JAPANESE MONOGRAPH No. 69

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Java-Sumatra Area Air Operations Record
Dec. 1941 - Mar. 1942

PREFACE

Through Instruction No. 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for War Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff.* Upon the dissolution of the War Ministry and the General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. Detailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in Memoranda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories".

The basic material contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that the enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material was reconstructed from memory.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G-3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the Demobilization Bureau.

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* The action under this memorandum and incidental detailed instructions, which followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, charged with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945.

In order to protect the interest of the United States, in the exploitation of Japanese Military Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of enemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental Archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Government was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the entire program, including the establishment of a small historical research section within the ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.)

Air Operation Record

(Southern SUMATRA, JAVA, and Northern SUMATRA)

August 1946

1st Demobilization Bureau

The "Air Operation Record" was compiled from the following sources:

1. Material gathered by the Military Staff College professors, Col. SHIN ISHIKAWA and Col. KATSUJI DOZONO, for the purpose of instructing aerial students, comprises a major portion of this record.

2. The above mentioned record was revised and enlarged by Col. MINORU MIYAKO, officer in charge of operations for the 3rd Air Group.

Air Operation Record (Southern SUMATRA, JAVA, Northern SUMATRA).

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Part A. The situation prior to this operation.

Chap. 1. The condition of enemy forces.

The condition of the enemy land forces.

The total strength of the DUTCH INDIES Army at the start of the PACIFIC War was

approximately 100,000. Its main force was in JAVA, and about 10,000 troops were garrisoned on SUMATRA. Also, in other outlying territories, one to two battalions were placed in areas important for their natural resources. Positions were constructed in the vininities of BANDOENG, SOERABAJA and BATAVIA, the main points for the defense of the JAVA area.

Being mutually connected with
~~In relation to~~ SINGAPORE, SUMATRA occupied an important position; and, therefore, stress was placed upon this area by the BRITISH. It seemed that the officers and men
~~members~~ of the BRITISH-AUSTRALIAN Army were in this area for the purpose of strengthening
~~reinforcing~~ military establishments on BINTAN Island and in BELAWAN, TANDJOENGBALIA and BRABAT, and turning SABAN Island into a fortress. Explosives were planted in factories and oil wells.

The condition of the enemy naval force.

The enemy naval force secretly ~~co-operated~~ with the BRITISH Navy and carried out sea patrols.

The condition of the enemy air force.

From July 1941, the DUTCH INDIES Air Force imported from the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND approximately 100 aircrafts, mostly CURTISS Falcon Reconnaissance planes, BREWSTER 339-C single-seater Fighters, and Tiger Moth Trainers. With the organization of new air units, more new airfields were constructed in various places. ~~In accordance~~ With the progress of the MALAY operation, the strength of the DUTCH INDIES Air Force was increased by the addition of the retreating BRITISH Air Force.from MALAY and the newly reinforced UNITED STATES Air Force. In the early part of February 1942, there were approximately 100 planes in SUMATRA, and approximately 300 in JAVA.

The distribution of airfields in SUMATRA and JAVA in early February is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. PALEMBANG is the principal airbase on SUMATRA.

Insert Appended Map No. 1

Enemy Air Situation at SUMATRA

Insert Appended Map No. 2

Enemy Air Situation at JAVA

ENEMY AIR SITUATION AT JAVA
(ATTACHED IS THE DISPOSITION OF LAND FORCES)

APPENDED MAP # 2

NUMBER OF PLANES:
1ST LINE PLANES approx. 120
RESERVE PLANES approx. 120
TOTAL 240 approx.

PURCHASED 117 GLENN MARTIN PLANES IN 1940 AND SINCE THEN HAVE PURCHASED OTHER AMERICAN-MADE PLANES. THE TOTAL NO. OF PLANES PROBABLY REACHES THE 400 MARK. HOWEVER IN AS MUCH AS THEIR PILOT TRAINING IS POOR, THEIR PILOTS ARE NOT TECHNICALLY SKILLED. ACCORDINGLY THAT POINT MUST BE CONSIDERED WHEN MAKING AN ESTIMATE OF THEIR FIGHTING CAPACITY.



Chap. 2. The condition of the JAPANESE Army.

The condition of the 16th Army.

The main force of the 16th Army (2nd Division, main force of units under the direct control of the Army and the SHOJI Detachment) gradually left TAKAO in early February and assembled in CAM-RANH Bay.

After the capture of MANILA, the 48th Division was relieved by the NARA Army ~~Corps.~~ Group. On 8 February it departed from LINGAYEN Bay and concentrated in the PATO (Bata) anchorage of HORO Island.

The condition of the SAKAGUCHI Detachment.

The SAKAGUCHI Detachment, which captured DAVAO immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, occupied TARAKAN on 11 January, BALIKPAPAN on 24 January, and BANDJERMASIN, on the southern tip of BORNEO, on 10 February.

The condition of the KAWAGUCHI Detachment.

The unit attacking BRITISH BORNEO (the KAWAGUCHI Detachment), after capturing KUCHING, advanced in a southerly direction and occupied PONTIANAK on 29 January. Together with the capture of SINGAPORE by the 25th Army, this established a route for the advance of the 16th Army.

The condition of the JAPANESE Navy.

After capturing MENADO, on the northern tip of CELEBES Island, on 11 January, with the aid of special marine and airborne units, the Navy occupied KANDARI on the 24th, AMBON, the strategic point in BANDA Sea, on the 31st, and MAKASSAR, the strategic point of the southernmost edge of CELEBES Island, on 12 February. ~~It~~ The Navy therefore ~~also~~ established the conditions for the attack on JAVA.

The Naval air force co-operated with the SAKAGUCHI Detachment and the marine units attacking AMBON. In addition, in February it began the battle for the destruction of enemy air forces in JAVA, and attacked enemy ships in the JAVA Sea area in order to gain command over sea and air ~~superiority~~.

The condition of the 3rd Air Group.

The main force of the 3rd Air Group co-operated with the 25th Army during the MALAY operation. After 11 February, ~~it~~ reconnoitered SUMATRA and BORNEO, ~~utilizing~~ the Headquarters Reconnaissance Unit. From the middle of January, portion of the 3rd Air Group attacked airfields in PALEMBANG, MEDAN and BAKAMBAR in preparation for the operation. (T.N. SUMATRA Campaign).

(Note: Details are given in the chapter on operational preparations).

Part B. Air operation in Southern SUMATRA.

Chap. 1. Operational preparation.

Reconnaissance and attacks during the preparational period.

Following the capture of KOTABHARU Airfield by the 25th Army, the 81st Air Regiment of the 3rd Air Group reconnoitered MEDAN Airfield ~~after~~ from 11 February, and BAKANBAR, PALEMBANG and MUNTOK Airfields ~~after~~ from the 17th. The 7th Air ~~Brigade~~ group carried out reconnaissance to determine the aerial situation in Northern SUMATRA. From January, the 81st Air Regiment kept continuous watch over the airfields of MEDAN and BAKANBAR and attacked with a portion of their forces in the following manner.

28 December:

Twenty-five planes (7 fighters and 18 light bombers) of the 3rd Air Group (~~59th~~ 75th and 59th Air Regiments stationed in SUNGEI-PATANI) attacked MEDAN Airfield at 1650 hours. Four enemy planes, a hangar and an ammunition dump were destroyed.

16 January:

The main force of the 3rd Air Group (~~59~~ 75th, 59th and 90th Air Regiments stationed in SUNGEI-PATANI and IPOH), attacked MEDAN Airfield at 1330 hours. One enemy plane and the runway area were destroyed.

17 January:

Forty-one planes (9 fighters and 32 heavy bombers) of the 7th Air Brigade

(64th and 12th Air Regiments stationed in ALORSTAR and IPOH) attacked BAKANBAR Airfield at 1125 hours. Five enemy planes and one warehouse were burned. Seven enemy planes and the runway were destroyed.

23 January:

Twenty-seven ~~planes~~ heavy bombers of the 7th Air Brigade (98th Air Regiment stationed in KETIL) attacked PALEMBANG Airfield at 1209 hours. One enemy plane was burned on the ground. Our force was intercepted by 15 enemy fighters, 5 of which were shot down. Slight damage was inflicted upon 14 of our planes.

Thus, the 3rd Air Group, together with carrying out reconnaissance of the aerial situation, attacked airfields in preparation for the SUMATRA operation. On 31 January, the 1st Raiding Group was placed under the command of the 3rd Air Group; and the following order concerning its employment was issued by the Southern Army Commander.

a. The 3rd Air Group Commander will employ the 1st Raiding Group in the Southern SUMATRA operation in ~~accordance with~~ the following order:

(1). The 1st Raiding Group will occupy PALEMBANG Airfield and ~~facilitate the execution of~~ support the Southern SUMATRA and JAVA operations. If possible, the PALEMBANG oil refineries will be occupied and held before their destruction by the enemy.

~~(2). If the weather permits, the first airborne invasion and landing~~ will be carried out on the morning before the start of the operation. If not this operation will be postponed.

(3). When the main force of the 38th Division arrives at ~~in PALEMBANG~~, the airborne and landing units will be placed under the command of the 16th Army ~~Commander.~~

(4). Upon the completion of the Southern SUMATRA operation, the command of the 1st Raiding Group (with the exception of the airborne and landing units) will be returned to its original unit without any separate order. ~~their original posts.~~

(5). The 3rd Air Group Commander will secretly co-operate with the 16th Army Commander in the execution of this order.

On the same day, the 3rd Air Group Commander issued the following order concerning preparations for the raiding operation.

a. A portion of the 3rd Air Group will make preparations for the Southern SUMATRA raiding operation.

b. The 7th Air Brigade Commander will place the 98th Air Regiment under my command.

c. The 98th Air Regiment Commander, utilizing the necessary force, will carryout joint maneuvers with the 1st Raiding Group in PNONPENOH, SUNGEI-PANTANI and KETILN in preparation for the Southern SUMATRA raiding operation. He will also aid in the advance of the 1st Raiding Group towards MALAY. The details of this plan will be decided with 1st Raiding Group Commander. The Southern Army will take charge of ground crews, billets and supplies in PNONPENOH.

d. The 1st Raiding Group Commander will carry out joint maneuvers with the 98th Air Regiment. The outline of the plan for the 1st and 2nd stages of the Southern SUMATRA raiding operation and necessary equipment will be sent to SUNGEI-PATANI, where operational preparations will be carried out.

The 98th Air Regiment will support the advance to SUNGEI-PATANI.

e. The 18th Air Sector Commander will take charge of ground crews, billets and supplies in SUNGEI-PATANI.

It was decided that the 16th Army would commence the SUMATRA operation on 10 February. (It was later delayed to the 15th by request ~~because of the condition~~ of the Navy). In order to destroy the enemy air force in the vicinity of PALEMBANG and to carry out the raiding operation by the 1st Raiding Group on 9 February (postponed until the 14th), the 3rd Air Group Commander issued the following order at 0800 ~~hours~~ on 4 February.

a. In addition to continuing its co-operation with the 25th Army, the 3rd Air Group will carry out the SUMATRA operation in co-operation with the Navy and the 16th Army.

The attack on SINGAPORE will begin on the night of 7 February, and the Southern SUMATRA operation will start on 10 February. It will be given in a separate order.

The outline of the Southern SUMATRA air operation is given in separate Volume No. 1. Notes on the ~~Army~~ and Navy aerial agreement concerning the Southern SUMATRA operation are given in separate Volume No. 2. The outline of the Southern SUMATRA raiding operation is given in separate Volume No. 3.

b. The 7th Air Brigade will ~~co-operate~~ coordinate its operations with the 25th Army in the ~~SINGAPORE~~ attack ~~by the 25th Army.~~ The KURAN Airfield ~~can~~ may be utilized as an advance base for a portion of its forces at anytime other than the day previous to the Southern SUMATRA operation.

The 64th Air Regiment will temporarily come under the command of the 3rd Air Group Commander at KAHANG from ~~after~~ 2400 ~~hours,~~ 5 February.

c. The 3rd Air Brigade Commander will have the following duties:

(1). ~~The~~ To continue ~~continuation of~~ co-operation in the 25th Army operation.

(2). ~~The destruction of~~ To search for and destroy enemy planes in the vicinity of PALEMBANG, using fighter units, ~~in the~~ 2 ~~or 3~~ to 4 days before the beginning of the Southern SUMATRA operation.

(3). ~~The~~ To carrying out ~~of~~ the raiding operation in the vicinity of PALEMBANG in accordance with separate ~~volume~~ No. 3.

(4). To escort the 38th Division convoy with a portion of his fighter units from 1700 ~~hours of~~ to the evening of the day before the start of the operation.

(5). ~~According to the conditions of the capture and defense of~~ With the complete occupation and equipping of the PALEMBANG Airfield, he will make preparations for ~~the~~ advance ~~of~~ up a portion of his forces to the airfield to work ~~PALEMBANG where they will co-operate~~ with the 16th Army.

The 64th Air Regiment will temporarily come under his command ~~of the 3rd Air Brigade~~ in KAHANG at 2400 ~~hours~~ on 5 February.

d. The 12th Air Brigade commander will have the following duties:

(1). The continuation of his previous duties, especially, the co-operation with the 3rd and 7th Air Brigades in the aerial battles in the SINGAPORE area 2 to 4 days before the start of the operation.

(2). During the Southern SUMATRA operation, he will keep BAKANBAR Airfield under observation; and, when the opportunity presents itself, he will destroy all enemy aircraft ~~appearing on it~~ found.

(3). He will advance into PALEMBANG Airfield with a portion of his forces after the start of the operation and make preparations for the aerial defense of this area.

Upon completing the supporting action in the advance of raiding air units into ~~KURAN~~ KLUANG and KAHANG, the 1st Squadron of the 11th Air Regiment will return to its original post.

e. In accordance with separate Volume No. 3, the 1st Raiding Group Commander will raid the PALEMBANG Airfield and oil refineries ~~after~~ at 1130 ~~hours of~~ on the day before ~~the start of the~~ beginning operation. They will capture and hold these areas and facilitate the operation of the 3rd Air Group and the 38th Division.

The 12th Air Transport Squadron will be attached to this group until the end of the Southern SUMATRA raiding operation. The 3rd Air Brigade and the 81st and 98th Air Regiments will carry out raids with the 1st Raiding Group. However, the details of these operations will be decided by the 98th Air Regiment Commander.

From the time of the landing of the 38th Division in PALEMBANG, the airborne and landing units will be under the command of the 16th Army Commander, and the remaining units will return to their former posts at the end of the Southern SUMATRA operation with ~~any~~ a separate order to the effect.

f. ~~Following~~ separate Volume No. 3, the 81st and 98th Air Regiments will carry out the raiding operation with the ~~above mentioned~~ units in accordance with the previous paragraph.

The 98th Regiment Commander will receive the details of this order from the 1st Raiding Group Commander.

g. After supporting the advance of the raiding air units into KURAN and KAHAN two days ~~before~~ the start of the operation, the 1st Squadron of the 11th Air Regiment will be return to its former ~~post~~ command.

Separate Volume No. 1

Outline of the Southern SUMATRA Air Operation

I. Mission.

a. To exploit the success of the SINGAPORE operation, in addition to controlling the DUTCH-INDIES Air Force in Southern SUMATRA, and to co-operate with the 16th Army in the BANGKA and PALEMBANG area campaign.

b. During this operation, to begin the Western JAVA air operation at an opportune moment and prepare for direct co-operation in the 16th Army landing operation in Western JAVA.

II. Tactical outline.

a. The period of the attack on SINGAPORE.

(1). Prior to the landing operation (or unloading of materials) in ENDAU, carry out the air operation, destroy the remaining enemy air force, attack important military establishments in the SINGAPORE area and destroy the enemy's will to fight.

(2). At the time of the attack on SINGAPORE by the 25th Army, strategic points of this island will be ~~bombarded with~~ bombed simultaneously with the bombardment artillery ~~fire~~ in order to facilitate its capture.

(3). ~~Regarding~~ Following the capture of ~~KURAN~~ KLUANG, KAHANG and BATPAHAT airfields, complete preparations will be made for the attack on SINGAPORE and ~~the~~ Southern SUMATRA ~~operation.~~

The pre-~~arranged~~ determined disposition of troops is given in Appendix sheet No. 1.

(4). At the opportune time during this period, attack airfields in SUMATRA ~~in order to cut the line of~~ and intercept and pursue the retreat ~~of the~~ enemy's air force, ~~and pursue him.~~ Control the enemy air force reinforcing the DUTCH INDIES Air Force and facilitate the execution of the SINGAPORE attack and the Southern SUMATRA campaign.

b. The period of the attack on Southern SUMATRA.

(1). In co-operation with the naval air force, support the landing operation of the 16th Army in BANGKA and PALEMBANG.

(2). During the 2 to 4 days before the beginning of the operation, destroy the enemy air power in PALEMBANG, using mainly the fighter squadrons of the 3rd Air Brigade.

(3). Send the 1st Raiding Group to raid PALEMBANG on the day before the start of the operation, and facilitate its movements with a portion of the air force.

(4). ~~As warranted by~~ Following the occupation and consolidation of airfields in Southern SUMATRA, send a strong element to this area. The main force will destroy the enemy air power in Western JAVA, and a portion will co-operate with the 16th Army in its mopping up operation in Southern SUMATRA.

During this period, hasten the establishment of TANDJOENG KARANG Airfield for the purpose of directly aiding the landing operation of the main force of the 16th Army in Western JAVA.

(5). ~~The outline of the co-operation between the army and naval air forces~~ main points of coordination will be decided separately. in the Southern SUMATRA ~~operation, the others forces of the 3rd Air Group will~~ (6.) at about the time of the attack on SINGAPORE, the remaining units of the 3rd air group will seek out and attack enemy vessels in the vicinity of SINGAPORE and MALACCA Strait.

c. ~~Other matters.~~ miscellaneous:

(1). Those forces not used in the Southern SUMATRA and JAVA operations will co-operate with a portion of the 25th Army in the Northern SUMATRA operation.

(2). A portion of the fighter units will ~~engage~~ be used in the aerial defense of

the SINGAPORE area.

III. Disposition of troops and the outline of the operation.

a. SINGAPORE.

(1). As the ~~KURAN~~ KLUANG, KAH AN and BATPAHAT Airfields are occupied, the 15th Air Sector Unit will advance to Southern MALAY in order to construct bases for the Southern SUMATRA operation, and ~~will accumulate~~ to transport munitions.

(2). Before the beginning of the Southern SUMATRA operation, changes in the organization of the air force are expected to be as follows:

Under the direct control of the 3rd Air Group.

81st Air Regiment.

98th Air Regiment.

1st Raiding Group.

3rd Air Brigade.

15th Independent Air Unit.

(51st Independent Air Reconnaissance Unit missing).

27th, 59th, 64th, 75th and 90th Air Regiments.

7th Air Brigade.

51st Independent Air Reconnaissance Unit.

12th and 60th Air Regiments.

12th Air Brigade.

1st and 11th Air Regiments.

47th Independent Air Reconnaissance Unit.

(3). The duties of the above units are as follows:

(a). 81st Air Regiment.

To engage in the general reconnaissance of SUMATRA and JAVA, particularly the latter in preparation for the impending attack ~~on it~~. KUCHING and REDO Airfields in BORNEO may be used temporarily. One element will ~~co-operate in the~~ work

directly with the ~~carrying out of the raiding~~ operation of the 1st Raiding Group.

(b). 3rd Air Brigade.

To co-operate with the 25th Army and in the Southern SUMATRA campaign.

(c). 7th Air Brigade.

To co-operate in the SINGAPORE attack. To reinforce, if necessary, the units in the Southern SUMATRA operation. (To prepare for ~~co-operation~~ participation in the Northern SUMATRA operation.)

(d). 12th Air Brigade.

To co-operate with the 3rd and 7th Air Brigades in controlling the air over SINGAPORE.

To keep watch over and at the opportune time to attack BAKANBAR Airfield. To defend the anchorage of the units in Southern SUMATRA and to make preparations for the JAVA operation, if possible.

b. Direct participation ~~To co-operate closely~~ in the Southern SUMATRA ~~operation~~.

(1). From 1700, ~~hours of~~ the day before ~~the~~ opening ~~of the~~ operation (previously determined as 10 February), a portion of the fighter units of the 3rd Air Brigades will provide cover for the convoy of units ~~in~~ participating in the Southern SUMATRA campaign.

(2). At the same time, the 3rd Air Group will co-operate in the raiding operation by the 1st Raiding Group. Because of this, the headquarters air reconnaissance units will reconnoiter the PALEMBANG landing area before and after the raid. The type 1 fighter planes units will ~~provide protection for~~ support the raiding (transport) air units.

(3). Following the landing of the Raiding Group, and until the arrival of the Southern SUMATRA landing units in PALEMBANG, the 3rd Air Group will transport airborne units and supplies in order to maintain their fighting power. In addition, it will co-operate with the raiding groups in their land engagements.

(4). ~~As warranted by~~ With the capture and consolidation of PALEMBANG Airfield, a portion of the 22th and 3rd Air Brigades will advance to this airfield and co-operate with the Southern SUMATRA landing units (includes the 1st Raiding Group) in their engagements.

In order to begin ~~Then,~~ the JAVA air operation ~~will be started~~ at ~~an~~ the opportune moment, ~~Therefore,~~ the equipping of TANDJOEN KARANG Airfield will be speeded up to facilitate the advance of the attack plane units and the model 97 fighter plane units to this airfield.

Appended Sheet No. 1-A

Plan of ~~Expected~~ Disposition of Air Units in Northern British MALAYA



Appended Sheet No. 1-B

Plan of
~~Expected~~ Disposition of Air Units
in Southern MALAY
British

Navy Medium Bomber Unit 2



KUANTAN



27th Air Regiment
(Mobile Air Field)

LABIS

64th Air Regiment
Raiding Group
1 ~~Regiment~~ Squadron of 98th Air ~~Brig~~ Regt.
Main Force of Naval Zero
Fighter Unit
(Mobile Air Base)



KAHANG



12th Air Brigade
(Main Force)

BATPAHAT

3rd Air Group H.Q.
3rd Air Brigade H.Q.
15th Independent Air Unit (51st Independent Reconnaissance Unit missing)
59th Air Regiment
Light Bombers of 3rd Air Brigade
Type 1 Fighter Planes

KLUANG

81st Air Regiment (HQ and ~~its~~ a Portion)
2nd Battalion of Raiding Group
Portion of 98th Air Regiment (Mobile Air Field

Separate Vol. No. 2

Notes on the aerial agreement between the 1st Southern Fleet Commander, 16th Army Commander and the 3rd Air Group Commander in connection with the Southern SUMATRA operation.

1st Southern Fleet Commander - Vice-Admiral JIZABURO OZAWA.

16th Army Commander - Lt. Gen. HITOSHI IMAMURA.

3rd Air Group Commander - Lt. Gen. MICHIO SUGAWARA.

A. Nomenclature and time table of the operation.

1. The operation in BANGKA Island and PALEMBANG will be called "L" operation.

2. The day of the MUNTOK landing by the 38th Division advance units will be designated as "L Day" and is prearranged as 10 February.

If it becomes necessary to change this date, due to the progress of the air operation, weather ~~or battle conditions~~ conditions or the enemy's condition, the commanders of the 1st Southern Fleet and the 16th Army will decide upon a new day by 1200 ~~hours of "L" Day plus 6.~~ on L-6 day. ~~However, the date of~~ In all matters concerning the air operation, ~~will be decided by~~ the 16th Army Commander will first consult ~~and~~ the 3rd Air Group Commander*.

B. Forces to be used.

1. Navy.

1st Air Unit.

Land bombers - Approx. 100 planes.

Fighters - Approx. 30 planes.

Reconnaissance planes - Approx. 6 planes.

MALAY Unit.
Seaplanes - approx. 40 planes

2. Army.

~~Hqrs~~ Headquarters Reconnaissance planes - Approximately 9 planes.*

~~Type~~ model 1 Fighters - Approx. 40 planes.*

~~Type~~ model 97 Fighters - Approx. 30 planes.*

Attack planes - Approx. 9 planes.*

Light Bombers (two motored) - Approximately 20 planes.*

16

Heavy Bombers - Approx. 30 planes.

(* denotes the planes which will advance to Southern SUMATRA airfields).

The number of planes will be changed according to the ~~condition~~ situation of the airfields.

C. Bases to be used and the disposition of troops.

1. Navy.

a. In case the use of REDO is possible.

REDO and KUTIN.

Land bombers - 2 air units.

Fighters - approx. 30 planes.

Reconnaissance planes - 6 planes.

KUWANTANG.

Attack planes -
~~Land bombers~~ - approx. 30 planes.

SUNGEI-PATANI - approx. 10 planes.

b. If the use of REDO and KUTIN is impossible, ~~this~~ the disposition of planes will be as follows:

KUWANTANG.

Attack planes -
~~Land bombers~~ * approx. 60 planes.

Fighters - a portion.

KAHANG

~~Fighters - approx. 30 planes.~~

This field will be used as an advance base for the supplying of fuel for the 30 land bombers.

SUNGEI-PATANI.

Attack planes
~~Land bombers~~ - approx. 10 planes.

KOTA-BHARU.

Attack planes
~~Land bombers~~ - approx. 40 planes.

2. Army.

KAHANG

Type 1 Fighters - approx. 25 planes.

Transport planes - approx. 45 planes.

The other units participating in "L" operation will use the airfields of KLUANG KUKAN, BATPAHAT, KUALA LUMPUR, IPOH and KETIL.

The disposition and size of the forces mentioned above will ~~be changed according to~~ depend upon the maintenance condition of the airfields and other conditions.

3. The maintenance of MUNTOK and PALEMBANG airbases will be the responsibility of the Army; the Navy will co-operate in the maintenance of MUNTOK. In the early stages of the occupation of MUNTOK and PALEMBANG air bases, PALEMBANG will be used by the Army; and MUNTOK will be used jointly by the ~~following~~ Army and Naval ~~units:~~ as follows:

Navy: Fighter planes and others - approx. 30.

Army: Fighter planes- approx. 30.

If possible, the Army will aid in the transportation of naval airforce fuel supplies.

The use of these air bases after this period will be decided by the Army and Navy Commanders concerned.

D. Outline of operations.

1. Destroy the enemy air force in SUMATRA and control it in JAVA.

The areas under the control of the Army and Navy has been divided as follows, but ~~they~~ each will ~~both~~ carry out attacks in ~~other~~ areas other than its own when opportunity presents itself.

Navy.

The area east of the line connecting MUNTOK and PALEMBANG.

Army.

The area west of this line.

2. The attacks on enemy ships will be the responsibility of the Navy.

3. Protection of convoys.

(1). During ~~the movement~~.

(a). On L minus 1, dirdct escort will be provided by Army and Navy fighters.

Before 1400 hours - Navy.

After 1400 hours - Army.

(b). Security measures other than the above mentioned will be the responsibility of the Navy.

(2). The MUNTOK and PALEMBANG anchorage and ~~during the period of~~ going upstream.

Following the advance of Army and Navy air units into this area, aerial defense will be carried out by both. However, other security measures will be carried out by the Navy.

4. Co-operation in land and river operations.

The Navy will co-operate in the movement up the river to PALEMBANG. ~~The~~ Army will assist in ~~the~~ land operations ~~which follows.~~ However, the Navy will co-operate until the Army planes have all reached this area.

E. Exchange of intelligence reports.

The Army will attempt to obtain information about the enemy air force in BATAVIA and will report such information to the Navy.

Separate Vol. No. 3

Outline of the Southern SUMATRA raiding operation.

1. Operational mission.

To capture PALEMBANG Airfield and facilitate the start of the "L" and JAVA operations. Also, to capture and hold the PALEMBANG oil refineries before their destruction by the enemy.

2. Outline of operations:

(1). Prior to L minus 1, the 3rd Air Brigade (including attached units) will

destroy the enemy air force in PALEMBANG.

(2). The first raid will be carried out at 1130 hours on L minus 1 day. However, this date will be postponed in a separate order, if weather or other conditions make it necessary.

(3). By the evening of L minus 2, the 1st echelon will be deployed in KAHAN; and the 2nd and 3rd echelons and one regiment of light bombers will be deployed in KURAN. Preparations for the raid will be made.

(4). The 1st and 2nd echelons will carry out their operations separately. The 1st echelon will land in PALEMBANG Airfield, and the 2nd echelon will land in the vicinity of the PALEMBANG oil refineries. They will destroy the enemy forces in the surrounding area and hold these places until the arrival of the 38th Division.

If ~~conditions are unfavorable~~ situation permits, the 1st echelon airborne units will attack ~~instead~~ the enemy barracks in PALEMBANG.

(5). The 3rd Air Brigade will advance with the ~~raiding group~~ light bomber wing of the 1st & 2nd echelons and will bomb enemy barracks in PALEMBANG prior to the landing, ~~of the raiding groups~~.

(6). The headquarters reconnaissance unit, under the direct control of the 3rd Air Group, will ~~observe~~ reconnoiter the battlefields before and at the time of the advance of the raiding group.

(7). Following the raid, the 1st and 2nd echelons and the light bomber units will assemble and return to their bases as soon as possible. The heavy bomber units will return to their base, and the raiding (transport) air units will ~~obtain oil supplies~~ refuel at KURAN and KAHAN airfields before returning to their bases. Those ~~not needed for this~~ ~~will~~ return to their bases directly will not refuel.

(8). The 3rd Air Brigade will provide cover for the first raid with a portion of their fighter units. This will be followed by the protection of the convoy after 1700 hours.

As need arises, support the advance of friendly troops, ~~As warranted by the advance of friendly troop, co-operate in these land~~

~~fighting~~.

(9). The headquarters reconnaissance unit of the 3rd Air Brigade will reconnoiter the battlefields of the landing units.

(10). Preparations for the 2nd raid will be made at 1500 hours of the day following the 1st raid.

The landing (airborne units) force will normally be about 2 transport squadrons. The landing point will be the ~~vicinity of~~ PALEMBANG airfield.

3. The disposition of troops and the operational timetable is given in appended sheet No. 1.

4. Basis of joint operations.

Details concerning

~~The~~ landing points, advanced disposition, etc. will be decided by the 1st echelon Commander.

would commence on 8 Feb.

It was decided that the SINGAPORE attack and the "L" operation would be started on ~~8 and~~ 12 February, (L day) respectively. In accordance with the above mentioned change, the 3rd Air Group Commander ~~reorganized~~ revised the activities of units under his command and ordered the 3rd Air Brigade Commander to ~~locate and~~ destroy enemy aircrafts in the vininity of PALEMBANG.

L Day was changed again to 15 February. Therefore, the 3rd Air Group Commander ~~reorganized~~ revised the activities of units under his command in accordance with the change in date and issued the following order:

1. The 3rd Air Brigade ~~Commander~~ will reconnoiter PALEMBANG Airfield and will destroy enemy aircraft whenever possible.

The 64th Air Regiment will come under the command of this brigade from 2200 ~~hours~~, 11 February.

2. The 7th Air Brigade Commander will ~~release the~~ place its 64th Air Regiment ~~and place it~~ under the command of the 3rd Air Brigade ~~at~~ after 2200 ~~hours~~, 11 February.

Vol. 4 Chart No. 1

Daily Schedule of Disposition of Forces for Raiding Operation in PALEMBANG

Object of Operation	Disposition of Force	Object of Operation (Duties)	Outline of Movements
to L minus 1 Day / L minus 4 Day	Fighter Units of 3rd Air Brigade (Including attached units)	To destroy enemy airfield on PALEMBANG.	Attack when opportunity permits. Base of departure is KLUANG and KAHANG Airfield.
	Necessary units from the 12th Air ~~Group~~ Brigade	Hold air superiority over "PO" area. To reconoiter BAKANBARU and if necessary destroy enemy aircraft in this area.	Attack when opportunity permits. Base of departure is BATUPAHAT. airfield
L minus 2 Day	1st Raiding Unit ~~of Raiding~~ Group 98th Air Unit 59th and 64th Air Units 3 planes of 81st Air Unit. 1 light bomber unit of 3rd Air Brigade	Each echelon will concentrate forces (by evening) to KLUANG and KAHANG for the first ~~air~~ raid. Prepare for action on L minus 1 Day. preparations on the field for use by	(1) 1st ~~Air~~ Raid Unit of ~~Air~~ Raid Group will leave SUNGEI PATANI and advance to KLUANG and KAHANG. (2) 98th Air Unit will leave ~~KEMAYU~~ 2 squadrons to concentrate in KAHAN and 1 in KLUANG.
L minus 1 Day	1st Echelon Part of Advance Raid 2nd Regiment (About 2 Air Companies. Squadrons Approx. 2 ~~Companies~~ of 98th Air Regiment. 64th Air Regiment 1 plane from 81st Air Regt. (Combined) 2nd Echelon Part of Advance Raid 2nd Regiment (Approx. 2 Squadron of Transport planes 1 Squadron of the 98th Air Regiment Part of 81st Air Regiment (Combined) Besides these 1 plane of 81st will ~~advance~~ precede the echelons	(1) 1st Echelon ~~to~~ will advance to vicinity of PALEMBANG Airfield and ~~to~~ secure it. Also ~~to~~ will make emergency ~~repair for~~ the 97th Air Regiment. (2) 2nd Echelon will advance to vicinity of PALEMBANG oil refinery and occupy the ~~before~~ are the enemy can destroy the refinery. (3) The 98th Air Regiment will assist air transport squadrons of both ehhelons. ~~To~~ transport ordnance and supplies and ~~give support from~~ protect the rear. (4) Fighter plane Regt. will directly escort each echelon. (5) H.Q. reconnaissance planes will reconnoiter and lead the patrol before & during the raid	(1) Will start at 1130 hours. (2) The 1st Echelon will depart from KAHANG and 2nd Echelon from KLUANG. (3) Will return to advance base if possible. (4) When air transport does not permit movement of troops number of men shall be reduced but all organization shall remain. All those able to continue further will directly return to base of operations

If the aforesaid

24

22

L minus 1 Day	Part of Light Bomber Unit of 3rd Air Brigade	To attack Army barracks within the city of PALEMBANG.	(b) Duty will be carried out prior to the 1st raid, co-operating with one of the 2 Echelon in the best way possible. (c) Base of departure will be KUANG.
	3rd Air Brigade (Including attached units). Part of Fighter Unit	Air protection for the convoy of the 38th Div.	(c) After escorting the 1st Raid Gp. it will return immediately and give air protection to convoy from 1700 hours. (d) Discontinue operation in time to be back by twilight.
L-Day	3rd Echelon Part of 2nd Raid Regt. (approx. 2 Squadrons of Transport planes) Approx. 1 Squadron of 98th Air Regiment. Approx. 1 part of Fighter Unit of 3rd Air Brigade (including attached units) 1 plane of 81st Air Regiment	(1) To advance to vicinity of PALEMBANG Airfield and reinforce the 1st Raid Units. (2) Duties of the co-operating air units will remain the same as previous day. separate	(a) Base of departure will be KURAN Airfield. (2) Time of raid is scheduled for 1500 hours. ~~Definite~~ order for departure will be given later.
	Part of 3rd and 7th Air Brigade	To co-operate with Ground Forces in vicinity of PALEMBANG ~~in case of emergency.~~ if necessary.	
	Part of 12th Air Brigade	Advance to PALEMBANG Airfield after emergency reconstruction. Make air defense preparations in PALEMBANG.	Base will be at BATUPAHAT. Order as to definite time for raid will be given later.
L minus 1 Day L Day	H.Q. Reconnaissance Plane Unit of 3rd Air Brigade	After the raid group ~~it is their duty to look over~~ battlefield situation at proper time. reconnoiter	

Note: (1) Orders in regard to troop movement after L-Day will be given separately.

(2) Part of this chart may change ~~time~~ to meet situation.

3. In spite of the above outline of operations, the 1st Raiding Group Commander and the 98th Air Regiment Commander will use KAHAN and KURAN, respectively, as their ~~1st~~ bases of departure. for the 1st raid.

Chap. 2. Execution of the operation.

a. Aerial Warfare in the PALEMBANG Area

~~a.~~ In conformity with the above disposition, the 3rd Air Brigade of the 3rd Air Group will begin the operation for the destruction of enemy air forces in PALEMBANG on 6 February; by 8 February three attacks will be carried out, and the greater portion of the enemy air force in the area will be destroyed.

The activities of the 3rd Air Brigade are as follows:

6 February.

The 59th, 75th and 90th Air Regiments (based in KURAN), and the 64th Air Regt (base in KAHAN) with a total of 66 planes (1 headquarters reconnaissance plane, 32 fighters, and 33 ~~light~~ bombers), concentrated at Point KUP at 1530 ~~hours~~ and then advanced to PALEMBANG. On this day it was cloudy and ~~raining~~ rainy in the vicinity of PALEMBANG.

At 1730 ~~hours,~~ planes of the 59th and 64th Air Regiments ~~(about 60 planes)~~ flew low and strafed 60 planes on the ground and engaged in combat with counterattacking enemy aircraft for 30 minutes. 15 enemy planes were shot down and 11 destroyed.

The light bomber unit (75th and 90th Air Regiments) abandoned this attack and changed ~~their~~ its objective to MUNTOK, which was attacked without any damage to our force.

7 February.

Through ~~the activities~~ reconnaissance of the H.Q. Reconnaissance Unit, it was known that approximately 30 planes still remained on the PALEMBANG Airfield.

The 3rd Air Brigade (59th, 64th and 90th Air Regiments), with a total of 37 planes (31 fighters and 6 light bombers), advanced to the airfield at 1520 ~~hours~~, concealing their movements by low-hanging clouds, but was strafed & bombed ~~and~~, going through heavy anti-aircraft fire, ~~attacked~~ enemy planes on the ground;

20 planes were destroyed, 10 were engaged in aerial combat and the majority of these were shot down. Two of our planes were shot down.

8 February.

The 3rd Air Group went to the same airfield with 42 planes (25 fighters and 17 light bombers) of the 59th, 64th and 90th Air Regiments ~~and~~ to destroy~~ed~~ the remaining enemy planes in this vicinity. From 1130 to 1140 ~~hours~~, 2 enemy planes were shot down, and 9 were destroyed.

Therefore, a major portion of the enemy airforce in PALEMBANG was destroyed by the 3rd Air Regiment; however, due to the condition of the Navy, the raiding operation was delayed. Thus, the 3rd Air Group Commander, in order to complete the destruction of the enemy air force, attacked PALEMBANG again with the 3rd Air Brigade and waited for the completion of the preparations for the raid.

The activities of the 3rd Air Brigade are as follows:

From 1030 to 1130 ~~hours~~, the 3rd Air Brigade (59th, 64th, 75th and 90th Air Regiments) attacked PALEMBANG Airfield with a total of 36 planes (29 fighters and 7 light bombers). Five planes were shot down and 4 were destroyed. Three of our planes did not return.

b. PALEMBANG Raiding Operation.

(1). Organization and preliminary training of the 1st Raiding Group.

The air borne raiding units ~~was~~ received training at SHINTABARA of MIYAZAKI Prefecture in November 1941. ~~However,~~ The temporary organization of the 1st Raiding Group was order on 1 December; and after the completion of the organization on the 4th, ~~training was~~ preparations for the coming operation were continued at the same place.

On 8 January, it was placed under the command of the Southern Army Commander and sent to PNONPENH. On 31 January, ~~it~~ the 1st Raiding Group was placed under the command of the 3rd Air Group Commander and operational preparations were made ~~following~~ based upon the separate volume on operational preparations.

The objectives of the operation ~~was~~ were PALEMBANG Airfield and the oil refineries. The date of the first landing was fixed ~~for~~ as the morning of L minus 1 day.

~~Appendix~~ Separate volume

Plans for the Operational Preparation of the First Raiding Group

I. Operation Object of--PALEMBANG

II. Expected Table of Operations
~~Anticipated Division of Troops~~ and ~~Their~~ Duties (~~will~~ to be decided at MALAY)

A. The 2nd Raiding Regiment

1. Airfield raiding unit

Commander--commander of the 2nd Raiding Regiment

Regimental Headquarters (minimum number necessary for raids)

Signal Section--men necessary for communication between the rear echelon signal headquarters and the company and between the signal headquarters and the unit which will attack the oil refineries.

Company A (one section and another section lacking one unit, without automatic guns but with anti-tank guns)

Engineer Company (one section and another section lacking a unit)

Total--260 men

The 2nd Raiding Regiment will ~~attack~~ raid & occupy the airfields and ~~will occupy and defend~~ guard them with a detachment. The main force will immediately attack the enemy at PALEMBANG and will securely occupy it.

The regimental commander will also command the unit that will raid oil refineries.

2. Oil refinery raiding unit

Commander--commander of Company B

Company B--one section and another section lacking a few men

Technicians--approximately 30 men

A part of the Signal Unit (men necessary for liaison with the main force)

Total 130 men

They will parachute to the vinini ty of the oil refineries and after raiding and occupying the oil refineries, they will firmly hold their positions.

3. Raiding Unit Reserves

Commander--commander of Company C

Company C

A section of Company A and a few other men

A section of Company B and a few other men

A section of the Engineers Company and a few other men

4. The personnel left in the battlefield will be given a commander and will remain in PNOM-PENH.

B. Aerial Raiding Unit

1. Airfield Raiding Air Unit

Commander--commander of the air raiding unit

Airplanes--27

2. Oil Refinery Raiding Air Unit

Commander--Capt. X

Airplanes--13

C. ~~Air Division~~ Supporting Heavy Bomber Unit (98th Air Regiment)

1. Airfield raiding air unit--approximately 19 planes

2. Oil refinery raiding air unit--approximately 8 planes

III. Daily ~~Routine~~ Schedule for Operational Preparations

February 2nd, 3rd and 4th

Combined training with heavy bombers at PNOM-PENH

2nd Regiment's operational preparation

Advancing of the ~~forward~~ Advance forces on the 4th

(This will be effected by 1 transport plane of the raiding air unit.)

February 5th and 6th

Advance to SUNGEIPATANI

February 7th

Operational preparations at SUNGEIPATANI

February 8th

Advance to KLUANG or KAHANG

February 9th

Execution of the raid

The daily ~~program~~ schedule up to the 7th is subject to change as the situation may demand.

IV. The principles for the operational operations are as follows:

Separate Chart

Basic Standard for the Preparation of the 1st Operation

1. 2nd Raiding Regt. will:

a. ~~Make plans for~~ Determine general disposition of forces and ~~plan for~~ stationing of the first raiding unit

b. ~~Make decision as to what~~ Determine type of materials ~~will be used~~ to be carried for the first raid.

c. ~~Decide on the amount~~ Determine number of heavy bombers required for the first raid.

d. ~~Decide on the advance plans for~~ Determine the disposition of air transport of men and materials in advancing

e. Prepare necessary documents for coordination with the supporting air units (especially heavy bomber units).

f. Complete necessary preparations for carrying out raid.

g. ~~Decide on the distribution of~~ Dispose troops for the raid.

2. Raiding Air Unit will:

a. Distribute raiding air units and heavy bomber units. (Decision will be made after agreement with the air group).

b. Decide on ~~the advance~~ plans for air transportation of advancing personnel and materials by Draft

c. ~~Decide the~~ plans for combined training of heavy bomber units and attached transport units.

d. ~~Decide the~~ Determine distribution of maintenance personnel.

e. ~~Make~~ Frame necessary ~~data~~ Items for coordination with air group.

f. Formulate plans ~~to~~ for replenish ing fuels and lubrication oils supply.

g. Formulate plans to replace aircraft and parts.

h. ~~Decide the~~ Determine distribution of troops for the raid.

3. Raid Group Headquarters will:

a. Decide the disposition of forces.

b. Make final plans for the distribution of troops for the first raid.

c. Make rough sketch of the distribution of troops for the 2nd and 3rd raid.

d. Decide distribution and location of the remaining personnel.

e. " disposal of late troops in the raid

f. Decide distribution of 2nd Raiding Regiment in advancing.

g. Decide the amount determine number of heavy bombers required.

h. Control and distribute air transport units and the 3rd Air Raid Unit.

i. Make coordination plan with the 3rd Air Group.

j. Receive maps and materials for operations.

k. Gather aerial photos.

l. Prepare ~~information~~ interpretive movies.

m. ~~Procure propaganda materials and espionage data by liaison between agents.~~ Liaison between propaganda and espionage personnel

n. Control ~~the arrangement of~~ & equip each unit with materials to be carried ~~by each unit.~~

o. Make plans for communication and weather observation sections.

p. Direct plans concerning intendance.

q. ~~Plan hygience courses.~~ make plans concerning sanitation.

r. ~~Plan for replacement of~~ Supply provisions, ~~and~~ ammunitions and personnel by air.

s. Prepare for supplying aircraft parts, fuels and lubrication.

t. ~~Arrange agreement~~ Coordinate action with 16th Army.

u. Draw up orders together with plans for ~~advance~~ raiding.

Note:

1. ~~Duties to be carried out by~~ The Raid Group Headquarters ~~is to~~ will and lead unify all the units under its command.

2. In making plans each unit will mutually keep liaison with other units.

(1) The Plans for Attack and A Summarization of the Raids of the First Raiding Group

As soon as the commander of the raiding group received orders on ~~February 4th~~ 4 February from the 3rd Air Group in regard to the execution of the raid, the commander made the plans for attack and a summarization of the raids, and with this as a basis, gave the following orders on the 11th:

The Gist of Orders for the 1st Raiding Group

I. The 1st Raiding Group, in accordance with a separate volume No. 1 of the 1st plans for attack, will carry out a raid on PALEMBANG airfield and the vicinity of the oil refineries on ~~X~~ L-1 Day at 1130 hours and will firmly occupy the positions. At the same time, it will ~~right on the fighting of~~ support the 38th Division and the 3rd Air Group.

Until the conclusion of Raiding Operation "L", the 12th Air Transport ~~Air Company~~ Squadron will temporarily be under my command. The 3rd Air Brigade, the 81st and the 98th Air Regiments will carry out the combined raids.

The parachute unit or the landing unit will ~~be~~ come under the command of the 16th Army commander upon the arrival of the main force of the 38th Division at PALEMBANG. Upon the conclusion of Operation "L", other subordinate units of the group will return to their original ~~detachments~~ stations without receiving new orders.

II. The ~~actions~~ movement of the airfield raiding unit will be as follows:

A. The main force will parachute to the southeastern section of the airfield and ~~the detachment~~ of the group to the western section of the airfield. They will attack and occupy the airfield and hold it firmly with the necessary force. The main force will attack and occupy PALEMBANG. Particular attention will be paid to the ~~protection~~ guarding of DJAMBI Road. The ~~paratroopers~~ area

will be protected by fighter planes ~~until the taking of their positions.~~ from the landing of the troops to the completion of preparing airfield for use. In attacking the airfield, ~~a close liaison~~ communication will be maintained ~~with~~ between the forced-landed planes and the other planes.

B. ~~As soon as~~ With the occupation of the airfield, ~~is effected, the repairing of~~ will first be repaired for use of the airfield ~~for~~ fighter planes, ~~will be undertaken first,~~ then for the larger planes. ~~later.~~

C. ~~As soon as~~ With the occupation of PALEMBANG ~~has been completed,~~ the various oil refining machinery and ~~the acquisition of the transporta-~~ as much as possible captured for use of the 38th Division tion facilities will be ~~safeguarded.~~

D. ~~The airfield raiding until will reorganize and command the oil refinery raiding unit.~~ After the raid, the command of the oil refinery raiding unit will be unified.

E. ~~The unit which has as a nucleus,~~ The 38th Division advance unit (one and a half infantry battalions) under the command of Colonel TANAKA ~~of the advanced unit of the 38th Division, is scheduled to go up the river to~~ will advance upstream to PALEMBANG on L +1 Day.

III. The oil refinery raiding unit will parachute to the vicinity of the oil refineries and will occupy the important parts of it with a surprise attack, and will endeavor to check enemy plans to destroy the refineries. The refineries will be held firmly after having been captured. Particular attention will be paid to enemy activities in the west and the on upper courses of the river. After the landing, the command will return to the regimental commander. ~~Thus~~ liaison will be made as quickly as possible.

IV. The commander of the 2nd Raiding Regiment will firmly hold the occupied area until the arrival of the main force of the 38th Division.

(~~Prearranged on~~ Fixed as L + 3 Day)

V. The aerial raiding unit carrying paratroops will attack the vicinity of PALEMBANG on L-1 Day at 1130 hours.

VI. The ~~Liaison~~ Supporting Heavy Bomber Regiment will assault the PALEMBANG region ~~and~~ transport necessary ammunition and supplies. It will also assume the duties of protecting the aerial raiding unit by setting up an AA ~~barrage~~ line of fire.

VII. A ~~summary of the raids made by~~ Raiding outline for the aerial raiding unit and the ~~Liaison~~ Supporting Heavy Bomber Raiding Regiment is shown in the separate Volume II.

VIII. The ~~Secondary~~ Raiding Ground Unit will be prepared to assault SUNGEIPAKNANI on L Day.

Separate Volume I

Plan for the Raiding Attack on PALEMBANG

I. Plan

On ~~L+1~~ L-1 Day (February 10), the 1st raid will be executed. At 1130 hours of the same day, paratroopers will be utilized and the surprise attack and occupation of PALEMBANG airfield will be carried out by the main force. After a firm position is established on the airfield, PALEMBANG will be attacked and occupied. Simultaneously a detachment will parachute to the vicinity of the oil refineries and maintaining firm pressure a surprise attack will be effected.

On L Day, the second raid will be effected and the fighting power will be increased. Maintaining close liaison with the co-operating air units, the co-ordination of the air and land units and ~~complete~~ security ~~counter~~ measures ~~espionage~~ will be anticipated.

II. ~~Gist~~ Outline

A. Deployment to the Line of Departure

Deployment will be carried out by dispatching the airfield raiding unit and the ~~co-operating~~ supporting air unit to KAHANG and by dispatching the oil refinery raiding unit and its ~~co-operating~~ supporting air unit to KLUANG in order to complete preparations for the raid.

B. Summary of Aerial Navigation

1. The departure from the base will be carried out so that at 1130 hours on L-1 Day, parachuting can be effected.

2. The details of the navigational formation will be determined by the commander of the raiding group after conferring with the commanders of the 2nd Raiding Regiment, the air raiding unit and the 98th Air Regiment.

3. The commander of the raiding group will make any change in plan necessary due to atmospheric conditions during ~~the execution of the operation~~ flight and up to the parachuting of the troops.

C. Parachuting ~~Maneuvers~~

1. The approaching direction, formation, height for parachuting and the aerial concentration will be determined by the commander of the raiding group after conferring with the commanders of the aerial raiding unit, the 2nd Raiding Regiment and the 98th Air Regiment.

2. The signal for parachuting will be given by the air unit, but the parachuting will be carried out by the paratroops.

3. If the parachuting operation cannot be carried out for reasons such as a wrong approach, etc. the manuever will be repeated within the limitations of the circumstances at the time.

D. ~~Execution of Attack~~

1. The unit which parachutes in the vicinity of the airfield will firmly hold the eastern section of the airfield with its main force and the airfield with a detachment. The main force will attack PALEMBANG and will occupy it. Close contact will be maintained with the plane that have forced-landed. The DJAMBI Road will be especially protected. When the occupation of PALEMBANG airfield is complete, as much transport facilities will be ~~preserved as much~~ captured as possible. The airfield will be ~~simultaneously~~

repaired for the ~~battle units~~ first fighter planes and later for large planes.

(One and a half battalions) infantry under the command of Colonel TANAKA, ~~who has been detached to~~ the advance unit of the 38th Division, is scheduled to ~~will go up the river~~ advance upstream to PALEMBANG on L+1 day.

2. The unit which will parachute to the vicinity of the oil refineries will occupy the oil refineries the important installations of first and will hold them firmly after landing.

3. Liaison will be maintained between the two raiding units. The oil refinery raiding unit will come under the command of ~~the commander of the~~ regiment commander after their landing.

4. Both of the units will hold their operational objectives firmly until the arrival of the main force of the 38th Division. They will then be under placed the command of the 16th Army ~~commander upon the arrival of the main force of the 38th Division~~. The main force of the Division will arrive at PALEMBANG on L+3 Day (February 13).

E. The Operations of the Air Units after the Raid

The air unit, namely the 98th Air Regiment, will consolidate and return to the base. The aerial raiding unit will refuel at ~~KURUANG~~ KLUANG and KAHANG airfields before returning to the base.

F. The Execution of the 2nd Raid

1. The second raid will take place at 1500 hours on L Day (February 10). The parachuting force will consist of 100 men under a company commander. They will depart from SUNGEIPATANI. After refueling at KLUANG or KAHANG the raid will be effected. The main force of the company will parachute ~~to the vicinity of the airfield and PALEMBANG Road~~ in the area adjacent to the PALEMBANG ROAD leading to the airfield. Approximately one section will parachute to the vicinity of the oil refineries. The landing point will be indicated by the ~~land~~ ground unit.

2. If the 12th Air Transport Corps ~~can be utilized, the second raid will go no farther than the preparatory stage. Execution will be carried out by a definite order.~~ is to be used in the 2nd raid, all preparations for the operation will be stopped. The 2nd raid will be carried out by a separate order.

III. The Distribution of Troops ~~(No. in parenthesis indicates~~ (In case ~~where~~ 12th Air Transport Corps is used, the size of units indicated in parentheses will be deleted.)

Landing forces of ~~The~~ 1st Raiding Unit ~~of the Ground Forces~~

Airfield Raiding Unit

Commander--2nd Raiding Regimental commander

One Infantry Raiding company--~~(1 section lacking and another section with part lacking)~~ (1 section & portion of another)

Raiding engineer company ~~(1 section lacking and another section with part lacking)~~ (1 section & portion of another)

Total 260 men

The Oil Refinery Raiding Unit

1 Infantry raiding company--~~(one section lacking and another section with part lacking)~~ (1 section & portion of another)

Technicians several

A part of the signal section

Total 130 men

~~2nd Raiding Unit of the Ground Forces~~ 2nd Ground Force Raiding Unit

1 Infantry raiding company--~~(part lacking)~~ a portion

Total 100 men

~~Aerial Raiding Unit~~ Raiding Air Unit

98th Air ~~Regiment~~ (unit under delegated command)

IV. Supplies for Parachute Units

The supplying of ammunition and other necessary material for the parachuted units after landing will be handled by the air transports when necessary.

Separate Volume II

Summary of the Raids by the ~~Aerial Raiding Unit~~ Raiding Air Units and ~~Each~~ the various Co-operating Air ~~Regiment~~ Squadrons

I. Plan

In the first raid which will take place at 1130 ~~hours~~ on L-1 Day, the ~~aerial raiding unit~~ raiding air Units and ~~each~~ the various co-operating air ~~regiment~~ squadron will be required ~~to do their~~ of the Raid utmost ~~co-operatively~~ cooperation, with ~~in~~ a firm conviction of ultimate victory.

II. ~~Summary~~ Outline of the Raids

A. Deployments ~~from~~ at the Line of Departure

Each company will ~~be deployed~~ deploy at KAHAN Airfield until around 1900 on L-2 Day and will ~~be prepared to execute~~ prepare for the execution of the raid. One company of the 11th Air ~~Regiment~~ Squadron at SUNGEIPATANI Airfield will accompany the ~~aerial raiding~~ raiding air unit ~~in order~~ to give protection after which the ~~later this~~ company will land at BATU-PAHAT Airfield. The heavy bomber ~~regiment~~ squadrons will deploy at KURUAN Airfield by the evening of L-2 Day and prepare ~~to execute~~ for the execution of the raid.

B. ~~Summary~~ Outline of Navigation

1. Departure

The preparation for departure will be completed by 0730 ~~hours~~ on L-1 Day. The time for departure will be ~~at~~ 0830.

~~2. Summary of the Actions of Each Co-operating Regiment~~ Outline

a. The fighter units (59th and 64th ~~Regiments~~ Squadrons)

The fighter unit will accompany the raiding unit and ~~take~~ escort ~~charge of direct protection~~. After the paratroops land, the ~~fighter unit~~ main force of the fighter unit will protect them while they are being ~~will with its main force protect them while the equipment is being supplied~~ equipped them. The rest of the forces will continue the mission of protecting the air unit.

b. Ligh+ bomber uni+

This uni+ will bomb airfield ~~and barracks~~ the barracks as well as the weapons at the airfield.

c. Headquar+ers reconnaissance uni+

Af+er aiding +he officers of +he ~~aerial raiding uni+ who will reconnoi+er +he +errain in +he vicini+y of PALEMBANG +o familiarize +hemselves wi+h i+ prior +o +he raid~~ raiding air units for a pre-raid reconnoitering and formation flight over the PALEMBANG vicinity terrain, +he headquar+ers reconnaissance uni+ will ~~reconnoi+er +he wea+her condi+ions of +he enemy +erri+ory and one plane will make a repor+ +o +he base by 0900 hours on L-1 Day.~~ send one plane to report the weather condition over the enemy territory by 0900 on L-1 Day. The other two planes will lead the para-troop unit and reconnoiter the condition after the unit parachutes into position.

3. Return

After the attack is completed, form the group together and return as soon as possible to the KAHAN Airfield.

Tranспor+ planes will re+urn direc+ly +o SUNGEIPA'ANI by order of +he aerial uni+ commander af+er +he breakaway from +he heavy bombers.

The heavy bomber uni+ will re+urn +o KECHIR Airfield ~~af+er~~ by wi+hdrawing from +he aerial raiding uni+ ~~if~~ in case +he enemy planes avoid ~~fighting~~ counter-attack. The ~~aerial raiding uni+~~ air unit will re+urn ~~to~~ SUNGEIPA'ANI by companies af+er refueling a+ KAHANG.

Par+ III. Fac+s Concerning +he Enemy Si+ua+ion +ha+ Should Be Known Prior +o +he A++ack; +he Con+our of +he Terrain and +he Wea+her Condi+ions

I. Enemy Forces in +he Vicini+y of PALEMBANG

PALEMBANG and DJAMBI subsidiary headquar+ers--(commander--a Colonel)

Infan+ry ba++alion--(commander--a L+. Colonel. 2-3 infan+ry companies)

4-5 ligh+ +anks

Machine guns and several infan+ry guns

Several an+i-aircraf+ guns

Several planes

II. The Main Ins+alla+ions of +he Enemy in +he PALEMBANG Vicini+y

Barracks--nor+hwes+ of PALEMBANG

SUNGEIGELONG oil refinery--abou+ 5 km eas+ of PALEMBANG

UYODIRAFF oil refinery--abou+ 5 km eas+ of PALEMBANG

North airfield of PALEMBANG--about 10 km northwest of PALEMBANG

New airfield in PALEMBANG--Uncertain (said to be located between the north airfield and PALEMBANG)

III. The Oil Fields

Oil wells are in DJAMBI, SEKAYU, TEBATAGUN and RABAT. Oil is transported to PALEMBANG by means of steel pipes.

IV. Land Features

The vicinity of PALEMBANG city is swampy so that communication is generally difficult except by road. The MUSI River is navigable up to PALEMBANG for ships of the 5 or 6 ton class. A railroad has been laid between PALEMBANG and TELOEKBETOENG and between PALEMBANG and RUBKLINGAU.

V. The Weather on February 14

Fine or cloudy with slight winds in MALAY. The cloud ceiling was 1000 meters with visibility of 10 to 20 kilometers. In the vicinity of PALEMBANG, the weather was bad before it changed. The cloud ceiling was 200 meters and visibility was poor, due to the smoke from the burning oil from SINGAPORE, hanging over the mouth of the MUSI River.

Part IV. The Raiding Operation and the Situation After Parachuting

The 1st Raiding Unit completed its deployment on KAHANG and KLUANG airfields at 1500 hours on the 13th. The situation was as follows:

KAHANG Airfield

Headquarters of Raiding Group

The 2nd Raiding Regiment (330 men)

2 Air Transport companies (34 bomber-type transport planes)

The 64th Air Regiment (3 air companies with Model I fighters)

KLUANG Airfield

The 98th Air Regiment (2 air companies with Model 97-2 heavy bombers)

The 90th Air Regiment (1 air company with Model 99-2 twin-engined light bombers)

The 59th Air Regiment (2 air companies with fighters)

The 15th Independent Air Unit

The 81st Air Regiment

The 3rd Company (90 men) which was to be the 2nd Raiding Unit waited for an opportunity to strike from SUNGEIPATANI.

1. The Battle on February 14

The 1st Raiding Unit started from KLUANG and KAHANG airfields at (0830 hours on February 14th. Assembling over BATUPAHAT, the unit began its advance by making 2 formations toward the mouth of the MUSI River at an altitude of 3,000 meters and under the direct protection of the fighter unit.

A part of the reconnaissance unit surveyed weather conditions and the enemy situation in the PALEMBANG vicinity prior to the departure of the raiding unit. On this day the weather in SUMATRA was unfavorable. Clouds overhung PALEMBANG. The cloud ceiling was 200 meters and the oil-smoke caused by the burning of SINGAPORE was overhanging far to the mouth of the MUSI River making visibility very poor.

Appendix

The adverse atmospheric conditions over the MUSI River and PALEMBANG made navigation difficult for the raiding unit, but by taking advantage of the adversity, the unit could carry the surprise attack to the enemy.

At 1120 hours, the raiding unit reached the mouth of the MUSI River. Each formation approached the point for the parachute operation. When the first formation approached the mouth of the MUSI and the 2nd

formation, the vicinity of the oil refineries, the surprised enemy began firing anti-aircraft guns and machine guns all at once. The paratroops began jumping into the think of the enemy fire. The airfield raiding unit completed jumping at 1126 hours, while the oil refinery raiding unit completed their jumping at 1130 hours.

The 98th Air Regiment dropped equipment such as guns and ammunition simultaneously firing at the enemy anti-aircraft guns. The 90th Air Regiment (light bomber regiment) checked enemy ground units by bombing them, easing the job of the paratroops in assembling guns and ammunition to start the attack. In the meantime, one plane of the 98th Air Regiment went down in flames after being shot in an engine.

While the 64th Air Regiment was covering the parachuting operation at an approximate altitude of 800 meters, 5 enemy fighters appeared and started to attack the heavy bomber regiment which was carrying the equipment to be parachuted. The 64th Air Regiment intercepted the enemy fighters shooting one down and driving back the others. At 1205 hours 10 enemy fighters appeared from the direction of PALEMBANG, while the 64th Air Regiment at an altitude of about 2,000 meters was covering the operation. Intercepting the fighters, the 64th Air Regiment shot down one plane and drove back the others. The time was 1217 hours. The 59th Air Regiment protecting the paratroops in the oil refinery area, strafed the enemy anti-aircraft guns in the oil refineries, neutralizing them, thus easing the pressure on the paratroops. After the paratroops were firmly established, the air cover units gradually withdrew from the combat zone from 1210 hours and returned to their bases.

The Fighting of the Paratroops Who Landed in the Airfield Area

As soon as the airfield raiding unit parachuted into the area, the unit commenced action about 3 kilometers southeast of the airfield at 1126 hours with the main force and on the southwest side of the airfield at 1130 with a partial force. With protection from the air, the unit advanced toward the airfield, attempting to grasp it. The main force which parachuted to the south east section of the airfield set out for the southeast corner of the airfield immediately. At about 1200 hours, the commander consolidated 10 paratroops and while advancing thru the jungle, 24 more officers and men were assembled at about 1330 hours in a hollow place about 2 kilometers southeast of the airfield. At this time, he was informed of the enemy situation in the vicinity of the road that leads to the PALEMBANG airfield. Anticipating that enemy reinforcements from PALEMBANG to the airfield would come quickly, he decided to intercept the reinforcements from the city by advancing speedily to the DJAMBI road. Sending 30 men with an officer to the road between PALEMBANG and the airfield, he ordered them toward the airfield administration building. Having an advance party of 20 men, this party advanced with armored cars, and came in contact with about 300 enemy troops coming from the vicinity of the airfield. Our troops destroyed the enemy after heavy fighting and then occupied the administration building at 1820. While advancing, the commander and his men came to grips with 100 of the enemy but our men arrived at the eastern section of the airfield. Assembling 25 more officers and men there, the commander reached the airfield administration building. At that location the commander came to control the unit which was there as well as the officers and men who assembled there in succession. Prior to this a unit (15 men including an officer) which had parachuted to the

vicinity of the road between the airfield and PALEMBANG fought with nearly 200 enemy troops equipped with 2 light armored cars at 1200 hours. Our units captured a light armored car and 3 trucks and cut off enemy reinforcements from the airfield.

In the southwest section of the airfield, a unit commander who had parachuted into that vicinity, carried on the advance, assembling the paratroopers under his command. As he approached the southwest barracks of the airfield at about 1400 hours, he came across 350 enemy troops. Because of the smallness of his force (2 men), he avoided combat. At about 1700 hours, he and his two men dashed into the barracks and occupied it. 16 men were assembled from the other unit. The guns and ammunition were not easily assembled, due to firing by the enemy from the anti-aircraft battery near the barracks. Our troops advanced with hand grenades and pistols, destroying the barracks. The enemy made a surprise attack and the commander died heroically after having been wounded by an enemy anti-aircraft machine gun. The troops advanced to the vicinity of the northwest edge of the airfield. With such progress, the airfield raiding unit occupied the airfield. The troops were assembling by midnight and kept a strict vigil. On this night there were no enemy counter-attacks except for spasmodic firing.

Fighting by the Paratroops In the Oil Refinery Area

As soon as the oil refinery attack unit had parachuted to the west side of the western oil refineries with the main force (the nucleus of Co. A of the 2nd Raiding Regiment with 60 men including officers) at 1130 hours and to the south side of eastern oil refineries with its smaller forces (39 men including officers) as planned, they attempted to consolidate their guns and ammunition and to concentrate the troops under aerial

protection. One section which parachuted into the west side of the western refineries began to assault the southwest firing positions in the refineries at 1140 hours. The positions were captured after a determined assault. The section advanced further to the north along the road where the company houses stood. These paratroopers came in contact with about 60 enemy troops who had 2 light machine guns and one heavy machine gun. An attack was carried out immediately. Two squads (6 men including 2 leaders) which overtook the section, received the order to follow the defeated enemy and dashed into the refinery to occupy it. Both squads rushed the oil refinery, occuped the central derrick and raised the flag of the rising sun high on the derrick. The time was 1330 hours.

Meanwhile, the section leader and his men destroyed the enemy and at 1310 hours when he saw the flag of the rising sun hoisted on the central derrick, began to advance to the derrick. The company arrived at this time and the section leader came under his command. On its way to the derrick, the section destroyed about 30 enemy troops with two light machine guns. Advancing toward the central derrick at 1410 hours, the section was strengthened by two advance squads. The pipe valves were tightened and the fire in the boiler was extinguished to prevent the burning down of the refinery.

The enemy, taking advantage of the smallness of our forces, fiercely counter-attacked. They came as close as 40 or 50 meters so that friendly fire was indistinguishable from that of the enemy. Meanwhile oil was gushing from the storage tanks and pipes.

The company commander ordered an assault. After repulsing the the foe, the section advanced to the northeast area close to the company's houses. The enemy commenced firing with trench mortars and the tanks and

pipes hit by the rounds burst into flames. Columns of murky smoke hung above, making the scene very terrifying.

The section leader learned from front line reports that the road leading to the barracks was the only road that could be marched on. He and his men advanced along the road in the face of fierce enemy firing, and at 1500 hours, they reached a point about 100 meters from the enemy. It was then that the section leader died heroically after being shot in the head.

Casualties were increasing. Because of the difficulty in advancing, patrols were dispatched at 1600 hours to find an alternate route but resulted negatively. Thus a night attack was planned. Preparations and strengthening of positions were taken care of. At 2300 hours, the section launched a night attack against the southeast portion of the barracks and later captured it. Attacks were repeated until all the derricks were occupied by 1000 hours on the 15th.

II. Fighting on February 15th

Combat in the Airfield Area

At 1030 hours on the 15th, a plane from the reconnaissance unit landed. A message describing the shortage of guns and ammunition was sent by this plane. The commander of the 3rd Air Group executed speedy transportation of personnel, guns and ammunition for the airfield battalion at KAHANG by transport planes. Simultaneously, he dispatched a part of the fighter unit to advance to PALEMBANG airfield to protect the raiding unit.

At 1130 hours, the commander of the raiding group arrived at the airfield and took over the general command. At 1300 hours, the 3rd company which was the 3rd echelon (90 men including officers) parachuted

to the airfield safely, increasing our fighting strength.

At 1600 the commander of the raiding group ordered a section of the 3rd company to enter PALEMBANG city. The section entered the enemy barracks in the city meeting no resistance. Enemy armored boats were discovered on the MUSI River going downstream. Firing was opened and one armored boat was put out of order throwing her crew into the water.

At 1930 hours, as soon as the commander of the raiding group learned of the section's situation, the raiding group was sent into PALEMBANG to begin mopping up operations.

The airfield raiding unit mopped up the city and in the meantime kept up liaison with the oil refinery raiding unit. In co-operation with the advanced unit of the 38th Division whixh was gradually arriving into the city at about 2100, the raiding unit firmly held the airfield and PALEMBANG. On the 20th, reins were turned over to the advanced unit.

Appendix

From facts learned after the fighting, the enemy defenders of the airfield numbered 530, consisting of British, Dutch and Australian soldiers. They were commanded by a Dutch colonel. Many trucks and light armored cars were attached to them. Several firing positions had been established around the airfield and 13 anti-aircraft guns and 5 anti-aircraft machine guns had also been emplaced.

Fighting in the Oil Refinery Area

The enemy counter-attacks became less intense on the dawn of the 15th. The raiding unit in the west oil refinery picked up the supplies that had been parachuted. After the job was finished the troops went back to the administration building at 0830 hours in 3 trucks.

In the east oil refinery area the derricks were firmly held throughout the night. At dawn of the 15th, mopping up operations in the vicinity were carried out. In spite of our vigil, the N.K.P.M. Company refinery exploded with a terrific blast and was soon enveloped in roaring flames. (The explosion of a time fuze shell seemed to be the cause.) The derricks and oil cracking equipment were not damaged. The oil refinery raiding unit completed the mopping up about noon of the 15th and held the area strongly. On the 20th, the garrison was replaced by a portion of the 38th Division.

Appendix

From facts obtained after the fighting, the defenders of the oil refineries numbered 550 men under the command of a captain. Several firing positions had been set up. Ten anti-aircraft guns and five anti-aircraft machine guns had been installed for aerial defense.

Thus the first army air borne raid was executed on PALEMBANG, the southernmost strategic point in SUMATRA, in a surprise attack with a small force. Parachuting deep into enemy territory, the enemy airfield and oil refineries had been occupied before their destruction, after overcoming various obstacles. The operation contributed greatly to future operations.

250,000 tons of oil in the oil refineries were captured as well as several British and American planes, by the airfield raiding unit.

Our losses as previously mentioned were 28 killed (3 of them due to the failure of their parachutes) and a few airplanes.

Article III. The Co-operation with the Landing Operations of the 16th Army

The Situation of the Advanced Unit of the 38th Division

The advanced unit of the 38th Division occupied MOENDOEK in the early morning of the 15th (2 companies) followed by the occupation of PANGKALPINANG and KOBA. The main force went up the MUSI River and reached PALEMBANG at 0 hour on the 16th and contacted the raiding unit. From the main force about 2 companies set off from PALEMBANG on the 16th on commandeered motor cars and dashed about 300 kilometers to occupy TANDJOENKARANG airfield on the 19th. On the 20th, the main force arrived at the place.

The Advance of the 3rd Air Group to PALEMBANG

As soon as the raiding operations of the 3rd Air Group had ended successfully and the landing of the advance troops of the 16th Army was completed, the command post of the 3rd Air Group was advanced to PALEMBANG. On the 11th, the 11th Air Regiment was advanced to PALEMBANG and was given the duty of protecting the anchorage of the MUSI River and the oil refineries. On the next day, the main force of the fighter unit, a part of the light bomber unit and the assault unit, were transferred to the same place to directly co-operate with the operation of the 38th Division. In southern SUMATRA there were no significant enemy forces. Because of a lack of objectives to attack, the air brigade took over the command, the liaison and the reconnaissance of the advancing front, etc. of the 38th Division.

The enemy assaulted the PALEMBANG vicinity with planes in small numbers day after day as follows:

Date	No. of Raids	No. of Planes	Target	Damage to Enemy	Our Damage
Feb. 15	3	4 Total	Airfield	2 shot down	None
Feb. 16	3	9 Total	"	None	None
Feb. 17	1	17	"	3 shot down	None
Feb. 19	1	3	Oil tanks and airfield	2 shot down	1 plane set on fire 1 half damaged
Feb. 20	1	1	Oil tanks	None	None
Feb. 21	1	1	Oil refinery	1 shot down	Cracking factory destroyed
Feb. 23	1	1	Airfield	None	2 planes set afire 3 planes half damaged
Feb. 24	2	3 Total	"	2 shot down	1 plane set afire
Feb. 25	1	1	Oil refinery	None	None
TOTAL	14	35 Total		10 shot down	4 planes set afire 4 planes half damaged

On the 20th, following the occupation of TANDJOENKARANG by TANAKA's detachment, the air group commander ordered the rapid repairing of the airfield. A part of the 12th Air Brigade was advanced to the airfield on the 24th to prepare for the JAVA operation which was to be in co-operation with the 16th Army.

Chapter III. Air Operations in JAVA

Paragraph I. Operational Preparations

Article I. The Summary of the Air Operation of the 3rd Air Group

The summary of the air operation of the 3rd Air Group is as follows:

I. Plan

1. Continued from "L" Operation, the rapid destruction of the enemy air force in the west JAVA area will be executed in co-operation

with the navy. Close co-operation with the operation of the 16th Army in west JAVA is also urged.

2. To accomplish the above mentioned objective, the base will be advanced rapidly to southern SUMATRA and then to western JAVA.

3. At the end of this operation, sustained combat will be effected to hold the occupied areas firmly. The transfer of forces to other areas may be carried out.

II. The Summary of the Directions

1. After the occupation and repairing of the PALEMBANG and TANJUNKARAN airfields, the enemy air forces in western JAVA (west from Longitude 108° E.) will be annihilated.

2. On the day before the landing of the main forces of the 16th Army, (landing will take place on February 26th and the day will be indicated as H Day). the 3rd Air Group will take the mission of protecting the convoy. After the SHOJI Detachment advances separately from point J, the aerial protection will be given to the convoy of the main forces of the 2nd Division.

3. After the main force of 16th Army has landed, the bases will be advanced as rapidly as the enemy airfields are occupied and repaired. At the same time, it is expected that the air sector force under the tactical command of the 16th Army will be attached to the Air Group.

4. Direct assistance to the fighting on land will be given after the 16th Army completes its landing operations.

5. The co-operation between the army and navy will be carried out according to separate agreement.

6. Direct assistance to the 48th Division in its operation

in Eas+ern JAVA will be given if circums+ances necessi+a+e i+:

III. The Allo+men+ of Uni+s

1. The division of uni+s is prearranged as follows:

Under direc+ command:

3 FB

12 FB

15 FS

11 FR

81 FR

(-51 FCS)

1 company of 1 FR

59 FR

64 FR

27 FR

(-1 company)

90 FR

75 FR

2. The du+y of each uni+, based upon +he above division, is prearranged as follows:

a. 81 FR will reconnoi+er enemy airfields and convey posi+ions and will +ake pho+ographs of +he landing poin+. All o+her reconnaissance will be carried ou+.

b. 12 FB will carry ou+ aerial comba+, +he pro+ec+ion of +he convoys and +he anchorages and if necessary +he pro+ec+ion of s+ra+egic poin+s.

c. The 3 FB will carry ou+ aerial comba+, direc+ air suppor+ +o +he ground opera+ions and if necessary +he pro+ec+ion of +he convoys.

3. A part of 7 FB will be utilized if necessary.

IV. The Other Units

A. In the west JAVA operations, a part of the 7th Air Brigade, the 3rd Air Brigade and the 12th Air Brigade may co-operate with the 25th Army in its north SUMATRA operations.

B. During this operation, a part of 12 FB will take charge of the air defenses of SINGAPORE and other strategic points in the occupied areas.

C. At the close of this operation, co-operation with the punitive campaign in the occupied area, the change to sustained combat, (constant disposition is expected) and the transfer of the unit to other areas is to be expected.

Insert Appended Map No. A

Planed Route of Transport Convoy


NOTE:
IF NO SPECIAL ORDERS ARE ISSUED ROUTE NO. 1 WILL BE TAKEN
APPENDED MAP A
PLANNED ROUTE OF TRANSPORT CONVOY
(SCALE IS SAME AS SEA MAP NO. 810)
KAMANG POINT
KAPAS
1ST ROUTE
2ND ROUTE
GREAT NATOENA ISL. (98)
ANAMBAS ISLS.
BORNEO
A
B
B'
C (4°-28'N 108°-50'E)
D (3°-5'N 107°-10'E)
E (2°-0'N 108°-12'E)
G (1°-35 107°-52'E)
(5°-26'N 107°-10E)
(10°-20'N 110°-46E)
0900 H-7
0900 H-5
1100 H-3
M H-7
N H-7
M H-7
M H-5
N H-5
N H-4
H-3
H-3
360'
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
NOTE:
IF NO SPECIAL ORDERS ARE ISSUED ROUTE NO. 1 WILL BE TAKEN
APPENDED MAP A
PLANNED ROUTE OF TRANSPORT CONVOY
(SCALE IS SAME AS SEA MAP NO. 810)
KAMENG POINT
KAMAU
1ST ROUTE
2ND ROUTE
GREAT NATOENA ISL.
ANAMBAS ISLS.
BORNEO
BANGKA ISL.
BILLITON ISL.
SUMATRA
BATAVIA
JAVA

Chapter 2. Outline of Activities of the Air Force Sector Units

Outline of activities of the air force sector units is as follows:

Whenever the battle progressed favorably the sector units of the air force immediately carried out landing transportation, reorganization etc. Furthermore they maintained close liaison with rear forces and simplified the advance of the air units to the extent that air units were able to co-operate closely with the front line.

A. Division of Transportation

1. Units that Advanced with the 2nd Division

The 4th Air Force sector headquarter

One part of the 24th Air Field Battalion

The 28th Air Field Battalion (minus one part)

Two squads of the 1st Air Signal Regiment

The 9th Air Field Preparation Unit

One part of the 9th Field Aircraft Repairing Factory

The 4th Meteorological Company (minus one part)

The 298th Independent Automobile Company (minus one platoon)

2. The Units that Advanced with the SHOJI Detachment

The 24th Air Field Battalion (minus one unit)

One part of the 28th Air Field Battalion

One squad of the 1st Air Signal Regiment

One observatory section of the 4th Meteorological Company

One platoon of the 298th Independent Automobile Company

One platoon of the 123rd Ground Service Company

B. Reconstruction of Airfields

1. The airfield preparation unit which advanced together with the 2nd Division was ordered to advance with the units that attacked

BATAVIA and BUITENZORG and reconstruct the airfields immediately after capturing these areas. A liaison airfield will be constructed as soon as possible after landing to maintain communication with army headquarters (by army reconnaissance planes).

2. The units that advanced with the SHOJI Detachment will dispatch the necessary manpower for airfield reconstruction which will advance together with occupation units to reconstruct the KALI-JATI airfield.

3. The zero hour for the seizure of the respective districts will be as follows:

BATAVIA airfield.....H +4 day

BUITENZORG airfield.....H +3 day

KALI-JATI airfield.....H day

4. In the reconstruction of the airfields natives in the vicinity will be employed to the fullest extent. Moreover to achieve immediate results infantry and engineering personnel will assist in the reconstruction. The area of reconstruction will be gradually enlarged to accomodate more planes.

5. To hasten reconstruction of airfields the process of disembarking and transporting men and materials will be simplified as much as possible.

6. Enemy mines etc. will be cleared after the occupation of the airfields to avoid unexpected mishaps. Remaining fuel, ammunition etc. will be collected.

C. <u>Preparation for the Ground Services</u>

1. With the progress of reconstruction of airfield, various equipment, fuel, ammunition etc. will be transported and concentrated so that the air units will be able to advance quickly.

2. Ordinarily the transportation of men and material is carried out by the respective units. In certain cases the assistance of other units may be required.

D. Communication Connection

1. The sector unit will install one wireless telephone apparatus immediately after landing and establish liaison with the 3rd Air Group. This liaisin with the 3rd Air Group will be maintained.

2. Immediately after the occupation of the airfield, liaison will be established in accordance with the following system to report the progress of the reconstruction and extend of utilization of the airfields.

 (Mobile ground radio station) KALI-JATI airfield

 (" " " ") BATAVIA airfield

(in the vicinity of the disembarkation area)



(aircraft radio----------aircraft radio) BUITENZORG airfield

3. Sector units will keep the air unit posted by plane, wireless telephone or message as to the condition of reconstruction and degree of utilization.

E. Guard Duty

The details of guard duty will be drawn up by the commander of the land units. However the actual guarding of planes and equipment will be effected by the air unit to avoid unexpected mishaps which might hinder the execution of important operations.

F. Quarters and Provisions

1. The above will be prepared in accordance with the instructions of the commander of the land units.

2. Sector units will be responsible for quartering and provisioning the air unit. Moreover this will be done in conformance with the conditions existing at the time and in a manner suitable to the execution of duties.

Chapter 3. The Army-Navy Air Agreement

The outline of the army-navy air agreements in the territory is as follows:

I. The Position of the Landing Army, the Designation of the Point of Disembarkation and Disembarkation District and the Reconnaissance Thereof.

Part 1. The Designation of the Point of Disembarkation and Disembarkation District.

A. The Units Transported in the First Wave

1. No. 1 Area (the 2nd Division and the main force of the units attached directly to the army).

The units which landed on A district (consisting mainly of two infantry battalions and a scouting regiment)--Southern MERAK.

Units which landed on B district (consisting mainly of two infantry battalions)--Northern MERAK.

Units which landed on C district (the main force of a division and the main force of units attached directly to the army)--BANTAM Bay.

2. No. 2 area (the SHOJI Detachment) (consisting mainly of two infantry battalions)--BATOLOL.

3. No. 3 area (consisted mainly of the 48th Division)

The right wing unit in D district (consisting mainly of three infantry battalions)--Northern KRAGAN.

The left wing unit in E district (the main force of a division)--Southern KRAGAN.

B. Units Transported in the Second Wave

No. 1 area (BATAVIA) or (BANTAM) approximately 100,000 tons

No. 3 area (SOERABAJA) or (KRAGAN) approximately 50,000 tons

C. The Units Transported in the Third Wave

No. 1 area (BATAVIA) or (BANTAM) approximately 100,000 tons

Part 2. Reconnaissance of Disembarkation Points

A. Reconnaissance by Airplanes

(Army) 30 photographic charts at 1/25,000 showing the disembarkation beachheads in No. 1 and No. 2 areas (10 charts show No. 2 area) will be handed to the army headquarters in SAIGON by 10 February. (3 of these charts will be handed to the 12th Air Fleet (the KAMIGAWAMARU) in CAM-RANH).

(Navy) 30 photographic charts at 1/25,000 showing the disembarkation beachheads in No. 3 area will be handed to the 48th Division in BORO (PORT BATA) by 10 February.

B. The details of other preparatory reconnaissance will be prearranged and executed by the commanders of the disembarkation group, the escorting unit and the air unit.

II. The Assembly Points of the Transports and the Dates of Their Arrival and Departure.

Distribution	Area	Assembling Point	Duration of Arrival	Date of Departure
The 1st Wave	No. 1 Area No. 2 Area	TAKAO next CAM-RANH	Continuous departure from the port of TAKAO from the beginning of February to 6 February and assembled in CAM-RANH.	H-8
The 1st Wave	No. 3 Area	LINGYAN next BORO (PORT BATA)	Completed embarkation by 7 February; departed 8 February and assembled in PORT BATA by 12 February.	
The 2nd Wave	No. 1 Area	Advanced from JAPAN to CAM-RANH, disembarked at BATAVIA (or BANTAM).		
	No. 3 Area	Advanced from LINGAYAN to BORO (or DAVAO) and then disembarked at SOERABAJA (or KRAGAN).		

The working details of the transportation following the 2nd wave will be pre-arranged and determined by the commander of the 16th Army and the commanders of the 4th and 5th Destroyer Squadron.

III. The Date and Time of the Landing Operation and the Duration of the Landing Period.

A. The Date of the Landing Operation

The first day of landing is determined as follows:

Eastern JAVA.....I-Day

Western JAVA.....H-Day

H and I days are anticipated to be 26 February. However the exact date will be decided at 1200 of H-9 day after consulting with the commander of the 16th Army and the commander of the 3rd Fleet. Whenever any change is required after departure a new date will be decided after conference.

B. The Time of the Landing Operation

The hour for advancing into the port was set at 0000 of H and I Day. However after completing preparation in each respective area the hour of landing was changed to 0200 of H and I Day.

C. The Duration of the Landing Period

1. Units transported in the first wave

No. 1 area.....approximately 7 days

No. 2 area.....approximately 5 days

If necessary the units not landing will be transferred to No. 1 area after H + 2 Day. However this will be determined after consulting with the commanders of the 16th Army and the 5th Torpedo Squadron.

No. 3 area.....approximately 5 days

No. 4 IV Assignment for convoys, location of Commanding Officers and estorting strength.

Classification	Convoy classification		Name of Unit	No. of ships	Location of Commanding Officer		Escorting Strength
					Army	Navy	
1st Transport Group	1st Area	1st Convoy	Landing Unit for "A" area	8	KOYO MARU (Inf Brig Hq) (142)	NATORI	5th Destroyer Sq 1st Escort Fleet Dest. 6 Cruiser 1
		2nd Convoy	Landing Unit for "B" area	6	REIYO MARU (Reg Hq) (528)		
		3rd Convoy	Landing Unit for "C" area Main force of Div & main body under direct Army command	Munitions - 2 No. 333 - 1 Water tank - 1 Collier - 1 Repair vessel - 1 27	SAKURA MARU (Army Hq) (844) AYATOSAN MARU (Div Hq) (850)		
	2nd Area	4th Convoy	SHOJI Detachment	7	SUWA MARU (Inf Bn Hq) (330)	YURA (depending on situation) SENDAI ( )	
	3rd Area	5th Convoy	Right flank unit	6	ADEN MARU (Inf Reg Hq) (296)	NAKA	Destroyer Sq (minus destroyer Group)
		6th Convoy	Left flank unit (Main force of Division)	Munitions - 2 Water tanker - 1 Collier - 1 Hosp Ship - 1 Repair vessel - 1 19	TEIYO MARU (Div Hq) (842) TONEGAWA MARU (Inf Brig Hq) (218)		
2nd Transport Group	1st & 3rd Area	Depending on situation					

No. 5 V Feinting Movement.

Navy Air Group when opportunity permits will bomb enemy naval bases in CHERIBON, TEGAL SEMARANG and PROBOLINGGO Area in a feinting movement.

No. 6 VI Anchorage and mooring formation of convoys will be determined after the conference between the landing group commander and the escort commander.

2. Units transported in the second wave

No. 1 area.....approximately 5 days

No. 3 area.....approximately 5 days

VII. Outline of the Landing Battle

Landing by sudden attack is preferable but a forced landing will be carried out if necessary.

VIII. Utilization of the Air Unit

Part 1. The Force

A. The 11th Air Fleet

Type 1 land offensive planes.....	approximately	80
" 96 " " "	"	35
" 0 fighters.....	"	70
Land reconnaissance planes.....	"	5

B. The 3rd Fleet

Reconnaissance seaplanes.....	approximately	50

C. The 3rd Air Group

Headquarter reconnaissance planes.....	approximately	15
Military reconniassance planes.....	"	4
Type 1 fighters.....	"	30
" 97 "	"	50
Offensive planes.....	"	20
Twin-engined light bombers.....	"	20
Heavy bombers.....	"	30

The above mentioned force may be increased or decreased according to the situation.

Part 2. Bases

A. Bases Located in SUMATRA, BORNEO Etc.

1. The PALEMBANG base will be reconstructed and utilized by the army. The navy will assign several land based attack planes to this base. Furthermore this base will be used as a relay point for approximately 36 land based attack planes for the purpose of attacking the enemy marine force in the INDIAN OCEAN area.

2. The MUNTOKU base will be reconstructed mainly by the army with the co-operation of the navy and will be used by both units. Approximately 30 fighters will be assigned to this base. When the army moves to the TANDJOENGKARAN airfield the MUNTOKU base will be used solely by the navy.

3. The LEDO base will be used by the navy. However the army may assign several headquarter reconnaissance planes to this base.

4. Beyond the above mentioned airfields, SUMATRA bases were utilized by the army while the navy will use the BORNEO airfields.

B. The Air Force Located in JAVA

1. The BATAVIA and CHILILITAN bases will be reconstructed by the army and both the army and the navy will use these bases.

Navy--(land offensive planes.....approximately 36
(fighters..... " 27

Army--(twin-engined light bombers.... " 20
(Hq. reconnaissance planes... " 15

2. The BUITENZORG and KALI-JATI bases will be reconstructed and used by the army. The navy will assign approximately 27 fighters to the KALI-JATI base in case the BATAVIA and the CHILILITAN airfields are damaged or the reconstruction is delayed.

Part 3. Outline of the Operation

A. Destroy the enemy air force in JAVA as soon as possible.

The prearranged distribution is as follows:

1. The division of command following the advance of the army air unit to PALEMBAM will be as follows:

Navy--east of east longitude 108°

Army--west of east longitude 108°

2. The annihilation of the remaining air power of the enemy will be carried on mainly by the navy after the army landing has been effected.

B. The navy will be in charge of attacking enemy ships.

C. Escorting the convoy during navigation and in port.

1. Area of the Main Force of the 16th Army

a. Prior to and on H-2 Day the navy will be in command of the escorts.

Note: The 1st Fleet dispatched to the South will be in command of escorting the convoy in the area north of north longitude 5°.

b. The navy will take charge of escorting the convoy until H-1 day when the convoy reaches the prearranged point. The SHOJI Detachment will separate from the main force of the army. After this the navy will take charge of escorting the SHOJI Detachment while the army will escort the main force of the army.

Anti-submarine measures will be in effect by the navy at all times.

2. Area of the 48th Division

The 3rd Fleet will take charge of anti-submarine precautions in addition to anti-aircraft precaution from that time when the convoy enters the port to the time when the fighter unit of the 11th Air Fleet advances.

other precautionary measures will be handled by the 11th Air Fleet.

3. Anti-Aircraft Precaution in the Port

The army will patrol the sky over the port in the BANTAM district until dusk of H + 2 day and until H + 1 day in the MERAK district. However if the occasion demands further vigilance precautionary measures will be carried out as soon as is necessary.

D. Co-operation in the Ground Operation

1. The area of the 16th Army

a. The army will be in charge of ground operation.

b. The navy will cut the enemy line of communication. Furthermore it will attack enemy reinforcements or retreat at the request of the army.

2. Area of the 48 Division

The 3rd Fleet will be in charge of ground operations. The 11th Air Fleet will assist the army who will also upon request participate in the action.

Part 4. Intelligence

A. Army and navy air units will verify the results of air combat, the results of reconnaissance of enemy airfields, meteorological intelligence etc. as soon as possible.

B. The army and navy will inform each other as to any enemy information.

Part 5. Distribution and Regulation of Airfields for Joint Use

Distribution and regulation of airfields for use by both the army and the navy will be pre-arranged by senior commanders of both forces concerned.

Part 6. Distinguishing Friendly from Enemy Forces

This will be based on the arrangement between the Southern Army and the combined fleet.

IX. Establishment of Defenses upon the Landing

A. The landing bases are decided as follows:

The areas of No. 1 and No. 2--BATAVIA (BANTAM will be utilized at first)

No. 3 area--SOERABAJA (KRAGAN will be utilized at first)

B. The navy will be in command of the defense of the sea. The army will take charge of land defense. The air defense will be under joint command.

X. Disposition of Tranports after Landing

After disembarkation each transport will return to the direct or indirect cover of therespective escort unit of the area appointed.

XI. Miscellaneous

A. The 48th Division will occupy and reconstruct the BALI airfield in co-operation with the navy before I-2 day to push the naval air base forward.

B. The navy will annihilate the enemy forces and cut of their retreat in the sea south of JAVA during the land operation.

C. Further details will be determined in mutual consultation by the commanders of the landing group concerned and the commanders of the escort unit and the air unit.

No. 2. Execution of the Operation

Chapter 1. Offensive Air Combat in Western JAVA

On 14 February the PALEMBAN operation was successfully under way and the PALEMBAN airfield was seized.

On 15 February the commander of the 3rd Air Group made the following assignments on the basis of the air operation and the army and navy agreement.

A. The commander of the 3rd Air Group will gradually move the necessary military strength to PALEMBAN with the progress of the reconstruction of the PALEMBAN airfield. The remaining strength will be stationed at the present area to carry on the following duties:

1. To destroy the enemy air power in Western JAVA west of the longitude 108° east.

2. To co-operate directly with the 38th Division in the battle of Southern SUMATRA.

3. To send a part of the force to assist the 25th Army in the BINTAN Island operation. Another part will be pushed forward when the TENGER airfield is reconstructed.

B. The commander of the 7th Air Group will order heavy bombers of approximately one combat unit to reinforce the operation "L" unit. The main force will be stationed in the QUATER sector and will be prepared to assist the 25th Army in the coming operation in Northern SUMATRA. When the SEMBAWAN airfield is reconstructed it will also be used as an operation airfield in addition to the KURUAN airfield.

C. The commander of the 12th Air Corps will order the main force to advance gradually to the PALEMBAN airfield and carry on it's former duties there. In addition one detachment will be prepared to co-operate with the 25th Army in the BINTAN Island operation. When the KALAN airfield is reconstructed some of the force will be forwarded there.

D. The commander of the 81st Air Combat Unit will use the PALEMBAN airfield as a base of operations.

In compliance with the above orders the main force of the 3rd Air Group advanced to the PALEMBAN airfield on the 17th and 18th and continually attacked the airfields in BATAVIA, LAI-JATI, BANDOENG and BUITENZORG. In

+his opera+ion 211 enemy aircraf+ were ei+her des+royed or damaged.

The ac+ion of +his group is shown in a separa+e char+.

On 17 February +he 11+h Air Comba+ Uni+ of +he 12+h Air Corps advanced +o PALEMBAN and defended +he oil refineries and +he por+. When +he advance uni+ occupied TANDJOENGKARAN a por+ of +he 12+h Air Corps was moved +here on +he 22nd while +he main force moved in on +he 24+h.

On +he 18+h +he naval air uni+ a++acked +he enemy naval base in SLAVAYA, damaged 5 des+royers and sho+ down 13 AMERICAN planes. On +he following day +his uni+ bombed PORT DARWIN for +he firs+ +ime, sho+ down or damaged 26 planes and sank 14 vessels including warships, cruisers e+c.

On +he 20+h +he naval parachu+e uni+ and +he army and naval uni+s occupied KOEPANG on TIMOR Island. On +he same day +he des+royer squadron a++acked +he combined AMERICAN and DUTCH Flee+ (+wo cruisers, 3 des+royers) in +he LOMBOK Channel eas+ of BALI Island and sank +wo des+royers.

Chap+er 2. <u>Co-opera+ion wi+h +he 16+h Army in +he Landing Opera+ion on JAVA</u>

Wi+h 28 February se+ by +he 16+h Army as +he day +o land on JAVA +he commander of +he 3rd Air Group ordered +he 12+h Air Corps +o give air pro+ec+ion +o +he convoy of +his army and +o from +he air defense over +he por+ from +he 27+h.

The 12+h Air Corps whose base is a+ TANDJOENGKARAN carried on +he following du+ies:

From 0925 +o 1630 on +he 27+h, 48 planes of +he 1s+ and 11+h Air Comba+ Uni+s escor+ed +he convoy while a par+ of +he 11+h Air Comba+ Uni+ carried ou+ air defense over +he PALEMBAN area.

From 1147 +o 2000 on +he 28+h, 90 planes formed +he air defense over +he por+.

SEPARATE CHART. SUMMARY LIST OF BATTLES IN THE WESTERN JAVA OPERATION BY 3rd AIR BRIGADE

Date	Time	Name of Unit	No. planes	Air field used	Target of Attack	Enemy losses	Planes our losses	Remarks
19/2	1010	59th Air Regt. 64th " " 90th " "	24 ^19 o 5	Palembang	Buitenzorg	Shot down 7 Damaged 4	0 0	Engaged 9 enemy fighter
19/2	1700	Same	37 ^28 o 9	"	Bandoeng	Shot down 13 Damaged 4	Missing 2	Engaged over 20 enemy fighte
20/2	1440	Same	34 ^24 o 10	"	Karidyati	Shot down 0 Damaged 5	0 0	
21/2	1225	Same	44 ^29 o 15	"	Karidyati West BANDOENG	Shot down 1 Damaged 7	Missing 1	Engaged over 14 enemy fighte
22/2	From 1200 to 1320	Same	41 ^26 o 15	"	Batavia Buitenzorg	Shot down 0 Damaged 6	0 0	
24/2	1030	59th Air Regt. 90th " "	31 ^14 o 17	"	West Bondung	Shot down 5 Damaged 6	0 0	Engaged 9 enemy fighter
24/2	1049	64th Air Regt. 75th " "	30 ^13 o 17	"	Karidyati	Shot down 0 Damaged 10	0 0	
24/2	1730	59th " " 90th " "	30 ^13 o 17	"	CHIKUTA	" 2 " 4	0 0	Engaged 1 enemy fighter
24/2	1730	64th " " 75th " "	18 ^13 o 5	"	Batavia	" 2 " 0	0 0	Engaged 3 enemy planes
25/2	1320	Same	28 ^12 o 16	"	Karidyati	" 1 " 6	0 0	Engaged 2 enemy Fighters
25/2	1420	59th Air Regt. 90th " "	28 ^12 o 16	"	Karidyati	" 3 " 1	0 0	Engaged 6 enemy Fighters
Total			345 ^203 o 142			" 33 " 53	3	

Note: Only planes in flames were specifically listed as damaged. In probable planes damaged exceeds 100.

^ = FIGHTER PLANE

O - LIGHT BOMBER

From 0810 to 1945 on 2 March 74 planes carried on the defense of the port and prepared themselves for the coming offensive.

From the 3rd to the 7th the main force of the 12th Air Corps covered the sky over the PALEMBAN Refinery in addition to defending MELAK and the ports in BANTAM Bay.

Since our air corps had air supremacy enemy planes were unable to attack our convoy.

Chapter 3. Co-operation with the 16th Army in the Capture of JAVA

The commander of the 3rd Air Group issued the following orders on 28 February in order to co-operate with the units of the 16th Army in the operation of JAVA.

A. Outline of "H" operation for the 2nd Division is shown in attached sheet No. 1 and the outline of "H" operation for the SHOJI Detachment is shown in attached sheet No. 2.

B. The commander of the 3rd Air Corps will co-operate with the main force of the 2nd Division and the SHOJI Detachment after 1 March.

C. The commander of the 12th Air Corp will continue to carry on the present duties.

Separate Sheet No. 1

Operation of the 2nd Division

I. Purpose

A. This Division will land on JAVA, route the enemy and capture BATAVIA as soon as possible.

B. After this the main force will advance through POERWAKARTA, SOEBANG and the area east of there toward BANDON. BANDON will be captured as soon as possible.

II. Outline of the Orders

C. At dawn of H Day the main force of the Division will land in the POJANEGARA area while a detachment will land in the areas north and south of MERAK. A part of the force will capture and hold the passage point of the river at RANGKASBITOENG and in the vicinity of KUROGIRAN. On the other hand a powerful unit will be promptly dispatched to BUITENZORG to cut off enemy liaison between BATAVIA and BANDON and to prevent retreat or reinforcement of the enemy. After the above mission is achieved this unit will enlarge the occupied area for the coming BANDON offensive battle.

D. The main force of the Division will begin to move toward the SERANG area before the completion of their landing and then advance rapidly through the districts along the SERANG-TANGERANG-BATAVIA roads toward BATAVIA and the area south of there and capture these areas as soon as possible. The SHOJI Detachment will move into the vicinity of KRAWANG at the passage point of River CHI-TARUM and cut off the enemy between BANDON and BATAVIA. After the completion of this operation the Detachment will prepare itself for the coming BATAVIA offensive battle.

E. After BATAVIA is captured the Division will take BANDON as soon as possible--the main force will advance through the POERWAKARTA and the SUKAN area toward BANDON while one unit will push forward through the TJILANDJOER area. If it is possible the unit that will advance through the TJILANDJOER area will capture BANDON in co-operation with the SHOJI Detachment before the main force arrives.

F. After the above operations are successfully accomplished the 2nd Division will capture entire JAVA in co-operation with the 48th Division.

Distribution of the troops of the 2nd Division at the time of

the landing (summary).

The NASU Detachment

Commander-in-chief--Colonel NASU (commander of the 2nd Infantry Group)

Hq. of the 2nd Infantry Group

The 16th Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion)

One tank company

One rapid firing gun company

The 2nd Scouting Regiment

A bicycle unit

One field artillery battalion

One anti-aircraft company

The FUKUSHIMA Detachment

Commander-in-chief--Colonel FUKUSHIMA (commander of the 48th Infantry Regiment)

The 4th Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion)

One rapid firing gun battalion (minus 2 companies)

One field artillery battalion

One anti-aircraft battalion (minus 2 companies)

The SATO Detachment

Commander-in-chief--Colonel SATO (commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment)

The 29th Infantry Regiment

The 2nd Tank Regiment (minus 3 companies)

One rapid firing gun company

The 2nd Engineering Regiment (minus 2 companies)

The occupying unit of Island PANGEAN

Artillery

Commander-in-chief--Colonel ISHIZAKI (commander of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment)

The 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (minus 2 1/2 battalions)

One heavy field artillery regiment (minus 1 company)

Engineering Unit

Commander-in-chief--Colonel ODA (commander of the 1st Independent Engineering Regiment)

Main force of the 1st Independent Engineering Regiment

The 4th Independent Engineer Company

One independent automobile platoon

Two river crossing construction companies (minus one part)

Air Defense Unit

Main force of the 16th Anti-aircraft Regiment

Separate Sheet No. 2

The Outlined Operation of the SHOJI Detachment

No. 1: Plan

A. The Detachment will land in the vicinity of PATROL and simultaneously occupy the KALIDJATI airfield. It will gain control of the NATALM River and separate the enemy forces in BANDOENG and BATAVIA.

B. Thereafter, in co-operation with the 2nd Division, the Detachment will attack BANDOENG from the northeast.

No. 2: Outline of Instructions

C. The Detachment will land near PATROL at dawn on H-Day and will simultaneously dispatch a section to occupy the KALIDJATI airfield. At the same time, the Detachment will advance to the vicinity of KRAWANG to separate the enemy forces in BANDOENG and BATAVIA.

D. Thereafter, it will occupy the strategic positions in SOEBANG, POERWAKARTA, TJIKAMPEK, etc. and prepare for the operation against BANDOENG. Under certain circumstances, a section of this Detachment will participate in the BATAVIA operation.

E. According to the advance of the main 2nd Division, this Detachment will attack SOEBANG from the Southeast. From the TJIKOERAMAS area, it will advance to the east of BANDOENG to cut off the enemy retreat.

F. Under certain circumstances, prior to the arrival of the main 2nd Division, this Detachment will attack BANDOENG in co-operation with a unit advancing from TJIANDJOER.

G. After the fall of BANDOENG, this unit, in co-ordination with the 2nd and 48th Divisions, will occupy the whole of JAVA.

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Organization of the SHOJI Detachment

Commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment--Colonel SHOJI

230th Infantry Regiment (excluding 3rd Battalion)

1 Tank Company

1 Machine Gun Battalion (excluding 2 companies)

1 Mountain Gun Battalion (excluding 1 company)

1 Engineer Company (excluding 2 platoons)

1 Anti-Aircraft Company

On the dawn of 1 March, the 16th Army Group simultaneously landed at various points and expanded the operation. At 1200 hours on 1 March, in order to bring about closer co-operation with the 16th Army Group, the commander of the 3rd Air Corps issued the following order:

A. The H-Day landing of the 16th Army Group has been successful, and now, at 1030 hours, a section is attacking SERANG from the East.

B. In order to co-operate closely with the 16th Army Group, this corps will dispatch a section of its force to JAVA.

C. The commander of the 3rd Air Brigade, in accordance with the maintenance of the west JAVA airfields, will gradually advance his forces there and carry on with his present duties. However, the 64th and 90th Air Regiment, the 91st and 94th Airfield Battalions, and also the 7th Airfield Squadron will carry on as before with PALEMBANG as their base. Later, the minimum transfer of the 15th Independent Air Unit (exclusive of the 50th Independent Air Squadron), 27th Air Regiment, and the 36th and 93rd Airfield Battalions will be considered.

D. The commander of the 81st Air Regiment will make preparations to move his main force to western JAVA and leave the 1st squadron in MALAYA.

E. The commander of the 12th Air Brigade will remain in his present duties until further orders.

The Condition of the 16th Army Group

The conditions of the entire 16th Army Group is as follows:

NASU Detachment

At 0300 hours on 1 March, it landed at MERAK. After occupying SOELANG it advanced southward on the SOELANG-BUITENZORG highway. On the morning of the 2nd, it attacked the positions west of BUITENZORG, occupying them on the 5th.

SATO Detachment

At 0300 hours on 1 March, it landed in the vicinity of BANTAM and, in co-operation with the NASU Detachment, occupied SOELANG. On the evening of the 3rd, it advanced to the TJISADANE River line, and on the night of the 5th, occupied DJAKARTA.

SHOJI Detachment

At 0400 hours on 1 March, it landed in the vicinity of PATROL and with a surprise attack, quickly occupied the KALIDJATI airfield. It then advanced to KRAWANG and blocked the BANDOENG-DJAKARTA highway. On the 4th, it advanced to the outer defenses of POERWAKARTA, and, on the 5th, to the outer defenses of BANDOENG.

The Main 48th Division

It landed in the vicinity of KRAWANG, west of SURABAYA, and immediately occupied LEMBANG, TJEPOE, and TOEBAN. On the 5th it occupied DJONGBANG and on the same day, its raiding elements occupied JOGJAKARTA. On the 7th, they occupied TJILATJAP, the enemy's route of retreat; and, on the same day, the main force occupied SURABAYA.

The Conditions of the 3rd Air Corps

From 1 to 7 March, the 3rd Air Brigade, following the above mentioned orders, carried out the following operations:

1 and 2 March:

On the 1st, the entire strength of the 3rd Air Brigade gave direct support to the 2nd Division and the SHOJI Detachment.

On the 2nd, with the object of maintaining the KALIDJATI airfield which was occupied by the SHOJI Detachment; a unit of fighters and the main strength of the assault force moved to the airfield; then 33 fighters and bombers (12 fighters, 21 two-motored light bombers) raided the west BANDOENG airfields.

3 March:

The main force of the Air Brigade advanced to the KALIDJATI airfield. The 64th and 90th Air Regiments raided the BANDOENG airfield in the morning; and during the afternoon the assault force and two-motor light bomber units attacked the enemy motorized units advancing towards KALIDJATI airfield. (According to reconnaissance information, about 20 armored cars had arrived at the airfield and about 150 armored cars were 16 km. west of the airfield. Also an enemy motorized unit was 12 km. southeast of SOEBANG, headed north.) The greater part of the advancing enemy forces were destroyed, and they were prevented from retaking the airfield. Thereafter, the Air Brigade concentrated on the direct support of the SHOJI Detachment, which support, was mainly responsible for the unconditional surrender of the enemy.

4 March:

After 0900 hours, in direct co-operation with the SHOJI Detachment, 12 planes made six separate attacks against the enemy in the vicinity

of POERWAKARTA.

5 March:

At dawn, the 59th and the 75th Air Regiments attacked the enemy airfield at BANDOENG and destroyed 13 planes; they also co-operated in the following land operations:

A. 23 planes of the 27th Air Regiment made 11 separate attacks; and the main force supported the SHOJI Detachment, while a section of the brigade supported the 2nd Division.

B. A total of 40 planes from the 75th and 90th Air Regiments made five separate attacks in close co-operation with the SHOJI Detachment, causing considerable damage to the enemy and facilitating the advance of the SHOJI Detachment toward BANDOENG.

6 March:

Co-operating closely with the BANDOENG operation of the SHOJI Detachment, the entire strength of the 27th, 75th and the 90th Air Regiments carried out repeated attacks from early morning till sunset. At the same time, two separate attacks, at dawn and at sunset, were carried out against remaining enemy air forces in TASIKMALAJA airfield.

7 March:

Very early in the morning, the Air Brigade attacked the TASIKMALAJA airfield and destroyed 12 planes on the ground by strafing. During the rest of the day, 20 planes, co-operating with the SHOJI Detachment, carried out 10 attacks against the enemy.

From 28 February to 7 March, the main force of the 12th Air Brigade was operating in the MERAK and BANTAM Bay area, acting as convoy escorts and as anchorage air defense.

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On 7 March, the enemy proposed a truce and surrendered unconditionally on the 8th.

Part 4. North SUMATRA Air Operations and the Redisposition of Troops

Chapter 1. Outline of Operation

The outline of the North SUMATRA Air Operations of the 3rd Air Corps is as follows:

No. 1: Plan

A. Prior to the landing by the Guard Regiment on northern SUMATRA, the air corps will observe the enemy air forces in the north SUMATRA and ANDAMAN areas and will destroy the enemy at the first opportunity.

B. Air protection for the Guard Division Convoy will be provided whenever necessary.

C. Direct co-operation with the ground operations will be carried out after the landing.

D. The main force of this participating air strength will be expected to be transferred during this operation.

No. 2: Outline of Instructions

A. Prior to the landing of the Guard Division, a section of the 81st FR and a reconnaissance unit from the 7th FB will observe the enemy air fields in the ANDAMAN and north SUMATRA areas and will destory the enemy at the first opportunity. The enemy is located in the area east of Longitude 98° E.

Enemy conditions in the area west of Longitude 98° E. will be reported to the navy.

B. The main object will be to give air protection to the LABOEHANROEK landing unit of the Guard Division, especially the concealment of its departure from SINGAPORE, and anchorage defense.

C. Immediately following the occupation of and consolidation at the MEDDANG airfield, the assaulting force, (type 97 fighter unit when required) will advance to the airfield. The main object will be to give direct co-operation to the land operations of the main Guard Division.

Air co-operation in other areas will be given whenever required.

D. After the landing of the Guard Division, its chief mission will be to observe the enemy airfields in the ANDAMAN area and to report to the navy; also to destroy the enemy at the first opportunity.

No. 3. Disposition of Air Groups

A. Disposition of the Groups will be as follows:

The 7th Air Brigade

7th Air Brigade Headquarter

12th FR

60th FR

64th FR

98th FR

Attached Units

51 FCS

1/1 FR

2/2 FR

A Part of the 12th Air Brigade (excluding under strength units)

A part of the 81st Air Regiment

North SUMATRA Air Sector Unit

93 AB--(two thirds strength)

6th Airfield Construction Unit (main force)

15th FTL (2 squad)

1 observation section of the 1st Metereological Company

B. The duty of each unit according to the disposition of the above Air Groups is as follows:

1. A part of the 81st FR:

a. Observation of enemy air force conditions in the ANDAMAN Islands and the SUMATRA area west of Longitude 98° E.

2. 7th FB:

a. Observation of enemy air force conditions in SUMATRA area east of Longitude 98° E.

b. Protection of convoys, air warfare and direct support of land operations.

3. A part of the 12th FB:

a. Convoy protection for ships leaving SINGAPORE.

4. North SUMATRA Air Sector Unit:

a. Accompanying the Guard Division, it will defend the MEDDANG airfield immediately after its occupation. Thereafter, it will remain as a ground service unit for the air forces using this airfield. The communication and metereological unit will be under the command of the Air Communication Group and the Metereological Group.

No. 4. Miscellaneous

1. The North SUMATRA Air Force will be under the command of the Guard Division while giving it air protection.

2. In case the 7th Air Group is transferred during this operation, the deployment of the air force might have to be changed as follows:

North SUMATRA Co-operational Air Force

90th FR

1/1 FR

2/27 FR

If this operation is carried out, the 90th FR, located in southern SUMATRA, will be transferred to the MALAYA area.

Agreements Made by the Army and Navy Concerning the North SUMATRA Campaign

No. 1. Object of Operation

To occupy northern SUMATRA and to capture the strategic naval bases and airfields as well as the vital natural resources.

No. 2. Name and Date of Operation

This will be called the T Operation.

W Day will be 28 February, and all accounts thereafter will be based from this date. In case the date of the landing is changed, the commanders of the 25th Army and the 1st Southern Fleet will decide on the new date; and the commander of the 3rd Air Corps will be notified of this new change.

No. 3. Landing Points and Reconnaissance

A. Landing Points

(See chart)

B. Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance from the sea on the landing points will not be carried out. Air reconnaissance will be properly carried out whenever necessary.

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No. 3. Landing Points and Reconnaissance

A. Landing Points

ORDER	UNIT		LANDING POINTS	
NO. 1	KOBAYASHI Detachment	1 Infantry Battalion as nucleus	SABANG Island	BALOANG Bay--south-east of SABANG Island
		2 Infantry Battalions as nucleus 1 Field Artillery Battalion	KOETARADJA	PEDRO Cape--north-east of KOETARADJA
	YOSHIDA Detachment	1 Infantry Battalion as nucleus	IDJI	Southern area of River IDJI
	Main Force of the Division	Main Force 5 Infantry Battalion) 1 Tank Company) 2 Field Artillery Companies) nucleus 2 Mortar Companies) 1 unit of the air force	LABOEHANROEK	Foot Soldiers shore 6 km. north-west of LABOEHANROEK Motorized LABOEHANROEK
NO. 2	1 unit of headquarters Remaining Guard Division (3 Tank Companies) (1 Field Artillery Battalion--nucleus) Quartermaster Unit Unit of Air Force Railway Unit			Main Force BELAWAN Unit LABOEHANROEK

No. 4. Disposition of Troops

A. Part 1

KOBAYASHI Unit

3 Infantry Battalions)
) nucleus
1 Field Artillery Battalion)

Duty: a section of the unit will capture SABANG while the main force will occupy KOETARADJA airfield. Thereafter, the main force will advance in the direction of IDJI.

YOSHIDA Unit

1 Infantry Battalion as nucleus

Duty: it will immediately occupy the LANTJA and PANGKALANBRANDAN oil areas and advance towards MEDDANG.

KOKUSHI Unit

1 1/2 Infantry Battalion)
)
1 Independent Engineer Regiment) nucleus
)
1 Mortar Battalion)

Duty: using the PEMATANG-SIANTAR and BALIGA highway, the unit will advance towards TAROETOENG and cut off the enemy retreat from the MEDDANG area; also, if possible, it will advance towards PADANG.

Main Force of the Division

Headquarters (about half)

Rest of the main force

Duty: it will advance swiftly towards MEDDANG and capture it and the MEDDANG airfield.

Units Under the Direct Command of the Army:

83rd Independent Air Unit

A section of the 84th Airfield Battalion

Co-operating Unit

A section of the 3rd Air Corps

B. Part 2

Army Command Post

Half of Division Headquarters

1 Tank Regiment, 1 Field Artillery Battalion

Units under the direct command of the Division

Units under the direct command of the army

A section of the air force

Main Quartermaster Unit

No. 5. Assembly and Departure of the Transport Vessels and Other Preparations

(See chart)

No. 5. Assembly and Departure of the Transport Vessels and Other Preparations

ORDER	CLASSIFICATION UNIT	No. of Transport Vessels	Speed	EMBARKATION Place	EMBARKATION DATE	ASSEMBLY Place	ASSEMBLY DATE	Depar-ture	Preparations
NO. 1	KOBAYASHI Detachment	4	9	SINGAPORE	W + 4 W + 5	West of BLAKANGMATI Island	W + 5 W + 6	W + 6	Combined training by each vessel will be held at the assembly point.
	YOSHIDA Detachment	2	8		W + 5 W + 6		W + 6 W + 7	W + 7	
	Main Division	8	8		W + 6 W + 7		W +7 W +8	W + 8	
NO. 2	Remaining part of the Division Quartermaster Unit Other Units	13	8	SINGAPORE	After the assembly of several small units of vessels, the convoy will depart.				There will be no training.

No. 6. Date of Landing

A. Rendezvous — Landing

KOBAYASHI Unit)
)
YOSHIDA Unit) W + 10 — W + 10
)
Main Division)

B. Landing schedule is as follows:

KOBAYASHI Unit--2 days

YOSHIDA Unit--3 days

Main Division--4 days

No. 7. Classification of the Ship Convoy

(See chart)

No. 8. Sea Protection

The disposition of sea defense is mentioned in a separate sheet. Further details will be in accordance with the agreement between the commander of defense and the commander of the landing party.

No. 9. Air Operation

A. The combined army and navy air forces will protect the convoy and landing operations against enemy planes and ships.

B. Pre-bombing attacks will not be carried out except at SABANG Island. They will bomb the vital enemy positions in the rear as well as enemy shipping. They will also demoralize the enemy and intercept all enemy reinforcements. If possible, a section will give direct support to the landing operations.

C. After the occupation and consolidation of the airfields, the army will assist in the following manner:

SABANG--entire landed unit

KOETARADJA--1 Infantry Battalion and 1 Engineer Platoon for 3 days

No. 7. Classification of Ship Convoy

Order	UNIT	Classification of Ships	Name of Ships--No. of Ships
NO. 1	KOBAYASHI Detachment	First Group	ANYO (974) KINUKAWA (922) GINYO (374) RAKUYO (996)
	YOSHIDA Detachment	Second Group	ARGONNE (934) LIMA (332)
	Main Division	Third Group	TACOMA (274) ALASKA (92) SHINKYO (692) YOSHINO (196)
		Fourth Group	SHINSEI (416) BUYO (364) SINGAPORE (28) HIROKAWA (846)
NO. 2	Remaining Division Communications Unit		Same as above excluding HIROKAWA (846). The classification is generally the same as No. 1 and necessary changes will be made when required.

MADDANG--1 Infantry Battalion and 2 Engineer Platoons

D. Further details will be decided whenever necessary. For this reason, a liaison officer (including communications) will be sent by the 3rd Air Corps to the Guard Division.

E. The allotment of airfields to the army and navy air forces is as follows:

Army

MADDANG, ALOR-STAR, KETIL, AYER-TAWAR, SUNGEI-PATANI, IDOH, KALANG.

Navy

SABANG, KOETARADJA, SUNGEI-PATANI, PENANG, SELETAR, SEMBARANG.

F. Duty

Army:

(1) Air cover for the landing units at EDJI and LABOEHANROEK and also direct co-operation with the landing operations.

(2) Direct co-operation after landing.

Navy:

(1) Air security for the SABANG and KOETARADJA landing units and also direct co-operation in the landing operations.

(2) Anti-submarine and anti-shipping patrol.

G. Air Strength

Army:

About 9-- Type 97 Fighter Planes

" 5-- Reconnaissance Planes

" 6-- Assault Planes

" 54-- Heavy Bombers

Navy:

About 36-- Medium Attack Planes

Abou+ 10--Type 96 Figh+er Planes

" 18-- Reconnaissance Sea Planes

" 8-- Carrier A++ack Planes

Above s+reng+h will be changed according +o circums+ances.

H. Ou+line of Air Opera+ion

(1) The Army Air Force will search for +he enemy air force and will des+roy i+ a+ +he firs+ oppor+uni+y. The search for +he enemy will be +he responsibili+y of +he Army Air Force and +he air comba+ du+ies are as follows.

Navy--wes+ of Longi+ude 98° E.

Army--eas+ of Longi+ude 98° E.

(2) Pre-bombing a++acks will no+ be carried ou+ a+ +he landing poin+s excep+ a+ SABANG. The Navy will make +he a++ack on +he SABANG landing poin+, and +he Army will assis+ if necessary.

(3) Air pro+ec+ion for +he SABANG landing uni+s will be emphasized, especially +he depar+ure of +he uni+ from SINGAPORE.

No. 10. Demons+ra+ion and fein+ a++acks will no+ be carried ou+.

No. 11. Pro+ec+ion for +he Landing Opera+ion and Assis+ance in +he Unloading Opera+ions.

A. Landing opera+ions will be carried ou+ despi+e enemy air a++acks.

B. Landing Pro+ec+ion

(1) Pre-bombing a++acks will be carried ou+ agains+ SABANG Island, and +he Navy will prepare for a naval barrage a+ dawn +o assis+ +he landing uni+s. However, +he opening of +he barrage will be a+ +he reques+ of +he landing uni+s.

(2) Pre-landing barrages will no+ be used excep+ a+ SABANG Island unless specially reques+ed by +he army.

C. Assist in the Unloading Operation

The Army will be responsible for this operation, and a section of the Navy will assist when necessary.

No. 12. Establishment of a Beachhead

A. The Army will construct a landing base at BELAWAN and, if necessary, at LABOEHANROEK.

B. The Army will assist the Navy as much as possible in its operations and in protecting its quarters and supply.

No. 13. Army and Navy Co-operation after Landing

A. The Navy will protect the initial landing until it is completed. After landing operations, the ships will form into several small groups and return to SINGAPORE. Protection will be provided by the Navy when necessary.

B. The Navy will give to the 2nd landing unit the same type of escort provided for the 1st landing unit.

C. The Navy, if possible, will protect the transfer if casualties and supplies after the initial landing.

No. 14. Information

The Army and Navy will immediately exchange the following informations:

A. The conditions of the enemy naval air force, especially submarines.

B. The enemy situation in SABANG and ANDAMAN archepelago.

C. The topographical conditions and the obstacles at the expected landing point and its vicinity.

Outline of the Disposition of Troops for Sea Protection

(See chart)

Outline of the Disposition of Troops for Sea Protection

DISPOSITION	COMMANDER	STRENGTH	DUTY
Main Force	Commander of the 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet	CHOKAI (Battleship) 7 s d x 4 MYHORO Air Unit 40th Air Unit SAGARA MARU	1. Support for general operation 2. Air battles
First Protection Unit	3 s d Commander	SENDAI KASHII (battleships) d x 6 1 w g ch x 2 11 chg Battleship YURA will join according to circumstances	Protection for landing units at SABANG and KOETARADJA
Second Protection Unit	9 ABg Commander	HATSUTAKA SHUMUSHU (battleships) CHOSA MARU (transport) EIKO MARU (transport) 41 wg 44 wg ch x 1 11 chg Four special patrol ships	The protection of the landing units at IDJI and LABOEHANROEK
REMARKS	Some parts will be altered according to circumstances.		

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Chapter 2. The Execution of the Operations and the Transfer of Troops to the BURMA Area.

The Disposition of the 3rd Air Corps by the Commander

After 26 February, the commander of the 3rd Air Corps had ordered the 7th Air Brigade to search for the enemy air force in north and central SUMATRA; and at the same time to make preparations to co-operate with the 25th Army in the northern SUMATRA operation. However, the air brigade found no enemy planes at the northern SUMATRA airfields. Also, the 12th Air Brigade gave protection to the Guard Division after leaving SINGAPORE, but it did not encounter any enemy planes.

The 25th Army ordered the Guard Division to land in northern and central SUMATRA. The main force embarked from SINGAPORE on 8 March as scheduled; and on the 9th, a powerful element of the 38th Division advanced to PADANG. This Division was stationed in southern SUMATRA and was under the command of the 25th Army. A strong unit of the Guard Division advanced to occupy airfields on SABANG Island, KOETARADJA and MEDDANG, and also to occupy oil fields in the vicinity of RANTJA and PANGKALANG-BALANDAN. The 3rd Air Corps Commander issued the necessary orders at 1700 hours on the 9th to the commanders of the 7th and 12th Air Brigades, 81st Air Regiment and the Air Sector Unit, to co-operate with the 25th Army.

According to orders, the 7th Air Brigade escorted the Guard Division convoy on the 9th and 10th with a section of fighter units. It also searched the northern SUMATRA coast but encountered no enemy vessels.

The 12th Air Brigade escorted the Guard Division convoy continuously from 0800 hours to 1400 hours on the 10th, with a total of 15 planes.

On the 10th, the corps commander ordered the 81st Air Regiment (excluding the 1st squadron) to be attached to the 3rd Air Brigade, and, at the same time, the 15th Independent Air Unit (exluding the 51st Independent

Air Squadron) to come under the direct command of this corps. In accordance with the Southern Army's order, the corps commander ordered the 60th Air Regiment to the PHILLIPPINES to be under the command of the 14th Army.

On the 11th, a section of the 7th Air Brigade escorted the Guard Division convoy and searched for the enemy naval air force. The main 7th Air Brigade strength was assigned to support the T operation.

On the same day, according to the Southern Army's orders to send the 7th and 12th Air Brigades to SIAM and BURMA to be under the command of the 5th Air Corps, the 3rd Air Corps commander made the following disposition:

A. The 7th Air Brigade and the 7th Air Transport Command will proceed to SIAM to be under the command of the 5th Air Corps. The 12th Air Sector Unit will send one third of the 94th Air Field Battalion to BANGKOK to be under the command of the 5th Air Corps.

The transfer of command will take affect when the air units arrive at SIAM and BANGKOK.

B. The 7th Air Brigade commander will send the air field construction personnel (except Headquarter personnel and air transport personnel of each air regiment--squadron) and material by land. The transport unit will cooperate in the T operation until 15 March and will transfer to SIAM as soon as possible. After the departure of the air brigade commanders from AYER-TAWAR, the 2nd Squadron of the 1st Air Regiment and the 2nd Squadron of the 27th Air Regiment will come under my direct command.

Because of the transfer of the Air Transport Unit, a squadron, composed of planes from the 7th Air Transport Unit and the Air Raiding Unit, will co-operate with the 7th Air Brigade after 16 March.

C. The commander of the 7th Air Transport Unit will send his land service personnel to BANGKOK by land under the command of the 94th Air Field

Ba++alion. Af+er 16 March, +he remaining +roops will co-opera+e in +rans-ferring +he air uni+s of +he 7+h Air Brigade.

D. The 12+h Air Brigade and +he 20+h An+i-Aircraf+ Regimen+ will pro-ceed +o BURMA +o be under +he command of +he 5+h Air Corps. A+ +he same +ime, +he 12+h and 15+h Air Sec+or commanders will send a sec+ion of +heir uni+s +o BURMA +o be under +he command of +he 5+h Air Corps. The +ransfer of command will +ake affec+ wi+h +he arrival of +he air uni+s a+ +he BURMA airfield and a+ +he arrival a+ RANGOON of +he land uni+s.

E. The 12+h Air Brigade commander will s+ar+ for BURMA wi+h his Air Transpor+ Uni+ +o arrive, a+ BURMA airfield by 20 March. Remaining uni+s will embark from SINGAPORE on 13 March.

Abou+ one squadron of +he Air Raid Uni+ will arrive a+ SEMBARANG airfield on 16 March +o co-opera+e wi+h +he Air Transpor+ Uni+ in making +wo round +rips.

F. The 12+h and 15+h Air Sec+or Commanders will send +heir +ransfer uni+s +o SINGAPORE +o embark on 13 March under +he command of +he 20+h An+i-Aircraf+ Ba++alion.

On +he 12+h, +he 7+h Air Brigade will co-opera+e in +he 25+h Army opera+ion as before; +ha+ is, +wo heavy bomber regimen+s will make +hree fligh+s +o LABOEHANROEK and EDJI. A+ +he same +ime, i+ will pro+ec+ +he +he aforemen+ioned anchorages wi+h a +o+al of 11 figh+er planes.

From +he 13+h +o +he 15+h, +he 7+h Air Brigade will pro+ec+ +he Guard Division convoy and +he anchorages wi+h +he figh+er uni+ as +he same +ime, i+ will give direc+ suppor+ +o +he 25+h Army opera+ion wi+h assaul+ and reconnaissance uni+s.

On +he 16+h, a sec+ion of +he assaul+ and reconnaissance uni+s of +he 7+h Air Brigade will advance +o +he MEDDANG airfield +o give direc+

co-operation to the 25th Army's SUMATRA operation. In the meantime, the main force will start to leave for SIAM.

The Situation of the 25th Army

The command post of the 25th Army landed at TEBINGTINGGI on the 13th and arrived at PADANGSIDIMPOEAN on the night of the 15th, by way of MEDDANG, PEMATANG, SIANTAR, and RANTAUPRAPAT.

The advanced units of the KOBAYASHI Detachment arrived at EDJI on the 15th, and the KUNITSUKASA Detachment (advanced unit of the Guard Division) occupied SIBOLGA on the same day and continued its advance to PADANG. On the dawn of the 17th, it occupied PADANG which ended the Northern SUMATRA campaign.

Part 5. The Situation in the Rear

Communication

On 4 February, the 3rd Air Corps Communication Unit transferred its base to KLUANG to give close support in the southern SUMATRA operation. Immediately after the landing of the first raiding group at PALEMBANG in the middle of February, two advance wireless squads were sent out to secure communications between KLUANG and PALEMBANG, as well as to strengthen the communication network and to direct operations for the southern SUMATRA and western JAVA operations. Just after the corps command post had advanced to PALEMBANG, three more wireless squads and a section of the wire communication unit proceeded to reinforce the communication network. As the west JAVA operation progressed, a section (3 wireless squads) of the 1st Air Communication Regiment, which had already landed in JAVA, came under the command of the 3rd Air Communication Unit. At the same time, a section of the PALEMBANG wire communication unit landed in western JAVA to strengthen the air communication network between MALAYA and western JAVA, also to

facili+a+e liaison be+ween +he air uni+s. As soon as +he corps Headquar+ers had advanced +o SINGAPORE a+ +he beginning of March, +he main communica+ion cen+er was +ransferred +here. In +he middle of March, a sec+ion of +he wireless uni+ co-opera+ed wi+h +he Guard Division in i+s SUMATRA opera+ion and se+ up communica+ion ne+work be+ween +he Guard Division, MEDDANG, AYER-TAWAR and SINGAPORE, and also for liaison be+ween air uni+s.

Si+ua+ion of +he Informa+ion and Air Naviga+ion Uni+s

The 16+h Air Informa+ion Uni+ deployed i+s main force in sou+hern MALAYA a+ +he beginning of February, +o se+ up an air informa+ion ne+work. I+ closely co-opera+ed wi+h +he air uni+s by collec+ing air informa+ion and local wea+her repor+s. In +he middle of February, when PALEMBANG was occupied, a sec+ion of +he informa+ion uni+ was sen+ +here +o co-opera+e wi+h +he 12+h Air Group.

The 16+h Air Informa+ion Uni+ consolida+ed i+s ou+pos+s, excep+ +hose in +he PALEMBANG area, +o +he sou+h of MALAYA, +o be responsible for collec+ing enemy air force repor+s in INDIA, AUSTRALIA, and +he EAST INDIES area. The corps Air Naviga+ion Uni+, as i+ had done previously, deployed on +he wes+ern coas+ of MALAYA and SINGAPORE island +o co-opera+e wi+h +he 3rd Air Corps in +he wes+ern JAVA and nor+hern SUMATRA opera+ions.

Si+ua+ion of +he Corps Wea+her Uni+

On 4 February, +he corps wea+her uni+ advanced +o KULUANG and sen+ ou+ observa+ion par+ies +o KAHANG and PATU-PAHAT +o co-opera+e in +he 3rd and 12+h Air Brigade opera+ions. On +he 17+h, +he uni+ sen+ ou+ one observa+ion par+y each +o PALEMBANG and MOENDOEK +o co-opera+e in +he "L" and "H" opera+ions. A+ +he end of +he mon+h, +he uni+ sen+ ou+ a sec+ion +o TANDJOENKARANG; and when T opera+ion commenced, an observa+ion par+y was dispa+ched +o MEDDANG.

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During this operation, the weather unit made accurate weather reports and carried out its duties magnificiently.

The Situation of the Air Repair Depot

At the end of February, a section of the 18th Shipping Air Depot and the Mobile Air Repair Section advanced to PALEMBANG to repair air equipment. At the same time, a section was dispatched to TANDJOENKARANG airfield when it was occupied.

Damaged and Lost Planes and Supplies

Our plane losses during this operation were 87 planes; and the conditions of our fuel and ammunition consumption up to 15 February is shown in a separate sheet.

Part 6. Situation After the Operation

After this operation, the 3rd Air Corps gradually transferred its main strength to the BURMA area to be under the command of the 5th Air Corps; and the Air Corps carried out maintenance, training and the strengthening of air bases.

Part 7. Result of the Operation

The progress and results of the EAST INDIES air operation are shown on charts nos. 3-6.

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TABLE SHOWING EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITIONS AND FUEL FOR AIR CRAFT FROM 8 DECEMBER, 1941 TO 15 FEBRUARY 1942
INVESTIGATED 28 FEBRUARY 1942

Articles / Units		Fuels (Kilo Litre)	Lubricating Oil (Kilo Litre)	BOMBS							Machine gun (shell(No.)	Pom-pom (No.)
				500kg. (No.)	250kg. (No.)	100kg. (No.)	50kg. (No.)	15kg. (No.)	Incendiary 50kg. (No.)	Incendiary 12kg. (No.)		
1st Air Reg.		394.9	16.2								58,100	
11th " "		342.4	15.9								39,500	
12th " "		1392.2	58.3	6	333	2289	292		779		74,400	
27th " "		5387	14.4				3223	36			93,000	
60th " "		1925.5	60.6	40	308	2085	4134		250		27,000	
59th " "		502.3	15.2								61,700	39,300
64th " "		487.2	18.6								27,600	48,700
75th " "		1067.5	33.8			450	4168	45	283		103,500	
81th " "		2164	18.7									
90th " "		1106.3	52.1			71	4168	24	232		26,700	
98th " "		888.8	39.1		20	1434	1160		177		53,800	
83rd Independent air unit		147.1	4.2				203	100			11,000	
15th Ind.	50th Ind. Air Sq.	169.0	6.9									
Air Units	51st Ind. Air Sq.	126.8	4.2									

Note: Headquarters, liaison and transport "Ki-44" planes are not included in this chart.

Insert Appended Map No.3

Air Operations to Destroy Enemy Air Forces

in SUMATRA from 28 Dec. 1946

AIR OPERATIONS TO DESTROY ENEMY AIRFORCES IN SUMATRA
FROM 28 DEC 1946

APPENDED MAP 3



Insert Appended Map No.4

Air Operation Over Western JAVA

AIR OPERATION OVER WESTERN JAVA

FROM 19 FEB 42 TO 7 MARCH 42.

APPENDED MAP. 4



THE 12TH AIR BRIGADE IS STATIONED AT BANDOENG-KALANG AND PALEMBANG. ESCORTED 16TH ARMY CONVOY AND PROTECTED ANCHORAGE. PROVIDED AIR PROTECTION OF OIL REFINERIES.

- AIR COMBAT.
- BOMBER
- FIGHTER
- AIR FIELD
- TRUCK UNIT

COMBAT RESULT:

ENEMY PLANES SHOT DOWN 49
(INCLUDES 9 PLANES NOT POSITIVELY SHOT DOWN)
ENEMY PLANES DESTROYED
BY BOMBING AND STRAFING 227
TOTAL 276
(INCLUDES 9 PLANES NOT POSITIVELY SHOT DOWN)

Insert Appended Map No.5

Palembang Raiding Operations from

14th-15th Feb. 1942

PROGRESS OF THE PALEMBANG RAID
14-15 FEBRUARY 1942



NOTE :

1. NO AIR RECCE OVER DUTCH'S OWN FIELD AT 1000, FEB. 15
2. THE FIRST AIR RAIDING UNIT ARRIVED ABOVE PLAN AREA FROM THE WESTWARD AND AT ALTITUDE VARYING FROM 12,000 TO 15,000 FEET.....

SUCCESS IN BATTLE

SHOT DOWN --- 2 PLANES
CAPTURED :
BUFFALO TYPE --- } 10 PLANES
HURRICANE TYPE --- } 10 PLANES
TRAINING PLANE --- }

OUR LOSSES :

SHOT DOWN --- ONE PLANE
FAILED TO RETURN -- ONE PLANE
DEAD (28 MEN, INCLUDING TWO OFFICERS)
WOUNDED - 20 MEN
FAILED TO ASSEMBLE ON EVENING OF 15 FEB. 30 MEN

LEGEND :

- FIGHTER
- BOMBER
- RECCE. COMBAT
- BOMBING
- AIR UNIT
- SEARCH-LIGHT
- SHIP
- PARATROOPS

Insert Appended Map No.6

Air Operations in cooperation with Land

Operations in Western JAVA

From 28 Feb.'42 to March'42

AIR OPERATIONS IN CO-OPERATION WITH LAND OPERATIONS IN WESTERN JAVA
FROM 28 FEB 1942 TO 7 MARCH 1942

APPENDED MAP #6