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JAPANESE MONOGRAPH No. 65

Southeast Area Air Operations Record, Phase III
Jul. 1944 - Aug. 1945

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Army, Washington 25, D. C. for a complete set of maps.

PREFACE

Through Instruction No. 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for war Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff.* Upon the dissolution of the War Ministry and the General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. Detailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in memoranda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational histories".

The basic material contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that the enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material was reconstructed from memory.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G-3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the Demobilization Bureau.

* The action under this memorandum and incidental detailed instructions, which followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, charged with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945.

In order to protect the interest of the United States, in the exploitation of Japanese Military Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of enemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Government was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the entire program, including the establishment of a small historical research section within the ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.)

Operational Record of the

3rd Air Force.

From July 1944 to the End of the War.

June 1947

1st Demobilization Bureau.

This document was compiled from the diaries and memory of the Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. HAITO, Adjutant, Maj. TANAKA (progress of war after Jan. 1945) and Officer attached to the historical section-1st Lt. TSUNODA.

Records concerning repairs, supplies and communication were compiled from the personal records and memories of the Staff Officer ANDO.

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Chapt. I. From July 1944 Until July 1945.

The Operation of the 3rd Air Force.

A. General Outline.

1. Imp. Gen. Hq. Plan and the Situation of the SOUTHERN Army.

After our failure in the PHILIPPINE and OKINAWA Operation the Imp. Gen. Hqs. decided to conduct the decisive operations on and in the vicinity of the HOMELAND. After the plan for HOMELAND Operations was adopted the distribution of planes to the SOUTHERN Army ceased and the Army was forced to rely on its own resources as far as the supply of planes was concerned.

The SOUTHERN Army assembled at SAIGON the Chiefs of Staff of all the units and explained to them the operational plan for the first half of 1945.

2. Operational Plan.

The entire Air and Land Forces of the SOUTHERN Army will assemble in the THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas in order to annihilate the enemy forces which might attempt to invade these areas and to divert the attention of the enemy away from the Homeland.

The Air Force under the command of the SOUTHERN Army was assigned the following duties.

a. The Air Force with the cooperation of the Navy, will annihilate the enemy force which attempts to invade the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area.

b. The PHILIPPINE Area will be reconnoitered and surprise attacks will be conducted on enemy air and sea bases.

Adhering to the above order, the Air Force assembled at SINGAPORE in the early part of February the chiefs of staff of each Air Div. (including the Indep. Air Brig.) and explained the operational plan for the first half of 1945 assigning the following duties to each air division:

B. Outline of the 3rd Air Force Operational Plan for the First Half of 1945.

Principles:

The Army assembling in the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas will together with the Navy defend the points of strategic value and of important resources.

Instructions:

a. Operational Preparations in the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas must be completed as quickly as possible, especially on the east front.

Operational preparations must be completed by the end of April.

- b. Any enemy force which attempts to land in the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas will be annihilated at sea.
- c. Necessary measures will be taken for safe transportation of important materials to the Homeland.
- d. Air defense must be well organized in the areas of strategic value and of important resources.
- e. The Air Force will intercept the advance of enemy air and sea bases and will cut off the enemy supply route by staging surprise attacks on its rear areas.

The following duties were assigned to each Air Div. and Indep. Air Brig.

5th Air Div.

- a. The main body of the 5th Air Div. will continue to assist the Army in BURMA and will also complete its operational preparations in the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas, especially on the east front.
- b. The Air Force will dispatch a part of its force to assist in any operation in the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area.

9th Div.

- a. The 9th Air Div. will guard the oil fields at PALEMBANG and PANGKALANG BRANDAN.
- b. The division will also prepare for the counterattack scheduled in the "SE" Operational Plan. (Appendix No. 1.).

7th Air Div.

- a. The 7th Air Div. will intercept the advance of enemy air and sea bases, cut off the enemy supply route and stage surprise attacks on enemy air and sea bases in the rear areas.
- b. The Air Div. will assist in Operation No. 10 (withdrawal of our forces from the areas north of AUSTRALIA).

2nd Air Div.

- a. The 2nd Air Div. will reconnoiter enemy air and sea bases in the areas of LEYTE and MANILA.
- b. The division will attack enemy transport ships in the SURIGAO STRAIT.

10th Indep. Air Brig.

- a. The 10th Indep. Air Brig. will strengthen its airbase in the western part of BORNEO.
- b. If a favorable opportunity arises, the Air Brig. will conduct surprise attacks on enemy air and sea bases intercepting their advance.

55th Indep. Air Brig.

a. The 55th Indep. Air Brig. will continue with its present duties.

For further improvement of the efficiency of the air crew, ^Priorities for training and education must be given to skilled technicians.

With the assignment of the 2nd Air Div. to the SOUTHERN Army, the entire SOUTHERN Sector with the exception of LUZON came under the command of the SOUTHERN Army. The remainder of the 2nd Air Div. (Main strength was exhausted in "SHO" - decisive operation on LEYTE - operation) was stationed in the vicinity of BAGLOD.

The strength of the 7th Air Div. and the 10th Indep. Air Brig. have also decreased considerably. Heavy material losses were suffered by the 5th and the 9th Air Div. which are the main body of the SOUTHERN Army's Air Force.

Because the supplies of airplanes from the HOMELAND were cut off and the Air Force was forced to operate with repaired old materials and equipments, it was unable to conduct offensive operations.

Although the opinions among the staff members of the Air Force varied, the Air Force nevertheless drew up the aforementioned operation plan, based on the SOUTHERN Army's Plan.

Operational Instructions for Each Area.

a. THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas. ("IN" Operation).

1). At any indication of an enemy attack the main body of the units (two fighter units, one torpedo unit and main part of type 100 2 ER "DINAH" planes) under direct command of the Air Force, and one heavy bomber and one fighter unit of the 9th Air Div. will be assigned to the 5th Air Div. (According to this plan, over 70% of the entire Air Force will assemble in the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area).

2). The air units will attack the enemy task force in close cooperation with the Naval Air Force.

b. The TENASSERIM, ANDAMAN and SUMATRA Areas.

The "SE" Operational Plan will be adhered to in conducting operations in the TENASSERIM, ANDAMAN and the SUMATRA Areas.

c. BORNEO Area. ("BO" Operation).

1). A part of the Air Force will harass the enemy as long as possible preventing him from exploitation of the natural resources on BORNEO.

2). A few of our planes, piloted by highly skilled officers will conduct surprise attacks.

3). Approx. twenty fighters and approx. ten light bombers will be assigned to the 10th Indep. Air Brig.

Outline of Operational Progress.

a. Despite assistance from the 5th Air Div. in conducting the "BAN" Operation (IRRAWADDY ^{EN} Engagement), the enemy penetrated our defense line along IRRAWADDY RIVER and captured MEIETILA Airbase in the middle of March. This enemy force advanced then towards the RANGOON Area, and recapturing RANGOON CITY in early part of May despite the opposition of the 5th Air Div.

b. Attack on Enemy Air and Sea Bases.

1). Excellent results were obtained by the heavy bombers of the 7th Air Div. which attacked the enemy airbase on MOROTAI Is. in February and March.

2). Heavy bombers (part of the 31st Air Regt. which was assigned to the 10th Indep. Air Brig.) and reconnaissance planes of the 10th Indep. Air Brig. attacked the enemy air bases on PALAWAN Is. in late part of April and inflicted considerable damage.

c. No remarkable results were obtained by our Air Force which counterattacked enemy B-29's attacking SINGAPORE. The Air Force attacked the air defense of the oil-refinery installations on BORNEO and MIRI and the air defense of SAIGON CITY shot down approx. thirty heavy enemy planes.

d. Convoy Escort.

1). The Air Force ordered to escort convoys transporting oil to the HOMELAND escorted the transports from SINGAPORE, as far north as the twentieth latitude and also off the EASTERN Coast of FRENCH-INDO-CHINA. The Air Force was released from this duty after March when our convoy J-88 was completely annihilated near the offing of CAM RANH.

The outline of the Convoy Escort is shown in Appended Chart.No. 10.

Under the supervision of the SOUTHERN Army Hqs. further study of the "IN" Operation was made at SAIGON.

C. The ¹Latter Half of the ^Period (From ^May 1945 Until the End of the War).

SOUTHERN Army's Plan:

The SOUTHERN Army's Plan based on deployment of the main body of its strength in the THAILAND FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas in coordination with the OKINAWA Operation was found to be unworkable because of our failure in the OKINAWA Operation. For this reason the Army drew up a new operational plan during the later half of the period and assembling the Chiefs of Staffs at SAIGON in early part of May assigned duties to various units.

The Plan was to maintain points of strategical value, to inflict as much damage as possible on enemy personnel instead of its equipment and to deploy a strong defense force around the city of SINGAPORE.

The SOUTHERN Army drew up the following operational plan based on the above principles and explained the main points of it to each divisional commander (including commanders of Indep. Air Brigs.) who were assembled at SINGAPORE.

The Operational Plan of the 3rd Air Force for the Latter Half of the Period.

Plan:

The Air Force will concentrate on the decisive operation around SINGAPORE, complete operational preparations on both the EASTERN and WESTERN FRONTS of the THAILAND FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas and annihilate the enemy in cooperation with the Navy.

Outline of the Operational Instructions.

a. Operational preparations must be completed on both the EASTERN and WESTERN FRONTS of SINGAPORE including SOUTHERN MALAY, SUMATRA and the RIOUW ARCHIPELAGO as quickly as possible.

The communication system and collection of bombs on the airfields, especially on the secret airfields must be completed as quickly as possible.

The above preparations must be completed by the end of August.

b. For conducting a decisive operation around SINGAPORE, two fighter units and one light bomber unit from the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area and two Special Attack Units (approx. twenty Model 97 fighters to one unit) from JAVA will be assembled in the MALAY Area. The 9th and the 55th Air Div. will also be assembled in this area. The operation will be conducted under direct command of the Air Force.

c. If the enemy should attack the THAILAND FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas the afore mentioned "IN" Operational Plan will be applied with the only change involving the reinforcement of strength by two fighter units from the main body of the Air Force.

Based on the above mentioned plan, the "SHO" Operational Plan was drawn up for the purpose of conducting an decisive operation around SINGAPORE.

During the period while the main AMERICAN Forces were pushing to the HOMELAND, ENGLAND and AUSTRALIA were gradually advancing from the east and west toward SINGAPORE, our largest fortress in the SOUTHERN PACIFIC OCEAN Area.

In early part of May, the enemy invaded TARAKAN, RABAN and MIRI all of which fell into enemy hands in July.

Although the Air Force advised the Southern Army that it would be best to employ the entire strength of the Air Force in the operation around SINGAPORE, the Army did not agree considering that it was paramount to maintain the defense of the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA areas.

Further changes in the Operation Plan.

a. Although, prior to the outbreak of the OKINAWA Operation, the ranking officers of the Air Force of the SOUTHERN Army were in favor of transferring the greater part of its air strength to the HOMELAND for the decisive operation on an around JAPAN PROPER, this was not done. However, at the end of the OKINAWA Operation a large part of the air strength was transferred to the FORMOSA Area.

b. With the 80% of the air strength of the SOUTHERN Army being transferred to the FORMOSA Area, the operational plan of the SOUTHERN Army was altered so that the entire air strength left in this area would only concentrate for the decisive operation around SINGAPORE. In early part of July, the 55th Air Div. ceased training its air crews as the considerable strength of the 5th and the 106th Air Training Brigades was deployed to the MALAY and SUMATRA Areas.

Outline of the Operational Progress.

a. BURMA Area.

Rain-No notable activities.

b. BORNEO Area.

Although, few planes from the 10th Indep. Air Brig. attacked the enemy which invaded TERAKAN, RABAN and the MIRE ISLANDS, the enemy succeeded in middle of June to land on BALIKPAPAN. The Air Force ordered the 61st Air Regt. (Torpedo Attack Unit) which was assigned to the 7th Air Div. to attack enemy ships.

The 61st Air Regt. attacking enemy ships on 25 June in the area east of BALIKPAPAN sank five ships (including cruisers) and damaged three.

c. MALAY Area.

Because an enemy convoy was sighted off PHUKET in the latter part of July, the Air Force assigned the necessary air strength to the 55th Air Div. for the purpose of conducting an attack on this convoy.

On 25 July, our Special Attack planes sank two enemy ships.

d. Convoy Escorts.

The Air Force was assisting in transferring our personnel from ANDAMAN ISL, in transporting war materials between FRENCH INDO-CHINA and SINGAPORE and in withdrawing our force from the area north of AUSTRALILIA. During this period the air force sank several enemy submarine.

e. Transfer of the Air Strength.

1). As was mentioned before, from the latter part of June for a period of approx. one month the main body (fighters and light and heavy bombers) of the Air Force was transferred to FORMOSA. The 55th Air Div. was in charge of the entire transfer operation.

(Refer to insert Chart No. 2).

2). Approx. 900 technicians of the 55th Air Div. were sent to the HOMELAND.

D. Organization and Movement of the Air Units, from Feb. 1945 to the End of War.

1. Transfer of Units from the PHILIPPINE Area.

On March 1945, the following units were transferred from the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS to the following areas as reinforcements.

a. The 13th Air Brig.

The Air Brigade Hqs.

The 30th Fighter Unit (Model 1 fighter)

The 31st Fighter Unit (Model 1 fighter).

Each fighter Unit had several planes and an air crew of approx. 20 men. The Air Force assigned the two units to the 5th Air Div. However, because the reinforcement of planes to oversea air units were ceased, these two units were in May ordered to return to the PHILIPPINES.

b. The 204th Fighter Unit

This unit was reassigned to the 2nd Air Div. in May 1945.

c. The 15th Air Unit (Reconnaissance Plane).

2. Transfer of Air Units to FORMOSA.

The following units were transferred to FORMOSA in June 1945.

a. From the 5th Air Div.

The 25th Independent Air Brig.

The 13th Air Unit (fighters).

The 50th Air Unit (fighters).

The 204th Air Unit (fighters).

The 8th Air Unit (Light bombers).

b. From the 7th Air Div.

The 12th Air Unit. (Heavy bombers).

c. From the 9th Air Div.

The 26th Air Unit (fighter).

The 21st Air Unit (fighter).

The 71st Indep. Air Squadron (fighter).

d. From a Unit under Direct Command of the Air Force.

The 61st Air Unit (Torpedo Attack Planes).

E. Operational Progress.

(From June to the end of September 1944).

1. Outline of Operational Progress.

a. Because of the rainy season in the BURMA Area, operations were temporarily suspended and the main body of the air units in this area was transferred to a dry area for the purpose of recovering its fighting strength and check of planes.

As a large number of our skilled air men were either killed or wounded, unskilled men were sent to replace this loss. The new replacements were trained and instructed, especially in team air fighting.

In preparation for future operation, the fighters were loaded with explosives, light bombers were fitted with additional oil tanks and various types

of planes were equipped with fire extinguishers.

The Model 1 type three fighter developed from a Model 1 type two fighter and the Model four fighter developed from a model 1 fighter were produced. However, due to the shortage of planes the pilots, were not given sufficient time in which to properly train themselves to fly these new planes.

b. In the SUMATRA Area, the enemy attacked in the latter part of June our oil refinery installation at PANGKALANG BRANDAN, and inflicted slight damages.

A group of enemy B-29's attacked the oil refineries at PALEMBANG on the night of 10 Aug. and inflicted damages which required approx. three weeks to repair.

The enemy dropped magnetic mines in the MUSI RIVER and important waterway for our oil transports. Because of the lack of minesweepers this river was closed for traffic for several months.

In August and September, the enemy attacked CAR NICOBAR ISLAND. Orders to commence operation "SE" No. 2 was issued (refer to Appendix No. 1).

Immediately after our air strength assembled in the NORTHERN SUMATRA Area in August, the enemy fleet in the adjacent area retreated.

In September, the nine fighters, which were flying to CAR NICOBAR Is. under the command of 1st Lt. ABE, encountered enemy planes and an enemy fleet just prior to the arrival on the island.

The fighters shot down several enemy planes and sank two enemy ships and crippled several others.

In order to check the activities of enemy reconnaissance planes, from three to four fighters were always kept on CAR NICOBAR ISLAND.

c. The air units escorted oil tankers between SINGAPORE and PALAWAN, liners running along the NORTHERN COAST of BORNEO to the HOMELAND and transports carrying cement, in the area between BATANG and DJAKARTA.

The Air Force ordered the 9th Air Div. to reconnoiter the INDIAN OCEAN within a radius of 600 kilometers from SABANG on NORTHERN SUMATRA and MANA on SOUTHERN SUMATRA.

d. The air bases in NORTHERN FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND were ordered to complete their operational preparations as quickly as possible for it was learned that two enemy airborne Divs. had landed in the area southeast of YUNNAN

e. The 106th Air Training Brig. and the 1st Auxiliary Air Units were ordered to train a new air crew. Because the operational situation in the vicinity of the PHILIPPINES became quite serious in September, the 107th and the 108th Air Training Brig. of the SOUTHERN Army were transferred to the PHILIPPINES.

f. Three fighter units and one Indep. Air Squad. of the SOUTHERN Army were assigned to the 4th Air Force to assist in the operation on HALMAHERA and in the PHILIPPINES.

2. General Condition of Our Air Strength.

a. The 5th Air Div.

Three Fighter Units at one time were alternately stationed in BURMA, THAILAND and the SOUTHERN FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area for the purpose of training and gaining actual fighting experience.

One reconnaissance and one light bomber units were also stationed in this area. Each fighter unit had an effective strength of fifteen to sixteen fighters.

b. The 9th Air Div.

The 9th Air Div. kept four fighter units, one Indep. Air Squad. and one Air Reconnaissance Squad. in and around PALEMBANG for the main purpose of protecting the PALEMBANG Oil Refinery Installation.

In early part of August, there were approx. 110 planes in actual service in the PALEMBANG Area.

The division has deployed, one fighter unit at TANDJOENPURA for the main purpose of guarding the oil refineries at PANGKALANG BRANDAN. One heavy bomber squad. was separately stationed at ^BSARANG and MANA to patrol the INDIAN OCEAN within a range of 600 kilometers from these two points.

One fighter training sub-unit, under the direct command of the Air Force, was stationed at LAHAT. This unit could be employed in the air defense of PALEMBANG if such necessity should arise.

In addition, the 9th Air Div. deployed four anti-aircraft gun regiment (total over 120 guns) and one pom-pom gun unit (approx. 70 guns) at PALEMBANG and one anti-aircraft gun regiment (approx. 30 guns) and one pom-pom gun unit (approx. 20 guns) at BANDAN.

c. The 106th Air Training Brig.

The 106th Brig. had four fighter sub-units at BANDOENG, CHERIBON,

BOGOR and PRIGI and one heavy bomber sub-unit at KALIDJIATI.

d. The 109th Air Training Brig.

The 109th Brig. organized two fighter sub-units one at ALOR STAR, KUALA LUMPUR and a third sub-unit at SAIGON. The brigade also organized two Reconnaissance Sub-Units at TAIPING and one at KUALA (SUMATRA).

e. The 1st Auxiliary Air Units.

The 1st Auxiliary Air Unit deployed one fighter unit at TENGAH, one reconnaissance sub-unit at KAJANG, one heavy bomber sub-unit at IPOH and one heavy bomber sub-unit at KLUANG.

f. The Air Unit Under Direct Command of the Air Force.

The Heavy Bomber Unit was positioned separately at MEDANG and SEMBARANG. One Reconnaissance Unit was based on BORNEO.

One Air Transport Unit was organized and stationed at PAKAN BHARU (T.N.)

The Air Unit (approx. twenty heavy cargo planes) attached to the Air Force Hqs. was stationed at KALLANG; all above mentioned planes totalled approx. 1300 in all.

3. Employment of the Training and Auxiliary Units in the Operation.

The following operational plan was drawn up for employment of the Training and Auxiliary Units because-as was mentioned before-the strength of our operation units was insufficient and also because the main body of the 9th Air Div. being assigned to the sole duty of guarding PALEMBANG could not be transferred to other areas without the approval of Imp. Gen. Hqs. and because in addition the air units under direct command of the Air Force were exclusively employed as convoy escorts.

The Outline of the Plan:

Immediately after the following order is received, the units will stop training and will complete their operational preparation.

a. "KIKUKIKU" No. 1.

All training units will stop training and will complete their operational preparations within twelve hours. When order "KIKUKIKU" No. 2 is received the units will complete their preparations within twenty four hours.

b. "KAWA KAWA" No. 1.

Training units on JAVA will stop training and complete operational preparation within twelve hours.

When order "KAWA KAWA" No. 2 is received the units will complete their preparations within twenty-four hours.

c. SHIMA SHIMA No. 1.

Training Units on MALAY will stop training and will complete their operational preparations within twelve hours.

When order "SHIM^A SHIM^A" No. 2 is received the units will complete preparations within twenty four hours.

M.F. Operational Progress.

(From October 1944 to the End of February 1945.)

1. Outline of Operational Progress.

a. Because our land forces in the BURMA Area was unable to continue the operation as was planned, the situation in this area has become quite serious.

Despite the efforts of the 5th Air Div. fighting strength of the land forces could not be restored. During the days toward the end of 1944 Groups of enemy bombers began the systematic raids.

b. Because the situation in the PHILIPPINE Area became very serious, the areas adjacent to the PHILIPPINE Area, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and BORNEO had to be strengthened.

Orders to commence the "SHO" Operation, (decisive operation on the PHILIPPINE ISLAND) was issued in the latter part of October, and three fighter units and one independent air squadron under the command of the Air Force were transferred to the PHILIPPINE Area.

In early part of November, the 21st Air Unit which had been the only night air defense unit at PALEMBANG was transferred to the CELEBES Area for the purpose of attacking the enemy on MOROTAI ISLAND.

The Air Force deciding at this time to conduct special attacks by the entire operation and training planes made great efforts to improve and convert planes for special attacks.

c. Since the situation in the PHILIPPINE became extremely serious, it became necessary to reinforce the air strength in the FRENCH INDO-CHINA and the THAILAND Area. The main base of the 5th Air Div. was moved to the sector around PHNOM-PENH and KRAKOR and air bases were constructed along the MEKONG RIVER in the PAKSE Area (east front). Along the west front temporary air bases were constructed

at OUDON, UDON, BOMANG (TN.?), LOP BURI and NAKHONSAMAN.

Despite the lack of transport facilities our strength was deployed in the HAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area. TAUDY and PHET BURI, which until recently had been points of major importance, were abandoned.

d. Although the Army had repeatedly stressed the importance of maintaining the east front, the 5th Air Div. ignoring these warning concentrated its efforts on the west front. Because after the U.S. Task Force conducted air-raids on and in the area of SAIGON at the beginning of 1945, the enemy air units had been intensifying their activities and have been checking the movement of transports running between the Homeland and the SOUTHERN Area in the sector east of FRENCH INDO-CHINA, the 5th Air Div., realizing the surmounting danger along the east front, transferred the main body of its strength to the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Sector and established its Hq. at PHNOM-PENH.

e. MALAY, JAVA and the SUMATRA Areas.

The enemy air force gradually intensified its attack on the MALAY, JAVA and the SUMATRA Area, which so far had been comparatively safe from air attacks.

After B-29's reconnoitered SINGAPORE, the enemy attacked PORT SELETAR in early part of November. By the beginning of 1945, groups of B-29s had attacked this position several times.

The activities of the BRITISH Task Force have been quite noticeable in the INDIAN OCEAN Area. The BRITISH Task Force attacked MERRISSA and CARNICOBAR IS. in the latter part of October.

The oil refineries at PANGKALANG BRANDAN in late December and in early January, and twice attacked the oil refinery at PALEMBANG in the latter part of January inflicting heavy material losses on all these areas. During this period, from one to seven BRITISH planes have daily reconnoitered (occasionally bombed) the eastern sector of JAVA.

f. The BORNEO Area.

In Aug. 1944, the 4th Air Force took command of the operation in the area east of the line running north to south through NORTHERN BORNEO and MIRI. Jurisdiction over the entire area of NORTH BORNEO was given to the 4th Air Force in Sept. 1944. However, in December, this sector was reassigned to the 3rd Air Force. Also in December, the 10th Indep. Air Brig. was placed under the command of the 3rd Air Force. Because the 3rd Air Force was in charge of operations on two fronts (east and west) it was feared that the strength on the east front

which was too large would not be sufficient for conducting effective operation.

In order to complete operational preparations on the east front as quickly as possible the Air Force tried to develop the fighting strength of the 10th Indep. Air Brig., to complete the air bases and to establish the communication system. However, because these efforts failed to materialize because of the shortage of ships, labor and material in this area, attempts to complete the operational preparations on the east front were given up.

It was later decided that the vicinity of SINGAPORE should be strengthened and that a key position be established at KUCHING located in WESTERN BORNEO.

2. Amendment to the "SE" Operational Plan. (Explained in Appendix No. 1. Amendment were made for the following reasons.

Several fighter units of the 3rd Air Force were transferred to the PHILIPPINE Area.

The strategical value of the SOUTHWESTERN COAST of BURMA had decreased because of the situation in the INDIA-BURMA Areas.

Naval Air Strength in the SOUTHERN Area was transferred to the HOMELAND. Experience from past operations necessitated drawing of a new plan.

The following is an outline of the amendment.

- a. The amendment was made because of the decrease in the air strength.
- b. Because of the losses in the Naval air strength, the Army Air Force which had until ~~now~~ been attacking enemy transports will hereafter concentrate its attack on enemy task forces especially on enemy carriers.
- c. The Air Force will attempt to assault and annihilate the enemy in one attack, preserving its own fighting strength as much as possible.
- d. The limitation of activities of the fighter unit in charge of the air defense of PALEMBANG was lifted by the order from Imp. Gen. Hqs. and the 9th Air Div. Cmdr. will be now free to employ this fighter unit in other areas if an urgent situation arises.

3. Organization and Movement of Units.

a. Transfer of the 107th and the 108th Air Training Brigs.

1). In middle of September, the 107th and the 108th Air Training Brigs. were transferred from the PHILIPPINE Area (4th Air Force) to the

area under the command of the 3rd Air Force. In early part of October both brigades were officially assigned to this Air Force.

The Air Force deployed the 107th Air Training Brig. to the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area and the 108th Air Training Brig. to SUMATRA.

2). Deployment of the 107th Air Training Brig.

(a). Organization and Deployment.

The Hqs. of the 107th Air Training Brig. was established at PHNOM PENH.

The second air training unit (twin engine, senior class training planes) was positioned at PHNOM PENH and the third air training unit (Army Reconnaissance plane) at TAIPING.

The 12th Air Training Unit (Model 1 senior class training planes).

The 7th Advance Air Training Unit (Model 3 fighters) was deployed to TAVOY.

(Note: The 8th Advance Air Training Unit (positioned at SAIGON) was placed under the command of the 107th Air Training Brig.).

Because the ships on which a part of the 107th Air Training Brig. (mainly composed of a ground crew) was being transported from the PHILIPPINE Area, was sunk, the Brigade suffered greatly in ground service, which was brought up to the normal strength only after lapse of four months.

(b). With the changes in the situation, the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area became the main operational area of the 5th Air Div. The deployment of the 107th Air Training Brig. to this area hindered the activities of the 5th Air Div., and eventually the units of this brigade were transferred in November to the following locations in MALAY.

Hqs.- IPOH

Second Air Training Unit - KECHIL (T.N.?)

Third Air Training Unit - TAIPING.

12th Air Training Unit - ALOR STAR.

The 7th Advance Air Training Unit (Model 3 fighter) was advanced to ^{AL}PELEMBANG ~~for the purpose~~ ^{for the purpose} of strengthening the air defense there.

This unit was placed under the command of the 9th Air Div. Cmdr. and was named the "HIEN" fighter unit.

3). Organization and Deployment of the 108th Air Training Brig.

The 31st Training Unit (Model 1 Senior Class Training Plane)
NORTHERN SUMATRA.

The 32nd Air Training Unit (Model 1 senior class training plane) - NORTHERN SUMATRA.

The 43rd Air Training Unit (Model 1 Senior class training plane) - NORTHERN SUMATRA.

The 15th Air Training Unit (Model 100 2 ER "DINAH") - NORTHERN SUMATRA.

(Note: The 15th Air Training Unit composed of several fighters was organized by the 3rd Air Force.

Almost the entire strength of the 108th Air Training Brig. was annihilated by the enemy while being transferred to the NORTHERN SUMATRA (KWALA). When the remaining strength of the brigade was assembled in NORTHERN SUMATRA (KUALA) it was found impossible to recover its full strength and on 31 Dec. 1944, it was reassigned to its original station.

b. Transfer of Units to the PHILIPPINE Area.

In late part of October an order to commence the SHO Operation (PHILIPPINE Decisive Operation) was issued. The following units of the 3rd Air Force were transferred to the PHILIPPINE Area (refer to Inserted Chart No. 3.)

1). From the 5th Air Div.

The 204th Air Regt. (approx. 25 Model 1 fighters).

2). From the 9th Air Div.

The 26th Air Unit (25 Model 1 fighters).

The 33rd Air Unit (23 Model 1 fighters).

The 24th Indep. Air Squad. (12 Model 1 fighters).

c. Transfer of Air Units from the PHILIPPINE Area.

1). In middle December (?) the 24th Indep. Air Squad. was reassigned to the 9th Air Div. and was stationed at BAJO (T.N.) Airfield.

2). In late December (?) the 26th Air Unit (several Planes) and the 33rd Air Unit (four planes) were reassigned to the 9th Air Div.

However, owing to certain circumstances, these units were stationed on KALLANG Airfield at SINGAPORE and placed under direct command of the 3rd Air Force.

d. Organization of the 55th Air Div.

The Hqs. of the 55th Air Div. was formed at the end of 1944 and entered in the 3rd Air Forces order of battle on 1 Jan. 1945.

The 106th, 107th and the 109th Air Training Brigs. were placed under the command of the 55th Air Div.

The 55th Div. Hqs. was established on SINGAPORE ISLAND.

e. The 2nd and the 7th Air Div.s.

The 7th Air Div. was placed under the direct command of the 3rd Air Force at 0000 of 1 Jan. 1945, at the same time as operational instructions were issued to the 2nd Air Div.

1). The 7th Air Div. was stationed on CELEBES and its Hqs. was located at MAKASSAR, its organization and the strength being as follows:

The 70th Indep. Air Sqd. (effective strength - three type 100 ZER "DINAH").

The 73rd Indep. Air Sqd. (effective strength - Six Army Reconnaissance planes).

The 12th Air Unit (effective strength:
Five type 97 heavy bombers);

The 3rd Air Force ordered the 7th Air Div. to retreat to JAVA for recovery of its fighting strength and to take the charge of the operation in the area of JAVA and east of SOUTHERN BORNEO. The operational activities of the 106th Air Training Brig. were directed by the 7th Air Div.

The following is an outline of the deployment of the 7th Air Div. on JAVA.

Hqs. - MALANG.

70th Indep. Air Sqd. - MALANG

73rd Indep. Air Sqd. - KLATEN.

12th Air Unit - KALIDJATI.

The following are the duties of the 7th Air Div.

a). To carry out air operations in the areas of JAVA and east of SOUTHERN BORNEO.

b). To assist the 16th Army in the defense of JAVA.

However, owing to certain circumstances, these units were stationed on KALLANG Airfield at SINGAPORE and placed under direct command of the 3rd Air Force.

d. Organization of the 55th Air Div.

The Hqs. of the 55th Air Div. was formed at the end of 1944 and entered in the 3rd Air Forces order of battle on 1 Jan. 1945.

The 106th, 107th and the 109th Air Training Brigs. were placed under the command of the 55th Air Div.

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70th Indep. Air Sqd. - MALANG

73rd Indep. Air Sqd. - KLATEN.

12th Air Unit - KALIDJATI.

The following are the duties of the 7th Air Div.

a). To carry out air operations in the areas of JAVA and east of SOUTHERN BORNEO.

b). To assist the 16th Army in the defense of JAVA.

c). To escort convoys.

d). To carry out operations at anytime if ordered by the 3rd Air Force.

e). Duties of the 2nd Air Div.

Because the communication between the 3rd Air Force and the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS had been almost completely cut off, no detailed information about the 2nd Air Div., which was deployed in the SOUTHERN Sector of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, had been received.

f. Organization and Movements of Other Units.

1). In November 1944, the 25th Air Brig. Hqs. arrived from the HOMELAND and was assigned to the 5th Air Div. (The 25th Air Brig. was at first stationed at HANOI for the purpose of strengthening the area of NORTHERN FRENCH INDO-CHINA, and was later transferred to SAIGON, as an Indep. Air Brig. assigned duty of carrying out the operations in the vicinity of SAIGON).

2). Transfer of the 21st Air Unit.

In later part of November, 28 planes of the 21st Air Unit (Model 2, two seater fighter; the only night fighter unit in PALEMBANG) advanced to CELEBES and was placed under the command of the 7th Air Div. for the purpose of attacking the enemy base on MOROTAI ISLAND.

The 21st Air Unit made several night attacks on MOROTAI ISLAND and obtained considerable results. On 22 Jan. 1945, the 21st Air Unit returned to PALEMBANG and was reassigned to the 9th Air Div.

3). In early part of December, the 58th Air Unit was placed under the direct command of the 3rd Air Force (part of the unit was stationed at SINGAPORE and the mainbody at MEDANG) in preparation against enemy attacks on the east and west fronts and for the purpose of escorting convoys in the adjacent areas. During this period, a light bomber unit of the 1st Auxiliary Air Unit was assigned to the 9th Air Div.

4). The 51st Air Unit (approx. 20 Model 4 heavy bombers) which arrived from the HOMELAND in middle December was positioned on SHANGI Airfield at SINGAPORE.

5). The 13th Air Unit (approx. 10 Model 1 fighters) was transferred from the PHILIPPINE Area to SINGAPORE to recover its fighting strength.

After a brief stay at SINGAPORE, the unit was assigned to the 5th Air Div. to serve as convoy escorts. (This unit was positioned at PHNOM PENH and KOMPONG THOM).

6). In January 1945, the 109th Air Unit (approx. 10 Model 100 Transport Planes) was transferred from PAKAMBAR to SAIGON and placed under the direct command of the 3rd Air Force.

4. Outline of Operations in Various Areas.

a. The 5th Air Div.

1). The Strength of the 5th Air Div. in October.

As was mentioned before, the Air Force assembled all available personnel and material in an attempt to recover its fighting strength by taking advantage of the lull during the rainy season.

However, because of the loss of its skilled air crew sent to the HOMELAND and due to the lack of material especially planes and because the confusion caused by the conversion of planes, (Model 4 fighters and Model 100 type 3 Reconnaissance plane from Model 100 "ER "DINAH") which necessitated training of pilots for these newly converted planes, the extent of recovery fell far short of the expectation and while, heretofore, a fighter unit was composed of 43 planes, this number was now down to approx. 20 planes in each unit.

Effective Strength of Each Unit was as follows:

The 8th Air Unit (Model 99 light bombers).

12 - 13 planes.

The 50th Air Unit (Model 4 fighter).

Approx. 20 planes (included Model 1 fighters). ~~12~~

The 64th Air Unit (Model 1 fighter).

Approx. 20 planes.

The 204th Air Unit (Model 1 fighter).

Approx. 20 planes.

The 81st Air Unit (Model 100 ZER "DINAH").

Approx. 10 planes.

2). Assisting the BURMA Area Army.

With the passing of the monsoon season in this area, the main body of the 5th Air Div. assisted the land force in the BURMA Area by conducting reconnaissance, air attacks, transportation of ammunition and provisions etc. Nevertheless, our losses were far greater than the enemies.

3); Attacks on Light Enemy Coast Defense Ships in the Area Along the SOUTHWESTERN COAST of BURMA.

Since the passing of the monsoon season, a BRITISH Coast Defense Fleet have been quite active along the SOUTHWESTERN COAST of BURMA.

The situation of our land force in BURMA became quite serious for the BRITISH Fleet began landing small groups of men along the coast diverting the attention of our forces from the main points of its operation by occasionally firing on the flanks and rear of our forces.

The 5th Air Div. made surprise attacks on the BRITISH Fleet whenever a favorable opportunity arose.

4). Counterattacks and Attacks on Enemy Air Bases.

Since it became impossible to attack the enemy air bases on a large scale, the 5th Air Div. began conducting a small scale attack of their own on enemy air bases during the period in which our land force needed no special assistance.

Since the reinforcements^{at} of planes ceased coming from the HOME-
LAND the air strength was preserved in the following way. Counterattacks were not carried out, unless satisfactory results were assured and the planes were dispersed and sheltered. A large number of POM-POM Guns and machine guns (taken from planes) were set up around the airfield to counterattack the low flying enemy planes. With these two weapons at our disposal an average of 30 enemy planes were shot down monthly.

5). The Air Defense at Points of Strategic Value and Convoy Escorts.

Since enemy activities in the east front had increased considerably, the 5th Air Div. which had up until now stressed its efforts on the air defense of the RANGOON Area shifted the point of importance to the SAIGON Area.

The Air Force ordered the Cmdr. of the 5th Air Div. to take charge of the 8th Advance Training Unit (over 10 Model 4 and Model 1 fighters) at SAIGON. This unit was responsible for the air defense of SAIGON and for the escorting of convoys in the area around CAP ST. JACQUES.

A U.S. Task Force attacked the air bases at SAIGON in January 1945. Constant air patrols by an enemy Air Base Unit necessitated escorting the transports in the area along the EASTERN COAST of FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

The main body of the 5th Air Div. was transferred to the PHNOM PENH Area and the 50th Air Unit was positioned at SAIGON for the purpose of escorting convoys in the area of CAP ST. JACQUES and the EASTERN COAST of FRENCH INDO-CHINA and for the air defense of SAIGON.

b. The 9th Air Div.

1). The "SE" Operation and the Defense of the Oil Fields in SUMATRA.

a). When an enemy task force attacked CAR NICOBAR and TERESIA Is., the Air Force issued an order to commence "SE" Operation and the commander of the 9th Air Div. advanced to MEDANG.

The fighter unit (lead by ABE) of the 1st Auxiliary Air Unit attacked an enemy task force off CAR NICOBAR Is. and sank two and crippled one ship. Beside this from four to five enemy planes were shot down.

The following strength participated in this attack:

The 58th Air Unit - 12 heavy bombers.

The 1st Auxiliary Air Unit.

Fighter Unit - nine planes

Reconnaissance Unit - four planes

Light Bomber Unit - Six planes

Heavy Bomber Unit - Six planes

The 17th Indep. Air Sqd. - 12 fighters.

The 74th Indep. Air Sqd. - four reconnaissance planes.

The 33rd Air Unit - 21 fighters.

TOTAL - 74 planes.

b). From 30 to 40 enemy carrier borne planes attacked the oil refinery installation at PANGKALANG BRANDAN and installations and equipments at BERAWAN HARBOR.

At the same time as the air force issued the order to commence "SE" Operation, the Cmdr. of the 9th Air Div. ordered an immediate counterattack on the above enemy planes.

Because of darkness, the assault unit which took off to attack the enemy task force sighted in the area west of SUMATRA by the reconnaissance planes earlier in the day, was unable to locate the enemy.

c). The Air Defense Unit at PANGKALANG BRANDAN shot down

four and crippled over 10 of the 60 enemy carrier borne planes which attacked the oil refinery installation at PANGKALANG BRANDAN.

Hardly any results were obtained in the "SE" Operation.

The Air Strength which participated in the "SE" Operation were as follows:

The 58th Air Unit - 10 heavy bombers.

The 1st Auxiliary Air Unit.

The Recon. Plane Unit 0 three planes.

The light Bomber Unit - Six Planes

The 71st Indep. Air Sqd. - 12 planes.

The 74th Indep. Air Sqd. - four type 100 SER "DINAH".

TOTAL - 39 planes.

d). On 24 and 29 January approx. 100 enemy carrier borne planes attacked and inflicted considerable damage on the oil refinery installation at PALEMBANG (Refer to Appendix No. 2). Remarkable results were obtained in the counterattack on the above mentioned enemy planes by the entire air and ground strength of our 9th Air Div.

C. Situation in the MALAY Area (The 55th Air Div.).

Until the first large scale attack by B-29's on SINGAPORE in early part of November the enemy had frequently reconnoitered the MALAY Area especially SINGAPORE. There have been several large scale enemy attacks since the above mentioned attack on SINGAPORE.

In preparation against enemy attacks on SINGAPORE The Air Force took command of the 1st Auxiliary Air Units (effective strength approximately 10 planes) and the 17th Advance Air Trng. Units (effective strength approximately 10 fighters). In cooperation with the Naval Air Units (five to ten fighters) the above mentioned units counterattacked enemy B-29's, without achieving, however, any substantial results. For the purpose of intercepting B-29's flying to and from SINGAPORE, several type 2 fighters were assigned to the air training unit in the MALAY Area.

D. Situation in the JAVA Area (The 106th Ind. Air Training Brig.)

1. Since considerable damage was received from an enemy task force which attacked MALANG Airfield in May 1944(?), the air force concentrated its efforts on the dispersing and sheltering the planes and on the employment of anti-aircraft weapons against enemy planes.

2. Some of our planes from an air base in the Eastern JAVA Area daily conducted attacks and carried out patrols. Enemy reconnaissance planes occasionally appeared in the central JAVA Area.

3. Because of the shortage of operational strength the Air Force was unable to keep a regular operational unit in the JAVA Area.

The Air Force assigned several fighter (No. 1 type fighters) to the 26th Air Trng. Unit at MALANG for the purpose of intercepting enemy planes.

The 106th Indep. Air Trng. Brig. temporarily suspended training, whenever there were indications of an enemy attack.

F. Situation in the BORNEO Area (the 10th Indep. Air Brig.).

1. As the defense of NORTHERN BORNEO had been assigned to the 4th Air Force from August to December the 3rd Air Force had no detailed information on the situation and operational preparations in this area during this period. It was found however when the defense of NORTHERN BORNEO was reassigned to the 3rd Air Force, that the operational preparations were far from being completed. Therefore the Air Force started to: (1) set up a communication system in this area; (2) collect necessary amount of ammunition and fuel; (3) reinforce the air strength and (4) improve the facilities for repairing damaged planes.

However, the abovementioned operational preparations could not be carried out effectively because of poor transportation facilities in this area, lack of local material and industrial installations, and the insufficient number of reinforcement planes from the Homeland.

All supplies, materials and planes (approx. 10 type 2 twin seater fighters) from the Homeland were assigned to the 10th Indep. Air Brig. to strengthen the defenses in the NORTHERN BORNEO Area.

~~XX~~
2. The Hq. of the 10th Indep. Air Brig., which was at first stationed ~~XX~~ at JESSELTON, and the 83rd Air Unit were transferred to the WESTERN BORNEO Area.

The transfers were still taking place at the time of the surrender because of delays caused by poor sea transportation facilities in this area.

3. Outline of the Operation of the 10th Indep. Air Brig.

The 10th Indep. Air Brig. assigned for the duty of escorting transports to the sector along NORTHERN BORNEO were attached to the 83rd Air Unit (part of Army recon. planes, model 2 twin seater fighters and direct cooperation air strength; total over 10 planes).

G. Other Operational Movements.

Whenever convoys sailed from MALAY to THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA, from MALAY to SUMATRA or from MALAY to JAVA and in other areas, the Air Force ordered its subordinate units (namely the 9th Air Div.) and the 1st Auxiliary Air Units) to escort the convoys in their respective areas.

G H. Outline of the Operational Progress between March 1945 to the End of War.

1. The 5th Air Div.

a. With the development of the land operation in the BURMA Area, the BURMA Sector Army requested the SOUTHERN Army to assign the entire ground unit of the Air Force in the BURMA Area to its command. The SOUTHERN Army assigned two airfield battalions and two to three airfield companies to the BURMA Sector Army but refused all other requests, for the SOUTHERN Army was well aware of the fact that without the Air Force in the BURMA Area it would be impossible to defend the whole east front in this theatre.

b. The enemy land forces which were composed mainly of mechanized brigades and which captured MEIKTILA in late part of February has been steadily advancing southward along the road running from PYINMANA through TOUNGGO to RANGOON.

An enemy force occupied the city of RANGOON on 3 May.

The 5th Air Div. frequently attacked the above mentioned enemy land forces (composed mostly of Mechanized Brigades) and obtained good results. However, our force was unable to influence the outcome of the operation in the BURMA Area because of insufficient strength.

c. The main body of our fighter units was employed in escorting of oil tankers to the HOMELAND. U.S. Planes from the air bases in the PHILIPPINES frequently interfered with the activities of our oil tankers. After convoy J-88 was annihilated off BAIE DE CAMRANH in later part of March, Imp. Gen. Hqs. stopped the transportation of oil to the HOMELAND.

2. The 9th Air Div.

a. Enemy "MOSQUITO" fighters have often appeared over the SINGAPORE Area since March (?). From the observation of their return route it was estimated that the "MOSQUITO" fighter base was located on COCO Is. The aerial photograph taken of COCO Is. by our heavy bombers revealed a newly constructed airfield there.

b. Owing to the wide dispersal of oil refinery equipment and because the oil was no longer being sent to the HOMELAND, the value of the PALEMBANG Oil Refinery Installation dropped considerably and the Imp. Gen. Hqs. permitted the employment of fighter planes at PALEMBANG for other purposes in other areas.

c. The Cruiser "HAGURO" and the destroyer "KAMIKAZE" were employed in the transportation of personnel from ANDAMAN Is. The Cruiser "HAGURO" was sunk at a point off PENANG at night action by a BRITISH Fleet.

d. As the enemy submarines have been recently operating freely in the vicinity of SUMATRA, anti-submarine attack units (two to three reconnaissance planes to each unit) were positioned at SIBOLGA and TANDJOENGGARANG for the purpose of checking the enemy submarine activities.

3. The 55th Air Div.

a. The 55th Air Div., which was assigned the duty of training air crew have recently been participating in active operations. In June the training assignment was completely ceased and operational duties were assigned to this Air Div.

b. In preparation for the decisive operation around SINGAPORE, three airfield companies at JAVA and SUMATRA were transferred to SOUTHERN MALAY.

c. Three enemy submarines were sunk in the STRAIT of MALACCA by our planes which had been constantly patrolling this sector.

d. In late part of July, a part of a BRITISH Oversea Patrol Group which appeared off PHUKET Is. landed some troops on this island for the purpose of reconnaissance. TOKUNAGA formation attacked this oversea patrol Group and sank two ships.

4. The 7th Air Div.

a. The 7th Air Div. was engaged in escorting the transports carrying Army personnels from the areas north of AUSTRALIA. The Air Division sank two enemy submarines in the STRAIT of LOMBOK and shot down and crippled several enemy B-24s at MAKASSAR.

b. The enemy, which attacked NORTHERN BORNEO in April, landed in BALIKPAPAN in middle of June.

The Air Force assigned the mainbody of the 61st Air Regt. to the 7th Air Div. The Cmr. of the 7th Air Div. ordered eight planes equipped with torpedoes to attack the enemy force which landed on BALIKPAPAN.

The above mentioned eight planes attacked BALIKPAPAN on the even of 25 June and sank five ships including cruisers crippling three others. In this operation we lost two planes.

c. The 7th Air Div. was reassigned to the CELEBES Area. The 106th Air Training Brig. was assigned the duty of conducting operations in the JAVA Area.

5. The 10th Indep. Air Brig.

a. In April, several Army Reconnaissance planes and several planes of the 61st Air Regt. attacked enemy airfield at PUERTO PRINCESA on PALAWAN Is.

b. Several of our planes in early part of June attacked enemy forces at JESSELTON and RABAN and in latter part of June the enemy force at MIRI.

Outline of the "SE" Operational Plan.

1. Purpose.

The strength of the BRITISH Naval Group around CEYLON Is. was estimated to be consisting of one to two carriers, two to three battleships, three to four heavy light cruisers and six to twelve destroyers.

A small task force with a carrier or carriers from the above mentioned BRITISH Naval Group has been making sorties in the sea west of the SOUTHERN Army Area on an average once a month. For the purpose of counterattacking this enemy task force a separate plan was drawn up in July.

2. Designation of Operations.

a. "SE" Operation No. 1.

Counterattack will be made on the enemy force which attempts to land on the SOUTHWESTERN Coast of BURMA.

b. "SE" Operation No. 2.

Counterattack will be made on the enemy force which operates in the INDIAN OCEAN Area in coordination with the U.S. Forces in the PHILIPPINE Area trying to divert our attention and attempting to invade ANDAMAN, NICOBAR and NORTHERN SUMATRA.

The counterattack on the enemy force which attempts to occupy ANDAMAN Is. will be referred to as the Special "SE" Operation No. 2., others will be referred to as the General "SE" Operation No. 3.

c. "SE" Operation No. 3.

Counterattack enemy which attempts to land on MALAY PENINSULA.

3. Operational Strength.

a. "SE" Operation No. 1.

The 3rd Air Div.

Three Fighter Units.

One Light Bomber Unit.

One Reconnaissance Unit (Type 100 ZER "DINAH").


b. Special "SE" Operation No. 2.

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Inserted Map No. 1
Protection of the Traversing Transport Vessels in French Indo China
(to be inserted here)

INSERTED MAP NO. 1

OUTLINE:

1. Air Superiority Above The Anchorage
2. Direct Protection Against Airplanes And Submarines In The Day (Always With The Whole Force)
3. Fighters Should Be Equipped With Bombs.



NOTE:
 THE PROTECTION OF THE TRAVERSING TRANSPORT VESSELS OF FRENCH INDO CHINA WILL BE CONTINUALLY CARRIED OUT AND WILL GENERALLY DEPEND UPON THIS OUTLINE....


LEGEND:
 ○ SHIP
 ✕ ARMY AIRPLANE

Vol. 79
Inserted Map No. 2
June 1945
Transfer of Strength to Taiwan After the Okinawa Operation
(To be inserted here)

Vol. 79
Inserted Map No. 3
Transfer of Strength of the Philippine Operation
Oct. 1944
(To be inserted here)

INSERTED MAP NO.3

**TRANSFER OF STRENGTH OF THE
PHILIPPINE OPERATION
IN OCTOBER 1944**



One Fighter Unit.

One Heavy Bomber Unit.

One Light Bomber Unit.

c. General "SE" Operation No. 2.

The 9th Air Div.

One Fighter Unit and two Indep. Air Sqdn.

One Light Bomber Unit.

One Heavy Bomber Unit.

An element of an Indep. Air Reconnaissance Sqdn.

d. "SE" Operation No. 3.

Two Fighter Units and two Indep. Air Sqdn.

One Heavy Bomber Unit and One Indep. Air Sqdn.

One Reconnaissance Unit.

4. Preparations.

From the airfields, located in areas where enemy attacks are anticipated, a main airfield must be selected.

Upon receiving the aforementioned code (Pg. 53) each subordinate units will be in Cmr. of the operations:

a. "SE" Operation No. 1. - 5th Air Div. Cmr.

b. General and Special "SE" Operation No. 2. - The 9th Air Div. Cmr.

c. "SE" Operation No. 3. - Air Force Cmr.

When General "SE" Operation No. 2 is to be conducted, the "SA" Assault Unit will be organized and being assigned to the direct command of the Air Force will be stationed at SUNGAI PAHANI. (The Cmr. of the 1st Auxiliary Air Unit will be placed in command of this Assault Unit).

2); The air section of the Air Force Hqs. the 109th Air Unit (Transport. Unit) and the 16th Air Training Unit (heavy bombers) will be employed in the transporting of ground crews.

3). Main Operational Airfields.

SUMATRA Area:

MEDAN, KUALA, LEOKSEUMAWA, BIREUDEN, SIGLI, LOETARADJA and

CAR NICOBAR.

MALAY Area:

ALOR STAR, SUNGAI PAHANI, KECHIR (T.N.?) and IPOH.

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Appended Map No. 1


"SE ICHIGO" Operation (NO. 1) Oct. 1944

(To be inserted here)

"SE ICHIGO" OPERATION (NO.1)

OCTOBER 1944

APPENDED MAP NO.1



X
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Appended Map No. 2


"SE NIGO" Operation (No. 1) Sept. 1944

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"SE NIGO" OPERATION

APPENDED MAP
NO. 2

(NO. 1 SEPTEMBER 1944)




31

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Appended Map No. 3
"SE SANGO" Operation (No. 1) Sept. 1944
(To be inserted here)

"SE SANGO" OPERATION

(NO. 1 SEPTEMBER 1944)

APPENDED MAP NO. 3



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4). Communication.

a). Operational Communication Relay Points will be established at SUNGAI PATANI and MEDAN. The Liason Communication Relay Point will be established at PALEMBANG and KLUANG. SINGAPORE will be the location of the central communication relay point for the entire communication network.

b). Wire Communication Network will be laid between SINGAPORE and SUNGAI PATANI and Between SINGAPORE and each airfield at NORTHERN SUMATRA.

5). Intelligence.

Intelligence on enemy situation will be obtained mainly from the BURMA Area Army and Navy.

6). Outline of the Disposition of Our Strength (Refer to Charts No. 1 to 3.).

APPENDIX NO. 2

Damage on the BELINJOE Oil Refinery Installation and Its Effects .

Chief of Staff - KAMIGASA. 17 July 1946.

1. Preface.

The following report on Fuel Depots, was written from Memory, for all reference material and data had been burnt at the time of the surrender.

2. Date, type and number of enemy planes which bombed the BELINJOE Oil Refinery Installation.

a. 1st Time - Night of 10 Aug. 1944 Approx. nine to twelve B-29s.

b. 2nd Time - 24 Jan 1945 Approx. 40 to 60 Carrier Borne Bombers.

(Accompanied by approx. 100 fighters).

c. 3rd Time - 20 Jan 1945.

Approx. 40 to 60 Carrier Borne Bomber (accompanied by approx. 100 fighters).

3. Damage Suffered and Its Effects.

a. 1st Time.

The fuel tank of the Oil Refinery Installation was destroyed. No other damages were inflicted on production equipments.

Enemy planes dropped mines into the MUSI RIVER, the waterway of our oil tankers. These mines made it impossible for our oil tankers to transport oil stored at BELINJOE to SINGAPORE.

The ~~S~~^SMATRA Branch of the 3rd Shipping transport Hqs. made great efforts to clear the river of mines.

Because, there were some mines (magnetic time mine) which could not be destroyed, the river was not cleared of mines until late in October. After October three of our ships were sunk by mines which had been overlooked.

For this reason, the Air Force sent the remaining ships to BERAWAN and PANGKALANG BRANDAN in NORTHERN SUMATRA to transport oil from these two points to SINGAPORE.

Because enemy submarine were very active in the STRAIT of MALACCA, our planes constantly patrolled this STRAIT.

Although, there were sufficient amount of oil stored at SINGAPORE to supply both the SOUTHERN Army and the HOMELAND, studies were made of other waterways which could be used by oil tankers, in preparation for future operations.

After 40 POM-POM Guns were received from the HOMELAND and other areas, the 9th Air Div. which had been in charge of the Air Defense of the BOLINJON Oil Refinery Installation was assigned the additional duty of defending the MUSI Oil Transportation Waterway.

2. 2nd Time.

a. One topping² equipment was completely wrecked and another topping and a cracking distillation equipment and the power plant was slightly damaged. An oil storage tank and an operation tank were also damaged by the 70 to 80 bombs which were dropped on the 1st Oil Refinery Plant.

b. No damages were caused to the 2nd Oil Refinery Plant.

Note: An ~~enemy~~^{SEVEN} task force with three carriers appeared in the area south of MANA. (WESTERN Coast of the PALEMBANG Area) and from 30 to 70 carrier borne planes from this task force passed over BANAUMEER and attacked interior of SUMATRA.

These enemy planes attacked the 2nd Oil Refinery Installation as described under the item "The 3rd Time".

Because of bad weather our Special Attack Planes were unable to sight these planes.

3. 3th Time.

a. Approx. 100 bombs were dropped on the 2nd Oil Refinery Plant.

Both the oil storage tank and the operation tank were severely damaged.

b. No damages were inflicted on the 1st Oil Refinery Installation.

4. Because of damages suffered in the last two enemy attacks, both the 1st and the 2nd Oil Refinery Plant were unable to operate for a length of time.

Within two weeks after the last attack the plants were operating on a small scale. The output rose to 1/3 of the output prior to the attack by late March and to 1/2 by May.

Although there were reserve materials and parts with which to repair damages they were preserved for the future needs and damaged materials and parts were repaired and used.

The SOUTHERN Army began establishing Small Oil Refinery Installations (Referred to as the "Battlefield" Oil Refinery Installation) at various points. Shortly before the surrender these simple oil refinery Installations at PALEMBANG, DIAMBI and BLANGMOLL were ready to operate.

The oil supply from these "Battlefield Oil Refinery Installations and the BELINJOE Oil Refinery Installation would have been sufficient to supply the entire SOUTHERN Army.

Moreover, there were considerable oil stored at SINGAPORE and PALEMBANG.

During this period, JAPAN did not suffer as much from the oil shortage as from the poor transport facilities.

We were fairly sure that a temporary halt in the operation of these oil refinery installations would not seriously affect the Air Army Operation up to the end of war.

It was estimated though that the enemy attack on PALEMBANG, the strategic point in the SOUTHERN Area, scoring a great success for the enemy would at the same time greatly affect the JAPANESE Army and the Nation will continue the fight.

NOTE: The Special Attack Unit (Six IJHF Heavy bombers) which took off towards the sea south of MANA just after the enemy's third attack failed to return, and the result of their exploits is unknown.

II. Matters Pertaining to the Repairs and Maintenance of Aircraft.

A. From June 1944 to the End of the War.

1. The 3rd Air Army had hoped to recover greater part of its strength during the rainy season (from June to the end of Sept.) in BURMA Area with the replacements of aircrafts from JAPAN. However, contrary to expectation, the supply of fighter planes was very poor (it must be remembered that the supply of aircrafts, including the training planes, was approx. 50 to 100 at that time) and could not fully replenish the operational combat strength. Furthermore, the alteration of the type of aircrafts (to be related later), their repairs, and the maintenance were not carried out as efficiently as was expected, and the 3rd Air Army was forced to carry out subsequent operations after the rainy season with insufficiently restored combat strength.

2. After the rainy season, the JAPANESE Army rushed the operational preparations in the PHILIPPINE Area and had further cut down the supply of aircrafts, especially of operational planes to this Air Army's area, delivering only about ten fighter planes and few other operational planes monthly. Consequently, in order to be able to maintain the fighting strength of a combat unit the Air Army gradually transferred the aircrafts, which were held by the Instruction Unit for training purposes to the 1st Operational Unit.

3. As stated above, with the decrease in the operational fighting strength, even the training planes had to be used for the operations. Based on the operational requirement, all aircrafts held by the Army (except reconnaissance and transport) were converted into special attack planes. The total number of aircrafts held by the 3rd Air Army around Oct. was 1,300 - 1,400 (most of these were training planes). The conversion of these planes was a great task and the greater part of the capacity of the Repair Depot was used for this purpose.

The conversion of the above planes to special attack planes was started in the latter part of October 1944, and was finally completed about June 1945.

4. After the completion of the PHILIPPINE Operation, scores of aircraft (mainly fighters) arrived in Feb. 1945, and the 3rd Air Army was somewhat encouraged. However, since that time no more planes except for several reconnaissance planes were sent from the Homeland ~~at~~ all the end of the war.

5. Although, with the progress of operations and with the increased responsibility involving the defense of PALEMBANG oil refinery zone and the Air Defense of SINGAPORE, the 3rd Air Army experienced a difficulty in replenishing its combat strength, especially that of 9th Air Div. and the SINGAPORE Air Defense Unit still it was able with a few planes sent from JAPAN and with some reconditional^{ed} planes. To keep up its combat strength the 9th Air Div. at one time was in possession of more than 110 fighter planes.

B. Supply of Training Planes.

1. Supply of training planes from the Homeland.

While the supply of combat planes was rather poor the supply of training planes from JAPAN was comparatively good and each unit had approx. 30 - 40 of those planes. However, the greater part of these planes was slightly used so that the actual number of planes suitable for operations was ^{on the average} 15 - 20 per unit. As stated previously, ~~on the average~~ training planes were converted into special attack planes.

C. Alteration of Type of Planes.

About May 1944, the question of the alteration of planes came up and as a result of various discussion with the higher authorities, the following plan was adopted:

1. The units that will convert their planes to type 4: 50th Air Regt., 24th Air Company, 87th Air Regt. and 3rd Air Regt.
2. The units that will convert their planes to type 1 model III fighter: Beside those in the above paragraph, units which possess type 1 Model II fighters.
3. Type 100 model II Hq. reconnaissance planes, ^{will be converted to type 100 Model III RECONNAISSANCE PLANES.}

In accordance with the above plan, the Army tried to at least complete the alteration of the type of planes of the 5th Air Div. during the rainy season in the BURMA Area. However, as stated previously, only a few planes were sent from JAPAN so that the alteration did not progress as well as was expected. Majority of the type 4 fighter planes supply of which was on a comparatively liberal scale could not be used due to engine defects (mainly the burned crankshafts). Consequently, when the rainy season ended, the 3rd Air Army was barely able to equip only the 50th Air Regt. with the type 4 fighter planes, and even the ~~air~~ half of these planes could not be used in combat.

At one time the 8th Air Training Unit had several fighter planes, type 4 but since the necessity of the SINGAPORE Air Defense became urgent, approx. ten of them were given to the 1st Bd. Air Repl. Unit. As a result the 8th Air Training Unit had only training planes and old type 1 fighters left and no other units were supplied with altered type 4 fighters.

4. As far as the alteration of planes to type 1 model III, is concerned, approx. half the 64th Air Regt. planes were altered during the rainy season and the subsequent alterations were gradually progressed until the end of war. While the 64th Air Regt. had almost completed the alteration of its planes the other fighter units had only a portion of model III planes ready.

5. The progress of conversion planes to type 100 Hq. reconnaissance planes was also slow and at the end of the war each reconnaissance unit was able to convert less than half of its planes to model III.

D. Repairs.

1. Major repairs of aircrafts were carried out by the Repair Depot and minor ones were made by the various units.

Repair difficulties were in fact due to shortage of spare parts, especially the parts for the undercarriages.

Consequently, the Army started local manufacture of wheels, near wheels and other simple parts for the aircraft based on JAVA and SINGAPORE. For the most part this venture was successful but a greater portion of spare parts still had to be ^{brought} from JAPAN proper.

The type 1 fighter plane's propellers shortage of which was very acute, were shipped from JAPAN by air and the repair installations were expanded in order to meet the additional work of handling them. The shortage of type 4 fighter engines however could not be made good in anyway.

2. The operation of Repair Depots.

a. While the airplanes were supplied, though few in number up to about the summer of 1944 from JAPAN, ^{Repair} ~~the~~ ~~Repair~~ Depots were engaged mainly in minor and medium repairs of fighter and reconnaissance type of planes. But when the supply of airplanes from JAPAN was decreased the ^{Repair} ~~Repair~~ Depots were required to carry out a major repair on the airplanes which heretofore had been abandoned as useless.

For this purpose it became necessary for the various Repair Depots to increase their working facilities.

Besides carrying out a repairs of airplanes the ^{Repair} ~~Repair~~ Depots started the manufacturing of a simple spare parts and work on converting the bombing and firing equipment of the various types of planes as well as the converting of the "TO" type planes. Being overtasked with work they were unable to make thorough repairs of aircrafts, and in order to overcome this difficulty it was decided to ~~transfer~~ ^{transfer} a few of the personnel to the Repair Depots from the front line units who became a surplus during the shortage of airplanes. For this reason, in spite of the supply of aircrafts from JAPAN being cut off after the spring of 1945 and although the loss of planes totalled 60 to 70 planes per month, the number of airplanes in the front line units did not decrease materially up to the end of the war.

b. Special Characteristics of Various Repair Depots.

1) The 19th Fd. Air Repair Depot was responsible mainly for the repair service in the 5th Air Div. Area. The special characteristics of the 22nd Fd. Air Repair Depot were that it was the rear base for the 5th Air Div. Area and a relay point for the replacement planes arriving from JAPAN.

2) The special characteristic of the 16th Fd. Air Repair Depot was that service as base for the material combat strength of the 3rd Air Army, it was a central store (same as the Air Depot) for the various Repair Depots.

3) The special characteristic of the 20th Fd. Air Repair Depot, stationed in BANDOENG, was that beside repairing airplanes by utilizing the JAVA industrial power, it was a self-supporting base as far as spare parts and materials for repairs ~~was~~ ^{was} concerned.

4) The special characteristics of the 25th Fd. Air Repair Depot were that being stationed in MALANG and carrying out the repairs of airplanes of the air units in the Eastern JAVA Area, it was at the same time the rear base for the Air Units operating in the area North of AUSTRALIA.

5) Branch Repair Depots established in MALAY, NORTH SUMATRA, SOUTH SUMATRA and BORNEO were responsible for repair service in their respective areas.

III. Matters Pertaining to Fuel Supply from Dec. 1943 to the end of the war.

A. General.

1. The operational area of the 3rd Air Army included the SUMATRA oil refinery zone and there were no difficulties in acquiring the aviation fuel up to the end of war. In the beginning of 1944, however, due to the shortage of the fuel containers, storage of fuel became very difficult and in order to overcome this difficulty the construction of fuel tanks was started in May in all the areas. The Air Supply Depot and various Sector Units (Hqs., Sector Airfield Bn's and Airfield Co's.) installed the fuel tanks and other fuel containers, which had been found scattered in various areas close to the airfields and stored fuel in them. Thus the shortage of drums was overcome after spending about a year in equipping of the fuel tanks, which were finally completed in beginning of 1945.

Note: The shortage of drums was due to the shortage of manufacturing materials (chiefly iron plates).

Simultaneously with the construction of fuel tanks, the research on the manufacture of wooden drums was started, but the war ended before any practical steps were taken in this direction.

2. The most difficulties in supplying fuel under the above circumstances were encountered in supplying the BURMA, THAILAND AND FRENCH INDO-CHINA areas. Through MALAY and SINGAPORE ISLAND as the relay bases. SUMATRA, beside being the fuel supply source mainly for JAPAN and other areas, supplied also fuel for the units in its own area. JAVA, beside supplying fuel for consumption in its own area, supplied fuel mainly for the areas North of AUSTRALIA (ARU, KAI, TANIMBAR and CELEBES Areas).

After the spring of 1945 the water transportation route between FRENCH INDO-CHINA and SINGAPORE became increasingly dangerous and the railroad running through MALAY was being bombed. The fuel supply for FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND Areas became very difficult. From that time and right up to the end of the war the sea transport losses were a matter of grave concern to the authorities.

3. Because it was expected that after the beginning of 1945, the Air raids against SINGAPORE will be intensified rendering the position of SINGAPORE as a supply and relay base very precarious. The measures were taken to disperse the fuel and ammunition to the front line immediately and this dispersion was nearly completed by the August 1945.

B. Fuel Supply System.

1.

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B. Fuel Supply System.

1. The disposition of supply bases is given on ~~map~~^{Map} 1 and 2.



2. The aviation fuel was refined chiefly in SUMATRA and JAVA and after being allocated by the General Army, this fuel was supplied chiefly to BURMA, THAILAND and FRENCH INDOCHINA Areas through the 20th Fd. Air Supply Depot in SINGAPORE. Besides SUMATRA and JAVA supplied all their local needs.

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Inserted Map Part 1
May 1944 - Aug. 1945
1943 - April 1944
(To be inserted here)

INSERTED MAP PART I

MAY 1944 — AUGUST 1945 (THE END OF WAR)


1943 — APRIL 1944



-----> LINE INDICATES THE MOVEMENT JUST BEFORE THE END OF WAR

Appended Plan No. II

AVIATION FUEL AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY SYSTEM.



3. The conditions of Fuel Supply to Various Areas.

a. BURMA Area.

Prior to the opening of the THAILAND - BURMA Railroad, the supply of fuel for the BURMA area was delivered ^{mainly} by sea route, in face of considerable dangers. After the completion of the THAILAND - BURMA Railroad, transportation by both land and sea became possible, but with the war situation gradually becoming increasingly critical the sea transportation in the latter part of 1944 was practically impossible leaving the only safe delivery by the THAILAND - BURMA Railroad.

Since the enemy air operations in BURMA seemed to be carried out entirely during the dry season, the rear transportation routes became increasingly dangerous during these operations, and supply had to be delivered entirely during the rainy season with the result that the fuel necessary for one year^s operation had to be transported from June to the end of October. Although ^a considerable difficulties were encountered in transporting from 15,000 to 25,000 drums every month by land, this task was finally completed and up to the end of the war there was no shortage of fuel for operational use experienced.

b. THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas.

Although these areas were somewhat in the nature of being the rear base for the Air Army operating in BURMA, they gradually became more like a front line bases for the air forces participating in the PHILIPPINE Operation and during the retreat from the BURMA Area. During ^{these} ~~time~~ periods the local consumption of fuel increased rapidly. Furthermore, due to the damages from the air raids, the shortage of containers and the decrease in transportation made the situation so bad that the supply could not keep up with the consumption and at one time a first class priority was given to this area for fuel supply by land and sea. Due to extreme shortage of containers, tank installations were completed in SAIGON and BANGKOK areas and the containers within these areas had to be used in rotation. Thus the fuel shortage for the operations was met. However, until the end of the war the supply for NORTHERN FRENCH INDO-CHINA (north of TOURANE) was not satisfactory due to transportation difficulties.

c. MALAY Area.

In the early stages this area was somewhat like a rear base with a front line priority supply for BURMA and the areas North of AUSTRALIA. However, since it became almost impossible for these latter areas to return the empty drums due to the war situation, it was planned to exert every effort for rotating the fuel containers in this area. Despite this effort the transportation facilities were not sufficient to meet the needs. And only by utilizing since the beginning of 1944, the airfield equipment such as small tanks, the supply of fuel finally became sufficient by May 1945. Furthermore as the fuel shipments to various areas were delayed considerably by the decrease in transportation facilities due to the damages from air raids. The amount of fuel delivered and dispersed in this area by the end of war was considerable.

* d. BORNEO Area.

Although the MIRI oil field refinery installations were completed, the fuel could not be shipped due to the shortage of transport facilities and all important areas had to be supplied from SINGAPORE. In spite of the PHILIPPINE Operation rapidly getting worse, the supply to SANDAKAN and KUDAT Areas was successfully delivered as required. However, since the war shifted rapidly to LABUAN and MIRI Areas, that supply was hardly touched until the end of the war. There was as yet an insufficient amount of fuel stored in KUCHING and other southern bases, but the operations were carried on by transferring the fuel from the north and with the shipments from SINGAPORE.

e. SUMATRA Area.

Though there was a sufficient quantity of fuel in the north and south since this area was an oil producing area, the regular flow of supply to the units could not be at first ~~was~~ maintained due mainly to the shortage of drums and to the presence of a large number of airplanes in this area. However, with the completion of tanks and the stepping up of transportation, the flow of supply gradually became regular. Since it became impossible to ship out fuel from the northern part due to troops movement and the laying of mines in BELAR⁷ Bay, considerable amount of fuel sufficient for the operations was stored in the north.

f. JAVA Area.

Although this area had sufficient supply of fuel from the fuel storage of the JAVA Branch Fuel Depot, the supply at one time became difficult due to the air raid damages to SURABAYA oil field. However with the supply of fuel

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from PALEMBANG the flow of fuel and supply of containers was uninterrupted until the end of war.

g. Miscellany item concerning fuel situation.

1) The foregoing statements on fuel situation are dealing mainly with gasoline. In regard to the lubricating oil, the mineral oil was generally scarce and there was a great anxiety concerning the oil suitable for the high performance planes. As the Imperial Hq., which was responsible for delivery of mineral oil slowed down its supplies. The Southern Fuel Depot was requested to investigate the possibilities of the local production of mineral oil and at the same time to supply the low performance planes with locally produced castor oil instead of mineral oil. By this method and by straining it was planned to ensure the required amount of mineral oil for the next operation.

2) The local production of castor oil was stepped up and a great quantity of oil was produced (especially in JAVA) which finally resulted in a surplus stock.

3) Ethyl

The supply of ethyl was received chiefly from the Imperial Hq. but as there were only several hundred drums stored it was planned to ship ethyl from BALIKPAPAN and deliver it by air from JAPAN, but the war ended without this plans being materialized.

4) Ethanol.

Since ethanol is an important part of fuel used in the high performance planes, the local production of it chiefly in JAVA and FRENCH INDO-CHINA was stepped up and finally reached a point of producing a surplus stock.

5) Construction of the factories for repairing and filling drums.

To keep the regular flow of supplies it was planned to complete the construction of factories at various supply bases (main and branch depots) completed only in the main depot. But, However, the construction was completed (SINGAPORE) and at the SAIGON Branch Depot. The others were only in the planning stage when the war ended.

IV. Matters Pertaining to Ammunition Supply From December 1943 to the End of the War.

A. General.

Since the early stages of the operation, the air ammunition was supplied without interruption from JAPAN and until the end of the war there was no shortage except for certain type of ammunition. However, as a result of the war situation changing

from offensive operation to defensive preparations, the ammunition which was not required in the beginning (for instance, against warships, for anti-submarine warfare, for navigation uses and for heavy caliber automatic cannons) started to be used in large quantity and there were considerable difficulties in procuring and supplying these various ammunition in required quantity.

1. Bombs.

After the loss of ^ASIPAN in 1944, the Army hardly had any anti-submarine bombs when the Allied submarines were present in the EAST CHINA SEA and in the waters adjacent to the southern areas. The Imperial Hqs. hurriedly made an experimental bomb with the three and one half seconds delayed action fuze. However, due to the defect in the functioning of the first manufactured fuze, the opportunity to use it against the enemy was lost. Anyway, as at that time the delivery by sea transportation was greatly restricted only approximately 200 - 300 fuzes were delivered by air.

By obtaining from the Navy air force a surplus of bombs left over through decreasing number of Navy airplanes the Army was able to supply the minimum requirements in the various areas as after the worsening of LEYTE Battle situation the need for bombs against warships became urgent. The Army bombs which weighed more than 100 kilograms were improved locally by reinforcing the bomb nose and tail assembly so that they could be used against the ships. ^{By these activities the} Army finally obtained by February 1945 the required amount of bombs. Since large bombs had to be used by the special attack planes, Nos. 25, 50 and 80 bombs were received from the Navy and these were altered so that they could be hung on the Army planes used for special attack purpose. Although transportation was difficult, the minimum required amount of bombs were finally accumulated by the end of war, ^{IN} MALAY, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, SUMATRA and JAVA areas.

2. Machine guns and automatic cannon ammunition.

In the early stage of the war the airplanes were equipped mainly with 7.7 mm and 7.9 mm machine guns and only the HAYABUSA fighter planes were equipped with a single 12.7mm gun. However, the operations gradually required larger caliber guns and it became necessary for the airplanes to be equipped with various large caliber guns.

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Especially the appearance of B-24s and B-29s made the need of large caliber guns extremely necessary as the 12.7mm machine guns which were finally mounted on the planes had little effect against enemy planes. Various planes equipped with 20mm, 37mm and 40mm automatic cannons appeared but since these planes were dispersed in various areas, the ammunition for those guns had to be also stored in various areas. For this reason sufficient amount of ammunition could not be had at any time and at any place. Therefore, to comply with the operational requirements and in order to avert the operational bottleneck emergency steps were taken to immediately ship the ammunition by air to the areas in need. However, due to the stoppage of supply of planes and the gradual damages to and losses of planes in the local areas, there was immediately before the war ended sufficient amount of ammunition for the number of planes in action.

The ammunition supply system was identical with that of the fuel supply.

B. The Situation of Ammunition Supply in Various Areas.

1. BURMA Areas.

Since the early phase of the operation considerable amount of ammunition was stored in this area, and though the transportation difficulties experienced in this direction were mounting, there was no anxiety. However, the situation in the AKYAB Area was becoming critical due to the increased demands for bombs against warships, as stated in the general paragraph and these bombs had to be transferred from the naval units in RANGOON. The anti-submarine bombs were needed from the early part of 1944 and this need was temporarily met by receiving the fuses by air transportation. The supply of 12.7mm gun ammunition for this area caused a great deal of worry, because there was in this area comparatively a large number of fighter planes which were busy in making assaults and counter attacks. Consequently, the planes which were equipped mainly with 12.7mm guns were very active and the consumption of ammunition by them was enormous. Considering the amount required and the amount supplied by the Imperial Hqs. and the dispersed ammunitions in the various areas, there were considerable supply difficulties.

Just before the war ended, there was a large surplus of various ammunition due to the decrease in number of planes and to the contraction of front line. Moreover, since offensive operations were impossible, a large surplus of aerial bombs (especially small 50 -kg bombs) was accumulated and just before the end of the war, the bombs which were used for land defense were also left over in great number.

In short, since the supply of ammunition in this area was accumulated in a comparatively large quantity, it was considered that except for a certain type of ammunition the later supply will be obtained without difficulties.

2. THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Areas.

From the latter part of 1942 with the operations gradually extending from east - west front line to BURMA and the SOLOMON areas, the THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA areas became the rear bases and the storage of ammunition there was limited to a bare minimum the more so that while the planes were idle during the rainy season, the ammunition was required mainly for training purposes only.

In the latter part of 1944 the war situation gradually became worse and especially since the neighboring waters were infested by submarines, the anti-sub bombs were urgently needed. This need was temporarily met with supply of bombs sent by air from JAPAN and from SINGAPORE. Furthermore, after the LEYTE Operation the possibility of air raids became greater and since the demand for machine gun and cannon ammunition and bombs to be used against warships in the special attacks increased greatly, the accumulation of ammunition was hurriedly organized. However, due to the transport facilities, the war ended without this organization being completed.

3. SUMATRA Area.

The ammunition supply for this area was organized very satisfactorily and there was no shortage of it to the operations. However, with the attack by the Allied Fleet against NICOBAR and SABANE ISLANDS Areas and mass raids against PALEMBANG by the carrier planes, the demand for bombs to be used against warships in the special attacks designed to destroy these forces increased greatly. This objective was accomplished by transferring the naval bombs stored at the naval base in this area to the Army.

4. JAVA and the Area North of AUSTRALIA.

Since there was a considerable quantity of ammunition stored in these areas after their occupation and since these areas were generally not included in attacking zone, the ammunition there was not in much demand. However, these areas were the training bases for the Air Training Units, so considerable quantity of training bombs had to be supplied to them. With the submarines making raids in the neighboring water just before the war ended the anti-sub bombs were in very much demand and the bombs to be used against warships were required in all these areas, but generally the supply of bombs was satisfactory.

5. BORNEO Area.

At the beginning this area was allotted to the 3rd Air Army and since this area formed a wing of the rear communication route, storing of ammunitions there was almost entirely neglected. Due to the preparations for the SHOGO Operation, the transfer of the SOUTHERN General Army to MANILA and the activation of the 4th Air Army, an order was issued to change the operational area. After 1944 this area was included in the 4th Air Army's operational zone. The accumulation of ammunition for the operation which was gradually becoming critical was apparently made with the supply from the Imperial Hqs. However, since the transportation became extremely difficult during the LEYTE Operation, this area was almost abandoned at one time. After the LEYTE Operation this area was again placed within the 3rd Air Army operational zone and the storing of ammunition was hurriedly started, but before this could be completed the enemy supported by submarines and persistent air raids landed on LABUAN ISLAND. Since the situation almost became hopeless the large bombs could be brought only by air and their supply was barely enough to meet the need of the operations.

V. Matters Pertaining to Communications.

A. Signal Units Strength.

The units under direct control of the 3rd Air Signal Group were the 1st, 3rd, 9th and the 11th Air Signal Regts. (strength: five to six Co's and one Materials Depot) and the JAVA and BORNEO Air Signal Units (the Navigation Aid Unit was attached to a part of each unit and the strength of each unit was approx. two Co's.)

Beside the above, the SOUTHERN Air Route Dept. (almost similar to the net of the Signal Regt.) was in charge of the Airplane arrival and departure reports and weather reports.

B. The area of deployment and the signal net are shown in the enclosed sketch.

C. Regarding the maintenance of perfect communications and special delivery.

1. As the strength of the personnel due to numerous deployed squads, was inadequate and as there were no spare equipment and because of the irregular supply of vacuum tubes and other accessories, numerous delays and interruptions of communications caused by defective equipment prevented the maintenance of perfect communications. Due to inefficient communication method caused by inferior quality of troops and their incomplete training, the special deliveries of reports were beyond expectation. Therefore, general revision of personnel replacement and the maintenance of mechanical equipment was necessary. Furthermore, in transmission of

radio waves, perfect communications were prevented by interference from strong static occurring daily at regular hours in the northern part of BURMA, the central part of SUMATRA and the northern part of BORNEO.

2. The average number of messages sent per hour by a single signal net was 12.3 messages; the minimum was five and the maximum was twenty.

D. Supply and Repairs of Signal Equipments.

The supply of equipment was not made as expected as due to the transport difficulties the supply from the Imperial Hqs. was irregular. The supply of vacuum tubes, a part of the accessories and vitally essential equipment was made by air, but from February the supply of new equipment became difficult.

The supply and repairs for the Army Signal Units were controlled and supervised by the 3rd Air Signal Group and were made through the Air Repair Depots. A part of the accessories was manufactured and assembled in SINGAPORE and BANDOENG and a part of the vacuum tubes was manufactured and assembled by the JAVA RADIO CO., LTD. However, since these manufactured accessories could not satisfy the entire demand and as there were many parts which were technically difficult to manufacture, it was still impossible to be locally self-supporting in the supply of signal equipment and accessories.

E. The Move to Adopt the Signal Units to the Need of Operations.

By changing the communication net or by carrying out a new deploying movements by the Signal forces in the attack on YUNNAN from BURMA, IMPHAL Operation, attack on PORT PRINCESSA in BORNEO or in the operation of escorting convoy carrying essential material from JAPAN, it was expected to form a communications net which could respond immediately to the operation needs their contributing immensely to its success. However, that system and the maintenance of perfect communications were difficult and slow. To demonstrate the value of air communications, further research and training in the method organization, operation and the communications were necessary. The signal organization especially suffered from the lack of equipment and spare parts, which were either delayed in transportation by land as were lost at sea by enemy action.

1. Protection of Communications.

Instructions had been given concerning the safe-guarding the signal equipment by taking care not to transmit unnecessary radio waves, prohibiting the use of ordinary messages, the accurate use of the code book, exerting all efforts to prevent the code book from falling into enemy hands and in taking immediate and reliable

measures to protect the equipment in the cases of emergency. However, these instructions were not complete, and the restriction on transmission of radio waves or the transmission of false radio waves had not yet been realized.

2. Research and Investigations in Signal Units.

The investigation and communications of the air conditions, maintenance of equipment and research of enemy signal interferences for the entire area were carried out by the Signal Section of the 3rd Air Signal Hq., in SINGAPORE and in each district by the local units using a spare equipment. These investigations were reported every ten days and monthly, giving the whole picture of the peculiarities of radio wave transmission in the South.

In regard to the equipment, the Signal Group, Material Depots and the various units made various researches on such things as shock proof appliances, measures to prevent the corrosion protection of equipment against statics, and the improvement of equipment designed to increase the capacity of wave transmission.

3. Efficiency of Communications.

The low abilities of the officers and NCOs who were in charge of the Signal centers and the poor quality of radio operators naturally caused the increase in the non-delivered and delayed telegrams, greatly decreasing their delivery the efficient performance of telegraphic communications in general.