

**Japanese Monograph No. 86**

**5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet Operations  
Feb – Aug 1945**

**WAR HISTORY OF THE 5<sup>TH</sup> AIR FLEET  
(The Ten Air Unit)**

**OPERATIONAL RECORD**

**From 10 February 1945  
To 19 August 1945**

## PREFACE

Through Instruction No. 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for War Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff. Upon the dissolution of the War Ministry and the General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. Detailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in Memoranda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories"

The basic material contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that the enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material was reconstructed from memory,

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids, rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G-3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the Demobilization Bureau.

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The action under this memorandum and incidental detailed instructions which followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, charged with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945.

In order to protect the interest of the United States, in the exploitation of Japanese military Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of enemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental Archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Government was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the entire program, including the establishment of a small historical research section within the ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.)

10 Feb. Cloudy

The 5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet was organized and Vice Adm. UGAKI was appointed Fleet Cmdr.

11 Feb. Cloudy

The Cmdr., the Chief of Staff, and the operational staff officers participated in the maneuver of the Combined Fleet at HIYOSHI. (The actual maneuver for the SHO Operation.)

12 Feb. Good

Same as preceding day

13 Feb.

1. At about 1000, information was received that the enemy task force left ULITHI on 12 Feb. for an attack operation. The Chief of Staff and the operational staff officers immediately returned to KANOYA from TOKYO.

2. Until the Cmdrs. arrival at KANOYA, Rear Adm. YAMAMOTO was ordered to command the 1<sup>st</sup> Mobile Base Air Force.

3. As preparations against an enemy attack, orders were issued concerning the responsibilities and disposition of our strength and the operational plan.

#### Outline of the Operational Plan

- 1). To contact the enemy as soon as possible, "Q" sector will be patrolled.
- 2). The special day attack units will carry out suicide attacks (bombings) to destroy enemy aircraft carriers.
- 3). The night attack unit will carry out torpedo attacks to follow through the previous operation.

14 Feb. Fair

1. After 0630, the second alert condition was put into effect.

2. Six FRANCES 11 bombers and two MYRT 11 Navy SAIUN carrier based planes, patrolled the "Q" Sector (Q27-Q37) during the early hours of dawn but they contacted no enemy planes.

3. A telegram was received stating that at 1200, a MYRT 11 plane from IWO ISLAND (IWO JIMA) had discovered a large enemy task force moving at a speed of 18 knots, 80 naut. miles west of SAIPAN, and in the direction of 330 degrees. An attack by this enemy task force was expected in the very near future.

Orders were issued to put the first alert condition into effect from 0530 of the following day and also for the 11<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Unit to patrol the sea north-east of TOI-MISAKI POINT from dawn.

4. The night patrols for the "Q" Sector by land based attack planes and flying boats were planned for precautionary measures but bad weather cancelled this plan.

5. At 1750, the Fleet Cmdr., Vice Adm. UGAKI, arrived at his post at KANOYA Base and the Admiral's flag was hoisted.

15 Feb. Clear

1. From 0530, the first alert condition was put into effect, and four MYRT 11 (SAIUN carrier based reconnaissance plane) and 11 Frances 11 (Navy GINGA bomber Model 11) patrolled the "Q" Sector but discovered no enemy planes. From 1030, the alert was reverted from first alert to second alert.

2. At 1600, reconnaissance planes of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet discovered one enemy battleship, two cruisers and 15 to 20 destroyers, 150 naut. miles from IWO ISLAND and in the direction of 160 degrees.

### 3. Estimation of the Situation

#### a. Enemy Situation

- 1). Although we were informed that an enemy task force departed from ULITHI on 12 Feb., its movement was unknown.
- 2). About 1200, on 14 Feb. a MYRT 11 plane from IWO ISLAND discovered a large enemy task force advancing toward the northwest, west of Saipan.
- 3). On this day, a MYRT 11 plane of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet located the enemy fleet south of IWO ISLAND.
- 4). Enemy submarines have concentrated in the RYUKYU ISLANDS Area.

5). Enemy planes were closely followed and keeping in contact with our 4<sup>th</sup> Carrier Div.

b. Our Estimation

- 1). After considering the progress of previous enemy advances and operations, the judgment that the next enemy attack will be directed at the RYUKYU ISLANDS, seems to be correct. However, enemy transport convoys were discovered west of SAIPAN and south of IWO, developing a greater possibility of an enemy attack on the SOUTHERN ISLANDS (IWO ISLAND) in order to advance its air base to this area and intensify its air raids against JAPAN PROPER.
- 2). An advance by the enemy task force was expected toward the direction of both KYUSHU and the KANTO Areas.

4. Two land based attack planes and two seaplanes patrolled the "Q" Sector during the night obtaining no intelligence information concerning the enemy.

5. Considering the elapse of days following the departure of the enemy task force from ULITHI, the enemy will most likely attack JAPAN PROPER about 16 Feb. An order was issued putting the first alert into force after 0530 of the following day. Our operational plan against the enemy task force was also issued.

- a. The 11<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Unit will patrol the sea sector as far out as 300 naut. miles off TOI-POINT between the directions of 115 degrees and 175 degrees. The FRANCES 11 Bomber Unit will patrol the sea between Q23 and Q37, 600 to 650 naut. miles off the coast.
- b. By 1530, all the attack units will be fully prepared for the order to attack.
- c. By 0230, the FRANCES 11 Bomber Unit will be fully loaded with bombs and ready for immediate takeoff when the order to commence the attack is given.
- d. The fighter plane unit will be prepared 30 minutes before sunrise, waiting for the interception (attack) orders.

16 Feb. Clear

1. Since early morning, our entire fleet was on the alert. At 0700, a telegram was received, stating that enemy carrier planes had raided the HACHIJO ISLAND Area, east of the KANTO District and were attacking our air base there.

2. Five MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes and seven FRANCES 11 bombers started out at 0350 and 0700 respectively, to patrol the "Q" Sector as planned, however, no enemy was found.

3. At 0709 the Combined Fleet issued the following orders:

- a. The alert for the No. 3 "SHO" Operation will be commenced.
- b. The land based air units will commence the No. 3 "SHO" Operation and the time for concentration of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mobile Base Air Force in the KANTO Area will be given in a special order.

4. According to this Combined Fleet order, with the exception of the specially ordered case, we decided that the main force of our Fleet will operate in the KYUSHU Area, while is element still remaining in the KANTO District will operate in the area under the command of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet instead of moving to our Fleet base.

5. At 1100, JUDY 11, Navy SUISEI carrier borne bomber (model 11), of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air fleet, scouting for the enemy, discovered two groups of enemy task forces 150 naut. miles from INUBO-POINT. Through interception to enemy communications, we were informed that two additional groups were approaching, with one group advancing west of the RYUKYU ISLANDS. Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes departed to scout for these enemy groups, but they were not found.

6. From 0700 to 1700, about 1,000 enemy planes attacked the KANTO Dist. In four waves and inflicted heavy damage upon all of our bases in this district. We did not counterattack against the enemy carriers.

7. At 1300, our Fleet ordered and alerted the patrol and all the attack units, to be fully prepared during the ensuing hour to track down the enemy. (if attacked by the enemy, to withdraw immediately). At 1341, instructions for the operational plan were given for the following day.

8. Four land based attack planes and two seaplanes patrolled the "Q" Sector during the night. A reflected radar wave was received at 2045, from a point 90 naut. miles east of TOI POINT. With this exception, no intelligence reports were received.

9. Estimation of the Situation

- a. Situation

- 1). The enemy task force attacking the KANTO Dist. consisted of four groups and their probable plan was to gain air supremacy through annihilation combat.
- 2). According to our intelligence report obtained through interception of enemy communications, another powerful task force was in the midst of its movement in addition to this task force.
- 3). Enemy warships considered to be just an element of the total attack units to be used for the IWO ISLAND operations were maneuvering in this area.
- 4). No notable changes in the RYUKYU ISLANDS Area.

b. Our Estimation

There was a great possibility of an enemy attack on IWO ISLAND. The enemy 58<sup>th</sup> Task Force was planning to gain air supremacy over the KANTO Dist. and at the same time to support the attack on IWO ISLAND. this task force may, however, advance westward and attack the KYUSHU Area.

17 Feb. Clear

1. Six MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes and eight FRANCES 11 bombers started at 0630 and 0700, respectively, to patrol the "Q" Sector. At 0825, they discovered two enemy patrol boats 60 naut. miles off TORI ISLAND and in the direction of 240 degrees. One FRANCES 11 bomber failed to return.
2. Since morning, enemy carrier planes again attacked the KANTO Dist. and the HAHA ISLAND Area (the total number of enemy planes participating were approx. 550 and in two waves) raiding our air bases and plane factories in these areas. With the exception of one cruiser found 100 naut. miles southwest of NO ISLAND by a reconnaissance plane of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Fleet, no enemies were found.
3. During the day, "Q" Sector was patrolled. No notable changes were noted in the situation. At 1014, the second alert was ordered and at 1530, reconnaissance planes and attack plane units were ordered to be fully prepared during the following hour for the operation. Orders were issued for the first alert to be put into force after 0530 of the following day, 18 Feb. The operational plan was also issued.
4. The Combined Fleet did not attack the enemy task force and an element of our Fleet, temporarily under the command of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet, was ordered to return to its base.



5. The Combined Fleet issued the following orders to the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet for the 2<sup>nd</sup> TEN Operation.

Outline of the Order

- a. When the enemy task force returns to its base at ULITHI, one screening unit of the SOUTHERN Expeditionary Fleet will take the opportunity to raid the task force at its base and destroy its aircraft carriers.
- b. 24 FRANCES 11 bombers will compose this attack unit.
- c. A suitable number of seaplanes from the 801<sup>st</sup> Air Unit will be used as guide planes.
- d. This attack unit will start from the KANOYA Base.
- e. The tactics to be used for this attack will be decided by the commander.
- f. The INNTER SOUTH SEAS Force will support this attack with MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes by scouting ULITHI and ENIWETOK (BROWN).
- g. This operation will be called the 2<sup>nd</sup> TEN Operation.

6. Three land based attack planes and three seaplanes patrolled the "Q" Sector during the night but obtained no information concerning the enemy.

18 Feb. Clear

1, Information was received that a large enemy unit passed our patrol line at 140 degrees west longitude on the midnight of 17 Feb.

2. Six MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes and eight FRANCES 11 bombers departed at 0630 and 0700 respectively to patrol the "Q" Sector. At 0855, the MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes discovered two small type enemy planes while the FRANCES 11 bombers located two groups of enemy task forces with one group consisting of two regular aircraft carriers and 16-17 other ships and the other group composed of three regular aircraft carriers and eight other ships. They were 200 naut. miles west of CHICHI ISLAND. It would be advantageous for us if we could intercept the enemy task forces in the IWO ISLAND Area since they might move northward and attack the KANTO Dist. Eight FRANCES 11 bombers and two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes stated at 1100 and 1130 respectively,

as the second patrol unit to track down the enemy task force. At 1250, our MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes located and followed the enemy task force. However, as the enemy moved southward and did not enter our attacking sphere, we gave up this attack.

3. Although the enemy task force was maintaining radio silence, numerous communications were being sent to the task force from enemy units in the IWO ISLAND Area. Judging from its movements, the enemy task force that we located today was expected to directly support the IWO ISLAND Operation.

4. An order was issued to organize the AZUSA Suicide Unit for the 2d TEN Operation.

5. The Cmdrs. and Staffs of the 762d and 801<sup>st</sup> Air groups assembled to discuss the 2d TEN Operation and the following measures were decided.

- a. The attack unit will be organized from the 762d Air Group with the 262d Attack Unit as its nucleus. Flight personnel from the 501<sup>st</sup> and 406<sup>th</sup> Attack Units will be organized into this Air Group.
- b. Guide planes of the 801<sup>st</sup> Air Group will be organized into a Special Attack Unit.
- c. Guidance for a long distance was doubtful because of the differences in speed between guide plane and the attack plane. Experimental flights must be made to study and overcome the disadvantages caused by the differences in speed.
- d. The attack unit will start from the KANOYA Base while the seaplanes will depart from the KAGOSHIMA Base.
- e. Each attack plane will be equipped with two No. 30 bombs and three attack planes will attack one enemy aircraft carrier.
- f. In order to insure a complete maintenance service and operational preparations for the FRANCES 11 bombers, the attack will be carried out after two successive days of good weather.
- g. Since the guide planes will have difficulty in locating OKINODAITO ISLAND, a submarine will be located in the ISLAND Area to act as a picket, while another submarine will be disposed in the ULITHI Area to reconnoiter the enemy situation and report the results of our attack.
- h. Abbreviated terms to be used for communications to the ground and to the

planes must be prearranged.

6. Four land based planes and two seaplanes patrolled the "Q" Sector during the night but obtained no information concerning the enemy.

19 Feb. Cloudy

1. A telegram was received stating that at 0800, the enemy commenced their landings on IWO ISLAND with carrier planes attacking the IWO and CHICHI ISLANDS Area. An element of its fleet was shelling IWO ISLAND at the same time.

2. Eight FRANCES 11 bombers departed at 0740 to patrol the "Q" Sector. At 1150 three groups of enemy task forces were located, each consisting of two, three and three regular carriers respectively. They were 100 to 140 naut. miles southwest of IWO ISLAND. Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes departed at 0630 and patrolled the "Q" Sector but found no enemy. An element of the enemy task force seems to be maneuvering east of IWO ISLAND.

3. The enemy task force was supporting the IWO ISLAND landing units, and consequently, there was little possibility of an attack on the KYUSHU Area. An order was issued to enforce the first alert after 0530 of the following day and the patrol scheduled for the night was cancelled. The 7<sup>th</sup> Air Regiment which arrived at KANOYA as reinforcement, was also ordered to return to TACHIARAI. The reconnaissance and attack units were ordered to be fully prepared and ready for the operation in the same manner as on the preceding day.

4. To transmit the order canceling the patrol, two seaplanes were dispatched to the "Q" Sector on this night and also no intelligence information was obtained concerning the enemy situation.

20 Feb. Clear

1. Day and night patrols were scheduled for every other day starting from this day.

2. Eight FRANCES 11 bombers and six MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes patrolled the "Q" Sector. At 1115, the FRANCES 11 bombers located two groups of an enemy task force consisting of 14 transports, one regular aircraft carrier and six other ships. The vanguard consisted of five aircraft carriers (including three regular carriers) and 15 to 16 other ships.

3. After 1000, the second alert was ordered and at 1045, the operational plan for the following day was issued.

4. The second conference was held to study the 2d TEN Operation.
  - a. Seaplanes acting as guide planes were capable of formation flights with FRANCES 11 bombers. However, they consumed a large amount of fuel in guiding the bombers through the entire flight making it difficult for them to return to their bases in the TRUK Area. Taking this into account, guide planes will be divided into two groups, with one group relieving the other group in the air over MINAMI DAITO ISLAND.
  - b. Weather forecasting reconnaissance planes and guide planes will probably be forced to land in the MINAMI DAITO ISLAND on their return to their bases because of fuel shortage.
  - c. The attack unit will depart from KANOYA at 0800 to arrive at ULITHI before sunset, while weather forecasting reconnaissance planes and the first guide plane will leave KAGOSHIMA at 0300 and 0700 respectively.
  - d. Weather forecasting reconnaissance will be carried out on the preceding day of the operation to insure a reliable forecast of the weather.
  - e. On the day of the operation, enemy submarines following the course of our attack unit will be cleared away to prevent detection of our plan by the enemy.
  - f. The attack will be suspended in the following cases.
    - 1). When it is certain that the enemy task force is not at ULITHI.
    - 2). In case of bad weather.
    - 3). When our attack unit passed OKINOTORI ISLAND later than 1300.
    - 4). When enemy submarines, reconnaissance planes or ships have perceived our intentions of attack. If any of these situations arises after the attack unit has passed OKINOTORI ISLAND, all decisions will be left to the discretion of the Cmdr.
  - g. Change in the Objective of our Attack
    - 1). If our attack unit discovers the enemy force enroute to ULITHI, according to the strength of the enemy task force, an element or the entire strength of our attack unit will be employed against this task force.

h. Concealment of Our Plan.

- 1). The attack unit will train at the MIYAZAKI Base, and two days before X Day (the day of the execution of attack) it will move to KANOYA.
- 2). The communication system and the amount of communication between KANOYA and the TRUK and YAP Area will be taken into account in order that our plan may not be detected by the enemy.

21 Feb. Cloudy, later rained.

1. Eight FRANCES 11 bombers started at 0730 and patrolled the "Q" Sector but found no enemy. The patrol scheduled for this night was cancelled and the 762d Air Unit was ordered to patrol the "Q" Sector during the day, and after the following day.

2. Although the movements of the enemy task force was unknown, there was little probability of an enemy attack on this area. At 1546, the alert was changed to the third alert and it was decided to enforce the second alert after 0530 of the following day.

3. From morning until afternoon of this day, officers and non-commissioned officers of each unit of our Fleet were assembled to have important details of our operational policy, plan, (tactics, communication, maintenance and defense) directions and training explained. The aim of the Fleet Cmdr. was pointed out.

4. The third conference for the 2d TEN Operation was held. The experiments following the investigations made at the second conference resulted in the investigation of important details and supplementary matters.

22 Feb. Clear

Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes and six FRANCES 11 bombers departed at 1630 and 1745 respectively to patrol the "Q" Sector, but found no enemy.

23 Feb. Cloudy, later clear.

Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes and six FRANCES 11 bombers departed at 1630 and 1745 respectively to patrol the "Q" Sector. At 0940, the Frances 11 bombers discovered a surfaced enemy submarine.

24 Feb. Cloudy, later rained.

1. Five FRANCES 11 bombers started at 0835, and patrolled the "Q" Sector but found no enemy.

2. Although the movements of the enemy task force was still unknown, there was the possibility of an enemy attack. From the following day, patrol for the "Q" Sector will be discontinued until further orders.

3. A telegram was received stating that at 2130, our picket boat perceived a large enemy unit consisting of three aircraft carriers, five cruisers and others moving west, 360 naut. miles southeast of TOKYO. At 2310, orders were issued for the patrol and alert for the following day.

25 Feb. Rain

1. Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes started at 0630 to patrol the "Q" Sector during the early morning, but found no enemy. Due to bad weather, the FRANCES 11 bombers cancelled their mission.

2. At 1730, an enemy task force attacked the KANTO Dist, with carrier planes bombing our air bases and the NAKAJIMA Aircraft Factory. No enemy carrier planes attacked in the afternoon as the weather became worse over the KANTO Dist., however, 130 B-29's raided the Imperial City, TOKYO.

3. At 2330, our picket boat perceived a large enemy unit moving south, 140 naut. miles south-southeast of HACHIJO ISLAND.

26 Feb. Fair

1. Five MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes departed at 0640 to patrol the "Q" Sector during the dawn. At 0950, they located an enemy unit consisting of one aircraft carrier, two submarines and three destroyers moving south, 300 naut. miles from OMAE POINT and in the direction of 180 degrees. Two groups of MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes departed at 1200 and 1540 respectively, with both groups failing to contact the enemy.

2. Judging from these enemy situations, the enemy was expected to attack the KYUSHU Area on the following day. Orders were issued to enforce the first alert after 0530 of the next day, to patrol during this night, and also for the 762d Attack Unit to be prepared to take off.

3. Three land based attack planes patrolled the "Q" Sector during the night but found no enemy,

27 Feb. Clear

1. The patrol during the night discovered no enemy. At 0113, the alert was changed to the second alert and the attack unit was allowed to rest. At the same time, instructions were issued for the plan concerning the day patrol for this day.

2. Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes and five FRANCES 11 bombers departed at 0800 and 1000 to patrol the "Q" Sector. No enemy was found with the exception of one submerged submarine discovered by a FRANCES 11 bomber at 1235. After 1100, the alert was changed to the third alert.

3. At 2000, a large explosion similar to the sound of a thunderbolt was heard in the direction north of KANOYA Base, and an instantaneous illumination was seen on the side of the mountain. A few said that they perceived a large plane flying west just about this time. It was concluded that this was probably an accident during the training and a unit was dispatched to this area on the following morning to investigate.

28 Feb. Clear

1. According to the report of the investigating unit, a bomb of about 800 kgs. had exploded on the hillside about two kms. north of KANOYA. This large explosion on the preceding night was judged to be a night bombardment by B-29's.

2. It was reported that a B-29 flew over and reconnoitered the OKINAWA Main Island twice at about 0900 and 1300.

3. The enemy task force seems to be maintaining radio silence since it moved south after the attack on the KANTO Dist. on the 25<sup>th</sup>. No information can be obtained concerning its movements. The attack by large type enemy planes on KANOYA and OKINAWA ISLAND Areas should be seriously considered.

1 Mar. Cloudy

1. At 0800 a telegram was received stating that enemy carrier planes attacked OKINAWA. It was now certain that the enemy task force, whose movements were unknown since 25 Feb., had advanced to the RYUKYU ISLAND Area. The second alert was immediately ordered to be enforced, and simultaneously, the reconnaissance and tracking units (unit to keep close contact with the enemy) were ordered to be fully prepared for the takeoff at any time while the AZUSA Suicide Attack Unit was ordered to be withheld.

2. Estimation of the Enemy Situation

a. Enemy Situation

- 1). A large number of enemy carrier planes were attacking the OKINAWA MAIN ISLAND and ATSUMI OSHIMA Area.
- 2). For the past several days a large number of enemy carrier planes were cooperating in the IWO ISLAND Attack. On 28 Feb. (the preceding day) about 1300 carrier planes attacked the IWO ISLAND.
- 3). No information was obtained concerning other powerful enemy units other than the above mentioned task force.
- 4). Enemy large type planes reconnoitered the SOUTHERN KYUSHU and OKINAWA Area for the past several days.
- 5). The enemy task force has not suffered heavy losses since it attacked the KANTO Dist. on 26 Feb.

b. Our Estimation

- 1). In spite of the large number of enemy planes supporting the IWO ISLAND Operation, the enemy task force in this Area was believed to consist of converted aircraft carriers for the simple reason that out air units cannot make an attack on the IWO ISLAND Area. For this reason, the task force attacking the RYUKYU ISLANDS probably was the main force of the 58<sup>th</sup> Task Force with regular aircraft carrier groups.
- 2). Judging from the fact that the enemy task force was not accompanied by landing forces, and that its operations were being conducted independently with no relationship to other units, the main enemy objective seems to be a reconnaissance of our air strength in the RYUKYU ISLANDS and SOUTHERN KYUSHU Area. There was little possibility of its advancing to the KYUSHU Area since it was found maneuvering in the RYUKYU ISLANDS Area. However, we must be particularly alert against its attack.

3. Whenever we were confident of gaining a certain degree of success, an annihilating attack would be carried out when the enemy was engaged. At 0956, instructions were given for the annihilating attack against the enemy task force.

4. Five MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes, the first echelon, started at 1015 to scout for the enemy, however no enemy was found. The second echelon, consisting of two MYRT 11 planes departed at 1200 and four FRANCES 11 bombers started at 1241 to search for the enemy, east of the RYUKYU ISLANDS. About 1430, a MYRT 11 reconnaissance plane finally located four enemy destroyers



about 70 naut. miles south of OKINAWA but the main force of the enemy task force was not found.

5. Taking this situation into account, we decided to carry out patrols during the night in order to contact the enemy against whom Tactic No. 1 will be used. At 1432, all the units were ordered to be fully prepared and ready to attack.

6. At 1500, a police report was received stating that about 1300, two land based attack planes, enroute from KANOYA to TOKUSHIMA, were attacked and shot down by enemy fighters. At first these enemy fighters were not considered to be GRUMMAN fighters as they were considered incapable of attacking over our territory due to its limited cruising range. Some presumed that our planes fought among themselves by error. However, the aircrews who returned to the base confirmed that they were attacked by enemy fighters.

7. Since it was definite that enemy fighters had attacked as far as the KYUSHU Area, at 2101, the first alert was enforced and the air patrol was maintained from 0530 of the following day.

8. Four land based planes and two flying boats took off from their bases between 1900 and 2000 to search for the enemy, east and west of the RYUKYU ISLANDS during this night.

2 Mar. Rainy

1. A report was received from a plane patrolling the RYUKYU ISLANDS Area during the night that at 0120, one enemy destroyer was perceived moving in the direction of 40 degrees from a position 200 naut. miles from SATA POINT and in the direction of 230 degrees. This patrol plane was being followed by an enemy night fighter.

In order to locate and destroy the enemy task force believed to be moving towards the north, at 0200, a land based attack plane was ordered to start on a scouting mission during the night. At 0230, another order was issued to commence the operation according to Tactic No. 1, and for the night attack unit to search out and attack the enemy.

2. Although the weather gradually became worse since the preceding night, 12 FRANCES 11 bombers and ten heavy bombers successively took off from their MIYAKAZI Base about 0500 on a dawn suicide attack mission. However, bad weather forced all of them to return midway from their target. Due to the stormy weather two heavy bombers were forced down enroute and one FRANCES 11 bomber fell into the sea on its return trip.

3. The entire night attack unit returned when the scouting plane failed to find the enemy. At 0800, the operation using Tactic No. 1 was suspended and the attack units were allowed to rest.

4. Although bad weather hindered our search for the enemy and made the situation uncertain, the alert was changed to the second alert at 0930 since no enemy planes attacked the RYUKYU ISLANDS from this morning.

5. At 1846, the broad area southeast of KYUSHU was ordered to be reconnoit-ered on the following day.

6. No further information was received concerning the enemy ship located by our patrol plane on the preceding night. Also, no unusual signs were perceived indi-cating enemy movements. Considering our former experiences with similar cases of mistaken identity, it was believed that the enemy gun fire seen by our patrol plane must have been just a star in the sky. This judgment was confirmed through consultation with the pilot which led to the conclusion that the probable enemy ship was our own ship, the TOMOZURU, maneuvering in that area about this time.

3 Mar. Cloudy, later clear

Five FRANCES 11 bombers and five MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes started at 0830 and 0720 respectively to patrol the broad area southeast of KYUSHU. As two FRANCES 11 bombers dispatched no communications after having ad- vanced east of SOUTH DAITO ISLAND, we presumed that an enemy task force was maneuvering in this area. Some expected the task force would attack the KYUSHU Area on the following day. The first alert was ordered to be put into force after 0500 of the following day and preparations for the operation Tactic No. 2 was also ordered.

4 Mar. Clear

Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes and five FRANCES 11 bombers departed at 0720, to patrol the 'Q' Sector. No enemy was found. The alert, which was enforced since this morning, was changed at 0830 to the third alert.

5 Mar. Cloudy, later rained.

Since the necessity for guarding against the enemy task force was reduced at 0000 of this day, a complete training program for the entire 5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet was com- menced. However, due to extremely bad weather, at 1530 the training was sus- pended until the following day.

6 Mar. Cloudy, later clear

1. At 0900, an order was issued to commence training at 2000. Since an intelligence report was received stating that special watch was necessary in our area against movements of the enemy task force, the training was postponed until the following day. At 1328, the operational plan for the next day was issued.

2. Four land based attack planes and two flying boats patrolled the "Q" Sector during the night but obtained no information concerning the enemy.

7 Mar. Cloudy

1. Nine FRANCES 11 bombers and two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes took off at 0830 to scout for the enemy in "Q" Sector, however, they found no enemy.

8 Mar. Clear

Five FRANCES 11 bombers patrolled the "Q" Sector, reporting no changes in the situation. At 1100, the training program was completed.

9 Mar. Clear

1. A conference was held to study the results of our training program.

- a. This training was carried out to study the operation using Tactic No. 1 against the enemy task force. The radar interceptor was not as successful as anticipated, due to the lack of maintenance service for radar search receivers on reconnaissance and attack planes and also because the objective of the radar interceptor was only one destroyer. In conclusion, it was doubtful if Tactic No. 1 was of any value toward achieving a successful operation.
- b. Taking the results of this training and of the operation on 2 Mar. into consideration, the fighting strength of the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet (especially the skill of the flight crew) was considered to be inadequate for defeating the entire task force with one blow. Some (chiefly the Imp. GHQ Authorities) held the opinion that advanced training of least two months was necessary before the start of the actual operation.

2. At 1500, a telegram was received from the 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet on the reconnaissance of ULITHI by a MYRT 11 reconnaissance plane. Five regular aircraft carriers, three converted cruisers, seven converted plane carriers, eight battleships, four cruisers, one light cruiser, 31 flying boats, 54 transports, and four tankers were reported at anchor. In addition, a group consisting of four regular plane carriers,

three battleships, and several cruisers were about to enter the harbor. On the following day, 10 Mar., it was decided to carry out the 2d TEN Operation. Orders were issued to carry out the operational preparations. At about 1800, a telegram was received from the Combined Fleet designating 10 Mar. as X day for the TEN Operation.

10 Mar. Clear

1. The weather forecasting reconnaissance planes departed KAGOSHIMA at 0330, 30 minutes later than the prearranged time. Other planes were executed according to schedule. The 1<sup>st</sup> Guide Plane Unit left KAGOSHIMA at 0730, 30 minutes late while the 2<sup>nd</sup> Guide Plane Unit departed on schedule at 0730. The Attack Unit was ordered to takeoff immediately and immediately after the Attack Unit took off at 0800, a telegram was received containing reports from one third of the reconnaissance photos on ULITHI. According to this telegram only one regular carrier was at anchor. The attack will be carried out only after confirmation of the general situation of plane carriers at ULITHI. In order to resume the attack on the following day, ample time was necessary for making preparations. Therefore, we decided to cancel this operation, and the attack unit and other planes were ordered to return.

2. Four land based attack planes started at 0430 to check enemy submarines found along the advance route of our Attack Unit. They found and neutralized one submarine.

3. Due to their small fuel capacity, the return of weather forecasting flying boats and guide planes was anxiously waited for. All of them safely returned and landed at 1430.

4. Although it was planned beforehand to dispatch suicide attack planes to the OKINAWA Base in order to ambush the enemy, this plan was suspended because of delays in maintenance service for planes and the inadequately trained flight personnel. On this day, six JUDY 11 bombers took off from KOROKU.

5. At 1000 one land based attack plane departed to report back the weather forecast. The weather for the following day was expected to be clear.

6. Upon close examination of the photographs, it was now clear that eight regular aircraft carriers, seven converted plane carriers and four other unknown type ships were at anchor at ULITHI. Endeavoring to capitalize on this good opportunity and also taking into consideration the weather conditions, we decided to carry out the attack on the following day.

7. According to reports of the weather forecasting flying boat, the actual flight

speed for planes on this day was faster than usual on account of the tail wind. To compensate for this and in order to arrive at ULITHI at their scheduled time, the take off of every unit was delayed one hour.

11 Mar. Clear

#### The 2d TEN Operation

- a. The weather forecasting flying boat departed at 0640 (due to engine trouble it was delayed one hour). On account of difficulties in starting the engines for both the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2d Guide Plane Units, their take off was later than their scheduled time. At 0900, the No. 2 plane of the 1<sup>st</sup> Guide Plane Unit finally departed and after this, the Attack Unit was ordered to take off. 24 planes of the Attack Unit joined the 2d Guide Unit in the air over SATA POINT and continued their advance.

The No. 1 plane of the 1<sup>st</sup> Guide Plane Unit departed at 0930 due to engine trouble.

- b. The weather forecasting flying boat advanced as scheduled, reporting clear weather conditions along the route. A plane of the Attack Unit turned back at the area south of SATA POINT because of engine trouble. In addition, several planes reported emergency landings. The No. 2 plane of the 1<sup>st</sup> Guide Plane Unit was relieved of its guide duty in the air over SOUTH DAITO ISLAND and, at the time of the substitution, it reported 19 attack planes in sight.

Although no reports were received from the lead plane that they had passed OKINOTORI ISLAND, and order was issued to that plane to attack at 1300. Immediately following this order, a report was received from the lead plane stating that they would now commence the attack. With the exception of the emergency landing reports from two planes, no further communications were received from the Attack Unit until 1852, the time of sunset at ULITHI. Many anxious moments were spent lest they had failed in their attack due to bad weather or through error in their advance route. At 1858, the lead plane reported that they had succeeded in surprising the enemy. Another plane reported that it was going to plunge into the enemy plane carrier. It was ascertained through interceptions of enemy communications that at the ULITHI Base, the air raid alert and all clear alarms were sounded at 1907 and 1955 hours respectively. Therefore, it was concluded that most of the Attack Unit arrived at ULITHI and carried out the attack. According to reports from attack planes, 11 planes plunged into enemy aircraft carriers. In addition to the plane force to return to KANOYA, ten planes made emergency landings and two planes were

missing.

- c. Four land based attack planes departed at 0430 to clear the enemy from the advance route of the Attack Unit and returned to the base at 1200 having neutralized one enemy submarine. The 2d Guide Plane Unit returned at 1430 while the weather forecasting reconnaissance plane returned directly to KAGOSHIIA at 2345. The No. 2 plane of the 1<sup>st</sup> Guide Plane Unit directly guided the Attack Unit until 1830 and then made an emergency landing at MILEYON at 2130. The No. 1 plane of the 1<sup>st</sup> Guide Plane Unit dispatched no communications since its departure and nothing has been heard of it since then.

12 Mar. Clear

1. Gathering all reports from bases where attack planes made emergency landings we discovered the location of these landings to be as follows:

- one plane – at KANOYA
- one plane – at OKINAWA
- one plane – at MIKAYO
- four planes – at SOUTH DAITO ISLAND (three planes heavily damaged)
- four planes – at YAP (one plane fell into the sea while one plane suffered no damage)
- two planes landed in the water in the middle of their course.
- one plane reported engine trouble.

2. According to the report from the MYRT 11 reconnaissance plane of the 4<sup>th</sup> Fleet which reconnoitered ULITHI, no changes were observed in the number of enemy plane carriers at ULITHI. This air operation was executed for the purpose of destroying the majority of the enemy aircraft carriers. The anticipated results were not obtained.

13 Mar.

1. The FRANCES 11 bomber and flight personnel that made emergency landings on SOUTH DAITO ISLAND returned.
2. In this TEN Operation, the main force of the day Suicide Attack Unit, that was composed of FRANCES 11 bombers and flight personnel was lost. In order to confer over the replacement for this loss, the Chief of Staff went to TOKYO.

14 Mar. Fair

1. A FRANCES 11 bomber which made an emergency landing on YAP (ten flight

personnel, including the AZUSA Suicide Attack Unit Cmdr. on board) departed from YAP at 0705 and returned to KANOYA at 1500.

Outline of the Cmdrs. report on the progress of the TEN Operation.

At 0930, the guide plane relieved in the air over SATA POINT reported that at that time, 19 attack planes were in sight. Although OKINOTORI ISLAND was not sighted as yet, good weather prevailed in this island area. After passing OKINOTORI ISLAND and advancing southwards, we met several tropical squall zones which we bypassed by flying over the clouds. About 200 naut. miles north of YAP, we discovered an enemy convoy (consisting of four transports, one cruiser and destroyer) moving eastward. To avoid detection, we changed our course of direction to the east in order to make a detour around the enemy convoy. Consequently, we could not locate ULITHI by the scheduled time. After the guide flying boat separated from us at 1830, we located YAP ISLAND about 20 naut. miles east of our position, we changed our course of direction immediately to the east. At this time, 15 attack planes were in sight. After we passed YAP ISLAND, an order was received to attack ULITHI. All echelons attack ULITHI simultaneously with the Attack Unit Cmdr's. plane leading the attack and five planes following it. Just before we charged into the enemy, a pillar of flame was seen outside of the harbor. (It was assumed that one of our attack planes flying at low altitude crashed into the sea exploding its bombs). The enemy did not black out until we entered the harbor. Several planes attacked before the attack of the command plane. Immediately following our first assault, the enemy blacked out the harbor. As it became impossible to locate the important objectives the command plane carried out bombings at low altitude using a light which appeared to come from a buoy. Other planes from the same echelon followed the Cmdr., carried out their bombings and then landed at YAP. Three planes landed on the YAP Airfield, while one plane made an emergency landing along the coast. On this day, a plane in good condition, transported the entire flight personnel back to KANOYA.

2. This air operation was considered a failure for the following reasons:

- a. The takeoff was delayed one hour.
- b. The takeoff guide plane was too late, passing over SATA POINT 30 minutes later than the scheduled time.
- c. We were forced to make a detour around the enemy convoy.
- d. We had to advance through several tropical squall zones north of YAP.
- e. The speed after passing OKINOTORI ISLAND reached only 160 knots per hour.

3. Information was received through telephone that a strict watch should be

maintained against the movements of the enemy task force. A large number of planes patrolled the MARIANA and ULITHI Areas. In the PHILIPPINE AREA, intercommunication between units was very active and necessitated constant patrol for the enemy.

4. A report was received stating that at 2030, our picket boat at the south patrol line perceived a large enemy group (consisting of two battleships, two cruisers and two destroyers), minus aircraft carriers, moving northwards 345 naut. miles from INUBO POINT and in the direction of 144 degrees.

15 Mar. Rain, later clear.

Considering the above-mentioned report by the picket boat, we decided to enforce the second alert after 0430 and to make preparations to patrol the "Q" Sector with GINGA bombers. Due to bad weather however, the patrol was cancelled at 0800, the alert was changed to the third alert.

16 Mar. Clear

The Fleet Cmdr. left KANOYA at 0800 to inspect the DEMIZU, the MIYAZAKI and later the KOKUBU Bases.

17 Mar. Clear

1. At 0830, a communiqué was received from the Combined Fleet stating that there was no doubt about the fact that the enemy task force had departed from ULITHI about 14 Mar. and an enemy attack was expected in the KYUSHU Area about 18 Mar. Therefore, the area must be strictly guarded. If the enemy task force was accompanied by a landing force, the screening force of the SOUTHERN Expeditionary Fleet will attack the enemy. If there is no landing force, an element of the screening force will intercept the enemy while other strength will be withheld.

According to this Combined Fleet order, at 1000 the outline for the operational plan (operational and guarding disposition and main points of the operational command) was issued and simultaneously, the 801<sup>st</sup> Air Unit was ordered to patrol the "Q" Sector this night.

At 1530, units were to prepare for the operation using Tactic No. 1.

2. The operational policy of the Combined Fleet against the enemy task force was studied.

According to the operational plan of the Combined Fleet, attacks will be



executed only when the enemy task force is accompanied by a landing force. If there was no landing force, efforts will be made to withhold our strength.

- a. It was impossible to judge whether or not an enemy task force was accompanied by a landing force. Even if it should be possible to ascertain this point, our bases will be raided by enemy carrier planes before we are able to discover the enemy landing force. Our losses and damages will be great, making it impossible for us to attack.

In all former enemy landing operations, the air annihilation combat was always carried out to gain air supremacy in advance of their landing operation. This made it almost impossible to ascertain in time whether or not the enemy task force was accompanied by a landing force.

- b. At present, the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Operational Air Force was disposed in the KYUSHU Sector, within easy cruising range of the enemy carrier planes. Defensive measures to protect our air strength against an attack by an enemy task force were not as yet completed. If the attack was not carried out it will be necessary to transfer the air strength to either KOREA or the HOKORIKU Area. However, there were no suitable bases to maintain this strength.
- c. Judging from the results of the training program completed the other day, there was some doubt of achieving success through the use of Tactic No. 1. Our radars function satisfactorily in locating only large enemy forces.
- d. In our attack against the enemy task force, the picked strength of our air unit will be lost immediately.

After studying and investigating the above mentioned point, the Fleet Hq. considered it more advantageous if we attacked the enemy task forces and pointed this out to the Combined Fleet Cmdr. and the Naval Gen. Staff. After an investigation, the Fleet Cmdr. was allowed to attack only if it became impossible to withhold and protect our air strength.

3. Since the intentions of the Combined Fleet Hq. and the Naval Gen. Staff were clarified, the Air Fleet Hq. proceeded with the operational preparations based on a plan utilizing Tactic No. 1 and to carry out this plan as soon as the enemy task force was located. At this time, the personnel of the Air Fleet were in their training stage with elements dispatched to OITA, TSUIKI, USA and TACHIARAI. The entire strength was ordered to concentrate in the SOUTHERN KYUSHU Area in order to speed operational preparations. (an element flew to the operational base during the night).

4. At 2013, the order was issued, giving the detailed plan for this intercepting operation by our fighters for the following day.

5. Two flying boats and four attack planes left TAKUMA at 1850 and 2200, respectively, to patrol the "Q" Sector. In "Q-27" Sector, at 2300, large enemy units were located at 29 degrees, 40 minutes North Latitude and 135 degrees, 25 minutes East Longitude and 29 degrees, 21 minutes North Latitude and 133 degrees, 35 minutes East Longitude.

In "Q-29" Sector, at 2340, our planes were fired upon by enemy Naval guns at 23 degrees, 30 minutes North Latitude and 233 degrees 50 minutes East Longitude. In "Q-25" Sector, the enemy unit was discovered at 30 degrees, 10 minutes North Latitude and 133 degrees, 30 minutes East Longitude.

The patrol plane was keeping constant contact with the enemy. Since Naval guns were fired at this plane, the enemy was without a doubt the task force.

18 Mar. Clear

1. A night patrol plane searched out and kept contact with the enemy unit until 2300. It was confirmed that about four groups of the enemy task force were moving along towards the northwest. At 0200, we decided to carry out the general attack with our entire strength. No. 1 Operation was commenced and the plan of attack was issued to the Attack Unit.

Instructions were given for reconnaissance at dawn and for the attack and intercepting operations during the day.

2. The flying boats which started on a mission of night patrol and the land based attack planes which started after 0000, searched out and kept contact with the enemy to guide our Attack Unit.

3. 24 FRANCES 11 bombers, 25 heavy bombers, eight JILL 11 Navy TEZAN carrier bombers took off from 0330 and carried out torpedo attacks at daybreak while six FRANCES 11 bombers (from the 262d Air Unit) carried out suicide attacks (bombardment) at dawn. As the takeoff was delayed, most of them carried out their attacks after daybreak. Reports were received that aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers were sunk and damaged.

20 JUDY 11 attack bombers successively left the KOKUBU Base at 0430, to continue the attacks during the day against the enemy task force.

4. Five MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes departed at 0550, and located at 0650, four groups of the task force, consisting of four, three, three, and five carriers

respectively (15 in all, including one afire). With this information, the entire strength of the enemy task force was known. The MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes were instructed to keep in contact with the enemy while JUDY 11 attack bombers and FRANCES 11 bombers were ordered to carry out suicide attacks during the day.

It was estimated that the number of enemy carriers was reduced through our dawn attack and the suicide attacks by our JUDY 11 attack bombers. At 1213, another order was issued to the SHINRAI (Navy type bomber Model 22, Betty 22) Unit and other units to attack with their entire strength.

5. At 0420, enemy fighters appeared at TOI POINT and intercepted and shot down three JILL 11 attack bombers and a heavy bomber enroute to attack the enemy. At 0540, enemy carrier planes continuously raided air bases in the SOUTHERN KYUSHU and SHIKOKU Areas.

On account of these air raids, not only were our planes damaged and lost, but our communications facilities were also destroyed making communications between the various bases very difficult.

6. At 1400, a MYRT 11 reconnaissance plane located and kept track of an enemy task force maneuvering 30 to 40 naut. miles south of ASHIZURI POINT. In order to annihilate this enemy, we planned to carry out a general attack at dusk, employing all of our FRANCES 11 bombers and heavy bombers. Since our air bases were raided, our attack units were dispersed and also our communication system was not functioning properly. Preparations were not completed on time and the attack was carried out during the night.

A SHINRAI Unit attack was planned and later cancelled since preparations were not completed. This was caused by commencing our preparations after the land based attack planes were moved from USA to KANOYA.

#### 7. Estimation of the Situation

- a. The enemy task force composed mainly of 15 to 16 plane carriers, attacked in four echelons. Judging from its objectives of attack, the enemy intentions appears to be the annihilation of our air strength and to gain air supremacy over the KYUSHU and SHIKOKU Areas.
- b. From 0540 to 0950, about 400 enemy planes attacked the KANOYA Dist. and about 1,000 enemy planes raided the SHIKOKU and KYUSHU Areas. In the afternoon, a reduced number of enemy planes attacked the KANOYA Dist.

- c. According to reports concerning the results of our dawn attack and suicide attack by our SUISEI attack bombers during the day (the results obtained by the suicide attack of our FRANCES 11 bombers and JUDY 11 attack bombers was not definite, therefore it was omitted) one regular plane carrier, two battleships, one cruiser and two destroyers were sunk and two aircraft carriers were set afire. The enemy was estimated to have suffered heavy losses.
- d. Although the enemy task force was counterattacked strongly, contrary to the previous attack in the KANTO Area, more than 10 carriers escaped damage. The enemy was expected to return and carry out a raid on the following day.
- e. In order to defeat the enemy task force, it was necessary to continuously attack without let up to employ our entire strength and to disregard the difficulties of future replacements.

8. From evening, we stopped keeping contact with the enemy task force, however, six land based attack planes and five flying boats departed at 2200 and 2000 respectively, to scout for the enemy east of KYUSHU. At 2205, 2250 and 2300 they located the enemy. They also perceived a pillar of flame and one enemy ship afire.

9. Eight FRANCES 11 bombers and 15 heavy bombers took off between 1930 and 2400 and were guided by a tracking unit plane. They contacted the enemy task force and carried out the attack. We sank one regular plane carrier and set one ship, type unknown, afire.

19 Mar. Cloudy, later rained

1. Three land based attack planes and a flying boat started at 0000 to keep in contact with the enemy task force which our tracking unit plane was investigating.

2. Five FRANCES 11 bombs departed at daybreak to carry out a suicide attack against an enemy task force 60 naut. miles south of ASHIZURI POINT.

3. Five MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes took off at 0650 to scout for the enemy after dawn. They located and kept contact with enemy task force groups consisting of three, two, two and four plane carriers, respectively, maneuvering between 110 naut. miles south-southeast and 40 naut. miles south of MUROTO POINT.

At 1030, two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes took off as the second echelon to scout and keep contact with the enemy and also to guide our carrier bombers.

4. From 0700, 20 JUDY 11 attack bombers took off and successfully attacked the enemy. After having bombed the enemy task force at low altitude, half of them returned to their carriers. Two planes definitely crashed on the enemy carriers.

5. Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes took off at 1430 to keep in contact with the enemy during the evening dusk. However, as the weather grew gradually worse, it was considered impossible to patrol or attack the enemy this night. Due to the difficulties of communication the actual situation of our bases was uncertain. It became necessary to reorganize our strength properly. Taking these situations into consideration, at 1820, an order was issued canceling the original attack plan.

The Cmdr. of the 701<sup>st</sup> Air Unit was able to send 20 JUDY 11 suicide planes on an offensive mission the following day and advised that the pursuit would be forcibly executed. For this reason, the above order was revoked and another order was issued to carry out the attack.

6. On this day, 1,100 enemy planes raided factories in KURE, OSAKA and KOBE and air bases in SHIKOKU and NORTHERN KYUSHU. According to reports from MYRT 11 reconnaissance and JUDY 11 attack planes, we sank an enemy carrier and a cruiser and set fire to another carrier.

20 Mar. Clear

1. It was impossible to execute patrols during the preceding night, consequently, no information was obtained concerning the enemy. At 0700, five MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes took off to patrol the area east of KYUSHU and by 1030 they located three groups of enemy task forces including six, four and one plane carrier respectively, moving southwards about 120 naut. miles east of TOI POINT. At 1250, two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes departed to keep contact with the enemy.

2. From 0800, 20 carrier bombers took off and successfully attacked, employing similar tactics used on the preceding day. An ESSEX type aircraft carrier exploded after being hit while a SARATOGA type aircraft carrier was set afire.

3. As the enemy began to withdraw southwards, it became necessary for us to pursue the enemy to inflict additional losses. Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes kept in contact with the enemy during the evening and night to obtain information concerning the enemy situation.

4. Six FRANCES 11 bombers, nine heavy bombers and eight JILL 11 attack bombers attacked during the night but inflicted little losses on the enemy.

5. Four land attack planes and one flying boat, while scouting for the enemy, located and kept contact with four enemy groups moving southward. As these enemy groups were expected to move toward the RYUKYU ISLAND Area on the following day, and alert was ordered for our units in this area. In case of good weather, we can expect to execute the SHINRAI Attack. Preparational orders were given accordingly. FRANCES 11 bombers and JILL 11 attack bombers were to reconnoiter the enemy during the following dawn.

21 Mar. Clear

1. Four MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes took off at 0810 to scout for the enemy task force withdrawing southward. Two groups of the enemy task force were located 320 naut. miles off TOI POINT in the direction of 145 degrees. Although the distance was considered too far, the good weather and the visibility of 30 naut. miles afforded a good opportunity for the SHINRAI Unit to attack. The SHINRAI Unit was ordered to attack immediately upon the completion of their preparation.

2. Two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes took off at 1100 to support the SHINRAI Unit Attack by contacting the enemy and reconnoitering the results of our attack. They located the enemy task force group moving southward in a circular formation of three, two and two aircraft carriers.

3. 18 land based attack planes (16 of these carried SAKURA-NO-HANA type aircraft) and 55 ZEKE 52 (Navy type fighter Model 52) started from KANOYA at 1135, but 20 fighters turned back at the halfway point. The SHINRAI Unit joined the remaining fighters and advanced south, but were intercepted by about 50 enemy GRUMMAN fighters approximately 60 naut. miles north of the enemy task force. Although our fighters counterattacked to protect the SHINRAI Unit, the enemy took advantage of the weakness in our SHINRAI Unit and destroyed the entire unit in a short time.

4. 15 FRANCES 11 bombers (suicide attack planes) and ten JILL 11 carrier borne attack bombers scouted and attacked the enemy during dawn. Two of our planes dived with torpedoes to attack an enemy cruiser.

5. Our dawn attack was unsuccessful.

The SHINRAI Unit was completely annihilated.

6. Reasons for the failure of the SHINRAI Attack.

- a. Although the SHINRAI Unit was very effective in the attack, it had its weak points in its slow and clumsy movements and short cruising range.

Therefore, air supremacy must be attained before success can be expected. There were heated arguments over the use of the SHINRAI Unit. The possibility for success were misjudged because we had believed that about half of the enemy carriers were lost or damaged and the enemy was withdrawing. Hence, we thought we could achieve success if supported by sufficient escort fighters.

- b. About 20 escort fighters turned back on the way and the remaining fighters were unable to cooperate in the combat against the enemy as they had to provide protection for the SHINRAI Unit.
- c. The weak points of the SHINRAI plane (land based attack plane) carrying HANA-NO SAKKURA (OHKA) type plane were greater than expected.
- d. The SHINRAI Unit movements were known to the enemy task force through skillful and efficient use of radar.

22 Mar. Cloudy, later rained.

1. Enemy movements were uncertain as no further information was obtained. It was presumed that after suffering heavy losses sustained through our attack, the enemy returned to ULITHI or the PHILIPPINE Area.

2. A conference was held to investigate and study the results obtained in this operation against the enemy task force.

- a. Confirmed losses of the enemy

five carriers	] All sunk
two battleships	
two large cruisers	
two medium cruisers	
one ship (type unknown)	

(20 planes dived into enemy carriers)

This estimation was gathered through details provided by reconnaissance planes, and reports from the attack unit and intelligence communications. The results achieved by the night attack unit were mostly discounted when reports of the flight personnel were cross examined.

Enemy situation reported by the patrol planes.

Located:

At 0650, of 18 Mar. four groups with four, three, three and five carriers respectively.

Total:

15 carriers.

About 0900, of 19 Mar., four groups with three, two, two and four carriers respectively.

Total:

11 carriers.

About 1030, of 29 Mar., three groups with six, four and one carrier respectively.

Total:

11 carriers.

On 21 Mar., the entire strength of the enemy was reconnoitered. Seven carriers, (including one converted carrier [cruiser]), eight battleships, thirteen cruisers, thirty five destroyers.

Total:

Sixty-three ships.

The enemy task force which carried out the latest attack was estimated to have 15 to 16 carriers, seven or eight which had been sunk or seriously damaged. It was estimated that the other enemy ships suffered serious damage.

b. Total number of planes which participated in this operation.

Attack planes - 193

Patrol and reconnaissance planes - 53

Planes lost - 161 (including 69 suicide attack planes and excluding planes lost or damaged on the ground through air raids).

c. Taking all this into account, our latest operation was considered a success although we failed to annihilate the enemy carriers.



23 Mar. Clear

1. The conference to investigate and study the lessons obtained from the latest operation.

- a. Tactic No. 1 originated by our unit, was used against the enemy task force. It was confirmed that Tactic No. 1 would be successful provided the radar operates satisfactorily. The tactics must be flexible according to the situation. Headquarters and each unit must have close cooperation and unity in their operational policy.
- b. The pre-requisite for a successful operation was the thorough knowledge of the enemy situation. In this last operation, reconnaissance by MYRT 11 planes during the day and scouting and tracking by land-based attack planes and flying boats during the night generally met these requirements and facilitated the operation of the Attack Unit. On the other hand, our reconnaissance suffered considerable losses. In order to strengthen the defense for reconnaissance planes and also to use these planes more advantageously, further research should be made immediately and the proper measures must be taken.
- c. There were always some doubts concerning the results of our night attacks. In this operation, the situation and the result of our night attack were not clear.
- d. The attack by the JUDY 11, Suicide Attack Unit of the 701<sup>st</sup> Air Unit, was very successful due to thorough study, proper training and timely command made by their unit commander. Two kinds of tactics are used by the JUDY 11 Suicide Attack Unit. One was the successive attacks in echelons (surprise attack by a single plane) and the other was an instantaneous group attack. In the last operation, successive attacks in echelon were used and proved successful.
- e. The 701<sup>st</sup> Air Unit successfully carried out a maintenance service which enabled the continuation of successive attacks for three days. In the other units, the maintenance service prior to take off was poor and delayed the start which hindered the operation.
- f. Our communication service was not satisfactory due to the damages suffered through enemy air reads and our operation was greatly impeded due to this condition. Second and third auxiliary methods should be prepared beforehand so that it can be put into effect in times of emergency.

- g. The strength of the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet was disposed in the operational bases of SOUTHERN KYUSHU and in the rear based of NORTHERN KYUSHU. Contrary to our estimation, however, all bases were raided by the enemy which greatly hindered our operation. The strength must be more deeply dispersed in the rear area.
- g. The emergency repair service and construction works were properly maintained at the KANOYA Base but at the OITA, USA, and KIZUKI Bases, these measures were not maintained satisfactorily.
- h. Although we inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy in this last operation, our strength was also greatly reduced. These losses must be replaced immediately to strengthen our fighting power for subsequent operations. In addition to replacements sent by headquarters each unit must try to provide training and repair of their damaged planes.

2. Information was received that enemy carrier planes were attacking OKINAWA and SOUTH DAITO ISLANDS from 0800. Two MYRT 11 planes took off at 1000, to scout for the enemy east of OKINAWA and at 1240, located the enemy unit about 60 naut. miles southeast of OKINAWA. At 1300, two MYRT 11 reconnaissance planes, the second echelon, departed to reconnoiter the enemy south of SOUTH DAITO ISLAND. It reported no enemy found at 1550 after which no communications were received. The daylight reconnaissance failed to locate the entire strength of the task force.

3. Three JUDY 11 attack bombers which had been waiting for the enemy at KOROKU, started to reconnoiter for the enemy. However, no information has been received from these planes.

4. According to the estimation made at KOROKU from radar and other communication reports, carrier groups and three planes were located 50 naut. miles (unreadable) of KOROKU in the direction of 160 degrees and 100 naut. miles off KOROKU in the direction of 135 degrees respectively.

5. According to the report from our ground unit in OKINAWA, six battleships, 12 cruisers and 20 destroyers had concentrated within 30 kms. of OKINAWA ISLAND and fired at our positions.

6. On this day, about 1,000 planes attacked the RYUKYU ISLANDS.

7. Estimation of the enemy situation.

- a. Since the entire strength of the enemy cannot be reconnoitered and no further information was received, the enemy strength was unknown.

Judging from the enemy strength attacking and maneuvering in the RYUKYU Area, the enemy was estimated to be a powerful unit such as a task force.

- b. The enemy task force which attacked KYUSHU was estimated to have lost half of its strength. If this task force attempts to attack us, it will probably adopt tactics whereby it can annihilate our air strength in the SOUTHWEST ISLANDS and attack our ships in the important harbors along the return route to their base.
- c. The enemy force was probably a new force advancing north from the PHILIPPINE Area or an element from the PHILIPPINES united with the task force which attacked KYUSHU (with the remaining carriers as it nucleus and newly reinforced). This enemy may try to land in the OKINAWA Area.

The estimations a, b, and c all have equal possibilities. If the "c" estimation is correct, the future strategic situation will be very critical.

24 Mar. Clear

1. At 0800, two SAUIN carrier reconnaissance planes (MYRT 11) headed for the area southeast of OKINAWA, to reconnoiter for the enemy task force, but no signs of the enemy were discovered. At 1230, the second SAUIN carrier reconnaissance party started. They encountered enemy fighter planes, and nothing was heard from thereafter. The complete strength and movements of the enemy task force were unknown.

2. Eight enemy battleships and 27 destroyers off KOROKU Airfield began Naval gun bombardment. The enemy fleet is cruising about NAKAGUSUKU BAY Area south of OKINAWA ISLAND.

3. Radar intelligence placed two enemy aircraft carriers at 65 naut. miles off KOROKU Airfield in the direction of 150 degrees off north. The radar also detected aircraft carriers at 130 naut. miles off KOROKU Airfield at 150 degrees.

Approx. 900 planes raided the RYUKYU ISLANDS today. (OKINAWA was approached by 700 planes).

4. Judging from the enemy Naval maneuvers and the intensity of the air raids by enemy carrier planes, it would seem that they are intent on occupying OKINAWA.

5. In order to frustrate the enemy offensive plan it is most essential to annihilate

the enemy task force.

With this as our main objective all units were ordered to make complete operational preparations.

6. At 1600, seven TENZAN carrier bombers (JILL 11) started from KUSHIRA, with KIKAI as a relay airfield, on a mission to attack enemy ships off OKINAWA. Two of the seven planes executed torpedo attacks on a battleship or a cruiser, but the results were unknown.

25 Mar. Clear

1. Two of the three SAUIN carrier reconnaissance planes which took off at 0730 to reconnoiter the area southeast of OKINAWA radioed back at 1000 that they had discovered three aircraft carriers at a point 75 naut. miles off NAWA at 165 degrees.

2. Reports from OKINAWA

Eleven battleships, ten cruisers and 50 destroyers or mine-sweepers were cruising approx. 10 naut. miles off OKINAWA ISLAND. This group had bombarded the KERAMA ISLAND, OKINAWA ISLAND and KUME ISLAND respectively. After the enemy swept the waters north of KEIBISHI the enemy transport convoy entered KERAMA Anchorage and commenced landing operations. It is now quite clear that the enemy is attempting to occupy OKINAWA using the same strategy employed in the MUNDA Operation.

3. The Combined Fleet issued orders to carry out the security measures for the No. 1 TEN Operations. (The air units stationed west of SUZUKA coming under our command).

4. At 2104, a general attack was ordered by our units to exterminate the enemy task force maneuvering off OKINAWA on the night of the 26<sup>th</sup>.

5. Five TENZAN carrier bombers assaulted ships off of OKINAWA using KIKAI as a relay airfield. Two battleships were reported as probable hits.

26 Mar. Clear

1. Two SAUIN carrier reconnaissance planes started at 0800 to reconnoiter the enemy task force in the OKINAWA Area. One SAUIN reconnaissance plane made a photo reconnaissance of KERAMA.

2. The 701<sup>st</sup> Air Unit Cmdr. submitted his opinion that the SUISEI carrier bombers

(JUDY 11) and KIKAI Airfield should be used in the mission in the OKINAWA Area, because the SAUIN carrier reconnaissance planes were not adapted for long distance flights. Therefore, 20 SUISEI carrier bombers proceeded to KIKAI Airfield.

3. The Combined Fleet issued the order to begin TEN Operation No. 1. The 7<sup>th</sup> Naval Air Force was ordered to proceed to KYUSHU Area at 1747.

4. No information was gathered from the day reconnaissance. The attack at dusk by the GINGA Navy bomber (FRANCES 11) Suicide Unit was suspended and in turn it was ordered to commence its dawn attack on the 27<sup>th</sup>.

Simultaneously, the orders for the night and dawn reconnaissance of the area southeast of RYUKYU ISLANDS were issued.

5. Twelve GINGA Navy bombers, 13 heavy bombers, and five TENZAN carrier bombers started at 2000 to attack the enemy task forces in the OKINAWA Area. Between the hours 2200-0330, the attacks were carried out and the results were as follows:

- Three cruisers sighted and sunk.
- One battleship damaged.
- One battleship seems to be on fire and out of control
- Battleship and destroyer struck by torpedoes

6. Three land based bombers and two flying boats were sent out on a night reconnaissance mission over the OKINAWA Area. One of the flying boats radioed back at 0100 concerning the discovery of a large enemy force.

27 Mar. Cloudy with rain

1. Four land attack bombers started out at 0000 to contact the large enemy force reported by our flying boat. However, two bombers did not return, and the mission was not completed.

2. At 0345, seven GINGA Naval bombers and five SUISEI's took off on a dawn suicide attack mission to contact the enemy task force in the KERAMA ISLAND Areas. Verified reports of a direct hit on a battleship, and the bombing of two cruisers were received. However, further details were unknown, as five GINGA and five SUISEI bombers failed to return from their missions.

3. The enemy entered KERAMA Anchorage and secured key positions for their supply and repair. Enemy battleship and cruiser units commenced their bombardment to clear the landing points and wipe out our land installations and

positions. The task force was being utilized by the enemy to cover the landing operations. The most prominent enemy factor in the OKINAWA Landing Operation was their air force. (Task force unit).

Our principal objective is still to exterminate the enemy task forces in order to prevent enemy occupation. Although efforts were made to rout the enemy, the heavy loss of aircraft in the EASTERN KYUSHU Aerial Battle made the situation very serious. (especially the strength of the SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes were cut). Consequently, the operation progressed unfavorably. Unless by the 30<sup>th</sup> the 7<sup>th</sup> Naval Air Force arrives in this area, the chance of attaining success was very low.

4. Telephone communications were received from the Combined Fleet that they had a temporary plan. For the 1<sup>st</sup> Naval Diversion Attack Force to proceed from the INSLAND SEA to SASEBO, in order to participate in the OKINAWA Landing Operation and simultaneously with the movement of the Attack Force to lure the enemy task force, which our units will be prepared to attack.

However, we have had similar plans become failures. With the present situation, direct fighter escort fighters are few, and the probability of success seemed little. There are other important missions for the 1<sup>st</sup> Naval Diversion Attack Force to fit into.

3. Today, due to bad weather, the strength was regulated for maintenance work.

28 Mar. Partly cloudy.

1. At 1230, 200 enemy carrier planes assaulted SOUTHERN KYUSHU. As a result of our reconnaissance during the night, we can begin our counterattack, but hope for success would be slight. Therefore, the enemy attack will be overlooked, because at present we plan to attack the enemy tomorrow.

2. Due to the lack of SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes, reconnaissance of the enemy situation was not carried out today. However, reports from an Army Hq. reconnaissance plane which took off from the TAIWAN Base states that four enemy aircraft carriers and 100 transports have been sighted 80 naut. miles from NAHA at 180 degrees.

Studying the enemy situation, we feel that the enemy landing units have approached OKINAWA and the time for their landing operations is close at hand.

3. The enemy situation will be cleared up by tomorrows reconnaissance, and night attacks will be carried out against the enemy task force.

The operational plan was issued.

4. At 1500, the 3d Air Fleet was advanced to KANOYA.

29 Mar. Clear

1. At 0630, three SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes reconnoitered the circumference of the RYUKYU ISLANDS and discovered two groups of enemy task forces, one including two aircraft carriers 35 naut. miles southwest of TANEGASHIMA and the other including one aircraft carrier 50 naut. miles southeast of TANEGASHIMA.

3. A part of the enemy task force was closing in on our position. Seeing that it would be poor strategy to continue this night attack mission, daylight suicide attack missions were planned, although the strength was very low.

A SAIUN carrier reconnaissance plane was sent out to maintain contact with the enemy task force, while simultaneously, four SUISEI carrier bombers were sent out on missions. Reports were received stating that two of the SUISEI bombers attained their missions by performing suicidal crash dives.

The SAIUN reconnaissance plane kept in contact with the enemy task force until 1430. The task force includes an aircraft carrier and is situated 50 naut. miles south of TANEGASHIMA.

We must prevent the enemy from approaching our positions too closely.

5. Between the hours of 2000-2100, four land based attack planes and two flying boats were sent out to perform night reconnaissance missions over the waters southeast of KYUSHU.

The flying boats detected enemy units at 80 naut. miles south of ASHIZURI POINT, and attempted to keep in contact with it. (Later, after the return of the flying boat crew, it seemed as though it was one of the radar decoys planted by the enemy).

6. The enemy landing units which had been advancing northward arrived at KERAMA. The Combined fleet ordered the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force, which had been conserving its attacking power, to attack the enemy transport convoy with its entire strength.

30 Mar. Fine, with fog in the early morning.

1. Since our contact flying boats detected the enemy task force, the enemy

seems to be making a deliberate attempt to proceed northward. Therefore we decided to concentrate our night attacks on this enemy.

2. Twelve GINGA Navy bombers, and 15 heavy bombers started out on their mission at midnight, 29 Mar. The flying boat, which was keeping in contact with the enemy task force, radioed that it was being assaulted by enemy fighter planes.

Although the attack was expected to be a success, foggy conditions seemed to make the attack almost hopeless. Though two squadrons were ordered to commence the attack, the only reports received thus far, concerning the attack were that one heavy bomber sank an enemy aircraft carrier. The other results of the successful attack were still unknown.

At 0200, a heavy bomber reported seeing two aircraft carriers, ten cruisers or destroyers at 70 naut. miles from MIYAZAKI and at 90 degrees.

3. Enemy fighters approached KANOYA Air Base, but due to heavy fog, no actions were taken by either side.

4. Three SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes took up photographic reconnaissance of the OKINAWA Area and patrolled the EASTERN Waters of the RYUKYU ISLANDS. However, no enemy was discovered.

5. Estimate of the Situation by the Combined Fleet.

The enemy task force is probably proceeding northward in order to meet our sea suicide unit. The enemy landing units at this time are not active, but they will probably commence landing operations within the next two or three days.

31 Mar. Clear

1. There is a possibility that the enemy task force in the rear area has started out from ULITHI (enemy base) on the 28<sup>th</sup>. Also, the enemy task force may be proceeding northward as anticipated. In order to check our judgment, two SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes were sent out to reconnoiter the position of the task force. Another SAIUN (MYRT 11) reconnaissance plane was dispatched for patrol duty over OKINAWA.

No trace of the enemy was found.

2. The enemy occupied KAMIYAMA ISLAND, and already numerous numbers of transports are approaching OKINAWA ISLAND. Now that the enemy plan to being landing operations today is clear, we will execute an intensified night attack



against the enemy with our entire strength with the exception of the anti-task force strength.

3. Several formations of B-29's raided KANOYA Base. This clarifies the fact that the enemy is now opening up a new attack.

4. Eight GINGA (FRANCES 11) Navy bombers, 12 heavy bombers, six TENZAN (JILL 11) carrier attack bombers, eight suicide planes, and a ZUIUN (PAUL 11) reconnaissance seaplane will carry out night attacks against the enemy task force in the OKINAWA Area.

Remarkable results were attained, however, when verified, the results were not too good.

Sunk – one cruiser, one transport ship  
Fires – one cruiser

5. The operational arrangements between the 3d and 5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet.

- a. The operational objective of the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force (K.F.G.B.) will be to encounter and exterminate the enemy task force. The 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet and an element of the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force will attack the enemy landing unit. The Combined Fleet will order the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Army to attack enemy ships in OKINAWA.
- b. Operational tactics will follow the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force Operational Plan. Each unit of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet will understand the plan fully, in order to omit any mistakes when carrying out their part of the operation.
- c. The 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force will have direct command over each unit concerned in this operation. (The staff officers of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet will work as part of the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force Staff).
- d. In the anti-task force operation, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet will dispatch part of the SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes to go under the command of the 11<sup>th</sup> TEI Unit.

1 April Clear

1. At 0700, the enemy forces commenced their landing operations on the WESTERN Coast of OKINAWA ISLAND.

2. According to the reports from an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane (DINAH 3), and two SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes which departed at

0630 to reconnoiter the enemy task force, the task force was located at 50 naut. miles southeast of OKINAWA. A carrier bomber and a suicide plane squadron were sent to attack the task force. However, after finding the reports to be wrong, the potential attack plan was suspended at 1530.

3. At 1535, a report was received from the SAIUN (MYRT 11) carrier reconnaissance planes which departed at 1250, that a task force, consisting of four aircraft carriers and four converted aircraft carriers were located 50 naut. miles south of AMAMIOSHIMA, course: northeast; speed: 24 knots. The 1<sup>st</sup> tactical operational battle order was given at 1709 to exterminate the enemy forces.

4. Four attack bombers and two flying boats were to commence with the attack at dusk. However, this was behind schedule. At 2100-2200, the previously mentioned party started out to patrol the waters southeast of KYUSHU, searching for expected enemy units. At 2300, the enemy units were detected a short distance east of TOI POINT. The radar station at TOI POINT had detected a strange disturbance on their radar equipment.

2 April Clear

1. At 0100, the land attack bombers detected enemy forces 150 naut. miles southeast of TOI POINT. If this force should check with the northerly movements of the previous day's report, the detected force should be the enemy task force. Therefore, at 0202, the 1<sup>st</sup> Tactical Operational Battle Order was put into operation. Immediately after this, another reconnaissance plane sighted an enemy unit consisting of one aircraft carrier, and one battleship a short distance south of KIKAI. Therefore our attack was ordered against this force.

2. Eight GINGA (FRANCES 11) Navy bombers, 13 heavy bombers and eight TENZAN (JILL 11) carrier attack bombers started between 0300-0430 to attack the task force. Our aircraft reached the location of the enemy force, however, all planes were unable to find their targets.

At about 0400, six GINGA (FRANCES 11) Navy bombers, and seven SUISEI (JUDY 11) carrier bombers took to the air, in order to execute suicide attacks. Although these planes sought their targets, the enemy units were not found.

3. The accuracy of the radar reports of the previous night radar detection now seemed doubtful. After the planes returned from their reconnaissance patrols, the radar equipment was checked. As a result of the investigation, it was discovered that the reconnaissance crew members mistook the reflections bouncing back from the coast to be the enemy units. Furthermore, the strange disturbance detected on the TOI POINT radar instrument were that of radar decoys planted by enemy submarines. (It seems as though the enemy set afloat balloons, which

interfered with our radar work). After further investigation, it was discovered that the crew mistook KIKAI ISLAND for an aircraft carrier. Thus the misleading reconnaissance reports brought about an unnecessary attack operation.

4. Two SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane took off at 0800 to reconnoiter EASTERN OKINAWA. At 1130, they sighted eight aircraft carriers at 40 naut. miles off NAHA at 180 degrees off north. Two other SAIUN reconnaissance planes which took off at 1300, sighted four aircraft carriers 20 naut. miles off NAHA in the direction of 135 degrees off north at 1610.

Thirty suicide planes were sent up at 1500 to attack the above mentioned task force. Four out of 30 planes executed crash dives against an aircraft carrier, a battleship and a cruiser.

5. The enemy task force, divided into several groups, maneuvered around OKINAWA. In order to carry out their landing operations successfully, most of the enemy task force is now engaged in aiding the landing operations. However, no distinct developments have been noticed on either side. With the situation as it is, most likely the enemy forces will not proceed northward as we had previously anticipated. We are finding it very difficult to encounter and execute attacks against the enemy, because the present position of the enemy is too far from our base to employ suicide tactics.

After today, we will strengthen and reorganize the night and suicidal attack tactics to be employed against the enemy ships off OKINAWA. (Also guerrilla tactics). Our forces will endeavor to draw out the enemy task forces, pulling them northward. The operational outline for carrying out such a mission has already been drawn up.

6. Eighteen land attack bombers which had taken off from USA at 2000, assaulted and sank one battleship, three cruisers, and damaged another enemy cruiser which had been at anchor off OKINAWA.

7. The 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet Hq. which was put under the command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force since 1 April, proceeded to KANOYA.

3 April Partly cloudy.

1. At 0700, two SAIUN (MYRT 11) carrier reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane started off in search of the enemy task force. At 0945 they reported back, stating that a task force including four aircraft carriers was sighted 40 naut. miles off NAHA at 80 degrees.

Two SAIUN reconnaissance planes which had taken off at 1000 reported back at 1235, that a group of ships, probably including aircraft carriers was sighted 80 naut. miles off AMAMIOSHIMA at 180 degrees.

A GINGA Navy bomber suicide unit will be sent to encounter and attack the former task force south of OKINAWA. As for the latter enemy group sighted south of AMAMIOSHIMA, a suicide unit of attack bombers will be dispatched. The order for these missions was issued at 1331.

2. 32 ZERO (ZEKE 52) and eight SHINDEN fighter planes started at 1500 to take air superiority from the enemy over the KIKAI OSHIMA Area. Twenty SUISEI carrier bombers and 24 suicide planes took off at 1500 to attack the task force south of OSHIMA. The result of the suicide attack is unknown. However, it was reported that the entire number of planes sent out assaulted the enemy with suicidal crash dives.

Half of the eight GINGA Navy bombers which attacked the task force south of OKINAWA at 1530, also made suicidal crash dives.

The results of the air superiority battle of KIKAI were as follows:

Our fighters encountered 27 enemy fighters, shooting down and damaging 18. Our losses included eight planes.

3. Operational arrangements were conducted between the staff officers of the Combined Fleet and the Imperial Hq. Naval Staff.

- a. The number of enemy forces used in the landing operations were two marine divisions and four divisions of the 24<sup>th</sup> Army. The number is much greater than our 32<sup>nd</sup> Army on the defensive. (32<sup>nd</sup> Army includes two divisions and two brigades). During the first day of the battle, our 32<sup>nd</sup> Army abandoned the airfield and withdrew to the SOUTH.
- b. According to intelligence reports, enemy reinforcements were now proceeding northward from LEYTE and other SOUTHERN Districts.
- c. Although the enemy has not utilized the abandoned airfield as yet, it is expected to be employed within the next two or three days.
- d. The enemy task force in the SOUTHEASTERN waters of OKINAWA are maneuvering actively, and are simultaneously supporting the landing operations.
- e. The 32<sup>nd</sup> Army is anxiously awaiting aerial support from our air units, in

order to overcome the Naval bombardment and aerial attack carried on by enemy task forces, which are making the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army's situation extremely grave.

After a thorough study of both the defensive battle situation and the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army operational plan, we find that it will be futile to try to turn the tide of battle with our present tactics. Thus, we have come to the conclusion that we must carry out a larger scale operation, in order to turn the situation to our favor.

- a. The 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force will conserve its strength in order to execute the main objective of encountering and destroying the enemy task force. Another unit will carry out attacks on ships off OKINAWA.
- b. The entire strength of the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Army, 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet and the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force (except for the anti-task force unit) will carry out a general attack against the ships in and around OKINAWA and will simultaneously wipe out the enemy landing forces.
- c. In order to insure the success of this major operation, the Army and Navy Air Force from FORMOSA will cooperate.
- d. To safeguard the success of this operation it must be kept in strict secrecy. As for the operational principles, all decisions will be made according to the situation, as well as taking the anti-task force operations into consideration.

4. The general attack against the ships off OKINAWA (KIKUSUI Operation No. 1) has been decided to be carried out on 5 April. The operational principles were also pointed out.

5. GINGA Navy bombers and nine heavy bombers which left on a mission to attack the task forces in the OKINAWA Area at 2200 later reported their results as being two cruisers (battleship), one converted aircraft carrier, one destroyer and another ship sunk or damaged.

4 April Partly cloudy

1. Eight SUISEI carrier bombers and four ZERO night fighters were sent up at 0330 for dawn reconnaissance duty to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy task force. No enemy traces were sighted, after covering an area of 300 naut. miles.

2. Two SAIUN reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane which took off at 0530 to search for enemy task forces, reported at

0735 that four aircraft carriers were found 70 naut. miles of NAHA at 210 degrees. However, no action was taken against this enemy, for it was too far from our base, and furthermore, the possibility of success of a daylight attack was slim.

3. Due to bad weather conditions, the scheduled night attack against enemy ships off OKINAWA was suspended.

4. 23 small type enemy planes were seen advancing to the north OKINAWA Airfield. The general attack will be enforced before the enemy can start employing more planes in this area.

The Combined Fleet issued orders to carry out larger scale aerial operations, and simultaneously an order to exterminate the enemy ships off OKINAWA. The objective of the Combined Fleet order seems to be pointed at the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Army to conduct an active attack against the ships off OKINAWA.

5 April Clear

1. At 0830 three SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes started out to search for the enemy task forces, while simultaneously another SAIUN plane proceeded to take photographic reconnaissance of the OKINAWA Anchorage. (Enemy). At 1137, an aircraft carrier was detected 230 miles off NAHA at 70 degrees. 12 SUISEI carrier bombers were sent out to assault the above objective, but as yet the results are not known.

2. A conference was held between all the staff officers of each unit, to explain the operational objective and the principles of the KIKUSUI Operation No. 1.

3. 6 April was decided as the date for the commencement of the KIKUSUI Operation No. 1. Therefore, the preliminary night reconnaissance and night attacks will commence from this evening.

Although three land attack planes, eight GINGA (FRANCES 11) Navy bombers, and three ZUIUN Navy fighter planes, 13 heavy bombers, and six TENZAN (JILL 11) carrier bombers had set out for a night attack against the enemy ships off OKINAWA, part of the group was compelled to return due to bad weather conditions. Therefore, this mission was not successful.

At 2130, three land attack planes departed for the coastal area north of the airfield, in an attempt to lay mines there. All planes were successful in their mission. At 2100, two land attack bombers and a flying boat set out to reconnoiter "Q" Area. The flying boat detected enemy units a very short distance south of SHIKOKU at 2230.

4. The Combined Fleet ordered the 1<sup>st</sup> Diversion Attack Unit (YAMATO – battleship and 2<sup>nd</sup> Destroyer Squadron) to commence with suicidal attacks on the enemy in the OKINAWA Area.

Although the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force had no orders to dispatch an air patrol unit for the 1<sup>st</sup> Diversion Unit, it was highly desirable for them to help out. However, this will be considered from an operational standpoint, since some units were needed to draw the enemy task forces out. Although success of this attack is doubtful, if it is carried out favorably, it will greatly improve the Navy situation.

6 April Fair

1. Eight SUISEI Navy bombers and six ZERO night fighters started at 0245-0300 to strafe and bomb the OKINAWA Airfields and landing forces convoys. Direct rocket bomb hits were reported on three cruisers and one transport was reported to be on fire.

2. The KIKUSUI No. 1 Operation was carried out immediately after last night's patrol. Reports from two SAIUN reconnaissance planes and one Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane, which had taken off at 0700, states discovering two groups of task forces (six aircraft carriers) south of OSHIMA. Attempts were made to encounter and destroy the two groups. At 1430, two SAIUN reconnaissance planes proceeded to observe the attack results.

3. 30 suicide planes, and 23 SUISEI Navy bombers were alerted to successively attack the task force southeast of AMAMI-OSHIMA, between the hours of 1015-1310. The majority of the bombers and fighters assaulted enemy aircraft carriers and cruisers, while the SUISEI Navy bombers took after the enemy battleships. The other aircraft which were unable to find any targets changed their courses to attack ships off OKINAWA.

Judging from the reports sent in by our attack planes and from intercepted enemy reports, we have listed four enemy aircraft carriers as probably sunk.

At 1600, two SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes started out on patrol duty.

4. After 1230, the following groups were sent up successively to carry out their respective missions.

One Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane – radar deception  
Ten SHINDEN Navy fighters, 20 Army fighters – air superiority over OSHIMA Vicinity.

104 ZERO (ZEKE 52) fighters (4 waves) – Air superiority over OKINAWA.

15 TENZAN (JILL 11) carrier bombers

45 Navy Type 97 (KATE 12) carrier attack bombers

49 Navy Type 99 (Val 22) carrier bombers

Suicide attacks on  
ships off of  
OKINAWA

The air superiority fighting units encountered 30 F6F and F4U (VOUGHT-SIKORSKY Fighters), and during the engagement shot down seven of the enemy planes.

The radar (decoy) planes seem to have been quite successful, according to intercepted enemy reports which seem quite confused. As for the suicide attack units which were sent to exterminate enemy ships off OKINAWA, reports have come back stating that half of the dispatched units had completed their mission. Approximately 100 planes for the 6<sup>th</sup> Army, 8<sup>th</sup> Air Div. and 1<sup>st</sup> Air Fleet, cooperated in carrying out this mission. According to intercepted enemy reports, the enemy seemed to be in a state of confusion.

Total enemy losses during the attacks against enemy ships off OKINAWA.

- a. According to the reconnaissance plane report, approx. 150 columns of black smoke were seen.
- b. Reports from the land forces.

1). Blown up and sunk

Battleships - 2  
Unknown type ships - 2  
Large type ships - 3  
Small type ships - 2

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Total – 9 ships

2). Sunk

Transports - 5  
Unknown type ships - 2

3). Damaged

Battleship - 1  
Destroyer - 1  
Transports - 6  
Small type ships - 2



Unknown type ships - 9

- 4). Ships on fire - 14  
Ships exploded - 3

Other later reports:

- a). Blown up and sunk

- Cruisers - 3
- Destroyers - 5
- Mine sweepers - 3
- Unknown type ships - 1

- b). Sunk

- Destroyers - 3
- Unknown type ships - 7

- c). Damaged and burned:

- Battleships - 2
- Cruisers - 6
- Destroyers - 2
- Mine sweepers - 2

The above results show clearly that KIKUSUI Operation No. 1 was successful. The reasons for the success are as follows:

- 1). A large strength was employed.
- 2). The daylight attack strategy which was employed against OKINAWA caught the enemy forces off guard.
- 3). The enemy land air bases were not as yet completely prepared for such an attack.
- 4). Simultaneous attacks made on the enemy task force.
- 5). Success of the radar deception tactics.

The strength should be immediately reorganized and strengthened and after further study on the operational principles, another attack should be repeated. After such matters have been completed, we should be able to extend our war results.

6. At 1700, four ZUIUN reconnaissance seaplanes departed from IBUSUKI for OKINAWA in order to carry out night attacks. Results: one ship of unknown type damaged.

7. Although four land attack planes started at 2200 to patrol the southeast area of TOI POINT, no enemy was discovered.

8. At 1800, the 1<sup>st</sup> Diversion Unit departed from BUNGO CHANNEL, and proceeded southward.

9. The Combined Fleet Hqs. advanced to KANOYA to set up its headquarters.

7 April Cloudy

1. Although our night patrols were unable to detect any enemy movements, we have no doubt that the enemy task forces will proceed northward, considering yesterday's attack on OKINAWA and the departure of the 1<sup>st</sup> Diversion Unit.

Two SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane started out on a search for the enemy task force at 0650. Two aircraft carriers and a converted carrier were spotted proceeding northward at reduced speed 80 naut. miles off OKINAWA in the direction 90 degrees off north, leaving traces of oil. Two aircraft carriers and a battleship were located east of SOUTHERN OKINAWA, and four aircraft carriers 100 naut. miles southeast of NAHA.

After the reports were received at 1100, 78 ZERO fighters of the air superiority unit, 20 suicide planes, 11 SUISEI carrier bombers, and 12 GINGA Navy bombers started out to attack the discovered task force units. One GINGA bomber and six SUISEI bombers seemed to have made suicide crash dives against two groups of aircraft carriers.

According to intercepted radio reports, two aircraft carriers were probably sunk, and two probably damaged. Two Army reconnaissance planes which directed the SUISEI bombers to their destination joined in the attack.

2. Intercepted enemy reports states that our 1<sup>st</sup> Diversion Unit had been detected by enemy submarines last night. Since 0800, eight ZERO fighters have been out on air patrol duty for the 1<sup>st</sup> Diversion Unit. It seems that our attacks had not completely shaken the enemy task forces, for at 1200, the 1<sup>st</sup> Diversion Unit radioed that they were being assaulted by enemy carrier planes. We were completely helpless to send emergency units to help the 1<sup>st</sup> Diversion Unit, for our entire strength was engaged at this time in assaulting the enemy task forces.

3. There was still the possibility that the enemy task force would proceed northward. Therefore, two SAUIN reconnaissance planes were sent at 1120 to contact the enemy. Reports were received that two other aircraft carriers had been located east of the damaged carriers discovered earlier in the day. Furthermore, two

47 carriers were discovered 100 naut. miles from KIKAI Area and at 150 degrees. Evening attacks were ordered against these task forces, however, due to changes in the weather condition, the attack was suspended at 1336.

4. Although three land attack planes and a flying boat had been sent out on night patrol over the area southeast of KYUSHU, no enemy was detected.

8 April Light rain, later cloudy.

1. At 0300, eight SUISEI night fighters were sent out to search for enemy task forces, however no information was gathered. The two SAIUN reconnaissance planes which took off at 0800, returned without completing their patrol due to inclement weather.

Today bad weather conditions prevented us from carrying out aerial attack or patrol duties.

2. Investigation and arrangements were carried out for the coming KIKUSUI Operation No. 2, which was to be begin on the 10<sup>th</sup>.

In the general attack against the enemy shipping off of OKINAWA, if we employ as much strength as in KIKUSUI Operation No. 1, and continuously attack the enemy each day, we may perhaps carry out another successful operation, and exterminate the enemy task forces. If success is acquired in this operation, the morale of the entire Army will be higher.

The above idea is our goal, however, the lack of strength makes it impossible. Therefore, further studies will have to be made on the operational principles in order to attain successful results.

The next operation will not be as easy to carry out as the previous one, for the enemy land air bases will be developed, and prepared for any emergency. In order to carry out this coming operation, plans must be made to first subdue the enemy land bases in the evening before the day of attack. Then, early in the morning, the first wave of fighter planes will proceed to the enemy area, which will compel enemy fighters to engage in the first wave, As soon as the enemy planes begin to land after combating our first wave, our attack units will be rushed to the enemy areas, giving them no opportunity to regain their air superiority.

3. At approx. 1000, several groups of B-29's approached from the southeast off TOI POINT, dropping bombs east of KANOYA through the clouds. The large type enemy bombers based at the MARIANAS will probably be used in the OKINAWA Operations.

9 April Rainy

1. After last night, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army opened their attack against the NORTHERN Area, which had been prearranged to begin on 7 April.

Due to this attack by the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army and still unorganized from the general attack on 6 April, the enemy seems to be in a state of confusion. Orders have been received from the Naval General Staff (Imp. GHQ Navy Section's Military Secret 091106) and the Combined Fleet (Combined Fleet's telegraphic Operational Order #620) that we will await the opportunity to cooperate with the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army in their attack, and carry out the operation.

2. Due to bad weather conditions, patrol missions were suspended for today, and the planes prepared for attack were set aside. The commencement date for the KIKUSUI Operation No. 2 was, changed to 11 April.

10 April Cloudy with some rain

1. Again patrol missions and attack operations were suspended due to bad weather. The heavy drizzle prevented the concentration of our strength thus forcing us once more to change the date for the KIKUSUI Operation No. 2 to 12 April.

2. The daily suspension of patrol missions due to bad weather has caused us to lose contact with the movements of the enemy task forces. Therefore orders were issued to enforce a large scale reconnaissance patrol as soon as the weather improves.

11 April Clear.

1. At 0630, three SUISEI night fighters took off to patrol the EASTERN SEA Area (flying over 300 nautical miles), however there was no trace of the enemy.

2. Since 0710, two SAUIN carrier reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane patrolled the waters southeast of TOI POUT, and the OKINAWA Area. At 0930, reports came through from the patrol concerning the discovery of the enemy task force, including two aircraft carriers, one converted aircraft carrier and three battleships.

A daylight suicide attack was begun.

3. Between the hours of 1230-1330, two SAUIN carrier reconnaissance planes took off to reconnoiter the enemy and check the results of our attack. 60 ZERO fighters, 15 SHINDEN fighters started out on an air superiority combat mission.

50 suicide attack planes and nine SUISEI fighter planes started on their suicide attack.

The air superiority unit encountered and engaged eight enemy F6F's on the way over KIKAI ISLAND. Between 1350-1700 seven attack planes attacked the carriers while four attack planes attacked the battleships and four SUISEI fighters assaulted the other carriers. Although our dispatched reconnaissance spotted two large columns of dark smoke, further details were not forthcoming, for the reconnaissance plane was assaulted by enemy fighters.

4. Since 1420, two SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes attempted to contact the enemy task force, in order to prepare for a full force evening attack. Final reports came in stating that two groups of task forces consisting of two aircraft carriers 50 naut. miles off KIKAI at 100 degrees had been discovered and a group with three carriers 30 naut. miles off KIKAI at 180 degrees.

5. As a result of our attack between 1850-1920 conducted against the enemy task force by five GINGA Naval suicide bombers, 12 GINGA Navy bombers, 16 heavy bombers, and eight TENZAN carrier bombers which took off between 1530-1800, three of the enemy carriers were sunk, one battleship (large-type cruiser) was set afire, and two destroyers and a cruiser were hit by torpedo attacks.

6. Aside from TUSGEN ISLAND, the enemy landed on PORT UNTEN and NAGO BAY. A large landing force convoy was anchored in NAGASUKU BAY.

The 801<sup>st</sup> Unit laid mines (marine) from land attack bombers. Out of nine land attack bombers which started off at 2000 for the mine laying mission, five completed their mission, and four failed to return. The results were none too satisfactory.

7. Tomorrow the KIKUSUI Operation No. 2 will begin. However, since it is quite probable that enemy task forces will also be maneuvering the KIKAI Area tomorrow, orders were issued for early reconnaissance patrols and the preparation for an offensive disposition of suicide units. These preparations are being made in order to open an attack on two fronts: one for the ships off of OKINAWA; the other for the enemy task forces maneuvering off of KIKAI.

8. Although four land attack bombers and two flying boats started between the hours of 2000-2100 for night reconnaissance duty over the Eastern waters of OKINAWA, no traces of enemy task forces were found. However a large enemy unit was detected off of MINAMI DAITO ISLAND.

12 April Clear.

1. KIKUSUI Operation No. 2 was begun from last night. At 0280, eight ZERO night fighters and 14 SUISEI carrier bombers were sent out to bomb and destroy the NORTHERN and CENTRAL Airfields on OKINAWA. Subsequent reports tell of three large fires.

2. At 0640, two SAIUN reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane were sent to reconnoiter the southeast waters of KYUSHU. An enemy unit including an aircraft carrier was sighted 60 naut. miles east of YORON SHIMA at 0830, against these suicide planes and GINGA'S were sent up. Between the hours of 1250-1300, 20 suicide planes, two 100 Hq. reconnaissance planes (suicide planes) and 12 GINGA Navy bombers set out. Reports were received giving details of the attack. Eight GINGA Navy bombers and the majority of the attack planes assaulted the enemy between 1500-1600.

3. Between 1100-1230 34 SHINDEN Navy fighter planes, 18 Army fighter planes proceeded to KIKAI SHIMA and ANAMAI SHIMA to assume aerial superiority, while 72 ZEROS flew over in three waves to assume air superiority on OKINAWA. At the same time, 13 land attack bombers, 29 Navy Type 99 carrier bombers, and eight OHKAS (piloted rocket glide bombs) (as the result of the scarcity of small type suicide planes, we were compelled to use the OHKA in order to make our attack effective. On this day the weather conditions were favorable for a high altitude surprise attack therefore OHKAS as were employed) started to begin their surprise attacks on shipping off OKINAWA.

At 0700, Army fighter planes were sent to compel the enemy fighters to take off from their carriers. The SHINDEN Navy fighters shot down 20 of the 40 enemy F4U's (VOUGHT-SIKORSKY) which our planes encountered at 1300 over KIKAI ISLAND. The ZEROS shot down 20 of the enemy' fighters over OKINAWA.

Seven of the suicide planes dive bombed on the enemy, three fighters reported that they sighted their targets, and six OHKAS were guided and released toward their target. (one battleship sunk; one battleship hit)

4. The first echelon of SAIUN carrier reconnaissance planes spotted the enemy task force, but was unable to carry out reconnaissance, due to interception by enemy fighters. Therefore at 1000, two other SAIUNS proceeded to reconnoiter the task force, however reports did not come through, due to defective radio instruments.

At 1330, three groups of enemy task forces, including six aircraft carriers and two converted carriers were sighted 60-80 naut. miles east of the northern point of OKINAWA. Through this discovery, we gathered that the enemy force was maneuvering about OKINAWA and helping in the landing operation, must have suffered serious damages from our repeated attacks. A plan was made to

exterminate the enemy task forces by means of employing our entire strength, commencing from tonight. The orders were issued at 1725.

5. Between 2030-2230, a flying boat and four land attack bombers proceeded on night patrols over the waters east of OKINAWA. At 1243 of the 13<sup>th</sup>, an enemy task force was detected 60-80 naut. miles east of SOUTHERN OKINAWA, and also radar detected disturbances 50 nautical miles north of KIKAI ISLAND.

The 15 GINGA Navy bombers and 16 heavy bombers which started at 1800, encountered and attacked the task forces between 1940-2145, sinking one converted aircraft carrier, two battleships (cruisers) and two unknown type ships, and inflicted a direct hit on another battleship.

6. At 1600, land attack planes (14) started another attack to increase the success of the daylight attack against ships off OKINAWA. The results of the attack from 1915-1940 were as follows:

Two cruisers sunk; one battleship on fire, and another battleship hit.

7. Results of the enemy losses through the KIKUSUI Operation No. 2:

located and sunk: one converted aircraft carrier, one battleship, two cruisers, one unknown type ship.

damaged: two battleships, one transport,

set afire: five ships (type unknown)

six columns of fire were perceived.

Due to the fact that this surprise attack employed less strength than operation No. 1, the results were not as satisfactory. However, through international radio reports, it was acknowledged that a severe blow was dealt the enemy.

13 April Clear-mild.

Approx. 50 naut. miles north of KIKAI, strange radar disturbances were detected by last night's patrol plane. Reports from the 951<sup>st</sup> Air Unit reconnaissance seaplane verified those disturbances, since they had located enemy aircraft carriers in that same area.

The two SAIUN reconnaissance planes which started out at 0600 to contact the located enemy carriers spotted a task force including three aircraft carriers south of the point where the enemy carriers were located last night. However, further details as to the enemy situation were lacking, for enemy fighters routed our reconnaissance planes. The general daylight attack previously planned, therefore was suspended.

2. From the standpoint of the position of the contacted enemy task forces, the counterattack by enemy fighters against our reconnaissance planes, and the enemy attacks on KIKAI Airfield during the night, it is quite certain that the enemy task forces are attempting to approach KIKAI ISLAND in order to begin their night fighting tactics.

Therefore, in order to block any such plan after tonight, our forces will carry out night attacks against the enemy carriers.

3. Although eight TENZAN carrier bombers and six land attack bombers proceeded at 1930 on night patrols over the SOUTHERN Waters of TANEGASHIMA, the enemy forces were not located. Therefore, the night attack against the enemy task force was not successful

4. The prearranged general attack order was altered.

14 April Clear.

1. The night patrol of TENZAN bombers and land attack bombers which had been sent on patrol duty over the area south of TANEGASHIMA found no sign of the enemy. At 0155, the 762<sup>nd</sup> Night Attack Unit which had been alerted was taken off the alert.

2. The operational principle and the commencement date for the KIKUSUI Operation No. 2, 16 April, were issued at 0807. The enemy increased its number of escort planes with the completion of enemy land air bases. At the same time, measures were adopted by the enemy to counterattack our attack units by employing radar patrol ships.

During the KIKUSUI Operation No. 2, we suffered heavy losses. Unless this air superiority attack is carried out successfully, the anti-task force attack on the enemy ships off OKINAWA will not carry off.

Therefore, plans were laid out to employ dusk suicide units in the evening. The entire air superiority fighter plane unit will be employed against enemy land bases in order to acquire air superiority.

Following this, the general attack will commence.

3. Two SAIUN reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 reconnaissance plane proceeded to reconnoiter the enemy task force and the enemy OKINAWA Anchorage. However, due to circumstances beyond our control, the SAIUN failed to return. The Army type 100 reconnaissance plane located a group consisting of eight ships and an aircraft carrier 75 nautical miles off TOKUNOSHIMA, at 125



degrees at 0940.

4. From 1030, the attack units of 125 ZEROS and SHINDEN fighters, two SUISEI night fighters, 21 suicide attack planes, and seven OHKA Bomb planes started on their respective missions against the enemy task force.

Although the SHINDEN fighter planes encountered the enemy ever KIKAI, the majority of the ZEROS returned without completing their mission, due to the lack of visibility and a misunderstanding as to orders. Therefore, the mission of gaining air superiority was not completely successful. Two attack planes were reported to have dived into the enemy. One OHKA bomb was released from its mother plans. Attack results were very poor.

5. According to reconnaissance reports of the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Fleet SAIUN reconnaissance plane two converted enemy aircraft carriers were located in anchorage At KERMA. At 1400, eight suicide planes were sent out to assault these converted carriers, however, no reports were received as to the results.

6. According to reports radioed back from a SAIUN reconnaissance plane and SHINDEN fighter which were on patrol over the area southeast of KIKAI, black columns of smoke were seen 60 nautical miles east of KIKAI. Furthermore, an aircraft carrier was located 110 naut. miles east of OSHIMA, and large spots of oil film were spotted 40 nautical miles northeast of KIKAI. (These may be the results of the morning attack).

7. Against the carrier task force, seven GINGA bombers, and eleven heavy bombers started on a concentrated attack at 1830. Five planes concentrated on a single objective, and the results were as follows: one battleship and a ship of unknown type, sunk; a large fire recognized on a large type ship (burning for an hour).

8. Out of the four TENZAN bombers carrying out the attack missions on ships off of OKINAWA, only one plane was reported to have carried out a suicide attack.

9. Plans were made to repeat another attack against the ships on the 15<sup>th</sup>. At 2000, four land attack bombers and a flying boat commenced night patrols over the area south of the RYUKYU ISLANDS. However, no enemy was contacted.

15 April Clear.

1. The reconnaissance plane from IBUSUKI located a large enemy task force 140 nautical miles from SADA POINT at 144 degrees, proceeding northward at high rate of speed at 2053 last night.

At 0115, orders were issued for reconnaissance and attack.

Four SUISEI night fighters which started on patrol duty at 0330 over the waters of TOI POINT found no enemy inside the area 150 nautical miles off TOI POINT and between the 150-152 degrees angle. Therefore, the attack was cancelled at 0643.

2. The two SAUIN reconnaissance planes which took off at 0700 to patrol the sea east of RYUKYU ISLANDS and reconnoiter the OKINAWA Area discovered no signs of the enemy.

3. In order to prepare for the KIKUSUI Operation No. 3, daylight attacks were suspended. During the afternoon details and arrangements were made for the KIKUSUI Operation No. 3, which is to begin on 16 April.

4. At 1400, 80 enemy planes equipped with auxiliary tanks assaulted our KANOYA Airfield. The surprise enemy attack caught our forces off guard. For that reason the SHINDEN fighters were delayed in taking off. Two of them were shot down as soon as they took off. However, 24 ZEROS from KASAHARA Airfield counterattacked the enemy, bringing one enemy fighter down.

It is probable that these enemy fighters came from OKINAWA Airfield. If this is true, then it is the first time such an attack has been carried out by enemy fighters from OKINAWA. Thus it is imperative that we should be especially cautious in the future.

5. KIKUSUI Operation No. 3 commenced on schedule. Ten ZERO fighters started at 1630, strafing at dusk and bombing the north and central airfields of OKINAWA, coordinating with the Army fighter planes. Each plane in the surprise attack mission completed its task successfully. At 1910, a large explosion was observed.

At approx. 2200, eight land attack bombers bombarded the NORTH and CENTRAL Airfields of OKINAWA. (Heavy Army bombers cooperated in this attack).

6. Six land attack bombers and three ZUIUN reconnaissance seaplanes carried out night attacks on enemy ships off OKINAWA.

7. According to reports received from three land attack bombers and a flying boat out on reconnaissance patrol since 2000 over the EASTERN Waters of the RYUKYU's, 20 ships were located 60 nautical miles southeast of KIKAI. Three land attack planes were ordered out at 0011 of the 16<sup>th</sup> to reconnoiter the area 250 naut. miles off TOI POINT between 130 degrees and 110 degrees.

16 April Clear.

1. Night patrols discovered enemy forces 60 nautical miles southeast of KIKAI. Therefore dawn attack and reconnaissance were ordered for the next morning. At the same time, 12 GINGA Navy bombers and 13 heavy bombers started at 0230 to attack the discovered enemy. However, battle results are unknown.
2. Continuing last night's attack on enemy airfield on OKINAWA, KIKUSUI Operation No. 3 was begun. At 0300, four ZERO fighters and 12 SUISEI fighter planes began their surprise attacks strafing and bombing the NORTH and CENTRAL Airfields on OKINAWA. 250 kg. bombs were dropped on each of the runways, and fires started in seven different places.
3. Four SAIUN reconnaissance planes started at 0543 and located three groups of task forces. Two groups, including four aircraft carriers and one converted carrier were located 50 naut. miles southeast of KIKAI. The other group including one aircraft carrier and two converted carriers was located 100 nautical miles south of KIKAI. Repeated attacks were carried out against the enemy task forces by the entire group, in order to completely exterminate the enemy.
4. 32 SHINDEN fighters started at 0630 to assume air superiority between KIKAI and OSHIMA. At 0830 between KIKAI and AMAMI OSHIMA the fighters encountered 24 enemy F6F's and out of that number 20 enemy planes were brought down. With air superiority attained, the way was now clear to carry out KIKUSUI Operation No. 3 and the annihilation of enemy ships off OKINAWA, and to carry on further, the anti-task force attacks.
5. (1<sup>st</sup> wave) 50 ZERO fighters, four SHINDEN fighters and 30 suicide planes started at 0730 on their attack mission to the southeastern waters of KIKAI. The attack commenced at 1030. (2<sup>nd</sup> wave) 26 ZERO fighters, 20 attack planes, 10 SUISEI carrier bombers and eight GINGA Navy bombers began their attack on the previously mentioned task forces. Between 1200-1400, five GINGA bombers assaulted their target; eight SUISEI bombers and attack planes took after the aircraft carriers; five planes assaulted the battleships, and the three remaining planes assaulted the remaining group.
6. According to reports sent in by two SAIUN reconnaissance planes on patrol over the EASTERN waters of the RUKYUS since 1400, a task force including an aircraft carrier and two converted carriers was located 40 naut. miles southeast of KIKAI, at 1530. Night attack was to be carried out by eight GINGA bombers, 12 heavy bombers and six TENZAN bombers. Between 2100-2030; out of the located task force a battleship and a ship of unknown type were sunk, as well as a battleship set on fire.

7. Between 0600-0700, 52 ZERO fighters, 19 Type 99 carrier bombers, ten Type 97 attack bombers, 20 suicide planes, 12 GINGA bombers, ten TENZAN bombers and six OHKA Bomb planes started off for OKINAWA, in order to assume air supremacy.

Over the NORTHERN Point of OKINAWA the planes encountered enemy fighters. From 0830-1000 the attack units began their attacks on enemy shipping.

The suicide plane unit dove in, hitting an aircraft carrier, a battleship, three ships and two transport's, and an OHKA sank a battleship (cruiser), by a direct hit. (Members of the OKINO ERABU SHIMA outlook post witnessed the sinking of an enemy battleship caused by an OHKA Bomb). Reports brought in by two SAIUN reconnaissance planes which started at 0800 states that they recognized the sinking of a battleship, a cruiser, and four transports off of KATENA.

8. Today, from 1030-1130, enemy carrier planes, (mainly fighters) attacked SOUTHERN KYUSHU, strafing and bombing the airfields. From the afternoon, formations of B-25's and P-51's repeatedly attacked KUSHIBA Base.

This was the first time that enemy planes had approached from the direction of IWO JIMA.

9. Plans have been made to assault the enemy task forces from dusk until dawn tomorrow, and detect enemy positions by employing night reconnaissance. From the three attack bombers and a flying boat sent out on night reconnaissance over the EASTERN waters of the RYUKUS reports were received between 2350 - 0140 as to the detection of two enemy groups. At 0200 (on 17<sup>th</sup>) a large enemy force was detected.

17 April Clear.

1. Following the discovery of the enemy task forces, three ZEROS and 12 SUISEI fighters started off to contact the task force at 0300. However, after patrolling more than 120 nautical miles east of the RYUKUS, no enemy task forces were sighted except for some enemy fighters.

Judging from the recent enemy task force movements, the enemy forces should still be within a radius of 100 nautical miles from a point 70 naut. miles off of NORTHERN OKINAWA. Since this judgment seemed logical, the attack against the task force was conducted without SAUIN reconnaissance.

2. From 0700 62 ZEROS, 15 SUISEI bombers, 30 suicide planes, four GINGA bombers, and 34 SHINDEN fighters (the SHINDEN fighters were employed in order to hold the route of advance and withdrawal clear for the attack units)

started on their attack missions.

From 0920-0940, eight planes were reported to have attacked their targets. The objectives were not mentioned, however, it is quite certain that they directed their attack against the two aircraft carriers and one converted carrier.

3. At 0630 and 1130 three SAUIN reconnaissance planes and an Army 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane located three different groups of enemy forces at 1300 while patrolling the EASTERN waters of the RYUKYU' s.

They were seven ships without carriers; 23 ships including a converted carrier, all approximately 30 nautical miles southeast of KIKAI.

#### 4. Estimate of the Enemy Situation.

- a. Since 7 April, when the enemy task force assaulted our Sea Suicide Unit in one large body, the enemy task force has not advanced NORTHWARD. However, it has been maneuvering along the eastern and southeast waters of OKINAWA, cooperating with the landing operation. Until this time the enemy task forces have suffered heavy losses from our air attack.
- b. Reconnaissance reports received until 16 April revealed that the three groups of task forces consisted three aircraft carriers; two aircraft carriers and a converted carrier; two aircraft carriers and converted carrier respectively. However, according to our Army Type 100 reconnaissance-plane reports for today, it would seem that three aircraft carriers and two converted carriers had been either sunk or damaged in yesterdays attack.
- c. Most likely the enemy task forces for the present have no plans for a NORTHWARD advance to attack KYUSHU. The enemy seems to be mainly concerned with the covering of the landing operation on OKINAWA, making counter attacks and performing patrol work in the frontal area against our attack units,

The enemy task forces are probably maneuvering in the waters 50-100 naut. miles southeast from the NORTHERN Tip of OKINAWA, where landing support may be carried out more easily in order to avoid our attacks

- d. Our forces must jump at this opportunity, before the enemy task forces can recover from their heavy losses. In order to do this, we must strengthen the attack and immediately destroy the crippled enemy force.

5. Although the anti-task force attack had been planned according to the above judgment of the situation, we ran into difficulties in strengthening the attack forces, for no SUISEI bombers or suicide planes were available to the main body of attack strength. Furthermore, we were now lacking in fighter planes.

6. Three land attack bombers and a flying boat started at 2080 to patrol the waters east of the RYUKYUS. The flying boat reported at 0230 that it was being assaulted by the enemy. Since then, no reports were received.

7. The Removal of the 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet from its Operational Mission.

Since the arrival of the 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet at KANOYA, it lost a majority of its strength through aerial attacks carried on against the enemy ships in the OKINAWA Area. Therefore, the 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet was withdrawn from the front lines in order to reorganize its strength for the future and because they lacked the power to continue with the TEN Operation.

18 April      Cloudy - rain later.

1. Since we had no plans for an attack today, the strength and equipment were rechecked and taken care of. However, for securities sake, reconnaissance patrols were sent out toward OKINAWA.

At 0700, three SAUIN reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane started out on reconnaissance patrol over the EASTERN waters of the RYUKYUS, and also over the enemy OKINAWA Anchorage for photographic reconnaissance.

2. Between 0730-0830, approx. 60 B-29's assaulted SOUTHERN KYUSHU bombarding the KANOYA, KASHAHARA, KUSHIRA and the KOKUBU Bases. Each base suffered heavy damages.

We judged that the enemy opened up its B-29 attacks against SOUTHERN KYUSHU with the intention of destroying our bases so that planes could not take off from here to harass the OKINAWA Landing Operation.

The enemy, in a effort to stop the increasing losses and the drawn out maneuvering of the task forces, will probably attempt to replace the task forces with planes from their air bases on OKINAWA and the MARIANAS.

Should the enemy carry out this plan to remove their task forces from the OKINAWA Area, we will miss our chance to deal complete destruction to the task forces.

3. Considering the above situation, plans were drawn for the complete destruction of the remaining task forces along the RYUKYUS, after the adjustment of strength and preparation were completed.

The orders to conduct operations for the complete destruction of the task forces were issued on 20 April.

4. The enemy forces have now landed Armies on OKINAWA, and commenced a general attack from the NORTHERN Front.

19 April Rainy, - clear later

1. Although two SAIUN reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 reconnaissance plane started on patrol at 0900, they were forced to return due to bad weather.

2. Three land attack bombers and a flying boat started out at 2030 to carry out night patrol over the SOUTHERN waters of the RYUKYUS. The flying boat detected several suspicious waves on their radar, which may have been the enemy.

20 April Clear but signs of cloud.

1. Twelve SUISEI bombers and three SAIUN reconnaissance planes started at 0300 and 0700 respectively, to carry out their respective reconnaissance missions. The SUISEIS departed for the SOUTH EASTERN Waters of KIKAI, and the SAIUNS left for the EASTERN Waters of the RYUKYUS. However, no enemy was located.

Although we intend to commence with the general attack by 2<sup>nd</sup> anti-task force, it seems futile since no signs of the enemy were detected during daylight reconnaissance. The enemy task force has probably turned to the high seas to refuel. The enemy task forces will be detected by night reconnaissance tonight.

2. The four land attack bombers and a flying boat which started on reconnaissance patrol along the RYUKYUS after 2000-2030 respectively, detected units of ships, including a battleship, in the waters east of OKINAWA. At 0200, large forces were detected 100 naut. miles east of KIKAI.

21 April Clear.

1. After investigating the enemy forces detected by reconnaissance of the previous night (land attack bombers), we found that it was too far south for us to attack. Furthermore no enemy was found north of the detected enemy position

(50 naut. miles east of OKINAWA), therefore the attack against the task forces was suspended until the following day. (0200).

2. According to intelligence reports from the Naval General Staff, groups of B-29's were seen proceeding northward at about midnight. It may be that the B-29's will attack this area by daybreak. The 1<sup>st</sup> alert was ordered at 0500. At 0630, approx. 280 B-29's approached our area, and continued to bombard USA, KASAHARA and IZUMI with delayed action bombs until 0930.

Our entire force of ZEROS and SHINDEN fighters were sent up to counter-attack the enemy, and as a result four B-29's were shot down.

After chasing the enemy, we were compelled to change our plan for a general attack for tomorrow afternoon, since fighter planes following the aerial combat landed at different airfields. (orders issued at 2017).

3. Reports received from the flying boat on last night's reconnaissance revealed the detection of large enemy forces 100 naut. miles east of KIKAI. Therefore, scarcely had the B-29 attack subsided, when two SAIUN reconnaissance planes started at 1200 to reconnoiter the waters east of the RYUKYUS. Four groups of enemy task forces were immediately located within a radius of 20 naut. miles consisted of four aircraft carriers, two cruiser converted-aircraft carriers, a converted aircraft carrier, six battleships, and two cruisers.

Against the enemy, plans were drawn up for night attacks and reconnaissance.

4. At 2000, three land attack bombers and a flying boat started out on night reconnaissance, while 12 GINGA bombers, 12 heavy bombers, and eight TENZAN carrier bombers started at 2130 on night attack missions. However, (reached the appointed position at approx. 2400) after thorough patrolling, neither the reconnaissance patrols nor the attack units were able to locate the enemy.

5. After the attack on KYUSHU by B-29's on 18 April, another similar bombardment was carried out by the enemy today. The main objective of the B-29's was to destroy our airfields and planes. Not only were the airfields severely damaged, but also our operations were hindered, for the attack planes intended for attack operations had to be sent up in order to counterattack the B-29's. It is extremely necessary that interceptors be sent to KANOYA Airfield, and be maintained there exclusively for counterattacks against the B-29's.

22 April Cloudy.

1. At 0300, eight SUISEI and four ZERO night fighters start on dusk patrol with



the intention of attacking the task forces. However, no enemy was found.

2. Due to the B-29 attack on SOUTHERN KYUSHU from 0730-0800, the departure of the patrol planes was delayed. Two SAIUN reconnaissance planes departed at 1100 and reported at 1346 on the discovery of enemy Naval Forces at 90 naut. miles southeast and 90 nautical miles south of AMAMI OSHIMA.

The air superiority fighter planes which had to be employed again the B-29's landed at separate landing fields, which made it difficult to carry out the anti-task force operation as pre-arranged. However, if the planes could again be reorganized to start by 1430, the operation will commence as planned. The pre-operational outlines and attack orders were issued at 0908.

3. 13 SUISEI carrier bombers and 20 suicide planes started at 1430 to attack the Naval Forces located by the SAIUNS previously. (due to lack of communication from the SAIUN planes we were unable to discover the strength of the Naval task forces). 60 ZERO fighters also started to carry out the air superiority mission at 1430.

The ZEROS encountered 36 enemy F6F's over KAGOSHIMA and southeast of KIKAI, shooting down 11 enemy fighters.

Eight suicide planes and five SUISEI bombers attacked the enemy task forces. The SAIUN reconnaissance plane noticed one unknown type ship afire and on the verge of going under, while other traces of oil were seen in the SOUTHERN and SOUTHEASTERN Waters of OSHIMA.

4. Three land attack bombers and two flying boats carried out night patrols over the waters SOUTHEAST of KYUSHU. At 2300 a large enemy force was located, however attack were suspended due to changes in the weather.

5. The bombing raids being carried on by the enemy B-29<sup>s</sup> over SOUTHERN KYUSHU had relatively great effect on the TEN Operation.

The RAIDEN Units (RAIDEN fighter plane unit) which had been under the Command of the Combined Fleet were transferred to the command of the 5th Air Fleet

6. The Combined Fleet Instructions as to the Principles of the Air Operational Policy.

The Combined Fleet will strongly enforce air operations to obtain the TEN Operational objective by subduing the enemy. At the right moment the strength will be transferred to OKINAWA by ship in order to clear up the situation there.

The following must be executed and completed in order to realize the above plan:

- a. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet and the 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet will cut down their strength as much as possible, in order to strengthen the 1<sup>st</sup> Base Air Operational Force. The TEN Operation will be strongly enforced by the entire air force strength.
- b. It is highly desired that Imp. GHQ reinforce the strength of the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet so they may cooperate in TEN Operation.
- c. Measures will be taken to strengthen the cooperation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Fleet and the Army Air Forces in TAIWAN.

23 April Cloudy.

1. The attacks carried out by B-29's on SOOUTERHN KYUSHU has become more intense and frequent. The damages and losses to our airfield and planes have increased and has had an effect on our operation. Therefore, the land attack bombers which had been based at KANOYA have now been transferred to OITA Airfield. Furthermore, in order to overcome the heavy enemy attacks, a decision was made to employ all of our fighter planes.

The outlines for counterattack were established.

24 April Rather clear:

1. Although two SAIUN reconnaissance planes departed at 0730 to reconnoiter the RYUKYU ISLANDS and the OKINAWA Area, inclement weather prevented them from obtaining any information.

Attacks in the OKINAWA Area were suspended, due to inclement weather.

2. Judgment of Situation.

- a. On 21 April, enemy task forces were located south of KIKAI and on 22 April enemy Naval forces were located south of AMAMI OSHIMA. Attacks were carried out against both of the located enemy forces, however, since that time no enemy intelligence was disclosed.
- b. As for the land battle being carried out in OKINAWA, since the enemy commenced their general attack from the NORTHERN Front on 18 April, our Army has been giving ground, and forced southward. The situation seems quit serious.

- c. Since 30 March, the movements of the enemy rear units in MARIANA and ULITHI turned active. A large Naval force is proceeding northward from the LEYTE Area.
- d. Active attacks cannot be carried out to any extent due to heavy losses suffered by repeated anti-task force attacks and anti-ship attacks in OKINAWA. Furthermore, an inadequate supply of equipment and planes has effected us. The 5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet has received no reinforcements, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet has not yet arrived.
- e. With much conditions prevailing, plans could not be laid out, except to continue night attacks to discourage the enemy.

Hoping for the best, the KIKUSUI Operation No. 4 was planned. (From the 25th to the 29th night attacks were to be continuously carried out against enemy air bases and ships in OKINAWA. On 28 April, a night suicide attack will be enforced against enemy ships in OKINAWA. Simultaneous with these attacks, reconnaissance will be made over the KYUSHU ISLANDS and anti-task force assaults will be carried out). Appropriate orders were issued.

25 April Cloudy.

1. At 0330 four SUIESI and, four ZERO night fighters departed for dawn reconnaissance over the waters SOUTH of KYUSHU. A ZERO night fighter reported the discovery of an aircraft carrier, and attacked it.
2. Two SAIUN reconnaissance planes and an Army Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane started at 0700 to reconnoiter the RYUKYU ISLAND and the OKINAWA ANCHORAGE. However, due to inclement weather they were forced to turn back without gathering any information.
3. A SAIUN reconnaissance plane departed at 1200, to investigate the weather conditions in the EASTERN SEA Area. The weather conditions were found to be bad, making it impossible to carry out the first night attack in accordance with KIKUSUI Operation No. 4.
4. The Study and the Arrangements of the 3<sup>rd</sup> TEN Operation:

Since the OKINAWA Operations began, the enemy task force has been maneuvering about in the OKINAWA Area cooperating in the landing operations. Simultaneously, at times the task force has made attempts to approach and attack the KYUSHU Area. Our patrol planes made efforts to seek out the enemy and our attack units attacked the task forces at every opportunity rendering

severe blows. However, now it would seem as though the task force will move to ULITHI and LEYTE. The reason for this is that the enemy NORTH and CENTRAL Airfields on OKINAWA have now been completely equipped with facilities, making it unnecessary for the task forces to continue to be around. Furthermore, the enemy has now occupied IE SHIMA. The purpose of TEN Operation was to contact and exterminate the enemy task forces when they returned to their former anchorages at ULITHI or LEYTE. As the Naval Gen. Staff and the Combined Fleet Hq. strongly requested the enforcement of TEN Operation a meeting was held to plan and arrange for its execution.

a. The Explanation as to Why the TEN Operation Should be Enforced.

Since commencement of the OKINAWA Operation, the enemy task force has been maneuvering in the OKINAWA Area. Although we made repeated assaults on the enemy task force, we have been unable to completely exterminate them. If the remaining task force is to return to its rear base, we will lose our opportunity to completely exterminate the task force. Thus, it is necessary to open a long range surprise attack upon the enemy at its advance bases, in order to carry out our plans. If we are to complete this mission, it will enable us to prevent or delay the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of the operation which the enemy is certain to carryout.

b. The Enforcement of the 3<sup>rd</sup> TEN Operation will be Difficult.

Although we fully understand the reasons for enforcing the TEN Operation, there are many difficulties which must be straightened out before it can be executed.

1). In comparing the personnel who had carried out the 2<sup>nd</sup> TEN Operation with the 3<sup>rd</sup> TEN Operation personnel there are signs of further decrease in efficiency and strength. This raises the question as to whether the long range offensive can be executed.

2). The main cause for the failure in the 2<sup>nd</sup> TEN Operation were in the mechanism and the performance of the GINGA Navy bomber's (FRANCES 11) motor. However, even now we have our doubts as to whether the engines have been fully improved or not.

3). In order to carry out the OKINAWA Operation, if we approach the enemy directly from SOUTHERN KYUSHU, our approach will be easily detected, which will mean encountering enemy counterattacks.

c. After studying the difficult situation, we decided to choose 12 planes and personnel from the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Fleets, and put them under the

command of the 4<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet Command. The date of commencement for the attack will be the first part of May, and our jumping off base will be TRUK. (The advance will be from KISARAZU-MINAMI TORISHIMA TRUK). In addition to the above mentioned, two SAIUN reconnaissance planes will be taken from the 11<sup>th</sup> Air Reconnaissance Unit and the base personnel for TRUK will be transported by a flying boat belonging to the TAKUMA Unit.

26 April Raining.

1. From 0700-1100, approx. 100 B-29's assaulted KYUSHU, maneuvering above the clouds due to the bad weather conditions.

1. Inclement weather prevented us from carrying out our attacks.

27 April Clear.

1. From 0300, six ZERO and six SUISEI night fighters carried out dawn patrol in order to attack enemy task forces. However, no enemy was sighted.

2. Two SAIUNS departed for reconnaissance duty over the waters east of the RYUKYUS, and also for photographic reconnaissance over OKINAWA. However no enemy was discovered.

3. From 0810-1000, approx. 70 B-29's assaulted SOUTHERN KYUSHU, bombing each airfield with delayed action bombs.

4. KIKUSUI Operation No. 4 was ordered as taking effect tomorrow. (anti-task force attack and the attack against the ships in OKINAWA).

Since 25 April, the weather conditions prevented the continuation of night attacks. However, as soon as the weather clears up the prearranged night attacks will begin.

5. Four ZUIUN reconnaissance planes, six land attack bombers, five heavy bombers and four TENZAN carrier bombers carried out night attacks against enemy ships in the OKINAWA Area.

A converted aircraft carrier, a large type ship, and a cruiser were recognized as having been hit by torpedoes. However, other results were unknown due to smoke screens.

6. Since 2000, four land attack bombers and a flying boat started on reconnaissance missions. The flying boat encountered enemy fighters, and at 0300, the

flying boat detected signs of a submarine.

7. Since 2000, eight ZERO and 20 SUISEI night fighters strafed and bombed the NORTH and CENTRAL Airfields on OKINAWA, and IE SHIMA Airfields. Fire sprang up in four different places.

28 April Clear.

1. The three SAIUN reconnaissance planes which started out at 0630 on reconnaissance patrol duty over the area southeast and southwest of the RYUKYU ISLANDS discovered enemy task forces including four aircraft carriers 100 naut. miles east of the NORTHERN Point of OKINAWA. Therefore, dusk and day attacks against the enemy were ordered to be continued.

2. Approx. 130 B-29's assaulted SOUTHERN KYUSHU at 0830. The damage received at the MIYAZAKI Airfields were very severe. (Hangars were hit by bombs destroying more than ten GINGA bombers).

3. Since the two SAIUNS on reconnaissance duty from 1046 reported that task forces were seen proceeding SOUTHWARD, the task force attacks were suspended. Now the entire strength was turned upon the ships in OKINAWA.

4. From 1830-1900, 26 ZEROS were sent up to gain air superiority, and eight Type 97 carrier attack bombers, 20 Type 99 carriers bombers, seven TENZAN bombers, and four OHKA planes for suicide attacks at dusk. Reports were received from the suicide planes, stating that they crash dived directly into an aircraft carrier, battleship, transport, and a ship of unknown type. A destroyer was hit by a torpedo. An OHKA bomb plane reported that it was starting for its objective. (Other planes saw a cruiser blown up). Six ZEROS and 12 SUISEIS commenced their attacks on the airfields in OKINAWA from 2300 until dawn. Four places of the CENTRAL Airfield were on fire.

5. Six each of GINGA bombers, heavy bombers, and TEANZAN planes attacked ships off OKINAWA. However, the results were unknown.

6. Four attack bombers started at 2000 to patrol the waters EAST of the RYUKYU ISLANDS. One plane radioed that it was being followed by enemy planes. Since then the planes could not be accounted for.

29 April Clear.

1. According to intelligence reports at 2400, B-29's were approaching our base. From 0700-0930, a hundred B-29's approached the SOUTHERN KYUSHU Area. (Out of this number, 50 B-29's assaulted the KANOYA Area, 70 ZEROS and 15

RAIDEN fighters encountered the B-29's, bringing down three of them and damaging seven).

2. The two SAIUNS which started at 0600 for dawn patrol reported the discovery of two large task forces proceeding northward, 70 naut. miles east of the NORTHERN tips of OKINAWA at 0840. The two task forces consisted of three aircraft carriers, two converted into carriers, two battleships, five cruisers and ten or more other ships; an aircraft carrier, one cruiser converted into a carrier, and ten or more other ships respectively. Attacks were enforced on the two task forces.

3. Since we lost a large number of ZEROS in counterattacking the B-29's, Army planes were employed. At 1800, 13 ZEROS and 12 Army fighters started out to gain the air superiority; 33 suicide attack planes started on their suicide mission, and one SAIUN reconnaissance plane started out to observe the results of our attack. At 1745 the attack was begun. Eight planes crashed dived enemy aircraft carriers, and 11 others on other ships. At 1710, the observation reconnaissance plane saw two attack planes diving on a cruiser.

4. Eight GINGA bombers, nine heavy bombers, and six TENZAN bombers carrying out night attack against enemy ships in OKINAWA making direct hits with torpedoes on an enemy battleship east of OKINAWA, and sank another cruiser.

Four ZEROS and 12 SUISEI bombers started at 2000 and from midnight till dawn carried out attacks on enemy airfields in OKINAWA. IE SHIMA Airfield was on fire.

5. No enemy was located in the night reconnaissance of the area east of the RYUKYUS by four land attack bombers.

30 April Clear

1. A land based bomber unit (951<sup>st</sup> Unit) at the OMURA Air Base received a report at 0445 that an enemy task force with one carrier had been sighted 100 miles west northwest of OMURA.

The two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN Carrier based recon. planes) which searched for the above mentioned task force in the eastern sea area were unable to locate this group.

2. Since the two MYRT 11's which sighted enemy ships in the area east of the RYUKYU ISLANDS were pursued by enemy fighters, they were unable to determine the strength of this group.

A daylight attack was not made against the three standard and two light converted enemy carriers which were sighted by one of our Type 100 Hq. recon. planes (DINAH), 70 miles south of OSHIMA ISLAND, at 1120 because our fighter unit, whose strength was too small to engage this enemy alone, was unable to secure the aid of an Army fighter unit.

A night attack was not made against this enemy force due to unfavorable weather conditions.

3. One land based bomber investigated the weather conditions in the EASTERN SEA Area at night.

4. Hq. in TOKYO reported that the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army will commence attacking in force in the SOUTHERN Area on 4 May.

Orders for the organization of the units and operational instructions (attacks will be conducted against enemy warehouses, airfields and patrol boats) were issued in preparation for Operation KIKUSUI No. 5 scheduled to commence on 3 May.

5. Estimation of the Situation.

a. Enemy Situation.

- 1). From three to five groups (with from 10 to 15 standard and converted carriers) of an enemy task force, which have been active in the area east and west of the RYUKYU ISLANDS, attempted to attack the KYUSHU Area several times during mid-April.

During the latter part of April from one to two groups (with from three to five standard and converted carriers) of an enemy task force were active in the region from 50 to 169 miles east of the northern point of OKI NAWA.

There has been no indication that the above enemy group is planning to start a new operation.

- 2). More than 100 B-29's from the MARIANAS have bombed (delayed bombs) our air bases on SOUTHERN KYUSHU daily since mid-April.
- 3). It has been observed that the enemy ships which arrived in the MARIANAS have been quite active during the latter part of April.

It was learned from an intercepted enemy communique that a powerful enemy group had arrived in the vicinity south of OKINAWA on approximately the 24<sup>th</sup>.



4). The number of enemy ships which have been anchored within the RYUKYU ISLAND seems to have decreased.

5). The enemy force that landed on OKINAWA has been advancing southward.

b. Estimation.

- 1). Our estimations are that since the land operation on OKINAWA had progressed considerably and airfields have established on the island, the enemy task force has requested that the air force on OKINAWA take charge of the operation. It is believed that the task force asked a B-29 unit to attack the KYUSHU Area.

It is believed that the main body of the above mentioned task force is returning to its advance base and that a part of it is, at present, patrolling the area around the RYUKYU ISLAND.

- 2). It is believed that the first group of transports of an enemy assault group is returning to the LEYTE Area and that a second group is advancing toward the RYUKYU ISLAND.

c. Countermeasures.

- 1). In attacking an enemy task force, it is important that the TEN Tactic (the strategy is to annihilate the enemy task force at its advance base) be employed. Planes at our air bases in the KYUSHU Area will be utilized in attacking the enemy task force anchored around OKINAWA.
- 2). The entire force will be employed in attacking enemy transports in the vicinity of OKINAWA.

1 May Rain

1. An order to take the first precautionary measure was issued at 0400 when it was learned from an intercepted enemy communiqué that B-29's had left their base in TINIAN at about 2300 last night. However, due to the rain, only a few B-29's appeared.

2. It rained all day.

2 May Rain- cloudy

1. With the clearing of the weather, two MYRT 11's reconnoitered the area east of the RYUKYU ISLAND.

2. An attack was made against the enemy bases and ships anchored in the vicinity of OKINAWA prior to Operation KIKUSUI No. 5. During the attack, six FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bombers), 11 heavy bombers and four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN attack bomber) sank one enemy cruiser and several transports. Damages sustained by the six land based bombers, which attacked the enemy airfields on OKINAWA, are unknown.

3. The following results were submitted by the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army stationed on OKINAWA.

a. The following results were obtained from 1 to 28 April.

Casualties --- 18,300

Destroyed---- 100 planes, 300 tanks, 80 cars and 40 trench mortars.

Burned ---- 60 barracks.

b. The first and the major part of the second echelon, which is the main echelon, have surrendered to the enemy. A decisive attack was planned for the purpose of delaying the enemy's operation for approximately a month.

c. The above operation, scheduled to commence at dawn on 4 May will be directed against the enemy's right flank. The enemy (24<sup>th</sup> Div.) is situated in the area south of the line running east and west through FUTEN.

4. The situation on OKINAWA, at present, is such that our forces will be annihilated if a counter attack is not carried out.

Together with the commencement of Operation KIKUSUI No. 5, the Naval Air Force will assist the Army in the counterattack. The FORMOSAN Army will also participate in this operation.

3 May Cloudy- clear

1. One SUISEI type night fighter took off at 0300 to attack enemy an airfield on OKINAWA.

2. One B-29 was shot down by the 50 ZERO fighters and 20 JACK 11's (Navy RAIDEN fighter) which counterattacked the B-29's (approx. 60) that bombed the KASAHARA, KANOYA and KOKUBU Air Bases on SOUTHERN KYUSHU at 1330.

2. Since the weather had cleared, Operation KIKUSUI No. 5 which was scheduled to be commenced on X day was definitely set for the was carried out

this evening.

4. Immediately after the four land based bombers which were scheduled to patrol the area around the RYUKYU ISLAND at night landed on KANOYA Air Base they were attacked and damaged by three B-24's. No reports were received after 0100 from the seaplane which took off at 2004 patrol the area east of the RYUKYU ISLAND .

5. The six land-based bombers, six FRANCES 11's, eight heavy bombers and 20 JILL 12's which attacked enemy cruisers and transports anchored in NAKAG-USUKU BAY and heavy transports off KADENO sank one cruiser and several other ships unknown types and sighted several columns of flames.

4 May Clear

1. Operation KIKUSUI No. 5 was commenced immediately after the attack last night.

2. Two installations on the northern airfield were burned by eight SUISEI type night fighters which attacked the enemy's northern and central airfields.

The nine land-based bombers and four PAUL 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. sea-plane) which took off at 0330 attacked enemy warehouses on OKINAWA.

3. False radio waves were transmitted to the vicinity of OKINAWA by three MYRT 11's and one Type 100 Hq. recon. plane (DINAH) for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.

Three enemy planes were shot down by 35 GEORGE 11's (Navy SHIDEN fighter) and 15 Army fighters which patrolled the area of the KIKAI and OSHIMA ISLANDS.

Forty-eight ZERO fighters and 35 Army fighters encountered enemy planes while flying over the enemy sea bases around OKINAWA and shot down 23 planes. Twenty-one heavy fighters attacked enemy patrol boats around OKINAWA.

From 0830 to 0900, two battleships, three cruisers, one destroyer and 21 transports anchored in the vicinity of OKINAWA were crippled by twenty of our heavy fighters, seven SAKURA NO HANA'S, seven carrier-based bombers, ten KATE Type 97 torpedo bombers and 28 recon. seaplanes. Four of the seven reported that they sank one battleship and a cruiser.

The observation post at OKINOERABU reported that they observed two enemy battleships, three cruisers and five other ships sinking at 0915 on the 4th.

Our land force on OKINAWA observed three enemy destroyers or cruisers sinking and one battleship burning at 0900 on 4 May.

4. Three land attack planes reconnoitered the area east of the RYUKYU ISLAND at night.

5. The 32<sup>nd</sup> Army reported at 1110 on 4 May that the enemy force to their immediate right front had faltered and that the firing from the enemy had slackened considerably.

In order to further assist the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army, the air unit participating in Operation KIKUSUI No. 5 was ordered to continue attacking this enemy force.

Because of unfavorable weather, the six FRANCES 11's, seven heavy bombers and seven JILL 12's which took off to attack enemy ships around OKINAWA were unable to carry out their mission.

6. Since there were indications of an enemy task force advancing north to counterattack Operation KIKUSUI No. 5, an order (the 11<sup>th</sup> Air Unit will scout for this task force at dawn; special assault units and fighter units will prepare to take actions against this force) was issued on 6 May to attack this task force.

5 May Clear

1. At 0230, six SUISEI night fighters took off to attack enemy airfields on OKINAWA.

2. Two of the three MYRT 11's that took off at 0630 to reconnoiter the area east of the RYUKYU ISLAND were not able to accomplish their mission due to mechanical trouble.

The order to attack the above mentioned task force was cancelled.

3. Seven heavy bombers and six FRANCES 11's sank one enemy battleship, crippled two and damaged several other ships anchored in the vicinity of OKINAWA.

Of the four land assault planes which took off to attack airfields on OKINAWA, two attacked the enemy's northern and central airfields.

4. Our estimations are that the main body of the enemy task force returned to

the ULITHI Area during the latter part of April, that the task force now active in the area east of KAKI ISLAND is a BRITISH task force and that the task force active in the area east of OKINAWA is a part of a U.S. task force.

Since it was predicted that the weather for the next few days would be favorable for making an attack against enemy ships in the vicinity of ULITHI, the 4<sup>th</sup> MITATE Unit which had been advancing toward the KANOYA Airfield since 4 May was ordered to carry out the 3<sup>rd</sup> TEN Operation on 7 May (the 4<sup>th</sup> MITATE unit was organized at KISARAZU on 1 May and they were scheduled to advance to TRUK, but since the enemy had learned of this plan and had made several attacks on TRUK and MINAMIDAITO ISLAND after the 30<sup>th</sup>, the unit was ordered to report to KANOYA).

6 May Clear

1. The six SUISEI night fighters which took off at 0300, bombed and burned 18 installations on the northern airfield and four installations on the central airfield.
2. Since the two MYRT 11's encountered enemy planes twice returning from a reconnaissance mission (reconnoitering the course to be taken in Operation TEN) in the vicinity of CAPE TOI, it is believed that our assault units will be easily detected by the enemy while advancing toward their objective. (Operation TEN)
3. It was assumed from an intercepted enemy communique and the number of enemy planes which appeared over the SOUTHWESTERN ISLANDS Area, that an enemy task force was, at present, active in the area east of the RYUKYU ISLAND.
4. Eight FRANCES 11's, 17 heavy bombers and six land assault planes reported that they sank one ship and crippled another in the vicinity of OKINAWA.
5. The 32<sup>nd</sup> Army reported that since almost all of their strength had been exhausted in the drive which had progressed as far as Northern YANAHARA, they had ceased all offensive operations at 1800 on 5 May and retreated to their former position.
6. The situation on OKINAWA is believed to be hopeless. Since the date for commencing Operation KIKUSUI No. 6 was definitely set for 8 May, the principal points (attack the enemy carrier groups if the situation seems favorable; continue attacks against enemy ships and airfields around OKINAWA) of the operational plans were explained.

7 May Clear-cloudy

1. Eight SUISEI night fighters took off at 0345 to attack an enemy task force which had advanced to the area southeast of KYUSHU (distance covered was 250 miles).
2. Two MYRT 11's and one Type 100 Hq. recon. plane took off at 0700 to reconnoiter the RYUKYU ISLAND and the area east of OKINAWA.
3. Operation TEN was carried out as it had been scheduled. Prior to the attack by the assault group two seaplanes from the WABIMA Airfield investigated the weather conditions along the course to be taken in Operation TEN.

The investigation covered the area as far as OKINOTORI ISLAND.

Two seaplanes took off from KANOYA Air Base at 0200 to clear the route (of enemy submarines) to be taken by our assault group in Operation TEN.

Five of the 24 planes were unable to make the scheduled flight at 0645 because of mechanical difficulties. Shortly after the take off, one plane crashed. Six of those which made the flight returned before reaching their destination.

The above assault group was forced to break formation because of rough weather. Ten planes returned to KANOYA Air Base, six of them in formation and the remaining four independently.

#### 4. Reasons for the failure of Operation TEN.

- a. Members of the assault group which was organized on 1 May 1 were improperly trained for this operation.
- b. The major part of the assault group was composed of inexperienced men.
- c. Use of faulty planes in the operation.
- d. Unfavorable weather along the planned course.

It appears as though great difficulties will be met by the inexperienced men in conducting long range attacks.

5. Results obtained by the six FRANCES 11's, 12 heavy bombers and four JILL 12's which attacked enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA are unknown.

8 May Cloudy-light drizzle.

1. Two MYRT 11's took off at 0700 to reconnoiter the area east of the RYUKYU ISLAND.
2. One carrier was damaged by six FRANCES 11's and six heavy bombers which attacked the enemy ships around OKINAWA.
3. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Force sent his colors to KANOYA Airfield at 1769.
4. Estimation of the Situation.
  - a. Despite heavy damages inflicted on the enemy force on OKINAWA during a period of 50 days, the enemy has been steadily advancing and strengthening their position. Airfields on the island have been repaired, and at present there are several B-29's and over 200 light planes on the northern and central airfields. The enemy has completed constructing a runway on the airfield on IEKO ISLAND.

It was believed that the main body of the enemy task force had returned to the vicinity of ULTTHI. The number of enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA has decreased considerably.

- b. The following assumptions were made in accordance with the above mentioned situations.
  - 1). Since it appears as though the enemy has an optimistic viewpoint on the outcome of the land operation on OKINAWA, it is assumed that an attempt will be made to annihilate our entire land force on the island.
  - 2). It is believed that the enemy will either reinforce or relieve their present force and transport equipment and supplies to the island to carry out this operation and to prepare for future operations.
  - 3). It is assumed that after the construction of airbases on OKINAWA has been completed, the enemy land force will not ask for assistance from the task force and the task force will return to it's advance base to prepare for the coming operation.
  - 4). It is also believed that upon completion of the air bases on OKINAWA, the enemy air unit assigned to this air base will attack KYUSHU in cooperation with a task force or the air unit stationed on the MARIANNAS.
- c. Countermeasures.

- 1). The air unit will annihilate the enemy task force at the advance base (Operation TEN).
- 2). A thorough investigation of the enemy situation will be made in order to be prepared to attack the enemy task force in force when it appears.
- 3). Repeated attacks will be made against enemy ships and airbases around OKINAWA by our air unit in order to weaken the enemy force on the island.

In conducting Operation TEN, the Army will employ the entire strength of their air force. The TEN Operational plan was drawn up by the Army to assist the Navy in their Operation TEN.

4). Our forces, conducting operations against enemy task forces and the land force on OKINAWA, will be reinforced. When a favorable opportunity arises, our forces will endeavor to regain OKINAWA.

9 May Clear

Although the weather cleared, attacks were not carried out because of the fact that only one MYRT 11 was available.

The following were decided upon at a conference by the officers of the air units and the staff officers of the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force.

1. Operation TEN No. 3

a. Necessary preparations for Operation TEN No. 3 will be completed by 12 May.

If it is learned after our air unit in the SOUTH PACIFIC reconnoiters the ULITHI Area that the enemy task force, which is believed to be in this area, has left, Operation TEN No. 3 will be postponed until the enemy task force in the vicinity of OKINAWA returns to ULITHI.

b. The 801<sup>st</sup> Naval Air Unit will investigate the weather condition in the area south of OKINAWA prior to the commencement of Operation TEN No. 3.

c. The air unit at SAEKI will clear the sea of enemy submarines in the area south of KYUSHU in the morning on the day Operation TEN No. 3 is to be commenced.



2. Operational Instructions for Operation KIKUSUI No. 6.

a. Reinforcement of the Fighter Units.

The strength of our fighter unit had decreased considerably since only a few ZERO fighters are in flying condition and a large number of GEORGE 11's (Navy SHIDEN fighter) have crashed immediately after the take off because of faulty mechanisms and flimsy construction.

Since we cannot expect immediate assistance from the Army fighter unit, a part of the heavy fighters will be transferred to the above mentioned fighter unit to newly organize the 13<sup>th</sup> Fighter Unit.

b. Attacks Against Small Enemy Ships.

The attacks against enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA will be made more frequently in order to facilitate our landing on OKINAWA. Since a large number of the planes of the 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet assigned to the fighter unit, which participated in Operation KIKUSUI No. 5, were destroyed, we are assuming that in the coming operations, the main body of this fighter unit will be composed of Army fighters.

Hereafter, the SHIGARIKU trainers and recon. seaplanes will be withheld so that they will be available for the operations to be conducted during the moonlit nights next month.

- c. Since it is believed that if the above mentioned ships are attacked an enemy task force will advance north to give assistance, 60 special light attack planes will be readied to attack the task force.
- c. The attacks against small enemy ships will be carried out in force during May to facilitate the landing operation of our force.

Two divisions will land after the airborne unit alight on the enemy's northern and central airfields.


Our air unit at SAEKI will clear the sea of enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA.

10 May Clear

1. It is believed that an enemy task force will not appear in the vicinity of the

SOUTHWESTERN ISLANDS since only a few enemy planes have been sighted in this area. However, if and when an enemy task force should appear in this area, it will be attacked in order to facilitate Operation KIKUSUI No. 6 which is scheduled to commence on 11 May.

The two MYRT 11's and one Type 100 Hq. recon. plane which took off between 0500 and 0630 sighted three groups of ships of an enemy task force at 0930 at the following points.



11 May Cloudy – rain

1. The four land assault planes of the 801st Unit, which took off at 2300 on 10 May in search of the enemy in

Two other MYRT 11's reported that one of the above groups was advancing south. Two MYRT 11's of the second wave, took off to locate the other two groups. An attack was not made because it was later learned that the point at which these ships were last sighted was as yet too far south for an attack. Simultaneously, with the commencement of Operation KIKUSUI No. 6, this task force will be attacked.

2, Operation KIKUSUI No. 6 which was scheduled to be commenced on X day was definitely set for 11 May. Operational instructions were issued.

3. Five night fighters of the FUYO Unit reconnoitered the CAPE SADA, KURD ISLAND and IWO ISLAND Areas at night.

4. The following instructions were issued to the 32<sup>nd</sup> Army on OKINAWA by the Combined Command.

The attacks against enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA by the entire force of the combined fleet will be intensified, Advance airbases will be established on the KIKAI and SAKI ISLANDS for the purposes of annihilating enemy transports in the vicinity of these two islands.

The Combined Command's plan is to transport the personnel on destroyers for the initial landing operation on OKINAWA. This operation is scheduled to be commenced in the very near future. The 32<sup>nd</sup> Army is expected to continue their operation on OKINAWA.

11 May Cloudy - rain

the area southeast of OKINAWA located a large group of enemy ships at a point, between 103 degrees and 115 degrees, 100 miles off the southern Point of OKINAWA at 0211, on 11 May. They were unable to obtain further information because they were pursued by enemy night fighters.

The three MRYT 11's which took off between 0510 and 0700 to search for the above mentioned enemy ships reported that they saw one group of an enemy task force with 2 standard carriers 80 miles south of KIKA ISLAND at 0850 and another group of enemy ships at a point, 100 degrees, 80 miles off the southern point of OKINAWA at 0900.

Eighteen JUDY 11's and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier-borne bombers) of the KOKUBU Air Unit and 30 heavy fighters of the 721<sup>st</sup> Air Unit were ordered to prepare to attack the above mentioned enemy groups. Twenty-six of the 30 heavy fighters of the 721<sup>st</sup> Air Unit took off between 0604 and 0707 and attacked one group of an enemy task force at approximately 0950.

It was reported by the above mentioned 26 fighters that three planes succeeded in attacking enemy carriers and three more succeeded in attacking cruisers. No definite report of the results obtained by the remaining planes have been received. It is believed that a large part of these planes succeeded in making suicide attacks.

The previously mentioned 18 JUDY 11's and 12's were assembled at the 2<sup>nd</sup> KOKUBU Airfield, but another group of planes crashed into the midst of the 18 bombers immediately after taking off. The explosion of the bombs attached to the JUDY 11's and 12's damaged the following; two ZERO fighters, eight JUDY 11's and 12's and seven Type 99 dive bombers (VAL 22). The scheduled attack against enemy ships by the eighteen JUDY 11's and 12's was cancelled due to this mishap.

2. Operation KIKUSUI No. 6 was carried out as scheduled.

The 14 land assault planes, six PAUL 11's and 10 SUISEI Type night fighters bombed nine installations on the enemy's northern airfield and the runway of the central airfield. The two SAKURA NO HANA'S which had taken off along with these planes returned after having flown halfway.

The 13 FRANCES 11's and heavy bombers of the 762<sup>nd</sup> Air Unit which had taken off from MIYAZAKI Airfield at 2300 on 10 May to attack enemy ships around OKINAWA were unable to obtain satisfactory results due to unfavorable weather conditions.

The 65 ZERO fighters, eight KYOKKOS, five carrier-based fighters, two recon-

naissance seaplanes, 10 JILL 12's, four SAKURA NO HANA'S and heavy fighters which attacked enemy patrol boats took off from their respective air bases at 0530 and reached their target at approximately 0830. Four (two KYOKKOS and two carrier-borne fighters) planes attacked enemy carriers, two (one KYOKKO and an carrier-borne attack plane) attacked enemy ships (type unknown) and one [incomplete] attacked an enemy carrier with torpedoes. A SAKURA NO HANA was reported to have attacked an enemy ship.

Seven of the four heavy bombers, 15 Type 4 fighters and 36 special assault planes of the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force were reported to have successfully attacked enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA (the observation point on TOKUNO ISLAND reported that they observed two enemy ships of an unknown type at a position near TORI ISLAND).

From an intercepted enemy communique, it was learned that 60 enemy night fighters and 75 fighters attacked our above mentioned planes at midnight and at dawn, respectively. Our estimations were that approximately 40 of our planes were shot down while flying toward their target. It is vitally important that these planes be replaced for Operation TEN.

According to an enemy communique two (CALLOURS, SISSER KATE [unknown meaning]) of the 12 enemy ships which were attacked by our planes suffered severe damages and one of the two ships had sunk later on. The other had to be towed. It was also learned from this communique that the SEAWELL and OLD IRONSIDES were also damaged.

3. Aside from the SHIRAGIKU training planes, all other planes were utilized for the above mentioned operation and it was requested that Army fighters be assigned to this air unit as replacements.

12 May Clear

1. The 10 SUISEI night fighters and two ZERO night fighters which took off at 0300 to search for the enemy in the area south of KYUSHU attacked and crippled enemy submarines at a point, 130 degrees, 20 miles off SUWASE ISLAND.

2. When it was reported that one enemy cruiser, two destroyers and four mine-sweepers were sighted at a position near TAKARA ISLAND, two MYRT 11's and seven JUDY 11's and 12's patrolled this area. It was later learned that it was not TAKARA ISLAND but KIKA ISLAND).

3. It was believed that communication between a flagship of an enemy task force, which left ULITHI, and their base in the MARIANNAS had been active during the

10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> of May. Since it was believed that the weather would be unfavorable for conducting Operation TEN No. 3, it was requested that this operation be postponed and an attack be made against the enemy task force when it appears in the vicinity of OKINAWA.

4. Since the MYRT 11 which took off at 1030 from the SOUTH PACIFIC Area reported that they sighted, only two converted carriers of the CASABLANCA type and three battleships at ULITHI (these ships were spotted from an altitude of 9,000 meters), it was definitely known that the main body of the enemy task force had left ULITHI. Operation TEN was postponed.

Since more than 10 enemy night fighters appeared over Southern KYUSHU and kept our planes from taking off, it was assumed that an enemy task force had advanced to the vicinity of our Homeland. Orders to attack this task force on 13 May were issued.

13 May Clear

1. The scheduled night attack was cancelled since enemy planes kept our planes from taking off all night. Although enemy GRUMMAN planes equipped with light bombs and radar had frequently attacked the KANOYA and MAZAKI Airfields, no great losses were suffered.

One MYRT 11 of the FUYO Air Unit was ordered to reconnoiter the above area. In order to take the 2<sup>nd</sup> precautionary measure at dawn against a possible enemy air raid was issued since it was believed that an enemy task force was in this area. An order was issued to prepare for an operation employing the first tactic.

2. Four enemy carriers and five destroyers were sighted by a SUISEI night fighter, which took off at 0450, at a point, between 130 degrees to 140 degrees, 130 miles off CAPE SAGA. One of the three MYRT 11's which took off at 0450 reported that they sighted enemy ships at a point, 152 degrees, 70 miles off CAPE TOI.

A seaplane of the 951<sup>st</sup> Air Unit, stationed in IBUSUKI, reported that they located two groups of an enemy task force at a position, 150 degrees, 180 miles off CAPE TOI at 0330.

3. While we were preparing to take precautionary measures, enemy carrier planes attacked SOUTHERN KYUSHU (KANOYA, KAGOSHIMA, TOMITA, KUMAMOTO, IZUMI, OITA and SAEKI) in three waves after 0500.

1st wave - 300 planes - 0622 to 0800

2nd wave - 220 planes - 1120 to 1300  
Between the 1st and 2nd wave - approx. 20 planes.  
3rd wave - approx. 100 planes - 1430 to 1520

Because of mechanical difficulties, two MYRT 11's which took off at 1330 returned without carrying out their mission.

Two GEORGE 11's sighted two groups of an enemy task force with three standard carriers at a point, 148 degrees, 100 miles off CAPE TOI. The entire force in the SOUTHERN KYUSHU Area were ordered to attack these two groups by employing the first tactic. Contact planes will report to the MIO and WABIMA Airfields, and the night assault unit will assemble at OITA Airfield prior to the attacks against these two groups.

4. An enemy task force was sighted at 2140 by the contact seaplane which left WABIMA Airfield at 2000.

A contact land assault plane, which took off from MIO Airfield at 2000, located groups of enemy ships at the following points off CAPE TOI.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Location</u>
2140	107 degrees, 120 miles
2305	135 degrees, 260 miles
2325	118 degrees, 30 miles
0130	156 degrees, 140 miles

1. An order to commence the operation employing the first tactic was issued at 1702 on 13 May.

Twelve heavy bombers and five FRANCES 11's of the 762<sup>nd</sup> Air Unit took off between 0330 and 0430 to attack the enemy task force sighted by one of our contact planes. Six of the above mentioned bombers attacked this task force at a point, 132 degrees, 110 miles off CAPE TOI.

2. Eight SUISEI night fighters of the FUYO Air Unit reconnoitered the area between 90 and 150 miles off KANOYA.

3. Fifty-four fighters and 28 heavy fighters took off between 0600 and 0630 to attack an enemy task force. Part of the 54 fighters engaged enemy planes over SOUTHERN KYUSHU while 13 continued toward their objective. Five heavy fighters attacked enemy carriers and one heavy fighter attacked another enemy ship. One fighter verified that one enemy carrier had been crippled.

4. Seven MYRT 11's and one GEORGE 11 were ordered to locate the enemy and confirm the reports of the results obtained in the above mentioned attack. One of the seven MYRT 11's which took off at dawn sighted an enemy group (ships) 60 miles east of CAPE TOI but were unable to determine its strength. After 1510, six other MYRT 11's reported that they sighted an enemy task force at a point, 120 degrees, 140 miles off CAPE TOI and an enemy group was reported to have been sighted at 1650.

5. Fifteen FRANCES 11's of the 706<sup>th</sup> Air Unit and 13 JUDY 11's and 12's and 35 ZERO fighters of the 701<sup>st</sup> Air Unit, which were scheduled to participate in Operation TEN, were ordered to attack an enemy task force at night with the assistance of Army fighters. This attack was cancelled because 25 enemy fighters staged a surprise attack immediately after our planes had taken off.

The following Order of Battle No. 28 and instructions on the utilization of FRANCES 11's of the 762<sup>nd</sup> Air Unit (4<sup>th</sup> MITATE Air Unit ) were sent to our air unit by the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Base Unit Hq. at KANOYA.

- a. It is estimated from the activities of the enemy task force in the KYUSHU Area and in the vicinity of OKINAWA that an opportunity to carry out Operation TEN will come within the next few days.
- b. An order to employ the entire strength of the Naval Air Unit in carrying out Operation TEN was issued by the Joint Naval-Command.
- c. The following instructions will be adhered to by each air unit.

- 1). TEN Air Unit

The entire strength of the TEN Air Unit (including the force which is scheduled to participate in Operation TEN) will participate in attacks against enemy task forces in the neighboring areas.

- 2). 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force

A part of the air force will assist in attacks against enemy task forces.

For purposes of facilitating the land operation on OKINAWA, the main body will carry out attacks against enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA.

- 3). 5<sup>th</sup> Air Base unit

This unit will continue to operate in accordance with the instructions in

the Order of Battle No. 122 issued by the 5<sup>th</sup> TERRITORIAL Air Force.

6. Enemy carrier planes appeared over NORTHERN and SOUTHERN KYUSHU and the SHIKOKU Area after 0500. An intercepted enemy communique disclosed that the enemy had ordered their planes to fly to the area north of MIYAKONOJO.

7. Since it was believed that it would rain tonight, scheduled attacks and reconnaissances were cancelled.

#### Reasons for Our Failure in Attacking the Enemy Task Force.

a. An Estimate of the Situation.

After it was reported that enemy task force had left its base on 10 May we assumed that this task force would advance to the vicinity of OKINAWA and would not appear in the KYUSHU Area during the preparational period for Operation TEN No. 3. However, these beliefs were later proven to have been wrong.

b. Shortage of Air Strength.

Since a large number of our planes had been expended in Operation KIKUSUI No. 6, carried out on 11 May, only 30 JUDY 11's and 12's were available for this attack. The assault group in the MIO Area was not prepared to participate in this attack on 14 May.

c. Sufficient information on the enemy situation was not obtained because of the lack of reconnaissance planes.

d. Shortage of Fighter Planes.

Because of the lack of fighter planes, they were only utilized for engagements over our own bases.

e. Changes in the Enemy tactics.

The enemy task force, which attacked in force in the operation from 17 to 21 March, changed its tactic and attacked the air bases in SOUTHERN KYUSHU during 12 and 13 May and then attacked NORTHERN KYUSHU and the SHIKOKU

f. Counteractions.



1). Reorganization of Our Air Bases.

Air bases in the southern area were transferred to the northern area because of damages suffered from successive B-29 raids during the latter part of April.

Reconnaissance and assault planes will be stationed at each air base. Communication systems will be established at all air bases immediately.

2). Reinforcement of Fighter Planes.

Although the number of assault planes have decreased, fighter planes will be replaced first.

Priority will be given to the fighter units in the distribution of airplane parts and equipment, Skilled technicians will be assigned to the fighter units.

3). Reinforcement of the Reconnaissance Unit.

Measures will be taken to reduce the rate of accidents involving reconnaissance planes which play a vital part in the outcome of an operation.

15 May Clear- rain

1. Since very few enemy planes have been seen, estimations were that the enemy task force had returned south.

Three MYRT 11's reconnoitered the area south of KYUSHU after the weather cleared.

2. Two land assault planes attacked enemy airfields on OKINAWA at night.

3. A study will be made of the enemy task forces tactics. Adhering to the following outline, plans for the disposition of our air strength which will participate in the operation employing the first tactic will be drawn up.

a. Daylight Reconnaissance Unit.

Half the number of MYRT 11's will be stationed at KANOYA and the other half at the MATSUYAMA Airfield. George 11's (navy SHIDEN fighter) assigned to the KANOYA Airfield.

b. Seaplanes will be assigned to the WABIMA Airfield. A large number of the assault planes will be assigned to the MIO Airfield and an element will be assigned to the KANOYA Airfield.

c. Night Assault Unit

FRANCES 11's and heavy bombers will be assigned to the MIO, OITA or OMURA Airfield.

d. Night Fighter Unit.

This unit will be assigned to either the IBAKA or SHIBUSHI Airfield.

e. Others.

Others will be assigned to the previously designated airfields;

16 May Clear

1. Three reconnaissance planes in the morning and three in the afternoon reconnoitered the area southeast of the RYUKYU ISLAND. A majority of the planes returned without carrying out their mission because of mechanical difficulties.

2. Hq. of the 1<sup>st</sup> Airfield Unit at KANOYA ordered the FRANCES 11's which were preparing for Operation TEN No. 3, to attack enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA as of tomorrow.

3. Five FRANCES 11's and six heavy bombers attacked enemy ships around OKINAWA at night. One FRANCES 11 attacked an enemy cruiser, anchored at its base, with a torpedo and another attacked an unidentified ship. Two FRANCES 11's and three heavy bombers directed attacks against enemy ships and the northern and central airfields.

Two heavy bombers detected radio waves, presumed to have been sent from an enemy task force, over the eastern sea. Two land assault planes attacked an enemy airfield on OKINAWA at night.

17 May Clear

1. Two MYRT 11's reconnoitered the area southeast of the RYUKYU ISLAND at dawn. Six FRANCES 11's, three heavy bombers and four JILL 12's attacked enemy ships anchored in the vicinity of OKINAWA at night and obtained the following results.

One FRANCES 11 - sunk one enemy cruiser 15 miles northeast of IHIYA ISLAND at 2305.

JILL 12's - crippled one battleship or a heavy cruiser off ITOMA.

One JILL 12 - crippled one light ship.

Three FRANCES 11's - attacked ships hidden by a smoke screen.

Two land assault planes observed one installation burning on the northern airfield.

Three land assault planes reconnoitered the area east of the RYUKYU ISLAND.

2. It was learned from an intercepted enemy communique that they had ordered the utilization of mine sweepers for transporting equipment.

3. The situation of the land operation on OKINAWA is such that we cannot hope to delay the operation any longer. In order to facilitate the operation of our land force, attacks will be made in force against enemy ships around OKINAWA.

18 May Clear

1. Two MYRT 11's and one Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane reconnoitered the area over and around the RYUKYU ISLAND. One MYRT 11 succeeded in taking an aerial photograph of OKINAWA.

Six FRANCES 11's, two JILL 12's and four heavy bombers attacked enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA. One FRANCES 11 sighted a crippled converted enemy carrier off KADENO at 2150, and another FRANCES 11 attacked an enemy cruiser or destroyer at 2125. One heavy bomber severely crippled a large ship off NAKAGUSUKU BAY at 2230 and another damaged a transport which was unloading in NAKAGUSUKU BAY. A JILL 12 attacked a ship also unloading in the said bay. The two heavy bombers which attacked enemy airfields on OKINAWA set fire to one installation on IEKO ISLAND and two installations on the northern airfield.

Two land assault planes and two seaplanes reconnoitered the area between 150 degrees and 210 degrees, 280 miles off CAPE ASHIZURI at night.

2, An intercepted enemy communique disclosed that the enemy had ordered the utilization of patrol boats for transporting supplies and ammunition and that the

first group of Task Force 58 and seven carriers had left their base at night on 19 May.

Our estimations were that the enemy transport group which left its base at ULITHI and the MARIANNAS will appear in the Homeland Area, escorted by a task force, between 21 and 23 May.

3. Information in regard to Operation GI was received from the 6th Air Force. The 6<sup>th</sup> Army Air Force will be assisted in the following manner.

Operation GI will commence shortly after the Army Air Force attacks the enemy's northern and central airfields, Enemy ships anchored in NAKAGUSUKU BAY and off KAIRAKAN will be attacked.

The entire strength of our fighter unit will attack enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA on X + 1 day.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Airbase Hq. (KANOYA) Order of Battle No. 45.

- a. Adhering to the following outline, the Territorial Air Force, the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Unit and the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet will attack enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA.
- b. This operation will be referred to as Operation KIKUSUI No. 7 and will commence on X day (23 May).
- c. Operational Instructions.
  - 1). At night of X-1 day, the Night Assault Unit of the Territorial Naval Air Force will attack enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA and KAIRAKAN, and the Night Bomber Unit of the Territorial Naval Air Force will attack enemy airfields on IEKO ISLAND.
  - 2). The GI Air Unit of the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet will patrol the area around OKINAWA during the night of X-1 day and a large number of the planes stationed in the western district will attack enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA.
  - 3). If air superiority should be attained, training planes will be utilized in this operation.
  - 4). The Territorial Naval Air Force will wait for a favorable opportunity to attack an enemy task force.
  - 5). The 5<sup>th</sup> Air Unit will, at the opportune moment attack enemy ships with

the assistance of the Territorial Naval Air Force and the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet.

4. Both the SHIRAGIKU Training Unit and the Seaplane Reconnaissance Unit of the 12<sup>th</sup> Fighter Group were ordered to attack enemy ships around OKINAWA prior to Operation KIKUSUI No. 7.

19 May Clear – cloudy

1. An intercepted enemy communique disclosed that an enemy force of approximately two divisions had left ULITHI on about 14 May. It was estimated that the enemy was preparing for a new operation since they have been transporting supplies with mine sweepers in the area of OKINAWA and have also been stepping up active communication with forces in the LEYTE Area. A large number of enemy planes attacked the KIKAI Area yesterday.

Two MYRT 11's and one Type 100 Hq. Reconnaissance plane reconnoitered the area southeast of OKINAWA after it was reported that one of our planes had detected enemy radio waves at a point 100 miles off KIKAI last evening.

2. The staff of General Headquarters requested that damaged planes of the Territorial Naval Air Force be repaired and that attacks around OKINAWA be made more frequently. After careful investigations were made of the above request, the Territorial Naval Air Force found that this could not be accomplished without reinforcements. At present, the types of planes in usable condition are the SHIRAGIKU trainers and seaplanes.

20 May Rain – clear

1. Two MYRT 11's and one Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane reconnoitered the area southeast of the southwestern islands because various indications had led us to believe that an enemy task force was close by. These planes sighted two standard carriers and four converted carriers at 1420 at a point 100 degrees, 100 miles off the southern point of OKINAWA.

2. The three JILL12's which assaulted enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA sank one light cruiser at 2335. It was later learned from an intercepted enemy communique that one heavy transport had been sunk and another ship had been heavily damaged.

3. Two land assault planes and two seaplanes patrolled the area between 162 degrees and 207 degrees, 250 miles off CAPE ASHIZURI at night.

21 May Rain

The two MYRT 11's and one Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane which took off to reconnoiter the RYUKYU ISLAND Area returned without carrying out their mission due to unfavorable weather.

22 May Cloudy - partly clear

1. One of the four JILL 12's which attacked enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA crippled an enemy battleship at 0040 on 23 May. The three remaining planes attacked enemy transports.

One enemy destroyer was sunk in the area northwest of IHIYA ISLAND by one of the five PAUL 11's which attacked enemy ships around OKINAWA.

2. Operation KIKUSUI No. 7 was postponed for a day because of bad weather in the area east of the central part of the Homeland.

23 May Clear

1. Three MYRT 11's, one Hq. Type 100 reconnaissance plane and two GEORGE 11's sighted enemy ships at the following positions.

Time - 1400

160 degree, 165 miles off the southern point of OKINAWA; one standard and three converted carriers, two battleships and over ten ships of various types heading southwest.

Time - 1335

307 degrees, 65 miles off the southern point of OKINAWA; two medium and two heavy cruisers heading northwest.

Time - 1800

50 miles southeast of the above-mentioned position; two battleships from four to five cruisers or destroyers and from five to six light cruisers heading north.

Time - 1428

123 degrees, 25 miles off the southern point of OKINAWA; one standard carrier and four ships of various types.

2. Operation KIKUSUI No. 7 ("B" Tactics) was postponed until 25 May because of rain in the vicinity of OKINAWA.

Note:

- a. "A" Tactic of Operation KIKUSUI No. 7: The main body to attack an enemy task force and an element to attack enemy assault groups and bases.
- b. "B" Tactic of Operation KIKUSUI No. 7: To carry out attacks against enemy assault groups and bases.

24 May Clear

1. Because one MYRT 11 from the KANOYA Airfield reported that they had sighted 50 enemy transports, escorted by eight destroyers, headed in a 40 degree course at a speed of 15 knots, 15 miles northwest of KE ISLAND at 0045, two GEORGE 11's took off at 0800 to locate these ships in the TAKARA, TOKUNO and ANAMIO ISLANDS Area. However, no enemy ships were sighted.

2. The four MYRT 11's which took off at 0950 to reconnoiter the area southeast of the RYUKYU ISLAND sighted between 1240 and 1340, three groups of an enemy task force with two standard and eight converted carriers in the area between 60 degrees and 120 degrees, six miles off the southern point of OKINAWA. Since our estimations were that this task force will advance north, an order to prepare for Operation KIKUSUI No. 7 ("A" Tactic) was issued.

Approximately 100 enemy carrier planes appeared over SOUTHERN KYUSHU between 1450 and 1630. At 1710, one MYRT 11 took off to locate the above mentioned task force.

3. The eight land assault planes and two seaplanes which took off before 2000 to search for the enemy in the area southeast of the RYUKYU ISLAND sighted between 2300 and 2346 two groups of enemy ships presumed to have been an enemy task force, in the locality where the four MYRT 11's sighted enemy ships between 1240 and 1340. It was reported at 0015 that the above mentioned ships were sighted 100 miles south of OKU ISLAND. It was later reported that these ships were groups of enemy submarines or light ships.

4. Of the nine FRANCES 11's, nine heavy fighters and 10 JILL 12's which searched for the enemy task force in the TOKUNO ISLAND Area, one FRANCES 11 attacked a transport and one JILL 12 badly crippled one cruiser. The remaining planes returned because they were unable to sight any enemy ships.

Eighteen land assault planes and four FRANCES 11's set fire to six installations on the IE ISLAND Airfield. The seven MYRT 11's and 20 SHIRAGIKU training planes, which attacked enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA, sank one cruiser and crippled nine other ships of various types.

5. Six planes of the GI Air Unit of the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force landed on the enemy's northern airfield and another two from the same unit landed on the central airfield at 2200. Installations on both airfields were set on fire.

25 May Cloudy

1. "A" Tactic was replaced by "B" Tactic at 0300, because it was estimated after 10 SUISEI night fighters and four ZERO night fighters reconnoitered the areas 200 miles east and west of the RYUKYU ISLAND, three MYRT 11's were unable to sight any signs of the enemy in the area southeast of the RYUKYU ISLAND. (?)

2. Of the 22 FRANCES 11's which attacked an enemy task force, two attacked an enemy carrier, one a battleship and another an unidentified ship. Ten Type 99 (VAL 22) and one SAKURA NO HANA were reported to have attacked unidentified enemy ships.

A part of our fighter unit engaged a group of enemy GRUMMAN fighters and shot down one.

Because the 20 SHIRAGIKU special attack planes had been dispersed to several airfields, they were unable to participate in the above mentioned attack when "A" Tactic was replaced by "B" Tactic.

3. The 100 Army special attack planes (10 returned after flying half way), which-assisted in the above mentioned (No. 2) naval attack, successfully attacked enemy ships. An intercepted enemy communique revealed that the enemy had been greatly disturbed by the results obtained in this attack.

4. Although enemy communiqes disclosed that an enemy transport group was preparing to launch a new operation, their objective is as yet unknown. However, indications are that they will advance to either the TOKUNO ISLAND or the KIKAI Area.

Since it is estimated that a task force will escort this transport group, our planes will be held intact until the actions of the task force are clarified. At the conference held between the air unit (Navy) and the Higher Air Command it was decided to reject the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force's request for assistance in conducting their 9<sup>th</sup> General Attack.

The strength of our air force is so low that at present we are unable to cooperate with the Army. However, we were ordered by the Higher Air Command to follow the orders issued by the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force.



26 May Clear

Four SUISEI night fighters and four ZERO night fighters took off at 0430 and reconnoitered the areas 80 miles east and west of the RYUKYU ISLAND (range covered -150 miles).

27 May Cloudy

1. The six ZERO night fighters which took off at 0300 in search of enemy submarines flew as far as AMMIO ISLAND.

2. At the time the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force carried out their 9<sup>th</sup> General Attack, our air unit attacked enemy ships and bases around OKINAWA (referred to as Operation KIKUSUI No. 8).

Six land assault planes and 12 SUISEI night fighters attacked enemy airfields on OKINAWA between 0030 and 0300 and set fire to three installations on the northern airfield, twenty SHIRAGIKU trainers, 11 ZERO Type seaplanes and four ZERO fighters attacked enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA at night. Six FRANCES 11's, 11 heavy bombers, four JILL 12's, four land assault planes and seven PAUL 11's also attacked enemy ships around OKINAWA between 0300 and 0400.

Verified Results of the Above Attacks.

Sunk- three cruisers, one destroyer and two transports.

Crippled - one cruiser and two unidentified ships.

Attacked with torpedoes - one cruiser and one transport.

An intercepted enemy communique disclosed that 11 of their heavy ships have been either sunk or damaged.

3. The three land assault planes and one seaplane which reconnoitered the area east of OKINAWA reported that they sighted five enemy ships in flames in the area west of KIKAI at 2300.

28 May Clear

1. The eight SUISEI night fighters and six ZERO night fighters that reconnoitered the area around the RYUKYU ISLANDS were unable to find any signs of the enemy. Early this morning, three MYRT 11's reconnoitered the area southeast of the RYUKYU ISLAND.

2. Between the hours of 1010 and 1630, four B-29's and 70 light planes (SB-20's,

[?] F4U's, F6F's, P-61's and P-47's) appeared over SOUTHERN KYUSHU. Fifty-seven ZERO fighters and 28 GEORGE 11's counterattacked these planes.

3. The 11 SHIRAGIKU special attack planes, three FRANCES 11's and four JILL 12's, which took off after 1930, attacked enemy ships around OKINAWA. It was later learned from an intercepted enemy communique that one unidentified ship had been sunk.

The 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force was detached from the combined force at 0000 on 28 May.

29 May Rain – cloudy

At dawn, eight SUISEI night fighters reconnoitered the area around the RYUKYU ISLANDS. Since an intercepted enemy communique revealed that the enemy transport group from the SAIPAN Area had entered the base at LEYTE, it was decided that attacks would have to be made more frequently against enemy ships around OKINAWA in cooperation with the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force.

30 May Cloudy - partly clear

Four SUISEI night fighters reconnoitered the area around the RYUKYU ISLANDS at dawn. The three MYRT 11's which took off before 0530 returned at 1010 without gaining any information because of poor visibility.

31 May Cloudy

Enemy fighters attacked the MYRT 11 which took off at 1150 to reconnoiter the the OKINAWA Area. Because the weather in the area north of AMAMIO ISLAND was reported to be unfavorable, Operation KIKUSUI No. 9 was cancelled.

1 June Cloudy – light rain

One PAUL 11 reconnoitered the TOKUNO and AMAMIO ISLANDS Area because the Army reported that they had sighted 20 enemy planes heading north in the TOKUNO ISLAND Area yesterday afternoon.

One MYRT 11 reconnoitered the area east of the RYUKYU ISLANDS.

Operation KIKUSUI No. 9 which was scheduled to be commenced simultaneously with the Army's 10<sup>th</sup> General Attack was postponed.

2 June Cloudy - light drizzle

1. Six ZERO night fighters and eight SUISEI night fighters reconnoitered the area around and east of the RYUKYU ISLAND.

2. Between 0800 and 1030, approximately 150 enemy planes (F4U's F6F's and P-51's) attacked SOUTHERN KYUSHU (KASAHARA, IZUMI, MIYAZAKI, KUSHIRA and TOMORA). All the airfields in this area were slightly damaged. Twenty GEORGE 11's counterattacked 20 enemy F4U's over CAPE SAGA and shot down 13. Our own losses were two planes.

3. Two MYRT 11's took off at 1050 to reconnoiter the area east of the RYUKYU ISLANDS (one plane turned back at a point, 180 degrees, 12 miles off CAPE TOI).

4. The five JILL 12's and two land assault planes that took off between 2200 and 2300 to attack enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA returned without carrying out their mission because of unfavorable weather.

The seaplane which took off at 2100 to scout the area south of KYUSHU also returned without carrying out its mission because of poor visibility.

3 June Clear

1. The two MYRT 11's and one GEORGE 11 which took off between 0520 and 0645 sighted, at 0830, two standard and one converted enemy carriers, one battleship, two cruisers and over 10 other ships at 120 degrees, 110 miles off the northern point of OKINAWA and three standard carriers, two battleships and over 10 other ships at 90 degrees, 70 miles off the northern point of OKINAWA at 0930. Our estimations were that these ships belonged to one group.

2. Only light damages were suffered from attacks by approximately 80 enemy F4U's and F6F's which raided the SOUTHERN KYUSHU Area between 0758 and 0915.

3. Commencement of Operation KIKUSUI No. 9 simultaneously with the Army's 10<sup>th</sup> General Attack.

Sixty-four fighters and six Type 99 (VAL 22) took off at 1040 for OKINAWA. During the course of the flight, a portion of the fighters engaged 19 F6F's and F4U's over the northern point of OKINAWA at 1325 and shot down five. Our remaining fighters turned back over ISKO and AWAKUNI ISLANDS.

Three Type 99 (VAL 22) were compelled to make a forced landing on TOKUNO ISLAND because of bad weather. The three remaining Type 99 (VAL 22) reported that they sighted enemy carriers and other ships.

4. During the Army's 10<sup>th</sup> General Attack, over 10 of the special attack planes succeeded in making suicide attacks.

5. An intercepted enemy communique disclosed that 17 of our planes were shot down. Operation KIKUSUI No. 9 was postponed because of unfavorable weather.

4 June Clear

1. The two MYRT 11's and one Type 100 Hq. reconnaissance plane which left at 0540 to reconnoiter the area around and east of the RYUKYU ISLANDS returned without carrying out their mission because of unfavorable weather.

2. One MYRT 11 left at 1320 to reconnoiter the IHIYA ISLAND Area because it was reported that approximately 20 light enemy ships had fired on IHIYA ISLAND at 0800 yesterday. However, no information was gained because of poor visibility.

3. The enemy land force on OKINAWA is, at present, directing their attack against the northern point of KOROKU Airfield. Although our forces on OKINAWA had requested for more mortars and percussion caps, we were unable to fulfill their request because of bad weather.

5 June Partly clear.

1. One MYRT 11 took off at 1040 to investigate the weather in the area west of the RYUKYU ISLAND since the enemy broadcasted typhoon warnings to its forces in the area south of OKINAWA. Operation KIKUSUI No 9 was commenced at 1400.

2. Because it was reported that four heavy and four light enemy ships were seen assembling in the area 30 miles west of TOKUNO ISLAND early this morning, two GEORGE 11's took off at 1100 to reconnoiter this area. However, no enemy ships were sighted.

3. Since one of our submarines (NAMI-33) 100 miles north of OKINOTORI ISLAND detected sounds of enemy ships, an order to take precautionary measures against an enemy task force was issued.

4. The eight FRANCES 11's and 12 heavy bombers which took off at 1947 to attack enemy ships around OKINAWA returned at 2000. Since it was believed that the air pressure had dropped considerably in the area south of KYUSHU, an order postponing Operation KIKUSUI No. 9 was issued at 2254.

6 June Cloudy

1. There are indications that an enemy task force had entered the eastern sea area. Three land assault planes and four seaplanes of the 634<sup>th</sup> Air Unit took off at 0050 to reconnoiter the area south of KYUSHU. At 0300 eight SUSEI night fighters and five ZERO night fighters took off to look for an enemy task force in the SOUTHERN KYUSHU Area.

One ZERO night fighter attacked an enemy submarine at the point, 140 degrees, 130 miles off CAPE TOI at 0330. Four MYRT Ills took off at 0450 to reconnoiter the area, between 130 degrees and 250 degrees, off CAPE TOI.

2. More than 10 heavy planes and approximately 50 light enemy planes appeared over SOUTHERN KYUSHU at 1400. One carrier based reconnaissance plane sighted an enemy task force with four carriers, 80 miles southwest of CAPE TOI at 1515. The OKINOERABU O.P. reported that they sighted 14 enemy cruisers, destroyers and minesweepers at 1540.

3. Six PAUL 11's which took off from the KANOYA Airfield between 2030 and 2115, attacked enemy ships around IHIYA ISLAND and sank one destroyer and slightly damaged another.

7 June Clear

1. After the weather had cleared, three MYRT 11's and one Type 100 reconnaissance plane reconnoitered the areas east and west of the RYUKYU ISLAND also took an aerial photograph of OKINAWA.

One carrier based reconnaissance plane reported having sighted four carriers and four cruisers, believed to be BRITISH ships, 100 miles east of MIYAKO ISLAND.

2. An order to commence Operation KIKUSUI No. 9 was issued at 0830. One MYRT 11 was ordered to investigate weather conditions in the vicinity of OKINAWA

Of the 1,000 planes of the Territorial Air Force, 570 are available for instant use and 700 [?] are in need of repair. Only 46 planes will be available for attacking enemy ships around OKINAWA if the necessary number of planes are reserved for the attack against the enemy task force.

3. The MYRT 11 which took off at 1225 reported that they sighted two enemy cruisers, five destroyers and 20 transports heading northwest 20 miles southeast of the southern point of OKINAWA and three cruisers and destroyer heading southeast 20 miles southeast of the southern point of OKINAWA.

4. Three land assault planes, one seaplane and two ZERO type seaplane scouted the areas south of KYUSHU and east of the RYUKYU ISLAND at night. One of the three land assault planes was last seen being attacked by enemy planes and did not return.

One seaplane sighted lights from what was believed to be an enemy ship 160 miles east of CAPE TOI.

5. Two of the three land assault planes successfully transported our airborne unit to OKINAWA.

6. The four land assault planes and five SUISEI night fighters which took off at 0200 on the 8<sup>th</sup>, set fire to two installations on the enemy's central airfield and to six installations on the IE ISLAND Airfield.

7. A portion of the four JILL 12's, four FRANCES 11's and three heavy bombers that attacked enemy ships in the vicinity of OKINAWA returned after flying half way.

The remaining planes sank one heavy ship (type unknown) and one battleship and crippled two cruisers. Six (three returned after flying half way) PAUL 11's which took off between 2030 and 2115 from the KONOYA Airfield, sank one and crippled another heavy destroyer in the vicinity of IHIYA ISLAND.

8. The naval force ordered KAWAMURA, the commander of the Air Force on OKINAWA and KUNIMACHI, staff officer of the Higher Command, to fight to the end.

9. Despite the efforts of the Army, Navy and Air Force in carrying out Operation TEN, satisfactory results were not obtained.

It is believed that the operation on OKINAWA is in its final phase. At present, each unit is preparing for Operation KETSU.

The Combined Command's orders stressed the importance of protecting all installations, factories and land and sea transportation systems against attacks by heavy bombers.

Forty FRANCES 11's were ordered to make a special attack, lead by the Commander of the 3rd Air Fleet against enemy carriers in LEYTE BAY and in the SOUTH PACIFIC against the bomber bases in the MARIANAS.

The Combined Command also ordered the 10<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Fleet to separate their ground and air units.

8 June Clear

1. Six ZERO fighters, headed south, passed over the RYUKYU ISLAND in search of enemy planes. Four of the six planes returned after having flown half way. The two remaining planes observed lights south of TANEGASHIMA ISLAND. The results of this mission are unknown.

2. One of the two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off at 1000 returned after having flown half way. The remaining plane sighted one enemy battleship and two cruisers 10 miles west of IE JIMA ISLAND, 13 heavy transports and a large number of medium transports in the KERAMA Area, and three transports and three cruisers in NAKAGUSUKU BAY.

3. After 1230, three groups (total 780) of enemy carrier planes (identified from an intercepted enemy communication) and land fighter planes attacked our airbases in southern KYUSHU. This attack was mainly concentrated on the KANOYA Air Base. Losses suffered on this airbase were 10 planes destroyed and 10 damaged. Our anti aircraft unit shot down seven and crippled eight enemy planes.

Estimating that these planes were from an enemy task force close by, two GEORGE 11's (Navy SHINDEN carrier based recon. plane) took off at 1623 in search of this task force which is believed to be in the area southeast of the AMAMIOSHIMA ISLAND. However no task force was sighted.

For this reason, it was estimated that this task force had escaped to the area east of southern OKINAWA after the attack. It will be difficult to locate and destroy this force

For purposes of counterattacking the enemy, which has recently begun to approach closer to land in the areas of KIKA and MINAMIDAITO ISLANDS, suicide attack planes must be distributed to the airbases on both islands.

4. Because the weather had cleared and an order to attack enemy ships anchored in the area of the OKINAWA ISLANDS was received, three FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bomber), three heavy bombers, four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack plane), three carrier borne attack planes and eight PAUL 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane) carried out the attack. The results obtained in this attack were as follows:

One large (heavy) ship - burned

One large (heavy) ship - crippled

One other ship was attacked but the result is unknown.

5. The three assault land planes, one seaplane, and three seaplanes converted

from ZERO'S which took off after 2200 in search of an enemy east of the ISLANDS reported having sighted a large number of enemy ships anchored at a point 60 miles off the southern point of MINAMIDAITO at 140 degrees at 0910 of the 9<sup>th</sup>.

9 June

1. Three of the 10 fighters converted from JUDY 11 and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier borne bomber) which took off at 0300 to attack enemy airfields on OKINAWA returned before reaching their destination. Two explosions and four fires were observed on an enemy airfield at IE JIMA ISLAND.

The five ZERO fighters that reconnoitered the area south of CAPE TOI were unable to obtain any information.

2. Two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon.) and one Type 100 DINAH reconnoitered the area east of the RYUKYU ARCHIPELAGO. Three enemy standard carriers, three converted cruisers and several other ships were sighted at a point 80 miles off the southern point of OKINAWA at 140 degrees at 0902. One battleship was sighted at a point 60 miles off and at 140 degrees from the same point at 0950 and five transports and over 10 ships at a point 50 miles off and at 125 degrees from the same point at 1000. All of the above ships were headed northwest.

Since it was supposed that this task force would advance north, one MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off at 1000 in search of the task force in the area south of TOKUNOSHIMA.

Upon examination of an aerial photograph, it was learned that the aforementioned three standard carriers were converted carriers.

According to intercepted enemy telephone message, the carriers YORK-TOWN, TICONDEROGA and SHANGRI-LA were not in the task force. Therefore this force is believed to be in the area south of MINAMIDAITO ISLAND.

3. Due to bad weather, a part of the seven heavy bombers and four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) which took off to attack enemy ships anchored near OKINAWA were forced to turn back. Another part of the squadron was unable to carry out the attack due to circumstances beyond its control. The damage inflicted on the enemy by the remaining planes is unknown.

The results of the attack carried out by five Paul 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. sea-plane) on enemy ships anchored off KADENO in the KERAMA ISLAND are un-



known.

10 June Clear

1. Despite bad weather, five assault land planes and four JUDY 11 and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier borne bomber) took off at 0200 to attack enemy airfields on OKINAWA but due to the poor visibility the extent of damage was unknown.
2. The four SUISEI night fighters and two ZERO night fighters which took off at 0630 to attack enemy planes in the AMAMIOSHIMA Area shot down one enemy plane.
3. At 0800, one MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) and one type 100 DINAH took off to reconnoiter the area southeast of the OKINAWA ISLAND.
4. From 0730, approximately 70 B-24's, P-47's and F6F's appeared over southern KYUSHU and in the afternoon 16 P-47's came to attack our air bases at KANOYA and KOKUBU but inflicted little damage. Our anti-aircraft unit shot down five enemy planes.
5. No information was obtained by the six ZERO type seaplanes which reconnoitered the area southeast of KYUSHU from the night of the 10<sup>th</sup> until dawn of the 11<sup>th</sup>.

11 June Clear

1. 40 ZERO fighters counter attacked 11 B-24's and 30 P-47's which attacked our airbase on KANOYA at 0850 but were unable to inflict any damages. On the contrary, four of our planes were shot down.
2. At 1500, two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off to reconnoiter the area east of RYUKYU ISLANDS.
3. Due to bad weather, the four FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bomber) and four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack plane) which took off after 1730 to attack enemy ships anchored around OKINAWA returned without having carried out their mission.

12 June Cloudy

1. At 1230, approx. 30 P-47's and F4U's attacked our KANOYA Air Base, but only slight damages were suffered.

We were unable to make any reconnaissance or attacks due to poor weather

conditions in the southwestern islands.

2. In order to assist the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Group in its counterattack on OKINAWA, important points and details of the KIKUSUI Operation Plan No. 10 were explained to all units under the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Group. (This plan will take effect on 15 June.)

Approx. 50 fighters and 50 KAMIKAZE planes constitute the entire strength of our Army Air Force at present.

The strength of our Naval Air Force which is scheduled to attack the enemy anchorage near OKINAWA has been almost reduced to nothing.

Because of the shortage of planes in our Army and Navy Air Forces, the main body of our attack force will consist of bombers (equipped with a rocket driven glide bomb called OHKA which is carried to its target attached to the belly of a bomber and released. The bomb is guided in flight either by remote control (direct or indirect) or an internal control which may be either mechanical or human).

The OHKA bomber will be used in operations of the following categories.

- a. Continuous day and night attacks.
- b. Daylight attacks
- b. Attacks utilizing craft other than the OHKA bombers will be carried out only during the day.

The above classifications (a, b and c) were made taking the weather, atmospheric conditions, etc. into consideration.

13 June Rain

1. The KYUSHU Area is still in the rainy season although it is almost over in the OKINAWA Area. For this reason, only a few enemy planes were seen in the KYUSHU Area today. Attacks were carried out by neither the enemy nor our forces.

2. This afternoon a conference was held concerning KIKUSUI Operation No. 10.

In attacking the enemy in the OKINAWA Area, OHKA tactics were employed. The attack was made by circling the enemy's flank from the east and the west under strong escort, but on account of poor maneuverability, it appears that satisfactory results have not been obtained.

In carrying out KIKUSUI Operation No. 10, the OHKA'S will be protected by a

fighter unit.

14 June Rain

Because of unfavorable weather, neither reconnaissance nor attacks were conducted. KIKUSUI Operation No. 10 was postponed until the 16<sup>th</sup>.

15 June Rain

The weather is still unfavorable in the southern area of KYUSHU. Two PAUL 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane) attacked enemy ships off OKINAWA at night.

The KIKUSUI Operation was postponed indefinitely.

16 June Rain

The weather conditions in southern KYUSHU and in the area of the southwestern islands are still unfavorable.

Large enemy planes attacked the northern area of KYUSHU. It was learned at noon today that a considerable number of enemy planes from OKINAWA were headed north, however we were unable to counterattack this enemy due to heavy rain.

17 June Cloudy

Due to poor weather conditions in the KYUSHU Area reconnaissance was not carried out. The enemy planes which appeared over the KYUSHU Area this morning did not attack our KANOYA Air Base.

The B-29's which appeared over the southern area of KYUSHU after 2300 bombed the city of JAGOSHIMA with incendiary bombs and severely damaged the city.

18 June Rain

1. Because of unfavorable weather conditions in southern KYUSHU, neither reconnaissance nor attacks were conducted.

One of our carrier based recon. planes sighted five converted enemy cruisers, two battleships and several other ships between OKINAWA and ISHIGAKIJIMA.

2. The Commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Regt. returned to KISARAZU Air Base from KANOYA today to direct the preparations for and to command the coming

operation.

19 June Cloudy

Weather is still unfavorable in the areas of KYUSHU and the southwestern islands.

After 2200, B-29's appeared over the northern area of KYUSHU and bombed the city of FUKUOKA.

20 June Rain-partly clear

Although the weather conditions in the areas of KYUSHU and the southwestern islands were still unfavorable, it was estimated from a report received from our reconnaissance unit that an enemy task force was advancing for an attack.

21 June Clear

1. At 0700, one Type 100 DINAH took off to observe the weather situation in the area of the southwestern islands.

Since it was estimated that the weather condition in the area of the southwestern islands was favorable for an attack from a report received from the above plane, KIKUSUI Operation No. 10 was started at 0846.

2. One MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off at 1440 to observe the weather situation in the area of the southwestern islands did not return.

3. Of the 11 land assault planes, eight SUISEI Type night fighters and two ZERO'S which took off to attack the enemy air base on OKINAWA, three land assault planes and two night fighters returned without carrying out their attack. Between 2300 and 0130, four assault planes bombed the enemy northern airfield while two night fighters attacked, inflicting heavy damages on the enemy airfield at IE JIMA.

4. Four FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bomber), seven heavy bombers, five JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack plane), eight PAUL 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane), SHIRAGIKU Type training planes and eight ZERO'S attacked enemy ships anchored off OKINAWA.

Some of the above planes equipped with torpedoes attacked one carrier, four cruisers and one destroyer, but the extent of damage inflicted on these ships is unknown.

A SHIRAGIKU type training plane reported having sighted our planes attacking one enemy carrier, one battleship and one medium size ship and six ZERO 'S equipped with torpedoes attacking enemy ships.

22 June Partly clear.

1. Six ZERO night fighters were unable to find any enemy in the eastern sea area.
2. One MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) and one Type 100 DINAH took off at 0530 to the area west of OKINAWA to send out radio waves for the enemy radar to detect.
3. Our land assault unit left at 0930 aboard 50 GEORGE 11's (Navy SHIDEN fighter).

At 0540, six OHKA bombers escorted by 66 ZERO fighters and eight heavy fighters took off to make a special suicide attack on enemy ships around OKINAWA (25 fighters and two OHKA bombers returned before reaching its target and one heavy fighter made a forced landing).

In this attack, one OHKA rocket piloted glide bomb was released over the city of NAHA. Two OHKA bombers reached IEKO JIMA and three heavy fighters were seen attacking enemy ships.

4. 11 of the 12 Army special attack planes made suicide attacks on the enemy. Although almost all available night attack planes were utilized in KIKUSUI Operation No. 10 on the 21<sup>st</sup>, no results worth mentioning were obtained. The only indication of damages inflicted on the enemy was a large fire observed in the CAPE ZAMPA Area.

The 25 planes which served as escorts in the special attack carried out on the 22<sup>nd</sup> returned before reaching their objective. Due to circumstances beyond our control, several planes were unable to assist the OHKA Bomber Unit as scheduled.

5. The night attack unit was ordered to conduct a night attack in force for the second time.

Six heavy bombers and eight PAUL 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane) attacked enemy shipping in the OKINAWA Area.

Results of the attack were as follows:

- 1 ship (type unidentified) - sunk
- 1 ship (type unidentified) - burnt
- 1 cruiser -burnt

23 June Cloudy

At 2350 of the 23<sup>rd</sup>, two ZERO type seaplanes took off to search for the enemy in the eastern RYUKYU Areas. The search was continued until dawn of the 24<sup>th</sup>, however no enemy was sighted.

24 June Rain

It was learned from a telegram received from the Army reconnaissance unit early this morning that at 1930 of the 23<sup>rd</sup>, three groups of transports (totaling 80) and another group of enemy ships believed to be a task force were sighted sailing on a 300 degree course at a point 260 kilometers off TAIHOKU (FORMOSA) at 0310.

The fleet in the CHINA Area and the base unit in FORMOSA reconnoitered for the above enemy ships but were unable to sight them. It was later learned that the previous information was false.

2. Judging from the progress of the operation in OKINAWA and the actions of enemy transports and the task force, it was estimated that the enemy assault unit will start a new operation in the very near future.

An order to be more cautious in submitting reports and information was issued, for lately, false information was prevalent.

25 June Cloudy

1. Because the weather had become favorable, attacks were conducted frequently on enemy shipping around OKINAWA. The MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off at 0935 to search for the enemy in the area east of the RYUKYUS, reported having sighted one carrier and approx. 50 transports of various types in NAKAGUSUKU BAY. After 1327 no other reports were received from this plane.

Due to circumstances beyond control, one Type 100 DINAH which took off at 1300 returned without carrying out its mission.

2. Eight JUDY 11's and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier borne bomber) and six land

assault planes (of which four turned about enroute) attacked enemy airfields at OKINAWA.

At 2300, five GINGA type land assault planes (three turned about enroute), three JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack plane) (one returned enroute) and eight PAUL 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplanes) took off to attack enemy ships near OKINAWA.

At about 2300, 14 SHIRAGIKU training planes (seven returned enroute) and at 1900 seaplanes left to attack enemy ships near OKINAWA.

a. Attacks on enemy bases.

Two of the three planes which bombed IE JIMA Airfield extinguished the lights along the runway and burned an installation. The two planes which attacked the northern and central airfields burned two installations at the northern airfield.

b. Three of the five SHIRAGIKU training planes successfully conducted a suicide attack on enemy transports. The success of the remaining two planes is unknown.

c. It has been reported that one FRANCES 11 (Navy GINGA bomber) carried out a suicide attack, but the results are unknown. The results of the attack made on one enemy cruiser and one patrol boat by two JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) are also unknown.

One PAUL 11 (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane) sank almost all of the enemy transports unloading in UGO BAY.

3. Three land assault planes, two seaplanes and three ZERO Type seaplanes took off to patrol the area east of the RYUKYUS because it had been reported that an enemy assault unit and a task force in the LEYTE Area had completed preparations for the advance north. The first of the above planes took off at 0200 of the 26<sup>th</sup>.

At 0150, the above seaplanes reported having sighted a large formation of enemy planes at a point 200 miles off CAPE TOI at 150 degrees. At 0210 these seaplanes were attacked by large enemy planes equipped with rocket guns.

Two enemy night fighters were sighted at 0245, and at 0418 four lights (believed to be signal lights from enemy ships) were observed but our radar was unable to detect these ships. After our seaplanes had landed on SHIBUSHI Air Base, they reported having observed lights in an easterly direction at 0125.

26 June Rain

1. The five ZERO night fighters which took off to search for the enemy in the AMAMIOSHIMA Area at 0230 were unable to obtain any information.
2. After 0400, an order to take the first precautionary measures and to prepare to counterattack an enemy task force was issued when it was estimated from a report received from our patrol plane that an enemy task force would start operations.

Early this morning, two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off from the MATSUYAMA Air Base to reconnoiter for the enemy, but because of bad weather the reconnaissance was unsuccessful.

Rain began in the KYUSHU Area after midnight.

At 0854, all preparations for the coming operation, reconnaissance and attacks on the enemy were stopped temporarily.

Because the lights that our seaplanes had sighted could not be detected by our radar and because our patrol planes were unable to sight any enemy, it was estimated that the lights were from enemy submarines.

3. The enemy landed on KUME ISLAND today. It was reported that 80 enemy ships of various types started north from LEYTE at 1640.

27 June Rain

1. The weather is still unfavorable in the areas of KYUSHU and the southwestern islands. One PAUL 11 (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane) and one ZERO fighter from our KANOYA Airfield attacked enemy ships around OKINAWA.

The PAUL 11 (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane) sank one enemy destroyer off KIMUBU BAY. A ZERO fighter almost succeeded in making a suicide attack on an enemy ship.

2. The Chief of Staff who was stationed at the HIYOSHI Fleet Hq. returned this morning and revealed the outline and details of KETSU Operation.

28 June Rain

Because of rain in the entire KYUSHU Area, operations were not carried out.

29 June (clear)



A conference for drawing up plans for the units to participate in the KETSU Operation was held. The plan was to be based upon the KETSU Operation Plan drawn up by the Navy.

In order to keep up with the drawing of the fleet's plan which is scheduled to be completed by mid-July, the following items will be studied and the plans for the units will be completed as quickly as possible.

- a. The Hqs. for the coming operation will be OITA. Each unit will be urged to complete its individual base at OITA as quickly as possible.

The Cmdr. of the 12<sup>th</sup> Air Raid Unit whose Hq. was transferred to OITA was ordered to direct the construction of the bases at OITA.

- b. Each unit will be assigned individual duties. Airfields, hangers and billets will be constructed and signal equipment and ammunition will be prepared as quickly as possible.
- c. The ammunition at the front line base (southern KYUSHU) will be removed to the rear.
- d. Ammunition will be stored at relay posts so that the units which will be transferred from the area east of the central district can be easily supplied.
- e. Because our forces are to be reorganized, plans for transporting personnel will be drawn up.
- f. The disposition of our land defense unit and the construction of positions and installations for equipment and weapons for the coming KETSU Operation will be completed as quickly as possible.
- g. Orders for the coming KETSU Operation will be drafted. Members of the force that will participate in the KETSU Operation will be properly instructed and trained.

30 June Cloudy

It was learned from an aerial photograph taken by two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) that three enemy battleships, three cruisers, 31 destroyers and 50 seaplanes were anchored at the base in OKINAWA.

1 July Cloudy – clear

1. All air units were instructed to cease hostile activities against small enemy

planes because of a severe fuel shortage.

2. The 7<sup>th</sup> and the 98<sup>th</sup> Fighter Units were assigned to the 6<sup>th</sup> Army Air Force.

a. Although the assistant Chief of Staff of the 6<sup>th</sup> Army Air Force supported the fleet Hq. when it objected to the assignment of the 7<sup>th</sup> and the 98<sup>th</sup> Fighter Units to the 6<sup>th</sup> Army Air Force for reasons listed below, the two fighter units were still assigned to the Army by the Hq's in TOKYO.

1). With the assignment of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 98<sup>th</sup> Fighter Units to the Army, the Navy air strength will be cut down considerably, thus making it extremely difficult to conduct overseas operations. Since the Navy had been carrying out all, or almost all reconnaissance missions until this time, the Army will also suffer greatly with the assignment of the 7<sup>th</sup> and the 98<sup>th</sup> Fighter Units to the Army.

2). The assault units will encounter great difficulties in carrying out operations without the joint assistance from the Army and Navy.

3). In order to successfully carry out overseas operations, it is important for the Navy to control all equipment and weapons.

4). As a result of the losses suffered in the past operations, the Navy has great shortages of planes equipped with torpedoes. The assignment of the 7<sup>th</sup> and the 98<sup>th</sup> Fighter Units will have a severe effect upon the Navy's air power.

b. Since the Cmdrs. of the 7<sup>th</sup> and the 98<sup>th</sup> Fighter Units doubted the effectiveness of the coming operation and the Army training program, they insisted that a part of their units be distributed to the airbases at OITA and TAISHA. However this request was rejected because these two air bases were unable to accommodate any more planes due to a lack of space.

3. It was learned from a reconnaissance report that the enemy had changed their signal code for dispatching planes in the PHILIPPINE and mid-PACIFIC Areas. We are anticipating an enemy attack since the enemy usually changes its signal code approx. two weeks before an operation.

2 July Cloudy – clear

1. Two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) sighted two battleships three cruisers and over 10 destroyers, 100 miles east of OKINAWA at 1510.

2. One of the four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) which attacked enemy ships anchored at the base in OKINAWA sank either one cruiser or a destroyer at D148 off CAPE ZAMPA. One other plane attacked an enemy cruiser off KADENO with a torpedo but the results of this attack are unknown.

3 July Clear

1. Of the six SUISEI Type night fighters which took off at 0100, four returned before reaching their objectives. The two remaining planes bombed two installations on an enemy airfield at IEKO JIMA.

At 0300, five ZERO night fighters and two SUISEI Type night fighters took off to search for the enemy in the AMAMIOSHIMA Area. However they were unable to sight the enemy.

Due to bad weather, one MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off to reconnoiter the OKINAWA Area returned without fulfilling its mission.

2. At a conference held from the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 3<sup>rd</sup> by the Staff Officers in regard to the KETSU Operation, the following items were decided upon.

- a. All medium type training planes which were utilized for suicidal attacks by our assault unit will be chiefly employed in conducting night attacks. Medium type planes not equipped for night flying will be escorted when making an attack.
- b. Because of the importance of the cruisers and battleships in an enemy assault group, our attack unit will be urged to attack these ships first. Attacks on battleships and cruisers will be conducted in a manner similar to that of attacking an enemy task force.
- c. Because of the shortage of fighter planes needed to obtain air superiority over enemy territory, the staff members of the 72<sup>nd</sup> Fighter Unit will urge the personnel of the fighter units to concentrate their attack on small enemy ships. However in conducting an operation, the fighter unit will first try to gain air superiority.
- d. The following will be taken into consideration when selecting a target:
  - 1). Will the destruction of this objective simplify the operation?
  - 2). Can satisfactory results be obtained? (In selecting a target the small ships will be excluded).

- e. Since difficulties will arise in conducting long range air reconnaissance, the area to be reconnoitered will be selected beforehand from a land observation post which will be established at points where an enemy landing is expected.

The Communication network will be completed as quickly as possible.

4 July Clear

1. Circumstances beyond control made it impossible for the two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which reconnoitered the OKINAWA Area to gain any information.

The Army reported that one of their reconnaissance planes sighted a group of enemy ships headed north on both the eastern and western sides of OKINAWA.

2. Two land assault planes and two seaplanes patrolled the area east of the RYUKYU ISLANDS at night. The seaplanes reported that they sighted what was believed to be enemy submarines.

5 July Clear

1. At 0300, four JUDY 11 and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier borne bomber) and four ZERO night fighters took off to search for the enemy in the RYUKYU ISLANDS Area but were unable to sight any enemy.

2. From the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup>, a conference on the coming air operation was held at the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force Hqs. in FUKUOKA. All staff members of each fleet and the fighter units were present at this conference.

The following points were discussed:

- a. It had been noted in the KETSU Operation Plan that the Army had overestimated its capabilities and had overlooked the lack of equipment necessary to conduct this operation.
- b. The Navy calculated the percentage of hits to be made by the suicide attack planes at 25%, while the Army calculated a perfect score of 100%.
- c. Although the Army was convinced that they would be able to attain the air superiority over enemy territory, the Navy was doubtful.
- d. The Army in comparison with the Navy has made little or no progress in converting training planes into suicide planes.

- e. Although the entire Navy Air Force is under the command of the TEN Air Force Cmdr., the Army Air Force is separated into several independent commands.

For this reason, it is believed that difficulties will arise in carrying out the coming operation.

6 July Cloudy – rain

A large number of our GEORGE 11's (Navy SHIDEN fighters) were damaged when some 50 to 60 B-24's and P- 51's attacked our air base at OMURA.

The enemy which had never before flown beyond south KYUSHU has lately been advancing into northern KYUSHU and at times as far as the CHUGOKU Sector.

It is estimated, therefore, that the enemy has already learned of our plan to conduct the KETSU Operation and is attempting to learn what preparations we are making or have made for the KETSU Operation.

7 July Rain

1. It is believed that the enemy is planning to start a new operation sometime in mid-July for there are indications of an enemy group advancing from LEYTE.

Our predictions are that this enemy group will either advance to the coast of CHINA or to the area of the southwestern islands.

Precautions will be taken for we are in the midst of preparation for the KETSU Operation and will not be able to defend ourselves against an enemy attack at present.

2. The Army and Navy's prediction of the situation.

- a. It is estimated that the enemy will start it's new operation sometime in mid-July and that it will not attempt to land on the mainland (JAPAN PROPER) at one time, but will concentrate their attacks on OSHIMA and its surrounding islands, the FUCHOU (CHINA) Area, and SHUZAN ISLAND.
- b. Our predictions are that the enemy task force will operate in the eastern sea area and in the area east off the mainland.
- c. Countermeasures.

1). A part of our force will attack transports of an enemy assault unit and will inflict as much damage as possible in the shortest period of time.

2). In counterattacking an enemy task force, our force will be preserved as much as possible. However, if the task force is accompanied by an assault unit and attempts to occupy TENEGASHIMA GOTO and SEISHUTO ISLAND, a part of our force will carryout a decisive attack on this enemy.

3. Three land assault planes and one seaplane patrolled the eastern sea and OKINAWA Areas at night.

8 July Cloudy

It is estimated that the enemy task force, which was reported to have left LEYTE by our reconnaissance unit will advance directly to the mainland (JAPAN PROPER) and will arrive here sometime on the 10<sup>th</sup>. For this reason, orders to take the first precautionary measures were issued at 0400. However as a result of the bad weather in the KYUSHU Areas these precautionary measures were lifted at 0900.

9 July Cloudy

Although the reconnaissance unit of the Navy Hq. in TOKYO reported that the above mentioned task force had not yet left LEYTE, necessary precautions will be taken.

10 July Rain

1. Since it was reported that the afore-mentioned enemy task force had attacked the KANTO District at about 0830 the southern district will take the necessary precautions.

Four MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) scouted for the enemy in the area southeast of KYUSHU but found no sign of them.

2. Three land assault planes and one seaplane patrolled the area southeast of KYUSHU.

3. Simultaneously, an enemy task force attacked the KANTO District and a considerable number of enemy planes attacked the KYUSHU Area.

4. Between 0510 and 1700, approx. 1,200 enemy planes attacked the KANTO District.

The reconnaissance unit of the Army Hq. reported that they had sighted three groups of enemy ships with a total of 12 carriers anchored at a point 250 kilometers off NO JIMA at 1309. The enemy broadcasted at noon today that they were now attacking TOKYO.

5. The 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 10<sup>th</sup> Air Regt. Hq. which was ordered to preserve as much of its strength as possible for the coming KETSU Operation, made no definite attempts to counterattack the above mentioned task force.

6. Anticipated moves of the enemy task forces:

Enemy plans are unknown at present.

However, as a result of the enemy boldness in broadcasting the fact that they were attacking TOKYO and because it would appear as though the enemy is anticipating a strong counterattack by our Air Force, it is estimated that the enemy had learned of our preparation for the KETSU Operation in the KYUSHU Area and had deliberately attacked the KANTO Sector to divert our attention from the KYUSHU Area. It is also estimated that the enemy when attacking the KANTO Sector will simultaneously launch an attack on the southwestern islands.

11 July Rain

1. The three MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which were ordered to scout for this task force did not take off because of unfavorable weather.

2. It was reported that this enemy task force had advanced westward to a point 300 miles south-southeast of CAPE SHIONOMISAKI.

An enemy code message was intercepted which stated that the carrier planes which took off at 0930 returned without carrying out their mission due to bad weather

3. From the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 11<sup>th</sup>, Staff Officers and all unit Cmdrs. were summoned and explained the principles and preparations to be made for the KETSU Operation. At this meeting the formation and strategy of the enemy assault group and countermeasures to be conducted on the enemy assault groups were studied.

4. Of the five land assault planes and one seaplane which took off at night to reconnoiter the area south of the SHIKOKU Sector, only one returned after having flown half way and the other five did not return at all.

12 July Rain

1. Because of unfavorable weather the two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which were ordered to prepare for a reconnaissance did not take off.

2. An order was issued to take precautionary measures against an enemy task force which was believed to be anchored in the area southeast of KYUSHU.

13 July Cloudy

Although it was believed that the enemy task force which appeared in the area south of CAPE SHIONOMISAKI on the 11<sup>th</sup> was still advancing westward, it was reported that this task force had returned to the eastern area and was now active in the area around the southern islands.

After 0400 of the 14<sup>th</sup>, an order to take the first precautionary measure was issued.

14 July Rain

1. 700 enemy carrier planes (from a task force which had been active in the area south of the KANTO Sector and which had appeared in the eastern area close to the TSUGARU STRAIT early this morning) appeared over the HOKKAIDO and TOHOKU Sectors. These planes attacked the main industrial installations and air bases in both districts. Moreover, enemy battleships, cruisers and destroyers totaling some 15 to 20 fired on the city of KAMAISHI (OU Sector) after 1140.

2. Judging from these actions, we are certain that this enemy task force will return to attack the western part of our mainland. Therefore, orders were issued to take the first precautionary measures between 0400 and 0800 and to counter-attack as instructed if this enemy should attack.

15 July Cloudy

1. Carrier planes from the enemy task force now active in the area east of HOKKAIDO attacked important points in MURORAN and ATSUKESHI Areas early this morning.

2. Because of unfavorable weather, we were unable to scout for the enemy in the southwestern islands area. However, it was learned from an intercepted enemy signal message that the enemy assault group was inactive at present.

3. Three of the four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack plane) which took off to attack enemy 'ships anchored around OKINAWA returned without carrying out their mission. The remaining plane damaged one battleship with



with torpedoes.

4. Over 100 enemy, fighters and bombers from the airbase on OKINAWA ISLAND were sighted heading north toward KYUSHU.

Some 30 to 40 enemy planes bombed the town of KASAHARA.

16 July Rain

1. A few enemy carrier planes appeared over OU (TOHOKU) Sector.

Our estimation is that the afore-mentioned enemy task force will advance to the southern coast after being re-supplied at sea.

2. A total of approx. 50 enemy ships (including 20 heavy transports) were sighted off KEIRAKAN by two of our MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which reconnoitered the OKINAWA Area.

17 July Cloudy - slight drizzle

1. Our reconnaissance unit reported that among the enemy carrier planes which attacked important points in the KANTO and the OU (TOHOKU) Sectors, there were a few new type planes from an ENGLISH task force.

2. After the aerial photographs of the OKINAWA Area which were taken by two of our MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) were developed, it was learned that five enemy battleships, 10 cruisers and about 150 various types of transports were anchored in NAKAGUSUKU BAY and off KADENO. There were three battleships, five cruisers and 15 small ships (including destroyers) anchored 60 miles west of KERAMA.

Although the enemy has been quite active in this area it is believed that the number of ships has not been increased.

18 July Cloudy - clear

1. The result of the four SUISEI night fighters which took off at 0300 to attack the enemy airfield on OKINAWA are unknown.

At 0330, eight ZERO night fighters and six SUISEI night fighters flew 200 miles from their base and reconnoitered the area east of the RYUKYU ISLANDS.

2. Our radar unit reported that the afore-mentioned task force is now in the area 110 miles east of CAPE INUBOSAKI and NO JIMA.

This afternoon, 180 enemy carrier planes attacked YOKOSUKA City.

3. Four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) attacked enemy ships anchored around OKINAWA. Two cruisers and one heavy transport were damaged. (From an intercepted enemy signal message it was learned that two warships ((type unknown)) were sunk in this attack).

19 July Clear

1. Two installations of the northern OKINAWA Airfield and four installations at IEKO JIMA Airfield were burned by 10 JUDY 11 and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier borne bomber) which took off at 0230.

No enemy was sighted by the 10 ZERO fighters which took off to scout the AMAMIOSHIMA Area at 0300.

2. Our reconnaissance unit reported that the enemy task force in the area east of our mainland had separated into two groups and that one group was carrying on active liaison with their base at OKINAWA.

Necessary precautions will be taken because it is unknown whether this latter group is planning to enter the base at OKINAWA or whether this active liaison indicated that the enemy force on OKINAWA is preparing for an attack.

3. The reconnaissance planes of the 8<sup>th</sup> Air Div. in FORMOSA reported that they sighted eight converted enemy carriers, eight battleships, 10 cruisers and 307 transports anchored at the base in OKINAWA and also reported that small enemy ships were considerably active.

There are some indications that two enemy divisions will shortly start on a new operation.

4. An Army reconnaissance plane which took off from our air base in the KANSAI Sector reported that they sighted one standard enemy carrier, one cruiser and one destroyer headed on a 250 degree course, speed 15 knots, and at a point 200 kilometers off CAPE SHIONOMISAKI at 160 degree between the hours of 1540 and 1820. They also discovered 10 trails of ships in the area west of the above-mentioned point.

For this reason, six ZERO Type seaplanes took off at night to scout for those enemy ships in the area east of KYUSHU, but due to bad weather the planes returned after flying 90 miles.

5. Instructions concerning the actions to be taken before KETSU Operation were

issued.

The following are the main points of the orders for the general units of the Army and Navy.

- a. The strength of each unit will be preserved as much as possible.
- b. Attacks on enemy task forces will be conducted only if the situation promises satisfactory results and if the task force is accompanied by an assault group.

After investigating the plans of the Army and Navy, the Naval Air Force ordered the units under its command to attack enemy carrier groups and approaching battleships and cruisers for it has been proven from past experience (an attack in the KANTO Sector by an enemy task force) that mere defensive encounters with the attacking enemy task force will result only in our suffering heavy damages (equipment, factories, psychological effect on the people, etc.)

#### 6. Transfer of the 72<sup>nd</sup> Fighter Unit Hq. to OITA.

The 72<sup>nd</sup> Fighter Unit Hq. has been located at KANOYA since its establishment and has control of the air defense and all aggressive operations of the fighter units in this area.

Although the construction of the communication system at OITA had not been completed, the 72<sup>nd</sup> Fighter Unit Hq. was nevertheless transferred to OITA to command the construction work of the 203<sup>rd</sup> Unit and to train the unit at the IWAKUNI Air Base.

20 July    Cloudy - rain periodically

An enemy telephone message believed to originate from a task force was intercepted today.

Because of poor atmospheric conditions (barometric pressure 725mm) in the area west of OKINAWA, no enemy planes have been sighted in this area since yesterday.

21 July    Clear – cloudy

1. It was estimated from a report that an enemy task force was anchored 300 miles east of the southern islands and is now being supplied at sea. We believe that this task force will either return to its base at OKINAWA or the PHILIPPINES or will attack the KYUSHU Area.

2. Enemy planes have not attacked the KYUSHU Area for several days because of unfavorable weather.

From a report received on the 19<sup>th</sup> from an Army reconnaissance plane and various other information, it was estimated that enemy assault groups were gathering at OKINAWA to start a new operation.

Orders to smash the new enemy operation on the 23<sup>rd</sup> were issued by the Naval Air Force.

3. Of the four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes), one attacked an enemy cruiser and two attacked a battleship and a transport. However the extent of the damages inflicted upon these ships is unknown.

It was learned from an intercepted enemy communication that one warship was heavily damaged.

22 July

It was learned from a report that at 0120 enemy ships fired on SAISHUTO ISLAND and that some of our ships anchored around the island were burned. Our guess was that the enemy has started on its new operation and would advance into the CHOSEN STRAIT.

GEORGE 11's (Navy SHIDEN fighter) from the OMURA Air Base in western KYUSHU and PAUL 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane) of the 634<sup>th</sup> Unit were ordered to reconnoiter the SAISHUTO ISLAND Area.

Six GEORGE 11's (Navy SHINDEN fighter) and six PAUL 11's (Navy ZUIUN recon. seaplane) which took off at 0800 reported that enemy submarines attacked our ships in the SAISHUTO ISLAND Area at about 1200.

23 July Partly clear

1. One MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off at 0630 to reconnoiter the OKINAWA Area between 0800 and 1000 sighted the following: Three enemy battleships, six cruisers, seven destroyers and 30 large transports in NAKAGUSUKU BAY, 120 transports of various types and 30 other ships off the coast of the northern and central airfields, and 30 ships off KORUKU. All of these ships were headed south.

2. Because of unfavorable weather in the area south of AMAMIOSHIMA, the night attack which was to be carried out tonight was postponed until the 24<sup>th</sup>.

3. Our reconnaissance unit reported that the afore-mentioned enemy task force was still anchored in the area 300 miles south of the KANTO Sector.

24 July Clear

1. After 0600, enemy carrier planes appeared over the SHIKOKU, western CHUGOKU, and northern KYUSHU Districts. After an enemy communication was intercepted, our estimate was that an enemy task force was at present headed in a 135 degree course off CAPE ASHIZURI.

For purposes of inflicting heavy damages on this enemy task force, an order to attack employing Tactic No. 3 was issued at 0810. In the afternoon, two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off in search of this task force but since the planes did not return in time, the order to employ Tactic No. 3 was cancelled at 1521.

2. In the first wave, a total of 100 enemy planes attacked the KYUSHU Area and 100 planes in the SHIKOKU and CHUGOKU Districts. In the second wave, 400 planes attacked the CHUGOKU District and in the third wave 70 planes attacked the SHIKOKU District.

The two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off to search for an enemy task force returned and reported sighting the following:

two standard carriers

two battleships or cruisers

Over 10 various types of ships at a point 100 miles off CAPE MURODO, at 160 degrees.

An order to prepare for an operation employing Tactic No. 1 was issued.

3. All reconnaissance planes on WABIMA Air Base were either destroyed or damaged by the enemy carrier planes which attacked early this morning.

The four land assault planes which took off from the OITA Air Base at 2200 in search of the enemy south of the SHIKOKU District did not sight any enemy.

25 July Clear

1. A conference in regard to the operation employing Tactic No. 1 was held at 0125, where it was decided that this tactic would be cancelled. At 0700 an order was issued to employ Tactic No. 2.

2. At 0130, nine SUISEI Type night fighters and three ZERO night fighters took

off from the IWAKAWA Air Base to search for the enemy in the area east of KYUSHU.

One MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off to scout for an enemy task force at 0700 did not return.

3. Early this morning, enemy carrier planes attacked the eastern part of CHUGOKU, SANIN and northern KYUSHU.

4. A Type 3 carrier plane with a SAIUN type engine took off at 1500 from the KISARAZU Air Base and sighted a group of enemy ships at a point 60 miles off CAPE SHIONOMISAKI at 145 degrees and the entire strength of the 38<sup>th</sup> Task Force (composed of 15 standard carriers which was divided into four groups) at a point 120 miles off CAPE SHIONOMISAKI in the same direction. Because of the vast distance (300 miles) between this task force and KYUSHU which made it difficult for a daylight attack, the night fighter unit was ordered at 1300 to attack this enemy by night. The GINGA Unit was also ordered to attack this task force by night.

At 1715, the operation employing Tactic No. 2 was cancelled.

5. At 1730, nine ZERO night fighters took off to search for an enemy task force in the area east of KYUSHU.

6. At 2200, three land assault planes took off from OITA Air Base to scout for an enemy task force.

7. Of the eight FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bomber) which took off at 2300 from the TAISHA Air Base, two returned from midway and another made a forced landing.

After completing their mission, the remaining planes separated and landed on TOYOHASHI, KOCHI and FUJIEDA Airfields.

8. Causes of our failure in attacking the afore-mentioned task force

- a. After information as to the enemy task force was received on 23 July, we were unable to make further investigation and did not receive any more information which might have been vitally essential in preparing for an attack on this task force.
- b. The planes which took off on 24 July in search of this enemy task force in the area south of CAPE ASHIZURI did not return (two planes returned but

too late) and the planes equipped with radar which conducted night reconnaissance were unable to obtain any information. The main causes for our reconnaissance planes being unable to obtain any information were that the men were improperly trained and the lack of equipment.

- c. As reported on 15 July, the vast distance between the task force and our base at KYUSHU made it impossible to conduct a daylight attack. The time between the sighting of the enemy task force on the 25<sup>th</sup> and sunset was so short that our planes were unable to trail them. Another detriment was the lack of night patrol planes.
- d. The FRANCES 11 (Navy GINGA bomber) which conducted reconnaissance on the night of the 5<sup>th</sup> was unable to obtain any information.
- e. The TFB (Territorial Air Force) was unable to control the units under its command firmly because the Staff Officers of the 7<sup>th</sup> Fighter Unit did not report to the TFB (Territorial Air Force) Hq. at KANOYA after they had returned to the KISARAZU Air Base in the middle of June.

26 July Clear – rain

Our estimations are that the enemy task force had returned to the southern area and is at present being resupplied at sea.

27 July Partly clear

1. Between 0001 and 0200, 16 SUISEI type night fighters attacked enemy airfields on OKINAWA and burned five installations.
2. It was reported that the enemy task force which disappeared on the 26<sup>th</sup> had returned and attacked the area west of HAMAMATSU (located in the central part of the mainland) early this morning and that by 1200, 700 enemy carrier planes had also attacked this area in five waves.
3. Of the four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) which attacked enemy ships anchored around OKINAWA between 1930 and 2030, three planes crippled two enemy cruisers and one plane crippled a transport. It was later learned from an intercepted enemy communication that two ships were sunk.
4. Four land assault planes reconnoitered the area east of the RYUKYU ISLANDS at night.

28 July Partly clear

1. Yesterday's intercepted enemy communication was believed to be from a task force at a point between 90 degrees and 100 degrees. Therefore, an order to take the first precautionary measure was issued.

After 0630, 1,200 enemy carrier planes appeared over the Western part of CHUGOKU, SHIKOKU and northern KYUSHU and approx. 250 B-29's and P-51's from the air base in the MARIANNAS attacked the KANTO District. Southern KYUSHU was also attacked by approx. 300 B-25's and P-47's from the-air base at OKINAWA.

2. At 0300, four SUISEI Type night fighters and eight ZERO night fighters took off to search for the enemy in the areas south and east of KYUSHU.

3. From an intercepted enemy communication it was estimated that the enemy task force was 100 miles off CAPE ASHIZURI at between 110 degrees to 135 degrees. However the two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off at 0800 did not sight any task force in this area.

4. At 1800, four ZERO night fighters took off to search for the enemy south of KYUSHU.

29 July Clear

1. At 0300, six land assault planes (three from the YAMATO Air Base and three from the OITA Air Base) took off to search for the enemy in the area south of SHIKOKU.

Due to unfavorable weather, the six SUISEI Type night fighters which took off at 1800 to scout for the enemy in the area southeast of KYUSHU returned without obtaining any information.

2. At 0001, six JUDY 11 and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier borne attack bomber) bombed enemy airfields on OKINAWA. Two installations were burned at the central airfield and four planes were damaged.

3. It appeared that the enemy task force was prohibited from using lights or communication since we have been unable to intercept any enemy communication.

4. A neutral country reported that ENGLAND, AMERICA and CHINA were proclaiming that JAPAN had no alternative but to surrender.

30 July Clear



1. The enemy task force which disappeared on the 29<sup>th</sup> attacked the KANTO District. After 0500, enemy carrier planes attacked our airbases in the KANTO, TOKAI and KANSAI Districts.

A part of the above task force fired on CAPES NOJIMAMISASE and OMAEZAKI.

After intercepting an enemy telephone message, it was estimated that an enemy task force was at present at a point 100 miles south of ISHIMURO at 90 degrees to 92 degrees.

After an enemy communication was intercepted, it was learned that the enemy task force which is operating close to the homeland is composed of 15 U.S. and five BRITISH ships.

2. Six ZERO night fighters took off at 1800 to scout for enemy submarines in the area south of KYUSHU.

3. Estimate of the enemy task force plans.

Since their attack in the KANTO District on 10 July, the enemy has conducting continuous air attacks on the entire Homeland. The attacks have been mainly concentrated on our ships and factories. Enemy planes from the bases in the MARIANNAS and OKINAWA also have been attacking important installations, positions, etc. in cooperation with the task force. A part of the task force has been firing on important installations, positions, etc. along the coast.

Lately the enemy has been bold enough to broadcast publicly where the next attack will take place and has been proclaiming that we have no alternative but to surrender.

At present, we are preserving the strength of our Air Force as much as possible in preparation for the decisive battle which will eventually take place on our mainland.

We must bide our time for a favorable opportunity and annihilate the carrier group of the task force first.

31 July     Cloudy – rain

Southern KYUSHU was attacked by approx. 400 B-29's and B-25's from OKINAWA between 0900 and 1700.

Approx. 40 B-25's bombarded the KANOYA Air Base at 1530 from above the

clouds.

1 August Rain

1. The 6<sup>th</sup> Air Force attacked OKINAWA and at 0100 12 SUISEI Type night fighters attacked the OKINAWA Airfields. Four ZERO night fighters took off to attack enemy submarines in the area south of KYUSHU.

2. At approximately 2230, our observation post on OSHIMA reported that they had sighted 3,000 enemy transports in three columns advancing toward BOSO Peninsula in the area east of OSHIMA.

At 2241, the Naval force ordered the units under its command to begin KETSU Operation No. 3.

It was later learned that the above-mentioned 3,000 ships were mistaken for noctucas, [?] and therefore the KETSU Operation was cancelled at 0023 of the 2<sup>nd</sup>.

The commander of the reconnaissance unit was ordered to be more cautious in sending in reports.

2 August Rain

1. Since 30 July, no enemy planes have appeared over the Homeland.

Our estimate is that at present the enemy task force is restricted from sending or receiving any messages.

2. For purposes of making arrangements for the transfer of his Hq. to OITA, the Cmdr. of the TSUNE Fleet left KANOYA at 1300 for OITA.

3 August Rain

1. The Cmdr's. colors were sent to OITA at 0740.

2. The Chief of Staff of the Army and Navy conferred directly by telephone with the Cmdr. of the TSUNE Fleet in regard to the establishment of a combined Air Force and the transfer of personnel which will be involved if a Combined Air Force is established.

3. TEN Air Unit agreed with the above plan but they requested that the transfer of personnel be conducted in such a manner that it would not interfere with their present operation.

4 August Rain

1. After various information was received, it was estimated that the enemy task force was anchored at its base.

At 0912, the order which was issued on 14 July to take the first precautionary measure at dawn, was cancelled.

2. At 1935, the Chief of Staff of the Army and Navy reported that in all probability the U.S. task force will anchor at its base in LEYTE and that the BRITISH task force will enter the base in the MARIANAS by tomorrow and will probably attack our important coastal positions within a week.

5 August Clear

1. The FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bomber) which were used in the transporting of personnel to FORMOSA reported that they sighted an enemy task force composed of over 10 ships including three carriers and three battleships. Speed 18 knots, course 140 degrees, at a point 200 miles off the MARITO ISLANDS at 2200.

The two land assault planes which took off in search of this task force sighted it 80 miles southeast of the originally reported point. Because of the tremendous distance, an attack on this task force was not carried out.

Orders to reconnoiter the enemy situation at dawn of the 6<sup>th</sup> and to take the first precautionary measure between the hours of 0400 and 0800 were issued.

2. At 1800, eight SUISEI Type night fighters took off to search for enemy submarines in the area 100 miles off the western coast of KYUSHU.

6 August Clear

1. At 0300, six SUISEI Type night fighters and six ZERO night fighters and at dawn, one MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off to search for the enemy in the eastern sea.

2. Two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off at 1230 to reconnoiter the OKINAWA Area.

3. Our airbase at FORMOSA reported that they sighted three converted enemy carriers and several battleships and cruisers, 30 degrees off the northern point of FORMOSA and that these ships have been attacking SHUZANTO ISLAND, since the 5<sup>th</sup>.

4. After it was learned that an enemy task force had attacked SHUZANTO ISLAND and that enemy ships were assembling at OKINAWA, our estimate was that the enemy was planning to start its new operation in this area.

Orders were issued to attack enemy ships around OKINAWA on the night of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup>.

7 August Clear

1. The MYRT 11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off at 0900 to reconnoiter the OKINAWA Area reported that they sighted the following at 1030:

Two converted carriers, one battleship, five cruisers and 15 destroyers in the area just south of CAPE KIYABU, 100 transports in NAKAGUSUKU BAY, 100 transports off the coast of OKINAWA'S northern and central airfields and 50 transports around IEKO JIMA.

2. At 1800, six SUISEI Type night fighters and four ZERO night fighters took off to search for enemy submarines in the eastern sea.

3. Of the seven FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bomber) which took off at 1930 from the TAISHA Air Base to attack enemy ships around OKINAWA, only one plane succeeded in carrying out its mission because of bad weather and the enemy counterattacks.

4. The KURE Naval Station reported that at approx. 0830, yesterday, HIROSHIMA City was attacked with a new type bomb which spread fires in mid-air and produced a deafening sound upon explosion and had almost completely demolished the urban and the suburban districts.

This new type bomb was thought to be an ATOMIC BOMB with which the enemy had been experimenting for a number of years and that this bomb was used because their task force had been unable to conquer our Homeland by air.

It appears as though we will eventually lose the war because of the tremendous damage this bomb can inflict upon our material resources and population.

8 August Clear

1. At 0900, approximately 60 B-29's attacked the town of USA and TSUZUKI. A large number of ZERO fighters were damaged at the

TSUZUKI Air Base because our alarm system were inadequate and we were unprepared to counterattack the enemy.

2. The seven FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bomber) which took off at 1840 attacked a converted enemy carrier, a transport and another unidentified ship off the coast of OKINAWA'S northern and central airfields. Four JILL12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) attacked enemy ships around OKINAWA. One of the planes attacked an enemy ship off KADENO.

9 August

1. The seven SUISEI Type night fighters which took off at 0100 attacked IEKO JIMA and the central airfield on OKINAWA.

2. NEW DAHLIA Station broadcasted that the USSR had begun operations against JAPAN.

After various information was collected, it was definitely known that the USSR had participated in an operation against us at 0001. At 1417, orders were issued to take necessary precautions against the SOVIET UNION.

3. It was learned from an enemy telephone message that a part of an enemy task force was headed north, which was previously reported to have been active in the area of the southern islands on or about the 7<sup>th</sup>.

Early this morning, enemy carrier planes from this task force appeared over the TOHOKU District and bombarded our air bases and harbor installations. A considerable number of our land assault planes and FRANCES 11's (Navy GINGA bomber) at the KAMIMACHI and MATSUSHIMA Air Base were damaged. A part of this task force fired on the city of KAMAISHI.

At 1200, an enemy task force with four carriers was sighted at a point 180 miles off CAPE INUBOSAKI.

4. An order to take the second precautionary measure against the USSR and the enemy task force was issued.

5. Estimations of the USSR operational plan.

We had estimated for a long time that SOVIET UNION participation in this war would have serious effect on the outcome of this war but the abruptness of the USSR declaration of war upon us has been quite a shock.

The progress of our Army and Navy preparations for an operation against the SOVIET UNION has been very unsatisfactory because both forces have been concentrating their efforts on the U.S. and the BRITISH Forces.

The strength of the SOVIET UNION overseas forces and Air Forces is far superior to U.S. Forces.

It is important that the SOVIET Army advance be checked and that we annihilate the U.S. and BRITISH task force.

6. At 2201, an order was issued by the Army and Navy to prepare for the KETSU Operation which would begin in the area of the JAPAN SEA, simultaneously, a special order to make a decisive attack on the SOVIET Army was issued.

10 August Clear

1. At 0625, two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off to reconnoiter the area east and west of the RYUKYU ISLANDS and several strategic points on OKINAWA ISLAND.

2. Since this morning, enemy carrier planes have been attacking our air bases and ships in the KANTO and the TOHOKU Districts.

3. It was reported that NAGASAKI City was bombed with an ATOMIC BOMB on the 9<sup>th</sup>.

We expect that the enemy will drop another ATOMIC BOMB.

4. At 2300, four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) attacked enemy ships around OKINAWA.

11 August Clear

1. No report of the task force which attacked the KANTO and the TOHOKU Districts on the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> has been received.

It was estimated from an intercepted enemy communication that this task force was in the area 300 miles east northeast of CAPE INUBOSEKI.

2. At 0700 four MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) reconnoit-ered the KYUSHU Area.

3. The SAN FRANCISCO Broadcasting Station broadcasted that JAPAN had accepted the POTSDAM Declaration.

4. Without taking into consideration the preparations made for the KETSU Operation, the Army and Navy issued an order to carry out a decisive attack on the U.S. task force. Although the details of this order had not been explained to us, we concluded from various indications that the principal points of the KETSU Operation Plan had been altered.

It would appear that the Army and Navy ordered this decisive attack in order to impress the enemy of our strength to be able to dictate or refuse some of the terms in the POTSDAM Declaration.

5. The TEN Air Unit was ordered by the Army and Navy to attack the enemy task force and also the ships and bombers from OKINAWA.

6. An order to attack the SOVIET Army was issued.

7. At 1745, six SUISEI Type night fighters and four ZERO night fighters took off to search for the enemy in the area southeast of the RYUKYU ISLANDS.

12 August Clear

1. It was learned from an intercepted enemy communication that an enemy task force was still in the area of the eastern sea.

2. The SOVIET Army penetrated Northern KOREA, HULUN and HEINO and landed on NATIN.

It was reported that a SOVIET Fleet composed of three cruisers and over 10 destroyers left VLADIVOSTOK and are now in the western and southern areas.

3. The 8<sup>th</sup> Fighter Unit, which was under the 10<sup>th</sup> Air Fleet, was assigned to the Territorial Air Force today.

13 August Clear

1. At 0400, eight SUISEI Type night fighters and six ZERO night fighters took off to search for the enemy in the areas south and west of KYUSHU.

The two MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off in search of the enemy in the area east of KOREA returned from midway because of bad weather.

2. An enemy task force appeared in the KANTO District and its carrier

planes attacked the area east of the TOKAI District, the KANTO District, and various places after 0530. It was learned from an intercepted enemy communication that an enemy task force (divided into four groups) was anchored in the area between 120 miles to 100 miles off CAPE INUBO-SAKI and at 75 degrees to 100 degrees respectively. It was also learned that several groups of enemy are anchored in the southern area and that enemy transports were assembling at OKINAWA.

It seems that the enemy task force is planning to attack in force in an attempt to influence our government into surrendering.

3. At 0742 the Army and Navy ordered the TOBU, TOKAI, CHUBU, and SEIBU Districts, and the TSUSHIMA (including the area west of it) to prepare for the KETSU Operations No. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 respectively.

At 1057, the Cmdr. of the Territorial Air Force was instructed by the Army and Navy as to how the air operation for the KETSU Operation will be conducted. The following is a general outline of the instructions.

- a. Attack and annihilate the enemy task force as quickly as possible.
- b. Destroy the enemy bombers.
- c. Conduct special attacks.

Our guess is that the orders were issued too late and that great difficulties will be encountered in carrying out these orders.

According to the orders from the Army and Navy, the Naval Air Force ordered all units under its command to prepare for the KETSU Operation (decisive operation).

4. Three of the five heavy fighters which have been stationed at KIKAI since mid-July, returned without carrying out their mission. The two remaining planes made suicide attacks on enemy carriers and other ships at 1945.

5. The four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) which took off at 2110 attacked enemy battleships and heavy transports anchored around OKINAWA.

6. Our observation post at OKINARABE ISLAND reported that it sighted 36 enemy ships at a point 30 miles west of OKINARABE ISLAND at 1230 and that two heavy destroyers, 40 mine sweepers and 22 small ships were headed west at 1715. Two land assault planes reconnoitered the area west of AMAMIOSHIMA



at night.

7. The 723<sup>rd</sup> Air Unit was assigned to the Territorial Air Force.

14 August Clear

1. Due to circumstances beyond control, one MYRT11 (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) was unable to take off this morning.

An Army reconnaissance plane reported that they sighted one enemy cruiser, four destroyers and 30 transports headed south at a point 18 miles off CAPE BONOMISAKI at 240 degrees at 0840.

The two MYRT 11(Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) which took off at 1600 to search for the above ships were unable to obtain any information for darkness had set in before they had reached the reported area.

Three JUDY 11 and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier borne bomber) from the KOKUBU Air Base took off to attack these enemy ships but were unable to locate them.

2. Four land assault planes reconnoitered the area south of KYUSHU at night.

3. One of the four JILL 12's (Navy TENZAN carrier borne attack planes) which took off to attack enemy ships around OKINAWA attacked an enemy cruiser. However, the result of the attack is unknown.

4. After a report was received from our reconnaissance unit, it was estimated that the enemy ships which had been assembling at OKINAWA had completed preparations for the coming operation and that some of the ships had already left their base at OKINAWA.

The bomber unit at OITA and KOKUBU Air Bases were ordered to prepare for an attack on enemy ships which would be carried out the following day in the OKINAWA Area.

5. The unit which was ordered to annihilate the SOVIET fleet, received instructions from the Army and Navy to accomplish its mission as quickly as possible.

15 August Clear

1. Because the SOVIET Fleet had begun to advance and both the U.S. and BRITISH task forces had begun their decisive operations, the Army and Navy issued orders to prepare for the KETSU Operation 1, 2, 11, 12 and 13.

2. At 0530, carrier planes from an enemy task force attacked the KANTO District.

It was learned from an intercepted enemy communication that an enemy task force was anchored at a point 170 miles off CAPE INUBOSAKI at 150 degrees at 0630.

3. Four MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) reconnoitered the areas east and west of the RYUKYU ISLANDS.

4. A foreign broadcasting station announced that peace negotiations with JAPAN had been completed.

5. Because the Army and Navy ordered through the KURE Naval Station that all operations be stopped against the SOVIET Army and enemy forces on OKINAWA, the attack which was to be made on enemy ships around OKINAWA was cancelled until farther notice.

6. At 1200, an Imperial rescript was issued announcing the end of the war in FAR EAST ASIA. Led by their Flight Cmdr., 11 JUDY 11 and 12's (Navy SUISEI carrier borne bomber) took off at 1500 from the OITA Air Base and carried out a suicide attack on enemy ships in the OKINAWA Area.

It was later reported that seven of the 11 planes had successfully crippled enemy ships.

7. Each unit under the command of the Naval Air Force was ordered to maintain firm control over their individual units to keep the strength intact and to prepare for a counterattack.

8. According to orders received from the Naval Hq., the Army and Navy ordered all the units to cease all hostile operations against the U.S., BRITISH, SOVIET and the CHINESE FORCES at 2237.

16 August Clear

1. According to orders from the Naval Hq., the Army and Navy ordered all units to cease all hostile activities but to conduct a defensive counterattack.

For the purpose of self defense, three MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) and one GEORGE 11 (Navy SHIDEN fighter) reconnoitered the area off the eastern coast of KYUSHU covering a radius of 200 miles.

At 1900, 12 SUISEI Type night fighters and eight ZERO night fighters took off to search for the enemy off the coast of KYUSHU, covering a radius of 120 miles.

3. At about 1800, it was reported that 13 masts which were believed to parts of enemy cruisers or battleships were sighted 25 kilometers south of KOCHI at 1245.

For this reason, it was estimated that an enemy assault group was advancing for an attack.

The four land assault planes which took off from the OITA Air Base to search for the enemy in the area south of the SHIKOKU District were unable to sight any enemy.

It was later learned that the afore-mentioned masts belonged to fishing boats.

4. Today, the Chief of Staff of the Army and Navy explained the reason for the issuance of the imperial rescript. However, the personnel of various units requested that the war be continued.

17 August Clear

1. Since various rumors had become prevalent, the Chief of Staff of the Naval Air Force left for TOKYO early this morning to obtain the details of the circumstances under which the war ended.

2. At 0630, four MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off to scout the area off the coast of KYUSHU, covering a radius of 200 miles.

At 1700, 12 SUISEI night fighters and eight ZERO night fighters took off to reconnoiter the area off the coast of KYUSHU, covering a radius of 120 miles.

18 August Clear

1. At 0630, four MYRT 11 's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) took off to reconnoiter the area off the coast of KYUSHU, covering a radius of 200 miles.

2. In the afternoon, the Chief of Staff of the Naval Air Force summoned all unit Cmdrs. to explain the circumstances in which the war ended and to clarify the fact that this order was from the Emperor.

19 August

1. Four MYRT 11's (Navy SAIUN carrier based recon. plane) reconnoitered the area off the eastern coast of KYUSHU, covering a radius of 400 miles.

2. Since the Cmdr. of each unit was ordered to assemble at TOKYO, the Cmdr.

of the Naval Force accompanied by one of his staff left for TOKYO. At approx. 2200, the staff officer who accompanied the Cmdr. to TOKYO informed the Naval Force by telephone concerning the procedure in which the Air Force personnel will receive furloughs and as to what will be done with the weapons.

At 2308, an order was issued to give furlough all NCO and EM's in active service.