint the PELELIU Area Unit.

(4) The YAP Area (cf. appended chart # 1)

No remarkable changes.

3. The estimation of the enemy situation.

a. The estimation of the enemy situation in relation to the entire battle.

The enemy will probably attempt to enforce the PALAU and MOROTAI Operation and simultaneously prepare for the large scale operation.

b. The estimation of the enemy situation on the present front.

Since the enemy had ~~encountered~~ received heavier damages than they had expected in the PELELIU and ANGUAR Area, they were compelled to send reinforcements immediately. ~~But the~~ It is our estimation that the enemy's pland are ~~still~~ to ~~occupy~~ hold these islands. In view of the situation of the

KOSSOL anchorage along with the enemy airplane activities, the enemy probably had plans to make its landing operation on the PALAU PROPER and KOROR Island Area too.

APPENDED

INSERT MAP NO. 4

DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFTS.

Chart No 4?

Appended Chart No. 1

Situation of Enemy Ships and Attacking Planes

Late September

Classification	Date	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Ships Anchored in the KOSSOL Anchorage area	Aircraft Carriers							4	4	8	4
	Battleships	3	3	3	6						
	Cruisers	3	4	4	4	1	1	4	3	1	
	Destroyers	10	7	9	8	7	1	9	11	9	3
	Sub-Chasers	7	13	19	13	14	3	1	8	2	2
	Transports	15	16	16	12	16	19	18	20	19	19
	Others	5	5	4	2	4	5	4	4	3	1
	Total	43	48	55	47	42	31	40	46	42	27
	Seaplanes	33	33	32	35	32	35	34		34	40
Ships in the vicinity of PELELIU and ANGAUR	Aircraft Carriers	10		7	5		6	3		1	
	Battleships	4	1	2	4	2	2	2			
	Cruisers	2	4		1		2				
	Destroyers	22	22	26	18	22	28	7	2	9	
	Sub-Chasers						3				1
	Transports	21	31	9	22	16	15	13	1	10	
	Misc Smaller	9	11	10	7		17	5			
	Small Boats						1			24	
	Landing Crafts						20				
	Tankers						1			5	
	Hospital Ships			1	1	2	1				
	Total	68	72	55	58	42	96	30	3	49	1
Situation of Attacking enemy planes	Vicinity of PALAU	F4F SB2C 165	210	80	92	150	89	103	59	89	20
	YAP		Large Flying Boat 1	B-25 1	B-25 1			Large Flying Boat 1	B-25 1	B-24 1	

Remarks: The air field targets on PALAU were Koror City, anti-aircraft gun positions, buildings, [illegible] and piers. The targets on YAP Island were TOMIL (TN?), (TN?) BALABAT and the 1st Airfield. (The number of planes raiding PALAU include those planes which made repeated attacks and were tallied accordingly).

601

021

Appended Chart No. 2

Flares Dropped on PELELIU and ANGAUR Islands (Late September)

Place / Time Date	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	Total
PELELIU (ANGAUR) 21	1	12 (1)	12 (2)	12 (1)	6 (1)	8 (2)	8 (1)	8 (2)	8 (1)	7	6 (1)	6	94 (12)
" 22	(2)	(7)	1 (10)	21 (26)	24	30	1	1	1	1	1		
" 23		25	(30)	25	70 (20)	50 (40)	13 (10)	30		60 (3)	40		
" 24	Unable to record due to poor visibility												
" 25					"								
" 26					"								
" 27					"								
" 28					"								
" 29					"								
" 30					"								

APPENDED
INSERT MAP NO. 5 ~~10~~

PROGRESS OF BATTLE ON PELELIU ISLAND.

(21 to 30 Sept.)

SHOWING THE [redacted]GRESS OF BATTLE ON PELELIU ISLAND APPENDED CHART #2

FROM 21 TO 30 SEPT.

THE MAIN FORCE OF THE 2ND BATTALION OF THE 15TH INFANTRY REGIMENT. ON THE 24TH OF SEPT.:
THE FIRST ECHELON ARRIVED WITHOUT TROUBLE AND CAME UNDER OUR COMMAND.
THE SECOND ECHELON IS CONCENTRATING EVEN THOUGH IT IS BEING HARASSED BY ENEMY ARTILLERY.
THE THIRD ECHELON WADING THROUGH WATER UNDER ENEMY BOMBARDMENT IS [redacted]TRAPING AFTER LANDING.

50000

ENEMY'S LANDING LOSSES UP TO THE 22ND

TANKS	STRANDED	124
GUNS	DAMAGED	MORE THAN 10
TRANSPORT SHIPS	BURNED	3
MINE SWEEPERS	SUNK	1
SUBMARINES	"	1
LANDING CRAFTS	"	2
ALLIGATORS	DAMAGED	4
PERSONNEL	KILLED OR INJURED	MORE THAN 10,000

ON THE NIGHT OF THE 28TH THE ENEMY LANDED ON NGESEBUS ISLAND. (STRENGTH UNKNOWN)

AT 0500 ON 23 SEPT. A REINFORCEMENT FROM THE MAIN ISL. SUCCEEDED IN LANDING ON AKALOKUL PIER.

THE LOCAL UNITS, HAVING REARRANGED THEIR BATTLE LINES WITH THE INTENTION OF HOLDING OUT, ARE WATCHING FOR THE FIRST CHANCE TO EXTERMINATE THE ENEMY BY CLOSE-QUARTER COMBAT

[redacted] ON THE 28TH THE ENEMY ANDED WITH ALLIGATORS.

RONGAURU IS.
NGESEBUS IS.
NGESEBUS BRIDGE
AKALOKUL PIER
AKALOKUL CHANNEL
NANKO VILLAGE
RADAR HILL
RUBY IS.
HAMAKAIDO (ROAD)
URAKAIDO (ROAD)
SUIFU YAMA
NAKA HILL
Ō YAMA
NGABADAD
RADAR STATION
NGARDORDLOR PIER
NENPISONUEL
TOMI YAMA
NAKAYAMA
TENZAN
ASIAS PIER
TOKAIDO (ROAD)
WEST PT.
WEST BEACH
TAKASAKI BAY
ICHINOJI PENINSULA
EAST BEACH
KOJIMA
NAKASAKI
SOUTH BAY
MINAMI JIMA PENINSULA

[redacted] ENEMY STRENGTH ON MAIN [redacted] DIV. [redacted] ARTILLERY AND [redacted]

[redacted] 20 [redacted] M3 MEDIUM TANKS [redacted] WARD AND [redacted] TRATED [redacted]

-REFERENCES-

- ZAN / YAMA } MT.
- & INF. REG. HQ
- & SCOUT CAR
- & INF. BATTALION HQ
- ▨ - BUILDINGS
- ▷ - BOAT

APPENDED

INSERT MAP NO. ~~11~~ 6

PROGRESS OF OPERATION ON ANGUAR ISLAND

(21 to 30 Sept.)

OPERATIONS SHOWING THE PROGRESS ON ANGUAR ISLAND
FROM 21st TO 30th OF SEPT.

APPENDED CHART NO.3



B. The battle of the third period from October 1st to October 10th.

1. The essential point of the general situation.

A. Together with the continuation of the PALAU and MOROTAI operations, the enemy seems to be preparing for ~~his~~ their next large operation. The enemy's amphibians units which had returned to the MARIANA bases to rearrange their equipments last month began ~~a movement which attacked~~ to the southwest islands on the 10th.

B. The enemy's airplanes based on western NEW GUINEA, the MARIANAS, and the CHINA areas were not very active. Thus it was a special event when B-24's conducted a strafing attack on the RASA islands on the 3rd. The attacks on RABAUL which lately have weakened noticably have increased again this month.

C. Our Army that landed on CHINA on the 27th of last month and which directed the FOOCHOW attack completely occupied the city of FOO CHOW on the morning of the 4th.

D. Our garrison units repeatedly conducted commando raids onthe enemy, who ~~had abundant material.~~ were well equipped. This resulted in a decrease in their army strength.

The ~~airplane~~ carriers which had been patrolling the PALAU islands seemed to have withdrawn to another area on the 4th.

The KOSSOL anchorage is widely used.

2. Intelligence reports received.

A. The battleship situation.

(1). Since October 1st the enemy patrols in the MARIANAS area increased greatly and, as in the PALAU area it seems they are carrying out a silent radio control. The enemy's amphibious units which had returned to the MARIANAS last month, appear to have begun a movement.

(2). A group of powerful battleships were found around YAP island during the period following the 1st of the month.

It seems that the objective of their communicatin tactics was to establish a wide and active communication system. Also the concentration of their army strength seemed to have been completely by the 4th.

Since the 1st the number of airplane carrier has decreased and it was expected that the fleet including eight battleships which had returned to the ADMIRALTY area from PALAU island on the 25th will carry out another sortie. The enemy seemed to be preparing for the next operation with a powerful fleet consisting of the group of battleships from the MARSHALL and HAWAIIAN areas.

(3). ~~Since~~ From the 24th The movement of enemy battleships to the western NEW GUINEA and HALMAHERA area began. They seemed to be ~~carrying out a plan to concentrate~~ assembling their army strength for their next operation ~~together with~~ and also increasing supplies ~~to~~ IN the PALAU and MOROTAI areas.

(4). At 16:00 of the 3rd, our submarines discovered three airplane carriers (course 29 degrees) 66 miles off GOERANGO point (northeastern MOROTAI). They sunk one carrier and damaged another. It seemed as if the ~~airplane~~ carriers were concentrated in this area.

(5). The reconnaissance reports of the 9th, from our air forces on the western NEW GUINEA area were as follows (seen by the naked eye).

A. The areas of HOLLANDIA, WAKDE (11:00 to 11:30).

(a). HUMBOLOT Bay

6-----aircraft carriers (A)

4-----Battleships (B)

10-----cruisers (C)

18-----destroyers (D)

23-----large transports (T)

45-----Medium Transports (T)

115-----small transports (T)

smaller vessels-----about 40

One destroyer patrolling the mouth of the bay.

(b). TANAHMERAH Bay.

2 large transport (T) and one destroyer patrolling.

(c). One destoyer advancing to the west 30 kilometer

off northern TARAWACHI (TW-?).

(d). 2 (T) large transports around WAKDE.

(e). 15 (T) large transports

4 (T) small transports

1 (D) destroyer patrolling around SARMI.

(f). 1 (D) destroyer, 55 smaller vessels advancing toward the west about 10 kilometers off northern WAKDE.

B. The area of BIAK twin islands (14:30-15:40)

(a). south of BIAK air base about 40 (T) transports (10,000 tons)

6 or 7 (C) cruisers.

3 (D) destroyers

Several smaller transports uncertain in number.

(b). The OKI island area

4 (T) transports-----(10,000 tons)

6 (T) transports-----(3,000 tons)

3 (T) transports-----(1,000tons)

Large number of smaller vessels.

(c). Close by the twin island area

6 (T) transports-----(5,000 or 6,000 tons)

(6). On October 9th, our units in MARCUS island ~~destroyed the attacking~~ the enemy's small task force and sunk one destroyer, damaged one cruiser and one destroyer. Our losses were very slight.

(7). On October 10th, the enemy's carrier units attacked the southwest islands. As seen from the land there were more than 7 (A) aircraft carriers and it appeared to be the main body of their amphibious units in the PACIFIC area.

B. The airforce situation.

(1). Together with the enemy's air attack on western NEW GUINEA, northern ~~AUSTRALIA~~ AUSTRALIA, BORNEO and the HALMAHERA areas, the UNITED STATES airforces based in CHINA began an attack in southern CHINA and THAILAND.

(2). The enemy air attack on RABAUL became active again and the attacks on the eastern CAROLINE Islands increased in intensity.

(3). Several larger type airplanes were flying over the northern KURILES, IWO, and MARCUS Islands.

On the 3rd, one B-24 conducted a strafing attack on RASA Islands.

(4). On thenight of the 7th, in spite of threatening weather, our airforce in CHINA made its initial attack on the UNITED STATES airforce which was also ~~concentrated~~ ASSEMBLED and preparing for an attack at the air base of CHENGTU. The overall results were as following:

23-----B-29's

19-----smaller type

2-----uncertain type

44-----total of airplanes were burned or blown up.

(5). On the night of 8th and 9th our airforces attacked the NUNHORU (TN?) airbase and inflicted heavy damages to the enemy's concentrated airplanes there.

(6). Four times between the hours of 0700 to 15:30 on 10 October, about four hundred enemy carrier planes came to attack OKINAWA, MIYAKO, and AMAMIOSHIMA Islands. Our units repelled them shooting down more than 26 planes. Our losses sustained were on the ground and some ships.

C. The war situation in front of our army groups.

1. PELELIU Area.

A. The war situation on the 1st.

a. There were no changes as our units destroyed the enemy that attacked our northern main post of SUIFUZAN in the central hills.

b. Our Communications with ~~GABOBUBU~~ NGESEBUS and the northern districts were cut off. The battle situation there was uncertain, but the enemy artillery ~~shell~~fire was severe.

c. The work details at the airbases were carried out at night under lights. The grounded airplanes there numbered 44 small

types, and one transport plane, and were located in the southeast and ~~sbuthwest~~ southwest corners of the airbase. A large amount of drums was concentrated there.

d. Between 20:00 and 21:00, our reconnaissance planes brought back ~~staisfactory~~ SATISFACTORY reports.

B. The war situation on the 2nd.

(a). ~~With no large scale battle,~~ IT SEEMS THAT the enemy acted as ~~if they were carefully~~ preparing for an attack on our surrounded garrison units in the ~~centmal~~ central hills.

(b). Our units secured one part of ~~GADOBUSU with~~ NGESEBUS AFTER severe fighting between the enemy and our units.

(c). ~~Perceived~~ Observed a burning ship (probably a transport) and burning concentrated materials at the northeast and south side of the air base.

C. The war situation on the 3rd.

a. All through the 2nd night, the enemy fired 40,000 rds. of artillery shells from ~~his artillery~~ their position on land and ships at our defense posts. ~~0730~~ on the 3rd, 110 tanks and about two infantry battalions began to attack the central hills from the north and south. (This was judged as the enemy's ~~total~~ attack) Our garrison units repelled them and withdrew. The enemy that attacked KANSOKUYAMA (our main post in southeast central hills) was its best picked company; However more than half of them were killed by our sharp shooting and trench mortars. In this district about 10e enemy troops infiltrated our front line secretly but were exterminated during the evening.

b. On ~~GADOBUSU~~ NGESEBUS Islands, the artillery ~~shell~~fire was ~~still~~ severe and ~~with~~ our one unit was still engaged in severe combat with the enemy

c. About 30 smaller type airplanes were grounded at the airbase. The work details were continued all through the day.

d. Judging from the enemy's organization, equipment, tactics and action. The units which were in the PELELIU area ~~must~~ were believed to be the marines with one part of the AUSTRALIAN Army. Their army strength was estimated at about five infantry battalions.

e. The commander of PELELIU garrison unit reported the following between the period of 23 September to 3 October.

More than 10,000 enemy troops were killed or wounded.

One medium tank and twelve alligators were damaged or run aground. (Three alligators were ~~perceived~~ seen burning in the northern area. The enemy losses were probably heavy.)

A large amount of the enemy's damaged weapons and ammunition were seized.

On 16:00 of the 2nd, we ~~perceived~~ observed an enemy destroyer sinking in the western sea.

f. The enemy propaganda was suspended.

D. The war situation on the 6th. HIL(?)

a. Together with a severe concentration of artillery fire in the early morning the enemy began the central hills attack. The enemy's plan seemed to be to attack KANSOKUYAMA (main post of the south eastern part) with flame throwers as well as SUIFUZAN hill (main post of the northern part). Our garrison unit by ~~sharp shooting~~ accurate firing and close quarter combat inflicted losses upon the enemy ~~and made them withdraw.~~ which then

At 1800, one part of the enemy troops which entered our front line to the south of KANSOKUYAMA were being ~~destroyed~~ wiped out by our forces.

b. The battle is continuing in the ~~GADOBUSU~~ NGESEBUS Islands.

c. The airbase seemed tobe almost reconstructed with the runway and airfields enlarged and its main tenance strengthened.

There were no changes in the grounded planes as of yesterday.

E. The war situation on the 5th.

a. All through the day, there was no change in the action of the enemy and therefore there is no special report.

The battle is continuing in the ~~GADOBUSU~~ NGESEBUS Islands.

b. There ~~is~~ are no changes at the airbase.

Grounded airplanes.

18-----fighters

2-----P-38

12-----twin-engined bomber

1-----Douglas transport

c. At 14:30, a transport ship was seen sinking in the southern sea.

F. The war situation on the 6th.

a. One part of the enemy came to attack thenortheast part of HIGASHIYAMA and the northern part of SUIFUZAN in the central hills. There were little changes in the front lines except that one part of the enemy infiltrated our front line at HIGASHIYAMA and maintained a foothold there. Our garrison unit is planning to destroy this unit tonight with d close-quarter combat.

b. The severe battle is still continuing at ~~GADOBUSU~~ NGESEBUS. Besides this there are no changes.

c. The fighting spirit of our garrison units is increasingly inspired. One part of our unit infiltrated into the airbase on the night of the 5th and threw the enemy into confusion and at the same time they caused a fire to the airbase between 00:30 to 02:50 on the 6th.

G. The war situation on the 7th.

Together with a concentrated artillery fire in the southeast area of the central hills, HIGASHIYAMA Hill, the western side of KANSOKUYAMA and SUIFUZAN, the enemy attacked but they were repulsed with the exception of the southern part of HIGASHIYAMA which was occupied. The artillery shells fired by the enemy totaled about 25,000 rounds. The ratio of the smoke shells mixed into this amount were one out of every five. Because of this, the field of vision was poor all through the day.

b. There were no change in the situation at the air base from yesterday.

H. The war situation on the 8th.

a. One part of the enemy came to attack SUIFUZAN hill with flame throwers but they were repulsed.

There is no special report from the other districts.

b. It seems that the battle is continuing at ~~GADOBUSU~~ NGESEBUS Island.

c. The enemy plan seems to be to burn down the central hills post to ashes by dropping gasoline from airplanes.

d. The use of the airbase became more and more active.

I. The war situation on the 9th.

a. All through the day the artillery shellfire was severe but there were no ~~large battle~~ heavy engagements and no changes in the front lines.

b. A sound of explosion was heard, with large ~~volumes~~ of black smoke from the western airbase between the hours of 11:30 and 13:30.

This must have been the result of our raid and close quarters combat with the enemy.

c. Today's enemy propaganda leaflet was as follows:

JAPANESE officers:

If you knew the strength of our ships and aircraft, you will find that you cannot ~~defend against the air of~~ hope to defeat the UNITED STATES Army. UNITED STATES airforces are bombing not only your positions but also PALAU KOROR and the neighboring islands. You can see smoke from the bombs even now. Your army in the northern district wants to help you, but how dan they do it? Do you value your soldiers? To sacrifice so many soldiers will only disgrace your Honor.

Several thousnad brave JAPANESE soldiers are thinking it is worthless to die in action and are anticipating the time when they can return home to reconstruct a new JAPAN. There is still time to act. The UNITED STATES Army will supply you with water, food and medical treatment. Lay down your arms and come out carrying a white flag.

J. The war situation on the 10th.

a. There were no large battles all during the day and no changes in the front lines. The front line secured at present are MT. OYAMA Headquarters, the eastern side of the [illegible] Hills, the native road

of SUIFUZAN, the eastern side of HIGASHIYAMA and KANSOKUYAMA.

b. The activity at the airbase increased. The grounded planes totaled 75 this morning.

c. Seen one destroyer sinking at 1700 in the norhtern sea.

2. ANGAUR area.

There were no communications and poor intelligence reports were received from this area. Judging from the flare-bombs and other indications, it is certain that our garrison units in the northwestern hills are annihilating the enemy in close quarter combat.

3. The northern islands of PELELIU.

a. The enemy artillery situated on the northern part of PELELIU fired on the southern coast of MAKARAKARU (EIL MALK) Island, MIKOSHIMA, ORUKUSU (ORUKUJZU) (TN?) Island, KARAKON (NGEREGON) (TN?) Island, AIDABURAI (AITABURAI Pt.) (TN?) Point, and enemy planes conducted strafing attacks on them at 0830 of the 8th. At 2330 3 amphibious tanks advanced from the GARAKAYO (TN?) Island area and attacked MIKO SHIMA but were repulsed in thirty minutes.

b. The activity of the amphibious tanks began from the GARAKAYO (TN?) Islands.

c. Together with the enemy's patrolling of the YO (TN?) Channel and the mouth of the DENGES Channel with destroyers and subchasers (CH), the patrolling of this area by enemy planes also became active.

4. PALAU Islands and the KOROR area.

a. These areas have been receiving enemy airplane attacks since last month. These attacks were not so heavy but since the 5th, they have increased greatly. The reasons can be judged as the enemy wanting to conceal the withdrawing of the main body of the aircraft carriers. Also it maybe a reconnaissance action to prepare for the real attack following.

b. The enemy in order to avoid losses did not attack our anti- aircraft positions. They directed their attack on the airbase, concentrated military stores, building and motor cars. The reconnaissance planes

MAKARAKARU would appear to be a rendition of MALAKAL — However, p. 184 places it 2 km from NGEREGON (KARAGON) which would make it EIL MALK.

~~MIKOJIMA MAY BE GOROKOTTAN~~
~~OR~~

could

, Judging from a literal translation of MIKOJIMA (THREE CHILDREN) it could be the three small islands W. of GARAKAYO. ~~The latter seems more probable~~ ;

APPENDED

INSERT MAP NO. 7

SUMMARY OF DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS

AND PLANES.

SHOWING THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND PLANES



SUMMARY OF THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND PLANES



Appended Chart No. 1

Situation of Enemy Ships and Attacking Planes

(Early October)

Classification		Date 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Ships Anchored in the KOSSOL Anchorage Area.	Aircraft Carrier	4									
	Cruisers	4									
	Transports	18	17	9	14	23	7	20	17	17	16
	Tankers			3	4	4	4	10	3	2	1
	Destroyers	16	5	3	4	7	4	4	10	2	1
	Sub-Chasers		2	19	21	6			28	21	20
	Others	6	4	1	13	36	25	30	7	20	34
	(Sea Planes)	(40)	(38)	(37)	(48)		(31)	(38)	(32)	(33)	(29)
	Total	48	28	35	56	76	58	64	65	62	72
Ships in the vicinity of PELELIU and ANGAUR	Transports	9	8		6	20	7	4	1	7	12
	Tankers		6		5			1	3		
	Destroyers	8				4	6	2	5	3	7
	Sub-Chasers	8	15		10	2				6	12
	Small Boats	10					1				
	Hospital Ships								6		
	Battleships and Cruisers	4	1		5	1	1	2			1
	Total	34	30		26	27	15	9	17	16	32
Number of planes attacking the PALAU and YAP Areas	Vicinity of PALAU	F4F 78	167			130	138	91	13	55	48
	YAP	B-25 1	No Raids due to Storm			B-25 1	B-25 1				B-25 1

Reference: The air raid rargets in the PALAU Islands were KOROR City, Anti-Aircraft Gun positions and Buildings. The targets on PALAU Island were the AILAI Airfield, Anti-Aircraft Gun positions, outstanding Buildings and piers. The targets on YAP Island were TOMIL (TN?), BALABAT (TN?), and the 1st Airfield. (The numbers indicating the number of planes participating in the raids on the PALAU Area include those planes which made 2 or more raids and were talled on each.)

Appended Chart No. 2

Flares Dropped on PELELIU, ANGAUR and MAKARAKARU Islands

(Early October)

Place	Time Date	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	Total
PELELIU ANGAUR)	1	Unable to record due to poor visibility.												
"	2	Unable to record due to poor visibility.												
"	3	7	15	9	3	1	8	6		4	2	3	2	60
"	4	9	19	7	8	9	4	3	2	2	3	2		68
"	5	8	11	5	6	4	6	3	3	2	3	3	2	56
"	6	16	5	2	3				8	10	3			47
"	7	5	4	8	8	3	2	3	4	7	1	3	1	49
"	8	6	16	6	7	5	12	5	6	7	5	4	4	83
"	9	5	4	9	8	10	11	8	6	7	7	7		82
"	10		32		31		9		13		29		7	121

APPENDED 8
INSERT MAP NO. ~~13~~

PROGRESS OF OPERATION ON PELELIU ISLAND.

(1 to 10 Oct.)

PROGRESS SHOWING THE OPERATIONS ON PELELIU IS.

1 OCTOBER TO 10 OCTOBER

APPENDED MAP *2



patrolling at night have increased greatly since the 5th.

5. YAP area.

No changes.

E. The battle of the fourth period from October 11th to October 20th.

1. The essential points of the general situation.

A. The main body of the enemy's 38th Task Force ~~seeing action~~ operating in the southwest islands, the eastern sea off FORMOSA and the LUZON area since the 10th, seems to be carrying out a plan to destroy our planes and ships.

B. At dawn, of the17th, enemy naval ships entered LEYTE Bay. On the 19th, one part of the enemylanded on CABALIAN (southeast LEYTE) and on the 20th, they began to land at SAN JOSE naval airbase and the PARAKAN (TN?) district.

C. Our garrison units ~~with~~ engaged in close quarter combat on PELELIU and ANGAUR are still holding their main positions and inflicting losses upon the powerful enemy.

The KOSSOL anchorage is still in use.

D. The intelligence reports received.

1. The battleship situation.

a. The enemy task force which is the main body in the 38th Task Force is ~~seeing action~~ operating in the southwest islands, the eastern sea off FORMOSA and the LUZON area and is carrying out a plan to destroy our airplane and ships.

b. Since the12th, our navy ~~strongly~~ attacked the enemy's task force day and night in the eastern sea off LUZON Island and ~~destroyed~~ annihilated more than half of the enemy. The enemy losses in this battle are as following:

~~Blown up and~~ sunk:

11-----aircraft carriers----------(A)

2-----battleships----------(B)

3-----cruisers----------(C)

1-----Cruiser or destroyer----------(C) or (D)

Damaged:

8-----aircraft carriers----------(A)

2-----battleships----------(B)

4-----cruisers----------(C)

1-----criuser or destroyer ---------(C) or (D)

13-----unknown types

Observed
~~Recognised as~~ burning

12-----unknown types

112 enemy planes shot down (excluding damage to grounded planes at air bases).

Our losses consisted of 312 plaes which failed to return, and about 50 to 60 small vessels sunk.

c. On the 19th, our airforces repelled the BRITISH Task Force which attacked the KAR NICOBAR Islands in the NICOBAR Islands. An aircraft carrier (A) and a destroyer (D) were sunk and a battleship (B) and a destroyer (D) were damaged.

d. ~~On~~ At 1430 of the 19th, the reconnaissance report ^ of LORENGAU ~~By a navy fighter~~ obtained from a Navy fighter was as follows:

(1). LORENGAU

6 aircraft carriers (A) (one of them a large type with a bridge).

14 battleships (B) (probably including a large cruiser (C)

(2). There were a large amount of smaller type airplanes at HAIN (TN?) airbase.

(3). The northern airbase of LOS NEGROS was invisible due to clouds.

(4). There were movements among the ships in the harber.

e. The intelligence report communicated to us was as following.

1. On the 19th, the rear guard task force including a transport force was dicovered in the ADMIRALTY area. On the 20th, they ~~seemed to be~~ were seen advancing westward along the northern coast of NEW GUINEA. The other task force from the NEW GUINEA area seems to have been transferred to the PHILIPPINE area. This ^ ~~judgement is~~ was estimated after having received reports from airplane reconnaissnace patrols which reported seeing navy ships advancing from the ADMIRALTY and HOLLANDIA district to the PHILIPPINES.

b. Communications have frequently been received to the effect that the enemy task force in the eastern BASHI Channel is ~~going~~ moving southward and is about to take part in the enemy's PHILIPPINE operation.

c. It seems that they are using ULITHI as a refueling airbase. Part of the damaged warships anchored in this area will go to the HAWAIIAN area for repairs.

2. Airforce situation.

a. The enemy task force which had attacked the southwest islands on the 10th, seems to have ~~gone~~ moved southward. On the 12th, 13th, and 14th, they attacked FORMOSA. The enemy losses were about 160 planes shot down.

Our losses were a few airplanes naval ships and some damage to our installations.

On the14th, about 100 B-29's based in CHINA also attacked FORMOSA.

b. Enemy task forces attacked FORMOSA and then ~~went~~ moved southward. The reinforcement task force from the NEW GUINEA area seemed to have been united with ~~it~~ this task force. Since the 17th, they ~~are~~ have been attacking LUZON.

3. The war situation of the PHILIPPINES .

a. After the dawn of the 17th, enemy naval ships moved into LEYTE BAY, but threatening weather (The velocity of the wind was more than 30 meters a second). prevented any action. The naval ships which entered the bay were as following:

3-----aircraft carriers-----(A)

9-----battleships----------(B)

5 or 6----------cruisers--------(C)

10-----destroyers----------(D)

10-----transports----------(T)

b. The 18th (good weather)

About 300 carrier planes attacked TACLOBAN, BACOLOD and CEBU. Another 450 planes attacked LUZON.

At 1400, a part of the ~~battleship~~ task force approached ~~the coast~~ to about 20 kilometers off the coast (some ships were closer to the coast) and attacked positions in northern DULAG with naval gun gire.

At 1500, 8 small vessels lowered from 4 battleships reconnoitered fr[illegible]

4 battleships

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4 battleships

the coast of DULAG and CATARMAN (one of them was sunk). 5 or 6 minesweepers swept the LEYTE BAY for mines between the HOMONHON and DINAGAT Islands. The artillery shells fired up until evening ~~consisted of~~ amounted to 3,000 rounds of ~~this~~ the larger caliber and 700 rounds of the medium caliber. They continued this artillery fire into the night.

At 1230, our 35th Army ordered the destruction of the enemy, 6 aircraft, carriers, 4 battleships, 9 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 3 minelayers, 15 mine sweepers, 20 transports and 8 unknown types ~~were~~ which were dicovered by airplane reconnaissance.

3. The 19th (cloudy weather)

The enemy ~~is~~ has been firing artillery ~~shells~~ guns successively from last night through this morning. Their targets were our position at DULAG, CATARMAN, TOLOSA ~~positions~~ and the SAN JOSE navy airfield.

At 0910, a part of the enemy's infantry landed at CABALIAN (south east of LEYTE Island).

About 1200, they began to land with 54 landing craft but they were repulsed with 3 landing craft sunk. About 70 infantry soldiers who landed at PALO (10 kilometers south of TACLOBAN) were repulsed by our night attack.

The enemy air raids decreased as follows:

100-----to MANILA
100-----to TACLOBAN
40-----to CEBU
25-----to ILOILO
16-----to DAVAO
12-----ZAMBOANGA.

18 transports were discovered at LEYTE Bay, 30 at a point 180 miles 110 degrees ~~off~~ north ~~of~~ TACLOBAN, 50 at SANSHIKARU (TN?), which is located on the southeastern side of SAMAR island. 98 in total.

At 1200, a group of transport ships were seen at a point 580 miles 130 degrees ~~off~~ north ~~of~~ MANILA, ~~were discovered.~~

4. The 20th (good weather)

At 1100, the enemy began to land at SAN JOSE navy airbase and in the PARAKAN (TN?) district. The landing crafts numbered about 200. The Our 16th Div divisions set out to annihilate destroy them. The enemy's strength of counter-attack and air raids decrased with 30 plaes to CEBU, 8 planes to PACOLOD, 53 planes to DAVAO. It was surprising when a large type airplane reconnoitered the LAGONOY Bay district. (The southeastern part of LUZON Island).

5. The enemy in making this fully planned landing had no tanks which was unexpected. Although a part of the enemy plan came to naught, the enemy successfully landed in force. ~~according to strategy.~~

6. The war situation in front of our army group.

A. PELELIU Area.

1. The ~~war~~ situation on the 11th.

(a). All through the day there ~~is~~ were no ~~large battle~~ heavy engagements with the enemy and our armies standing face to face. The areas which are secured by our garrison units at present are OYAMA, SUIFUZAN, KANSOKUYAMA, the main districts of the central hills. HIGASHIYAMA is still in enemy hands.

2. Grounded planes at the airbase

42 fighters
8 transport planes
5 reconnaissance planes

The fighters were continuously in the air.

3. 2 transport ships and one hospital ship were close to the coast putting ashore men and transferring wounded to the hospital ship. Also since the 10th, 4 transport ships ~~are~~ were putting ashore troops to replace their losses.

B. The ~~war~~ situation on the 12th.

1. The enemy seems to have made SUIFUZAN ~~his~~ their main objective. They attacked SUIFUZAN and the western hills of SUIFUZAN with ~~fierce~~ flame throwers. At the SUIFUZAN district they penetrated into our front lines but were repulsed by our night attack. Our losses suffered from the flame throwers were slight due to our effective defense.

2. The enemy seems to be ~~preparing the arrangements of his~~

strength ~~in~~ increasing their force in other districts but is not acting very fast.

3. There were 35 fighters, 3 recinnaissance planes, and 8 transport planes at the airbase, with one or two planes patrolling.

C. The war-situation on the 13 th.

1. About 0900, 8 enemy planes attacked the northern hills of KANSOKUYAMA with 12 incendiary bombs. This bomb which has a compensating tank attached ~~to it will burst~~ exploded upon touching the ground spreading fire all around.

2.. There are no special changes evident in the front lines of other districts.

3. Our total strength (including the navy) on the 13th was as follows:

a. armed forces--------1150

b. equipments:

13----machine guns

5,000 ----rifles (20,000 rounds of ammunition)

6-----heavy machine guns (10,000 rounds)

12-----grenade dischargers (150 rounds)

1-----Automatic gun (type 97 20 M.M.) 50 rounds

1-----anti-tank gun (350 rounds)

1-----type 92 Infantry gun 70 mm. howitzter (120 rounds)

3-----mortars (?)

1300-----hand grenades

40-----anti-tank mines

80-----K.G.---Yellow chemicals

80-----K.G.---smoke candle (type 94 1.0 K.G.)

There were some shells which could beused among the captured ammunition.

D. The war situation on the 14th.

a. ~~Since yesterday~~ The enemy attacked SUIFUZAN and the western districts of SUIFUZAN. yesterday. A powerful unit of our garrison force in a daring night attack, attacked the enemy in this area. At present fierce combat and severe artillery shellfire is taking place with the results unknown.

b. There ~~are~~ were no changes in the front lines of other districts.

E. The war situation on the 15th.

1. 22 enemy airplanes again attacked the northern districts of KANSOKUYAMA with incendiary bombs.

2. A unit of the enemy penetrated into SUIFUZAN and the western part of HIGASHIYAMA. Our units which are holding the southern part of SUIFUZAN together with another strong raiding unit are repulsing the enemy.

3. The enemy intercepted our ~~actions~~ movements in the western part of HIGASHIYAMA with a mortar attack which lasted all through the night. ~~Also~~ They also attacked with ~~f~~flame throwers attacked to tanks.

F. The war situation on the 16th.

1. 1200. At present the enemy and our units are fighting in the central districts of SUIFUZAN. The front line in other districts are the same as in the 15th.

2. The enemy is daily replacing ~~his~~ their increasing losses suffered from our raiding attacks and ~~celose~~ close quarter combat. According to reports ~~of~~ from our garrison units on the 17th, the enemy seems to be replacing ~~his~~ their front line troop with fresh troops. The ~~general~~ engagement in the front line ~~battle~~ is becoming increasingly active.

G. The war situation on the 17th.

1. It ~~seems as if~~ was estimated that the enemy would make a total attack, concealed by ~~a~~ smoke screen and after ~~a~~ severe artillery fire ~~in~~ in the morning. But this attack was not activated. As a result there were no changes in the front lines.

2. Judging from the ~~complete war~~ situation on PELELIU the enemy marines seems to have ~~re~~placed the army troops ~~since~~ on the 15th.

3. The enemy attack is ~~carried out by~~ being carried out with flame throwers and continuous trench mortar fire.

4. There ~~is~~ are no changes in the siuation at the air base and also inthe number of grounded planes.

H. The war situation on the 18th.

1. The enemy's light weapons fire decreased, but the firing of heavy weapons increased with infantry soldiers advancing under the

covering fire.

2. At About 1430, a part of the enemy units climbed the 20 meter high cliffs with ladders to attack the eastern hills of OYAMA. However, they were repulsed. Besides this there were no changes in the front line of other districts.

3. Enemy transport ships close to the coast landed soldiers during the night.

4. For several days enemy airplanes ~~are~~ were continuously patrolling around the PELELIU area. They seem especially to be patrolling the sea for a long distance.

I. The war situation on the 19th.

1. The enemy plan seems to be to destroy our command headquarters. They repeatedly fired their artillery ~~shells~~ (including white phosphorous bombs and smoke bombs) at the low lands of the eastern side of OYAMA and its northeastern hills (headquarter position). And also about 1400, 8 planes attacked us with incendiary bombs. Our losses were light.

2. The front lines are ~~generally~~ quiet with no changes.

3. The number of enemy planes at the airbase is as follows:

41-----fighters (including some carrier planes)
1-----P-38
2-----transport planes
4-----others
48-----total

4. The patrolling by ships and planes in the PELELIU area is still vigorous.

J. The war situation on the 20th.

1. A part of an enemy unit attacked SUIFUZAN. Besides this there ~~are~~ were no changes in the front lines. The enemy which concentrated artillery fire on the northeastern hills of OYAMA is still continuing their ~~his~~ fire.

2. There are no changes in the number of enemy planes at the airbase. However, many planes are taking off and landing at this base.

B. The ANGAUR area.

Our communications with this area have not been restored. Thus the report on the war situation there has not been received. Judging from the enemy's artillery fire and illuminous shells, our garrison units are still holding the main positions of the northwestern hills and imposing casualties upon the enemy.

C. The northern islands of PELELIU

1. It is certain that the enemy is landing soldiers on KARAKAYO (~~TN?~~) and KONGHURU Islands. There is frequent traffic of Landing Ship Tanks and landing crafts to these islands.

2. At 0900 on the 12th, the enemy artillery fired about 30 rounds from the PELELIU area on the ORUKUIZU (~~TN?~~) Islands.

3. At 0630 on the 14th, two enemy mine sweepers 12 kilometers off the coast of MALAKAL Channel fired on our battery at the URUKUTABURU (~~TN?~~) batteries, and then went toward the southeast at 0940.

4. The daily patrolling from sea and air is still active.

D. PALAU Island and KOSSOL area.

1. We have received enemy air raids almost daily, although the raids were not very severe. ~~The~~ Night ~~patrolling~~ is still persistent.

2. At About 1450 on the 19th, 2 sub-chasers (CH) reconnoitered the western channel districts and fired at the mouth of KARAMADOO (TN?) BAY.

E. The YAP area.

There are no special changes.

3. Our estimation of the enemy's situation.

A. Our estimation of the enemy's situation with regards to the ~~complete war~~ battle situation.

The enemy seems to be planning to carry out forcefully the PHILIPPINE operations because of political demands, and are also ~~Also they will completely~~ secure probably the PALAU and MOROTAI areas, which will be their defensive positions.

APPENDED

INSERT MAP NO. ~~14~~ 9

DISPOSITION OF ENEMY AIR AND

NAVAL UNITS.

SHOWING THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY AIR AND NAVAL UNITS

APPENDED MAP NO. 1



-REFERENCE-

A.. AIRCRAFT CARRIER
B BATTLESHIP
C CRUISER
D DESTROYER
K.D.B. TASK FORCE

SHIPS
SUNKEN SHIPS
HEAVY BOMBER BASE

Appended Chart No. 13

Situation of Enemy Ships in the Vicinity of PALAU (Middle of October)

Classification	Departure and Arrival	Date	11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		Total		Previous Period	
			Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In
KOSSOL Anchorage Area	Departure and Arrival	Transports			1	1	1	2	1	1					2			2		1	5	2	10	13		
		Tankers		4			1						1							2	4		6	6		
		Destroyers		3	1	1	1	4	4	5			1		1	2		2	2	1	1	2	15	22		
		Sub-Chasers	2	5		2	3	3	4				1	2	2					2	3		15	14		
		Service Ships		1																				1		
		Small Boats							18	1	[illegible]			1									18	2		
		Small Naval Ships									[illegible]				9		15	4	1	5	5		30	9		
		Sub-Total	2	13	2	8	8	9	27	9	[illegible]		3	3	14	2	15	8	3	11	20	4	98	67		
		Total	15		10		17		36		[illegible]		6		16		23		14		24		168			
	Anchored	Transports	23		23		23		21				20		18		2		19		22		169		158	
		Tankers	4		2						[illegible]		4		3				6		5		24		31	
		Destroyers	7		7		9		6		[illegible]		11		1		7		7		1		51		56	
		Sub-Chasers	9		4		6		12		[illegible]		2										33		117	
		Small Naval Ships	7		25		6		10				46		31		3		10		18		156		176	
		Small Boats	19		14		22		23		[illegible]		6						8				92			
		Others	1				12		7		[illegible]		16		1		4		5		2		48			
		(Seamless)	(36)		(32)		(38)		(32)		[illegible]		(27)		(29)				(34)		(29)		(257)		(326)	
		Total	70		73		78		89		[illegible]		105		54		16		55		48		588		538	
Vicinity of PELELIU		Transports	2		3		15		4		[illegible]		9		8		5		14		16		76		74	
		Tankers			1						[illegible]												1		15	
		Destroyers	3		7		3		4		[illegible]		1				1		2		6		27		35	
		Sub-Chasers							2		[illegible]		7		8		1		17		16		51		53	
		Mine Sweepers	5		2		6		1		[illegible]						4				1		19		17	
		Cruisers							1														1			
		Hospital Ships	1		2								1		1				1		1		7			
		Total	11		15		24		12				18		17		11		33		40		182		194	
Vicinity of MAKARAKARU		Sub-Chasers																								
		Cable Laying Ships																								
		Floating Crane																								
		Repair Ship																								
		Boat																								
		LST																								
		Total																								

Legend:

Departure
Arrival
PELELIU and NAKARAKARU



Appended Chart No. 2

Air Situation in the PALAU Area (Middle of October)

Area	Classification	Date / Type	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total	Previous Period
PALAU Island	Attacking Planes	F4U	80	100	145		87	64	192		120	90	878	720
		P38	5	2				3	1	1	2	7	21	
		Sub-Total											899	
	By Passing Planes	Larrge Flying Boats	12	7	4		2	3	3	7	4	3	45	
		Transports					2						2	
		Sub-Total											47	
	Total												946	
YAP Island	Attacking Planes	B25	1	1			1	1	1		1		6	
		B24			3	1							4	
		Sub-Total											10	4
	By Passing Planes	Larrge Flying Boats	1	1	9	2	3	7	3		8		34	
		F4U								17			17	
		P38								1			1	
		B25												
		Sub-Total											52	
	Total												62	
Vicinity of PELELIU & ANGAUR	Attack & Reconnaissance planes in the air	F4U					4	4	9	4	9	8	38	
		P38					31			1			1	
		P82								1	5		6	
		?									5	2	7	
		Transports										2	2	
		Large Flying Boats										2	2	
Battle Results		PALAU Island		2 F4U & 1 P38 shot down							5 shot down. 1 damaged			

PELELIU Airfield	No. of Departure and Arrivals	Classification	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.	Do.	Arr.

134

150

Appended Chart No. 3

Flares Dropped on PELELIU, ANGAUR and MAKARAKARU Islands
(Middle Of October)

Place	Time Date	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	Total
PELELIU (ANGAUR)	11	13	13	12	9	13	4	9	10	13	8	6	3	113
"	12	8	4	7	8	8	7	6	4	4	5	8		69
"	13		8		7				2	13	16	36		82
"	14	1	7	12	23	31	38	16	20	2	1	1		152
"	15	10	22	20	25	27	13	25	22	10	55	18	25	272
"	16	2	6	11	2	8	16	6	4	6	32	4		97
"	17	9	5	20	49	15	14	7	15	13	11	4		162
"	18	4	55	36	61	50	24	21	15	53	54	19		383
"	19	11	15	60	22	18	19	30	16	16	23	30	16	276
"	20	15 (5)	17 (6)	31 (12)	8 (15)	17 (17)	11	15 (18)	10 (4)	9 (11)	10 (11)	16 (13)	9 (6)	168 (141)

APPENDED 10

INSERT MAP NO. ~~15~~

PROGRESS OF OPERATION ON PELELIU ISLAND. (11 to 20 Oct.)

They ~~are~~ were forced to take this defensive position because of ~~their great~~ heavy losses suffered in the area off FORMOSA and the eastern sea of PHILIPPINES.

B. The estimation of the enemy's situation in front of our armies

~~In the case of~~ If the enemy carrying out their PHILIPPINE operation they will probably consider the importance of PALAU as a base for their fleet. And in case of losses to their main body of the task force they will probably consider YAP and PALAU as necessary to their defensive position. Thus when the enemy makes either offensive or defensive plans, ~~they will hurry~~ it is probable that they will to secure ~~completely the~~ the area PALAU area as quickly as possible. To do this, the enemy will probably launch a large scale attack using powerful ~~new~~ and fresh troops.

Note:

At that time the PALAU army groups firmly believed the great losses to the enemy task forces were suffered by the and judged the enemy's war situation as stated above.

F. The Battle of the 5th Period. (October 21st to October 31st.)

1. The essential points of the general situation.

A. A powerful enemy fleet is continuously cruising the eastern sea off the PHILIPPINES. They are taking part in the LEYTE operation and are receiving the full attack of our naval forces.

B. The enemy which landed on LEYTE Island had been increasing supplies to speed the capture of the airbase. Our armies are fighting the enemy in several districts.

C. On the 25th about 100 B-29's based in CHINA made air raids on KYUSHU ~~an~~ and the SAISHU-TO Islands.

D. On the night of the 26th, our troops in the CHINA area attacked CHENGTU airfield and obtained very satisfactory results. From the 25th, our KAMIKAZE special attack corps ~~is~~ has been vigorously attacking the enemy task forces and transport ship groups in the eastern sea off the PHILIPPINES.

E. Our garrison units in the PELELIU and ANGAUR area are repeatedly fighting the enemy ~~in~~ close quarter combat and imposing casualties upon them. The enemy seems to have ~~attacked~~ stressed more importance to the northern islands of PELELIU and the northern districts of the PALAU islands.

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~~The usage of~~ KOSSOL anchorage is still ~~great~~ being used extensively.

2. Intelligence reports received.

A. The battleship situation

1. The enemy task forces ~~are continuously~~ cruising the eastern sea off the PHILIPPINES and also the enemy's powerful forces have invaded the LEYTE Bay. Our forces ~~are attacking them severly~~ attacked this force from both sea and air.

2. On the morning of the 24th, the reports from our navy's reconnaissance planes were as follows:

a. 4-----Battleship
4-----Cruisers
——5 miles off DULAG

5-----Battleships
8 Cruisers
10-----Destroyers
80-----Transports
——10 miles off DULAG

1-----Transport
3-----Destroyers
10-----merchant vessels)
(seems to be enemy vessels
——40 miles south of DULAG

b. Destroyer cruising in LEYTE Bay .

c 10 torpedo boats 60 miles southeast of TACLOBAN

c. 6 aircraft carriers, 20 others in the eastern sea off LUZON.

3. Our DAVAO navy forces reported on 0200 of the 7th, an enemy fleet with a large amount of transport ships ~~were discovered~~ has been seen in the area off TARODO (TN?) islands.

4. From October 24th to the 26th, a battle between our fleet and the enemy fleet took place in the eastern sea off the PHILIPPINES. The results were as follows.

a. The total enemy losses.

Sunk:

8-----Aircraft carriers
4-----Cruisers
4-----Transports

Damaged:

9-----Aircraft Carriers

1-----Battleship

2-----Cruisers

3-----Cruisers or destroyer.

More than 500 planes were shot down.

b. Our losses.

Sunk:

1-----Aircraft carrier

2-----Cruisers

2-----destroyers

~~Half~~ Partly damaged

1-----aircraft carrier

126-----planes failed to return

Our losses in LEYTE Bay

Sunk:

1-----Battleship

~~Half~~ Partly damaged:

1-----Battleship

This battle ~~will~~ was be called the "Naval Battle of the PHILIPPINES.

5. Our forces ~~daily~~ attacked daily the enemy transport ships and naval escort vessels which invaded LEYTE Bay on the 17t .

The total results achieved in the LEYTE Bay actions by the 26th were as following:

Sunk:

6---Transports

3---Cruisers

10---Cruiser or destroyers

1---Destroyer

17---Large type vessels

37---Total.

Damaged, burned or run aground:

53---Transports

2---Aircraft carriers

3---Battleships

4---Cruisers

4---Destroyers

1---Oil tanker

2---Large type vessels.

3---Unknown types

71---Total

The complete total was 108 ships.

B. The airforce situation

1. The enemy task forces are still continuously cruising the eastern sea off the PHILIPPINES. The airraids by the enemy carrier planes decreased as a result of our attack.

2. On the 25th, about 100 B-29's based in CHINA attacked KYUSHU and SAISHUTO islands.

The enemy losses:

5---planes shot down

19---planes damaged.

24--- Total

3. On the night of the 26th, our air forces based in the CHINA area made a surprise air raid upon the UNITED STATES airforces bases at CHENGTU with all planes returning safely.

The enemy losses were as following:

15---B-29's----------Burned completely

42---B-29's----------Damaged

3---smaller types

60---Total-- Planes.

4. Our airforces attacked the airbases of TACLOBAN and DULAG in the PHILIPPINES area, the airbases in BENGAL state in the BURMA area and also the bases in the SZECHWAN PROVINCE of the CHINA area.

The results obtained were ~~old~~ all very satisfactory.

5. Since October 25th, our KAMIKAZE special attack corps has been vigorously attacking the enemy task forces including transport ships in the eastern sea, (includes LEYTE Bay) off the PHILIPPINES.

The enemy losses up to the present ~~are~~ were as follows.

Sunk:

3---aircraft carriers

1---cruiser

1---transport

Damaged:

6---aircraft carriers

2---battleships

2---cruisers

1---transport

3---unknown types

6. Twice ^ On the morning of the 30th, about 14 to 16 large type planes attacked the TRUK Islands ~~twice in the morning~~ from the MARIANA area.

These planes were probably B-29's.

C. The war situation in the PHILIPPINES.

1. The war situation in the LEYTE area up to the night of the 22nd.

a. The KAKI army group of the 16th division reported that the enemy force ^ which completed their operation on landed ~~up until~~ the night of the 21st totaled ~~probably is~~ about a division and a half in front of DULAG and ~~one~~ division and a half in between PALO and SAN JOSE. and that our group was still ~~We are~~ holding the TAHANE (TN?) and HORITA (TN?) districts in front of DULAG and the western hills of PALO and TACLOBAN in the PALO district.

b. We are still holding the coastal positions in front of KATORU (TN?), TANAUAN districts and one part of each raiding unit is carrying out raiding attacks upon the enemy.

c. The spirit of the KAKI army group is very high and they seem to be imposing great losses upon the enemy equipped with tanks. Our losses in the front lines are also running high.

d. Since the 20th, the enemy has been directed ~~129~~ their air raids upon the southern districts of LEGASPI.

2. The war situation in the LEYTE area up to the time of 0200 of ~~on~~ the 23rd.

a. The DULAG area.

Our forces are holding the front line of RERUTA (TN?) extending from north to south with a platoon guarding the right side of TAKITAN (TN?) river which is to the south of DULAG.

The ground crews of the airforces are holding the south side around

BURANEN airbase, but ~~t is~~ unit appeared as though the appears to lack ed strength.

b. The KATOMON (TN?) and TANAUAN areas.

The part of the enemy which landed in these areas does not have sufficient strength to attack. Our forces ~~still~~ holding the coastal positions are taking part in the combat of this neighborhood.

d. The PALO, TACLOBAN districts.

Our forces are holding the western hills of the PALO and TACLOBAN districts.

d. The enemy air raids are still directed at the southern districts From LEGASPI to NAKA (TN?). The enemy air attacks on the MINDANAO areas is being made with land based planes while the in LEGASPI area is made by carrier planes. The activity of the enemy planes is still great but naval shellfire is decreasing.

e. The enemy's direction of attack ~~is~~ has changing ed to the SAN PABLO ~~APURO~~ (TN?) airbases. They seem to be planning an advance to the DAGAMI district from thenorth.

3. The war situation in the LEYTE area up to the night of the 24th.. (In front of the KAKI army group)

a. The DULAG area:

Our forces counterattacked a stubbirn enemy along the road from DULAG to BURAUEN.

We are holding the front line 2 kilometer in front of thenortheastern part of theSOUTH BURAUEN air base and the NORTH BURAUEN airbase.

At the time of 2000 of the 24th, the enemy consisting of two infantry battalions and 30 to 40 tanks attacked BURAUEN, ~~with a fierce battle resulting.~~

On the morning of the 24th, another part of the enemy tanks advanced to the TABONKABON (TN?) districts.

Enemy artillery fire has been ~~was~~ directed at theDAGAMI district.

b. Except for the appearance of a part of the enemy tanks in the northeastern district which came by a round about route through the KATOMAN (TN?) hills from the south, there were ~~are~~ no great changes in the war situation of the KATOMON (TN?) TANAUAN districts.

c. The PALO district:

We are still holding the western hills of PALO.

d. The TACLOBAN area:

The enemy battleships are certain to be in action in the SAN JUANICO strait between LEYTE and SAMAR.

e. The ORMOC Bay area:

At 0100 of the 24th, our motor powered sailing vessels were attacked by enemy torpedo boats in the sea between MERIDA(south-western ORMOC) and PILAR (BAYBAY Island).

f. The enemy deems to have started the use of the DULAG and TACLOBAN airbases.

g. Judging from the war situation of the 25th, we estimate that about 20 to 30 enemy transports ~~have~~ arrived at LEYTE Bay to ~~strengthen~~ assist their army. To counteract this our reinforcements (about 2 battalions and a half removed from MINDANAO Islands) succeeded in their ORMOC landing at dawn of the 26th. However, the transporting of troops hereafter will necessitate the air control of the sea and the landing area.

4. The war situation on the LEYTE area up to the evening of the 31st.

The main body of the KAKI army group is still holding the western hills of DAGAMI and another part of this army is holding the KATOMON (TN?) hills.

Since the 25th, the enemy's attack has been steadily decreasing.

Since the 26th, our reinfrocements ~~are still~~ has been landing at ORMOC in the LEYTE islands bringing our ~~forces there~~ strengthen up to 5 battalions by the 31st.

The enemylosses suffered from the hands of the KAKI army group up to the 30th ~~are~~ were as following:

Killed or wounded---more than 4,500

Sunk----------1 destroyer

Damaged----------1 cruiser
1 destroyer
115 smaller vessels

Damaged tanks------12--M4

Captured----------1---15cm. howitzer

Shot down----------20 planes.

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D. The war situation in front of our army group

1. PELELIU area.

(1). The war situation on the 21st.

a. The enemy repeatedly attacked us with fierce artillery fire and with incendiary bombs. Their plan seems to be to destroy our command headquarters, but so far no damage has been sustained. The enemy made no progress in the battle with our units at the northeastern part of the front line.

b. 6 transport ships which arrived recently are landing troops.

c. The airbase situation.

The enemy in order to avoid another attack like the one which took place on the 20th, ~~changed his~~ transferred their sheltered air base to the southern side. A construction is underway to lengthen the northeast and southwest runways.

d. The raiding forces, which our garrison units strengthened, have achieved very satisfactory results in inflicting damages to the airbase and to their command headquarters. But definite details of these raids are not clear because many failed to return.

(2). The war situation on the 22nd.

a. The enemy's artillery fire is still severe.

b. There are no changes in the other front line.

(3). The war situation on the 23rd.

a. The front line is comparatively quiet. ~~The~~ A part of the enemy which attacked SUIFUZAN advanced to the northern part of the north eastern hills of OYAMA.

A part of our garrison unit will attempt an infiltration raid tonight.

b. Our secured positions are within the area bounded by KANSOKUYAMA, the southern part of OYAMA, the northern part of TENZAN (including CHUZAN), the northeastern hills of OYAMA (it will be called

NANSEIZAN henceforth) and the northern low lans of KANSOKUYAMA.

c. Our total garrison units number about 700 soldiers (including sightly wounded men).

d. The number of the grounded planes at the airbase.

Fighters (chiefly F4U)---32 planes

Transports----------3

Others----------5 (including 3---P-38's)

Total----------40 planes with frequent take offs and landings.

e. According to the reports from our garrison units, when one of our reconnaissance seaplanes approached the PELELIU airbase between the time of 2000 to 2100 on the 22nd, it caused quite a commotion. Air raid warnings were given, construction at the airbase ceased and all lights were blacked out. The naval ships nearby also blacked out. And because of the black out enemy fighters took about five minutes to take off.

f. At About 1430 on the 20th, 2 enemy tanks which invaded our field hospital area were repulsed.

(4). The war situation on the 24th.

The front line was generally quiet with no changes. The enemy in the northeastern part of the central hills advanced close to our front line and constructed a position with sandbags. From there they continuously fired on us with mortar shells.

(5). The war situation on the 25th.

There were no changes in the front line. The battleat NANSEIZAN was still going strong. Their plan seems to be to cut us off from our fountain head in the south western lowland of CHUZAN. The enemy attack in this area was persistent, but we hold because the fountain head which this was where we obtained is our water supply at night.

(6). The war situation on the 26th.

a. The enemy activity is still very in the northern part of NANSEIZAN ~~is still great~~. They advanced to our positions and engaged us in a hand grenade fight.

b. Besides this there were no changes in the front lines.

c. The grounded planes at the airbase were as follows:

carrier fighters--------36

transport planes--------4

others----------3

Total----------43

(7). The war situation on the 27th.

a. The enemy advanced their sandbag revetments close to our front lines and at the same time they strengthened their positions. The enemy attack during the daytime was comparatively quiet. At night they fired machine heavy guns and light machine guns at random and also attacked with hand grenades, but they do not seem to have any definite plan of attack.

b. Our garrison units were continuously carrying out infiltration tactics against the enemy.

(8). The war situation on the 28th.

A part of the enemy invaded NANSEIZAN and constructed zig-zag wire entanglements to hinder the water supply to our forces from the fountain head in the southwestern low lands of CHUZAN.

A part of our garrison units carried on infiltration tactics in order to make secure our general defense line.

The enemy's light weapons fire and hand grenade attack at night was severe but they have hardly made any progress.

Our units were encouraged by the rain which fell all through the day of the 28th.

(9). The war situation on the 29th.

a. The enemy is strengthened their front lines close to our positions and have been planned an attack against our defense line.

The enemy attack was light during the day but at night his small arms fire and hand grenade attack became severe. Especially it was especially strong at NANSEIZAN where the enemy and our units were standing face to face.

b. Our garrison units (including slightly wounded) number about 500 soldiers.

c. At the airbase:

Fighters----------30 (including carrier planes)

Transport planes---2

Others------------2

Total----------34 planes

(10). The war situation on the 30th.

a. There are no special changes on our defense lines. Enemy planes attacked the western lowlands of NANSEIZAN with incendiary bombs and strafed our slit trenches. But there were no damages sustained.

b. The raiding units organized from the navy and assigned to infiltrate enemy positions in PELELIU seems to have achieved satisfactory results. In the northern districts artillery fire from last night through today is still severe. The sound of artillery fire is close to the middle of PELELIU island. So far no communication has been reached with our garrison units there.

c. No communication has been received from our suicide swimming units which were sent to PELELIU for the purpose of establishing a communication system and carrying communication materials.

d. At the airbase:

34---fighters (including carrier planes)

2---transport planes

3---others

39---Total

(11). The war situation on the 31st.

a. The enemy advanced generally over our front lines. His actions in the northern and northeastern parts were especially heavy.

b. The enemy and our units are continuously battling face to face at NANSEIZAN.

c. Our navy raiding units seems to be fighting in the northern districts. There is frequent enemy airplane patrolling. Artillery

fire ~~can be~~ were heard. Our garrison unit ~~is trying~~ tried to communicate with the navy raiding units.

(2). The ANGAUR area.

Our ~~communications~~ system with this area have not been restored.

We ~~are~~ were not sure of the war situation there but judging from the enemy artillery ~~fire~~ and flares it ~~can be~~ was assumed that our units there ~~are~~ were imposed ing casualties upon the enemy.

(3). The northern islands of PELELIU .

The enemy ~~has been~~ patrolling from sea and air and on active offensive ~~has begun~~ began their operation against the northern islands. The commuting of alligators between the islands of KONGAURU, GARKAYO (TN?), and BAIRAKASERU ~~has been~~ were was frequent.

On the afternoon of the 29th, 3 sub-chasers entered DENGES passage and anchored at the southern coast of MAKALACAL. They fired at ~~MAKALACAL~~ EIL MALK and MIKOJIMA. (Kez)

On the afternoon of the 31st, 2 sub-chasers entered this passage and another 2 sub-chasers ~~were~~ patrolling ed the mouth of DENGES passage.

(4). The PALAU Island and KOROR area.

a. The enemy air raids ~~received~~ were ~~have not been~~ NOT TOO severe. Night patrolling ~~is~~ was very active.

b. About 0430 on the 21st, naval ships of the smaller type located outside of reef of the eastern sea of AIRAI fired about 60 rounds of small caliber shells at the southern small island of AIRAI.

c. Since the 25th, the enemy appear ed to have placed more importantance to ~~ARUKORON~~ AREKALONG Pen. and GARASUMAO NGARDMAU (?) in the northern area of PALAU island. The reconnaissance and naval vessel fire in these districts had been frequent and almost in a day to day basis.

d. The use of KOSSOL anchorage ~~has~~ steadily increased.

(5). The YAP area

There ~~are~~ were no changes in this area.

APPENDED 11
INSERT MAP NO. ~~16~~

DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND PLANES

SHOWING THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY PLANES AND SHIPS

APPENDED MAP NO. 1



REFERENCE

KDB - TASK FORCE
(A) SHIPS
(Ab) HEAVY BOMBER BASE
ZAMA SHIMA } ISLAND
B BATTLESHIP
d DESTROYER
T TRANSPORT
(?) NOT IN
B - BOMBER
F - FIGHTER
ST - SMALL TYPE
MG - MEDIUM SIZE
LT - LARGE TYPE

Appended Chart No. 1

Situation of Enemy Ships in the Vicinity of PALAU (Late October)

Classification	Departure and Arrival	Date	21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		Total		Previous Period	
			Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In
KOSSOL Anchorage Area	Departure and Arrival	Transports		4				1			2	9	2	1	1	2	14		4	3	1			6	24	26	10	13
		Tankers										1							1	1					1	2	6	6
		Destroyers	4					3	8	5	4	7	1	1	1	5	6	4	1		1		5		31	25	15	22
		Sub-Chasers		2	2	2	2	3	9	4	2	2	2		2	2		2		1			2	5	21	23	15	14
		Small Naval Ships	2	1	16	3	1			1						1			4	1		1	5		30	8	30	9
		Small Boats	1			2						1						2							3	3	18	2
		Hospital Ships		2							1	2													1	4		
		Cruisers							2	2															2	2		
		Sub-Total	7	9	18	7	5	7	19	12	9	22	5	2	4	10	22	6	10	6	2	1	12	11	113	93		
		Total	16		25		12		31		31		7		14		28		16		3		23		206		163	
	Anchored	Transports	25		21		31		31		38		37		36		22		25		21		25		312		169	
		Tankers	1		2		3		3		2		3		4		4				5		5		32		24	
		Destroyers					3				3		3		7		5		4		3		3		29		56	
		Sub-Chasers			3				3		2				4		4				10		5		31		33	
		Torpedo Boats	1				1		1				2		1		1				1		1		9			
		Small Naval Ships	16		14		35		11		12		7		5		5		7		29		18		159		156	
		Others	5		13		2		38		13		19		20		20		22		2		15		169		140	
		Seaplanes	(34)		(29)		(37)		(31)		(32)				(40)		(40)		(33)		(32)		(30)		(338)		(257)	
		Total	58		57		73		87		62		70		78		62		59		70		72		748		588	
Vicinity of PELELIU		Transports	17		21		14		17		15		14		13		17		15		5		11		159		76	
		Tankers															3		2						5		1	
		Destroyers	8		11		9		8		11		5		10		13		10		2		8		95		27	
		Sub-Chasers	14		17		11		16		23		16		18		12		20		12		17		176		51	
		Small Naval Ships			2												3						1					
		Small Boats	1				1		7		5		6		12		2		4		1		5		44		1	
		Hospital Ships	1		1		1		1																4		7	
		Total	41		52		36		39		54		41		53		50		51		20		31		489		182	
Vicinity of MAKARAKARU		Sub-Chasers																	3		3		7		13			

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Situation of Enemy Ships in the Vicinity of PALAU (Late October)

Classification	Departure and Arrival	Date	21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		Total		Previous Period	
			Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In
KOSSOL Anchorage Area	Departure and Arrival	Transports		4				1			2	9	2	1	1	2	14		4	3	1			6	24	26	10	13
		Tankers										1							1	1					1	2	6	6
		Destroyers	4					3	8	5	4	7	1	1	1	5	6	4	1		1		5		31	25	15	22
		Sub-Chasers		2	2	2	2	3	9	4	2	2	2		2	2		2		1			2	5	21	23	15	14
		Small Naval Ships	2	1	16	3	1			1						1			4	1		1	5		30	8	30	9
		Small Boats	1			2						1						2							3	3	18	2
		Hospital Ships		2							1	2													1	4		
		Cruisers							2	2															2	2		
		Sub-Total	7	9	18	7	5	7	19	12	9	22	5	2	4	10	22	6	10	6	2	1	12	11	113	93		
		Total	16		25		12		31		31		7		14		28		16		3		23		206		163	
	Anchored	Transports	25		21		31		31		38		37		36		22		25		21		25		332		169	
		Tankers	1		2		3		3		2		3		4		4				5		5		32		24	
		Destroyers					3				3		3		7		5		4		3		3		29		56	
		Sub-Chasers			3				3		2				4		4				10		5		31		33	
		Torpedo Boats	1				1		1				2		1		1				1		1		9			
		Small Naval Ships	16		14		35		11		12		7		5		5		7		29		18		159		156	
		Others	5		13		2		38		13		19		20		20		22		2		15		169		140	
		Seaplanes	(34)		(29)		(37)		(31)		(32)				(40)		(40)		(33)		(32)		(30)		(338)		(257)	
		Total	58		57		73		87		62		70		78		62		59		70		72		748		588	
Vicinity of PELELIU		Transports	17		21		14		17		15		14		13		17		15		5		11		159		76	
		Tankers															3		2						5		1	
		Destroyers	8		11		9		8		11		5		10		13		10		2		8		95		27	
		Sub-Chasers	14		17		11		16		23		16		18		12		20		12		17		176		51	
		Small Naval Ships			2												3						1					
		Small Boats	1				1		7		5		6		12		2		4		1		5		44		1	
		Hospital Ships	1		1		1		1																4		7	
		Total	41		52		36		39		54		41		53		50		51		20		31		489		182	
Vicinity of MAKARAKARU		Sub-Chasers																	3		3		7		13			


Legend:
Departure
Arrival
PELELIU and MAKARAKARU
50
40
30
20
10

Appended Chart No. 2

Air Situation in the PALAU Area (Late October)

Area	Classification	Date / Type	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Previous Period
PALAU Island	Attacking Planes	F4U (Includes SB2C)	110	30	260	144	103	66	52	12	80	109	158	1,113
	By Passing Planes	P38	3	1	3	4	3	1			1	2		18
		Larve Flying Boats	2	2	8	10	6	5	15	3	10	2	7	70
		Transports	1	4		3	2		3		2	2	1	18
		F4U						8			27	14		49
		Sub Total	6	7	11	17	11	14	18	3	40	20	8	155
	Total		116	37	271	161	112	80	70	15	120	120	166	1,268
YAP Island	Attacking Planes	B25	1		3	1	2		2	1	2	1	2	15
		B24	2	8	11	9	2		2	1	5	6		46
		P38		1		1	1	1	1			1		6
		F4U		7	7	7	12	8	5		6	11	19	82
		PBM				2		1	1					4
		Sub Total	3	16	21	20	17	10	11	2	13	19	21	153
	By Passing Planes	Larve Flying Boats	2	8	11		3	2	1	1	16	2	2	48
		Transports		3			1		1	1	2	4	2	14
		Sub-Total												
	Total		2	11	11	20	21	12	13	4	31	25	25	215
Battle Results	PALAU Island		1 P-38 damaged		1 shot down 4 damaged	2 shot down 3 damaged					2 shot down (YAP)		1 F4U shot down (YAP)	

References: The number of planes participating in raids on PALAU Island as listed above include those planes which made repeated attacks and were tallied accordingly. The actual number of planes was approximately 15.

Appended Chart No. 3

Flares Dropped on PELELIU, ANGAUR and MAKARAKARU Islands

Late October.

Place	Time / Date	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	Total
PELELIU (ANCHOR)	21	8 (5)	24 (23)	15 (3)	11 (9)	17 (6)	20 (11)	24 (11)	10 (4)	33 (11)	18 (20)	18 (7)	8 (4)	206 (112)
"	22	2	3	2 (2)	25 (5)	8 (4)	8 (4)	13 (7)	10	18 (9)	17 (5)	33 (11)	3	142 (47)
"	23	5	4	9	7 (6)	8 (6)	11 (5)	30 (7)	16 (4)	18 (3)	17 (2)	10 (3)	26 (1)	161 (38)
"	24	17 (1)	35 (3)	32 (3)	82 (13)	69 (7)	41 (5)	22 (17)	47 (15)	43 (3)	32 (4)	104 (2)	97 (7)	621 (80)
"	25	12 (3)	29 (1)	17 (2)	19 (2)	31 (1)	17	33 (6)	23 (9)	83	32	83 (3)	71 (1)	450 (28)
"	26	27	12	36 (14)	24	24 (10)	39 (4)	17 (3)	63 (7)	43 (1)	54 (6)	43 (8)	47	429 (53)
"	27	18	9 (2)	9	32	32	27	68	40	32 2)	67 (2)	104	9	447 (6)
"	28	4	4	17	12	6		2	1	6	53	53 (3)	27	185 (3)
"	29			12	11	6	6	3	4			6	3	51
"	30	Unable of record due to poor visability.												
"	31	8	8	7	3	8	4	3	6	6	4	2	3	62

APPENDED

INSERT MAP NO. ~~17~~ 12

PROGRESS OF OPERATION ON PELELIU ISLAND

(21 to 23 Oct.)

THE OPERATIONS SHOWING THE PROGRESS ON PELELIU ISLAND

FROM 21 TO 23 OCTOBER

APPENDED MAP #2



G. The 6th Engagement

November 1 -- November 10

(1) Summary of the General Situation.

1- The enemy task force, cruising in the eastern part of the PHILIPPINE SEA is cooperating in the operation of LEYTE and at the same time supplying and reinforcing ships participating in the operation.

Our Air Unit is now attacking this enemy task force.

2- There are approximately 50 B-29's in thearea of the MARIANAS and it is expected that more B-29's will arrive in the very near future.

One of the above mehtioned B-29's reconnoitered TOKYO.

3- Our Air Unit, on the dawn of the 3rd successfully staged a surprise attack on the airfields in SAIPAN and TINIAN Islands.

This same Air Unit attacked the airfields at MOROTAI, and LEYTE Islands and attacked and inflected many casualties and damages upon ships coming to assist in theoperation of LEYTE.

4- Altough the situation of the fighting on LEYTE Island is difficult to follow our forces seems to be making fairly good progress.

5- The number of personnel of our Defense Unit fighting in thearea of PELELIU is small and the conditions are rather difficult, The unit is inflecting a great number of casualties on the enemy from a hill, which id of a strategic importance.

It is believed that our defense unit fighting in the area of ANGAUR is making good progress.

6- Our Amphibious Commando Unit attacked an enemy force on KARAGON (NGEREGON) Island on the 8th.

7. It is believed that the enemy has a large interest in thearea North of the PALAU main land.

The KOSUMORU (KOSSOL) (TN-?) harbor is often utilized by the enemy.

(2) Reports received.

1- Situations of Ships. (cf. appended map no. 1)

a. Same as no. 1 of "Summary of the General Situation" on Page 239.

b. On the night of 3 November, a submarine attacked an enemy Taskforce in the eastern part of the PHILIPPINE SEA and sank 1 Essex type Aircraft Carrier.

c. The following is information obtained after Naval reconnaissance of ~~RORRNKOU (TN-?)~~ LOCHEES at 1500 of the 1st.

There were 10 Destroyers, 20 or more transports and 4 battle ships of which on e was crippled. At the airfield on PETERU (TN-?) Island 20 medium planes were observed.

d. The movements of the enemy Task Force were as follows:

a) On 28 August 3 groups (1st, 2nd, and 3rd) of the enemy's 38th Task Force assembled in the vicintiy of PALAU and attacked the PHILIPPINE Island from the 12th to the 24th of September. It ~~is~~ was believed that the 4th group of the Task Force cooperated in the landing operation at PALAU.

b) After the above mentioned operation the 1st group returned to ADMIRALTY and 2nd group to SAIPAN and the 3rd group to ~~WARUSHI (TN-?)~~ WARUCH.

On about the 1st of October the 5th group left theADMIRALTY Islands. On the 7th the 2nd group left SAIPAN and together ~~they~~ attacked OKINAWA on the 10th. On the 11th the 1st group headed south and attacked APARRI (P.I.).

During the above mentioned operation the 3rd and the 4th groups left PALAU and on the 12th the entire 38th Task Force attacked FORMOSA.

c) After this the main body of the38th Task Force attacked by our Air Units retreated in the southeasterly direction. A part of this task force (which was believed to be composed of the 1st and 3rd groups) attacked LUZON between the 15th to the 19 October.

It is believed that the main body of the Task Force returned to ~~URUSHI (TN-?)~~ ULUTHI.

d) It was definitely known that the 2nd

and 4th groups were 2 of the 3rd groups that participated in the Naval battle off the coast of the PHILIPPINE Island from the 25th to the 29 October. The 3rd of the 3 groups was believed to have been the 1st group.

The 2 aircraft carriers the WASP and the HORNET which belong to the 3rd and the 1st groups were definitely known to have been in ~~URUSHI (TN-?)~~ ULUTHI at that time.

The following movements were made by the above mentioned groups.

The 3rd group after having attacked a JAPANESE Fleet in the vicinity of MINDORO on the 23rd of the 24th received a report that another JAPANESE Fleet was at the present moment passing through the Straits of BASHI and headed south. Therefore the 2nd group, assisted by the 1st and the 4th groups headed north to attack this fleet. Because of a request received from General MACARTHUR the 3 groups turned back and attacked another JAPANESE Fleet headed north through the Straits of SAN BERNARDINO and SURIGAO. After this the 2nd and the 4th believed to have been joined by 2 other groups attacked the area of LUZON on the 26th and the 29th.

Movements made after this ~~are~~ were not known.

(2) Signal Communications and Intelligence Reports.

(cf. appended map No. 1)

It is beleived that on the 7th the enemy task force in the area east of the PHILIPPINES joined a part of a fleet that was assembled in the area of ~~URUSHI (TN-?)~~ ULUTHI in preparation to counter-attack any attacks made by the JAPANESE Fleet or to advance to the areaof FORMOSA and LUZON to attack our air units and fleet from the 15th. There is a strong possibility of the UNITED STATE Air Force in CHINA assisting in the operation.

During the time there ~~is a possibility that~~ were possibilities of the main body of a unit from the area of NEW GUINEA reinforcing the area of the Gulf of LEYTE and a part of this unit landing in the northern extreme of SAMAR Island or in the area of CATANDUANES Island.

1- It is beleived that a U.S. fleet left the west

coast of the U.S. in the mid-part of October and assembled in the MARIANNAS and in the area of ~~URUSHI (TN-?)~~ ULOTHI. A part of this fleet (beleived to be composed of the ships RANGER, SARATOGA, YORKTOWN, SHANGRILLA, BENNINGTON, and LEBON HOMME RICHARD) was beldeved to have joined a Task force in the eastern side of the PHILIPPINES.

At 1500 hour of the 8th the 3rd group was seem at a point 650° - 800 Km. in the vicinity of TACLOBAN and the 1st group at a point 100° - 230 Km. also in the vicinity of TACLOBAN.

At the present time the main body of the above mentione d U.S. fleet is assembled in ~~URUSHI (TN-?)~~ ULOTHI

2- On the 4th a Commander arrived in the area of PELELIU and kept up active correspondence with HAWAII, MARIANNAS, ~~URUSHI (TN-?)~~ ULOTHI, NEW GUINEA, and the SOLOMON Islands and with the task force east of the PHILIPPINES.

3- Enemy communications were quite active between YUNNAN, BIAK and the task force east of the PHILIPPINES.

4- It is believed that reinforcement units left HOLLANDIA and RORENKO ~~(TN-?)~~ on the 4th and the 6th.

Active correspondence was continued between the commander of the task force in the area of LEYTE and the commander of the Task force east of the PHILIPPINES.

It is estimated that on the 6th a large number of ships left from the areas of NEW HEBRIDES and AUSTRALIA towards the areas east of ADMIRALTY and NEW GUINEA.?

It is believed that ADMIRALTY and HOLLANDIA are being reinforced.

(3) Air Situations.

1- A lone B-29 from theairbase in the area of the MARIANNAS on about 1300 hour of the 1st and at 1330 hour headed back in a southeasterly direction.

It is believed that this plane flew over TOKYO to reconnoiter. It is also surmised that the number of B-29's at the airfields in the MARIANNAS is at least fifty of equivelant to 4 companies.

2- Our air unit ~~of the attacked at~~ attacked on the dawn of the 3rd and destryed enemy airfields at SAIPAN and TINIAN Islands.

3- On the 1st our KAMIKAZE Unit attacked an enemy

Convoy Escort Unit in the Gulf of LEYTE and sunk 2 cruisers, 1 battleship or cruiser and 1 destroyer.

4- Our Air Unit attacked, from the night of the 1st until dawn of the 2nd, enemy ships in the gulf of LEYTE and the Straits of SURIGAO and sank 1 transport, 1 cruiser, and 3 destroyers.

5- Heavy casualties are being inflected on an enemy force in the vicinity of LEYTE by our air unit.

The following are results obtained after attacking TACLOBAN, SAN PABLOand TRUK Airfields and enemy ships from the night of 2nd until thedawn of the 3rd.

Enemy losses

110 or more planes. approximately 20 airfield installations 1 transport ship.

Due to the smoke caused by the fire on the airfields the other results could not be ~~observed.~~ obtained

a. Losses inflected on the airfield at LEYTE.

45 planes

10 or more installations

b. Our losses.

3 planes

6. The numbers of B-29's in the area of the MARIANNAS totaled fifty but it is estimated thatthis number will be increased to 100 in the very near future.

a. It is definitely known that the airfield at ASURITO (TN-?) is being used but it is indefinite as to whether the airfield at OMIYA Island is being utilezed.

b. The following are theresults obtained from our air reconnaissance on the 6th.

1) The air fields at SAIPAN and ASURITO ~~(TN-?)~~ which measures 2300 X 150 is used ~~solely~~ solely for B-29's.

2) The Measurement of the newly established airfields at SAIPAN and ASURITO ~~(TN-?)~~ is 2150 X 60.

The runways of these airfields were completed and ~~work was completed~~ and work was being ~~done~~ completed on the parking area. It is believed that Cargo planes are already using these airfields.

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3) The newly established CHACHA (TN-?) airfield on SAIPAN measures 1600 X 100. Installations are now being built. This airfield will probably be the air base for the lighter planes. 70 light planes were seen on this airfield which is large enough to accommodate approximately 130 planes.

4) The 2 airfields, Northern Airfield and the 4th Airfield are now being expanded to approximately 2500 meters. On the 4th Airfield 33 B-24 and 25 light planes were seen.

The Western Airfield runway measuring approximately 2100 meters or over is now being completed. It is believed that B-29's will be used on this airfield in about a month.

7. The following is the situations relevant to the enemy Air Bases which are to be used in the PHILIPPINE operation.

a. LEYTE Air Base:

5 Airfields are now being utilized on LEYTE.

It is believed that the 2 airfields north of TRUK and BURAUEN are not as yet being used.

Enemy air power numbers 300 - 350 planes but is is estimated that only 150 or so of these planes are actually being utilized. It is also estimated that the air strength will be increased to 500 planes but this will depend upon the strength of our attack from the 2 airfields now being established and which are scheduled to be completed on about the 20th.

b. MOROTAI Air Base.

It is our estimation that at the present time thaere are no less than 8 airfields being utilized by the enemy. The names of these air fields are DARUGA (TN-?); East GIRA (TN-?); West GIRA (TN-?); WATSUMO (TN-?); WATSUMO(TN-?) 1st (south); WATSUMO(TN-? 2nd (north); SANGO (TN-?) and SOBI (TN-?). These airfields are being used by both the Army and the Navy. It is believed that the total number of planes at these airfields has been recently increased to 700.

On the morning of the 10th 380 planes of the enemy Air Unit attacked the PHILIPPINES. This was the largest force that had ever attacked our forces in the PHILIPPINES proving beyond any doubts that our above mentioned estimations were correct.

It is believed that if the enemy should ever utilixe the air base at MOROTAI, the area of MINDANAO would be used by a glider Unit and the area of BISAYA by the Parachute Unit.

c. PALAU Air Base.

The situation at ANGAUR is not very clear but it is believed that the air base at PELELIU has two runways. The maximum number of planes that this PELELIU air base can accommodate is estimated to be about 250 planes.

It is believed that this airfield will not as yet be able to assist in the operation on LEYTE.

d. MARIANA Air Base.

There are 7 or 8 airfields in the MARIANAS. B-29's were the only type of planes which participated in the PHILIPPINE operation. These B-29's were from the OMIYAJIMA Air-Base and the air base south of ASURITO (TN-?). It is our estimation that the air base at TINIAN will be used solely for B-29's.

There are but 50 or so B-29's but this number is expected to increase for the attack on TOKYO and the operation in the PHILIP-Pines.

e. Collation of Reports.

It is our estimation that the entire enemy 5th Air Division will advance to the area of BISAYA and the main body of the 13th Air Division to the areas of MOROTAI and PELELIU from where they will probably advance to the PHILIPPINES.

8. From the 20 October the number of transport planes actually being utilized at the MOROTAI Air Base averaged about 50 a day and was steadily increasing.

The majority of the enemy Army planes attacking the PHILIPPINES are from the airfields at BIAK and SANSAPORE (TN-?) and a few from the airbase at MOROTAI.

The Air Transport route runs from BIAK thru PELELIU to LEYTE. The MOROTAI Air Base is as yet restricted from use.

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It was learned that the enemy Air Units were having difficulties in assisting in the operation on LEYTE Island from the air bases at LEYTE, MOROTAI, PLAU and the MARIANAS.

(4) PHILIPPINE Situations.

Details on the LEYTE operation were not obtainable but following ~~is~~ were the situation on the 4th.

1- The 24th Division of the U.S. Army with Artillery Guns and 60 or 70 Mo 4 were trying to advance to KARAGON ahead of our ~~GYOKU Group~~ 1st Division.

It ~~is~~ was believed that at 1540 hour of the 3rd a part of the 24th Division advanced to the vicinity of MANAGASONSU (TN-?) located about 10 Km. west of CARIGARA.

The (~~GYOKU Group~~ 1st Div) is at the present attacking this 24th DIVISION.

2- It is believed that a part of the enemy force will attack SAMAR while the main force will join the 24th Division and prepare to counter-attack our forces on CARIGARA. Details of this operation are not known,

3- Our Defense Unit under the command of the Infantry Regiment Commander is defending theKATORU (TN-?) hill. It is believed that the enemy force in the area of KATORU (TN-?) is the main body of the 96th Division of the UNITED STATES Army.

The main body of our ~~KAKI Group~~ 16th Div is still fighting in the hills west of TAGAMI (TN-?).

The enemy situation -

It is believed that a part of the 7th Division of the UNITED STATES Army advanced from the area of ABUYOG, to the vicinity of BAYBAY and joined the 24th Division andtogether headed north by way of the west coast road.

Our Infantry Group Headquarter was temporarily dispatched to the areas pf ABUYOK and BAY BAY.

4- The situation in the area of SOKOTO (TN-?) which is at the southern extremity of LEYTE is not known.

(5) Other situations.

It is our estimation that of the 16 - 20 aircraft carriers

of the 38th Task Force that participated in the engagement in the FORMOSA Sea, only 3 remained and that 6 aircraft carriers of the 38th Task Force participated in the PHILIPPINE SEA operation. The above mentioned estimations were confirmed by radio message received on the 20th. This confirmed ~~information~~ report was obtained from the captured enemy flight personnel. From the following ships, HORNET, WASP, INTERHINT, BANGKOK and the CABOT. Other enformations received from these captured personnel were that the aircraft carrier the ENTERPRISE ~~is~~ was at present participating in the LEYTE operation and that the 3 air craft carriers that returned from the engagement in the FORMOSA SEA participated in the air attack on LUZON and the names of the carriers were the INTREPID and the CABOT (which belonged to the former 1st group of the 38th Task Force) and the BANGKOK (which belonged to the former 4th group). Otherinformation received from these captured personnel was that 2 or 3 cruisers, 4 or 5 destroyers alsoparticipated in the attadk on LUZON.

The captured personnel were not able, since they had no knowledge, to give detailed accounts of the PHILIPPINE operation, but it was our estimation that the enemy suffered heavy losses.

1. Outline of information obtained from the 3 prisoners captured during the enemy attack on LUZON on the 29 are as follows.

a. THE ORGANIZATION OF the 38th Task Force (not definite)

The 38th Task Force was composed of 12 aircraft carriers. There were 4 groups (composed of 8 aircraft carriers) that participated in the major operations. Two battleships were attached to each of these four groups. These prisoners also stated that the groups in the rear bases had no battleships attached but this information was indefinite.

b. The 38th and the 58th Task Force was one and same, the number was changed depending upon who was in command.

When either HALSEY or MITCHER were in command the Task Force was known as the 38th and when either SPRUANCE or MCKEN were in command the Task Force was known as the 58th.

When either HALSEY or MITCHELL were in command, SPRUANCE and MCKEN'S only duties were to assist the former.

There were 20 - 25 UNITED STATES Battleships of which all but 8 that belonged to the 38th (58th) Task Force were under the command of General MACARTHUR.

c. Each of the 3 poisoners stated that no other losses weee sustained in the LUZON operation except for the PRINCETON, 1 carrier, and 2 heavy cruisers.

The 38th Task Force in the invasion of PALAU continued operating without returning to its base throughout the entire operation.

2. Following is characteristic data of the enemy's motor Torpedo Boat.

Abbreviated name - PF

Displacement Tonnage 20 and 35 tons.

crew - 10 men

length - 18 meters to 24.7 meters.

Maximum speed - 50 knots.

4 - 18 inch Torpedo Directing Tubes.

2 - 13mm Multiple mount machine guns.

It is said that the cruising range of this boat is 5 days but according to the data compiled in the southeast area the average cruising range was from 150 - 300km and maximum was 600km.

(6) Situations to the Front of the Group

I. PELELIU Area

a. Situations on the 1st.

Enemy fired on our forces with mortars at set intervals all day long and on the same day, the enemy air units twice dropped incendiary bombs on our force.

2. Number of active, Enemy Planes increases.

At 1300 on B-24 was seen landing on PELELIU airfield.

3. Enemy Gun fire in the north area ~~can still be heard~~ were still audible.

a. Situation on the 2nd.

Throughout the night andthis morning the enemy has been firing at and bombing our forces, violently.

Several units of the enemy force were seen entering the Mountains KANSOKU and OYAMA.

b. Situations on the 3rd.

1) 50 days have elapsed since the enemy landed on PELELIU.

Since this day was the birthdate of Emperor MEIJI, the officers and men of our Defense Unit were in very high spirits.

2) Part of this enemy unit which entered Mt. KANSOKU and the southern extremity of Mt. OYAMA were observed strengthening their positions with sandbags and ~~were~~ wire entanglements.

Our Defense Unit attacked this enemy unit every night but to no avail.

The enemy forces at MT. NANSEI ~~are~~ were still there.

No great changes were observed on the other fronts.

3) The following is the number and type of planes seen on the airfield at PELELIU:

31 - fighter and Carrier Borne Bombers.

2 - transport planes.

3 - P-38's

It ~~is~~ was our guess that thenumber of B-24 planes at this airfield ~~is~~ was as yet small.

4) The following is the weapons and food situation as of the 31st October.

a) Total number of weapons and ammunitions ~~on this date in the possetion of the Navy and IDA~~ (Sai) Battalion.

190 - rifles

8 - light machine guns (10,600 rounds)

4 - heavy machine guns (2800 rounds)

20 - grenade discharger (20 rounds)

500 - hand grenades

10 - liquid flame bombs

20 - tank mines

b) Ammunitions

The ration of ammul was cut to half the normal ration for the 650 men but even at this it was tentative

as to whether it would last until 20 November.

c. Situation on the 4th.

1) The enemy movements has been ~~were~~ steadily increasing since yesterday. The enemy, planning to penetrate our main defense line is now constructing roads passable for tanks.

The enemy forces at Mts. NANSEI, OYAMA and KANSOKU are strengthening their positions.

2) It is our guess that fighting is still going on in the northern area.

d. Situation on the 5th.

1) No change in our defense line.

2) It seems as though the enemy had completed their work on ~~making~~ the tank road ~~passable for tanks~~ therefore we are expecting an attack at any time after tomarrow the 6th.

3) Our water supply due to enemy interference is running low.

4) The personnel of our unit still able to fight numbered approximately 350. This includes menthat have suffered minor injuries in theformer operations. There are 130 heavy casualties.

5) It has not been reported that The Suicide Unit that has been dispatched to assist our Defense Unit in the PELELIU AREA HAS NOT ~~AS YET~~ ARRIVED at the Defense Unit Headquarter. This unit was ordered to conceal their movements.

It is our guess that this Suicide Unit has reached its destination.

e. Situation on the 6th.

1) At 0900 the enemy broadcasted a propaganda message through a loud speaker and at 1400 commenced firing but there were no changes in our defense lines.

2) It is our surmise that the enemy force had completed the expanding and strengthing of their position with sand bags and ~~were~~ are now reconnoitering our position.

3) No great changes at PELELIU Airfield.

f. Situation on the 7th.

1) The enemy force is still strengthening and expanding their positions with sandbags. This enemy fire power, from their positions behind the sandbags is weak.

2) No change in our defense line.

g. Situation on the 8th.

1) No great changes in our lines.

2) The enemy is advancing closer to our position. It is our estimation that this enemy force has completed their preparations and will now attack.

h. Situation on the 9th.

1) The men of our Defense Unit are in high spirits and are prepared to yield their utmost in the coming engagement.

2) The main point of our defense line is at OYAMA Mountain. The length of this line is 400 meters and runs north to south, the depth is 150 meters. (east-west)

The following is a detailed drawing of the above mentioned defense line.



1. Situation on the 10th.

1) The enemy attack is not as yet too progressive, the shortest distance between our position and the enemy's is 20 meters.

2) The enemy, further strengthening their positions with sandbags and increasing their fire power is trying to ~~oppress~~ overpower our force.

4. Islands north of PELELIU.

a. The enemy is defending the Stra it of DENGISU (TN-?) Island. Every day 5 to 10 GH's passed through this reef and commenced bombarding ~~MAKARAKARU~~ EIL MALK ? (TN-?) and ~~MITSUGO~~ MIKOJIMA (TN-?) Islands.

b. ~~Since~~ a part of an enemy force had occupied and established a position on KARAGON Island (3km. southeast of EIL MALK Island) on the 4th ~~they~~ and have ~~been~~ commenced constructing a peer.

On the night of the 8th, 9 officers and men of our amphibious Commando Unit stationed in the MAKARAKARU (TN-?) Sea infiltrated to the Island of MAKARAKARU (TN-?). The following are accounts of this daring infiltration:

1) Tactical Situation

a) These 9 men left from Cape AITABUIRA (TN-?) located on the southeast extremity of MAKARKARU (TN-?) Island at 2130 hour of the 8th and at 2230 hour landed on the reef 500km, north of KARAGONIsland, then advanced by foot to the northeast corner of KARAGONIsland at 2400 hours.

b) The commander of this small group, assembled and ordered the men to wait at the point where the landing was made and set out alone to reconnoiter the enemy situation.

The commander indicated 4 houses on the southeastern coast of the Island to be the objective of their 1st raid. Upon reaching these 4 houses the men were instructed to attack these houses then assemble in the grove of coconut trees located on the central portion of the Island. At 0240 hour this group divided into 4 teams set out for their 1st infiltration.

members of these 4 teams were:

1st team - 2nd Lt. TAKAGAKI and leading Private NAKAI.

2nd team - Cpl. YOSHIDA and leading Private YAMAMOTO.

3rd team - Cpl. FUJIWARA, Leading Private TAKADA and Superior Private INOUYE.

4th team - Cpl. FUJIKAWA and Superior Private NISHIYAMA.

Note: - Each team had only rifles except for the 3rd team which had a light machine gun. Each member of this group had 5 hand grenades and 1 explosive.

c. Each team following Lt. TAKAGAKI attacked their individually designated house. At 0400 all 4 teams assembled at the appointed place.

d. Lt. TAKAGAKI estimating the main forces of the enemy to be in the houses in the northweat area of the Island, reconnoitered this area. The enemy in the houses sensing an attack ascapted toward the sea.

e. On this above mentioned attack the teams captured 1 radio set weapons, powder, medical supplies and food and retumned to their assembly point at 0600 hours.

f. Lt. TAKAGAKI, not satisfied with the results of the two attacks decided to stay on the Island and attack an enemy force which he felt sure would land on the Island during the day.

g. A t approximately 1100 hours of the 9th, an enemy group of 20 men landed on the Islahd and advanced towards the coconut grove in which our 4 teams were hidden. The teams attacked this group as soon as they entered the grove and killed 9 of its members, the rest escaped toward the sea. In this attack Cpl. FUJIWARA was killed and Leading Private NAKAI was wounded.

h. From 1240 hours, enemy ships commenced firing upon our teams, which were ordered by Lt. TAKAGAKI to take over in the air raid shelters and assemble at the landing point after sunset.

i. After sunset Lt. TAKAGAKI went to the designated place of assembled to find only Cpll TAKADA and Leading Private INOUYE there. He ordered these 2 men to report back to EIL MALK MAKARAKARU (TN-?) Island while he returned to look for the other members

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but all in vain. On the morning of the 10th he reported back to MAKARAKARU (TN-?) Island and returned to KARAGON Island on the 10th ~~and~~ the 11th to search a gain for the members of his team, and retnnned with a fewaof the men that he was able to find IN THE early ~~on the~~ morning of the 12th.

3) Effect on the enemy, by the afor e mentioned Infiltration.

a) The 16 sub-chasers that were anchored in the night rest harbor south of MAKARAKARU EIL MALK (TN-?) Island, started to retreat to the sea east of KARAGON NGEREGON Island at 1240 hours of the 9th, Joined by 1 Destroyer the 16 sub-chaser ~~opened~~ commenced heavy firing on KARAGON Island.

From early morning of the 10th 30 fighters and 6 Carrier Borne Bombers, which were almost the entire force at PELELIU Airfield, attacked KARAGON NGEREGON Island.

From the afternoon through the night of the 10th, the sub-chasers and the destroyer kept up ~~its~~ their firing but at a more relaxed pace.

b) From 1640 of the 10th the sub-chaser and the Destroyer commenced firing on GOROTTAN (~~TN-?~~) Island south of KARAGON NGEREGON.

c) Firing of the guns from the Destroyer and the sub-chasers ~~can be~~ were heard at PELELIU Airfield.

4) Mainland of PALAU and the area of KORORO (TN-?).

a) Attacks ~~as~~ received practically everyday by our forces were weak. On the 3rd our forces were attacked by 33 B-24's. Enemy night Patrols still persists.

b) It is our guess that the enemy is interested in the area north of PALAU. The enemy bombed and reconnoitered the region of ARUKORON ARIKALONG (TN-?) and GARASUMAO NGARDMAU (TN-?) on the 1st, 9th and 10th.

c) The enemy is utilizing the night rest harbor at ~~KOSUSORU~~ KOSSOL (TN-?) quite often.

5) YAP Area

APPENDED

INSERT MAP NO. 19 ~~19~~

DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND PLANES.

DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFTS

TOP - ORIGIN

APPENDED CHART #1



THE ENEMY TASK FORCE ATTACKED
THE PHILIPPINE AREA PRIOR TO THE 24TH
AND ABOUT THE 25TH IT APPEARED TO BE
RETURNING TO THE MARIANAS FOR
REFUELING

WITH THE CONTINUED SENDING
OF SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS TO
PALAU AND MARIANA ISLANDS THE
ENEMY SEEMED TO BE MAKING
PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT OFFENSIVE.

SYMBOLS

- (H) HEAVY BOMBER BASE
- (N) NAVAL TASK FORCE

Appended Chart No. 1

Situation of Enemy Ships in the Vicinity of PALAU (Early November)

Classification	Departure and Arrival	Date	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		Total		Previous Period	
			Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In
KOSSOL Anchorage Area	Departure and Arrival	Transports	5	2		4	1	4		4	1	5		2			2			2		1				
		Tankers	3							2		1		1												
		Destroyers	8			5		4	2	3	1	2								1	1					
		Sub-Chasers	2	5			1		1		3	4	1	2				1		1						
		Small Naval Ships		2					1		1		4				1									
		Small Boats		1		2	2	1				1														
		Sub-Total	18	10		11	4	9	6	9	6	13	5	5			3	1		4	1	1				
		Total	28		11		13		15		19		10				4		4		2					
	Anchored	Transports	27		27		27		27		34		32				32		29		33					
		Tankers	4		4		2		4		2		3				3		3		1					
		Destroyers	2		5		10		7		7		6				1				6					
		Sub-Chasers	5		3		3		6				9								1					
		Small Naval Ships	13		19		26		13		14		28				30		38		15					
		Small Boats	14		19				10		33		4						10		14					
		Others			1		2		2		2		3				2		12		2					
		(Seaplanes)	(31)		(38)		(36)		(37)		(35)		(30)						(20)		(27)					
		Total																								
Vicinity of PELELIU		Transports	20		22		14		11		12		11						11		11					
		Tankers																								
		Destroyers	11		14		5		10		7		8						5		4					
		Sub-Chasers	26		33		23		18		15		23						3		1					
		Large Boats	15		8		5		3		1		6						3		2					
		Floating Crane							1		1								2							
		Small Boats											2													
		Total	72		77		87		43		36		50						24		18					
Vicinity of MAKARAKARU		Sub-Chasers	5		5		4		4		4		9						2							
		Cable Laying Ship																								
		Floating Crane																								
		Repair Ship																								
		Dock																								
		LCT																								
		Small Boats	2				1																			
		Total																								


Legend:
Departure
Arrival
PEARL HARBOR and MAKARAKARU
50
40
30
20
10

Appended Chart No. 2

Air Situation in the PALAU Area during November

Area	Classification	Type / Date	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total	Previous Period
PALAU Island	Attacking Planes	F4U	115	108		19	46	54	33		46	47	466	1,333
		P38		1		3	3						7	
		B24			33							6	39	
										[illegible]				
										[illegible]				
										[illegible]				
		Sub-Total	115	109	33	22	49	54	33	[illegible]	46	53	512	1,333
	By-Passing Planes	P38	1	2						[illegible]			5	
		P38	2	2	1				1			2	8	18
		Large Flying Boats	1	1	4	4	1	1	1			6	27	70
		047		1		1	1	1				5	11	18
		Sub-Total	8	8	5	5	6	4	2			33	53	
		Total	123	117	38	27	55	58	33		46	66	563	106
YAP Island	Attacking Planes	F4U	7	11		6	11				11	12	58	82
		B25	1	2		1	1	2	2		1	2	12	15
		P38		1	2						1	1	5	6
		B24			5								5	46
		Large Flying Boats			2				1	[illegible]			3	4
		Sub-Total	8	14	9	7	12	2	3	[illegible]	13	15	83	153
	By-Passing Planes	Large Flying Boats	2	5			1			[illegible]		5	13	48
		P38	1	1						[illegible]			2	
		B25B			2							7	9	
		Transports												14
		Sub-Total	3	6	2		1					12	23	
		Total	11	20	11	7	13	2	3		13	27	106	215
Battle Results		PALAU Area		1 F4U & 1 large flying boat shot down. 4 damaged								1 F4U shot down. 1 B24 damaged		

Reference: The numbers indicating the number of planes participating in the raids include those planes which made repeated attacks and were tallied accordingly.

Appended Chart No. 3

Flares Dropped on PELELIU, ANGAUR and MAKARAKARU Island

(Early November)

Place	Time / Date	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	Total
PELELIU (ANGAUR	1	5	16	21 (8)	17	8	21	7	6	9	5	5		192 (8)
"	2	3	8	11	10	28	15	6	43	21	37	9	28	211
"	3	22		23	27	29	25	21	18	24	11	13	7	220
"	4	32	48	34	21	11	32	28	6	8	6	8		234
"	5	22 (1)	36 (2)	34 (1)	36	25 (2)	36	9	12	11	23	8		260 (6)
"	6	26	32 (2)	42	47	38	13	34	7	13	20	6		315 (2)
"	7		(2)						21	18	7	4		50 (2)
"	8	38	24	38 (7)	23	22	21	11	14	10	9	14	2	226 (7)
"	9	22	28	30	20	21	21	19 (1)	22	16	18	5		232 (1)
" MAKARAKARU	10	16	12 (6)	16	21	11	23 (1)	13	12	3	9	6	2	144 (7)

H. 7th engagement.

(1) Summary

1- In order to assist in the operation of LEYTE the 38th task force has been attacking our air base and ships in the areas of MANILA and CLARK Field from the morning of the 13th.

2- Approximately 80 B-29's from CHINA attacked the western part of KYUSHU and SAISHU Island on the 11th.

3- Our air Units ~~are~~ attacked and inflected ~~ing~~ much ~~many~~ damage ~~casualties~~ on the enemy air bases, and convoys in the sea east of the PHILIPPINES and in the area of the MARIANAS.

4- Our units on LEYTE are defending the main strategic points.

5- Our units in CHINA, after occupying the areas of KWEILIN and LIU CHUAN invaded NINNING on the 20th.

6- The strength of our Defense Unit in the area of PELELIU is small, but the unit is putting up stubborn resistance.

It is our surmise that our units at ANGAUR are still fighting.

The enemy is utilizing the night rest harbor at KOSUNKU (TN-?)

(2) Reports Received.

1- Situations of ships. (cf. appended Map NO. 1)

a. The enemy is planning to reinforce LEYTE and it is estimated that the strength of this reinforcement will be about 2 Divisions.

The following is a table on enemy ships captured up to 1330 of the 13th captured in the vicinity of SALUAN.

TIME	Point of capture SOLOMON Island center Point	No. of captured ships and personnel
0720	120° 40 Nautical Miles	Approximately 1 Unit
0820	130° 160 " "	" 25 (T) & 10 destroyers
0840	108° 230 " "	" 1 Unit
0924	95° 270 " "	2 (T) type ships headed SW
0925	100° 230 " "	2 large (T) type ships 5 destroyers bearing course 300°
0950	120° 170 " "	10 transport ships bearing course 290°

0952 97° 114 Nautical Miles 15-12 (T) & 5 Destroyer type and 5 convoy Escort Planes.

2- As explained previously, the task forces that had been attacking our air bases and ships at MANILA and CLARK Field since the morning of the 13th were situated at 1000 hours at points 57° 140 Nautical Miles and 61° 131 Nautical Miles from MANILLA? Each group of this task force had 5 or more aircraft carriers.

3- The following are results obtained at 1340 hours of the 20th with an Army Headquarter Reconnaissance Plane.

a. Ships

1) 1 Medium Aircraft Carrier docked in a floating Dock.

2) 2 Battleships of which 1 was being repaired.

3) 1 Cruiser, 5 crisers or large destroyers and 8 Destroyers.

4) 23 large transport ships, 20 medium transport ships and 5 tankers.

5) 5 LSV 3 LCT and a large number of smaller ships.

6) Transport ships are dispersed.

b. Planes.

Observed 5 airfields. 4 large, 12 medium bombers and 47 transport planes were seen at an airfield on the northern extremity of LOS NEGROS Island.

Photographs could not be taken of the HAIN (TN-?) airfield.

4- Air Situations.

a. At 1000 of the 11th approximately 80 B- 29's from CHINA attacked the weste n part of KYUSHU and SAISHU Island. Bombs were dropped from above the clouds; our losses were small.

b. The BANDA Unit of the Army Suicide Air Unit with the support of fighter planes sunk 1 Battleship and 1 transport ship at the Gulf of LEYTE on the 12th.

c. On the 12th our KAMIKAZE Unit attacked a convoy in the Gulf of LEYTE, sunk 2 and crippled 7 large transport ships (tonnage 10,000)/

d. The FUGAKU Air Unit of our Army Suicide Air Unit attacked a task force east of LUZON and sank 1 battleship on the eve of the 13th.

e. On the evening of the 19th our air units attacked an enemy task force east of LUZON, sank 1 cruiser and crippled 1 aircraft carrier and 1 battleship.

Our loses were 8 planes.

f. On the 20th our air unit attacked an enemy convoy southeast of OMIYAJIMA and crippled 4 transport ships of which 1 was believed to have been sunk and also shot down 1 B-25 escort plane.

g. On the 18th our air unit attacked a convoy in the gulf of LEYTE and crippled 4 transport ships.

(3) Situation in the PHILIPPINES.

1- CARIGARA Area.

The enemy increased its strength in the area of MANAGASUNASU (TN-?)

It is estimated that 1 enemy group will land on ABUYOG on the 18th and invade ORMOC from the north and south.

A part of the enemy 96th Division advanced to JARO (located 24km southwest of TACLOBAN) and are at the present time engaged with a part of our IZUMI Group.

2. KAKI (16th Div) Group

The KAKI Group, although ~~as~~ the casualties are ~~great~~ heavy, is stubbornly defending their position west of DAGAMI ~~(TN-?)~~, and a part of this group is defending KATOMON (TN-?) hill.

3. IZUMI (26th Div) Group

The main body of the IZUMI Group in the area east of ARENOBUEO (TN-?) is preparing for the advance towards BURAUEN and one battlion of this group is at the present attacking ARENOBUEO (TN-?) (located 13km southeast of ORMOC.

4. TAMA (1st Div) Group

The Commander, Commanding 3 newly arrived battalion is advancing from ORMOC, to the area of CARIGARA.

(4) Other Situations.

1- The Enemy estimation of our forces in the PHILIPPINES made in the early part of November.

a. Air strength on the 3rd Northern part - 281planes Central part - 107 planes, Southern part - 61 planes, total 449 planes.

b. Strength of ground forces on the 1st.

LUZON Island - 161,000, Central part - 51,900, Southern part- 61, 100, Total - 274,000.

2- Information obtained from an captured enemy flier on the 13th at MANILA.

a. This prisoner was a pilot from the Carrier WASP which belonged to the 81st Air Unit of the 38th Task Force. He was a Captain and 24 years of age.

b. Route of movement

This prisoner left SAN DIEGO aboard the BANCROFT on the 20th of August, and transfered to theship COPAHAE at MAUFURU (TN-?) Island on the 26th ofOctober and arrived in GUAM on the 6th of November. On the 8th his group relieved the 14th Fighter Unit aboard the WASP and left GUAM with 4 cruisers and on the night of the 12th joined the main force of the Task Force. This Captain was captured on the 13th in the attack of the PHILIPPINES.

c. The group that this prisoner belonged to was composed of the following No. and types of ships.

1. 3 Standard Aircraft Carriers. (WASP, HORNET and the ESSEX types)

2. 1 special Aircraft Carrier (VOGUE type)

3. 1 battleship (SOUTH DAKOTA)

4. 1 Cruiser (BENSACO)

5. 4 Destroyers.

6. 3 standard Air Craft carriers to the right and ldft of the group.

d. The second prisoner questioned was Lt. J.G. in the Navy. He was from the ship BUNKER HILL which belonged to the 4th Group of the 38th Task Force. This group was composed of ships BUNDER HILL and FRED WAYNE (TN-?)

e. After summarizing the information obtained from the prisoners, we ~~have come to~~ arrived at the following conclusion.

1) The 38th Task Force ~~is~~ was divided into 4 groups.

2) 11 of the aircraft Carriers were converted to Cruisers.

3) There were several Special Aircraft Carriers.

4) Changes has been made in organization.

5) They have aircraft carriers as escorts.

f. Both prisoners were credited with 400 hours flying time.

3. Situation to the front of the group.

a. PELELIU Area.

1) Situa tions on the 11th

a) Firing had kept up all day but there were nogreat changes in our lines.

b) The enemy Infantry Platoon and 3 tanks advanced to the southside of OYAMA Mountain from the 11th and constructed a tank road.

c) It s believed that the enemy main point of attack will be on the east side of OYAMA Mountain.

2) Situation on the 12th

a) The area defended by our Defense Unit with OYAMA Mountain as the main point runs 400 meters north to south and 150 meters deep.

b) Enemy fire was heavier at night than during the day, and the firing was concentrated on our connecting road.

Several men advanced toward our forces under supporting firing and tried to destroy the tank shelters but ~~did not succeed~~ were unsuccessful.

The casualties of our Defense Unit added up to about 300.

c) Ammunition, food, water and radio batterys of our defensive units were running low and it was the unit surmise that the radio batterys would not last any longer than the 15 November.

3) Situations of the 13th.

a) The enemy began attacking our defense line at Mt. OYAMA. A part of the enemy force attacking from the west and south, the main force from the east. Our defensive Unit put up a stubborn resistance but the enemy force succesfully penetrated the defense line. This enemy force attacked the men of our Defense Unit hidden in shelters with flame throwersand guns.

b) Our Defense Unit put up a stubborn struggle that lasted until night fall.

c) At night the main body of this enemy force adsembled on the south side of OYAMA Mountain.

It is believed that the enemy will continue thaeir attack from earky morning of the 15th.

4) Situations of the 14th.

a) The enemy were strengthening their position as they advanced. Because the attack on the morning of the 14th was rather weak, it was our belief that a part of the enemy force had been transfered elswhere.

b) The enemy atta cks at night were weak.

Our movements were interrupted by enemy flares.

5) Situation on the 15th.

a) 2 months have elapsed since the enemy landing. The officers and men of our unit are prepared to put up stubbon resistence.

b) It was our opinion that the enemy constructed tank roads to try to split our unit in the vicinty of OYAMA Mountain in two (north and south). Although the enemy strengthened their position as they advanced and attacked our unit with planes there were no great changes in our lines.

6) Situation on the 16th.

a) A lthough the fighting around the OYAMA Mountain was fierce there were no changes in our defense line.

b) It is our guess that the enemy in the northern part of Mt. OYAMA are planning to capture our Defense Unit Headquarters.

7) Situation on the 17th.

a) Fighting has been fierce on every fron t of our Defense line since morning.

b) The enemy on the east side of OYAMA Mountain penetrated our defense line and advanced towards the Defense unit Headquarter at the same time attacking our men who were hidden in shelter with flame throwers. In this attack the casualties of our Defense Unit were ~~large~~ heavy.

There have been no changes in our defense line on the west sid e of OYAMA Mountain.

c) The main body of our Defense Unit assembled in the area of OYAMA Mountain on the night of the 17th and continued to put up stubborn resistance.

d) It was our guess that a part of our unit is still fighting in the northern area because gun fire was heard on the 16th.

8) Situation of the 18th.

a) The enemy force is still attacking our defense unit but there ~~is~~ were no great change in our lines.

b) The enemy force in the area north of OYAMA advanced their position closer to our defense line.

c) It is believed that fighting is still going on in the northern area.

d) The men of our Defense Unit still capable of fighting number approximately 150. This includes light casualties.

9) Situation on the 19th.

a) There are no great changes in the defense ling. It is believed that the enemy is strengthening their attacking power.

b) Our surmise is that the enemy has progressed in the construction of the tank road to a point where they will be able to attack with tanks tomarrow the 20th.

10) Situation on the 20th.

a) It was ~~guessed~~ believed that the enemy would move a ~~lot of~~ majority their equipment to the front line and try to exhaust our unit.

This movement has token place as expected but the enemy has not as yet attacked.

b) The Commander and the men of the units are putting up their last stand with vigor and courage seldom seen.

11) Situation of the 21st.

a) With the completion of the tank road, the enemy began advancing towards the main point of our Defense line on the 21st.

b) The enemy destroyed shelters and trenches on the south slope of Mt. ~~MINNING~~ NANSEI.

c) Until 1200 hour 18 B-24's took off from PELELIU Airfield and headed in the southwest direction. Between 1500 - 1615 hour 36 (B-24), 21 (C-47), and 1 (C-54) landed on PELELIU Airfield.

12) Situation on the 22nd.

a) The enemy force is attacking the m in point of our Defense line with flame throwers.

b) From 0800 hours of the 22nd communication has been getting difficult and the unit has been on the ~~beige~~ verge of collapse.

13) Situation on the 23rd.

The enemy force is still attacking the main point of our defense line with flame throwers.

14) Situation on the 24th.

a) Our Defense Units were on the verge of being completely annihilated ~~and burned~~ therefore the unit destroyed the 2nd Infantry Regiment flag which they had in their possession.

b) All documents were burned

c) Since 1800 the personnel left in this Defense Unit were Capt. NEMOTO and 56 men. This number split into 17 teams and decided to put on a last raid.

The last radio message received fromthis Defense Unit was as follows:

The splitting of men into 10 teams was completed at 1700 hours of the 24th. Following the Commanders wishes, we will attack the enemy everywhere. This will be the last message we will be able to send or receive.

Situation since the night of the 24th.

The 17 teams under the command of Capt. NEMOTO hid in jungles and Caves during the day came out of hiding at night to raid the enemy force.

b. ANGAUR Area

What little of our men left in this area are still resisting enemy attacks stubbornly.

c. Islands north of PELELIU.

1) Since infiltration was made on ~~KARAGON~~ NGEREGON Island the enemy from the 17th has been guarding the Straits, the seas, and Islands closely. It was also feared by the enemy that our forces will be reinforced for the operation of LEYTE.

2) Statements made by the enemy of our infiltration on KARAGON were as follows:

Approximately 200 men of the JAPANESE Army landed on KARAGON Island. The U.S. Army with ships then cut off the Strait of ~~DENGISU (TN-?)~~ DENGES and commenced firing on ~~KARAGON~~ NGEREGON Island.

d. PALAU Mainland and the area of KORORO (~~TN-?~~)

1) Attacks made by enemy fighter Planes were weak.

Our Artillery position in the area of KORORO (~~TN-?~~) was the bombing target of the enemy.

2) Movements of small enemy ships in the area north of PALAU Mainland are still active.

3) The enemy is still utilizing the night rest harbor at ~~KOSUSORU (TN-?)~~ KOSSOL.

e. YAP Area

No great changes.

SHOWING THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND PLANES

APPENDED CHART NO. 1



SHOWING THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS AND PLANES

APPENDED CHART NO. 1



APPENDED 14

INSERT MAP NO. ~~16~~

DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SHIPS

AND PLANES.

Appended Chart No. 1

Situation of Enemy Ships in the Vicinity of PALAU (Middle of November)

Classification	Departure and Arrival	Date	11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		Total	
			Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In
KOROR Anchorage Area	Departure and Arrival	Transports	2	1	5	4	3	1		4	5	3			2		1	5	1	2	4	2	21	22
		Tankers													1		1						2	
		Destroyers	2	5	2	1	7	5	7	1	4	2	2	1				2			1		25	17
		Sub-Chasers	1	2	2	1		1		2	6	5	1	1	2	2	3	3		1	2	3	17	21
		Aircraft Carriers		5			5															1	5	6
		Small Boats	1	2		2					1	2		1		3		1	2	2	2	1	6	11
		Large Boats				2					1					12							1	14
		Battleships (Cruisers)						3(2)	3(2)														3(2)	3(2)
		Sub-Total	6	15	9	10	15	12	12	7	17	12	3	3	5	17	5	11	3	5	9	7	84	98
		Total	21		19		27		19		29		6		22		16		8		16		182	
	Anchored	Transports	33		33		32		36		34		33		27		36		36		36		336	
		Tankers	4		3		3		4				5		4		1		2		3		29	
		Destroyers (Cruisers) (Battleships)	12		6		7(2)(3)		4		4		2		4		7		3		7		56(2)(3)	
		Sub-Chasers	14		3		4		8														29	
		Aircraft Carriers	5		5																1		10	
		Special Duty Ships	3		29		6		13		24		24		27		30		25		26		207	
		Small Boats	15		14		15		19		12		10		11		14		21		15		146	
		(Seaplanes) Others	4(26)		2(19)		2(31)		(28)		3(35)		2(29)		2(26)		(33)		2(31)		1(26)		17(284)	
		Total	90		95		74		84		76		76		75		88		89		89		835	
Vicinity of PELELIU		Transports	16		16		19		16		9		10		14		12		8		12		119	
		Tankers															1						1	
		Destroyers	7		7		6		7		2		5		5		4		2		5		45	
		Sub-Chasers	21		9		22		13		16		16		12		19		15		20		153	
		Large Boats	3		4		5		1		3		3		3		5		2		2		28	
		LST																						
		Floating Crane											1		1		1				1		4	
		Total	47		36		52		37		30		35				42		27		40		346	
Vicinity of NAKARAKARU		Sub-Chasers	3		6		10		5		9		9		6		6		3		3		49	
		Cable Laying Ships			2		2																4	
		Floating Crane			2		2						1										5	
		Repair Ship																						
		Docks																						
		LST																						
		Tankers			1		1																2	
		Total	3		11		15		5		9		10		6		6		3		3		51	

Appended Chart No. 2

Air Situation in the PALAU Area

Middle of November

Area	Classification	Type / Date	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total
PALAU Island	Attacking Planes	F4U	85	105	52	46	50	61	55	57	36	101	648
		B-24	12	7	6	12	11				24		72
		Sub-Total	97	112	58	58	61	61	55	57	60	101	720
	By Passing Planes	P-38	2	1	1	4	3	2	4	1	2	2	22
		Large Flying Boats	15	4	9	1	2	2	16	2	3	2	56
		C-47	3		2	3	6	8	14		6	1	43
		SBD		6	5	2	4	6	4	1		1	29
		Sub-Total	20	11	17	10	15	18	38	4	11	6	150
Total			117	123	75	68	76	79	93	61	71	107	870
YAP Island	Attacking Planes	F4U	12	12	12	10	2	12	12	12	12	12	109
		SBD								12			12
		P-38			1								1
		B-25		2	1	1	1	2					7
		TBF		20				13				13	46
		Sub-Total	12	34	14	11	3	27	12	25	12	25	175
	By Passing Planes	H8SB		2	1		1	2	3		7	4	20
		PBM		1	2		1			1	2		7
		Large Flying Boats			2		1	3	2	2		1	11
		P-38						1	1				2
		Sub-Total		3	5		3	6	6	3	9	5	40
Total			12	37	19	11	6	33	18	28	21	30	215
Battle Results			1 B-24 shot down 2 B-24 Damaged	1 B-24 Damaged	1 B-24 and 1 F4U damaged			1 F4U damaged	1 F4U damaged	1 F4U shot down (YAP) 1 B-24 damaged (PALAU)			

		Type	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.	De.	Arr.
PELELIU Airfield	No. of Departures and Arrivals	B-24	24		34										24				25			
		C-47																	18		59	48
		TBF																			8	31	26	37
																					1	2	1	2

Annexed Chart No. 3

Flares Dropped on PELELIU and ANGAUR Islands

Middle of November

Place	Time Date	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0100	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	Total
PELELIU (ANGAUR	11	11	13	4	11	13	10	6	8	8	7	7	4	102
"	12	6	18	24	12	15	17	40	16	13	31	11	5	208
"	13	11	7	6	10	9	15	29	16	23	6	8 (1)	2 (1)	142 (1)
"	14	5	12 (4)	10 (3)	8 (2)	4	8	5 (3)	25	32	36	71	7	223 (13)
"	15	25	7	16 (1)	11	8	3	18	2	19	19	9	3	140 (1)
"	16	21	6	8	6	4	12	1	2	13	4	3	2	92
"	17	3	2	2	1	1	1		3	2	1	14	3	33
"	18	2	2	2		1	1			1	2	3		14
"	19	1	3	8		3	1							18
"	20	2					1	1	1					5