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CHINA AREA OPERATIONS RECORD

July 1937 - November 1941

(Revised Edition)

PREPARED BY
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UNITED STATES ARMY, JAPAN

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PREFACE

This monograph is one of a series prepared under instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN No. 126, 12 Oct 1945). The series covers not only the operations of the Japanese armed forces during World War II but also their operations in China and Manchuria which preceded the world conflict. The original studies were written by former officers of the Japanese Army and Navy under the supervision of the Historical Records Section of the First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureaus of the Japanese Government. The manuscripts were translated by the Military Intelligence Service Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command.

The writers were handicapped in the preparation of the basic manuscripts by the non-availability of many operational records which are normally employed as source material in this type of study. Many official orders, plans and unit journals were lost during operations or were destroyed at the cessation of hostilities. A particular handicap has been the lack of strength reports. Most of the important orders and other information sources, however, have been reconstructed from memory and while not textually identical with the originals are believed to be accurate and reliable.

Monograph No. 70 gives a general outline of the operations of the Japanese forces in China and the major enemy counteroffensives during the China Incident. Details of political and diplomatic aspects of the situation at that time as well as the actual planning and conduct of the operations will be found in related Japanese monographs referred to in footnotes throughout this monograph.

The basic manuscript used in compiling this monograph was written by Lt. Col. Heizo Ishiwari, a former member of the War History Compilation Section, Army General Staff partly from his own recollections of the events and partly from documents in the possession of former officers who had participated in the China Incident.

This monograph was originally edited and published in February 1952 but, in the light of the tremendous amount of additional information developed by Foreign Histories Division, Office of the Military History Officer, since then, it has been completely rewritten. Inaccuracies have been corrected and much pertinent data obtained through research during the almost six-year period has been added. The old maps have been withdrawn and new ones inserted to support the new text.

The History Section, Army War College, Japanese Self-Defense Force, has proved most helpful by placing its documents and personnel at the disposal of the Foreign Histories Division.

The editor has received valuable assistance in research and in the preparation of maps and charts from Tadao Shudo, formerly a lieutenant colonel on the staff of the 11th Army in central China and later a member of the Army General Staff, 4th Air Army and Air Army General Staff.

All maps submitted with this monograph were drawn by the Foreign Histories Division and the spelling of place names in the text and on the maps is that used in AMS 5301.

Tokyo, Japan
30 December 1957

Table of Contents

	Page
CHAPTER 1 - The China Incident Spreads	1
Chaihar Operation	4
Operations in Southern and Central Hopeh Province	6
Capture of Yangchu	9
Shantung and Huang Ho Operations	11
Shanghai Operation	12
Nanching Operation	15
CHAPTER 2 - Securing the Occupied Areas	18
Tungshan Operation	20
Wuchang-Hankou-Hanyang Operation	22
Canton Operation	24
Situation After the Occupation of the Wu-Han Sector and Canton	25
Estimate of Situation After the Capture of Wu-Han Sector	27
Reorganization of Forces in China	31
CHAPTER 3 - Major Mopping-Up Operations	38
Shansi Province Operations	39
Mt. Wutaishan Operation	40
Eastern Shansi Province Operation	40
Spring Operations in Southern Shansi Province	41
Central Shansi Operation	42

	Page
CHAPTER 3 - (Cont'd)	
Chungyuan Operation	44
Mopping-Up in Hopeh and Shantung Provinces	46
Northern Kiangsu Operation	47
Hopeh-Shansi-Chahar Border Operations	47
Mopping-Up Along the Lower Yangtze River	48
Operations of the 11th Army	51
Kiangsi-Hunan Operation	54
Ichang Operation	56
1st Changsha Operation	58
Operations in South China	60
Capture of Hainan Island	60
Capture of Swatow and Chaoan	61
Capture of Nanning	62
Advance into Northern French Indo-China	64
Strengthening of the Sea Blockade	66
Cutting of Supply Routes in Central China	66
Advance into Southern French Indo-China	69
CHAPTER 4 - Major Enemy Counteroffensives	71
Winter Operations	71
North China	72
Central China	73
South China	74


	Page
CHAPTER 5 - Air Offensive Against the Interior of China	76
CHAPTER 6 - Establishment of New Government in the Occupied Territories	80


Maps

No. 1a, b	Theatre Reference Map	viii, ix
No. 2a, b	Disposition of China Expeditionary Army, December 1939	36, 37
No. 3	Operation to Cut Supply Lines in Central China, April 1941	67
No. 4	Disposition of 25th Army, August 1941	70

General Reference Maps

No. I	Outline of Operational Progress in North China, July 1937 - June 1938	83
No. II	Outline of Operational Progress in Central and South China, August 1937 - March 1939	85





CHAPTER 1

The China Incident Spreads

Prior to the outbreak of the China Incident, under the terms of the Boxer Protocol of 1901, Japan maintained a garrison in north China to guard its embassy and protect the rights of its nationals. This force, known as the China Garrison Army, was commanded by Lt. Gen. Kanichiro Tashiro and was composed of one infantry brigade, one field artillery regiment and one tank unit.¹ Its main strength was stationed in Tienching with small units in the vicinity of Peiping and along the Peiping-Linghai Railway.

The Chinese 29th Army in north China was commanded by Sung Che-yuan, a war lord from Hopeh and Chahar Provinces, and was composed of four divisions, two independent brigades, two cavalry divisions and one cavalry brigade.

On the night of 7 July 1937, Chinese troops fired on a Japanese unit on night maneuvers in the vicinity of Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge). This was the match that set off the conflagration that became known as the "China Incident."

1. Due to illness, General Tashiro was recalled to Tokyo on 11 July 1937 and replaced as commander of the China Garrison Army by Lt. Gen. Kiyoshi Katsuki. General Tashiro died in Tienching on his way home.

The Japanese Government immediately instructed the China Garrison Army to endeavor to settle the Incident amicably and to do everything possible to prevent its spreading to other parts of China but the tension which had been mounting for many years was so great that the Incident quickly developed into a full scale although undeclared war between the two countries.

On 25 July, the 38th Division of the Chinese 29th Army launched a surprise attack against a Japanese signal unit engaged in repairing the telephone lines in the vicinity of Langfang station on the Peiping-Linghai railway. An infantry company of the China Garrison Army stationed nearby to protect the railway successfully defended the station throughout the night but suffered heavy casualties. The following day the China Garrison Army lodged a strong protest in regard to this incident and, at the same time, demanded that the Chinese forces be withdrawn from the Lukouchiao area within 24 hours. This demand was disregarded and, about sunset that day, an infantry battalion of the China Garrison Army returning to Peiping to protect the Japanese nationals within the walled city, was attacked by Chinese troops as it was passing through the Kuangan Gate. The Japanese troops suffered heavy casualties. Anti-Japanese feeling by this time had reached such a pitch that the China Garrison Army found it difficult to protect its nationals and maintain lines of communication. The China Garrison Army commander, therefore, decided that the only solution to

the situation was to drive the Chinese forces from the vicinity of Peiping and Tienching. This decision was approved by the Central Authorities in Tokyo.²

On 28 July, therefore, the China Garrison Army, supported by one emergency mobilized division, two mixed brigades (one of which was mechanized) and one air group, opened its attack and, by the 30th, had forced the Chinese in the vicinity of Peiping and Tienching to retreat to the south of the Yungting Ho.

Being aware of the limited strength of the China Garrison Army and fearing that it might not be possible to localize the incident, Central Authorities mobilized the 5th, 6th and 10th Divisions and the Provisional Air Group in Japan and dispatched them as reinforcements to north China to meet the threat of the armies under the direct command of Chiang Kai-shek, which had advanced into southern Hopeh Province.

On 6 August, the Nanching Government, determined to enter the war, transferred reinforcements to the Peiping-Tienching area from Chahar Province and the Peiping-Hankou railway area.

On 9 August, Lt. Isao Oyama, commander of the 1st Company of the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force, together with another marine, was killed by Chinese troops in the International Settlement

2. Japanese Monograph No. 179, North China Area Operations Record, July 1937 - May 1941.

of Shanghai. After this, feeling between the Naval Special Landing Party charged with the protection of Japanese residents in Shanghai and the powerful Chinese Army which had invaded the west suburb (unarmed zone) of Shanghai, daily grew more tense. On 15 August the Chinese Government issued a general mobilization order and, on the same day, the Central Authorities decided to send the Shanghai Expeditionary Army to reinforce its naval unit in that area.³

In late August, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, composed mainly of the 3d and 11th Divisions and commanded by General Iwane Matsui, landed in central China, and the North China Area Army, composed mainly of the 1st and 2d Armies and commanded by General Hisaichi Terauchi, arrived in north China.

Chahar Operation

Two divisions of the Chinese Central Army had crossed the border between Chahar and Hopeh Provinces and captured Nankou. Convinced that they were awaiting an opportunity to attack the Peiping-Tien-ching area, the Central Authorities ordered the China Garrison Army to attack the enemy east of Wanchuan. At the same time, the Kwantung Army commander received orders to support the China Garrison Army's operation from Jehol Province and Inner Mongolia.

3. Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

In mid-August, therefore, the China Garrison Army commander committed the 11th Independent Infantry Brigade (later reinforced by the 5th Division) to this operation, while three mixed brigades and seven infantry companies of the Kwantung Army (known as the Provisional (Tojo) Group) supported the operation from the north. Toward the end of August, the China Garrison Army broke through the enemy positions near Pataling while the Kwantung Army penetrated their lines in the vicinity of Wanchuan. The Japanese forces continued to pursue the enemy and, in mid-September, the 5th Division captured Yuhsien.⁴ Then, in accordance with North China Area Army orders, the 5th Division commander prepared to transfer the Division from Yuhsien to the Chingyuan Plains.⁵

Upon receipt of information that the enemy was building up for an offensive along the border of Chahar and Shansi Provinces, west of Yuhsien, the 5th Division commander decided to destroy this force prior to transferring the Division to the Chingyuan Plains. In mid-September, a strong force from the Division attacked and destroyed the enemy near the Chahar-Shansi border. In late September, however, this unit was encircled by a powerful enemy force near the Inner Great Wall

4. In mid-September, the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade which had been attached temporarily to the China Garrison Army at the outbreak of the China Incident, reverted to the Kwantung Army.

5. The China Garrison Army was integrated into the North China Area Army on 31 August 1937, at which time the commander of the China Garrison Army became the commander of the 1st Army.

of China and the situation deteriorated to such a degree that it became necessary to order the main body of the Division to go to the aid of the defenders. Fierce fighting ensued. In the meantime, the Chahar Detachment of the Kwantung Army, driving westward, captured Tatung in mid-September and then mopped up hostile remnants in the area. Upon receiving information that the 5th Division was fighting desperately against heavy odds, the Chahar Detachment launched an attack from the north against the enemy forces disposed along the Inner Great Wall and, by late September, had annihilated them and relieved the pressure on the 5th Division. It pursued the enemy fleeing westward along the Huto Ho until, in early October, it reached the area to the south of Taihsien. There the main body of the Detachment was placed under the command of the 5th Division and the Division advanced toward Yangchu.

During this period, the 5th Division commander had dispatched three infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion to the Chingyuan Plains by way of Laiyuan. This unit, which had left Yuh-sien in mid-September, reached the Chingyuan Plains in early October.

In mid-October, a powerful element of the Chahar Detachment, under orders from the Kwantung Army, captured Suiyuan and Paotou.

Operations in Southern and Central Hopeh Province

In order to stabilize the situation along the Peiping-Tienching railway and to destroy the Chinese forces still in central Hopeh Province, in early September, the commander of the North China Area Army

planned to launch an offensive against the enemy forces in the Chingyuan and Tsanghsien sectors.

In mid-September, therefore, in accordance with orders from the North China Area Army, units of the 5th Division advanced and occupied Yuhsien and there prepared for operations on the Chingyuan Plains; the 1st Army (commanded by Lt. Gen. Kiyoshi Katsuki and composed of the 6th, 14th and 20th Divisions) advanced to the Ihsien-Pahsien line to prepare for the attack on Chingyuan, while the 2d Army (commanded by Lt. Gen. Toshizo Nishio and composed of the 10th, 16th and 109th Divisions) advanced toward Machang.⁶

On 11 September, the 2d Army captured Machang. It then received orders to advance to a position south of Tsanghsien where its main force was to prepare for the Chingyuan Operation.

About the middle of September, the 1st Army began its offensive against the enemy in the vicinity of Chohsien and Chingyuan while the 2d Army, having ordered its 10th Division to operate along the Tienching-Pukou railway, gradually advanced toward Tsanghsien.

As operations in all sectors were progressing as planned, on 18 September, the commander of the North China Area Army decided to pursue the enemy toward the Chengting-Tehsien line. The main body of the 5th Division was ordered to advance to the Chingyuan area while

6. On 21 September, the 108th Division arrived at Tienching from Japan. It was placed under the direct command of the North China Area Army, which, in turn, attached it to the 1st Army and disposed it in the sector south of Changhsintien along the Peiping-Hankou railway line.

a strong element was to support the operations of the Chahar Detachment (Kwantung Army) whenever required. After breaking through the enemy positions in the Chingyuan area, the 1st Army was to pursue the enemy toward Chengting. The 2d Army's main force was to advance to Chengting immediately to cut the enemy's route of retreat, while one division was to be used to push the enemy back toward Tehsien.

During the latter part of September, the 1st and 2d Armies captured Chingyuan and Tsanghsien respectively. Early in October, the 1st Army left Chingyuan and began its drive toward Chengting. Prior to this, in mid-September, the main force of the 2d Army had advanced southwest along the Chulung Ho from Tienching and, on 5 October, arrived at Hsiaofanchen, 110 km east of Chengting. In addition, at the beginning of October, the 10th Division, which had been advancing along the Tienching-Pukou railway, captured Tehsien.

In view of this favorable situation, the North China Area Army commander issued the following order to destroy the enemy fighting strength in the Hopeh Plains:

The North China Area Army will destroy the enemy forces on the Hopeh Plains.

The 1st Army will launch an attack at the earliest opportunity and, after breaking through the enemy positions in the vicinity of Shihchia-chuang, will pursue the enemy toward Hsingtai. To support the 5th Division, which is now engaged in the Yangchu Operation, an element of the 1st Army will advance and occupy the strategic area to the west of Chinghsing, and cut enemy lines of communication in Shansi Province.

The 2d Army will attack the rear of the enemy's main force from the left bank of the Puyang Ho.

After capturing Shihchianchuang on 9 October, the 1st Army continued to pursue the enemy retreating along the Peiping-Hankou railway.

By mid-October, the 1st Army had advanced to Hsingtai and the Chang Ho (a river running east about 15 km north of Anyang) while the main body of the 2d Army, having occupied Ningchin, in cooperation with the 1st Army, pursued the enemy east of the Peiping-Hankou railway toward Yungnien. In addition, the 10th Division, moving along the Tienching-Pukou railway, captured Pingyuan.

Capture of Yangchu

Early in October, determined to occupy Yangchu, the Central Authorities in Tokyo issued the following orders to the North China Area Army and the Kwantung Army:

Part of the North China Area Army operating in northern Shansi Province will capture Yangchu. In order to facilitate this operation, necessary units from the Kwantung Army will be placed under the command of the commander of the North China Area Army.

The North China Area Army commander placed the transferred Kwantung Army units under the command of the 5th Division commander and ordered the 5th Division to capture Yangchu. The 5th Division attacked the enemy entrenched in strongly fortified positions in the vicinity of Hsinkouchen but was unable to dislodge them. On 17 October, therefore, the North China Area Army commander issued the following order to the 1st Army:

The 1st Army will use a strong force to break through the enemy positions along the Shihchiachuang-Yangchu railway and advance to Yutzu in order to assist the 5th Division in the capture of Yangchu.

The 1st Army dispatched part of the 20th Division to the Shihchiachuang-Yangchu railway area but the enemy continued to resist stubbornly in the vicinity of Chinghsing. On 21 October, therefore, the Area Army commander ordered the 1st Army commander to use the full strength of the 20th Division as well as part of the 109th Division to overcome this force. Subsequently, on 27 October, the entire force of the 109th Division was ordered to participate in the operation.

On 24 October, the 20th Division, having destroyed the enemy positions confronting it, crossed the Hopeh-Shansi Province border and pursued the retreating enemy west along the Shihchiachuang-Yangchu railway.

The 5th Division (which had been placed under the tactical command of the 1st Army on 3 November) broke through enemy positions in the vicinity of Hsinkouchen and on 8 November occupied Yangchu.

After the capture of Yangchu, the 5th Division withdrew to Chingyuan when it again was placed under the direct command of the North China Area Army, and the Kwantung Army units, which had participated in the operations to capture Suiyuan and Shansi Provinces, were gradually returned to their original commands.

Shantung and Huang Ho Operations

On 13 December 1937, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army occupied Nanching. Imperial General Headquarters⁷ was determined to control the area along the Chinan-Chingtao railway and along the north bank of the Huang Ho west of Chinan, and, on 18 December, ordered the North China Area Army to undertake this mission.

The 2d Army, under the command of the North China Area Army, crossed the Huang Ho, and, in late December, occupied Chinan. By early January, units of the 2d Army had advanced to a line running through Chining, Tsouhsien, Lishan and Mengyin, thereby fulfilling the Area Army's plan to control the area north of this line.

In order to occupy Chingtao, the North China Area Army placed the 5th Division under the tactical command of the 2d Army but, before the Division reached its objective, on 10 January, Japanese marines occupied Chingtao.

On 10 January 1938, the North China Area Army ordered the 1st Army (14th, 16th, 20th, 108th and 109th Divisions) commanded by Lt. Gen. Katsuki, to subjugate the enemy along the left bank of the Huang Ho, along the Peiping-Hankou railway front and in southern Shansi Province. After the capture of Yangchu, the 1st Army occupied northern Shansi Province with two divisions (20th and 109th

7. Prior to 17 November 1937, when Imperial General Headquarters was established in Tokyo to command the armies in China, the Central Authorities, comprising representatives from the Army and Navy General Staffs and the War and Navy Ministries, had directed Japanese operations in China.

Divisions) and disposed three divisions (14th, 16th and 108th Divisions) in the Peiping-Hankou railway area. The front line was advanced to Chingyuan and Pingyao in Shansi Province and to Anyang in the Peiping-Hankou railway area. On 7 February, the 1st Army began its operation against northern Honan Province, north of the Huang Ho and, on the 11th, began to advance toward Changchih in Shansi Province. During the latter part of February, the 1st Army annihilated the enemy in the area along the southern part of the Tatung-Fengling-tu railway and, by early March, had completed its assigned mission.

Shanghai Operation⁸

After the Oyama Incident in Shanghai on 9 August 1937, feeling between the Japanese Special Naval Landing Unit (approximately 4,000 men) and the strong Chinese Army (approximately 50,000 men) daily grew more tense until, on 13 August, fighting broke out. On the 15th, the Central Authorities, dispatched the Shanghai Expeditionary Army (3d and 11th Divisions) to the vicinity of Shanghai to support the Japanese naval unit and to protect Japanese residents in the area.

On 23 August, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army landed at the mouth of the Huangpu River and in the area to the northwest thereof. It overcame the enemy stationed in this area and advanced to Tachangchen. Next it attacked the enemy in the vicinity of Shanghai but the

8. Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

enemy's superior strength and the difficult terrain combined to arrest the Expeditionary Army's advance.⁹

On 11 September, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was reinforced by the 9th, 13th, 101st Divisions and the Formosa Independent Brigade.

At the beginning of October, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army again took the offensive but, at first, made little progress. Toward the end of the month, however, it broke through the enemy positions and pursued the enemy retreating toward the Suchou Ho. There the Chinese forces made a stand at prepared positions. The Japanese forces attacked and after bitter fighting again put the enemy to flight.

In the meantime, on 20 October, in order to envelop and destroy the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Shanghai, the Central Authorities had ordered the 10th Army (6th, 18th, 114th Divisions and the Kunisaki Detachment commanded by Lt. Gen. Heisuke Yanagawa)¹⁰ to land at Hangchow Bay and attack the right rear flank of the enemy. Another force of division strength (16th Division) was to land in the vicinity of Palmaokou to attack the enemy's left rear flank.

9. On 20 August, it was estimated that there were approximately 14 or 15 Chinese divisions around Shanghai and thereafter one or two divisions were added each day until, toward the end of the Shanghai Incident, there were 85 Chinese divisions in this area.

10. The 6th and 16th Divisions and the Kunisaki Detachment were transferred from north China while the 18th and 114th Divisions were dispatched from Japan.

On 7 November, the Central Authorities organized the Central China Area Army, with the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army as its main force. General Iwane Matsui was appointed commander of the Central China Area Army and Lt. Gen. Yasuhiko Asaka commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army.

As soon as the 10th Army landed in the vicinity of Hangchow Bay on 5 November it ordered one unit to advance toward Kunshan and strike directly at the right rear flank of the enemy facing the Shanghai Expeditionary Army while its main force was to march first toward Chiahsing and then advance toward Wuchin. The first line units acted in accordance with these orders but, on 12 November, the Chinese began a general retreat with the Shanghai Expeditionary Army pursuing them along and to the north of the Nanching-Shanghai railway. As a result of the Chinese retreat, the 16th Division and part of the Shigeto Detachment which were scheduled to land in the vicinity of Paimaokou on 16 November, landed on the 13th.¹¹ This force encountered very little opposition and advanced to within ten kilometers east of Changshu the same day. Under these favorable conditions the Central China Area Army advanced to a line connecting Changshu, Suchou and Chiahsing on 19 November but failed to contact the main force of the retreating enemy.

11. The Shigeto Detachment, which had been attached to the Shanghai Expeditionary Army on 7 September 1937, was commanded by Lt. Gen. Chiaki Shigeto, commander of the Formosa Army Garrison Unit.

At first, Imperial General Headquarters had hoped that the objectives of the Shanghai Operation would be achieved when the Chinese were driven from the area around Shanghai and had decided to halt the advance at a line connecting Suchou and Chiahsing but the tactical situation at the end of November proved so favorable that the Central China Area Army decided to push ahead and extended its pursuit boundary to a line connecting Chingyangchen, Wuhsi and Wuhsing.

Nanching Operation

Having carefully considered the general military situation, on 1 December, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Central China Area Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to prepare to capture Nanching. At the same time, it instructed the Area Army to conduct limited operations considered necessary to attain its objective in the strategic areas along the left bank of the Yangtze River.¹²

It was estimated that about 100,000 Chinese troops were still in the vicinity of Nanching although the main force of the Chinese Army was being withdrawn far to the west.

On 7 December, the Central China Area Army ordered the Shanghai Expeditionary Army (9th, 13th, 16th and 101st Divisions and the Shigetō Detachment) to attack the enemy in the eastern outskirts of Nanching with its main force, while part of its force was to capture the

12. Prior to this, in an effort to prevent the spread of the Incident, Imperial General Headquarters had restricted the operations of the Central China Area Army to the right bank of the Yangtze River.

fortifications along the banks of the Yangtze River. The Expeditionary Army was then to advance and cut off the Tayun Ho north of the Yangtze River and, after crossing to the left bank of the Yangtze River, to cut the Tienching-Pukou railway. At the same time, the Area Army ordered the main strength of the 10th Army to advance to the southern outskirts of Nanching and an element to proceed to Wuhu by way of the Kuangte-Hsuancheng-Wuhu road, while another unit of the 10th Army was to cross the Yangtze River at Tangtu and advance to Pukou on the bank opposite to Nanching in order to cut the enemy's withdrawal route. The 10th Army advanced and, on 13 December, occupied Nanching.

Units of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army occupied Chiangtu on the left bank of the Yangtze River on 14 December and Chuhsien on the 20th, thereby cutting vital enemy communication lines to the north of the river.

Early in December, the 10th Army had received orders from the Area Army to capture Hangchou. After the fall of Nanching, the Army started a drive from the Kuangte-Wuhsing-Chiahsing line with about two divisions and, meeting very little resistance, captured Hangchou on 24 December.

On 13 December 1937, the Kunisaki Detachment was returned to the command of the North China Area Army and, on 15 January and 10 February 1938, the 16th and 114th Divisions also were returned to the North China Area Army.

An outline of the operational progress of the Japanese forces in north China from July 1937 to June 1938 is shown on General Reference Map No. I and that of the Japanese forces in central and south China from August 1937 to March 1939 is shown on General Reference Map No. II.

CHAPTER 2

Securing the Occupied Areas

With the successful conclusion of the Nanching Operation, the Japanese Government again endeavored to control the spread of the China Incident. On 11 January 1938, the Imperial Council met and a policy was decided upon whereby Japan, in cooperation with China and Manchukuo, would form an axis for peace in the Orient. Conclusions were reached as to the peace terms to be offered should Chiang Kai-shek's Government sue for peace but, should Chiang Kai-shek's army continue to fight, it was to be destroyed and a new Central Chinese Government friendly to Japan was to be established.¹

Chiang Kai-shek's Government withdrew westward with the remnants of its armies and established a temporary headquarters at Hankou. On 16 January, the Japanese Government published a statement to the effect that it would no longer treat with the Nationalist Government. Every effort was made to maintain peace and order in the occupied area and, as it was evident that the Incident might now expand into a prolonged war, Japan prepared to strengthen and expand its battlefront and to conduct aerial operations against the enemy's rear areas.

1. Japanese Monograph No. 144, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part 1.

In January 1938, enemy guerrillas became increasingly active, particularly in the 10th and 13th Divisions' areas of responsibility. Toward the end of January, the 13th Division opened its campaign and succeeded in destroying the guerrillas operating along the banks of the Huai Ho. The enemy guerrillas in the 10th Division's zone of responsibility (Chinan - Tzuyang) gradually increased in strength and, about mid-February, a large well-equipped force attacked the Japanese troops stationed to the west of Tzuyang and forced them to withdraw. Powerful enemy units facing the 2d Army (5th and 10th Divisions) still constituted a direct threat. It was decided, therefore, to attack and destroy this enemy once and for all. The 10th Division was ordered to drive back the enemy in the vicinity of Wenshang and Chining and to the west of the Tayun Ho while the 5th Division was to advance a unit toward Lini in order to facilitate the 10th Division's operation. The enemy was defeated in the vicinity of Chining and forced to withdraw west beyond the Tayun Ho. Chiahsiang was occupied on 25 February and Tangtouchen on 5 March.

Reports were received that five enemy divisions in the Tienching-Pukou railway area were planning to conduct an offensive against the 10th Division about mid-March and the 2d Army commander decided to attack first. Superior enemy forces, however, checked and encircled the Japanese troops in the vicinity of Taierhchuang and forced them to withdraw.²

2. Japanese Monograph No. 178, North China Area Operations Record, July 1937 - May 1941.

Tungshan Operation

Chinese morale increased tremendously with the victory at Taierh-chuang. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, planned to employ units from both central and north China in a pincer movement against the Chinese 5th War Sector Army concentrated near Taierh-chuang, not only to eradicate incessant nuisance actions on the 2d Army front but also for morale purposes.³

In accordance with Imperial General Headquarters' plan, the North China Area Army attached the 16th and 114th Divisions to the 2d Army and ordered the 2d Army to contain the enemy primarily in the vicinity of the Hanchuang-Tsien line, while the 14th Division of the 1st Army was to cross the Huang Ho and cut the Lunghai railway line near Lanfeng. Two and a half divisions from the Central China Expeditionary Army were to advance north from the Huai Ho between Pangfou and Huaiyuan.⁴

On 23 April, the Central China Expeditionary Army crossed the Yangtze River and began to march northward and, on 10 May, the North

3. Japanese Monograph No. 178, North China Area Operations Record, July 1937 - May 1941, and Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

4. On 14 February 1938, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the inactivation of the Central China Area Army, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army. On the same day, it ordered the organization of the Central China Expeditionary Army. For details see Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

China Area Army began to advance toward Tungshan. The Armies converged on the area surrounding Tungshan and, on 19 May, the main force of the Central China Expeditionary Army occupied the town. The Central China Expeditionary Army's forces, however, were spread too thinly and many of the enemy escaped to the west. The North China Area Army reinforced the 2d Army with two brigades (later added another division) and ordered the Army to pursue the enemy along the Lunghai railway between Shangchiu and Yungcheng.⁵ The 2d Army successfully completed this mission and, by the end of May, had captured Shangchiu and Pohsien. It continued to pursue the enemy to the west. It occupied Chihhsien and Checheng on 3 June, Yushih on the 4th, Kaifeng on the 6th and Chungmou on the 7th, while elements cut the Peiping-Hankou railway south of Chenghsien on the 10th and the sector southwest of Hsincheng on the 12th.

On 8 June, the 2d Army commander planned to concentrate the main force of the units which had been pursuing the enemy near the line to which they had advanced but, on the 12th, the enemy destroyed the banks of the Huang Ho northeast of Chenghsien and diverted the river toward the southeast, compelling the 2d Army to assemble its forces in the sector east of the Kaifeng-Chihhsien-Yungcheng line.

5. On 18 May, the 3d and 13th Mixed Brigades of the Kwantung Army arrived in China from Manchuria and the North China Area Army immediately attached them to the 2d Army. They were returned to the Kwantung Army on 11 June. On 2 June the 14th Division was transferred from the 1st Army to the 2d Army. It was returned to the 1st Army in increments between 14 and 24 June.

Early in June, Chiang Kai-shek moved his government to Chungking but massed his strength in the Wuchang-Hankou-Hanyang area.

Wuchang-Hankou-Hanyang Operation⁶

With the favorable conclusion of the Tungshan Operation, Imperial General Headquarters immediately began preparations for the Wu-Han Operation, its objective being to drive the Chiang Government from central China and gain control of the Yangtze River by capturing Hankou. There is an old Chinese saying that "the one who controls the Wuchang-Hankou area controls China." After occupying Hankou, Canton was to be seized in order to cut the Chinese supply route.

The Central China Expeditionary Army was ordered to capture Hankou by advancing one army through the district along the Huai Ho and another army through the district along the Yangtze River.

Although early in June the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army had completed plans for this operation, due to the flooding of the Huai Ho, it became necessary for him to revise these plans. It was decided that the army which previously was to have moved through the district along the Huai Ho would now advance through the district north of the Tapieshan Mountains.

In accordance with Imperial General Headquarters master plan for the operation the tactical organization for the operation was to be:

6. Full details of the Wuchang-Hankou-Hanyang Operation (abbreviated title Wu-Han Operation) are given in Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

2d Army: 3d, 10th, 13th and 16th Divisions

11th Army: 6th, 9th, 27th, 101st and 106th
Divisions
Hata Detachment

Forces under the
command of the
Central China Expeditionary Army: 116th and 18th Divisions
peditionary Army: 115th, 17th and 22d Divisions

Air Group: 3 air brigades

On 22 August, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Central China Expeditionary Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to invade and occupy key points in the vicinity of Hankou and the North China Area Army simultaneously to commence diversionary actions. On 27 August, the 2d Army units began to move from their assembly areas and, by late September, had wiped out the enemy on the northern slopes of the Tapiehshan Mountains. They continued to advance from a line linking Huangchuan and Shangcheng.

In the meantime, the 11th Army, having assembled its forces in the vicinity of Hsiaoehikou, launched an attack against Tean and the area along the north bank of the Yangtze River with part of its force, while using its main force to attack the enemy along the Canton-Hankou railway to the south of Hankou.

Both armies having penetrated the steep mountain ranges and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, by the end of October, had captured the Wuchang-Hankou sector. The 11th Army continued to advance along the Canton-Hankou railway and, by 11 November, had captured Yoyang.

Canton Operation⁷

At the end of 1937 south China was very important to Chiang Kai-shek as a means of maintaining contact with the outside world. Canton and Hong Kong were particularly important as not only did they serve as vital centers for the transportation of supplies from abroad to the Chinese forces in the interior (it was estimated that approximately 80 per cent of all the supplies for the interior passed through Canton) but they were also hotbeds of intrigue for those seeking to aid Chiang Kai-shek. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, felt that to cut these links with Chungking would not only deprive the Chinese of essential war materiel but it would also seriously affect their power to continue the war. Operations in south China were under consideration for some time before the actual planning was begun in early November 1937.

On 19 September 1938, Imperial General Headquarters issued an order activating the 21st Army at Kurume, Kyushu, Japan. On the same day, Lt. Gen. Mikio Furusho was appointed commander of the Army and the 5th, 18th and 104th Divisions and the 4th Air Brigade were placed under the command of the 21st Army.⁸ General Furusho was informed that Imperial General Headquarters desired to capture Canton immediately after the capture of Hankou in order to deprive the enemy of

7. Japanese Monograph No. 180, South China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

8. At this time the 5th Division was at Chingtao, the 18th Division at Shanghai and the 104th Division at Dairen.

important bases in south China and to cut the main overseas communication and supply routes. To achieve this objective the 21st Army was ordered, in cooperation with the Navy, to capture the key points in the vicinity of Canton.

By the end of September the 21st Army forces, having been transported from Chingtao, Shanghai and Dairen, assembled at Mako in the Pescadores Islands and, on 2 October, General Furusho flew from Taipei to join his army.

On 9 October, escorted by the 5th Fleet, the Army forces left Mako and, without encountering any opposition, made a surprise landing near Bias Bay on 12 October. The Chinese had about one division stationed in the vicinity of Bias Bay, their main force disposed at Huiyang, and a small number of observation units along the beach and at various other strategic points. With the help of the Navy Air Force, the enemy was quickly overcome and the main force of the 21st Army advanced along the Huiyang-Tsengcheng-Canton road. On 21 October, Canton was captured. In the meantime, part of the 5th Division went up the Lichi Hung waterway and, on 25 October, occupied Sanshui, thus blockading the Hsi Chiang and the Pei Chiang.

Situation After the Occupation of the Wu-Han Sector and Canton

The enemy, defeated in the Wu-Han sector and at Canton, retreated first to a line connecting Nanyang, Hsiangyang, Ichang, Changsha and Nanchang and later to the hinterlands of Kansu, Shensi, Szechwan, Kweichow and Kwangsi Provinces.

Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Central China Expeditionary Army commander to continue mopping-up operations in the Wu-Han sector and, at the same time, to concentrate part of his force in the vicinity of Nanching by mid-December for subsequent employment by Imperial General Headquarters.

On 15 December, all organic units of the 2d Army were assigned to the 11th Army and the 2d Army headquarters was ordered home. Immediately after its arrival in Japan it was inactivated.

In January 1939, in the lower reaches of the Yantze River, the Chinese 3d War Sector Army, occupying the right bank of the Chientang Chiang, the vicinity of Hsuancheng and the southern bank of the Yangtze River above Wuhu, was actively engaged in guerrilla warfare, while in the Wu-Han sector, the Chinese 9th and 5th War Sector Armies to the north and south of the Yangtze River were constructing positions near the Japanese lines and disturbing the occupied area by taking advantage of the Japanese shortage of strength to guard the vast area under occupation. In order to combat this situation, Japanese units constantly carried out punitive expeditions against the guerrillas.

In early February, the Expeditionary Army ordered the 11th Army to occupy Nanchang. Before attacking Nanchang, the 11th Army first occupied Chungsiang. In late March, it had completed the occupation of Nanchang and secured the strategic lines south of the city.

Remnants of the defeated enemy still held their ground at Mt. Lushan in April, after the occupation of Nanchang, and continued to

conduct guerrilla warfare. The 11th Army, therefore, initiated action on 17 April and, by the 22d, had cleaned out this sector.

During the latter part of March, there were strong indications that the Chinese Army would launch a general counteroffensive during April, particularly in the 5th War Sector Army sector. The 11th Army, therefore, acting under orders from the Expeditionary Army, contacted and destroyed the enemy in the area south of Tang Ho.

Estimate of Situation After the Capture of Wu-Han Sector

After the successful conclusion of the Wu-Han Operation, Imperial General Headquarters estimated the situation in China to be:

Although Chiang Kai-shek's forces has suffered tremendous casualties during the Wu-Han Operation and has retreated to the remote western provinces of China, they will make every effort to recover their military strength and to bring in military supplies through newly-established overland routes or through ports in French Indo-China and will continue to resist.

The next important step for the Japanese Army is to create conditions favorable to the sound development of the new central regime in China, in process of being set up. It is not considered necessary to conduct a large-scale, prolonged war against the Chiang Kai-shek regime but rather to establish a new regime which will cooperate with Japan, at the same time maintaining sufficient Japanese strength in China to secure peace and order.⁹

9. A Provisional Government was established in Peiping on 14 December 1937 and in Nanching on 28 March 1938.

In addition, it is estimated that tremendous efforts will be expended with little worthwhile results should the Japanese Army continue to seek out the enemy's weak points and capture local strategic areas. At the same time, it is realized that it would be foolish to completely ignore Chiang Kai-shek's regime with its future potential to again wage war. Appropriate steps will be taken, to include military operations when considered necessary, to destroy the Chiang regime.

Based on this estimate, future operations were planned as follows:

Plan

The occupied territory will be firmly secured and rapidly stabilized. The remaining anti-Japanese forces will be destroyed by a strong prolonged seige.

Outline of General Conduct

Aid will be given to the sound development of a pro-Japanese regime by securing important points in the Inner Mongolian Provinces, the presently-occupied areas in north China and in the eastern part of central China and by establishing peace and order in these areas.

Garrison troops will be stationed at permanent posts whenever possible and garrison strength shall be as high as possible in order to accelerate the restoration of peace and order. Guidance will be given to Chinese armed organizations with the object of obtaining their cooperation in maintaining peace and order under the Japanese Army's control.

One powerful army will be stationed in the Wuchang-Hankou-Hanyang area for the purpose of restraining and intimidating the hostile main force in Hupeh, Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces.

Another army will be stationed in the Canton area to cut the enemy's supply routes from the south.

Air operations will be conducted as aggressively as before and efforts will be exerted to neutralize enemy military and political strategic centers and to destroy enemy air strength.

The formation, disposition and installations of the air units in China will be reorganized gradually to facilitate active operations over an extended period.

Espionage and political activity organs will be skilfully utilized to destroy the anti-Japanese forces.

According to the situation, local operations will be carried out in support of the above plan.

Chinese forces with pro-Japanese and anti-Communist inclinations outside the Japanese occupied areas will be aided and the areas they occupy will be maintained. Every effort will be exerted to pacify these forces and, at least, make them non-partisan factions of the new regime.

Operational Plan for Each Area

a. North China Area

The occupied territory must be secured and stabilized. Special attention will be given to the rapid restoration of peace and order in the strategic areas in northern Hopeh Province, Shantung Province, northern Shansi Province and the strategic points in Inner Mongolia. At the same time, important lines of communication will be secured.

If necessary, large-scale mopping-up operations will be carried out in the occupied territory.

b. Central China Area

The occupied territory east of the Hofei-Wuhu-Hangchou line will be secured and stabilized. Peace and order will be maintained especially in the districts around Shanghai, Hangchou and Nanching. The main lines of communication must be secured.

Forces will be deployed in the vicinity of Wuchang and Hankou and at Hsiaoohihkou. In cooperation with the Navy, navigation will be secured in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River from Yoyang. At the same time, this force will destroy the enemy's offensive in the area surrounding Huaining, Hsinyang, Yoyang and Nanchang.

c. South China Area

In cooperation with the Navy, Army forces will occupy Humen, Canton and Sanshui and cut the enemy supply routes along the Canton-Hankou railway and the Chu Chiang.

After the capture of the Wuchang-Hankou-Hanyang area and Canton, the 10th and 27th Divisions from central China and the 5th Division from south China were diverted to north China.

The strength of the Japanese Army in China at the beginning of 1939 was approximately 1,000,000 men comprising 11 divisions, four mixed brigades and one cavalry brigade in north China, 10 divisions and one cavalry brigade in central China and two divisions and one detachment in south China, as well as various lines of communication units.¹⁰ In addition, it was planned to organize second reserve units in Japan into ten independent mixed brigades and station these brigades in north and central China.

10. The combat strength of the Japanese Army was estimated at approximately 550,000 and the lines of communication units at 450,000.

Japanese air strength in China at the beginning of 1939 was about 270 Army and 250 Navy planes. The main strength of the Army Air Force was disposed in central China with elements in north and south China while the Navy air strength was disposed mainly in central and south China.

Reorganization of Forces in China

In mid-September 1939, recognizing the necessity to coordinate military and political measures throughout China, Imperial General Headquarters decided to establish the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters at Nanching. The authority of the Commander in Chief of this headquarters was to be the same as an Area Army commander over the 11th and 13th Armies in central China, while his authority over the North China Area Army and the 21st Army was to consist of ruling on fundamental issues and policy on military operations and administrative situations; details were to remain the responsibility of the North China Area Army commander and the 21st Army commander.

On 23 September, the Central China Expeditionary Army was inactivated and, on the same day, orders of battle of the China Expeditionary Army and the 13th Army were published. In addition, the order of battle of the 11th Army was revised.¹¹ Following this, on 29 September, the commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army, together with his headquarters, returned to Japan.

11. Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941, Chart 3.

With the changing situation in China, the order of battle of the North China Area Army changed from time to time until, on 23 September 1939, it was as shown in Japanese Monograph No. 178, North China Area Operations Record, July 1937 - May 1941, Chapter 3.

The mission of the China Expeditionary Army was:

The area east of the line from West Sunite (Sisunitewangfu, 107 km north of Wanchuan) to Hangchou, via Pailingmiao, Huang Ho, inundated area of the Huang Ho, Hofei and Wuhu, will be secured and stabilized.

Peace and order will be established in the strategic areas of Chahar, Suiyuan, northern Shansi, Hopeh and Shantung Provinces, as well as in the triangular area of Shanghai-Nanching-Hangchou.

Communication lines along the lower reaches of the Yangtze River from Yoyang will be maintained.

Planned enemy offensives will be blocked from the operational bases in the Wu-Han sector and from Hsiao-chih-kou.

The Army's operational zone in this area will be limited by a line from Huaining to Hsin-yang to Yoyang and Nanchang.

The areas around Canton and Swatow and the strategic points on northern Hainan Island will be secured in order to cut the enemy supply route from the south. The operational zone in the vicinity of Canton will be limited by a line through Huiyang, Tsunghua, Chingyuan, Pei Chiang, Hsi Chiang to south of Sanshui.

Ground operations beyond these lines will be governed by separate orders.

Air attacks will be made to subjugate and disrupt strategic and political enemy centers and to check the reorganization of the enemy air force.

Close coordination will be maintained with the China Area Fleet commander in all coastal operations.

Other effective measures to weaken the enemy's power will be taken.

In order to establish a foundation for a prolonged war, during 1930 Japan relieved the greater part of her standing and special divisions with garrison divisions, and gradually reorganized second reserve units into approximately ten independent mixed brigades to garrison the rear areas.

The number of units dispatched to China or organized in China during 1939 was 10 divisions, 14 independent mixed brigades, one mixed brigade and one independent infantry unit.

During the year, ten divisions which had been fighting in China were returned either to Japan or Korea. Of these, the 9th, 10th, 14th and 16th Divisions upon return to Japan were reduced to peacetime strength with the men whose term of service was completed being demobilized. The 20th Division was returned to Korea where it was reduced to peacetime strength and the 101st, 106th, 108th, 109th and 114th Divisions were ordered to return to Japan to be inactivated and the men demobilized. The return of the 106th Division was delayed until the spring of 1940 as it became necessary to attach this division to the 21st Army in the Canton area for a time.

By November 1939 the garrisons for the occupied territory of China had been established and were maintained until 1943 with little change in strength.

In November 1939, the garrisons under the command of the China Expeditionary Army were:

North China Area Army:

1st Army (three divisions and four mixed brigades)	Shansi Province
12th Army (two divisions and three mixed brigades)	Shantung and northern Kiangsu Provinces
Mongolia Garrison Army (one division, one mixed brigade and one cavalry brigade)	Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces
Units directly attached to the Area Army (three di- visions, four mixed bri- gades and one cavalry brigade)	Hopeh and northern Honan Provinces


Units under the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army:

11th Army (eight divisions and two mixed brigades)	Wu-Han area
13th Army (four divisions and four mixed brigades)	Lower Yangtze River
21st Army (four divisions and two mixed brigades)	South China
3d Air Group (six air re- giments and six independ- ent air squadrons)	



At the end of 1939, the Japanese forces, consisting of approximately 35 divisions, one cavalry group and one air group, occupied a

vast area which it was forced to defend against an enemy numbering approximately 250 divisions. It was necessary to use the entire strength defensively against enemy counterattacks and guerrilla warfare and, in consequence, few troops could be held in reserve.

(Maps 2a and b)



MAP NO. 2(b)



CHAPTER 3

Major Mopping-Up Operations

During 1940 the China Expeditionary Army concentrated on securing the occupied area which was encircled by an enemy force vastly superior numerically. Japanese troops were widely dispersed to prevent the enemy from infiltrating into areas where peace and order had been restored, while, at the same time, it was necessary to conduct mopping-up operations against a powerful enemy force which had driven a wedge into the occupied areas.

In north China, the Chinese 2d War Sector Army was deployed in western Shansi Province while the 1st War Sector Army was in southern Shansi and Honan Provinces. The 5th War Sector Army was deployed in the northwestern part, and the 9th War Sector Army in the southwestern part of central China with the 3d War Sector Army along the right bank of the lower Yangtze River. The 4th War Sector Army was in southern China. In addition, the Communist 8th Route Army was located in the vicinity of Fushih in Shensi Province.

The Chinese, in an effort to stop the Japanese advance, constructed positions in depth close to the Japanese lines and completely destroyed all roads connected with the occupied territory. In addition, guerrilla units constantly infiltrated the Japanese lines and created disturbances. Intelligence reports stated that the Chinese were mobilizing and training vast numbers of men and were await-

ing an opportunity for a mass counterattack against the Japanese forces.

The Communist Army, in particular, displayed great skill in conducting guerrilla warfare in the mountainous districts in Shansi Province as well as in the mountains west of Peiping, along the borders of Hopeh, Shansi and Chahar Provinces, in the mountains west of the Shantung Peninsula and in the plains of southern Shansi and Hopeh Provinces. Later, the Communist Army operated against the entire occupied territory, mainly in surprise actions against the garrisons dispersed over wide areas. They destroyed railways, roads, telephone and telegraph lines, and generally disrupted lines of communication. In addition they disseminated anti-Japanese propaganda and conducted campaigns to convert the Nationalists of China in the occupied territory.

To cope with this situation, the China Expeditionary Army disposed its forces over a wide area to protect the roads and waterways and conducted strenuous mopping-up operations during 1940.

Shansi Province Operations

Northern Shansi Province had been captured by the Japanese Army in October 1937. During February and March 1938, operations were conducted in southern Shansi Province and the enemy was driven from the areas along the main railways and in the Changchih area. Many, however, escaped to the mountains from where they carried on guerrilla warfare. During the Tungshan Operation, Japanese forces were

transferred from Shansi Province and the 1st Army found itself hard pressed and often encircled.¹ After the Tungshan Operation, therefore, the area was reinforced and the Changchih area reoccupied. The rest of Shansi Province, particularly the Tahangshan and Chungtiaoshan mountain areas, was still in the hands of the Kuomintang Army and was the enemy's largest base of operations in north China. In addition, the mountainous country to the north of Changchih and in the vicinity of Mt. Wutaishan was filled with communist guerrillas who had indoctrinated the natives with strong anti-Japanese feelings.

Mt. Wutaishan Operation

There were no real roads through the mountains in the vicinity of Mt. Wutaishan and the guerrillas were strongly entrenched in this area.

In May 1939, the 1st Army launched an attack against this area from all sides. The enemy withdrew but hid so effectively in the surrounding mountains that it was impossible for the Army to strike a decisive blow. It was necessary, therefore, for the 1st Army to garrison the area with part of its force in order to control the guerrillas' activities.

Eastern Shansi Province Operation

As the 1st Army units which had previously guarded the vicinity

1. Japanese Monograph No. 178, North China Area Operations Record, July 1937 - May 1941.

of Changchih had been transferred to participate in the Tungshan Operation, approximately 80,000 Nationalist Army troops and about 20,000 Communist troops had moved into the area.

On 3 July, the North China Area Army launched attacks from Hantan, Chinyang, Taiku, Linfen and Hsiahsien with approximately four divisions and, by 21 August, had defeated the enemy and occupied the area. It then stationed garrison units at strategic points.

Spring Operations in Southern Shansi Province

As a result of the Eastern Shansi Province Operation and the Changchih Mopping-Up Operation carried out in the summer and autumn of 1939, the Changchih area was occupied by Japanese forces. The rest of southern Shansi Province, however, particularly the Tahangshan and Chungtiaoshan mountain areas, was still in the hands of the Kuomintang Army. The Chinese fighting spirit was very high in southern Shansi Province. About mid-March 1940, the Kuomintang Army ordered a force to advance from the south bank of the Huang Ho to the vicinity of Kaoping and, at the same time, changed its troop disposition, laying emphasis on the sector south of Changchih, to meet a possible attack by the Japanese Army from the Changchih area. In addition to ten other divisions disposed in this area, the main force was about twenty divisions commanded by Wei Lihuang of the 1st War Sector Army. With the change in the disposition of the Kuomintang Army, the Communist forces on the Changchih Plain retired to the north of Changchih.

Due to the return to Japan and Korea of three divisions during the previous summer and autumn, the strength of the 1st Army in Shansi Province had dwindled to three divisions and four independent mixed brigades.

In view of the strength of the Chinese forces in southern Shansi Province, in mid-April the North China Area Army ordered the 1st Army to attack and destroy them.

At dawn on 17 April, the 1st Army launched its attack under aircraft cover. Fierce fighting ensued and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy which, by early May had been routed. The 1st Army garrisoned such strategic positions as Pinglu, Changmatsun, Chinsui, Yangcheng and Chincheng and ordered its troops to carry out mopping-up operations and to establish peace and order.

During this operation the Central 98th Army, commanded by Li Wen, invaded Taning and Hsiangning and harassed the Japanese rear. The 1st Army took the initiative, and although the enemy resisted stubbornly from steep mountain positions, they were defeated and forced to retreat to the north.

From May to June, the 1st War Sector Army attempted desperately to recapture Changchih but the 1st Army drove it back.

Central Shansi Operation

In late August 1940, Chu Te, commander of the 18th Army Group, ordered his communist forces then concentrated in north China to simultaneously carry out attacks on railways and the industrial areas.

On the night of the 20th, they launched surprise attacks along the Shihchiachuang-Yangchu railway and the northern section of the Tatung-Fenglingtu railway, blasting and destroying the railroads and the communication facilities. In addition, they completely destroyed the Chinghsing coalmine.

Although it was impossible to send reinforcements to the garrisons in these areas as the roads and railways had been destroyed, after fierce fighting the garrison forces finally succeeded in repulsing the enemy. The Japanese 9th Independent Mixed Brigade advanced and mopped up the enemy to the west of Yangchu and Hsinhsien and the 3d Independent Mixed Brigade mopped up the enemy to the west of Yuanpingchen.

In the southern sector of the Tatung-Fenglingtu railway, the 41st Division repulsed all attacks.

On 20 and 21 August, the enemy attacked the Tungkuan-Changchih railway but was repelled.

Although at the end of August the 1st Army had defeated the enemy wherever it had encountered them, strong units were still hiding in the area. Japanese forces continued mopping up operations with considerable success until, by 3 December, they considered the operation completed.

The heavy losses suffered by the Communist forces during this operation forced them to resort to guerrilla warfare and thereafter they offered very little resistance in this area.

Chungyuan Operation

The Communist troops, which were entrenched in the mountainous region in the northern part of central Shansi Province, had been hard hit during the autumn of 1940 but their 120th Division to the south of Hsinghsien was gradually becoming more active. Although the Japanese Army conducted small-scale operations against this force, it was found impossible to engage them in a major battle and they gradually retreated to the east bank of the Huang Ho. In addition, Chiang Kai-shek's Army continued to hold strategic positions in southeastern and southern Shansi Province. The total enemy strength in the province early in 1941 was estimated to be about 24 divisions with about 168,000 troops.

The North China Area Army, therefore, decided to destroy Chiang Kai-shek's Army which was occupying the Chungtiaoshan Range and to improve the public peace in Shansi Province by pushing its main garrison line farther toward the Huang Ho. Preparations for this operation were begun in the autumn of 1940.

In order to employ its strength efficiently in the main attack and not be concerned with the possibility of attacks against its flanks, the 1st Army planned to first destroy the Chinese 27th Army at Lingchuan and the 15th Army on the plain south of Icheng in March 1941.

The China Expeditionary Army planned to transfer the 33d Division from the 11th Army to reinforce the 1st Army (this transfer was delayed until late April) and ordered the 3d Air Group to cooperate in the operation. The North China Area Army dispatched the 21st Division of the 12th Army to the Hsinhsiang Plains while the 35th Division was already assembled in that area.

On 6 March, the North China Area Army opened its attack and, by the end of the month, had defeated the 15th Army and occupied the district south of Icheng and east of Chianghsien. The Japanese Army continued to advance and captured the Henglingkuan-Changmatsun line where it began preparations for the next phase of the operation. The operational plan called for the annihilation of the enemy to the west and east of the Changmatsun-Yuanchu line. The 1st Army was ordered to destroy the enemy to the west. On 7 May, an attack was launched by the 9th and 16th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 36th, 37th and 41st Divisions. These forces advanced south to the Huang Ho, driving a wedge through the enemy lines and, by the evening of 9 May, were in control of all river crossings, thereby checking the enemy's retreat to the south. The enemy was thrown into confusion and dispersed into the hills. Repeated mopping-up operations were conducted and, by 14 May, enemy forces north of the Huang Ho had been annihilated.

On the eastern front, the 33d Division advanced south from the Changmatsun-Yangcheng line, while the 35th and 21st Divisions moved

north from Chinyang and Shaoyuancheng. These forces attacked the enemy in a pincer movement, inflicting heavy casualties.

By 15 June, the operation had been completed and the Chinese Army in southern Shansi and northern Honan Provinces had been completely wiped out.

In order to support this operation, the 11th Army in the Wuchang-Hankou area on 5 May, launched an attack on the enemy to the north with three divisions and one mixed brigade, and advanced and occupied the Tsaoyang-Yuanan line.²

During the latter part of May, the 11th Army forces returned to their original stations without having engaged the enemy in any major engagements. Although the enemy immediately began to occupy the areas vacated by the 11th Army, it was felt that this diversionary action was helpful to the North China Area Army's operation in that it contained the 5th War Sector Army and prevented its participation in any action in the Shansi Province area.

Mopping-Up in Hopeh and Shantung Provinces

Hopeh and Shantung Provinces and the Chahar-Suiyuan district were the rear zone of the Japanese occupied territory and were not subjected to large scale enemy attacks. The vast area, however, was lightly garrisoned and the guerrillas, especially the Communists,

2. Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

constantly infiltrated the area, necessitating frequent minor operations to maintain peace and order.

Northern Kiangsu Operation

After the Tungshan Operation in 1938, the enemy disposed two of its armies and one division in the vicinity of Tunghai and Huaiyin as there were no Japanese forces east of Tungshan to the coast. The North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to destroy this force and enlarge the occupied area.

In February 1939, the 12th Army attacked the enemy from the west and north with the 5th and 21st Divisions, at the same time landing small units of the 5th Division near Chingtao. The enemy dispersed, offering very little resistance and the Army stationed garrison forces at Tunghai and Huaiyin in order to maintain order.

Hopeh-Shansi-Chahar Border Operations

At the outbreak of the China Incident, the Chinese Central Army had been stationed in the mountainous area on the border of Shansi and Hopeh Provinces, west of Peiping and Chahar and, even after the Japanese occupation, enemy bandits and the Communist Army continued to infiltrate this area and use it as a base for guerrilla activities in north China. Japanese troops continually conducted mopping-up operations but without satisfactory results.

During November and December 1939, the Japanese Army had used approximately 12 infantry battalions to clear out this part of the

country but without marked success. Again in 1940, from October to mid-December they had attacked the Chinese forces infiltrating the occupied area but failed to engage them in any major battle. In August 1941, the North China Area Army recognizing the urgent necessity to mop up this area planned a further operation to drive out or annihilate the estimated 50,000 enemy troops still dispersed through this area. In early August, the 1st Army and the Mongolia Garrison Army blockaded the border of Hopeh Province while the units directly attached to the Area Army (approximately three divisions) encircled and destroyed the enemy along the Huto Ho near Wuchi and Shentse. During the latter part of August and early September, Japanese troops advanced toward the Tahangshan Mountain Range and defeated the enemy located at Fengtou, Taomakuan and Fouping. The Area Army then deployed its forces at strategic points and established a line to intercept enemy troops attempting to escape. In addition, combat patrols were maintained in an effort to suppress guerrilla activities in the area.

By the end of October, with the destruction of enemy bases, the operation was completed.

Mopping-Up Along the Lower Yangtze River³

In Central China, after the capture of Nanching in December 1937, the Japanese forces had constantly been threatened by the 3d War Sector Army, deployed along the right bank of the Yangtze River east of

3. Ibid.

Poyang Hu. Not only did the Chinese forces disrupt the peace and threaten to cut the lines of communication in the area but, assisted by Chinese in the Shanghai settlements, they smuggled through supplies and munitions. Further, they continuously fired on Japanese vessels using the waterway. In order to combat this, in mid-September 1938, the Central China Expeditionary Army ordered the 116th Division to secure the river banks between Hukou and Wuhu. The newly-organized 15th, 17th and 22d Divisions arrived at Shanghai between early and mid-August 1938 and, by 19 September, these three divisions had been deployed in the area from Suchou to Hangchou. The 3d War Sector Army, however, continued to engage actively in guerrilla warfare. The 11th, 12th and 13th Independent Mixed Brigades, therefore, were organized in central China in mid-January 1939 and placed under the direct control of the Expeditionary Army. The Expeditionary Army attached the 11th and 12th Independent Mixed Brigades to the 15th and 22d Divisions respectively to assist in maintaining peace in the area, and assigned the 13th Independent Mixed Brigade to garrison duty along the railway line connecting Shanghai, Nanching and Wanchihchen. In mid-November 1939, the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade was organized in China and entered in the order of battle of the 13th Army and the 13th Army disposed this brigade in the vicinity of Shanghai to further strengthen the area.

The Japanese front line in the area east of Wuhu had originally

been drawn at a line through Hsuancheng-Liyang-Ihsing-Changhsing-Hangchou-Yuhang. As it was necessary, however, to transfer all available strength from the lower Yangtze River area during the Wu-Han Operation, the front line was withdrawn to Wanchihchen-Lishui-Chintan-Hochiaochen. Taking advantage of this, the Chinese advanced to the Hsuancheng-Liyang line from where they continued to molest the Japanese occupied territory. In consequence, it was necessary for the units south of the Yangtze River to make frequent attacks against the guerrillas operating in this sector. In addition, the Japanese units in the coastal area around Hangchou, the Hangchou-Changhsing area and the right bank of the Yangtze River southwest of Wuhu, during 1939, were constantly under attack from guerrilla units and enemy forces.

Although during early 1940 it was recognized that the Japanese strength was not sufficient to completely destroy the 3d War Sector Army, it was imperative that the right bank of the Chientang Chiang be occupied in order to cut the enemy's lines of communication to Shanghai. The 13th Army, therefore, ordered the 22d Division, then guarding the vicinity of Hangchou, to cross the Chientang Chiang and attack and occupy Hsiaoshan. On the morning of 22 January 1940, the main strength of the Division carried out a surprise crossing of the Chientang Chiang south of Hangchou and forced the enemy to retreat to the south of Linpucheng. By the evening of the 26th, the Division had concentrated near Hsiaoshan. An element of the division was left to garrison the area while the main strength returned to its home station.

Chinese guerrillas still continued to infiltrate the occupied areas and to keep their supply channels through Shanghai open sporadically. In April 1941, in a further effort to cut the Chinese supply lines to the coast, the 5th Division captured and occupied the area around Ningpo.

In addition, as the coast of Kiangsu Province to the north bank of the Yangtze River was a rich source for salt which the Chinese used as a means of barter overseas for much needed munitions, in the summer of 1941 the 12th Independent Mixed Brigade captured Yencheng and checked enemy activities in this area.

Operations of the 11th Army⁴

In early 1939, in the Wu-Han sector, the Chinese 5th and 9th War Sector Armies to the south and north of the Yangtze River constructed positions near the Japanese lines and, taking advantage of the Japanese shortage of strength to guard the vast area under occupation, disturbed the peace and harassed the Japanese forces. In order to combat this situation, Japanese units constantly carried out punitive expeditions against the guerrillas.

It had at first been planned to capture Nanchang during the Wu-Han Operation but the general situation had not permitted this, therefore, in early February, the Expeditionary Army ordered the 11th Army to carry out this operation. Before occupying Nanchang, the 11th Army occupied Chunghsiang. By late March, it had completed the occupation of Nanchang and secured the strategic lines south of the city.

4. Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

As remnants of the defeated enemy still held their ground near Mt. Lushan and continued to create disturbances, in April the 11th Army ordered the 14th Independent Mixed Brigade to clear out this sector. The Brigade initiated action on 17 April and, by the 22d, had mopped up this district.

In late March there were very evident signs that Chiang Kai-shek planned to launch an over-all offensive in April. The two armies (six divisions) composing the 31st Army Group, commanded by General Tang En-Po, one of Chiang Kai-shek's most competent and trusted generals, moved from the south to the north of the Yangtze and gradually began to concentrate forces in the region south of Tsao-yang. It was estimated that General Tang En-Po would mount an offensive with this force toward Suihsien, while at the same time directing the movement of the 1st and 5th War Sector Armies. On 21 April, therefore, the Central China Expeditionary Army ordered the 11th Army to attack the enemy in the districts south of the Tang Ho during April and May and, at the same time, ordered the Air Group to assign units to assist the 11th Army's operation. The 11th Army assembled the 3d, 13th and 16th Divisions together with the 4th Cavalry Brigade between Chehoshih and Chungsiang and planned to launch its attack to the north of Chehoshih in early May. The 3d Division was to attack in the area north of the Chehoshih to contain the enemy in the mountainous northeastern district while the main force was to

move along the left bank of the Han Chiang to the Kun Ho, striking from the vicinity of Chungsiang. Thus the Army would surround and destroy the enemy's main force assembled in the area northeast of Tsaoyang.

During the first week of May the 11th Army launched its attack. Each unit successfully carried out its mission and struck heavy blows against the retreating enemy in the district north of Hsihsinchi and in the vicinity of Tangho.

On 12 May, the 11th Army prepared to return to its base of operations to draw up plans for the destruction of the miscellaneous enemy troops remaining in the sector northeast of Tahungshan Mountains. It ordered the 3d and 13th Divisions to turn back and mop up the enemy on both banks of the Kun Ho, south of Tsaoyang and in the sector north of Suihsien. The 16th Division was to assemble in the vicinity of Tsaoyang and, at an opportune time, to advance to the southeast, while the 4th Cavalry Brigade was to advance southward along the left banks of the Tang Ho and Han Chiang. From the 12th to the 14th, the units advanced southward, destroying strong enemy groups on the way. On the 21st and 22d, they assembled in their new garrison areas.

During this action approximately 30 enemy divisions were engaged. Although the 10 divisions on the flanks escaped with light casualties, a heavy blow was struck against the other 20 divisions,

greatly reducing their fighting strength and causing them to withdraw from the district east of the Han Chiang.

Kiangsi-Hunan Operation⁵

Having been forced to abandon the Wu-Han sector, the 9th War Sector Army assembled its forces to the south of the 11th Army's occupied area from where, taking advantage of the gaps created by the wide deployment of the Japanese Army, it continued to harass the Japanese forces. Enemy strength was estimated at approximately 50 divisions, including about 16 divisions of Chiang Kai-shek's highly-trained and well-equipped Central Government Army.⁶ Determined to destroy this Army, the 11th Army planned to launch surprise attacks about the middle of September by the 106th Division from Fenghsien, and by its main force from the vicinity of the Canton-Hankou railway toward the mountains along the border of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces.⁷

On the night of 14 September, the 106th Division advanced to the vicinity of Fukuan and then turned northwest to Kaoan, striking the

5. This operation was known to the Japanese as the Kiangsi-Hunan Operation but to the Chinese as the 1st Changsha Operation. In consequence, the operation designated 1st Changsha Operation by the Japanese became the 2d Changsha Operation to the Chinese, the Japanese 2d Changsha Operation became the Chinese 3d Changsha Operation, etc.

6. During the Japanese 1st Changsha Operation, the estimate of 50 Divisions was revised to 30 divisions.

7. For details of the strength used by the 11th Army in this operation see Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941, Chart No. 5.

enemy at will as it advanced. On the 18th and 19th, it contacted and struck severe blows at the enemy fleeing to the west of Kaoan. Meanwhile, the Saeda Detachment destroyed the enemy massed in the Chih-tienchang area and, on the 18th, advanced to the vicinity of Kaoan. In accordance with 11th Army orders, the 106th Division then advanced toward the lower reaches of the Hsiu Shui. By 4 October, the Division had reached a line connecting Santu and Shihchieh but, in accordance with Army orders, on the 6th, the main force of the Division began to withdraw. By the 9th, it had assembled in the vicinity of Fenghsin. Part of the division returned to Wuning about the middle of October after defeating an enemy force which had attacked it in the vicinity of Santu.

The 6th Division, the Nara Detachment and the 33d Division captured the enemy's advanced positions on their respective fronts and then prepared to attack the enemy's main positions. At dawn on 23 September they began the attack and successively broke through a series of defense positions.

After breaking through the enemy's main positions, the 33d Division attacked and destroyed a force which had resisted stubbornly in the mountainous district south of Tungshan. It then advanced to the upper stream of Ku Shui.

On the morning of the 25th, the 6th Division and Nara Detachment advanced to the left bank of the Ku Shui. The 11th Army next ordered its main force (6th and 33d Divisions and Nara Detachment)

to turn eastward and destroy the enemy which they expected to withdraw to the south. Each group advanced as directed, and by the 30th had reached the district to the northeast of Changsha.

From the end of September through early October, groups from the main force of the 11th Army, having reversed their direction, mopped up the enemy. They returned to the area north of the Hsinchiang Ho between 7 and 9 October.

During this operation the Japanese forces inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, however, it was felt that the objective of breaking the enemy's will to fight was still far from achieved. At the same time, it was recognized that more could not have been expected from the approximately four Japanese divisions which had participated in the fighting.

Ichang Operation

Although the Japanese Army generally had driven the enemy back during the winter offensive of 1939, the 5th War Sector Army claimed that it had inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese Army, and its morale was high. The 11th Army, therefore, drew up plans to attack and destroy the 5th War Sector Army in the area along the west bank of the Han Chiang before the rainy season commenced in 1940. The operational plan required the enemy to be defeated in the district north of the Suihsien-Hsiangyang line during the first phase of the operation early in May and, during the second phase, after pushing

the enemy back to the vicinity of Ichang, to annihilate the remaining forces in the area along the right bank of the Han Chiang. It was planned to use the 3d, 13th and 39th Divisions and the Ikeda and Ishimoto Detachments during this operation.

On 1 May, the 3d and 13th Divisions, together with the Ishimoto Detachment went into action from Hsinyang and Chungsiang. They broke through the enemy's flanks and cut off their routes of retreat toward Tsaoyang. On the 4th, the main force (39th Division and Ikeda Detachment) advanced toward Tsaoyang from Suihsien and, by the 10th, had destroyed the greater part of the enemy trapped in the area northwest of Tsaoyang, Tang Ho and Pai Ho. The Chinese reinforced the vicinity of Tsaoyang from the southwest and north with the main force of the 5th War Sector Army but the 11th Army defeated and threw back this force when it attacked from the north toward the bank of the Tang Ho, in addition to crushing the enemy's 55th Army which had crossed the Han Chiang south of Hsiangyang.⁸

In preparation for the second phase of the operation, the 11th Army first concentrated its forces to the west and southwest of Tsaoyang. On the evening of 31 May, the 3d and 9th Divisions crossed the Han Chiang and advanced south in parallel lines, driving the enemy before them. On 4 June, the 11th Army ordered the 13th Division to cross the Han Chiang in the sector south of Chiukouchen and march

8. Japanese Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941, Map 30.

toward Ichang where, in cooperation with the groups advancing south, it was to destroy the opposing enemy. Simultaneously, the Ikeda Detachment crossed the lower reaches of the river and proceeded to Shashi to cooperate with the Army's main force. On 12 June, 11th Army units penetrated Ichang and cleared the vicinity of enemy troops.⁹

As the objective of the Ichang Operation had been achieved, the 11th Army began to return its units to their original stations when word was received that Imperial General Headquarters desired Ichang occupied not only as a base from which Chungking and other inland cities could be bombed but also for its propaganda value. Accordingly, the 11th Army ordered the 13th Division to secure Ichang and deployed the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade (which had been stationed at Wuning) at Tangyang, the 39th Division near Kingmen and the 4th Division in the district east of the Han Chiang.¹⁰

1st Changsha Operation

The 9th War Sector Army had not been employed in battle since the fall of 1939 when it had suffered serious losses during the Kiangsi-Hunan Operation. During the two intervening years this Army had concentrated on restoring its strength until, by the fall of 1941, it numbered approximately 30 divisions of well trained and well equipped troops.

9. Ibid, Map 32.

10. On 1 July 1940, the 4th Division, which had been scheduled to return to Japan from Manchuria, was placed under the command of the 11th Army.

Early in September 1941, the 11th Army received orders from the China Expeditionary Army to crush this force, using four divisions (3d, 4th, 6th and 40th Divisions) two detachments and two infantry battalions.

By the night of 17 September, the 11th Army had completed the deployment of its forces and, at dawn on the 18th, opened its offensive. It broke through positions on the south bank of the Hsinchiang Ho and pursued the retreating enemy toward the Ku Shui, destroying the force located in the highlands between the two rivers. The Army continued to advance rapidly southward. Although the 4th Division's advance was slowed down by strong opposition, the Hayabuchi Detachment, which was attached to the Division, overran enemy positions near Lichiao on the 25th, and advanced toward Changsha. At dawn on the 27th, the Detachment broke through positions on the south bank of the Liuyang Ho and, on the 28th, occupied Changsha. In the meantime, the 4th Division after defeating the enemy in its line of advance, on the 28th, reached the Luiyang Ho and, on the 29th, assembled its forces near Changsha.

Having attained its objective, the 11th Army prepared to concentrate its main force in the vicinity of the lower reaches of Ku Shui, but, on the 28th, received a dispatch that the 3d Division was carrying on a running fight between Chintan and Chuchou. The Division continued to push back the enemy and, on the 29th, occupied Chuchou and destroyed military installations in its vicinity. It then returned to Chintan on the 30th.

To support this operation, the China Expeditionary Army ordered the 35th Division from the North China Area Army to advance and secure Chenghsien. On 2 October, the Division crossed the new Huang Ho between the Peiping-Hankou railway bridge and Chungmou and, on the 4th, captured Chenghsien, temporarily securing the area until the end of the month when it began to return to its original position. By order of the Area Army, the Division posted approximately two infantry battalions to secure the hill on the south bank near the railway bridge and Chungmou to facilitate subsequent operations.

Operations in South China¹¹

With the capture of Canton in the fall of 1938, the Japanese Army cut the enemy's main overseas supply route. War materials were still reaching the enemy, however, by way of the south China coast and overland from the south. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, ordered the 21st Army to carry out interceptive operations wherever necessary to cut the enemy's supply routes.

Capture of Hainan Island

Hainan Island was important as an air base from which to cut off Chiang Kai-shek's supplies from French Indo-China and Burma as well as to blockade the coast of China. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy,

11. Japanese Monograph No. 180, South China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941.

to occupy and hold strategic points on the island in the vicinity of Haikoushih. The 21st Army commander designated the Formosa Mixed Brigade to undertake the mission.

On 10 February 1939, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, in close cooperation with naval units, made surprise landings on north Hainan Island and, meeting very little resistance, by midday had occupied Haikoushih. On the same day, the Brigade advanced and occupied Tingan. It occupied Wenchang on the 22d and Chinglan Port on the 23d.

Capture of Swatow and Chaoan

Swatow was an important sea port through which the Chinese could maintain contact with the outside world. As large quantities of munitions were being imported through this port and then transported to the interior along the Chaoshao road (the road connecting Chaoan and Shaochow) Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to occupy Swatow and Chaoan. The 21st Army assigned the mission to the Goto Detachment. On 21 June 1939, without meeting much resistance, the Detachment supported by the Navy, occupied Swatow. On the 27th, after defeating the main strength of the Chinese 9th Independent Brigade near Fengchi, the Detachment captured Chaoan.

Taking advantage of the vacuum created by the Japanese troops being pulled out for the Swatow operation, Chinese troops penetrated the area around Huahsien from where it was estimated they were preparing to launch a counteroffensive. The 21st Army, therefore, using the 104th Division to attack the enemy entrenched around Tunghua

and Huahsien, defeated this force and compelled it to withdraw.

Capture of Nanning

Although the Chinese had lost many important ports in south China, they were still receiving war materiel through French Indo-China and Burma. In the fall of 1939, therefore, Imperial General Headquarters planned to cut the southwestern supply routes to China and to capture Nanning in order to convert it into a base from which the Japanese Navy Air Force could launch an operation to cut the Haiphong-Yunnan railway and the Burma-Yunnan road.

In order to reinforce the 21st Army for this operation, on 16 October 1939, the 5th Division was returned to its command. The 21st Army then published its plan to capture Nanning using the 5th Division and the Formosa Mixed Brigade supported by units of the 5th Fleet and the 1st and 2d Carrier Divisions.

On 16 November, the Formosa Mixed Brigade landed south of Chinghsien and, without meeting much resistance, occupied the town. On the same day, the main force of the 5th Division, after travelling up the Maoling Chiang in boats, landed in the vicinity of the Ching-Ning road and immediately began to advance northward. On the 24th, after beating back numerous counterattacks, it occupied Nanning while the Formosa Mixed Brigade advanced to the vicinity of Hsiaotungshu in order to guard the right flank of the Division and secure the Ching-Ning road.

In mid-December, the Chinese Army began a large-scale counter-offensive throughout China, part of this being a drive to retake Nanning. Originally, the Chinese forces in the Nanning area had consisted of six divisions from Kwangsi Province but, with the arrival of reinforcements from Hunan Province, its strength was built up to an estimated 10 divisions. On 17 December, the Chinese launched their attack. Bitter fighting ensued. The Chinese forces overran Japanese positions. The Kunlunkuan Garrison Unit was annihilated and the enemy occupied the town.

In view of the critical situation in the Nanning area, the 21st Army, in order to divert its main force to that area, planned to push its attack against Wengyuan earlier than the appointed date and, by the year's end, had completed this operation.

Although the Nanning-Chiutanghsu road had been opened at the end of December, the enemy had advanced to the mountainous area north of the Nanning-Chiutanghsu road and had constructed strong positions in that area. Furthermore, to the east, west and north of the Chitanghsu-Patanghsu area the Chinese had encircled the Japanese forces and constantly bombarded them from artillery positions set up in Kunlunkuan. It was estimated the Chinese strength in the area at the beginning of 1940 was approximately 25 divisions most of which were composed of highly trained troops under the command of the Chinese High Command.

In order to launch a counteroffensive against the enemy in the district to the northeast of Nanning, the 21st Army planned to use the 18th Division and the Imperial Guards Mixed Brigade from the Canton area, as well as the 5th Division and the Formosa Mixed Brigade already stationed in the Nanning area. On 28 January 1940, the 21st Army opened its offensive and, by 8 February, had not only defeated the enemy and occupied Pinyang but had also occupied the heights north of the Pin-Ning road. It then concentrated its main force in the Nanning area.

Immediately after this operation, because of the wide area over which the Japanese forces were deployed, Imperial General Headquarters inactivated the 21st Army and organized the South China Area Army, under the command of Lt. Gen. Rikichi Ando. The Area Army was placed under the command of the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army and assigned the mission of defending south China. The units in Kwantung Province and the newly-activated 22d Army were placed under its command.

The 22d Army, with its headquarters in Nanning, was composed of the Imperial Guards Division, the 5th Division and the Formosa Mixed Brigade and was assigned the mission of securing the Chingsien-Nanning area. The 18th Division remained under the direct command of the South China Area Army.

Advance into Northern French Indo-China

Although the Japanese occupation of the Nanning area had cut the

Chinese supply line from French Indo-China by way of the Nanning-Kweilin road, they still continued to bring in supplies through Paise and other northern points. In order to stop this, Imperial General Headquarters felt it necessary to occupy northern French Indo-China.

On 17 June 1940, France surrendered to Germany. On the 20th, the French Indo-China authorities submitted to Japan's demands to ban the transit of supplies to Chiang Kai-shek's forces and agreed to a border surveillance committee to investigate and supervise the actual transportation of supplies. In September, agreement was reached whereby Japanese troops marched into French Indo-China.¹²

As the advance of the Japanese forces into northern French Indo-China stopped the flow of supplies from that area into China, it was considered no longer necessary for the 22d Army to continue to garrison the Nanning sector. In November, therefore, Imperial General Headquarters ordered its return Canton, where it was inactivated. The commander and some of his staff returned to Japan. The 5th Division was returned to Shanghai where it was placed under the direct command of Imperial General Headquarters, and the other units were attached to the South China Area Army.

During the year, mopping-up operations were conducted to assure the cutting of Chinese supplies lines and to maintain order.

12. Japanese Monograph No. 146, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part II.

Strengthening of the Sea Blockade

In a desperate effort to maintain the flow of munitions needed to carry on the fighting, the Chinese established supply points along the coast of south and central China.


About mid-February 1941, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the China Expeditionary Army and the South China Area Army to carry out blockade operations wherever necessary. The China Expeditionary Army was responsible for the blockade of the coast north of and including Chekiang Province while the South China Area Army was responsible for the coast south of and including Fukien Province.

Between February and May 1941 the South China Area Army made landings at the various points along the coast where it was known supplies were being brought in but, despite the success of these operations and the fact that the Hong Kong-Shaochow route had been cut, supplies from abroad still continued to reach the Chinese.¹³

Cutting of Supply Routes in Central China

In February 1941, when Imperial General Headquarters ordered the China Expeditionary Army to cut the enemy supply routes north of and including Chekiang Province, it placed the 5th Division under the tactical command of the Expeditionary Army and ordered it used for this operation. The Expeditionary Army assigned the mission to the

13. For details of these operations see Japanese Monograph No. 180, South China Area Operations Record, 1937 - 1941, Chapter 4.



13th Army and ordered it to use the 5th Division to attack Ningpo, Yungchia and Linhai from the sea about 10 April.¹⁴ In addition, the 22d Division was to be used to attack Chuchi from Hangchou in support of the 5th Division.

On 16 April, the 22d Division opened its attack and, on the 20th, captured Chuchi where it seized large quantities of supplies.

On 19 April, the main force of the 5th Division (seven infantry battalions) landed at Chenhai and Shihpu while two infantry battalions landed at Haimenchen and a further three infantry battalions landed at Juian. On the same day, these units occupied Ningpo, Yuyao, Linhai and Yungchia, capturing supplies in each town.

Although Ku Chu-tung, commander of the 3d War Sector Army, concentrated the 10th Army Group in the district southeast of Chuchi in an attempt to recapture Chuchi, by mid-May, the 13th Army units had forced these troops to retreat. The 13th Army concentrated part of its force at Yungchia and Linhai and elements of the 5th Division occupied the Hangchou-Ningpo railway area and Shihpu. (Map 3)


14. At the end of March 1941 the 5th Division, which was regarded as one of the crack divisions of the Japanese Army, was returned to Kyushu, Japan from Shanghai. Here, in cooperation with the Navy and Air Force, it underwent intensive training in preparation for amphibious landings, to be made if and when the planned southern operations should be launched. In early April, in an attempt to test the Navy's capabilities in protecting a convoy, the Division was transported from northern Kyushu to the coast of Chekiang Province under a simulated air attack by Japanese air units based in Manchuria. Former Lt. Col. Tadao Shudo, then a staff officer of the Air Army General Staff, Imperial General Headquarters, states that the operation was undertaken to point up the defects in transporting large numbers of troops, in preparation for the launching of attacks to the south on 8 December 1941.

Advance into Southern French Indo-China

As Imperial General Headquarters felt it necessary to exert stronger pressure on Chungking from the south, in July 1941, the Japanese Government initiated negotiations with the Vichy Government of France in the interests of mutual defense and, on 24 July, agreement was reached whereby Japanese troops would occupy southern French Indo-China.¹⁵

In the meantime, on 5 July, Imperial General Headquarters inactivated the South China Area Army and organized locally the 23d and 25th Armies. The 23d Army assumed the mission of the South China Area Army in south China, while the 25th Army advanced to French Indo-China to be stationed at strategic points. (Map 4)

15. Japanese Monograph No. 147, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part III.



CHAPTER 4

Major Enemy Counteroffensives

After their defeat in the Wu-Han Operation, the enemy withdrew to the south of the Yangtze River and stationed elements in northwest and southwest China, where it attempted to regain its strength by recruiting new soldiers and by reorienting and training its surviving force.

In April 1939, the Chinese launched an offensive but everywhere the Japanese Army threw them back. In the Chahar-Suiyuan area the Japanese Mongolian Garrison Army met and defeated the 8th War Sector Army. Part of the 1st War Sector Army crossed the new Huang Ho and marched toward Kaifeng but was defeated and forced to retreat. There was very little action in Shansi and Honan Provinces. In central China, the 11th Army inflicted heavy casualties on the 9th War Sector Army during the Nanchang Operation in March and although the 5th War Sector Army twice took the offensive in April, both times it failed to attain its objective. In south China the 4th War Sector Army took the offensive with the capture of Canton as its objective, but was defeated by the Japanese 21st Army in surprise attacks on the various fronts between 4 and 29 April.

Winter Operations

From June to November 1939, the enemy conducted a second reorganization and training program. Upon its completion it appeared

that they were prepared to launch an offensive along the entire front. At the end of November, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to his troops to take the offensive, emphasizing the fact that the Japanese Army, because of the expansion of its front had shifted to the defensive and had discontinued large-scale advances.

North China

Toward the end of 1939, the 8th War Sector Army attacked Paotou with approximately 5,000 troops but was driven back by the Japanese forces. Chiang Kai-shek ordered his army to attack the town again. About mid-January 1940, approximately 10,000 enemy troops advanced eastward along the north bank of the Huang Ho via Shanpa and Wuyuan and, around 15 February, guerrilla forces opened operations to cut the railway line between Suiyuan and Paotou. In addition, there was estimated to be approximately 30,000 enemy troops operating north of the Huang Ho and west of Paotou.

To destroy these hostile forces, the Mongolian Garrison Army ordered its main force to advance toward Wuyuan along the Paotou-Anpei-Wuyuan road while elements were to advance toward the same destination by following the Huang Ho. On 3 February Japanese troops occupied Wuyuan. An element of this force continued to advance to Shanpa and Linho. Having mopped up the enemy in this sector, the Army withdrew from the Wuyuan Plain and, by 1 March, had returned to its original stations.

On 21 March, an enemy force, believed to be the 35th Army, again attacked Wuyuan. Although at first they succeeded in taking Wuyuan castle, the Japanese rushed in reinforcements and, by the 26th, had put the enemy to rout. After mopping up hostile remnants in the area, the Japanese forces left Wuyuan on 29 March and returned to their respective original stations.

Central China

In Central China it was estimated that the 3d War Sector Army would be used as the main force for the winter offensive but, based on Chinese losses during the April offensive, it was judged that the operation would not be a large one and that the morale of the Chinese forces was low.

At the end of 1939, Japanese first-line troops were deployed over a wide area. With the exception of the 101st and 106th Divisions, which had been placed temporarily under the command of the 13th Army but which were already sailing down the Yangtze River to return to Japan, there were no mobile Japanese forces in the area.

On 12 December, the 5th and 9th War Sector Armies opened their offensives and, on the 16th, the 3d War Sector launched its attack.

On the 11th Army's front, the enemy launched persistent attacks with approximately four divisions in the areas north of Chunghsiang and south of Chukouchen. Some positions on the left flank of the 13th Division were lost but the Division, aided by supporting units, succeeded in holding its first-line positions.

On the 13th Army front, the 116th Division bore the brunt of the 3d War Sector Army's winter offensive. On the morning of 16 December, an enemy force of about four divisions launched an attack in the vicinity of Tatungchen, directing its main effort against the Japanese positions northwest of Chingyang. On the 17th, it had captured these positions. The 116th Division attacked the lost positions and, by the 20th, had recaptured them.

With the exception of the Wu-Han area where the 6th Division of the 11th Army continued to engage the enemy until 23 January, enemy actions in central China were brought under control by the end of 1939.

South China

Part of the large-scale offensive launched by the Chinese Army in mid-December was directed against the Nanning area. After incessant attacks the enemy broke through the 5th Division's front line positions at Kunlunkuan. It destroyed the garrison force and occupied the town.

The 4th War Sector Army had posed a definite threat to the Japanese forces stationed north of Canton. The 21st Army, therefore, planned to advance to the Wengyuan-Yingte line and destroy this force. By the end of December, the 21st Army had occupied Wengyuan and Yingte. In order to relieve the situation in the Nanning area, the 21st Army then ordered this force to return to Canton.

The 21st Army commander planned to trap and defeat the enemy force assembled in the Nanning area. One and a half divisions were transferred from Canton to Nanning. On 28 January 1940, these reinforcements advanced eastward along both banks of the Yung Chiang and then turned to the left to attack the enemy's left flank. By 8 February it had enveloped and defeated the enemy in the vicinity of Pinyang. The 21st Army then occupied the heights north of the Pin-Ning road and concentrated its main force in the Nanning area.

CHAPTER 5

Air Offensive Against the Interior of China

Prior to the China Incident the Japanese Army, because its policy had been to train its air units to support ground operations, had shown little interest in long-range bombing attacks and had neither a sufficient number of long-range bombers nor the trained personnel to conduct such attacks. In the early phases of the China Incident long-range bombings were carried out by naval air units. Experience in the field, however, amply demonstrated to the Army the need for long range bombers and plans were drawn up to reorganize and reinforce the Army Air Force.

On 11 July 1937 a joint Army and Navy agreement was published whereby the Army Air Force was responsible for the destruction of the enemy air force in north China and the Navy Air Force was responsible for the destruction of the enemy air force in central and south China. During the first years, however, the Air Force was used mainly to support ground operations.

Between December 1938 and September 1941, the Japanese Air Force in China launched five major air operations. The first operation was directed against Szechwan Province and the Lanchow area. From 26 December 1938 to the end of January 1939, attacks were launched by the Army Air Force from Hankou against the strategically and politically important areas around Chungking, however, weather conditions made it difficult to confirm targets. As Lanchow was an im-

portant communication point between China and Russia, the destruction of the enemy air force in that area was considered of the greatest importance. During February, Japanese air attack units cooperated in attacks on this area, but, although they reported damaging approximately 100 enemy planes in the air and on the ground, they themselves suffered such heavy casualties they were forced to suspend the operations and were ordered to withdraw and assemble in central China to restore its strength for future operations.

Profiting by the lessons learned during this operation in regard to employment of air units, organization, equipment and training, on 28 April, Imperial General Headquarters reorganized the air force in China and issued directives concerning the preparation and execution of air attacks and cooperation between the Army and Navy Air Forces.

A second air operation was planned for early autumn but, on 1 September, the main strength of the Air Group in north China as well as air units from central China were transferred to Manchuria to assist in the final crucial phase of the Nomonhan Incident. The second operation was finally carried out during October 1939 when raids were carried out against Changan, Paochi, Loyang, Pingliang, Fushih, Ichuan, Lochuan, Nancheng and Chiahhsien. Although it was claimed that planes were shot down, airfields were damaged, and military installations destroyed, exact details are not available.

After the conclusion of the second air operation the Army Air Force continued to train its personnel for both daylight and night attacks.

In late December 1939, a combined Army-Navy Air Force (approximately 100 planes consisting of 36 Army heavy bombers and 64 Navy land medium type attack planes) raided enemy airfields in the Lanchow area and the city of Lanchow. It shot down 20 enemy planes and inflicted severe damage on important establishments in the city.

From the middle of May 1940, the Navy Air Force conducted successive attacks on Chungking and Chengtu. The Army Air Force completed its preparations for attacks on the plains of Szechwan Province from north China in cooperation with the Navy's attacks from central China and, on 6 June 1940, launched its first attack against Chungking. From then until mid-September the main strength of the Army and Navy Air Forces continued their attacks with Chungking and Chengtu as their main objectives. This, the fourth air operation, not only destroyed military objectives but also greatly affected the morale of the enemy. The attacks were suspended when the Air Force was called upon to support the troops occupying French Indo-China.

With the successful conclusion of the Chungyuan Operation, the fifth air operation was launched at the beginning of August 1941. During this operation the 1st Air Brigade attacked Chungking and Tze-liutsing as well as important areas in north China using Ani airfield while the 3d Air Brigade attacked ships on the Yangtze River

from Kingmen airfield and strategic areas in central China from bases at Hankou and Wuchang. Although the results obtained during this operation were regarded as satisfactory, on 12 September it was necessary to halt the operation in order to prepare for the Pacific Area Operations.¹

1. Japanese Monograph No. 76, Air Operations in the China Area, July 1937 - August 1945.

CHAPTER 6

Establishment of New Government in the Occupied Territories

With the progress of the China Incident, self-governing bodies were established in each of the occupied provinces to handle administrative matters. During 1937, the Southern Chahar Committee was established at Wanchuan, the Northern Shansi Autonomous Government was established at Tatung and the Federal Autonomous Government was established at Suiyuan. In November 1937, these three bodies were combined to form the United Mongolian Committee.

In Hopeh Province in July 1937 the Peiping Maintenance Committee was established and in August of the same year the Peace Maintenance Committee was set up in Tienching. In mid-August, the Northern China Peoples' Autonomous Federation was set up and, in mid-December, the China Restoration Government was organized. In the latter part of November 1937, the Honan Province Autonomous Government was organized while, in mid-December, self-governing provincial bodies were set up in Shansi Province. In January 1938, in Shantung Province, peace maintenance committees were established in Tsinan and Chingtao. These autonomous bodies were affiliated with the China Provisional Government until the spring of 1938.

In central China, the Shanghai Tatao Government was set up in the first part of December 1937, while the Nanching and Hangchou

Autonomous Committees were set up in their respective cities in January 1938. These local bodies formed the basis for the China Restoration Government in Nanching in the latter part of March 1938.

Autonomous bodies were established in each district as the Japanese occupied territory was enlarged. All these bodies were affiliated with the China Provisional Government in north China or the China Restorational Government in central China, according to their location.

Both main governments were pro-Japanese and anti-communistic. However, they were not backed by a military or financial power and their leaders were not dependable and, in consequence, their administrative results were not satisfactory.

After the Wu-han Operation in 1938, Wang Ching-Wei, vice-president of the Nationalist Party in China, began to advocate peace with Japan. Then in response to a declaration by Japanese Premier Konoye urging the two countries to overthrow the Nationalist Government and unite for their common good, Wang Ching-Wei broke with Chiang Kai-shek and fled to Indo-China. There he continued to advocate peace with Japan based on an anti-Communist policy.

On 31 March 1940, Wang established his regime in Nanching under the pretext of reorganizing the national government. Simultaneously, the provisional and reformed governments were abolished. On 30 November a treaty was signed formally between Japan and the Nanching

Government aimed mainly at establishing good neighborly relations and friendship and joint defense and economic cooperation, but it also stressed the special nature of the north China and Inner Mongolia areas.

Although the Nanching Government made every effort to stabilize the nation's economy and strengthen its political power the Chungking Government still continued to resist. Under the circumstances, Imperial General Headquarters was forced to recognize that peace could not be attained through the new government and that it must be prepared to fight a long war.

