AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS DURING WORLD WAR II
VOLUME II
U. S. BUREAU OF SHIPS

FIRST DRAFT NARRATIVE
PREPARED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION
BUREAU OF SHIP

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME II

CHAPTER

PART III
"DEFENSIVE WAR AND TURNING OF THE TIDE"

PAGE

VI. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY AND THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

1

The Pearl Harbor Attack

The Balance of Fleets

The Strategy

The Impact upon the Bureau

VII. DEATH AND REJUVENATION AT PEARL HARBOR

23

VIII. PERSONNEL EXPANSION

67

IX. EXPANSION OF FACILITIES

163

Introduction

The Expansion

Production Shortages

Financing

Types of Contracts

Lessons Learned

X. CONTROL OF THE SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

197

Overall Controls

Program Planning

Production Requirements Plan

Controlled Materials Plan

…..

Operation

Scheduling Components for Shipbuilding and Maintenance

Raw Materials Section and Its Functions

XI. INSPECTION

255

Supervision and Inspection

Jurisdiction

Personnel and Locale

Post-War

XII. SHIP SALVAGE AND FOREIGN REPAIR

273

Salvage Operations by Civilians

Salvage in Forward Areas

Foreign Ship Repair

XIII. SHIPBUILDING AND TURNING OF THE TIDE

307

Chronology of Defensive War

Shipbuilding Production

 

Appropriations

Planning

Precedence Lists

Problems of Production

Production Record

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TABLES

Table No.

Page

14

Balance of fleets before Pearl Harbor 1 December 1941. Major combatant vessels

5

15

Personnel on board - BuShips, Navy Department; by months, 1933-1945

71

16

Number of employees by service, giving percentage of
total civilian personnel, 1941-1945

76

17

Total number of professional employees, 1941-1945, by grade

77

18

Total number of sub-professional employees, 1941-1945

78

19

Total number of clerical, administrative and fiscal employees, 1941-1945, by grade

79

20

Total number of crafts, protective and custodial employees, 1941-1945, by grade

80

21

Number of contract employees, 1942-1945

82

22

Engineering personnel as of 1 September 1947

113

23

Distribution of Officers attached to activities under the cognizance
of the Bureau of Ships, 1 September 1944

115

24

Officer Personnel, 1940-1945

118

25

Summary - procurement, training and assignments of
Reserve Officers, BuShips, December 1942 through December 1945

121

26

Summary - BuShips Reserve Officers indoctrinated January 1943 to December 1945.

122

27

Summary of Training Input, December 1942 to December 1945

123

28

Technical Officers assigned duty from Indoctrination or
Naval Reserve Midshipman Schools, December 1942 to December 1945

124

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TABLES, Cont'd

Table No.

Page

29

Educational background of WAVE Officers in BuShips

136

30

WAVE Officers and V-10's assigned to BuShips and its Activities

141

31

Number of shipyards building, repairing and converting (selected periods)

166

32

Geographical list of shipyards as of 10 July 1943

170-74

33

Facilities expansion, June 1940 to November 1945

186

34

Dollar value of Certificates of Necessity sponsored by BuShips

188

35

Analysis of major salvage operations under NObs 36, December 1941 to December 1945.

284

36

Foreign Ship Repair

303-04

37

U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Program - Authorising Acts, 1934 to 1942

318

38

Ship construction or acquisition by Authorization Acts, January 1942 to January 1944

319

39

New construction and conversions directed by CNO or SecNav, 1942 to 1943.

329-30

40

Major changes in precedence of Naval vessels, 1941 to 1943

333

41

Semi-annual estimated dollar value of construction and
maintenance appropriations only of ship completions, 1942 and 1943

357

42

New Construction, conversions and acquisitions by number of vessels and tonnage completed, by type,

358

43

New Construction completed, 1942 and 1943 - Combatant, Mine Craft and Patrol Craft

359

44

New construction completed, 1942 and 1943 -Auxiliaries

360

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TABLES, Cont'd

Table No.

Page

45

New construction completed, 1942 and 1943 - District Craft

361

46

New construction completed, 1942 and 1943 - Landing Craft

362

47

Vessels and tonnage converted, 1942 and 1943 - Combatant, Mine Craft, Patrol Craft and Auxiliaries

363-64

48

Total conversions and acquisitions - Auxiliaries, District Craft, Landing Craft, Small Boats, 1942 and 1943

365

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CHARTS

Chart No.

Page

VI

Organization chart, BuShips, 23 October 1942

15

VII

Personnel on board, BuShips, Navy Department, January 1940 to June 1945

70

VIII

Civilian personnel in BuShips, Navy Department, by type of service, 1941 to 1945

74

IX

Civilian personnel in BuShips, Navy Department, by type of service,
shown as a percentage of total civilian personnel, 1941 to 1945

75

X

Private and Naval Shipyards in geographical sequence, as of 10 July 1943

169

XI

Proposed organization chart of CMP Section

238

XII

Tabulation showing, by quarters, controlled material estimated requirements,
peak allotments by BuShips and peak allotments to BuShips by OP&M

239

XIII

Cumulative tonnage completed of new construction, January 1942 to January 1944

356

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PART III

DEFENSIVE WAR AND TURNING OF THE TIDE

DEC, 7. 1941 - AUGUST 1943

The First 21 Months

CHAPTER VI

DEFENSIVE STRATEGY AND THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

VI. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY AND THE BUREAU

On the peaceful Sunday morning 7 December 1941, the Japanese hurled a devastating attack upon the United States Fleet based at Pearl Harbor while her representatives in Washington were still engaged in discussions, presumably in the interest of preventing war. The attack was essentially an air raid, although there were some 45-ton submarines which participated.

As will be discussed at length in Chapter VII, the primary objectives of the Japanese were clearly the heavy ships in the harbor. Our previous study of the comparative fleets and our further perusal in this chapter of the fleet at the time of the attack illustrate the Japanese reasons for attempting to balance the capital ship ratio.

Although at Pearl Harbor on that fateful morning our forces had evidenced "lack of alertness", the United States Navy throughout the world could not be accused of a state of unpreparedness.

Despite Congressional budgetary limitations, the Navy, for twenty years in its program of readiness, worked under schedules of operation in competitive training and inspection unparalleled in any other Navy of the world. Fleet problem tactical exercises, amphibious operations with the Marines and Army, aviation, gunnery, engineering, communications were all integrated in a closely packed annual operations schedule. This in turn was supplemented by special activities ashore and afloat calculated to train individuals in the fundamentals of their duties and at the same time give them the background of experience so necessary for sound advances in the various techniques of Naval warfare. Ship competitions established for the purpose of stimulating and maintaining interest were

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climaxed by a realistic fleet maneuver held, once a year with the object of giving officers in the higher command experience and training in strategy and tactics approximating these responsibilities in time of war. To the technical bureaus, such as the Bureau of Ships, these maneuvers proved of inestimable value. Our peace time training operations and administrative preparations, which had involved hard work and many long hours of constructive thinking at long last were ready to pay dividends.

In other elements of our fighting strength also we were rapidly becoming more able to cope with an engagement in full scale warfare. As we have seen the so-called Two-Ocean Navy bill of 19 July 1940 provided for an expansion of about 70% in our combat tonnage - the largest single building program ever undertaken by any country. The Navy Department had already initiated expansion of Naval shipbuilding facilities in private yards and in Navy yards.

In many instances, particularly in Navy Yards, the expansion provided facilities which were to be available for repair as well as new construction. At the time of the Two-Ocean Navy bill's passage, expansion of general industry also occurred to meet the requirements of the shipbuilding program beginning with plants producing raw materials. Under such a situation did the United States find itself drawn into World War II.

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I. BALANCE OF THE FLEET

However great the dynamic situation of the comparative fleet prior to 1941, this one year became the "year of decision". In a desperate effort to overcome a noticeable disadvantage, the Japanese doubled their tonnage under construction, while their major combatant vessels on hand also enjoyed a perceptible increase of over 150,000 tons. Their emphasis rested upon aircraft carriers primarily and light cruisers secondarily during this pre-war preparation.

At first glance, Japan’s naval status at the moment of the war's outbreak appeared to suffer considerable inferiority. The Nipponese fleet of 285 major combatant vessels at that time totaled approximately one and one-half million tons. Great Britain and the United States, however, possessed a combined sea power of 1,200 vessels amounting to five and one-half million tons. In light of this decided disadvantage the declaration of war by the Japanese appeared suicidal. Table 14 however may offer sane reason behind the diabolical scheme of the Japanese.

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TABLES 14

BALANCE OF FLEETS

BEFORE PEARL HARBOR 1 DECEMBER 1941

MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS

UNITED STATES

On Hand

Under Construction

Total

No.

Tons

No.

Tons

No.

Tons

Battleships

17

531,300

15

700,000

32

1,231,300

Aircraft Carriers

6

134,800

12

320,100

18

151,900

Heavy Cruisers

18

171,200

14

269,200

32

440,100

Light Cruisers

19

157,775

10

368,000

59

525,775

Destroyers

171

236,920

193

371,590

361

608,510

Submarines

112

117,130

74

110,850

186

227,980

Total

343

1,352,125

318

2,139,710

691

3,191,865

GREAT BRITAIN

Battleships

14

113,950

7

270,000

21

713,950

Aircraft Carriers

8

161,100

3

69,000

11

230,100

Heavy Cruisers

16

157,030

-

-

16

157,030

Light Cruisers

50

313,180

16

102,500

66

115,980

Destroyers

205 (a)

267,489

69

117,535

271 (a)

385,021

Submarines

58

54,697

61

17,810

119

102,537

Total

351

1,397,746

156

606,875

507

2,004,621

JAPAN

Battleships

11

357,000

1

15,000

12

102,000

Aircraft Carriers

10

178,070

8(b)

200,800

18

378,870

Heavy Cruisers

18

217,000

-

-

18

217,000

Light Cruisers

17

81,805

4

24,000

21

105,805

Destroyers

102

151,605

22

11,550

121

199,155

Submarines

71

107,393

18

30,027

92

137,120

Total

232

1,095,873

53

344,377

285

1,110,250

 

(a) Does not include Hunt Class Escort Destroyers, 49 of 56,703 tons under construction and 37 of 33,460 tons built.

(b) Includes 3 vessels of 71,000 tons in the process of being converted to aircraft carriers.

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U.S.S. WISCONSIN
Another ship under construction at the time of Pearl Harbor, two years later is launched to owing a more favorable balance of naval power.

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The British necessity of "bottling up" the German Fleet reduced the Pacific warfare to an engagement almost solely between Japan and the United States. At the same time, however, the United States were also required to maintain a supply line to Great Britain and to its expeditionary force against the Germans as well as to fight the excessive submarine warfare being waged by the Germans.

Having reasoned to this extent therefore, the Japanese undoubtedly studied the statistics as illustrated in the accompanying Table 14.

Japan had a total tonnage on hand of over 1,000,000 which the United States exceeded by only one-quarter million tons. By the end of 1941, the United States had well over two million tons under construction as compared to Japan's one-third million. The Nipponese concluded therefore that the time had arrived if they ever were to strike.

The strategy of a surprise attack being established, the problem then became one of determining upon which class or classes of ships to concentrate their blows. Table 14 depicts the relative strength of the three navies by class of ships. Although enjoying a superiority in aircraft carriers and an equality in cruisers, the Japanese suffered by comparison in battleships and destroyers. A concentration of desired targets being presented them in Pearl Harbor, the Nipponese formulated their treacherous plane and on 7 December 1941 put it into execution.

The result of this attack and the United States efforts to overcome the devastation are fully discussed in Chapter VII. The immediate effect

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upon our Fleet, however, may be summarized approximately as follows:

5 battleships totalling 150,000 tons sunk
4 battleships totalling 120,000 tons damaged
5 cruisers of 26,000 tons damaged
3 destroyers totalling 4,500 tons sunk

Also damaged or sunk:

1 aircraft carrier
1 repair ship
1 floating drydock
1 tug

Whatever degree of success this attack may have seemed to the Japanese, the extent of the damage to the United States naval power was serious. In an hour of utter darkness the only light seemed to be the absence of the aircraft carriers from Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. If the Allied inferiority in this class had been more severely jeopardized at that time, the fleet's ensuing retaliation against the enemy would have been rendered almost completely impossible.

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II. STRATEGY

The comparative statistics listed above illustrate to some extent the situation facing the United States Navy as a whole and the Bureau of Ships in particular when this country was catapulted into World War II. The tremendous shipbuilding and salvage task, compounded by the European war requirements, pressed upon the newly formed Bureau a program of incredible magnitude.

Although we had made some progress, our armed forces and our production still were not adequately expanded to permit our taking the overall offensive in any theatre. In both oceans we assumed the defensive while preparations for an amphibious war were intensified.

In the Atlantic our primary concern centered upon maintaining our lines of communications to Great Britain and other bases of future operations. The Germans presented a formidable foe in their submarines and air forces in the battle for the Atlantic, while their surface forces constituted a constant threat. The United States program, therefore became one of anti-submarine or escort vessels, landing craft for the projected invasions and auxiliary vessels for supply and transport.

In the Pacific we were immediately placed on the defensive and the first task became one of halting the onrushing Japanese tide. Only after that could the turning and over-running of the tide come to pass. Expansion of the fleet in every class of ships, the development of a landing craft program, the establishment of a line of advanced bases, the emphasis upon aircraft carrier production after early battle losses which further increased our inferiority, and the extension of our submarines

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into the far reaches of the Pacific were the main elements of the overall strategy at the war's inception.

The basis of this strategy being based to a considerable degree upon the shipbuilding program, the Bureau of Ships was to play a role second to none. The ensuing chapters of this section reveal the Bureau's matter and manner of execution of this role during the defensive and turning of the tide phases of the war.

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III. IMPACT UPON THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

Although the impact of the Pearl Harbor attack upon the Navy Department was tremendous, it apparently left responsible officers little time to concern themselves with purely organizational matters. Proposals to merge the shipbuilding and design divisions to avoid administrative difficulties, however, were discussed within the Bureau.

The urgency of the need for increased delivery of ships of all types particularly landing craft, added to the problem of defining the prospective responsibilities of the shipbuilding group interested primarily in expediting production and the design section concerned equally with matters of improvement in design to incorporate lessons learned as the result of combat operation and volume production.

Although the period prior to Pearl Harbor required responsible officers to work overtime and to overcome what often seemed to be impossible barriers to the completion of vessels or equipment, the period immediately thereafter was even more hectic and did not leave any one much time for careful consultation and coordination of his activities with all other interested groups. The result was that strong differences of opinion as to proper procedure and policies developed between shipbuilding and design. Although some sort of reorganization proved to be inevitable, the form it should take became a matter of extended controversy. An independent management survey brought to light three closely related basic organization problems:

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(1) What should be the relation between the different sets of ship type desks of the Design, Maintenance and shipbuilding Divisions?

(2) What should be the proper interrelation of the ship type desk of the three divisions and the technical sections in design?

(3) What were the proper duties and responsibilities of the operating divisions, particularly the Shipbuilding Division?

The original bureau organization did not provide for the creation of ship type desks in the Shipbuilding Division, for the Development and Design Branch Desks were believed adequate to care for all plan action necessary in the building of a ship. The creation of the type desk in shipbuilding, probably justified as a means of simplifying shipbuilding responsibility for expediting, soon led to the duplication of many of the functions of the Design Desks, to the confusion and consternation of personnel in the Bureau and shipyards.

The difficulties in clarifying the relations between ship type desks and technical sections often stemmed from differences in personalities, although in this early war period the greatest pressure was being exerted on all hands for the rapid procurement of equipment and completed vessels. The type desk as organized was considered responsible for the production or maintenance of a given type of ship.

The technical desk, not concerned about types of ships but specific machines, material and pieces of equipment, did not interest itself with the progress of a particular program. This division, without very carefully established controls and procedures, led sometimes to

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the duplication of effort and to overlapping as pressures developed first in one area and then another. A strong type desk head, seeing his ship delayed as the result of a failure to obtain delivery of a generator, found it difficult to accept the promise of the technical desk to expedite delivery. His natural inclination, and often his practice, was to get in touch with the manufacturer without reference to the technical desk. On the other hand, a technical desk having difficulty filling all the demands of the various type desks for a particular type of equipment might often wish and sometimes did get in touch with the various shipbuilders to establish to their own satisfaction the relative need for this equipment and to redistribute the available supply. Being the group with engineering knowledge of the equipment, they also wished to deal directly with the shipbuilder on technical, questions. The management survey believed that the ideal would be attained if type desks were the sole source of authority in dealing with the shipyard, and the technical desk the sole source of authority in dealing with the manufacturer of the material or equipment.

The final problem mentioned above is the definition of the responsibility of the Shipbuilding Division. One reason for the confusion which existed at that time was the fact that in the rapid expansion of the Bureau the Division was assigned a variety of miscellaneous activities and responsibilities that did not seem to fit into other parts of the new organisation. Thus it acquired the merchant ship conversion program, a job that functionally should have gone to Maintenance, and also a miscellaneous lot of patrol craft and non-standard boats, a job which

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should have been assigned to the Design Division. Within the Shipbuilding Division, there developed a certain amount of overlapping, particularly with regard to scheduling and estimating of materials, facilities and delivery. Again, this resulted from rapid growth and new demands being placed on the Bureau as the result of the creation of the Office of Production Management and the need for better estimates and tighter controls.

A decision was finally reached on these matters and on 16 November 1942, the Shipbuilding Division and the Design Division were consolidated into a new shipbuilding division. As a part of the general reorganization, two outstanding officers were assigned to assume leadership in this unparalleled construction program. Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) E. L. Cochrane, USN, with an outstanding record in ship design of all classes, became Chief of the Bureau of Ships. Bear Admiral (nov Vice Admiral) E. W. Mills, USN, whose valuable experience as engineering officer in all branches of the Navy balanced so well with Admiral Cochrane's background, became Assistant Chief of the Bureau. As described in Chapter XVIII these two officers throughout the entire war provided the forceful leadership and inspiration so vitally required by the greatly expanded Bureau. Also, at this time it was decided that the great expansion in the volume of work in the fields of radio, radar and underwater sound justified the granting of division status to the former Radio and Sound Branch of the Design Division.

This resulted in the organization, presented in Chart VI.

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During 1942 the problem of scheduling and materials control became one of paramount importance. The general shortage of materials and over-taxation of industrial resources made it essential that the Bureau be able to determine with accuracy its needs for material and equipment as determined by shipyard production schedules. The establishment of the Controlled Materials Plan by the War Production Board (described in detail in Chapter X) precipitated the issue and delegated to the Bureau of Ships many new functions, particularly the preparation of detailed requirements for controlled materials and the allotment of materials under CMP.

In peacetime, when materials, facilities and labor were abundant, the Navy and the Bureau could decentralize detailed shipbuilding and component scheduling to contractors and manufacturers. Under war conditions neither contractors nor the Navy had full control of the planning and scheduling of ship programs. These programs competed with Army, aircraft, Maritime, Lend Lease, civilian, and other needs for materials, machines and men, there not being enough to go around. The problem faced by the Bureau therefore was new, both in magnitude and in complexity. Under the conditions prevailing in 1942 and 1943 planning and scheduling work in the Bureau proved of critical importance.

These new developments required an unusual expansion of personnel. The Scheduling and Statistics Section of the Shipbuilding Division, the central planning and statistical control activity, assumed major responsibility for the operations of CMP in the Bureau of Ships. In the Construction Branch of the Shipbuilding Division and in the Maintenance Division, however it

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also became necessary to assign personnel for the purpose of handling certain specialized functions and of preparing basic data to be processed by the general statistical control group. Major type desks had from one to five persons working on scheduling, statistics and reports while from one to seven persons worked on expediting and progressing.

Technical desks had to make similar provisions to fulfill their duties.

By March 1943 the Shipbuilding, Maintenance and Radio Divisions of the Bureau of Ships had a total personnel of 3919 people. Of these 435 were on materials estimating and allotting, 587 on scheduling, statistics and reports, 278 on progressing and expediting, and 2619 on design and other activities of the Bureau.

In effect, one employee in every three of the Bureau was involved in planning, scheduling, statistical, progressing and expediting work,

Of the total of 1300 people so employed, 718 or well over half were in the Scheduling and Statistics Section. This latter figure compares with a corresponding total of 162 employees at the end of April 1942.

The expansion of the planning and control functions of the Bureau indicated above is a reflection of, first, the stage of development of the shipbuilding program and, second, the major role of the Bureau once the shipbuilding program had gotten under way. By early 1943 ships of all types building and converting had reached a point close to the peak production load of which American industry was capable. In February 1943, slightly less than seven millions of tons of vessels were under construction. (The peak period reported was reached in January 1944, when something over 8,600,000 tons of vessels of all types were

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building or being converted.) Another reason for the tremendous expansion in work load was the extreme urgency of certain critical programs requiring the tightest possible control. First landing craft and then destroyer escorts were required for vital military objectives, and in such quantities that all possible energy had to be devoted to the procurement of the many thousands of items of equipment.

The expansion of the Bureau organization responsible for control and expediting of the program also reflected organizational changes within the department, as in January 1942 the Office of Procurement and Material had been established under the direction of Vice Admiral S. M. Robinson, former Chief of the Bureau. Functions and procedures of the Office of Procurement and Material are the subject of a separate history; however, its existence and reports required by it affected the type of organization which was established within the Bureau. Liaison with the War Production Board and other procurement agencies was centered in the Office of Procurement and Material, and the important function of representing the Navy's interests before the Requirements Committee of the War Production Board was delegated to the O.P.&M.

Another important development arising out of departmental change was the creation of a new legal office in the Bureau. The procurement Legal Division of the Under-Secretary's Office, established under the administration of H. Struve Hensel in August 1941, promptly assigned a special attorney representing that office to the Bureau of Ships. Prior to this addition, the only legal group in the Bureau existed in the Contracts Branch, which was staffed solely by officers with limited commercial legal experience. In a relatively short space of time the new representative of the Secretary's Office

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added to the Bureau staff experienced lawyers to advise negotiating officer.

The next major step was the creation of the Officer of Counsel for the Bureau of Ships. On 13 December 1942 the Secretary of the Navy directed a general reorganization of procurement procedures in the Navy Department. This reorganization granted the Chief of the Bureau of Ships discretion to determine the extent to which contracts would be prepared and executed in the Bureau of Ships and the extent to which the services of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts would be used for the negotiation, preparation, and execution of contracts. Prior to the 13 December 1942 directive procurement of materials under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships had been divided between it and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. The Bureau of Ships made and executed directly the greater portion of negotiated contracts, at least in respect to money value, for such subjects as major and minor combatant vessels, auxiliary, patrol craft and landing craft, yard and district craft, shipbuilding and manufacturing facilities, main propelling machinery, design services, expediting services, and salvaging services. However, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts did prepare and execute a large number of contracts for such materials, equipment, and small boats as were initiated by this Bureau and the various continental Navy Yards, but this arrangement gave rise to inconsistencies and delay. A clear line of demarkation for those contracts which were to be negotiated by the Bureau of Ships and those which were to be delivered by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts did not exist. Frequently the same contractor held separate contracts with the two Bureaus for the same type of article. The differences in contract administration

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inevitably resulted in considerable confusion.

The discretion granted the Chief of the Bureau to extend the field of the Bureau of Ships direct procurements was exercised cautiously. By mid 1943 auxiliary equipment for new construction, materials to repair battle damage and contracts covering the repair and alteration of naval vessels been added to the contracts normally negotiated directly by the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts vas left only the preparation and execution of  contracts covering purchase of stock materials, including those covered by annual contracts, non-urgent items of equipment for normal maintenance, personal service contracts, and equipment and materials commonly purchased by more than one Bureau, although under the primary cognisance of the Bureau of Ships, such as radio, radar, and sound material and equipment. This division afforded a clear line of demarkation which accelerated the procurement of those items primarily involving technical consideration and where time was of the greatest importance.

The organization of the Office of Counsel in the Bureau of Ships had other beneficial effects. Prior to the reorganization, procurement legal services were the responsibility of three distinct organizations, viz: The Procurement Legal Division of the Office of the Under Secretary, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, the Contract Branch of the Bureau of Ships. Under this system the approval of as many as eight attorneys was required for contracts and other legal documents. The Office of Counsel officially established by Administrative Order on 18 June 1943 centralized within the Bureau all matters of legal procurement. The rescinding of orders and directives requiring the reference of the Judge Advocate General definitely reduced the time

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required to prepare, execute and distribute negotiated contracts.

The other major action taken within the Bureau was to designate the Finance Office of the Administrative division a separate Division on 9 February 1942. Administratively this action affected the other parts of the Bureau slightly, if at all, and was presumably justified by the reduction of the burdens placed upon the head of the Administrative Division and the increase in prestige accruing to the head of the Finance Division in negotiations with Congressional Committees, the Bureau of the Budget, and other parts of the Bureau and Navy Department.

Although minor changes also took place which tended to strengthen the organizational structure, the above modifications proved the major ones during the first half of the war.

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CHAPTER VII

PEARL HARBOR

DEATH AND REJUVENATION

CHAPTER VII

DEATH AND REJUVENATION AT PEARL HARBOR

A. WAR.

On 7 December 1941 the premeditated, murderous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, intended to cripple American naval power, hurled the United States into World War II against the Axis powers. Before the fires had died at the scene of the catastrophe, key naval and civilian personnel were flying to Pearl Harbor to meet under the administrative command of Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to determine the damage suffered by the attack and to lay plans for the salvage and repair.

Captain Edvard L. Cochrane, future Chief of the Bureau of Ships and then assistant head of the Bureau’s Design Division, accompanied the Secretary of the Navy, the late Frank Knox, to Pearl Harbor. After grave consultation, the higher brackets of command devised an overall salvage and repair, plan, the Bureau of Ships being the principal technical bureau concerned.

All activities endorsed the appointment of Captain Homer N. Wallin, U.S. Navy, an Engineering Duty Only officer and at that time Fleet Salvage officer, to assume complete charge of salvage work at Pearl Harbor.

Because of its factual content and excellent historical summary of the situation, Captain Wallin's report on the problems presented and how they were conquered in the salvage of the damaged ships is quoted in full from the December 1946, issue of "The United States Naval Institute Proceedings".

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B. REJUVENATION AT PEARL HARBOR

Disaster to General MacArthur’s land and air forces in Leyte would certainly have come if the Japanese Fleet had not been decisively defeated by American Naval forces in the Battle for Leyte Gulf in October, 1944. It was a narrow squeak, but the final outcome was the utter rout of the Japanese sea forces. Hirohito’s ships suffered such destruction and damage that never again could they be assembled as a major fighting force.

A most striking aspect of the battle occurred at Surigao Strait where the southern prong of the Japanese Fleet was met and destroyed by the American Seventh Fleet.

It was a matter of great satisfaction to many Americans, and it must have been a bitter pill for the Japanese, to realize that five of the six battleships of the force which thus polished off the Sons of Heaven had been damaged at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Several of those Pearl Harbor battleships had already taken part in the landings in the Aleutians, at Tarawa, and in the Marianas; one had fought through the Normandy landings; all were yet to contribute mightily to the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Thus before the war ended nearly all of the ships which were sunk or damaged on December 7 came back to avenge in fullest measure the Japanese treachery at Pearl Harbor.

Regarding the salvage and repair of the vessels sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor, there has been much misunderstanding in the public mind. Indeed, the public has for over four years thirsted for authentic information on every aspect of Pearl Harbor. Many persons have wanted to know details of torpedo and bomb damage, and specific causes for the sinking of our ships. Others, and especially those with a technical bent, have desired some knowledge as to methods of refloating and rehabilitation.

A Committee of Congress has explored most exhaustively what occurred before the events of December 7, without enlightening the public fully on many controversial points. The review of any disaster usually discloses that the facts which precede it are confused by views and opinions in great number and intensity, and the separation of fact and opinion becomes increasingly difficult with the lapse of time. Pearl Harbor was no exception.

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After the fire - Battered by aerial torpedoes and bomb hits, the 31,800 ton U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA (nearest ship) rests on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Fire following the explosions as well as oil flames from the nearby sunken U.S.S. ARIZONA added extensively to the damage. Note the wrecked scout plane topside of gun turret at right and the overturned plane in the right hand corner. U.S.S. TENNESSEE is in the Background.

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86 SHIPS PRESENT - 9 WERE SUNK

What occurred during and after the attack is much more factual. We know, for instance, that out of a total of 86 naval vessels in the harbor during the attack only 9 were sunk and 10 others were damaged severely. True, five of our battleships and one large target ship rested on the bottom of the harbor which was dredged to a depth of about 40 feet; three destroyers were sunk in drydock. The total count by number, type, and nature of damage was as follows:

ARIZONA, battleship, struck by one torpedo (possible) and about eight bombs of various sizes. One large bomb, of about 2000 pounds armor-piercing, apparently entered the powder magazines forward and caused the virtual disintegration of the forward half of the ship. A terrific oil fire burned for two days. Inasmuch as the torpedo hit has not been confirmed, it is likely that the Arizona was destroyed by bombs alone.

OKLAHOMA, battleship, struck by about four aerial torpedoes causing a very rapid inflow of water which resulted in the capsizing of the vessel within about eleven minutes.

The ship rested on the bottom at an angle of 150° from upright. Only a small segment of the bottom and the starboard bilge were visible above the water.

CALIFORNIA, battleship, was struck by two aerial torpedoes and one bomb. Another bomb which was a near-miss exploded close aboard and opened a large hole in the ship's port side. Another near-miss fell off the starboard bow but caused only minor damage. The CALIFORNIA stayed afloat for over three days but gradually settled until her main deck aft was about 17 feet under water.

WEST VIRGINIA, battleship, was struck by 7 aerial torpedoes and 2 bombs. The ship sank rapidly and rested on hard bottom. Fire damage throughout the ship was severe.

NEVADA, battleship, was struck by one aerial torpedo and five bombs of various sizes. The vessel was able to get underway but the continued inflow of water necessitated beaching her near the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor. She was severely damaged by fire.

UTAH, an old battleship used as an aerial target, was probably struck by three torpedoes. The vessel capsized and came to rest on the bottom 165 from the upright position.

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PENNSYLVANIA, battleship, was in drydock and was struck by one medium-sized bomb which caused considerable topside damage and a number of personnel casualties.

MARYLAND, battleship, was struck by two bombs forward which caused considerable flooding and trimmed the bow down about five feet.

TENNESSEE, battleship, was struck by two large bombs which caused minor damage to one turret and several major caliber guns. The limited damage was due to low orders of detonation. The ship suffered serious damage aft due to oil fire on the water near the ARIZONA.

HELENA, light cruiser, was struck by one aerial torpedo which caused destruction of about half of the main machinery, and considerable flooding.

OGLALA, minelayer, was struck by the pressure wave from the explosion of the aerial torpedo which hit the HELENA. The side of this 40-year old vessel was opened up, and uncontrolled flooding caused her to capsize and lie on her side in 40 feet of water.

HONOLULU, light cruiser, suffered side damage from the near-miss of a medium-sized bomb, causing considerable flooding and damage to electrical wiring.

RALEIGH, light cruiser, was struck by one aerial torpedo amidships which destroyed about half of the main machinery. One bomb hit aft caused extensive flooding.

VESTAL, repair ship, was. struck by two bombs causing considerable local damage and serious flooding aft.

CURTISS, aircraft tender, was struck by one large bomb, which caused serious local damage. Also, one Japanese plane which had been hit by anti-aircraft fire crashed into a crane of the Curtiss and caused some damage.

SHAW, destroyer, was struck by three small bombs which caused great damage including the blowing up of the forward magazines, thus wrecking the forward third of the ship. The vessel was on a floating drydock at the time of the attack.

FLOATING DRYDOCK NO. 2 was struck by five bombs which destroyed its water-tight subdivision and caused it to sink to the bottom together with the destroyer SHAW and the small yard tug SOTOYOMO.

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Wrecked U.S.S. DOWNES (DD-375) at left and U.S.S. CASSIN (DD-372) at right. In the rear is the U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA (BB-38) 33,100 ton flagship of the Pacific Fleet, which suffered only light damage and was repaired after the attack. Main and auxiliary machinery fittings of the DOWNES and CASSIN are being transferred to new hulls.

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CASSIN and DOWNES, destroyers, were docked abreast of each other in a graving drydock. These vessels were struck by three small bombs which exploded on the bottom of the drydock. Hundreds of fragments caused very extensive damage to the hulls and started oil fires which grew to great intensity. The combination of bomb explosions, oil fires and flooding caused the CASSIN to fall off the blocks and against the DOWNES. The first appraisal indicated that these two vessels were total losses.

TYPE AND INTENSITY OF JAPANESE ATTACK

From the general description of damage listed above, it will be noted that severest damage was suffered by the battleships and that most of such damage resulted from aerial torpedoes. It is clear the Japanese strategy was to cripple the backbone of the American Navy and that they had adapted the aerial torpedo for use in shallow waters to a degree which made it indeed a lethal weapon. It is interesting to note that the aerial torpedo was an American invention which came back to bite us. Likewise the Japanese used dive bombing, another American development, very successfully against our ships.

It is fortunate that none of our few aircraft carriers was present in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, as later events proved the dire need for and the extreme shortage of vessels of this type. The Japanese claimed the sinking of a carrier at the berth occupied by the UTAH - they knew that the SARATOGA was usually moored there when in port.

From Japanese sources the fact has now been established that the attack on Pearl Harbor was made in great strength.

The naval force which eventually launched its planes about 200 miles north of Oahu consisted of 6 aircraft carriers, 5 battleships, 30 destroyers and a few auxiliaries. The Japanese have stated that they launched 361 planes, of which all returned except 27. The armament carried by these various planes is not at present a matter of record. It is known, however, that every plane had a specific mission. A large number were assigned to bomb and put out of commission allair fields in the Hawaiian Islands, such as Hickam, Ford Island, Bellows, Kaneohe, and Ewa. Of the planes assigned to attack naval vessels in the harbor, a large proportion no doubt were armed with torpedoes having large explosive charges.

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JAPANESE MISSION AT PEARL HARBOR

The real objective of the Japanese was to cripple the American Fleet, but the first requisite was the destruction of all American air power on the Hawaiian Islands. This latter was accomplished to an extent which seemed unbelievable to officers of the Fleet. For example, when the writer inquired of a fellow officer on the CALIFORNIA why our aircraft were not attacking the Japanese' bombers swarming overhead, the answer was that ours had all been destroyed on the ground, which was almost a factual statement.

It was ascertained from some of the Japanese planes which were shot down that each pilot had specific instructions and a very clear chart of Pearl Harbor indicating to him the target he was to attack. It might be mentioned that these charts were essentially correct even as to location of specific ships, thus indicating the accuracy of Nipponese espionage -which of course was impossible to prevent in view of the terrain and other considerations.

Naturally the Japanese, even with the large number of planes at their disposal, could not attack all targets which were of major importance. For instance, no attack was made on the extensive facilities of the Navy Yard except in the case of two drydocks which held several ships. No real damage was suffered by the large array of shops and work facilities for repairing ships, which proved of such tremendous value to the nation from December 7 onward. Likewise, the tremendous oil stowage adjacent to Pearl Harbor was not attacked at all, and it was wondered why the Japanese failed to drop at least a few bombs which might have started a conflagration that would have proved disastrous, especially to the mobility of the undamaged vessels of the Fleet in the days to follow December 7.

MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

Aside from the material damage to our Fleet, the Japanese were successful in accomplishing the premeditated murder of nearly 3,100 Navy men at Pearl Harbor on that typically beautiful Hawaiian morning of Sunday, December 7. Additional lives were snuffed out elsewhere in the Hawaiian Islands, particularly at air fields and in civilian areas. Several unsuspecting civilians who were flying their personal aircraft that morning were shot down by Japanese war planes.

Unlike most occurrences of the calamitous nature there apparently was nobody who could say "I told you so." The savage and unprincipled act of a leading world power came as a wholly unexpected shock. A thing deemed impossible in this age of enlightenment and peaceful purpose had actually occurred. To

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most persons it seemed like a horrible dream from which one struggles to be released by waking. But waking consisted of a gradual realization of the fact that the stealthy Japanese had been successful in seriously crippling our sea and air power and murdering a large number of our nationals.

Some critical comment has been passed to the effect that personnel engaged in national defense should have anticipated such an attack from the Japanese. Well, as an afterthought it is always easy to see where persons might have acted differently or thought differently. But in this case our military personnel, and civilian too in Hawaii, had approximately the same viewpoint toward the Japanese problem as did the whole American people. That viewpoint is hard to describe but included the fallacious conclusion that the Japanese were trying to get along peaceably in the world and that they would shrink from warring against a country as powerful as ours. The vicious thing which occurred was not within our horizons of thought; such an outrage simply "could not happen here."

DESTRUCTION AND FIRE

Torpedo and bomb explosions wrought much damage and initiated fires of great intensity. Tons of fuel oil were loosed on the water and burned furiously as the stiff trade wind shifted it from one end of the harbor to the other. The dense smoke from the conflagration on and around the ARIZONA was visible for many miles.

The harbor was soon filled with debris from sinking and damaged war ships; many injured small boats were adrift. Fragments of Japanese aircraft also littered the harbor. The whole sky over the harbor was dotted with shell bursts from our anti-aircraft guns. Some vessels, like the ARIZONA, sank to the bottom very rapidly; others responded to the valiant efforts of their crews to keep them afloat. Some ships showed serious lists due to acute damage. The OKLAHOMA capsized through an arc of 150° within ten or twelve minutes after the attack began; the UTAH was more leisurely.

OUR SHIPS STRIKE BACK

The Japanese attackers were brought under anti-aircraft fire almost immediately, — as soon as it was realized that the Japanese had struck with lethal intent. In accordance with Fleet instructions all ships had certain guns manned and ammunition at hand. Prompt action was taken to man other guns and to start the flow of ammunition. On some ships this was

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impeded by the damage suffered in the initial stages — damage such as severe flooding, listing, oil fires on board, loss of power and light. Oil flooding within the ship was a great handicap because of deadly fumes and impossible footing on inclined linoleum decks. In spite of all obstacles and although suffering from the shock of extreme surprise, the ships' personnel gave a magnificent account of themselves. Their anti-aircraft fire was reasonably accurate and effective. It was estimated at the time that approximately 40 Japanese aircraft were shot down at Pearl Harbor, as against the later Japanese statements that 27 failed to return.

Although rocked back on their heels, our sailormen quickly rose to the occasion and demonstrated the traditional American fighting spirit. Deeds of great valor and self-sacrifice were commonplace. Every person devoted his full efforts toward fighting off the enemy, saving the stricken ships, fighting fires, alleviating suffering, and rescuing shipmates. The nation and the Navy may well feel proud of the manner in which the crews of our warships conducted themselves.

Space does not permit the recording of the many outstanding examples of heroism and sacrifice. However, on one battleship an officer busied himself pushing the smaller person through a 12-inch airport while he remained trapped and went down with the ship. When the Oklahoma capsized it was soon ascertained from hammer signals that a considerable number of persons were trapped in the bottom compartments of the ship, such compartments then being above water or within air bubbles. A rescue group was immediately organized to free as many men as possible. Holes were cut in the exposed bottom of the Oklahoma mostly by hand tools to release these men. In this manner men were rescued from certain death over a period of 36 hours.

ONE TASK FORCE AT SEA

It might be mentioned that at the time of the action at Pearl Harbor the Pacific Fleet was divided into three task forces and that it was customary for one or two task forces to be at sea in conformity with a drastic training schedule. Such schedules included war games in which one task force might be pitted against another. Thus there was always one task force at Pearl Harbor for refueling, supplies, recreation, and rest. This latter part of the schedule was of course essential as personnel must have a reasonable amount of rest and recreation to forestall staleness in training. On December 7 it happened that two task forces

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were at Pearl Harbor and only one task force at sea. Possibly the Japanese had access to information regarding the Fleet schedule -- or possibly it was merely luck on their part that they found two task forces available as targets. Regardless of the amount of information which might have been in possession of the Japanese, the fact is that one task force composed essentially of cruisers was at sea. This task force immediately set out to the westward in search of the enemy with the purpose of attacking and destroying him. However, we now know that the Japanese task force lay to the north of Hawaii and therefore was not sighted. As we now look back on the early days of the war it seems fortunate that our task force failed to contact the Japanese, for the greatly superior strength of the enemy task force might have caused us such losses as to greatly delay, if not prevent, the magnificent performance of our small Fleet in the dark months following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

EARLY ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The prompt arousal of the natural fighting spirit possessed by Americans following the shock of infamous attack was paralleled by immediate action toward ship repair and ship salvage. The splendid organizational procedure which pervades our Navy was brought into full play at once. The higher brackets of command were furnished from various sources well-considered estimates of the situation as regards extent of damage, time required for repairs, prospects of salvage, etc. The purpose of the high command was to accomplish the following:

(a) To make immediately available to our intact task force at sea all of the undamaged or lightly damaged warships in Pearl Harbor.
(b) To complete at the earliest possible date the regular overhauls which had been underway on a number of vessels assigned to the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.
(c) To expedite repair of damages to ships not too badly hurt in order that they might be ready to fight at the earliest possible date.
(d) To lay out a long-range program for the refloating and rehabilitation of vessels which had been sunk or seriously damaged.

The overall purpose was to handle the program of rehabilitation so as to insure being able to live up to the Navy’s high standard "of doing most with what we have" at

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any particular moment. In compliance with this program the ships with minor damage received first attention and were given the utmost priority.

Any estimate of the situation following a disaster or conflagration is almost certain to be pessimistic — this for the reason that superficial evidence thrusts itself before the eye and covers up values which are hidden underneath. Pearl Harbor was no exception, as was proved later.

First appraisals indicated the total loss of several ships which were later raised and saved and others from which the bulk of the machinery and equipment were salvaged and reinstalled in new hulls. However, it is interesting to note that the first official release of information to the public regarding the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor appeared overoptimistic to persons on the spot. When the President gave the American people in a radio address on February 24, 1942 the list of ships which were lost, it seemed highly improbable that the list would work out to be that short. The President’s statement, however, was accepted as the directive of the Fleet in connection with salvage and rehabilitation. Within four or five months the salvage work had proceeded so favorably that it was clear that the President’s list of losses could not only be met but considerably shortened.

START OF SALVAGE OPERATIONS

Salvage and rescue work began immediately following the attack, as was necessary to keep ships afloat and to prevent them from capsizing. Ships' crews worked day and night in damage control parties to prevent the spread of flooding, to reduce lists, to jettison topside weights, to fight fires, and to make essential repairs to keep ships' machinery and equipment in operation. Aid and assistance were furnished from other vessels, particularly repair ships and tenders. Civilian personnel from the Navy Yard lent a hand, as did other civilian personnel drawn from contracting firms.

Tugs like the ORTOLAN and WIDGEON which had great pumping capacity were invaluable. Other small craft aided wherever practicable. The lowly garbage lighter YG16, sometimes nicknamed the "Violet", won commendation for its 36-hour vigil fighting oil fires.

The VESTAL and RALEIGH -- While the officers and crews of all ships applied themselves to their jobs in accordance with the best traditions of the service, mention should be made of the VESTAL and the RALEIGH as outstanding cases of successful damage control work and consequent self-

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preservation. The VESTAL, a repair ship, was tied up alongside the ARIZONA when the attack began. This ship was struck by several bombs and eventually the Commanding Officer was blown overboard from the bridge by the concussion of severe explosion on the ARIZONA. He swam back to his ship, got her underway, and successfully beached her to prevent sinking. For his valor this plucky officer was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Later he commanded the heavy cruiser SAN FRANCISCO and was killed by Japanese shellfire in the night Battle of Guadalcanal.

The RALEIGH also put up an ideal fight for self-preservation. Due to torpedo and bomb damage a large portion of the vessel was flooded and she was in imminent danger of capsizing. Every measure and artifice known to damage control personnel was utilized to keep her afloat and upright, including the removal of many topside weights, many of which were thrown overboard but recovered later by divers.

The CALIFORNIA. — The damage to the CALIFORNIA was extensive, but strenuous efforts were made to keep her afloat. At one time it seemed probable that she might capsize as had the OKLAHOMA and UTAH, but this was prevented by appropriate remedial action by the Commanding Officer and the damage control organization. It was only the lack of adequate pumping capacity which prevented saving the CALIFORNIA. In spite of valiant efforts the flooding of the ship gained headway and soon all power on the ship was lost due to general flooding and to heavy smoke in the fire rooms. This originated from a serious fire on board. After three days the ship finally sank and rested on the bottom. It had been predicted that the soft nature of the bottom would not support the weight of the vessel and that she probably would sink out of sight. Fortunately, however, the CALIFORNIA finally stopped sinking when her main deck was about 17 feet underwater and with a list to port of 5 1/2 degrees. No more strenuous effort was ever made to keep a vessel afloat. It was a source of touching gratification to witness the deviated efforts of the young Americans comprising her crew as they stayed on their jobs for three days with little or no opportunity for rest or to remove the fuel oil with which they were smeared. For most of them their bill of fare for the period consisted almost entirely of sandwiches and coffee.

ORDNANCE MATERIAL — On December 7 a start was made in removing from severely damaged ships all of the anti-aircraft guns which could be more advantageously used elsewhere, and also ammunition and ordnance material such as range finders, spotting glasses, etc. There was a dearth of such material in the Hawaiian area, particularly around air fields, and it was therefore a welcome relief to see anti-aircraft guns installed

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around the Navy Yard and the Army’s Hickam Field.

INITIAL REPAIRS -- While preliminary salvage work proceeded, plans were developed for major salvage operations. At the same time repairs on damaged vessels were being prosecuted vigorously by all hands, particularly at the Navy Yard. The battleships and cruisers which were not severely damaged were put into condition to make them seaworthy and able to fight within a short time. Other vessels were drydocked for temporary repairs to permit passage to the West Coast navy yards for final repairs and installation of machinery and equipment which had been destroyed.

It should be understood that the many vessels which had not been damaged in any way, particularly destroyers and submarines, had put to sea following the attack, or as they were readied and supplied for offensive operations against the enemy.

SCHEDULE OF REPAIR WORK

On the basis of repairing ships in inverse order to the amount of damage suffered, the following schedule of repair work was carried out:

(a) There were three battleships which had received damage which could be repaired in a reasonably short time.

The Commander in Chief was particularly anxious to expedite repairs on these battleships in order to get them to sea.

All essential work was finished in about three weeks, consisting mainly of the following:

(1) The PENNSYLVANIA required replacement of one 5 inch 25 caliber anti-aircraft gun which, together with its foundation structure, was destroyed by a 500-pound Japanese bomb. A similar gun was removed from the WEST VIRGINIA and installed on the PENNSYLVANIA.

(2) The MARYLAND received two bomb hits on the forecastle. One of about 100 pounds exploded on the main deck and caused miscellaneous small damage affecting the watertightness of the forecastle deck. The second bomb of about 500 pounds passed through the port side of the ship about 12 feet under water and exploded in a storeroom near the keel. This explosion destroyed flats and bulkheads in the vicinity, and the fragments opened numerous leaks through the bottom and shell and scattered stored materials everywhere. It was an onerous job to stop these various leaks without going into drydock but inasmuch as the drydocks were at a premium the repair work on the MARYLAND was of a

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temporary nature. The effort was successful and the 5 or 6 foot trim by the head was corrected, but not without a very trying time.

(3) The TENNESSEE was hit by two large bombs, probably of the 15-in. shell type. One passed through the armored top plate of No. 3 turret. Fortunately, it was a dud and caused no serious damage. The other struck the center gun of No. 2 turret and caused a large crack which would necessitate the replacement of the gun. The most serious damage suffered by the TENNESSEE resulted from the continuous oil fires around her stem adjacent to the burning ARIZONA. In spite of all precautionary measures the heat started serious fires aft which spread forward as heavy layers of paint reached ignition temperatures.

Much of the hull plating became warped and some of the riveted joints were badly strained. Electric cables, including the degaussing lines, were burned out. Repairs were accomplished by working parties from repair ships and from the Navy Yard.

One of the most serious circumstances regarding the TENNESSEE was that she was wedged tightly between the sunken WEST VIRGINIA outboard and the concrete quay inboard. It was possible to move her only after the quay had been removed by successive applications of dynamite. Some damage to the TENNESSEE'S port side at the turn of the bilge resulted from contact with the bilge of the West Virginia as she settled to the bottom after pivoting on her torpedoed port side.

(4) The crew of the VESTAL did an excellent job in accomplishing repairs to the damages caused by two bombs. As in the case of the MARYLAND, the bomb exploded in a storeroom in the bowels of the ship. After about ten days pumping and removing of damaged material it was possible to accomplish temporary repairs, which permitted the vessel to remain fully afloat. When the dry dock schedule at Pearl Harbor relaxed somewhat, the VESTAL was sent in for permanent repairs.

(5) The crew of the RALEIGH, as heretofore mentioned, did an excellent job in keeping their ship afloat. The one bomb which hit aft did not explode but penetrated three decks and the ship's side aft. Temporary repairs to this damage were accomplished by the ship's force. Later the RALEIGH was docked and permanent repairs in way of the torpedo hit were effected by the Navy Yard. Thereafter the RALEIGH returned to the mainland for installation of new machinery and equipment to the extent required.

(6) The floatability of the CURTISS was in no way affected, but there was considerable topside damage from bomb fragmentation and from the gasoline fire caused by a Japanese

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airplane colliding with the starboard boat crane. The ship's crew went a long way in repairing the damages, which were eventually made good by the Navy Yard.

(7) The HONOLULU was tied up at a Navy Yard pier. One bomb of about 500 pounds struck and passed through the pier and exploded in the water alongside the HONOLULU at about frame 40 port. This near-miss opened the side slightly and ruptured a sea chest for a magazine flood, eventually causing the flooding of five magazines and the handling  room of one turret. It was necessary to dock the HONOLULU for repairs to the shell and to replace some electrical circuits which were flooded out. The Ship was ready to sail early in January.

(8) The HELENA was also moored at a Navy Yard pier. Her only damage resulted from the torpedo hit in way of machinery spaces on the starboard side. The HELENA was the first ship docked in No. 2 drydock at Pearl Harbor, which was not yet completed on December 7. Temporary repairs were made to the HELENA'S hull to make her seaworthy, after which she proceeded to Mare Island for permanent repairs and the installation of machinery and equipment which had been destroyed.

(9) The destroyer SHAW was an interesting case of repairing a severely damaged vessel. As a result of a bomb hit, the forward magazines of the SHAW blew up and wrecked all of the ship forward of the bridge. First appraisals were that the SHAW was a total wreck but in due time it was found that the machinery and the whole ship other than the forward area were in good condition. At the earliest opportunity the SHAW was removed from the wrecked floating drydock and redocked on the marine railway. There she was trimmed off neatly and measured up for a false bow, which was eventually fabricated and installed at a subsequent drydocking. About February 10 the SHAW set sail for Mare Island under her own power, the first "wrecked" vessel to do so. Her skipper and crew were a proud set of people, and that same feeling of satisfaction permeated all of Pearl Harbor as the SHAW successfully ran her trials and then departed for the mainland.

(10) The floating drydock YFD-2 was struck by 5 bombs, 4 of which affected very seriously her watertight integrity. As work on her proceeded it was ascertained that her watertight compartments were pierced by over 150 fragments. There was also considerable fire damage. Holes affecting water tightness were patched or plugged so that the drydock could be floated on January 9, 1942. Thereafter permanent repairs were proceeded with so that the drydock was again placed in limited use on January 26, 1942 and continued to serve a most useful purpose throughout the war.

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RAISING AND SALVAGING OF THE NEVADA

When the Japanese attack began, the NEVADA, was moored in the berth next to the ARIZONA. In accordance with the Fleet doctrine she immediately prepared to get underway, and was able to do so although suffering from one torpedo hit. As she steamed down the channel toward the sea entrance she was heavily attacked by dive bombers and suffered 7 or 8 bomb hits. Two of these hits in the forward areas induced serious flooding. By the time the NEVADA reached the entrance she had taken on a great amount of water and it was apparent to the plucky young officer then in command that the ship should not enter the channel at the risk of blocking same. Accordingly, he decided to beach her and did a very successful job so doing. The fine spirit of her personnel which permitted the NEVADA to get underway and fight off her attackers soon was to carry her over the difficulties of refloating and rehabilitation and the eventual return home under the ship's own power.

As the NEVADA lay beached near the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor she really was a sorry sight to behold. It was not a pleasant spectacle for new ships arriving to reinforce or support the Pacific Fleet. Her stern was only a few feet from the shore, while her bow was practically submerged in the deep water near the channel. The forecastle was pretty much a tangled mess of twisted steel, and the superstructure up through the bridge had been entirely gutted by fire. The inside of the ship was completely filled with water and fuel oil.

There was considerable doubt in most minds as to whether the ship could ever be floated, and there were very few who even dimly hoped that she could be of any further military value. The "Cook's tour" of damaged ships by newly arrived personnel usually brought forth pessimistic forecasts regarding the NEVADA — and she was the least damaged of the battleships which had been sunk.

OPTIMISM -- However, the officers and men of the NEVADA, who had not been transferred were full of optimism, optimism that seemed a bit foolhardy perhaps. They insisted, especially the Engineer Officer, that the remainder of their crew be kept together in order that the ship when raised might be returned to the mainland under her own power. This fine spirit of the ship's personnel was greatly respected and appreciated. Their request was approved, but with some mental reservations. Yet this time optimism paid off!

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FLOODING -- Immediately following December 7 the crew of the ship had set to work to remove wreckage and to condition the ship for salvage operations. Salvage personnel, including divers, had made a careful check of underwater damage and had found that most of the flooding occurred through three large holes — one a torpedo hit on the port side at frame 40 and 20 feet below the waterline, and two bomb hits, the first at frame 13 starboard which passed through the forecastle and out through the shell about 13 feet below the main deck. This bomb exploded alongside the ship and opened up a triangular hole about 25 feet long and 18 feet deep, which was responsible for most of the flooding of the ship. A second bomb passed through the bottom of the ship. It exploded in the water and left a hole about 6 feet in diameter. As a matter of special interest, this bomb passed through the large built-in gasoline tanks without igniting the contents,

USE OF PATCHES -- In order to shut off flooding from the torpedo hole a large wooden patch was manufactured by the Navy Yard. This patch was shipshape, about 55 feet long and 32 feet deep, and extended around the turn of the bilge. The shape of the patch was obtained from measurements taken from the exposed bilge of the OKLAHOMA which was a sister ship of the NEVADA. The patch was a massive affair and proved unsatisfactory for the purpose intended. The divers were unable to fit the patch to the hull of the ship satisfactorily for a number, of important reasons, one of which was that it just seemed too large to handle satisfactorily in one piece. Eventually it was decided to endeavor to unwater the NEVADA without this large patch, on the assumption that some of the bulkheads in area of the damage would be sufficiently intact to restrict the inflow of water, at least to a degree which would permit internal measures to be taken.

The two holes caused by bombs in the bow area were temporarily patched by wooden patches ordinarily referred to as window frames. The work was done by divers on the outside. The patches were drawn up reasonably tight by hook bolts. The bolts were hooked into holes burned into the small shell plating by underwater cutting torches.

All hull openings were plugged wherever possible by divers. Broken airports under water were made tight by use of wooden plates and draw bolts, Drain scuppers were plugged with mattresses, wooden plugs, and other similar material.

PUMPS USED FOR THE WORKA large number of gasoline-driven suction pumps were used to unwater the NEVADA, varying in size from 3" to 10". Inasmuch as the maximum lift of a suction pump under the operating conditions embodied was about 15 feet, it was necessary to install pumps at various

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levels throughout the ship. The small 3" pumps were used for "clean-up" jobs, such as for the final water in cut-up compartments, corners, etc. An excellent organization was developed to operate the pumps continuously, and this organization became very adept at diagnosing troubles and remedying them.

In the case of ships floated after the NEVADA a much improved pump became available. This was the "deep-well" pump which was of the centrifugal type operated by a propeller shaft extending from the topside to the bottom of the vertical piping. Of course such pumps could be used for straight pipe lines only, and were ideally suited for use in trunks such as were common on the battleships under salvage. These pumps came in sizes varying from 8" to 12" and were capable of handling tremendous quantities of water; the 10" pump would handle about 4000 gallons per minute.

REMOVAL OF WATER -- As indicated heretofore, the NEVADA was completely filled with sea water and oil. The plan for floating the ship contemplated, the installation of a sufficient number of pumps to remove the water faster than it could flow into the ruptured shell with patches in place to the extent mentioned. As the unwatering work commenced it was apparent that there would be no difficulty in floating the vessel. However, the amount of space from which water was removed at any one time had to be governed by a schedule taking into account a large number of considerations. Some of these pertained to stability and list of the ship; others had to do with making temporary repairs inside the vessel as the water was removed, such as stopping off leaks, shoring bulkheads, etc. Others pertained to removal of debris, cleaning, preservation of mechanical and electric equipment, etc.

EFFECTS OF TWO MONTHS' SUBMERGENCE — As the water level was reduced inside the ship it was noted that all surfaces were deeply coated with fuel oil. This had some good effects but mostly bad. Steps were taken to organize working parties to remove such coating by hosing down with a hot caustic solution and rinsing with salt water. Sand was placed on the decks to improve footing. As various compartments were uncovered the ship’s force removed the wreckage, stores, provisions, and eventually ammunition. Electric motors and certain items of auxiliary machinery were removed as soon as possible after they were unwatered. The motors were sent to the Navy Yard for reconditioning, as were also many pieces of equipment. As the work went on it was found that although the motors had been submerged in salt water for about two months

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it was possible to recondition them for service in about 95 per cent of the cases. It was also found that items of mechanical machinery that had been protected by the fuel oil were 100 per cent salvable. Even delicate instruments such as electric meters were capable of reconditioning.

As the main machinery spaces were pumped out it began to seem very probable that the machinery could be put in operable condition, and all hands developed an accelerated optimistic spirit regarding the ability of the NEVADA to go home under her own power. The crew of the NEVADA (about one-third original crew) applied themselves most strenuously to the job of cleaning up the ship and especially toward getting the machinery and equipment in running condition.

As successive stages of pumping were undertaken the bow rose higher and higher in the water, and it soon became clear that no great difficulty would be found in floating the ship. However, it was important to reduce the draft as much as practicable, and for this reason it was decided to remove all the oil still remaining aboard and as much of the storeroom and magazine contents as practicable. The removal of oil was undertaken by operating the vessel's fuel oil transfer pumps on compressed air which was furnished by portable compressors. The operation was wholly successful and marked the beginning of self-operation on the part of the NEVADA.

TOXIC GAS — As the unwatering schedule continued a number of people felt ill effects from the apparent prevalence of gas which seemed to fill the ship. The very dangerous toxic properties of this gas were discovered on February 7. On that date Lieutenant Clarkson was in the pumped-out trunk forward of the steering engine room and removed the cap from the air test fitting on the door to determine the water pressure within. The water which entered the trunk from the steering engine room released a large volume of toxic gas and Lieutenant Clarkson was overcome and collapsed. Other persons entered the trunk to rescue him, with the result that eventually six or more persons were overcome. The final result was that Lieutenant Clarkson and Chief Machinist Mate DeVries died as a result of gas poisoning. Thereafter a very careful investigation was made of the gas situation and it was determined that the gas was generated by reason of the polluted and stagnated harbor water being under pressure in closed compartments, thus forming hydrogen sulphide which is given off in large volumes in lethal concentrations when the water is released from pressure. Immediately precautionary steps were taken to provide additional ventilation, mostly suction blowers. Also persons were prohibited from entering compartments without respiratory equipment if the compartments were found to contain dangerous concentrations of

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gas. There were no more persons overcome by gas on the NEVADA, but practically all persons working continuously on the ship were continuously subjected to some gassing.

TO THE DRYDOCK — The vessel was fully afloat on February 12, 1942 and was scheduled for drydocking two days following. There was some trepidation about towing the NEVADA across Pearl Harbor channel because of the possibility of some occurrence which might cause reflooding and possible sinking in the channel, thus blocking it. Careful inspections were made to insure that all bulkheads and patches were reasonably tight and that there was little if any possibility of reflooding. The drydock was put in readiness and tugs took the NEVADA in tow at 0600 on February 14. Within a few hours the first vessel to be raised was safely tucked away in drydock No. 2 and there was great jubilation in the hearts of the NEVADA'S crew and the salvage personnel. On the coping of the dock stood the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and high ranking officers of his staff, and also the Commandant and Manager of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

This show of interest and support was a great boon to the salvage operations still ahead.

HOME, BOYS, HOME — With the ship in drydock, the Navy Yard turned to with a will to repair the serious hull damage, to recondition the machinery, and otherwise to get the NEVADA in shape to return to the West Coast. The work proceeded most satisfactorily with the result that the NEVADA sailed for the Navy Yard, Puget Sound under her own power on April 22, 1942. It was a great day for the salvage organization, and indeed was a happy event for all hands of the Navy who were aware of the event.

Within a few months the NEVADA was revamped and modernized and took her place in the Fleet as a highly valuable anti-aircraft and bombardment vessel.

RAISING AND SALVAGING OF THE CALIFORNIA

The refloating of the NEVADA without undue difficulty brought a feeling of increased optimism regarding the much more difficult jobs of refloating the CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA. True, the CALIFORNIA had shown a strong disinclination to sink. The battle to keep her afloat had gone on for three and a half days, and was lost only because of inadequacy of pumping equipment. This was a favorable consideration in

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refloating the ship because it was ample proof that the inflow of water was reasonably well restricted by watertight compartmentation and closures. However, the fact that the main deck of the vessel on the low side was over 17 feet underwater presented a major problem which did not exist in the case of the NEVADA.

The assistance of the Navy Yard Design Section was utilized in making technical studies of the problems of stability and hydrostatic pressures on various parts of the ship's structure. For instance, it was readily determined that the deadweight corresponding to 17 feet of water on the quarter deck was more than the structure of any ship would stand. This fact ruled out any thought of pumping out the inside of the ship to obtain the buoyancy required for flotation. Some means had to be found to remove the water above the quarter deck; this could be accomplished only by some kind of cofferdamming.

Shortly after December 7 it seemed to be agreed by the salvage experts that complete caissoning of the CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA would be necessary. This would consist of driving steel sheet piling into the bottom of the harbor entirely around the vessel in order that external and internal repairs could be made when the water was pumped out, leaving the vessel sitting on the bottom in a make-shift drydock. Of course this would be a stupendous and hazardous job, and there was some doubt as to a successful outcome on account of the softness of the bottom soil. It was clear that unless the caisson piling was driven very deep the hydrostatic pressure of some 40 or 45 feet would cause a "blow-up" of the bottom and consequent unintentional reflooding of the caissoned area. Finally a simpler cofferdam arrangement was adopted.

TYPE OF COFFERDAM USED -- The cofferdam decided upon consisted of a wooden fence-like structure erected around the edge of the quarter deck. It consisted of vertical heavy 8" planking made up in sections, each section being about 30 feet long and 20 feet high. The planking extended down the side of the ship 2 or 3 feet.

The weight was taken on the deck and waterway. Bolts passing through the quarter deck stanchion feet were used to draw the sections hard up against the side of the ship. Extensive internal shoring was installed to

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resist external pressures which would occur as the water within the fence was removed. Large bins were built near the top of the fence for holding sand bags used to overcome the buoyancy of the wood.

Handling of these cofferdam sections was accomplished by cranes mounted on barges. The exact positioning and securing was handled by divers. Watertightness was accomplished by use of various puddings, or packing materials used as old hose, oakum, sawdust, etc.

A fence of somewhat similar but much lighter construction was installed on the port forecastle which was under varying depths of water up to about 5 feet. The excellent design and most of the work of installation of this structure was performed by the Pacific Bridge Company, which company had the contract for drydock construction, when the Japanese struck.

It was decided that no attempt would be made to patch externally the two torpedo holes in the port side of the CALIFORNIA because exploratory work plus some considerable knowledge of the efficacy of torpedo bulkhead protection indicated that the flow of water through such areas could not be of great volume. However, a large patch of about 30 feet square had already been manufactured to cover the 15-foot triangular hole forward at about frame 40. This was properly rigged and secured. Divers did a great amount of work in plugging up other hull openings through the vessel, such as gunports, broken airports, drain scuppers, etc.

PUMPING PROCEDURE -- The general scheme of pumping was to erect a large number of deep-well pumps of the Peerless and Pomona type at numerous locations, especially in trunks. The purpose was to provide sufficient pumping capacity to remove the water faster than it could flow in. With this tremendous pumping capacity it was realized that there might be a possibility of setting up large hydrostatic pressures and moments due to differences in water levels on opposite sides of bulkheads, etc. It was therefore decided to facility the flow of water without restriction throughout the ship.

For this reason all doors and hatches were opened by divers before pumping commenced. In later stages holes were cut In certain bulkheads for the same reason.

Finally the day came to test out the ability of the pumps. Happily it was soon demonstrated that they were capable of lowering the level of the water inside the fence structure. As pumping proceeded, with greater and greater

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difference in the level of water inside and out, it was easy to note any serious leaks near the surface. Divers immediately turned to on these weak spots and gradually increased the watertightness of the work. Within a few days the quarter deck was cleared of water and at that time a schedule of pumping operations was drawn up. This schedule allowed time to clear out wreckage as spaces were pumped out, to remove electric motors for reconditioning before long exposure to the air, to recover valuable personal property and place it in proper custody, and to recover bodies which were known to be in the vessel.

As in the NEVADA, it was found that the CALIFORNIA was thoroughly coated with a heavy film of fuel oil. Arrangements were made for a tug alongside to furnish high pressure on salt water hoses to wash down all surfaces as they were unwatered. Later, but before the fuel oil hardened, a thorough job was done by hosing with hot caustic solutions and washing down with sea water. This general method was used thereafter on all vessels.

The plan of salvage included the lightening of the weight of the CALIFORNIA as much as possible by the removal of such items as the conning tower, cage masts, 14 inch guns etc. This was done by the Navy Yard's 150-ton crane. The anti-aircraft battery had been removed and reinstalled elsewhere.

As spaces were emptied of water the reduced ship's force of about 300 men turned to on all kinds of work such as removal of debris, cleaning of spaces, unloading of stores and provisions, removing ammunition, etc. Such work was indeed a "lousy assignment" especially in the case of men who were not a part of the regular crew. It was a far cry from the opportunity to get on sea going vessels to go out and fight the Japs. But it was work that had to be done and eventually was satisfactorily completed.

Due to rupturing of oil tanks by the two torpedo explosions there was a very large amount of loose oil all through the ship. Attention was given to means for picking up such oil in order to reduce the fire hazard and to minimize the amount of cleaning which would be necessary. A Wheeler system installed on a barge did a very successful job in handling such oil, and recovered about 200,000 gallons floating on the surface of the water in various parts of the ship. Oil which was still in stowage tanks was pumped out

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eventually by the vessel's fuel oil transfer pumps operating on compressed air.

CONDITION OF MACHINERY — While the machinery of the NEVADA was found to be in good condition, it had been believed from the start that the electric propulsion machinery of the CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA would probably be a total loss. However, in view of the fine record made in reconditioning the low voltage electric motors of the NEVADA and other vessels there were a few optimists who felt that it would, be possible to recondition the main machinery of the CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA at least sufficiently for return to a mainland Navy Yard. This general question was discussed at great length and it was finally decided that one or two units would be reconditioned while the other two units would be broken down and completely rebuilt in place. Arrangements were made with the General Electric Company, the original supplier, to send out a force of experts to handle the job. About 60 of them arrived in due course. The work of cleaning and drying out was commenced immediately after the machinery was unwatered.

This force was supplemented by Navy Yard personnel, ship's personnel, and Navy Mobile Repair Unit Nos. II and III which was assigned to the salvage organization. With respect to the success of this work, it might be stated that although a very optimistic undertaking, the results were very satisfactory. Eventually the CALIFORNIA left Pearl Harbor under her own power on two rebuilt units, as did also the WEST VIRGINIA. A very large number of electric motors were sent to the mainland for reconditioning after proper preservation procedure was taken on the ship. This program was very successful.

CONDITION OF BOILERS — As in the NEVADA, the boilers were found to be in good condition except for bricking. All that was required was cleaning, both inside and out, and complete rebricking.

RECOVERY OF BODIES -- Based on the total number of personnel missing, it was anticipated that 48 bodies would be recovered within the ship. However, only 32 complete bodies were found. Due to the advanced state of decomposition, it was necessary to work out a method of removing the bodies with a minimum of handling. This consisted in stopping the pumps when several feet of water still remained on each deck, at which time a search was made for bodies floating in the water. Large canvas bags were made up so that the bodies could be floated into the bags and carried intact from the scene. This arrangement proved unusually effective in all respects.

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The USS CALIFORNIA after being raised from the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The wooden structure around the after end of the ship is the cofferdam construction to hold out water during the raising.

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FIRE PROTECTION -- Great care was taken by the salvage organization to guard against fire. The vast amount of oil throughout the ship would have caused a holocaust if a fire once got started and heated the oil to ignition temperature. A large amount of fire extinguishing equipment was readily available at all points, and personnel organized and instructed. A rather large number of small fires occurred, usually from short circuits of temporary lighting leads. But none of these fires was permitted to gain headway on any of the ships under salvage, except in the case of the OGLALA which is hereinafter referred to.

GAS HAZARD — The lessons learned on the NEVADA were put into full effect on the CALIFORNIA and all succeeding salvage jobs. A generous quantity of exhaust ventilators were kept running continuously to prevent the accumulation of toxic or explosive gases. There were no gas poisonings on the CALIFORNIA or succeeding ships, although it was frequently necessary to remove personnel from certain areas in which water under pressure was being released. Gas concentrations were continuously checked by specialists.

REMOVAL OF MEAT — One of the meanest jobs on the CALIFORNIA and VEST VIRGINIA was the removal of tons of decomposed meat from refrigerated storerooms. There really was no way of performing this job in a pleasant way. A maximum of forced ventilation was pumped into spaces and gas masks were worn by members of the crew. As they brought the meat from the storerooms into passageways it was picked up by cargo nets and hooks and hoisted by cranes on barges alongside. The meat was placed on other barges and towed to sea where it was dumped, no doubt to the great relish of Hawaiian sea life. Later, on the WEST VIRGINIA it was found that high pressure water hoses had the effect of shredding the meat so that it could be pumped overboard by the salvage pumps.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING — In the hot Hawaiian climate, especially on kona days, the personnel assigned to salvage work on board the ships had a most loathsome job. Fuel oil was everywhere, hydrogen sulphide fumes were in most places, and part of the time there was a general atmosphere of things going very, very slowly.

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Some sort of protective clothing for the men was essential.

Boots and gloves were issued out in some cases, hut there was a great shortage of such items. In lieu of boots, "nips" were made up by wrapping burlap around the feet; this offered some protection against fuel oil which covered the decks as a heavy scum when the water was pumped out. Also there was a sort of "goon gown" as the sailors called them, which were manufactured by the Navy Yard, These were a coverall of light slate-colored cloth such as is used for targets. They were fitted very loosely and secured with tie-ties instead of buttons, and were very comfortable.

They became pretty well soaked up with oil after a day or two of use, at which time they were turned in and sent to a drycleaning plant in Honolulu. Within a few days they could be reissued.

MEANS OF CONTROLLING INFLOW OF WATER — As heretofore indicated, the damage to the underwater hull of the California was caused by two torpedo explosions and one bomb explosion close aboard. It was certain that the torpedo protection built into the ship was fairly effective and that the amount of water entering due to the two torpedo hits could be fairly well controlled by interior work performed by divers — including the full utilization of watertight doors, ventilation closures, pipe line stops, etc.

The large hole in the port bow caused by the bomb explosion, however, was not in the vicinity of torpedo bulkheads, although the subdivision of the ship in the general area of frames 9-15 was very favorable for restricting the spread of flooding water.

A patch to place over this 15-foot by 15-foot triangular hole was, however, manufactured. It was made up of wood reinforced by steel and was installed without difficulty. It proved very effective and was regarded as an excellent patch job — up to a certain point, which was when it was blown off and wrecked by an internal explosion on the ship.

Four days before the CALIFORNIA was scheduled to go into drydock she was beset by an incident which at first appeared likely to cause a considerable delay. On a quiet Sunday afternoon a violent explosion occurred below the third deck forward. The immediate result was the rapid settling of the bow of the CALIFORNIA which was not well afloat. At first there was some suspicion of sabotage, but it was finally concluded that the explosion resulted from the accumulation of gasoline vapor, inasmuch as the gasoline system and stowage just forward had been ruptured. The explosive mixture was probably

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set off by a short circuit in the temporary lighting system.

By the help of a diver and the barge crane, the patch which had been doing such a fine job was picked off the bottom and brought to view. It was badly splintered and torn out of shape and obviously of no further use.

Instead of waiting for the manufacture of another patch it was decided to do the best with what we had. Divers were sent down into the flooded area of the ship to close the watertight hatch at the lowest level practicable, which proved to be the third deck. All water above the third deck was then removed and steps were taken to make as watertight as possible the partially distorted third deck hatch. A considerable portion of the lowered buoyancy of the bow was thus regained and docking was carried through as scheduled.

SAFE IN DRYDOCK -- The scheduled date for placing the CALIFORNIA in drydock was April 9, 1942, and in spite of the explosion casualty and other difficulties this date was met. Again the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and other high ranking officers were on the coping of the drydock to welcome "The Prune Barge," as the CALIFORNIA was affectionately nicknamed by sailors who served on her. When the dock was pumped down, the usual discovery was made, namely that the underwater damage was less than anticipated. Permanent repairs to the underwater hull were instituted immediately by the Navy Yard and the work was carried on rapidly in order to have the dock available for use of major vessels in case of serious battle damage. The repairs to the CALIFORNIA were scheduled in such a way that it would be possible to remove the CALIFORNIA from dock on not more than 72 hours' notice. Fortunately this was not necessary.

After flooding water was entirely removed from the inside of the ship, a careful inspection was made to determine the types of damage which permitted the spread of flooding water throughout the ship. In general such flooding was caused by ruptured pipe lines, ventilation ducts, drains, and some damaged closing plates over oil tanks and voids.

The importance of the design of pipe lines, sea connections, and ventilation ducts was amply demonstrated.

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RAISING AND SALVAGING OF THE WEST VIRGINIA

Salvage work on the VEST VIRGINIA proceeded fairly rapidly during the latter stages of work on the CALIFORNIA as additional shipments of essential pumps and other materials arrived in Hawaii. By the time the CALIFORNIA vas drydocked the salvage operations on the WEST VIRGINIA were moving forward at high speed. Even though the floating of the WEST VIRGINIA was a very much greater job than in the case of the CALIFORNIA, she vas fully afloat on May 17, 1942 and placed in drydock on June 9.

NATURE OF DAMAGE -- Unlike the CALIFORNIA there vas very little water on top of the main deck of the WEST VIRGINIA because of the lesser depth of water and harder bottom on which the WEST VIRGINIA rested. The extent of damage to the WEST VIRGINIA vas however many times greater than in the case of the CALIFORNIA. The ship had been struck on the port side by six torpedoes and the whole side for a length of nearly 200 feet was virtually wrecked. Another torpedo had struck near the rudder and had destroyed the external steering arrangements and most of the internal steering system. Very serious oil fires had been started by either bomb or torpedo explosions, and the fire damage throughout the ship had destroyed considerable structural strength as well as the contents of the various compartments. Thus the salvage of the WEST VIRGINIA was a new problem. Obviously, some sort of external patching would be necessary to shut off the flow of water along the port side, as it vas readily apparent that the damage to the multiple bulkheads was too great to permit controlling the inflow of water in any other manner.

TYPE OF PATCH INSTALLED — The Navy again utilized the splendid talents of the Pacific Bridge Company in designing and installing the two patches required, one from frame to 52, the other from 61 1/2 to 97 1/2. These patches were made up in sections about 13 feet long. Each section extended from the turn of the bilge to a point well above the main deck, a total height of about 50 feet. The sections were of composite design of steel, heavy timbers, and concrete. The general makeup consisted of 24-inch steel "I" beams running vertically, a large number of 12 inch by 14 inch timbers running longitudinally, with vertical 4 inch planking on the waterside. These sections were shored against the side, including the armor plates. The upward thrust of buoyancy

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pressures was transmitted from the large "I" beams to the underside of the armor belt. The outer edge of the sections was about 2 feet from the original shell of the ship. Each section was hauled up snugly at the bottom and was held in place by hook bolts taking up in holes burned by divers through the shell of the ship. The joints between sections were made reasonably tight by old rubber hose and other packing materials. Draw bolts were used to hold, sections together snugly. The forward patch consisted of three sections, while the large patch consisted of 11 sections. The barge cranes were used to place the patch sections in proper location; negative buoyancy was obtained by use of heavy lead weights, placed on a shelf near the bottom. These weights were removed for future use after each section was secured.

USE OF CONCRETE -- After the sections were all installed and properly secured, a large amount of underwater concrete was poured to seal off the patch along the bottom.

This produced reasonable watertightness between the damaged hull and the patch and at the same time provided means for taking up the buoyancy pressure of the patch against the bottom. The concrete was a rich mixture, that is, one of cement to three and a half of aggregate. Similarly, concrete was used to seal off each end of each patch. The fore and aft thickness of the concrete was about 4 feet. For the whole job about 650 tons of concrete were used.

It was foreseen that when the buoyancy support of the patches was lost in drydock it would be necessary to support the patches in place. Accordingly, heavy steel rods were rigged to a vertical position and welded to intact portions of the hull, so that these rods would take the weight of the patch in drydock.

It might also be mentioned as a point of interest that access doors for divers were provided in the patches about every 40 feet so that divers could move in and out as required to fit and secure the patches in place. Before pumping started these doors were secured and made watertight.

PUMPING PROCEDURE — For a week prior to final readiness of patches a number of the large capacity pumps were operated for several hours per day to circulate the water within the ship. Much of the water had been stagnant and under pressure for nearly six months, and experience on the CALIFORNIA and NEVADA had indicated that such water would be heavily charged with dangerous concentrations of hydrogen sulphide gas. Insofar as possible all main compartments were

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opened up to permit removal of old water and inflow of new. Of course it was not possible to remove stagnant water from small compartments such as storerooms, for which reason some difficulty with toxic gas was later experienced.

After the patches had been installed the whole battery of pumps was started to ascertain the tightness of the patches and their ability to control the inflow of water. The water level within the ship was lowered readily and there was soon a difference of three or four feet between the inside level and the outside level. But such happy results were short-lived as the pumps were unable to lower the water any further, indicating that very large leakages existed somewhere. As per custom the divers inspected both inside and out and gradually found the causes for the inflow and remedied them. Within a few days the patches were made reasonably tight, air ports were plugged, and fragment holes not previously detected were stopped up.

It was soon determined that the plan and procedure would prove entirely satisfactory.

USE OF COMPRESSED AIR -- Compressed air had been used to some extent on the CALIFORNIA but it was used very greatly on the WEST VIRGINIA. It became necessary to remove all the water and oil which could be pumped or blown in order to reduce the draft sufficiently to dock in drydock No. 1.

It was desired that the larger drydock be left available for battle-damaged combatant vessels. The Commander in Chief was not willing to tie up drydock No. 2 for the time required to make flotation repairs to the WEST VIRGINIA, if this could be avoided.

Compressed air was used extensively in partially damaged oil tanks, feed tanks, and for the operation of machinery such as fuel oil pumps, winches to hoist 16-inch ammunition, stores, and trash; even 5-inch ammunition hoists were operated by hooking up air drills. The steering engine room had been badly wrecked by a torpedo hit on the rudder and it was not practicable to patch this area and pump out the flooded spaces. Instead air pressure was applied to force out some of the water and considerable buoyancy was gained thereby.

POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO THE LARGE PATCHES -- As the vessel came afloat it was recognized that a serious hazard existed in the possible failure of the large patches, either due to inadequate design or to damage, either of which

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might cause collapse. Such collapse would permit the sudden inrush of water which might snuff out many lives, and could cause the ship to capsize. The side of the ship and the decks in way of the patch were so badly destroyed that any sizable failure would certainly cause the ship to sink and under certain conditions might cause capsizing. Steps were taken to recondition many watertight doors and hatches that had been damaged on the port side. A schedule of counter flooding of the emptied oil tanks and voids on the starboard side was set up and men on watch instructed accordingly. Care was taken to insure that tugs and running boats gave the patched area a wide berth.

The possibility of serious teredo damage to the wooden patch sections that had been installed for two or three months was not lost sight of. Also the possibility of air raid damage was ever-present, and an air raid bill was worked up to insure the most practicable manner of handling any such damage sustained; this included a fire fighting crew with necessary equipment. It also included the availability on the crane barge of several heavy collision mat type of patches to repair quickly any damage to the main patches. Fortunately, none of the possible hazards materialized, due in large part to the fact that possible air raids were turned back at the Battle of Midway.

TOXIC GASES — The amount of hydrogen sulphide on the WEST VIRGINIA greatly exceeded that found on the CALIFORNIA. Additional precautions were taken under the expert direction of a medical officer. A bulletin board was kept up to date to indicate compartments which were safe and those which were considered unsafe. The latter ones could only be entered by using a rescue breathing apparatus or suitable face mask with air hose. Hydrogen sulphide was found in greatest concentrations in storerooms containing a large amount of paper or many cardboard containers. In addition to hydrogen sulphide, there were many cases of oxygen deficiency and a few cases of carbon monoxide. These of course were readily remedied by proper ventilation, which was available in large quantities.

RECOVERY OF BODIES -- Sixty-six bodies were recovered from the WEST VIRGINIA, and were handled very satisfactorily in the same manner as in the CALIFORNIA. There were some exceptions inasmuch as bodies were found in unusual locations. In the after engine room a number of bodies were found lying on top of the main steam pipes; it is likely that the men sought that location because of the air bubble which existed

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in the upper spaces of the flooded area. Three bodies were found on the lower shelf of a clothing storeroom which had not been flooded. These were clad in blues and jerseys instead of the regular whites. A calendar was found in this compartment on which each date had been checked off from December 7 to December 23, 1941. The battle station of these men was apparently in the adjacent pump room. It was noted that the emergency rations had been consumed. A manhole to the fresh water tanks below the pumps had been removed. The indications were that the men had obtained adequate food and water but had finally succumbed to oxygen deficiency.

REDUCTION OF MEAN DRAFT TO 33 FEET -- In order to dock the ship in drydock No. 1 it was necessary to get the mean draft down to about 33 feet. This required strenuous efforts on the part of all hands in removing all weights aboard that could be handled, such as loose water, oil, stores, provisions, meat, shells, powder, wreckage, personal effects, guns, armored turret tops, etc. The officers and crew of the WEST VIRGINIA won great admiration by their devotion to their task and its very successful fulfillment.

The crew at that time was considerably less than 400. Sixty of these were marines, and it should be mentioned that these marines saw to it that they did nothing less than their share of the onerous work.

TRANSFER TO DRYDOCK -- The WEST VIRGINIA was floated on May 17 and was placed safely in drydock on June 9, 1942. Immediately following drydocking the Navy Yard undertook the difficult job of effecting permanent repairs to the port side damage. Prefabricated sections of the heavy multiple-sided structure were installed more rapidly than had been anticipated. The slowest job was found to be the construction of a new rudder and steering engine parts -- slow due to the great shortage of steel casting capacity throughout the country.

As in the case of previous ships, electric motors and instruments were removed for preservation treatment very soon after they were exposed to the air. A large number of such items were reconditioned for future use on he vessel; all major items and those pertaining to vital circuits were shipped to the mainland for rewinding.

A view of the WEST VIRGINIA in drydock exposed the very great damage suffered by the ship, but on the other hand it also showed that a large portion of the ship was still there.

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A great amount of manpower and material was necessary, of course, to bring back the ship as a fighting unit of the Fleet. But the aggressive action of the shore-based facilities accomplished this within a reasonable time.

FLOATING AND SALVAGING OF THE OGLALA

Perhaps the most interesting salvage job at Pearl Harbor was that of the U.S.S. OGLALA, the flagship of Commander Minecraft Force. It was interesting because of the variety of problems presented in her salvage and the many difficulties which seemed to beset the work.

At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack the OGLALA was tied up outboard of the HELENA. An aerial torpedo passed under the shallow draft OGLALA and exploded against the side of the HELENA. The force of this explosion was sufficient to cause some damage to the OGLALA, at least enough to permit sufficient flooding to cause the vessel to capsize some two hours after being damaged. Such capsizing would not have occurred except for the fact that the OGLALA was a vessel 40 years old, with very inadequate compartmentation and structure. In her younger days she had plied between Boston and New York on the Old Fall River Line. She was acquired by the Navy in World War I.

POSSIBILITIES OF SALVAGE -- When the smoke of battle cleared away comments were freely cast about as to what should be done about the ugly duckling, the OGLALA.

She was considered a total loss, and she fouled one of the most valuable piers of the Navy Yard. Her removal was therefore considered of high priority. Many schemes were put forth looking to her removal, but none of them contemplated full salvage and future use of her antiquated hull. One proposition was to blow out the water by use of compressed air — thus to float her so she could be towed on her side either for beaching or into drydock for righting. But it was soon found that her structure was not sufficiently strong or tight to hold the air pressure necessary. Another proposition was to blow up the ship with dynamite and pick up the pieces for scrap. A modification was to cut her up with underwater cutting torches and remove her piecemeal by cranes from this valuable berthing space. Still another scheme was to rig her between two pairs of large lifting barges so that she could be cleared of the bottom and towed to a shallow beach. But barges of the type required were at a premium so that ultimately this scheme had to be abandoned.

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Thus nearly everybody had some ideas as to what treatment should be accorded to the poor old OGLALA, but for one reason or another none of them proved as simple and efficacious as the orthodox salvage procedure which was finally adopted. Of course there was some delay in getting started on the OGLALA because of the lack of salvage material previously referred to, and also because the work was given priority following the battleships, even though clearing of the dock space was very important.

SCHEME OF SALVAGE -- The OGLALA lay on her port side in about 45 feet of water, so that the starboard side amidships was only a few feet out of water. The scheme consisted of two steps. The first was to right the OGLALA by use of salvage pontoons, and the second was to refloat her by the same technique as employed on the CALIFORNIA.

Ten submarine salvage pontoons were available in Pearl Harbor and the use of these was authorized by the Navy Department. These pontoons were sunk in appropriate locations along the weather deck of the ship and were secured to heavy chains which passed under the ship and to stoppers welded to the starboard side. As the water in the pontoons was displaced by compressed air there would be exerted a turning force of some five to seven hundred tons. In order to assist the pontoons in breaking away from the mud two other forces were applied. The first was the use of compressed air in the hull of the OGLALA to the maximum extent practicable. Another was a pull of some 50 to 100 tons exerted by winches on a barge anchored outboard of the OGLALA. Rough calculations indicated that the forces to be applied would be sufficient for the job.

RIGHTING OF THE VESSEL — At the appointed time on April 11, 1942 an attempt was made to right the ship. However, as the pontoons were blown they came to the surface one by one, indicating some failure in the chain attachments. This first effort was a failure and it was found that the bridles attaching the two chains to each pontoon had parted. They were old and worn items (like the ship they served) which had been recovered from the scrap heap. It was necessary to replace them with new and stronger material.

The second attempt was made on April 23 and was entirely successful. The ship came to rest on her bottom with an initial list to port of about 20 degrees which was gradually reduced to something under 7 degrees.

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USE OF THE FENCE-TYPE COFFERDAM — The quarter deck cofferdam used so successfully on the CALIFORNIA was modified to suit the OGLALA. The cofferdam was installed around the deck edge from stem to stern. The depth of water above the deck varied from 6 feet forward to something over 25 feet aft. The installation arrangements were similar to those described for the CALIFORNIA, Before the cofferdam could be installed satisfactorily it was necessary to remove practically all of the wooden deck house and top hamper. This was done by hoisting cranes assisted by divers.

PUMPING OUT THE SHIP — The pumping arrangements were similar to those previously used. It was decided, however, that in view of poor compartmentation of the OGLALA it would be well to install a patch over the damage found in her port bilge after the vessel had been righted. Divers took the necessary measurements, and the patch was built on the dock and installed by divers. It was soon concluded that the refloating of the vessel would be comparatively easy.

TROUBLE, TROUBLE, TROUBLE -- The OGLALA soon came to be known as the Jonah ship on account of the various troubles encountered in salvaging her. The first failure occurred when the water level inside the cofferdam was pumped down about 7 feet. At that time two of the CALIFORNIA cofferdam sections which had been lengthened showed signs of distress and gradually failed. This was not a design failure, but resulted from the action of some "practical men" in the field substituting 12" by 12" timbers for the steel "H" beams called for by the blueprint.

After this failure was remedied the pumping was resumed, and the vessel came afloat on June 23, 1942. However, drydock considerations required that the draft not exceed 37 1/2 feet. As the vessel rose higher in the water the stability was greatly reduced, this because of the weight of the cofferdam totalling about 1300 tons, and also due to the large amount of free water surface within the ship. Calculations indicated that these adverse factors would produce negative stability well before the draft could be reduced to 37 1/2 feet.

Some remedial steps were taken to reduce the topside weight, but it became apparent that the draft could not be reduced much below 40 feet without undue impairment of stability, or without accepting other risks in connection with removing part of the cofferdam structure.

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The next casualty was nothing less than the resinking of the ship during the night of June 25-26. This was somewhat sad, of course, but was a very interesting and instructive casualty. It was caused by the plugging up of float-controlled pumps which were depended upon to keep the bow of the ship up. When these pumps failed the bow gradually settled, and as it settled water ran forward at an ever-increasing rate, because of the fact that there were no athwartship bulkheads on the mine deck. Unfortunately, the bow went down and down until it came to rest in 48 feet of water. Soon the stem followed, as might be expected. This was an excellent example of the loss of longitudinal stability due to free surface. The salvage crew went to work with considerable vim the next morning, in spite of some discouragement; the vessel was brought afloat again the following day.

The next casualty was another "practical man" failure. This time the stern section of the cofferdam collapsed on June 29 due to failure of two 10" by 12" timbers. The designer realized this weak spot and on the plan called for tie-rod supports at three points but the tie rods had. been omitted by the field force. The result was that the OGLALA once more sank to the bottom. Repairs were soon made to the cofferdam and the vessel was refloated two days later.

The next casualty was a fire which broke out within the cofferdam during the evening of July 1, 1942. The fire was started during a gasoline refueling operation on one of the 6-inch pumps. Some of the gasoline splashed on to the hot exhaust manifold and immediately ignited. This caused the attendant to drop the 5 gallons of burning gasoline into the water, and this in turn set on fire a heavy layer of fuel oil on the surface of the water within the cofferdam. The fire was brisk indeed for about twenty minutes, by which time it was extinguished by the prompt and efficient action of the fire watch on board plus the crew of the U.S.S. ORTOLAN and the Navy Yard fire department. Damage to the cofferdam proved to be superficial only, so that this near-serious casualty did not set back the work.

DOCKING OF THE OGLALA -- Number 2 drydock was ready to receive the OGLALA on July 3, 1942. At that time the vessel had a mean draft of a few inches less than 40 feet. She was placed in drydock looking for all the world like Noah's ARK except that there was no roof over the straight sides of the cofferdam. Very little of the OGLALA itself was in sight above the water; only a small portion of the bow area.

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The damage to the underwater hull was found to be very moderate and the Yard proceeded forthwith to make permanent repairs. The cofferdam was quickly removed and steps were taken to rehabilitate the vessel. There was considerable discussion as to what use the OGLALA might be put. Admittedly she had rather small value as a naval vessel, but in those times any kind of a ship was a mighty valuable commodity. Eventually she was reconditioned and put into service as a repair vessel and tender for motor torpedo boats.

PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S.S. ORTOLAN — Major credit for the successful salvaging of the OGLALA goes to the officers and crew of the ORTOLAN. That vessel was attached to the Submarine Base Pearl Harbor as a submarine salvage vessel and had on board a goodly number of qualified divers, and also personnel familiar with the use of submarine salvage pontoons. The officers and crew of the ORTOLAN were assigned to the OGLALA job shortly after December 7, and they took a great interest in all aspects of the work. This initiation in salvage work and battle damage repairs turned out to be just the kind of experience the ORTOLAN required. Following the salvage of the OGLALA she was assigned to the South Pacific Force and hung up a most remarkable record as a salvage tug in handling battle damage repairs, underwater diving work, pulling ships off reefs, etc.

SALVAGE WORK ON THE CASSIN AND DOWNES

These two vessels were a sorry spectacle indeed following the December 7 attack. They were docked abreast of each other in drydock No. 1. The first bomb passed through the deck edge of the CASSIN and exploded between the two vessels. The fragments riddled the side of the DOWNES in way of oil tanks and started an oil fire which proved disastrous. Another bomb struck the DOWNES and exploded in the chart house.

A third bomb exploded between the two vessels causing further, riddling of the sides of both ships and increasing the intensity of the oil fires. The tremendous heat of the oil fires resulted in many oil tank explosions and the detonation of the warheads in one of the torpedo tubes of the DOWNES. It was necessary to flood the drydock in order to protect the PENNSYLVANIA and to help control the oil fires which were now raging. Eventually the CASSIN capsized and caused serious damage to her main hull structure. The high temperatures of the oil fires caused widespread and serious damage to hull plating and strength members. The first appraisal was that both ships were total losses.

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SAVING SOMETHING FROM THE WRECK — As the CASSIN and DOWNES were inspected in detail under more favorable circumstances it was ascertained that considerable portions of the vessels were still intact, especially the machinery components and much of the equipment in spite of some damage due to water, oil, and heat. The pessimists proposed to cut up the vessels for scrap or to tow them out to sea and sink them. The optimists desired to recondition the vessels with a minimum of work necessary to make them suitable for patrol or escort duty. Arguments were traded back and forth for some time and eventually it was decided by the Navy Department that new hulls would be constructed at Mare Island and that the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor would ship to Mare Island as much of the hull structure as would be worth-while and the bulk of the machinery and equipment. The salvage job was eventually handled on that basis, and parts not shipped were cut up as scrap.

WORK OF THE DESTROYER REPAIR UNITS -- Reference has heretofore been made to the valuable contributions to salvage work on the part of the Destroyer Repair Units (afterwards called the Pearl Harbor Salvage and Repair Unit). This very worthy component was transferred from Sen Diego to Pearl Harbor shortly after December 7 and consisted of some 600 working hands plus additional numbers for housekeeping and maintenance. Their spirit and devotion to duty was most commendable end they performed outstanding service in handling certain aspects of battleship salvage. On that work they had to do mostly with specialties such as temporary lighting, removal of electric motors for reconditioning, preservation of machinery components, tending pumps during the night watches, etc. On the CASSIN and DOWNES they did practically all of the work.

On these two vessels they did a tremendous amount of patch work by electric welding to close up the hulls so the vessels could be floated out of drydock. In the case of the DOWNES it was necessary to reconstruct a considerable portion of her side in way of the torpedo explosion. The DOWNES was floated out of drydock on February 6, 1942. The CASSIN was righted on February 5, 1942 and was floated out on February 18, 1942. This made the drydock available for Fleet use, particularly for battle damage repairs, which was a matter of first consideration.

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Both before and after removal from drydock the CASSIN end DOWNES were stripped of their machinery components, shafting, equipment, etc., and later were placed in drydock for removal of important hull sections for shipment to Mare Island. It is estimated that approximately 50 percent of the two ships were installed in the new hulls bearing their names.

WORK ON THE ARIZONA AND UTAH

Reference has been made to the fact that the ARIZONA was substantially destroyed by the explosion of her forward magazines and that the UTAH was resting on the bottom nearly upside down. Due to the time which their salvage would entail, and the need for conservation of labor and materials, it was decided to refrain from major work on these two vessels.

However, a very large amount of work was done in connection with removal of valuable items, such as guns, ammunition, safes, etc. Fuel oil also was a most valuable commodity and a scarce article in the spring of 1942. Accordingly, a large amount of oil was pumped from the intact oil tanks of these vessels, and about a million gallons was recovered from the OKLAHOMA. All of this work was tangible proof of the marvelous performance of the divers and their organization.

WORK ON THE OKLAHOMA

Salvage work on the OKLAHOMA was restricted to removal of materials such as mentioned above, but arrangements were made for a long-time salvage operation which involved the manufacture of major equipment necessary to. bring the ship to an upright position so that she could be refloated. The scheme consisted of setting up about 20 high-geared hauling winches on Ford Island, These winches were operated by fractional horse power electric motors and were rigged with high leverage to exert a tremendous turning moment on the ship. It was also contemplated that some submarine salvage pontoons be employed to help break the ship out of the mud and that compressed air be used inside the ship to blow out the water on the outboard side and thus to exert an additional righting moment.

This work was given a low priority, but went along in due course, and eventually the OKLAHOMA was righted and floated. The cost of reconditioning her as a naval unit appeared disproportionate to the value of the ship, for which reason various utilizations of the ship were proposed from

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time to time. However, none of these materialized and the vessel is still afloat in Pearl Harbor. The Navy Department has recently authorized her sale to help alleviate the national shortage of scrap metal. Even though the vessel was not put to any useful purpose her salvage constituted one of the most difficult salvage operations of all time and is a great credit to the personnel who carried the work through.

Her removal released a very valuable berth for use of large combatant ships.

DIVING OPERATIONS

Without a very large number of highly qualified divers the salvage work at Pearl Harbor could not have been accomplished. The underwater work performed by divers was revealed after some ships were placed in drydock -- most persons were amazed at the extent and the proficiency of the work.

The divers of the salvage division were drawn from a number of sources -- some from the ships under salvage, some from the Navy Yard, some from the civilian contractor, a considerable number from Destroyer Repair Units, many from the U.S.S. ORTOLAN and U.S.S. WIDGEON and a few from the Submarine Base. In all there were nearly a hundred. The work was divided up into special assignments depending upon individual proficiency, such as inspection and measuring of underwater damage, removal of underwater wreckage, installing and attaching cofferdams, patches and closures, operation of watertight doors and hatches inside the ship, interior inspections to find inflow of water, operation of ships' pumps on compressed air, and utilization of pumping systems and valves, removal of submerged guns, ammunition, recovery of confidential matter, etc. It is noteworthy that all of the diving work in the salvage operation, much of it of a hazardous nature, was accomplished without a single severe casualty. The total work consisted of approximately 3,000 dives totaling about 9,000 diving hours. Most of the diving work was done on the OGLALA; next the WEST VIRGINIA, then the NEVADA and CALIFORNIA. Later a large amount of diving work was done on the OKLAHOMA which is not included in the above totals.

THE NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR

Rejuvenation at Pearl Harbor in material matters was handled in the greater part by the officers and civil

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service employees of the Navy Yard. Their spirit was not lagging. Essential materials and manpower were hurried from the mainland to build up the repair capacity. Thousands of mechanics and lesser ratings throughout the country volunteered for service at the Navy Yard. The force available at the Yard to serve the Fleet grew quickly from a few thousand to ten times that number. Throughout the war this great military outpost contributed mightily to the success of naval arms. The Navy Yard’s accomplishments in repairing the damages suffered by vessels of the Fleet on December 7 were of the very highest order -- a marvelous performance.

PEARL HARBOR IN RETROSPECT

The disaster suffered by our nation at Pearl Harbor demands careful scrutiny and analysis. The lessons learned will always be of great benefit to the Government -- to the State Department as well as to the military forces. An idealistic people have been awakened to the stern possibilities which can quickly upset a peaceful world and threaten the very foundation of civilization.

As is usually the case, the extent of the disaster can be visualized in truer proportions only in retrospect. The immediate appearance of any disaster hides the truth.

True evaluation comes only with the passage of time. Pearl Harbor was a bitter blow; of that there is no gainsaying. The crippling of our Fleet and Air Force was a most serious military setback. The loss of nearly 3,500 lives was a finality that can never be turned back. But there were compensating features, and retrospectively one can well nigh detect the all-guiding hand of Providence outlining the future of our nation.

The loss of 3,500 lives can not be mitigated in any possible way, but let us not forget that such a loss is small in a major battle on either land or sea, or even in a cataclysm of nature. The material loss, though great, was rectified not only by a successful salvage program but in many other ways as well. The shock of material loss induced a great spiritual gain.

Some great military leader has said that the spiritual is to the material as ten is to one. Pearl Harbor generated spiritual values within the military forces which carried through to great victories. The same is true of the civilian forces, both in military organizations and on the home front.

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Except for Pearl Harbor the United States could not have entered the war as a united nation. The fact that this calamity solidified our people in the field of politics and industry made possible the great marvel of war production which knew no limitation. Pearl Harbor consolidated our people into the greatest war machine imagined by man. In the battle zone and on the home front the kaleidoscopic effects of Pearl Harbor insured all-out war and guaranteed unconditioned victory.

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CHAPTER VIII

PERSONNEL EXPANSION

CHAPTER VIII PERSONNEL EXPANSION

I. Introduction:

When Congressional authorization in the middle 1930's finally appropriated an increase of our naval forces, the effect of this expansion extended throughout every branch of the service. This was mirrored in the expansion of personnel, not only within the organization of the two shipbuilding bureaus but also in their cognizant field activities. At first the workloads of the employees increased with no noticeable increase of personnel which is reflected by the fact that in June 1933 the combined total Washington office complement of the Bureaus of Engineering and Construction and Repair amounted to only 344. By June 1940, however, this complement had risen to 1107, under the impetus of the emergency declaration, and by June 1945, under wartime conditions, to 6305. The field activities under the Bureau of Ships, however, had increased at an even more astounding rate.

As shown by Chart VII and Table 15, the complement of the Washington office consisted primarily of civilian personnel during the Emergency period prior to our entry into the war. In June 1940, for example, the civilians comprised almost 90% of total complement as opposed to the military's representation of just slightly over 10%. Five years later, at the war's end, however, the civilians carried little more than a majority over the military assigned to the Bureau of Ships' Washington headquarters.

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In view of its comprehensive nature, the consequences and statistics of this personnel expansion will be fully discussed in this chapter from the standpoint of the entire war period, rather than separately in the defensive and the offensive phases of the war. This subject is covered at this early juncture of the history for two reasons: first, because of personnel importance in the over-all Bureau of Ships' wartime operation, and, secondly, because the major expansion occurred during the early stages of the war. When the offensive phase of our operations commenced in the middle of 1943, the expansion of personnel continued, but at a decreasing rate.

The magnitude of the personnel problems and administration can scarcely be comprehended by a disinterested party. The constantly fluid situation with regard to officers assigned to the Bureau, for example, posed a problem of first degree, for each new replacement required extensive indoctrination not only as to his particular duties but also as to the Bureau's over-all functioning and procedures. The expansion and pressures caused by the wartime load thrown on the Bureau, moreover, forced many organizational change: sections grew to divisions, the Shipbuilding and Maintenance Ship-Type desks combined, responsibilities for contracts and procurement changed, and naval personnel were introduced into civilian type jobs which, upon demobilization, required civilian replacements. This entire organizational change placed upon the Civilian Personnel Branch considerable duties: job sheets had to be rewritten or new positions established; employees had to be reassigned, promoted or transferred; frequent changes caused unsettled conditions with resultant personnel reaction; new supervisors required supervisory training; time sheets had to cover every employee; etc.

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In view of the numerical superiority of civilian personnel in the Bureau's operation and their more complex administration, they will he discussed first in this study. Since the military are governed by specified rules and regulations, their administration and problems provide little basis for comprehensive study. The civilians, however, not falling under the military jurisdiction, offer a considerably more extensive field of inspection and therefore will be investigated more thoroughly than the military.

Following this, the officer personnel will be reviewed, and, lastly, in this chapter, but not "in the hearts of their countrymen", the W.A.V.E.S. -- the winged sentries of the Bureau of Ships — will be adequately covered from all points of view. In view of woman's eternal complexity, however, this literary coverage will prove lengthier and more involved than that of the officer personnel.

In conclusion, a brief survey is made of civilian-military relationships and the possible steps which may be taken to alleviate the frictions seemingly inherent within such a double-standard situation.

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CHART VII

BUREAU OF SHIPS
PERSONNEL OR BOARD BY MONTHS 1933-1945

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TABLE 15

Month and
Year

Total
Personnel

OFFICERS

ENLISTED

CIVILIAN

Ships

Eng.

C & R

Ships

Eng.

C & R

Ships

Eng.

C & R

June 1933

344

75

50

25

269

133

136

" 34

445

75

48

27

370

162

208

" 35

531

75

50

25

456

190

266

" 36

607

81

53

28

526

224

302

" 37

637

86

54

32

551

237

314

" 38

696

96

62

34

600

288

312

" 39

884

99

62

37

785

353

432

" 40

1107

117

71

46

990

449

541

" 41

2001

221

1

1787

" 42

3670

509

2

3159

" 43

5225

982

341

3902

" 44

5809

1310

702

3797

" 45

6305

1477

1018

3810

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Civilian Employees of the Bureau of Ships being Presented Distinguished Civilian Service Awards by the Chief, Admiral E. L. Cochrane, U.S.N. Left to right: N. L. Merriman, W. E. Stine, L. Flaherty, H. Gregory, J. Schombert, Adm. Cochrane, E. Pallange, W. Fifer, C. Whitney, M. Portnoy and J. Niedermair.

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II. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL*

A. WARTIME EXPANSION

Although the civilian complement of the Bureau of Ships' Washington office increased from 990 to 3810 over the period from June 1940 to June 1945, this expansion could not compare with the military's twelve-fold increase. The detachment of civilians from military regulations and discipline, however, was fraught with momentous problems, particularly during a wartime operation. For this reason, the discussion of civilian personnel will be comprehensive in this report, not bo much to present noteworthy accomplishments within the Bureau but more to provide a basis for future action in this field should another emergency expansion present itself.

Table 15 indicates the personnel growth within the Shipbuilding bureaus from the initial naval expansion program in 1933 when 269 civilians were employed until the war's end when 3810 civilians were assigned within the Bureau of Ships.

Breaking down these civilian statistics for the emergency and war period, since this chapter deals with the over-all personnel program throughout the entire war, Chart VIII indicates the trend in each service (P, CAF, SP, CPC) by total number in the Bureau; Chart IX indicates the trend in each of these services by percentage of the total civilian personnel; Tables 16 through 20 present the number of employees in each grade in each service yearly from 1940 to 1945.

* Based upon a report prepared by Mr. Theodore W. Taylor, formerly head of the Civilian Personnel Section of the Administrative Division.

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CHART VIII

BUREAU OF SHIPS
Civilian Personnel by Service
1941-1945

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CHART IX

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TABLE 16

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

BY SERVICE

GIVING PERCENTAGE

BUREAU OF SHIPS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

31 Dec. 1940

31 Dec. 1941

31 Dec.

1942

31 Dec.

1943

31 Dec.

1944

30 June

1945

30 Sept. 1945

31 Dec. 1945

PROFESSIONAL

472

706

1063

1169

1132

1136

1057

993

Percent of Total

32.2%

32.1%

31.2%

30.9%

29.2%

28.5%

28.7%

29.8%

SUB-PROFESSIONAL

86

135

180

187

164

135

121

107

Percent of Total

5.9%

64

5.3%

5.0%

4.2%

3.4%

3.3%

3.2%

CLERICAL

795

1181

1954

2230

2426

2560

2383

2131

Percent of Total

54.2%

53.6%

57.3%

59.0%

62.6%

64 .3%

64.7%

64.0%

CUSTODIAL

113

181

210

194

152

153

120

98

Percent of Total

7.7%

8.2%

6.2%

5.1%

3.9%

3.8%

3.3%

2.9%

TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES ON BOARD

1466

2203

3407

3780

3874

3984

3682

3329

 

NOTE: Figures obtained from payroll.

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TABLE 17

TOTAL NUMBER OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES BY GRADE

Service & Grade

31 Dec. 1940

31 Dec. 1941

31 Dec. 1942

31 Dec. 1943

30 June 1945

30 Sept. 1945

P-1

60

103

142

83

14

10

P-2

103

199

331

273

121

88

P-3

163

189

278

374

382

355

P-4

95

129

178

243

345

339

P-5

42

70

100

137

189

197

P-6

11

16

33

51

73

76

P-7

0

0

1

8

11

11

P-8

0

0

0

0

1

1

TOTAL NUMBER
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES

472

706

1063

1169

1136

1057

 

NOTE; Figures obtained from payroll.

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TABLE 18

TOTAL NUMBER OF SUB-PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES

BY GRADE

Service & Grade

31 Dec. 1940

31 Dec. 1941

31 Dec. 1942

31 Dec. 1943

30 June 1945

30 Sept. 1945

SP-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

SP-2

0

0

0

5

2

1

SP-3

2

31

32

26

6

7

SP-4

20

25

44

34

16

10

SP-5

8

20

37

36

28

26

SP-6

23

20

35

37

46

39

SP-7

10

13

14

22

19

17

SP-8

23

26

18

27

18

21

TOTAL NUMBER
SUB-PROFESSIONAL 
EMPLOYEES

86

135

180

187

135

121

 

NOTE: Figures obtained from payroll.

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TABLE 19

TOTAL NUMBER OF CLERICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND FISCAL EMPLOYEES

BY GRADE

Service & Grade

31 Dec. 1940

31 Dec. 1941

31 Dec. 1942

31 Dec. 1943

30 June 1945

30 Sept 1945

CAF-1

81

132

90

28

3

3

CAF-2

298

481

876

637

776

711

CAF-3

275

382

636

864

805

715

CAF-4

73

112

219

414

513

495

CAF-5

31

40

75

142

194

195

CAF-6

18

9

23

28

55

54

CAF-7

9

11

20

61

95

99

CAF-8

2

3

3

6

10

9

CAF-9

2

7

8

39

77

74

CAF-10

1

1

1

1

0

0

CAF-11

2

3

3

5

23

21

CAF-12

2

0

0

5

9

7

CAF-13

1

0

0

0

0

0

TOTAL NUMBER CLERICAL,
ADMINISTRATIVE AND
FISCAL EMPLOYEES

795

1181

1954

2230

2560

2383

 

NOTE: Figures obtained from payroll.

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TABLE 20

TOTAL NUMBER OF CRAFTS,
PROTECTIVE AND CUSTODIAL EMPLOYEES
BY GRADE

Service & Grade

31 Dec. 1940

31 Dec. 1941

31 Dec. 1942

31 Dec. 1945

30 June 1945

30 Sept 1945

CPC-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

CPC-2

1

0

0

96

107

69

CPC-3

112

181

193

81

39

45

CPC-4

0

0

15

16

6

6

CPC-5

0

0

0

0

1

0

CPC-6

0

0

2

1

0

1

TOTAL NUMBER CRAFTS,
PROTECTIVE AND CUSTODIAL 
EMPLOYEES

113

161

210

194

153

121

 

NOTE: Figures obtained from payroll.

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In view of provisions in the appropriation acts authorizing the Bureau to employ contract employees, many necessary personnel during the early war period were obtained through a "personal service contract" which specified a per diem rate for the individual's services. Other personnel were obtained through "company contracts" wherein the Bureau contracted with a company for the professional services of an engineer (no specific name mentioned) and agreed to pay the company a stipulated price.

The statistics on contract employment are shown in Table 21.

Another type of employee hard to classify and under the jurisdiction of the naval personnel office is the "Civilian Technician". These men were contract employees or service employees sent out by companies to service that company's equipment in the field. Since these men were not assigned to the Bureau in Washington, however, statistics on them are not readily available.

Limitations on the comprehensiveness of this report must be recognized, for although the study covers the over-all civilian personnel problem as it existed in the Washington office of the Bureau of Ships, it does not include the situation in the Bureau's field activities. In general, however, the difficulties reviewed herein may be considered to have existed in the other activities, either in whole or in part.

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TABLE 21

NUMBER OF CONTRACT EMPLOYEES

BUREAU OF SHIPS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

DATE

PERSONAL
SERVICE
CONTRACT

COMPANY
CONTRACT

31 Dec. 1941

48

31 Dec. 1942

158

44

31 Dec. 1943

107

34

31 Dec. 1944

36

35

30 June 1945

34

32

30 Sept. 1945

10

6

31 Dec. 1945

6

2

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1. Professional Employees

There is no actual data available, but it is probably safe to estimate that approximately seventy-five percent of the officers were assigned to technical or semi-technical work in place of unobtainable civilians and that many of the remainder were assigned to administrative work in place of unobtainable civilians. Although the figures show (Table 16) that there was a decrease in the percentage of the civilian complement made up of professional employees, there existed a general trend in the direction of establishing higher grade positions for civilian employees. Another trend, however, became apparent in the decrease in the number of P1's and P2's due to the Bureau’s inability to recruit them during the latter part of the war period.

2. Clerical, Administrative, and Fiscal Employees

Since almost all of the enlisted personnel were assigned to civilian type clerical work, it is necessary to consider both enlisted and the lower CAF employees in order to obtain a complete picture of the clerical force in the Bureau.

Although a general increase in the percentage of Bureau employees in the CAF service occurred, analysis indicates, among other things, that:

(1) Grade CAF1 became practically eliminated.
(2) Higher grade CAF positions increased considerably.  

Under a peacetime organisation, however, the overall percentage of CAF employees decreases slightly, while the percentage for professional employees increases slightly and the upward trend in the higher CAF positions continues.

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3. Sub-professional and Crafts, Protective, and Custodial Employees

Sub-professional employees gradually became less and less a factor in the Bureau's labor force, partly due to the relatively high qualifications required and to the lack of persons with such qualifications during the war period. Through necessity, therefore, higher grade CAF employees were substituted in many instances. In like manner, some work that could have been done by draftsmen and engineering aids, had they been available, was performed by professional employees.

Due to higher efficiency, Crafts, Protective and Custodial employees decreased in percentage and in numbers. Up until 1942, each section had its own messengers but with the centralization of the messenger system, a greater utilization of messenger's time was obtained. The re-organization of the mail room and mail procedures also proved important in effecting a better job with less man-hours. This is a particularly remarkable result, when it is realized that the employees were all male in 1941 and 1942 but at the end of the war that they were almost all females, who proved less efficient on messenger work because of greater physical troubles.

It may readily be realized that unless strict control is maintained, a tendency will arise for the percentage of CPC employees to increase.

From a budgetary standpoint, this is a matter of considerable importance.

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B. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH

At the beginning of 1941, the Personnel Branch of the newly formed Bureau of Ships was reorganized from the original plan into five sections: Placement and Appointments, Classification, Time and Payroll, Training, and Status Control. One of the major problems proved to be the obtaining of necessary authority from Central Navy's Civilian Personnel Branch to perform certain personnel functions in the Bureau of Ships. The Booz report of July 1941 stated:

"After considerable effort, the Bureau has been granted permission to do its own recruiting for new personnel, prepare its own appointment papers and make its own contacts with Civil Service. All vacancies in additional identical positions can now be filled without prior classification approval in the Secretary's Office. In effect, the Bureau operates with no contact, except on new classifications, reallocations, and for control purposes, with the central personnel office. This is a major forward step and saves weeks of time on each request."

One of the major reasons for the establishment of a strong Bureau Personnel Office proved to be the Central Navy's lack of a large enough staff to meet the emergency problems presented them. Coincident with our entry into the war, the whole theory of personnel management changed in the Bureau of Ships from the Chief Clerk type of operation to a specialized function run by well-qualified competent personnel technicians.

The ensuing organizational changes within the Branch will be covered during the over-all personnel discussion which follows.

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C. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

1. Responsibility

In a memorandum to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships 15 May 1945 Under-Secretary Ralph A. Bard stated the following:

["Without minimizing in any way the advances we have made, I am also impressed with the growing importance of Civilian Personnel Administration, and with the necessity of giving it even greater attention. The Navy must continue to improve its relationship with its civilian employees if it is to accomplish its mission in the Japanese War and if it is to make a successful adjustment to peace time conditions. It is vital to the Navy's future that its reputation as a progressive, fair and efficient employer be firmly established with the public in general and our own large civilian and military force in particular, as well as with organized groups of citizens and other Government agencies."

"The facts of the case are that within the framework of established policy, Bureau Chiefs are responsible for the adequacy of personnel administration within their respective Bureaus and at the shore establishments under their jurisdiction. Moreover, management has the authority that is essential to a satisfactory discharge of this responsibility.

In short, the task of applying established personnel policies firmly, equitably and with good judgment, to the end that sound employer-employee relationship and high morale are developed, rests squarely with operating management."

This expression reveals the consciousness on the part of Navy Department officials of the importance of personnel management.

As expressed in a report before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs,

["The productive capacity of the Bureau of Ships rests on the efficiency of its employees. The efficiency with which employees do their job depends in large measure upon the calibre of supervision received, from the immediate supervisor to the top of the chain of command .... Even the lowest ranking supervisor is management both to the Navy and to the rank and file of employees .... The great bulk of the problems which relate

--86--

[to the efficient utilization of manpower axe closely or directly related to the competence and numbers of supervisors who must direct the work of civilian employees.

It is considered that no other problem is even remotely as important and basic to manpower ills as supervision."

The most important factor in production is the employee's attitude toward his work. An experiment carried on for many years at the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company indicated that when employees feel they belong, feel they are doing a job that has a purpose, and have a feeling of stability, they work faster and better. This same experiment showed that the feelings of employees count more than hours of labor or wages.

"Improving the supervisor's "people handling" ability is the key to high production because the supervisor is primarily responsible for an employee's attitude toward his job."

2. Discharging ResponsibilityE

The Navy Under-Secretary's memorandum to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships further concerned itself with the proper discharge of this responsibility of supervisors.

--87--

"I am convinced that the improvement of the Navy's relationship with its civilian employees is an essential phase of our management job and I hope the Bureau chiefs will be able to devote increased attention to it, as I propose to do. A desire for sounder and more progressive personnel administration must generate at the top of the organization. This interest and point of view must be reflected down through the Bureaus and Shore Establishments to the employee's immediate supervisor and thence to the employee himself. By whatever means you consider appropriate, I hope you will impress upon the officers reporting to you the importance of giving increased consideration to personnel matters. This word should be passed on down through successive levels of management (both military and civilian) in Washington and throughout the field service."

As stated above the primary way of discharging management's responsibility is for management to became conscious of its personnel responsibility and devote the necessary time to it. It is true, however, that line officials are busy and have many operating problems to deal with. Furthermore, ae organizations become larger and more complex (and as more is learned about the reactions of human beings to the work environment) personnel management techniques become a large field of specialization. As a result, in most agencies, private and public, staff assistance in the form of personnel offices have been established.

At the Navy Department level, the top personnel group reported directly to the Under-Secretary. In most of the Bureaus of the Navy, the civilian personnel function is under an Administrative Officer. This is a rather common type of organization throughout the Federal Service.

In an article appearing in "Public Administration Review" we find the following:

--86--

"The executive must operate by using these two functions (personnel management and budget planning) in the true sense of staff relationship. He must assign them to staff located organizationally in his executive office and reporting directly to him. They should plan and formulate policies for his determination. They should see to it that details of command are effectively executed. However, they should be anonymous, organizationally, since they act in the executive’s name, and he has full responsibility. After review of proposed policies and programs, and of progress following action decisions, the executive must direct his line supervisors to integrate planning in day to day operations. He can devote necessary attention to such direction through personal contact only if his staff organization is well established."

It is pointed out that many students of management feel that the greatest task of the first line supervisor is not the production problem but the problem of handling people so that the greatest quantity and quality of production can be obtained. At the level of the line supervisor, personnel operations and line operations are inseparable within an organization.

The work of the personnel office might be divided up into three different aspects:

(1) Research- investigation as to personnel problems and operations within the agency and policies and good methods of doing things in other agencies and in private industry;

(2) Influence- to influence rather than to exert control over line management in a positive way for better personnel practice, and,

(3) Administration- last because it is probably the least important of the three, it includes such activities as training, recruiting and placement classification and other service functions of the personnel office. Some of these functions involve control

--89--

operations as required by law or regulation for the purpose of achieving desired practice and necessary uniformity. Even in operation of services, it should not be forgotten that the responsibility should be logically placed on the supervisor for proper personnel management. The staff service of training cannot train all individuals in the Bureau, but it can help supervisors train their employees and render special assistance in training classes. On the job training, however, cannot be replaced.

The greater the development and thoroughness in research and influence and the resultant establishment of clear-cut, definite, concise and thorough policy and directives, the less requirement there will be for any type of control operation in personnel. The ultimate objective is to eliminate as many control operations as possible. If proper standards and policies are developed, the line operators who have the primary personnel responsibility can follow out the requirements themselves in many instances with only occasional necessary reference to personnel technicians.

3. The Bureau of Ships

Organization planning and finance planning within the Bureau of Ships report to the Chief and Assistant Chief. The one major organizational change frequently proposed and one with which the Chief of the Bureau has already concerned himself relates to having a personnel officer report directly to the Chief. In this regard, the Chief stated on 5 March 1945:

--90--

"The responsibilities of Section, Branch, and Division Heads, in technical and administrative matters, are so heavy that the Chief of Bureau recognizes that in the main it is impractical for these officers personally to make the detailed administrative analyses necessary for the moat effective utilization of the Bureau's manpower. It is essential, however, that detailed and specific information be available to me as the Chief of the Bureau in supporting requests for personnel action involving promotions or increases in force in order that requests may be adequately supported in the naval administration outside the Bureau and with the Civil Service Commission. It is likewise essential that the Chief of the Bureau have uniform information as to standards of utilization of the Bureau's staff."

The Chief of the Bureau recognized the staff nature of a manpower utilization survey team, for he continued:

"With the size to which the Bureau has grown, it is impossible for it to be operated exclusively on the straight "line-command" principle in which a military organization is normally organized and it is necessary that in some phases of the Bureau's work the functional scheme of management be adopted, ie., the use of specialists to assist in a problem common to a number of sections.... It should be recognized .... that such a Team itself has no administrative authority. It ie simply a fact-finding group trained in work of this sort...

As pointed out earlier, personnel management was often regarded as a limited service function and this conception in the Bureau of Ships proved to be most dominant. The Civilian Personnel Branch did possess service functions: the actual operations of classification, recruitment, record keeping, paper processing and the like, hut experience proved it feasible to assign to this branch staff, advisory and policy relationships with the head of the agency in which it was placed, (including such things as classification, policy, recruitment policy, leave policy promotion policy, disciplinary policy, etc,).

--91--

The field of personnel management is complex. Every supervisor and line official cannot be expected to know the best personnel practices, just as they cannot be expected to know all of the legal implications of matters for which they are responsible. In the one case the help of well-trained, broad-gauge personnel specialists is required; in the other case the advice of competent legal counsel is required. In both instances however the final responsibility for decision and action rests in the hands of the line official.

In view of the above, it would seem feasible in the future to provide greater access to the personnel staff in order that their vast background of experience in this field may be utilized in planning by the Chief of the Bureau and his Committee.

Thus far this report has concerned itself solely with the Washington Office of the Bureau. The Chief of the Bureau, however, has much broader personnel responsibilities, for his authority extends to the naval personnel and the field establishments under the cognizance of the Bureau. The coordination of the personnel functions involved with these activities will be considered next.

--92--

D. SHORE DIVISION AND THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH.

Before Pearl Harbor, the Bureau maintained a field records section which kept a card for each civilian employee under the Jurisdiction of the Bureau in the field (i.e., being paid from BUSHIPS appropriation). With the Branch reorganization in 1941, however it was found that no use could be made of these records, but the Civilian Personnel Branch continued to receive copies of personnel action on employees in the field being paid from Bureau of Ships funds until early 1944. Since nothing was done with these copies except to file them, however, field activities then routed all actions directly to the Shore Establishments Division.

The Secretary's office had primary jurisdiction over the personnel guidance of Naval field establishments, at first through it's Office of Personnel Supervision and Management, but later this changed into the Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel Division. During the latter days of the Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel Division (1945), the Bureau of Ships established a Shore Division which became charged with the administrative phases of Bureau of Ships activities in the various shore establishments. With the reorganization order of the Secretary, providing that the Bureau of Ships would be directly responsible for Naval shipyards, the Shore Division assumed responsibility for all field personnel matters of the Bureau.

Both the Shore Division and the Bureau's Liaison Office for Supervisors of Shipbuilding and Inspectors of Naval Material informally utilized

--93--

the Civilian Personnel Branch's technical section to avoid duplicate services. Having a classification staff, an employment branch staff, and other specialized groups who are currently informed on Civil Service and Navy Department regulations, the Civilian Personnel Branch render such advice and technical, assistance as is possible to the Shore Division.

--94--

E. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE: INTERNAL POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT

1. Staff Nature and Service Attitude

Since the Civilian Personnel Branch is not an end in itself but exists for the purpose of properly serving top management, operating sections, and employees, it ie essential that the personnel staff constantly bear this purpose in mind. In accord with this policy a status control system was established in 1941 providing a record of every personnel request which came into the office and recording the progress of action until completion. The unit handling this record, called "Statue Control", operated as an independent unit, first under the personnel officer, then under the Classification Section. Finally it transferred to the Records and Services Section where the card and procedure were revised and became known as "Progress Control Record".

The Progress Control Record kept complete information on the processing of all requests, making possible estimates at anytime on the status of the workload in the Personnel Branch as well as the workload within any particular section of the branch.

There is no question but what information of this nature on workload and progress have a stimulating effect on production. It also makes it possible for an office the size of the Civilian Personnel Branch to know what is going on. Without such controls and information, necessary knowledge may not be available to the officer-in-charge, the Director of Administration, or the Chief of the Bureau.

One of the purposes of Progress Control is to serve as an information center on status of actions — not only information for members of the

--95--

Civilian Personnel Branch but for operating officials who want to know the status of their requests. This saves a good deal of the time of the analysts in the various parts of the Civilian Personnel Branch in answering questions on status of actions.

2. Staff Relations with Section Head

During the first two war years, there existed a strong centralization of the Civilian Personnel Branch's operations. The Officer-inCharge, for example, actually participated in every disciplinary and discharge action, but as an adequate staff came into being a gradual trend toward decentralization occurred. By 1944 section heads had become fully responsible for the operation of that part of the personnel office under their cognizance with only certain specified types of matters coming to the Officer-in-Charge's attention. In general, the Officer-in-Charge coordinated the action of the various sections so that they did not work at cross purposes; acted as a representative of the Personnel Branch with operating sections, branches and divisions; and transmitted to the Director of Administration and/or the Chief of the Bureau information on matters of policy.

In delegating responsibility and authority to the sections, part of the coordination of the personnel operation was obtained through the use of a "Manual of Procedure" which did not come into being until 1944.

With the policy statement, functional statement, and procedural processes clearly outlined, it was possible for the section heads to operate in their proper spheres efficiently and in cooperation with other members of the staff. The degree of decentralization practiced in this branch would not be safe without definite policy, functional and procedural statements on which to operate.

--96--

With decentralization of operation, it became difficult without the aid of reports for the Officer-in-Charge of Civilian Personnel to know what transpired in hie sections. Progress Control provided statistical and overall information but analysis of trends, expressions of existing problems, statements of accomplishment in flesh and blood language, and declarations of future problems to be solved had to come from the operating sections. Consequently in 1944, a system of monthly reports was installed which proved highly effective.

3. Relations with Administrative Superiors: (Code 200)

In general, the relationship between the Civilian Personnel Branch and the Director of Administration proved to be harmonious and productive throughout the war years. The Director of Administration attempted no tight control, his only requirement being that matters about which he should know should be brought to his attention by the Branch before other sources did so. Naturally any policy matters of major importance which might have repercussions of one kind or another in the Bureau were cleared with the Director of Administration. This confidence and wholehearted backing of the Administrative Officer proved of great assistance in the operation and performance of the Civilian Personnel Branch.

--97--

F. UTILIZATION OF MANPOWER

In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy dated 7 June 1945, the following activities of the Bureau of Ships which were designed to assure effective use of officer, enlisted and civilian personnel, were outlined:

"(A) The basic organization of the Bureau has been under constant study and several important changes have been made which have clarified work assignments and eliminated duplication of effort.

"(B) During July, August, and September of 1943 the Bureau cooperated with the Management Engineer's Office in a study of the placement and the use of all officers in the Bureau of the rank of Lieutenant Commander and below.

(C) From January 1944 to date the Bureau has conducted a continuous utilization survey of all personnel in the Bureau. This survey was sponsored by the Management Engineer's Office and administered by the Bureau of Ships.

(D) The Bureau of Ships has developed a modern personnel office with an experienced staff which is daily giving close attention to the proper placement and utilization of personnel within the Bureau.

(E) The Bureau is in the process of developing a workload reporting system which will reflect monthly for each of its organization units quantitative variations in work performed. This system will facilitate the reassignment or release of personnel within the Bureau as the workload fluctuates or eventually decreases. A brief description of each of these programs is set forth in the following paragraphs".

1. Civilian Personnel Branch Activity

a. Breakdown of jobs of utilization of skills

The most efficient organization to accomplish an engineering task has as many engineers as are required for peak loads. Application of this principle resulted in an excess of engineers who were doing engineering, sub-professional and clerical work. To break down the responsibilities so that clerical personnel could work on the clerical part, sub-professional personnel on the sub-professional part, and engineers on the technical part of the job required a great deal of thought and effort.

Further, it required a great deal of coordination and good supervision.

--98--

The Civilian Personnel Branch worked with sections in attempting to work out some of these breakdowns of lots, "but there was manifested a reluctance on the part of the sections to engage in the necessary training of non-engineers to carry on the clerical and sub-professional parts of the job. Further, under the pressures of war-time, sections were inclined to leave things as they were and have engineers do related sub-professional and clerical duties if it was at all possible to have engineers assigned. From the resultant pressure exerted for deferments of necessary civilians and recruitment of additional civilians, it may be observed that should another national manpower shortage present itself in any possible future conflict, the Bureau could go much further in breaking down jobs for the utilization of its available skills.

b. Employment and Placement

The Recruitment Section made every attempt to recruit as high a quality of personnel for the Bureau as possible, but doing an adequate job in this area was handicapped by the limited number of qualified persons available and to some extent by personal preferences of line officials. A good placement job is a part of overall management operation and is not possible without a progressive reassignment and promotion policy. However, during the war the Bureau of Ships attempted in considerable degree to stabilize the employee in his present job, for it was believed that the time necessary for training new individuals caused by turnover through promotion and reassignment would have a deleterious effect on the Bureau's production and therefore on the war. When considered in its long run aspects, this theory may be subject to debate,

--99--

for under such circumstances morale of the employee suffers with consequent decrease of productivity. Of course, during the war the stimulus of patriotism and the desperate necessity of doing everything possible to defeat the enemy had a strong influence on employee production.

The same problems were encountered when an employee was considered for transfer from the Bureau. This Bureau, as throughout the armed services, in most cases would not release the employee if he proved highly useful, even though the employee might receive a promotion in some other Bureau or agency.

In the event of another national emergency and shortage of manpower, it is recommended that this problem of promotion, reassignment, and release he thoroughly considered prior to the adoption of a policy by the Bureau. The progressive type of policy on these personnel activities naturally would require a well-informed line of supervision which recognizes its management and personnel responsibilities. This may be one of the main programs upon which the Bureau may work in peacetime since it proves so fundamental, to the Bureau's ability to do its wartime job.

c. Color

During the war the Jefferson Memorial was created commemorating the memory of Thomas Jefferson and what he stood for -- namely the rights of men to equal opportunity and freedom. Jefferson followed this through to the logical conclusion when he fought for a law to free slaves in Virginia at the time he was a member of the Legislature of that state.

If, during the war, Jefferson should have spent a couple of days in the Bureau of Ships, he might have run onto numerous incidents in keeping with his beliefs of equality. It has been amply demonstrated in various parts of the Bureau of Ships that the white and black races can work together. The

--100--

outstanding example occurred in the Correspondence Room where, during most of the war years, approximately 32 percent of the employees were colored. It was the policy of the supervisor in charge not to segregate by race. Every employee was treated as an individual with the result that when asked the racial proportion within her unit, the supervisor had to sit down and think of each individual by name in order to remember what color they were. When people work harmoniously together and come to know each other ae individuals they do not think in terms of race. This fact the Chief of the Bureau recognized, for during the war he told the Divisions that they were to take personnel assigned regardless of color and instructed the Civilian Personnel Branch to make assignments without discrimination. If a section refused to go along on this policy, the Chief of the Bureau requested that he be advised of the fact, which proved of substantial aid in making the situation workable.

This problem, however, was not peculiar to the Bureau of Ships. It was and is a national problem. However, the answer to the problem will come in places like the Bureau of Ships where the colored race is attempting to earn a living and where real headway is being made to surmount these difficulties. The final solution will come through the colored race proving that it can ably perform a job.

d. Stenographic Work

During the time when there was a critical shortage of stenographic skill the Bureau made quite a drive for the use of dictaphone machines.

In many cases, whether a stenographer is available or not, the machine method of dictation and transcription is far more efficient. The dictator does not

--101--

have to wait until the stenographer is available, and. the stenographer does not have to wait while the dictator is answering the telephone or taking care of other interruptions. It should be mentioned that for a successful system the dictator has to be well trained in his end of the job otherwise the transcriber can not possibly do the kind of a job the dictator wants.

It is undoubtedly true that during the course of the war the Stenographic Room often saved the situation for the Bureau of Ships because there was an available staff of trained typists and stenographers which could be placed on an urgent peakload job to meet a deadline. Experience has dictated that if, in the future, a larger percentage of stenographers and typists are in Correspondence Rooms rather than in sections, this will make for more flexibility in use of stenographic and typing personnel, will take care of peakloads and will make for complete utilization of stenographic and typing skills.

e. Training and Employee Relations

As of June 1945 nearly 400 supervisors had been trained under the Bureau of Ships' supervisory training program. The training was in three areas (Known as the three J programs): Employee Relations, Office Methods, and Instruction on the Job. Although specific savings which can be traced to these training programs have resulted in the saving of 20,000 man-hours having net dollar value of over $17,000 per annum, and although the Bureau of Ships has gone further in supervisory training than any other Bureau in the Navy Department, it is felt that an even bigger and more productive program can be followed in the future.

--102--

Concerning utilization of employees, very often employees came to the Employee Relations Office when their morale was suffering because they did not have enough to do, or when they were not put on the highest type of work for which they were capable. When either of these instances developed, it was incumbent upon the Employee Relations Officer concerned to contact the section and see if the situation could not be corrected.

Very often the supervisor proved unaware of the problem and, when it was called to his attention, the situation was quickly corrected. Flagrant cases of underutilization of personnel were called to the attention of the Employee Relations Officer or the Personnel Officer who in turn went over the supervisor concerned if necessary to higher echelons in the line of command.

G. BUREAU, DIVISION, BRANCH, AND SECTION PERSONNEL RELATIONS

1. Centralized Personnel

Historically, there have been different methods of dealing with personnel operations and processes in the various parts of the bureau.

Some Division Directors like to have close control over their personnel operations, even going so far as to clear each action. Other Division Directors were content to let their sections deal directly with the Civilian Personnel Branch,

Throughout the war years this situation has continued. In some cases the Placement Section deals with small sections; in other cases, they deal with an entire division through a divisional representative.

--103--

Personnel processing was centralized at a division level in the Contracts and Electronics Divisions. Branches which developed centralized processing of personnel records were the Ship Maintenance Branch, the Maintenance Equipment Branch, and the Scheduling and Statistics or Materials Branch.

Fox' most of the war, the great portion of the bureau involved in the Shipbuilding Division was contacted on an individual section basis, although the actions naturally flowed through the chain of command.

With the development in some areas in the bureau of assistants who worked on personnel matters, there was a tendency for some overlapping of activity to occur. For example, the personnel assistants reporting to the director of the Electronics Division tended to reassign or assign personnel without any reference to the bureau office and to counsel personnel on off-and on-the-job problems without reference to the bureau office. There also existed as a consequence of this overlapping development of duplicate records, which occasioned a waste of both effort and time.

Another function of the personnel assistants in some areas was to follow up on personnel requests and to expedite action.

In an effort to centralize all of these personnel problems under one head with a Division status within the Bureau, an extensive survey and conference was conducted. However, both Admiral Cochrane and Admiral Mills, the Chief and Assistant Chief respectively, felt that their bureau had not achieved sufficient size to warrant such an organizational change. However, this did precipitate action to the extent that an Administrative Order in 1945 provided in essence for greater centralization of personnel administration within the Bureau and for the reduction in size of division personnel offices.

From an overall viewpoint the cooperation between the Civilian Personnel Branch and the Divisions proved to be satisfactory despite the occasional disagreements which naturally arise in any function of this nature. Needless to say, however, great advances may be made during peacetime concerning personnel administration and jurisdiction within the Bureau, for only upon firm organizational foundations may any future emergency personnel expansions be effectively attained.

H. BUREAU - SECRETARY’S OFFICE RELATIONSHIP

In early 1941 civilian personnel authority and processing in the Navy Department was primarily located in the Secretary's office, which retained all personnel files, prepared all personnel actions, and allocated positions for the department. The Bureaus performed only clerical functions, for all personnel technicians, if any, remained in the Secretary's office.

This led to considerable difficulty as illustrated in the Booz report which stated:

"There has been some delay in recruiting heads for the Training and Placement Sections because of the refusal of Mr. __________ (Secretary's Office) to authorize adequate grades. The Civil Service Commission has recently overruled Mr. __________ in favor of the Bureau so recruitment for these positions can proceed."

--105--

Not until 10 July 1941 did the Chief of the Bureau of Ships obtain the delegation of the following personnel functions from the Director of Personnel to the Bureau of Ships Civilian Personnel Branch:

(1) All preliminary recruiting and placement work. The Bureau of Ships was delegated the responsibility of contacting the Civil Service Commission for the purpose of obtaining certification of eligibles. Requests for certificates of eligibles’ changes in status, reinstatement, transfers, however, were required to bear the stamped signature of the Director of Personnel for the Navy Department;

(2) All incidental paper work relative to the preparation of appointment papers which were to bear the stamped signature of the Director of Personnel for the Navy Department;

(3) Recruiting of civilian personnel for all approved Bureau positions; and

(4) Administering of all oaths of office pertaining to civilian employees as soon as an employee was commissioned a Notary Public.

The Chief of the Bureau further stated that delegation of the above work did not eliminate the responsibility for obtaining authorization of all new and/or additional positions by the Assistant Secretary, nor did it preclude the necessity of having the Director of Personnel for the Navy Department review and certify all appointment papers before final approval has been made by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

--106--

The establishment of the Navy Department Civilian Personnel Council on 17 February 1943 constituted an important step forward in Navy Department Civilian Personnel administration. This practice of having all the bureau personnel officers get together with a representative of the Secretary's office to talk over policies, procedures and practices proved invaluable during the war period and helped greatly to coordinate personnel activity throughout the department. It also provided an opportunity for the best practices in a given bureau to be exposed to view so that other Bureaus could profit thereby.

Also, out of this evolved the present system of Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions rather than the forever uncertain circulation of personnel letters. Under the NCPI system, as established by the Secretary's office, all phases of personnel administration are covered by policy, regulations and specific procedures, as required. It is now possible for the Bureaus to know what the broad Navy Department policy and procedure is on almost any topic and to set up their policies and procedures to coincide and fit in with such regulations.

With the granting to the Bureau of allocation authority, an elimination of duplicate review prior to the establishment of a new position was effected. The Navy Department's authorization of Bureau analysts to certify for the Department proved to be a successful experiment in Department-Bureau relationships.

--107--

The periodic meetings held by the central classification staff with the Bureau's officers proved a profitable practice, with reference to classification procedures and to the adoption of special questionnaires and specifications developed by the Central Navy Classification office.

The training courses offered by the Central Classification office also were a great help to the Bureau classification staff and served invaluably in developing classification analysts during a period of shortages of skilled man-power.

In summary, it may be stated that relations in civilian personnel matters between Central Navy and the Bureau were affected by the following factors:

(1) The Bureaus being somewhat autonomous in operation, the Central Office did not know how far it could go in carrying out its directives;

and,

(2) After the Bureaus built up personnel staffs with competent personnel technicians, the lack of necessary qualified technicians in Central Navy did not permit it to assume active leadership in these matters.

In a letter to the Bureaus from the Under-Secretary of the Navy on 29 November 1945, however, the responsibilities of Department civilian personnel officials are fully outlined, which serves to illustrate the recognition by Central Navy that in order to change the relationship in this area it is imperative to provide adequate staffing of the Central Navy operation.

--108--

I. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

With the war came a change from a loose labor market to a tight labor market. In accord with this, the Civil Service Commission eliminated many of its restrictions and bottlenecks and earnestly attempted to process actions rapidly. Without this forthright action, the Commission would not have eased the pressure thrown upon it by the war and would have broken down completely.

During the war the commission emphasized the placing of resident analysts in operating agencies and gradually gave them the power to allocate positions on the spot rather than having to forward cases to the Civil Service Commission.

From the Commission's standpoint, it must be observed that out of one hundred names, perhaps ten applicants would indicate an interest in jobs and only one or two at best would prove of quality worth considering for a position. In spite of the Commission's recognition of this fact, however, in general it approved legitimate requests of the Bureau for the assignment of personnel, although solely on War Service appointments.

Without this adjustment to the wartime situation and relaxation of stringent requirements, it would have been impossible to staff the Bureau during hostilities.

Hot until the war's end was any concerted effort extended in the field of classification standards by the Commission, but even this endeavor offered no model personnel manuals including such subjects as personnel policies and

--109--

procedures of vital importance. In like fashion, budgetary appropriation cuts denuded the Commission of post-war training programs and left it without a strong stand on policy and research in the field of personnel.

The tremendous organization of the federal government is well-known to all and the Civil Service Commission occupies the apex of the giant pyramid structure concerned with personnel matters. In view of its position, however, it is very far removed from personnel operations In the departments.

Not only because of this, but also because of Congressional budgetary limitations as to staff complements, it would seem desirable for the Commission to divorce itself from the day-to-day routine operations in the Departments and to operate solely to establish policy and standards, to act as a training stimulus and service, and to check on personnel operations throughout the government on a post audit basis.

--110--

III. OFFICER PERSONNEL OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

A. INTRODUCTION

Although the civilian employees throughout the war comprised the majority of personnel attached to the Bureau of Ships and its field activities, the outnumbered military personnel maintained the positions of authority throughout the organization. In view of the specified regulations in areas of authority in any military organization, the administration of officer personnel requires no lengthy discussion as that already devoted, to the civilians. Instead, the primary concern of the Bureau with regard to officers centered about the correlation of positions to be filled and of qualified personnel to fill them. Into this overall problem entered the factors of recruitment and training, of reassignment from the field and of promotion and rotation.

As a background for the solution of these factors as they arose throughout the emergency and war period, it is well to review the actual number of officers involved in this problem. Although the wartime figures are not entirely accurate, the following approximate post-war breakdown as of September 1947 may be made to illustrate the magnitude of this Bureau's task: at the war's end there were approximately 22,000 Naval Reserve officers with engineering background, about one-third of which, classified as engineering specialists, came under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships. In addition 737 engineering duties only (EDO) officers of the regular Navy also fell under the jurisdiction of this Bureau.

--111--

Table 22 provides a sufficiently accurate picture to portray the general situation in its wartime as well as in post-war status, since no appreciable increment occurred within the ranks following 1944 to alter the comprehensive picture.

--112--

TABLE 22

ENGINEERING PERSONNEL

(Approximate figures as of 1 Sept. 1947 and applicable for general purposes from 1944 on)

Naval Reserve Officers with engineering background (entire Navy)

22,000

Bureau of Ships Cognizance:

Regular Navy Engineering Duty Only (EDO)

737

Reserve Inactive:

SE (general)

4900

SE (L) (hull)

518

SE (2) (machinery)

142

SE (3) (electrical)

135

SE (4) (Diesel)

64

SE (T) (Electronics)

608

6367

Reserve-Active:

SE (general)

490

SE (L) (hull)

52

SE ( ) (machinery)

14

SE ( ) (electrical)

14

SE ( ) (Diesel)

7

SE (T) (Electronics)

61

638

7005

Total Engineering Officers under BuShips

7742

COMPARATIVE STATISTICS

Total Navy: Regular Navy to Reserve Officers

16%

Regular Engineering to Total Reserve Engineers

3-1/3%

Regular Engineering to Total BuShips Engineers

10-1/2%

--113--

The distribution of officer personnel throughout the many activities coming under the cognizance of this Bureau is a matter of considerable interest. Table 23 illustrates this distribution and although the figures do not indicate only engineering specialists, it is safe to say that a good majority of the officers assigned to these activities were under the Bureau’s cognizance. The figures of Table 23 for 1 September 1944 are approximately the maximum attained throughout the war by these activities as a whole.

--114--

TABLE 23

DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS* ATTACHED TO ACTIVITIES UNDER COGNIZANCE OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1944

On Board

Under
Inst. & 
Temp. Duty

Permanent
Staff

Authorized
Complement

Bureau of Ships

1472

166

1306

1550

Navy Yards

3407

574

2833

2947

Industrial Managers, Astindmans, & Outlying Activities of Navy Yards

1094

59

1035

1038

Supervisors of Shipbuilding

1190

1

1189

1231

Inspectors of Machinery

43

--

43

45

USN Repair Base, San Diego, Industrial Command

286

--

286

256

USN Drydocks, Terminal Island (San Pedro)

148

10

138

132

USN Drydocks, Hunters Point

125

4

121

121

Naval Stations

67

67

67

USN Section Base, New Orleans

56

23

33

32

USN Frontier Base, Tompkinsville

56

56

64

Engineering Experiment Station

115

2

113

94

Taylor Model Basin

52

3

49

59

Naval Supply Depots

50

--

50

43

Landing Force Equipment Depots

192

58

134

149

Naval Research laboratory

347

19

328

340

Underwater Sound Laboratory

15

15

3

Radio and Sound laboratory

11

--

11

10

TOTALS

8726

919

7807

8181

 

*Includes Warrant Officers

--115—

U.  S, Naval Shipyard, Hunters Point, California
One of the more important field activities under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships to which over 100 specialized personnel were assigned.

--116--

The officer personnel of the two shipbuilding bureaus, Washington officer, in 1953 totalled only 75; by June 1940, under the impetus of the emergency program and the consolidation of the two Bureaus into one, the unprecedented peacetime high reached 100. By January 1945, however, this figure totalled 1,533! An even more staggering increase occurred in the Bureau’s officers assigned to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding posts, for in June 1940 they numbered 65, but by January 1944 this group had expanded to 1,231.

The above statistics are included in Table 24, which represents only one portion of the entire technical officer personnel coming under the Bureau of Ships components (as depicted by Table 23).

--117--

TABLE 24

OFFICER PERSONNEL
1940 - 1945

Bureau of Ships

Supervisors of
Shipbuilding

Inspectors of
Machinery

Date

USN

USNR

WAVES

TOTAL

1940

June

*

*

*

100

65

12

1941

January

128

39

0

167

77

5

July

138

92

0

230

*

*

1942

January

138

160

0

298

*

*

July

138

352

0

490

*

*

1943

January

140

728

16

884

*

*

July

151

811

50

1,012

1,045

*

1944

January

162

888

104

1,154

1,231

*

July

175

996

152

1,323

1,191

*

1945

January

174

1,167

192

1,533

1,133

*

July

169

1,111

217

1,497

921

22

1946

January

169

592

116

877

534

21

 

* Data not available

--118--

Since enlisted WAVES replaced all but 50 of the male enlisted personnel of the Bureau, they proved of considerable importance and are discussed with the WAVE officers in this chapter. In view of this fact, therefore, emission of the male enlisted personnel from this discussion may be made since their numbers were not great, their primary jurisdiction came under the Bureau of Naval Personnel and their jobs proved of a routine nature. In the overall picture of the Bureau, male enlisted personnel played a meager part, but it is a matter of record that those hands who were associated with the Bureau proved to be of the highest caliber and of excellent technical background.

As already illustrated by Table 15, the combined military personnel assigned to the Washington office of the Bureau of Ships comprised only 10% of the total personnel at the time of Pearl Harbor; by the war’s end, however, this percentage had multiplied four times and the positions they held were of high authority.

--119--

B. RECRUITMENT

The Bureau's problems of recruitment primarily occurred prior to the outbreak of war, during which time retired regular and reserve officers were recalled to duty, colleges were canvassed for graduating engineers, and Naval Officer Procurement Offices were established. These three combined proved the backbone in the pre-war expansion and the last-Procurement Offices --- became the principal source of qualified officer recruitment after the outbreak of war.

Under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, these Procurement Offices recruited reserve officers with skills required by the various segments of the Navy. Unfortunately, experience proved that few candidates actually possessed sufficient skill or training to do the work required both in the Bureau and in the field.

As a consequence, a partial solution of this problem was found by the establishment of training schools and on-the-job courses. Table 25 lists by period the procurement of officers by the Bureau of Ships in relationship to the number of applicants. The number of these officers requiring training are also included and these figures are then broken down in the succeeding tables.

--120--

TABLE 25

SUMMARY

Procurement, Training, Assignments
Bureau of Ships Reserve Officers
December 1942 through December 1945

12/42-6/43

7/43-6/44

7/44-6/45

7/45-12/45

Total

A. Procurement:

(1) Applications Reviewed

*No Data

5550

898

(2) Officers Procured

1100

3045

732

4877

(3) W. O. Procured (Not Reviewed)

No Data

664

(4) Total Officers Procured (Including W. O.)

1100

3709

752

5541

B. Training:

(l) Indoctrinated (including NRMS)

1891

2509

866

71

5337 (Table 26)

(2) Assigned Technical Training

1274

2111

1091

98

4574 (Table 27)

(3) Assigned Duty from Indoc.

588

480

284

17

1369 (Table 28)

A. Officers procured under BuShips quotas for such programs as: Diesel, Naval Mine Warfare, W. O. Electrical & Diesel, Radar, PT Maint., Steam Engineering, technically were not under this Bureau's cognizance unless assigned to BuShips or to BuShips field activities.

B. (1) From the 5337 E-V(S) (or later E(L)) officers completing Indoctrination or NRMS, 1064 were assigned Diesel training and 271 were in Steam Engineering (combined Indoc. & tech. train.) and were not under BuShip’s cognizance.

(2) The 4574 officers designated technical training include a number for special programs waiving indoctrination, and approximately 55 picked up from other sources and through changes in Classification for Ship Salvage and Fire Fighting programs.

(3) Included a number assigned to urgent billets with indoctrination waived.

--121--

TABLE 26

SUMMARY OF BUREAU OF SHIPS RESERVE OFFICERS INDOCTRINATION SCHOOLS AND NAVAL RESERVE MIDSHIPMAN SCHOOLS OUTPUT FOR PERIOD JANUARY 1943 - DECEMBER 1945.

NRMS

JAN. 43
June 43

JULY 43
DEC. 43

JAN. 44
JUNE 44

JULY 44
DEC. 44

JAN. 45
JUNE 45

JULY 45
DEC. 45

TOTAL

Cornell

 36

7

43

Notre Dame

130

 109

 192

 46

 16

 35

 528

NY, NY

 6

 31

 9

 46

US Nav. Acad.

 12

 3

 6

 21

Miscellaneous

 3

 14

 17

 130

 109

192

 64

 89

 71

 655

NTS (lNDOCT)

Arizona

 460

 471

 302

 254

 1487

Cornell

 148

 119

 267

Dartmouth

 198

 198

Ft. Schuyler

 892

 273

 169

 145

 1479

Hollywood

 63

 37

 12

 112

Plattsburgh

 20

 20

Princeton

 355

 482

 282

 1119

 1761

 1255

 953

 713

 4682

SUMMARY OF
OFFICER CANDIDATES
INDOCTRINATED

 130

 109

 192

 64

 71

 655

 1761

 1255

 953

 713

 4682

TOTAL:

 1891

 1364

 1145

 777

 89

 71

 5337

--122--

TABLE 27

SUMMARY TRAINING INPUT DECEMBER 1942-DECEMBER 1945

Type of Training

Dec. '42
June '43

July '43
June '44

July '44
June '45

July '45
Dec. '45

Total

CRF (including teletype

26

20

32

4

82

Damage Control

1

27

9

37

Diesel (Cornell, Flint, Penn., Raleigh)

316

387

361

1064

Fire Fighting

54

80

23

157

Gyro Compass

10

51

28

89

Harbor Defense

89

25

114

Magnetic Compass

51

24

4

79

NANCY

16

1

17

Naval Architects

73

105

99

277

Naval Mine Warfare School

58

22

80

NavMine Warfare Test Station (C/M)

4

22

26

NSD, Mechanicsburgh

4

23

13

40

Oxygen Generating Program

16

16

PT (Packard) Maint.

6

23

29

Radar

367

250

107

724

Ship Salvage

59

71

82

21

233

Sonar (Key West & WCSS)

96

132

21

249

Ship Repair Unit (duty NYD)

779

139

39

957

Steam Engineering

148

123

271

UCL

12

3

15

Miscellaneous

9

10

19

Total:

1274

2112

1091

98

4575

--123--

TABLE 28

NUMBER TECHNICAL OFFICERS ASSIGNED DUTY FROM INDOCTRINATION OR NAVAL RESERVE MIDSHIPMEN SCHOOLS DECEMBER 1942 to DECEMBER 1945.

Total:

Dec. 1942-
June 1943

July 1943-
June 1944

July 1944-
June 1945

July 1945-
Dec. 1945

Dec. 1942-
Dec. 1945

Advanced Bases

22

10

32

Afloat

5

2

7

BuShips Duty

61

66

26

 

153

for Further Assignment

12

63

2

77

Bureaus

9

4

13

Engineering Experimental Station

25

34

3

62

Industrial Manager

18

22

16

46

Inspector Naval Material

75

22

10

107

Drydocks

1

11

2

14

Navy Landing Force Equipment Depots

10

6

4

20

Mine Warfare Training School

1

22

19

8

50

Naval Research laboratory

23

28

12

63

Navy Yard Duty

136

 

 

 

136

 (Duty Under Instr.)

49

21

133

2

205

Radio Material Office
(later Electronics Office)

5

40

31

76

SupShips - duty

66

49

11

5

131

SupShips - instruction

24

11

35

Misc. duty assignments

46

69

17

132

Fiscal year total of indoctrinated
officers assigned to duty

588

480

284

17

1358


--124--

C. TRAINING

Although there never existed a shortage of candidates available for assignment to the Bureau of Ships following the institution of the Naval Officer Procurement Offices, there was a great shortage of trained personnel. As a consequence, the training program of this Bureau became probably the most important of the officer personnel problems.

The magnitude of the training program is well illustrated in Tables 25 to 28. Table 26 summarizes the Bureau of Ships' 5337 Reserve officers attending seven indoctrination Schools and five Naval Reserve Midshipman Schools throughout the war. Table 27 lists the distribution of 4575 students among the technical training schools' under the bureau's cognizance in the periods from December 1942 until  December 1945. The majority of these technically trained officers had received indoctrination. Table 28 lists those 1358 officers assigned duty directly from Indoctrination or Naval Reserve Midshipmen Schools without further technical training, except those ordered to activities under the bureau's cognizance for instructional purposes.

The above figures evidence adequate information to illustrate the magnitude of the training program.

Although the Bureau of Ships established the general type of training required, each course was set up in collaboration with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and with the educational institution offering its facilities and instruction staff.

--125--

An accepted procedure soon developed. The officers were assigned to a Navy Yard for primary instruction and then, as needs grew for officers in advance bases, they were sent out to the field. They were replaced by inexperienced men fresh from advance instruction in Naval schools. As a result of this system, there was always a pool of officers in training and another pool in positions where they were gaining experience. The Bureau, therefore, was able not only to meet its own needs but also to make men with engineering training available for duty in the engineering departments of vessels in the fleet and in all specialties such as floating drydocks, etc.

With the momentous expansion of electronics, the Navy found itself particularly short of qualified electronics officers. The growth of radar, sonar, IFF, and other devices necessitated specially trained men for their design, production, installation and maintenance. The first step taken to fill this urgent need occurred early in 1941 when 50 newly commissioned reserve officers were sent to England to learn about English radar. The search for qualified candidates proved extraordinarily difficult, due to the newness of this field. As technical institutions aided the services in this respect, however, the number of qualified men available grew until at the war's end there were over 670 Electronics Specialists (E(T)) in the Navy.

In addition, as the need became more pressing, there came into existence special programs for petroleum inspection, fire fighting, gyro compass, harbor defense, magnetic compass, naval mine warfare, PT maintenance, and various specialized research projects. The three major types of training were in Diesel engines, ship repair units,

--126--

and radar. The next major group consisted of naval architecture, steam engineering, sonar, and ship salvage. Following this came the wide category of specialized training such as firefighting, harbor defense, etc., in which the small number of trainees was compensated for by the importance of each specific job in the overall scheme of things.

D. PROMOTION AND ROTATION

As seen in the Bureau, two major limitations in the Naval Reserve Officer Program were the limitation upon the use of rank in original procurement and, later, the failure to recognize the contribution and responsibilities of officers in specific jobs. It was not unusual to find a Lieutenant or Lieutenant (jg) running a section with major responsibilities and a Lieutenant Commander in a position substantially less important. Also, officers representing the Bureau’s interests often attended meetings within the Navy or, more perceptibly, with the Army where their rank tended to place them in an inferior position.

However, the policy of rank and promotions based primarily on age and service as established by the Navy Department as a whole definitely prevented many abuses to which any alternative policy might have been subject. To the Bureau of Ships' credit, it must be said that it followed the established policy consistently, the number of spot promotions or other variations from established policy being smaller than in most other parts of the Navy organization. Although a serious consequence proved to be their inability to gain a hearing in high places, on the whole, the fairness of the Bureau administration prevented any marked reaction upon the morale of the officers.

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Another major problem worthy of considerable thought and discussion is that of personnel rotation. Moat of the Reserves in the Bureau were procured and then trained in rather highly specialized skills. Working under emergency conditions, much of the experience of the Bureau was not made a matter of record but became embodied in the personnel who had done the job. Similar conditions existed in the field but, because of the great demand for officers to man advance bases and repair ships, the policy of rotation was followed quite consistently, men being sent out after a period of training and experience in Navy Yards. Although the Bureau endeavored to transfer its reserve officers in a similar fashion, no sweeping program was ever found possible.

Although morale both ashore and afloat would have been better if a policy of rotation had been followed, the vicissitudes of the war never permitted any substantial number of personnel afloat to be made available for assignment ashore. When the Bureau made personnel available for duties afloat, it became necessary to replace such personnel with newly appointed officers, occasioning the manifold difficulties of acclimation and on-the-job training. Experience has shown that those officers yearning for combat and for assignment to forward areas prove more efficient when this desire is fulfilled and that continued duty within the continental limits builds up a frustration which tends to destroy their effectiveness.

In all, however, it may be safely expressed that officer personnel offered comparatively few problems in the Bureau's prosecution of its war duties.

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One of the more than three thousand WAVES contributing so greatly to the success of the Bureau of Ships.

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IV. W.A.V.E.S. PERSONNEL*

In the incorporation of women into the military structure of the warring countries, history has given us sporadic examples of martial maidens scattered through the centuries, but the only deliberate attempts to utilize women in the military service of the United States before the present era had been as nurses in all our wars and, to a limited extent, as yeomen in World War I. The yeoman organization, fostered by Josephus Daniels during the first World War, had proved to be successful within a narrow area; but the program awkwardly entitled "Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service", and familiarly known by the alphabetical W.A.V.E.S., in World War II represented a significant change in our nautical philosophy of war-making.

The United States Army had already merged the W.A.A.C.S. into an auxiliary service when the Navy, in July 1942, eight months after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, made women an integral part of the U.S. Naval Reserve both in commissioned and in enlisted status. Heated discussion concerning the WAVE bill preluded its passage and, interestingly enough, one of the strong supporters of the concept of a Women's Reserve was Rear Admiral Cochrane, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships. Admiral Cochrane had been in England in 1940 and, having seen the part played by the WRENS in the war in Europe, he became convinced that American women could pull their weight in our country's wartime naval service.

*Based upon a report prepared by Lieut. Comdr. H. Barry O'Neil, Women's Reserve Officer in the Bureau of Ships.

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The function of the members of the Women's Reserve, simply defined in Public Law #689, 77th Congress, dated 30 July 1942 served, "to release male officers and enlisted men of the Naval service for duty at sea".

Scene of the limitations placed on candidates for the Women's Reserve were that they shall "have attained the age of twenty years", "shall be restricted to the performance of shore duty within the continental United States only and shall not be assigned to duty on board vessels of the Navy or in combat aircraft" and "shall not be used to replace Civil-Service personnel employed in the Naval Establishment".

While the Congressional legislation was in process of passage, the Navy had chosen a young American woman, Mildred Helen McAfee, President of Wellesley college and an outstanding educator, to be head of the new organization. As soon as the WAYS bill had become law, officer recruiting began and an Indoctrination School for W-Y(P)s set up at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, to which a class reported on 28 August 1942.

The first class of WAVE officers, 120 in number, made up largely of women well known in professional walks of life was ironically described by newsmen as the "Brains Battalion" and by their male instructors (who considered assignment to Smith as a kind of undeserved punishment) as the "Paradise Lake Fleet". This class received four weeks of memorable training, after which enlightenment the majority of the graduates pioneered in procurement offices or in newly established training schools for WAVES or in the Bureaus in Washington. The WAVE officers who reported to the Bureaus for duty had the specific tasks of helping to determine what military billets

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then filled by male naval personnel could be filled equally well by WAVE personnel, and of acting as liaison officers with BuPers in the assignment of qualified WAVES to these billets. The Bureau assignments were complex ones. They entailed far more than the ability to make job analyses; they required intelligence, tact, a sense of humor and patience to overcome old prejudices against the introduction of women into any new field, but most especially into the proudly traditional field of the male Navy.

However, these pioneer WAVES did their work well, but instead of the 10,000 WAVES, planned for in the original program, by March 1943 there were only 845 WAVE officers and 1,485 enlisted women, which caused procurement quotas to be noticeably increased.

The problem of accepting WAVES as part of one's ship company, a problem which in some activities became acute, was solved happily in the Bureau of Ships by virtue of the enthusiasm and vision of the Chief of the Bureau and his Administrative Staff. The desirability of assignment to this Bureau became a legend with the WAVES and the Women's Reserve Representatives who served under Admirals Cochrane and Mills found them not only inspiring leaders but also understanding friends. The importance of this point can scarcely be overestimated, because the success or failure of the Women's Reserve in any activity can be measured in terms of the attitude of the Commanding Officer and his staff. Since in Washington, D.C., officers are subject to the heads of the respective activities to which they are attached and to the Chief of Naval Personnel, whereas all enlisted personnel came under the Supervision of the Potomac River Naval Command, WAVE Officers and Enlisted Personnel will be considered separately.

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One of the first questions which arose in connection with the placement of WAVE officers in BuShips was to what extent women commissioned status. A careful study of Bureau functioning revealed, however, that there were many officer billets in which an engineering degree, though helpful, was not essential, and over a three-year period WAVES came to represent 13% of the officer complement of the Bureau.

From the reporting of the first WAVE officer in October 1942 to the demobilization of the first WAVE officer in September 1945, 290 WAVE officers, 24 of when were fleeted up from the enlisted group, were assigned to duty in BuShips. Seventy-five of the 290 were detached from the Bureau but since fifty of these seventy-five were transferred to other activities, many of them under BuShip's cognizance, and only twenty-five re-assigned, the loss to the Navy was not beyond normal expectancy. The factors causing attrition were: pregnancy (14 cases), family hardship (5 cases), psychological inaptitude (5 cases), and return to previous job (1 case).

The low incidence of psychopathic or psychoneurotic cases indicates the high level of mental adjustment characteristic of most WAVE officers in this Bureau; it does not mean however, that minor maladjustments did not occur. Experience demonstrated that many of the difficulties encountered by WAVE officers had an emotional and peculiarly feminine component and the role of the Women's Reserve Representative was as often that of psychologist as that of administrator. It should be said here that the

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handling of large groups of women in military life can be done most effectively through the medium of understanding and sympathetic women officers, and should not be made the sole responsibility of male officers.

The two hundred ninety WAVE officers came from every part of the United States and using birthplace to plot a geographical distribution, the following states were best represented: California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Three officers were born outside the United States - one in Korea, one in Poland, and one in Alaska.

The age range of the WAVE officers varied from 22 to 45 and presented graphically a skewed curve with the peak around 26 years.

The adaptability of a WAVE officer of any age to a Navy job is of course an individual matter but in general it may be said that young women, just out of college and without any business experience and older women who have spent years in a routine type of work, found it most difficult to fit into their assigned Navy niches. Women coming from progressive industrial companies or from provocative professional fields carved their own places in the Bureau of Ships.

The educational standards of the BuShips' officers was high, as one would expect, because the officer qualifications requirements included at least two years at an accredited college and preferably an undergraduate degree. Two hundred thirteen WAVE officers had undergraduate degrees, twenty-eight post-graduate degrees and forty-nine no degrees. Sixteen of the forty-nine officers having no degrees were originally in the enlisted group and three of the 28 officers holding

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post-graduate degrees were PhDs. Experience indicated that graduate education except in the fields of engineering, math and science, and to some extent psychology and law, did not make WAVE officers more valuable to a technical Bureau.

Concerning the two hundred thirteen undergraduate degrees the fact was clearly established that college education per se is no real common denominator in the human equation when dealing with WAVE "Officer Personnel".

Concerning the possible motivations behind military careers for women, marital and other romantic statistics indicate that, since their fiancés were overseas in the Amy or Navy, WAVES were stimulated by a desire to be more closely allied with the war effort than was possible in civilian life rather than the more popular indictment that the desire was solely "to get a man". At any rate, few WAVES found glamor, adventure or romance in the billets assigned them yet their fine performance of routine tasks has won them a permanent place in the Navy's Hall of Fame.

The civilian occupations of the WAVE officers present a varied pattern and cannot be fitted into any strict categories without oversimplification 29 ). The largest number had held secretarial jobs in every type of office, the next largest group had been teachers, the majority of these having been employed at a secondary school level. There were a few lawyers, a few librarians, a few engineers, a few draftsmen, a few statisticians, a few economists, and a limited number of women from the field of merchandising. A surprisingly small number of the WAVE officers in BuShips had been employed by the Federal

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TABLE 29

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

B. A.

M. A.

B. S. Soc. Sc.

Bus Adm. and Sec'1.

B. S. Lib. Sc.

LLB

PhD

B. S. Math. Chem.

Fine Arts

No Degree

Total By Billet

Naval Duty:

Adm. Asst.

70

12

5

23

3

3

1

13

11

141

Editing

2

2

1

1

1

7

Librarian

1

1

Personnel

17

2

1

1

2

1

1

6

31

Semi-Tech.

38

2

11

6

**3

1

28

1

5

95*

Technical

*12

1

1

1

1

5

1

22*

Training

3

1

1

5

Total:

142

15

20

31

8

8

3

48*

3

24

302

*Includes approximately 15 given Naval Training Radar of Admin. Radar

*Includes:

22 B. S., Math. Major

18 B. S., Chemistry

**Librarianship work in technical field

7 B. S., Architecture

Civilian:

1 B. S., Elect. Eng.

Art & Advertising

5

1

3

3

12

Attorney

3

3

Bus. Adm. & Sec'1

72

4

3

27

4

5

18

133

Editorial

5

3

Educational

31

10

12

1

1

3

15

73*

Eng.; Semi-Tech.

12

1

1

17

1

32

Government

7

2

4

13

Librarian

3

1

8

12

Nursing, X-Ray

1

1

2

War Work (Defense)

3

3

No Experience

5

l

2

2

6

16

Total:

142

15

20

31

8

8

3

48

3

24

302

 

*Includes 28 elementary teachers, 39 high school teachers, 6 college instructors.

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Government. Three or four artists, writers, and editors contributed to the technical publications of the Bureau. There were also about ten WAVE officers whose training had been largely in the medical field as X-ray technicians, biochemists, medical secretaries, medical statisticians, or nutrition experts, and pharmacists; and two whose work had been in the social service world. The length of time spent in civilian jobs was less than ten years for about half the WAVE officers but extended to twenty-three years in the case of the oldest WAVE officer.

The types of billets filled by WAVE officers in BuShips were chiefly those of a non-technical nature. The WAVES seemed to be beat fitted for work involving administration, personnel, training, procuring, expediting, requisitioning, and scheduling. When assigned to technical sections they found themselves either limited to a very small area of technical work or relegated to practically clerical jobs. As one would expect, some Officers-in-Charge of Sections did not place enough responsibility on the WAVE officers assigned to them but treated them always as glorified secretaries. By the same token some WAVE officers failed to show any aptitude for the intricacies of Navy bureaucracy and were content to work in mediocre fashion. Sixty-nine WAVE officers directly replaced male officers; the others filled so-called authorized expansion billets, that is, billets for which it would have been necessary to obtain male officers had WAVE officers been unavailable. WAVE officers were unevenly distributed among the divisions in BuShips, certain divisions consistently having a larger number on board throughout the period of the war.

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The Electronics Division usually had the largest number of WAVE officers; Shipbuilding, Maintenance, Administration and Contract ranking in descending order. No WAVE officers were, at any time, assigned to the Finance Division, the smallest division in the Bureau. The largest total number of WAVE officers were on duty in the Bureau from January 1945 to September 1945, the average being 214 a month.

An evaluation of the work done by WAVE officers is ostensibly one of the most important phases of any discussion about them, even though no objective method of measuring their contribution to the war effort has been set up. In general WAVE officers in the Bureau of Ships were considered by their superiors to have done satisfactory and in many cases outstanding pieces of work. The fact that in the early part of the war WAVE officer billets were not well defined added to the fact that WAVE procurement officers were often not sufficiently well aware of the nature of the work done by the various Bureaus in the Navy Department, combined to bring about a situation in which ill-defined pegs were constantly being fitted into amorphous holes. Little wonder then that some of the results were incongruous. It would seem that a much better result would have been obtained had each Bureau set up an officer qualifications manual for WAVE officers, as for male officers, specifying maximum and minimum requirements and numbers of officers required for each program. This would have saved WAVE Detail the embarrassment of sudden oversupply and just as sudden undersupply and would have assured the Bureau of the right number of properly qualified officers.

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Another factor which affected the work-value of WAVE officers was the complete lack of a training program for them when they came into the Bureau. Apart from the original interview by the WRR who tried to give the reporting WAVE officers a comprehensive concept of the Bureau of Ships and some insight into the relationship between their billets and the accomplishments of the Bureau as a whole, no formal attempt was made to orient them in their assignment. In cases in which a WAVE replaced a male officer the latter frequently had neither the time, the inclination, nor the knowledge to instructs her properly during the overlap period. In cases in which a WAVE filled an authorized-expansion billet, her immediate superior often had too little management engineering experience to state to her clearly what her duties were to be. Over and over again, capable WAVE officers spent months in a section muddling through odd and unrelated jobs or being kept in a "standing by" position just in case something should turn up until either their interest or their belief in Naval procedures or both were worn thin. WAVE officers in BuShips seldom complained of having too much to do; the few who complained at all stated that they had too little to do. In all fairness one must remember that World War II was a laboratory for the Women's Reserve and that all comments on an empirical situation are meant to be of a constructive rather than of a critical nature.

A third factor in the utilization of WAVE officers lay in the delicate realm of human relationships. The navy had not been accustomed to dealing with women in a military capacity nor had the male naval

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officer, even of high rank, as a rule, come into contact on a work level with women of educational and professional standing comparable to his own. WAVE officers had the alight advantage of a few weeks indoctrination to the Navy. The Navy had the major disadvantage of an on-the-job indoctrination to the WAVES. (From a woman's standpoint) Let it be said to the everlasting glory of the members of the Women's Reserve that the majority of them laid aside for the duration their professional distinction along with their civilian wardrobe and learned to behave like gentlemen even though they continued to think like ladles.

In the months which followed the passing of the bill permitting overseas service, about one-third of the officers on duty in the Bureau of Ships volunteered to go. The opinion generally voiced by WAVE officers, however concerning extra-continental service, was that it came a little late in the war, that it was too limited as to area, being confined to non-combat zones, and that it carried practically as many social implications as military ones.

WAVE officers were also used in activities which came under the cognizance of BuShips (Table 30.) Because of the kind of work done in the inspection offices, and because they were often located in remote places, where there were no other WAVES, the adaptability of WAVE officers to duty in this field was not so high as in the Bureau of Ships itself.

It proved to be generally true that isolated stations did not provide an optimum milieu for WAVES, either officer or enlisted, because both working and living conditions were uncongenial. BuShips research laboratories too had their complement of. WAVE officers. N.R.L., E.E.S., D.T.M.B., the

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TABLE 30

WAVE OFFICERS AND V-10's ASSIGNED BUREAU OF SHIPS AND ACTIVITIES

Officers
W. R.

Enlisted
V-10

Total
WAVES

(A) Number Actually Assigned:

Line FSA-18 BuShips

302

1010

1312

Line FSA-16

 

NavShip Yards (11)

132

645

777

NavRep Base

5

228

233

IndMan (7th, 8th, 9th, 11th)

16

18

34

AstIndMan (5 Offices)

IB

46

64

InsMach (2 Offices)

6

1

7

SupShips (22 Offices)

61

41

102

Miscellaneous (includes: BuShips Service Parts Agency, David Taylor Model Basin, Electronics Field Service Group, NRL Equip. Depot, NMWTS, Solomons; NRL; RRL; Underwater Sound Lab., New London (Eng. Exp. Station)

79

418

497

Total FSA-16

317

1397

1714

Total FSA-18 and FSA-16

619*

2407**

3026

(B) Estimated Requirements:

BuShips and Field Activities

450

1900

2350

 

* Includes 26 WAVE Officers trained in Radar, MIT, and 100 trained in Administrative Radar at Fleet Service School, Norfolk.

** Includes Sk (T) assigned Electronics Supply Depots.

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Computing lab at Harvard and some of the sound laboratories requested WAVES for scientific or administrative billets but the only laboratory in which BuShips used WAVE chemists was at the Engineering Experiment Station and even there the type of chemical analysis which they did was not altogether commensurate with the level of their ability and education.

Several training courses especially in the field of electronics were opened to the WAVE officers in BuShips. Quite soon after WAVES had reported to the Bureau a group from the Radio Division were sent to school at the Underwater Sound laboratory at San Diego. Later, BuShips officers sat in on conferences at BuPers which resulted in WAVE officers being sent to the regular radar school at M.I.T. and receiving a technical classification. Still later a special course was set up at the Fleet Service School at Norfolk to train eighty officers for BuShips and some for BuAer, in Administrative Radar. A WAVE officer free the Shipbuilding Division was sent to the Damage Control School in Philadelphia. Two WAVE officers from the Contract Division were detailed to take the official course in Termination of Contracts given by the Army at the Pentagon Building and several WAVE officers took short courses on poison gases given at Aberdeen under Army auspices. WAVE officers were sent to represent the Bureau of Ships at conferences in Washington and in the field, to contact manufacturers, to run surveys, to participate in exhibits and to check progress in the laboratories. It can be said without reservation that the Bureau of Ships reflected the confidence of its Chief in the calibre of officer material of either sex assigned to him and that merit was usually recognized.

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No disciplinary action was taken against any WAVE officer in BuShips during the period covered which is neither strange nor especially creditable. The Navy selected its WAVE officers with great care and since Joining the naval branch women's military services was a matter of volition and not of conscription it was to be expected that obedience to the rules and regulations of the naval service would be a matter of noblesse oblige.

The WAVE officers formed a small but dynamic part of the military complement of BuShips. The enlisted WAVES, who reported to the Bureau shortly after the first WAVE officers were on board, became in time, a much larger and an equally forceful group. Enlisted WAVES finally replaced all except fifty enlisted men in the Bureau and it was a matter of some interest to watch the companies which came out to drill change from many men and a few women to altogether "maidens in uniform" and then, towards the end of the war, to many women and a few men. As has been mentioned before, enlisted WAVES came under a different command than WAVE officers and it is not possible in every instance to parallel the information about them.

During the period of World War II, enlisted WAVE personnel in BuShips grow from seven yeomen in December 1942 to a little over a eleven hundred in August 1945. Altogether twelve hundred forty-one enlisted WAVES were assigned duty in the Bureau of Ships over a three year period. About three hundred fifty of the total number aboard were detached from BuShips, approximately one third receiving a change of duty within the continental limits of the United States, a fifth going to duty in Hawaii, a fourth being discharged and seventeen being sent to Officer Candidate

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School. The reasons for discharge, following the barracks listing, were in order of importance: pregnancy, convenience of women, dependency, inaptitude, medical, underage. Only one undesirable discharge and one bad conduct discharge were issued to BuShips WAVES. The detachment of about twenty-five per cent of the enlisted WAVES is not excessive and the reasons for discharge, except for inaptitude and undesirable and bad conduct discharges, are exceptionally favorable.

A decided flaw in regard to the discharge of enlisted WAVES and one which should not be repeated in the structure of a similar organization lay in the fact that their separations from the Navy were effected through the Naval Barracks, often without prior knowledge of the Bureau concerned. This not only caused embarrassment to the Enlisted Personnel Section of the Bureau and made the planning of a work-load difficult, but, more important than the job aspect, such a procedure also often removed the enlisted girl from the group who knew her best at a time when she most needed them. Many of the inaptitude cases and even a few of the cases with deeply psychopathic implications could have been saved to the Navy and to themselves had they been spared the coldly impersonal experience of psychiatric scrutiny. Barracks officers gave of their best to the enlisted WAVES housed in their roofs but it stands to reason that the officer who sees a girl occasionally in some WAVE quarters is apt to know less about the working of her inner self than the officer who sees her for eight hours a day, six days a week at work. Yet the Bureau officer is powerless to help her, so the enlisted WAVE goes along

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trying to solve her own problem until it becomes so acute that it may be beyond remedy. One of the few criticisms which might be leveled against the treatment of enlisted WAVES is that the Navy, in handling them in large groups, left many with a sense of complete desolation, and tragedies ensued which should never have happened. The human spirit needs more than comfortable quarters and healthful food to develop normally.

As was true of the officers the background and birthplaces of the enlisted WAVES proved comprehensive. The age range of enlisted WAVES covered a span from twenty to thirty-eight with the majority crowded at the younger end of the graph. The extreme youth of some of these girls plus being away from home for the first time made the equation which equaled social mishap and disaster for a few of them.

The educational background of the enlisted WAVES was on the whole good. While procurement offices required only two years of high school, a larger number of enlisted WAVES had four years of secondary school, same had a year or two of training beyond that, and a few had college degrees. The impression one received when dealing with them individually was that a great many had above average intelligence, advanced cultural interests and sound family training. This impression was confirmed after V-J Day by the interest shown by demobilizing WAVES in going on to college or back to college or specializing in some field after intermediate training.

As was true of officer WAVES, the largest number of enlisted WAVES were married after V-E and V-J Days when their fiancés, or boys with whom they had been friends before the war, returned from overseas.

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A list of the civilian occupations of the enlisted WAVES would read like the government publication Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The majority of the enlisted WAVES assigned to BuShips, because of the nature of the work to be done, had been either stenographers or clerks or some combination of the two, such as clerk-stenographer or clerk-typist, but the remainder ran the gauntlet of occupations.

The rating of the greater number of enlisted WAVES when they came to the Bureau was yeoman. Other ratings, in proportionately low numbers, to be found listed as time went on, were storekeepers, seamen, and specialists I and X.

The first enlisted girl to be made Chief received that rating in January 1945 with two others being advanced to Chief before July 1945.

The matter of ratings was one of the phases of WAVE administration which leaves some room for discussion and improvement. In the early days of the Women's Reserve, high ratings and swift promotion tended to be the order of the day. The result of this was an oversupply especially of yeoman ratings so that some of the girls who came into the WAVES later in the war received lower ratings than their experience warranted and girls who were already in the service found themselves frozen in their rates because there were no vacancies in the higher ratings. Periods of months sometimes elapsed between the time when a yeoman had passed the required tests, and the time at which she actually received her higher rating. This proved to be very discouraging to the enlisted girls as the war dragged on and they found themselves caught in a routine from which they were powerless to escape because it was part of a hierarchical

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system. Misrepresentation by the procurement officers of opportunities for further training and promotions in the Navy accounted also for some of the disillusionment felt by enlisted women who had been high powered into uniform in order to fill quotas. In all procurement offices, moreover, the standards of selection, whether it was for officer or enlisted, men or women, reflected the laws of supply and demand and the quality of military personnel procured was not consistently high throughout the war.

The type of work in the Bureau of Ships which the enlisted WAVES did included acting as secretaries or stenographic clerks, drafting, maintaining charts and progress records, handling dispatches and shipment orders, working on IBM machines, operating switchboards, running addressographs, doing teletype work, and being chauffeurs, artists and timekeepers. One hundred sixty-nine enlisted men were replaced by enlisted WAVES, and for a period of time there were only a few enlisted men attached to BuShips. Besides replacing enlisted men, the enlisted WAVES filled newly set-up military billets or civil service vacancies for which civilian employees were unobtainable. Enlisted WAVES, because their mobility was a matter of Navy policy not of personal desire, provided a stable factor in the personnel crisis and it is safe to say that there would have been a more serious shortage of stenographic and clerical personnel had the WAVES not been available to take over. As soon as civilian personnel became available for civil service jobs the WAVES were transferred out of them in keeping with Congressional statute.

Three divisions in the Bureau of Ships, the Shipbuilding Division, the Maintenance Division and the Electronics Division, consistently had between 200 and 250 enlisted WAVES on board. The Administrative Division

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ran these three Divisions a close second, and, as in the case of officer WAVES, the Finance Division had the smallest quota of WAVES assigned to it, there being one or none there through the entire three-year period.

The greatest number of enlisted WAVES on board at any one time was in August 1945 when the Enlisted WAVE total reached nine hundred sixty-five.

It would be difficult to praise adequately the work done by enlisted WAVES during World War II. When compared to WAVE officer performance, it must be pointed out that the billets for the enlisted WAVES were more clearly defined than those for the officers, that the relationship between their previous training and their Navy job was, as a rule, closer, and that the volume of work done by them was more tangible.

The most striking thing about the performance of enlisted WAVES of BuShips was the patriotic attitude which characterized the work of the majority of them. They accepted willingly the responsibility for getting difficult jobs done and done on time; they worked overtime, at their own volition, in order that material would get to the fleet as it was needed; they guarded the classified information, which same of them were cleared to handle, with an integrity which was above question, and, as a group, they won the admiration and respect of the officers under whom they worked.

No finer tribute could be paid to them than the interest and concern for their welfare which their Commanding Officers expressed over and over again to the Women's Reserve Representative.

The factors which bore directly or indirectly on the work of enlisted WAVES were different from those influencing WAVE officers but are none the less important. The enlisted WAVES reflected, frequently, the environmental

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conditions under which they lived and over which they had so little control. Except for a few WAVES in the higher ratings, enlisted WAVES were quartered in barracks, and, in spite of the splendid work done by the barracks officers, barracks life is not the summun bonum for either men or women but especially the latter. In the early days in BuShips few complaints about quarters were made to the WRR; in the summer before V-J Day the complaints became so numerous as to constitute a matter of serious concern. It must be remembered that patience and endurance wear thin as well as building materials and that a situation which is a matter for humorous comment the first year in the naval service can became a matter for bitter criticism after two and one-half years. It certainly was apparent that in the interest of maximum efficiency at work, greater efforts would have to be made to keep the enlisted WAVES milieu after work more congenial.

Another outside factor which became a source of daily annoyance to many of the enlisted WAVES was the difficulty of transportation.

Not only did there exist inadequate bus and trolley service but the cost of transportation too proved considerable for girls in the lower pay grades and not until late 1945 did a carfare allowance come into effect.

A third factor which affected the working capacity of enlisted WAVES because it affected their personal happiness was their social life or lack of it. Many of these girls, who were very young and away from home for the first time, came to feel that no one in the whole military organization of which they were a part, had any

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personal interest in their happiness or unhappiness and they reacted by developing abnormal psychological mechanisms which resulted in their discharges or even confinement to mental institutions. Other girls, driven by loneliness and lack of social resourcefulness, picked up the wrong kind of companions and either got into serious physical difficulties or suffered personality lesions from which they will never fully recover.

It may be said that any or all of the factors mentioned above apply equally well to the civilian population in war time but the civilian has a greater element of choice in his life and is not subjected to the frightening impersonality of a large organization. It seems reasonable to say that fewer personal difficulties would have occurred among the enlisted WAVES had more officers, properly trained, been free to devote their time solely to counselling and guidance.

Seventeen enlisted WAVES from BuShips were sent to Officer Candidate School and fourteen of these seventeen were commissioned. It was found that Officers-in-Charge of enlisted WAVES sometimes recommended them for commissioned status because they had done enlisted work well rather than because they showed any proclivities for doing work of a more responsible nature and the Board was careful to weed out such people at the Bureau level.

A large number of enlisted WAVES asked for overseas service when the opportunity for extracontinental duty became possible for members of the Women's Reserve. Enlisted WAVES had to volunteer and to meet the same requirements as WAVE officers. The procedure for selection as set up by the Bureau of Naval Personnel was different,

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however, in that a group of officers, including the Women's Reserve Representative was designated by the Chief of each Bureau "to investigate the application of each enlisted woman to determine her qualifications". Each Bureau then decided which of its enlisted women were to go in order to fill the quota by numbers and ratings which had been designated by BuPers. The Bureau of Ships released seventy-two enlisted WAVES for duty in Com-Fourteen and less than five of these were weeded out at Camp Shoemaker before embarkation.

The Bureau of Ships bad an outstanding reputation at the Potomac River Naval Command for the infrequency of disciplinary cases in relation to the large number of enlisted WAVES on board. Over a three-year period only one hundred sixteen disciplinary cases were recorded, the charges being: AWOL, forty-eight; miscellaneous, twenty-four; uniform violations, eight; quarters violations, six; loss of ID card, twenty-eight; tardy, two.

The Bureau of Ships in two respects was exceptional in its administration of enlisted personnel. In the first place it maintained, throughout the period of the war, an excellent program of drill with Saturday inspection by the top-ranking officers in the Bureau and with an annual parade end review to which distinguished guests were invited and at which the best company was chosen and awarded a prize. The drill period extended from 15 March to 15 June for the spring season and from 15 September to 15 November for the Fall season each year. The company officers were WAVE officers who volunteered for the duty. A small group of male officers also gave

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of their services and were invaluable in helping with drill. He enlisted WAVES were not always enthusiastic about the actual drilling but when they "stood by" in BuShips enclosure while medals and commendations were awarded to officers back from combat or when the Potomac River Naval Command called on them to take part in great National events such as the funeral procession for the late Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the parades for General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz, they were filled with understandable pride. From the point of view of physical fitness some type of required drill or athletics for all WAVES would have been a salutary thing and would have carried a sense of military bearing beyond the short period of indoctrination.

The other respect in which the Bureau of Ships was unique with regard to enlisted WAVES was in the establishment of a WAVE Drum and Bugle Corps. This organization was started in July 1944 and was trained through the courtesy of the Navy Band which loaned a Chief Musician to BuShips for conductor and teacher. The requisites for being part of this corps were a desire to play with the group and a willingness to be present at the practice periods. The corps had fifty members and achieved a commendable skill as marching musicians. He Drum and Bugle Corps took part in civic as well as military ceremonies and was in great demand in Washington as its fame spread abroad.

He psychological value of such activities, organized under Navy auspices, military in connotation yet educational and recreational in purpose, cannot be heavily enough underscored. More time and thought should have been given to planning similar outlets both for the good of

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the WAVES and for the good of the service. One of the greatest disappointments to the Reserve personnel was the sudden transition from the strictly Navy regime of the indoctrination schools to the "civilian-in-uniform" life in cities like Washington.

Enlisted WAVES like WAVES officers were assigned to duty at field activities which came under the cognizance of BuShips. The largest number to be detailed to any one type of activity was to be found at the Naval Shipyards, where as many as fifteen hundred were on duty in the various departments of the yards at one time. Enlisted WAVES appeared on the rosters at many of the research laboratories and at such agencies as Engine Parts Coordinating Agency in Detroit and Surplus Materials Redistribution And Disposal Agency in New York City. It was not uncommon, moreover, for the Bureau to send enlisted WAVES on travel orders both to other Naval activities and to industrial concerns with whom the Bureau of Ships did business.

No discussion of WAVES in BuShips would be complete without some mention of civilian military relationships there. Although more than half of BuShips' personnel during the war were civilians, in comparison with other Navy bureaus a high proportion of civilians to military, their relationships were generally most compatible, but where antagonisms did arise they could usually be traced to personality conflicts and not to differences in dress.

The harmony that prevailed between civilians and WAVES is a further reflection of the fine spirit which characterized BuShips and of the wisdom

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of a Chief and his Assistant who had as well developed a sense of the architecture of human relations as of the design of a fighting ship.

Although it may never be sung of the WAVES that they "launched a thousand ships" or "burned the topless towers" of a city, they did in a less epic way, contribute greatly in the building of the greatest fleet which the world has ever known. The WAVES came from all parts of the United States, from every profession and occupation, from varied social and economic levels and from conglomerate national backgrounds and found in an engineering bureau the way to express their common belief in a democratic form of government and their common faith in a great cause. They brought to the Bureau of Ships, youth, idealism and a willingness to work. They took away from the Bureau of Ships experience in a technical field, a new consciousness of Naval history and a love for every ship of the United States Navy from the proudest carrier to the most versatile "amphib". They are proud to have been the "winged sentries" of the Bureau of Ships.

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V. CIVILIAN - MILITARY RELATIONS

In the Bureau of Ships, one recurrent problem of first magnitude constantly presented itself with regard to personnel matters. The separation of naval and civilian personnel branches of the Administrative Division led to such difficulty in coordination that an inter-Division report dated 23 April 1943 pointed out:

"There seems to be little excuse for the Bureau's left hand not knowing what its right hand is doing as is the present case in its personnel activity. Naturally, there are specialists who are experts on classification, placement, training, and on the different regulations covering service and civilian personnel. The fact that personnel is so complicated that specialists are needed emphasizes the need for coordination of the specialists under one responsible head."

The above report went on to recommend that:

(1) Assignments for both civilian and service personnel should be made in the same branch to obtain necessary coordination;

(2) There be a consolidation of personnel information files and records in the service and civilian personnel offices;

(3) There be a consolidation of the travel service for the Bureau as a whole; and,

(4) There be coordination of ability and qualifications to the level of work to which officers and civilians are assigned.

In the early days it was possible for a section head to request personnel from both the service personnel office and Civilian Personnel Branch for the same work. The section head took whichever came first. This often proved embarrassing to the Civilian Personnel Branch when they had found a qualified candidate and, while negotiating

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for him to come in, suddenly discovered that the vacancy had been filled by a reserve officer. This led to poor public relations as well as waste of time.

Another type of problem sometimes developed when junior officers were assigned administrative supervision over high grade technical personnel or when an officer was assigned to routine and low grade clerical duties which could be performed by an enlisted man or a clerical civilian. All such actions affected not only the morale of the individuals directly concerned but others in the office to whom it was ah evidence of poor administration.

The establishment of the Personnel Coordinator's office in 1943 eliminated the ability of a section to request personnel from both the Naval Personnel Branch and the Civilian Personnel Branch for the same billet, thus achieving some coordination in recruitment. Complement control continued this function and also exercised some influence over the quality of personnel required for the billet described.

In 1945, the Director of Administration was interested in the possibility of coordinating further the work of the Naval and Civilian Personnel branches. The Officer-in-Charge of Civilian Personnel submitted a suggested rough draft organization chart which provided for the consolidation of functions under a single personnel officer for all personnel operations in the Bureau of Ships and the separation of the administration of field officer administration from this centralized personnel office. The consolidation of functions included: combination

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of officer and civilian travel desks, centralization of officer and civilian personnel jackets under the supervision of one file supervisor, recruitment of Naval and civilian personnel under one placement officer, and the judgment of difficulty of work to which Naval and civilian personnel were being assigned in the Classification Section, and the like.

The Manpower Survey also made a report on personnel coordination recommending, primarily, the consolidation of the Civilian and Naval Personnel branches under one personnel officer.

1. Key positions held by military

The fact that key positions are held by naval officers has an important bearing upon management in the Bureau of Ships.

Although no precise scientific study has been made of this problem it seems logical to assume the following results from the fact that key positions are not available to civilians: (1) it often prevents the recruitment of the most able men in the field for available bureau positions; (2) it often keeps employees of. the bureau from growing and developing to the same extent they might otherwise.

These two results stem from the fact that the ceiling for advancement and responsibility in the bureau is limited. This not only hinders the attractiveness of the bureau to high-calibre employees but takes a certain amount of stimulus away from those employees on board, as they know they have no chance to reach the top positions. Other agencies in which the Branch and Division jobs are held by civilians are likely to have more appeal.

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A committee, appointed by the Chief of the Bureau in the fall of 1945, studied the classifications of top civilian positions in the bureau and recommended that more duties be assigned to the civilian heads of the various technical sections so that higher classification ratings could be obtained. Following the recommendation would, in essence, make the head civilian engineer the Chief Engineer of a section, with the senior naval officer assigned to the section acting as military consultant and passing on the military problems and characteristics of equipments being considered.

2. Rotation

Another important factor bearing on the Bureau's management is the practice of rotating naval personnel. Just about the time an officer becomes familiar enough with his assignment in the bureau to be of real value he is often detached. This means that upon the civilian head falls the task of training the new officer.

3. Junior Officers in Sections and Units

There has been some feeling on the part of civilians against being supervised by junior officers who have less background and experience than the civilians being supervised. Because of the large number of officers assigned to the Electronics Division, this problem proved more prevalent in that Division than in other places.

4. Difference in Dress

A basic psychological problem between military and civilians of any category is the fact that they are easily distinguishable as

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separate groups by their dress. Because of this, generalizations on group conduct may be drawn from poor behavior on the part of one member of a group. As certain naval officers have cast aspersions on civilians, 50 civilians have reciprocated with similar retorts concerning WAVES and Naval officers.

5. Differing Personnel Regulations

Basically, the pay of a civilian employee depends upon the complexity find responsibility of the work to which he is assigned.

Under naval rules, enlisted personnel advancement in rating depended upon passing certain tests. If the bureau did not coordinate the responsibility of the job to which the enlisted personnel was assigned with advancement in rating, oftentimes it resulted in enlisted personnel doing jobs similar to civilian personnel but receiving disproportionate remuneration.

Many times officer supervisors, not being subject to civilian personnel regulations, were not as familiar with civilian rules and problems as might have been desirable; this handicapped the officers in their supervisory responsibility.

6. Waves

Upon several occasions some old guard civilians became worried about or jealous of the jobs assigned to WAVES, which emphasizes the need for proper supervision of the employees concerned.

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7. Hazy Areas of Responsibility

In some sections where there existed a dual organization topside - an officer group paralleled by a civilian group - confusion arose as to exact areas of responsibility and spheres of action.

The effects of this type of situation topside were reflected by decreased efficiency in the section and personality clashes.

8. Reluctance to carry out Difficult Aspects of Personnel Management Responsibility

When a personnel problem arises in a section, the solution sometimes has to be stringent and unpleasant. No supervisor likes to tell an employee he is not performing his duties properly and that he is recommending demotion or discharge. The rotation system provides an easy "out" for the supervisor and, as a result, many situations that should be fundamentally corrected are patched up and passed along to the next man, which only compromises the position of the bureau. It also lowers the morale of all civilians who know about the situation.

9. Apparent Discrimination

Numerous discriminations also arise from the situation of military preference. For example, civilians were not shown any movies from a long time, despite the obvious advantages which might have accrued, and civilian Engineers from the Bureau of Ships were delayed and hampered in Navy Yards by demands for credentials unless escorted by an officer. These and other minor irritations exercised civilians considerably.

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10. Conclusion

It is difficult to analyze the net effect of the civilian, naval officer, and enlisted relationships on production in the bureau during the war. When one reviews the job that the bureau did and the handicaps and time limitations imposed in doing the job, one wonders how it could conceivably have been done at all. But the job was done and, despite the discrepancies listed above, the majority of civilian - officer relationships were effected with relatively few visible evidences of friction.

Although the visible evidences of frictions were few, however, it is only fair to recognize the undercurrents pervading the overall situation. When one talks to professional engineers, for example, and talks long enough, it may frequently be discovered that the civilian status had been irksome to them and had to some degree affected their work and attitudes. What effect this had upon bureau operation, it is impossible to estimate, but the question is only one of degree, for an adverse reaction did present itself.

Some of the possible solutions to the civilian problem are discussed in the endorsement by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships on the Joint Letter of the Naval Research Laboratory, David Taylor Model Basin and Naval Ordnance Laboratory of 9 June 1945 dealing with the subject of professional employees in the Naval Service. The basis for a solution of this problem is well stated by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships:

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"A basic change in the Navy philosophy and organization is required to effectively solve this problem, and nothing short of the creation of a career of satisfactory breadth is necessary, not only in fields of personal activity but with satisfactory authority and corresponding opportunity for responsibility for those men who prove to have outstanding qualifications."

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CHAPTER IX

EXPANSION OF FACILITIES

CHAPTER II

EXPANSION OF FACILITIES

A - INTRODUCTION

The ancient saying "Because of a nail, the kingdom was lost" illustrates the truism in production that small component factors may be responsible for the success or failure of great programs. Since, in the war shipbuilding program, one of the most important "nails" proved to be the adequate expansion of facilities, a review of the major problem concerning these facilities should be of continuing interest even though the type of production required at some future date may differ substantially from that of World War II.

Although the most obvious direct interest of the Bureau of Ships was in the expansion of shipyards, as illustrated by the Bureau's greatest investment being made in that activity, its greatest headache centered on the problem of upland facilities capable of manufacturing the components and materials necessary to keep the shipyards supplied.

It is not unreasonable to state that the Bureau devoted as much effort to the increase of production capacity in supporting industries as to the increase of the shipbuilding facilities.

The high degree of efficiency characteristic of American industry is derived in large measure from the fact that markets have been large enough and technical advances have developed sufficiently so that specialisation in manufacture has been carried further than any other country in the world. It is possible to establish a shipyard capable of manufacturing its own steel, main propulsion equipment and other major components.

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In the past this was accomplished, but it is not desirable under the conditions characteristic of a war period, nor has it proved feasible from the standpoint of research development. The source of this country’s ability to expand the output of war goods was based upon the general strength of American industry. The problem of the Navy and of the Bureau was that of utilizing this widespread potential as effectively as possible in competition with other war production programs of equal importance which required their fair share of the general industrial output. Components such as valves, motors, etc., used by. all the services, were also vital in the manufacture of such strategic materials as rubber and high octane gasoline. Such was the comprehensive nature of the overall war program and the intense competition for these components and materials that, through a greater part of the entire war, actual shortages or impending shortages of such material and components tended to limit the size and scope of the shipbuilding program.

There is no easy solution to the problem of assuring a balanced set of facilities capable of meeting the needs of the Navy and other war programs, however, when the needs of the future are unknown. The problems of equating the supply and the demand are fully discussed in Chapter X.

B - EXPANSION OF FACILITIES

Because of the existence of surplus capacity, the expansion of shipbuilding started in 1933-1934 was readily absorbed by the existing yards. Gradually, however, a few new yards were needed, which occasioned a facilities expansion, leading to the operation in July 1940 of 29 yards concerned with new construction and 19 yards with

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conversion and repair work for the Navy. Table 31 lists the ensuing expansion of shipyard building, repairing and conversion. For the purposes of presenting the overall war program, this table includes the statistics from 1940 to October 1945. By December 1942, 322 new construction yards were active, which proved to be the wartime peak for this activity. Not until September 1944, however, did conversion and repair work engage the largest number of shipyards - 248.

The fact that the Bureau found it necessary to encourage the development of shipyards in 34 out of the 48 states proved to be one of the most interesting features of the expansion of facilities under the auspices of the Bureau of Ships. Although 14 shipyards in the Great Lakes area were used in World War I, the expansion of the lake and river yards in World War II greatly exceeded anything known before. By July 1943, there were 50 yards active in the Great Lakes area from Vermont to Minnesota and 18 in the Mississippi Valley area from Alabama to Minnesota. This expansion of Naval shipbuilding spread to the Gulf Coast area from Fort Myers, Florida to Texas, where 21 yards were active by July 1943.

One of the most serious problems occurred on the West Coast, however, where the Navy shipbuilding facilities were vital for the repair and maintenance of the Fleet operating in the Pacific. This area, which had never been as extensively industrialized as the East, suddenly became a center for three major war production programs: Naval shipbuilding, Maritime shipbuilding and the aircraft industry. As a consequence, shortages of labor became more acute in this area than in any other section of the country. In view of the necessity of maintaining Naval shipbuilding and

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TABLE 31

NUMBER OF SHIPYARDS BUILDING, REPAIRING AND CONVERTING
(Selected Periods)

TYPE OF YARDS

JULY 1940

DECEMBER 1941

(a)

New Construction

29

156

(b)

Conversion and Repair

19

76

TOTAL

48

232

 

TYPE OF YARDS

DECEMBER
1942

SEPTEMBER
1943

SEPTEMBER
1944

NOVEMBER
1944

(a)

New Construction

322

300

225

212

(b)

Conversion and Repair

143

222

248

230

TOTAL

465

522

473

442

 

TYPE OF YARDS

JANUARY
1945

APRIL
1945

JULY
1945

OCTOBER
1945

(a)

Hew Construction

181

171

137

102

(b)

Conversion and Repair

231

229

227

227

TOTAL

412

400

364

329

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ship repair facilities as close as possible to the theater of operations, hindsight indicates that it may have proved much wiser to have made an effort, at least, to remove a substantial part of the aircraft industry and some part of the maritime program from this critical area. Chart Z and Table 32 indicate the geographic distribution of shipyards as of July 1943 when the tide of the war turned in the allies' favor and the offensive phase of our operations began.

The problem of the conflict between the shipbuilding program and other war programs did not confine itself, of course, to the West Coast,

It occurred and recurred in various forms throughout the war. Without perfect foresight which would permit the needs of all procurement agencies to be known in advance, there is no way to completely solve this problem. Efforts to minimize it were, however, made throughout the war period by requiring the clearance of all facilities expansion through the War Production Board.

In spite of the large number of yards involved in the shipbuilding program at the peak, most of the work was performed and the greatest investment was made in the nucleus of 28 private yards and 8 Navy yards. In these plants alone could the necessary management and facilities be combined to do the tremendously complex work required for the construction of major combatant types. Smaller yards turned out a great many more vessels and craft than the big yards, but their product was small and the tonnage and dollar values substantially less than the production of the larger establishment.

Steel fabricating companies, bridge builders, wooden boat builders, etc., were all enlisted in the program and may of them did an outstanding Job. The landing craft program, in particular, became possible only through

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BETHLEHEM STEEL COMPANY, QUINCY, MASS. 1940-1941

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CHART X

SHIPYARDS IN GEOGRAPHICAL SEQUENCE

7-10-43



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Navy Department
Bureau of Ships
10 July 1943

TABLE 32

GEOGRAPHICAL LIST OF SHIPYARDS
NAVSHIPS (728)

This list includes all Private Shipyards and Navy Yards building vessels for the United States Navy.

These yards are arranged immediately following this note in geographical order by areas, with a number beside each yard indicating its exact location on the front cover map.

The main body of the report lists the builders alphabetically by company name.

There is added a listing of builders for the United States Army, Maritime Commission and Coast Guard.

NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

(From Maine through Maryland)

Geo.
No.

Name of Company

Geo.
No.

Name of. Company

1.

Maine Bt. Yds. Associates, Inc.

32.

R. Bigelow k Co.

2.

Mt. Desert Bt. Yd., Inc.

33.

Carl N. Beetle

3.

So. West Bt. Corp.

32.

Palmer Scott k Co,

4.

S. B. Norton & Sons.

35.

Martha's Vinyard S. B. Co.

5.

Bristol Yt. Bldg., Co.

36.

Herreshoff Mfg. Co.

6.

Camden S. B. & Mar. Ry. Co.

37.

Warren Boat Yd., Inc.

7.

Snow Shipyards

38.

Harris k Parsons Inc.

8.

Waldoboro Shipyard, Inc.

39.

Perkins & Vaughn Inc.

9.

Bath Iron Works Corp.

40.

Anchorage, Inc.

10.

H. G. Marr

41.

C. Hiltebrant D. D. Co., Inc.

11.

Rice Bros. Corp.

42.

Island Docks, Inc.

12.

Hodgdon Bros. & Goudy & Stevens

43.

Franklin G. Post & Son

13.

Frank L. Sample Jr., Inc.

44.

Mystic Shipyard

14.

Reed Brothers

45.

Noank S. B. Co.

16.

A. R. True, Inc.

46.

Electric Boat Co. - Groton

17.

John E. Matton & Son, Inc.

47.

Saybrook Yacht Yard, Inc.

19.

Quincy Adams Yt. Yd., Inc.

48.

Eureka S. B. Corp.

20.

W. A. Robinson, Inc.

49.

New York Rubber Corp.

21.

Calderwood Yt. Yd., Inc.

50.

Armstrong Rubber Co

22.

Hood Rubber Co., Inc.

51.

The City Lumber Co.

23.

Baltzer-Jonesport Bt. Corp.

52.

The Boat Shop

24.

Simms Bros.

53.

Greenport Basin & Const., Co.

25.

Geo. Lawley & Sons, Corp.

54.

Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co.

26.

Beth., Pore River

55.

Luders Marine Const., Co.

27.

Beth., Hingham

56.

Walter E. Abrams Shipyard, Inc.

28.

U. S. Rubber Co.

57.

Wm. E. John & Associates

29.

American Wringer Co.

58.

Elscott Bt., Inc.

30.

Walsh-Kaiser Co., Inc.

59.

Robt. Jacob, Inc.

31.

T. B. Kingman Marine Const.

60.

United Bt. Ser. Corp.

61.

Henry B. Nevins, Inc.

62.

Julius Peterson

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TABLE 32. Cont’d.

Geo.
No.

Name of Company

Geo.
No.

Name of Company

63.

Bruns-Kimball & Co.

90.

Zobel's Sea Skiff & Yt. Wks.

64.

Cons. S. B. Corp. - N. Y.

91.

Irwin's Yacht Works

65.

Nassau Bt. Basin, Inc,

92.

Hubert S. Johnson Bt, Mfg.

66.

Freeport Point Shipyard, Inc.

91.

Cramp S. B. Co.

67.

Marin Bt. Wks., Inc.

95.

John H. Mathis Co.

69.

J. K. Welding Co., Inc.

96.

John Trumpy & Sons, Inc.

70.

Rubber Corp. of America

97.

New York S. B. Corp.

71.

DeKom S. B. Corp.

98.

B. T. C. Shipbldg. Corp.

72.

Dawn Cruisers, Inc.

99.

Penn-Jersey S. B. Corp.

73.

Great Kills Bt. Yd.

100.

Chas. B. Leek & Sons

74.

Beth., Staten Island

101.

Ventnor Bt. Wks., Inc.

75.

Wheeler S. B. Corp.

102.

Dravo Corp. - Wilmington

76.

Trageser Copper Works

103.

Am. Car & Fdy. Co.

77.

Peterson's Shipyard, Inc.

104.

Delaware Bay S. B. Co., Inc.

78.

Jakobson Shipyard, Inc.

105.

Berg Boat Co.

79.

Ira S. Bushey & Son, Inc.

106.

The Owens Yacht Co.

80.

Wheeler Shipyard, Inc.

107.

Am. Electric Welding Co., Inc.

81.

Sullivan D. D. & Repair Co.

108.

Beth. - Key Highway

82.

Purdy Boat Co.

109.

Maryland D. D. Co.

83.

Electric Boat Co. - Elco

110.

Cape May Shlpbldrs., Inc.

84.

Federal S. B. &. D. D. - Kearny

111.

International Latex Corp.

85.

Federal S. B. & D. D. - Newark

112.

Oxford Boat Yard Co.

86.

New Jersey S. B. Corp.

113.

Modern Marine Service

87.

Walsh-Steers Co.

114.

Annapolis Yacht Yard, Inc.

88.

Jennings Yt. Bldg. & S. Yd., Inc.

115.

Vinyard S. B. Co.

89.

Fairhaven Yacht Wks., Inc.

116.

Seaford S. B. Co., Inc.


 

SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA (From Virginia to Miami, Florida)

 

 

117.

Horace E. Dodge Boat k Plane Corp.

127.

Huckins Yt. Corp.

 

118.

Newport News S. B. & D. D. Co.

128.

Gibbs, - Jacksonville

 

120.

Elizabeth City Shipyard

129.

Daytona Beach Bt. Wks., Inc.

 

121.

Barbour Boat Works

130.

Pine Castle Boat & Const., Co.

 

123.

Charleston S. B. & D. D. Co.

131.

Ft. Pierce Bt. Co.

 

124.

Savannah Mach. & Fdy. Co.

132.

Miami S. B. Corp.

 

125.

Brunswick Marine Const. Co.

133.

Prigg Boat Wks.

 

126.

Aetna Iron & Steel Co.

 

 

 

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TABLE 32. cont‘d

GULF COAST AREA

(From Fort Myers, Florida to Texas)

Geo.
No.

Name of Company

Geo.
No.

Name of Company

134

Ft. Meyers S. B. Co.

145

Canulette S. B. Co.

135

Bushnell-Lyons, I. W., Inc.

146

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

136

Tampa S. B. Co., Inc.

147

Higgins Ind., Inc.

137

Food Machy. Corp. - Lakeland

148

Levingston S. B. Co., Inc.

138

Newport Ships

149

Cons. Steel Corp., Ltd., Texas

139

Charles W. Smith, Receiver for
Pensacola Shipyard & Eng., Corp.

150

Weaver Shipyards

151

Gulfport Boiler Welding Wks.

140

Gulf S. B. Corp.

152

Brown S. B. Co.

141

Choctaw Boat Works

153

Rice Bros. & Co.

142

Ingalls S. B. Corp.

154

Remonte Mfg. Co.

143

Westergard Boat Works - Biloxi

144

Gulf Coast Towing Co., Inc.

PACIFIC COAST AREA

(From California to Territory of Alaska)

155

San Diego Marine Const., Co.

182

Food Machinery - San Jose

156

Kettenberg Boat Works

183

Soule Steel - San Francisco

157

Campbell Machine Co.

184

Anderson & Christofani

158

Harbor Boat Works

185

Beth., San Francisco

159

Lynch S. B. Co.

186

Judson - Pacific War Ind.

160

Wilson Co.

187

George W, Kneass Co.

161

American Pipe &. Const. Co.

188

Dravo Corp. - California

162

North-American S. B. Corp.

189

Moore D. D. Co.

163

The Peyton Co.

190

Kaiser Co., Inc. - Richmond

164

South Coast Co.

191

Wm. F. Stone & Son

165

Long Beach Boat Shop

192

General Eng. & D. D. Co.

166

Victory S. B. Co.

193

McDonough Steel Co.

167

Lowman Boat Co.

194

United Eng. Co.

168

Western Pipe & Steel Co.

195

Pollock Stockton S. B. Co.

169

Robert V. Staats Co.

196

Stephens Bros. Bt. Mfg. Co.

170

Wilmington Boat Works, Inc.

197

Madden & Lewis Co.

171

Fellows & Stewart

198

Calif. Steel Prod. Co.

172

Cons. Steel Corp. Craig Yd. L. A.

199

Fulton Shipyard

173

Food Machy. Corp. - Riverside

200

Sacramento S. B. Co.

174

Al Larson Boat Shop, Inc.

201

Colberg Boat Works

175

Beth. S. P. - Terminal Island

202

Moore Equipment Co.

176

Garbutt - Walsh, Inc.

204

Basalt Rock Co., Inc.

177

Ackerman Boat Co.

205

Kruse & Banks S. B. Co., Inc.

178

Harbor Bt. Bldg. Co.

206

Gunderson Bros.

179

Soule Steel - Los Angeles

207

Commercial I. W.

180

Los Angeles S. B. & D. L. Corp.

208

Albina Eng. & Mach. Works, Inc.

181

San Pedro Bt. & Yt. Co., Inc.

209

Willamette Iron & Steel Co.

210

Portland S. B. Co.

--172--

TABLE 32, Cont'd.

PACIFIC COAST AREA (Cont'd)

Geo.
No.

Name of Company

Geo.
No.

Name of Company

211

Soule Steel - Portland

224

Ballard Mar, Ry. Co., Inc.

212

Kaiser Co., Inc. - Vancouver

225

Assoc. Shipblders. - H. I.

213

Astoria Mar. Const., Co,

226

Assoc, Shlpbldrs. - L. U.

214

Harbor Plywood Corp,

227

Olson & Winge Mar. Wks.

215

Tacoma Bt. Bldg., Co.

228

N. J. Blanchard Boat Co.

216

Western Bt. Bldg., Co.

229

Washington Boat Works

217

Mojean & Ericson

230

Siems - Drake

218

Seattle-Tacoma S. B. - Tacoma

231

Puget Sound Bridge k Dredging Co

219

Nelson Boiler & Tank Co., Inc.

233

Winslow Mar. Ry. & S. B. Co., Inc.

220

J. M. Martinac S. B. Co.

234

Lake Washington

221

Shain Mfg., Co.

235

Everett Pacific Co.

222

Seattle S. B. Co.

236

Everett Mar. Ways

223

Seattle-Tacoma S. B. - Seattle

237

Reinell Boat Works

238

Bellingham Mar. Ry. & Bt. Bldg.

239

Northwestern S. B. Co.

GREAT LAKES AREA

(From Vermont to Minnesota)

240

Donovan Contracting Co.

264

Graham - Page Motors, Corp.

241

Proctor's Yt. Works

265

Chrysler Corp.

242

Hutchinson Bt. Works, Inc.

266

Chris - Craft Corp.

243

Richardson Bt. Corp.

267

Gar-Wood Ind., Inc.

244

Amphibian Car Corp.

268

Defoe S. B. Co.

245

Bison S. B. Co.

269

Eddy S. B. Co.

246

Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp.

270

Foster Boat Co.

247

Niagara S. B. Corp.

271

Victory S. B. Co. - Michigan

248

Erie Concrete & St. S. Co.

272

Borg - Warner Corp.

249

Am. Boiler Works

273

Truscott Bt. & Dock Co.

250

Stadium Yt. Basin Inc.

274

Robinson Mar. Const., Co.

251

General Motors Corp.

275

Dachel - Carter S. B. Corp.

252

Am. S. B. Co. - Cleveland

276

Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.

253

Am. S. B. Co. - Lorain

277

Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co.

254

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co Akron.

278

Henry C. Grebe & Co.

255

Goodyear Tire k Rubber Co.

279

Froemming Bros., - Inc.

256

General Tire & Rubber Co.

280

Burger Boat Go.

257

B. F. Goodrich Co.

281

Manitowoc S. B. Go.

258

Master Tire k Rubber Corp.

282

Dunphy Boat Corp.

259

Eagle Rubber Co., Inc.

283

Leathem D. Smith S. B. Co.

260

The Matthews Co.

284

Peterson Boat Works

261

Lyman Beat Wks.

285

Fox River Boat Works, Inc.

262

Am. Cruiser Co., Inc.

286

Thompson Bros. Bt., Mfg. Co.

263

Fisher Boat Works, Inc.

287

Walter Butler

288

Globe Shipbuilding Co.

289

Zenith Dredge Co.

--173--

TABLE 32, Cont'd.

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY AREA

(From Alabama to Minnesota)


Geo.
No.

Name of Company

Geo.
No.

Name of Company

290

Firestone Tire & Rubber - Memphis

291

Pidgeon - Thomas Iron Co.

292

Nashville Bridge Co.

300

Mt. Vernon Bridge Co.

293

Mo. Valley Bridge & I. Co., Ind.

301

Quincy Barge Builders

294

St. Louis Car Co.

302

Omaha Steel Works

295

St. Louis S. B. Steel Co.

303

Dravo Corp. - N. I.

296

Mo. Valley Bridge & I. Co., Kansas

304

Am Bridge Co.

297

Darby Products of Steel Plate Co.

305

Chamberlain Corp.

29S

Kansas City Structural Steel Co.

306

Cargill, Inc.

299

Jeffersonville Bt. & Mach. Co.

307

Durkee Atwood Co.


NAVY YARD AND CANADIAN COMPANIES

15

Navy Yard, Portsmouth

309

War Supplies, Ltd.

18

Navy Yard, Poston

309(a)

Collingwood Shipyds., Inc.

68

Navy Yard, New York

309(b)

Kingston S. B. Ltd.

93

Navy Yard, Philadelphia

309(c)

Midland Shipyards, Ltd.

119

Navy Yard, Norfolk

309(d)

Morton Eng. & D. D. Co. Ltd.

122

Navy Yard, Charleston

309(e)

Canadian Vickers, Ltd.

203

Navy Yard, Mare Island

309(f)

Toronto Shipbuilding Co., Ltd.

232

Navy Yard, Puget Sound

308

Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor


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the superb work accomplished by yards and management which had never thought of building a ship before the war.

Although the majority of new yards engaged in constructing smaller types of vessels, 10 new yards capable of handling major types were built from the ground up. Two of these, Hunters Point and Terminal Island, both in California, came under Navy management, while 8 others came under private management:

Electric Boat Company Victory Yard, Groton, Connecticut (submarines)

Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock, Port Newark, New Jersey (destroyer escorts)

Consolidated Steel Corporation, Orange, Texas (destroyers, destroyer escorts)

Brown Shipbuilding Company, Inc., Houston, Texas (destroyer escorts)

Todd-Pacific Shipyard, Inc., Tacoma, Washington (escort carriers, originally developed by the Maritime Commission and further expanded by the Bureau of Ships)

Todd-Pacific Shipyards, Inc., Seattle, Washington (destroyers)

Western Pipe and Steel Company, San Pedro Plant, Los Angeles, California (ice breakers for Coast Guard)

Bethlehem-Hingham Shipyard, Inc., Hingham, Massachusetts Plant, New York, N. Y. (destroyer escorts).

Another practically new yard, the Cramp Shipyard at Philadelphia, capable of handling major types, sprang up on the site of the old Cramp Shipbuilding Company, which had been completely inactive for many years.

With the expansion of these facilities, there existed a concomitant increase in the number of shipyard employees required to meet the new

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workload. The shipyard employees engaged in building and repairing United States Navy vessels during this critical defensive phase of the war were:

January 1942

443,500

January 1943

911,900

July 1943

1,049,981

Under the pressure of providing ships for the hard fighting United States Fleet, the shipyards considerably reduced the time required to construct major combatant ships. The figures listed below are testimony to the increased efficiency of production, coordination between all agencies, the sweat and tears of the workers in and out of uniform, and the Bureau of Ships under whose jurisdiction this construction fell.

MONTHS REQUIRED FOR U.S. NAVY CONSTRUCTION BEFORE AND AFTER PEARL HARBOR

TYPE

BEFORE

AFTER

BATTLESHIP

39

32

AIRCRAFT CARRIER

32-1/2

15-1/2

SUBMARINES

14

7

DESTROYERS

13-1/2

5-1/2

(After = last ship completed in 1943).

This shipyard expansion, however, was only one element in the total war time industrial growth. As the new program for cargo ships, tanks, planes and army and navy equipment of all kinds started to pyramid early in the period of the shipyard expansion, it became apparent that the country's latent manufacturing capacity would soon be overloaded.

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Thus the problem became not merely one of expanding shipyards, but one of expanding the manufacturing capacity of industry as a whole to meet the needs of the Navy Shipbuilding program.

Expansion of general industry to meet the requirements of this shipbuilding program began with plants producing basic raw material. Next to be enlarged were the plants capable of manufacturing the component parts of a modem man of war, ranging all the way from jewel bearings to huge turbines. So comprehensive was the building program that nearly every branch of American industry was affected either directly or indirectly. Manufacturers were encouraged to let out their work to subcontractors, particularly to plants which had been producing non-essential material.

An automobile manufacturer, for example, was given the job of producing extremely intricate gyroscopic compasses and a stone finishing concern undertook the manufacture of towing machines and deck winches. Early in the shipbuilding program an acute situation in the construction of turboelectric propulsion machinery was solved by the construction of an enormous new plant in a 50 acre cornfield. As an illustration of the speed with which the whole program was undertaken, the construction of that particular plant was not begun until May 1942, yet by the end of the year the first unit had been produced, completed and shipped.

The controls so important in the coordinating of this overall programs are described in the next chapter, but the shipbuilding program alone serves to illustrate the comprehensive task of the Navy and country as a whole and of the Bureau of Ships in particular.

C. PRODUCTION SHORTAGES.

The expansion of facilities which began on a large scale after the

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legislation of June and July 1940 concentrated at first on shipyard facilities. It was generally recognized that such an increase would have to be undertaken but it was not realized that facilities for the building of many ship components would likewise have to be expanded, nor were the details known of what these expansions would have to be. Until Pearl Harbor, shipbuilding schedules and actual construction programs in the yards had not reached a point where serious delays or cutbacks were necessary, and at no time were real delays experienced because of the shortage of shipbuilding facilities (ways) themselves.

Up until Pearl Harbor, serious difficulties were experienced, however, in obtaining sufficient machine tools to equip yards and general industrial facilities, and periodically crises would arise requiring special expediting efforts to obtain components or materials. Unfortunately, attention being fixed on production, these difficulties were not regarded seriously until almost too critical a condition had been reached.

After Pearl Harbor, the situation became much more difficult. Production schedules were stepped up and substantial additions made to the building program. The first of these to hit was the 1799 Vessel Program, representing this country's effort to meet the immediate needs of the British. Later in 1942 the addition of the Emergency Landing Craft Program had equally serious results.

Perhaps the most disturbing shortage in this period was the shortage of steel, and in April 1942, a review of the situation required a complete readjustment of the entire program of the Navy. It became clearly established that there would not be enough steel to proceed with the

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shipbuilding program previously contemplated, and a review was made of outstanding shipbuilding facilities expansion projects to determine what adjustment could be made with the least serious interference with the war effort. Four projects were cancelled outright at this time and some others reduced. At the same time minesweepers and 58 submarine chasers were cancelled and plans for several other vessels were modified to provide for construction of wood instead of steel.

At one point it was thought that the entire shipbuilding program would have to be out substantially, but this did not prove to be necessary.

A memorandum of 4 September 1942 from Vice Admiral Robinson, Chief of the Office of Procurement and Material, to the Chief of Operations, on "Delays in Shipbuilding Program" contains the following comment:

"Expansion of facilities to produce ships' components has proved to be much more onerous than that of providing the ship ways themselves. It has also been a much heavier contributor to shipbuilding delays up to date. This is due to two reasons: it is normally much simpler to build, a shipbuilding way than it is to build a factory for the manufacture of a machine; and the need for expanded facilities for many components was not apparent in time to prevent a shortage of that component from causing delay in ships' construction. Among the delays from this cause which can be cited are delays in submarine chasers and minesweepers due to insufficient facilities for the manufacture of gears; minor delays in practically all types because of lack of facilities for the manufacture of valves; delays in some destroyers because of lack of facilities for the production of turbines and gears, and for forced draft blowers. There will be delays from this cause, for a short time, however, because the facilities for erecting ships have reached completion ahead of the facilities for construction of ship components. Unless there is an unforeseen increase in the shipbuilding program, or in some other war program which interferes with the manufacture of shipbuilding components, causes

--179—

VIEW OF ONE SHAFT OF CV-9 PROPULSION MACHINERY WITH TOP CASINGS LIFTED SHOWING CRUISING TURBINE, CRUISING GEAR, FLEXIBLE COUPLING, HP ROTOR, LP AHEAD AND ASTERN ROTOR, AND MAIN REDUCTION GEAR.

In this intricate but vital CV shaft it may be seen how a shortage a machine tools, dies, steel, skilled machinists, or just one critical part might cause a chain reaction which would halt the entire aircraft carrier building program.

--180--

of delay in ship's construction due to facilities for manufacturing components should disappear by the spring of 1943."

Unfortunately, the optimistic conclusion that all would be well by the spring of 1943 was not realized. Continual increases in all phases of the war program made previous calculations obsolete, and machine tools, the basic ingredient in all facilities expansion, continued to be a major bottleneck. To solve this problem the Bureau of Ships had been forced to initiate its own efforts to break the bottleneck and an 1 May 1942 established in the Shore Facilities Branch of the Shipbuilding Division a section known as the "Available Used Machine Tools Section."

A civilian expert in the field was brought in to establish a means of locating used machine tools, welding machines and cranes which were idle or engaged in non-essential production, and to make them available for contractors engaged in war production or for the Navy's continental or advanced base facilities. Field representatives were set up in the Naval Inspection Districts and in cooperation with representatives of the local Naval Inspector canvassed plants and obtained information as to availability of critical equipment. This procedure, although in conflict with the desire of many to centralize the allocation of available machine tools in the War Production Board, proved to be effective and many thousand available tools were located and put to work on important war contracts. It was not, however, until the latter part of 1943 that the worst shortage was over.

The turbine and gear shortage mentioned in Admiral Robinson's

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memorandum above was, of course, tied to the shortage of machine tools. Not until 1943, however, did it reach its most serious proportions, which resulted from the tremendous increase in requirements arising out of the destroyer escort program. Although the destroyer escort program was completed successfully and more than the scheduled number of ships were delivered to the fleet in 1943, inability to obtain production of turbines and gears resulted in compromise designs utilizing diesel propulsion of less power, and resulted in ships with inferior speed.

Another shortage which became most acute in 1943 was in the capacity of valve manufacturers. This case illustrates the difficulty in planning facilities expansions in industries serving more than one procurement agency. The Bureau, realizing in part its growing needs for valves, had invested considerable amounts in the expansion of the major companies in 1941 and 1942. By the spring of 1943 however, an over-all deficit existed, seriously threatening the shipbuilding program. One reason for this shortage was the increase in naval requirements growing out of the expanded DE program, which, of course, had not been fully anticipated. The acute shortage grew, however, out of the simultaneous expansion in requirements for the high octane gasoline program, the maritime program, and the rubber program, the rubber program being administered by a "czar" with directive authority exceeding that of any other procurement agency.

Another reason for the shortage was the change in the character of valves needed for war production, the emphasis being on high pressure

--182--

type which had been produced in small volume prior to the war. These types of valves required high quality steel or bronze castings which in turn required the expansion of the steel and non-ferrous casting industry. A good bit of the effort devoted to the expansion of valve production had to be concentrated on the subsidiary industries.

This example is typical of the experience in many other areas, where expanded ship production schedules could be met only as the Bureau became actively concerned with such seemingly unrelated fields as steel and bronze casting industries or other industries equally removed from shipyards.

Still another feature of the valve shortage was the difficulty in preventing the various procurement agencies from using artificial dates for required deliveries, thus over-estimating the capacity necessary to meet true needs. Although there was no question that valve production capacity was inadequate to meet all demands, it was found that a large part of the shortage was fictitious and the most vital needs were met after a review of the situation permitted a deflation in estimated requirements. It was this sort of experience which emphasized the need for effective central control and review of requirements, estimates and allocations.

Of all the subsidiary industrial interests of the Bureau, perhaps the most important was the diesel engine industry. Until World War II the diesel engine had been used very little either by the Navy or by private interests in this country, the Navy's most important use being for submarines. The limited volume of production, however, meant that such engines were generally custom-built to Navy specifications and procured in small quantities complete with on-board, tender and overhaul spares.

--183--

Immediately after the outbreak of war, skyrocketing demands for patrol craft and landing craft necessitated the expansion of the diesel industry so that it could keep pace with the expansion in production of the multitude of landing craft and other types using this type of propulsion. Direct investment by the Bureau of Ships, made in 11 diesel manufacturing companies, amounted to over $50 millions and in 21 separate companies manufacturing components for diesel engines at an estimated cost of over $40 millions. As a result of this investment and other expansions financed by the companies involved, the Bureau's needs were met with few delays. The role of the diesel engine in the ships of the Navy was one of the most important chapters of the entire war effort, the aggregate horsepower installed exceeding that in combatant or other steam propelled vessels and by 1945 reaching the total of over 50 million horsepower.

Another problem typical of the war experience generally was the provision of adequate spare parts production and, with the tremendous increase in diesel horsepower in service, special efforts had to be made by the Bureau to provide for expansions which would permit a regular flow of spares in addition to new engines. (This is fully discussed in Chapter XV).

Chapter X deals with the controls exacted to bring these shortages and problems under control.

D. FINANCING

In the period June 1940 through November 1945, nearly $2,000,000,000 was spent or had been committed for all types of facilities. Of this total, nearly one and only-half billion represented investments in shipyard

--184--

or other facilities at Naval establishments. This sum was divided fairly equally between Navy Yards and other Naval establishments on the one hand and private shipbuilders on the other. The investment in general industry such as motor manufacturers, turbine and gear manufacturers etc., amounted to slightly over $400,000,000.00. Table 33 which follows summarizes this record.

--185--

TABLE 33

Facilities Expansion
June 1940 - November 1945

Appropriation Charged

Navy Yards & Other Naval Establishments

Private Shipbuilders

General Industry

Machine Tools for Plant Expansion

Total

IRNV (C&M) 1

$532,110,889.93

$219,909,735.64

$290,054,994.14

$7,896,561.26

$1,049,972,180.97

IRNV (EC) 2

9,397,580.00

137,257,713.45

144,026,113.99

290,681,407.44

Repair Facilities, Navy

161,725,875.22

323,348,088.47

485,073,963.69

Defense Aid Facilities and
Equipment
1941-1944

27,687,987.00

914,230.00

2,425,000.00

31,027,217.00

Total

730,922,332.15

681,429,767.56

436,506,108.13

7,896,561.26

1,856,754,769.10

 

1 Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels, Construction and Machinery.
2 Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels, Emergency Construction.


--186--

As explained in Chapter V, an additional source of funds for the expansion of facilities resulted from legislation permitting private investment necessary for war work to be amortized for tax purposes within a five year period. This was made possible by a modification of the Internal Revenue Law passed in October 1940. It provided that, for facilities acquired or constructed after 10 June 1940, an annual deduction of 20% of the cost could be taken at the election of the taxpayer if the expansion were certified as necessary to the interest of national defense. Although no government funds were given directly to the contractor, the provisions for such rapid amortization

had substantially the same effect under the conditions existing from 1940 on.

From 1 July 1940 to 31 December 1945, the Bureau of Ships sponsored approximately $400,000,000.00 worth of expansion under the provisions of the tax amortization law. As certificates were often approved for 30% or some other percent of the total expansion, the total investment stimulated in this manner was substantially larger. Certificates of necessity were approved by the Bureau with reluctance, however, for it believed that the Government's interests could be better protected by direct investment and a relative competitive position of different contractors maintained more nearly equal under a direct investment policy. Certificates of Necessity were most frequently granted in cases of badly scrambled facilities, where expansion was required to supplement facilities owned by the contractor. In these cases the value of the addition to the plant was so tied to existing facilities that it became unfeasible to make a direct investment. Table 34 summarizes

this record.

--187--

TABLE 34
Dollar Value of Necessity Certificates Sponsored by Bureau of Ships

Fiscal Year

Total Dollar Value of NC
Applns. Sponsored During
Fiscal Year.

Accumulated Dollar
Value of BuShips 
Sponsored NC 
Applications

July 1, 1940 - July 1, 1941

$75,910,829

$75,910,829

July 1, 1941 - July 1, 1942

$126,229,499

$202,140,328

July 1, 1942 - July 1, 1945

$120,283,441

$322,425,769

July 1, 1943 - July 1, 1944

$67,503,731

$389,929,500

July 1, 1944 - July 1, 1945

$10,371,087

$400,300,587

July 1, 1945 - Dec. 31, 1945

$2,636,819

$402,937,406

(The above compilation does not include the dollar value of Necessity Certificates sponsored by the Bureau of Ships with respect to facilities constructed or acquired pursuant to Emergency Plant Facilities Contracts.)

--188--

Still another source of expansion sponsored by Government must be mentioned, although the extent to which the Bureau of Ships participated has not yet been determined. In these cases the Defense Plant Corporation or some other Government agency financed the expansion of a facility serving more than one procurement agency. In view of the extensive number of dependent activities, almost the entire raw material plant expansion came under defense Plant Corporation financing, as did a large percentage of the general industrial plant expansion, which was mainly constructed for the benefit of more than one procurement agency.

The extent of the wide expansion of facilities financed without any Government assistance must also be mentioned, although no data applicable to the Bureau of Ships are available at this writing. It may be estimated with safety, however, that this private investment constituted a considerable portion of the overall wartime financing.

E. CONTRACTS.

Important considerations in the facilities expansion program were the form and terms of the contract used by the government. Until the two ocean Wavy program was launched in June and July 1940, the placing of contracts and expansion of facilities had been restricted by legislation, which had been imposed for various reasons in the years of small scale shipbuilding. Shipbuilding contracts could be let only after competitive bids had been received. Profits were limited to 10% and direct investment in plant facilities by the government was not provided for, although private capital understandably failed to venture into the field of armament production under the conditions of uncertainty which existed at that time. By an act of 28 June 1940 "to expedite Naval

--189--

shipbuilding and for other purposes", the Navy received authorization to negotiate contracts directly without competition, to advance funds to contractors as an aid in providing working capital, to execute cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts and to engage in direct investments in facilities. Without this legislation, it is doubtful that the expansion started at that time could have been completed. Particularly important proved to be the fact that extended negotiations required by competitive bidding and difficulties experienced in providing adequate financing could be dispensed with and firm contracts executed within a very short period after the appropriations had been made available.

In the main, three types of facilities contracts have been used: the Government Ownership, the Defense Plant Corporation and the Emergency Plant Facilities types. In the early stages of the emergency, all Bureaus concentrated mainly on the DPC and EPF types. The latter, which was promulgated by the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, had several undesirable features, particularly the provision for removal of facilities and restoration of the site by the government if the contractor did not elect to purchase the government’s interest in the facility. By the middle of 1941 all Bureaus had discontinued the use of the EPF type in so far as practicable. At the same time the Bureaus of Ordnance and Ships discontinued the use of the DPC type, which provided for the administration of the contract and supervision of construction by the Defense Plant Corporation, mainly because they preferred to have the Navy Department supervise the construction of the facilities. Tills decision on the part of the Bureaus of Ordnance and Ships has involved them in the

--190--

necessary provision of staff personnel for the administration of these contracts and has currently required them to become involved in the complicated problems of final settlement and disposition of facilities no longer needed. The experience of the Bureau of Aeronautics and the limited experience of the Bureau of Ships with the DPC type of contract has, so far as it can be determined, been completely satisfactory, and it is the consensus of interested parties that a more thorough review of this experience might be made with an eye to the evaluation of the record for purposes of future policy. A summary of the three principal types of facilities contracts used is as follows:

Government Ownership Type

Acquisition:

The contractor constructs or purchases the facilities, although land, drydocks, machine tools and other facilities already owned or to be directly acquired by the Government sire frequently furnished for use under the same contract.

Financing:

The contractor pays for the facilities constructed or purchased by it and is reimbursed for its allowable costs as the work progresses. Advance payments through controlled accounts ere occasionally provided.

Title:

Title vests in the Government as the facilities are acquired.

Right to Use:

The contractor has the right to use the facilities on Government and private work giving priority to the former. The contractor is required to maintain the facilities so long as it has the right to use them but charges the cost to its supply contracts.

Risks of loss and damage are assumed by the Government so long as the facilities are used on Government work and during any standby period.

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Rent:

Rent is charged for the use of the facilities except in cases of shipbuilding, ship repair, aeronautical and ordnance facilities used solely on Government work. The rent is ordinarily based on normal straight line depreciation plus in some cases an allowance for a return on the investment, and is subject to variation according to use.

Termination:

The contractor’s right to use is terminable, at the election of the Government, at the expiration of the use of the facilities for war production or at any time when the public interest so requires. This right is also terminable in most instances by the contractor after the end of the emergency or of the use of the facilities for war production.

Standby:

After the termination of the contractor's right to use the facilities they are usually to be maintained in standby by the contractor at the Government’s expense for a period ordinarily limited to five years.
The Government may terminate the period at any time.

Options:

The contractor has the option to purchase the facilities usually at their fair value as determined by the Secretary of the Navy or the Board of Contract Appeals, but in some cases at cost less normal straight line depreciation with a minimum of 15% of cost. In many cases the option is applicable to all but not part of the facilities and in other to all or any part. Many of the options are exercisable at any time prior to the end of the standby period, but others may be exercised only after the period of use or standby. Where substantial permanent improvements to contractor-owned land are involved, the Government frequently has a secondary option to acquire the site at a price determined by negotiation or arbitration.

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Removal:

If neither option is exercised and the Government does not own the site, the Government has the right and in some cases may he required to remove the facilities. The earlier contracts usually required the Government to restore the contractor's premises, but in the more recent cases any obligation to restore has been expressly negatived. Facilities on contractor-owned land not removed by the Government may be removed by the contractor.

Defense Plant Corporation Lease Type

Acquisition:

The contractor constructs or purchases the facilities as agent of the DPC.

Financing:

The DPC pays for the facilities either directly or through reimbursement of the contractor. The Navy is obligated to reimburse the DPC for or 50% of the cost initially and for the balance if and when funds are appropriated by Congress for the purpose, in each case with interest at 1-1/2% per annum. Rental and proceeds of sales received by the DPC are credited against the Navy's obligation.

Title:

Title is in the first instance vested in the DPC. When the DPC has been reimbursed in full, title is to be transferred to the Government and the Navy is to be substituted for the DPC under the contract with the contractor.

Right to Use:

The contractor has the right to use the facilities on work for the Government or suppliers of the Government. The contractor is required at its expense to maintain, insure and pay taxes on the facilities.

Rent:

Rent ie charged by the DPC for the use of the facilities except in some cases where their use is confined to work directly for the Government. The rental is usually on a basis intended to reflect normal straight line depreciation.

Termination:

The contractor's right to use expires on a

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specified date usually four to seven years from the date of the contract and is subject to earlier termination by the DPC with Navy concurrence or by the contractor when use of the facilities for Government work is no longer required.

Standby:

None.

Options:

Upon termination the contractor has the option for a period of ninety days to purchase the facilities at cost plus interest at 4% per annum less rental payments with interest thereon at such rate, or at cost less depreciation, whichever results in the higher price. The contractor has a right of first refusal if the DPC proposes to sell the facilities within ninety days from the expiration of the option.

Removal:

If the option is not exercised and the facilities are located in a plant of the contractor, the DPC has the right to remove the facilities and may be required to remove the moveable machinery and equipment at its expense. Any such machinery and equipment not so removed within sixty days from the request of the contractor therefor, may be removed and stored by the contractor at the expense of the DPC.

Emergency Plant Facilities Type

Acquisition:

The contractor constructs or purchases the facilities.

Financing:

The contractor pays for the facilities usually with funds borrowed upon the security of the contract. The Government reimburses the contractor for its costs in sixty equal monthly installments beginning upon the completion of the facilities and a certificate of necessity is generally issued. Reimbursement is accelerated if the contract is terminated.

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Title:

Title to the facilities is in the contractor

Right to Use:

The contractor may use the facilities for any purpose and is required to maintain and insure them.

Rent:

None.

Termination:

The contract may be terminated by the Government at any time and by the contractor when the facilities have not been used for any ninety-day period on Government work.

Standby:

None.

Options:

Upon termination the contractor has the right for a period up to 180 days to retain the facilities upon payment to the Government of cost less normal straight line deprecation, or such lesser amount as may be negotiated with the approval of SecNav. If such right is not exercised, title to the facilities must be transferred to the Government. The contractor has a right of first refusal if the Government thereafter proposes to sell or lease the facilities.

Removal:

If the site is not part of the facilities, the Government has the right and may be required to remove the facilities and restore the site."

F. LESSON FROM FACILITIES EXPANSION:

The final appraisal of the facilities expansion program of the Bureau of Ships cannot be made until all settlements have been completed and the perspective gained by them permits a better evaluation of the salient points. It is believed, however, that, above all else, the experience of World War II indicates that the only way to minimize the periodic crises arising out of inadequate facilities for the production of components, material or whatever, is to emphasize and re-emphasize the need for careful breakdowns of all material and components going into ships on a hill of materials basis. In this manner reasonably accurate estimates

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of needs can be prepared as soon as a decision is made to add a vessel to the building program. Throughout 1940, 1941 and 1942 the most serious problems of the War Production Board and the various procurement agencies arose out of the confusion which existed with regard to true requirements. Strange as it may seem, this was further aggravated by the fact that for a long time there existed no definitive source of information concerning the supply which might be expected in any period.

A final step to bring order out of chaos is of course the establishing of firm controls so that production may be scheduled and allocated to meet true needs and not dissipated in the building up of excessive inventories.

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CHAPTER X

CONTROL OF THE SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

A. OVER-ALL CONTROLS

The development of effective control of the war economy proved one of the major goals of World War II. In spite of many false starts and continued difficulties, by the middle of 1943 it had become possible to determine what, where and when most war goods could be produced and to know that utilization of this country's vast resources was proving reasonably effective. However unspectacular the achievement may have seemed, without such controls ships could not have been built rapidly enough and our men at the front would not have had at their command the quantity or quality of material that often made the difference between success or failure.

The major problem was that of scheduling and controlling the production of war materials and other essential goods so that the total program stayed in balance, with neither more nor less of any product produced than could be used with the greatest effectiveness. With war production well under way, virtually all productive facilities were fully employed, but under these conditions a large increase in one program could be obtained only at the expense of some other program. When the industrial resources of the country are fully employed, relative overproduction of one item or group of items is as serious as underproduction. Overproduction of one product will result in the utilization of manpower, materials and facilities which might be used to better advantage for some other product. This sort of diversion is found in its worst form when the output of materials and components required for the completion of an end product gets out of balance. Lack of a single

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vital part may make ineffective many thousands of tons of steel. Similar standards prevail in the planning of the total shipbuilding program.

When the CNO decides the combination of ships and craft necessary to attain a given objective, each type of ship has a definite role to play in relation to the total number of ships available. For example, all the destroyers or other combatant vessels in the world are of little use in the far reaches of the Pacific if there are not sufficient auxiliaries to keep them supplied with ammunition, fuel and the other services necessary to keep them in fighting trim. Landing craft prove of little use if there are not enough major combatant vessels available to soften up the beaches and protect the landing from attack by the enemy fleet.

The emphasis on the undesirable effects of overproduction in the examples above serves to illustrate the fundamental point of the overall war production control problem: that it is not enough merely to assist manufacturers in obtaining scarce materials or facilities or manpower to meet orders. In war it becomes necessary to control the distribution of all factors of production, materials, facilities and manpower, so that the maintenance of a balanced program is assured.

The more passive approach tends to break down because, on the one hand, there are some manufacturers who always seems to be able to exceed the required levels of output, and, on the other hand, some manufacturers cannot maintain required levels due to limited capacity for the production of some part of the total product. Positive controls are necessary to prevent either of these situations.

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No single manufacturer or industry group can maintain the type of information required or control the total program. Nor can responsibility be left entirely to the different procurement agencies. One central agency must be able to keep books on the total supply and requirements picture so that plans are not based on false hopes and so that the relative importance of different programs may be weighed and the final decision made effective. Details of execution may be left to the separate procurement agencies, but the total picture has to be in the hands of one authority which can decide where cuts must be made if requests for limited resources exceed the supply available.

It is the purpose of this section to describe the evolution of controls in the Bureau of Ships and their relation to the development of overall controls of the war economy. Although the Bureau of Ships controlled only a part of the total picture and often had to follow the lead of higher authority, its contribution to the development of effective control will rank as one of its outstanding achievements.

The Bureau of Ships controls were particularly important within the Navy Department, as a large part of the other procurement activities of the Department were keyed to the schedules established for shipbuilding.

In peace, the Bureau of Ships and its predecessors, the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering, were primarily concerned with developmental work, perfecting new designs, testing, and maintenance. The procurement functions of the bureau and its predecessors were limited by the small size of the building program and the

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fact that procurement could be delegated to the building yards once the contract had been let. The Navy did not procure sufficient material to require any elaborate controls. In placing contracts in private yards, Congress required the Navy Department to obtain bids for each job and

to give the contract to the lowest bidder who could meet Navy specifications. In the case of contracts placed in Navy Yards, estimates were made in the Yard and procurement centered there. There was little immediate concern about productive capacity, for excess capacity existed in most fields and the limited amount of Navy business was sought after by more firms than could be given even a small part of the job. In some cases technical problems would develop, causing delay, and in other cases building times were not up to the standards desired; but on the whole, the real problem was to obtain sufficient funds to continue the modest building program, not to find a way of building the ships for which there existed appropriations.

Thinking in terms of a full scale war program proved difficult when the main efforts of the shipbuilding bureaus were to obtain the minimum appropriations necessary to do a very limited job. Even after the pressure began to grow, following declaration of war in Europe, materials remained generally available and no serious shortages of components materialized for more than a year. Under these conditions it was incumbent upon the bureaus solely to place contracts and to keep tabs on the shipbuilders' general performance, but with a limited staff available, this served to be more than a full time job.

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During the explosive international developments of the middle 1930's, the possibility of war become apparent to the Navy Department, but Congress' and the general public's attitude did not support the extension of governmental power over the economy. Even the gathering of information from industry for the purpose of planning or setting the stage for future planning occasioned remarks about "war mongers" and "militarists". Development of a central agency for the coordination of the different programs involved in preparation for national defense proceeded at such a meager pace that we found ourselves entering World War II with little real preparation for the task of obtaining maximum production from a wartime economy.

One of the most serious impediments to the development of plans and controls for the shipbuilding program was the lack of a clear conception of the job to be done. The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 made obvious the immediate need for an increase in the size of the Navy; the completion date for ships then under construction was moved up. The Congressional Hearings on further Naval expansion held during the spring of 1940 resulted in the passing of the 11% Expansion Act in June 1940, almost simultaneously with the birth of the Bureau of Ships. Before this act could be digested, the fall of France stirred up demands for a further increase In the strength of the Navy and by July the 70% Expansion Act was passed. This rapid increase in the size of the shipbuilding program created a host of problems in the administration of the new bureau's work. Daily emergencies being the rule, little time

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could be devoted to the sort of work that would pay dividends only in the long-run. With ships constantly being added to the program and delivery dates being advanced, the bureau could accomplish little in the way of planning. The final blow of Pearl Harbor further upset the smooth functioning of the central authorities so much that not until the latter part of 1942 did things settle down enough for a long-range view to be taken.

The fact that the Army, the Maritime Commission and parts of the Navy other than the bureau were all seeking to expand at the same time added to the difficulties inherent in the shipbuilding program. Most of the materials and many of the ship components were being manufactured by companies who were being pressed by all of the procurement agencies; a keen competition developed, so that firms that might be expected to supply Navy materials were tied up with Army contracts and vice-versa. As the needs of war demanded the support of such industries as rubber and gasoline, programs for the expansion of these industries competed directly with shipbuilding for such important items as valves, compressors and pumps. The one hope of all authorities came to be that the Office of Production Management (later to become the War Production Board) could control the distribution of goods so that conflicts between the different agencies would be minimized and so that the most important needs would be met first. The War Production Board was established in January 1942. Such broad powers were relegated to it that the Board could be practically anything necessary to assure the delivery of goods to the place desired

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or the limitation of civilian production necessary to release capacity for war production.

In spite of the authority granted under the first and second War Powers Acts, the WPB and before it the OPM were faced with the same sort of overwhelming demands. Heroic measures were required to meet specific emergencies. Until well into 1942 the WPB grappled with the problem of overall control of the war economy. Limitation of civilian production and expansion of capacity were the only means of increasing the potential output of war goods. In this area the combined energy of the WPB and the procurement agencies proved reasonably effective, although lagging behind what might have been done with better and more experienced administration. Civilian production was reduced considerably and the capacity formerly devoted to production of automobiles and other consumer goods was converted to the manufacture of war material. Expansion of plants at both the primary and secondary stages of production proceeded In all areas and, in spite of the failure to begin soon enough, both cuts and expansion permitted the tremendous increase in output with which we are familiar.

The vast productive capacity of the country, however, was not capable of supplying all essential needs at the same time or even over a considerable time. It became necessary to find some means of deciding what should be produced first and then of assuring the even flow of material for the completion of the finished goods. The OPM and later the WPB first tried to do this job by the issue of preference ratings to all users of critical materials. More direct methods of control were

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confined to the prohibition or the limitation of the manufacture of certain civilian goods or the prohibition or limitation of the use of certain critical materials in the manufacture of specified goods. The preference ratings system was supposed to assure delivery of material to the most essential uses, but in practice it did not assure production as desired. High rated military orders were often unfilled and delivery was often delayed while the requisite goods were being used for less essential purposes. Under such a system it proved impossible for either the WPB or the Navy to maintain the program in balance so that combination of materials, components and facilities necessary to complete a given ship were all available at the same time in proper quantities.

Administrative weakness and growing pains were responsible for some of the faults of the system but a much more important defect was the failure of the preference rating system to provide for control of the quantities of material going into different uses. A shipbuilder might get the top rating for all material necessary to construct a ship and pass this rating on to his subcontractors for materials and components purchased, but the WPB would have no accurate information on the quantity of material that would be ordered under this priority rating. Competition developed among the producers of finished goods to assure delivery of essential materials at the proper time, and manufacturers of material were asked to make delivery in advance of true needs. The industry branches of the WPB, which controlled the issue of preference ratings, had no means of checking applications and they issued more high preference ratings than the productive capacity of American industry could

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honor. When the situation became too bad and inflation of the top hands of the preference rating system had gone so far that no deliveries could he guaranteed, a new set of symbols was devised and the whole process started again.

The lack of quantitative control had another serious limitation. Even if the issue of ratings had been limited to the supply available, the lower rated orders approved by the WPB could not have been given adequate consideration. Often the lower rated orders were as essential to a balanced war program as the higher, but due to lack of information on building schedules and total requirements the highest ratings were reserved for those items for which there was the greatest immediate pressure. A review of the changes in the list of top ratings will indicate how first one and then another crisis required new ratings to overcome a shortage.

A review of the shipbuilding program in the period from Pearl Harbor through 1942 and even into the first quarter of 1943 reveals that frequent changes in the program and failure of the materials and scheduling controls occasioned considerable delays.

The first and one of the most serious reasons for delay was the fact that facilities for the manufacture of components were not being developed so rapidly as the shipbuilding ways and other fabrication facilities. A partial explanation for this may be found in the understandable failure to anticipate the increased demands resulting from reduction in the building times for most vessels. Not until well after serious shortages had developed did an overall control of component manufacturing capacity come into play. Lack of valve production continued to delay the whole program

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through 1943; lack of gears delayed, submarine and minesweeper production and contributed to the delay of destroyer production; lack of turbine output also proved important in the delay of destroyers; finally, the difficulty in obtaining delivery of steel resulted in a delay of the total building program. The steel shortage became so acute in April 1942 that a flat reduction of 30% in the Navy Program was considered. Although the reduction did not become necessary in the end, much time was lost because of the lack of any control that would assure deliveries according to generally accepted priority of need. The mill capacity was available but no means had as yet been devised to bring it into balance with demand.

As discussed in the shipbuilding sections of this history, the frequent changes in the Program occasioned major delays. Although there is no way to measure the exact impact of these changes, the effects were felt throughout the entire economy. Orders cancelled and rush orders placed with manufacturers meant wasted effort, wasted material and wasted labor. Inventories became too large in some yards and below a minimum working level at other yards. Machine shops were forced to retool to meet new demands, and to deny delivery to customers who could complete ships if only a few parts were available. Hundreds of officers were assigned to the work of expediting the delivery of material which might have been delivered without difficulty if orders had been placed in time. It resulted in an overall reduction in production.

Many of the personnel not of policy level but concerned with expediting and production often questioned the advisability of the over-all

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planning, such as the frequent number of program changes and the in inexplicable award of high priorities to unknown activities of apparently debatable importance. Non-policy level personnel, however, not being fully acquainted with facts, were in no position to judge accurately. One activity, the Manhattan Project, served as a constant source of discontent because it absorbed so many valves, so much piping, etc., but few were cognizant of the momentous purpose of this project.

The adverse effect on total production occasioned by frequent program changes became exceedingly obvious, but only on the policy level could the accounting of gains and losses in the overall war picture be measured.

The responsibility of proper ship design to accomplish certain objectives being vested in the Chief of Naval Operations, only that office knew the complete story. If landing craft became necessary, two or three more cruisers could not do the job. If carriers proved imperative for future operations, another battleship or two would serve little or no use. The problem, therefore, was intimately involved with the over-all strategy. Since the record of the war serves as the only test with any meaning, it is on this basis that CNO must be judged. How much greater the output might have been if there had not been so many disruptions in the program no one will ever know.

The Bureau of Ships concerned itself solely with executing the directives of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of Navy.

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GRAYMARINE DIESELS

Fig. B13—Model 64-YTL, Starboard Side.

Fig. B14—Model 64-YTL, Port Side.

Production of thousands and thousands of these engines for landing craft involved extensive controls of materials.

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B. PROGRAM PLANNING

Until the Bureau of Ships had estimates or directives of the size of the projected shipbuilding program, it was impossible to plan for the procurement of the materials and components which would be required. The basic importance of this planning, therefore, cannot be overly stressed and its initial formulation becomes a matter of great interest.

Based upon the initiative of the Bureau of Ships, the first major attempt to prepare a shipbuilding program for planning purposes came to pass immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack 7 December 1941. A memorandum of 18 December 1941 from the Chief of the Bureau of Ships to the Chief of Naval Operations initiated the planning program; it stated in part:

"If it is possible, it would be preferable from this bureaus's point of view if the Chief of Naval Operations would establish official figures for Column 3 (Projected Strength of the United States Navy by Types) which could be used for all planning purposes including authorizations and construction of ships and requests for appropriations as well as estimates for material needs. Once these figures are established, it will be a relatively simple matter for this bureau, and, presumably for all bureaus, to revise its plans and estimates according to such revised figures."

Upon receipt of this memorandum, the Chief of Naval Operations referred it to the General Board for action and the General Board, together with key officers in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, proceeded to investigate it item by item. The General Board decided that it would be better if the district craft and the small boats were considered by the District Craft Development Board and the

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Department Continuing Board for Development of Landing Boats, as those two hoards were more familiar with the needs for vessels of these types than was the General Board. The General Board, however, proposed to accept the results of these two boards as the figures which they would include in their final report. The two boards considered all the figures, calling before them various witnesses and including in their meetings several members from the Bureau of Ships. The results were submitted to the General Board for inclusion in their report.

On receipt of the General Board report, Fleet Maintenance then conducted some meetings with the various bureaus and with representatives from the Maritime Commission, as a result of which they prepared a forwarding endorsement for the signature of the Chief of Naval Operations, who passed the report on to the Secretary of the Navy.

The Secretary of the Navy approved the report on 51 January 1942, as amended by the Chief of Naval Operations.

With the approval of the Secretary of the Navy the report was complete as a planning document, but, under the existing conditions and directives, the authority of the President had to be obtained to put the recommendations of the report into effect as building directives. It was decided therefore to divide the report into three parts: (1) Vessels in the planning program for which immediate authorization for construction would be deferred; (2) vessels for which the authority of the President was requested to proceed immediately with construction, and (5) vessels for which authorization of the President and/or Congress had been received,

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funds were available, and for which only administrative action by the Department was required. The first part, submitted to the President for his consideration in a memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy on 6 February 1942, was approved by the President in principle. A memorandum to the President stated that the Maximum War Effort building program did not involve facilities not already approved and that such a program was necessary, in addition to previously approved programs, to give the Office of Production Management something to shoot at in over-all planning for raw materials for the Navy.

Parts 2 and 3 of the report were made into a composite list and submitted to President Roosevelt in a memorandum from the Secretary on 6 February 1942. Certain items were questioned in a handwritten endorsement on the original memorandum, not all completely seriously; the list included one retriever boat and nine yawls and these were bracketed by the President and annotated, "No dogs."

A memorandum of 12 February 1942 requested reconsideration and subsequently the President approved the list in full.

Following final presidential approval, authorization to award contracts and undertake construction of vessels in categories 2 and 3 was given to the Bureau of Ships and by 1 March 1942 a revised set of tables had been prepared. This finally established an approved Maximum War Effort Planning Program extending through 1946.

In the process of the plan's clearance, immediate needs had to be considered, but by March first the finally approved program achieved directive status.

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Developments during the year 1942 soon placed the Bureau of Ships in a position where it needed a new planning program at the same time that the imposition of the Controlled Materials Plan brought additional pressure upon the bureau for more accurate estimates of its future needs. Early in 1943, therefore, the bureau undertook again to make predictions of the magnitude of the shipbuilding program beyond vessels directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary.

Finally, on 25 May 1943 the Vice Chief of Naval Operations approved a chart covering a building program extending into 1947. In this letter, however, it was stated, "This is transmitted solely for use in planning of material and is not in any sense a directive to construct." This continued in effect until 28 July 1944, when a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations to all bureaus cancelled the 25 May 1943 program and substituted a much less detailed new program for future planning.

The Bureau of Ships' imperative necessity for advance notice of the general magnitude of the shipbuilding program will be readily apparent from the discussion which follows. This has already been demonstrated in Chapter IV of this history in connection with the extreme lag between financial appropriation for construction and the actual completion of the ship. Two major attempts, one early in 1942 and the other in mid-1943, to provide the bureau with advance notice seem in retrospect to have been inadequate. The program of early 1942 changed in its development from a planning program to a directed program and the program of May 1943 remained

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without modification over too long a period of time to be of maximum usefulness.

In retrospect it would seem to have been desirable to have devoted much more attention and thought to such programs during the war, maintaining sufficient staff to incorporate, perhaps on a monthly basis, all modifications which would appear to be desirable as the result of changes in the character and tempo of the war.

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C. PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS PLAN

Procurement planning and improvement in the precision with which material and components requirements might be estimated lagged in the Navy because experience through the greater part of 1942 proved that important programs could be developed and results achieved only as the bureau and its allied Navy field offices proceeded to follow up in detail and with great persistence all matters in which the bureau had an interest. For the most part it is fair to say that in spite of priority assistance given to Navy programs by the War Production Board, or its predecessor, the Office of Production Management, the granting of priority could not get delivery of materials or components as required. Although the War Production Board proved exceedingly helpful in the summer of 1942 in assisting the bureau in its emergency landing craft program, the assistance rendered was in large measure the granting of authority to expedite directly the procurement of scarce items, backed up by the authority of an over-riding directive which could be used for the program in special cases. In other words, until the War Production Board set its system of control in order, it was exceedingly difficult for the Navy and manufacturers to see the necessity for the laborious preparation of detailed estimates of requirements.

Appreciating these difficulties, the War Production Board instituted the Production Requirements Plan in June, 1942. The War Production Board hoped by this plan to control the allocation of basic metals so that it could achieve a balance between supply and requirements. It attempted to do this, however, by a system of estimates and allocations tied to users

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of the metals rather than procurement agencies or end products. All manufacturers using more than $5,000 worth of metals were required to submit data stating the dollar value of all shipments of products listed in an end-product code in the three months preceding its application, and at the same time to submit estimates as to its requirements for each of the items listed in the code in the succeeding quarter. In this way it was hoped that, with data gathered simultaneously on the supply of critical metals, it would be possible to balance supply and requirements for the most important users of critical materials.

Difficulties soon appeared in this plan, however, for requirements as submitted for succeeding quarters were found to exceed greatly supplies available. When an effort was exerted to cut back the requests of manufacturers to existing supplies, the code used to identify the uses to which the metals were put proved not sufficiently detailed to make reasonable decisions. Arbitrary cutbacks in requests from different manufacturers soon had to be revised, and an increasing number of special cases developed requiring individual action. The problem of enforcement also arose, as there existed no assurance, other than the fear of punitive action, that the manufacturer would use the metals obtained for the purposes stated in his application. Within a short period the conclusion became evident that a balanced war program could not be achieved under this plan.

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D. CONTROLLED MATERIALS PLAN

The failure of the Production Requirements Plan left the various war agencies in an extremely serious position. In spite of adequate way capacity, the Bureau of Ships’ programs were being delayed because of shortages of materials and components. No system yet existed to assure the production and delivery of materials and components to meet shipyard production schedules. As a result, contractors and Navy Yards were encouraged to overstate their requirements in hopes that in this manner they could obtain assurance of the availability of materials and components necessary for them to maintain a good record.

The Controlled Materials Plan, announced in November 1942, provided a means of positive control of the number and size of all var production programs and a means of coordinated schedule of these programs. To accomplish this task three major steps were required: (1) to estimate requirements, (2) to schedule production programs to determine when materials would be needed, and (3) to allot materials available according to scheduled production programs in order of their priority. Within the bureau preliminary work had been done in both the estimating and the scheduling phases. The bureau was not, however, prepared to make allotments and it did not have the detailed statistics necessary to submit estimated requirements exactly as required by the plan.

Controlled Materials Plan was based on the assumption that by control of the three basic "bottleneck" materials in the war economy, aluminum, copper, and carbon and alloy steel, positive control could be obtained over

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production programs. Specific controls were instituted from time to time in other critical areas, but from November 1942 to the end of the war, the major controls were in terms of the three basic materials.

In general, the controlled materials requirements were computed by using bills of material, which listed the critical materials and components going into approved end-products. Such bills of material indicated what materials were required; by developing prototype erection schedules, it became possible to estimate when materials would be required for any specific end-product.

This procedure served in the estimating of all purely Navy products such as ships or major items of equipment. However, certain products with the common characteristic of being made normally for wide distribution from a catalog or shelf and used for many different purposes were placed in a special category and called "CLASS B PRODUCTS". Preparation of Controlled material requirements for these products centered in the War Production Board rather than the Bureau of Ships. The Bureau simply advised the War Production Board of the approximate quantity of the products required.

The Bureau of Ships’ estimates were submitted to the Office of Procurement and Material which in turn submitted to the War Production Board total Navy requirements. The War Production Board then prepared estimates of total anticipated supply of each controlled material and determined on the basis of total supply and demand the allotment each claimant agency

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could have. When the allotment vas made to the Navy through the Office of Procurement and Material, the latter would in turn transmit to the Bureau of Ships its share of the total Navy allotment.

The Bureau of Ships then made allotments to its contractors, who would, in turn, pass on some portion of their allotment to their subcontractors. Modifications made necessary by changes in the program were sometimes met by revisions in schedules or might, in case of an emergency, be met by dipping into a reserve fund maintained for such purposes. In extreme cases it was possible to reopen the basic allotment made by the Requirements Committee of the War Production Board and divert steel and other controlled material from one claimant agency to another.

The actual operation of the Controlled Materials Plan in the Bureau of Ships can best be described by the reproduction of three memoranda prepared at the end of the war by the sections responsible for major portions of the task. These memoranda are reproduced in full in view of the importance of material controls and of experience in this respect during World War II.

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Operation of Controlled Materials Plan 1

FOREWARD

The Controlled Materials Plan has been under the direction of the War Production Board. Any future use of the following information presupposes the re-establishment of the Controlled Materials Plan for the distribution of scarce materials among war contractors and civilian manufacturers.

All records, files, correspondence and related material assembled by the Bureau during the operation of the plan have been placed in storage through Code 230c.

Code 230c stands ready to produce any of this material and has been furnished a complete list or index of the boxes so stored.

CONCLUSIONS AMD RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In summarising, certain recommendations are in order if advantage is to be taken of the experience gained during the operation of the Controlled Materials Plan. Detailed description has purposely been avoided, since it is felt that any future plan would have to be worked out on an entirely new basis. Enough information has been included to give a concise picture of the overall operation of functions handled by the section. In general it is thought that the organization in effect during the last year was excellent and no major changes are contemplated or recommended in this report.

2. During the almost three years the Controlled Materials Plan was in operation there were numerous changes in organization and method. Most of these changes were beneficial in that they resulted in simplified procedures, smaller personnel, and a closer relationship among related sections. Below is a summary of recommendations which seem pertinent at this time.

(a) Military rank of officers selected should be commensurate with the tasks performed. The section head should be of the rank of commander and the sub-section leaders should be lieutenant-commanders.

 

1 This section prepared by Lieutenant Commander M. C. Mundell, USNR, CMP. Estimates and Allotments Section of the Raw Materials Group.

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Rank is especially important in dealing with field personnel.

(b) Field activities should be thoroughly indoctrinated and re-educated when personnel changes are made. Much of our trouble was due to shifting of personnel and the failure of topside to attach sufficient importance to the work being done.

(c) There should be much closer liaison with those codes making plans for ship construction, changes in design, and changes in the programming or rate of productions. Otherwise the material situation is apt to receive only slight consideration,

(d) Field staffs should be called in to give advice when major changes in procedures or directives are contemplated. This method was followed to a degree and was found to be conducive to securing cooperation and to the discovery of problems not known to Bureau officers.

(e) It is recommended that some one person be assigned the task of becoming thoroughly familiar with the voluminous regulations, directives, interpretations, et cetera, issued by the War Production Board so that prompt application to naval problems might be made. This duty should probably fall to the assistant of the section head.

(f) Every attention should be given to the elimination of forms, reports, records and red tape of all kinds. It should be remembered that field activities are strictly limited in the number and quality of personnel, hence no undue burden should be placed on them.

(g) Personnel should always be restricted to the number actually needed to do the job. No 'boondoggling' or 'make work' propositions should be countenanced. At maximum there might be seventy-five people needed to carry on the functions as outlined in this report.

(h) Most field audits should be conducted jointly with OP&M. Such a procedure eliminates duplication of visits and materially speeds up the job since the Bureau representatives are thoroughly familiar with the peculiarities of each field office.

HISTORY

3. Previous to the entry of the United States into World War II, it became obvious that controls over material and restrictions of production were necessary if maximum essential production for preparedness and for war were to be obtained.

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Various types of relatively mild controls were instituted, all of which were beneficial only to the degree to which they were effective. When the situation became more critical the plan known as the Production Requirements Plan was put into operation. The chief feature of the Production Requirements Plan was its system of priorities by means of which preferences or priorities were issued in bands and theoretically on the basis of need.

In 1942 it became evident that PRP was doomed, largely because so many top priorities had been issued and, as a result, had become meaningless and impotent in securing the preference for which they were designed. As a result it was patently necessary to establish a system of controls which would rigidly and effectively control the use of strategic and vital materials. So the Controlled Materials Plan was born.

The Controlled Materials Plan was founded on certain basic concepts which had been gleaned from previous attempts and failures. One concept was that it was unnecessary to control each and every material. The three most critical and most widely used major metals, steel, copper and aluminum were selected for control, though other metals and materials continued subject to other controls.

It was thought that in general the flow of nearly all strategic materials could be gauged by the activity of the three, due to the interrelationship of construction and manufacturing processes. A second concept was that total production or supply of the controlled materials could be fairly accurately determined—though the problem was extremely complex when it came to estimating mill capacity in all the various shapes and forms of the metals. Obviously it did no one any good to have unbalanced mill production and the more decreasing of one form or shape did not necessarily increase another in short supply. A third concept was that the demand picture could be determined by bringing together all known major elements on the demand side. To this and there were established the various Claimant Agencies, of which the Navy was one. The whole plan was organized under the jurisdiction of the War Production Board. It is not necessary here to delve into the magnitude and complexity of that organization, since the plan is clearly set forth in the records and regulations of that agency. It is sufficient to know that WPB at all times had full authority.

Quarterly estimates of need were prepared by the claimant agencies and submitted to WPB. There the accumulated demand was analyzed and compared with available supply. The available supply was apportioned out to the Claimant Agencies

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and they in turn allocated amounts to their own organizations for allotment to manufacturers and consumers.

The Navy operation was organized on the established bureau system under the control and direction of the Office of Procurement and Material. The Bureau of Ships frequently required the major portion of the Navy's share and was always one of the largest in the Bureau group. Within the Bureau of Ships there was an early distinction between the material needs for electronics and ship construction and repair. Consequently two separate organizations were established. This report deals entirely with the construction, repair, maintenance and conversion of ships, excluding electronic material.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

The Chief of the Bureau of Ships appointed a Controlled Materials Officer in the Shipbuilding Division and in turn the Scheduling and Statistics section was designated to include the Controlled Materials Plan. In the fall of 1942 officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel were procured and placed in three major operating sections in Scheduling and Statistics. There were: (1) Scheduling, (2) Estimating and (3) Allotting. Scheduling was a highly important section but is only indirectly related to the subject of this report. Estimating was, of course, a major function in the operation of the Controlled Materials Plan and approximately 200 people were first employed developing the necessary data. Allotting was the other major function and something over 100 persons were first employed in this work.

As first conceived and carried out the plan envisaged numerous complexities of operation. The Bureau lacked factual data as to the metal content of ships and components built, building, or proposed. Bills of material were not available for the hundreds of components which now incorporated in a ship. Shipyards were being established all over the country in areas where ship construction was almost completely foreign. Lead time was something everyone talked about but few understood and which varied immensely from yard to yard even when the same type of ship was involved. No one knew just which manufacturers were operating under Navy Procurement—even addresses were unknown. As a result of the hundreds of conflicting problems and situations it was little wonder that CMP was frequently known as "Confusion Made Permanent".

Gradually order began to appear out of the chaos. Procedures were developed; field instructions prepared; bills of material procured; forms designed, redesigned and simplified; organizational changes made; definitions and clarifications obtained; and, in general a harmonious smoothly working unit was operating in an efficient manner,

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In 1944 a reorganization was effected which did much to unify and improve the operation of the plan in the Bureau of Ships, The Estimating and Allotting sections were combined and placed in the "Raw Materials Section". Due to simplifications and knowledge previously gained it was possible to reduce personnel to approximately 65. This organization continued until the end of CMP and was generally thought of as being a closely integrated and effective unit. The organization chart included with this report, enclosure (C), is basically the same as the one in operation at the end of the war.

FUNCTIONAL OPERATION

5. As mentioned above, the major functions of the CMP section were estimating and allotting. There were other related functions which, though of a minor nature, were nonetheless highly important. Immediately below is an outline which depicts the functional operation. Following the outline is a discussion of each function but arranged on an organizational basis rather than with exact regard to the function.

I. Allotting of Controlled Materials

1. To component manufacturers.

2. To naval activities for hull construction and repair.

(a) Consuming activities - i.e. Navy Yards

(b) Disbursing activities - i.e. Supervisors of Shipbuilding.

(c) Minor activities - i.e. Industrial Managers, etc.

II. Estimating

1. For Components Requirements.

2. For Hull Requirements.

III. Record Keeping

IV, Classification of Components

1. To determine claimant agency cognizance.

2. To determine CMP category.

V. Bills of Material and Special Reports

1. Bills of Material

2. Hull Steel Progress Report

3. Plate and Sheet Report

4. Special Battle Damage and Repair Materials Report.

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COMPONENT ESTIMATES, ALLOTMENTS, CLASSIFICATION AND RECORDS

GENERAL:

6. The component sub-section is responsible for estimating CMP allotment requirements for Bureau of Ships Special Navy Products, as defined and listed in enclosure (B), and for Government Furnished Controlled Materials and Glass "A" Products. The sub-section is also responsible for the issuance of CMP allotments to manufacturers of these products. An additional function involves the CMP classification of all Bureau procurement. The organization, complement and detailed operations are summarized in the following paragraphs, and are. based upon the actual history of the section so as to indicate the average organizational set-up which could be adopted at some future date should the need arise,

ORGANIZATION OF COMPONENT ESTIMATING & ALLOTTING:

7. The organization of the sub-section is set forth in enclosure (C). The organization and complement is quite similar to that which existed toward the end of World War

II but is set up to meet the peak-load of a shipbuilding program under full swing. The officers should be men of considerable business experience, since this has proved to be a most important asset in dealing direct with manufacturers. The engineers should also have business experience, if possible, but in any case should have a good background in mechanical engineering, ship construction and manufacturing processes. The officers and engineers are the only personnel which need be selected for their particular training and background.

The marine engineer in charge of CMP classification is the civilian supervisor and assistant head of the section. He should, in addition to the qualities described above, have a thorough knowledge of the organization of the Navy and the Bureau and be familiar with all the parts and materials that go into ship construction. His unit reviews all Bureau procurement to apply proper CMP classification and CMP instructions and should be authority to hold up such procurement when it is not in accordance with CMP.

The unit also keeps the estimating and allotting units currently advised of all new procurement. The unit is also liaison with other Bureaus, the Central Navy CMP Office and other government agencies on matters of CMP jurisdiction, classification and procedures.

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The control desk maintains control records for all CMP allotment applications and bills of material. CMP-4A applications for material are numbered and placed in individual manila folders and thereafter copies of all correspondence, supplementary applications and allotment documents relating to the same contract or group of contracts are maintained in the same folder. Thus the entire history of each allotment case is available in one place. The control desk also maintains numerical and alphabetical cross index files on all applications and bills of material, permanent files and a current mailing list of manufacturers.

The estimating and allotting units are the actual operating groups of the section. Each is responsible for a number of the component programs specified in enclosure (B). Division of programs between units is based upon such factors as: knowledge of unit personnel concerning specific components, technical desk cognizance (so that only one unit contacts each technical desk), and relative estimating and allotting workload involved in various programs. The work of each of the estimating and allotting units is essentially the same, differing only with respect to the components handled and such varying methods as may be necessary because of the peculiarity of such components. The functions of component estimating and allotting, although closely related and complementary, are actually carried on separately and are so described in the following paragraphs.

COMPONENT ESTIMATING:

8. The fact that the Bureau's estimates of its CMP allotment requirements must be prepared three to four months in advance of the quarter involved creates many difficulties in accurately estimating component requirements. New ship construction programs planned well in advance are relatively long but programs quickly planned and executed and repair and maintenance requirements are difficult to estimate because of long component lead times and a general lack of long term procurement or planning. Subject to these difficulties and continually changing programs and procurement, the following procedure is followed:

Specific lists of each Bureau of Ships Special Navy Products and Government Furnished Class "A" Products and Controlled Materials are prepared for each vessel in the building program. Prototype Bills of Material are then obtained from representative manufacturers for each such component. Then, using Basic List "A" or similar report

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giving estimated keel laying and completion dates for each vessel, component requirements are calculated by applying the applicable bills of materials to the authorised production schedule of the manufacturer involved. Where production schedules are not available, the Component Percentage Schedule showing the percentage before completion that each individual component is required at the building yard is used. When CMP-4A applications covering the production schedule have been received and approved actual allotment figures are used in preference to the theoretical estimate. Component requirements for each ship program are then forwarded to the main estimating section for consolidation with hull requirements.

Maintenance requirements for components must be largely projected from an analysis of previous allotment data shoving issues for this purpose during previous quarters and from an analysis of such actual or planned procurement for maintenance purposes during the quarter involved as may be available. Experience has indicated that previous allotment data is the most reliable guide since procurement for maintenance purposes is modified from day to day in accordance with the needs of the fleet. It is pointed out in this connection that it has usually been necessary to make supplementary requests for allotments during each quarter to cover unexpected maintenance programs,

The marine engineer in each unit is primarily responsible to the unit head for preparation of the specific lists, adequacy of the bills of material and layout of each estimate. The clerks of the unit actually do the scheduling out of requirements under his supervision.

COMPONENT ALLOTTING:

9. The policy of processing requests for component allotments in the same unit responsible for preparing the estimate for the program involved was found to be the best procedure for accurate and prompt action since all requests and estimates may thus be cross-checked by those most familiar with the program. Each request is first checked for proper CMP classification and cognizance. The manufacturer's production schedule is then checked against this authorized schedule as determined by the scheduling section, the Component Percentage Schedule and/or contract. The production schedule is also weighed as to its practicability in relation to ability to procure material and in relation to his production capacity. Upon determination that his production schedule is correct the applicable bill of materials is

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PROVING GROUNDS OF THE CONTROLLED MATERIAL PLAN

Bethlehem Steel Company, Hingham, Mass.. 1945 L. East.

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checked against it to determine if the proper materials, quantity and lead times have been requested. The Technical Desks, Ship Type Desks, Scheduling Section and Raw Materials Section may lend valuable aid in processing difficult cases.

If the request is deemed unreasonable the manufacturer is contacted by letter, dispatch or telephone by the individual handling the case to determine proper corrections.

The successful processing of allotment requests depends to a large degree on good business judgment, speed of action, and friendly, helpful cooperation between the Bureau and the manufacturer.

RECORD KEEPING:

10. The Record Keeping Section had a staff of ten people as follows: one person as the administrative head of the section, one CAF-6 as supervisor, four bookkeeping machine operators, and two clerks for checking and auditing, one distribution machine operator and one file clerk. It is thought that similar personnel would be sufficient to handle any reasonable volume of work.

The records included one master control, called CMP Summary Control, which showed the amount of each controlled material designated to the Bureau from OP&M and also the amounts allotted by the Bureau to manufacturers and field activities. This control gave a daily balance of the actual amount of material left for distribution. The Summary Control was used as the basis for most of the reports made up for either the Bureau or for OP&M on Bureau allotments.

A separate control was kept for each of the breakdowns of allotments: i.e. Component Programs, Ship Programs, Disbursing Naval Activities, and Consuming Naval Activities. The postings to these controls included the regular allotments by the Bureau to manufacturers and field activities and also the Budget Estimates on Component Programs as set up by the Bureau and all allotments used ,by naval activities or reallotted by them to consumers.

The individual ledgers were the break-down of the various controls and the information for posting to these ledgers was the same as on the controls.

The allotments to the Bureau were received on documents directly from OP&M. All component allotment and budget estimate documents were received from the Component Section

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of CMP. Documents showing the allotments to all field activities were sent to the record-keeping section from the Hull Allotting Section. The weekly reports of allotments by the field activities were sent in from the field directly to the record-keeping section.

All postings to ledger cards were done on regulation book-keeping and accounting machines with journal sheet attachments. These journal sheets were checked daily for accuracy in posting.

The individual ledgers were checked against the corresponding controls semi-monthly in preparation for the reports. The postings to the summary control were also verified at the same time.

The weekly reports of allotments and balances sent to the Bureau from the field activities were always verified with the Bureau records, and any discrepancies were immediately investigated and the necessary corrections were made to either the Bureau’s records or field activities' records as necessary.

Reports made by the record-keeping section were as follows: Daily Report of CMP Summary Balances for the Bureau use; Bi-weekly Analysis of Allotments for the Bureau use; Semi-monthly Report of Allotments to OP&M; and the Quarterly Report of Ship Summary Program for OP&M.

Prom time to time audits of the records were made by representatives of OP&M and WPB.

HULL ESTIMATES, ALLOTMENTS, BILLS OF MATERIAL AND FIELD REPORTS

GENERAL:

11. The Hull Sub-Section is responsible for estimating CMP allotment requirements for controlled materials used in the Hull construction and repair of naval vessels. Also, it is the function of the sub-section to issue CMP allotments to Navy yards, to supervisors of shipbuilding for further extension to private shipyards, and possibly to certain minor naval activities. It was found necessary to procure certain informational reports from the various shipyards and naval activities so the analyzing and summarizing of such reports was included in the unit responsible for bills of material. The detailed operations are briefly

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described in the following paragraphs. Statements made previously in this report regarding qualifications and types of personnel apply to all personnel and hence are not repeated.

ORGANIZATION OF HULL ESTIMATING & ALLOTTING:

12. Enclosure (C) sets forth the proposed organization of this sub-section. The proposed plan is almost identical to the actual organization used in World War II. One difference might be noted, to wit: that officer personnel

Is about one rank higher. It has been found from experience that officers dealing with field activities do so much more effectively if they have a close, first hand knowledge of the organization, methods, procedures and personnel in the field. This entails much traveling and since the visiting officer must issue instructions, audit records, and review procedures it is thought that his rank should command respect commensurate with his responsibilities.

In organizing the work of the sub-section it has been determined that a functional basis was the most desirable. However, there was at all times a very close relationship among the various units and the personnel of the units so as to achieve a homogeneous and harmonious operation. The functions were: (1) estimating, (2) allotting, and (5) bills of material and field reports.

The estimating group prepared estimates for the Bureau which shoved the total CMP requirements. The work was largely that of contracting and expanding bills of material and then scheduling out the requirements for the various programs. A more detailed description is included in paragraph 13. By using information available in the allotting units it was found that the theoretical statistical estimates could be adjusted to obtain a much more practical and accurate estimate .

The hull allotting function was divided up into three units based on a territorial distribution of shipyards and naval activities. For convenience and for an equitable division of the work it was found that the east coast made up one area, the central states a second area and the west coast the third area. If necessary these units could he further subdivided. Some consideration was given to organizing on a ship type basis which would allow a certain amount of specialization but would have the disadvantage of continual overlapping in those yards building more than one type of vessel.

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The bills of material unit had as its major activity the procuring and study of hull bills. On occasion this unit would prepare a bill of material which could be used pending the receipt of the prototype from the building yard or the design agent. Also, this unit prepared reports for distribution and use in the Bureau which were based on data submitted by shipyards such as the Hull Steel Progress Report, the Plate and Sheet Report, and the Bureau of Ships Special Battle Damage and Repair Materials Report.

HULL ESTIMATING:

13. The primary function of this group was the computation and assembly of the estimates of material requirements for the Bureau of Ships CMP Reports. The procedures employed in making the estimates varied from the first CMP Report on 2 December 1945 and the last, No. 11, on 14 July 1945. Since the procedures established during the last three reports provided satisfactory only those methods will be discussed.

Material requirements were calculated from two sources, the Hull and Components, for all ships in the Building and Planning Programs. In addition to the requirements for new obstruction it was necessary to include Conversions, Repairs and Maintenance, and Lend Lease. The estimates for these programs were submitted by those units having cognizance over them.

In general, the procedure employed in making an estimate was as follows:

 (a) Basic A, Official Ships Program, issued by Code 1835 at the beginning of each Quarter was the basis for ships to be included in the estimate. This list of ships by type and Program contained the necessary data for scheduling requirements including keel, launching and completion dates. All ships with a completion date prior to the first month of the Quarter to be estimated were eliminated. The building period of a ship, for estimating purposes, is the time lapse from "Pre-Keel", "Keel to Launching", and "Launching to Completion", This period was calculated for all ships in the estimate by type and Program number.

(b) Prototype Bill of Materials was a Summary Bill of Materials received generally from the Building Yard and represented one ship's worth of materials, distributed by months over the building period of the ship. Hull requirements

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were calculated by scheduling all similar type vessels on the prototype bill of material basis. Frequently the building period on the Prototype had to be adjusted to agree with a specific ship's building period. Tables were prepared expanding and contracting the keel to completion portion of the building periods from 5 to 40 months, these were known as "Conversion Factors" and were applied to the Prototype Bill of Materials. The factors were calculated by distributing the original building period over the required number of months, on a percentage basis. Copies of the conversion factor tables have been placed in the CMP permanent files. After the correct Prototype Bill of Materials was made for each ship the requirements were scheduled on Yard Sheets.

(c) Yard Sheets were prepared for each ship in the Building Program. They contained the pertinent data for the ship, the Building Yard, Ship Program, Prototype, Keel, Launching and Completion dates, allotment record as well as Hull Steel receipts.

It was possible to consult these yard sheets for the status of a ship and the allotment records were compared to the estimated requirements and steel receipts. In some quarters these yard sheets reached a total of 70,000. From these yard sheets a Yard Summary was prepared for the hull allotment group. The totals were adjusted by that group to recognize the allocations of materials granted by the Bureau. These yard sheets were also adjusted to agree with building program changes contained In Logs issued between Basic Lists A.

(d) Summary Work Sheets were prepared providing for summation by material, ship program and summary program for hull and components. The final Hull figures as approved by the allotment unit were transferred to these work sheets.

(e) Component requirements were calculated in the Component group by component, but were summated

by Ship Program and Summary Program in the estimating unit. Factors were added to the totals to provide for components not covered in the estimate. These requirements were transferred to the work sheets and the hull and component requirements, added.

(f) The final tables were examined carefully by the officers in charge and any necessary adjustments made. Stencils were cut and the final copies assembled and submitted to OP&M for inclusion in the Navy's estimate to the War Production Board.

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(g) A complete set of Prototype Bills of Materials was made up after the issuance of CMP No. 11, and published in book form (see enclosure (B)). An attempt was made to include a Prototype Ship Summary Bill of Material for most types and sizes of vessels. The Component Bills of Materials were added to hull requirements resulting in the total requirements for one ship's worth of controlled materials.

HULL ALLOTTING:

14. The method of issuing allotments for hull materials was entirely different than that followed by the component allotting group. Hull allotments were extended to relatively few activities whereas component allotments were made directly to many hundreds of manufacturers. Supervisors of Shipbuilding were designated as one group of the "Supervising Naval Activities" and were given wide powers in the issuance of allotments to the private shipyards under their cognizance. For record keeping purposes the Supervisors of Shipbuilding were known as "Disbursing Naval Activities" because their function was to extend but not actually use any of the allotments issued to them. Actual issuance of the allotment was made by the private shipyard. Similarly, Navy Yards were known as "Consuming Naval Activities" because they actually used the materials in building and repairing ships. No allotments were made to private yards for repair of naval vessels. By agreements, the Coordinator of Ship Repair and Conversion located at 11 Broadway, New York, acting as an office under the Maritime Commission, made all allotments to private yards for the repair and conversion of naval vessels. However, all allotting activities for battle damage, repair and conversion work done in navy yards was handled by the Bureau.

Private shipyards submitted their requests for allotments to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, who, after thoroughly screening the requests as to quantity and quarter, summarized them and forwarded a form "Q" to the Bureau,

Many requests and authorizations were made by telephone, and by dispatch so as to not delay material procurement. All supervising naval activities including navy yards, were permitted to maintain a balance of unissued allotments so as to take care of small transactions and to reduce the paper work. Balances were watched closely by the Bureau so as to prevent undue attrition. Also, navy yards were requested to submit monthly requirements for repair and battle damage

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since it was possible for them to expend the major portion of their allotment with the Supply Department by withdrawing needed materials from the "Navy Controlled Material Warehouses" established in each yard.

Requests for material authorizations, when received by the Bureau, were examined as closely as possible to prevent excessive procurement both as to quantity and as to time. Close cooperation and assistance from the various field activities made this procedure relatively successful with the exception of one program, the LVT’s. This exception was largely due to the constantly vacillating program of construction, changes in building yards, and spares procurement. All yards had a natural tendency to procure too much material and to request delivery prior to actual need.

This tendency, unless held in check, would, of course, defeat the whole plan of material control.

One of the complicating factors in the control of allotments to shipyards was the "Central Procurement Agency".

In the larger shipbuilding programs it was necessary to coordinate material purchasing for the various yards involved by appointing one yard or some firm, generally the design agent or lead yards, to act as purchasing agent for certain common materials and components. Usually the plans were executed in an efficient manner but it was almost impossible to determine the validity of specific requests for allotments. Again the best answer seems to be a very close and cordial relationship with the agency or yard involved so that adequate information and satisfactory explanations maybe obtained.

Weekly reports were required from all naval activities covering their receipt and issuance of allotments. These reports were accompanied by duplicate copies of the allotting documents. It was from these reports that the Bureau was able to coordinate its records with those in the field. The allotting desks maintained "desk records" with each of their activities and these records established a material control as well as a ship program breakdown by building yard. These "desk records" were not the official records but served a very useful purpose in checking the official records and in furnishing exact information as to the amount of material used in each yard on each type of ship - a classification not readily obtainable from the machine bookkeeping records. All field units were required to maintain a uniform system of accounts. A few variations were permitted where it appeared to be necessary or desirable but no deviation was permitted in submitting adequate weekly reports. Periodic audits of field accounts were made by officers from-OP&M, WPB and by cognizant Bureau allotment officers. The main difficulty

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encountered was in the frequently changing personnel of field organizations.

As described in paragraph 13 the information concerning the allotments extended to the various ship programs in the shipyards was used in preparing the estimated requirements for future quarters. This information was supplemented by obtaining informal estimates of future requirements from the various naval activities once each quarter. There was, therefore, a close coordination within the sub-section of related functions.

BILLS OF MATERIAL & FIELD REPORTS:

15. When the Controlled Materials Plan was inaugurated the Bureau of Ships lacked adequate factual data as to the material content of naval vessels both as to hull and components. Steps were immediately taken to secure from ship builders and design agents the necessary hull bills of material which would show the quantities of controlled materials needed and the distribution of those materials over the construction period of the prototype ships. There were many problems which had to be solved both in the Bureau and in almost every building yard before satisfactory bills could be compiled and submitted. Eventually, however, there was available a series of bills of material which could be described as satisfactory though subject to continual changes due to modifications in ship construction, design changes, changes in yard methods, improvements in material usage and many other factors. It should be remembered that World War II brought out many types of ships designed for special purposes and that these ships required immense quantities of material in their construction. As the bills of material were received they were examined closely by competent engineers. Studies were conducted to determine accuracy and on occasion the building yards were required to review their findings.

From time to time it was found necessary to request information of various kinds from ship yards and navy yards. This information was usually formalized in report form. One such report was the "Hull Steel Progress Report". Yards were requested to submit monthly, by hull number, the amount of steel required per hull, received, fabricated and erected. Such information was valuable in making comparisons with other progress reports, in comparing requirements with bills of material, and in determining if the yard might be procuring materials in advance of actual need which would mean depriving some other yard of material when needed. Thus mill schedules could be adjusted if necessary.

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A second field report found very useful during critical months was the "Status of Steel Plate and Sheet Orders". This report showed the amounts of carbon plate, carbon sheet, high tensile plate, and special treatment plate which had been rolled for each hull, the amount scheduled for mill rolling during future months and finally the amounts not on mill schedules. Hence, it was possible to ascertain points at which mill schedules were likely to become overloaded, and it was also possible to locate points at which shifts in mill schedules could be made. This juggling of mill schedules by the material expediters in the Raw Materials Section was one of the features of the Bureau’s shipbuilding program. Expediting was given substantial assistance from these field reports.

The third major report handled by this subsection was known as the "Battle Damage and Repair Report" or more commonly as "B.D.&R.". All navy yards and certain other activities which stocked Bureau of Ships special materials submitted quarterly reports to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts showing the receipt, transfer, use and remaining balance of each item of material by stock number. These reports were forwarded to the Bureau of Ships for summarizing and analyzing. Some of the controlled materials so reported were boiler tubes, condenser tubes, certain refrigeration products or materials, and ballistic steel plates whose thickness was three inches or less. Another material, shipboard cable, was obtained from a report submitted to the Electrical Section. The Bureau prepared a condensed report for OP&M from this basic data.

Much of the inventory control work was evolved from such reports. Many discrepancies were discovered both in the Bureau and in the field. Material procurement methods were improved but probably the greatest improvement was the initiation of a complete rejuvenation and remodeling of field and Bureau material records.

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PROPOSED ORGANIZATION CHART CMP SECTION

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CODE 1847

CHART XII

TABULATION SHOWING BY QUARTERS, CONTROLLED MATERIAL ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS, PEAK ALLOTMENTS BY THE BUREAU OF SHIPS, AND PEAK ALLOTMENTS TO THE BUREAU BY O.P.&M.

4Q43

1Q44

2Q44

3Q44

4Q44

2Q45

MATERIAL #1 (Carbon Steel)

CMP Report of Estimates (Tons)

660,000

800,000

800,000

890,000

850,000

640,000

340,000

300,000

Peak Allotment by Bureau for Quarter

685,000

900,000

1,030,000

910,000

780,000

510,000

360,000

280,000

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

687,000

900,000

1,030,000

920,000

785,000

515,000

340,000

280,000

MATERIAL #2 (Alloy Steel)

CMP Report of Estimates (Tons)

187,500

200,000

210,000

230,000

240,000

185,000

107,500

100,000

Peak Allotment by Bureau for Quarter

190,000

205,000

240,000

235,000

200,000

140,000

105,000

92,500

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

192,500

207,500

245,000

240,000

232,500

200,000

107,500

92,500

MATERIAL #3 (Brass Mill Copper, Base Alloy (Sheet & Strip))

CMP Report of Estimates (000 Lbs)

4,050,000

5,850,000

5,850,000

4,200,000

5,550,000

6,450,000

3,750,000

2,200,000

Peak Allotment by Bureau for Quarter

5,175,000

5,100,000

4,950,000

3,900,000

6,075,000

4,275,000

2,550,000

1,960,000

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

5,500,000

5,200,000

5,100,000

4,200,000

6,150,000

4,950,000

2,625,000

2,200,000

MATERIAL #4 (Brass Mill Copper-Base Alloy (Rod, Bars & Wire)

CMP Report of Estimates (000 Lbs)

12,600,000

8,200,000

8,200,000

5,400,00

6,900,000

7,000,000

6,800,000

5,300,000

Peak Allotment By Bureau for Quarter

6,300,000

7,200,000

7,200,000

6,600,000

6,300,000

7,800,000

5,700,000

7,200,000

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

6,600,000

7,200,000

7,200,000

6,700,000

6,600,000

7,800,000

5,800,000

7,300,000

MATERIAL #5 (Brass Mill Copper-Base Alloy (Tubing & Pipe)

CMP Report of Estimates (000 Lbs)

9,100,000

16,000,000

16,000,000

13,000,000

14,100,000

12,100,000

6,800,000

5,400,000

Peak Allotment by Bureau for Quarter

12,500,000

15,850,000

14,500,000

12,500,000

11,250,000

8,000,000

6,500,000

5,500,000

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

12,500,000

16,000,000

15,000,000

13,500,000

11,500,000

9,000,000

6,750,000

6,000,000

MATERIAL #6 (Brass Mill Copper (All Ships))

CMP Report of Estimates (000 Lbs)

11,600,000

11,200,000

9,400,000

5,900,000

7,700,000

5,300,000

5,100,000

4,100,000

Peak Allotment by Bureau for Quarter

9,500,000

8,500,000

7,000,000

6,500,000

6,600,000

5,000,000

4,350,000

3,500,000

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

11,250,000

9,000,000

8,000,000

7,250,000

7,000,000

5,250,000

4,250,000

3,900,000

MATERIAL #7 (Wire Mill Products (All Ships))

CMP Report of Estimates (000 Lbs)

24,000,000

27,900,000

26,900,000

24,600,000

24,900,000

20,400,000

10,400,000

7,300,000

Peak Allotment by Bureau for Quarter

25,000,000

25,000,000

24,500,000

24,000,000

21,000,000

21,500,000

10,000,000

5,000,000

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

26,000,000

26,000,000

25,000,000

24,500,000

21,500,000

21,600,000

10,000,000

5,000,000

MATERIAL #8 (Foundry Products (All Ships))

CMP Report of Estimates (000 Lbs)

39,000,000

42,200,000

42,600,000

42,400,000

43,500,000

34,500,000

25,400,000

19,500,000

Peak Allotment by Bureau for Quarter

44,000,000

44,000,000

45,000,000

40,100,000

39,500,000

26,500,000

24,000,000

22,000,000

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

44,500,000

44,000,000

46,500,000

42,000,000

40,000,000

28,000,000

24,500,000

21,000,000

MATERIAL #9 (Aluminum)

CMP Report of Estimates (000 Lbs)

15,500,000

17,200,000

14,800,000

17,700,000

19,400,000

16,800,000

13,500,000

12,100,000

Peak Allotment by Bureau for Quarter

13,500,000

13,500,000

15,600,000

17,500,000

17,750,000

14,000,000

11,250,000

11,850,000

OP&M Allotment to Bureau as of Peak Date

13,750,000

16,000,000

16,500,000

17,500,000

18,000,000

14,500,000

12,000,000

11,500,000

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SCHEDULING COMPONENTS FOR SHIPBUILDING AND MAINTENANCE1

1. Efficient utilization of resources requires planned operations to achieve desired goals. In a private manufacturing enterprise machines, materials and labor are articulated by management so as to yield that production which will maximize profit. A military organization, or more properly speaking - the country - fighting a war has a similar problem of planning utilization of resources; the touchstone here is not profits, but progress towards the ultimate goal - the achievement of final victory. For the Bureau of Ships the goal has been the construction and maintenance of the maximum number of vessels required by military strategy.

2. Technical skill and engineering knowledge have always been understood to be essential pre-requisites to the Bureau's accomplishment of its assigned tasks. The recent war effort has established further the necessity in an economy of scarcity, namely, the war-time economy of scheduling, if appropriate military requirements are to be met.

3. Scheduling, as far as the Bureau of Ships is concerned, is the planning, production and distribution of materials and components to achieve maximum production of the wanted end products giving due consideration to their relative urgency. Those end products include new ships, ship repairs, consignments to Lend Lease, Advanced Base and Battle Damage Spares. Discussion here is limited to components.

4. The first job of scheduling is determining what is wanted, how much of it, and when, or the more usual technical phrase "establishing requirements". The second step is to secure the availability of what is wanted in the quantities required, and the third step is to distribute them to the places they are wanted when they are needed.

5. During the war period, techniques and organizations were developed by which the aforementioned goals could be achieved. Perfection was not, nor could it have been achieved, but by the process of trial and error the Bureau did increase its effectiveness in operating to reach the desired end. It is not intended to discuss here the various steps by which procedures were evolved, techniques perfected, and organizations streamlined over the course of the past several years in the process of accumulating skill doing the Bureau's job.

1 This section prepared by Lieutenant L. M. Bernstein, USNR, Scheduling and Expediting Section of Requirements Control Group.

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A. Determining Requirements

1. The first essential in the establishment of requirements is the definition of program. In this the Bureau plays a primarily passive role, determinations being made by Operations as an integral part of military and strategic planning.

The programs as established by Operations provide the basis for the determination of requirements. Thus, the accelerated Landing Craft program in Winter 1943-44 was of a military demand for the end product - a stated number of specific types of landing craft within a certain period of time. The Bureau's job was to take the action necessary to meet this program.

(The Bureau had helped to formulate the program determination by the submission of data as to what it believed was possible of accomplishment (of which more later).

2. The responsibility for building the vessels called for by this program was assigned to various shipyards with whom contracts were placed for construction of stated numbers of vessels. This was Step One in the determination of requirements - given the military decision to build the ships, Step Two was securing from the shipbuilders estimates of when they could expect to deliver the ships. Step Three was determining what the shipbuilder needed and when in order to complete the ships as planned.

3. Specifications for the design of the vessels determined what was needed; building schedule patterns (Material Erection Schedules) determined at what stage the material was required. Application of the Material Erection Schedules to estimated completion dates told the Bureau when the material was needed.

4. The Bureau published Basic List "A" which contained shipbuilders' approved predictions as to keel laying, launching, and end of construction dates of individual ships in each of the Bureau's construction and conversion programs.

This Basic List "A" is the keystone in the establishment of requirements, since it is towards the meeting of these dates particularly the predicted end of construction date that scheduling activity is directed.

3. For each class of new ship construction and programmed conversions Materiel Erection Schedules were prepared, listing the stage of completion at which each of the principal classes of components should be received in the building yard to permit orderly construction. To the largest possible extent, individual builder's production planning or order of performing various construction jobs, and installing given pieces of equipment were re-adjusted to conform to these Material Erection Schedules. Initially, they were developed in conference

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CRANEWAYS AND BUILDING WAYS, BROWN SHIPBUILDING CO., NOBS - 421, NEG. No. 93, AUGUST 8, 1942 The end result of planning, scheduling, and controls... The shipyard and its new construction.

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with the interested activities in which compromise between various erection techniques was effected to facilitate the establishment of standardized or more or less mass production techniques. It should be clear that the stage of construction for a given item was not the point beyond which non-receipt would mean an equivalent delay in completion of the vessel, but rather the desirable date for orderly construction.

6. By applying the Material Erection Schedules or schedules of required dates to the key dates contained in Basic "A", individual actual required dates for each vessel is obtained. The Bureau did this by mechanical methods for all of the percentage or lead factors (scale readings) for each of the ships in the Basic "A", and published them in

a document called Component Percentage Schedule. This provided a handbook of all required dates to be used in scheduling any components for vessels in the building and conversion program.

7. Maintenance requirements are not so readily determined as are those for the construction and conversion programs. Projection of previous usage factors provides some objective basis for formulating requirements, but it does not have the defensability of requirements based on vessel completion dates. Actual Battle Damage requirements are unambiguous, but estimates of future Battle Damage needs, and replenishment. spare parts requirements are necessarily a combination of various statistical factors any of which might be subject to a different weighting. In final analysis, maintenance requirements during a non-stable period must necessarily be estimates.

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B. Securing Production

1. With the Landing Craft as with any other program, the second basic step is securing the production of the required quantity of material and components at the time they are needed. The WPB 3003 Form, developed during 1943, provided the tool by which requirements were summarized in terms of number of units per month for each program. This then furnished manufacturers with a production goal for the Bureau's end use. Total units purchased under a given contract were set forth as required to be shipped at a stated rate, the manufacturer being requested to so plan his production as to complete those units as required.

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2. Properly speaking, the VPB 3003 Form is a tool for summarizing open orders on the manufacturer's order board identifying those orders with prime Bureau contracts and Navy programs, establishing requirements for those contracts to meet the requirements of the program and summarizing production plans against those contracts. For a 100% Bureau plant, all production is available to meet the Bureau's requirements; in other plants other Navy programs and programs of other claimant agencies had to be satisfied out of available production capacity.

3. When the manufacturer's total production capacity was adequate and he had no material or sub-component difficulties, he could schedule his production so as to meet all requirements served on him. In other words, his planned schedule and his actual shipments would correspond to the statement of requirements. In such a case securing production (once contracts were placed) was simply a matter of stating requirements.

4. The usual situation during war-time conditions, however, is inability to meet all requirements, at least initially. Under these conditions positive and vigorous action is required to secure production. Such action will include the following:

[a. Expansion of total production capacity where this is insufficient.

b. Increased flow of critical sub-components and/or materials where lack thereof were determining or contributing to failure to meet requirements.

c. Recruitment of necessary labor, technical and otherwise where insufficient labor force is a factor in failure to meet requirements.

5. Remedies listed above are applicable within a given industry. Thus if a given plant cannot meet requirements, but other plants in the industry can, then the needs of a program could be filled from more than one plant. If an industry as a whole cannot meet total requirements then expansion of the industry would be the remedy.

6. Expansion of a plant or an industry must be understood not only to include enlarging existing facilities of producers currently engaged in production of the industry's products, but also enlarging through extension of subcontracting, namely, moving certain processes previously or normally performed

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within the plants of the industry to outside organizations permitting, the industry proper to concentrate its expansion on a more limited number of processes.

7. Increasing, flow of critical sub-components and material is undertaken by the application of scheduling techniques to sub-producers in the production cycle with remedies for insufficiency of production similar to those just outlined.

8. For an individual program the technique of securing production in addition to expansion of total production, includes the diversion of production efforts from one or more programs to the program considered of greatest urgency. Complete identification of program is therefore essential to permit intelligent choice between programs. This identification necessarily must be carried down through all levels of the production chain where end use of product is distinguishable. But identification is not enough; there must be measures of relative urgency.

9. During the war various tools were provided to indicate relative urgency of programs. The development of the priority system was an overall technique of so doing. Since most of the military programs occupied the same priority band, AA-1, additional graduation of urgency was required. This was in general provided by the Production Urgency List which reported the War Production Board’s translation into priority of program of directives from Joint Chiefs of Staff. Detailed discussion of these techniques belongs properly to the framework of discussion of the priority system.

10. Allocation of limited production as between competing programs was accomplished in detail by formal or informal claimant agency conferences. While the production control agency for the economy acted as final arbiter (the WPB Industry Division), "horse trading" between representatives of the various claimants to allocate production of an industry or a particular company, has proven a practical solution to the problem. Manufacturers' order boards identified as to programs (WPB 3003 Form) formed the basis for the discussion. Obviously, readily justifiable requirements strengthen the hand of the "horse traders". Equally obviously, vigorous aggressive "horse traders" contribute to an individual claimant agency securing "a larger share of the pie".

11. Directives from CNO established for the Bureau of Ships relative urgency of programs. This, published in the form of Master Precedence List in which individual vessels within programs were assigned numbers reflecting their priority within a total program, provided Bureau of Ships with guides for

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its "horse trading". At a late stage in the war effort, the relative urgency of the various maintenance programs was integrated within the vessel precedence.

---

C. Distribution of Production

1. Where production is adequate to meet all requirements it is quite clear that distribution presents no problems; Components are delivered to programs (e.g. shipbuilders) when required. Where production is not adequate to meet all requirements, distribution in accordance with urgency of program requirements becomes essential. The Master Precedence List referred to above, provides the tool by which distribution is controlled. The basic rule developed during the war period was that where production was inadequate to meet requirements, shipments should be made in strict accordance with Master Precedence List. This was applied not only within a given program, that is, as between different shipbuilders, but between programs. In the latter situation, however, strict compliance is not possible where material is not interchangeable between programs unless decisions as to what is put into production are determined by this same guide. With the limitations imposed by economical production runs and changes in urgency during production cycle, it is not always possible to adjust production promptly to permit shipment to follow in order of precedence.

2. For convenience in adjustment, the calendar month was taken as the time period to be considered. Thus previous requirements unfilled and a current month’s requirements were arranged in accordance with precedence. This was carried forward on a monthly basis until requirements are made when due.

3. It will be apparent that distribution in accordance with rules as previously outlined, cuts across and frequently conflicts with contractual obligations, sometimes calling for deliveries in advance of contract dates, other times slowing down deliveries below that rate called for in contracts.

Where contract price is based on planned production runs, resistance may frequently be encountered to reduction of delivery below contract rate on the basis that additional costs are incurred thereby. Likewise, efforts to speed deliveries up faster than called for by contract, frequently encounters opposition, contractors objecting that such requirements exceed their commitments. Such difficulties can be obviated only if the scheduling system either implicitly or

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explicitly is incorporated within prime contracts placed by the Bureau and passed on by such prime contractors to their subcontractors.

4. Detailed action on distribution is required on critical items, components, in short, supply. For the Bureau these items were listed on the List of BuShips Scheduled Items.

---

D. Organization

1. What has been said thus far has been limited to general principles and techniques. The organization for scheduling can take various forms as has been indicated by war-time experience. Centralized control and supervision are essential to any organization for scheduling activity. Distribution of the responsibility for the actual conduct of detailed scheduling action will follow from basic policy. It is not possible to prove out of wartime experience whether centralization or de-centralization as a plan is most effective.

2. It is the writer's considered judgement, as a result of participation in the development and operation of scheduling that de-centralization should be the goal in planning the organization. In final analysis, the job must be done at the plants of the manufacturers concerned. This must be done by the field offices of the Material Inspection Service.

2. The only question then to organization is whether these offices should be told in precise detail or whether they should be given the rules and tools with which to operate and then delegated the responsibility for carrying out necessary scheduling activity. In any case there are certain activities which must be conducted at the Bureau level as well as others which must be conducted at the plant level.

4. Establishing requirements in its broader aspects is necessarily a Bureau function because the Bureau would receive program directives from Operations, and determine to what shipbuilders contracts should be awarded for construction of program. It may be pointed out here too, however, that supervising Naval activities quite properly can assist in Bureau's evaluation of the ability of individual shipyards to undertake a portion of a program. The Bureau likewise must prepare the Basic List "A" which contains all the individual

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elements in the program, and the key dates. Here again the supervising Naval activity has a responsibility in "editing" shipbuilders forecasts as to when vessels can be delivered. However, final responsibility for dates to be used must necessarily be assumed by the Bureau.

5. Material Erection Schedules are likewise a central responsibility. The conference technique, as previously indicated, is desirable in formulating appropriate erection schedules. The Bureau must be the final arbiter in reconciling conflicting views of various shipbuilders.

6. A Component Percentage Schedule, as noted previously, reports a listing of all of the individual required dates necessary for use in scheduling material for each individual ship. This, too, is a tool which the Bureau should prepare and distribute.

7. Given the Component Percentage Schedule based on the key dates in the Basic "A" and the Material Erection Schedule, any person or activity can calculate the requirements for an individual ship and a group of ships at an individual yard, or a program. Requirements on an individual manufacturer can be determined by any one with these tools, and the knowledge of what orders are placed on the manufacturers.

8. The facts on what the manufacturer is producing, and what he can produce obviously can be adequately ascertained at only the manufacturer's plant. Analysis of manufacturers’ bottlenecks and solution thereof likewise can be best done on the spot. A doctor may be able to successfully diagnose disease from a distance provided he had someone to relate the description of symptoms, but he certainly cannot perform surgery at long distance. And long distance diagnosis is fundamentally only as good as the reporter; hence, the surgeon's practice of diagnosing and treating in person. Production bottlenecks are likewise solved best at first-hand. While during the war, the Bureau did assist in solving such problems, in point of fact, personnel from Material Inspection Service did the job, guided by the Bureau of Ships personnel at a distance, but more particularly by visits to the plant.

9. Instructions as to distribution of production can be formulated in Washington or at the plant level. Actual administration of the distribution and policing of it can be done only close to the manufacturer's shipping floor.

10. Allocation of production between the different programs can be done in theory either in Washington or at the plant. Intelligent allocation can actually be undertaken only in consultation with qualified personnel representing manufacturers concerned. Even claimant agency "horse trading" conferences,

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most of which were held in Washington during the war, can be effectively carried on at the plant level. The field task committees for allocation of ICE parts late in the war effort was a recognition of this.

11. In any case, when decisions as between Navy programs and decisions as between claimant agencies have been reached, barriers must be set up to prevent parties interested in portions of the picture from engaging in expediting action which would run counter to those decisions; hence, the necessity for the frozen schedule as that was developed in 1944.

12. Manufacturers of stated critical items, submitted to the War Production Board summaries of their order boards, identified to program. These summaries included statements of requirements and manufacturer's production schedules against those requirements. Upon approval by the WPB these production schedules were frozen for stated time periods. This meant that the manufacturer was obligated to make and deliver material in accordance with the schedule as approved by the WPB.

The schedule, as approved, frequently represented a variation from the plan as submitted by him, being the result of claimant agencies - "horse trading". Once the schedule was frozen changes could take place during the freeze-period only at the direction of the WPB. Changes were directed by them, fundamentally only when justified by relative urgency of programs affected.

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SUMMARY

1. Planning for a future situation in which scheduling is necessary requires that provision be made for the following:

 a. Clearcut definition and identification of program.

b. Tools for the establishment of requirements, e.g. Basic List "A", Material Erection Schedule, Component Percentage Schedules.

c. Measures of relative urgency, e.g. Master Precedence Lists, Production Urgency Lists.

d. Production Scheduling Tools - Serving of requirements by program on manufacturer via form similar to WPB 3003 Form on which programs are identified.

e. Controlled distribution of critical items -detailed shipping schedules based on relative urgency.

f. Frozen schedules to maintain agreed upon allocation.

2. Organization wise provisions must be made for:

a. A central scheduling group in the Bureau to prepare and maintain the tools listed above and to police their use.

b. Adequately staffed field offices to carry out scheduling action in the various plants.

c. Aggressive representation on production allocation groups.

3. It will be noted that nothing has been said here about program coordinating groups. The full responsibility for a program should be assigned to one group within the Bureau. Any coordination required should be possible using Bureau personnel and facilities particularly if the other recommendations herein are effected.

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3. Raw Materials Section and Its Functions1

The Raw Materials Section was originated during 1941 as a part of the Progress Branch, Shipbuilding Division. Its responsibility was to procure and expedite Steel, Copper and its alloys, Aluminum, Lumber and Rubber.

In the middle of 1943, when the Controlled Materials Plan was established by the War Production Board for the procurement of steel, copper and its alloys, and aluminum, the Raw Materials Section was transferred to the Scheduling and Statistics Branch, where a CMP section had been established. In March 1944 the CMP section was placed under the command of the Raw Materials Section. This arrangement proved most satisfactory, as the CMP system was part of the procurement function.

The usual action of this section, regardless of product, vas to develop production sources through the War Production Board. All the officers on board were experienced from industry in the particular product they handled and had the full cooperation of the industry men at the WPB. This cooperation proved most valuable, as other Military representatives and Federal agencies did not have men of this caliber and did not get the cooperation enjoyed by this Bureau. It was found that men with a sales background were much better equipped for this type of duty than engineers and production men.

The Office of Procurement and Material set up a procedure whereby all urgent requirements of the several Bureaus had to be screened through their Material Section. Considering the requirements of all Bureaus this system was probably practical as it created a funnel through which the Navy requirements as a whole could flow and tie up with CMP allotment, which vas controlled by the Material Section of OP&M.

It is strongly recommended that in the future this Bureau insist that it have a senior officer representative on the WPB Requirements Committee or equivalent thereof; also that a BuShips representative be assigned to the Materials Section of OP&M to follow directive requests and offset the aforementioned attitude of the OP&M Material Section. This is a most important point. During the greater part of the War this Bureau consumed 75% of the total Navy Steel required and vas never permitted representation.

1This section prepared by Lieutenant Commander A. Linton Lundy, Jr., USNR, of the Raw Materials Section.

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Within the Bureau the sailing would have been much smoother had this section teen technical and had an opportunity to review all contracts as made up. A close relationship was enjoyed with the senior officers placing contracts for shipbuilding, which allowed this section to provide the necessary production capacity when needed. However, no word as to when raw materials would be required for components, equipment and Bureau furnished material, could be obtained within the Bureau. The first this section would know of a case would be after a considerable amount of time had elapsed and then the Inspector of Naval Material, Supervisor of Shipbuilding or contractor concerned would storm in with a near impossible request. Invariably, all requests for procurement and expediting were fulfilled. However, the recommendation that the Raw Material Section be made technical and placed in the Shipbuilding Division is hereby made to facilitate future operations. Further, this section would be closer to actual construction and repair if placed in the Shipbuilding Division.

One of the principal functions of this section was to regulate the flow of the quantity of material to BuShips’ Naval Activities and contractors. Each concern involved had a strong tendency to request more than was actually required for a given month.

During 1942 and 1945 the Navy Yards showed great reluctance to reduce Industrial inventories to comply with the VPB inventory restrictions. Even though the Supply Officer maintained a six months stock of comparable material the Industrial Departments were not inclined to rely upon same. Through the constant efforts of this section the industrial inventories were gradually reduced. OP&M constantly criticized this Bureau for the stocks maintained in the Industrial Departments.

After this section was convinced that the stocks were reduced to the proper working level as a whole, the Yards were required to explain the individual inventories as reported quarterly to OP&M. This breakdown, showing the purpose for which each item was being held, proved to OP&M that most individual items were within limits and held for a legitimate purpose and stopped the nagging and investigations.

Relationship with the SupShips and INM’s was very close, as the shipbuilders’ and contractors' requests for procurement or expediting came through those channels. It was found that rarely the Naval activity made a close study of the actual requirements and showed a tendency to approve the requirement as submitted, without regard to inventory or rate of yard or manufacturer production capacity.

It was necessary for the Bureau to insist that its shipbuilders submit prototypes, production and inventory reports in order to judge the amount of material actually required monthly. It is recommended that in

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the future each SupShip be compelled to assign competent authority to the duty of definitely determining the contractors' requirements during a given month. Try as this section did to keep inventories at an absolute minimum, several large inventories were uncovered at the completion of contracts that had never been reported by the SupShip or contractor.

In this regard the best estimate of Bureau owned steel left in contractors' hands at the termination of contracts amounted to only 180,000 tons of all types of steel, the bulk of which was destined for ships under construction. During the period of CMP, this Bureau was responsible for the procurement of 6,170,000 tons.

For future operation it is strongly recommended that:

(a) the Raw Materials Section be set up as a technical section.

(b) have full authority over the inspection, progressing and estimating of all raw materials.

(c) prepare contracts for these materials for Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to place, as is now done in the case of steel.

(d) be headed by a civilian who has the aggressiveness and ingenuity to keep in touch with new developments in industry and keep the Bureau abreast of the times.

(e) the Head of Section be a representative on the Army Navy Munitions Board or future equivalent thereof.

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CHAPTER XI

INSPECTION

A. SUPERVISION AND INSPECTION

The actual manufacturing of ships and equipment under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships is done in three types of industrial establishments: First, private shipyards; second, Naval shipyards; and third, general industrial facilities, by far the greater part of which are privately owned and operated. Private shipyards and general industrial establishments operating under contract with the Bureau of Ships are required to maintain certain standards as established by the bureau. It has therefore always been necessary for the Navy to maintain an inspection force in or close to principal yards and industrial establishments to make certain that the quality of the work performed would be satisfactory.

Under normal conditions and up until the emergency program starting in June 1940, Navy representatives concerned themselves primarily with purely technical inspection matters. Under the full impact of the emergency program, however, it became obvious that the Bureau of Ships would have to decentralize the work of the bureau and give to its field representatives much greater authority and responsibility including matters concerned with procurement. This program was initiated in a letter of 15 January 1941 from the Secretary of the Navy to the Chief of the Bureau

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of Ships and all Supervisors of Shipbuilding. At the same time standards of inspection were reviewed to reduce and eliminate tests that proved not essential and to encourage inspectors to use their own judgement when it would accelerate work. This change in the role of the inspector was not easily made and had to be reemphasized throughout the period of the war. A memorandum of 21 October 1943 from the Chief of the Bureau of Ships to all Supervisors of Shipbuilding and all Inspectors of Machinery concerned the subject "Responsibility and Administration of Inspection under Navy Shipbuilding Program Contracts" expressed the following situation to exist:

"It has come to the bureau's attention that in at least one case a Supervisor of Shipbuilding has assumed that even under present day conditions his responsibilities in connection with the shipbuilding program are limited to technical items, namely, compliance with approved plans and specifications for the ships under construction, and that responsibilities as to the efficient employment of the contractor's force rest solely with the company management.

This was the situation in prewar days of fixed price contracts. With the advent of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, and with the further development of renegotiation of contracts by the Price Adjustment Board it has ceased to be the case in many contracts, and it is essential, in safeguarding the Government's interests, that the Supervisor should assume some measure of responsibility that the management of the contractor shall take suitable steps to assure acceptable standards of performance in return for Government expenditures in payment of the costs incurred."

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Another statement of the role of the Supervisor is contained in the following statement sent to all Supervisors of Shipbuilding by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, 2 November 1944:

"MISSION: To get complete, well-built ships delivered as rapidly as possible at a reasonable and fair price.

1. Under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, to administer Navy shipbuilding, conversion, completion and repair contracts at those private shipbuilding yards which have been placed under the cognizance of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding; to make sure that satisfactory production is maintained and scheduled completion dates are met; to require conformance to contract terms, plans, and specifications; and to insure that Government-owned facilities are efficiently utilized and maintained, that economy is practiced, and the Government’s interests protected in the management of all contracts.

2. Under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, to inspect installations of all ordnance and fire control equipment for conformity with approved plans and specifications, and to perform such tests as are necessary to insure its proper functioning.

3. Under the direction of the Commandant, to carry out such policies and orders as may be issued concerning military and other matters under his cognizance.

TASKS AND OBJECTIVES:

1. Policy - To coordinate, interpret, and carry out the policies and instructions received from higher authority relating to this activity; and to develop and establish such supplemental policies as are required for the efficient operation of this office, and for the guidance and assistance of private contractors.

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2. Production - To advise and aid contractors so as to obtain satisfactory production and adherence to reputed completion schedules; to maintain close personal contact with the progress of work, with conditions in the shipyards, and with methods of construction, in order to anticipate problems, aid in their solution, insure maintenance of satisfactory standards of workmanship, and expedite production through avoidance of work stoppages, interruptions and delays; and to keep cognizant superior officers fully informed.

3. Manpower and Labor Problems - To help solve manpower and labor problems by working with contractors, Naval District Civilian Personnel and Labor Relations Officers, Bureau of Ships Zone Stabilization Officers, and with field representatives of the War Production Board, War Manpower Commission, U. S. Employment Service, Selective Service, and other Governmental agencies; to keep informed regarding the manpower situation in the area and in the plants being supervised; to notify the Bureau of Ships promptly whenever manpower or labor difficulties threaten to interfere with production; to use all proper means, with respect to the various contractors, to insure a properly balanced distribution at their yards between trades, and to discourage and prevent hoarding of labor, overmanning, loafing, or the undue acceleration of one phase of construction when it is evident that the delivery time of a critical component will prevent the general acceleration of the ship.

4. Cost-Consciousness - To be cost conscious; to maintain in cooperation with the contractors and the Navy Cost Inspector, and without unduly interfering with management, adequate checks and controls to insure that Government funds are being spent economically under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts or under any contract where costs in whole or in part are reimbursable by the Government; and to see, in connection with fixed-price or incentive contracts which are subject to renegotiation, that costs in general are not unreasonable.

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5. Ability and Capacity of Contractors - To report concerning the available manpower and productive capacity of shipyards, suitability of facilities for certain types of work; the ability of contractors; and to make recommendations relative to schedules, and to special contract provisions, in order to assist with the placing and terms of new orders, with negotiations, and with schedule changes under existing contracts.

6. Health and Safety - To urge contractors to adopt such recommended measures and practices concerning the health and safety of their employees as are issued by the Secretary of the Wavy, and to make periodic checks on these matters.

7. Facilities - To protect and promote Government interests by making sure that facilities provided by the Navy are effectively employed and properly identified, inventoried, used, and maintained; to see that adequate measures are taken to safeguard Government-owned buildings, equipment, material, and other property; and to make recommendations to the Bureau of Ships regarding authorization of additional facilities requested.

8. Commandant - To carry out the policies and orders of the Commandant regarding military, public relations, and other matters under his cognizance; to make necessary preliminary arrangements in connection with launching ceremonies; to commission in accordance with his instructions such vessels as may be designated.

9. Unified Command - To maintain by conferences and frequent personal inspections close contact with the personnel, facilities, and problems of all branch offices and departments under this activity, so that their inter-relationship and coordination will produce a unified command.

10. Supervision of Departments - To exercise supervision through appropriate department heads over the branch offices and the several departments

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so as to insure their efficient operation; to carry on the Navy Management Program so that sound management practices may be established throughout the activity, preventing duplication of efforts; to make every effort to do the maximum job with the minimum total personnel.

11. Personnel - To procure, assign and promote the welfare of civilian personnel in accordance with the policies and directives of the Navy Department and the Civil Service Commission, and to request necessary officers and enlisted personnel so that an adequate number of Naval and civilian personnel are available to perform effectively all required tasks; to train such personnel in their assigned duties and for greater responsibilities; to establish adequate control of overtime in excess of established office hours for Civil Service employees; to maintain active records of all personnel; and to prepare and forward civilian payrolls to the disbursing office.

12. Coordination of Personnel with Workload -To study the present and prospective workload of the Nava1 offices which comprise this activity so as to make sure that proper plans are made and carried out to coordinate the number of personnel with the amount of work; to plan for an orderly reduction of force when the need arises, in order to prevent unexpected separations and unfairness to civilian employees or retention of officers who could be used to better advantage elsewhere.

13. Morale - To stimulate a high degree of loyalty and cooperation, of initiative and discipline in the Naval and civilian personnel, and to maintain an atmosphere conducive to a frank and constructive exchange of ideas to the end that the war effort may not be lost sight of in petty or personnel jealousies or differences of opinion.

14. Information for Employees - To make available as appropriate to all officer and civilian personnel such circular letters, ALNAV, bulletins and other information from higher authority as may be of interest to them or affect their welfare.

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15. Commissioning Detail and Ships' Personnel - To work with and render all possible assistance to the Commissioning Detail, Prospective Commanding Officers, and ships' personnel; to provide suitable channels for such personnel to make any desired recommendations and suggestions; to help officers and crews in every practicable way to obtain a detailed working knowledge of their ships.

16. Trials - To maintain a Sub-Trial Board for conducting acceptance trials on such vessels as are designated by the Board of Inspection and Survey, to prepare trial data and to submit required reports of trials to the Board of Inspection and Survey and to the cognizant bureaus; and to arrange details in connection with the acceptance and delivery of vessels.

17. Administration - To make sure that complete administrative facilities and services are available to serve the needs of the office, and that they are so organized as to provide an efficient, centralized control of such associated functions as incoming and outgoing mail; files and records; procurement, issue, and accounting for office supplies and equipment; correspondence and typing; obtaining of temporary additional duty orders; preparation of vouchers; careful checking of all employees' time and overtime and maintenance of accurate records thereof and similar tasks.

18. Communications - To provide and operate an adequate communications system so that classified mail and other communications are handled accurately with due regard for security, and with dispatch.

19. Automotive Equipment - To operate and maintain all automotive equipment under the cognizance of this office.

20. Security - To guard the security of the Navy offices of this activity; to check periodically on the security and plant protection measures taken by the contractors to insure conformity to regulations laid down by the War and Navy Department.

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21. Contract Administration - To administer and process all contractual matters under the cognizance of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, from the inception of the awarded contracts to their completion or termination, including such functions as progress payments, guaranteed loans, advance payments, insurance, taxes, approval of subcontracts, adjudication of changes and other related financial matters, so that upon conclusion of the contracts the obligations of both parties set forth therein are fully discharged and a certificate of release of the Government’s obligations obtained at the earliest practicable date; and to provide necessary interpretation of contract provisions.

22. Technical - To see that plans and requisitions prepared by contractors conform to applicable specifications governing details of construction and materials requested; to be familiar with all important technical phases of work under contract; to advise the Bureau of Ships, or the supervisory activity controlling design, when technical improvements resulting in better ships can be made; to assist contractors in the solution of technical problems; to maintain up-to-date files of plans, specifications, and technical information; to deliver to the vessels such instruction books, test reports, plans and other information as are necessary for operation in service,

23. Allowances and Stowage - To see that accurate allowance and stowage lists are prepared promptly, distributed and corrected, so that ships receive all material necessary to efficient operation by the end of the fitting-out period; also, to plan shipboard stowages so that material is properly stowed for sea, and can be readily located and identified.

24. To maintain such inspection of construction, repair, alteration, installation or manufacturing, under the cognizance of the Supervisor

of Shipbuilding and the Naval Inspector of Ordnance, as is necessary to insure compliance with approved plans and specifications; bring promptly to the attention of the contractor all unsatisfactory items

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in order that timely and economical action may be taken to correct them; to see that such work is proceeding according to established schedule; to make sure that adequate tests are scheduled and performed in order to prove correct installation, proper functioning, and reliable operation of machinery, ordnance and equipment, and to assure structural strength and tightness; make suitable record of inspections and tests; to estimate physical progress of work; and to assist in determining status of work at time of changes.

25. Materials - To expedite delivery of all Government-furnished material, and to assist in expediting contractor-furnished material, in order to meet Bureau of Ships Erection Schedules; to review contractors' purchase orders to insure that materials conform to approved plans and specifications, that delivery dates agree with governing schedules, and that, where costs are reimbursable by the Government, quantities are correct and prices reasonable; to see that proper inspection is made; and to make sure that incoming material to which the Government has title or for which it assumes risk of loss or damage, is checked, handled, stored, and accounted for in such manner that the Government's interests are fully protected.

26. Controlled Materials Plan - To operate the Controlled Materials Plan and the priority system so as to conform with the War Production Board and Bureau of Ships' directives; and to help the contractors solve problems concerning these matters.

27. Surplus Materials - To effect the redistribution or disposal of all surplus materials resulting from cancellations or terminations, or from other causes, promptly, and in conformity with Navy Department directives; and to see that, when appropriate, contractors' purchase orders are checked against local lists of surplus or excess materials and those lists received from other activities, so that all suitable existing stocks are utilized."

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B. JURISDICTION

Administrative jurisdiction over the Bureau of Ships Field Inspection organization had originally been in the bureau and the bureau vas also responsible for the bulk of the offices of Inspector of Naval Material. As the result of a directive of the Secretary of the Navy of 2 May 1942 all inspection offices of the Navy were placed under the jurisdiction of the OP&M (Inspection Administration). This action vas taken to provide for better coordination of the various field offices of the Navy. On 1 June 1942 the Bureau of Ships turned over administrative control of Inspectors of Naval Material and the offices of Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Inspector of Machinery to the new Inspection Administration office. After a few months it vas found that the work of the offices of Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Inspector of Machinery vas so bound up with that of the Bureau of Ships that the bureau vas being seriously handicapped under this new directive in carrying out its responsibilities for designing and building warships. Finally, in the fall of 1942, it became evident that the shipbuilding program vas being interfered with by the dual jurisdiction over the latter types of offices. Accordingly, an unofficial understanding vas reached with Captain Veilings of the office of Inspection Administration under which the Bureau gradually has assumed control

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over all phases of the operation of these offices.

The Bureau's position in this matter was ably presented in a memorandum of 10 March 1944 of Captain R. C. Williams, Bureau Field Inspection Officer, to Captain Thomas E. Van Metre, of the Office of the Naval Inspector General. In this memorandum Captain Williams made the following comment:

"The offices of Inspector of Naval Material conduct inspection, "progressing and expediting work for all material Bureaus. The offices of Supervisor of Shipbuilding and of Inspector of Machinery are working primarily for the Bureau of Ships. Many of the Supervisors' offices have jurisdiction over one or more design agencies: for example, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, New York has jurisdiction over all the work being done for the Navy by Gibbs & Cox, Inc. This company, in addition to being the design agent on several classes of vessels, also acts as central procurement agency. The responsibility of the Supervisor of overseeing the tremendous volume of work is of vital importance to the Bureau. Many other offices of Supervisor of Shipbuilding likewise supervise design agents and central procurement programs. In fact, most all Supervisors perform much work that is similar to that which is being conducted within the geographical limits of the Bureau in Washington. Most of these offices may be looked upon to all intents and purposes as an integral part of the Bureau, physically removed. They, largely, are staffed by the same type of officers with which the Bureau of Ships is staffed, namely, "engineering duty only" officers and E-V(S) officers. The Bureau, of necessity, has hundreds of daily contacts with these officers. It is unthinkable that the Bureau, responsible for the productive work of these offices, should be required to permit an office not under the control of the Bureau of Ships and, without responsibility, to exercise control over officers and personnel in these offices, and over a thousand and one other matters which border on the term "Administrative Matters". For the past year the offices of Supervisors of Shipbuilding and Inspector of Machinery have functioned satisfactorily under the present arrangement.

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The offices of Inspector of Machinery, which are few in number, in addition to conducting inspection represent the Bureau On many design phases. They are staffed by especially qualified officers, usually "engineering duty only", selected by the Bureau of Ships, and work as a part of the Bureau.

The above paragraphs give a brief explanation of why the offices of Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Inspector of Machinery are being unofficially controlled by the Bureau of Ships, although this is not in accordance with the directive of 2 May 1942.

The Field Inspection Officer of the Bureau reports directly to the Chief or Assistant Chief of the Bureau and is in general charge in the Bureau of the offices of Supervisor of Shipbuilding and of Inspector of Machinery. His office is an integral part of the Bureau and personnel therein are in close proximity to various sections of the Bureau, resulting in the utmost cooperation in regard to all matters occurring in these Field Agencies of the Bureau.

The original conception of the duties of an office of Supervisor of Shipbuilding was to see that ships in private shipyards under the jurisdiction of a Supervisor were built in accordance with the plans and specification. However, the duties of the majority of these offices of Supervisor now have so expanded that most of them have become a field office of the Bureau. Many of them, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, have duties similar to those of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, New York, which of course is way beyond the scope of inspection and of supervision of construction of ships. In addition, in many instances Supervisors also supervise repair and conversion work at private shipyards under their jurisdiction. All Supervisors of Shipbuilding have additional duties as Naval Inspector of Ordnance and the Bureau of Ordnance deals directly on any matters concerning that Bureau. This dual job for Supervisors has worked out to the entire satisfaction of both bureaus. Ninety-five percent or more of the work of these offices is, however, for the Bureau of Ships.

An Inspector of Machinery is located at a private plant where important machinery units are constructed for the Navy. There are but a few of them and the work in these offices, in all instances but

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one, is entirely for the Bureau of Ships. For example, the Inspector of Machinery, Fairbanks, Morse and Company, Beloit, Wisconsin inspects primarily main propelling units for Submarine and other Diesel units for the Bureau of Ships."

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One of the Naval Inspector’s bailiwicks

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C. PERSONNEL AND LOCALE

Not only did the functions and responsibilities of the Bureau of Ships' Field Inspection Force grow, but with the expansion of the program it was necessary greatly to increase the number of offices and officers. In June 1940 there were 11 Main Offices of Supervisor of Shipbuilding inspecting new construction in 14 shipyards. By August 1945 there were 26 Main Offices of Supervisors of Shipbuilding having jurisdiction over inspection and new construction in 171 shipyards. Although main offices never exceeded this peak, Assistant Supervisors of Shipbuilding and yards supervised were, of course, greater in 1943 and 1944 when the heaviest new construction load occurred.

In June 1940 there were 3 Offices of Inspector of Machinery and 2 Assistant Inspectors of Machinery. By August 1945 there were 7 Offices of Inspector of Machinery and 4 Offices of Assistant Inspectors of Machinery.

Although from May 1942 on the Offices of Inspector of Naval Material were clearly under the administration of the Office of Procurement and Material, a large part of their work was for the Bureau of Ships and it is of interest to note that they expanded from a total of 12 Offices of Inspector of Naval Material and 143 Offices of Resident Inspector of Naval Material in 1940, to

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19 Offices of Inspector of Naval Material and 197 Offices of Resident Inspector of Naval Material by August 1945.

The value of material inspected by Inspectors of Naval Material in 1940 vas $372,326,680 compared with $9,914,975,331 in 1943. Information is not available as to the value of material inspected by other inspection offices.

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D. POST-WAR

Not until after the cessation of hostilities did a new policy reestablishing the Bureau of Ships’ control over Supervisors of Shipbuilding and Inspectors of Machinery come into effect. A memorandum of 1 November 1945 from the Secretary of the Navy to all interested parties reaffirmed the direct control of the Inspection Administration over Inspectors of Naval Material and Resident Inspectors of Naval Material but reversed the 2 May 1942 directive by giving to each bureau both management and technical control of its own field inspection offices. In the case of the Bureau of Ships, this applied to Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Assistant Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Inspectors of Machinery and Assistant Inspectors of Machinery. The Inspection Administration was left in these cases only coordination control to insure integration among all units.

Coincident with the cut-back in building contracts and wartime production, the Naval Activities associated with these factors also contracted. The estimate by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy's Material Division for the year beginning 1 January 1947 included six Supervisors of Shipbuilding to continue in existence, with 25 other Supervisors of Shipbuilding disestablishing throughout the year upon completion of contracts under their jurisdiction. The personnel thus employed or assigned include

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21 officers and 439 civilians. The estimate also covers five Inspectors of Machinery with total complement of 6 officers and 96 civilian personnel.

With the relegation of authority to cognizant bureaus in the Navy’s post-war planning, full advantage of our wartime experience in supervision of shipbuilding and inspection of Naval machinery is being exercised. The importance of satisfactory bureau field representatives is being fully recognized in the planning for any future emergency.

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CHAPTER XII

SHIP SALVAGE AND FOREIGN REPAIR

XII. SHIP SALVAGE AND FOREIGN SHIP REPAIR.1

A. INTRODUCTION

The maintenance and repair of United States vessels were important tasks throughout the war, hut they did not assume extraordinary importance until 1944 and 1945. Therefore, they will be considered in Chapter XV. Ship salvage and foreign ship repair, on the other hand, were most important during the initial stages of the war, when the German submarine campaign was at its peak. They are fitting subjects for Part I of this work.

B. SHIP SALVAGE2

The Navy had not even an embryonic salvage organization in 1939. It performed very minor repairs and raised its own submarines, but otherwise it had no salvage vessels or equipment, almost no well-trained personnel and little in the way of plans for wartime.

Indeed, the Navy felt no need for a salvage organization. Like the Army and Coast Guard, it maintained annual contracts which assured the immediate availability of commercial facilities. The contracts were administered by the Bureau of Construction and Repair and then the Bureau of Ships, which was charged by Naval Regulations, Article 525, with the

1 This Chapter was written in December, 1951, by Mr. J. W. Boatman, of the Bureau of Ships History Section.

2 The term "salvage" is used in this essay according to the following definition: "Salvage . . . comprises the processes involved in refloating and delivering to safe waters or repair yards, beached, stranded or sunken vessels. Its scope also includes the recovery and reconditioning of cargo or equipment from wrecked or abandoned vessels and, to a limited extent, removal of hulks for scrap or as menaces to navigation."

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Bow of U.S.S. PITTSBURGH torn off in typhoon off Guam in June 1945. The bow was raised in Agat harbor in Guam by a salvage crew.

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responsibility for the provision of facilities and arrangements for the salvage of vessels. Operations under these contracts were conducted on a "no cure-no pay" basis, which meant that the contractor was paid a percentage of the value of successfully salvaged ships and cargoes.

The award was usually substantial, so this type of contract was costly, but it did enable the Navy to dispense with the maintenance of a large store of expensive salvage equipment and the training of professional salvors.

Such an arrangement was inadequate to meet the needs of the nation in wartime. The Navy found it expedient in 1917 to set up a salvage service composed of the facilities of three commercial firms, the personnel of which was inducted into the Navy. The organization established a good record, but its total activities were too restricted in quantity and area to be valuable as a foundation for future planning.

After the first World War the salvage business was in the doldrums. In England it enjoyed a brief period of popularity, which led to feverish speculation and fantastic overexpansion; when the inevitable crash came, England was bereft of nearly all salvage protection. Dutch and German salvage companies maintained their existence only with the aid of government subsidies. In the United States, the Navy had no sooner demobilized the three firms in its service than one went into bankruptcy and the other two merged to form the Merritt-Chapman and Scott Corporation, one of the very few large-scale salvage organizations which managed to survive the lean inter-war years without a subsidy.

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This corporation was now the only organization in the United States upon which the Navy could rely for salvage work, and for eighteen years the Navy did so, completely. Suddenly, the Navy was thrown back on its own resources, for in 1938 aggregate financial losses forced Merritt-Chapman and Scott to withdraw from the West Coast. Immediately, that equipment of the corporation which had been on the West Coast was purchased and collected at San Diego. One officer with some experience in salvage was ordered to set up a Naval Selvage Base there; be was given three trained men to aid him in his appointed tasks, but they were trained in deep sea diving, not salvage. Nevertheless, these men made a study of salvage problems on the Vest Coast and of the salvage facilities available there, so that the necessary additional equipment could be assembled at the Base. The gear wes stored so that it could be easily loaded onto Navy tugs or minesweepers in case any Naval vessel might require salvage services; personnel for the work was to be recruited at the time of need from whatever sources might be available.

The Navy thus achieved a temporary solution to its salvage problem on the West Coast, but a more serious problem now loomed. The concatenation of international imbroglios led the Navy to reconsider the entire salvage situation, as a preliminary to the provision of plans for a wartime organization. The situation was not reassuring. Certainly a salvage organization such as that established in World War I was not feasible. Merritt-Chapmen and Scott had equipment and vessels totally inadequate for wartime needs and what other selvage gear existed was insignificant in quantity. Furthermore, the number of professional salvors available to the Navy had dwindled. After World

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War I, salvage officers had been mustered into the Naval Reserve, but by 1938 ill-health and advancing age had deprived the Navy of each and every one's services. Nor was another supply available; young men had not been attracted to the depressed business, so that the scarce non-Reservist salvors were in most cases too old for active duty.

The Navy's response to this unwholesome situation was to instruct the commanding officer of the Naval Salvage Base at San Diego to familiarize himself thoroughly with salvage techniques and to devise plans for a wartime organization. He remained the only officer assigned to the consideration of this problem until a few days before the attack upon Pearl Harbor. To make matters worse, while he was at San Diego he was assigned so much 'additional duty' as docking officer that he could get to the base only on week-ends. Later, he was able to devote his time exclusively to the study of salvage problems and in the winter of 1940-1941 he was able to study the British wartime organization at first hand. By Spring, 1941, the Navy had made slight progress toward the establishment of a wartime organization, but at least it had, in the mind of this one officer, the basic outlines of a superb organization.

This officer was LCdr (now RAdm, ret.) W. A. Sullivan. He brought to his work an uncommonly forceful personality, an active mind and untiring drive. For what experience he lacked in 1938 he had more than compensated by 1941. And by that time he had become somewhat of a crusader for an adequate salvage organization. A crusader was what was needed, for the lethargy which his projects encountered was truly impressive. It was difficult to arouse the interest of the average seafaring man, for such

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a man regarded salvage operations with the utmost casualness. If he had studied the salvage files in the Library of Congress he could not have avoided the conclusion that the work of amateurs had done more harm than good more often than not. However, he did not study the files and salvage men's direst prophecies of unnumbered ships and valuable cargo and invaluable lives lost for lack of adequate salvage protection - went largely unheeded until they began to be realized. After that, the recommendations of salvage experts were treated with more respect.

The first program to be successfully implemented was a salvage service for the Western Hemisphere - along the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts of the United States, in the Caribbean Sea off Panama and in Alaska waters. It is not difficult to understand why this project mot

with such success: the menace of the submarine to our shipping was patently obvious to all and the solution to the salvage problem was relatively simple. The district organizations could be and were made responsible for salvage in Navy Yards and Naval vessels in inland waters, for such operations are usually uncomplicated and can be accomplished by non-professionals - the Bureau provided adequate instructions. Merritt-Chapman and Scott was willing to assume the responsibility for offshore salvage. If suitably expanded by the acquisition of Navy-furnished equipment, they were quite capable of carrying out the task. The Bureau of Ships decided that the necessary command relationships could be most effectively implemented by having

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Salvage crews raise the bow of the U. S. S. PITTSBURGH

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the Navy take over the private concern.

Before any contract could be concluded a legal problem had to be overcame. The contemplated organization would have to provide salvage services to private and foreign vessels, yet the Navy had not the requisite authority to engage in such action. The Bureau of Ships requested authorization to do so by contracting with commercial firms; the request was granted by Public Law 280, 77th Congress:

An Act

To authorize the Secretary of the Navy to provide salvage and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized during war or national emergency -

(a) To provide, by contract or otherwise, necessary salvage facilities for both public and private vessels upon such terms and conditions as he may, in his discretion, determine

to be in the best interests of the United States.

(b) To acquire or to transfer, by charter or otherwise, for operation by private salvage companies, such vessels and equipment as he may deem necessary.

(c) To advance to private salvage companies such funds as may, in his judgment, be necessary to provide for the immediate financing of salvage operations, these advances to be on such terms and under such conditions as he may deem adequate for the protection of the Government.

Sect. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such funds, not in excess of $5,000,000 annually, as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act.

Approved, October 24, 1941.

The $3,000,000 limit - indeed, any limit - was removed by Public Law 446, 10 February 1942.

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It took several months for this bill to pass through the legislative mill, so it was not until 11 December 1941 that the Bureau of Ships, proceeded to create the Naval Salvage Service. By the terms of the contract, NObs 36, Merritt-Chapman and Scott agreed to turn over to the Navy all of its vessels, bases, and equipment, subject to their return or replacement upon termination of the contract. The corporation was made responsible for the management and operation of its vessels and bases, plus any that the Bureau might assign to it. Naturally, a substantial amount of equipment was assigned by the Bureau, for the contractor could not be expected to purchase equipment sufficient for the extraordinary requirements of wartime. Merritt-Chapman and Scott personnel remained in a civilian status, thus enabling full utilization of the older salvor’s skills. The Navy was to pay all expenses plus a fixed fee - a much cheaper arrangement than that provided by "no cure-no pay" contracts. Salvage operations on private vessels under this contract were to be paid for on a "no cure-no pay" basis, however, and all awards were to be forwarded to the Treasury.

The Bureau of Ships appointed a Supervisor of Salvage to administer all of its salvage responsibilities, including Contract NObs 36; he maintained an office in New York adjacent to the headquarters of Merritt-Chapman and Scott. All important matters came under the Supervisor's cognizance, but the contractor was given a very free rein, especially in regard to methods and techniques. In fact, the corporation handled its responsibilities so effectively that the Supervisor needed to do little besides coordinate the salvage

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activities and, when necessary, assign priorities. He was free to concentrate upon more pressing problems. During the war this position was held alternately by Commodore Sullivan and Captain (now RAdm) Manseau. Actually, Commodore Sullivan spent most of his time in Europe, so that Captain Manseau was the man primarily responsible for the skillful juggling of personnel and equipment that kept the overseas organizations as nearly adequately furnished as was possible. He also had most of the responsibility for the raising of the Normandy and the operation of the Salvage School.

The Naval Salvage Service was widespread. It maintained shore stations at more than a dozen locations, ranging from Woods Hole, Massachusetts, to Trinidad British West Indies, and from Dutch Harbor, Alaska, to Balboa, Canal Zone. Approximately thirteen salvage vessels were stationed over an equally extensive area. The contractor also kept several experienced salvage men standing by in New York for use in emergencies occurring where the ordinary facilities of the service were unavailable. In several instances these men accomplished remarkable results with no equipment other than experience; in other instances they gathered information which made it possible to decide intelligently the allocation of equipment and services. All activities were centrally controlled.

This organization provided good coverage with a minimum of men and material. Detailed information on its problems and accomplishments is available in another study2, so only a brief resume is included herein.

Problems the Service had a-plenty, but most were technical in nature, of the sent that one would expect to arise during salvage operations. Relations between the corporation and the Navy were on the whole excellent. There was some difficulty over communications. It was essential that

2 NAVSHIPS 250-694-1, A Short History of the Naval Salvage Service-Contract NObs 36. Issued by the Bureau of Ships 10-13-48.

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communications be speedy and encoded and that, on occasion, radio silence be broken. Failure to work out the differences between the Navy high command and the Naval Salvage Service beforehand led to repeated altercations. The differences were not obviated until spring, 1944, but at that time they were solved to the entire satisfaction of both parties.

Of course, the hazards of war posed problems too. Mines repeatedly delayed operations until the area could be swept and even then mines exploded nearby more than once. The submarine menace was rather neatly handled: wooden spare used in certain operations were painted and rigged to look like guns; when submarines surfaced near salvage vessels, as they did several times, their commanding officers took one look at the "large caliber guns" and ordered a hasty withdrawal.

Notwithstanding its problems, the Naval Salvage Service answered well over 600 calls for assistance, 398 of which proved to be major salvage jobe resulting in the reclamation of vessels and cargoes valued at $594,380,772 (see breakdown, Table 35). Most of these were government owned ships and cargoes, but some were privately owned.

For the latter, claims amounting to nearly $6,000,000 have been presented and, in part, paid.

Moreover, 52 menaces to navigation were removed. Ordinarily this task is a function of the Army Engineers, but early in the war it became apparent that the Engineers' facilities were inadequate. Therefore, an agreement was reached whereby the Naval

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TABLE 35

An Analysis of Major Salvage Operations Under NObs 36 Period: 12-11-41 to 12-31-45

 

Year

No. of cases
handled

Sound Values

U.S. & Foreign
gov't combat 
vessels

Merchant
vessels

Merchant
cargoes

Total

1942

99

$12,577,000

$73,980,000

$60,834,000

$147,391,500

1943

102

34,991,000

65,778,000

77,136,000

177,905,000

1944

108

65,712,000

49,666,500

14,451,000

129,829,500

1945

89

36,700,000

71,547,000

27,007,772

139,254,772

Total

398

149,980,000

260,971,500

179,428,772

594,380,772


Gross Costs of NObs 36 in all Operations Period: 12-11-41 to 12-31-45

Year

1942

1943

1944

1945

Total

Cost

$4,681,124

$6,801,359

$3,776,853

$1,936,279

$17,195,615

 

 

 

 

 

 


From: NAVSHIPS 250-694-1. p. 35.


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U.S.S. PITTSBURGH CL-72

Temp bow put on in floating drydock just outside Agat Harbor in Guam.
She sailed to Puget Sound Navy Yard in July 1945 for permanent bow.

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Salvage Service did the job at cost; eventually $932,222 was received from the War Department. Incidentally, the work on menaces to navigation was arranged in such a manner that it never interfered with ordinary salvage operations.

All of these tasks were carried out at a cost to the government of less than $18,000,000. The ships and cargoes salved for this amount were, at the time, worth far more for the prosecution of the war than the final evaluation indicates. In some cases the failure quickly to salve vessels carrying vitally needed material would have resulted in serious delays in production. There were times when more ships would have been sunk than were being produced if it had not been for the Naval Salvage Service. Contract NObs 36 was surely one of the most profitable contracts ever entered by the Navy.

The Bureau of Ships was no less successful in providing salvage equipment than it was in providing salvage protection in the Western Hemisphere. Specifications were drawn up for practically all important salvage gear before the war began, at the San Diego Naval Salvage Base. Our manufacturers were tooled up by the time we entered the war, for while Cdr. Sullivan was in England he gave the British our specifications and their purchasing commissions placed large orders in the United States. The industry was further stimulated early in the summer of 1941 by the placing of large orders by Merritt-Chapman and Scott. Bather than delay until Public Law 280 was passed in the fall, the corporation and the Bureau signed Contract NOd 2263, which enabled the former to acquire with government funds enough equipment and vessels so that it could

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meet wartime demands. It is fortunate that the Bureau had the foresight to make this preliminary arrangement, for without it the Naval Salvage Service would not have been able, without impairing its effectiveness, to deliver two railway carloads of vitally needed salvage equipment to Pearl Harbor immediately after the surprise attack. The service was also able to rig without delay all the Naval vessels assigned to it for salvage duty and the establish stockpiles in Iceland and San Diego. Incidentally, the Naval Salvage Service continued to make most of its own procurements, although the demand imposed by the German submarine campaign did outstrip the contractor's normal source of supply sufficiently so that the Bureau had to undertake to procure all especially designed gear.

Meanwhile, the Bureau had not been allowing the needs of the fleet to go unheeded. The fleet was accountable for salvage at advanced bases or in areas under fleet commands and the Bureau was to provide the wherewithal. The Bureau had thirty-one salvage vessels constructed, outfitted four major shore based ship salvage and harbor clearance groups (Mediterranean, Normandy, Central Pacific and South West Pacific) and equipped thirteen salvage bases located strategically throughout the world for supplying salvage equipment as might be needed. Funds expended for the procurement of ship salvage equipment for overseas operations amounted to approximately $14,000,000. The thirty-one vessels cost an additional $64,500,000.

The nature of the equipment furnished by the Bureau did not alter radically, on the whole. Underwater cutting and welding methods, which bad been developed just before the war, were perfected. The standard

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deep sea diving dress remained essentially unchanged. However, a light weight dress and a variety of diving masks were developed to meet special requirements, as well as a self-contained diving outfit which allowed a diver underwater to swim, walk, or operate unattended and invisible from the surface.

The problem of providing trained salvage men was not nearly so easily solved. The little group at San Diego gathered quantities of material on salvage work from the Library of Congress and Merritt-Chapman and Scott, classified it and prepared a series of lectures on salvage and underwater work. However, no school was forthcoming. Navy men were on the whole apathetic toward it and their attitude was reinforced by the dubiousness with which experienced salvage people regarded the efficacy of training good salvage officers rapidly (ordinarily it took twenty years to train a good officer). Navy salvage people felt that good officers could be turned out in a short time if the proper men were chosen as candidates, i.e., heavy engineering graduates who had about five years of experience and who had been in the Naval Reserve long enough to qualify for standing watches at sea.

These arguments were apparently successful, for in 1939 it was decided to establish a school at Pearl Harbor. Equipment, including even a ship with which to practice, was collected at San Pedro and candidates were interviewed, screened, selected and then sent to San Francisco to await transportation to the Hawaiian Islands. They were still waiting on December 7th 1941. For reasons which have not yet been fully substantiated, the decision to establish the school at Pearl Harbor was reconsidered, and found

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unwise. No other site was considered available. Fundamentally, the reason for the delay is to be found in the failure of most officers to understand the importance of especially trained salvage personnel. Be that as it may, both equipment and personnel were shipped to Pearl Harbor on the night of the 7th, the latter not to attend school but to work feverishly for months on the job so ably described by Rear Admiral H. N. Wallin in Chapter VII.

However, about a month later the USS LAFAYETTE, formerly the NORMANDIE and at the time in the process of being converted to a troop carrier, capsized and sank next to Pier 88, New York Harbor, after a severe fire. The Salvage Service was assigned the responsibility for salvaging the enormous ship (any one of its three funnels was large enough to hold both tubes of the Holland Tunnel). The job was complex, it required much time and there was plenty of space available on Pier 88: it was an ideal site for a salvage school. After some weeks the school was authorized.

The school was designed to train both divers and salvage officers. So great problems were encountered in the training of the officers. The quality of the work they performed belied the gloomy prognostications of old-line salvage people, as long as the men who received training possessed the proper background. However, during the last year and a half of the war the shortage of properly grounded men was so great that it was necessary to accept less suitable candidates. The performance of these latter-day graduates was much less satisfactory.

There were two significant problems in connection with the training of salvage divers. The lesser of the two was the age limit of

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twenty-eight set by the Bureau of Medicine to minimize the hazards of deep sea diving. It was most desirable that trainees in salvage diving be experienced mechanics. In wartime it was hard to get many who were under this age limit. However, since salvage operations seldom, if ever, involve diving to great depths, the Bureau of Medicine was prevailed upon to raise the limit to thirty-five, which solved the issue.

The more significant problem was the lack of a Salvage Mechanic rating for the enlisted men. Although salvage people in the Navy exerted considerable pressure to obtain the rating, none was forthcoming until after the war; even then it was suspended after a few months. The confusion involved in having salvage divers retain their previous ratings proved considerable and dangerous. While groups of enlisted salvage men were enroute to their destination, their parties were repeatedly raided by officers who needed cooks, shipfitters, etc., and who did not understand the mission of the men. When the group arrived at its destination it was sometimes so short of salvage mechanics that it was essential to let untrained volunteers do some diving; more than one man lost his life unnecessarily in this way. There is still no appropriate rating, but some improvement can be afforded by a provision for earmarking the men for salvage work on their orders.

Over 300 officers and 1800 divers were graduated from the Naval Salvage School, Pier 88, at a cost of about $320,000. Most were Navy men, but some were Army and Coast Guard personnel and some were officers and men from the Allied Navies. Their training was especially valuable because they obtained practical experience in underwater work on the LAFAYETTE and, occasionally, in the course of clearing menaces to navigation. The Bureau of Ships kept a record of the training and experience

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of these and other ship salvage personnel so as to be in a position to nominate for assignment personnel especially qualified for any particular requirement.

Theoretically, Bureau of Ships responsibility went no farther than this - providing salvage protection for shipping in much of the Western Hemisphere and furnishing salvage equipment and men trained for salvage work. Actually, by 1943 and probably earlier the fleet was relying almost completely upon the Bureau's Salvage Section for the discharge of its (the fleet's) salvage responsibility in the European theatre. The development was a natural one, for at the time salvage work could be properly organized and administered only by experienced people, as will become apparent in the following discussion.

Several factors influenced the distribution of personnel and the organization of salvage forces overseas. Salvage work is quite uniform in its main characteristics, but some of the equipment is highly specialized and rarely used; it would have been foolish to have maintained more than a few pieces of such equipment, for they could be so disposed as to be readily flown to their destination when needed. Most salvage men are somewhat specialized too. Although they all received general training in the fundamentals of stability and buoyancy, some were much better at demolition than others, some at patching, some at rigging, etc. Moreover, salvage work at a particular place often required specialized talents; at Naples men experienced in heavy rigging were most needed: at Bizerte, men experienced in demolition. The organization had to provide a means to make special talents available where most needed. Another factor was the infrequency of calls for salvage assistance in any particular locality. If salvage forces adequate to meet all contingencies had been established in various localities, it is more than likely that the salvors

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would soon have been incorporated into some other organization and lost to the salvage service. At best, the inactivity would have been deleterious to salvors' skills. Moreover, if the salvors had been thus scattered, too few would have been readily available where they were most needed. When salvage aid is needed, it is needed in a hurry, so the forces must be so disposed as to be available with a minimum of delay.

Over a period of many months an organization suitable to the needs of the European theatre was evolved.3 Since it was impossible to provide every port or locality with the wherewithal to meet all eventualities, personnel and facilities were furnished to provide for the probable needs for a limited period of time of an entire area (e.g., the Mediterranean) for which the United States forces were responsible. Eventually, fire-fighters in the area were integrated with the salvage forces and all were placed under the command of a single salvage expert called the Principal Salvage Officer, During relatively stable periods, a large portion of the force worked at various ports, while a basic force was stationed reasonably near the current front; the entire organization was kept as fluid and mobile as possible. Meanwhile, headquarters for the area kept in close touch with the current military situation and future plans.

As soon ae an assault was projected, plane were laid for the proper disposition of men and equipment. Combat, rescue, salvage and fire-fighting teams were organized and accompanied the assault forces on tugs or other suitable vessels to take care of casualties occurring while the assault was in progress. A small salvage group accompanied them to estimate and commence harbor clearance work, pending the arrival of the regular unit.

3 A detailed discussion of organization problems particularly in Europe, is available in a confidential pamphlet entitled Ship Salvage, prepared by the Salvage Section and issued by the Bureau of Ships 8-1-44.

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Early in the war the combat teams had, after the assault, joined the harbor clearance units. However, the strain of operations during assaults (during the attack on Salerno the combat teams sustained casualties to the extent of 10%) rendered the men so much less effective that they were relieved of this duty and returned to the base force.

Before the assault, most salvage workers in the overall area assembled at a suitable base near the jump-off area, where they remained as a reserve. If the need for more men or equipment or for a large number of men with special skills arose, they could be furnished with a minimum of delay. After more or less stable conditions again obtained, the reserve force was reduced to a minimum by reassignment to all existing projects in order to importance.

Command relationships were not altogether clear in the European theatre, except on paper. Naturally enough, the Principal Salvage Officer was a member of the staff of any given area's fleet commander. This was satisfactory except when salvage work, such as moat harbor clearance work, had to be coordinated with the work of the Army Transportation Corps and the Army Engineers. Early in the war the area theatre commander concept was only partially developed, so there was little coordination on the top levels. The salvage forces, Army Engineers and the Army Transportation Corps tended to work out their own plans and to try to prevent interference from above. After orders from above resulted in some unhappy experiences and after repeatedly successful collaborations with the two Army technical corps, officers quite naturally began to feel that their salvage forces should be independent for all practical

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purposes. In effect, they were just that during the latter part of the war in Europe. Since then, however, unification of the armed forces and the maturation of the theatre commander concept have eliminated the important justifications for semi-independence.

In the Pacific, the situation was somewhat different. Whereas the salvage forces east of the United States grew out of the Bureau's activities and retained close ties with the Bureau, salvage units in the Pacific burgeoned with little reference to the Bureau. They were attached to the Service Force from the beginning and remained there. At first there was little attempt to do more than improvise, for the need for salvage greatly exceeded the available supply of personnel and equipment. Not long after the operations in the Solomons, however, the organization took much the same form as that in Europe, especially the organizations for invasions.

The organizational problems were basically the same as those in Europe, but they were accentuated by a variety of factors. Rather than a relatively small area in which most of the action took place and in which the salvage forces could be concentrated, the war in the Pacific sprawled over enormous stretches of sea. Personnel and equipment could not be dispersed and reassembled with the ease with which they were in the European theatre. This was true even though the salvage forces were broken down into three units, one under each of the South, Southwest and Central Pacific Service Forces. The hulk of the salvage forces had to remain close to the extremely fluid operating line. That left little in the rear areas to contend with the numerous groundings occasioned by the plethora of coral reefs, the damage caused by typhoons, occasional mine and torpedo damage, etc.

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Moreover, with personnel and equipment so dispersed, the use made of them could not be as effective as in the European theatre; coupled with the greater need for mobile unite, this resulted in a perennial shortage of both.

Captain Lebbeus Curtis, the key figure in Pacific salvage operations, wrestled with these problems throughout the war. The shortage of men was somewhat relieved by the establishment of a school for divers at Noumea, but the school did not really get moving until the end of 1943. Although liaison with Bureau of Ship's Salvage Section was not nearly so close as that of the salvage forces in Europe, the Bureau was very responsive to the specific wished of Captain Curtis, so that what equipment and personnel he received was eminently suited to the requirements of the Pacific salvage forces.

The salvage of landing craft presented a rather special problem.

Of course, they were more easily subject to stranding or disabling damage than most vessels, not only as a result of combative action, but also as a result of storms. Now, the longer landing craft remained on the beach, the more difficult it was to salvage them. Besides, they often were blocking beaches which were needed for the landing of supplies for invading forces. Obviously, it was urgent that the stranded craft be patched up and pulled and/or pushed off the beach with the greatest possible speed. The course of events, notably in the Pacific, soon revealed the essentials basic to the accomplishment of this task.

A single officer must control all salvage personnel, tugs and equipment, including, if possible, the Beach Battalion's bulldozers and pumps, and he should have a command ship with adequate communications facilities. If at all possible, a few experienced salvage personnel should be placed

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in the group, for inexperienced people, although, well-intentioned and well-trained, can greatly slow down a job by over-meticulous work. At Normandy the amphibious salvage group had no experienced men for a time and was making little headway at clearing the cluttered Omaha beach.

The men were making permanent repairs where temporary work - stuffing a mattress in a hole or something of that sort - would have been sufficient to save the craft and get it off the beach. The work proceeded more speedily once experienced men were placed in the group.

This discussion gives little indication of the extent of salvage activities overseas. Considering the size of the organization, they were enormous. The combat salvage teams accompanied every major assault, giving vitally needed assistance to hundreds of combatant ships, transports end landing ships and clearing landing craft and wreckage from the traffic lanes on the assault beaches. At Normandy, off the Omaha and Utah beaches, more mine damage occurred to United States ships than in all other invasions put together, yet the frenetic activity of the salvage force prevented all but four from sinking. A great many landing craft were damaged in landing. When they could still maneuver, they limped to the salvage ships offshore and moored there, sometimes twenty at a time, to await sufficient repairs to enable them to continue in operation. Besides, more than 500 landing craft were removed from the traffic lanes on the beaches with the utmost speed, once experienced men Joined the amphibious salvage team. Combat salvage at other assault benches differed only in degree from that at Normandy.

After the assaults, the harbor clearance units moved in to provide adequate shipping lanes and docking facilities, by blasting obstructions

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into the bottom, by cutting them up, by floating them away, by covering them to form improvised piers. At Manila about 360 wrecks were removed in various ways. The list of ports at which work of this nature was accomplished reads like an itinerary of the war: Casablanca, Port Lyautey, Oran, Bougie, Bone, Algiers, Tunis, Ferryville, Bizerte,

Palermo, Naples, Anzio, Leghorn, Marseille, Toulon, Port de Bouc, Cherbourg, LeHavre, Rouen, Bremerhaven, Manila, Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and many others. The work of these harbor clearance units to permit the entry of troops, equipment and supplies, while immeasurable in dollars, was undoubtedly the most important contribution of the salvage forces to the war effort. The salvage of millions of dollars worth of ships and cargo was incidental to harbor clearance.

Besides these broad categories of salvage work, the salvage bases and vessels aided and often saved hundreds of Allied ships, combatant and non-combatant, on all of the theatres.

It is impossible to provide the dollar value of the vessels and cargoes saved by the salvage organization overseas. This much is certain:

It amounted to several hundred millions of dollars. The total cost, for vessels, equipment and training the personnel, amounted to approximately $79,000,000.

If war should come again, some benefit may be obtained from World War II experience. Certainly that experience proved the value of a contract such as NObs 36 for salvage near the United States. Fortunately, the United States will be in a position to implement a contract such as NObs 36 much more readily than it was early in 1941. On 10 May 1947 the Naval Salvage Service was wound up and at the same time a contract (Contract NObs

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2638) was signed which was substantially the same as the Navy's pre-war agreements with Merritt-Chapman and Scott. However, the absence of salvage facilities on the West Coast convinced Congress of the necessity of granting to the Navy the authority to maintain, notably by expanding the facilities private concerns, offshore facilities in United States waters adequate for the needs of private as well as Naval vessels. The Navy received the authority, similar to that granted in Public Law 280, by Public Law 513, approved May 4, 1948.

World War II experience just as surely proved the value of a highly centralized administration of salvage activities in a given area overseas, with a strategic disposition of the forces available and the maintenance of the forces in as highly mobile a condition as possible. Without such an organization, far more personnel and equipment will be necessary to provide far less effective salvage protection. Moreover, the indications are that any salvage organization, however organized, would operate far more efficiently if Naval officers received some indoctrination in salvage work. Fortunately, very many officers now realize that salvage is crucial and merits special attention; indoctrination may not be far off.

C. FOREIGN SHIP REPAIR

The United States had to perform a great deal of repair and maintenance work for the Allied Navies, especially during the early years of the war, when the enemy was inflicting the most damage. After the Germans had overrun the Continent, those ships of the conquered nations which escaped to the free world had only United States facilities to turn to. The Navies of the South and Central American states so greatly

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expanded that they exceeded the capacity of their own repair facilities; they too needed our help. British repair and maintenance bases were overworked and short of material and German bombers reduced their effectiveness, so they could not assimilate England's work-load. Besides, many British ships were in the Western Hemisphere when they most needed attention. Therefore, it was sometimes necessary and often most practical for the United States to accomplish the repair and maintenance work for England, France, the Netherlands, for Belgium and Norway, for various Central and South American countries and even for Canada.

The Bureau of Ships performed more work on British ships than on those of any other nation. At one time, before Pearl Harbor, one seventh of all repair and maintenance work on naval vessels in the United States pertained to British ships. Peak loads occurred at the climax of the German submarine campaign and again, during the period when the Mediterranean was very nearly an Axis lake, while the British were maintaining at terrific cost the vital island of Malta. Most of the work on French ships was effected shortly after the North African invasion; we then found ourselves repairing damage we had inflicted. Although these peak loads were occasioned by battle damage, most of the work consisted of routine overhauls. Such vessels as the Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth, used as troop transports, received all of their overhauls in the United States. Table 36 summarized the foreign ship repair work.

The special problems posed by foreign ship repairs were not as serious as might be expected. With the British we have a common language, similar technical terminology and methods of measurement, and

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The majestic RICHELIEU, largest of the French battleships, arrives in New York harbor to be repaired and refitted before sailing once more against the Axis.

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from them we were able to obtain ships’ plans. Problems were minimized by the appointment of British inspectors to assist in our yards and by the helpfulness of the British Admiralty delegation in Washington,

D. C. The work accomplished was extensive as well as intensive, for all alterations were made at a single availability. We made a limited number of alterations on each successive availability of our ships, but, of course, there was little certainty that British ships would return.

There were many more problems involved in the repair and maintenance of French vessels. The language difficulty was easily overcome, but French ship designs differed radically from ours - yet plans were usually unavailable - ; French alloys were often unique - yet specifications were not obtainable - ; French methods of construction were unusual - yet we had little knowledge of them. Guns were odd-sized and machinery was different, but spare parts were very nearly non-existent, so innumerable parts had to be custom built on the spot. Some administrative problems were born of political disputes between the Free French and the government, but they were not allowed to delay the work. In fact, ingenuity reduced the magnitude of all problems to such manageable proportions that work on French ships took only slightly longer than that on British ships.

The vessels of other nations presented similar problems only occasionally, especially since so many of the Central and South American ships had been constructed in the United States. That repair and maintenance of foreign ships consumed more time than similar work on United States vessels is undoubtedly true; equally true it is that the work was not always essential to the war effort. But it was diplomatic:

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repairing one of our vessels might well have provided greater immediate returns than repairing a Norwegian vessel, but who is to say that the effect upon Norwegian morale and American-Norwegian relations was not in the long run more valuable?

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TABLE 36

Foreign Ship Repair

Country

Type

Estimated
Cost1

Tonnage

United
Kingdom

8 BB

$16,000,000

280,000

6 CV

10,000,000

18,000

4 CVE

500,000

60,000

34 DD

8,500,000

51,000

2 DE

150,000

2,000

22 SS

10,000,000

33,000

23 CL

47,000,000

230,000

28 Corvettes

4,200,000

28,000

8 AMC

9,400,000

120,000

3 CM

900,000

60,000

1 AM

66,000

1,000

5 AVG

1,600,000

5,000

4 AG

1,500,000

20,000

3 AD

375,000

15,000

23 XAP

2,500,000

345,000

Patrol Craft

2,500,000

6,000

186

115,191,000

1,274,000

France

2 BB

9,000,000

70,000

1 AVC

8,500,000

30,000

5 DD

5,500,000

7,500

5 CL

8,000,000

50,000

5 SS

4,000,000

7,500

6 AO

1,800,000

30,000

1 AG

25,000

5,000

2 PG

1,100,000

1,000

27

37,925,000

201,000

Netherlands

2 DD

450,000

3,000

6 SS

2,000,000

9,000

3 Corvettes

300,000

3,000

3 Patrol Craft

150,000

1,500

2 Tug

200.000

1.000

16

3,100,000

17,500

Canada

1 PF

50,000

500

14 Corvettes

3,000,000

14,000

15

3,050,000

14,500

 

1 Includes all costs but BuOrd.

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TABLE 36, cont‘d

Foreign Ship Repair

Country

Type

Estimated
Cost1

Tonnage

Mexico

8 PG

$ 990,000

4,000

3 Patrol Craft

1,000,000

1,500

11

1,900,000

5,500

Nicaragua

3 Patrol Craft

1,000,000

1,500

8 PG

900,000

4,000

11

1,900,000

5,500

Cuba

5 PG

835,000

2,500

Peru

4 SS

100,000

6,000

Ecuador

3 PY

400,000

1,500

Venezuela

2 PG

250,000

1,000

Norway

1 DD

280,000

1,500

281

164,931,000

1,595,500

 

1 Includes all costs but BuOrd

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With bow and stern torn off by a German Torpedo, the HMAS ARGONAUT crossed the Atlantic to be repaired in an American Shipyard --- Philadelphia Navy Yard, 1945.

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CHAPTER XIII

SHIPBUILDING AND THE TURNING OF THE TIDE

In order to bring more forcibly to light the significance of the Bureau's shipbuilding program in the successful prosecution of the war effort, a brief chronology of the naval var during the first twenty-one months--the defensive and the turning of the tide phases--will be included herewith. This operational history having been presented, the reader may better conclude the extent to which operations depended upon the implements of war produced under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships. This historical report will also illustrate the paramount necessity for flexibility in the shipbuilding program, for the dynamic nature of these initial operational phases dictated the need for changing priorities on specific classes of ships and for modifications of production and of equipment. The effectiveness and timeliness of the Bureau's products in operations is the "proof of the pudding".

I. CHRONOLOGY OF DEFENSIVE WAR:

A. PACIFIC THEATER

The necessity of the American seapower to be divided between two areas and the success of the Japanese attack upon our fleet at Pearl Harbor placed the Allied forces in the Pacific in a noticeably inferior position.

The results of the Pearl Harbor attack have already been enumerated and, although most of the ships damaged or sunk finally returned to service after masterful salvage and repair work by our service forces, the absence of these fleet elements during the critical period was keenly felt.

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In view of overwhelming Japanese superiority in the air, the entire fleet in the western Pacific area retreated, leaving a handful of submarines and motor torpedo boats to impede the enemy's advance. Although these units fought gallantly and took toll, little could be done to delay the onrush. Soon the retreating units of the fleet were engaged with overwhelmingly superior Japanese forces far to the south.

In the Battle of Java Sea, the Allied unite lost four cruisers and five destroyers, plus auxiliaries; only two destroyers escaped to Australia. The Nipponese had struck hard and effectively against an inferior Allied force which fought bravely with what it had.

As the Java Sea campaign was ending, in late February 1942, Admiral Nimitz in the central Pacific was carrying out the first American offensive of the war, attacking the Marshall and Gilbert Islands with considerable success. Although the attacks were primarily against land installations and against areas where Japanese landings had been effected, some enemy combat vessels and transports were sunk in New Guinea. This led to the Battle of the Coral Sea--the first full scale naval engagement and the first major naval engagement in history in which surface ships did not exchange a single shot. The Allied airmen inflicted considerably more damage than that sustained by our forces. The difference in strength between the opposing fleets was rapidly being narrowed.

Whatever difference existed in May 1942 was eliminated in the Battle of Midway during the first week of June. The engagement marked the end of Japanese offensive actions, and removal of threats to Hawaii and to the west coast, the confinement of Japanese activity to the

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South Pacific (except for the Aleutians), and, most importantly, the restoration of the balance of naval power in the Pacific.

On 7 August 1942 the battle for the Solomons began. This historic land-sea-and-air campaign needs no retelling. Not until mid-November, after a three-month see-saw battle during which our fate hung in the balance upon numerous occasions, did the United States' forces finally succeed in commanding, once for all, our position in the southern Solomons. It proved a most decisive victory, in spite of the heavy losses suffered by us. By this time, however, the rate of Allied ship production was surpassing the attrition sustained in the series of campaigns, while the Japanese shipbuilding program vas falling far in arrears of their losses.

As a result of these battles, building priorities could now be assigned with greater certainty, for our major losses had already been sustained and, since our strategy for the future vas relatively fixed, requirements became more definite.

The Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal to make their stand in the northern Solomons and New Guinea. The New Georgia campaign (some two several hundred miles northeast of Guadalcanal) began in June 1943 with repeated air attacks against the enemy. In July a series of decisive naval engagements occurred. Both fleets suffered considerable damage, but the U.S. Navy prevented the Japanese from reenforcing their troops and removed all serious threats to further American landings in the area. The tide of battle had turned.

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In New Guinea the enemy fought with equal tenacity hut with the use of less extensive naval forces, for his seapower was concentrated primarily in the Solomons. Following the Coral Sea battle in May, the enemy increased his activity in New Guinea to parallel hie Solomons penetrations. The Japanese advance over the Stanley Owen mountain range, towards Port Moresby on the southern coast facing Australia, stalled just thirty miles short of the objective. Starting from the easternmost tip of the 1,500 mile long island, the Allied forces hopped up the coast. The Navy used planes and PT boats to reduce the Japanese barge traffic and the incursions of enemy submarines.

In the northern Pacific the only major naval engagement proved inconclusive and the enemy's endeavors to attack our convoys and landing forces used to recapture the Aleutians were unsuccessful. By August 1943, the string of northern islands forming the aerial highway between the two continents fell into our possession.

Although not mentioned as a part of specific engagements, the submarine must be mentioned as a force in itself which contributed greatly to curbing the enemy's advance. From the inception of the war, when 29 submarines based in the Philippines succeeded in delaying the Japanese advance, the underwater craft continued to interrupt the enemy's lines of communication and to attack his men-of-war and merchant men with telling effect. Without adequate shipping, Japan could not support or even hold her Pacific islands. The shipping lanes, therefore became the prime target of the submarines and resulted in their sinking throughout the war over 63% of all Japanese merchant tonnage lost.

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B. THE ATLANTIC THEATER:

At the outbreak of war, the American fleet in the Atlantic was employed primarily in escorting convoys to Great Britain, Russia, the Near East, the West Indies, and South America. This fleet also was so disposed that it might immediately be available against any German Fleet action against our shipping. The U-Boats took a toll of our shipping prior to our entry into war when American vessels pursued their trans-Atlantic traffic routes. In order to protect our shipping, we convoyed our traffic and also transferred fifty over-age destroyers to the British Fleet. With our entry into the war, however, every target became a legitimate one to the German periscopes. They spread their depredations into wide areas, while our resources were of necessity stretched, particularly in the escorting of troop movements, which left no adequate force to cover the many maritime traffic lanes. The early months of 1942 were disastrous to our coastal shipping despite our pressing into service every available vessel possibly convertible to anti-submarine warfare. By mid-1942, the coastal menace had become merely a problem, due chiefly to the production of sub-chasers under the Bureau of Ships' program. However, these little ships could not dispel the threat posed by submarines in the open sea. The larger vessels could not be produced as rapidly as the sub-chasers and it was not until late 1942 that this problem came under comparative control. The underwater craft took a toll not in combatant vessels but in merchant craft, which were of such vital importance in our supply and troop movements. By the middle of 1943, however, the tide had turned and the number of U-Boats lost by the enemy mounted quickly.

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And one more Nazi U-Boat heads for the bottom in the turning of the tide of the Battle of The Atlantic in spring of 1943. Anti-Submarine warfare waged on three fronts: Shore-Based Aircraft, Convoy Escorts and Roving Escort Carriers.

--312--

 

C. THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER:

The invasion of North Africa was a complicated operation. The perplexities presented by the uncertain French political situation were compounded by the necessarily combined operations, involving the Army,

Navy and Air Forces of the British and Americans, and by the unprecedented production and transportation problem involved. In July 1942 the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to invade North Africa within four months. The sharp repercussions of the shortness of notice upon the Bureau of Ships were without precedent. The French forces and German aircraft offered resistance at the five points of attack on North Africa, but it was short-lived.

American naval activity ceased in this theater, except for the operations of light units such as motor torpedo boats, until the German forces had been driven from Tunisia in May 1943. By then our fighting strength was such that plans could be made for a major offensive in the enemy's own territory. Sicily was designated as the immediate objective. The amphibious forces—unprecedented in size—landed at five points on July 10, 1943. By the 13th naval forces retired, having unloaded all troops, supplies and equipment, having repulsed with their guns the enemy's tank counterattack against the land forces, and having suffered little damage. During August the Navy supported the movements of land forces as they closed toward Messina, ending the Sicilian campaign.

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Thus had the tide turned in the European theater. All of this chronology, however, is but a backdrop against which the role of the Bureau of Ships may be studied. To distort a phrase: "The proof of the putting (out of ships) is in the heating (given the enemy)".

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II. SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTION:

With this historical background, it is possible to evaluate with better perspective and more readily the importance and magnitude of the shipbuilding program of the Bureau of Ships. In view of the fact, however that statistics are determined generally for an entire year, the study of production during the defensive and turning of the tide phases will be extended to January 1943—approximately five months into the offensive period of the war.

The accomplishments of the Bureau in this program cannot be measured solely in terms of dollars, number of ships, or tonnage of vessels completed. One of the Bureau's greatest achievements was its ability to meet changing demands for different types of vessels. As the requirements for global war was constantly increased and altered, so did the building program. Thus the task of the Bureau became one of not only controlling a tremendous production program but also maintaining flexibility.

A. BACKGROUND OF APPROPRIATIONS:

Before any contracts may be placed for the construction of naval vessels, however, Congressional authorization and appropriation must be obtained. With the advent of the emergency program, commencing with the 11% Expansion Act of June 1940 and the 70% Expansion Act ("Two Ocean Navy Bill") of July 1940,

Congress transferred control over building almost entirely to the Navy. In addition to adequacy of the appropriations, Congress granted to the Navy the power to determine to a large

--315--

extent the types and numbers of each class to be built.

The first wartime appropriation was the 5% Expansion Act of 23 December 1941, which increased the authorized combatant tonnage by 150,000 tons and provided that they should be of such "types and tonnages as he (the President of the United States) determines to be necessary for the successful prosecution of the war."

An even more unusual type of authorization grew out of negotiations over the United States' Lend-Lease aid to the British. After preparing a list of vessels which were to be built, the Navy found that Congress authorized the batch in the Act of 6 February 1942 in the following language; "That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to undertake the construction of one thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine minor combatant, auxiliary, and patrol vessels of various types, in addition to those heretofore authorized, for the United States Navy or for disposal in accordance with existing law."

As important or even more important than the increase in the flexibility of the authorization acts was the fact that authorizations grew to exceed the immediate constriction program; after July 9, 1942 it was unnecessary to obtain any additional authority.

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Table 37 lists the appropriations available to the Bureau of Ships for wartime construction.

Table 38 indicates those appropriations utilized for building during the first two years of war.

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TABLE 37

U. S. Naval Shipbuilding Program Authorization Acts

Name of Act

Date

Combatant
Vessels

Auxiliary
Vessels

Patrol, Mine,
and Miscellaneous 
Small Craft

Landing and
District Craft

Tonnage

Authorized

No. Authorized

Tonnage
Authorized

Vinson-Trammell

27 March

1934

1,262,068

20% Expansion

17 May 1938

1938

295,412

11% Expansion

14 June

1940

167,000

75,000

26 June

1940

39,552

289

70% Expansion

19 July

1940

1,525,000

100,000

72

9 Sept.

1940

186,640

31 Jan.

1941

400

5 April

1941

77,164

24 May

1941

550,000

21 Nov.

1941

400

17 Dec.

1941

800,000

400

5% Expansion

23 Dec.

1941

150,000

1,799 Vessels

6 Feb.

1942

#

#

#

#

(Emergency Construction
Program) Submarine Act, 1942

12 May

1942

200,000

None coined

9 July

1942

1,900,000

1,200,000

800 constr.

200 acquired

26 May

1943

1,000,000

17 June

1943

1,000,000

17 Dec.

1943

2,500,000

1,000,000

31 May

1944

1,000,000

5,299,480

6,528,556

2,561

5,000,000

# By the war's end 1,773 vessels were constructed under this program,  

251 – Auxiliary
178 - Destroyer Escort
4 - Experimental Ships 947 - Landing Craft
593 - Patrol, Mine, and Miscellaneous Small Craft

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TABLE 38

SHIP CONSTRUCTION OR ACQUISITION BY AUTHORIZING ACT January 1, 1942 -- January 1, 1944

PROGRAM NUMBER

AUTHORIZING ACT OF

CONSTRUCTION OR ACQUISITION

1942

No. 23

Vinson-Trammell

7 Destroyers, 5 Submarines

No. 24

70% Expansion

32 Destroyers

No 25

24 May 1941

550,000 tons of Auxiliaries
(including 15 CVE, 8 LSD, and patrol craft).

No. 26

21 Nov 1941

400 light draft vessels
(including 30 AM, 181 SC, 44 PC, 108 PT, 8 PGM).

No. 27

17 Dec 1941

400 light draft vessels
(including APC, PC, SC, PT, PGM, and YMS).

No. 28

17 Dec 1941

800,000 tons Auxiliaries
(including 29 CVE and considerable patrol craft).

No. 29

23 Dec. 1941

150,000 tons Combatants
(2 CV, 2 CL, 17 DD, 27 SS).

No. 30

13 May 1942

200,000 Tons Combatant;
102 SS, 4 DD.

1943

No. 31

9 July 1942

1,900,000 Tons Combatant:
10 CV, 4 CVE, 17 CA, 15 CL, 88 DD, 12 DM, 253 DE, 55 APD)

No. 32

9 July 1942

800 Patrol and Mine Vessels.

No. 33

9 July, 1942

200 Small Vessels for Coastal Defense

No. 34

9 July 1942

1.200,000 Tons Auxiliaries
(including 16 CVE and considerable landing craft).

--319--

These tables indicate that although a basis for recrimination might have existed in the limitation of Naval appropriations in the years immediately preceding the emergency, there could be no complaint on the part of the Navy after the program got under way. The funds to build whatever the Navy needed were never lacking. On 1 January 1940, when the emergency program had gained momentum, the 1,525,000 tons of authorized combatant vessels scarcely shaded the 1,275,000 tons on hand. Less than a month following Pearl Harbor, however, on 1 January 1942, the authorized strength jumped to 3,000,000 tons, with an appreciable increase in vessels on hand for the year. In the early part of 1942 little change occurred in either category, for the construction of ships required many months. By January 1, 1943, the combatant vessels on hand had increased to almost 1,600,000 tons, while authorized combatant tonnage became set at 5,275,000 for the rest of the war. The future appropriations were to be primarily for auxiliaries, patrol and landing craft.

In light of the war's chronology, inspection of the preceding tables suggests that although the authorization for combatant vessels was obtained well in advance of needs there was less leeway in the case of auxiliary vessels and landing craft. This is not, however, due to a strict policy on the part of Congress but, rather, to the Navy's tardiness in realizing the magnitude of its building programs in these two fields.

--320--

In the case of landing craft the early construction vas authorized under the general authority for the maintenance of the fleet and not until the size of the program grew to major proportions did it seem necessary to obtain special authority. In the case of auxiliaries it was simply a case of neglect of what was generally considered a secondary program until the later stages of the war, when logistic support of the fleet became the major bottleneck.

--321--

B. PRODUCTION PLANNING:

Under the circumstances already outlined, the responsibility of the Navy Department for the development of the shipbuilding program vas limited only by the Chief Executive, by others in the hierarchy of the war agencies who administered some of the Presidents war powers (principally the War Production Board), and by the decisions of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. These limitations, combined with the extensive appropriations, make very difficult an explanation of the manner in which wartime ship programs were decided upon. Theoretically, the assumed procedure was for the Secretary of the Navy to ask the General Board for recommendations as to what ships were to be built. A recommendation was then considered and acted upon by the Secretary after he had consulted and received the professional advice of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and the Vice-Chief of Naval Operations. Following the cognizant Bureau's comments as to practicability of attainment, the final directive passed to the Bureaus for accomplishment.

Actually the programs of the emergency period were a composite of the directives of many different agencies and embodied the independent ideas of many separate agencies, such as: Representatives of the United Kingdom; the Combined Chiefs of Staff; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Army Command; some separate desks in Operations; the Commander-in-Chief, etc. Many parts of the program were personally initiated by the President. After meetings of the Big Three, or of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, many changes were initiated.

--322--

Although the formal procedure requires that the Bureau of Ships maintain the position of an agent for the execution of the work laid out by higher authority, it was the one place where all parts of the program were brought together, and as a consequence much of the balance and coordination found in the final programs was the result of action initiated within the Bureau itself. Major programs initiated in the war period were dictated at the outset by strategic considerations, as the chronology has already indicated. Thus, for example, the German submarine warfare led to the destroyer escort program, the development of Army plans for invasion of hostile shores led to the landing craft programs, and the logistic requirements of the fleet, as it began to grow and operate further from home waters, led to the expansion in the auxiliary programs. Even in this area, however, the Bureau took action to anticipate the requirements of the fleet, as in the case of the destroyer escort program where the Bureau had prepared plans for such a vessel well before the need for them was generally recognized. After major programs had been initiated, however, the continuation of the various programs and the maintenance of the various programs in balance was a function of the Bureau. By keeping track of all available facilities and the status of all programs, the Bureau was in a position to make studies to advise the Vice Chief of Naval Operations of alternative programs which might be undertaken in the near future and initiate studies which could lead to the early determination of additional programs. In two instances the Bureau prepared detailed studies of additional con-

--323--

struction programs, projected some years in advance, which were later adopted with minor modifications for program planning purposes.

In all this procedure with regard to program determination individuals were often the spark plugs and in few oases were procedures and orderly methods of program determination developed.

The reason for this lack of planning on the part of well organised staff groups is beyond this study, but it seems that a large part of the responsibility may be found at the very highest levels of authority. The personal handling of many important matters by President Roosevelt was well known and tended to give advantage to the individual who could get to him with his case. The Joint Chiefs of Staff never established their authority in this area and, as a result, the importance assigned to the preparation of detailed program plane was diminished. Programs were prepared independently by the various procurement agencies without review or analysis by the Joint Chiefs or other groups to determine relative priority or to test their feasibility. Thus, it was often found that a given program could not be executed without delay and extensive readjustments. The difficulties in topside program determination are summarized in the report to the Secretary of the Navy on the "Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security" prepared under the direction of Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt. In a chapter on Procurement

--324--

and Logistics it reports that "The Navy did not provide for centralized accumulation and coordination of experience data and usage factors to the degree required for effective logistic planning. This not only prevented the development of complete logistic plans but handicapped the Navy’s procurement, distribution, and supply performance" (p. 105) In a later section of the same study further pertinent comment is made as follows:

"The split in the organizational structure of the Navy between the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, primarily a planning agency, the Secretary's Office, a policy agency, and the Bureaus, which were the procurement and distribution agencies, gave rise to another aspect of logistics which was not fully recognized by the Navy until late in the war. This was the matter of adequate controls. In any type of operation in which one group sets the goals to be attained, another sets the policies, and a third establishes the detailed plan to meet the goals, a need exists for controls in order to assure that detailed plans meet objectives and do not accumulate excessive surpluses. The Office of Procurement and Material of the Secretary's Office attempted to meet this need early in the war with only limited authority. A further attempt on a broader basis was made in February 1945 through the establishment by the Secretary of the Navy of the Requirements Review Board, composed of representatives from the staff of the Commander-In-Chief, United States Fleet, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary's Office .... Creation of this Board, however, did not cure the basic organizational weaknesses." (p. 110-111)

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The result of this failure to plan in advance and to consider the total production program in all of its ramifications led to the haphazard development of requirements. Regardless of the reason for the many program modifications, their existence made the job of the Bureau much more difficult than it would have been if greater stability had prevailed. The production planning reflecting strategy and operational necessities, as well as design advances under war experience, is expressed in two forms of directives: (1) the quantity of new construction and conversion by class of ships and (2) the precedence list of naval vessels.

--326--

1. CONSTRUCTION AND CONVERSION:

The frequency and severity of major changes in ship construction and conversion reflected major decisions in the evolution of the main strategy of the war. In some instances, also, specific campaigns altered the production program, either because our naval forces suffered severe losses in one class of ships or because our fleet sustained considerably less damage than anticipated. Consideration of Table 39, which lists the monthly directives for new construction and conversions during 1942 and 1943, may offer the individual reader interesting indications of altering strategy (in light of the chronology already presented). The frequent changes listed by this table, although offering some impression of the constant turbulence suffered by the production program, do not include the innumerable minor changes or those that were never made a matter of formal directive, the major changes that were planned but never executed in full, or the internal alterations resulting from manufacturers' inefficiencies or shortages.

Not one month of the twenty-four under consideration passed without the Bureau of Ships receiving at least one directive either ordering a ship to be built or cancelling others previously ordered. However small the number of vessels involved, each modification had its disruptive reaction on the Bureau's production and planning.

--327--

A CLEVELAND CLASS CRUISER UNDERGOING REPAIRS IN A FLOATING DRY DOCK CAPABLE OF HOLDING THE LARGEST SHIP AFLOAT.

These "Field Hospitals" for Navy ships proved an important factor in the successful prosecution of the war and in the issuance of construction directives and precedence lists.

--328--

[Proofers, please consult the original for the "red" items. (See footnote.)]

NEW CONSTRUCTION AND CONVERSIONS DIRECTED BY VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS OR SECRETARY OF NAVY TO THE BUREAU OF SHIPS - 1942 AND 1943

TABLE 39

LVT

LCS(S)(1)
LCS(S)(2)

LCP(N)

LCR
LCR(S)

LCP(L)
LCP(R)
LCVP
LCV

AD

AE

AF

AG

AK

AKA

APA

AP

APc

APB

APL

APR

APV

ARL-ARG
AR-ARS(T)
ARH-ARB
ARV-ARS
ARV(6)
AKV(A)
ASR-A6

AGC
AGP

AGS

AH

APH

AW

AKN
AKS
AKV
AN

AV
AVC
AVD
AVP

ATA
ATF
ATO
ATR

AO
AOG

PY
PYc

IX

CM
CMc

1942 January

71

406

402

4

11

3

49

1

3

6

1942 January

January

1

January

February

40

100

500

1

9

35

6

2

1

February

March

1100

3

1

1

1

8

8

3

March

March

March

April

1703

6

1

3

50

2

2

4

4

April

April

1

April

May

12

1645

97

4

2

2

6

1

1

14

14

4

5

May

May

3

May

June

600

600

1

1

1

4

3

2

June

June

June

July

30

300

3

50

3

14

July

August

600

74

1

11

15

1

40

24

August

August

1

August

September

1900

1118

120

1

8

26

6

3

2

1

1

September

September

1

September

October

107

3300

3

20

2

1

October

October

15

10

October

November

551

353

56

3

November

November

6

26

November

December

500

5

1

2

December

December

1

December

1943 January

54

4000

11

11

1

1

1943 January

January

January

February

400

1000

8

52

32

6

1

1

February

February

3

February

March

835

1

11

1

12

4

3

1+0

10

March

March

11

1

March

April

1

2

4

1

2

April

April

6

14

April

May

50

1

1

24

2

May

May

400

1

2

3

May

June

2120

282

2119

7259

7

3

12

51

6

3

13

7

2

June

June

June

July

1

11

14

3

2

2

1

July

July

3

July

August

15

2

5

August

August

2

August

September

1000

1

15

1

1

1

2

2

5

September

September

2

September

October

900

11

4

6

4

35

October

October

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

October

November

3936

21

10

2

8

November

November

1

1

November

December

3500

218

400

11

8

4

December

December

9

December

Months and Figures Underlined in Red Represent Decreases

--329--

NEW CONSTRUCTION AND CONVERSIONS DIRECTED BY VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS OR SECRETARY OF NAVY TO THE BUREAU OF SHIPS - 1942 AND 1943

TABLE 39 (Cont'd)

BB

CV
CVL

CB

CA

CL

DD

SS

CVE

DE

AM

PC

PCE

PCS

SC

PF

PG

PGM

PT
BPT
FTC

LSD

LSV

LST

LCS(l)(3)
LCI(FF) 
LCI(G)
LCI(L)

LSM

LSM(R)

LCT

LCM(3)
LCM(2)
(Mk 2)

1942 January

2

2

16

23

250

148

189

150

100

1

120

300

300

1942

January

January

January

February

30

150

February

March

6

2

26

4

March

March

6

March

April

5

63

200

850

April

April

6

56

April

May

14

17

19

100

120

24

420

190

350

500

May

May

3

May

June

3

43

50

90

110

123

40

June

June

3

100

30

June

July

July

August

1

8

30

August

August

August

September

2

10

September

September

48

September

October

80

457

October

October

October

November

88

November

November

November

December

December

December

December

1943 January

11

100

16

20

192

120

830

1943

January

January

2

1

January

February

15

50

2000

February

February

1

February

March

1

8

March

March

March

April

72

102

April

April

April

May

4

7

82

110

205

41

40

40

21

1

May

May

100

20

May

June

1

12

219

182

380

2775

June

June

3

June

July

20

July

July

5

July

August

1

609

August

August

37

August

September

24

100

220

1697

September

September

40

September

October

30

October

October

21

40

36

October

November

8

96

275

265

60

359

November

November

20

12

November

December

8

12

23

December

December

2

December

Months and Figures Underlined, in Red Represent Decreases

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Sufficient evidence is not available to make a thorough analysis of the justification for all the changes or their full significance -- and neither is it the intent of this history to pass judgment. For the benefit of future planning, however, it may be explained that many directives to the Bureau allowed inadequate time for execution of normal procedures in the ordering of material and scheduling of production. One of the most outstanding examples of this occurred between July and November of 1942. As we have seen, in July of that year the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to launch an unprecedented offensive against the shores of North Africa .... within three and one-half months! This occurred at a time when the production and scheduling of the Bureau was, for the first time, beginning to assume some semblance of order, following the initial wartime adjustment period. The confusion and effects of improvisation may readily be imagined. Some future decisions of this sort proved even more flagrant.

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2. PRECEDENCE LISTS:

In addition to the frequent additions and cancellations to the program already outlined, other directed changes proved equally upsetting to the production program. The most important were the frequent changes in precedence of various vessels or classes of vessels and the even more frequent changes in the characteristics of vessels which resulted from the accumulation of experience in operating theaters. Assuming that no more changes were made in designs than were justified by the improved results in performance, it is still important to realize that the emergency shipbuilding program was made much more difficult of achievement as a result. The possibility of adopting true mass production methods was severely limited and the procurement of materials and components was made more difficult. From December 1941 to October 1943, nine major precedence list changes were issued, which reflected more closely than all other modifications the changing fortunes of war and the major developments in strategy. These lists maintained a flexibility, but the price paid for them, as for the construction and conversion directives already discussed, was high in terms of the effort required to modify production schedules.

Table 40 outlines the nine major changes in precedence of naval vessels from our entry into the war until the end of 1943.

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TABLE 40

MAJOR CHARGES IN PRECEDENCE OF NAVAL VESSELS

Precedence
Group

17 December, 1941

18 March, 1942

4 June, 1942

3 Sept., 19421

30 Oct., 1942

5 Nov., 1942

11 Nov., 1942

24 Nov., 1942

5 Oct., 1943

A*

Overriding-Landing Craft, Orig. AA

Landing Craft (Orig. AA Priority)

NONE

SAME

SAME

SAME

All LST, LCI(L), LCT(E), LSM, LCM(3), LCVP, & LVT compl. prior to 1 June, 1944.

B*

Repairs & Alterations to operating vessels; Parts for SS, including spare.

CV 22, 9, 16, 23, 10, 17

(1) CV 22, 9, 16, 23, 10, 17

(2) "Must" items. Landing craft.

6 CV - 22, 9, 16, 23, 10, 17

SAME, plus 83 DE & BDE

SAME, plus Repairs, Alterations, necess. spare parts, 83 DE & BDEb

Repairs, Alterations, &

Spare Parts.

C*

1

BB 57, 58, 59, 60

SAME

DD, DE, BDE, completing by 9-30-43

SAME

SAME

"Must" items of landing craft -original priority: AA

DD, BDE, DE (after above 83); AM 58-65;

100-121; BAM 1-32.

SAME plus AM 122-131

All landing craft types; APA, AKA, AGC; selected AP.

2

CV 9, 16, 10, 17, 11, completing '43 in order listed.

CV 20, 9, 16, 23, 10, 17, 24, 11, 25, 26, 27, 28, 13.

BB 60

SAME

SAME

DD, BDE, DE AM 58-65; 100-121

BAM 1-32

Items of landing craft necess. to clear facil. for demand and keen amphib. forces supplied.

First:

200 LST

302 LCT(L) and 340 LCT(E) 

DD

Including Brazilian CT

3

BB 61-62, completing '43 in order listed.

AVC's converting (CVE's)

CV

CV, except above.

SAME

BB 60

SAME

Completed 11-10-42

CV except above 6

Formerly all AKA & APA now in Group I.

4

PC, 110' & 173'

Combat loaded AP's & AK's converting.

AVG (CVE) APA AKA conversions

SAME

SAME

CV, except above.

SAME

ACV(CVE), APA, & AKA Conversions.

SS

5

CL

BB 61-62

Patrol vessels

SAME

SAME

ACV (CVE), APA, & AKA Conversions.

SAME

Patrol vessels - 16 YN. Coast Guard-Ice breakers (CR 96-99 only)a

CV, CVL, CVB

6

DD

(DD, BDE)a

By quarters-patrol vessels, vessels undergoing overhaul.a

Cruisers

SAME

Patrol vessels & 10 YNa

SAME

Cruisers

Remainder of 1st 400 DE compl. after 10-1-43.

PF, PG, 226' CG Cutter before 4-1-44 + 44 'Winds

7

SS

CL

SS

SAME

SAME

Cruisers

SAME

SS

CVE

8

All other vessels.

DD & DE

BB 61-62

SAME

SAME

SS

SAME

BB 61-62

CA, CB, CL

9

SS

DD & DE; BDE completing after 9-30-42

SAME

SAME

BB 61-62

SAME

All other types of vessels.

BB

10

All other types in order of completion dates.

SAME

SAME

SAME

DD, BDE, DE compl. after 9-30-43.

All other types

Tugs & Barges.

11

All other types.

Remainder of Auxiliaries.

12

220' AM (Including Algerines)

13

All patrol craft, YN, AN, PE, SC, PCS, PCE, PCER, PT, PTC, BPT, RPT, RPC, YP & test. CG cutters, tenders & icebreakers

14

Remainder DE, PF, PG & 225' CG. 180' AM, APA, YMS, PT, YDG, YDT, YFB, YHB & small boats.

a-Added by 1-18-42 Letter

a-SS spare parts placed to rank with Patrol vessels-5-25-42

a-10 YN added by VCNO Ltr. 11-7-42

a - Added by VCNO Ltr. 12-31-42.

b - Repairs B Alterations

*A - "Overriding precedence" (WPB) Directive Assistance);

B - "First Precedence" (Repair & Alterations);

C - "Second Precedence" (Special cases as est'd in MPL).

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This table, more than any other, experiences a correlation with the historical chronology of campaigns. Issued jointly by the Bureaus of Ships and of Ordnance on 17 December 1941, the first directive reflected the battle damage suffered by our fleet at Pearl Harbor just ten days previously. The first and third precedences were awarded to battleships while the second centered on aircraft carriers, in which, as already seen by our comparative fleet charts, the American naval forces experienced an embarrassing inferiority. The fourth priority, awarded to patrol craft, indicated the vital need for coastal escort vessels to combat the submarine menace along our own shores. Destroyers and destroyer escorts, with fifth precedence, were required for the trans-Atlantic and Pacific escorting as well as for combat purposes in the projected plans to retake the Pacific islands. Submarines, in view of our comparative strength in this class, received seventh priority, with all other vessels following.

Within three months, however, two noticeable changes occurred on the precedence lists: emphasis increased on aircraft carriers and carrier escorts, while auxiliaries -- troop transports and supply ships -- jumped into the fourth priority.

On 4 July 1942, with the invasion of North Africa planned for November and of the southern Solomons for August, landing craft sky-rocketed from nowhere to a Double-A Over-Riding Precedence over all other vessels. With ships of Pearl Harbor declared quickly repairable and with battle damage suffered by our naval forces at the battles of Coral Sea and Midway making inoperative a portion of our fleet, repairs and alterations to operating vessels assumed

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precedence B -- the second highest. Number 1 precedence (or third highest) then fell to the destroyers and destroyer escorts, to better maintain our increasing lines of communication. Carriers, carrier escorts, and auxiliaries also rated top priorities.

The fourth major precedence list, following the battle of and landings on Guadalcanal and immediately preceding the invasion of North Africa, was issued on 3 September 1942. Landing craft still dominated all others, with aircraft carriers receiving second emphasis following our heavy losses during the first battles of the Solomons and the Battle of Midway. Destroyers and transports still retained considerable attention.

Not until 11 November 1942 did the list materially alter. At this time landing craft continued to retain first consideration, but aircraft carriers divided second highest precedence with 83 DEs, as the escort program continued to be of utmost importance for the protection of our expanding lanes of supply and communication, principally to Africa, England, South and Southwest Pacific, and Russia.

On 24 November 1942 repairs, alterations and necessary spare parts again received part of the primary considerations, with all other precedences remaining fundamentally the same.

This list continued almost entirely intact until 5 October 1943.

By the end of the offensive phase in August 1943, the Allied nations, as we have seen, had turned the tide and were on the offensive throughout the globe. By this time our tactics and strategy had changed, which became reflected in the precedence list of 5 October. The A precedence continued to be awarded to

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major landing craft but now only to those major types to be completed by 1 June 1944 — the sailing date of the last convoy to arrive before the invasion of Normandy. With primary attention having been devoted to production since the war's inception, spare parts and maintenance of necessity had to toe disregarded. Now, however, repairs, alterations and spare parts assumed the second highest precedence, for many of the vessels produced within the twenty-three months of war were easily put out of commission for want of a small spare part. Additional emphasis to landing craft was expressed with the award of third precedence to all types together with troop transports and supply ships. Destroyers for convoy and combatant support came next on the list followed by all other transports and supply ships not selected for third precedence. By now our submarine offensive warfare was waging in the westernmost reaches of the Pacific with telling effect, principally upon the Japanese merchant ships so vitally needed in the support of their hard pressed troops. To bring greater pressure to bear upon this Nipponese lifeline, submarines were awarded sixth precedence. By this time, also, carriers had been rushed off the ways under the earlier pressure of construction, so that they now were moved down the ladder as the demand for future production proved less pressing than the foregoing classes. Patrol craft, destroyer escorts and carrier escorts continued to enjoy some emphasis in view of protection required for the continuing extension of our communication and supply lines. Battleships rated priority over the remaining vessels. Thus did the precedence lists reflect the changing strategy and tides of war during the first two years.

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3. OTHER PROBLEMS AND A SUMMARY:

Still another constant source of change in program arose out of the shortages which continued to crop up in the war economy. Some of these required changes in design to permit the substitution of some material or component for another in short supply, others resulted in delays which had not been anticipated in the completion of certain vessels, thus tying up critical material where it was doing little good.

One of the best summaries of the difficulties faced by the Bureau in the early period is contained in a memorandum sent by Vice Admiral S. M. Robinson to the Under Secretary of the Navy 31 July 1942. This memorandum is reproduced in full as it gives the Bureau's side of the case and illustrates most of the problems faced to a greater or lesser extent throughout the entire war.

--338--

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

ept, 4, 1942

From: The Chief of the Office of Procurement and Material
To: The Chief of Naval Operations
SUBJECT: Delays in Shipbuilding Program

Enclosure: (herewith)

(A) Copy of OP&M Memo PM 200:JWP/C/hkc, PM 7311031 dated 7/31/42

1. It appears highly desirable to present a general discussion of the delays which have been encountered in the shipbuilding program, the reasons therefor, and the possible effect on the completion of the program. In general, there are only five causes of shipbuilding delays, namely: Program, Design, Facilities, Labor and Materials.

PROGRAM

The Program is a general cause of delays in two ways - (a) size, and (b) changes:

(a) The size of the Program is effective in delaying the shipbuilding program, principally through the working of the other causes when the size becomes excessive. Measured in man-hours, the total value of the Shipbuilding Program on the books on September 1, 1939 was 360,000,000 man-hours; it had risen to about 2,250,000,000 man-hours on January 1, 1942, and as of today is 3,000,000,000 manhours. If this program had grown in an orderly way, any delayed effect of the growth would be chargeable to others of the general causes. Since it actually grew in a disorderly manner, the effects are better described in the next sub-paragraph under Changes in the Program.

(b) Changes in the Program have been by the addition of new elements and by changes in relative priority of existing elements, For example, the landing craft program which was superimposed, represents approximately 100

--339--

percent utilization of the entire shipbuilding labor force for more than 10 weeks. It can be expected that this one change, alone, may represent an overall delay in the entire program of three or more months. Such an effect cannot be analyzed in detail. In connection with this matter, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum which I prepared for the Under Secretary of the Navy, which presents the general chronology of the changes which have occurred in the shipbuilding program since only the beginning of 1942. Any changes which constitute a superimposition of additional program on an existing one must inevitably lead to delays in other parts of the existing program and changes which advance completion date of any parts of the program must lead to compensatory delays in other parts of the program.

DESIGN

Design has been and will probably continue to be cause for some delays. This is effective under two categories - (c) Slowness in development of the basic ship design, and (d) Changes in the Design either during or after development:

(c) It has been necessary to prepare many new designs of entirely new types such as: escort vessels (DE), Submarine Chasers 180' (PC), Motor Minesweepers (YMS), Landing Ship Dock (LSD), Landing Ship Tank (LST), Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI(L)), Landing Craft Tank, Mark 5 (LCT(5)), and many others. In addition to that, for Practically every other type, modified designs were necessary and these modifications were so great as to constitute essentially new designs. The number of these designs and the necessity for going to many design agents with little or no naval experience has resulted in some delays. Perhaps the most marked of these delays have been .in the motor minesweeper (YMS) and the 180' Subchasers and Minesweepers. Both of these designs through necessity were assigned to agencies which had difficulty in getting under way on a type of work which for them was entirely new.

--340--

(d) Design changes during the construction of a ship, although frequently quite minor in themselves, are cumulatively destructive of shipbuilding progress. Any design change involves some drafting work which must be awaited in most cases before the physical work can be done. If in addition the change requires the scrapping of some work already completed, the probability is that even in a simplification, the net result will be an increase in the changes in the 220' minesweeper program. It is my opinion that during the progress of any war, design changes made at times as result of analysis of action reports and delays resulting from these changes must be paid for by delays in vessels, and should therefore be limited to an irreducible minimum.

FACILITIES

It was generally and publicly recognized when the expanded shipbuilding program was initiated that increase in the facilities for building ships would have to be undertaken. It was not as well recognized that the facilities for the building of many ship components would likewise have to be expanded, nor were the details of what these expansions would have to be known.

(e) Expansions of shipbuilding facilities have come about in three ways: enlargement of existing plants experienced in Naval work; second, building of entirely new plants and assigning Navy work to and enlargement of yards which had not theretofore built Navy ships. These were planned to provide for the specific program in mind at the time. These expansions were based on best expected production rates, measured by time on the ways, available at the time. Developments to date indicated that as far as the actual occupancy of shipbuilding ways is concerned, the time required is considerably less than was thought to be attainable a year or two ago. The result has been some curtailment in the expansion originally planned. At the present time from

--341--

the expansions which are practically completed, we have attained a position where shipbuilding way facilities for combatant ships are in excess of the most hopeful flow of material to these ways. Today there is no real delay nor is any to be expected hereafter due to shortage of shipbuilding facilities (ways), themselves.

(f) In addition to the quantity of shipbuilding facilities, their quality is an immediate factor. Due to the spread of work in the small yards, many small shipbuilders became involved in work with which they were totally unfamiliar. The period which was necessary for the indoctrination of these inexperienced builders and the elimination of some of them resulted in delayed programs. This was notably true in the case of the 173' subchasers.

(g) Expansion of facilities to produce ships' components has proven to be much more onerous than that of providing the ship ways themselves. It has also been a much heavier contributor to shipbuilding delays up to date. This is due to two reasons: it is normally much simpler to build a shipbuilding way than it is to build a factory for the manufacture of a machine; and the need for expanded facilities for many components was not apparent in time to prevent a shortage of that component from causing delay in ships' construction. Among the delays from this cause which can be cited are delays in submarine chasers and minesweepers due to insufficient facilities for the manufacture of gears; minor delays in practically all types because of lack of facilities for the manufacture of valves; delays in some destroyers because of lack of facilities for the production of turbines and gears, and for forced draft blowers. There will be delays from this cause, for a short time, however, because the facilities for erecting ships have reached completion ahead of the facilities for construction of ship components. Unless there is an unforeseen increase in the shipbuilding program, or in some other war program which interferes with the manufacture of shipbuilding components, causes of delay in

--342--

ships' construction due to facilities for manufacturing components should disappear by the spring of 1943.

LABOR

Labor can be the cause of shipbuilding delays for one of three cause - (h) insufficient labor; (i) untrained labor; (j) strikes or other labor troubles:

(h) In general, there has been no shortage up to the present time in the supply of unskilled labor available for training in shipbuilding. The increase from 53,554 men working an average of 37.4 hours per week on September 1, 1939, to 574,715 men working an average of 49.3 hours per week on the 1st of August, 1942, is a measure of the accomplishment. This represents an increase from about 2,000,000 man-hours a week to over 28,300,000, or 1416 percent. There is a possibility of delay in all of the Navy Yards because of the chance that at some moment a repair load of such magnitude as to stop or materially slow down shipbuilding may be imposed. There have been none but minor delays in ships due to an insufficiency of labor.

(i) There have been some delays due to dilution of labor, that is, the expansion of force with the spreading of the experienced craftsmen thinner to productive work. Very few delays can be specifically charged to this account but this has certainly been a contributing factor to many of them. At the present time and in the future this cause of delay should be eliminated unless the working of the Selective Service Act should require the replacement of a large number of ship yard workers.

(j) There have been many, usually minor and scattered, strikes in ship yards and component manufacturing plants. Cases where these have resulted in specific delays of ships have not been of great consequence except the strike at the Federal S. B. & D. D. Company where some destroyers were delayed for about a month. These delays have been more than made up at the present time.

--343--

MATERIALS

The shortage of materials has caused many delays to date. Fleet Tugs building by Charleston S. B. & D. D. Company were delayed in starting due to the non-delivery of steel. The CURRITUCK, AV7, building at the Philadelphia Navy Yard was held up for some months for some cause. It is only quite recently that the effect of shortages of material have become glaringly apparent. The reports appear to be coming from all sides that something will be delayed unless material is obtained. It now appears that due to alloy steel shortages we may be delayed in turbines, diesel engines and gears with resulting delays in almost every Type of ship. It is expected if the copper situation does not clarify, that specific delays due to copper shortages will begin to show up. Any delay due to raw material becomes effective only after stocks are completely deleted and the effect of the delay actually shows up in respect to the finished ship. Due to the fact that inventories have been available in most cases and the critical delays to date with few exceptions have been in the manufacture of components, it is not possible to analyze the effect of these delays on specific ships.

In any consideration of this subject, it must be recognized that many apparent delays have resulted from over-optimistic predictions rather than to actual delays. Before any delay, it must be established that the original scheduled completion date, or the one from which the delay was counted, was responsible. Delays have been charged where greater experience in accepting the job of building a ship would have resulted in an initial completion date somewhat later than the one arrived at. By the first of October all predicted completion dates will have been reduced to realism and any delays which result thereafter can be definitely traced to some specific cause, if any base line date previous to that one is used for determining delays, there will always be the possibility that apparent delays are really poor original predictions.

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INDICATED DELAYS

It must be realized that predicted completion dates are often set for "pressure purposes." By this is meant that at the time of negotiating the contracts the earliest possible completions date is established in order to insure that every effort is made to complete the vessels as soon as it is physically possible to do so. By this method it is felt that delivery of a vessel is definitely expedited but this procedure creates an impression that the Bureau and the shipbuilders have fallen down on the job due to the fact that the most optimistic dates as established cannot in all cases be met. A good example of this is the Aircraft Carriers. When the "speedup" order for Carriers was received in December, 1941, the Bureau of Ships called a conference of all interested parties and arbitrarily fixed the most optimistic completion dates over the protest of the shipbuilders that these dates were impossible of accomplishment. Notwithstanding the protest, these dates were established and the progress reports were prepared accordingly. Although some, at least, of these dates will not be met, I am confident that we will get the vessels at an earlier date than would otherwise have been possible. [/block]

"IN SUMMARY"

[block] Shortage of critical materials is at present the controlling factor in the Shipbuilding Program and it is not possible to make accurate prediction as to deliveries until this cause of delay is under better control. The increasing effect of loss of labor to the draft introduces another indeterminate element in an attempt to predict future progress. However, the ability of the shipyards to train inexperienced personnel to build up their present forces, is good insurance that delay from this cause will not be serious or long as men and women are available for shipyard work. Lack of manufacturing capacity to produce machinery and auxiliaries has been a major cause of delays and will probably continue to

--345--

be through the larger part of the calendar year 1943. Future modifications in the Building Program and in the relative importance of various classes of ships, of which some 21 instances were experienced in the first seven months of this year, is another unpredictable factor. Changes in design have delayed the Shipbuilding Program. Further changes, if made, will unquestionably cause further delays, proportionate to the extent of such changes.

Summing up all of the above causes of delay it is evident that no accurate prediction can be made as to deliveries until the present critical material situation is under much better control than at the present time. Once this primary uncertainty is removed, reasonably accurate dates of delivery can be set. It is impossible to overemphasize the vital necessity of eliminating present critical material delays."

S. M. ROBINSON
Chief of Office of Procurement & Material

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PM 200:JWP/c/hkc
PM 7311031
July 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Under Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Chronology of Modification of Shipbuilding Program. January 1, 1942 to July 1942.

1. Since the beginning of 1942 the Navy Shipbuilding Program has been in almost continuous turmoil due to no less than 21 modifications, or changes in, or additions to the number and types of ships under construction and to changes in priority directives, as the apparent urgent need varied for first one and then another type of vessel. Without going into great detail, the following list of actions or threatened actions affecting this program since the first "Ship Priority Grouping" was prepared by the Bureau of Ships on December 17, 1941, and since the first master list was prepared on January, 1942, 12 have taken place:

(a) During December 1941 and January 1942 the Emergency Construction Program was approved by representatives of. the British Government to include 1929 vessels. This was approved by the President in January, 1942 for 1799 vessels. Among these vessels were 250 escort vessels, 300 Atlantic Tank Lighters, 150 - 180' Submarine Chasers, etc. The completion date was set for 1944.

(b) In January 1942, the House Naval Affairs Committee exerted considerable pressure on the Navy Department to speed up the submarine program and proposed a large appropriation for additional vessels of this type. As one of the results, the Cramp Shipbuilding Company was assigned to build this type in addition to its program of 6" gun cruisers, and an additional yard was constructed at Groton, Connecticut.

(c) During February and March it was determined to convert certain 6" gun cruisers to airplane carriers. It required some weeks of study and discussion to determine the number of these vessels to be converted and the best procedure for effecting their completion at the earliest possible date. The entire program was eventually concentrated at the New York Shipbuilding Company plant and nine vessels were finally affected by this change, which required about five separate orders, and which of necessity caused confusion in the building program of that company. The New York Shipbuilding Company is one of the Navy's major shipbuilding yards.

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(d) In February 1942 additional Landing Craft were ordered and their delivery set for the spring of 1944.

(e) In April 1942, impending shortages of the steel required a reassessment of the entire program, and as a result 48 minesweepers and 56 - 180' submarine chasers from the Emergency Program were cancelled.

(f) In April 1942 the shortages of steel and other critical material necessitated the consideration of a flat 30% reduction in the Navy Program, which was finally found to be not necessary.

(g) In April 1942 the completion of a proportion of the Landing Craft Program was advanced and additional vessels were contracted for. This program was at that time set for completion by September 30, 1942. The addition to this program were provided as a margin to meet possible failure by some of the less experienced contractors.

(h) In April 1942, 50 small Coastal Transports were added to the Program to meet unforeseen requirement due to submarine losses and other transportation shortages.

(i) In April 1942, because of the large submarine losses, the maximum pressure was placed on the completion of the anti-submarine vessels of 110' and 183' types.

This delayed and interfered with some of the other building programs where material had to be diverted from large to smaller vessels.

(j) In April 1942, the shortage of steel necessitated changing 14 types of vessels to wood and concrete construction. Of course all of these vessels had to be redesigned. The result was a saving of about 40,000 tons of steel, but a delay in the placing of contracts and the completion dates of the vessels.

(k) In May 1942, the completion of the Landing Craft Program was advanced from September 30 to September 1, with further dislocation of the program of vessels competing for the material necessary for the Landing Craft.

In May 1942, the Navy Department was requested to expedite completion of convoy vessels. The necessity for these vessels was urged as more important than other classes of higher priority.

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(m) In May 1942, the dates of delivery of the bulk of the Landing Craft that were still scheduled for completion during the spring of 1944 were advanced to February 15, 1943. At this time additional ships were added to the program to provide a margin for the earlier completion dates. To attain this goal, these ships were given priority over all the rest of the war effort and to meet it, experienced yards were assigned contracts for these ships, in spite of the fact that they were already fully employed on other combatant types of vessels. This similarity effected all material suppliers.

(n) In May 1942, a priority directive was issued that would have brought to a halt a very considerable proportion of the combatant ship program by reducing the priorities on material for certain of these vessels to a priority rating where deliveries of material could not even be hoped for. The combined efforts of the representatives of the Navy Department, including the Secretary of the Navy, were necessary to countermand this directive.

(o) In May 1942 the mounting difficulty of obtaining steel plants, together with shortages of other critical material, resulted in the deferring of construction of Battleships 67-71 inclusive and the cancellation of Large Cruisers, 5-6 inclusive.

(p) In order to meet the requirements for expedited delivery, the machinery for the escort vessels was changed, and the revision of machinery plans caused confusion and delay in the progress of these vessels.

(q) Early in June 1942, Mr. Henry Kaiser proposed to build aircraft carriers of the type of the AVGs converted from Maritime Commission C3 ships. This proposal was approved by the President first for 100 of these vessels, later reduced to 50. The material for these aircraft carriers became a matter of major importance as the steel plates had to be supplied either from the Navy or from the Maritime Commission Program. A few days later a proposal was made by Mr. Kaiser that he also build a large number of escort vessels. At one time this was approved, but the order was later cancelled. It was determined to build new shipyard for the building of Kaiser aircraft carriers, but his was later changed and aside from

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a small addition to one yard, these vessels will be constructed in an existing shipyard replacing the same number of Maritime Commission vessels. These negotiations with Mr. Kaiser continued during most of June.

(r) In July, great pressure was brought to bear to expedite Landing Craft, which were given priority over all other vessels.

(s) In July, great pressure was brought to bear to push the completion of escort vessels, and priorities were requested ahead of all other vessels except Landing Craft.

(t) In July, great pressure was brought to bear to complete Patrol Craft and priorities were requested ahead of all other vessels except Landing Craft and escort vessels.

(u) In July, priorities for ship groups were reassigned and finally approved, which has resulted in a rearrangement of priorities for materials for many groups of ships in the program.

2. The Bureau of Ships is now preparing a new master priority list. During August, the program should be reestablished on a revised basis to meet, so far as possible, the conflicting demands for the various types of vessels. That all of these proposals have delayed the entire program and have resulted in great confusion is self-evident. To anyone conversant with the tremendous detail involved in scheduling the material for building ships and programing the work of construction, it is immediately apparent that our program has been seriously hampered. The revised schedule now under way should not be changed except for reasons far more compelling than most of those enumerated above that have resulted in the confusion and interference of the last seven months.

S. M. ROBINSON
Vice Admiral, USN

--350--

Although this memo is comprehensive it does not illustrate changes caused later by shortage of labor or strikes, by the failure of a company or yard to live up to a predicted production schedule and the necessity for all or a part of its work to be farmed out to others, and finally the changes required to substitute less critical for items in short supply.

An example of a change resulting from labor shortages was the shift of three cruisers, seven destroyers, four minesweepers, and nine ocean going tubs from the San Francisco area to free the area for repair work. The Bureau was directed to take this action by a letter from the Vice-Chief of Naval Operations of 21 September 1943. At the same time it was also directed to slow down the rate of construction of some of the vessels remaining in the area.

The type of case in which a company failed to live up to its schedules and perform in a satisfactory manner is illustrated by the Cramp Shipbuilding Company which could not make normal progress on the submarines it was building. Several had to be sent to the Portsmouth Navy Yard to be finished. Other Cramp Ships had to be cancelled and reassigned to other yards in addition to their existing burden.

Shortage of particular items led to many different changes in the program. One of the most important was the necessity of redesigning the destroyer escort to provide for four entirely different types of propulsion equipments, there not being sufficient turbine capacity to equip all the vessels building according to the original designs.

--351--

Throughout the program difficulties arose from the fact that additions to the main program which developed from time to time usually carried a high priority and often had to be worked into the program ahead of vessels already under construction. One of the first major cases of this type was the addition of a large number of large landing craft to the program in May 1942. The need for these craft was such that large ways, normally used only for major combatant vessels, were cleared, even after keels were laid, to make way for LSTs. Similar measures were used to speed up the output of destroyer escorts when they had top precedence and, later, when carriers were given precedence over the rest of the program.

A different sort of change, but in many ways as detrimental to the accomplishment of efficient results, was the cancellation of many vessels. Aside from the lose of material components, the greatest lose resulting from cancellation was the effect of such changes on planning, scheduling, and estimating the future work program. The amount of time devoted to review and reappraisal of the program due to cancellations is impossible to determine but it was greater than most would like to admit.

Inadequate data on the supply and requirements of basic materials caused many adjustments as the true position became known. This was a fault which grew out of inadequate central control over the total war program. In the case of the shipbuilding program the decision to abandon certain facility expansion programs in April 1942 was the direct result of an appraisal

--352--

of the steel situation and a decision that the capacity of fabricating plants exceeded the capacity of steel mills. In other words inability to predict accurately the supply and requirements for steel tended to delay the creation of a balanced program.

The evolution outlined above points to one of the major problems of any agency responsible for the control of a major program in time of war: How can efficiency in production be reconciled with the type of flexibility which war demands? If the ideal in efficiency were to be attained there would be few if any, changes in the program. If the ideal in flexibility were to be attained the system would be geared to meeting any change in the program which might give temporary advantage to the commanders in the fleet. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that the groups responsible for the major decisions do not bear the responsibility for the efficient execution of the program, and the group responsible for the production of vessels and equipments does not always see the importance of the maintenance of flexibility. The danger in this situation arises if either group does not keep the other's point of view and problems in mind. If those who think of efficiency in production are not careful, it is possible that the system established to maximize output will become an end in itself, at the cost of getting the type of equipment most needed in the prosecution of the war. On the other hand, if the immediate needs of the fleet are used to justify changes without regard to the

--353--

effect of such change on output, the price paid for flexibility might eliminate the value of flexibility.

Two factors make analysis of this problem in the war period difficult. First, it is too early to gather all the information together which bears on the problem and, second, it is generally accepted that the tremendous productive resources of this country were never sufficiently taxed so that emergency programs necessitated such cutbacks in other areas of war production that the war effort was seriously impaired. If the balance between the enemy and our forces had been more even, the question would have arisen in a much more realistic form.

--354--

C. PRODUCTION RECORD:

The rapidity of the naval expansion under the auspices of the Bureau of Ships had a profound effect upon our military strategy. Regarding this, Admiral King stated: "As a result (of our rapid naval expansion) we were enabled to seize and hold the initiative sooner than we had originally anticipated, and to deal successfully with the submarine situation in the Atlantic. The former, of course, meant a vast improvement in our military situation everywhere, and the latter was of great benefit to the shipping situation, which was very serious in the early months of the war and threatened to become more so with the prospective increases in overseas troop movements and their support."

This expansion leading to our "holding the initiative" in the offensive phase of the war may best be illustrated by a graphic presentation. Now that we have seen the strategy and course of the war reflected in precedence lists and production directives, the following Tables 41 to 48 and Chart XIII will present the number and tonnage of vessels actually completed, converted and acquired, by class and types, during 1942 and 1943.

--355-

CHART XIII

CUMULATIVE TONNAGE COMPLETED OF NEW CONSTRUCTION FROM
1 JANUARY 1942 - 1 JANUARY 1944.

--356--


TABLE 41

ESTIMATED DOLLAR VALUE
CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE APPROPRIATIONS ONLY
OF SHIP COMPLETIONS 1942 - 1943

1942

1943

CLASS AND TYPE OF VESSEL

1ST HALF

2ND HALF

1ST HALF

2ND HALF

CONSTRUCTION - TOTAL

$720,249,000

$1,468,597,000

$2,550,974,000

$3,799,208,000

COMBATANT *

496,852,000

704,899,000

1,431,962,000

2,499,053,000

MINE CRAFT

58,759,000

157,482,000

156,519,000

256,826,000

PATROL CRAFT

80,762,000

169,829,000

179,498,000

207,897,000

AUXILIARIES

46,071,000

51,101,000

154,834,000

164,965,000

LANDING CRAFT

25,641,000

385,689,000

604,226,000

620,412,000

DISTRICT CRAFT

12,164, 000

19,597,000

23,935,000

50,055,000

COMBATANT CRAFT:

BATTLESHIP BB

175,895,000

57,027,000

147,218,000

0

AIRCRAFT CARRIER CV

0

53,200,000

159,600,000

159,600,000

AIRCRAFT CARRIER, LARGE CVB

0

0

0

0

AIRCRAFT CARRIER, ESCORT CVE

0

0

141,150,000

112,920,000

LARGE CRUISER CB

0

0

28,512,000

152,064,000

HEAVY CRUISER CA

0

0

0

0

LIGHT CRUISER CL

0

0

53,686,000

53,686,000

DESTROYER DD

75,654,000

98,062,000

49,312,000

112,828,000

DESTROYER DD

156,760,000

394,749,000

456,830,000

512,208,000

DESTROYER ESCORT DE, BDE

0

0

267,367,000

1,212,739,000

SUBMARINE SS

90,543,000

101,861,000

128,287,000

183,008,000

 

--357--

TABLE 42

NEW CONSTRUCTION, CONVERSIONS AND ACQUISITIONS
BY NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE
COMPLETED BY TYPE - 1942 AND 1943

1942

`943

No. Vessels

Tonnage

No. Vessels

Tonnage

Combatant

145

595,294

568

1,779,571

Mine Craft

269

75,920

389

120,752

Patrol Craft

474

84,821

716

132,698

Auxiliary

184

584,160

328

792,440

District Craft (S. P.)

499

61,617

243

53,337

District Craft (N. S. P.)

238

38,939

500

173,754

Total District Craft

737

100,556

743

227,091

Landing Craft (Large)

680

171,235

825

618,481

Landing Craft (Small)

8,799

58,763.1

20,708

175,278.9

Total Landing Craft

9,479

229,998.1

21,533

793,759.0

Small Boats

4,090

15,964.2

6,860

33,177.1

Total all Types

15,378

1,686,713.3

31,137

3,879,489.0

--358--

TABLE 43

NEW CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 1942 - 1943

COMBATANT, MINE CRAFT AND PATROL CRAFT

1942

1943

No. Vessels

Tonnage

No. Vessels

Tonnage

COMBATANT

Battleships (BB)

4

140,000

2

90,000

Aircraft Carriers

CV

1

27,100

6

162,600

CVE

19

254,980

CVL

9

99,000

Cruisers

CA

4

54,400

CL

8

68,000

7

62,000

Destroyers (DD)

81

143,990

128

255,810

Destroyers Escort (DE)

300

385,625

Destroyer Escort (British)(BDE)

6

6,900

Submarines (SS)

34

51,884

56

85,456

TOTAL COMBATANT

128

430,974

537

1,456,771

 

MINE CRAFT

Mine Layers (CM)

1

4,710

Minesweepers (AM)

33

18,555

63

44,450

Large Minesweepers (LL) (BAM)

15

11,925

Coastal Minesweepers (AMc)

35

6,650

Motor Minesweepers (YMS)

130

26,910

264

54,648

Motor Minesweepers (LL) (BYMS)

33

6.831

47

9,729

TOTAL MINE CRAFT

232

63,656

389

120,752

 

PATROL CRAFT

Submarine Chasers (SC)

186

15,570

221

18,785

Submarine Chasers (PC)

109

29,975

127

34,925

Patrol Craft Escort (PCE)

23

13,754

Submarine Chasers (PCS)

9

1,827

Gun Boats (PG)

6

5,340

19

17,435

Motor Torpedo Boats (PT)

110

4,113

237

8,682

Motor Torpedo Boats (BPT)

17

561

41

1.353

TOTAL PATROL CRAFT

428

55,559

677

96.761

--359--

TABLE 44

NEW CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED 1942 AND 1943 AUXILIARIES

1942

1943

No. Vessels

Tonnage

No. Vessels

Tonnage

Ammunition Ships (AE)

1

5,220

Motor Torpedo Boats Tenders (AGP)

4

6,112

Cargo Ships (AK)

5

5,780

Cargo Ships (Lend Lease) (BAK)

2

2,312

Gasoline Tankers (AOG)

6

11,010

Transport Attack (APA)

2

8,722

Coastal Transports (APc)

21

3,465

78

12,870

Repair Ships (AR)

1

8,350

Repair Ships Battle Damage (ARB)

3

4,470

Repair Ships Landing Craft (ARL)

6

8,940

Salvage Vessels (ARS)

11

11,825

Salvage Vessels (Lend Lease) (BARS)

5

5,324

Submarine Tenders (AS)

1

8,680

2

17,360

Submarine Tenders (ASR)

1

1,598

4

6,392

Ocean Going Tugs (AT)

7

7,476

Ocean Going Tugs (Lend Lease) (BAT)

11

11,748

Ocean Tugs, Fleet (ATF)

24

27,504

Ocean Tugs, Rescue (ATR)

23

15,816

Seaplane Tenders (Small) (AVP)

4

6,264

8

12,528

TOTAL AUXILIARY

45

39,231

185

170,535

--360--

TABLE 45

DISTRICT CRAFT

SELF PROPELLED AND NON-SELF PROPELLED
NUMBER OF VESSELS AND
TONNAGE COMPLETED 1942-1943

1942

1943

No. Vessels

Tonnage

No. Vessels

Tonnage

SELF PROPELLED

Diving Tenders (YDT)

1

190

Covered Lighters (YF)

8

2,560

13

4,160

Ferry Boats & Launches (YFB)

5

75

Garbage Lighters (YG)

8

1,480

Net Tenders (YN)

4

2,000

3

3,174

Fuel Oil Barges (YO)

6

5,556

25

11,958

Gasoline Barges (YOG)

4

1,688

District Patrol Craft (YP)

6

198

10

330

Seaplane Wrecking Derricks (YSD)

7

700

5

500

Harbor Tugs (Big) (YTB)

4

1,180

15

4,570

Harbor Tugs (Little) (YTL)

18

1,116

42

2,904

Harbor Tugs (Lend Lease) (BYT)

2

620

Harbor Tugs (Lend Lease) (PYT)

1

310

Water Barges (YW)

8

3.376

TOTAL (S.P.) DISTRICT CRAFT

58

14,005

135

34,640

NON-SELF PROPELLED

Open Lighters (YC)

62

7,333

124

13,300

Car Floats (YCF)

3

522

Open Cargo Lighters (YCK)

51

3,920

Aircraft Transportation Lighters (YCV)

2

200

5

827

Covered Lighters (YF)

63

9,120

149

21,040

Torpedo Transportation Lighters (YFT)

4

345

Garbage Lighters (YG)

2

180

8

360

Gate Vessels (YNg)

12

2,575

Fuel Oil Barges (YO)

9

2,700

4

892

Gasoline Barges (YOG)

3

746

17

3,791

Floating Workshops (YR)

11

5,940

8

4,320

Floating Workshops (Hull) (YRD(H))

3

1,620

Floating Workshops (Mach.) (YRD(M))

3

1,620

Stevedore Barges (YS)

12

600

4

200

Sludge Removal Barges (YSR)

3

307

Torpedo Testing Barges (YTT)

1

430

2

860

Water Barges (YW)

2

446

15

3,730

TOTAL (N. S. P.) DISTRICT CRAFT

177

28,869

405

59,055

--361--

TABLE 46

LANDING CRAFT

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND
TONNAGE COMPLETED 1942 - 1943

1942

1943

No. Vessels

Tonnage

No. Vessels

Tonnage

LARGE

Landing Ship, Dock (LSD)

8

36,000

Landing Ship, Tank (LST)

62

92,380

336

500,640

Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)

153

26,775

305

58,367

(LCI(L))

Landing Craft, Tank Mark VI

171

22,914

(LCT(6))

Landing Craft, Tank Mark V (LCT(5))

465

52,080

5

560

TOTAL LARGE LANDING CRAFT

680

171,235

825

618,481

SMALL

Landing Craft, Control (LCC(l))

36

846.0

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM(6))

52

1,149.2

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM(3))

1,233

24,366.8

3,967

77,755.6

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM(2))

22

503.0

Landing Craft, Support (LCS(S)(l))

150

1,200.0

Landing Craft, Support (LCS(S)(2))

145

1,160.0

Landing Craft, Personnel (LCP(L))

307

1,964.8

282

1,804.8

Landing Craft, Personnel (LCP(R))

1,563

10,003.2

24

153.6

Landing Craft, Vehicle & Personnel (LCVP)

215

1,720.0

8,027

64,216.0

Landing Craft, Vehicle (LCV)

1,891

12,102.4

365

2,336.0

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(l))

851

6,637.8

302

2,355.6

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(A)(1))

3

40.2

288

3,859.2

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(2))

1,540

16,478.0

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(A)(2))

200

2,640.0

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(3))

1

10.9

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(4))

11

121.0

Landing Craft, Personnel (LCP(N))

2

.9

10

4.5

Landing Craft, Rubber (LCR(L))

1,259

125.9

2,258

225.8

Landing Craft, Rutter (LCR(S))

1,301

65.1

3,194

159.7

45' Artillery Lighters

2

33.0

TOTAL SMALL LANDING CRAFT

8,799

58,763.1

20,702

175,275.9

--362--

TABLE 47

COMBATANT, MINE CRAFT, PATROL CRAFT AND AUXILIARIES
NUMBER OF VESSELS AND
TONNAGE CONVERTED 1942 - 1943

1942

1943

No.
Vessels

Tonnage

No.
Vessels

Tonnage

COMBATANT

Carriers, Escort (CVE)

14

148,120

30

317,400

Carriers, Escort (LL) (BCVE)

3

16,200

1

5,400

TOTAL COMBATANT

17

164,320

31

322,800

MINE CRAFT

Mine Layers (CM)

2

7,164

Minesweepers (AM)

4

2,000

Minesweepers (Base) (AMb)

21

1,605

Coastal Minesweepers (AMc)

10

1,495

TOTAL MINE CRAFT

37

12,264

PATROL CRAFT

Submarine Chasers (SC)

1

95

Frigates (PF)

29

31,900

Gunboats (PG)

15

16,560

1

2,250

Yachts (PY)

9

6,866

1

954

Coastal Yachts (PYc)

21

5,741

3

640

Motor Torpedo Boats (PT)

5

193

TOTAL PATROL CRAFT

46

29,262

39

35,937

AUXILIARY

Destroyers Tenders (AD)

1

9,739

Ammunition Ships (AE)

1

5,592

1

3,741

Store Ships (AF)

9

44,454

2

8,775

Miscellaneous Auxiliaries (AG)

8

16,228

1

1,850

Amphibious Force Flagships (AGC)

3

15,520

Surveying Ships (AGS)

3

3,750

Cargo Ships (AK)

15

60,388

33

114,405

Cargo Ships Attack (AKA)

6

31,215

General Stores Issue Ships (AKS)

1

5,000

--363--

TABLE 47, Cont'd

COMBATANT, MINE CRAFT, PATROL CRAFT AND AUXILIARIES
NUMBER OF VESSELS AND
TONNAGE CONVERTED 1942 - 1943
(Continued)

1942

1943

No. Vessels

Tonnage

No. Vessels

Tonnage

AUXILIARY (Cont'd)

Net Laying Ships (AN)

1

2,750

Oilers (AO)

19

107,753

21

123,960

Gasoline Tankers (AOG)

5

4,134

Transports (AP)

31

243,004

8

60,865

Transport Attack (APA)

22

119,999

Transports for Wounded (APH)

2

15,500

1

7,000

Repair Ships (AR)

1

5,000

Repair Ships Int. Comb. Eng. (ARG)

2

7,828

Salvage Vessels (ARS)

4

3,400

Submarine Tenders (AS)

1

7,500

Ocean Going Tugs (AT)

2

1,400

Seaplane Tenders (Large) (AV)

1

9,000

Miscellaneous Unclassified (IX)

18

10,469

19

58,400

TOTAL AUXILIARY

113

525,288

129

581,331

--364--

TABLE 48

TOTAL CONVERSIONS AND ACQUISITIONS AUXILIARIES,
DISTRICT CRAFT, LANDING CRAFT, SMALL BOATS 
NUMBER OF VESSELS AND
TONNAGE COMPLETED 1942-1943

1942

1943

No.
Vessels

Tonnage

No.
Vessels

Tonnage

Auxiliaries Acquired

26

19,641

14

40,574

District Craft:

Self-propelled (Converted)

352

36,870

75

14,472

Self-propelled (Acquired)

89

10,742

33

4,225

Non-self-propelled (Converted)

7

675

24

94,175

Non-self-propelled (Acquired)

54

9,395

71

20,524

Landing Craft (Acquired)

6

3.0

Small Boats (Acquired)

25

1,443.2

--365--

And the most technically advanced equipment in the world boosted morale too!

--366--

In order to present a resume of this unprecedented construction by class of ship during the defensive and turning of the tide phases, it may be well to quote in full Admiral King's summary of the program as reported to the Secretary of the Navy in March 1944:

Battleships

"At the beginning of the program ten battleships were under construction. By the time Pearl Harbor was attacked only two, NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON, were in service, but since that time, six more have joined the fleet. These include SOUTH DAKOTA and three sister ships, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS, and ALABAMA, and two of a larger class, IOWA and NEW JERSEY. A third ship in the latter class, WISCONSIN, was launched 7 December 1943, appropriately enough, two years to the day after Pearl Harbor was attacked. In speed, in fire power, particularly antiaircraft fire, in maneuverability, and in protection, these ships represent a great advance over previous designs.

Aircraft Carriers

"Construction of aircraft carriers represents one of the most spectacular phases of the Naval shipbuilding program. The carrier strength of the Navy on 7 December 1941 was seven first-line vessels and one escort carrier, a converted merchant ship. Contracts had been placed for several large carriers of the new ESSEX

--367--

class, and some of these had been laid down. Conversion of a number of merchant vessels was under way. The pressing need to add to our striking power in the air and to replace losses suffered in the Pacific during 1942 led to a great expansion of the construction program for first-line carriers. Concurrently, an even larger expansion of the escort carrier program was undertaken. By the end of 1943, more than 50 carriers of all types had been put into service in our Navy, and in addition a large number of escort carriers had been transferred to Great Britain.

"This remarkable record in construction enabled us in a single year to build up our carrier strength from the low point reached in the autumn of 1942, when SARATOGA, ENTERPRISE and RANGER were the only ships of our fleet carrier forces remaining afloat, to a position of clear superiority in this category. The rapidity with which new carriers of various types were put into service in 1943 influenced naval operations in many important respects. Availability of several ships of the ESSEX class and of a considerable number of smaller carriers, completed months ahead of schedule, contributed to the success of our operations in the Southwest Pacific, aided materially in checking the submarine menace in the Atlantic, and enabled us to launch an offensive in the Central Pacific before the end of the year.

"A large proportion of the ESSEX class carriers have joined the fleet. Excellent progress is being made on construction of

--368--

the remaining ships in the original program and of the additional vessels in this class authorized after the Pearl Harbor attack. Nearly all of the carriers of the INDEPENDENCE class, converted from light cruisers, have been completed. These ships, though smaller than the ESSEX class vessels, are first-line carriers.

It is planned to supplement these two basic types of carriers with a third, substantially larger than any of our present classes, which will displace 45,000 tons, and will be capable of handling bombing planes larger than any which heretofore have operated from the decks of aircraft carriers. They will be far more heavily armed than smaller carriers and will be much less vulnerable to bomb and torpedo attack.

"The Navy's first escort carrier was the LONG ISLAND, converted early in 1941, from the merchant vessel MORMACMAIL. When experiments with this ship proved successful, a sizeable conversion program was initiated, using Maritime Commission C-3 hulls, and a number of oilers. In 1942, because of pressing need, this program was greatly expanded.

"The 'baby flat-tops" have three principal uses. They serve as antisubmarine escorts for convoys; as aircraft transports, delivering assembled aircraft to strategic areas; as combatant carriers to supplement the main air striking force of the fleet. Although their cruising speeds are lower than those of our first-line carriers, these auxiliary carriers can be turned out more

--369--

rapidly and at a fraction of the coat of conventional carriers. These ships have proved invaluable in performing convoy escort and other duties for which larger and faster carriers are not needed.

Cruisers

"The BALTIMORE class heavy cruisers, a number of which are now in service, were designed during the period from 19 July 1940 to 7 December 1941. These cruisers are considered as powerful as any heavy cruisers afloat, particularly as recent technical developments have made it possible to improve their fighting characteristics. The CLEVELAND type of light cruiser (a development of the BROOKLYN class) was approved for a large part of the cruiser program, its design having been completed just before the expansion was authorized. The design of the large ALASKA class was the result of a series of studies commenced when treaty limitations went by the board and we were no longer bound by any limitations on the size of ships.

Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts

"The FLETCHER class of destroyers, designed just after the outbreak, of the war in Europe, formed a large part of the new destroyer building program. As compared with earlier destroyers, they are larger and have greatly increased fighting power, made possible by the same technical developments that permitted similar improvements in our cruisers.

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"Destroyer production has been highly satisfactory, and it has been possible to expand and accelerate this part of the program in an orderly manner. Although some new yards were engaged in building destroyers the increases were made possible by expanding facilities in yards which had had experience in destroyer construction. An idea of the acceleration in the rate of delivery of destroyers may be had by comparison with the figures for 1941 and 1943. In 1943, the rate was approximately eight times that of 1941.

Destroyers

Average Monthly Production

1941

1.33

1942

6.75

1943

10.83

"Contracts for the first destroyer escorts were let in November 1941. In January 1942, the program was increased, and as Germany stepped up the construction of U-boats several more increases were found necessary. Because of priorities the commencement of a large building program was delayed, but after delivery of the first vessel of the class, in February 1943, mass production methods became effective in the 17 building yards concerned. The result was a phenomenal output of those very useful vessels.

Submarines

"As a result of the orderly progress which had been made in the construction of submarines, involving continuous trial under

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service conditions, the main problem to be solved in building more submarines was the expansion of facilities. For a period of 15 years or more, there were only three yards in the United States with the equipment and the know-how to build submarines. These were the Navy yards at Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Mare Island, California, and the Electric Boat Company at Groton, Connecticut.

"In addition to the expansion that took place at these yards, two other yards went into the production of submarines. One of these was the Cramp Shipbuilding Corporation of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the other was the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company of Manitowoc, Wisconsin. The building at the latter yard is a further testimonial to the ingenuity displayed throughout the entire program, in that submarines are built at Manitowoc, tested in the Great Lakes, then taken through the Chicago drainage canal, and down the Mississippi River to New Orleans, where they are made ready for sea.

Landing Craft

"One of the most important achievements has been the landing craft construction program. Although the Navy had begun to experiment with small landing craft in 1936, we had only a few thousand tons in this category when we entered the war. In 1942, a billion dollar program for the construction of landing craft was superimposed on the already heavy building schedule, and the work was given top priority until the desired quota was filled.

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The facilities of existing public and private shipyards were given part of the burden. New yards were constructed, many of them in the Mississippi Valley, where bridge-building and steel-working companies which had had no previous experience in shipbuilding put up new plants and swung into production. In the second half of 1942, almost a quarter of a million tons of landing craft were produced and the figure increased to well over a third of a million tons for the first half of 1943.

"This production included a tremendous variety of vessels from small rubber boats to tank landing ships more than 300 feet in length. Within this range are small craft designed to carry only a few men, and ships with a capacity of 200, tracked craft capable of crawling over coral reefs or up beaches, craft for landing tanks or vehicles, craft for landing guns, craft for giving close fire support - in fact, all types necessary for success in that most difficult of military operations, landing on a hostile shore.

Auxiliaries

"The tremendous increase in the number of fighting ships and the global nature of the war required the acquisition of commensurately large fleet of auxiliaries. These ships were obtained by construction, by conversion of standard Maritime Commission commercial hulls and by acquisition and conversion of commercial vessels. A considerable number of conversions of standard Maritime Commission types have been accomplished under

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the supervision of the Maritime Commission. Probably the most important vessels produced under the auxiliary program during 1943 were those which take part in actual landing operations, consisting of attack transports, attack cargo vessels and general headquarters ships. The demand for repair ships of standard and special types, which increased many-fold during 1943, was met by new construction and conversion.

Patrol Craft

"As previously stated, patrol vessels were necessary to a properly balanced Navy. The first group of patrol craft, whose design was developed before the war, was completed in the spring of 1942, and more than 600 vessels of this type were completed in 1943. Motor torpedo boats (which have been employed to good advantage in several different theaters) were produced at intervals in accordance with military requirements. The classification "Patrol Craft" includes the 110-foot-sub-chaser and the 136-173-and 184-foot steel vessels. The greatest emphasis on this type of ship prevailed prior to and during the German submarine offensive off our Atlantic Coast and in the Caribbean."

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In this manner, then, did the unbelievable construction of fleets of ships under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Ships contribute to the operational successes against the enemy during the first two years of the war.

Now we may turn to the offensive phase of the war, which continued until the unconditional surrender of both major enemies.

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