JAPANESE MONOGRAPH MO. 55
Southeast Area Air Operations Record Phase I, Nov. 19*0. - Feb. 1942
PREFACE
Through Instruction Ho. 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for «iar Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War iuinistrj and the Japanese General staff.* Upon the dissolution of the ijiar Ministry and the General staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the immobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. i«tailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in -memoranda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories'.'.
The basic ma.terial contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It shoulu be noted at once, that the enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material. ..as reconstructed from memory.
The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in aG or G-3 records, however, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the JJemooilization bureau.
The action under this memorandum and inci-ental detailed instructions, wiich followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Gri^, charged with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945.
In order to protect the interest of the United btates, in the exploitation of Japanese military Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of eaemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Government was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the en* tire program, including the, establishment of a small historical research section within the aTIS (AlHed I'ranslator and Interpreter Section.)
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A*r Operation Record (UALAXA 1st Period of Southwest Area Operation)
■ August 1946
The F<rst Demobilization Bureau.
est
Edition of a*r operation records are as follows:
1. This «b a condensed instruction manual, Materials were gathered by Colonels SHIN ISHIKAi7A and KATSUJI DOZOiJE, instructors at .the General Staff College.
2. It was enlarged and revised by Colonel 1IE10RU MIXAIO, Chief Staff Officer in charge of 3rd Air Corps Operations.
A*r Operation Record (I.ALAYA)
Part I. Situation befcre the Operation
Chapter 1. Enemy Situation
A. The BRITISH Situation at MALAY
B. Situation at STAM and BURLA.
fart II. Strength and organization of 3rd A*r Corps.
Part III. Preparation for the Operation
Chapter 1. Preparation by the 15th and 25th Army.
Chapter 2. Preparation by the 3rd' A*r Corps.
A. Establishment of the Air Base.
B. Plans of the operation.
C. Dispersal of the forces. v
Part 17. Practical operation.
Chapter 1. Cooperation in the landing operation of the 15th and 25th Apay Advance units, the Northern BTHf&A Preliminary Air Operation, and the cooperation with the 15th Army in its advance to STAL.
Chapter 2. .A'r opefation in Central MALAY and cooperation in the operation of the 25th Army against the KEDA* State. * "
PERAK
Chapter 3. Cooperation in the operation of the 25fih Army against -PRfiA* and
SEP.ANGBUL States.
Chapter 4. Cooperation in the operation of the 25th Apiny against NEGRT S£JtB=RJE States aid the air operation in SINGAPORE.
Chapter 5. Cooperation in the operation of the 25th Army against SINGAPORE.
Part V. Situation f_ _n the rear.
Chapter 1. Situation of supplies and the loss and replacement of men.
A. Loss and supply of Planes.
B. Other supplies.
C. Fuel and ammunition.
D. Loss and replacement of personnel.
Chapter 2. SHuat-<on of the Signal Corps.
Chapter 3. Situation of the A*r 7ntell*gence UnUs and the Aircraft Location Un*to.
Chapter A, SHuat*on of the Meteorological UnU. Fart VT. Snuat«on after the Campaign
Fart VII. iiesults of th« n^ro^m ^
Part I. S^uat^on before the Campaign, ter 1 Enemy Situation.
A. The BRTTSH Situation. Bnemy situation at MALAY.
The positions of the BRITISH Infantry Unit* on MALAY as known at the beginning of November 1941 are indicated *n the attached map 0 1.
Situation of file A*r Force *n MALAY.
Although the position of BP.TTSH A^r Force *n MALAY was not clear, ^t was known that new airfields and bomb shelters were being constructed. The raa^n strength of the air force, seemed to be stationed in SINGAPORE, wHh about 3 squadron of 2 engine medium bombers scattered about the KOTABEARU airfield. The bay of STAM aeemed to be guarded closely.
The situation of BRITISH A4r Force in MALAY as known at the end of November ^s indicated in the attached map # 2.
The effectiveness of fiie enemy A4r Force in MALAY.
BLENHETM ^ouble engine medium bomber made up the main force of bomber un'ts and trained for3and operation, day and night flying and bombing by group or s*ngle. Tndicat*ons showed that they were to cooperated w*th ground operation and not aerial.
BUFFALO planes made up the fighter un*ts and was trained for defensive a*r tactics only.
The torpedo bomber units made up of old fashioned SWORDFTSH type plan received intensive tra^n4ng and were stationed *n SELETAR airfields. They had a bout 500 tons of torpedos and no more.
B. Situation in S*AM and BURMA. Snuat^on of the SIAMESE Army.
Tn order to preserve neutrality, the SWMESE Army began making the following preparation for the «ventual war.
ma
1. Since the 15th of November, a reserve army of 250,000 men was mobilized.
2. The Eastern Border Patrols were increased.
The main strength of S'AM Air Force were deployed along the Eastern front. Preparation was completed 4n the latter part of November.
Skotoh of Troop Dfapoo Won in tho BRTTTSH TKRRTTGRT Of MALilA.
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Situation of Imt Air f«ro* 1» BITCH malaia At «i Bar. 49.
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The Enemy Situation at BUFiLA
The situation of the enemy a*r force in southern STAK and BURi'A as known up to the end of November 4e indicated in the attached map # 3.
The enemy a4r force in B'TRVA, strengthened its -airfield and increased its personnel. About 70 of the planes were deployed as follows;
TdNGOO
Fighter planes about 25 planes
Bombers ---- about 16 planes
KTKGALQDOM
r
Fighter planes - about 10 planes
Bombers ---- about 10 planes
I'OULKETN and HSLCUE Few planes.
Chapter 2 Our Army Situation.
A. General Situation.
The southern Army General Headquarters was established in SAIGON on 4th of December.
The 25th Army was set up.4n SANA on 3rd of December. The advanced units of the 15th Army were atationed in SETCREAP and western £II£AT and were preparing for an advance 4nto STAK.
B. Situation fo the 3rd Air Force.
On the 6th of November, the 3rd Air Corps was transferred from the Expeditionary Force in CHTNA to the Southern Army. A new battle order was made ty the 3rd Air Corps, and according to the deployment plans of the Southern Army drawn on 15th of November (refer to Part 2,) the 10th Air Crop, the £3rd Independent A4r Unit, and others were placed under to command of the 3rd A4r Crops. Preparation for the operation against the strong-po/nts 4n the Southern Areas were made and on December 6 deployment of the A4r Force to Southern FRENCH-TNDO CHI^iA was completed.
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Skatah Showing Bnaaj Air Situation 1b 80uthto THATLAJH) and BTOA
m m* 0 wm ML
Part TI. Stl-cngth and Organisation of the 3rd Air Corps. The orgainzation and strength of the 3rd Air Corps are as follows:
1. Air Corps Commander - Lieut. Gen. MTCHIYO SUGAWARA.
2. The 3rd A*r Corps Headquarters.
3. The 3rd A*r CorpB.
a. The 3rd A*r Group Headquarters.
b. The 59th Ail Fleet (fighters) *; Model 1---21 planes.
Model 97 3 planes.
c. The 27th Air Fleet (light bombers) Model 99 28 planes
d. The 75th Air Fleet C Hodel 99 (double engined) 25 planes
e. The 90th A4r Fleet (light( bombers) Model 99 (double engined) 23 planes
4. The 7th"Air Groups.
a. The 7th Air Group Headquarters.
b. The 64th Air Fleet, (fighters)
Model 1 --- 35 planes
Model 97 6 planes
c. The 12th A*r Fleet (heavy bomber) Model 97B - 27 planes
d. The COth Air Fleet (heavy bombers) *"odel 97B planes
e. The 98th Air Fleet (heavy bombers) Model 99B - 42 planes
5. The 12th Air Groups , a. The 12th Air Group
b. The 12th Air Group Headquarters
c. The 1st Air Fleet (fighters) Model 97 ~ 42 planes
d. The 11th Air Fleet (fighter) Model 97 ~ 39 planes
:. The 15th Independent Air Fleet
a. 15th independent Afr Fleet Headquarters
b. 50th Independent A'r Squadron (reconnaissance) Model 100 2 planes Model 97 3 planes
c. 51st Tndependent Air Squadron (reconnaissance) Model 100 2 planes Model 97 3 planes
The 31st Air Fleet (reconnaissance)
Model 100 6 planes Model 97 20 planes
8. The 1st A*r Sector Headquarters
9. The 7th Air Sector Headquarters
10. The 12th Air Sector Headquarters
11. The 15th Air Sector Headquarters ^
12. The 18th A4r Sector Headquarters
13. ^The 36th Airfield Battalion (reconnaissance) 1ft. The 82nd Airfield Battal4on (reconnaissance)
15. The 15th Airfield Battalion (fighters)
16. The 21st Airfield Battalion (fighters)
17. The 22nd Airfield Battalion (fighters)
18. The 41st Airfield Battalion (fighters)
19. 94th Airfield Battalion (fighters)
20. The 27th Airfield Battalion (light bombers)
21. The 35th Airfield Battalion (light bombers)
22. The 91st Airfield Battalion (light bombers)
23. The 93rd Airfield Battalion (light bombers)
24. The 17th Airfield Battalion (heavy bombers)
25. The 23rd Airfield Battalion (heavy bombers)
26. The 92nd Airfield Battalion (heavy bombers)
27. The 96th Airfield Battalion (heavy bombers) 23. The 29th Airfield Company (reconnaissance)
29. The 3rd Airfield Company (reconnaissance)
30. The 5th Airfield Company (fighters)
31. The 33rd Airfield Company (fighters)
32. The 6th Airfield Company (light bombers)
33. The 12th Airfield Company (light bombers)
34. The 7th Airfield Company (heavy bombers)
35. The 9th Airfield Company (heavy bombers)
36. The 15th A«r Signal UnU (excluding a section)
37. The 25th Air Signal Unit
38. A section of the 1st A'r Intelligence Unit.
39. The 16th Air Intelligence Unit AO. The 40th Aircraft Locate7 Company
41. The 12th Air Transport Company.
42. The 5tk, 6th, 7th, and 8th Airfield Construction Unit. A3. A section of the 12th Aeronautical Repair Unit
44. A section of the 15th Field Air UnU
A5. The 20th AA Regiment
46. The 32nd Field AA battalion (B)
47. The 36th Field AA Battalion (B)
A8. The 280th and 281st independent Motor*"Pool Corapaies A9. The 1st Transportation Compales
50. -The 86th Transportation Compares
51. The 67th, 68th, 69th, and 70th Ground Duty Companies
52. The 80th and 81th Ground Duty Companies
53. The 43rd Construction Company
54. The 48th Construction Company v ~?~
55. The 10th Air Croup (l air fleet each of fighters, light bombers and reconnaissance squadron)
56. The 33rd Independent Air Unit (3 reconnaissance squadron)
57. The 40th Airfield Battalion (fighters)
58. The 97th Airfield Battalion (light bombers)
59. A section of the 1st Air Signal Regiment (l company each of telephone and wireless company)
60. The 1st Meteorological Batta.ion Headquarter
61. The 1st and 2nd Meteorological Companies
62. The 25th Meteorological Unit
63. 2nd Company of the 13th Special Air Transport Unit
64. The 15th Special Air Transport Unit
65. The 7th Special k*T Transport UnU
66. The 25th Air Sector Unit
67. The 17th and 18th Shipping Department
68. The loOth, 167th, 184th and 190th Transportation Companies.
pflrt III* ?rgpftrat:9B fgr tto Cawa/a
Chapter. 1 The Operation of the 25th and the 15th Army.
A. Plans
1. The 25th Army w*ll land the main force of the 5th Division ^n Southern STAJi at the beginning of the battle. And immediately thereafter, they will advance to the PEEAK River Hue to capture and establish airfields and vital points. The main force will take KUALA LUI'PUR as. quickly as possible and after the occupation of the rear sector is completed they will advance toward JGHOriStraits in conjunction with the advance of the 3rd Air Corps.
2. The 25th Army reserve w*U attack PENANG byway of Southern £TAL, while the 5th Divis'on advance to the western coast of L'ALAIA.
3. According to the prevailing situation, one corps will be landed *u the area between KUAlJANv and ;.'J£.-iSTNtto ease the operation of the main force.
4. Tn order to capture SINGAPORE Fortress, the army will make concerntrated lightning attack from the eastern flank of JOHORE Bridge.
5. A detachment will be landed in KOTA ESARU area to take enemy airfield by X - 1 day to make the operation of the main force easier
B. uutline of operational instruction
T. The movement of 5th Division (the first landing un4t)
6. The 5th Division will leave SANA area at 1000 hours of
X - U days under the protection of the Navy. They will select a route patrolled by JAPANESE planes stationed in Southern FRENCH -TND0 CHINA. On X day the 5th Division with its full force will land single units at SONG KHLA anchorage, TAPEwand FATTANI anchorage and capture airfields there. At the same time without losing an opportunity a strong unit will be s ent to HAT XAI, SADAO and BENTOKG area to occupy strategic points there and establish communication lines.
7. The various area landing units strength will be decided by consider'ng their future use and are as followsi
1. SONG KHLA Area
D<v*s*on Headquarters 9th Infantry Brigade Main Force of 5th Cabalry Regiment Ka4n Force of 5th F4eld Artillery Regiment Ka4n Force of 5th Engineer Reg4ment Units*directly under command of Division Air Units concerned.
2. TAPI Area 1 Battalion of A2nd Tnfantry Reg'ment A4r Units concerned
3. PATTANI Area Ma4n strength of 42nd Tnfentry Rggiment a sector of 5tfa Field Artillery Regiment
8, Immediately after the landing operation 4s completed (on about X - 5 days) the ma*n force of the 5th D4 vision will 4nvade the border from SADAO area wh4le a unit will invade from BENTONG area and advance toward PE.XAK River line. They will capture river crossings, ALOR STAR, SUl.'GET PAI'AN't, TATPING airf*elds and cooperate in the advance of the 3rd Air Group Ma4n Force. Together w4th the land4ng of the sencond wave on X - ? day they will immediately advance toward KUALA LUMPUR ( expect at X - 15 day) after the occupation of the rear area is completed.
If the situation permits, one unit will advance deep into Southern area and try to capture com.nun4cat4on Key po4nts.
9. After KUALA LUMPUR 48 captured, the troops will advance toward JOHORE Strait and try to t ake the JOHORE Bridge.
10. They will avoid any fight4ng aga4nst SIAld Army stationed in Southern SIAM. If the SIAMESE interferes with our plans we w»U attack with full force.
II. The DAMI Detachment movements.
11. The DAW Detachment will advance hand in hand with the main force of the 5th Division. After making a force landing on X day they will advance to KOTA BHARU jUrfield immediately and capture it. Then they will a4d in the landing of army main force.
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However if the situation does not perm*t, they will follow up the landing of the 5th Division main force. On X - day at 0000 hour. In case the landing is extended it will be decided by the Army -Navy commanders conference by 1000 hours of X - 1 day and the convoy will wait in the vicinity of PHU QUOY island for an opportunity.
12. The first airfield the DAMT Detachment must capture will be the airfield northeast of KOTA BHARU and if the situation permits they will quickly TANAMERAHand KUALA BEST airfield.
13. The DAUT Detachment will progress toward TRENGGANU and KUANTANG District by boats in accordance w*th operation progress of the main force.
IH. The Second Landing Movement of the 5th Division and DAMI Detachment.
14. The troops of the 5th Division and DAMI Detachment for the second landing will be assembled in CAM RANH Bay by Xv - 3 days, and on X -1 day they will leave under the protection of naval fleet and on about X - 8 day will enter SONGKHLA, PATTAK7 and KOTABHARU anchorage to land.
IV. Action of KONOYE Division
15. At the beginning of the operation, the KOKOYE Division by orders of the 15th Army Commander will leave a part of its unit in Southern FilENCH-INDO China and together with the establishing of its safety, the main force will advance to BANGKOK and guard the airfields and railroad to gain advantage for the 25th Army operation.
16. The main force driving forward toward BANGKOK will use railroad and ships to advance to Southern SIAM quickly in order to make the operation of the 5th Division easier. The units consisting of 3 infantry regiment as ita nucleus will make a effort to assemble at the rear of the 5th Division by X - 1 day.
The remaining main force and the small unit at SATG0K will pass through Southern S'AM and assemble as quickly as possible in the rear of 5th Division, They will bo relieved of guard duty by the 55th Division, and according to tho situation they will let the 5th Division drive forward and go before them.
V. The Movement of the Army Main Force.
17. The army main force (main strength of the 18th Division and remaining strength of 5th Division) will assemble in the vicinity of FORMOSA, and CACTON and on X - 25 day under the protection of the naval fleet the main force will land In the SONGKHLA, while a small unit will land in the vicinity of PATTANI and catch up with the 5th Division.
18. The 18th Division will capture PENANG aw soon as possible and control the northern rear sector of the PERAK River line. They will simplify the main force.southern flank operation and will prepare for future operation.
VI. Movement of 56th Division.
19. The 56th Division will follow the progress of the main army and will land in area between KUANTANfc and MERSING and advance toward JOHORE Stra4t to assist the army main force operations. The Division will concentrate its full strength in MERSTNG, AYER TAWAR and JOHORE Strait areas as conditions permit,
VII. Movement of Army Headquarter.
20. The Aj-my Combat Headquarter will leave SATG0N on X - "J.5 day to SANA, there board the RYTJJO MARU. They will land at SONGKRTA on X day-together with the first ~ave of the 5th Division. Later, following the progress of battle situation they will advance to TATPTNG, KUALA LUMPUR and KLUANG.
21. The remaining Headquarter U it will board ship at CAM RAHN Bay by X - 2 days and together w*th the 5th D-*vision second rave they will land at SONGKHLA. However, a portion of the unit will be left behind in SAIGON to maintain communication.
The outline of 15th Army's Advance in STAM.
1. - The 15th Army, on X day will advance through the borders of
STAM and go through TNDO-CHINA to BANGKOK with the advance troop (3 infantry and 1 artillery battalion as its nucleus) bf KONOYE Division under its command..
2. The NAKHOK landing unit ( 1 infantry battalion (minus 1 unit) and 2 transport bessels of air unit) of UNO Detachment (lA3rd Infantry) Regiment as its nucleus) Will wait aboard ship in the vicinity of PHU QUOC Island and will land 4n anchorage,on X day together with our 5th Division and capture airfields.
11/
The landing units (detachment strength) of D"0KG DONG, CHTKOi: PONG and PetfEC ■OHTAP area will fellow the 5th Division from St. JACQUES and on the morning of X day enter in anchorage. Thereafter they w*ll immediately capture BANG-DONG airfield and V'CTOPTA Point.
Chapter 2. The Operation Preparation of 3rd A4r Corps. Part T. Establishment of Air Base Constructing of a4r base 4n Southern FTtENCI! "HBO CHINA was an Important phase 'n the preparation of Southern area operation. However the army and air corps overcame the numerous difficulties to meet the demands of operations. The numerous difficulties are as follows:
1. FRENCH TKDO CH"NA being a red clay land becomes very muddy during rainy seasons. This preparation of operation being made dur*ng the rainy season forced then to finish the most d'fficult task 4n a short Mas with great difficulties.
2. The ant*-JAPAN attitude of FRENCH "pND0 CJTNA made it difficult to get piastre (FRENCH TDO CHTHA money) j therefore the expense of the array was restricted.
3. Inconvin'ent transportation made it difficult to gether equipment and building material for airfields, labors and transportation.
A. Due to the long commun*cation between the homeland and FRENCH TNDO CHINA, and the shortage of ships, It was difficult to send supples*
The 3rd A*r Corps Commander dispatched the staff and others to FRENCH "HiDO mlts 'n mid -October. At the same time he advanced the command post to SAIGON to take over the project. He devotee! himself 4n the completion of the airfield. Owing to the suitable d* sposal 1aken by the Imperial General Headquarter and the preparation of air operation carried out by the stationary army of FRENCH TNDG CHINA he overcame the fore- mentioned difficulties and barely succeeded in- deploying all the unit bj the beginning of December.
The 3rd Air Corps Headquarter was advanced to PHHGM PEi.K on December 1.
Report or. accumulation of fuel and ammunition.
Accumulation of fuel and ammunition in Southern FRE2.CK TNDO CHINA was not too successful due to contradiction and delay in transportation. The arrival of airplane belly talcs and pom pom gun shells were very few. The 3rd A4r Corps accumulated barely enough %o meet the demand just before the battle comencec by opening a commun*cation and transportation route.
■ Fart XI. BlB °f °P?ratioB
I. Destruction of Operation.
1. The air corps cooperating with the naval air unit (22nd Naval Air Fleet) will destroy BRTTTSH Air Power in MALAYA at the beginning of the
battle.
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Following the landing of the -2Ath Army in MALAY, the 3rd k*r Corps will advance <ts base and at the same tine destroy enemy air power in BURMA, while cooperating with the 15th Army^e operation.
2. A portion of the 3rd Corps will be used 4n the SIAM-BUPiuA aree, and If necessary, they will destroy the enemy's air power and at the same time cooperate with the 15th Army operation.
II. Outline of operation instruction.
3. The main air force w4ll assemble (named the 1st Kass Assembly) and deploy (called the Medium Deployment) in Korth FRENCH 'NDO CJBKI and Southern CHINA.
At this time a port4on will attack the CH^ffiSE Army -*n order to camouflage our movement.
4. The main air force will advance to FRENCH ^NDO CHTNA(called the 2nd Assemble) and deploy (called the operation deployment).
In the first assault the 22nd Naval Air Fleet will destroy enemy air power in the North BRTT"rSH MALAY.
5. Immediately after landing, the advance unit of tie 25th Army, on the eastern coast of MALAY Pennonsula without losing a moment will advance a portion of the fighter and light bomber un«t. After they capture and repair the airfielc the main force will advance to make the aerial exterra'nating campaign a greater success.
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During this operation, the a*r force will protect the navigation and landing operation and cover the advance of the 25th Army.
6. The a*r fleet will give necessary protection to the 25th Army enroute and during landing operation on the eastern coast of HALAY Penninsula and thereafter ass'st in the operation.
7. From the beginning of the operation the a4r corps will engage in cutting off the'enemyJs rear cp,,imocatopni ;ome. attacl votal points and if necessary reconnoiter enemy positions,
8. During the early stage of the 15th Army operation 4n BURl'A the air force will give necessary cooperation.
The progress of army operat'on progressed and great success v.as obtained Jn the BURMA enemy aerial extermination campaign by units based in Central STAK. This made the operation of the main force much easier. The air fleet will cooperate in the 15th Army operation. v Til. Distribution of Groups.
10. The Group will with the main force cooperate in the 25th Aymy area operation while a small portion will aid in the 15th Army area operation.
TV. Gentroli zati on.
11. The main unit of the air fleet will deploy in Southern CHniA and Northern and C ntral EiENCH INDC CHINA (intermediate deployment) and later deploy in Southern FRENCH niDO CHINA (operation deployment).
12. The assembly of ground forcess will be made by railroads and ships. The ground unit before being transported to an assembly area w*ll gather at the point of embarkation to shorten the date of centralization.
V. Outline of Operation.
13. The Outline of intermediate deployment is shown in the attached tap # A.
14. Tn the ;ntenr.adiate deployment the air force will make an attack on strategic points in South CHINA according to the following outline.
A*
App«d«d lap # it
3ket«h of Pint Astaabled Formttw Aa of tha WmA* of 28 lor.
A. They will use the minimum force repu4red in order to complete the mission. Kuch'effort will be made to train the newly distributed troops in unit command and drill(mainly cooperation of light bombers and fighter planes) The army will try to avoid the exhaustion of fighting power and attacks will be carried rut once in 2 days.
B. During the attack period, the air corp will make the following preparation for the next operation.
a. Get acquainted with the terrain along the coast line of South FRENCH "NDO CHINA.
Necessary Staff Officers
All a4r squadron commanders and formation leaders.(by using their own plan)
b. Preparation of reconnaissance of operation deployment airfields.
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Each air group will have one transport loaded to Its capacity with troops.
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C. Operational area of air group is outlined as follows:
jFB Westernerea excluding the connecting line between NANNTN and KIYO
7FB Easterna-ea including the~above mentioned line.
D. According to the situation a unit of 7FB will carry out the attack on KUNMING. In this attack the. will use HANOI airfield as their intermediary base.
E. LOFB will not participate in this operation, but will devote itself
for the preparation of operation and also work for the acquisition of supplies.
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15. The deployment positions of air units in South FRENCH TNDO CHINA and Southern SIAK at the beginning of operation is indicated on the attached
16. The disposition of air sector units at the beginning of battle are as follows:
A. The 1st, 7th and 15th Air Sector Units will deploy in Central and Southern FRENCH "NDO CHINA. s
B. The 12th and 18th'"'Air Sector Units will progress forward together with the advance units of the 25th Army and establish airfields in Southern STAK near KOTABjtff'ar ea.
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appealed Map # 5t
Sketah Showing Operational Deployment On 8 DM.
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5.
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C. Following the advance of the 15th Army, the 15th Air Sector Unit w'll establish a*r base <n Central S^JH.
17. The position before the first assault and the capture a*rf*elds 4n Southern STAM by the advance uhHs are as follows.
# 1 ~ Outline for protecting areas above the sh*p transport groups.
A. The fighter plan, based 4n Southern S'AM w*ll be responsible for protecting the convoy carrying the advance units of the 25th Army
throughout the daytime of X - 1 day.
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B. Main object of protection will be a gainst enemy torpedo plane. Most of the protection unit strength wi'll be directed on the western flank of the transport route.
C. Leader of the 12th Air Group will have command of the Protection
Force.
D. The protection of the 25th Army voyage will be decided according to the situation at that moment.
i 2 -- Outline of preparation against counter -attach.
A. If attacked by the enemy during the movement of the advance unit, the corp will make individual connter-attack.
B. Tn preparat'on of the afore mentioned offensive the projected force of foe 1st assault will complete its operational deployment by the eye of X 3 days and make preparation for the 1st assault.
According to the weather, the 1st assault units may carry out operational deployment on X A days.
C. The counter - attack position depends on the conditions of the convoy protecting unJt, strength and weather etc. Consideration must be given to the number of type 101 fighters and main force of bombers available for attack. Starting time be fixed so they can return to the base by sundown.
D. The offensive outline 1s almost similar to the plans of the 1st
assault.
| j Outline for carrying cut 1st assault. (Flahned assault) Direction
When the advance unUs of the 25th Army lands at dawn, (time may be changi according to the moon) the air corps will destroy enemy air powe* in Northern BRTTSH MALAY.
The ma*n object will be directed on enemy torpedo unit a*r fields, f*ght«r plane unite w'll concentrate on strafing. Outline
A. Collection of Intelligence Report.
a. The Intelligence Section will deploy in PHNOfc PENH and mainly gather air intelligence report 4n Northern BRTTTSI: I'ALAY.
b. The unit commander of tiie landing party v'll g4ve the weather report and progress of the 25th Army advance unit *n the 1st assault.
B. Outline of Attack. . . «
a. After the landing of the 25th Army advanced unit on X day, the air force will destroy enemy torpedo and bomber planes in Northern BRITISH MALAX, with incendiary and fragmentation bombs. Grounded enemy plane will be strafed.
C. Outline of Attack target and deployment, strength. v
a. Flan #1 "<7hen enemy torpedo planes are stationed in the vicini ty of KOTA BHARU and the main force of the enemy bombers are at KEDAll. 3FE (minus 27FR) and 62FR Enemy torpedo plane airfield.
In KuTA BHARU and TRENGGANU area and also in SOKGKHLA and BLTTANT depending on the situation.
7FB Enemy bombers in Northern BRT'SH I'ALAY (mainly heavy bombers) A-»r. unit airfields (ALOR STAR, SUKGET P1TTAHI PENANG, T ATP TNG, KETTL, A YEP. T ATTAR)
S1FB A reconnaissance unit, however will take part 4n the attack if the 22nd Naval Air Fleet cannot participate by«ting as bait attracting enemy fighter planes in the vicinity of S^GAPCRE.
12FE Beside escorting cqvoys they will protect air bases in Southern FRENCH "NDO CETA and care for the attack units.
b. Plan {I 2'-- T'O attack enemy torpedo p^ane main strength, when the planes are at KOTA BEARU and TRENGGAKU airfields. 3TB (minus 27FB)
Tfill attack torpedo and bomber
7FB (minus 98 and 6AFE)
planes at KOTA BHARU and
Air Raiders (nanus 50FCS)
TRENAGG1HJ air fields.
98 FR W«n attack 3 airfields 4n
6A FR 9 planes only ALOR STAR, SOTGS7 PATAir, 50 FCS T1TPTHG, KEPA1A EATAS area.
S*milar to plan ill
c. Plans #1 and #2 are made so it can be carried out by squadrons by squadrons or formations. However, '? good weather permits a complete attack w»ll be made in dirdtion of the main power to show the enemy our concentrated strength.
d, Tn every case, the attack will be executed against enemy main forces at ?0 minute intervals.
D« Searching of Reconnaissance Unit is as Follows:
50FC8 From the western side of HAT.YC mountains (included)to the northern side of l4ne between TREKAGGUM and PERAK Valley.
51FCS
70FC"5 Eastern area of HA^.TO mountains (included to the northern side of lJne between 7RENAGGUU a^d FEriAK River Valley).
81FG6 Areas south of TBSKAQGHD and PERAK River Vallejr line.
E. Starting Base.
7FB
3FB (minus 27FR) Operational deployment airfields will
70 FCS be used. -
S2FR '
However, 6AER will use KQLTQNG TRACii (advance on eve of previous
cay.)
12FB will use SOC TRAHG or PHD 8D0C Island or K0KP0NG TRACH as base to protect convoys.
Other un'ts will use present base.
F. 10FB(minus 62FR) will cooperated free tly with the 15th %sgr 4n the BURIuA area.
G. lieteorologi cal Control System.
Tmraediately after aomplet4ng the 1st att.ek, the meteorlog4-cal control system y:411 be carried out »n FRENCH 'NDO CHINA. (After advance ss made the control system will be set up quickly.)
E. Army and Navy Agreement will be decided after the conclusion of the Ifeparlal headquarter agreement. T. Others.
a. The fighter un'ts of the KEDAUState airfield attack force will refuel at airfields captured by advance unHs and must return to home baae 'n FREHCH INDO CHINA. This is the standard rule.
b. The 1st attack un4t will prepare for the next operation as soon as they return from the previous mission.
c. The 12F^ willmit in readiness for p rsu4ng enemy planes.
d. Tf the airborne unJts are a ttached, they will be used *n the 25th Army advance operation in KEDAll State and air exterminating capaign. They may also be used in capturing enemy airfields.
18. Positions until the capture and completion of^airfield by advance units are as follows:
A. 12 FS and 27FB w*H quickly advance to airfield 4n Southern STAii and protecfc .the advance units base. At the same time they will cooperate will the invading operation of 'he 3rd and 7th FB (a4r brigades) and battle advance un*t. During th-'s V-.e the 27FR will be under the command of the 12F3 leader. .
B. The 3FB will quickly advance to the Southern SIAK a^'eld and while continuing the air exterminating capipaign, will directly cooperate with ground operation of advance units.
C. The 7FB and 62FR will continue its former duty and if condition permits they will go into action using the airfield 'n Southern S'AL as its advanced base. Vital points of PENA1.C Island will be attacked if situation allows.
-D. The 10F3 (minus 62FH) will take part in the air exterminating campaign of BURMA and at the sane time they will cooperate directly with the 15th Army's operation.
19. The air sector unit advancing together with the advance un*t of the 25th Army will f*rst of all quickly establish bases in the following manner.
A. Runway area and all quarters will be completed so planes can land or leave safely.
B. Establish communication system.
C. Prepare supply and loading works for fuels and bombs.
D. Acquire necessary' equipment for inspecting and assembling airplanes .
£. Kake air and ground protection. Camouflage, cover, dispersion
and protection of planes.
F. Bittet personnel.
G. Complete traffic and debarkation system.
E. Prepare supplementary work of airfield and repairing bomb craters. . . 20. The movement and action of the 1st advance air units in Southern SUM is as follows:
A. Following the advancement of the base 1 ir^Southern STAK, the 12th FB and 27FR w'll promptly proceed one after another, (by X - 1 day)
they will protect the anchoring area of the advance units cooperating with the 3rd FB, 7FB, and a part of 10FB in their advancing operation.
B. If situation permits on advance, the 83FS, and part of 31F^ (or full strength) will go.
C. All aforementioned units will be nnder the command of the 12 FB leader at one time.
D. With the situation the command post of the air corps headquarter or intelligence post will be advanced to SONGKHLA.
E. The airfield expercted bo be used for the advance of the 1st wave are m follows:
SC1.GKELA TFR 12 FB PATTAK" 11 FR- 27FR Paj.t of the 83FS and 31FR will go tb the above mentioned airfields first and their to TAPWwhen it is oompleted.
F. The 1st advance units'.will have the following attached transport units.
♦
12 FB approximately 2 squadrons 27 FR approximately 1 squadron
The following facts are for the 2nd advance un*t to Southern S:
A. Advance strength. Rema'ning part of 1st air wave. The main strength of 3rd FE Air Corps Headquarters.
B. Disposals of troops are as follows: The air'corpsheadquarters and 1FR, 12FB, llF4' and 27FR in
SONGKHLA and FATTAN'.
TAP* 50 FCS, 6AFR, 31FR ( main force) 90FR as advance unit must consider to land the 98F^ and type 100 headquarter reconnaissance planes
TRANG 3rd Air Brigade Headquarter, 59 Ft and 51FCs. TRANS will be used temporarily by other units according to the weather situation.
NAKHON 75 F".
23 It the 25th Army is sucessful in capturing airfield groups in KEDAA State at tie beginning of battle, the following are expected.
A* According to the degree of necessity 4n direct cooperation with ground campaign, the frequent changea of troops distribution will be as follows:
3rd FB 75 FR 90 FR " 27 FR 11 FR
If situation permits a part of 70 FCS, 31FR and 83FS(ninus 89FCS) will be attached.
(7FB), 15FS, 50FCS, 51FCS, 60FR, 121*, 98FR, 59FR, 64FR. Tf sUu-ation allows a part or full fcrce of 62FR will be attached.
(81FR), C12FB), 1FR (minus 1 squadron), llFn also a part 77 FR will be attached if condition allows.
B. Following the capture of KEDAl State, the usage o£*s,irf ields will depend on the situation* that timej especially the completion of Southern STAK airfields, number of captured airfields and its estimated damage. The following are the disposal of various air brigade.
AYER TAWAR ALOR STAR ma4n force of 3FB
SATSURU
Southern area of NAKHON (included) 7FB *f situation permits Southern SUM airfields a part or full force of
10FB.
KOTABHARU airfields it'll be used by naval ZERO fighter units* however if necessary a part of army TRENAGGNU and S^GAPORE attqck units will be attached.
C. The a4r transport gguadron tc be attached to the 2nd assault advance un*t will be decided separately.
23. The outline of BURMA aerial operation are as follows: #1 of its plan. A. First the air nuits will destroy air power 'n BURJIA and gain air superiorly, and at the same t*na cut off enemy communication route in the MALAY area.
3. Tn the ground operation, the air corpswill cooperate in annihilat-BUFA1A Army and also the CHINESE Army which Is expected to invade from the South-eastern CKTNA.
#2 of plan.
A. A part or full force of 10FB will be used and if necessary the 7FB Wll also be used.
B. The following are the airfields expected to be used. dttBSBB DOMUAK FRACEIN BUR! PHTTSANULQK 99JCSU0UXLOUM RAKAENG
If necessary CHIANG MAI, LAKPANG airfields.
C. The following are airfields expected to be attacked. VTCTORTA Point
RANGOON
TGUNGOO if necessary LOTEN, LASJTO, TAVOY, '"ERGUT airfields.
■hen the air corp cannot use too much power *n EURMA areas on account of the Southern MALAY operation, the attack orders are as followst
a. The a*r corp will cont*nously destroy landing area of enemy airfield and decrease the activities of enemy air power. This will be repeated over and over on VCTORJA Pp/nt and RANGOON.
b. When military strength of the Southern MALAY operation 'e available a crushing blow will be dealt on the airfields at VCTORTA Point and RANGOON at the opportune time.
S. The air corps direcfc cooperation with the 15th Army will be decide on the situation at that time.
F. Attacking of vital points will be specially stressed in the RANGOON area.
G. In the attack of -VICTORIA Point the air corp wfii keep in touch with the 15th Army.
2A. During this period of operation, the air corp district headquarters will be established. This headquarter will be in command of all sector units in SUM and MALAY area.
25. Following the advance of the 10FE main force in Central STAM,
a sub-unit of the air supply dump will be individually pushed forward to BANGKOK and SONGKHLA (also in ALOR STAR depending on the situation).
26. Following the completion of airfields in Southern STAM, the main force of 7FB will use TAPE as an advance base.
The meteorlogical condition east of the MALAY HATRYO range and the battle situation of BURMA area will determine the 7FB advance. The entire force will invade STAM and will later be used in the area west of MALAY HAIRYO range to BRTTSH MALAY. It will also.be used 'n the BURMA and CHINESE Army operation.
27. The method of operation, to be used after the advance of the air corp'8 main force in Southern STAM and MALAY area will depend on the situation at that time. The distribution of units as staged on paragraph 22 ar» as followss
* t
a. Used to destroy enemy air power. Concentrated at MEDAN vicinity, Northern SUMATRA,'aid area south of Central BRTTtSH MALAY especially airfields and factories in SINGAPORE.
b. G've direct cooperation to the 25th ARmy from the time the 25th. ARray attack KEDAiJ State t* 11 after the capture of SINGAPORE Fortress. Include the slow progress of the 25th *Rmy in KEDAJl State; cutting off enemy rear communications, troop movement, interruption in transporting ammunition and prevention of enemy withdrawal.
B. 3FB
a. Mainly to give direct cooperation to the 25th Army ground operation (cutting off enemy retreat included).
b. If necessary take part *n destroying enemy air power (Northern SUMATRA excluded).
C. 12 FB -- (Air Brigade)
a. Enemy a'r power exterminating campaign.
b. Gain air security in battlefield areas. Depending on the situation, concentrate on areas where troops are gathered.
c. Participate *n ground operat'on when necessary, (this will be carried out only in favorable terrain).
D. 31 FR
They will engage in searching the enemy plans in MALACCA Strait, ex-pedally KEDAA State and strategic points on the west coast of Southern STAM; Ionj range reconnaissance will be carr}ed cut. Enemy fighter units in vicinity of STGAPORE will be engaged to d4vert their attention. 5. When air raiders un4ts and transport units are attached, they will be used in PERAK River crossings, and KUALA ItttS^^area according to the situation.
28. Tn order to cope with the anticipated battle report, the outlines of direct cooperation with the 25th Army are follows:
A. Cooperation of operatin *n KEDAA State include the t'ae when the 25th ARmy tattle progress *s against expectation.
a. 3YB (if necessary add a part of full strength of 12FB and 7FE) w+11 cooperate *n advacing the ma*n frontal attack. Cooperation r*th mechanized troops w*ll be stressed.
b. The 7FB and 12FE will occasionally carry cut a*r poller extermination campaign in Northern and Central EETTTSH MALAY.
c. If necessary, the 12F3 \ ill ga4n air security over battlefield areas. .
d. $f the situation requ*reSj the air corp will neutralize the 2nd enemy l*ne and artillery.
e. Attack on enemy reinforcement landing on the west coast of KEDAA State cr retreating enemy troops.
f. Reconnoitering enemy's plan of landing in the rear of 25th Army from the western ceast of Southern £TAM and also to annihilate them.
g. Preventing enemy withdrawal at various cross points of FERAK River.
h. When the ^3FS attached to 25th Army is under the command of the 3rd Air Corps, they will be used for photographic reconnaissance, communication, and artillery cooperation. Their main purpose is to attack enemy ground forces.
3. Reconnaissance of MALACCA Strait area.
a. The.a'r corps will find out whe»ther the enemy has and intent4 on of sending replacements from INDIA and the Middle East area (TEAS, IRAQ) and also find out if they plan to w«thdraw from the MALAY area to Northern SUKffRA.
C. Ehen the 25th J&ay attacks south of the PERAK River l4ne, the air corps 4s expected to cooperate with the following directions.
a. Reonnoiter enemy plans in KAMTANG, VxLAlD, KUALA LT?TS, TANJONG KARANG area lines and cooperate *n the 25th A^my'attack of this area.
}
b. Reconr.o4ter enemy plans 4n PAHAKG R4ver l4ne, IBHlMtft KUALA LUMPUR l4ne and also KUAKTA2.G, SEREMBAT area and cooperate 4n the attack of this area. ./ C. Destroy enemy jungle zone and supply dui.ips. W4th the follow4ng object, the a4r corp w4ll carry out large scale 4nceud4ary attacks.
a. OpenJng path for the long def4le assault troops 4n jungle
zone.
b, Burning of enemy munit4ons. £. Farachut4ng of supply.
For the advancing troopB of the 25th .Ar,my the a4r corps w*ll drop amnun4t4ons, foods and other goods by parachutes or use captured a4r-f4 elds to supply goods 4f necessary.
F. Cooperation of operation on the coast of MALAY Penninsula.
a. T it 4s necessary to land troops of the 25th Army 4n the v4c«n*ty of KUANTAN or MERER*!, a port4 on of the a4r group w4ll cooperate in th4s.
b, Tf a un4t of the 25th Anay carr4es out amph4b4ous landings on the west coast of MALA-, the a4r corps w4ll cooperate 4n the amp-fa4 b4ous operation.
G. Cooperat4on 4n operation to capture STNGXPORE Fortress, a. In the operat4on of capturing SINGAPORE Fortress, the air
corps w4ll dec4de the d4stribution of troops "n the following manner:
3FB w4ll cooperate wnh the 25th ARmy 4n the assault of SINGAPORE, however 4f necessary a part of 12FB and 77FR w'll be attached to the na4n force. m'
7FB In addition to the distribution of troops ad stated before, the 62HR of 10. FB will be attached 4f needed.
b. The a4r corps w4ll reconno4ter the enemy's front and cooperate 4n attacking the enemy advance pos4t4on of S^iGAPORE defense, 2nd the "
l4ne between MERS'lfcaifcd 3FB and 12FB w4ll be the main body.
c. Make reconna4ssance of enemy plans 4n Northern area of JOHORE Stra4t and the main defense line of SINGAPORE Fortress and cooperate 4n 4ts attack.
3FB and 12FB w4ll be the ma4n strength used and 4f necessary, add 7FB.
9-1
d. When attacking important targets on STliGAPORE Island, attack w'll be concentrated on the following a*rf*eld, airplane factories, and other military factories, water works, power plants, fuel storage, m4l*tary areas, arm;' headquarters, administrative organization. The navy 4s expected to carry out attacks on naval ships and installations. 29. The outline of cooperation of the 16th and the 25th Army in the west JAVA operation w4ll be decided according to the situation of that moment.
C. Concentration and Deployment.
The General Headquarters of the 3rd Air Group Is at NANKING and the assigned units in CHINA, MANCHURIA and JAPAN, respectively. On 15 November, when the Air Group was engaged in CHINA operations, the Chief of the Air Group announced the following orders on concen tration and deployment.
The Summary of Orders (15 Nov.)
1. The Southern Air Forces in cooperation with the Navy should promptly prepare for the occupation of the southern strategic areas The forces listed on the annexed sheet will be under bur7 command from midnight, 15 November.
2. The Air Group will prepare for future operations by deployment and concentration to South CHINA and FRENCH INDO-CHINA.
The KWANTUNG Army Command and the assigned 1st Air Group Com-mand (except the units stationed in FORMOSA) will be concentrated under delegated command.
3. The 15th Independent Air Unit (except the 51st Independent Air Squadron) will remain in its present status.
The 8lst lir Regiment will deploy and concentrate to Southern INDO-CHINA and prepare for future operations.
4. The 12th Air Brigade will prepare air defenses in FRENCH INDOCHINA after concentrating and deploying there.
5. The 7th Air Regiment (which includes the 51st Independent Air Squadron) and the 3rd Air Regiment, after concentrating and deploying in Southern CHINA and Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA, will prepare for attacking strategic areas in South CHINA.
The order of attack should be issued later.
6. The 19th Air Regiment will prepare for future operations by concentrating and deploying to HAINAN Island and Central FRENCH INDO-CHINA and a section of it will be responsible for the air defense near SANAH Harbor.
7. The 83rd Air Regiment (except the 89th Independent Air Squadron) will prepare for future operations by concentrating in TAICHU.
8. The following Air Transportation Units were attached for concentration purposes.
The order for attachment will be issued afterwards. The 8lst Air Regiment: A section of the specially organized 15th Air Transport Unit (6 planes, B type or MC) will be attached at RANKING.
The ^rd Air Brigade; The remainder of the specially organized 15th Air Transport Unit will be at TACHANGCHEN and the 12th Air Transport Squadron at NANKING.
The 10th Air Brigade: A squadron of the specially organized 13th Air Transport Unit will be attached at NANYUAN soon after its arrival.
The 12th Air Brigade: The General Headquarters of the 7th Air Transport Unit will be NANYUAN. The assignment of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons will depend on the order of" the KWANTUNG Army Command.
9. The 10th and the 12th Air Brigades will search for the shortest route of concentration.
10. The other airforces, while making preparation for future operations, will assist in the concentration of the abovementioned forces.
11. In concentration and deployment, the abovementioned airforces will be under the following delegated command or receive the following .assistance.
1. From midnight of 15 November the 1st Air Brigade Command will assist in communication, meteorological conditions, maintenance, supply, forced landings quarters, etc. in CHINA as long as doing
,so does not interfere with its own battle operations. The 23rd Army Command is delegated to take care of the administration, finance, quarters and supplies of the air units in Southern CHINA. The Air Sector Unit of the command will also assit in communication meteorological conditions, maintenance, supply and forced landings.
2. In JAPAN (including FORMOSA) they will be assisted by the 1st
Air Group Command, Air Inspectorate General (Chief of Air
Headquarters) and assigned Air Units (schools). 3. In INDO-CHINA, the 15th Army Command is delegated to take care of the guard, quarters and supply of the Air Units and the 21st Independent Air Unit will assist in communication, meteorological conditions, maintenance, supply and forced landings.
Attached Sheet
The 10th Air Brigade The 83rd Independent Air Unit The 40th Airfield Battalion (Fighter Unit) The 97th Airfield Battalion (Light Bombers)
A Section of the 1st Air Signal Regiment (Air Signal Wire Company,
Wireless Company) General Headquarters of the 1st Field Meteorological Battalion The 1st and 2nd Meteorological Companies The 25th Field Meteorological Unit
The 1st Squadron of the 13th Special Air Transport Unit The 15th Special Air Transport Unit The 7th Air Transport Unit The 25th Air Sub-Depot The 17th and 18th Shipping Air Depot
The Commander of the Air Group, seeing the necessity for control of concentration and deployment organized unit districts and designated sector units to each district. The 1st Air Sector Unit will deploy from Eastern FRENCH INDO-CHINA to HAINAN Island, the 7th Air Sector Unit to the northern South FRENCH INDO-CHINA, and the 15th Air Sector Unit to the southern South FRENCH INDO-CHINA. He ordered all to prepare for operations. Ahead of the Air Forces, these Air Sector Units were transported successively to South FRENCH INDOCHINA and by 28 November most of them succeeded in landing. By the end of the month the deployment was completed.
After deploying to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA, the Air Intelligence
1
Regiment, the Weather Unit and the Air Signal Regiment, which are under the command of the 25th Army at SAIGON, organized nets of air intelligence, meteorological data and air communication and
33
completed them by the end of November.
The Air Force performed the concentration operation in two steps. The 1st operation is to proceed to South CHINA and Northern FRENCH INDO-CHINA and the 2nd operation ^o Southern FRENCH INDO* CHINA. The 2nd operation to be carried out before the commencement of the actual battle. Due to adverse weather conditions the concentration to Central CHINA area was delayed; however, by 28 January the 1st concentration was almost completed.
On 29 November the Commander of the Air Group issued the following order. On 6 December the 2nd operation of concentration and deployment was completed and the preparation for operation continued.
1. In the occupation of the SINGAPORE area, the 25th Army will land in MALAYA area, occupying all bases promptly and securing the foremost positions.
The 15th Army will facilitate 25th Army operations by invading THAILAND and prepare for future operations against BURMA. They will mkke secure and stabilize THAILAND and place the CHINESE in that area under blockade*
2. The main force of the Air Group will prepare for future operations by deploying to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA.
3. The 3rd Air Brigade, to which is attached the 15th Independent Air Unit (except the 51st Independent Air Squadron), will deploy to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA by the evening of (X minus 3) day and from (X minus 2) day will prepare for an aerial annihilation combat against the KOTABHARU area.
By noon of (X) day the 27th Air Regiment will prepare for an advance to 8INGOR0.
*' - - ■. ''^i
The disposition of Air Transport Units for the 2nd concentration will remain as before.
4. On the evening of (X minus 2>) day the 7th Air Brigade will deploy to South FRENCH.INDO-CHINA and from (X minus 2) day prepare for aerial annihilation combat against the KEDAH area.
For the sake of the 2nd concentration, the 7th Air Transport
Unit and the temporarily assigned heavy bombers will be under the command of the unit at CANTON.
5. After deploying to South FRENCH INDO-CHINA, on the evening of (X minus 3) day, the 10th Air Brigade will prepare for an aerial annihilation combat against the KOTABHARU area and South BURMA on (X minus 2) day. They will also prepare to cooperate with the main force of the 15th Army.
The summary of the operations in cooperation with the 15th Army is shown on an attached sheet.
The section of a fighter unit reserved for the air defense of SANAH will return to the main force to enable the advance group of the 25th Army to proceed beyond the sphere of power. When the commander of the Air Brigade arrives in KunAKOntJ the 70th Independent Air Squadron will return to its original attachment.
The assignment of the Air transport Unit for the 2nd concentration is as Before.
On (X minus 2) day, the 3rd, 7th and 10th Air Brigade will advance to the front line of battle with the following troop strength.
Half of the force from dawn till 1500 hours of J[X minus 2) day Full force from dawn till 1500 hours of (X minus 1) day.
7. While carrying out their assigned mission the 12th Air Brigade will arrange to protect the advance group of the 25th Army and convoys of the section of the 15th Army. Orders pertinent to the protection of convoys will be issued later.
Upon arrival in South FRENCH INDO-CHINA, at the latest in CANTON by 3 December, the 7th Air Transport Unit and the specially attached heavy bombers will be under the command of the 7th Air Brigade.
8. The 83rd Independent Air Unit will advance to NHATRANG and prepare for a future rush.
Annexed Sheet
Operational plans for cooperation with the 15th Army 1. The summary of plans is as follows: (1). Plan A.
3
In the event that the 15th Army should make a forced invasion of THAILAND.
(a). At dawn of (X) day, the main force of the 19th Air Brigade, in cooperation with the advance units of the Guard Division, will facilitate an invasion of BANGKOK by attacking potential enemy air and ground forces. Under certain conditions the Air Brigade will cooperate directly with the YOSHIDA Detachment.
' (b). The Reconnaissance Force will reconnoiter the situation of the Guard Division and on the dawn of (X) day, will especially check the situation of the YOSHIDA Detachment and the landing of UNO Detachment.
(2) . Plan B.
In the event that the 15th Army meets little resistence.
(a) . Beginning at dawn of (X) day, the ground forces will pre-pare for attack in case of resistance from the THAILAND Army.
The date and points of attack of the ground force will be limited only to what is necessary.
(b) . In the event that the airfield at KONGMUANG is useable on (X) day, a part of the soldiers will be transported by air from
KRflKOR
KURAKOnU to BANGKOK by the Air Transport Unit.
(c) . The reconnaissance is applied to Plan A.
(3) . The operation of the 15th Army after the occupation of THAILAND.
After the ground forces secure the airfields in Central THAILAND, the Air Brigade will cooperate in the future operations of the 15th Army by advancing forces as soon as possible.
(4) . In case the BRITISH Army invade THAILAND first and makes the initial attack upon us.
If the 15th Army has already invaded THAILAND under orders] the forces will operate according to the plans A or B.
2. Details of the abovementioned operations will be conferred upo by the forces concenned.
3. The choice of either A or B plan for use in the 15th Army occupation of THAILAND will be decided by (X minus 3) day. This
information will be sent to the 15th Afmy and on (X) day, before the departure of the 10th Air Brigade, the information will again be conveyed to the 15th Army in order to be certain. 4. Communication Liaison.
(1) . Communication network.
The communication between the General Headquarters of the 15th Army and the 10th Air Brigade will be carried out on the communication network of the Air Signal Forces.
(2) . Air-Ground Liaison.
The air-ground liaison between the 15th Army General Headquarters and the 10th Air Brigade will be based on the 15th Army liaison regulations.
The situation of the 1st and 2nd concentrations of the Air Force will be shown on the attached sheet.
The 2nd concentration was carried out during a severe northeast monsoon, in the worst weather the east coast of fRENCH INDOCHINA had ever experienced. Because of this the operations of the air units were considerably hadiicaped. In the course of concentration, many air accidents occured and the commanders of the 27th and the 75th Air Brigade were killed.
During the 1st concentration from 15 Nov. to 1 Dec, the 3rd and 7th Air Brigades based upon the plans of the South Army, made plans for attacking enemy military installations at KOMMEI, KEIRIN and HYAKUSHOKO. Because of unfavorable weather conditions, they were unable to attack the assigned targets but succeeded in hitting other important installations.
On 11 Nov. the General Headquarters of the 3rd Air Group was transferred to SAIGON.
Chapter IV The Execution of Operations Sec. I
In cooraiaation with the landing operation of the advance groups of the 15th and 25th Armies, the aerial annihilation combat in Northern MALAY at the outbreak of war, and the invasion of
37
UMrUd DlAfraas Chart Showing tha Court* of Oonraigta of Air ttait*
J*
THAILAND by the 15th Army.
In the early part of December cloudy weather with frequent squalls prevailed over THAILAND Bay and the same weather continued until 7 Dec. At $00 meters strato-cumulus with cumulo-nimbus clouds predominated the course of our convoy, making visibility very poor. From 1400 hours till sunset the weather became worse, making our return flight from convoy protection very difficult.
In regard to the protection of the convoys of the advance group of the 25th and 15th Armies, the Commander of the 3rd Air Brigade issued the following orders J
(1) . The Air Brigade will protect the convoys of the advance group of the 25th Army and those of a section of the 15th Army. The prearranged course and the division of convoys are shown in the annexed sheets No. 1 and No. 2 respectively.
(2) . On (X minus 2) day the 12th Air RegimentJ to which are attached the main force of the 77th Air Regiment, a section of the 64th Air Regiment, and the 8lst Air Regiment, will be responsible for the protection of the main force of the convoys described in order (1), as per attached sheet No. 3*
(3) . On the evening of (X minus 1) day, the Commander of the 7th Air Brigade will make a section of his heavy bombers available to aid in the safe return of the 12th Air Brigade fighter units used for the protection of convoys described in order No. (2).
(4) . On the evening of (X minus 1) day, the 7th Air Brigade Command will guide the return of the fighter unit described in order No. (2) and make arrangements for landing at night.
Annexed Sheet No. 3 Outline of Convoy Protection
1. The 12th Air Brigade will be^responsible for the aerial protection of the convoys of the advance group of the 25th Army and those of a section of the 15th Army.
After the convoys have advanced separately from point G, of the attached sheet No. 1, the Air Brigade will protect the landing barges between SINGORU and SATANI.
2. The period of above mentioned protection will be from sunset o
frrrmumi Convoy Rout.
40
Separate Sheet No. 2
Sectional Chart on the Advance Troop Convoy
<4f
to sunrise, especially around 1500 hours. The attack will be directed against enemy bombers and torpedo bombers.
3. The reconnaissance seaplanes of the Naval Airforce will be responsible for protection of the convoys against enemy submarines until sunset.
4. The airfields at S0ND0, KUKAN, KONPONTOrtACIIU and TANI may be utilized in carrying out the duties of No. (1) and (2).
The Commander of the 12th Air Brigade ordered three reconnaissance planes attached to the General Headquarters to reconnoiter the convoys and direct the fighter units, from early moining of the 7th. He also directed a squadron of the fighter unit to form aerial cover for the convoy and 3 attached heavy bombers against submarines.
A squadron of the 1st Air Regiment on first duty missed the anticipated position of the convoy and returned to its base without sighting it. Toward evening 3 heavy bombers of the 98th Air Regiment sighted the convoys but due to unfavorable weather conditions returned to their base.
The 64-th Air Brigade left for the final protection of the convoys inspite of bad weather but were forced to return due to low hanging clouds over the sea and several squalls. Two planes did not return and one was forced to land. In the morning and the afternoon one plane each of the 1st Air Brigade was seriously damaged in forced landings.
Orders on the 1st attack:
Prior to this, at 1200 hours of 5 Dec, the Commander of the 3rd Air Group issued the following order on the 1st attack on PNON PENH.
1. The South Army in cooperation with the Navy will commence occupation of south strategic areas.
On the night of 7 Dec, in order to occupy SINGAPORE, the main advance unit of the 25th Army will land on the east coast of SINGORA while a section of the unit will land at TARPEY, pATANI and KOTA-BHARU. After these armies secure their foremost positions by occupation of the above-mentioned airfields, the main force will
promptly penetrate KEDAH Province. After the invasion of THAILAND, the 15th Army will facilitate the operations of the 25th Army and assist in putting the mids of the people of THAILAND at ease. They will also place a blockade on CHINA from this area, and prepare for future operations in BURMA.
On the dawn of 8 Dec.,taa malnrforce of the UNO Detachment of the 15th Army will land at DURACHAPU, KIRIRAN and CHUNPONG in order to secure the airfields, and a section of the Detachment will land at BANDONG and NAKON.
2. From dawn of 8 Dec, the main 4nty of the Air Brigade will be the destruction of enemy air power in North MALAYA., in close cooperation with the operations of the 15th and 25th Armies.
At 0600 houaa of 8 Dec. the 22nd Naval Air Regiment will attac the group of airfields near SINGAPORE and KWANTAN. §. On dawn of 8 Dec.^ the Commander of the 3rd Air Brigade will attack enemy airplanes on airfields at KOTABHARU (except KOTABHARU Airfield) and will annihilate them rapidly with successive attacks.
From 1200 hours of 8 Dec. a squadron of the 27th Air Regiment at R§Nf$NKUNAN Airfield will prepare for penetration into airfields in South THAILAND.
By 1500 hours of 7 Dec, 2 planes of the Regiment will be dispatched to PNONPENH Airfield and be under direct command of the 3rd Air Group Commander.
4. On the dawn of 8 Dec the Commander of the 7th Air Brigade will attack enemy airplanes on group of airfields at KEDAH and annihilate them promptly by successive attacks.
In the event of unfavorable weather conditions, the Commander will attack the group of airfields at KOTAHBARU (except KOTABHARU Airfield). s *
When the heavy bombers of the AOth Air Brigade make their first attack, a fighter unit squadron will as sitt them.
5. The boundary for the zones of action of the 3rd and 7th Air Brigades will be the line connecting &ATANI and GUAMSAN.
6. At 0930 hours of 8 Dec, the heavy bomber unit under the
command of the 15th Air Brigade will attack enemy airplanes on the group of airfields at KOTABHARU (except KOTABHARD Airfield), assisted by a fighter unit squadron of the 7th Air Brigade. The main force of the 7th Air Brigade will cooperate with the 15th Army invasion of THAILAND.
7. On 8 Dec, when the 25th Army has secured the airfields in South THAILAND, the forces responsible for the air defense of the two harbors at SINGOBA and feATANI will be the 22nd Air Regiment from dawn till 1100 hours and the 12th Air Brigade from 1100 hours on. While the necessary forces are protecting the harbors, the rest of the forces will make attacks on enemy alrforces near KEDAH and KOTABHARU.
8. On 8 Dec. the Commander of the 8lst Air Regiment will perform the following duties:
(a) . In the early morning, occupy the airfields and recon-noiter the battle conditions in the vicinity of the landing place for the 25th and 15th Armies.
(b) . At 1200 hours and 1700 hours, respectively, will recon-noiter the enemy air situation in Central, South MALAYA and South BURMA.
9. By 1200 hours on 8 Dec, the Commander of the 83*d Independent Air Unit will take a squadron of his reconnaissance planes and push forward to the 2nd airfield at TANI and prepare for a rush on the airfield in South THAILAND.
10. The assignment of transport planes for rushing South THAILAND on 8 Dec will be as follows:
ASSIGNED UNIT DISPATCHING UNIT ATTACHED DATES
(Types and Amount of Air Planes)
12th Air Brigade 13th Special Air Transport 1800 of 7 Dec at
Unit Z00ND0. \ " 3 AT of 2nd Squadron
27th Air Regiment 15th Special Air Transport 1800 of 7 Dec at
Unit K-0NB6NKUNAN.
2 AT of 2nd Squadron konpou^
Squadron of Recon. Same as above 1800 of 7 Dec at
planes of 83rd 2nd Airfield at
Independent Air TANI. Unit
11. Commanders of the 13th and 15th Special Air Transport Units will dispatch1 the above-mentioned planes and place them under the command of the respective units.
12. The Commanders of the 15th Special Air Transport Unit (except 2nd Squadron) and temporary Air Transport Units will arrive at KURAKHORU at 1500 hours on 7 Dec. and cooperate in the transporting of the units of the 15th Army on the 8th. By 1200 hours on 9 Dec. they will return to original base.
While assisting in transporting the units of the 15th Army, the Commander of the 15th Special Air Transport Unit is delegated the command of the Commanders of the temporary air transport units. Meteorological Effects on Operations
Around 8^9" Dec. the anti-cyclone predominant in MONGOLIA declined considerably and the monseon in the THAILAND Bay and MALAYA areas subsided. Though in the morning, during/the 1st attack, the weather was unusually good, dense clouds prevailed off the MALAYA Peninsula in the afternoon, slowing operations considerably.
On dawn, 8 Dec, while the main strength of the 7th Air Brigade was deploying at PNONPENH Airfield, a violent squall hit the
q
area changing it into a fuagmire, thus making it very difficult for the planes to take off..The Commander of the Air Brigade, giving up the plan for unified attack, was waiting for better conditions (the 1st attack being set at 1200 hours). Only the 98th Air Regiment, which was deployed at SAIGON Airfield (where there was no squall) was able to carry out the 1st attack at the appointed hour; whereas the main force of other units were directing their operations toward the 1st attack. >
The Situation of the Advance Group of the 2tfth Army and the WAMI Detachment *
At 0200 hours, 8 Dec, the advance group of the 25th Army entered the anchorage and between 0400 hours and 0500 hours the main force landed at SINGORA. A section landed near BATANI to occupy the airfields. At 0200 hours, 10 Dec, the main force invaded KEDAH Province by crossing the northwest front. The
WAMI Detachment landed near KOTABHARU after a fierce night attack and at 1000 hours on 10 Dec. occupied the airfield at TANAHMERAH. The 15th Army succeeded in advancing to TBAILAND without meeting resistance at O83O hours, 8 Dec, and reached BANGKOK by crossing the frontier.
The Battle Proceedings of the 3rd Air Group
Although the movement of the 3rd Air Group did not coincide with hhe previous plan, on dawn of 8 Dec, the Air Group made its 1st aerial annihilation attack on the KOTABHARU and KEDAH areas. Within 2 days the enemy was subjugated and defeated; one-third of the BRITISH Airforce defeated and the rest retreated to SINGAPORE.
Accocding to the order of the South Army, on the 9th, the 83rd Independent Air Unit was now under the command of the 25th Army.
Outline of the Progress of Battle Proceedings
v
in Various Areas KOTABHARU Area (8 Dec.)*
Thirty-nine airplanes (11 fighters and 28 light bombers) of the 3rd Air Group (59 FR, 75 FR, 90 FR) left K0NP0NT0RA0HU between 0800 hours and 0900 hours and attacked the airfields at TANAHMERAH and KUWARADEOTO. They destroyed the landing field and the runaway and fought with 15 enemy fighters, which had come to counter-attack Ten enemy planes were shot down and 5 of our planes seriously damaged.
A favorable target of more than 10 twin-engined fighters was sighted on KOTABHARU Airfield but because of the agreement with the 25th Army the 3rd Air Brigade returned without attacking them. Fifty-three airplanes (5 fighters and 48 light bombers) of the 2nd attack unit (59 FR, 75 FR, 90 FR) advanced to the front but due to unfavorable weather returned to their base. Twenty-three planes of the 75th Air Regiment attacked -K9WARABEST0 and demolished the runway and 3 fighters wax* enclosed in a revetment. The 12th Air Brigade, taking charge of the Naval Air Force, succeeded in landing at SINGORA between 1110 hours and 1330 hours and commenced performing duties of air defense around
SINGORA.
KSDAH Area (8 Dec):
Nine>y-three planes (18 fighters and 75 heavy bombers) of the 7th Air Brigade (12 FR, 60 FR, 98 FR, 64 FR) left the airbases at PNONPENH, SAIGON and ZUHONDO, Between 0800 hours and 0900 hours, a section of them and between 1210 hours and 1240 hours. The main force attacked, respectively, the airfields of SUNGEIfATANI (north and south), ARORUOTAR, KECHIRU, AMIUTAWARU and PENANG. In this attack 23 enemy grounded planes, hangar, and various other installations were demolished, while 3 of our planes were seriously damaged and forced to land. THAILAND Area (8 Dec):
As the 3rd Air Group Commander was not certain until 1500 hours of the 8th whether the Army had advanced to THAILAND by force or without meeting resistance, he found it necessary to attack DONG MUANG Airfield (where ground 50 enemy planes were thought to be assembled) and ordered the Commander of the 10th Air Brigade to prepare for the attack. Around 1300 hours, because of a message received from the 15th Army, it was decided they could advance without encountering resistance. On the same day, the 62nd Air Regiment of the 10th Air Brigade participated in an attack upon KOTABHARU Area. In this battle 5 airplanes, including the Commander's plane were lost in the main forces of FRENCH INDOCHINA because of dark nights and unfavorable weather conditions. Twenty planes (11 fighters and 9 light bombers) of the other main force (77 FR and 11 FR) made a flight over ABANPBANTET Airfield to demoralize the enemy.' ; ... _u. SB the KOTAffHARU Area (9 pec.):
Forty-five planes (6 fighters and 39 light bombers) of the 3rd Air Brigade (59 FR, 75 FR, 90 FR) took off around 1100 hours; a section attacked the airfield at KOTABHARU and the main force at &WWARABESTO and destroyed 11 grounded enemy planes and the runway.
At 1350 hours the 62nd Air Regiment (heavy bombers) of the
V7
*1
10th Air Brigade attacked the airfield at TANAHMERAH and destroyed 8 enemy grounded planes. One of our planes was slightly damaged and forced to land.
f ■
A fighter squadron and an assualt squadron of the 12nh Air Brigade attacked the airfield at CANAHMERAH and destroyed one enemy grounded plane and 2 anti-aircraft machine-guns. At KEDAH Area (9 Dec):
Ninety-three airplanes (17 fighters and 76 heavy bombers) of the 7th Air Regiment (64 FR, 12 FR, 60 FR, 98 FR) advanced to attackthe principal airfield In KEDAH Area but becaase of bad weather changed their course to VICTORIA POINT and suspended attack. Only the 64th Air Regiment landed at SINGORA . With the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Air Group in command, they attacked the airfields at PENANG and AERUTJBWARU and shot down 6 BLENHEIM planes and destroyed 5 enemy grounded planes. k
A squadron each of fighters and assualt planes of the 12th Air Brigade attacked the airfield at AERUTAWARD" and destroyed 16 enemy planes.
Details of the 3rd Air Brigade*s Bombardment of Friendly Troops by Mistake
In accordance with the agreement with the 25th Army, the 3rd Air Group ordered the 3rd Air Brigade to make the initial attack on the interior airfields at -K8W*ttA-BEST0 and TANAHMERAH (except KOTABHARU Airfield) on 8 Dec
The 3rd Air Brigade directed the 1st attack upon these airfields as ordered. The convoys of WAMI Detachment fought a hard battle wacause of enemy attacks at KOTABHARU from both land and air. However, the main force of the bombers attacked the interior airfields and few fighters attacked the enemy airplanes above the convoy. ^
Judging from the report of the General Headquarters reconnaissance planes that 6 friendly vessels were advancing toward the northwest with 2 vessels burning near the seashore, the Commander of the Air Brigade was doubtful about the landing of the WAMI
Detachment and concluded that the airfield of KOTABHARU was not yet occupied. After returning to the base he reported the fact to the Commander of the Air Group and thought it wise to direct the 1st attack upon the airfield. But the Commander of the Air Group received the report that the airfield was occupied so ordered the 3rd Air Brigade to attack the original targets in the 1st attack. But because of unfavorable weather conditions most of the Air Brigade returned to the base. Only the 7fth Air Regiment succeeded in attacking the airfield at KPWARABESTO.
On hearing that KOTABHARU Airbase had been occupied the Air Brigade Commander prepared to advance there because the fighter unit was suffering from lack of air jettlsonable fuel tanks. Around evening the report turned out to be false. That evening the 25th Army Commander asked the^Chief of Staff to attack the planes on the airfield at KOTABHARU. On 9 Dec. the Commander of the Air Group ordered the 3rd Air Brigade to attack the KOTABHARU Airfield. The 3rd Air Brigade directed their attack upon the airfield. On arriving over the field they noticed that the WAMI Detachment was occupying the airfield and so directed their attack on alffields at TANAHMERAH and KDWAHABESTO.
Movements of the Naval Air Force
At early dawn of 8 Dec, the Naval airplanes bombarded the enemy airforce headquarter installations at TENGAR and SEEETAB, near SINGAPORE. On the morning of the 9th they attack one BRITISH cargo vessel and damaged it seriously. In the afternoon of that day they bombarded the airfield at KUWANQTANG and destroyed 10 enemy planes and the hangar.
Anchorage and Landing Protection for the Advance Units of the 25th Army
On 8 Dec. at KUKAN Airfield the Commander of the 12th Air Brigade was eagerly looking forward to the report of the occupa-tion of the harbor airfields. However, he received no definite report and having no desire to land in the midst of the enemy, he left the airfield with all his units. The 1st Air Regiment
Hi
The Commander of the Air Brigade, commanding the 1st Air Regiment, cruised directly over SINGORA and did not see any enemy planes. Finding that the vessels were all safe and the airfield already occupied, he landed on SINGORA Airfield at 1110 hours.
While scouting over SATANI the 11th Air Regiment encountered 2 enemy planes at the height of 1,000 meters and turned them back. Since the airfield at BATANI was not to be occupied till 1200 hours and was flooded, they landed at SINGORA at 1330 hours. A squadron each of the 1st and 12th Air Brigades were detached for anchorage protection.
On the 9th, a squadron each of the 1st and 12th Brigades was assinged to protect airfields at TANAHMERAH and ABRUTAWAnU. Situation of the Air Sector Units . The 1st Air Sector Unit cooperated with the air units passing through and the l$th Air Sector Unit cooperated with the 3rd, 7th and 12th Air Brigades. The 7th Air Sector Unit cooperated with the operations of the 10th Air Brigade. They cooperated especially with them in advancing a section of them to DONGMUANG Airfield after the 15th Army invasion of THAILAND. The 12th and 18th Air Sector Units were with the advance unit of the 25th Army when they landed in South THAILAND and KOTABHARU. Thw 12th Air Sector Unit landed and deployed at SINGORA, BATANI and KOTABHARU and the 18th at BANDONG and NAKONG. Thus these air sector units c cooperated closely with the advance units in the aerial invasion * of MALAYA by establishing, completing and protecting th"e airfields Movements of Enemy Airforce
We cannot discover the plan of the enemy on our landing in MALAYA, but as a whole the movements of the enemy airforce were > very few, according to the prisoners1 statement thee airforce of the enemy at the outbreak of war amounted to about 300 planes.
Situation of the Occupied Airfields SINGORA Airfield
Because of bad drainage equipment, large hollow areas, and
frequent violent showers the work on the airfield did not progress. Since the airfield was in bad condition accidents occured frequently. However, by the middle of December we were able to carry out operations from this field. BATANI Airfield
Violent flood and destruction from bombardment made the field very difficult to use at first, but by the 15th we were able to use it. KOTABHARU Airfield
Can be used by No. 1 type fighters and-99 type assault planes TANAHMERAH Airfield
Can be used by large airplanes. fteWARABESTO Airfield
Can be used by medium-sized planes. NAKON Airfield v
Can be used by medium-sized planes.
Section 2. The period covering the coordinated land operations and annhiliating air attacks by the 25th Army in KEDA Province «f Central MALAYA. Condition of the 25th Advance Army Corps.
The main force of the 25th Advance Any Corps will penetrate the border between SIAM and BRITISH MALAYA and advance southward on 10 Dec. It will attack and occupy JTTTORA em 12 December, and PENANG Island em 18 Dee. The AHDO Detachment will penetrate the border la the direction of PETONG on 15 Dec, and will advance to the vicinity of LEKON with a unit of the Aade Detachment on IS December. The WABIMI Detachment will attack KUALA i&RAI from H Dec. and occupy TOLENGASU on 18 Dec.
The 3rd Wave of the transport convoy of the 25th Advance Army Corps will commence advance landings en SINGORA on 15 Dec. Our naval air units achieved groat success in attacks oa the battlships PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE of the BRITISH Mala Fleet off the oeaat of MALAYA ea 10 Dec. Status of the 3rd Air Division.
The 3rd Air Division commander Issued orders for the cowpleto destruction of enemy air power in both the KOTABARU and KEDA^Pr evince sectors Together with the exploitation of battle successes of the 25th Army, it nado preparations for the advance towards Southern SIAM for the purpose of aa Immediate following-up operation. Along with the continuation of the destruction of the enemy air power with the same force, it will cooperate with the landing operations of the 25th army* Simultaneously, it will determine the prosecution of the attack ea the important positiea of PENANG. At 2000 hours em 10 December a summary of the following orders was handed down.
1. The main force of the 25th army Landing unit advanced to YARA (AO kilometers south of EATANl), SINGORA and the ALOR STAR highway near the border ea the evening of 9 Dec. The Headquarters will be situated at SINGORA at this time* About 30 enemy ships were sighted yesterday (9 Dee.) near PENANG Bay and about 15 ships were sighted today.
2. The main farce of the 3rd Air Division will continue aerial annhiliation attacks aa well as cooperating la the operations of the 25th Army aad attacking
inpertant positions.
...
It cooperatod mainly la the battles of the 25th Any and made preparations for the aerial annhiliation attacks em FUKDTOH and VICTORIA POINT.
if The 7th Air Division commander was responsible for the attacks en GEORGETOWN and PENANG harbor, especially against enemy ships after 11 Dec, and the destruction of the enemy air strength in the vicinity of KDANTAN.
The fighter unit sill be allseed te utilise the KOTABARU airfield.
5. The 12th Air Division commander will pursue his previous duties. The 3rd Air Division.
6. Air transport units will be attached to the 3rd and 7th Air Divisions as follows is their advance. However, the transportation of those rapid advance unit mechanics will be limited to a minimum.
The 3rd Air Division.
The 2nd Squadron of the Mobilised 15th-Air Transport Unit will bo formed at 0900 hours 11 Doc* at KOHPONQTOHsfiHP* The 7th Air Division.
The 12th Air Transport Squadron will bo formed st 0800 hours at
PNOk PENH.
It will immediately return to its station after completing its
duties.
7. During the time for transporting, the 12th Air Transport Squadron will come under the command of the 7th Air Division commander.
The cimiller of the Mobilised 15th Air Transport Unit will order the 2nd Squadron to cone under the command of the 3rd Air Division commander.
The situation of the 3rd Air Division on 10 Doc. is indicated In appended chart No.6.
After-Battle Summary.
After 21 Doc*, owing to the approach of the windy season sad thick cloud formations along the eastern coast of MALAYA and the Gulf of SIAM, the deployment of heavy bomber units to southern INDO-CHINA could not be prosecuted oven when 16 Dec. approached.
However, the weather around the western coast of MALAYA was favorable The 3rd and 12th Air Divisions and the 6Ath Fighter Unit which wore te advance to Southern SIAM while attacking the enemy airfields at KEDAHand PEEAK Provinces, co-operated with the 25th Army* The target area of PENANG was
Appandad Map # 6» Sk.teh «r 3RD Air Ore* Paraattaa Oa 10 Dm.
attacked, 31 enemy planes were shot down, 20 large-sized boats and inmumera-ble email boats vers sunk or destroyed by fire. Over 50 trucks were damaged and widespread damage was inflicted on various establishments.
However, our side suffered the loss of 6 aircrafts.
The ground crew unit that was to land in Southern SIAM became attached to the spearhead unit of the 25th Army. It gradually advanced to airfields in KEDA^Province as well as deploying to various airfields in Southern SIAV, KOTABARU and TANAKERAJj.
Co-operation of the 3rd and 12th air Divisions in the Ground Operations of the 25th Army.
The main force (27th and 59th Air Regiments and Air Brigade Hdqrs.) of the 3rd Air Division advanced to NAKOMG airfield on 11 Dec. and the 75th
and 90th Air Regiments advanced on 14 Dec. From 14 to 16 Dec. it co-operatec
Subset p/tra*'
with the 25th Army in its battles between ALOR STAR and OUNKEIDATAN?, attacked the retreating enemy unite and their trucks, alleviated the attacks of the 25th Army and co-operated in the battles of the Wabini Unit in the vicinity of KUALA with one detachment from 18 to 20 Dec.
One assault squadron of the 27th Air Regiment which is attached to the 12th Air Brigade will co-operate in the operations of the Wabimi Detachment (this same squadron will return to its original station on 15 Dec.
Aerial Axmhlliation Battle.
The 3rd Air Brigade (59th, 90th and 27th Air Regiments) attacked 6 times between 15 to 20 Dec. with NAKOMG as its base. Sixty seven planes were engaged (39 fighters, 6 assault and 22 light bombers) in the attack em LPOH airfield. Fourteen enemy planes were shot down or destroyed.
The 98th Air Regiment of the 7th Air Brigade with SAIGON as its base attacked KUALA BESTO airfield with 26 heavy bombers on 13 Dec. The 12th Air
Regiment and the 60th Air Regiment of the 7th Air Brigade with its base at
neitsVi
PNC* PENH attacked MBLUGI airfield with 51 heavy bombers on the same day. The 98th Air Regiment of the 7th Air Brigade attacked the wireless station on MAIATSUKU island together with the incessant attacks on KUANTAN airfield by 32 planes of the 64th Air Regiment with its base at KOTABARU em 14 Dec. and bombed various installations destroying large-sized enemy planes.
The various airfields at OTKCfO, fiTTNWffllTANI, ABttJTAWAnU, KSSMIRU
pfiUKCT, 5y^*el 9*TM'j nvte T«-*«, <tfT«*-
and peking were attacked by respective units of the 12th Air Brigade which" was based at SINGORA between 10-K Deo. Twenty eight enemy aircrafts were destroyed with our losses being a serious damage to 1 plane and 3 planes missing.
Attack en PENANG
Aside from aerial axmhillation attacks as statedbefore, the 3rd Air Division attacked PENANG Harbor and the hone depots at GEORGETOWN between 11-13 December, obtaining favorable results. That is, the 64th, 12th and 60th Air Regiments of the 7th Air Brigade with a total of 58 planes (17 fighter and U heavy bombers). 59th, 27th, 75th and 90th air Regiments of the 3rd Air Brigade with a total of 26 planes (5 fighters, 3 assault and 18 light bombers) as well as the 98th air Regiment of the 7th Air Brigade with 26 heavy bombers attacked PENANG Harbor and the streets of GEORETOWN on 11, 12 and 13 Deo. respectively. Thirteen large transports and numerous snail boats were sunk.
Furthermore, harbor establishments were bombed and destroyed. We engaged 10 enemy fighters on 13 December and we suffered the loss of 5 planes, including the commander of the 59th Air Regiment.
Protection of the 12th Air Brigade Base.
The 12th Air Brigade overcame the difficulties of inclement weather and a bod airfield in its mission to protect the landing operations of the transport convoy of the 25th Amy on 15 December.
Condition of the Air Sector Units.
The Air Division commander will deploy various ground crew unite on 15 Doc. inorder to deploy the main force of the Air Division in the MALAY peninsula as well as having it co-operate la the operations of other air units. The 18th Air Sector Unit will be advanced toalrfielde at ALOB STAR and fiUTOBIBATAW, simultaneously with the occupation of KEDAWairf ield by the 25th amy*
1* The disposition of the ground service units is Illustrated la separate shoot No. 1*
2* Aside from continuing to perform his previous duties, the 18th Air
Sector Unit commander will deploy fresh subordinate units to various airfields located on the western bask of the PE1AK river In BRITISH MALAYA. He will take charge of the airsectar duties and aid la deployment of the ground crow units under direct control of Air Division.
The 12th Air Sector unit commander will aid la the debarkation and transportation of newly arrived subordinate units.
The basic disposition of the 18th Mr Sector Unit ia indicated In attached sheet Ho. 2.
3* Aside fro* conducting his previous duties, the 12th Air Sector unit commander will gradually deploy the new subordinate units upon their arrival. He will take charge of the air sector duties.
He will futhermore aid in the debarkation and transportation of the 18th Air Sector unit and the ground crew unit under direct command of Air Division.
The basic disposition of the 12th Air Sector unit is Indicated In attached sheet No.3.
A* After considering transferring the following units, the commander of the 12th Sir Sector Unit concentrated them in the vicinity of SDJGORA and BATANI and waited for an opportunity.
1 unit of the 21st Airfield Bn.
1/2 Company of a Line of Communications Motor-car Unit.
5. The 1st, 15th and K)th air Brigades were attached and the air sector boundaries were adjusted as followst
The boundary between the 1st and 15th Air Sectors will run southward from SAVANNAKHET along the MEKONG River (en the oast side if there Is a tributary) and northward of SAVANNAKHET along the boundary line between SIAM and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. The boundary between the 15th and 10th Air Brigade sectors will run southward of BAKUMUJI along the SIAM-FRENCH INTO-CRXNA boundary line.
6* The zero hour for taking command of the newly arrived air sector units and the readjustment of airsecter boundaries la FRENCH INDO-CHINA and Central MALAYA will be 20 December. The sere hour la MALAYA for the troops there at present will be en 18 December.
The time for the landing of the troops advancing in MALAYA will be determined alee.
Saeh Air Sector Unit commander will dispose his subordinate unite ae they leave or dispose air ground crows until their commanders arrive or between the dispatch of the commander until the dispatch of the concerned air ground crow units.
7. The commander of the air signal unit of the 2nd Air Division, the commander of the speed calculating unit, the commander of the meteorlogical service unit and the commander of the 16th Air Intelligence unit will take special charge of their respective duties as to the deployment of the advancing units of the main force into the MALAX peninsula as shown in attached sheets #A-6.
8. The commander of the air force field repairing depot will deploy a part of the Ath Mobile Repairing Squad to SUGOBA sad aside from charge of the repairing and supplying of the advance units in MALAY, ho will wait for an opportunity with the main force of the 3rd and Ath Mobile Repairing Squad at SINGORA and prepare for further advances.
Separate Shoot #1.
Disposition of the Ground Crow Unit of the 3rd Air Division. 1st Air Sector Unit.
Commander ----- Col. Kawamoto.
1st Air Sector Headquarters. 1/3 of the 23rd Airfield Bn. 3rd Airfield Company (minus 1 unit)
6th |
■ |
■ |
7th |
|
■ |
12th |
a |
■ |
33rd |
■ |
■ |
281st Independent Motor-car Co. Air Sector Unit attached te the 10th Air Brigade 7th Air Sector Headquarters. Commander Col, Taniuchi 15th Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3) 1 port of the 27th Airfield Bn. ACth Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3).
97Ah Airfield Bn.
Airfield Bn. of '■he 62nd Air Regimen* 9*h Airfield Co. 29*h Airfield Co.
190*h Company of Line of Cou;i>unicalions Vehicle's 80*h Ground Crew Co. I5*h Air Sector Uni*
Cojiiander of *he I5*h Air Sector HeadquartersCol. MA^oUZAKI 15* h Air Sector Headquarters Approx. 1/3 of the 15*h Airfield Bn.
11 it 11 n I74"h ' " "
27lh Airfield 3n. (minus 1 uni-1) Approx. 1/3 of Ahe 35*h Airfield Bn. 36lh Airfield Bn. (minus l/3) Approx. 1/3 of the 40th Airfield Bn. 11 it 11 11 41sj- " " 1. Q2nd " "
11 11 11 11 ^Ist " *
11 11 11 11 92nd " " 11 n n n 93rd " "
11 11 it 11 94-ih *» "
96th Airfield Bn. 36*h Field AA Bn.
184th Line of Cora unica'ions Vehicle Co. 280vh Independent l'otor-car Co, 8ls* Ground Crew Co. 12Ah Air Sec'or Uni4
Coin :ander of Jhe 12'h Air Sector Headquarters;--L1. Col. HIZUSHJLA 12*h Air Sec**£ Headquar1 ers 1 par* of -"he 31s* Air Regimen 23rd Airfield Bn. (minus l/3) 21s* Airfield Bn. ' 22nd Airfield Bn. (minus 1/3) ' 1 par* of *he 41s* Wing
Approx. 1/3 of *he 36 lh Airfield Bn. 92nd Airfield Bn. (minus l/3) 94*h " " (minus 2/3)
32nd Field A.A. Bn. (minus 1 Co.) 5Ah and 8*h Airfield Establishment Uni1 43rd and 48*h Construction Co. 67th, 68Lh, and 69*h Ground Crew Co. 167*b Line of Con-unica'ions Vehicle Co. 18th Air Sector Uni*
Commander of the l8*h Air Sector Headquar*ers--Ll. Col. FUJICKA l8*h Air Sector Headquarters Approx. l/3 of *he 22nd Airfield Bn. 17th Airfield Dn. (minus 1/3) 35t.h « " » «
4lgi H rt H H
82nd » 84th " "
91st « n (ninua 1/3) 93rd " " ■ " Approx. l/3 of the 94* h Airfield Bn. 20*h A.A. Rest.
1 Co. of lhe 32nd Field A.A. Bn.
6*h and 7'h Airfield Es*ablishraen* Unixs
17'h Ground Cretr Co.
lsA, 86Ah and l60*h Line of Communications Vehicle Co. Is1- Air Signal Uni1 of Air Division Com-.and erL' . Col. TASAKA
25*h Air Signal Uni4 (2 a''ached wireless uni's of "he l$*h s Air Signal Unit)
1 par1 0f -he Is* Air Signal Reg*. (Bn. Headquar*ers, 1 Co. each of line and v/ire-less uniAs)
2nd Air Signal UniA of Air Division
^omi.ianderif. Col. OGASAWARA
64
15* h Air Signal OWL* (minus 2 wireless squads) l6*h Air Intelligence Uni* Speed Calculating Unit of Air Division ComuanderCap*. OISHI 17*h Air Speed Calculating Unix
Airspeed Calcula'ing Company of lhe lsA In'elligence Uni* Field Air Repairing DepoA of Air Division ComrAnderL*. Col. YOSHIDA
I part of Jjie i5*h.Field Air Depo* (is*, 2nd, 3rd, and 4*h Mobile
Repairing Squad)
25* h - ranch Air Depot 17th Marine and Air Depo*
l8xh " h it n
Me'oorolo-jical Unit of AiivPivision Coa..;anderMaj. MOT©
Is* Bn. Headquarters of Field Me1oorological Uni* 1st l!e' eorological Company 2nd
25'h Field Meteorological Uni*.
7'h Air ""ranspor* Uni1 1'2'h Air ''ranspor* Company
2nd Co. of lhe 30lh Mobilized Air ""ranspor* Unit 15lh Mobilized Air ""ranspor* Uni1 "emporary Air ""ranspor* Units Condi'ion of 'he Sneuv Air Torce
Because of our severe attacks from 'he star* of "-ho war, *he enemy air uniJ s re'rea*ed *o SINGAPORE from KOTABARU and KUDA and s*opped in Lhe vicinity of IPOH and merely a"-*emp'ed small guerrilla like surprise a' 'acks. Te ,crresl#ed 'ho enemy's comuand of *he air from *hem.
II was very for*una*e 'ha* *he ener»y air force did noA a''ack before our air forces had advanced down lhe MALAY Peninsula. Appended ITo' est
1. Inmediately af*er *he commencement of hos*ili*ies our *ype 1 fighler uni*s comple*ely inac*iva*ed *he enemy air unils. By our daring
6*
51
*a» on tha .basis di< coition of the 10th Air Sector * it. Tol 2 ^operate, Sheet Ho
BASIC DISPOSITIOM OF THE 12th AIR SECTOR UNIT Separate sheet Ie.3
63
Map em the diai it ion of the a* Mailed navlgat ■ *' units. Vol 2
Separate Sheet Ie.4
The first disposition and deployment of the assembled meteorological unit in MALAYA
Separate Shefcc No. 6 /ol. II
First Disposition and Deployment map of 16th Air Lbtellegence Unit in Ualaya.
ground a'lacks, 'bo area of 'he a'-tacking dis'arco was shortened and 'he enemy air unils were decimated.
2. Cur advancing air uniJs in -'he MALAY Peninsula, v/i'hou' locing an opportunity, overcame difficulties such as airfields in poor condition and bad v;eaJher, and overwhelmed lhe enemy v;i'h -*heir spiri'uoll inspired alIacks,
3. The 25Ah Army seized lhe KUDA and KOTABARU sectors wi+ih crushing strength and advanced 'he air base deeper, fnis procedure being "he ir.ost suiJable for the landing of the main force.
Section III. Co«»opera'-ion in the Landing Opera1 ions during 'he Period 'ho AI'.".. co 'o ?2inv:. --■ ..u.-.j-W. ;'rov:-.co "y 'he
to -v
Outline of Ooera'ions of 'he 25*h Army
"he main force of xhe 25*-h Army ■which pierced lhe enemy lines aA KUDA province continued »-o pursue xho enemy and occupied "7JBIN on 22 Jeceraber. On 23 December Ahey reached 'he PSEAK River wiAh a spearhead.
They made preparations for crossing xhe river up *ill 25 Jeceiabe ^he KOMOYS Division crossed *he river in lhe vicinity'of OUHCSOiilDUB on 26-&wCember and the 5'h Division crossed xho river in 'he vicinily of PRAlJJA destroying and pursuing Ahe enemy everywhere. I1 occupied IPOH airfield on 23 Doceaber and pursued Jhe enemy along lhe IPOH, mABBH- and !3KCfrCAK roads. On *he way iJ captured -he strong points of KAilAR, SUHKAI and -_j:"\fikAK. Along \;i'h the daring movement of 'he small boats, Ahey pushed "-heir linos inLo PEfcAK province on 7 January 1942 and pushed inlo SERAKGOL in pursuit 0f the enemy. On 11 January the strong poinx of I3JALA LUMPUR was occupied.
After 'he occupaAion of on 17 January, a uni* of the
i>T/iBIJ.ZE Detachmen1 engaged 'he enemy in ba'*le a1 KUARAKURAI and advanced southward along he eastern ^acoast road wi'-h Ahe main force, occupying he strong point of IC'/AN^AN on 31 January and seized ixs airfield. One parJ of the uni' proceeded sou'-hward along 'he coastal road and *-he main force advanced in'lhe direction of KUALA LUMPUR., Condi'ion of -'-he Enomv Air Force
As racnlioned above lhe onemy air uniJs in MALAYA concealed
■-hensoives because of 'he des'rucAive slacks made by our air unils. Only lhe airfiolds a1 KUALA LULPUR and ....^."'Arl were utilized and guer-rilla al'acks wore conduced. Ils 8J-rengJ-h was .ee-1 imaged aJ- abou1 60 fighter s, 20-bomber8 and 10 seaplanes. However, 1 here was no reason for 'heir having used Ahe bases a-1 SuuAmRA since reinforcecenAs did no1 arrive from Ahe DUTCH 2A3T IKDIBS, AUSTRALIA or INDIA.
Our rear line of coi.u.unica^ions in SlAi.1 and Hor'l.ern LALAYA was AhrsaAoned by lhe gradual increase of 'he Bri+ish air force in BURMA. Si ion of 'he Ir- ,j.r ^i/ision
'"Vie Air Division sen1 i-'s 3rd Air Brigade '-o !ALAYA Ao directly co-opera'e in "he opera "-ions of Ahe 25'b Army.
'''he main force of Air division vill aAAack Ahe viciniAy of RA1 COM v.i'ii i's 7'h and 10'h Air Brigades from 23 December lo 25 December. Af'er neu'-rnlizi.ng lhe enemy air force in sou'h^em BURMA, "hey advanced and deployed in MALAYA -lovard 'he end of December and commenced an a'-Aack againsx SliiGAPCRS.
Co-ouora'-ion in 'he Crossing o: ' g . .IttAK River by the 2?Jh Army
"he Air Division Command S*a*ion wa3 advanced -=-0 SUiiGEIPA",ANI
■
on 12 December. The 3rd Air brigade gradually advanced 4o 'he airfield a1 SUHGSIPA^Al'JI from 19 December afAer i's occupation by Ahe 25lh Army.
On 19 December lhe Air Brigade com.ander venA Ao Ahe 5xh Divi-sion Headquarters 5 miles sou'-h of SUNGEIPA'^ANI. An agreement was made
on subsequent ba,Ales and on lhe same day and Ahe following cay (20
December), 'he "rain s'a'ions aJ ""AIPIMfrand 3A4ANS2RAI and moving Arains
were attacked, Co-opera"ing v;ilh 'he 5'-h Division in balAle, ix a'1acked
IP OH airfield several ' imos and shoA down 14 enemy planes.
IA a' ' acked Ahe 'rain slaAions wi'-h par-*- of 'he uni* aA
H.vuUKUItAI and GUMAKISAN eAc. and co-oparaAed wiJh -"-he WABILiI De'achmen1
in ba'Ale. Cn 22 December i' a''acked enemy ships on 'he sea near KARAN
and des4- roved 3 enemy ships ranging from 3»000 Ao 6,000 Aons. A-*- Ahis
line "ho 25lb Army Headquarters had already advanced 'o ALOR S^AR. The
Headquarters commander'made a call on f-he 3rd Air Brigade commander a4-iuv(,d pitHhi
3*uKj'UIDA'SA airfield on 22 December and demanded xhaA. Ahey proven4- the PJSfAK bridge from- being destroyed by -"-he enemy.
""he A*ir Brigade commander realized the ex'reae difficulty of *he mission and since iAs success or failure would have greatly influenced subsequent operations of lhe 25lh Army, he gave iA much Ahought.
Motet Since 'he dostruc'ion of 'his bridge would have delayed opera'ions for ano'her month'iA was planned "o occupy this bridge by dispatching a raiding parAy immediately upon landing.
Up o 'his 'ime-'he Air Brigade commander had considered Ahe importance of 'he 25Ah Army commander's previous plan. mherefore, on 21 December he handed down ordors xo Ahe following effect J
1. '"he 25J'h Army will advance Ao 'he easAern sec'or of'mAIPIN before 'he evening of 22 December. A ' ank uni' will pene-lraAe 'o KlJlaALAKAHQAM "on 'he following day23 December.and plan 'he occupation of 'he. bridge before iA is destroyed by 'he enemy.
2. "he Air Brigade will co-operale wi+hA*s main force in order Ao accomplish 'his mission. r
3. *"he 3rd Air Brigade commander will control and direcA Ahis mission' in 'he vicini'y of jra^AiuiuiS.iL vi'h 'he entire strength on 23 December.
4. *"he 7*h Air Brigade commander will- direcAly co-operaAe viih
'he 2plh Army wi'h a figh'er uniA on 23 December. For 'his reason i* .Till 'ecporarily advance Ao ALOR S""AR before the evening of 22 December . and 'he smaller details regarding ils co-operation will be received from
' 'e 3rd Air Brigade commander.
5. . ""he 12Ah Air Brigade commander will direc*ly co-operaAe vi'h he 25lb Army wi'h its enAire force on 23 December.
For 'his purpose, i1 will ' emporarily advance A0 ALOR s-r^R before 'he evening of 22 December, and consul' v/i1 h he com.iander of *he 3rd Air Brigade on deAails regarding 'he prosecu'ion of 'he opsra'ion. l.o' es;
1. *"he fighAer unit of the 7xh Air Brigade (64th Air Regt.) had already been ordered lo at'ack RANGOON buA 'his order was changed while prepara'ions were being made. Consequen'ly, il was 'o participate in 'he defense of Ahe bridge wi'h Ahe.25xh Army.
St
2. The arrival daxe of '-he ground crew 'o 'he above men'ioned bridge was es-'-ina'ed a1 abou+ 25 December, "here was an opinion xhax 25 Decetiber was oppor^uno for xhe Air Brigade Jo commence ac-'ion, bux since il was believed lha' 'he bridge would be destroyed by xhax da"-e, xhe arrival of xhe "-roops was sex a* 23 December.
"bus, xhe 64xh Air Regx. of xhe 3rd Air Brigade and xhe 12*h Air Brigade began xo move ax dawn of 23 December bux xhe enemy had already destroyed 'he bridge.
.V 'his poir.', 'he Air Brigade endeavored xo seize xhe po'n'oon bridge approximately 3° kilomexers downsxream from xhis bridge. Ix awaixed 'he arrival of 'he 25lh Army bux i' did nox arrive, as ix was hoped. For 'his reason, 'he ponxoon bridge was also desxroyed by xhe onemy.
"he 3rd Air Brigade coranander wished xo reconsxrucx xhe des-'royed ponloon bridge from his bank of xhe river and ^Miose xwo unixs allernalely worked on 'he projec' up Lill 25 December, bombing 'he enemy in he region in order xo comple'e 'he recons'rucxion of xhe bridge. However, 'he ground crew gave up *-he idea of utilizing 'his bridge ax 1400 hours of 'he same day since '-hey received orders J o cross lhe river by boa's afxer 27 December, "he enemy gave up resisxaiice afxer xhe 20 hours of severe" bombing by our forces; xhe 25lh Army was able 'o cross "he PiiaAK River wixhoux any opposi'ion.
Then 'he 64 lh Air Reg1, advanced xo ALOR STAR from KOTABARU for xhe purpose of parxicipaling in Jhe ba*-xle for holding xhe above menxioned bridge on 22 December, ix made a surprise a'Jack on 'ho airfield ax KUALA LU1IPUR and engaging in a fighx wixh enemy figh-'-ers, i* shox down 15 fighxers while our side losx one suicide plane.
The 3rd Air Brigade axxacked xhe enemy axxemp'ing xo rexreax by xrain, des'-royod railway esxablishmen's oexween 3AB0 CAJIYA and SBiAS and ott*. 'he. escape rou'e of lhe enemy. I1 ax'acked 'he airfields ax H2DAN, KUALA LUliPUR, o'c. I' dosxroyed and burned more lhan 10 -Tucks near KANPAR, one 1,000 'on lype 3hip ax KURAN, one 6,000 xon lype ship a-1 LURTOH and secrexly co-oporaled in xhe operations of 'he 25lh Army. X* also destroyed 30 '-rucks ax KUANTAII on 30 December.and destroyed 'wo
r.3 and several '■rucks on 31 December as well as co-opera"1 ing wiAh ' he 7A3IMI Detachment.
Co-ojera'-ion of 'he 2J?Ah Army in 'he MovemenA of Boa's oi'f 'he CoasA of I'ALAYA
'''he 25Ah Army, wi*h a s'rong segment of 'he 5lh Division, landed by boa's near LULU'" on Ahe evening of 31 December and cu* off Jhe escapee rou-te of 'he enemy,
Hie 3rd Air Brigade co-opera-ted in 'his action and aAAacked Ahe enemy vessels on 'he MALACCA Sea wixh 'he main force on 1 January. It burned and destroyed 2 vessels of 2-3>000 *ons, 1-lorpedo boa1, 3 'orpedo boa's made unnavigable, and pro-ec'ed the air over 'he moving uni's.
The Air Brigade advanced the 27'h Air Regt. 'o IPOH on 2
s*. -
January which a'tacked abou' 50 trucks between KAMtAR and DEKON, des-Toying over half of 1 hem and succeeded in destroying one Aran8porl vessel of 1,500 ■ons.
sum
Co-ooor;.tion jn 'he 3a1 Lle lone "ear KAhjAR and StfLBr
""he enemy offered stubborn resistance ' o Ahe advance of lhe main force of xhe 25Ah Army near KAISBAR buA commenced '6 reAreat on 2 January in .lhe face of severe a'*acks of Jhe 5lh Division and advance of 'he landing units.
''he 3rd Air Brigade aided Ahe army in i'-s pursuiJ- of 'he enemy and along wi'h a''acking lhe re'reaJing enemy from Ahe morning
-TArMJOAJfi HAkiM
of 3 January, iA bombed lhe birdge near SAwfiOASAftfi: and cu* oi'f 'he enemy's escape rou'-e.
On 4 January lhe main force of the 3rd Air Brigade advanced 'o IPOH, aiming for lhe sxrong points in Ahe fron* of Ahe 5*h Division. IA burned and deslroyed more Ahan 10 'rucks aA SUL Ik and des'-royed 1 transport ship of 3,000 'ons in Lhe MALACCA Strait, "en large sized planes were seen a* KURUMAN airfield^by ^he Reconniassance UniA on Ahe evening of 'he same day. On lhe evening of Ahe same day lhe Air Brigade commander sen* the 75xh Air Reg-'-. lo bomb *he runway of 'his same airfield. A* dawn of 5 J.nuary 'he escape of Ahe enemy planes was blocked and Ahe 59Ah and 90Ah Air Regimen's a"acked Ahe airfield.
The Air Brigade a*lacked xhe rexreaxing enemy 10 -iraes on 'his day, deslroying 38 trucks and 11 armored cars. On 7 January ix a"acked and sileneed 1 he enemy arAillery near Altacking lhe enemy in
-fAKJ0,J«r SUM
lhe area of WUSfll^-fltJIrlli and BATAK BELJUWTA, it destroyed 6 vehicles, 5 tanks and 10 cannons on 8 January.
Ax xhaA lime xhe main force of 'he 3rd Air 3rigade (Air Brigade Headquarters, 59'h, 27Ah and l5Ah Air Regiments) was disposed ax IPOH and a par* (75*h and 90Ah Air Regimen'- s) was disposed aA SUl'G2It?Ar,ANI bux since comriunicaAions were bad between '-hese xwo airfields, it was impossible lo give commands. One 'bird of the lighx bombers of each air regLmen' was summoned '0 IPOH on 8 January, and afler planning A0 'ake a chance, 'nay advanced wi'h xhe 75xh Air Regimen' Ao TAIPEI xogexher with Ahe advancing ground crew units.
^he KOKUSIII DeAachment, a Utti* of 'he K01I0YE Division., landed in xhe area of SEfcAKGOL on 9 January and severed 'he escape rouAe of tJo enemy. "Tie 5*h Division alJacked xhe enemy ax KUBU ROAD. Co-opera'ion in,'-he Babies in 'he Vicini'v ~-JI^.,-^ :-"J.^-^ I -'. V' :\
The main force of xhe 3rd Air Brigade aided -"-he 5Ah Division while one parx co-opera'ed wixh "-he KOKUSHI Detachment and des'royed more xhan 20 trucks, 7 tanks, 1 cannon and 1 'rain. On 10 January xhe Air Brigade co-opera'ed mainly with xhe 5Ah Division and cuA off Ahe re'rea1 rou'e of 'he enemy. IA overturned one train east 0f ^AIIBIN, bombed and destroyed 20 vehicles, armored cars and several guns)
I' seemed as though lhe enemy was in full rexreax af^er xhe daring pursuit by xhe 25Ah Army and bombing by xhe 3rd Air Brigade on 10 January. One unit planned x0 escape by sea.
-The main force of *he 3rd Air Brigade attacked xhe railway, sxaxions, and" -Arains soulh of TALiPIN and cux lhe enemy escape rouAe. One parA aA'ached enemy ships in 'he MALACCA Sea, "destroying 4 ships from 1-7,000 t0ns and 2 submarines.
On 11 January he spearhead of 'he 25Jh Army penexraAed xo KUALA LUliPUR.
Each air sec1or uni* gradually deployed in i's advance, according 'o Ahe progress of "!e and closely aided *he aerial unixs as well
as discharging i's sectoral duties. Condi'ion of Jhe Kaval Air Unixs
"he naval air unils ax,acked 'he airfields a1 SEkiTAtfand KARA!; from midnighx 29 December 'o 'he dawn of 30 December. mhey bombed airfields a4- SINGAPORE, CHBIGA and SENBAWAN midnight of 1 January ' o dawn of 3 January.
Season for Jhe .s'oaping of Preparations Tor v.- Landing Operations a*
..-.-"■a.
Tlie Southern Army planned '0 send a par1 of '-he l8'-h Division in 2 transport ships from SEIGOHA *0■ KUAliWN *o occupy 'he air bases quickly and '0 advance J-o air bases from which lo a''ack SINGAPORE. Cn 26 December an agreeuonx concerning 'his ma**er was made bexween xhe commander of General Headquarters of xhe Sou'-horn Army, *he Southern Expedi'ionary ?leex Headquarters commander, xhe 3rd Air Division commander and the 22nd Air Regimen1 Keadq.iarters cpmmander.
KUANmAN was suddenly occupied by xhe VtABU'I Detachment so the landing operations'were cancelled.
Seclion 4. Aerial"Annihila'-ion of SINGAPORE and Co-opera'-ion by 'he 25-Lh --.rm-, in Land Caere'ions durin;-. 'he Pane' raJ ion ir.'o 3l...lgiJi.. t-r ovine 0
t*r**i scum*-**
Condi-'ion 01 b ' h Army
The main force of xhe 25*h Army advanced on 'he road xo KUALA LUmPUR, fiEiiDAUAW :'.nd G3LAS while one par4 advanced on 'ho MALACCA coas'-al road 'o KUHAN. They ax'acked MALACCA on 15 January and 3SLA6 on 16 January raid is rapidly pursuing ,:he enemy '-oword JOHCVBiaW-
"he KOBA Dexachnen'- .which advanced '0 Jhe eas'- coasx arrived a' 'he banks of -he ElIDtU River on 16 January and began xo a^ack xhe enemy near MliRSalNfr.
Jonli'ion of 'he Enemy rAr J ogee in 'he SINGAPORE Sec'or
■"he aerial strength of 'he enemy air force in SINGAPORE a1 xhe beginning of January was estima'ed a1 60 figh'ers (Hawker Hurricanes and Buffalos), 20 bombers (mainly Bleiheims) and 10 seaplanes (mainly Consolidated). Afier the la-''er par1 of February, a small force of enemy planes fe''acked our air bases, "aking advan'age of xhe dork evenings.
Condi'ion of 'he "3rd Air jiv'.sion
The deploynisr.* in 'ho advance of 'he main force of xhe 3rd Air Division in'o J'ALAYA up 'o 'he end of December is shown in axxached 'able No. 7. Thile co-opera'ing direC-ly wilh *he 25lh Army in i's operation wi'h i's 3rd Air 3rigade, prepara'ions were being made xo raze *he SIIiGAPORB area wixh xhe 7*h and 12xh Air 3rigade3. According xo xhe progress of xhe operations, each air sec'or unix was making prepara'ion for 'he gradual advance in'o norxhern LALAYA and closely co-opera1 ed in 'he opera'ions of 'he air uni's.
As soon as xhe WADILI De'-achraen* occupied KUAl^AN, *he Air Division commander sen' 'he secxor'unils 'o 'he same airfields and equipped 'hem.
Surprise A"acks on SINOAPOBJ wj*h a, Smajl '.lumber of Planes
''he 3rd Air Brigade comnandVr believed *haJ *here was indicaxion ef growing enemy s"rengxh ax SIl^GAPORE during xhe xime xaken by xhe -enemy during which 'he Air Brigade was advancing in 3URAA. Ix harrassod various airfields in SINGAPORE and exhausxed "-he fighxing will of xhe enemy. Surprise nighx a''acks co:.-.menced from 29 December wixh a small number of planes (usually 2 planes).
The 3rd Air Division commander issued xhe following order on 31 December ax SUKGEIIA"ANI as regarded making more vigorous nigh* surprise a''acks.
1. The Air Division will harrass by surprise xhe enemy air bases near SINGAPORE.
Up xill 4 January 'he 22nd Air Regimen* will make a nigh* l*ack on SINGAPORE. The *ime of each a**ack vrf.ll be broadcast
2. Ti'h a small force of planes dexached from 'his bombing uni1, xhe 3rd Air Brigade cozxiander will surprise xhe enemy airfields in SINGAPORE in xhe everting when xhe oppor*unixy perai's. The *ime of 'he a"ack was se* a' an odd numbered hour.
3. '"he 7*h Air Brigade comriander will conducx nighxly surprise ■acks on 'he air bases in SINGAPORE wixh A small force from January xo
9 January. mhe ximo of a* ack was sex ax an even numbered hour.
4. "hose uni13 will be informed of 'he weaxhor forecaex near
\
Html* f Ti Chart Showing Disposition of 3RD Air Qr©*> Aa of 31 Dm.
SINGAPORE frora 1400 hours *o 2000 hours.
Based on xhe above mentioned orders, xhe 3rd and 7'h Air Brigades
opera'-ed successively every nighx xhaA Ahe weaxher perraitxed and achieved favorable resul's. No'est
1. ""he night, surprise a' lacks on SINGAPORE were mainly made by ligh1 bombers which flew over Ahe MALACCA SlraiA, cu1 'heir motors inxo a glide and dive-bombed Ahe enemy. The reason for *hese' tactics was lhax -lhe large's were dis'inc* and easily discernible and 'he ' aking of "-he enemy by surprise was an easy raa'-Aer.
2. Our planes rexurnod safely vi'-hou1 losses al'hough xhe enemy uAilized 70 searchlights, 200 A.A. guns and a small force of figh'ers around 'he air bases in SINGAPORE and xhe ciAy ixself. The 3rd Air Division coriander, as menxioned before, nox only conducted nighx surprise a'-'-acks on SINGAPORE and co-operaxed wi'h xhe 25*h Army, bux was making preparations for in'ensive annihilaxing a-* lacks agains1 xhe enemy air sLreng'-h wixh fha respecxive uni's. However, on 7 January xhe 7Ah
Air Brigade wa3 concenTa'ad on xhe K0TA3ARU and KEDA*1 airfield group. As soon as xhe -KUANTAN airfield was complexed, 'ho 12Ah Air Brigade (xho 47xh Independent Squadron vi'h xype 2 figh'ers was axxached on 4 January) advanced 'o lhe same airfield and issued xhe following orders on 8 January.
1. In conducxing xhe bombing of SINGAPORE, Ahe secxor and classified names is as in Ahe separa'e chart.
""he Army and Navy agreement concerning xhe aerial operations agains'- SINGAPORE is as in separa'e sheeA No. 1.
2. The Air Division will annihilate xhe enemy air strength a* SINGAPORE.
The first fay 0f o.ne a'tack will*«be set ax jj. January on a separa'e order.
The summary of xhe aerial operations over SINGAPORE is as w±ixxen in separate sheet u0> 2.
3. The 7xh Air Brigade commander will dispatch a powerful
V - \
unit composed of fighAers and bombers and Ahe 12Ah Air Brigade commander
will dispa'ch his whole s'reng'h and "-hey will bch a''ack SIHGAFORS l'orna'ely. They will seek ou* 'he enemy figh'ers firs1 and de's-Toy 'hem. mhe poin+s on 'he prosecu'ion of 'he a"acks will depend on 'he Army-Uavy agreement on 'he separa'e shee-1-. A' presen', up 'ill 'he rd a''ack will be conduced.
The derails on 'he co-ordina'ed a"ack will be mutually agreed
upon.
4. The 3rd Air Brigade commander will continue his present
duties.
5. The 8ls* Air Regimen1 will reconnoiAer 'he wea'her condi'ion over SINGAPORE on 0700 hours of 11 and 12 December. IA will broadcas' 'he wea'her by wireless and jus* before and afAer '-he a"ack, i' will search 'he condi'ion of -'he enemy air uni's and condi'ion of 'he enemy's plane.dispersion.
IINrM Map i
Sectionals at'on and Referonoo Abbrevlat'ona for Carrying out Bonbtnf Attack..
v.
s
X ' 6
\
Separated Volume No. 1
The Army and Navy Agreement on Air Operations in the SINGAPORE Area
Commander of the 3rd Air Group
Lieutenant General DODAI SUGAWARA
Commander of the 22nd Air Combat Unit Rear Admiral SADAICHI MATSUNAGA
This memorandum shows the early stages of the operation hased on the agreement between the Southern Army and the Southern Fleet in adc ition to an outline of the subsequent attacks: No. 1. Military strength. Army
The 3rd Air Brigade (approximately 15 planes) 59th Air Regiment.
Type 1 Fighters2 squadrons The 7th Air Brigade (50-80 planes) 50th Independent Air Squadron
Headquarter Reconnaissance Planes1 squadron 64th Air Regiment
Type 1 Fighters3 squadrons 12th Air Regiment 60th Air Regiment 98th Air Regiment
Heavy bombers- In the early stages 3-6 squadrons of the above forces.
The 12th Air Brigade (70-80 planes) 47th'Independent Air Squadron
"KI" 44 planes1 squadron 1st Air Regiment
Type 97 Fighters3 squadrons 11th Air Regiment
Type 97 Fighters3 squadrons
The 8lst Air Combat Unit
Headquarters Reconnaissance Planes2 squadrons (10-20 planes
Navy
The 22nd Fighter Unit
Medium size offensive planes2 units 5* planes (When the occasion demands Type 1 land offensive planes will be used in place of the medium size offensive planes). '
Type 0 ship fighters1 unit 20 planes
Land reconnaissance planes5 planes No. 2. Bases.
The 3rd Air Brigade
INOH or jfUANTAN v
The 7th Air Brigade
Heavy bomber unitKUALA BESTO, TANAKMElAfl, AERUTAWAL and AU>R STAR v
Fighter unitI»0H
Headquarter .Reconnaissance plane unitABRUTAWAL The 12th Air BrigadeKUANTAN
The 8lst Air Combat UnitStNGEI BATANI and J»*LSTAR
Medium size offensive plane unitf
3AIG0N, SUNGEI BATABI, KOTA BHARU Fighter unit and land reconnaissance unit,
KOTA BHARU (if it is necessary KUALA BESTO will be used). No. 3« Distribution of assault targets.
Although the targets are pre-arranged as follows the two forces wil if necessary assist each other ^n carrying out their mission. Army--TENGAH Airfield and KAJjAN Airfield.
Navy- Airfield, SELETAR Airfield and enemy vessels in the
vicinity of SINAPORE.
No. 4. Outline of the Assault.
Some changes will be inevitably with each assault, however, the outline for the day of attack and the day following is as follows:
1, The army and navy will cooperate closely in the assault, The first attack will be carried out solely by the army. Although the first day of the assault is scheduled for 11 January this will be arranged for separately.
2. The assault is scheduled as follows: The 1st attack.
The 1st day1000 (time A) The 2nd attack
The 1st day1430 (time B) The 3rd attack
The 2nd day1100 (timeC)
3. Outline of the 1st attack. The forces to be used:
Heavy bombersapproximately 30 planes. Type 97 fightersapproximately 70 planes. Type 1 fightersapproximately 40 planes. "KI" 44 planesapproximately 7 planes. Starting from KUANTAN and KEDAH Airfields the will advance directly over SINGAPORE through the front of and KAHANG. Both forces wi]
meet over TENGHHK Airfield at 1000.
4, Outline of the 2nd attack. (1). Army:
Type 97 fightersapproximately 70 planes. "KI" 44 planesapproximately 7 planes. (The base will be KUANTAN.) Navy:
Medium size offensive planes 54 planes (2f planes will be at KOTA BHARU and the remaining 27 planes will be at SAIGON). Type 0 fighters20 planes. Land reconnaissance planes2 planes. (The base will be KOTA BHARU.)
The above forces will enlarge the area of assault of the 1st attack.
(2) . The naval air unit in MALAY will pass through K1ANTAN and attack the enemy in cooperation with the 12th Army Air Brigade at 14-30. Prior to the passing of the main force over KUANTAN one naval land reconnaissance plane will be in contact with the 12th Air Brigade. The attack will be carried aut as scheduled with full strength regardlews of the weather condition or any other contingency. /
(3) . In case of bad weather the type 0 fighter unit will transfer to KUALA BESTO a day before the attack. The army will accommodate this unit with supplies, quarters provisions etc.
5. Outline of the 3rd attack.
(1) . The forces to be used. Ammy: v
Heavy bombersapproximately 60 planes (AHOLDTAR and AEHUTEWATi) Type 1 fightersapproximately 40 planes (IROH) Type 97 fightersapproximately 70 planes (KUANTAN) "KIH 44 planesapproximately 7 planes (KUANTAN)
Navy:
Medium size offensive planes27 planes (KOTA BBXRU) Type 0 fighters20 planes(KOTA BHARU)
(When the weather is unfavorable only type 0 fighters will be used.)
(2) . Time of attack1100
(3) . For purposes of communication a naval land reconnaissance p plane will make reports to the unit located at KUANTAN of the action of the naval planes enroute to this unit.
$. The 4th etc. attacks.
The army will be in charge of attack on odd numbered days (nights s included) and the navy will be in charge on even numbered days. The details of the targets will be decided according to the situation* No. 5» Intelligence.
1. Intelligence reports will we mutually exchanged above all each force will imform one another as soon as possible as the number of planes
destroyed.
2. Meteological intelligence reports will be Bade by the army to the navy at the proper time. No. 6. Utization of airfields.
In the event that the naval air unit is forced to land aver the KEDAH sector due to unfavorable weather ar any other situation the SUNGEI BATANI Airfield will be used provided that they are able to transfer to other air fields in the event that an emergency arises* The armyunit will assist in the above planes. No. 7» Distinguishing friendly forces from the enemy.
1. In distinguishing friendly forces from the enemy, other than the formal regulation, when planes approach each other at a distance of 200 meters or less, one plane will tip its wing^several times and if the other is a friendly plane it will answer with the same sign.
2. For purposes of mutual recognition between friendly planes one plane will be dispatched as follows prior to the action:
8 January"KI" 44 plane to KOTA BHARU.
9 JanuaryType 0 ship fighter to IffOH.
10 JanuaryType 0 ship fighter to KUANTAN. (Any changes made will be notified).
No. 8. Miscellaneous.
When any agreement is changed the forces will be informed as soon as possible.
Separated volumeNo. 2 The outline of the air operation in SINGAPORE. No. 1. Purpose.
1. Prior to the cloture of SINGAPORE by the 25th Army the enemy air force in BRITISH MALAY will be destroyed.
2. Following the above operation Important targets located in SINGAPORE will be attacked and enemy resistance will be crushed. No. 2. The outline of deployment.
1, The KUANTAN airfield will be rapidly reconstrusted by the air
sector mult in cooperation with the TAL'I Detachment, The reconstruct!or is scheduled to be completed on 7 January and not later than 10 January.
2. The necessary men and materials will be sent with the 5th div-ision and immediately after the capture of KUALA LUMPUR and iCUILAN Airfields they will reconstruct these airfields. Later one part of the 18th Air Sector Unit will be forwarded there,
3. When 1 and 2 is completed to some extent the 12th Air Regiment and the 64th Air Regiment (the 59th Air Regiment will take place of 4 one of the above forces when the occasion demands) will advance to the KUANTAN Airfield while one part of the 3rd Air Regiment will move into the KUALA LUMPUR Airfield.
4. The main force of the 7th Air Brigade will complete the deployment of the KOTA BHRRU Airfield group and theKEDAH lector Airfield
alor sYaR. AY6R TAuJar.
group by the first day of the assault. AROLOTAR and AERUTAWAL-will be included in the KEDAH Sector Airfield group. No. 3« The outline for attack.
1. The strength of the enemy air force in SINGAPORE will be determined and its fighter units will be destroyed as soon as possible, followed by the annihilation of the rest of the force. The attack is scheduled of 8 January. Orders will be issued separately from this outline.
2. Following the above attack the main targets will be demolished and the enemy resistance will be crushed by using large scale attacks or surpmise attacks until SINGAPORE is captured. (This operation is scheduled for the first ten days of February.)
3» In carrying ou the above operations (1 and 2) every effort will be made to destroy the enemy anti-aircraft guns. No. AY .Pfeparatldn for the StJMATfiA- OpSrmtion.
1. If it is necessary the enemy air power in SUMATRA will be destroyed during the SINGAPORE Operation.
j<u>A*<r
2. In order to attack Southern SUMATRA, the KULANG and KAHANG Airfields will be rapidly reconstructed to accommodate type 1 fighter units and heavy bomber units.
Note: Since our forces suffered some loses in the attack on
M
RANGOON the 59th Air Combat unit was transferred to the 7th Air Brigade on 7 January to increase the strength of the fighter unit. On the same day the 10th Air Brigade and some other units were released from the 5th Air Group by order of the Southern Army while the 7th Air Sector Headquarters and other units were attached to this group.
Orders of the Southern Army (summary)
1. To enforce air operations in MALAY and BURMA.
2. The 5th Air Group v.il come under our flirect command while the-14-th Army Air Unit will be under the command of the 14th Army.
3. The commander of the 3rd Air Group will return the units shown in separated sheet No. 1 to their sormer positions and transfer the units shown in the separate sheet No. 2 to the 5th Air Group.
When the commander of the 5th Air Group arrives in SIAM the 3rd A Air Group commander will be relieved of the duty of destroying the enemy air force jkn the BURMA Area and in assisting the 15th Army with its, operations.
4. The commander of the 5th Air Group will carry out air Aperations according to the following ..instructi ons:
1. During its advance the CHINESE Army located in the border area of the Northern INDO-CHINA will be annihilated in one assault.
2. The enemy air power in the BURMA Area will be destroyed as soon as possible and the group will assist the 15th Army In its operations.
3. At the right time it will cut off the BURMA Road and attack enemy transports in the ANDAMAN Sea.
4. When required it will by using heavy bombers assist the 3rd Air Group in the attack on SINGAPORE, the time for the operation will be decided separately. ^
5. The units listed in attached sheet No. 1 and 2 will be transferred to the commander of the 5th Air Group when he arrives in SIAK. Other units will be transferred at 12oo on 10 January.
6. The coranander-in-chief of the Southern Army will be in SAIGON Attached Sheet No. 1
The units which will be returned from the command of the 3rd Air Group to their former positions: The 10th Air Brigade; The 40th Air Field Bn. (fighters) The 97th Air.Field Bn. (light bombers) Attached Sheet No. 2.
The units which will be transferred to the commander of the 5th Air Group from the 3rd Air Group.
The 7th Air Sector Headquarters. The 15th Air Field Bn. (fighters) The 9th Air Field Co. (heavy bombers)v
The 29th Air Field Co. (headquarters reconnaissance planes) The 36th Field Anti-aircraft Bn.. Air Operations in the SINGAPORE District.
On the 10 th the commander of the group decided that 12th will be the first day of operations and continued to make preparations.
In accordance with the above decision the 7th and the 12th Air Brigaded of the group attacked on the 12th. However the enemy planes did not take any positive action since most of their force had retreated toward SUMATRA. Consequently only 16 planes were shot down.
Due to the lack of enemy resistance the scheduled objectives were changed to attacking important establishments in SINGAPORE and mopping up the remaining enemy air power. On the 13th the following orders were issued.
" 1. The result of the ]st and 2nd attack in the SINGAPORE Operation was 16 planes shot down. The enemy fighters appeated to be retreating.
2. From the 14-th the group will assault the military key-points in SINGAPORE City and mop up the remaining air power in the SINGAPORE District.
3. From the 14th the commander of the 7th Air Brigade will attack imported military establishments and enemy air fields in the SINAPORE
district. After the completion of the 3rd assault he will return the 59th Air Combat Unit to its former command in IBOH.
4. From the 14th the commander of the 3rd Air Brigade will attack important military installations and enemy airfields in the SINGAPORE district with all of his available force in addition to carrying on his present mission. After the completion of the 3rd attack the 59th Air Combat Unit will return to his command.
5. The time for assault of orders Nos. 3 and 4 is as follows: The 3rd Air Brigade will attack on every odd hour while the 7th
r Brigade will attack on every odd hour plus thirty minutes.
6. The commander of the 12th Air Brigade will assist the 3rd atod 7th Air Brigades as much as possible. In addition he will mop up the remaining enemy air resistance in the SINGAPORE District.
7. The commander of the ©1st Air Combat Unit will continue his present duties.
The commander of the 3rd Air Brigade cooperated with the 25th Army in its battle with the main force of his brigade. In addition one part of the brigade attacked the airfields in 9EMKERWAN and TENGAH and several planes made a surprise attack at midnight on the same area. The commander of the 7th Air Brigade attacked the air fields in SELET4R and TENGAH daily as well as central establifhments in SINGAPORE with * main force of his brigade. Moreover several planes assisted the 3rd Air Brigade in a surprise attack at midnight.
The commander of the 12th Air Brigade assisted the 3rd and fth Air BrigeVde. However no enemy planes were shot down since they offered no air eesistance.
meanwhile the commander of the group changed the location of the bases to the area south of the jnouth of the PAPAN River-MENTARAB*Cape RACHADO with the progress of the operation of the 25th army. On the 18th he ordered the commander of the 15th Air Sector to reconstruct the airfields in KUfcAN»> KAHANG, and PAPPAHAT. ,
By attaching SINGAPORE continually for 10 days the group acquired absolute air supremacy in that area. However in consideration of the progress of the battle bu the 25th Army the following orders were issu
on the 26th to annihilated enemy tesistance.
1. The enemy facing the 25th Army appears to be making its last atamd.
2. The group will .attack the ememy in the SINGAPORE Area day arid night and break their resistance in addition to cooperating secretly with the 25th Army.
3. The commander of the 3rd Air Brigade will carry on its presen duties.
4. From 28 January the commander of the 7th Air Brigade will continue to attack important objectives in the SINGAPORE Area during the day with a superior unit. He will furthermore attack enemy resistance mith several planes by night attacks.
The details of the attack on the PALEMBANG Airfield will be issued separatly from the above.
5. The commander of the 12th Air Brigade will continue in his present mission. When the PAPPAHAT Airfield is reconstructed and equipped it will be used as an operation base. After the completion of the above airfield he will then secure air supremacy over SINGAPORE and its vicinity and seek out and destroy enemy planes.
6. The Commander of the 15th Air Sector will reconstruct and complete the PAPPAHAT Airfield for the above unit and then take charge of maintainance of the airfield. One part of the 25th Army will cooperate in reconstructing the PAPPAHAT Airfield.
The 3rd Air Brigade kept in contact with the 7th Air Brigade while cooperating with the 25th Army in the operation. In addition it made a surprise attack on the airfields in KENGAH, SELh-TAR, aEMBERWAN etc. at night. The. 7th Air Brigade attacked continously;from. the 26th to the 31st and bombed the airfield in KALAN^ TENGAH, SEMBERWAN and SELETAR the military establishments in SINGAPORE aha KALAMj-as will as the vessel in and mear the port.
The 12th Air Brigade engaged 51 enemy fighters and bombers which were protecting the convoy over ENDAU on the 26th and shot down 40 planes. This Air Brigade advanced to the PAPPAHAT Airfield on the 31st.
this unit bombed the vicinity of the northern bridge base to cooperation with the 7th Air Brigade which was planning to Advance into that area.
The enemy artillery oomaardment of the 25th Army was rather severe in the SttLAl Area. On the other hand many enemy ships were discovered sailing southwest in the vicinity of the southern tip of MALAY Pennisul by a headquarter reconnaissance plane on the 30th. The commander of the Air Brigade silenced the enemy artillery with the main force and attacked the ships with a detachment. Prior to this the landing operation on ENDAU was suspended and on 20 January the 18th Division landed on SINGAPORE. All available army transportation facilities were utilized for the operation against SINGAPORE.
Accordingly the air brigade temporarily stopped converting the
base south of KUALA LUMPUR due to the difficulty in^ transporting fuel
and ammunition. The flight of the 27th JU.r Combat Unit from KUALA
LUMPUR to SINGAPORE was difficult since the base was at the extreme
end of the battle line. Furthermore, the 75th and the 90th-Combat Unit
IPo*.
encountered some inconveniences in starting from INPOH. Consequently the commander of the Air Brigade requested the commander of the group to at least assign the fighter unit and the assault unit to the vicini of KULANG.
This request was granted and the following units were assigned to KULANG.
One part of the 27th Air Combat Unit on 30 January; the main force of the above unit on the 30st; the 59th Air Combat Unit and the 15th Independent Air Unit on 1 February. From 3 February the main force of the 75th Combat Unit and the 90th Combat Unit were advanced to KUALA
KLVW6-
LUMPUR while the remainder was advanced to KULANG".
On the morning of 31 January JOHORE Bridge was demolifhed by the enemy.
Escorting of the convoy and the protection Of the port in the ENDAU Area by the 12th Air Brigade.
As mentioned previously the plan for the 18th Division landing in
Prior to the above operations the commander-in-chief of the South-em Army made plans to send the main forces of the 18th Division to the ENDAU Area to capture SINGAPORE with the cooperation of the army and navy. On 13 January the operational details were cleafced up by the army and navy and by command of the Southern Army. The commander of the 3rd Air Group ordered the 12th Air Brigade to escort the convoy and protect the port. He also ordered the 3rd Air Brigade to assist in the land operation. This operation order, however, was rescinded on the 19th. On the same day one part of the independent engineering unit and the anti-aircraft company were put under the- command of the 3rd Air Group. The commander of the group was ordered to disembark the air unit (one part of the signal unit of the 96th Air field Bn.) which had been waiting in C0MHRAN Bay t<o the ENDAU Area by 26 January.
Cooperation of the 3rd Air Brigade in the land operation.
Immediately after the 25th Army eccupied MALACCA on 15 January one part of the Guard Division was ordered to land on PAPPAHAT from the sea and interupt the retreating enemy. Since this interception was an important part of the army operation the commander of the 3rd Air Brigade stopped his assistance and the 5th Division cooperated with the Guard Division from the 18th. He then ordered the main force (the 27th, 59th and the 15th Independent Air Unit) to advance to KUALA
IfOH
LUMPUR and the 75th and 90th Combat Unit to INROII.
Although the battle situation of the Guard Division had not developed by 23 January the operation on the front of the 5th Division developed so far beyond expectation that it was able to advance to the vicinity of YOMPEN. Consequently the commander of the 3rd Air Brigade changed his main objective to cooperate with the 5th Division and to route the enemy in the J^JLA&£- Area. He furthermore, ordered the head-quarters reconnaissance plane unit to watch the JOHORE Bridge and to prevent the enemy from entering SINGAPORE Island. On the 29th and 30th,
the ENDAU Area was suspended. In accordance with the order of the Southern Army to debark one part of the airfield battalion and other units on ENDAU the 3rd Air Giraup advanced the 12th Air Brigade to KUANTAN to escort the convoy. The movements of the convoy were as follows:
Departed SAIGON on the evening of 22 January, arrived at SINGORA at 2400 on the 25th; departed there on the morning of the 26th; arrived at ENDAU and completed debarkation by the evening of the 28th. (3 days were reserved for disembarkation).
The 12th Air Brigade forwarded its main force to KUANTAN immediately after the capture of that area by the TAMI Detachment. One squadron escorted the above convoy.
At dawn of the 26th the convoy was 20 kilometers or more off ENDAU. After the navy had cleared mines the convoy lowered anchor at ENDAU Port at 1040 hours and disembarkation began from approx. 1200 hours. At 0936 hours 2 enemy fighters (LOCKHEED HUDSON) flew over the convoy but were driven back by our planes. Around 1635 hours approx. 30 enemy fighters and bombers came to attack the convoy. At that time one squadron (9 planes) of the 11th Air Combat Unit of the 12th Air Brigade was patrolling the area and without hesitation attacked the enemy. In addition one more squadron (9 planes) of the 1st Air Combat Unit participated in the battle. During the combat which lasted approx. 30 minutes 24 enemy planes were shot down. Our losses were only 2 planes.
At approx. 1900 hours 18 enemy fighters came to attack. One squadron of the 1st Air Combat Unit and the 47th Independent Air Squadron intercepted them and shot down 15 planes. Our losses were nil. At approx. 2000 hours 6 enemy bombers approached the convoy. One squadron, of the 11th Air Combat Unit engaged them and destroyed one plane. We suffered no damages. Judging from the above attacks the enemy carried on waves of attacks purposely at intervals of one to two hours. However, they suffered heavy damages from our air force.
As a result of this debarkation nearly all of the remaining enemy air force in SINGAPORE which had been hiding until now was destroyed. This made the attack on SINGAPORE by the 25th Army and the 3rd Air Group
comparatively easy and favorable for us.
The actions of the air sector units are as follows: The 1st Air Sector Unit which was deployed throughout Southern INDOCHINA forwarded one unit to SUNGEI lATANI which was placed under the command of the 18th Air Sector Unit. The main force of the unit was put under the direct jurisdiction of the Southern Army and on 7 January and performed the following duties.
(1) . Ground operations for the army air units which passed through INDO-CHINA or stationed in Southern INDO-CHINA and assisted in their transportation duties.
(2) . Assisted the ground units of the group which were advancing toward MALAY and took charge of the aircraft material left behind.
2. The 12th Air Sector Unit.
This unit was scattered in Southern SIAM and the KOTABHARU area and served mainly in distributing, forwarding and evacuating aircraft material forwarded by vessels and trains. At one time the unit assisted the 7th Air Brigade which was based in the KOTABHARU area in the battle.
3. The 15th Air Sector Unit.
On 9 January the duties of this sector were transferred to the 1st Air Sector Unit and then on 18 January the main force concentrated at SUHGEI SATANI. In the same date the 15th Air Sector was reorganized in the district south of the mouth of DAHANG River-MENTAKOB-Cape RACHADO and some other units were put under its command. Immediately after this the main force followed the front line units and deployed to various units to LABIS, KAHANG, KULANG and PAPPHHET which had Just been captured. The reconstruction of these areas was generally completed shortly before the end of the month. Some other air units were also deployed in these districts.
4. The l£th Air Sector Unit. This unit forwarded a detachment to-IPOH and TAIPING during the
first ten days of the month immediately after having deployed the air unit simultaneously with the advance of the land forces and cooperated with the air units in addition to accumulating materials for rapid organization. During the second ten days when the entire 7th Air Brigade moved into the KEDAH district the air sector cooperated with
them in reconstructing the airfield. Moreover after the land force had reached the KULANG-KURLA LUMPUR line the 15th Air Sector Unit and the mobile units reconstructed the KUALA LUMPUR Airfield which had been completely destroyed by the enemy. Later the 18th Air Sector cooperated secretly with the 3rd Air Brigade which was half deployed to the above airfield.
Meanwhile enemy planes attacked the airfields at KUALA LUMPUR, SUNGEI SaTANI, IPOH, etc. for several days and great efforts were made to repulse them.
In short this unit was kept very busy servicing the main force of the group which was deployed within She district as well as naval planes and the large units of planes under the direct command of the army. 5. The KUANTAN Air Sector Unit.
The unit cooperated wecretly with the 12th Air Brigade in the battle from KUANTAN. In addition it helped to distribute and transport aircraft materials. On 31 January this unit was combined with and put under the command of the 15th Air Sector Unit.
The action of the Naval Air Force.
From 15 to 31 January the Naval Air Force attacked SINGAPORE ten times and shot down approx. 70 planes. In addition they greatly damaged ground installations.
The action of the enemy air forces.
Due to our decisive air supremacy the enemy air force in SINGAPORE gradually retreated into SUMATRA and used SINGAPORE only ad an advance
The action of the 3rd Air Group on 31 January is shown in illustration No. 8.
Appended Hap f 8,
DinpooUlon of 3rd lir Croup On 31 Jan. 42.
TABLE (F PLANES DAMAGED AMD REPLACED FOB THE 3rd ' AIR GROUP DURING TBI MALAY OPERATIONS
-1-_u--1-.--j-L--
T55J? Halt ' ^J*1?*1 Mo. Damage ■ «* Me. lift after Reason fe
«f planes replacenents operation Ism of
____j_'___pla
-----r^T^
97 Recoan 51 Independent 33 8 7 SA>
Air Ce.
100 Reconn 81st Air group 20 10 15 25
51st Ind. Air Co.
91 Amy Seoena 73rd Lai. Air Co. 20 20 9 9
98 Ditsot 98 Ind. Air Ce. 13 6 5 12 Cooperation
97 Fighter 11th Air group 132 60 69 141
59th Air group 3056
99 Twin not or 75th Air group 82 48 54 18 Light beaber 90th Air group 36%
99 Haider 27th Air group 37 35 21 23
60*
97 Heavy Type 35 10 5 30
97 ■ 12th Air group
60th Air group 129 AO 30 119
\ 44 A7th Ind. Air Ce. 8 3 5
97 Transport 55 7 2 50
XP Type Transport 5
100 Transport 1
Tetal 670 331 270 627
"able Per1 airiing. To Aviaxion Fuel And Am...uni'ion Immediately Appended Char* 1. Jorc r... . ^..v.ir.,- Of .,ar (Souxhern Arc-a n' .■■■■^ J:.-I::dO Ci.L.'A)
Parx 1.
I 87 gasoline........... 300"barrels I SIEL-RSAR "ft KRAKOR
Castor oil............ 53 " ""rr_ _
50 kg bomb............1,000 G7 gasoline.......i...1,300 barrels I
15 kg bomb............3,500 Gas-or oil............ 85 " j 1
M.G. incendiary....... 10 boxes 100 kg bomb........... 100 TT UDOKG
II.G. armour piercinR.. 30 " 50 kg bomb..'.........1,000
15 kg bomb........... 500
M.G. incendiary....... 5 boxes . 1
M.G. armor piercing... 15 " TT PKOM-PENH
^ I Mineral oil........... 50 barrels
1 J - I v J 91 gasoline...........4,900 barrels L
TT "ANI TT TAill 87 " ........... 600
__Z_ _ Mineral oil........... 350
91 gasoline.,.........3»000 barrels M.G. armor piercing... 325 boxes Castor oil............ 4*0 "
87 " ...........3,300 " Small flares.......... 300 250 kg bomb........... 190
Mineral oil............ 220 " 205 kg flares......... 110 100 " " ........... 7P0
Cas*or oil............ 220 " 100 " " ......... 600 50 " ■ ...........3,'500
50 kg incendiary...... 200 50 " " .........3,000 s 50 " incendiary..... 600
: .G. incendiary....... 75 boxes M.G. incendiary....... 3° boxes
M.G. armor piercing... 90 "
-+J. Small flares.,,,,,,,,, ^00_■_
J] ,U.J!-AN . _{T DUONG-DOKG PHU-*0C ,.V'"' .
91 gasoline...........300 barrels 91 gasoline...........1,400 barrels
87 " ...........350 " 87 "........... 400
I -'ineral oil........... 30 " Mineral oil........... 120
W Casxor oil............ 20 " Cas-or oil............ 20 "
M.G. incendiary.......15 boxes M.A. ordinary......... 160 boxes
M.G. armor piercing... 45 " M.A. incendiary....... 9 "
M.A. armor piercing... 65 "
B» Clip-.................. 4 "
M.G. incendiary....... 40 "
M.G. armor piercing... 120 "_
KOUPOKG-CHEIIANG
1 8? gasoline...........1,500 barrels I
Oa3"-or oil............ 112
Mineral oil........... 50 "
50 kg bomb............1,400 JJ KHA-TRANG
15 » " ............6,500 _
12 H incendiary......1,000 91 gasoline... 300 barrels
M.G, incendiary....... 45 boxes 87 " ...1,400
M.G. amor piercing... 135 " Mineral oil... , 20 "
Small flare........... 300 " Castor oil...._10_nm_\
"j"!" KOMPONU-TRACH
I 91 gasoline...........1,300 barrels M.A. ordinary............. 53 boxes J
87 " ...........3,250 " Clipe..................... 2 » . .
Mineral oil........... 80 " M.G. incendiary........... 55 " V
Cas*or oil............ 220 " M.G. armor piercing.......165 H
100 kg bomb........... 150 Small flares..............300
50 " ■ ...........3,500
50 " incondiary..... 200 ^
M.A. incendiary....... 3 boxes ■ ■
I ..A. armor piercing... 24' "_ _[_J SAIGOti
91 gasoline...........3,200 barrels Supply
87 " ........'...1,000 » §7 gasoline...........2,480 barrels
Mineral oil........... 250 " Castor oil............ 363 ' "
C.as'or oil............ 100 " 100 kg bomb...........1,200
250 kg bomb____;...... 200 50 ■ " ...........3,500
100 " " ........... 650 15 M ■ ...........2,000
50 " " ...........3,100 "ype 94 " ........... 200
M.G. incendiary....... 55 boxes Small flares.......... 100
50 kg.'incendiary..... 300 M.G. ordinary......... 72 boxes
M.G. armor piercing... 165 boxes M.G*. incendiary....... -32 "
Small flares.......... 100 M.G. armor piercing... 50
_Slips................16,900_
Castor oil............ 330 barrels M.G. armor piercing... 457 boxes *
500 kg bomb........... 162 Small flares.......... 200
250 " " ........... 796 Ting flares...........1,500
100 ■ ■ ........... 800 50 kg incendiary...... 600
50 " "...........1,958 12 " " ...... 100
15 " " ...........2,500 1 " " ...... 500
50 " incendiary.....1,700
12 " .....2,000
- M.G. incendiary...... 157 boxes . ■
i
V
Inserted Chart
Table of Ariation Fuel and Aeenmition Prior to the Beginning of War
(TAIWAN ARSA) ___
Paragraph V. Cooperation lm the land Operations at the Time ef the Capture ef SINGAPORE by the 25th Army.
(Summary ef the Progress ef the Operations ef the 25th Army)
The 25th Army began preparations fer the capture ef SINGAPORE immediately upea its arrival at the JOHQHX waterway en 31 January and commenced landing at 2400 en 8 February after a fierce battle. SINGAPORE was completely captured en 15 February.
(Summary ef the Progress ef the Operations ef the 3rd Air Group)
The main force ef the 3rd Air Croup attacked enemy warships and merchantmen escaping from SINGAPORE Harbour and cooperated with the 25th Army. It also carried out destructive aerial warfare in the SUMATRA area with a part ef its strength. On the 14th, it carried out a raiding operation on PALEMBANG.
Note: The operation in the SUMATRA area will be wrttten in the section containing the DUTCH INDUS operation.
(Aerial operations during the period of preparation for the Capture ef
SINGAPORE.)
The 3rd Air Group Commander reorganized the air sector units in order to conform with the attack preparations of the 25th Army for the capture ef SINGAPORE. The air units also advanced as the airfields were completed and cooperated in the attack preparations of the 25th Army. Furthermore, the 3rd Air Group carried out the necessary reconnaissance and feinted in the air in order to conceal the plan ef the 25th Army. Subsequently, it attacked a group of oil tankers off "SELEPAR" and "EULANCHI" day and night with its main body. Enemy warships and merchantmen in the strait of MALACCA were also attacked. "\ .
The main 7th Air Group attacked important military installations, wharves, and wardhouses in SINGAPORE. Moreover, a part of the force attacked fleeing enemy warships and merchantmen, the KABAK Airfield, the eastern
8 TIMAH
fertooes ef MANDAI Hill, and the enemy positions on "BSWEMA" Hill and facilitated the operational preparation of the army. The 12th Air Group acting in close cooperation with fcho 3rd and 7th Air Groups, attacked enemy
V
planet and. protected the operational preparations of the Army. Meanwhile, on the 3rd, the Group Commander gave instructions ao to the construction of air bases to be advanced after the capture of SINGAPORE Island and also changed the command post to KFLAHB on the 4th. On the 5th arrangements with the 25th Army were made. Thus, the Air Groups acquired complete commend of the air ever SINGAPORE as wall as bombing important military installations and oil tankerb. The operational preparation of the 25th Army was perfected. The 3rd Air Group commander drew up the following plan for the capture of SINGAPORE. On the 4th, the Air Group Commander gave instructions for the cooperation with the 25th Army and te continue preparations.
Outline of the Cooperation in the Campaign to capture SINGAPORE. I. Plan K
1. The Air Group, keeping pace with the 25th Army plan to capture SINGAPORE will completely eliminate enemy air activity in the SINGAPORE sector. It will alee attack key positions on the island as well aa directly cooperating in land combats of the 1st line forces to accelerate the capture of the objective.
The commencement of the operation will begin en 7 February. XI. Summary of the 25th Army Plan for the Capture of SINGAPORE
(1) Plan
2. The Army, after wiping out the enemy north of JOROEE Channel, will make careful preparations te storm the enemy from the sector weot of the land bridge with its full strength and restrict the enemy te the sector east of the land bridge. Then it will quickly advance te the important lines in the vicinity of *BgITEMA*. If the enemy still dees net surrender, we will attack and overwhelm the whole island.
s
(2) Outline
let Phase. The period for attack preparations.
3. After wiping out the enemy in the vicinity of JOHORE, each divioion with a part of its force will map up the north bank sector of JOHORE Channel after capture of the river bank. It will make the inhabitants withdraw to the sector north ef "PONAANKER", "J(rAI", and KOTA TINGGI. It will be responsible for the reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain, and will
cover the deployment ef the artillery.
The main body will concentrate as follows and prepare fer subsequent attacks. However, the Guard Division will divert the enemy te the sector east ef the laid bridge by making aggressive and wide felat moves.
GD In the vicinity ef TEBRAU and "MASAI"
5D Seeter east ef SKUPAI 18D secter east of the Reservoir Height
4. The Artillery Unit under the direct command ef the army will occupy positions in the sector north ef JOHORE BHARU with its main body and in the vicinity of A 572 with a part ef its force. It will obstruct the use of enemy airfields by bombarding the oil tanks at "TENG-A", "SEHBAWAH«>, and "PASttBAMJAH." with the cooperation of the divisional artillery and also destroy important military installations. It will neutralize the enemy artillery at the proper time. During this period, the Artillery Unit will prepare positions for the main body in the upper stream sector ef the "MALAE" River and make the main body change its positions en the nights of X-2 and X-l.
5. After the advance to the JOHOBE Channel line, the days of preparation required till the commencement of attack is estimated to be five days.
$nd Phase. (Period of the capture of SINGAPORE)
6. Upon completion ef the attack preparations, the entire artillery will carry out preparatory bombardment fer attack from the morning of X day simultaneously with the bombing by the air units.
7. The main bodies of the 5D and 18D will advance to the north bank sector of the JOHORE Channel on the night ef X-l day and complete preparations for the attack.
The GD will continue its feint moves until the night of X-l day and then concentrate in the sector east and west of JOHORE BHARU after the latter half*of the night of X-day while a part ef the force remains.behind.
8. Each unit will land simultaneously with the first landing forces of the 5D and 1SD at 2230 on X-day immediately after the supporting assault fire of the artillery. Part of the 18D will check the movements of the enemy sea forces from the direction ef the west and ef the channel.
9. The units which landed en the enemy beach will enlarge their
footholds towards the front as much as possible and advance te the line on
the morning of X / 1 day and continue to advance te the "JBRON* River- C
"BKIMANDAI" Hill line. After concentrating the forces on the same line and preparing for the attack en "BKxTEHl" Hill, they will break through the enemy positions and advance to the line east of the same hill under the close cooperation of the air units. Infantry, tanks, and artillery will be utilized. The GD will concentrate in the rear of the 5D and advance to the sectsr east of the reservoir from the direction of "MANDAI" at the proper time.
10. In case the enemy does net surrender even after our advance to the
foregoing line, we will attack and occupy the city and the surrounding
fortresses. At this time, the 18D will etand guard against the 11BL AC ASST. J«H»U
"MATEI-" and "fcANJAN" Fortresses and if necessary, capture them with a part of its force.
III. Outline of the Air Operations.
1st Phase The Period of Attack Preparations
11. The results of the SINGAPORE air operations were exploited and at the same time, preparations were made for the PALEMEANG operations. The movement of enemy planee in the air over the SINGAPORE sector was completely destroyed.
12. While the attack on the SINGAPORE sector will be repeatedly carried out with fighters the main purpose of the air force will bo to guard the sky above the main bodies of the 5D, 18D, and the Army Artillery unit and cover their preparations for attack after X-l day.
13. Our force will mainly attack the important military targets with heavy bombers, subdue the center of enemy defensive installations and attempt to break up the enemy's resistance.
14. The Light Bomber (Assault) Unit will cooperate in the attack preparations with a part of its strength and prepare for ito cooperation after the cemmoncemenfof attack (including X-day) with the main body.
2nd Phase (The Period of the Capture of SINGAPORE Island)
15. The fightere will cooperate in the battle of the heavy and light bomber with a part of its force. It will gradually shift te the preparation for the next phase of operations while being reoponoible for the control
of the air above the battlefield.
16. The Light Bomber (Assault) Unit with its main bedy will cooperate In the river crossing of the first lino divisions and the battloe after the river crossing from the evening of X-day. For this reason, after X-day the Unit will neutralize the enemy en the north coast ef SINGAPORE Island in coordination with the Army Artillery Unit firing. Accompanying the river crossing and the advance ef the main bedy ef the Army, it will keep ahead ef the main bedy ef the Army and neutralize the enemy in that locality. Particularly, the Unit will closely cooperate with the firet line forces after the morning of X-ll day at about the time ef the advance to "TENGA" airfield and neutralize the enemy in the immediate front. It will also break up tho enemy counter-attacks at the opportune moments.
Accompanying the advance ef the Army Artillery Unit, the Unit will appropriately change targets simultaneously with the artillery fire and mainly neutralize the enemy in the vicinity ef "flKUBa," Hill.
17. The Heavy Bomber Unit will continue its attacks on the targets stated in Item No. 13 in conforming with the situation in the advances of the 5D and 18D. It will further endeavor to perceive the enemy plan against the right flank of the main body of the army (interference from the west side fortress of SINGAPORE Island) and neutralize such attempts at the proper time if the necessity arises.
18. Besides the foregoing, the Unit will observe the movements ef the enemy sea forces at about the time ef the river-crossing ef the lend unite and will subdue and annihilate these forces with the cooperation of a part of the 18D at the proper time.
q.T»HM
19. After the capture ef "BKWSMA" Hill, the Unit will chiefly attack the city of SINGAPORE, and at the same time, destroy the enemy on the flank who is obstructing the advance ef the main body of the Army. It may also attack the enemy's escaping ships at opportune times.
80. The strength employed is as follows, 77B, 127R, 60PR 123T3
8SFB and 127B commanders may use the strength assigned for the next
phase sf operations in the present campaign if the necessity arises. 21. The duty sf each unit as follows:
3FB Direct cooperation in the capture operation 7FB (except deficient units) Deetruction of key positions on SINGAPORE Island, rear targets, and position installations as well as crushing the resisting will ef the enemy.
12FB Annihilation of enemy planes in the air above the SINGAPORE sector; the protection of the 25A during the period of preparations and in the early stage of the attack and cooperation with the 3F3 and 7FB.
Eased on the above disposition, the 3rd Air Group, in compliance with the request of the 25th Army, cooperated in the feint moves ef the Guard Division from the direction of "UHIN" Island with a part of its force on the 6th and 7th. On the 8th it took charga ef the destruction of enemy ' searchlights in the area ef the main body ef the Army.
When the main body of the Army commenced its river-crossing at midnight of 8th, the Air Unit cooperated with ite main force and especially facilitated the battle progress ef the Army by neutralizing the enemy artillery. On the 11th the Air Unit was appointed to an additional duty of searching and attacking the enemy ship groups. Satisfactory results were obtained in the attacks en enemy warships and merchantmen south ef SINGAPORE.
The 7th Air Group attacked 17 times between the 9th andllth with its full strength. It bombed the enemy positions in the vicinity ef "PAN JAN", "JUtfONG", "MANDAI", THE CHANGli. fortress and the 4kSl>U" fork read. 8n the 11th it attacked the wharves, ships, and railroad stations. Further more, the main point ef attack was directed towards the enemy artillery in the immediate front ef the 5th and 18th Divisions in accordance with the Group Order. Thus the Air Unit bombed the heavy artillery positions
at "rA6ILPANJAN", "CHANGMF and the sector west of the city, and the "SnAflA-
s
NMANA" fortress guns which facilitated the advance of the land units. It also attacked the retreating ship group with a part of its force. The total number of planes ef the 7th Air Group that were in action from the beginning of February till the fall ef SINGAPORE was actually 1,018 and the bombs dropped was 773 tens.
The 12th Air Group pushed its Command Pest form "QUANTAN" to "PAPPAHAT" en the 6th. It acquired air superiority ever Sr'OAPORE Island in
coordination with the attacks by the 3rd and 7th Air Groups. Following the advance ef the land units, it advanced to "TENGA" airfield with a part of its force on the 13th and facilitate the movements of the 25th Army and the bomber units.
After the capture ef the "TENGA" airfield by the 25th Army on the 10th, the Group Commander ordered a part of the 15th Air Sector Unit to advance to the airfield and take charge ef the emergency maintenance. On the 11th it was reinforced with a part of the 18th Air Sector Unit. The airfield was to be used as a staging base ef the 12th Air Group. He further instructed all the air sector unite to closely cooperate with the Air Groups. Thus the Air Group w*s at its full strength.
Thus, all the strategic points ef SINGAPOEE, the stronghold ef the KALAI Britieh Army, were completely penetrated by our severe attack from air and land and the enemy finally surrendered unconditionally at 1950 on 15 February.
Chapter V The Situation in the Bear.
Paragraph 1. Situation of the ^esses and replacement of material and personnel.
Article 1. Loss and Replacement of Airplanes
Our plane losses from the outbreak of the war till the fall of SINGAPORE were 331 planes. The chief causes were due to direct combat, 50#, unskillful handling, peer maintenance ef airfields in MALAYA, and enemy strafing. Besides the foregoing, 46 planes were lost during cen-centration due to bad weather.
The type ef plane which suffered the greatest loss was the Type 1 Fighters (about 65#). The Type 99 Assault Planes (about 60#) came next while the Type 97 Fighter, Type 99 Twin Engine bomber, Type 97 Heavy. Bomber Model 2, etc., also showed fairly high percentages. (Supply Situation)
The total number of planes replenished for the said loss was 270 which was 80# of the. loss.
A total ef 148 planes of various kinds were successively sent to TAIWAV, CANTON, HANOI, and SAIGON from the middle of November for the SeuthQ ern Army as the first shipment ef planes to the^front (mainly for replacement
Meanwhile operations were started. Frem the middle ef December the second shipment ef 151 planes to the frent (for replenishment use up te 10 January) be"an te arrive at SAIGON and of the total ef the twe shipments, 299 planes, the 3rd Air Group was supplied with 14P planes by the end ef December and the losses of each unit were replenished at each loss.
The Air Group was supplied with 80 planes by the end ef January and 40 mere planes In February from the third shipment of planes to the front (for replenishment use up to 10 February).
The situation of the losses and replacement of planes of the 3rd Air Group during the MALAY operations Is as mentioned in the following tablo.
tide II Supply of Material other than Airplanes.
Of the materials other than airplanes, the jettieonable fuel tanks for fighters were the most difficult to supply. The Air- Group possessed only a few ef them in the early stages of development. Under an emergency sup-ly from the homeland, fuel tanks gradually arrived at SAIGON from about 6 December by air transport and those by ship also began to ive. The Air Group had eufficient fuel tanks by the end of January.
Article III Fuel and Ammunitions
The situation of the accumulation of fuel and ammunition in South French INDO*CHINA at the outbreak of the war is aa stated en the separate sheet No. 1, 1 and 2.
Though the first shipment arrived in French-Indo China almost before the opening of the war, the quantity was net great. At one time, a fuel shortage arose and emergency measure of using the general reserve fuel and ammunition at SAIGON had to be taken. However, the 2nd and 3rd shipments beg^an to arrive In succession from the diddle ef January. It became almost poesible to meet the requirements ef the operations.
(Various Air Depots)
The 3rd Air Group Commander carried out the repair and oup->ly of the Group with the 16th Field Air Depot.
(Main depet at CANTON; main body of the 21st Branch Depot at SAIGON (returned te HANOI at the end ef January); and a part ef the 21et Branch Depet at HANOI), the 19th Field Air Repair Depet (at BANGKOK); and the 20th Field Air Supply depet (main body at SAIGON; a part at "PUNOKBEN" and subbranch.ee at BANGKOK and SINGORA after 11 December). They were under the direct command ef the Southern Army and parts ef the 12th and 15th Field Air Depets included within the battle order ef the Group and the 25th Air Branch Depot (at SAIGON). The 17th and 18th Shipping Air Depots came under the command ef the Group Commander according te the distribution of troops by the Southern Army.
At the beginning ef January, the 3rd Air Group Commander restored the 25th Air Branch Depot te its original command (under the direct command of the Southern Army) and carried out repairs with parts ef the 12th and 15th Field Air Supply Depot established branches at SINGORA and BANGKOK and a subbranch at "ALOESTAR" and cooperated invthe supplying ef the Group.
The 19th Field Air Repair Depot, after the arrival of the main body of the 5th Air Group in THAILAND in the middle ef January, undertook the supply and repair of the Group.
The Commander-in Chief ef the Southern Army ordered a part ef the personnel of the 16th Field Air Depot te advance to MALAYA in the latter part ef January accompanying the developments in the battle situation in MALAYA. They were placed under the command of the 3rd Air Group commander for the establishment ef air bases in SINGAPORE.
Early in February* the 20th Field Air Supply Depot advanced the ALOES TAR sub-branch te "KUHDAN" and, after the fall ef SINGAPORE, opened a branch depot in SINGAPORE Branch Depot was reorganized into a sub-branch.
The actual results ef the repairs after the opening ef the air depots until the fall ef SINGAPORE are as mentioned in the separate sheet. Article IV Losses and Replacement of Personnel Losses and Replacement ef Personnel
The personnel loss ef the 3rd Air Group during the operation was 582 (of which 73 were officers). The greater part ef the less was air crewmen and their replacement was not carried out as saticfactorily as planned. Moreover since the ability of the replacement personnel was poor, it was
Inserted Chart ^ Airplane fforks of Two Vonths After the Beginning of War
CHART'OF LOSSES AND REPLACEMENTS OF PERSONNEL OF THE -3rd AIR GROUP DURING THE L'ALAY OPERATIONS
DECSUBXR JANUARY FEBRUARY TOTAL
CLASSIFICATION
r -1--------
Classic Author- Replace- Replace- Replace- Replace-
fica*ion ijied Losses men's Losses men's Losses nen's Losses raenls S'reng'h
Officers 221 46 None 42 15 10 4 98 19 «Q
officer 861 169 None 200 43 21 17 390 60
and non-coms' - 1
------
To*al 1082 215 0 242 58 31 21 488 79
Appended D<agraa # 1; tot* of 3RD Air Ore* VtroloM Botwork
v
Appended Dlagrea § 3i Sketch of 3Rd A4r Group Couutentlon Network. As of 10 Jen.
The air group command peat was advanced te PALEKBANG en 21 February.
Situation ef the enemy air force The remaining enemy air force retreated te Northern SUMATRA and JAVA.
Chapter VII. Restate The composite results of the 3rd air group during theee operations are an mentioned in the separate sheet.
*
Appoaded Map § 9«
Ottilia* mowing Strength IHapoaUloa of 3RD Mr Group Aa of 15 Fob.
///
impossible to make up for the less. Hewever, as the lessee considerably decreased in February and the replacements began arriving the situation became better.
The situation ef the losses and replacement ef air crewmen is as given in the following table.
Paragraph II. The situation of the Signal Unit
The signal unit could generally meet the requirement* ef the operations throughout the period ef operational preparation and during the operations. Although communications note was changed very frequently due to the swift advance ef the air unite after the opening ef hostilities, it was successful in meeting the demands ef the operations.
The aerial communications net ef the 3rd Air Group at the outset of the war, namely at the beginning ef January and February is as mentioned in the separate sheets Nob. 1 to 4.
Paragraph III. The Situation of the Air Intelligence Unit and the Navigation Aid Unit
The 16th Air Intelligence Unit was responsible for the leakout of enemy places and for the collecting of important information. Part of its force carried out special Intelligence duty. Accompanying the progress ef the battle situation, the unit advanced the MALAYA and cleoely cooperated with the air units.
The 17th Nevigation Aid Unit closely cooperated for the safer nevigation of the air units.
Paragraph IT. The situation of the meteorological unit.
The Unit carried out meteorological service during the operations of the Group. Especially, after 4 February in the capture ef SINGAPORE. The meteorel gical unit always advanced te the first line under the most difficult condition such as incurring enemy shells and bullets at JOHORE, and performed their duty ef observing and reporting.
Chapter TI. The Situation after the operationo Situation of the 3rd Air Group The 3rd Air Group, after the fall of SINGAPORE, prepared for operation in the Northern SUMATRA and Western JAVA areas, with a part ef the force in the positions mentioned in the inserted chart.
WAR RESULTS
Dec. 8, 1941 to Jeb. 15, 1942
Airplanes Shot down 233
Airplanes Destroyed by gun 279 Total 512
Motor Vehicle 387 Meetly Trucks
Tanks Damaged by explosions 48 Armoured Cars
Steamships 11 35,000 Tons
Submarines Sunk 1^ Torpedo Boats 1
------_______----------_------------__----_------------------------------______
Steamship* 34 126,500 Tons
Destroyers 3
Torpedo Boate Destroyed (Burned) 5
Large Model Oil Engine ( Boate 7
Submarines 2
Railroad Baggage Cars - 26
Train Damaged by explosions 8
Cannon 35