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JAPANESE MONOGRAPH NO. 55

Southeast Area Air Operations Record
Phase I, Nov. 1941 - Feb. 1942

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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PREFACE

Through Instruction No. 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for War Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff.* Upon the dissolution of the War Ministry and the General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. Detailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in Memoranda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories".

The basic material contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that the enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material was reconstructed from memory.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G-3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the Demobilization Bureau.

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* The action under this memorandum and incidental detailed instructions, which followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, charged with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945.

In order to protect the interest of the United States, in the exploitation of Japanese Military Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of enemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental Archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Government was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the entire program, including the establishment of a small historical research section within the ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.)

Air Operation Record

(MALAYA 1st Period of Southwest Area Operation)

August 1946

The First Demobilization Bureau.

Notes:

Edition of air operation records are as follows:

1. This is a condensed instruction manual. Materials were gathered by Colonels SHIN ISHIKAWA and KATSUJI DOZONE, instructors at the General Staff College.

2. It was enlarged and revised by Colonel MINORU MIYAKO, Chief Staff Officer in charge of 3rd Air Corps Operations.

Air Operation Record (MALAYA)

Part I. Situation before the Operation

Chapter 1. Enemy Situation

A. The BRITISH Situation at MALAY

B. Situation at SIAM and BURMA.

Part II. Strength and organization of 3rd Air Corps.

Part III. Preparation for the Operation

Chapter 1. Preparation by the 15th and 25th Army.

Chapter 2. Preparation by the 3rd Air Corps.

A. Establishment of the Air Base.

B. Plans of the operation.

C. Dispersal of the forces.

Part IV. Practical operation.

Chapter 1. Cooperation in the landing operation of the 15th and 25th Army Advance units, the Northern BURMA Preliminary Air Operation, and the co-operation with the 15th Army in its advance to SIAM.

Chapter 2. Air opefation in Central MALAY and cooperation in the operation of the 25th Army against the KEDAH State.

Chapter 3. Cooperation in the operation of the 25th Army against ~~PREAK~~ PERAK and SERANGBUL States.

Chapter 4. Cooperation in the operation of the 25th Army against NEGRI ~~SENDIRAN~~ SEREMBAN States and the air operation in SINGAPORE.

Chapter 5. Cooperation in the operation of the 25th Army against SINGAPORE.

Part V. Situation in the rear.

Chapter 1. Situation of supplies and the loss and replacement of men.

A. Loss and supply of Planes.

B. Other supplies.

C. Fuel and ammunition.

D. Loss and replacement of personnel.

Chapter 2. Situation of the Signal Corps.

Chapter 3. Situation of the Air Intelligence Units and the Aircraft Location Units.

Chapter 4. Situation of the Meteorological Unit.

Part VI. Situation after the Campaign

Part VII. Results of the Campaign

Part I. Situation before the Campaign.

Chapter 1 -- Enemy Situation.

A. The BRITISH Situation.

Enemy situation at MALAY.

The positions of the BRITISH Infantry Units on MALAY as known at the beginning of November 1941 are indicated in the attached map # 1.

Situation of the Air Force in MALAY.

Although the position of BRITISH Air Force in MALAY was not clear, it was known that new airfields and bomb shelters were being constructed. The main strength of the air force seemed to be stationed in SINGAPORE, with about 3 squadron of 2 engine medium bombers scattered about the KOTABHARU airfield. The bay of SIAM seemed to be guarded closely.

The situation of BRITISH Air Force in MALAY as known at the end of November is indicated in the attached map # 2.

The effectiveness of the enemy Air Force in MALAY.

BLENHEIM double engine medium bomber made up the main force of bomber units and trained for land operation, day and night flying and bombing by group or single. Indications showed that they were to cooperated with ground operation and not aerial.

BUFFALO planes made up the fighter units and was trained for defensive air tactics only.

The torpedo bomber units made up of old fashioned SWORDFISH type plan received intensive training and were stationed in SELETAR airfields. They had about 500 tons of torpedos and no more.

B. Situation in SIAM and BURMA.

Situation of the SIAMESE Army.

In order to preserve neutrality, the SIAMESE Army began making the following preparation for the eventual war.

1. Since the 15th of November, a reserve army of 250,000 men was mobilized.
2. The Eastern Border Patrols were increased.

The main strength of SIAM Air Force were deployed along the Eastern front. Preparation was completed in the latter part of November.

Appended Map # 1:

Sketch of Troop Disposition in the BRITISH TERRITORY OF MALAYA.

Appended Map # 2:

Situation of Enemy Air Force in BRITISH MALAYA

At end Nov. 43.

see append map #1

Sketch of troop disposition in the British Territory of Malaya.

appended #2 -

Situation of Enemy Air Force in British Malaya. at end of Nov. 43

The Enemy Situation at BURMA

The situation of the enemy air force in southern SIAM and BURMA as known up to the end of November is indicated in the attached map # 3.

The enemy air force in BURMA, strengthened its airfield and increased its personnel. About 70 of the planes were deployed as follows;

TONGOO

Fighter planes ---- about 25 planes

Bombers ---- about 16 planes

MINGALODON

Fighter planes ---- about 10 planes

Bombers ---- about 10 planes

MOULMEIN and ~~MELGUE~~ MERGUI

Few planes.

Chapter 2 -- Our Army Situation.

A. General Situation.

The southern Army General Headquarters was established in SAIGON on 4th of December.

The 25th Army was set up in SANA on 3rd of December.

The advanced units of the 15th Army were atationed in SETMREAP and western BILSAT and were preparing for an advance into SIAM.

B. Situation fo the 3rd Air Force.

On the 6th of November, the 3rd Air Corps was transferred from the Expeditionary Force in CHINA to the Southern Army. A new battle order was made by the 3rd Air Corps, and according to the deployment plans of the Southern Army drawn on 15th of November (refer to Part 2,) the 10th Air Crop, the 83rd Independent Air Unit, and others were placed under to command of the 3rd Air Crops. Preparation for the operation against the strongpoints in the Southern Areas were made and on December 6 deployment of the Air Force to Southern FRENCH-INDO CHINA was completed.

Appended Map # 3:

Sketch Showing Enemy Air Situation in SOUTHERN THAILAND and BURMA.

At end of Nov. 41.

Part II. Strength and Organization of the 3rd Air Corps.

The orgainzation and strength of the 3rd Air Corps are as follows:

1. Air Corps Commander - Lieut. Gen. MICHIYO SUGAWARA.
2. The 3rd Air Corps Headquarters.
3. The 3rd Air Corps.
   a. The 3rd Air Group Headquarters.
   b. The 59th Air Fleet (fighters)
      Model 1 --- 21 planes.
      Model 97 -- 3 planes.
   c. The 27th Air Fleet (light bmmbers)
      Model 99 -- 28 planes
   d. The 75th Air Fleet C
      Model 99 (double engined) -- 25 planes
   e. The 90th Air Fleet (light bombers)
      Model 99 (double engined) -- 23 planes
4. The 7th Air Groups.
   a. The 7th Air Group Headquarters.
   b. The 64th Air Fleet (fighters)
      Model 1 --- 35 planes
      Model 97 -- 6 planes
   c. The 12th Air Fleet (heavy bomber)
      Model 97B - 27 planes
   d. The 60th Air Fleet (heavy bombers)
      Model 97B - ? planes
   e. The 98th Air Fleet (heavy bombers)
      Model 99B - 42 planes
5. The 12th Air Groups
   a. The 12th Air Group
   b. The 12th Air Group Headquarters
   c. The 1st Air Fleet (fighters)
      Model 97 -- 42 planes
   d. The 11th Air Fleet (fighter)
      Model 97 -- 39 planes
6. The 15th Independent Air Fleet
   a. 15th Independent Air Fleet Headquarters

b. 50th Independent Air Squadron (reconnaissance)

Model 100 -- 2 planes

Model 97 -- 3 planes

c. 51st Independent Air Squadron (reconnaissance)

Model 100 -- 2 planes

Model 97 -- 3 planes

7. The 81st Air Fleet (reconnaissance)

Model 100 -- 6 planes

Model 97 --20 planes

8. The 1st Air Sector Headquarters

9. The 7th Air Sector Headquarters

10. The 12th Air Sector Headquarters

11. The 15th Air Sector Headquarters

12. The 18th Air Sector Headquarters

13. The 36th Airfield Battalion (reconnaissance)

14. The 82nd Airfield Battalion (reconnaissance)

15. The 15th Airfield Battalion (fighters)

16. The 21st Airfield Battalion (fighters)

17. The 22nd Airfield Battalion (fighters)

18. The 41st Airfield Battalion (fighters)

19. 94th Airfield Battalion (fighters)

20. The 27th Airfield Battalion (light bombers)

21. The 35th Airfield Battalion (light bombers)

22. The 91st Airfield Battalion (light bombers)

23. The 93rd Airfield Battalion (light bombers)

24. The 17th Airfield Battalion (heavy bombers)

25. The 23rd Airfield Battalion (heavy bombers)

26. The 92nd Airfield Battalion (heavy bombers)

27. The 96th Airfield Battalion (heavy bombers)

28. The 29th Airfield Company (reconnaissance)

29. The 3rd Airfield Company (reconnaissance)

30. The 5th Airfield Company (fighters)

31. The 33rd Airfield Company (fighters)

32. The 6th Airfield Company (light bombers)

33. The 18th Airfield Company (light bombers)

34. The 7th Airfield Company (heavy bombers)

35. The 9th Airfield Company (heavy bombers)

36. The 15th Air Signal Unit (excluding a section)

37. The 25th Air Signal Unit

38. A section of the 1st Air Intelligence Unit.

39. The 16th Air Intelligence Unit

40. The 40th Aircraft Locator Company

41. The 12th Air Transport Company.

42. The 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Airfield Construction Unit.

43. A section of the 12th Aeronautical Repair Unit

44. A section of the 15th Field Air Unit

45. The 20th AA Regiment

46. The 32nd Field AA battalion (B)

47. The 36th Field AA Battalion (B)

48. The 280th and 281st Independent Motor Pool Companies

49. The 1st Transportation Companies

50. The 86th Transportation Companies

51. The 67th, 68th, 69th, and 70th Ground Duty Companies

52. The 80th and 81th Ground Duty Companies

53. The 43rd Construction Company

54. The 48th Construction Company

55. The 10th Air Group (1 air fleet each of fighters, light bombers, and reconnaissance squadron)

56. The 83rd Independent Air Unit (3 reconnaissance squadron)

57. The 40th Airfield Battalion (fighters)

58. The 97th Airfield Battalion (light bombers)

59. A section of the 1st Air Signal Regiment (1 company each of telephone and wireless company)

60. The 1st Meteorological Battalion Headquarter

61. The 1st and 2nd Meteorological Companies

62. The 25th Meteorological Unit

63. 2nd Company of the 13th Special Air Transport Unit

64. The 15th Special Air Transport Unit

65. The 7th Special Air Transport Unit

66. The 25th Air Sector Unit

67. The 17th and 18th Shipping Department

68. The 160th, 167th, 184th and 190th Transportation Companies.

Part III. Preparation for the Campaign

Chapter 1 -- The Operation of the 25th and the 15th Army.

A. Plans

1. The 25th Army will land the main force of the 5th Division in Southern SIAM at the beginning of the battle. And immediately thereafter, they will advance to the PERAK River line to capture and establish airfields and vital points. The main force will take KUALA LUMPUR as quickly as possible and after the occupation of the rear sector is completed they will advance toward JOHORE Straits in conjunction with the advance of the 3rd Air Corps.

2. The 25th Army reserve will attack PENANG by way of Southern SIAM, while the 5th Division advance to the western coast of MALAYA.

3. According to the prevailing situation, one corps will be landed in the area between KUANTAN and MERSING to ease the operation of the main force.

4. In order to capture SINGAPORE Fortress, the army will make concerntrated lightning attack from the eastern flank of JOHORE Bridge.

5. A detachment will be landed in KOTA BHARU area to take enemy airfield by X - 1 day to make the operation of the main force easier

B. Outline of operational instruction

I. The movement of 5th Division (the first landing unit)

6. The 5th Division will leave SANA area at 1000 hours of X - 4 days under the protection of the Navy. They will select a route patrolled by JAPANESE planes stationed in Southern FRENCH -INDO CHINA.
On X day the 5th Division with its full force will land single units at SONG KHLA anchorage, TAPEH and PATTANI anchorage and capture airfields there.
At the same time without losing an opportunity a strong unit will be s ent to HAT YAI, SADAO and BENTONG area to occupy strategic points there and establish communication lines.

7. The various area landing units strength will be decided by considering their future use and are as follows:

6

1. SONG KHLA Area

Division Headquarters

9th Infantry Brigade

Main Force of 5th Cabalry Regiment

Main Force of 5th Field Artillery Regiment

Main Force of 5th Engineer Regiment

Units directly under command of Division

Air Units concerned.

2. TAPI Area

1 Battalion of 42nd Infantry Regiment

Air Units concerned

3. PATTANI Area

Main strength of 42nd Infantry Regiment

a sector of 5th Field Artillery Regiment

8. Immediately after the landing operation is completed (on about X - 5 days) the main force of the 5th Division will invade the border from SADAO area while a unit will invade from BENTONG area and advance toward PERAK River line. They will capture river crossings, ALOR STAR, SUNGET PATANI, TAIPING airfields and cooperate in the advance of the 3rd Air Group Main Force. Together with the landing of the sencond wave on X - 8 day they will immediately advance toward KUALA LUMPUR (expect at X - 15 day) after the occupation of the rear area is completed.

If the situation permits, one unit will advance deep into Southern area and try to capture communication Key points.

9. After KUALA LUMPUR is captured, the troops will advance toward JOHORE Strait and try to t ake the JOHORE Bridge.

10. They will avoid any fighting against SIAM Army stationed in Southern SIAM. If the SIAMESE interferes with our plans we will attack with full force.

II. The DAMI Detachment movements.

11. The DAMI Detachment will advance hand in hand with the main force of the 5th Division. After making a force landing on X -- day they will advance to KOTA BHARU airfield immediately and capture it. Then they will aid in the landing of army main force.

However if the situation does not permit, they will follow up the landing of the 5th Division main force. On X - day at 0000 hour.

In case the landing is extended it will be decided by the Army -Navy commanders conference by 1000 hours of X - 1 day and the convoy will wait in the vicinity of PHU QUOY Island for an opportunity.

12. The first airfield the DAMI Detachment must capture will be the airfield northeast of KOTA BHARU and if the situation permits they will quickly TANAMERAH and KUALA BEST airfield.

13. The DAMI Detachment will progress toward TRENGGANU and KUANTANG District by boats in accordance with operation progress of the main force.

III. The Second Landing Movement of the 5th Division and DAMI Detachment.

14. The troops of the 5th Division and DAMI Detachment for the second landing will be assembled in CAM RANH Bay by X - 3 days, and on X - 1 day they will leave under the protection of naval fleet and on about X - 8 day will enter SONGKHLA, PATTANI and KOTABHARU anchorage to land.

IV. Action of KONOYE Division

15. At the beginning of the operation, the KONOYE Division by orders of the 15th Army Commander will leave a part of its unit in Southern FRENCH-INDO China and together with the establishing of its safety, the main force will advance to BANGKOK and guard the airfields and railroad to gain advantage for the 25th Army operation.

16. The main force driving forward toward BANGKOK will use railroad and ships to advance to Southern SIAM quickly in order to make the operation of the 5th Division easier. The units consisting of 3 infantry regiment as its nucleus will make a effort to assemble at the rear of the 5th Division by X - 1 day.

The remaining main force and the small unit at SAIGON will pass through Southern SIAM and assemble as quickly as possible in the rear of 5th Division, They will be relieved of guard duty by the 55th Division, and according to the situation they will let the 5th Division drive forward and go before them.

V. The Movement of the Army Main Force.

17. The army main force (main strength of the 18th Division and remaining strength of 5th Division) will assemble in the vicinity of FORMOSA, and CANTON and on X - 25 day under the pretection of the naval fleet the main force will land in the SONGKHLA, while a small unit will land in the vicinity of PATTANI and catch up with the 5th Division.

18. The 18th Division will capture PENANG as soon as possible and control the northern rear sector of the PERAK River line. They will simplify the main force southern flank operation and will prepare for future operation.

VI. Movement of 56th Division.

19. The 56th Division will follow the progress of the main army and will land in area between KUANTANG and MERSING and advance toward JOHORE Strait to assist the army main force operations. The Division will concentrate its full strength in MERSING, AYER TAWAR and JOHORE Strait areas as conditions permit.

VII. Movement of Army Headquarter.

20. The Army Combat Headquarter will leave SAIGON on X - 15 day to SANA, there board the RYUJO MARU. They will land at SONGKHLA on X day together with the first wave of the 5th Division. Later, following the progress of battle situation they will advance to TAIPING, KUALA LUMPUR and KLUANG.

21. The remaining Headquarter Unit will board ship at CAM RAHN Bay by X - 2 days and together with the 5th Division second wave they will land at SONGKHLA. However, a portion of the unit will be left behind in SAIGON to maintain communication.

The outline of 15th Army's Advance in SIAM.

1. The 15th Army, on X day will advance through the borders of SIAM and go through INDO-CHINA to BANGKOK with the advance troop (3 infantry and 1 artillery battalion as its nucleus) of KONOYE Division under its command.

2. The NAKHON landing unit (1 infantry battalion (minus 1 unit) and 2 transport bessels of air unit) of UNO Detachment (143rd Infantry) Regiment as its nucleus) will wait aboard ship in the vicinity of PHU QUOC Island and will land in anchorage on X day together with our 5th Division and capture airfields.

The landing units (detachment strength) of DUONG DONG, CHIKON PONG and ~~POULO CHIAP~~ PRACHUAP area will follow the 5th Division from St. JACQUES and on the morning of X day enter in anchorage. Thereafter they will immediately capture BANG-DONG airfield and VICTORIA Point.

Chapter 2.-- The Operation Preparation of 3rd Air Corps.

Part I. Establishment of Air Base

Constructing of air base in Southern FRENCH INDO CHINA was an important phase in the preparation of Southern area operation. However the army and air corps overcame the numerous difficulties to meet the demands of operations. The numerous difficulties are as follows:

1. FRENCH INDO CHINA being a red clay land becomes very muddy during rainy seasons. This preparation of operation being made during the rainy season forced them to finish the most difficult task in a short time with great difficulties.

2. The anti-JAPAN attitude of FRENCH INDO CHINA made it difficult to get Piastre (FRENCH INDO CHINA money) ; therefore the expense of the army was restricted.

3. Inconvinient transportation made it difficult to gether equipment and building material for airfields, labors and transportation.

4. Due to the long communication between the homeland and FRENCH INDO CHINA, and the shortage of ships, it was difficult to send supplies.

The 3rd Air Corps Commander dispatched the staff and others to FRENCH INDO CHINA units in mid -October. At the same time he advanced the command post to SAIGON to take over the project. He devoted himself in the completion of the airfield. Owing to the suitable disposal taken by the Imperial General Headquarter and the preparation of air operation carried out by the stationary army of FRENCH INDO CHINA he overcame the fore- mentioned difficulties and barely succeeded in deploying all the unit by the beginning of December.

The 3rd Air Corps Headquarter was advanced to PHNOM PENH on December 1.

Report on accumulation of fuel and ammunition.

Accumulation of fuel and ammunition in Southern FRENCH INDO CHINA was not too successful due to contradiction and delay in transportation. The arrival of airplane belly taks and pom pom gun shells were very few. The 3rd Air Corps accumulated barely enough to meet the demand just before the battle commenced by opening a communication and transportation route.

Part II. Plan of Operation

I. Destruction of Operation.

1. The air corps cooperating with the naval air unit (22nd Naval Air Fleet) will destroy BRITISH Air Power in MALAYA at the beginning of the battle.

Following the landing of the 24th Army in MALAY, the 3rd Air Corps will advance its base and at the same time destroy enemy air power in BURMA, while cooperating with the 15th Army's operation.

2. A portion of the 3rd Corps will be used in the SIAM-BURMA area, and if necessary, they will destroy the enemy's air power and at the same time cooperate with the 15th Army operation.

II. Outline of operation instruction.

3. The main air force will assemble (named the 1st Mass Assembly) and deploy (called the Medium Deployment) in North FRENCH INDO CHINA and Southern CHINA.

At this time a portion will attack the CHINESE Army in order to camouflage our movement.

4. The main air force will advance to FRENCH INDO CHINA(called the 2nd Assemble) and deploy (called the operation deployment).

In the first assault the 22nd Naval Air Fleet will destroy enemy air power in the North BRITISH MALAY.

5. Immediately after landing, the advance unit of the 25th Army, on the eastern coast of MALAY Penninsula without losing a moment will advance a portion of the fighter and light bomber unit. After they capture and repair the airfield the main force will advance to make the aerial exterminating campaign a greater success.

During this operation, the air force will protect the navigation and landing operation and cover the advance of the 25th Army.

6. The air fleet will give necessary protection to the 25th Army enroute and during landing operation on the eastern coast of MALAY Penninsula and thereafter assist in the operation.

7. From the beginning of the operation the air corps will engage in cutting off the enemyds rear cp,,imocatopm ;ome. attack votal points and if necessary reconnoiter enemy positions.

8. During the early stage of the 15th Army operation in BURMA the air force will give necessary cooperation.

The progress of army operation progressed and great success was obtained in the BURMA enemy aerial extermination campaign by units based in Central STAM. This made the operation of the main force much easier. The air fleet will cooperate in the 15th Army operation.

III. Distribution of Groups.

10. The Group will with the main force cooperate in the 25th Army area operation while a small portion will aid in the 15th Army area operation.

IV. Gentrolization.

11. The main unit of the air fleet will deploy in Southern CHINA and Northern and Central FRENCH INDO CHINA (intermediate deployment) and later deploy in Southern FRENCH INDO CHINA (operation deployment).

12. The assembly of ground forcess will be made by railroads and ships. The ground unit before being transported to an assembly area will gather at the point of embarkation to shorten the date of centralization.

V. Outline of Operation.

13. The Outline of intermediate deployment is shown in the attached Map # 4.

14. In the intermediate deployment the air force will make an attack on strategic points in South CHINA according to the following outline.

Appended Map # 4:

Sketch of First Assembled Formation

As of the Evening of 28 Nov.

A. They will use the minimum force required in order to complete the mission. Much effort will be made to train the newly distributed troops in unit command and drill(mainly cooperation of light bombers and fighter planes) The army will try to avoid the exhaustion of fighting power and attacks will be carried out once in 2 days.

B. During the attack period, the air corps will make the following preparation for the next operation.

a. Get acquainted with the terrain along the coast line of South FRENCH INDO CHINA.

Necessary Staff Officers

All air squadron commanders and formation leaders.(by using their own plan)

b. Preparation of reconnaissance of operation deployment airfields. Each air group will have one transport loaded to its capacity with troops.

C. Operational area of air group is outlined as follows:

3FB -- Western area excluding the connecting line between NANNIN and KIYO

7FB -- Eastern area including the above mentioned line.

D. According to the situation a unit of 7FB will carry out the attack on KUNMING. In this attack they will use HANOI airfield as their intermediary base.

E. LOFB will not participate in this operation, but will devote itself for the preparation of operation and also work for the acquisition of supplies.

15. The deployment positions of air units in South FRENCH INDO CHINA and Southern SIAM at the beginning of operation is indicated on the attached map # 5.

16. The disposition of air sector units at the beginning of battle are as follows:

A. The 1st, 7th and 15th Air Sector Units will deploy in Central and Southern FRENCH INDO CHINA.

B. The 12th and 18th Air Sector Units will progress forward together with the advance units of the 25th Army and establish airfields in Southern SIAM near KOTABARU area.

Appended Map # 5:

Sketch Showing Operational Deployment

On 8 Dec.

Appended Map #5

Sketch Showing Operational Development

C. Following the advance of the 15th Army, the 15th Air Sector Unit will establish air base in Central SIAM.

17. The position before the first assault and the capture airfields in Southern SIAM by the advance units are as follows.

1 -- Outline for protecting areas above the ship transport groups.

A. The fighter plan based in Southern SIAM will be responsible for protecting the convoy carrying the advance units of the 25th Army throughout the daytime of X - 1 day.

B. Main object of protection will be against enemy torpedo plane. Most of the protection unit strength will be directed on the western flank of the transport route.

C. Leader of the 12th Air Group will have command of the Protection Force.

D. The protection of the 25th Army voyage will be decided according to the situation at that moment.

2 -- Outline of preparation against counter -attack.

A. If attacked by the enemy during the movement of the advance unit, the corp will make individual connter-attack.

B. In preparation of the afore mentioned offensive the projected force of the 1st assault will complete its operational deployment by the eve of X -- 3 days and make preparation for the 1st assault.

According to the weather, the 1st assault units may carry out operational deployment on X -- 4 days.

C. The counter - attack position depends on the conditions of the convoy protecting unit, strength and weather etc. Consideration must be given to the number of type 101 fighters and main force of bombers available for attack. Starting time be fixed so they can return to the base by sundown.

D. The offensive outline is almost similar to the plans of the 1st assault.

3 -- Outline for carrying out 1st assault. (Planned assault)

Direction

When the advance units of the 25th Army lands at dawn, (time may be changed according to the moon) the air corps will destroy enemy air power in Northern BRITISH MALAY.

The main object will be directed on enemy torpedo unit air fields, fighter plane units will concentrate on strafing.

Outline

A. Collection of Intelligence Report.

a. The Intelligence Section will deploy in PHNOM PENH and mainly gather air intelligence report in Northern BRITISH MALAY.

b. The unit commander of the landing party will give the weather report and progress of the 25th Army advance unit in the 1st assault.

B. Outline of Attack.

a. After the landing of the 25th Army advanced unit on X day, the air force will destroy enemy torpedo and bomber planes in Northern BRITISH MALAY, with incendiary and fragmentation bombs. Grounded enemy plane will be strafed.

C. Outline of Attack target and deployment strength.

a. Plan #1 -- When enemy torpedo planes are stationed in the vicinity of KOTA BHARU and the main force of the enemy bombers are at KEDAH.

3FB (minus 27FR) and 62FR

Enemy torpedo plane airfield.

In KOTA BHARU and TRENGGANU area and also in SONGKHLA and PATTANI depending on the situation.

7FB -- Enemy bombers in Northern BRITISH MALAY (mainly heavy bombers)

Air unit airfields (ALOR STAR, SUNGEI PATTANI PENANG, TAIPING, KETIL, AYER TAWAR)

81FB -- A reconnaissance unit, however will take part in the attack if the 22nd Naval Air Fleet cannot participate by acting as bait attracting enemy fighter planes in the vicinity of SINGAPORE.

12FB -- Beside escorting convoys they will protect air bases in Southern FRENCH INDO CHINA and care for the attack units.

b. Plan # 2 -- To attack enemy torpedo plane main strength, when the planes are at KOTA BHARU and TRENGGANU airfields.

3FB (minus 27FR)
7FB (minus 98 and 64FR)
Air Raiders (manus 50FCs)
62 FR

Will attack torpedo and bomber planes at KOTA BHARU and TRENAGGNU air fields.

98 FR — Will attack 3 airfields in

64 FR — 9 planes only — ALOR STAR, SUNGET PATANI,

50 FC^S — TATPING, KEPALA BATAS area.

81 FR

12 FB — Similar to plan #1

c. Plans #1 and #2 are made so it can be carried out by squadrons by squadrons or formations. However, if good weather permits a complete attack will be made in dirdtion of the main power to show the enemy our concentrated strength.

d. In every case, the attack will be executed against enemy main forces at 30 minute intervals.

D. Searching of Reconnaissance Unit is as Follows:

50FC^S -- From the western side of HATRYO mountains (included)to the northern side of line between ~~TRENAGGUN~~ TRENGGANU and PERAK Valley.

51FC^S

70FC^S-- Eastern area of HATRYO mountains (included to the northern side of line between TRENAGGNU and PERAK River Valley).

81FC^S -- Areas south of TRENAGGNU and PERAK River Valley line.

E. Starting Base.

7FB

3FB (minus 27FR) — Operational deployment airfields will

70 FC^S — be used.

82FR

However, 64FR will use KOMPONG TRACH (advance on eve of previous day.)

12FB -- will use SOC TRANG or PHU QUOC Island or KOMPONG TRACH as base to protect convoys.

Other units will use present base.

F. 10FB(minus 62FR) will cooperate directly with the 15th Army in the BURMA area.

G. Meteorological Control System.

Immediately after completing the 1st attack, the meteorlogical control system will be carried out in FRENCH INDO CHINA. (After advance is made the control system will be set up quickly.)

H. Army and Navy Agreement will be decided after the conclusion of the Imperial Headquarter agreement.

I. Others.

a. The fighter units of the KEDAH State airfield attack force will refuel at airfields captured by advance units and must return to home base in FRENCH INDO CHINA. This is the standard rule.

b. The 1st attack unit will prepare for the next operation as soon as they return from the previous mission.

c. The 12FB will wait in readiness for pursuing enemy planes.

d. If the airborne units are attached, they will be used in the 25th Army advance operation in KEDAH State and air exterminating capaign. They may also be used in capturing enemy airfields.

18. Positions until the capture and completion of airfield by advance units are as follows:

A. 12 FB and 27FB will quickly advance to airfield in Southern SIAM and protect the advance units base. At the same time they will cooperate will the invading operation of the 3rd and 7th FB (air brigades) and battle advance unit. During this time the 27FR will be under the command of the 12FB leader.

B. The 3FB will quickly advance to the Southern SIAM airfield and while continuing the air exterminating campaign, will directly cooperate with ground operation of advance units.

C. The 7FB and 62FR will continue its former duty and if condition permits they will go into action using the airfield in Southern SIAM as its advanced base. Vital points of PENANG Island will be attacked if situation allows.

D. The 10FB (minus 62FR) will take part in the air exterminating campaign of BURMA and at the same time they will cooperate directly with the 15th Army's operation.

19. The air sector unit advancing together with the advance unit of the 25th Army will first of all quickly establish bases in the following manner.

A. Runway area and all quarters will be completed so planes can land or leave safely.

B. Establish communication system.

C. Prepare supply and loading works for fuels and bombs.

D. Acquire necessary equipment for inspecting and assembling airplanes.

E. Make air and ground protection. Camouflage, cover, dispersion and protection of planes.

F. Bittet personnel.

G. Complete traffic and debarkation system.

H. Prepare supplementary work of airfield and repairing bomb craters.

20. The movement and action of the 1st advance air units in Southern SIAM is as follows:

A. Following the advancement of the base in Southern SIAM, the 12th FB and 27FR will promptly proceed one after another. (by X - 1 day) they will protect the anchoring area of the advance units cooperating with the 3rd FB, 7FB, and a part of 10FB in their advancing operation.

B. If situation permits on advance, the 83FS, and part of 31FR (or full strength) will go.

C. All aforementioned units will be under the command of the 12 FB leader at one time.

D. With the situation the command post of the air corps headquarter or intelligence post will be advanced to SONGKHLA.

E. The airfield expercted to be used for the advance of the 1st wave are as follows:

SONGKHLA -- 7FR -- 12 FB

PATTANI --- 11 FR- 27FR

Part of the 83FS and 31FR will go to the above mentioned airfields first and their to TAPAH when it is completed.

F. The 1st advance unitswill have the following attached transport units.

12 FB -- approximately 2 squadrons

27 FR -- approximately 1 squadron

21. The following facts are for the 2nd advance unit to Southern SIAM

A. Advance strength.

Remaining part of 1st air wave.

The main strength of 3rd FB

Air Corps Headquarters.

B. Disposals of troops are as follows:

The air corps headquarters and 1FR, 12FB, 11F^{R} and 27FR in SONGKHLA and PATTANI.

TAPEH -- 50 FCS, 64FR, 81FR (main force) 90FR as advance unit must consider to land the 98F$_{R}$ and type 100 headquarter reconnaissance planes

TRANG --3rd Air Brigade Headquarter, 59 FR and 51FCs.

TRANG will be used temporarily by other units according to the weather situation.

NAKHON -- 75 F^{R}.

23. If the 25th Army is sucessful in capturing airfield groups in KEDAA State at the beginning of battle, the following are expected.

A. According to the degree of necessity in direct cooperation with ground campaign, the frequent changes of troops distribution will be as follows:

3rd FB 75 FR 90 FR

27 FR 11 FR

If situation permits a part of 70 FCS, 31FR and 83FS(minus 89FCS) will be attached.

(7FB), 15FS, 50FCS, 51FCS, 60FR, 12F^{R}, 98FR, 59FR, 64FR. If situation allows a part or full force of 62FR will be attached.

(81FR), (12FB), 1FR (minus 1 squadron), 11F^{R} also a part 77 FR will be attached if condition allows.

B. Following the capture of KEDAH State, the usage of airfields will depend on the situation at that time; especially the completion of Southern SIAM airfields, number of captured airfields and its estimated damage. The following are the disposal of various air brigade.

AYER TAWAR

ALOR STAR — main force of 3FB

SATSURU

Southern area of NAKHON (included) — 7FB if situation permits a part or full force of 10FB.

Southern SIAM airfields

KOTABHARU airfields will be used by naval ZERO fighter units; however if necessary a part of army TRENAGGNU and SINGAPORE attack units will be attached.

C. The air transport squadron to be attached to the 2nd assault advance unit will be decided separately.

23. The outline of BURMA aerial operation are as follows:

#1 of its plan.

A. First the air units will destroy air power in BURMA and gain air superiority and at the same time cut off enemy communication route in the MALAY area.

B. In the ground operation, the air corps will cooperate in annihilating BURMA Army and also the CHINESE Army which is expected to invade from the South-eastern CHINA.

#2 of plan.

A. A part or full force of 10FB will be used and if necessary the 7FB will also be used.

B. The following are the airfields expected to be used.

~~BAIG DONG~~ BANDOENG DOMUAN PRACHIN BURI PHITSANULOK

~~PRACHAPKILIKAN~~ PRACHUAP KHIRI KHAN RAHAENG

If necessary CHIANG MAI, LAMPANG airfields.

C. The following are airfields expected to be attacked.

VICTORIA Point

RANGOON

TOUNGOO if necessary LOYDEN, LASHIO, TAVOY, MERGUI airfields.

D. Outline of airfield attack.

When the air corps cannot use too much power in BURMA areas on account of the Southern MALAY operation, the attack orders are as follows:

a. The air corp will continously destroy landing area of enemy airfield and decrease the activities of enemy air power. This will be repeated over and over on VICTORIA Point and RANGOON.

b. When military strength of the Southern MALAY operation is available a crushing blow will be dealt on the airfields at VICTORIA Point and RANGOON at the opportune time.

E. The air corps direct cooperation with the 15th Army will be decide on the situation at that time.

F. Attacking of vital points will be specially stressed in the RANGOON area.

G. In the attack of VICTORIA Point the air corp will keep in touch with the 15th Army.

24. During this period of operation, the air corp district headquarters will be extablished. This headquarter will be in command of all sector units in SIAM and MALAY area.

25. Following the advance of the 10FB main force in Central SIAM, a sub-unit of the air supply dump will be individually pushed forward to BANGKOK and SONGKHLA (also in ALOR STAR depending on the situation).

26. Following the completion of airfields in Southern SIAM, the main force of 7FB will use TAPE as an advance base.

The meteorlogical condition east of the MALAY HAIRYO range and the battle situation of BURMA area will determine the 7FB advance. The entire force will invade SIAM and will later be used in the area west of MALAY HAIRYO range to BRITISH MALAY. It will also be used in the BURMA and CHINESE Army operation.

27. The method of operation, to be used after the advance of the air corp's main force in Southern SIAM and MALAY area will depend on the situation at that time. The distribution of units as stated on paragraph 22 are as follows:

A. 7FB

a. Used to destroy enemy air power. Concentrated at MEDAN vicinity, Northern SUMATRA, and area south of Central BRITISH MALAY especially airfields and factories in SINGAPORE.

b. Give direct cooperation to the 25th ARmy from the time the 25th ARmy attack KEDAH State till after the capture of SINGAPORE Fortress. Include the slow progress of the 25th ARmy in KEDAH State; cutting off enemy rear communications, troop movement, interruption in transporting ammunition and prevention of enemy withdrawal.

B. 3FB

a. Mainly to give direct cooperation to the 25th Army ground operation (cutting off enemy retreat included).

b. If necessary take part in destroying enemy air power (Northern SUMATRA excluded).

C. 12 FB -- (Air Brigade)

a. Enemy air power exterminating campaign.

b. Gain air security in battlefield areas. Depending on the situation, concentrate on areas where troops are gathered.

c. Participate in ground operation when necessary. (this will be carried out only in favorable terrain).

D. 81 FR

They will engage in searching the enemy plans in MALACCA Strait, expecially KEDAA State and strategic points on the west coast of Southern SIAM; long range reconnaissance will be carried out. Enemy fighter units in vicinity of SINGAPORE will be engaged to divert their attention.

E. When air raiders units and transport units are attached, they will be used in PERAK River crossings and KUALA ~~KANSAL~~ KANGSAR area according to the situation.

28. In order to cope with the anticipated battle report, the outlines of direct cooperation with the 25th Army are follows:

A. Cooperation of operation in KEDAA State include the time when the 25th ARmy battle progress is against expectation.

a. 3FB --(if necessary add a part of full strength of 12FB and 7FB) will cooperate in advacing the main frontal attack. Cooperation with mechanized troops will be stressed.

b. The 7FB and 12FB will occasionally carry out air power extermination campaign in Northern and Central BRITISH MALAY.

c. If necessary, the 12FB will gain air security over battlefield areas.

d. If the situation requires, the air corp will neutralize the 2nd enemy line and artillery.

e. Attack on enemy reinforcement landing on the west coast of KEDAA State or retreating enemy troops.

f. Reconnoitering enemy's plan of landing in the rear of 25th Army from the western coast of Southern STAM and also to annihilate them.

g. Preventing enemy withdrawal at various cross points of PERAK River.

h. When the 3FS attached to 25th Army is under the command of the 3rd Air Corps, they will be used for photographic reconnaissance, communication, and artillery cooperation. Their main purpose is to attack enemy ground forces.

B. Reconnaissance of MALACCA Strait area.

a. The air corps will find out whether the enemy has and intention of sending replacements from INDIA and the Middle East area (IRAN, IRAQ) and also find out if they plan to withdraw from the MALAY area to Northern SUMTRA.

C. When the 25th ARmy attacks south of the PERAK River line, the air corps is expected to cooperate with the following directions.

a. Reonnoiter enemy plans in KANTANG, JAYLAND, KUALA LUPIS, TANJONG MARANG area lines and cooperate in the 25th ARmy attack of this area.

b. Reconnoiter enemy plans in PAHANG River line, MENTAKA [redacted], KUALA LUMPUR line and also KUANTANG, SEREMBAN area and cooperate in the attack of this area.

C. Destroy enemy jungle zone and supply dumps. With the following object, the air corp will carry out large scale incendiary attacks.

a. Opening path for the long defile assault troops in jungle zone.

b. Burning of enemy munitions.

E. Parachuting of supply.

For the advancing troops of the 25th Army the air corps will drop ammunitions, foods and other goods by parachutes or use captured air-fields to supply goods if necessary.

F. Cooperation of operation on the coast of MALAY Penninsula.

a. If it is necessary to land troops of the 25th Army in the vicinity of KUANTAN or MERSING, a portion of the air group will co-operate in this.

b. If a unit of the 25th Army carries out amphibious landings on the west coast of MALAY, the air corps will cooperate in the amphibious operation.

G. Cooperation in operation to capture SINGAPORE Fortress.

a. In the operation of capturing SINGAPORE Fortress, the air corps will decide the distribution of troops in the following manner:

3FB will cooperate with the 25th ARmy in the assault of SINGAPORE, however if necessary a part of 12FB and 77FR will be attached to the main force.

7FB -- In addition to the distribution of troops as stated before, the 62RR of 10 FB will be attached if needed.

b. The air corps will reconnoiter the enemy's front and cooperate in attacking the enemy advance position of SINGAPORE defense, and the line between MERSING and KLUANG.

3FB and 12FB will be the main body.

c. Make reconnaissance of enemy plans in Northern area of JOHORE Strait and the main defense line of SINGAPORE Fortress and co-operate in its attack.

3FB and 12FB will be the main strength used and if necessary, add 7FB.

24

d. When attacking important targets on SINGAPORE Island, attack will be concentrated on the following airfield, airplane factories, and other military factories, water works, power plants, fuel storage, military areas, army headquarters, administrative organization. The navy is expected to carry out attacks on naval ships and installations.

29. The outline of cooperation of the 16th and the 25th Army in the west JAVA operation will be decided according to the situation of that moment.

C. Concentration and Deployment.

The General Headquarters of the 3rd Air Group is at NANKING and the assigned units in CHINA, MANCHURIA and JAPAN, respectively. On 15 November, when the Air Group was engaged in CHINA operations, the Chief of the Air Group announced the following orders on concentration and deployment.

The Summary of Orders (15 Nov.)

1. The Southern Air Forces in cooperation with the Navy should promptly prepare for the occupation of the southern strategic areas. The forces listed on the annexed sheet will be under our command from midnight, 15 November.

2. The Air Group will prepare for future operations by deployment and concentration to South CHINA and FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

The KWANTUNG Army Command and the assigned 1st Air Group Command (except the units stationed in FORMOSA) will be concentrated under delegated command.

3. The 15th Independent Air Unit (except the 51st Independent Air Squadron) will remain in its present status.

The 81st Air Regiment will deploy and concentrate to Southern INDO-CHINA and prepare for future operations.

4. The 12th Air Brigade will prepare air defenses in FRENCH INDO-CHINA after concentrating and deploying there.

5. The 7th Air Regiment (which includes the 51st Independent Air Squadron) and the 3rd Air Regiment, after concentrating and deploying in Southern CHINA and Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA, will prepare for attacking strategic areas in South CHINA.

The order of attack should be issued later.

6. The 10th Air Regiment will prepare for future operations by concentrating and deploying to HAINAN Island and Central FRENCH INDO-CHINA and a section of it will be responsible for the air defense near SANAH Harbor.

7. The 83rd Air Regiment (except the 89th Independent Air Squadron) will prepare for future operations by concentrating in TAICHU.

8. The following Air Transportation Units were attached for concentration purposes.

The order for attachment will be issued afterwards.

The 81st Air Regiment: A section of the specially organized 15th Air Transport Unit (6 planes, B type or MC) will be attached at NANKING.

The 3rd Air Brigade: The remainder of the specially organized 15th Air Transport Unit will be at TACHANGCHEN and the 12th Air Transport Squadron at NANKING.

The 10th Air Brigade: A squadron of the specially organized 13th Air Transport Unit will be attached at NANYUAN soon after its arrival.

The 12th Air Brigade: The General Headquarters of the 7th Air Transport Unit will be NANYUAN. The assignment of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons will depend on the order of the KWANTUNG Army Command.

9. The 10th and the 12th Air Brigades will search for the shortest route of concentration.

10. The other airforces, while making preparation for future operations, will assist in the concentration of the abovementioned forces.

11. In concentration and deployment, the abovementioned airforces will be under the following delegated command or receive the following assistance.

1. From midnight of 15 November the 1st Air Brigade Command will assist in communication, meteorological conditions, maintenance, supply, forced landings quarters, etc. in CHINA as long as doing so does not interfere with its own battle operations. The 23rd Army Command is delegated to take care of the administration, finance, quarters and supplies of the air units in Southern CHINA. The Air Sector Unit of the command will also assit in communication, meteorological conditions, maintenance, supply and forced landings.

2. In JAPAN (including FORMOSA) they will be assisted by the 1st Air Group Command, Air Inspectorate General (Chief of Air

Headquarters) and assigned Air Units (schools).

3. In INDO-CHINA, the 15th Army Command is delegated to take care of the guard, quarters and supply of the Air Units and the 21st Independent Air Unit will assist in communication, meteorological conditions, maintenance, supply and forced landings.

Attached Sheet

The 10th Air Brigade
The 83rd Independent Air Unit
The 40th Airfield Battalion (Fighter Unit)
The 97th Airfield Battalion (Light Bombers)
A Section of the 1st Air Signal Regiment (Air Signal Wire Company, Wireless Company)
General Headquarters of the 1st Field Meteorological Battalion
The 1st and 2nd Meteorological Companies
The 25th Field Meteorological Unit
The 1st Squadron of the 13th Special Air Transport Unit
The 15th Special Air Transport Unit
The 7th Air Transport Unit
The 25th Air Sub-Depot
The 17th and 18th Shipping Air Depot

The Commander of the Air Group, seeing the necessity for control of concentration and deployment organized unit districts and designated sector units to each district. The 1st Air Sector Unit will deploy from Eastern FRENCH INDO-CHINA to HAINAN Island, the 7th Air Sector Unit to the northern South FRENCH INDO-CHINA, and the 15th Air Sector Unit to the southern South FRENCH INDO-CHINA. He ordered all to prepare for operations. Ahead of the Air Forces, these Air Sector Units were transported successively to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA and by 28 November most of them succeeded in landing. By the end of the month the deployment was completed.

After deploying to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA, the Air Intelligence Regiment, the Weather Unit and the Air Signal Regiment, which are under the command of the 25th Army at SAIGON, organized nets of air intelligence, meteorological data and air communication and

completed them by the end of November.

The Air Force performed the concentration operation in two steps. The 1st operation is to proceed to South CHINA and Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA and the 2nd operation to Southern FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The 2nd operation to be carried out before the commencement of the actual battle. Due to adverse weather conditions the concentration to Central CHINA area was delayed; however, by 28 January the 1st concentration was almost completed.

On 29 November the Commander of the Air Group issued the following order. On 6 December the 2nd operation of concentration and deployment was completed and the preparation for operation continued.

1. In the occupation of the SINGAPORE area, the 25th Army will land in MALAYA area, occupying all bases promptly and securing the foremost positions.

The 15th Army will facilitate 25th Army operations by invading THAILAND and prepare for future operations against BURMA. They will make secure and stabilize THAILAND and place the CHINESE in that area under blockade.

2. The main force of the Air Group will prepare for future operations by deploying to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

3. The 3rd Air Brigade, to which is attached the 15th Independent Air Unit (except the 51st Independent Air Squadron), will deploy to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA by the evening of (X minus 3) day and from (X minus 2) day will prepare for an aerial annihilation combat against the KOTABHARU area.

By noon of (X) day the 27th Air Regiment will prepare for an advance to SINGORA.

The disposition of Air Transport Units for the 2nd concentration will remain as before.

4. On the evening of (X minus 3) day the 7th Air Brigade will deploy to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA and from (X minus 2) day prepare for aerial annihilation combat against the KEDAH area.

For the sake of the 2nd concentration, the 7th Air Transport

Unit and the temporarily assigned heavy bombers will be under the command of the unit at CANTON.

5. After deploying to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA, on the evening of (X minus 3) day, the 10th Air Brigade will prepare for an aerial annihilation combat against the KOTABHARU area and South BURMA on (X minus 2) day. They will also prepare to cooperate with the main force of the 15th Army.

The summary of the operations in cooperation with the 15th Army is shown on an attached sheet.

The section of a fighter unit reserved for the air defense of SANAH will return to the main force to enable the advance group of the 25th Army to proceed beyond the sphere of power. When the commander of the Air Brigade arrives in ~~KURAKORU~~ KRAKOR the 70th Independent Air Squadron will return to its original attachment.

The assignment of the Air Transport Unit for the 2nd concentration is as before.

On (X minus 2) day, the 3rd, 7th and 10th Air Brigade will advance to the front line of battle with the following troop strength.

Half of the force from dawn till 1500 hours of (X minus 2) day

Full force from dawn till 1500 hours of (X minus 1) day.

7. While carrying out their assigned mission the 12th Air Brigade will arrange to protect the advance group of the 25th Army and convoys of the section of the 15th Army. Orders pertinent to the protection of convoys will be issued later.

Upon arrival in South FRENCH INDO-CHINA, at the latest in CANTON by 3 December, the 7th Air Transport Unit and the specially attached heavy bombers will be under the command of the 7th Air Brigade.

8. The 83rd Independent Air Unit will advance to NHATRANG and prepare for a future rush.

Annexed Sheet

Operational plans for cooperation with the 15th Army

1. The summary of plans is as follows:

(1). Plan A.

In the event that the 15th Army should make a forced invasion of THAILAND.

(a). At dawn of (X) day, the main force of the 10th Air Brigade, in cooperation with the advance units of the Guard Division, will facilitate an invasion of BANGKOK by attacking potential enemy air and ground forces. Under certain conditions the Air Brigade will cooperate directly with the YOSHIDA Detachment.

(b). The Reconnaissance Force will reconnoiter the situation of the Guard Division and on the dawn of (X) day, will especially check the situation of the YOSHIDA Detachment and the landing of UNO Detachment.

(2). Plan B.

In the event that the 15th Army meets little resistence.

(a). Beginning at dawn of (X) day, the ground forces will prepare for attack in case of resistance from the THAILAND Army.

The date and points of attack of the ground force will be limited only to what is necessary.

(b). In the event that the airfield at KONGMUANG is useable on (X) day, a part of the soldiers will be transported by air from ~~KURAKORU~~ KRAKOR to BANGKOK by the Air Transport Unit.

(c). The reconnaissance is applied to Plan A.

(3). The operation of the 15th Army after the occupation of THAILAND.

After the ground forces secure the airfields in Central THAILAND, the Air Brigade will cooperate in the future operations of the 15th Army by advancing forces as soon as possible.

(4). In case the BRITISH Army invade THAILAND first and makes the initial attack upon us.

If the 15th Army has already invaded THAILAND under orders, the forces will operate according to the plans A or B.

2. Details of the abovementioned operations will be conferred upon by the forces concerned.

3. The choice of either A or B plan for use in the 15th Army occupation of THAILAND will be decided by (X minus 3) day. This

information will be sent to the 15th Army and on (X) day, before the departure of the 10th Air Brigade, the information will again be conveyed to the 15th Army in order to be certain.

4. Communication Liaison.

(1). Communication network.

The communication between the General Headquarters of the 15th Army and the 10th Air Brigade will be carried out on the communication network of the Air Signal Forces.

(2). Air-Ground Liaison.

The air-ground liaison between the 15th Army General Headquarters and the 10th Air Brigade will be based on the 15th Army liaison regulations.

The situation of the 1st and 2nd concentrations of the Air Force will be shown on the attached sheet.

The 2nd concentration was carried out during a severe northeast monsoon, in the worst weather the east coast of FRENCH INDOCHINA had ever experienced. Because of this the operations of the air units were considerably handicaped. In the course of concentration, many air accidents occured and the commanders of the 27th and the 75th Air Brigade were killed.

During the 1st concentration from 15 Nov. to 1 Dec., the 3rd and 7th Air Brigades based upon the plans of the South Army, made plans for attacking enemy military installations at KOMMEI, KEIRIN and HYAKUSHOKU. Because of unfavorable weather conditions, they were unable to attack the assigned targets but succeeded in hitting other important installations.

On 11 Nov. the General Headquarters of the 3rd Air Group was transferred to SAIGON.

Chapter IV

The Execution of Operations

Sec. I

In coordination with the landing operation of the advance groups of the 15th and 25th Armies, the aerial annihilation combat in Northern MALAY at the outbreak of war, and the invasion of

Inserted Diagram:

Chart Showing the Course of Convergence of Air Units

See Japanese text

THAILAND by the 15th Army.

In the early part of December cloudy weather with frequent squalls prevailed over THAILAND Bay and the same weather continued until 7 Dec. At 300 meters strato-cumulus with cumulo-nimbus clouds predominated the course of our convoy, making visibility very poor. From 1400 hours till sunset the weather became worse, making our return flight from convoy protection very difficult.

In regard to the protection of the convoys of the advance group of the 25th and 15th Armies, the Commander of the 3rd Air Brigade issued the following orders:

(1). The Air Brigade will protect the convoys of the advance group of the 25th Army and those of a section of the 15th Army. The prearranged course and the division of convoys are shown in the annexed sheets No. 1 and No. 2 respectively.

(2). On (X minus 2) day the 12th Air Regiment, to which are attached the main force of the 77th Air Regiment, a section of the 64th Air Regiment, and the 81st Air Regiment, will be responsible for the protection of the main force of the convoys described in order (1), as per attached sheet No. 3.

(3). On the evening of (X minus 1) day, the Commander of the 7th Air Brigade will make a section of his heavy bombers available to aid in the safe return of the 12th Air Brigade fighter units used for the protection of convoys described in order No. (2).

(4). On the evening of (X minus 1) day, the 7th Air Brigade Command will guide the return of the fighter unit described in order No. (2) and make arrangements for landing at night.

Annexed Sheet No. 3

Outline of Convoy Protection

1. The 12th Air Brigade will be responsible for the aerial protection of the convoys of the advance group of the 25th Army and those of a section of the 15th Army.

After the convoys have advanced separately from point G, of the attached sheet No. 1, the Air Brigade will protect the landing barges between SINGORA and PATANI.

2. The period of above mentioned protection will be from sunset o

Inserted Diagram

Prearranged Convoy Route

Insect Diagram

Prearranged Conday Route

Separate Sheet No. 2

Sectional Chart on the Advance Troop Convey

Landing Troops		Landing Units	Ship Units	Ship Number and Position of Commander
25th Army	First Landing Unit of the 5th Division	Right Flank Unit (SINGORO)	1st Squad	ATSUTE MARU (Brig. C.O. Maj. Gen. KAWAMURA); WAKO MARU; KASHII MARU (Div.C.O. Lt. Gen. MATSUI); RUJO MARU; KANZAI MARU (Comm.- in-Chief Lt.Gen. YAMA - SHITA; 41 Inf. Regt. CO Col. OKABE)
			2nd Squad	SASAKO MARU; ASAKA - YAMA; AOBAYAMA MARU; KYU - SHU; SADO MARU; MAMI-NOUE MARU (Hosp. ship) (11th Inf. Regt Co. Col. WATANABE)
		Left Flank Unit (TAPI and PATANI)	3rd Squad	(MALAYA) TAPI: KINU-KAWA MARU; ASOZAN MARU. PATANI: TOZAN MARU; KOSEN MARU; KINKA MARU; SAGAMI MARU
	UMI Detach.	KOTA - BHARU	4th Squad	AWAGISAN MARU (Brig. C.O. Maj. Gen. UMI); AYATOSAN MARU; SAKURAI MARU (56th Inf. Regt.C.O. Col. MASU)
15th Army	UNO Detachment		5th Squad	(BANDOENG) YAMAURA MARU; (PRACHUAP) JOHORU MARU; (CHUMPHON) FUSHIMI MARU; RYOYE MARU (143rd Inf. Regt. C.O. Col. UNO)
			6th Squad	ZENYO MARU; MIEKE MARU; TOHO MARU (Repair Ship)

Note: The Army and Navy Commanders will decide all matters other than these after their meeting.

to sunrise, especially around 1500 hours. The attack will be directed against enemy bombers and torpedo bombers.

3. The reconnaissance seaplanes of the Naval Airforce will be responsible for protection of the convoys against enemy submarines until sunset.

4. The airfields at SONDO, KUKAN, ~~KONPONTORACHU~~ KOMPONG TRACH and TANI may be utilized in carrying out the duties of No. (1) and (2).

The Commander of the 12th Air Brigade ordered three reconnaissance planes attached to the General Headquarters to reconnoiter the convoys and direct the fighter units, from early morning of the 7th. He also directed a squadron of the fighter unit to form aerial cover for the convoy and 3 attached heavy bombers against submarines.

A squadron of the 1st Air Regiment on first duty missed the anticipated position of the convoy and returned to its base without sighting it. Toward evening 3 heavy bombers of the 98th Air Regiment sighted the convoys but due to unfavorable weather conditions returned to their base.

The 64th Air Brigade left for the final protection of the convoys inspite of bad weather but were forced to return due to low hanging clouds over the sea and several squalls. Two planes did not return and one was forced to land. In the morning and the afternoon one plane each of the 1st Air Brigade was seriously damaged in forced landings.

Orders on the 1st attack:

Prior to this, at 1200 hours of 5 Dec., the Commander of the 3rd Air Group issued the following order on the 1st attack on PNON PENH.

1. The South Army in cooperation with the Navy will commence occupation of south strategic areas.

On the night of 7 Dec., in order to occupy SINGAPORE, the main advance unit of the 25th Army will land on the east coast of SINGORA while a section of the unit will land at TARPEY, PATANI and KOTA-BHARU. After these armies secure their foremost positions by occupation of the above-mentioned airfields, the main force will

promptly penetrate KEDAH Province. After the invasion of THAILAND, the 15th Army will facilitate the operations of the 25th Army and assist in putting the mids of the people of THAILAND at ease. They will also place a blockade on CHINA from this area, and prepare for future operations in BURMA.

On the dawn of 8 Dec., the main force of the UNO Detachment of the 15th Army will land at ~~BURACHAPU, KIRIKAN~~ PRACHUAP KHIRI KHAN and CHUMPONG in order to secure the airfields, and a section of the Detachment will land at BANDONG and NAKON.

2. From dawn of 8 Dec., the main duty of the Air Brigade will be the destruction of enemy air power in North MALAYA, in close co-operation with the operations of the 15th and 25th Armies.

At 0600 hours of 8 Dec. the 22nd Naval Air Regiment will attack the group of airfields near SINGAPORE and KWANTAN.

3. On dawn of 8 Dec., the Commander of the 3rd Air Brigade will attack enemy airplanes on airfields at KOTABHARU (except KOTABHARU Airfield) and will annihilate them rapidly with successive attacks.

From 1200 hours of 8 Dec. a squadron of the 27th Air Regiment at ~~KONPONKUNAN~~ KOMPONG Airfield will prepare for penetration into airfields in South THAILAND.

By 1500 hours of 7 Dec., 2 planes of the Regiment will be dispatched to PNONPENH Airfield and be under direct command of the 3rd Air Group Commander.

4. On the dawn of 8 Dec. the Commander of the 7th Air Brigade will attack enemy airplanes on group of airfields at KEDAH and annihilate them promptly by successive attacks.

In the event of unfavorable weather conditions, the Commander will attack the group of airfields at KOTAHBARU (except KOTABHARU Airfield).

When the heavy bombers of the 90th Air Brigade make their first attack, a fighter unit squadron will assist them.

5. The boundary for the zones of action of the 3rd and 7th Air Brigades will be the line connecting BATANI and GUAMSAN.

6. At 0930 hours of 8 Dec., the heavy bomber unit under the

command of the 15th Air Brigade will attack enemy airplanes on the group of airfields at KOTABHARU (except KOTABHARU Airfield), assisted by a fighter unit squadron of the 7th Air Brigade. The main force of the 7th Air Brigade will cooperate with the 15th Army invasion of THAILAND.

7. On 8 Dec., when the 25th Army has secured the airfields in South THAILAND, the forces responsible for the air defense of the two harbors at SINGORA and PATANI will be the 22nd Air Regiment from dawn till 1100 hours and the 12th Air Brigade from 1100 hours on. While the necessary forces are protecting the harbors, the rest of the forces will make attacks on enemy airforces near KEDAH and KOTABHARU.

8. On 8 Dec. the Commander of the 81st Air Regiment will perform the following duties:

(a). In the early morning, occupy the airfields and reconnoiter the battle conditions in the vicinity of the landing place for the 25th and 15th Armies.

(b). At 1200 hours and 1700 hours, respectively, will reconnoiter the enemy air situation in Central, South MALAYA and South BURMA.

9. By 1200 hours on 8 Dec., the Commander of the 834d Independent Air Unit will take a squadron of his reconnaissance planes and push forward to the 2nd airfield at TANI and prepare for a rush on the airfield in South THAILAND.

10. The assignment of transport planes for rushing South THAILAND on 8 Dec. will be as follows:

ASSIGNED UNIT	DISPATCHING UNIT (Types and Amount of Air Planes)	ATTACHED DATES
12th Air Brigade	13th Special Air Transport Unit 3 AT of 2nd Squadron	1800 of 7 Dec. at ZOONDO.
27th Air Regiment	15th Special Air Transport Unit 2 AT of 2nd Squadron	1800 of 7 Dec. at ~~KONDONKUNAN~~. KOMPONG
Squadron of Recon. planes of 83rd Independent Air Unit	Same as above	1800 of 7 Dec. at 2nd Airfield at TANI.

11. Commanders of the 13th and 15th Special Air Transport Units will dispatch the above-mentioned planes and place them under the command of the respective units.

12. The Commanders of the 15th Special Air Transport Unit (except 2nd Squadron) and temporary Air Transport Units will arrive at ~~KURAKHORU~~ KRAKOR at 1500 hours on 7 Dec. and cooperate in the transporting of the units of the 15th Army on the 8th. By 1200 hours on 9 Dec. they will return to original base.

While assisting in transporting the units of the 15th Army, the Commander of the 15th Special Air Transport Unit is delegated the command of the Commanders of the temporary air transport units.

Meteorological Effects on Operations

Around 8~~0~~9 Dec. the anti-cyclone predominant in MONGOLIA declined considerably and the monsoon in the THAILAND Bay and MALAYA areas subsided. Though in the morning, during the 1st attack, the weather was unusually good, dense clouds prevailed off the MALAYA Peninsula in the afternoon, slowing operations considerably.

On dawn, 8 Dec., while the main strength of the 7th Air Brigade was deploying at PNONPENH Airfield, a violent squall hit the area changing it into a quagmire, thus making it very difficult for the planes to take off..The Commander of the Air Brigade, giving up the plan for unified attack, was waiting for better conditions (the 1st attack being set at 1200 hours). Only the 98th Air Regiment, which was deployed at SAIGON Airfield (where there was no squall) was able to carry out the 1st attack at the appointed hour; whereas the main force of other units were directing their operations toward the 1st attack.

The Situation of the Advance Group of the 25th Army and the WAMI Detachment

At 0200 hours, 8 Dec., the advance group of the 25th Army entered the anchorage and between 0400 hours and 0500 hours the main force landed at SINGORA. A section landed near BATANI to occupy the airfields. At 0200 hours, 10 Dec., the main force invaded KEDAH Province by crossing the northwest front. The

WAMI Detachment landed near KOTABHARU after a fierce night attack and at 1000 hours on 10 Dec. occupied the airfield at TANAHMERAH. The 15th Army succeeded in advancing to THAILAND without meeting resistance at 0830 hours, 8 Dec., and reached BANGKOK by crossing the frontier.

The Battle Proceedings of the 3rd Air Group

Although the movement of the 3rd Air Group did not coincide with the previous plan, on dawn of 8 Dec., the Air Group made its 1st aerial annihilation attack on the KOTABHARU and KEDAH areas. Within 2 days the enemy was subjugated and defeated; one-third of the BRITISH Airforce defeated and the rest retreated to SINGAPORE.

According to the order of the South Army, on the 9th, the 83rd Independent Air Unit was now under the command of the 25th Army.

Outline of the Progress of Battle Proceedings in Various Areas

KOTABHARU Area (8 Dec.):

Thirty-nine airplanes (11 fighters and 28 light bombers) of the 3rd Air Group (59 FR, 75 FR, 90 FR) left ~~KONPONTORASHU~~ KOMPONG TRACH between 0800 hours and 0900 hours and attacked the airfields at TANAHMERAH and ~~KUWARABESTO~~ KUALA BESTO. They destroyed the landing field and the runaway and fought with 15 enemy fighters, which had come to counter-attack Ten enemy planes were shot down and 5 of our planes seriously damaged.

A favorable target of more than 10 twin-engined fighters was sighted on KOTABHARU Airfield but because of the agreement with the 25th Army the 3rd Air Brigade returned without attacking them. Fifty-three airplanes (5 fighters and 48 light bombers) of the 2nd attack unit (59 FR, 75 FR, 90 FR) advanced to the front but due to unfavorable weather returned to their base. Twenty-three planes of the 75th Air Regiment attacked ~~KUWARA~~KUALA BESTO and demolished the runway and 3 fighters were enclosed in a revetment. The 12th Air Brigade, taking charge of the Naval Air Force, succeeded in landing at SINGORA between 1110 hours and 1330 hours and commenced performing duties of air defense around

H6

SINGORA.

KEDAH Area (8 Dec.):

Ninety-three planes (18 fighters and 75 heavy bombers) of the 7th Air Brigade (12 FR, 60 FR, 98 FR, 64 FR) left the airbases at PNONPENH, SAIGON and ZUHONDO, between 0800 hours and 0900 hours, a section of them and between 1210 hours and 1240 hours. The main force attacked, respectively, the airfields of SUNGEI PATANI (north and south), ~~ARORUSTAR~~ ALOR STAR, ~~KECHIRU~~ KETIL, ~~AERUTAWARU~~ AYER TAWAR and PENANG. In this attack 23 enemy grounded planes, hangar, and various other installations were demolished, while 3 of our planes were seriously damaged and forced to land.

THAILAND Area (8 Dec.):

As the 3rd Air Group Commander was not certain until 1500 hours of the 8th whether the Army had advanced to THAILAND by force or without meeting resistance, he found it necessary to attack ~~DONG MUANG~~ DOMUAN Airfield (where ground 50 enemy planes were thought to be assembled) and ordered the Commander of the 10th Air Brigade to prepare for the attack. Around 1300 hours, because of a message received from the 15th Army, it was decided they could advance without encountering resistance. On the same day, the 62nd Air Regiment of the 10th Air Brigade participated in an attack upon KOTABHARU Area. In this battle 5 airplanes, including the Commander's plane were lost in the main forces of FRENCH INDO-CHINA because of dark nights and unfavorable weather conditions. Twenty planes (11 fighters and 9 light bombers) of the other main force (77 FR and 11 FR) made a flight over ~~ARANPRANTET~~ ARANYAPRATHET Airfield to demoralize the enemy.in the KOTABHARU area

In the KOTABHARU Area (9 Dec.):

Forty-five planes (6 fighters and 39 light bombers) of the 3rd Air Brigade (59 FR, 75 FR, 90 FR) took off around 1100 hours; a section attacked the airfield at KOTABHARU and the main force at ~~KUWARA~~ KUALA BESTO and destroyed 11 grounded enemy planes and the runway.

At 1350 hours the 62nd Air Regiment (heavy bombers) of the

10th Air Brigade attacked the airfield at TANAHMERAH and destroyed 8 enemy grounded planes. One of our planes was slightly damaged and forced to land.

A fighter squadron and an assualt squadron of the 12th Air Brigade attacked the airfield at TANAHMERAH and destroyed one enemy grounded plane and 2 anti-aircraft machine-guns.

At KEDAH Area (9 Dec.):

Ninety-three airplanes (17 fighters and 76 heavy bombers) of the 7th Air Regiment (64 FR, 12 FR, 60 FR, 98 FR) advanced to attackthe principal airfield in KEDAH Area but because of bad weather changed their course to VICTORIA POINT and suspended attack. Only the 64th Air Regiment landed at SINGORA . With the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Air Group in command, they attacked the airfields at PENANG and ~~AERUTAWARU~~ AYER TAWAR and shot down 6 BLENHEIM planes and destroyed 5 enemy grounded planes.

A squadron each of fighters and assualt planes of the 12th Air Brigade attacked the airfield at ~~AERUTAWARU~~ AYER TAWAR and destroyed 16 enemy planes.

Details of the 3rd Air Brigade's Bombardment
of Friendly Troops by Mistake

In accordance with the agreement with the 25th Army, the 3rd Air Group ordered the 3rd Air Brigade to make the initial attack on the interior airfields at ~~KUWARA~~ KUALA BESTO and TANAHMERAH (except KOTABHARU Airfield) on 8 Dec.

The 3rd Air Brigade directed the 1st attack upon these airfields as ordered. The convoys of WAMI Detachment fought a hard battle because of enemy attacks at KOTABHARU from both land and air. However, the main force of the bombers attacked the interior airfields and few fighters attacked the enemy airplanes above the convoy.

Judging from the report of the General Headquarters reconnaissance planes that 6 friendly vessels were advancing toward the northwest with 2 vessels burning near the seashore, the Commander of the Air Brigade was doubtful about the landing of the WAMI

Detachment and concluded that the airfield of KOTABHARU was not yet occupied. After returning to the base he reported the fact to the Commander of the Air Group and thought it wise to direct the 1st attack upon the airfield. But the Commander of the Air Group received the report that the airfield was occupied so ordered the 3rd Air Brigade to attack the original targets in the 1st attack. But because of unfavorable weather conditions most of the Air Brigade returned to the base. Only the 75th Air Regiment succeeded in attacking the airfield at ~~KUWARA~~KUALA BESTO.

On hearing that KOTABHARU Airbase had been occupied the Air Brigade Commander prepared to advance there because the fighter unit was suffering from lack of air jettisonable fuel tanks. Around evening the report turned out to be false. That evening the 25th Army Commander asked the Chief of Staff to attack the planes on the airfield at KOTABHARU. On 9 Dec. the Commander of the Air Group ordered the 3rd Air Brigade to attack the KOTABHARU Airfield. The 3rd Air Brigade directed their attack upon the airfield. On arriving over the field they noticed that the WAMI Detachment was occupying the airfield and so directed their attack on aiffields at TANAHMERAH and ~~KUWARA~~KUALA BESTO.

Movements of the Naval Air Force

At early dawn of 8 Dec., the Naval airplanes bombarded the enemy airforce headquarter installations at TENGAR and SERETAR, near SINGAPORE. On the morning of the 9th they attack one BRITISH cargo vessel and damaged it seriously. In the afternoon of that day they bombarded the airfield at ~~KUWANGTANG~~KUANTAN and destroyed 10 enemy planes and the hangar.

Anchorage and Landing Protection
for the Advance Units of the 25th Army

On 8 Dec. at KUKAN Airfield the Commander of the 12th Air Brigade was eagerly looking forward to the report of the occupation of the harbor airfields. However, he received no definite report and having no desire to land in the midst of the enemy, he left the airfield with all his units. The 1st Air Regiment

advanced over SINGORA and the 11th Air Regiment over BATANI.

The Commander of the Air Brigade, commanding the 1st Air Regiment, cruised directly over SINGORA and did not see any enemy planes. Finding that the vessels were all safe and the airfield already occupied, he landed on SINGORA Airfield at 1110 hours.

While scouting over BATANI the 11th Air Regiment encountered 2 enemy planes at the height of 1,000 meters and turned them back. Since the airfield at BATANI was not to be occupied till 1200 hours and was flooded, they landed at SINGORA at 1330 hours. A squadron each of the 1st and 12th Air Brigades were detached for anchorage protection.

On the 9th, a squadron each of the 1st and 12th Brigades was assinged to protect airfields at TANAHMERAH and ~~ABRUTAWARU~~ AYER TAWAR.

Situation of the Air Sector Units

The 1st Air Sector Unit cooperated with the air units passing through and the 15th Air Sector Unit cooperated with the 3rd, 7th and 12th Air Brigades. The 7th Air Sector Unit cooperated with the operations of the 10th Air Brigade. They cooperated especially with them in advancing a section of them to ~~DONGMUANG~~ DOMUAN Airfield after the 15th Army invasion of THAILAND. The 12th and 18th Air Sector Units were with the advance unit of the 25th Army when they landed in South THAILAND and KOTABHARU. The 12th Air Sector Unit landed and deployed at SINGORA, BATANI and KOTABHARU and the 18th at BANDONG and NAKONG. Thus these air sector units c cooperated closely with the advance units in the aerial invasion of MALAYA by establishing, completing and protecting the airfields.

Movements of Enemy Airforce

We cannot discover the plan of the enemy on our landing in MALAYA, but as a whole the movements of the enemy airforce were very few, according to the prisoners' statement thee airforce of the enemy at the outbreak of war amounted to about 300 planes.

Situation of the Occupied Airfields

SINGORA Airfield

Because of bad drainage equipment, large hollow areas, and

frequent violent showers the work on the airfield did not progress. Since the airfield was in bad condition accidents occured frequently. However, by the middle of December we were able to carry out operations from this field.

PATANI Airfield

Violent flood and destruction from bombardment made the field very difficult to use at first, but by the 15th we were able to use it.

KOTABHARU Airfield

Can be used by No. 1 type fighters and 99 type assault planes.

TANAHMERAH Airfield

Can be used by large airplanes.

KUALA
~~KUWARA~~BESTO Airfield

Can be used by medium-sized planes.

NAKON Airfield

Can be used by medium-sized planes.

Vol. II. Part 3.

Chapter I.

Section 2. The period covering the coordinated land operations and annhiliating air attacks by the 25th Army in KEDA Province of Central MALAYA.

Condition of the 25th Advance Army Corps.

The main force of the 25th Advance Army Corps will penetrate the border between SIAM and BRITISH MALAYA and advance southward on 10 Dec. It will attack and occupy JITTORA on 12 December, and PENANG Island on 18 Dec. The ANDO Detachment will penetrate the border in the direction of PETONG on 15 Dec., and will advance to the vicinity of LEKON with a unit of the Ando Detachment on 18 December. The WABIMI Detachment will attack KUALA ~~KURAI~~ KRAI from 14 Dec. and occupy TOLENGASU on 18 Dec.

The 3rd Wave of the transport convoy of the 25th Advance Army Corps will commence advance landings on SINGORA on 15 Dec. Our naval air units achieved great success in attacks on the battleships PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE of the BRITISH Main Fleet off the coast of MALAYA on 10 Dec.

Status of the 3rd Air Division.

The 3rd Air Division commander issued orders for the complete destruction of enemy air power in both the KOTABARU and KEDA Province sectors. Together with the exploitation of battle successes of the 25th Army, it made preparations for the advance towards Southern SIAM for the purpose of an immediate following-up operation. Along with the continuation of the destruction of the enemy air power with the same force, it will cooperate with the landing operations of the 25th Army. Sumultaneously, it will determine the prosecution of the attack on the important position of PENANG. At 2000 hours on 10 December a summary of the following orders was handed down.

1. The main force of the 25th Army Landing Unit advanced to YARA (40 kilometers south of BATANI), SINGORA and the ALOR STAR highway near the border on the evening of 9 Dec. The Headquarters will be situated at SINGORA at this time. About 30 enemy ships were sighted yesterday (9 Dec.) near PENANG Bay and about 15 ships were sighted today.

2. The main force of the 3rd Air Division will continue aerial annhiliation attacks as well as cooperating in the operations of the 25th Army and attacking important positions.

3. A segment of the 3rd Air Division will advance towards NAKONG. It cooperated mainly in the battles of the 25th Army and made preparations for the aerial annhiliation attacks on FUKUTOH and VICTORIA POINT.

4. The 7th Air Division commander was responsible for the attacks on GEORGETOWN and PENANG harbor, especially against enemy ships after 11 Dec., and the destruction of the enemy air strength in the vicinity of KUANTAN.

The fighter unit will be allowed to utilize the KOTABARU airfield.

5. The 12th Air Division commander will pursue his previous duties.

The 3rd Air Division.

6. Air transport units will be attached to the 3rd and 7th Air Divisions as follows in their advance. However, the transportation of these rapid advance unit mechanics will be limited to a minimum.

The 3rd Air Division.

The 2nd Squadron of the Mobilized 15th Air Transport Unit will be formed at 0900 hours 11 Dec. at ~~KONPONGTORASHU~~ KOMPONG TRACH.

The 7th Air Division.

The 12th Air Transport Squadron will be formed at 0800 hours at PNOM PENH.

It will immediately return to its station after completing its duties.

7. During the time for transporting, the 12th Air Transport Squadron will come under the command of the 7th Air Division commander.

The commander of the Mobilized 15th Air Transport Unit will order the 2nd Squadron to come under the command of the 3rd Air Division commander.

The situation of the 3rd Air Division on 10 Dec. is indicated in appended chart No.6.

After-Battle Summary.

After 21 Dec., owing to the approach of the windy season and thick cloud formations along the eastern coast of MALAYA and the Gulf of SIAM, the deployment of heavy bomber units to southern INDO-CHINA could not be prosecuted even when 16 Dec. approached.

However, the weather around the western coast of MALAYA was favorable. The 3rd and 12th Air Divisions and the 64th Fighter Unit which were to advance to Southern SIAM while attacking the enemy airfields at KEDAH and PERAK Provinces, co-operated with the 25th Army. The target area of PENANG was

Appended Map # 6:

Sketch of 3RD Air Group Formation

On 10 Dec.

See Japanese Text

Appended Map # 6

Sketch / 3rd Air Group
formation on 10 Dec

attacked, 31 enemy planes were shot down, 20 large-sized boats and immumerable small boats were sunk or destroyed by fire. Over 50 trucks were damaged and widespread damage was inflicted on various establishments.

However, our side suffered the loss of 6 aircrafts.

The ground crew unit that was to land in Southern SIAM became attached to the spearhead unit of the 25th Army. It gradually advanced to airfields in KEDAH Province as well as deploying to various airfields in Southern SIAM, KOTABARU and TANAMERAH.

Co-operation of the 3rd and 12th Air Divisions in the Ground Operations of the 25th Army.

The main force (27th and 59th Air Regiments and Air Brigade Hdqrs.) of the 3rd Air Division advanced to NAKONG airfield on 11 Dec. and the 75th and 90th Air Regiments advanced on 14 Dec. From 14 to 16 Dec. it co-operated with the 25th Army in its battles between ALOR STAR and ~~SUNGEIBATANI~~ SUNGEI PATANI, attacked the retreating enemy units and their trucks, alleviated the attacks of the 25th Army and co-operated in the battles of the Wabimi Unit in the vicinity of KUALA ~~KURAI~~ KRAI with one detachment from 18 to 20 Dec.

One assault squadron of the 27th Air Regiment which is attached to the 12th Air Brigade will co-operate in the operations of the Wabimi Detachment (this same squadron will return to its original station on 15 Dec.

Aerial Annhiliation Battle.

The 3rd Air Brigade (59th, 90th and 27th Air Regiments) attacked 6 times between 15 to 20 Dec. with NAKONG as its base. Sixty seven planes were engaged (39 fighters, 6 assault and 22 light bombers) in the attack on IPOH airfield. Fourteen enemy planes were shot down or destroyed.

The 98th Air Regiment of the 7th Air Brigade with SAIGON as its base attacked KUALA BESTO airfield with 26 heavy bombers on 13 Dec. The 12th Air Regiment and the 60th Air Regiment of the 7th Air Brigade with its base at PNOM PENH attacked ~~MELUGI~~ MERGUI airfield with 51 heavy bombers on the same day. The 98th Air Regiment of the 7th Air Brigade attacked the wireless station on MATATSUKU island together with the incessant attacks on KUANTAN airfield by 32 planes of the 64th Air Regiment with its base at KOTABARU on 14 Dec. and bombed various installations destroying large-sized enemy planes.

The various airfields at ~~PUKETO~~, ~~SUNKEIBATANI~~, ~~AERUTAWARU~~, ~~KECHIRU~~ PHUKET, SUNGEI PATANI, AYER TAWAR, KETIL and PENANG were attacked by respective units of the 12th Air Brigade which was based at SINGORA between 10-14 Dec. Twenty eight enemy aircrafts were destroyed with our losses being a serious damage to 1 plane and 3 planes missing.

Attack on PENANG

Aside from aerial annhiliation attacks as statedbefore, the 3rd Air Division attacked PENANG Harbor and the home depots at GEORGETOWN between 11-13 December, obtaining favorable results. That is, the 64th, 12th and 60th Air Regiments of the 7th Air Brigade with a total of 58 planes (17 fighter and 41 heavy bombers), 59th, 27th, 75th and 90th Air Regiments of the 3rd Air Brigade with a total of 26 planes (5 fighters, 3 assault and 18 light bombers) as well as the 98th Air Regiment of the 7th Air Brigade with 26 heavy bombers attacked PENANG Harbor and the streets of GEORETOWN on 11, 12 and 13 Dec. respectively. Thirteen large transports and numerous small boats were sunk.

Furthermore, harbor establishments were bombed and destroyed. We engaged 10 enemy fighters on 13 December and we suffered the loss of 5 planes, including the commander of the 59th Air Regiment.

Protection of the 12th Air Brigade Base.

The 12th Air Brigade overcame the difficulties of inclement weather and a bad airfield in its mission to protect the landing operations of the transport convoy of the 25th Army on 15 December.

Condition of the Air Sector Units.

The Air Division commander will deploy various ground crew units on 15 Dec. inorder to deploy the main force of the Air Division in the MALAY peninsula as well as having it co-operate in the operations of other air units. The 18th Air Sector Unit will be advanced toairfields at ALOR STAR and ~~SUNKEIBATANI~~ SUNGEI PATANI, simultaneously with the occupation of KEDAHairfield by the 25th Army.

1. The disposition of the ground service units is illustrated in separate sheet No. 1.

2. Aside from continuing to perform his previous duties, the 18th Air

Sector Unit commander will deploy fresh subordinate units to various airfields located on the western bank of the PERAK river in BRITISH MALAYA. He will take charge of the airsector duties and aid in deployment of the ground crew units under direct control of Air Division.

The 12th Air Sector Unit commander will aid in the debarkation and transportation of newly arrived subordinate units.

The basic disposition of the 18th Air Sector Unit is indicated in attached sheet No. 2.

3. Aside from conducting his previous duties, the 12th Air Sector Unit commander will gradually deploy the new subordinate units upon their arrival. He will take charge of the air sector duties.

He will futhermore aid in the debarkation and transportation of the 18th Air Sector Unit and the ground crew unit under direct command of Air Division.

The basic disposition of the 12th Air Sector Unit is indicated in attached sheet No.3.

4. After considering transferring the following units, the commander of the 12th Air Sector Unit concentrated them in the vicinity of SINGORA and BATANI and waited for an opportunity.

1 unit of the 21st Airfield Bn.

1/2 Company of a Line of Communications Motor-car Unit.

5. The 1st, 15th and 10th Air Brigades were attached and the air sector boundaries were adjusted as follows:

The boundary between the 1st and 15th Air Sectors will run southward from SAVANNAKHET along the MEKONG River (on the east side if there is a tributary) and northward of SAVANNAKHET along the boundary line between SIAM and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The boundary between the 15th and 10th Air Brigade sectors will run southward of BAKUMUJI along the SIAM-FRENCH INTO-CHINA boundary line.

6. The zero hour for taking command of the newly arrived air sector units and the readjustment of airsector boundaries in FRENCH INDO-CHINA and Central MALAYA will be 20 December. The zero hour in MALAYA for the troops there at present will be on 18 December.

The time for the landing of the troops advancing in MALAYA will be determined also.

Each Air Sector Unit commander will dispose his subordinate units as they leave or dispose air ground crews until their commanders arrive or between the dispatch of the commander until the dispatch of the concerned air ground crew units.

7. The commander of the air signal unit of the 2nd Air Division, the commander of the speed calculating unit, the commander of the meteorlegical service unit and the commander of the 16th Air Intelligence unit will take special charge of their respective duties as to the deployment of the advancing units of the main force into the MALAY peninsula as shown in attached sheets #4-6.

8. The commander of the airforce field repairing depot will deploy a part of the 4th Mobile Repairing Squad to SINGORA and aside from charge of the repairing and supplying of the advance units in MALAY, he will wait for an oppertunity with the main force of the 3rd and 4th Mobile Repairing Squad at SINGORA and prepare for further advances.

Separate Sheet #1.

Disposition of the Ground Crew Unit of the 3rd Air Division.

1st Air Sector Unit.

Commander ----- Col. Kawamoto.

1st Air Sector Headquarters.

1/3 of the 23rd Airfield Bn.

3rd Airfield Company (minus 1 unit)

6th " "

7th " "

12th " "

33rd " "

281st Independent Motor-car Co.

Air Sector Unit attached to the 10th Air Brigade

7th Air Sector Headquarters.

Commander ----- Col, Taniuchi

15th Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3).

1 part of the 27th Airfield Bn.

40th Airfield Bn.(minus 1/3).

97th Airfield Bn.

Airfield Bn. of the 62nd Air Regiment

9th Airfield Co.

29th Airfield Co.

190th Company of Line of Communications Vehicles

80th Ground Crew Co.

15th Air Sector Unit

Commander of the 15th Air Sector Headquarters--Col. MATSUZAKI

15th Air Sector Headquarters

Approx. 1/3 of the 15th Airfield Bn.

" " " " 17th " "

27th Airfield Bn. (minus 1 unit)

Approx. 1/3 of the 35th Airfield Bn.

36th Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3)

Approx. 1/3 of the 40th Airfield Bn.

" " " " 41st " "

" " " " 82nd " "

" " " " 91st " "

" " " " 92nd " "

" " " " 93rd " "

" " " " 94th " "

96th Airfield Bn.

36th Field AA Bn.

184th Line of Communications Vehicle Co.

280th Independent Motor-car Co.

81st Ground Crew Co.

12th Air Sector Unit

Commander of the 12th Air Sector Headquarters--Lt. Col. MIZUSHIMA

12th Air Sector Headquarters

1 part of the 31st Air Regiment

23rd Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3)

21st Airfield Bn.

22nd Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3)

1 part of the 41st Wing

Approx. 1/3 of the 36th Airfield Bn.

92nd Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3)

94th " " (minus 2/3)

5th " Co.

32nd Field A.A. Bn. (minus 1 Co.)

5th and 8th Airfield Establishment Units

43rd and 48th Construction Co.

67th, 68th, and 69th Ground Crew Co.

167th Line of Communications Vehicle Co.

18th Air Sector Unit

Commander of the 18th Air Sector Headquarters--Lt. Col. FUJIOKA

18th Air Sector Headquarters

Approx. 1/3 of the 22nd Airfield Bn.

17th Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3)

35th " " " "

41st " " " "

82nd " " " "

84th " "

91st " " (minus 1/3)

93rd " " " "

Approx. 1/3 of the 94th Airfield Bn.

20th A.A. Regt.

1 Co. of the 32nd Field A.A. Bn.

6th and 7th Airfield Establishment Units

17th Ground Crew Co.

1st, 86th and 160th Line of Communications Vehicle Co.

1st Air Signal Unit of Air Division

Commander--Lt. Col. TASAKA

25th Air Signal Unit (2 attached wireless units of the 15th Air Signal Unit)

1 part of the 1st Air Signal Regt. (Bn. Headquarters, 1 Co. each of line and wireless units)

2nd Air Signal Unit of Air Division

Commander--Lt. Col. OGASAWARA

15th Air Signal Unit (minus 2 wireless squads)

16th Air Intelligence Unit

Speed Calculating Unit of Air Division

Commander--Capt. OISHI

17th Air Speed Calculating Unit

Airspeed Calculating Company of the 1st Intelligence Unit

Field Air Repairing Depot of Air Division

Commander--Lt. Col. YOSHIDA

1 part of the 15th Field Air Depot (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Mobile Repairing Squad)

25th Branch Air Depot

17th Marine and Air Depot

18th " " " "

Meteorological Unit of Air Division

Commander--Maj. MUTO

1st Bn. Headquarters of Field Meteorological Unit

1st Meteorological Company

2nd " "

25th Field Meteorological Unit

7th Air Transport Unit

12th Air Transport Company

2nd Co. of the 30th Mobilized Air Transport Unit

15th Mobilized Air Transport Unit

Temporary Air Transport Units

Condition of the Enemy Air Force

Because of our severe attacks from the start of the war, the enemy air units retreated to SINGAPORE from KOTABARU and KUDA and stopped in the vicinity of IPOH and merely attempted small guerrilla like surprise attacks. We wrested the enemy's command of the air from them.

It was very fortunate that the enemy air force did not attack before our air forces had advanced down the MALAY Peninsula.

Appended Notes:

1. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities our type 1 fighter units completely inactivated the enemy air units. By our daring

Map on the basic d[illegible]sition of the 18th Air Sector [illegible]lt. Vol 2, Seperate, Sheet No 2

Note:
1. The 25th Army will direct the deployment and disposition of the 81st Airdrome Bn.
2. (KGTIL Kechiru) and (Penang) will be used as reserve Airfields.




(Penang)

(KGTIL Kechiru)



(AYER TAWAR)

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BASIC DISPOSITION OF THE 12th AIR SECTOR UNIT

Separate sheet No.3



Note:

1. Reserve Air field will be at PATANI

2. The disposition of the sector units will be determined after the main force of the heavy bomber brigade advance to the airdrome of KOTA-BHARU air field group.

Map on the disposition of the assembled navigation units. Vol 2

Seperate Sheet No.4

















Note:

1. ⅄ - Signifies units deployed from the Air Route Regiment.
2. The wave length of navigation units are given on this map.
3. The navigation unit in Saigon and (Bangkok) will remain as they are until further orders.

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Separate Sheet No. 5

The first disposition and deployment of the assembled meteorological unit in MALAYA



Separate Sheet No. 6 Vol. II

First Disposition and Deployment map of 16th Air Intellegence Unit in Malaya.



ground a**acks, *he area of *he a**acking dis*ance was shor*ened and *he enemy air uni*s were decima*ed.

2. Our advancing air uni*s in *he MALAY Peninsula, wi*hou* losing an oppor*uni*y, overcame difficul*ies such as airfields in poor condi*ion and bad wea*her, and overwhelmed *he enemy wi*h *heir spiri*ually inspired a**acks.

3. The 25*h Army seized *he KUDA and KOTABARU sec*ors wi*h crushing s*reng*h and advanced *he air base deeper, *his procedure being *he mos* sui*able for *he landing of *he main force.

Sec*ion III. Co-opera*ion in *he Landing Opera*ions during *he Period of *he Advance *o PERAK and SERANGOON Province by *he 25*h Army

Ou*line of Opera*ions of *he 25*h Army

The main force of *he 25*h Army which pierced *he enemy lines a* KUDA province con*inued *o pursue *he enemy and occupied TAIPIN on 22 December. On 23 December *hey reached *he PERAK River wi*h a spear-head.

They made prepara*ions for crossing *he river up *ill 25 December. The KONOYE Division crossed *he river in *he vicini*y of ~~SUNGEISHIDUB~~ SUNGEI SIPUT on 26 December and *he 5*h Division crossed *he river in *he vicini*y of PRANJA des*roying and pursuing *he enemy everywhere. I* occupied IPOH airfield on 28 December and pursued *he enemy along *he IPOH, ~~*ABEH~~ TAPAH and MEROKAK roads. On *he way i* cap*ured *he s*rong poin*s of KAMPAR, SUNKAI and MEROKAK. Along wi*h *he daring movemen* of *he small boa*s, *hey pushed *heir lines in*o PERAK province on 7 January 1942 and pushed in*o SERANGOL in pursui* of *he enemy. On 11 January *he s*rong poin* of KUALA LUMPUR was occupied.

Af*er *he occupa*ion of _____ on 17 January, a uni* of *he NABIMI De*achmen* engaged *he enemy in ba**le a* ~~KUARAKURAI~~ KUALA KRAI and advanced sou*hward along *he eas*ern seacoas* road wi*h *he main force, occupying *he s*rong poin* of KWANTAN on 31 January and seized i*s airfield. One par* of *he uni* proceeded sou*hward along *he coas*al road and *he main force advanced in *he direc*ion of KUALA LUMPUR.

Condi*ion of *he Enemy Air Force

As men*ioned above *he enemy air uni*s in MALAYA concealed

themselves because of the destructive attacks made by our air units. Only the airfields at KUALA LUMPUR and KWANTAN were utilized and guerrilla attacks were conducted. Its strength was estimated at about 60 fighters, 20 bombers and 10 seaplanes. However, there was no reason for their having used the bases at SUMATRA since reinforcements did not arrive from the DUTCH EAST INDIES, AUSTRALIA or INDIA.

Our rear line of communications in SIAM and Northern MALAYA was threatened by the gradual increase of the British air force in BURMA.

Situation of the 3rd Air Division

The Air Division sent its 3rd Air Brigade to MALAYA to directly co-operate in the operations of the 25th Army.

The main force of Air Division will attack the vicinity of RANGOON with its 7th and 10th Air Brigades from 23 December to 25 December. After neutralizing the enemy air force in southern BURMA, they advanced and deployed in MALAYA toward the end of December and commenced an attack against SINGAPORE.

Co-operation in the Crossing of the PERAK River by the 25th Army

The Air Division Command Station was advanced to SUNGEIPATANI on 22 December. The 3rd Air Brigade gradually advanced to the airfield at SUNGEIPATANI from 19 December after its occupation by the 25th Army.

On 19 December the Air Brigade commander went to the 5th Division Headquarters 5 miles south of SUNGEIPATANI. An agreement was made on subsequent battles and on the same day and the following day (20 December), the train stations at TAIPING and BATANSERAI and moving trains were attacked. Co-operating with the 5th Division in battle, it attacked IPOH airfield several times and shot down 14 enemy planes.

It attacked the train stations with part of the unit at KUALA KRAI ~~KWARAKURAI~~ and GUMAMSAN etc. and co-operated with the WABIMI Detachment in battle. On 22 December it attacked enemy ships on the sea near KARAN and destroyed 3 enemy ships ranging from 3,000 to 6,000 tons. At this time the 25th Army Headquarters had already advanced to ALOR STAR. The Headquarters commander made a call on the 3rd Air Brigade commander at SUNGEI PATANI ~~SUNGEIPATA~~ airfield on 22 December and demanded that they prevent the PERAK bridge from being destroyed by the enemy.

The Air Brigade commander realized the extreme difficulty of the mission and since its success or failure would have greatly influenced subsequent operations of the 25th Army, he gave it much thought.

Note: Since the destruction of this bridge would have delayed operations for another month it was planned to occupy this bridge by dispatching a raiding party immediately upon landing.

Up to this time the Air Brigade commander had considered the importance of the 25th Army commander's previous plan. Therefore, on 21 December he handed down orders to the following effect:

1. The 25th Army will advance to the eastern sector of TAIPIN before the evening of 22 December. A tank unit will penetrate to ~~KUALALAKANSAN~~ KUALA KANGSAR on the following day--23 December, and plan the occupation of the bridge before it is destroyed by the enemy.

2. The Air Brigade will co-operate with its main force in order to accomplish this mission.

3. The 3rd Air Brigade commander will control and direct this mission in the vicinity of ~~KUALALAKANSAI~~ KUALA KANGSAR with the entire strength on 23 December.

4. The 7th Air Brigade commander will directly co-operate with the 25th Army with a fighter unit on 23 December. For this reason it will temporarily advance to ALOR STAR before the evening of 22 December and the smaller details regarding its co-operation will be received from the 3rd Air Brigade commander.

5. The 12th Air Brigade commander will directly co-operate with the 25th Army with its entire force on 23 December.

For this purpose, it will temporarily advance to ALOR STAR before the evening of 22 December, and consult with the commander of the 3rd Air Brigade on details regarding the prosecution of the operation.

Notes:

1. The fighter unit of the 7th Air Brigade (64th Air Regt.) had already been ordered to attack RANGOON but this order was changed while preparations were being made. Consequently, it was to participate in the defense of the bridge with the 25th Army.

2. The arrival date of the ground crew to the above mentioned bridge was estimated at about 25 December. There was an opinion that 25 December was opportune for the Air Brigade to commence action, but since it was believed that the bridge would be destroyed by that date, the arrival of the troops was set at 23 December.

Thus, the 64th Air Regt. of the 3rd Air Brigade and the 12th Air Brigade began to move at dawn of 23 December but the enemy had already destroyed the bridge.

At this point, the Air Brigade endeavored to seize the pontoon bridge approximately 30 kilometers downstream from this bridge. It awaited the arrival of the 25th Army but it did not arrive as it was hoped. For this reason, the pontoon bridge was also destroyed by the enemy.

The 3rd Air Brigade commander wished to reconstruct the destroyed pontoon bridge from his bank of the river and these two units alternately worked on the project up till 25 December, bombing the enemy in the region in order to complete the reconstruction of the bridge. However, the ground crew gave up the idea of utilizing this bridge at 1400 hours of the same day since they received orders to cross the river by boats after 27 December. The enemy gave up resistance after the 20 hours of severe bombing by our forces; the 25th Army was able to cross the PERAK River without any opposition.

When the 64th Air Regt. advanced to ALOR STAR from KOTABARU for the purpose of participating in the battle for holding the above mentioned bridge on 22 December, it made a surprise attack on the airfield at KUALA LUMPUR and engaging in a fight with enemy fighters, it shot down 15 fighters while our side lost one suicide plane.

The 3rd Air Brigade attacked the enemy attempting to retreat by train, destroyed railway establishments between ~~BASO GAJIYA~~ BATU GAJAH and GEMAS and cut the escape route of the enemy. It attacked the airfields at MEDAN, KUALA LUMPUR, etc. It destroyed and burned more than 10 trucks near KANPAR, one 1,000 ton type ship at KURAN, one 6,000 ton type ship at MURTON and secretly co-operated in the operations of the 25th Army. It also destroyed 30 trucks at KUANTAN on 30 December and destroyed two

trains and several trucks on 31 December as well as co-operating with the WABIMI Detachment.

Co-operation of the 25th Army in the Movement of Boats off the Coast of MALAYA

The 25th Army, with a strong segment of the 5th Division, landed by boats near LUMUT on the evening of 31 December and cut off the escape route of the enemy.

The 3rd Air Brigade co-operated in this action and attacked the enemy vessels on the MALACCA Sea with the main force on 1 January. It burned and destroyed 2 vessels of 2-3,000 tons, 1 torpedo boat, 3 torpedo boats made unnavigable, and protected the air over the moving units.

The Air Brigade advanced the 27th Air Regt. to IPOH on 2 January which attacked about 50 trucks between KAMPAR and DEKON, destroying over half of them and succeeded in destroying one transport vessel of 1,500 tons.

Co-operation in the Battle Zone Near KAMPAR and ~~SULIM~~ SLIM

The enemy offered stubborn resistance to the advance of the main force of the 25th Army near KAMPAR but commenced to retreat on 2 January in the face of severe attacks of the 5th Division and advance of the landing units.

The 3rd Air Brigade aided the army in its pursuit of the enemy and along with attacking the retreating enemy from the morning of 3 January, it bombed the birdge near ~~TANGONMARIM~~ TANJONG MALIM and cut off the enemy's escape route.

On 4 January the main force of the 3rd Air Brigade advanced to IPOH, aiming for the strong points in the front of the 5th Division. It burned and destroyed more than 10 trucks at ~~SULIM~~ SLIM and destroyed 1 transport ship of 3,000 tons in the MALACCA Strait. Ten large sized planes were seen at KURUMAN airfield by the Reconnaissance Unit on the evening of the same day. On the evening of the same day the Air Brigade commander sent the 75th Air Regt. to bomb the runway of this same airfield. At dawn of 5 January the escape of the enemy planes was blocked and the 59th and 90th Air Regimentes attacked the airfield.

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The Air Brigade attacked the retreating enemy 10 times on this day, destroying 38 trucks and 11 armored cars. On 7 January it attacked and silenced the enemy artillery near ~~SUBIM~~ SLIM. Attacking the enemy in the area of ~~TANGON SUBIM~~ TANJONG SLIM and BATAN BELJUNTA, it destroyed 6 vehicles, 5 tanks and 10 cannons on 8 January.

At that time the main force of the 3rd Air Brigade (Air Brigade Headquarters, 59th, 27th and 15th Air Regiments) was disposed at IPOH and a part (75th and 90th Air Regiments) was disposed at SUNGEIPATANI but since communications were bad between these two airfields, it was impossible to give commands. One third of the light bombers of each air regiment was summoned to IPOH on 8 January, and after planning to take a chance, they advanced with the 75th Air Regiment to TAIPIN together with the advancing ground crew units.

The KOKUSHI Detachment, a unit of the KONOYE Division, landed in the area of SERANGOL on 9 January and severed the escape route of the enemy. The 5th Division attacked the enemy at KUBU ROAD.

Co-operation in the Battles in the Vicinity of TAMPIN and KUALA LUMPUR

The main force of the 3rd Air Brigade aided the 5th Division while one part co-operated with the KOKUSHI Detachment and destroyed more than 20 trucks, 7 tanks, 1 cannon and 1 train. On 10 January the Air Brigade co-operated mainly with the 5th Division and cut off the retreat route of the enemy. It overturned one train east of TAMPIN, bombed and destroyed 20 vehicles, armored cars and several guns.

It seemed as though the enemy was in full retreat after the daring pursuit by the 25th Army and bombing by the 3rd Air Brigade on 10 January. One unit planned to escape by sea.

The main force of the 3rd Air Brigade attacked the railway, stations, and trains south of TAMPIN and cut the enemy escape route. One part attacked enemy ships in the MALACCA Sea, destroying 4 ships from 1-7,000 tons and 2 submarines.

On 11 January the spearhead of the 25th Army penetrated to KUALA LUMPUR.

The Actions of Various Air Sector Units

Each air sector unit gradually deployed in its advance, according to the progress of the battle and closely aided the aerial units as well as discharging its sectoral duties.

Condition of the Naval Air Units

The naval air units attacked the airfields at SERETAR and KARAN from midnight 29 December to the dawn of 30 December. They bombed airfields at SINGAPORE, CHINGA and SENBAWAN midnight of 1 January to dawn of 3 January.

Reason for the Stopping of Preparations for the Landing Operations at KUANTAN

The Southern Army planned to send a part of the 18th Division in 2 transport ships from SINGORA to KUANTAN to occupy the air bases quickly and to advance to air bases from which to attack SINGAPORE. On 26 December an agreement concerning this matter was made between the commander of General Headquarters of the Southern Army, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet Headquarters commander, the 3rd Air Division commander and the 22nd Air Regiment Headquarters commander.

KUANTAN was suddenly occupied by the WABIMI Detachment so the landing operations were cancelled.

Section 4. Aerial Annihilation of SINGAPORE and Co-operation by the 25th Army in Land Operations during the Penetration into ~~SUGRI SEMBILAN~~ NEGRI SEMBILAN Province

Condition of the 25th Army

The main force of the 25th Army advanced on the road to KUALA LUMPUR, ~~SENBAWAN~~ SEMBAWANG and GEMAS while one part advanced on the MALACCA coastal road to KURAN. They attacked MALACCA on 15 January and GEMAS on 16 January and is rapidly pursuing the enemy toward JOHORE BARU.

The KOBA Detachment which advanced to the east coast arrived at the banks of the ENDAU River on 16 January and began to attack the enemy near MERSHING.

Condition of the Enemy Air Force in the SINGAPORE Sector

The aerial strength of the enemy air force in SINGAPORE at the beginning of January was estimated at 60 fighters (Hawker Hurricanes and Buffalos), 20 bombers (mainly Bleiheims) and 10 seaplanes (mainly Consolidated). After the latter part of February, a small force of enemy planes attacked our air bases, taking advantage of the dark evenings.

Condition of the 3rd Air Division

The deployment in the advance of the main force of the 3rd Air Division into MALAYA up to the end of December is shown in attached Table No. 7. While co-operating directly with the 25th Army in its operation with its 3rd Air Brigade, preparations were being made to raze the SINGAPORE area with the 7th and 12th Air Brigades. According to the progress of the operations, each air sector unit was making preparation for the gradual advance into northern MALAYA and closely co-operated in the operations of the air units.

As soon as the WABIMI Detachment occupied KUANTAN, the Air Division commander sent the sector units to the same airfields and equipped them.

Surprise Attacks on SINGAPORE with a Small Number of Planes

The 3rd Air Brigade commander believed that there was indication of growing enemy strength at SINGAPORE during the time taken by the enemy during which the Air Brigade was advancing in BURMA. It harrassed various airfields in SINGAPORE and exhausted the fighting will of the enemy. Surprise night attacks commenced from 29 December with a small number of planes (usually 2 planes).

The 3rd Air Division commander issued the following order on 31 December at SUNGEI PATANI as regarded making more vigorous night surprise attacks.

1. The Air Division will harrass by surprise the enemy air bases near SINGAPORE.

Up till 4 January the 22nd Air Regiment will make a night attack on SINGAPORE. The time of each attack will be broadcast.

2. With a small force of planes detached from this bombing unit, the 3rd Air Brigade commander will surprise the enemy airfields in SINGAPORE in the evening when the opportunity permits. The time of the attack was set at an odd numbered hour.

3. The 7th Air Brigade commander will conduct nightly surprise attacks on the air bases in SINGAPORE with a small force from January to 9 January. The time of attack was set at an even numbered hour.

4. These units will be informed of the weather forecast near

Appended Map # 7:

Chart Showing Disposition of 3RD Air Group.

As of 31 Dec.

See Japanese Text

SINGAPORE from 1400 hours to 2000 hours.

Based on the above mentioned orders, the 3rd and 7th Air Brigades operated successively every night that the weather permitted and achieved favorable results.

Notes:

1. The night surprise attacks on SINGAPORE were mainly made by light bombers which flew over the MALACCA Strait, cut their motors into a glide and dive-bombed the enemy. The reason for these tactics was that the targets were distinct and easily discernible and the taking of the enemy by surprise was an easy matter.

2. Our planes returned safely without losses although the enemy utilized 70 searchlights, 200 A.A. guns and a small force of fighters around the air bases in SINGAPORE and the city itself. The 3rd Air Division commander, as mentioned before, not only conducted night surprise attacks on SINGAPORE and co-operated with the 25th Army, but was making preparations for intensive annihilating attacks against the enemy air strength with the respective units. However, on 7 January the 7th Air Brigade was concentrated on the KOTABARU and KEDAH airfield group. As soon as the KUANTAN airfield was completed, the 12th Air Brigade (the 47th Independent Squadron with type 2 fighters was attached on 4 January) advanced to the same airfield and issued the following orders on 8 January.

1. In conducting the bombing of SINGAPORE, the sector and classified names is as in the separate chart.

The Army and Navy agreement concerning the aerial operations against SINGAPORE is as in separate sheet No. 1.

2. The Air Division will annihilate the enemy air strength at SINGAPORE.

The first day of the attack will be set at 11 January on a separate order.

The summary of the aerial operations over SINGAPORE is as written in separate sheet No. 2.

3. The 7th Air Brigade commander will dispatch a powerful unit composed of fighters and bombers and the 12th Air Brigade commander

will dispatch his whole strength and they will both attack SINGAPORE alternately. They will seek out the enemy fighters first and destroy them.

The points on the prosecution of the attacks will depend on the Army-Navy agreement on the separate sheet. At present, up till the 3rd attack will be conducted.

The details on the co-ordinated attack will be mutually agreed upon.

4. The 3rd Air Brigade commander will continue his present duties.

5. The 81st Air Regiment will reconnoiter the weather condition over SINGAPORE on 0700 hours of 11 and 12 December. It will broadcast the weather by wireless and just before and after the attack, it will search the condition of the enemy air units and condition of the enemy's plane dispersion.

Inserted Map:

Sectionalization and Reference Abbreviations for Carrying out Bombing Attacks.

See Japanese Just
of Bombing Areas

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Separated Volume No. 1

The Army and Navy Agreement on Air Operations in the SINGAPORE Area

Commander of the 3rd Air Group
Lieutenant General DODAI SUGAWARA
Commander of the 22nd Air Combat Unit
Rear Admiral SADAICHI MATSUNAGA

This memorandum shows the early stages of the operation based on the agreement between the Southern Army and the Southern Fleet in addition to an outline of the subsequent attacks:

No. 1. Military strength.

Army

The 3rd Air Brigade (approximately 15 planes) 59th Air Regiment.

Type 1 Fighters--2 squadrons

The 7th Air Brigade (50-80 planes) 50th Independent Air Squadron

Headquarter Reconnaissance Planes--1 squadron

64th Air Regiment

Type 1 Fighters--3 squadrons

12th Air Regiment

60th Air Regiment

98th Air Regiment

Heavy bombers- In the early stages 3-6 squadrons of the above forces.

The 12th Air Brigade (70-80 planes)

47th Independent Air Squadron

"KI" 44 planes--1 squadron

1st Air Regiment

Type 97 Fighters--3 squadrons

11th Air Regiment

Type 97 Fighters--3 squadrons

The 81st Air Combat Unit

Headquarters Reconnaissance Planes--2 squadrons (10-20 planes)

Navy

The 22nd Fighter Unit

Medium size offensive planes--2 units 54 planes (When the occasion demands Type 1 land offensive planes will be used in place of the medium size offensive planes).

Type 0 ship fighters--1 unit 20 planes

Land reconnaissance planes--5 planes

No. 2. Bases.

Army:

The 3rd Air Brigade

IPOH or KUANTAN

The 7th Air Brigade

Heavy bomber unit--KUALA BESTO, TANAH MERAH, ~~AERUTAWAL~~ AYER TAWAR and ~~AROLSTAR~~ ALOR STAR.

Fighter unit--IPOH

Headquarter Reconnaissance plane unit--~~AERUTAWAL~~ AYER TAWAR

The 12th Air Brigade--KUANTAN

The 81st Air Combat Unit--SUNGEI PATANI and ~~AROL~~ ALOR STAR

Navy:

Medium size offensive plane unit;

SAIGON, SUNGEI ~~BATABI~~ PATANI, KOTA BHARU

Fighter unit and land reconnaissance unit,

KOTA BHARU (if it is necessary KUALA BESTO will be used).

No. 3. Distribution of assault targets.

Although the targets are pre-arranged as follows the two forces will if necessary assist each other in carrying out their mission.

Army--TENGAH Airfield and KALAN Airfield.

Navy--~~SEMBERWAN~~ SEMBAWANG Airfield, SELETAR Airfield and enemy vessels in the vicinity of SINAPORE.

80

64

No. 4. Outline of the Assault.

Some changes will be inevitably with each assault, however, the outline for the day of attack and the day following is as follows:

1. The army and navy will cooperate closely in the assault, The first attack will be carried out solely by the army. Although the first day of the assault is scheduled for 11 January this will be arranged for separately.

2. The assault is scheduled as follows:

The 1st attack.

The 1st day--1000 (time A)

The 2nd attack

The 1st day--1430 (time B)

The 3rd attack

The 2nd day--1100 (timeC)

3. Outline of the 1st attack.

The forces to be used:

Heavy bombers--approximately 30 planes.

Type 97 fighters--approximately 70 planes.

Type 1 fighters--approximately 40 planes.

"KI" 44 planes--approximately 7 planes.

Starting from KUANTAN and KEDAH Airfields the will advance directly over SINGAPORE through the front of ~~KULANG~~ KLUANG and KAHANG. Both forces will meet over TENGAH Airfield at 1000.

4. Outline of the 2nd attack.

(1). Army:

Type 97 fighters--approximately 70 planes.

"KI" 44 planes--approximately 7 planes.

(The base will be KUANTAN.)

Navy:

Medium size offensive planes 54 planes (27 planes will be at KOTA BHARU and the remaining 27 planes will be at SAIGON).

Type 0 fighters--20 planes.

Land reconnaissance planes--2 planes.

(The base will be KOTA BHARU.)

The above forces will enlarge the area of assault of the 1st attack.

(2). The naval air unit in MALAY will pass through KUANTAN and attack the enemy in cooperation with the 12th Army Air Brigade at 1430. Prior to the passing of the main force over KUANTAN one naval land reconnaissance plane will be in contact with the 12th Air Brigade. The attack will be carried out as scheduled with full strength regardless of the weather condition or any other contingency.

(3). In case of bad weather the type 0 fighter unit will transfer to KUALA BESTO a day before the attack. The army will accommodate this unit with supplies, quarters provisions etc.

5. Outline of the 3rd attack.

(1). The forces to be used.

Army:

Heavy bombers--approximately 60 planes (~~AROLSTAR~~ ALOR STAR and ~~AERUTEWAL~~ AYER TAWAR)

Type 1 fighters--approximately 40 planes (IPOH)

Type 97 fighters--approximately 70 planes (KUANTAN)

"KI" 44 planes--approximately 7 planes (KUANTAN)

Navy:

Medium size offensive planes--27 planes (KOTA BHARU)

Type 0 fighters--20 planes(KOTA BHARU)

(When the weather is unfavorable only type 0 fighters will be used.)

(2). Time of attack--1100

(3). For purposes of communication a naval land reconnaissance plane will make reports to the unit located at KUANTAN of the action of the naval planes enroute to this unit.

6. The 4th etc. attacks.

The army will be in charge of attack on odd numbered days (nights included) and the navy will be in charge on even numbered days. The details of the targets will be decided according to the situation.

No. 5. Intelligence.

1. Intelligence reports will be mutually exchanged above all each force will imform one another as soon as possible as the number of planes

destroyed.

2. Meteological intelligence reports will be made by the army to the navy at the proper time.

No. 6. Utization of airfields.

In the event that the naval air unit is forced to land over the KEDAH sector due to unfavorable weather ar any other situation the SUNGEI PATANI Airfield will be used provided that they are able to transfer to other air fields in the event that an emergency arises. The armyunit will assist in the above planes.

No. 7. Distinguishing friendly forces from the enemy.

1. In distinguishing friendly forces from the enemy, other than the formal regulation, when planes approach each other at a distance of 200 meters or less, one plane will tip its wing several times and if the other is a friendly plane it will answer with the same sign.

2. For purposes of mutual recognition between friendly planes one plane will be dispatched as follows prior to the action:

8 January--"KI" 44 plane to KOTA BHARU.

9 January--Type 0 ship fighter to IPOH.

lo January--Type 0 ship fighter to KUANTAN.

(Any changes made will be notified).

No. 8. Miscellaneous.

When any agreement is changed the forces will be informed as soon as possible.

Separated VolumeNo. 2

The outline of the air operation in SINGAPORE.

No. 1. Purpose.

1. Prior to the capture of SINGAPORE by the 25th Army the enemy air force in BRITISH MALAY will be destroyed.

2. Following the above operation important targets located in SINGAPORE will be attacked and enemy resistance will be crushed.

No. 2. The outline of deployment.

1. The KUANTAN airfield will be rapidly reconstrusted by the air

sector unit in cooperation with the TAMI Detachment. The reconstruction is scheduled to be completed on 7 January and not later than 10 January.

2. The necessary men and materials will be sent with the 5th division and immediately after the capture of KUALA LUMPUR and ~~KUILAN~~ KURAN Airfields they will reconstruct these airfields. Later one part of the 18th Air Sector Unit will be forwarded there.

3. When 1 and 2 is completed to some extent the 12th Air Regiment and the 64th Air Regiment (the 59th Air Regiment will take place of ~~s~~ one of the above forces when the occasion demands) will advance to the KUANTAN Airfield while one part of the 3rd Air Regiment will move into the KUALA LUMPUR Airfield.

4. The main force of the 7th Air Brigade will complete the deployment of the KOTA BHARU Airfield group and the KEDAH Sector Airfield group by the first day of the assault. ~~ALOR STAR~~ ALOR STAR and ~~AERUTAWAL~~ AYER TAWAR will be included in the KEDAH Sector Airfield group.

No. 3. The outline for attack.

1. The strength of the enemy air force in SINGAPORE will be determined and its fighter units will be destroyed as soon as possible, followed by the annihilation of the rest of the force. The attack is scheduled of 8 January. Orders will be issued separately from this outline.

2. Following the above attack the main targets will be demolished and the enemy resistance will be crushed by using large scale attacks or surprise attacks until SINGAPORE is captured. (This operation is scheduled for the first ten days of February.)

3. In carrying ou the above operations (1 and 2) every effort will be made to destroy the enemy anti-aircraft guns.

No. 4. Preparation for the SUMATRA Operation.

1. If it is necessary the enemy air power in SUMATRA will be destroyed during the SINGAPORE Operation.

2. In order to attack Southern SUMATRA, the ~~KULANG~~ KLUANG and KAHANG Airfields will be rapidly reconstructed to accommodate type 1 fighter units and heavy bomber units.

Note: Since our forces suffered some loses in the attack on

RANGOON the 59th Air Combat unit was transferred to the 7th Air Brigade on 7 January to increase the strength of the fighter unit. On the same day the 10th Air Brigade and some other units were released from the 5th Air Group by order of the Southern Army while the 7th Air Sector Headquarters and other units were attached to this group.

Orders of the Southern Army (summary)

1. To enforce air operations in MALAY and BURMA.

2. The 5th Air Group wil come under our direct command while the 14th Army Air Unit will be under the command of the 14th Army.

3. The commander of the 3rd Air Group will return the units shown in separated sheet No. 1 to their sormer positions and transfer the units shown in the separate sheet No. 2 to the 5th Air Group.

When the commander of the 5th Air Group arrives in SIAM the 3rd A Air Group commander will be relieved of the duty of destroying the enemy air force in the BURMA Area and in assisting the 15th Army with its operations.

4. The commander of the 5th Air Group will carry out air operations according to the following instructions:

1. During its advance the CHINESE Army located in the border area of the Northern INDO-CHINA will be annihilated in one assault.

2. The enemy air power in the BURMA Area will be destroyed as soon as possible and the group will assist the 15th Army in its operations.

3. At the right time it will cut off the BURMA Road and attack enemy transports in the ANDAMAN Sea.

4. When required it will by using heavy bombers assist the 3rd Air Group in the attack on SINGAPORE. The time for the operation will be decided separately.

5. The units listed in attached sheet No. 1 and 2 will be transferred to the commander of the 5th Air Group when he arrives in SIAM. Other units will be transferred at 1200 on 10 January.

6. The commander-in-chief of the Southern Army will be in SAIGON.

Attached Sheet No. 1

The units which will be returned from the command of the 3rd Air Group to their former positions:

The 10th Air Brigade;

The 40th Air Field Bn. (fighters)

The 97th Air Field Bn. (light bombers)

Attached Sheet No. 2.

The units which will be transferred to the commander of the 5th Air Group from the 3rd Air Group.

The 7th Air Sector Headquarters.

The 15th Air Field Bn. (fighters)

The 9th Air Field Co. (heavy bombers)

The 29th Air Field Co. (headquarters reconnaissance planes)

The 36th Field Anti-aircraft Bn.

Air Operations in the SINGAPORE District.

On the 10 th the commander of the group decided that 12th will be the first day of operations and continued to make preparations.

In accordance with the above decision the 7th and the 12th Air Brigaded of the group attacked on the 12th. However the enemy planes did not take any positive action since most of their force had retreated toward SUMATRA. Consequently only 16 planes were shot down.

Due to the lack of enemy resistance the scheduled objectives were changed to attacking important establishments in SINGAPORE and mopping up the remaining enemy air power. On the 13th the following orders were issued.

1. The result of the 1st and 2nd attack on the SINGAPORE Operation was 16 planes shot down. The enemy fighters appeared to be retreating.

2. From the 14th the group will assault the military key-points in SINGAPORE City and mop up the remaining air power in the SINGAPORE District.

3. From the 14th the commander of the 7th Air Brigade will attack imported military establishments and enemy air fields in the SINAPORE

district. After the completion of the 3rd assault he will return the 59th Air Combat Unit to its former command in IROH.

4. From the 14th the commander of the 3rd Air Brigade will attack important military installations and enemy airfields in the SINGAPORE district with all of his available force in addition to carrying on his present mission. After the completion of the 3rd attack the 59th Air Combat Unit will return to his command.

5. The time for assault of orders Nos. 3 and 4 is as follows:

The 3rd Air Brigade will attack on every odd hour while the 7th Air Brigade will attack on every odd hour plus thirty minutes.

6. The commander of the 12th Air Brigade will assist the 3rd and 7th Air Brigades as much as possible. In addition he will mop up the remaining enemy air resistance in the SINGAPORE District.

7. The commander of the 81st Air Combat Unit will continue his present duties.

The commander of the 3rd Air Brigade cooperated with the 25th Army in its battle with the main force of his brigade. In addition one part of the brigade attacked the airfields in ~~SEMKERWAN~~ SEMBAWANG and TENGAH and several planes made a surprise attack at midnight on the same area. The commander of the 7th Air Brigade attacked the air fields in SELETAR and TENGAH daily as well as central establishments in SINGAPORE with the main force of his brigade. Moreover several planes assisted the 3rd Air Brigade in a surprise attack at midnight.

The commander of the 12th Air Brigade assisted the 3rd and 7th Air Brigade. However no enemy planes were shot down since they offered no air resistance.

meanwhile the commander of the group changed the location of the bases to the area south of the mouth of the PAPAN River-MENTARAB-Cape RACHADO with the progress of the operation of the 25th Army. On the 18th he ordered the commander of the 15th Air Sector to reconstruct the airfields in ~~KULANG~~ KLUANG, KAHANG, and PAPPAHAT.

By attacking SINGAPORE continually for 10 days the group acquired absolute air supremacy in that area. However in consideration of the progress of the battle bu the 25th Army the following orders were issued

on the 26th to annihilated enemy resistance.

1. The enemy facing the 25th Army appears to be making its last stand.

2. The group will attack the enemy in the SINGAPORE Area day and night and break their resistance in addition to cooperating secretly with the 25th Army.

3. The commander of the 3rd Air Brigade will carry on its present duties.

4. From 28 January the commander of the 7th Air Brigade will continue to attack important objectives in the SINGAPORE Area during the day with a superior unit. He will furthermore attack enemy resistance with several planes by night attacks.

The details of the attack on the PALEMBANG Airfield will be issued separatly from the above.

5. The commander of the 12th Air Brigade will continue in his present mission. When the PAPPAHAT Airfield is reconstructed and equipped it will be used as an operation base. After the completion of the above airfield he will then secure air supremacy over SINGAPORE and its vicinity and seek out and destroy enemy planes.

6. The Commander of the 15th Air Sector will reconstruct and complete the PAPPAHAT Airfield for the above unit and then take charge of maintainance of the airfield. One part of the 25th Army will cooperate in reconstructing the PAPPAHAT Airfield.

The 3rd Air Brigade kept in contact with the 7th Air Brigade while cooperating with the 25th Army in the operation. In addition it made a surprise attack on the airfields in TENGAH, SELETAR, ~~SEMBERWAN~~ SEMBAWANG etc. at night. The 7th Air Brigade attacked continously from the 26th to the 31st and bombed the airfield in KALANG, TENGAH, ~~SEMBERWAN~~ SEMBAWANG and SELETAR the military establishments in SINGAPORE and KALANG as well as the vessels in and mear the port.

The 12th Air Brigade engaged 51 enemy fighters and bombers which were protecting the convoy over ENDAU on the 26th and shot down 40 planes. This Air Brigade advanced to the PAPPAHAT Airfield on the 31st.

this unit bombed the vicinity of the northern bridge base in cooperation with the 7th Air Brigade which was planning to advance into that area.

The enemy artillery bombardment of the 25th Army was rather severe in the ~~KULAI~~ POLAI(?) Area. On the other hand many enemy ships were discovered sailing southwest in the vicinity of the southern tip of MALAY Pennisula by a headquarter reconnaissance plane on the 30th. The commander of the Air Brigade silenced the enemy artillery with the main force and attacked the ships with a detachment. Prior to this the landing operation on ENDAU was suspended and on 20 January the 18th Division landed on SINGAPORE. All available army transportation facilities were utilized for the operation against SINGAPORE.

Accordingly the air brigade temporarily stopped converting the base south of KUALA LUMPUR due to the difficulty in transporting fuel and ammunition. The flight of the 27th Air Combat Unit from KUALA LUMPUR to SINGAPORE was difficult since the base was at the extreme end of the battle line. Furthermore, the 75th and the 90th Combat Unit encountered some inconveniences in starting from ~~INPOH~~ IPOH. Consequently the commander of the Air Brigade requested the commander of the group to at least assign the fighter unit and the assault unit to the vicinity of KULANG.

This request was granted and the following units were assigned to KULANG.

One part of the 27th Air Combat Unit on 30 January; the main force of the above unit on the 30st; the 59th Air Combat Unit and the 15th Independent Air Unit on 1 February. From 3 February the main force of the 75th Combat Unit and the 90th Combat Unit were advanced to KUALA LUMPUR while the remainder was advanced to ~~KULANG~~ KLUANG.

On the morning of 31 January JOHORE Bridge was demolished by the enemy.

Escorting of the convoy and the protection of the port in the ENDAU Area by the 12th Air Brigade.

As mentioned previously the plan for the 18th Division landing in

Prior to the above operations the commander-in-chief of the Southern Army made plans to send the main forces of the 18th Division to the ENDAU Area to capture SINGAPORE with the cooperation of the army and navy. On 13 January the operational details were cleared up by the army and navy and by command of the Southern Army. The commander of the 3rd Air Group ordered the 12th Air Brigade to escort the convoy and protect the port. He also ordered the 3rd Air Brigade to assist in the land operation. This operation order, however, was rescinded on the 19th. On the same day one part of the independent engineering unit and the anti-aircraft company were put under the command of the 3rd Air Group. The commander of the group was ordered to disembark the air unit (one part of the signal unit of the 96th Air field Bn.) which had been waiting in CAMHRAN Bay to the ENDAU Area by 26 January.

Cooperation of the 3rd Air Brigade in the land operation.

Immediately after the 25th Army eccupied MALACCA on 15 January one part of the Guard Division was ordered to land on PAPPAHAT from the sea and interupt the retreating enemy. Since this interception was an important part of the army operation the commander of the 3rd Air Brigade stopped his assistance and the 5th Division cooperated with the Guard Division from the 18th. He then ordered the main force (the 27th, 59th and the 15th Independent Air Unit) to advance to KUALA LUMPUR and the 75th and 90th Combat Unit to ~~INROH~~ IPOH.

Although the battle situation of the Guard Division had not developed by 23 January the operation on the front of the 5th Division developed so far beyond expectation that it was able to advance to the vicinity of YOMPEN. Consequently the commander of the 3rd Air Brigade changed his main objective to cooperate with the 5th Division and to route the enemy in the ~~KULANG~~ KLUANG Area. He furthermore, ordered the headquarters reconnaissance plane unit to watch the JOHORE Bridge and to prevent the enemy from entering SINGAPORE Island. On the 29th and 30th,

the ENDAU Area was suspended. In accordance with the order of the Southern Army to debark one part of the airfield battalion and other units on ENDAU the 3rd Air Group advanced the 12th Air Brigade to KUANTAN to escort the convoy. The movements of the convoy were as follows:

Departed SAIGON on the evening of 22 January, arrived at SINGORA at 2400 on the 25th; departed there on the morning of the 26th; arrived at ENDAU and completed debarkation by the evening of the 28th. (3 days were reserved for disembarkation).

The 12th Air Brigade forwarded its main force to KUANTAN immediately after the capture of that area by the TAMI Detachment. One squadron escorted the above convoy.

At dawn of the 26th the convoy was 20 kilometers or more off ENDAU. After the navy had cleared mines the convoy lowered anchor at ENDAU Port at 1040 hours and disembarkation began from approx. 1200 hours. At 0936 hours 2 enemy fighters (LOCKHEED HUDSON) flew over the convoy but were driven back by our planes. Around 1635 hours approx. 30 enemy fighters and bombers came to attack the convoy. At that time one squadron (9 planes) of the 11th Air Combat Unit of the 12th Air Brigade was patrolling the area and without hesitation attacked the enemy. In addition one more squadron (9 planes) of the 1st Air Combat Unit participated in the battle. During the combat which lasted approx. 30 minutes 24 enemy planes were shot down. Our losses were only 2 planes.

At approx. 1900 hours 18 enemy fighters came to attack. One squadron of the 1st Air Combat Unit and the 47th Independent Air Squadron intercepted them and shot down 15 planes. Our losses were nil. At approx. 2000 hours 6 enemy bombers approached the convoy. One squadron of the 11th Air Combat Unit engaged them and destroyed one plane. We suffered no damages. Judging from the above attacks the enemy carried on waves of attacks purposely at intervals of one to two hours. However, they suffered heavy damages from our air force.

As a result of this debarkation nearly all of the remaining enemy air force in SINGAPORE which had been hiding until now was destroyed. This made the attack on SINGAPORE by the 25th Army and the 3rd Air Group

comparatively easy and favorable for us.

The actions of the air sector units are as follows:

1. The 1st Air Sector Unit which was deployed throughout Southern INDO-CHINA forwarded one unit to SUNGEI BATANI which was placed under the command of the 18th Air Sector Unit. The main force of the unit was put under the direct jurisdiction of the Southern Army and on 7 January and performed the following duties.

(1). Ground operations for the army air units which passed through INDO-CHINA or stationed in Southern INDO-CHINA and assisted in their transportation duties.

(2). Assisted the ground units of the group which were advancing toward MALAY and took charge of the aircraft material left behind.

2. The 12th Air Sector Unit.

This unit was scattered in Southern SIAM and the KOTABHARU area and served mainly in distributing, forwarding and evacuating aircraft material forwarded by vessels and trains. At one time the unit assisted the 7th Air Brigade which was based in the KOTABHARU area in the battle.

3. The 15th Air Sector Unit.

On 9 January the duties of this sector were transferred to the 1st Air Sector Unit and then on 18 January the main force concentrated at SUNGEI BATANI. In the same date the 15th Air Sector was reorganized in the district south of the mouth of DAHANG River-MENTAKOB-Cape RACHADO and some other units were put under its command. Immediately after this the main force followed the front line units and deployed to various units to LABIS, KAHANG, ~~KULANG~~ KLUANG and PAPPAHET which had just been captured. The reconstruction of these areas was generally completed shortly before the end of the month. Some other air units were also deployed in these districts.

4. The 18th Air Sector Unit.

This unit forwarded a detachment to IPOH and TAIPING during the first ten days of the month immediately after having deployed the air unit simultaneously with the advance of the land forces and cooperated with the air units in addition to accumulating materials for rapid organization. During the second ten days when the entire 7th Air Brigade moved into the KEDAH district the air sector cooperated with

them in reconstructing the airfield. Moreover after the land force had reached the KULANG-KUALA LUMPUR line the 15th Air Sector Unit and the mobile units reconstructed the KUALA LUMPUR Airfield which had been completely destroyed by the enemy. Later the 18th Air Sector cooperated secretly with the 3rd Air Brigade which was half deployed to the above airfield.

Meanwhile enemy planes attacked the airfields at KUALA LUMPUR, SUNGEI PATANI, IPOH, etc. for several days and great efforts were made to repulse them.

In short this unit was kept very busy servicing the main force of the group which was deployed within the district as well as naval planes and the large units of planes under the direct command of the army.

5. The KUANTAN Air Sector Unit.

The unit cooperated secretly with the 12th Air Brigade in the battle from KUANTAN. In addition it helped to distribute and transport aircraft materials. On 31 January this unit was combined with and put under the command of the 15th Air Sector Unit.

The action of the Naval Air Force.

From 15 to 31 January the Naval Air Force attacked SINGAPORE ten times and shot down approx. 70 planes. In addition they greatly damaged ground installations.

The action of the enemy air forces.

Due to our decisive air supremacy the enemy air force in SINGAPORE gradually retreated into SUMATRA and used SINGAPORE only as an advance base.

The action of the 3rd Air Group on 31 January is shown in illustration No. 8.

Appended Map # 8:

Disposition of 3rd Air Group

On 31 Jan. 42.

See Japanese Text for Translation

TABLE OF PLANES DAMAGED AND REPLACED FOR THE 3rd AIR GROUP DURING THE MALAY OPERATIONS

Type of plane	Unit	Original No. of planes	No. Damaged	No. of replacements	No. left after operation	Reason for loss of planes
97 Recomn	51 Independent Air Co.	33	8	7	34	
100 Recomn	81st Air group 51st Ind. Air Co.	20	10	15	25	
91 Army Recenn	73rd Ind. Air Co.	20	20	9	9	
98 Direct Cooperation	98 Ind. Air Co.	13	6	5	12	
97 Fighter	11th Air group 59th Air group	132	60 30%	69	141	
99 Twin moter Light bomber	75th Air group 90th Air group	82	48 36%	54	88	
99 Raider	27th Air group	37	35 60%	21	23	
97 Heavy Type —		35	10	5	30	
97 " " =	12th Air group 60th Air group 98th Air group	129	40 25%	30	119	
✱ 44	47th Ind. Air Co.	8	3		5	
97 Transport		55	7	2	50	
☐ Type Transport			5			
100 Transport			1			
Total		670	331	270	627	

Appended Chart 1.
Part 1.

Table Pertaining To Aviation Fuel And Ammunition Immediately Before The Beginning Of War (Southern Area Of FRENCH-INDO CHINA)

87 gasoline	800 barrels
Castor oil	53 "
50 kg bomb	1,000
15 kg bomb	3,500
M.G. incendiary	10 boxes
M.G. armour piercing	30 "

SIEM-REAR

KRAKOR

87 gasoline	1,300 barrels
Castor oil	85 "
100 kg bomb	100
50 kg bomb	1,000
15 kg bomb	500
M.G. incendiary	5 boxes
M.G. armor piercing	15 "
Mineral oil	50 barrels

UDONG

PNOM-PENH

91 gasoline	4,900 barrels
87 "	600 "
Mineral oil	350 "
Castor oil	40 "
250 kg bomb	190
100 " "	700
50 " "	3,500
50 " incendiary	600
M.G. incendiary	30 boxes
M.G. armor piercing	90 "
Small flares	300 "

TANI

91 gasoline	3,000 barrels
87 "	3,300 "
Mineral oil	220 "
Castor oil	220 "
50 kg incendiary	200
M.G. incendiary	75 boxes

TANI

M.G. armor piercing	325 boxes
Small flares	300
205 kg flares	110
100 " "	600
50 " "	3,000

QUAN-AN

91 gasoline	300 barrels
87 "	350 "
Mineral oil	30 "
Castor oil	20 "
M.G. incendiary	15 boxes
M.G. armor piercing	45 "

DUONG-DONG PHU-QOC

91 gasoline	1,400 barrels
87 "	400 "
Mineral oil	120 "
Castor oil	20 "
M.A. ordinary	160 boxes
M.A. incendiary	9 "
M.A. armor piercing	65 "
Clip	4 "
M.G. incendiary	40 "
M.G. armor piercing	120 "

KOMPONG-CHENANG

87 gasoline	1,500	barrels
Castor oil	112	"
Mineral oil	50	"
50 kg bomb	1,400	
15 " "	6,500	
12 " incendiary	1,000	
M.G. incendiary	45	boxes
M.G. armor piercing	135	"
Small flare	300	"

NHA-TRANG

91 gasoline	300	barrels
87 "	1,400	"
Mineral oil	20	"
Castor oil	70	"

KOMPONG-TRACH

91 gasoline	1,300	barrels
87 "	3,250	"
Mineral oil	80	"
Castor oil	220	"
100 kg bomb	150	
50 " "	3,500	
50 " incendiary	200	
M.A. incendiary	3	boxes
M.A. armor piercing	24	"
M.A. ordinary	53	boxes
Clips	2	"
M.G. incendiary	55	"
M.G. armor piercing	165	"
Small flares	300	

SAIGON

91 gasoline	3,200	barrels
87 "	1,000	"
Mineral oil	250	"
Castor oil	100	"
250 kg bomb	200	
100 " "	650	
50 " "	3,100	
M.G. incendiary	55	boxes
50 kg. incendiary	300	
M.G. armor piercing	165	boxes
Small flares	100	

Supply

87 gasoline	2,480	barrels
Castor oil	363	"
100 kg bomb	1,200	
50 " "	3,500	
15 " "	2,000	
Type 94 "	200	
Small flares	100	
M.G. ordinary	72	boxes
M.G. incendiary	32	"
M.G. armor piercing	50	"
Clips	16,900	

Reserve

Castor oil	330	barrels
500 kg bomb	162	
250 " "	796	
100 " "	800	
50 " "	1,958	
15 " "	2,500	
50 " incendiary	1,700	
12 " "	2,000	
M.G. incendiary	157	boxes
M.G. armor piercing	457	boxes
Small flares	200	
Wing flares	1,500	
50 kg incendiary	600	
12 " "	100	
1 " "	500	

Inserted Chart

Table of Aviation Fuel and Ammunition Prior to the Beginning of War

(TAIWAN AREA)

Paragraph V. Cooperation in the land Operations at the Time of the Capture of SINGAPORE by the 25th Army.

(Summary of the Progress of the Operations of the 25th Army)

The 25th Army began preparations for the capture of SINGAPORE immediately upon its arrival at the JOHORE waterway on 31 January and commenced landing at 2400 on 8 February after a fierce battle. SINGAPORE was completely captured on 15 February.

(Summary of the Progress of the Operations of the 3rd Air Group)

The main force of the 3rd Air Group attacked enemy warships and merchantmen escaping from SINGAPORE Harbour and cooperated with the 25th Army. It also carried out destructive aerial warfare in the SUMATRA area with a part of its strength. On the 14th, it carried out a raiding operation on PALEMBANG.

Note: The operation in the SUMATRA area will be written in the section containing the DUTCH INDIES operation.

(Aerial operations during the period of preparation for the capture of SINGAPORE.)

The 3rd Air Group Commander reorganized the air sector units in order to conform with the attack preparations of the 25th Army for the capture of SINGAPORE. The air units also advanced as the airfields were completed and cooperated in the attack preparations of the 25th Army. Furthermore, the 3rd Air Group carried out the necessary reconnaissance and feinted in the air in order to conceal the plan of the 25th Army. Subsequently, it attacked a group of oil tankers off "SELETAR" and "KULANCHI" day and night with its main body. Enemy warships and merchantmen in the Strait of MALACCA were also attacked.

The main 7th Air Group attacked important military installations, wharves, and wardhouses in SINGAPORE. Moreover, a part of the force attacked fleeing enemy warships and merchantmen, the KALAN Airfield, the eastern fortress of MANDAI Hill, and the enemy positions on "~~BKITEMA~~ B. TIMAH" Hill and facilitated the operational preparation of the army. The 12th Air Group acting in close cooperation with the 3rd and 7th Air Groups, attacked enemy

planes and protected the operational preparations of the Army. Meanwhile, on the 3rd, the Group Commander gave instructions as to the construction of air bases to be advanced after the capture of SINGAPORE Island and also changed the command post to ~~KULANG~~ KLUANG on the 4th. On the 5th arrangements with the 25th Army were made. Thus, the Air Groups acquired complete command of the air over SINGAPORE as well as bombing important military installations and oil tankers. The operational preparation of the 25th Army was perfected. The 3rd Air Group commander drew up the following plan for the capture of SINGAPORE. On the 4th, the Air Group Commander gave instructions for the cooperation with the 25th Army and to continue preparations.

Outline of the Cooperation in the Campaign to Capture SINGAPORE.

I. Plan

1. The Air Group, keeping pace with the 25th Army plan to capture SINGAPORE will completely eliminate enemy air activity in the SINGAPORE sector. It will also attack key positions on the island as well as directly cooperating in land combats of the 1st line forces to accelerate the capture of the objective.

The commencement of the operation will begin on 7 February.

II. Summary of the 25th Army Plan for the Capture of SINGAPORE

(1) Plan

2. The Army, after wiping out the enemy north of JOHORE Channel, will make careful preparations to storm the enemy from the sector west of the land bridge with its full strength and restrict the enemy to the sector east of the land bridge. Then it will quickly advance to the important lines in the vicinity of ~~"BKITEMA"~~ B. TIMAH. If the enemy still does not surrender, we will attack and overwhelm the whole island.

(2) Outline

1st Phase. The period for attack preparations.

3. After wiping out the enemy in the vicinity of JOHORE, each division with a part of its force will map up the north bank sector of JOHORE Channel after capture of the river bank. It will make the inhabitants withdraw to the sector north of "PONAANKER", "~~K~~RAI", and KOTA TINGGI. It will be responsible for the reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain, and will

cover the deployment of the artillery.

The main body will concentrate as follows and prepare for subsequent attacks. However, the Guard Division will divert the enemy to the sector east of the land bridge by making aggressive and wide feint moves.

GD In the vicinity of TEBRAU and "MASAI"

5D Sector east of SKUDAI

18D Sector east of the Reservoir Height

4. The Artillery Unit under the direct command of the army will occupy positions in the sector north of JOHORE BHARU with its main body and in the vicinity of A 572 with a part of its force. It will obstruct the use of enemy airfields by bombarding the oil tanks at "TENGA", "SENBAWANG, and "PASIR PANJANG" with the cooperation of the divisional artillery and also destroy important military installations. It will neutralize the enemy artillery at the proper time. During this period, the Artillery Unit will prepare positions for the main body in the upper stream sector of the "MALAE" River and make the main body change its positions on the nights of X-2 and X-1.

5. After the advance to the JOHORE Channel line, the days of preparation required till the commencement of attack is estimated to be five days.

2nd Phase. (Period of the capture of SINGAPORE)

6. Upon completion of the attack preparations, the entire artillery will carry out preparatory bombardment for attack from the morning of X day simultaneously with the bombing by the air units.

7. The main bodies of the 5D and 18D will advance to the north bank sector of the JOHORE Channel on the night of X-1 day and complete preparations for the attack.

The GD will continue its feint moves until the night of X-1 day and then concentrate in the sector east and west of JOHORE BHARU after the latter half of the night of X-day while a part of the force remains behind.

8. Each unit will land simultaneously with the first landing forces of the 5D and 18D at 2230 on X-day immediately after the supporting assault fire of the artillery. Part of the 18D will check the movements of the enemy sea forces from the direction of the west and of the channel.

9. The units which landed on the enemy beach will enlarge their footholds towards the front as much as possible and advance to the line on the morning of X + 1 day and continue to advance to the "JURONG River-

"BKIMANDAI" Hill line. After concentrating the forces on the same line and preparing for the attack on "~~BKITEMA~~ B. TIMAH" Hill, they will break through the enemy positions and advance to the line east of the same hill under the close cooperation of the air units. Infantry, tanks, and artillery will be utilized. The GD will concentrate in the rear of the 5D and advance to the sector east of the reservoir from the direction of "MANDAI" at the proper time.

10. In case the enemy does not surrender even after our advance to the foregoing line, we will attack and occupy the city and the surrounding fortresses. At this time, the 18D will stand guard against the "~~BLACAN-MATEI~~ BLAKANGMATI" and "~~LANJAN~~ ST. JOHNS" Fortresses and if necessary, capture them with a part of its force.

III. Outline of the Air Operations.

1st Phase The Period of Attack Preparations

11. The results of the SINGAPORE air operations were exploited and at the same time, preparations were made for the PALEMBANG operations. The movement of enemy planes in the air over the SINGAPORE sector was completely destroyed.

12. While the attack on the SINGAPORE sector will be repeatedly carried out with fighters the main purpose of the air force will be to guard the sky above the main bodies of the 5D, 18D, and the Army Artillery unit and cover their preparations for attack after X-1 day.

13. Our force will mainly attack the important military targets with heavy bombers, subdue the center of enemy defensive installations and attempt to break up the enemy's resistance.

14. The Light Bomber (Assault) Unit will cooperate in the attack preparations with a part of its strength and prepare for its cooperation after the commencement of attack (including X-day) with the main body.

2nd Phase (The Period of the Capture of SINGAPORE Island)

15. The fighters will cooperate in the battle of the heavy and light bomber with a part of its force. It will gradually shift to the preparation for the next phase of operations while being responsible for the control of the air above the battlefield.

16. The Light Bomber (Assault) Unit with its main body will cooperate in the river crossing of the first line divisions and the battles after the river crossing from the evening of X-day. For this reason, after X-day the Unit will neutralize the enemy on the north coast of SINGAPORE Island in coordination with the Army Artillery Unit firing. Accompanying the river crossing and the advance of the main body of the Army, it will keep ahead of the main body of the Army and neutralize the enemy in that locality. Particularly, the Unit will closely cooperate with the first line forces after the morning of X-11 day at about the time of the advance to "TENGA" airfield and neutralize the enemy in the immediate front. It will also break up the enemy counter-attacks at the opportune moments.

Accompanying the advance of the Army Artillery Unit, the Unit will appropriately change targets simultaneously with the artillery fire and mainly neutralize the enemy in the vicinity of "~~BKITEMA~~ B. TIMAH" Hill.

17. The Heavy Bomber Unit will continue its attacks on the targets stated in Item No. 13 in conforming with the situation in the advances of the 5D and 18D. It will further endeavor to perceive the enemy plan against the right flank of the main body of the army (interference from the west side fortress of SINGAPORE Island) and neutralize such attempts at the proper time if the necessity arises.

18. Besides the foregoing, the Unit will observe the movements of the enemy sea forces at about the time of the river-crossing of the land units and will subdue and annihilate these forces with the cooperation of a part of the 18D at the proper time.

19. After the capture of "~~BKITEMA~~ B. TIMAH" Hill, the Unit will chiefly attack the city of SINGAPORE, and at the same time, destroy the enemy on the flank who is obstructing the advance of the main body of the Army. It may also attack the enemy's escaping ships at opportune times.

20. The strength employed is as follows,

7FB, 12FR, 60FR

12FB

7FB and 12FB commanders may use the strength assigned for the next

phase of operations in the present campaign if the necessity arises.

21. The duty of each unit as follows:

3FB Direct cooperation in the capture operation

7FB (except deficient units) Destruction of key positions on SINGAPORE Island, rear targets, and position installations as well as crushing the resisting will of the enemy.

12FB Annihilation of enemy planes in the air above the SINGAPORE sector; the protection of the 25A during the period of preparations and in the early stage of the attack and cooperation with the 3FB and 7FB.

Based on the above disposition, the 3rd Air Group, in compliance with the request of the 25th Army, cooperated in the feint moves of the Guard Division from the direction of "UHIN" Island with a part of its force on the 6th and 7th. On the 8th it took charge of the destruction of enemy searchlights in the area of the main body of the Army.

When the main body of the Army commenced its river-crossing at midnight of 8th, the Air Unit cooperated with its main force and especially facilitated the battle progress of the Army by neutralizing the enemy artillery. On the 11th the Air Unit was appointed to an additional duty of searching and attacking the enemy ship groups. Satisfactory results were obtained in the attacks on enemy warships and merchantmen south of SINGAPORE.

The 7th Air Group attacked 17 times between the 9th and 11th with its full strength. It bombed the enemy positions in the vicinity of "PAN JAN", "JURONG", "MANDAI", THE CHANGI fortress and the "~~BKITEMA~~ B. TIMAH" fork road. On the 11th it attacked the wharves, ships, and railroad stations. Further more, the main point of attack was directed towards the enemy artillery in the immediate front of the 5th and 18th Divisions in accordance with the Group Order. Thus the Air Unit bombed the heavy artillery positions at "~~PASILPANJAN~~ PASIR PANJANG", "CHANGI" and the sector west of the city, and the "~~BLACANHANA~~ BLAKANGHATI" fortress guns which facilitated the advance of the land units. It also attacked the retreating ship group with a part of its force. The total number of planes of the 7th Air Group that were in action from the beginning of February till the fall of SINGAPORE was actually 1,018 and the bombs dropped was 773 tons.

The 12th Air Group pushed its Command Post form "QUANTAN" to "BAPPAHAT" on the 6th. It acquired air superiority over SINGAPORE Island in

coordination with the attacks by the 3rd and 7th Air Groups. Following the advance of the land units, it advanced to "TENGA" airfield with a part of its force on the 13th and facilitate the movements of the 25th Army and the bomber units.

After the capture of the "TENGA" airfield by the 25th Army on the 10th, the Group Commander ordered a part of the 15th Air Sector Unit to advance to the airfield and take charge of the emergency maintenance. On the 11th it was reinforced with a part of the 18th Air Sector Unit. The airfield was to be used as a staging base of the 12th Air Group. He further instructed all the air sector units to closely cooperate with the Air Groups. Thus the Air Group was at its full strength.

Thus, all the strategic points of SINGAPORE, the stronghold of the MALAY British Army, were completely penetrated by our severe attack from air and land and the enemy finally surrendered unconditionally at 1950 on 15 February.

Chapter V The Situation in the Rear.

Paragraph 1. Situation of the Losses and replacement of material and personnel.

Article 1. Loss and Replacement of Airplanes

Our plane losses from the outbreak of the war till the fall of SINGAPORE were 331 planes. The chief causes were due to direct combat, 50%, unskillful handling, poor maintenance of airfields in MALAYA, and enemy strafing. Besides the foregoing, 46 planes were lost during concentration due to bad weather.

The type of plane which suffered the greatest loss was the Type 1 Fighters (about 65%). The Type 99 Assault Planes (about 60%) came next while the Type 97 Fighter, Type 99 Twin Engine bomber, Type 97 Heavy Bomber Model 2, etc., also showed fairly high percentages.

(Supply Situation)

The total number of planes replenished for the said loss was 270 which was 80% of the loss.

A total of 148 planes of various kinds were successively sent to TAIWAN, CANTON, HANOI, and SAIGON from the middle of November for the Southern Army as the first shipment of planes to the front (mainly for replacement use during the half-month after the commencement of operations).

Meanwhile operations were started. From the middle of December the second shipment of 151 planes to the front (for replenishment use up to 10 January) began to arrive at SAIGON and of the total of the two shipments, 299 planes, the 3rd Air Group was supplied with 148 planes by the end of December and the losses of each unit were replenished at each loss.

The Air Group was supplied with 80 planes by the end of January and 40 more planes in February from the third shipment of planes to the front (for replenishment use up to 10 February).

The situation of the losses and replacement of planes of the 3rd Air Group during the MALAY operations is as mentioned in the following table.

Article II Supply of Material other than Airplanes.

Of the materials other than airplanes, the jettisonable fuel tanks for fighters were the most difficult to supply. The Air Group possessed only a few of them in the early stages of development. Under an emergency supply from the homeland, fuel tanks gradually arrived at SAIGON from about 6 December by air transport and those by ship also began to arrive. The Air Group had sufficient fuel tanks by the end of January.

Article III Fuel and Ammunitions

The situation of the accumulation of fuel and ammunition in South French INDO*CHINA at the outbreak of the war is as stated on the separate sheet No. 1, 1 and 2.

Though the first shipment arrived in French-Indo China almost before the opening of the war, the quantity was not great. At one time, a fuel shortage arose and emergency measure of using the general reserve fuel and ammunition at SAIGON had to be taken. However, the 2nd and 3rd shipments began to arrive in succession from the middle of January. It became almost possible to meet the requirements of the operations.

(Various Air Depots)

The 3rd Air Group Commander carried out the repair and supply of the Group with the 16th Field Air Depot.

(Main depot at CANTON; main body of the 21st Branch Depot at SAIGON (returned to HANOI at the end of January); and a part of the 21st Branch Depot at HANOI), the 19th Field Air Repair Depot (at BANGKOK); and the 20th Field Air Supply depot (main body at SAIGON; a part at "~~PUNOMBEN~~" PHOM PENH and subbranches at BANGKOK and SINGORA after 11 December). They were under the direct command of the Southern Army and parts of the 12th and 15th Field Air Depots included within the battle order of the Group and the 25th Air Branch Depot (at SAIGON). The 17th and 18th Shipping Air Depots came under the command of the Group Commander according to the distribution of troops by the Southern Army.

At the beginning of January, the 3rd Air Group Commander restored the 25th Air Branch Depot to its original command (under the direct command of the Southern Army) and carried out repairs with parts of the 12th and 15th Field Air Supply Depot established branches at SINGORA and BANGKOK and a subbranch at "ALORSTAR" and cooperated in the supplying of the Group.

The 19th Field Air Repair Depot, after the arrival of the main body of the 5th Air Group in THAILAND in the middle of January, undertook the supply and repair of the Group.

The Commander-in Chief of the Southern Army ordered a part of the personnel of the 16th Field Air Depot to advance to MALAYA in the latter part of January accompanying the developments in the battle situation in MALAYA. They were placed under the command of the 3rd Air Group commander for the establishment of air bases in SINGAPORE.

Early in February, the 20th Field Air Supply Depot advanced the ALORS TAR sub-branch to "KUHUAN" and, after the fall of SINGAPORE, opened a branch depot in SINGAPORE Branch Depot was reorganized into a sub-branch.

The actual results of the repairs after the opening of the air depots until the fall of SINGAPORE are as mentioned in the separate sheet.

Article IV Losses and Replacement of Personnel

Losses and Replacement of Personnel

The personnel loss of the 3rd Air Group during the operation was 582 (of which 73 were officers). The greater part of the loss was air crewmen and their replacement was not carried out as saticfacterily as planned. Moreover since the ability of the replacement personnel was poor, it was

Inserted Chart

Airplane Works of Two Months After the Beginning of War

CHART OF LOSSES AND REPLACEMENTS OF PERSONNEL OF THE 3rd AIR GROUP DURING THE MALAY OPERATIONS

MONTH / CLASSIFICATION		DECEMBER		JANUARY		FEBRUARY		TOTAL	
Classification	Authorized Strength	Losses	Replacements	Losses	Replacements	Losses	Replacements	Losses	Replacements
Officers	221	46	None	42	15	10	4	98	19
Warrant officer and noncoms	861	169	None	200	43	21	17	390	60
Total	1082	215	0	242	58	31	21	488	79

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Appended Diagram # 1:

Sketch of 3RD Air Group Wireless Network

Appended Diagram # 3.

Sketch of 3Rd Air Group Communication Network.

As of 10 Jan.

RADIO NETWORK OF 3RD AIR GROUP

DEC. 31, 1941.



#4

Radio Network for the 3rd Air Group.
(For March 9th)



The air group command post was advanced to PALEMBANG on 21 February.

Situation of the enemy air force

The remaining enemy air force retreated to Northern SUMATRA and JAVA.

Chapter VII. Results

The composite results of the 3rd air group during these operations are an mentioned in the separate sheet.

Appended Map # 9:

Outline Showing Strength Disposition of 3RD Air Group

As of 15 Feb.

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impossible to make up for the loss. However, as the losses considerably decreased in February and the replacements began arriving the situation became better.

The situation of the losses and replacement of air crewmen is as given in the following table.

Paragraph II. The situation of the Signal Unit

The signal unit could generally meet the requirements of the operations throughout the period of operational preparation and during the operations. Although communications nets was changed very frequently due to the swift advance of the air units after the opening of hostilities, it was successful in meeting the demands of the operations.

The aerial communications net of the 3rd Air Group at the outset of the war, namely at the beginning of January and February is as mentioned in the separate sheets Nos. 1 to 4.

Paragraph III. The Situation of the Air Intelligence Unit and the Navigation Aid Unit

The 16th Air Intelligence Unit was responsible for the leakout of enemy places and for the collecting of important information. Part of its force carried out special Intelligence duty. Accompanying the progress of the battle situation, the unit advanced the MALAYA and closely cooperated with the air units.

The 17th Navigation Aid Unit closely cooperated for the safer navigation of the air units.

Paragraph IV. The situation of the meteorological unit.

The Unit carried out meteorological service during the operations of the Group. Especially, after 4 February in the capture of SINGAPORE. The meteorological unit always advanced to the first line under the most difficult condition, such as incurring enemy shells and bullets at JOHORE, and performed their duty of observing and reporting.

Chapter VI. The Situation after the operations

Situation of the 3rd Air Group

The 3rd Air Group, after the fall of SINGAPORE, prepared for operation in the Northern SUMATRA and Western JAVA areas, with a part of the force in the positions mentioned in the inserted chart.

WAR RESULTS

Dec. 8, 1941 to Feb. 15, 1942

Airplanes	Shot down	233	
Airplanes	Destroyed by gun	279	Total 512
Motor Vehicle		387	Mostly Trucks
Tanks	Damaged by explosions	48	
Armoured Cars			
Steamships		11	35,000 Tons
Submarines	Sunk	1	
Torpedo Boats		1	
Steamships		34	126,500 Tons
Destroyers		3	
Torpedo Boats	Destroyed (Burned)	5	
Large Model Oil Engine Boats		7	
Submarines		2	
Railroad Baggage Cars		26	
Train	Damaged by explosions	8	
Cannon		35	