BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-1-t.jpg

AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS DURING WORLD WAR II

VOLUME III

U. S. BUREAU OF SHIPS

FIRST DRAFT NARRATIVE PREPARED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION BUREAU OF SHIPS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME III

CHAPTER

PAGE

PART IV
"THE OFFENSIVE PHASE OF WAR AND THE VICTORY"

XIV.

OFFENSIVE STRATEGY AND THE BUREAU

1

The Strategy

The Balance of Fleets

The Impact upon the Bureau

XV.

MAINTENANCE, CONVERSION AND REPAIR

13

Introduction

Repair:

Continental

Advanced Base

Ship Repair Units

Conversion

Spare Parts

Background and Problems

Systems and Categories

Automatic Flow

XVI. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

125

Bureau Organization for Industrial Relations

Manpower

Labor Relations

Conclusions for the Future

XVII. SHIPBUILDING AND HISTORY OF THE WAR

149

The Strategy

Chronology

Reflecting Strategy:

Precedence Lists

Construction Directives

Production Board

Facilities and Their Expansion

Field Activities of the Bureau

--iii--

CHARTS

[Get chart page numbers from hardcopy or from this text if I forget to add them.]

Chart No.

Title.

Page

XIV

Vessels and tonnage on hand, cumulative, July 1940 to January 1946

XV

United States Naval Shipbuilding Program:
breakdown graphically of vessels on hand, building and converting,
as well as completions and acquisitions during World War II.

1

XVI

Graph of New Construction by tonnage and number of vessels of all types.

1

XVII

Expenditures by types of ships in World War II.

2

--iv--

TABLES

Table No.

Title

Page

49

Estimated strength of principal naval powers in major combat vessels as of January, 1944.

7

50

Alteration, conversion, or fitting out work in continental naval facilities
and Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, fiscal 1939 through fiscal 1945.

18

51

Shipyard employees building and repairing U.S. Naval vessels,
 January 1942 through October 1945

22

52

Shipyards repairing and converting, 1940-45.

23

53

Advanced base components procured, 12-7-41 to 8-15-45

48-50

54

Vessels and tonnage converted, 1939-45.

80

55

Major changes in precedence on naval vessels.

179-181

56

New Construction and conversions directed

185

57

Major combatant vessels of the U.S., Great Britain,
and Japan on hand 12-7-41 and subsequent wartime construction

193

58

New Construction by tonnage and number of vessels of all types of  Combatant vessels

195

59

New construction by tonnage and number of vessels, mine craft

196

60

New construction by tonnage and number of vessels, patrol craft

197

61

New construction by tonnage and number of vessels, auxiliaries

198

62

New construction by tonnage and number of vessels, district craft (self-propelled)

199

63

New construction by tonnage and number of vessels, district craft (non-self-propelled)

200

64

New construction by tonnage and number of vessels, large landing craft

201

65

New construction by tonnage and number of vessels, small landing craft.

202

66

New construction by tonnage and number of vessels, small boats

203-204

--v--

TABLES Cont'd

Title

Page

67

Conversion of combatant, mine craft, and patrol

205

68

Conversion and acquisition of auxiliaries,

206

69

Conversion and acquisition of district craft (self-propelled)

207

70

Conversion and acquisition of district craft (non-self-propelled)

208

71

Acquisitions: small landing craft and small boats

209

72

Semi-annual value of ship completions by type of ships.

213

73

Appropriations for construction, acquisition, and Conversion of ships

214

74

Field Activities administered by the Bureau of Ships

218-220

--vi--

PART IV

THE OFFENSIVE PHASE OF WAR AND VICTORY AUGUST 1943 TO AUGUST 1945

The Last 24 Months

CHAPTER XIV

OFFENSIVE STRATEGY AND THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

CHAPTER XIV

OFFENSIVE STRATEGY AND THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

I. Strategy of the offensive phase.

The tide of the war had definitely turned by August 1943. Guadalcanal had been secured for six months; the New Georgia campaign was rapidly drawing to a close; the Aleutians had been secured; Africa had been conquered and Sicily invaded; the Axis submarines in the Atlantic were now a problem, rather than a menace. The Japanese strongholds of Truk and Rabaul were under constant attack. Our New Guinea forces had moved up the coast as far as Salamaua and our submarines were stabbing at the enemy's life line in the westernmost reaches of the Pacific. On all fronts the enemy was on the defensive, but at this moment he was retrenching in heavily fortified positions in the taking of which the allies would encounter considerable difficulty.

The significance of the Bureau of Ships' miraculous shipbuilding program in this shift in the fortunes of war has already been described. The offensive strategy, however, required an overwhelming superiority of ships, submarines, boats and landing craft, so that a heavy responsibility for operational success continued to devolve upon the Bureau of Ships and its activities.

Now, under the strategy of full-fledged offensive warfare in all theaters, the role of the Navy was to become widely dissimilar in the two major campaigns. In Europe the naval forces were to be concerned primarily with two "battles of the beaches" - in Italy and against the

--1--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-2-t.jpg

PLANNING THE DOWNFALL OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE: GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT, ADMIRAL WILLIAM LEAHY AND ADMIRAL CHESTER NIMITZ,

[PROOFERS, please see original for complete caption.]

--2--

western shores of Europe - and following this, the major task was to be one of protecting the trans-Atlantic sea routes against the Axis submarines and of using these lanes for the transportation of troops and supplies. The magnitude and importance of the anti-submarine warfare are difficult to over-emphasize in the overall strategy and operation of the Atlantic war.

In the Pacific, however, warfare still involved, above all, "crossing the ocean". Important steps in the crossing were the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, which would serve as staging bases for further steps westward, as diversions of enemy troops from the northern Solomons and New Guinea campaign, and as training grounds for the new air and surface units of the Fleet. With these bases, the allied fleet might then attack by air and sea the intermediate zone of defense for the Japanese empire -Marianas, Carolines and Kuriles. Following the neutralization of New Guinea by the strategy of "coast hopping" the plan then called for the occupation of Palau and for the return to the Philippines. From this point the attack upon the homeland of the empire might better be prosecuted if circumstances so dictated. In the northern reaches of the Pacific, the Aleutians - the strategic aerial highway between the North American continent and the Far East - now fell under allied control and became an area of defense against any possible counter-attack. The submarine counted heavily in the planning for the offensive operation. As it is impossible to over-emphasize the submarine's importance during the dark early days of the war, so the extent of their vital role in the offensive area eludes description.

--3--

This strategy for the prosecution of global warfare, however, rested, to a considerable degree upon production. As Admiral King reported, "The best officers and men can do little without an adequate supply of the highly specialized machinery of warfare." He continued, saying that "Our guiding policy is to achieve not mere adequacy but overwhelming superiority of material." The responsibility for producing this "overwhelming superiority of material" for naval warfare rested to a large degree upon the Bureau of Ships and its associated activities. However remarkable the production program may have been during the defensive and pivotal phases of the war, the greatest production program under the Bureau was yet to come.

II. BALANCE OF FLEET.

The successful operations by the allied armed forces and the unbelievable shipbuilding production of the United States placed the allied nations in a most favorable position with regard to naval strength as the offensive phase of the war began in mid 1943.

According to the overall strategy, Great Britain's navy was to provide considerable assistance to the American fleet during the invasion of the European continent. Following that, however, its task would be, primarily, the maintenance of a "fleet in being" to keep the German fleet "bottled up." The other allied and axis fleets played minor roles in the European scheme of things. Therefore, only a portion of our naval strength was deployed in the Pacific to grapple with the Japanese. The comparative strength of these two nations may be found on the following table 49 which lists the major combatant vessels of the principal naval powers as of January 1944.

--4--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-3-t.jpg

U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA CV-47
ANOTHER CARRIER ENTERS THE WATER TO ADD TO U.S. NAVY'S "FLAT TOP" STRENGTH

--5--

Only in heavy cruisers did the Japanese approach the American navy in strength at this time. In all other classes the Japanese proved woefully inferior, but they were favored with the advantages of fighting a defensive war and of having shorter lines of communication and supply.

In contrast, the allied forces still had the ocean to cross. In battleships, aircraft carriers, light cruisers and submarines, the America fleet enjoyed a strength double that of the Japanese; in carrier escorts, destroyers and destroyer escorts, the Japanese suffered an overwhelming inferiority.

In addition to this favorable growth of combat vessels, one of the most important factors in the successful execution of the strategic plans was the adequate production of landing craft and of large assault transport These two programs, as the tide turned, assumed highest priority. In view of the offensive nature of these vessels and the defensive position of the Japanese after this time, comparison of these vessels in the two navies would prove of little significance. In truth, the Nipponese suffered so badly by the contrast in these classes that a comparison could scarcely be drawn.

III. IMPACT UPON THE BUREAU.

A. Organization:

Immediately following the inception of the Allied offensive phase in mid-1943, no major Bureau of Ships' reorganizations were effected. Several minor alterations occurred, however, to strengthen the organization structure.

--6--

ESTIMATED COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTH OF PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS IN MAJOR COMBAT VESSELS AS OF JANUARY 1944 SOON AFTER THE INCEPTION OF THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE PHASE

TYPE

BRITISH EMP.

FRANCE

RUSSIA

UNITED STATES

JAPAN

ITALY

GERMANY

No.

Tons.

No.

Tons.

No.

Tons.

No.

Tons.

No.

Tons.

No.

Tons.

No.

Tons.

Battleships

15

481,170

5

136,567

4

98,150

22

731,700

10

345,020

6

177,944

4

101,600

Aircraft Carriers

6

137,450

1

22,146

---

-----

19

356,000

9

199,070

--

------

---

-----

Carrier Escorts

37

377,029

--

-----

---

----

35

299,668

6

84,000

--

------

---

-----

Heavy Cruisers

12

118,945

3

30,000

7

59,600

16

168,675

15

175,100

2

20,000

4(b)

51,400

Light Cruisers

52

331,819

8

57,280

1

7,000

32

271,775

17

84,665

9

51,975

4

23,400

Destroyers

220

306,487

21

28,610

52

96,200

328

570,850

83

123,787

23

36,855

38

64,125

Escort Destroyers

60

62,130

--

------

--

-----

--

-----

--

-----

--

----

Destroyer Escorts

136

179,525

2

2,640

31

20,870

251

318,050

18

21,600

41

28,507

33

18,680

Submarines

105

82,902

20

16,890

165

110,000

172

219,830

87

127.840

51

42,995

320(a)

186,958

TOTAL

643

2,077,457

60

294,133

391,820

2,936,548

245

1,161,082

132

358,276

403

446,163

 

TOTAL ESTIMATED FORCES

ALLIED POWERS

AXIS POWERS--

No.

Tons.

No.

Tons.

Battleships

46

1,447,587

20

522,964

Aircraft Carriers

26

515,596

9

199,070

Carrier Escorts

72

676,697

6

84,000

Heavy Cruisers

38

377,388

21

246,500

Light Cruisers

93

667,874

30

160,040

Destroyers

621

1,867,947

144

224,767

Destroyer Escorts

420

521,085

92

68,787

Escort Destroyers

60

62,130

Submarines

462

429,622

458

357,793

TOTAL

1838

5,699,958

780

1,965,521

--7--

In the summer of 1943, two Bureau of Ships' activities --- the Advance Base Sub-Section of the Shipbuilding Division and the Base Maintenance Branch of the Maintenance Division --- were consolidated for administrative purposes.

Another change designed to clarify Bureau operations was made on 29 October 1943, when all facilities sections were made responsible to a single head and this officer in turn was given duty as Joint Staff Assistant to the Head of the Maintenance Division and Head of the Shipbuilding Division. This change transferred the facilities codes from the Contract Branch of the Shipbuilding Division to the Joint Staff Assistant. On 30 December 1943, final action was taken establishing a Facilities Branch of the Shipbuilding Division.

The year 1944 occasioned considerable alteration of the Bureau's organizational structure. This came to pass to a marked degree by the readjustment following the extremely concentrated efforts of the entire Bureau during the first half year upon the landing craft program for the invasion of Normandy and for the accelerated pace of the Pacific operations Following this period of unprecedented output, the workload tended to fall off and reorganizations ensued.

Two moves taken in June 1944 reflected the changed emphasis already felt or anticipated in the Bureau's workload. On 10 June 1944, a Contract Termination Section was established in the Contract Branch of the Shipbuilding Division and on 19 June a Contract Division was established, centralizing all contract negotiation and administration except for radio, radar and sonar, and including a Cost and Labor Estimates Section. On 15 July the exception made for electronics equipment in the establishment

--8--

of the original Contract Division was rescinded and final authority for all contracts was placed in the Contract Division.

These new trends also led to another minor revision on 21 October 1944, when the Contract Termination Branch was established in the Contract Division. This Branch was responsible for all terminations except for facilities contracts, which remained with the Facilities Branch of the Shipbuilding Division.

During the first part of the year 1944, considerable attention and thought were devoted to the major problem of spare parts and maintenance of the vastly expanded fleet. Although this topic is discussed at great length in the following chapter (XV), it is necessary here to point out the organizational changes which the Bureau effected to handle this new paramount problem.

On 3 February 1944 a Spare Parts Section was established in the Shipbuilding Division. Later, in August 1944, a Materials Branch became established to operate jointly under the Maintenance and Shipbuilding Divisions, with an eye to spare parts control, inventory control, and scheduling of spares. Its task was that of coordinating procurement of all materials and components for new construction and maintenance and coordinating the activities of the Scheduling and Statistics Section devoted to CMP and requirements determination. In his report to the Secretary of the Navy in March 1945, Fleet Admiral Xing mentioned another problem of considerable importance to the Bureau of Ships. He stated: Because the postwar size of the Navy is yet to be determined no precise estimate of the number of naval personnel (or of ships) that will be

--9--

required, is possible. The deciding factor (of both) will be the needs of the Navy in order to carry out the strategic commitments of the nation. However, for more than a year we have worked on demobilization methods and have completed tentative plans." Within the Bureau these methods and plans fell under the cognizance of the newly established (April 1944) Demobilization Section of the Maintenance Division. This forward looking action is discussed in its overall aspects in Chapter XXIV --- "The Reserve Fleet". The matter of primary importance is the foresight of the Navy Department and the Bureau of Ships in placing emphasis upon a post-war problem during the height of the war.

Some purely incidental changes occurred on 15 December 1944. The Radio Division became the Electronics Division, the Maintenance Division became the Ship Maintenance Division, and the Heads of the Divisions were designated as Directors.

Two changes in the year 1945 stand out and represent a major shift in Bureau administration. The first was the consolidation of the Shipbuilding and Maintenance Divisions in almost all operating relationships. The second was the establishment of a Shore Division.

From the inception of the Bureau, maintenance and new construction had been separated, parallel ship type desks being maintained throughout. As the pressure for the new construction program declined and the maintenance load increased, it was generally accepted that more effective results could be obtained and more efficient utilization of personnel would result if the type desks were consolidated. A gradual program

--10--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-4-t.jpg

U. S. S. FRANKLIN - CV13 HOMEWARD BOUND

--11--

was undertaken, therefore, on 28 March 1945 to consolidate all construction and maintenance type desks. The first step taken on that date involved the carrier desks of the two Divisions. As of 4 April 1945, the Construction Branch of the Shipbuilding Division and the Ship Maintenance Branch of the Maintenance Division were consolidated to form a Ship Technical Branch under the joint direction of the Directors of Shipbuilding and Ship Maintenance. From this date on, action was taken to reorganize the parallel ship type desks as rapidly as possible. Although the new organization permitted the more efficient discharge of the Bureau's responsibilities, no marked reduction in personnel was possible, due to the magnitude of the repair and maintenance job.

The second major change -- the establishment of the Shore Division on 20 April 1945 --- charged this new division with responsibility for the "efficient management and operation of those industrial production activities of the naval shore establishment for which the Bureau of Ships is responsible." This included all equipping of Navy Yards, private shipyards and manufacturing plants under Bureau of Ships sponsorship; operation of seized plants; maintenance or disposition of facilities no longer required for active production, etc. The Facilities Branch and Labor Relations and Manpower Section of the old Shipbuilding Division and the Base Maintenance Branch of the old Maintenance Division formed the core of the new Shore Division.

In this fashion, therefore, did the Bureau of Ships adjust itself to changing tides of the war as the Allied forces advanced and expanded under their offensive strategy. The following chapters of this section will show the Bureau's vital role in this offensive.

--12--

CHAPTER XV

MAINTENANCE, CONVERSION AND REPAIR

CHAPTER XV

MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND CONVERSION

A. Introduction

One of the prime responsibilities of the Bureau of Ships is to provide for the maintenance, repair and salvage of all naval vessels. In addition, the Maintenance Division of the Bureau as originally constituted was made responsible for the conversion of vessels held by private interests to meet the needs of the fleet.

The Bureau's interest in maintenance, repair and salvage work grew from relatively small proportions prior to the war until they were the most critical of all Bureau activities in the summer of 1945. The primary reason for this change was the success of the new construction program, which so increased the size of the fleet that by mid 1945 over 13 million tons of vessels of all types had to be serviced, whereas at the outset only slightly over 2 million tons were in service. Chart XIV presents vividly the nature of this expansion.

--13--

CHART XIV

CUMULATIVE VESSELS AND TONNAGE ON HAND

(JULY 1940 - JANUARY 1946)

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-5-t.jpg

--14--

Three other factors increased the maintenance load of the Bureau: First, it was rapidly found that war conditions greatly increased the work load. Vessels steamed faster, further and under more adverse conditions than in peacetime. Crews were so green and experienced officers spread so thinly that many breakdowns of equipment occurred which might have been avoided in normal times. Second and most obvious were the salvage and repairs made necessary by battle damage. Pearl Harbor and the Kamikaze attacks of late 1944 and early 1945 resulted in the most conspicuous battle damage Jobs, but throughout the war many vessels were repaired and sent back to Join the fleet after the Japs had been reasonably confident that they would never see action again. Third was the problem of procuring and distributing necessary spare parts and material to the areas needed. As the theater of operations expanded this tended to tie up more and more material in pipe lines and inventories, greatly increasing the burden on the Bureau.

The maintenance and repair duties of the Bureau included frequent overhauls of all types of vessels and extensive changes in the armament and other installations of vessels to incorporate improvements gained by experience as the war progressed. The complete rebuilding of some obsolete vessels was undertaken, but most additions and modifications were less extensive. Throughout the

--15--

war equipment and guns were added to improve the defensive characteristics of surface craft against aircraft attack. Increases in communications facilities were found necessary and, with the advent of radar, a complete overhauling of fire control and aircraft detection devices was undertaken, leading to the development of the combat information center, which required many changes in the internal arrangements of ships. Other major changes included the addition of much fire fighting equipment and the elimination of all combustibles, including in older vessels layers of paint which were found to be particularly dangerous in the event of any widespread fire; improvements in methods of gasoline stowage, extensive additions to the splinter protection provided for exposed personnel and, finally, for ships engaged in amphibious work the addition of boat handling facilities and provision for boat stowage, primary requisites for their participation in amphibious attack.

The actual responsibilities of the Bureau may be divided into two major parts: Repairs in continental Navy establishments and other major bases, such as Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor on the one hand, and advanced base repairs on the other. The Bureau's interest in the continental establishments carried through to the actual supervision and scheduling of the work in the Yard. The Bureau's interest in advanced base repair was confined to the provision of equipment and material necessary for the advanced base to perform its function. The Bureau did not maintain any direct control over the manner in which the work was done in advanced bases.

--16--

Although salvage and foreign ship repair have already been discussed in Chapter XII under the defensive phase of the war, it must be kept in mind that throughout the latter half of the hostilities these activities played an active, although relatively minor, part in the over-all war program. This chapter will concern itself with three activities of major importance in the prosecution of the war: repair, conversion and maintenance. The failure of any one of these phases would have occasioned most serious repercussions in the global picture as one of them, maintenance, almost proved.

--17--

B. REPAIR:

1. Repair, Continental Naval Facilities and Pearl Harbor

Repair of Naval vessels in peace has always been concentrated in Navy Yards or other Naval facilities. During the war same exceptions were made to this rule, particularly on the West coast, but almost all major repair jobs were done in Naval facilities. Table 50 below indicates the growth of repair work for the fiscal year 1939 through fiscal year 1945.

TABLE 50

Alteration, Conversion or Fitting out Work in Continental Naval Facilities and Navy Yard Pearl Harbor

Number of Vessels Available

Fiscal
Year
1939

Fiscal
Year
1940

Fiscal
Year
1941

Fiscal
Year
1942

Fiscal
Year
1943

Fiscal
Year
1944

Fiscal
Year
1945

Combatant

230

209

389

844

1,591

3,873

3,840

Auxiliary

60

51

169

426

970

1,495

2,925

Minecraft

17

21

51

279

655

1,878

2,603

Patrol Craft

-

-

31

163

1,116

2,774

3,435

landing Craft

0

0

0

0

483

1,754

4,834

District Craft

-

-

7

134

782

1,187

1,891

307

281

647

1,848

5,597

12,961

19,528

Data on all availabilities prior to fiscal year 1941 are relatively incomplete and data on District Craft are believed to be incomplete for the entire period covered.

--18--

Under the conditions which existed throughout the war, vessels were not made available unless they were either so badly in need of repair they could not continue to operate with the fleet or were in need of such extensive alterations that they would otherwise be considered obsolete. Work done on vessels was not undertaken lightly but as a result of considered Judgment that the vessel in question had to be repaired, converted or whatever to maximize the fighting strength of the fleet. There is no measure of the actual work load that would permit comparisons between repair and new construction, for repairs and alterations could range from the addition of relatively minor pieces of equipment or repair of such equipment to the practical reconstruction of the vessel. In the case of some of the badly damaged ships complete new bows, stems, or other sections of a ship had to be fabricated and Joined to the existing hull. Although battle damage reports were submitted to the Bureau and to the activity to do the repair work within a very short period after the vessel had suffered damage, the exact nature of the necessary repair work could not be finally determined until the vessel had been placed in drydock or tied to the pier in the Navy Yard. Advance planning was encouraged and in many cases complete sub-assemblies were ordered well in advance of the availability of the vessel on which they were to be placed, so that there was little delay between the time the vessel arrived at the yard and the Job was finished.

Advance planning could not, however, anticipate battle damage work loads before the damages occurred, so all Naval activities engaged

--19--

in ship repair had fluctuating work loads. For this reason an effort was always made to maintain some new construction which could be used to fill the gaps between major repair Jobs. Complete transferability of personnel or equipment, however, was not always possible, which occasioned a consequent loss of efficiency. In repair work, a much higher degree of skill is required to do the sort of improvisation required in patching up a badly damaged ship. For example, a very ordinary electrician can wire a new vessel under construction, but the same man might be unable to find out what needed to be reinstalled in the electrical system of a vessel which had been damaged. Similar differences in the skills required were found in other key trades.

The greatest problem in the field of labor grew out of the fact that in the latter stages of the war the heaviest repair loads were found on the West coast, which had the tightest labor market in the country. Grave difficulties were experienced in even maintaining the unskilled labor necessary to man the existing facilities.

The two new Naval facilities on the coast, built primarily to repair major fleet units, Terminal Island and Hunter's Point, were never able to recruit sufficient manpower to meet all their needs. Similar, although less acute, problems were faced by all other Naval establishments.

The overall manpower shortage in shipyards building or repairing ships became a matter of paramount importance after the tide of the war had changed in 1943. Table 51 lists the number of shipyard employees

--20--

concerned with the building or repairing of U.S. naval vessels. When compared with Chart XIV (cumulative vessels and tonnage on hand) and Table 52 listing the number of shipyards repairing and converting, it is easy to imagine the magnitude of the problem: as the volume of repair and conversion increased and new construction slackened slightly, the fall in shipyard employment became critical.

--21--

TABLE 51

SHIPYARD EMPLOYEES

Building and Repairing

U. S. NAVAL VESSELS

January 1942

443,500

January 1943

911,900

July 1943

1,049,981

January 1944

970,900

January 1945

861,300

October 1945

572,800

--22--

TABLE 52

SHIPYARDS REPAIRING AND CONVERTING
1940-1945

July

1940

19

December

1941

76

December

1942

143

September

1943

222

September

1944

248

November

1944

230

January

1945

231

April

1945

229

July

1945

227

October

1945

227

--23--

Each of the Navy Yards and shipyards within the continental limits of the United States had a distinct function to perform throughout the war, with special emergency tasks also being assigned as expediency directed. The Navy Yards’ general jobs and their location were:


Boston Navy Yard, Boston, Mass.

Design and construction of destroyers, manufacturing of chain, rope, etc.,
emergency ship repairs and shores support for inactive ships

Portsmouth Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H.

Design., construction and repair of submarines and miscellaneous small ships,
manufacturing of electrical fittings and other items.

New York Navy Yard, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Design, construction of heavy combatant ships,
repair of miscellaneous types and miscellaneous manufacturing support for inactive ships.

Philadelphia Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pa.

Design, construction of heavy combatant ships, repair of miscellaneous types
and miscellaneous manufacturing and shore support for inactive ships.

Norfolk Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Va.

Design and construction of heavy combatant ships, repair of miscellaneous types
and miscellaneous manufacturing; shore support for inactive ships.

Charleston Navy Yard, Charleston, S. C.

Minimum construction, one destroyer or similar size every two years,
overhaul miscellaneous ships of less than cruiser size and manufacturing of minor items as assigned.

 

--24--


Terminal Island Navy Yard., San Pedro, California

Repair of surface ships of all sizes and minor manufacturing as assigned.

Mare Island Navy Yard, San Francisco, California

Minimum construction, one submarine every two years,
repair ships of all sizes up to and including heavy cruisers and submarines,
manufacturing of paint and miscellaneous items and shore support for inactive ships

San Francisco Navy Yard, San Francisco, California

Repair of surface ships of all sizes, minor manufacturing as assigned

Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.

Minimum construction, one destroyer or similar craft every one to two years,
repair surface ships of all types, manufacturing as assigned and shore services for inactive ships.

--25--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-6-t.jpg

F644C7460
NAVY YARD, NEW YORK
AUGUST 19, 1944

SHOWING STBD. SIDE & STERN OF U.S.S. DE 401 AS AFT. SECTION IS BEING TRANSFERRED FROM U.S.S. DE 401 TO U.S.S. DE 320 IN D. D. #6.

CROSS SECTION OF U.S.S. DE 401 AT FRAME 119 IS ALSO SHOWN. STACK HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM HOLDER.

--26--

 

To illustrate better the function and purposes of these Navy Yards, a description of one of them—The Norfolk Navy Yard is quoted from that activity's handbook of information printed for civilian employees.

"A great variety or activities is carried on here in the Norfolk Navy Yard. But the Yard has only one purpose, that is to serve and strengthen the fleet. It does that through new construction, conversion, outfitting, repairs, alterations, and alterations-equivalent-to-repairs. Anything else is incidental to this main purpose.

"This is primarily a repair rather than a new construction yard. The word "repairs" is defined as the work necessary to restore the ship or article to serviceable condition without any change in design. "Alterations" may involve changes in design, additions of articles or parts, or changes in material of which an article or part is made.

"Alterations are frequently approved by "Shipalt", "Ordalt", or by other Bureau directive for an entire class or group of ships. The alterations will then be made at the first opportunity. A great deal of repair and maintenance work and even some alterations may be done by the ship's force while at sea. What cannot be done by the ship's force while at sea is noted by ship's officers so

--27--

that when it is time for them to put in to a navy yard they have up-to-date lists of alterations and repairs to he made. Those lists serve as a basis for the work request lists presented to the yard, the items falling into ten general groups, namely Repairs under each of the five following: Hull, Machinery, Electrical, Ordnance, and Electronics, and also Alterations under each of those headings.

"Before arrival, the ammunition, fuel or diesel oil, or gasoline, that would interfere with the work to he done should have been removed at appropriate depots or bases, and if time permits, fuel tanks steamed out and gasoline tanks flushed with salt water and filled with inert gas.

"Pre-Arrival Planning. Prior to arrival the Assistant Planning Officers of the group supervising her type assemble all information in the files regarding work to be investigated and • undertaken, noting particularly the status of authorized alterations, uncompleted job orders, and of plans and material procurement. A list of the outstanding jobs which are to be accomplished, either wholly or in part, during the vessel’s stay, is sent to the Production Officer so that work may begin as soon as the vessel arrives.

"Before arrival also the Ship Superintendent is appointed. He will meet the ship and see that power, steam, air and telephone lines are connected. He will introduce himself to the commanding and division officers.

The Arrival Conference

"An arrival conference is held, attended by the Ship Superintendent, Assistant Planning Officers and other yard representatives and representatives of the ship.

These officers keep in mind the Availability or length of time the ship is to he in the yard and decide what work the yard will do. Each item proposed is examined and carefully analyzed to determine its scope, need and, in the case of alterations, the authority for accomplishment.

Assistant Planning Officers are responsible for getting out the original Job Orders (J. O.) and the subsequent or amplifying instructions in Supplementary Work Orders (S. W. O.). The Ship Superintendent represents the Production Officer and his principal assistants in coordinating and accomplishing the work authorized on the vessel and is thus the Yard's representative immediately on hand at the work.

"Ship's force provides fire watch, guards, does miscellaneous cleaning, scraping, testing, and much of the painting; and if the ship is in drydock, will scrape the bottom.

"Briefly then the shops of the Industrial Department do the work of new construction, conversion, alteration or repair. The Supply Department gets the needed materials here. The Accounting Department pays the civilian employees and keeps accounts of costs and charges to be made against each authorization or allotment of funds under which the work is done. The Medical Department is concerned with the health of employees and naval personnel. The Disbursing Department pays the naval personnel. The Captain of the Yard (Military Department) looks after security of the Yard and exercises certain control over uniformed personnel while here. The Commandant has general over all control and is the highest authority in the Yard."

--29--

Advanced Base Repair

Although the Bureau of Ships is charged with the responsibility of providing for the maintenance of vessels and equipment under its cognizance, the bureau's administrative responsibility for the facilities necessary for this type of work does not extend beyond the continental limits and established bases in such places as Hawaii and the Philippines. In peacetime, ship repairs were accomplished by two distinct general methods: the shore or Navy Yard method, and the afloat or tender method.

From the outset of World War II, Navy Yards and other established ship repair facilities were soon flooded with new construction and major overhauls. Tenders capable of accommodating only minor overhauls or repairs and alterations could not meet the increasing demands of the fleet in advanced areas. It became necessary, therefore, to establish supply, repair and other service facilities in newly acquired advanced areas in order to eliminate as often as possible long return voyages to major repair facilities.

These repair and service facilities, known as "Advanced Bases", were established by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations and were administered by the operating Command in their respective areas. For the maintenance and support of

--30--

these bases it was necessary to procure large quantities of equipment for shipment as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

In 1942 it was evident that the repair capacities of the initial advanced bases were inadequate and that the apparent shortage of equipment reflected the necessity for extensive revised planning. In the last quarter of 1942, therefore, a system was evolved whereby self-contained units were designed to supply the various types of services needed in advanced areas. These units were titled "Advanced Base Functional Components" and incorporated the plans and suggestions of both the forces afloat and the material bureaus. A particular bureau was set up as the dominant bureau for each component. This bureau furnished the major portion of materials, and also became responsible for the coordinated assembly of the material contributions of other bureaus.

Components, when assembled, were designed to perform a specific type of function such as repair, medical, supply, administration, or harbor defense, etc. Upon arrival in an advanced area, the combining of a group of components activated the establishment of an advanced base, the mission of the base determining the number and variety of components provided. The major assembly groups were called: LION, CUB, ACORN GROPAC,

--31--

STANDARD PT BASE UNIT, STANDARD LANDING CRAFT UNIT, FLEET SUPPLY UNIT, AVIATION SUPPLY UNIT, HARBOR DEFENSE UNIT, STANDARD AIRCRAFT and ENGINE OVERHAUL UNIT.

The LION, the largest advanced base unit, provided personnel and material necessary for the establishment of a major all-purpose naval base. It consisted of a large number of functional components which enabled a base to perform voyage repairs and minor battle damage repairs to a major portion of the fleet, to provide logistic support for operating forces in the area, and to operate a large and active port. For its own support, it contained adequate harbor defense, communication, supply, disbursing, medical, ordnance and base maintenance facilities. The installation of a LION Unit required the services of construction battalions to assist in the unloading operation and to construct the base facilities.

The CUB provided personnel and material necessary for the establishment of a medium sized advanced fuel and supply base. It did not contain ship repair facilities. It was made up of a number of functional components which enabled it to provide logistic support for a small task group of light forces and to operate an active port. The installation of a CUB Unit required the services of construction battalions.

--32--

An ACORN was an advanced base unit consisting of personnel and material necessary for the establishment of an advanced air base. It contained plane repair facilities. It was made up of a number of functional components and, when augmented by a Carrier Aircraft Service Unit or a Patrol Service Unit, could service, rearm, and perform minor repairs and maintain the planes of one carrier group, one patrol plane squadron, or equivalent.

A GROPAC was a commissioned naval organization designed to install and operate harbor and waterfront facilities, and to provide certain harbor defenses for an advanced base. It normally provided for the unloading of ships; Installation and maintenance of navigational aids, piers, moorings, net defenses and underwater sound detection; the repair of small craft and harbor equipment; the operation of a harbor defense patrol; and the provision of a boat pool for use within the harbor. It provided, also, for its own administrative, communication, medical and housing needs. GROPACS varied materially from each other in size and composition since each was individually designed to meet the needs of a particular island or area.

A STANDARD PT BASE UNIT was designed for the maintenance of one squadron of PT Boats. This unit did not contain major engine overhaul facilities, and if they were desired an E12 component was added to the unit.

--33--

The function of a STANDARD LANDING CRAFT UNIT was to establish garrison boat pools in seized areas during the amphibious phase of assault operations in order to provide for shore-to-shore movements, harbor needs for personnel transportation, and for unloading of ships of the garrison echelons. The SLCU (Large) provided for two-shift operation - 24 hour continuous duty - of 50 LCM, 48 LCVP and 2 LCP(L). These craft were provided from amphibious assault shipping prior to final retirement from the objective area.

Concerning equipment COMINCH ordered:

(1) Equipment and supplies, exclusive of fuels and oils, to be loaded in the assault echelon were limited to one-half (1/2) ton per man and were to include a 30 days' supply of spare parts and 30 days' rations.

(2) The 30 days' supply of spare parts was to be boxed in four equal parts so that each might readily be loaded, together with 1/4 of the E10 personnel, in LSDs or ARLs which accompanied the assault echelons.

(3) The remaining equipment and supplies, which were to be kept to a minimum, were to be loaded in an early garrison echelon, to be in the custody of a small group of SLCU personnel.

The FLEET SUPPLY UNIT was an advanced base unit for the establishment of a complete supply facility. This unit contained a D1 component as a nucleus and possessed only those additional components which contributed directly toward the supply operation. No "A" or administration

--34--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-7-t.jpg

U.S.S. PITTSBURGH CA-72
Floating drydock outside of Agat Harbor in Guam. Bow was lost in typhoon June 1945.

--35--

component was assigned, as these functions could have been performed by the Dl. It is to be emphasized that the FLEET SUPPLY UNIT not only provided storage buildings, personnel and equipment, but also the stores or supplies to fill those buildings. Adequate space was provided to store enough base consumables to maintain a LION-type base, and, in addition, to store the following:

(a) Fresh provisions, 60,000 men for 30 days

(b) Dry provisions, 60,000 men for 90 days

(c) Clothing and Small Stores, 60,000 men for 90 days

(d) Ship's Stores, 60,000 men for 90 days

(e) Fleet supplies (GSK) equivalent to 10 BBB (basic Boxed Base) loads.

The Bureau of Ships served as the dominant bureau responsible for the procurement of ship and boat repair components or the so-called "E" components, and as the dominant bureau for most of the harbor control and defense components involving communications equipment, underwater sound protection, small boat pools, and harbor patrol.

The bureau also dominated the majority of communications components involving radio, radar and visual signalling components. Its final interest included waterfront and seadrome fire protection components. In addition to the cognizance of its components, the bureau also made extensive contributions to components under the dominance of other bureaus, amounting to approximately one third of the dollar value of the Bureau of Ships dominated components. Included

--36--

in this category were components for administration, supplies, aviation, ordnance, camps, and the miscellaneous functions. A detailed description of all major equipment, machine tools, and miscellaneous materials supplied in the various components has been summarized and published in the Advanced Base Initial Outfitting List - Abridged Catalogue.

The E-1 SHIP REPAIR (GENERAL) component, the largest under the domination of the Bureau of Ships, was designed to make voyage repairs and minor battle damage repairs to all types of vessels in the fleet. It was shore based, with shop facilities larger than a repair ship (AR) plus the special tools found on a destroyer tender (AD) and a submarine tender (AS). For its operation it required approximately thirty officers and 1300 enlisted men for a two-shift operation. The approximate weight of the E-1 was 3700 long tons and its cube was approximately 7500 measurement tons. Major repair facilities provided were as follows:

[Boiler and Shipfitter Shop Welding Shop
Blacksmith Shop and Foundry
Sheet Metal Shop
Coppersmith and Pipe Shop
Machine Shop (General)
Internal Combustion Engine Shop
Carpenter and Patternmaker Shop
Electrical and Refrigeration Shop
Battery Shop
Canvas and Gas Mask Shop
Radio, Radar and Sonar Shop
Gyro Compass Shop
Shop Consumables - 90 day initial supply (90 day replenishment on request)

--37--

Housing - Approximately 13 utility bldgs. 40 x 100; 6 utility bldgs., 102 x 100; and one hanger type bldg. 200 x 200.
Waterfront Structures - Pontoon wharf, bridge, barges and propelling units

Transportation Equipment - Trucks, dock mules, dock trailers and shop platform trailers
Construction Materials - Cranes, hoists, air compressors, lumber, cement, hardware, etc.  

Although the E1 component contained large and numerous repair facilities, the need did not arise to establish a large number of such facilities. As the war continued, stress was placed upon highly specialized components designed to perform a specific function. This was particularly true of equipment designed to repair and salvage various types of landing craft and assault vessels so that landing craft could be repaired in time to carry succeeding waves of the initial assault. A description of the major repair and specific types of components follows:

E2 - SHIP REPAIR (CAPITAL SHIPS)

Made voyage repairs and repaired minor battle damage to all types of vessels in the fleet, primarily to capital ships. It was the shore based equivalent of the shop facilities of a repair ship (AR), minus all ordnance shops.

E3 - SHIP REPAIR (DESTROYERS)

Made voyage repairs and repaired minor battle damage to most types of ships, but particularly to destroyers or smaller vessels. It was the shore based equivalent of a destroyer tender (AD), minus ordnance shops.

--38--

E5 - SHIP SERVICING COMPONENT

A docking and working party intended to perform ship's force work such as running out fuel and power lines, assisting in docking, moorings, provisioning and other such service functions.

E6 - LANDING CRAFT AND EASE REPAIR COMPONENT

Repaired both hulls and engines of all types of landing craft. It was specifically designed to maintain the following craft for six months:

12 LST

36 LCT (5) or LCT (6)

 

12 LCS(L) (3)

200 LCMs

 

12 LCI(L)

100 LCV(P)s

 

12 LSM
(6 Fairbanks Morse Engines
and 6 General Motors)

E6A - LANDING CRAFT SPARE PARTS (LARGE)

This component was designed to be added to an E6 component. It provided initial stocks (six months' supply) of hull, machinery and internal combustion engine spare parts for landing craft.

E8 - REPAIR - SMALL BOAT

Maintained and repaired both hulls and engines of the small boats at a small or medium sized advanced base having 25 assorted craft Including 50' tank lighters and 36' landing craft.

E9 - REPAIR - SMALL AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT (MOTORIZED)

A truck mounted component designed to make hull and engine repairs to 50' and 36' amphibious craft and other small boats at any point beyond the range of stationary repair facilities. Basically it had three distinct functions:

(1) It could be moved from its parent base as a working unit to a single disabled craft. Upon arrival, It could perform hull repairs and top motor overhaul so that the craft could return to its base.

--39--

(2) It could move out as a self-contained unit for about one week and maintain approximately 25 LCVPs and LCMs. This maintenance period could be extended by the establishment of a flow of supplies from the parent base.

(3) The two truck-mounted shops could be divided and each attached to one of the shops of an E10 component to increase the scope of the E10 by about 15 percent.

E9A - MOBILE LVT REPAIR COMPONENT

A highly mobile facility for repairing and salvaging amphibious tractors. The unit shops were designed to be transported in amphibious tractors and intended to go ashore with one of the early waves of an action. It would make spot repairs to battle damaged LVTs, and generally assist the beachmaster in keeping the beach clear in addition to regular operating maintenance. It was capable of quick dismantling and removal. It was self-sustaining so far as materials, fuel, food and berthing for personnel were concerned for a period of four days.

E10 - STANDARD LANDING CRAFT UNIT -MAINTENANCE COMPONENT

Maintained 60 landing craft (40 LCMs and 20 LCVPs) assuming 20% under repair at all times. Repaired both hulls and engines and maintained six months' supply of consumables.

E10A - LANDING CRAFT SPARE PARTS (SMALL)

This component was designed to be added to an E10 component. It provided six months' supply of hull, machinery and internal combustion engine spare parts.

E11 - PT OPERATING BASE REPAIR COMPONENT

Provided facilities for major hull repair, minor engine repair, and replacement of engines for one operating squadron of PT Boats.

--40--

E12 - PT MAJOR ENGINE OVERHAUL COMPONENT

This component was designed to be added to a Motor Torpedo Boat Operating Base. It provided facilities for the major engine overhaul of four operating squadrons of PT Boats.

E13 - MINESWEEPING EQUIPMENT REPAIR COMPONENT (LARGE)

Would make repairs to, and have available replacements and spare parts for thirteen or more minesweepers. The quantity of material varied according to the number of ships to be served.

E14 - MINESWEEPING EQUIPMENT REPAIR COMPONENT (MEDIUM)

Made repairs to, and had available replacements and spare parts for seven to twelve minesweepers.

E15 - MINESWEEPING EQUIPMENT REPAIR COMPONENT

Made repairs to one to six minesweepers.

E16 - OXYGEN GENERATING PLANT

A plant capable of generating 55-80 lbs. of liquid oxygen per hour, or sufficient oxygen to fill 1,200 - 1,600 standard 220 cubic foot cylinders per month with oxygen at 2,000 lbs. per square inch pressure, suitable for all uses including aviator's breathing.

E17 - ACETYLENE GENERATING PLANT

A mobile acetylene generating and cylinder charging plant, mounted in a van type semitrailer with dolly, capable of continuous generation of a minimum of 500 cubic feet per hour.

E19 - TYPEWRITER REPAIR COMPONENT

Provided facilities for the repair of 50 typewriters per month. Minor repairs could be made to other types of office machines. When assigned to a base at which an Optical Shop (J10) was located, this component would operate in conjunction with that shop and thereby be capable of making major repairs.

--41--

E20 - BASE LVT REPAIR COMPONENT

Provided facilities for the major repair and overhaul of 100 LVTs per month, where the accomplishment of such repair was beyond the scope of the regularly established Army and Marine Corps organic repair and maintenance agencies.

E21 - PT SQUADRON PORTABLE BASE EQUIPMENT

Provided a PT Squadron of from 8 to 12 boats with portable, lightweight repair and operating equipment. It would act as a small temporary base under the direction of the squadron commander where boats could refuel and reprovision, where emergency medical treatment was available, and where a small radio station capable of transmitting one or two frequencies could maintain contact with the nearest operating base.

E22 - LANDING AND PATROL CRAFT REPAIR (MOBILE)

Using the principle of tray-mounted selfpowered tools, this component could be operated in four distinct ways:

(1) As a self-contained unit, it could be established on a beach early in an invasion for combat repairs on all types of landing craft along an extended section of a beach.

(2) It could move with a group of approximately 100 LCMs and LCVPs and handle routine maintenance and minor repairs for a period of about two weeks. The maintenance period could be extended by establishing a flow of supplies.

(3) It could also move in with the first echelon of a large repair base such as a LION and maintain ferries, lighters, and other equipment until the main repair facilities were set up.

(4) In a congested area it could be used in conjunction with, but at some distance from, a large repair facility.

--42--

E24 - CARBON DIOXIDE GENERATING PLANT

A mobile CO2 generating and cylinder charging plant, mounted in a van type semi-trailer with dolly, capable of filling 2 1/2 to 3 standard 30-pound capacity CO2 cylinders per hour.

E25 - MATERIAL RECLAMATION AND RECONDITIONING UNIT- one of the latest components to be developed.

Reclaimed all types of worn-out, broken or damaged machinery and engine parts, restored parts and sub-assemblies to original condition, and specially preserved and packed them for reissue as new parts. It was shore based with shop facilities suitable to the reconditioning operations required, particularly including special facilities for welding, metal spraying and chromium plating to restore parts to size prior to finish machining.

As mentioned in the foregoing, it was necessary to effect changes in design and method of repair in order to cope with the rapid progress of the war. The most pronounced changes in design were toward increasing mobility and flexibility. The first development was the truck mounted repair component called the E9. It consisted of three trucks: (1) spare parts van, (2) carpenter shop, and (3) machine shop. It was designed to repair small landing craft and other internal combustion engine equipment. The practical use of this component was well demonstrated in the Normandy landings. Several were landed and were operating from D+1 Day on, with one of these units being expanded and sent forward to become the major naval repair facility for the landing craft used in the Rhine

--43--

crossing northwest of the Remagen bridgehead.

The next type of mobile repair activity accommodated the amphibious tractor or alligator - the LVT.

This repair unit was called the E9-A and was mounted on trays designed to fit into the LVT(4). Similar developments resulted in the design of the E21, a portable component furnishing base equipment for a PT boat squadron, and the E22, a landing and patrol craft unit mounted on 27 skids or trays, including in addition to shops, laundry and ice cream equipment, two bulldozers or retrievers, a jeep, a LeTourneau crane, a water still and a 75 KW diesel power plant.

A critical shortage of cylinders for the transportation of gases for industry and aviation use led to the development and procurement of self-contained portable plants for the manufacture of the principal gases used at advanced bases. The E16, E17 and E24 functional components were used respectively for the production of oxygen, acetylene and carbon dioxide. In addition to the design of functional components for gas manufacture, the bureau developed equipment which made possible for the first time successful bulk shipment of liquid oxygen by sea and air, and the conversion of this liquid to high pressure gas charged in cylinders at the point of use.

--44--

A summary of the number of components procured from 7 December 1941 to 15 August 1945 appears in Table 53 below.

A review of this table suggests the magnitude of the Advanced Base Program. Its importance cannot be measured quantitatively. It is not an exaggeration to say, however, that without the development of advanced base components and the procurement and shipment of this equipment to advanced areas, the war would have been more costly in terms of men and material, and the war could not possibly have progressed as rapidly to a favorable conclusion.

--45--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-8-t.jpg

GUAM -- ONE OF THE CAPITALS OF THE U.S. NAVY'S "ISLAND EMPIRE"

--46--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-9-t.jpg

 

AND THEN THERE WERE THE COMFORT AND JOYS OF SOME PT BOAT BASES.

--47--

 

TABLE 53

ADVANCED BASE COMPONENTS PROCURED

7 DECEMBER 1941 - 15 AUGUST 1945

(A) COMPONENTS DOMINATED BY BUREAU OF SHIPS

Code

Title

Quantity

B1

Harbor Entrance Control Post

24

B2B

Harbor Patrol

4

B4A

Port Director (Medium)

15

B4B

Port Director (Small)

31

B4C

Harbor Patrol

35

B4D

Beachmaster (Large)

23

B4E

Beachmaster (Small)

10

B4F

Port Director (Large)

1

B4G

Port Director (Medium-Large)

2

B5A

Boat Pool

58

C7

Visual Station - Operating Base (Large)

20

C8

Visual Station - Operating Base (Small)

115

C19

Registered Publication Issuing Office

14

E1

Ship Repair - General

5

E2

Ship Repair - Capital Ships

None

E3

Ship Repair - Destroyers

8

E4

Ship Repair - Submarines

None authorized

E6

Landing Craft Base Repair Component)

18

E6A

Landing Craft Spare Parts - Large )

E8

Repair - Small Boat

32

E9

Repair - Small Amphibious Craft (Motorized)

65

E9A

Mobile LVT Repair Component

21

E10

Standard Landing Craft Unit Maintenance Component )

26

E10A

Landing Craft Spare Parts - Small )

Ell

FT Operating Base Repair Component

16

E12

PT Major Engine Overhaul Component

1

E16

Oxygen Generating Plant

12

E17

Acetylene Generating Plant

12

E20

Base LVT Repair Component

3

E21

PT Squadron Portable Base Equipment

16

E22

Landing and Patrol Craft Repair - Mobile

None

E24

Carbon Dioxide Generating Plant

2

P12C

Fire Protection - Waterfront

21

P12D

Fire Protection - Seadrome

13

--48--

TABLE 53, cont'd.

(B) COMPONENTS UNDER COGNIZANCE OF OTHER BUREAUS
TO WHICH BUREAU OF SHIPS CONTRIBUTED

Code

Title

Quantity

A1

Administration (Large)

18

A2

Administration (Medium)

28

A3

Administration (Small)

94

A4

Administration (PT Base)

22

A7

Shore Patrol Company HQ

20

D3

Tank Farm (Large)

4

D4

Tank Farm (Medium)

10

D19

Material Recovery (Large)

3

D23

Logistics Support Company

14

H10

Additional Operating Equipment -Landplanes

50

H11

Additional Operating Equipment -Seaplanes

40

H14A

Aviation Tank Farm (Large)

13

H14B

Aviation Tank Farm (Medium)

13

H14C

Aviation Tank Farm (Small)

58

H16A

Aerological (Large)

35

H16D

Aerological (Arctic)

None

H23

Air Transport Operations (Seaplane)

5

J12A

Net Component (Large)

5

J12B

Net Component (Medium)

16

J13A

Degaussing Component (Large)

3

J13B

Degaussing Component (Medium)

3

J13C

Degaussing Component - Minesweeper Base

4

J13D

Degaussing Component - Submarine Base

None

J13E

Degaussing Component for Mobile Unit

None

N9

Base Recreation Component

40

P12A

Fire Protection - Basic

156

Q1

Rapid Landing Gear

41

N1A

Camp (250 Men) -Tents

884

N1B

Camp (250 Men) - Tropical Huts

129

N1C

Camp (250 Men) - Northern Huts

83

N2A

Camp (100 Men) - Tents

100

N2B

Camp (100 Men) - Tropical Huts

35

N2C

Camp (100 Men) - Northern Huts

9

N3A

Camp (50 Men) - Tents

46

N3B

Camp (50 Men) - Tropical Huts

28

N3C

Camp (50 Men) - Northern Huts

2

N4A

Camp (25 Men) - Tents

39

N4B

Camp (25 Men) - Tropical Huts

5

N4C

Camp (25 Men) - Northern Huts

6

N7A

Camp (1000 Men) - Tents

76

N7B

Camp (1000 Men) - Tropical Huts

58

N7C

Camp (1000 Men) - Northern Huts

None

--49--

TABLE 53, Cont'd.

(C) ESTIMATED PROCUREMENT PRIOR TO INCEPTION OF COMPONENT SYSTEM


Equivalent
Code

Equivalent Title

Quantity

A3

Administration (Small)

18

B5A

Boat Pool

18

C6

Radio Station - Airfield (Front Line Combat)

13

E9

Repair - Small Amphibious Craft (Motorized) Additional

18

H10

Operating Equipment - Landplanes

18

N1A

Camp (250 Men) - Tents

104

Q1

Rapid Landing Gear

17

C5

Radio Station - Air Base (Small)

4

C8

Visual Station - Operating Base (Small)

5

N2A

Camp (100 Men) - Tents

5

 

--50--

 

5. SHIP REPAIR UNITS*

During the offensive phase of World. War II the public began to realize that there is much more to a far-flung naval war than just the shooting. Newspapers began saying that the American answer to the most gigantic logistics problem in naval history -- that of supplying provisions, fuel, ammunition, and repairs for warships far from bases and docking facilities -- was the true "secret weapon" that upset Japanese strategy.

Though this many-edged weapon was many months in the forging, its plan was writ in the fire and chaos of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the dark months that followed it. During the desperate days when the Japanese tide was flooding southward through the Pacific, overrunning island after island, somebody foresaw the ebb of that tide and had the moral courage to prepare for it. The strategic pattern was clear. Jap-held islands would have to be recaptured, one by one; units of the Jap fleet would be engaged whenever and wherever they could be caught; and the enemy merchant fleet would be strangled so that it could not support the outposts of the new Empire of the Rising Sun.

All this had to be done with a Navy far from home; indeed, often far from ports of any sort. This meant that every striking force of the Navy must constitute an advanced naval base in itself And so, as the Japanese tide began to recede, and the islands began to be reconquered, tenders and repair ships and other ships with specialized duties became an important part of the battle fleet.


*In part adapted from an article by Lt. R. E. Williams, USNR, in the "United States Naval Institute Proceedings" dated March 1946.

--51--

Repair ships steamed in toward conquered islands even before the famed Seabees could get ashore to begin their construction of shore installations. The repair crews aboard those floating shops began their work of servicing and repairing everything from combat vessels to amphibious tanks the minute the anchors of their ships touched bottom in coral lagoons or malarious roadsteads. As the fleet advanced slowly, pushing the enemy back step by step toward his homeland, other repair crews went ashore on reconquered islands and set up shop on a more stable basis. In the meantime the combat arm of the fleet was moving northwestward and the repair ships -- the ADONIS, the JASON, the LUZON, and the other ugly ducklings of the Navy -- followed in its wake, patching up battle damage as fast as the Japs could inflict it.

Big ships, badly hurt, might return to one of the island bases. There an advanced base sectional dock — literally a mobile dry dock, and a device new to the Navy -- might help to overhaul a ship near the scene of action, or to effect temporary repairs so she could make it safely back to her home port. By use of these advanced base sectional docks, generally known as ABSDs, many a ship was spared a time-consuming trip back to a mainland port for repairs; indeed many a ship was saved by them.

The circle of Japanese domination grew smaller and weaker, but there still remained a broad area, even at the last, in which the surface ships of the United Nations could strike only spasmodically, and it was in that area that the Japanese were most sensitive to attack,

--52--

for it was over those waters that their lines of communication ran, dependent upon their attenuated mercantile marine and their rapidly dwindling escort vessels. Upon the fringe of this circle the tenders and the repair ships hovered. Battle-damaged ships were repaired and resupplied in days, instead of weeks, and were hack in the fray again. Instead of sending them hack to naval bases, the naval bases were taken out to them.

Against this strategic backdrop a mere 20,000 men played one of the most important supporting roles in the war. They were the men who kept the combat ships in fighting trim — the repair crews on repair ships and on almost-forgotten island bases in the rear areas (the Advance Base Components discussed in the proceeding section).

They had no worthy champion to make them glamorous in the public eye, no tangy name to lend romance to their work. They just worked, these men of the "Monkey Wrench Navy".

This program began the war with an handful of men and an idea. Although ship repair gained recognition in pre-Pearl Harbor planning as a specialized function in continental naval establishments, little thought had been devoted to special training for this work in the fleet. The only source of training men continued to be the traditional rudimentary apprentice system whereby men and officers were assigned without any particular selection to such repair bases, ships or tenders as existed. No provision was made for earmarking experienced men for continuation in ship repair work in the course of rotation of sea and shore duty.

--53--

a. PEARL HARBOR AND "THE MONKEY WRENCH NAVY"

Known formally by the prosaic name of "Ship Repair Units", these repair forces had their beginning while a pall of smoke still hung over Pearl Harbor, while fires still smoldered, before anybody really knew how much damage had been done by the Japanese sneak attack. It was merely by fortuity that the Navy already had the nucleus of a Ship Repair Unit at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. The assembly of two destroyer-repair units had been authorized in June 1941 and the Destroyer Base at San Diego was designated as the place at which the units were to be trained and assembled.

The original plan was to send Destroyer Repair Unit No. 1 to Londonderry, Ireland, to man the Naval Operating Base nearing completion at that time. This base was being built as part of the plan for transferring 50 overage destroyers to the Royal Navy in exchange for the use of naval bases scattered throughout the British Empire. The ultimate destination of Destroyer Repair Unit No. 2 was to be some point in Scotland.

Personnel to man those bases was carefully selected by name from various repair ships of the United States Fleet. Material for the two units, with the exception of diving equipment, was already arriving in the British Isles at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. By December 7, 1941, Destroyer Repair Unit No. 1 consisted of 671 officers and men, and No. 2 of some 480 officers and men.

--54--

Almost immediately after the Japanese attack on December 7 the two units were consolidated and sent to Pearl Harbor to assist in the repair and salvage of ships damaged there. All men with artificer ratings were selected for that duty. All commissioned officers and warrant officers of Destroyer Repair Unit No. 1 and all warrant officers of Unit No. 2 were sent.

The first contingent of the Ship Repair Unit arrived at Pearl Harbor just two weeks after the disastrous attack. No arrangements having been made for berthing or messing the 1,100 men, they were forced to sleep in the open on the grass and live on whatever food they could find. Much of it was salvaged from the stores of the sunken vessels until better arrangements could be made.

Among the members of this first Ship Repair Unit were about 30 divers. They were completely equipped, because they had been using their diving gear for training at San Diego, and had not shipped it to Ireland with the other equipment. These men took over the biggest part of the diving job at Pearl Harbor, because only a few divers were in the regular navy yard complement there. Thousands of man hours of feverish underwater labor resulted in only one fatal accident. The arduous and often extremely dangerous work and the results obtained at Pearl Harbor have already been fully discussed in Chapter VII.

Diving equipment was utilized to salvage as much apparatus and as many tools as could be clawed from the sodden bowels of the sunken warships. Everything was scarce, and frequently the repair unit had to

--55--

salvage the necessary tools before it could go ahead with a repair job. Electric motors were salvaged to drive salvaged machine tools and eventually a whole machine shop and an electrical shop were built from these retrieved materials. Much of their office equipment -- desks, typewriters, filing cabinets and other furniture -- came from the sunken ships.

Five months after the first Ship Repair Unit went into action 140 officers and men were detached from it and sent back to San Diego to become the nucleus of a second unit. Meanwhile, the warrant officers of Destroyer Repair Unit No. 2 were detached and sent to Londonderry, the original destination of the group. It was at about this same time that the two units were merged and designated as the Pearl Harbor Salvage Detail.

None of the equipment originally set aside for Destroyer Repair Units No. 1 and No. 2 ever reached Pearl Harbor. Moreover, the new unit never was officially commissioned, which was a drawback, for no maintenance fund was available. Though some funds were available in a roundabout way, the unit never had any of its own. As a result, everything the Ship Repair Unit acquired had to be salvaged from the sunken ships or "procured" through various ingenious means.

For example, much equipment was "acquired" from stores destined for such places as the Dewey Drydock at Manila, which was at that time in Japanese hands. This stock of machinery, according to orders, was

--56--

to be stored at Pearl Harbor, so the Ship Repair Unit worked out a new system of storage. A large warehouse was built, the machinery was uncrated, some person or persons unknown promptly bolted it to the floor, and a new repair shop went into operation in the warehouse, these somewhat irregular methods of getting things done earned the name "Scavengers" for the Pearl Harbor Salvage Detail and its officer-in-charge assumed the irreverential nomenclature of "Jake the Snake". Since those ribald days all Ship Repair Units have acquired an aura of respectability.

As the demand for salvage personnel decreased, the unit was called upon to make many voyage repairs on ships, and in November 1942, the unit became known officially as Ship Repair Unit, Pearl Harbor. Its complement was established as 1,329 officers and men.

At about this same time the repair ship MEDUSA departed from Pearl Harbor, and most of the ship-repair work of the base was left to the Ship Repair Unit, though its equipment was far from equal that aboard the MEDUSA.

b. THE SRU COMES OF AGE.

Throughout the first year of the war and well into the second almost all of the repair work in the fleet was accomplished by crews haphazardly collected and trained only as they might acquire knowledge and skill under the antiquated apprenticeship system.

In the Navy's eyes, however, the Ship Repair Unit had proved its worth by the quick and efficient way in which it solved many of the

--57--

knotty problems of ship salvage and repair at Pearl Harbor, so that in March 1943 the Bureau of Ships requested the Bureau of Naval Personnel to establish an adequate expanded program. As a result of this initiative, on 15 May 1943 the Vice Chief of Naval Operations ordered official establishment of more units to be under the Joint control of the Bureau of Ships, which was to determine the total number of men and officers to be procured, define qualifications, and directly supervise the training program, and the Bureau of Naval Personnel, which recruited and assigned the Personnel. Relations between the Bureau of Personnel and the Bureau of Ships were adjusted so that the Bureau of Ships maintained the initiative and leadership throughout the program. From early 1944 an officer billeted in the Bureau of Ships and assigned additional duty in the Bureau of Personnel maintained control over the program. Emphasis on training for "production" was maintained throughout as the result of the Bureau of Ships' interest.

As originally established, the program contemplated the use of enlisted men obtained through the Selective Service System and Navy representatives were advised to earmark men in categories of some 50 different trade skills required by ship repair work. Industrial replacement lists were reviewed by an officer in each district with an eye to the selection of men with the proper skills, and Navy representatives were advised to try to get men in these categories to choose the Navy. Unfortunately too many other organizations wanted men of the same brand: shipyards, industries, the Army and the Sea Bees, so the program fell behind quota.

--58--

Since this system of obtaining men did not produce the results desired, by the end of October 1943 a change became necessary. Fortunately, at this same time the recruiting program for Sea Bees had come to an end, as they exceeded their quota, making it possible on 1 November 1943 for the Bureau of Personnel to transfer field representatives from the Sea Bee program to the SRU program. As an inducement to volunteer for induction before receiving notice, it became necessary to give men ratings prior to induction. To further protect the interest of the Navy, the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Personnel agreed to build a backlog of men in an active status up to 15,000.

Once it had been decided to get men into the program prior to their induction, the recruiting program went well. Additional men were obtained by transfer from the overfilled Sea Bee program, 2,000 being transferred in 1943 and 2700 in 1944. Recruiting vent so well, in fact, that at one point there were 17,000 men in the backlog and the excess in certain trades had to be called to active duty.

Another source of skilled personnel developed in the spring of 1944 when national policy vas established severely limiting the possibility of deferment of men under 26. This made from 1000 to 1500 men available for induction in each Navy Yard and stimulated the voluntary induction of many men with a high degree of skill.

Since they could not get entirely skilled personnel, however, they began to accept semiskilled men and those who displayed special

--59--

aptitude in some skill. Besides, most of the personnel required further adaptation to naval repair work. Plans for training Ship Repair Units were laid accordingly. Some of the trainees were needed, of course, for the repair departments of tenders and repair ships, hut a far greater number was needed for the so-called "ship repair functional components" of the advanced-base units. These ship repair functional components were to receive, besides individual training in repair work, whatever training was necessary to make the members of a unit work together as a team,

c. SRU TRAINING:

In view of the importance of Ship Repair Units to any over-all war effort, it may be feasible to include a description of the training program in order to evaluate it properly in the comprehensive Bureau of Ships history. The fundamental principle behind the training of Ship Repair Units was that they should learn by doing actual repair Jobs, and that the training should be thoroughly practical. For these reasons Ship Repair Training Units had to be centered where a reasonable number of ships would be available for repair of battle damage or for overhaul. Men selected for this service were sent to the navy yards at Boston, Philadelphia, Mare Island, or Puget Sound; to the Naval Frontier Base at Tompkinsville, N. Y.; or to the Naval Repair Base at San Diego or New Orleans. The Industrial Manager of the Navy Yard or Repair Base (under the Commandant or Commanding Officer) became responsible for the actual training of all Ship Repair personnel assigned to his organization for training. To assist the Industrial Manager in discharging

--60--

this responsibility the Bureau of Naval Personnel assigned to each industrial command a well-qualified Ship Repair Training Officer and a staff of officers and enlisted men. Officers for repair units were trained at navy yards within the continental limits of the United States.

A somewhat specialized Ship Repair Training Unit was established under the Commanding Officer of the U.S. Naval landing Force Equipment Depot at Albany, California. At that station, only advanced base functional components were trained in the repair of small boats and amphibious craft.

Toward the end of the war the number of enlisted men in training at each of the training activities was about as follows: [move table here]

Navy Yard, Boston

500

Naval Frontier Base, Tompkinsville

1,050

Navy Yard, Philadelphia

1,000

Naval Repair Base, New Orleans

800

Navy Yard, Mare Island,

1,500

Naval Repair Base, San Diego

7,500

Navy Yard, Puget Sound

1,500

Naval Landing Force Equipment Depot, Albany,

1,150

 

When Japan capitulated in August, 1945, some 33,400 enlisted men and 1,700 officers were serving in Ship Repair Units on repair ships and tenders, and in advanced base functional components overseas. At the same time about 12,000 more enlisted men were in training within the continental limits of the United States, ready to be used as replacements or to man new units to counteract the mounting Japanese kamikaze tactics.

In general, an enlisted man assigned to a Ship Repair Training Unit went through two periods of training. The first was a four-week period of

--61--

regular indoctrination at a Naval Training Station, where he was taught naval history, naval traditions, and Navy Regulations, and was given rigorous physical training to put him in top physical condition for hard work to follow. The next phase of the training was the actual ship-repair training at navy yards or repair bases. Although men of this "monkey wrench Navy" were not intended to be combatants, they were taught to use weapons to defend themselves in hand-to-hand combat, and to man battle stations aboard a ship.

Development of versatility in mechanical skill and the all-round toughness of a hard-hitting fighter were the primary objectives of the intensive Ship Repair training program, which lasts from two to six months, depending on the individual and the type of unit to which he was to be assigned eventually.

Versatility proved to be an essential qualification for these men, for units were called upon to do such diversified Jobs as repairing and rebuilding engines, installing radio and radar devices, repairing damaged armament, or they might have to install magazines, repair gun mounts, make underwater repairs, clear harbors of wrecked enemy ships, or put captured enemy ships back in action. At times the Job had to be done under harassing enemy fire.

d. REPRESENTATIVE TRAINING PROGRAM

Though the general objectives of all Ship Repair Training Units were identical, the curricula and methods of instruction varied somewhat

--62--

from unit to unit. Probably the program of the Naval Repair Base at New Orleans is representative. At that base the training of Ship Repair personnel was divided roughly into four categories: (1) military training; (2) individual training in trade skills not normally found outside the Naval Establishment, for example, gyro compasses, Selsyn motors, hydraulics, and electric coding machines; (3) component or group training; and (4) improvement in the individual's trade skills.

Trainees received at the Repair Base were first sent to the so called "schools division", where for the first three days they received further indoctrination in the general policies of the unit and a more specific explanation of their military duties. This was especially important, because many of the men enlisted in the Navy as petty officers (later, when all enlisted men came into the Navy through draft-board quotas, specially qualified men became petty officers only after they had completed the Ship Repair training) and had only a vague conception of their military duties. Included in the general naval training were such topics as petty-officer training, leadership, malaria, booby traps, firefighting, small arms, eye training, Polaroid trainer, anti-aircraft measures, rescue-breathing apparatus, and night lookout.

After this general training the men were divided into divisions in which they worked at the base, and later aboard ship. In those groups they received practical instruction in the types of work they were to

--63--

perform in the Navy. They were then sent into the shops or aboard ships to work at tasks corresponding with their ratings and trade abilities. While they were doing practical work they wore given further instruction. Operating units, models, motion pictures, charts, and other visual training aids were used as much as possible to shorten and simplify instruction.

All trainees attended firefighting school. During a two-day course they were taught the fundamentals of modem shipboard firefighting, using dummy compartments and simulated shipboard conditions.

The purpose of this course was twofold: to teach the men how to fight fires, and to teach then teamwork and co-ordination. Every student was required to learn how to operate rescue breathing apparatus in a smoke-filled structure.

One of the phases of military training that proved its value many times was the anti-aircraft training. Men from the Ship Repair Training Unit at the Naval Repair Base at New Orleans were sent to Shell Beach for a period of one week for instruction and actual firing of all anti-aircraft guns up to 3 inches in bore. This course was particularly valuable because it taught the men to defend themselves against aerial attack, and -- perhaps even more important -- it taught the essentials of teamwork, which is all-important in fusing a group of men together into a working component.

Under the Schools Division Officer at New Orleans were three other division officers, each in charge of the practical training of certain groups of men, according to trade skills. In the Machinery Division the course provided general instruction in most kinds of

--64--

engineering repairs aboard ship. The course in the Electrical Division was desired to give the trainee a working knowledge of some phases of the electrical trade that are not familiar to the average civilian electrician. Courses given by the Hull Division were broken down according to naval ratings or trade skills, because most of the hull ratings have little relation to each other. All Hull Division classroom instruction was followed by an instructional period in the shop.

For example, welders were made to qualify on Navy standards; carpenters -- most of them house carpenters -- were taught to apply their knowledge of house construction to ship framing and shop work.

The Training Unit at New Orleans also maintained six other courses of instruction in which attendance was governed entirely by selection, request, or aptitude. These were: (1) refrigeration school, (2) hydraulic mechanism repair, (3) Higgins Diesel school, (4) velocity power tool school, (5) diving school, and (6) Welding school.

Refrigeration school was open to machinist's mates and electrician's mates. It lasted six days and emphasized the repair of small refrigeration apparatus, which has caused a great deal of trouble in the fleet. Selection of students was made entirely by Division Officers.

Hydraulic mechanism repair was a 12-day course providing instruction of machinist's mates in the fundamentals of Vickers, Waterbury, and Northern hydraulic gear. Training aids used in this course included actual hydraulic equipment and many operating models manufactured by the trainees themselves Students were selected for the course on the basis of previous experience and aptitude.

--65--

The Higgins Diesel school was operated with the help of the Higgins Boat Company, and was located on the premises of that company. The course was a thoroughly practical one, and the model engines used for instruction were actual landing-craft engines. The course was divided into three phases -- basic, intermediate, and advanced -- each of which required two weeks. In the advanced course men were taught "spot" diagnosis of engine troubles, as well as boat operation and fundamental navigation. All motor machinist's mates were required to take the course.

As many machinist's mates and shipfitters as could be accommodated were given the course in the use of velocity power tools. Some damage control was taught in this course, but only as it applied to the use of velocity power tools. The course required six days.

After completing the diving school the men had enough training to enable them to qualify as divers, second class. The course took six weeks and the trainee was taught not only diving but also underwater burning and welding. Before a student was permitted to make an actual dive in deep water he was given several opportunities to make trial descents in the diving tank to get the "feel" of it. The diving school worked closely with the Industrial Command at the Naval Repair Base at New Orleans, and the students and instructors did most of the routine diving at the base.

Before a student could graduate from the course he had to demonstrate his proficiency at diving, and to demonstrate to his instructors that he could convert a standard gas mask into a shallow-water face plate.

This was considered important, because with this knowledge a man's

--66--

services as a diver could be utilized during many emergencies, even though regular diving equipment might not be available. During the course a student was required to make at least 12 dives with full equipment, not including tank dives, in addition to his qualifying dives.

To help fill the almost insatiable demand for trained welders, the Ship Repair Training Units at New Orleans and some of the other bases established welding schools to provide welders for smaller repair ships and advanced-base components. These training units recognized that in small organizations such as Ship Repair Units the actual allowances of welders as established by the Bureau of Naval Personnel could not be increased. But if the number of trade skills in a unit could be increased, the over-all effectiveness of the unit could be increased. On this basis, as many men as possible were trained to work at more than one trade. All shipfitters and metalsmiths were taught to weld, and many of them became proficient. Another reason for conducting the welding school was that quite a few trainees, though welders by trade could weld in only one position; others could not qualify as welders according to Navy standards. Those men were taught to improve their skill and increase their usefulness.

Training of the men in groups was on a "made to order" basis, so to speak. Orders to assemble a certain types of unit usually went from the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the Ship Repair Training Unit about two months before the team or component was to be ready. As soon as the orders were received, assembly of the group was started and all training thereafter was on a group basis. The men were assigned to their own barracks, which

--67--

were policed by their own master-at-arms and maintained by their own compartment-cleaning details. They were organized into sections, and all ship-repair work was done under the supervision of the section leaders.

Trainees attended the anti-aircraft and firefighting school in teams. In this way they learned first-hand the value of team work and esprit de corps and attained a high caliber of self-sufficiency many weeks before they reported to their ships or bases. This kind of group training probably decreased the length of the shakedown and adjustment period and engendered the proper spirit of co-operation before the units reached combat areas.

After the courses were completed the teams were held in reserve in a pool, doing actual ship repair work, until they were eventually assigned to advanced-base components or repair ships or tenders. Almost all Ship Repair Training Units used similar curricula, although the Unit at the Naval Repair Base, New Orleans, emphasized the repair of landing craft more than the other Units; consequently a Ship Repair Unit to specialize in the repair of destroyers or capital ships would receive training somewhat different from that described here.

e. CONCLUSION:

The importance of the Ship Repair Unit and Advanced Base Functional Component as on integral part of any over-all war program cannot be stressed too strongly. The tremendous advantage of patching up or servicing a damaged ship in the battle area is gained not only by the elimination of a

--68--

time-consuming trip to a mainland port but also in some instances by the actual saving of the vessel through temporary repairs. With the continental facilities taxed to capacity during hostilities in the production of new units of the fleet and in the handling of vessels unable to be serviced in a forward area, this advanced repair force provides a balance for the Allies over-all production, maintenance, conversion and repair facilities.

The experience gleaned in World War II indicates that foresight in planning, particularly with regard to technical personnel activities, is of utmost importance. All skilled repair personnel in the U. S.

Naval Reserve must be kept constantly informed on recent developments in their general trades and must be induced to continue an active interest in the Navy in the event another emergency should arise. With the recent improvements of offensive weapons, the possibility of greater damage to our fleet units increases. The armed forces must have at their immediate disposal experienced repair units should an emergency suddenly arise. These men of the "monkey wrench navy" in any future conflict, as in the past, will not be the glorified heroes upon whom decorations are showered. In World War II the "ships that came back" ... the PENNSYLVANIA, the CALIFORNIA, the WEST VIRGINIA, the NEVADA, the PITTSBURG, the ROSS and scores of others ... these were proof enough that the Ship Repair Unit had done an important Job and had done it well.

As some unknown salty bard of the SRU has phrased it:

--69--

"Theirs not the glory of the kill,

The tale to which the people thrill;

Thiers but the pride in work well done

And peace of mind when war is won

Their motto 'Do the job in hand,

Forget the fanfare and the band.'

In shop and ship with forthright skill

These men gird ships to make the kill.

All hail! these men in dungarees

Whose skill creates our victories."

--70--

Conversion Program

Auxiliary Program:

In spite of sporadic attempts to glamorize the role of individuals and equipment necessary to support modern fighting forces, there is a general tendency to under-rate both the importance and the magnitude of the effort required. Fighting ships and fighting men are photogenic, and the risks they run and the direct damage they inflict upon the enemy naturally attract attention. However, in this war, to a greater extent than ever before, tremendous efforts had to be applied to keep combatant vessels and men supplied and in fighting trim. A complex logistic organization was developed and great advances were made in technique. An essential part of the development was the expansion of the auxiliary fleet. This job was of the greatest importance, and required vessels able to play their part in the thick of battle. The very name "auxiliary", however, tended to detract from the vital role played by these vessels.

Another reason for the relatively lowly position of the auxiliary in the public eye is that there are a great number of different types of vessels designed or adapted to meet specific needs. In the list of U. S. Naval vessels one may find fifty-seven different classifications

--71--

of auxiliary vessels now in active service, ranging from tenders and repair ships to minesweepers and from transports to distilling ships. This list does not include the many variations within each class of vessel.

Approximately 1700 auxiliary vessels were built, converted, or acquired without conversion between 1 January 1939 and December 1945, the total tonnage of these vessels amounting to more than 5,700,000 displacement tons. Both in number and in tons, this auxiliary fleet was of a magnitude greater than the total pre-war Navy, and in tonnage was 116% of the combatant vessels completed in the same period. Of this total 918 vessels of 4,537,120 displacement tons were converted, including vessels, built for the Navy by the Maritime Commission, which were constructed and converted to Navy design concurrently.

By far the largest conversion tonnage in the auxiliary classification was in transports (AP) and attack transports (APA), which represented approximately one-half of the total tonnage of all vessels converted. As might be expected, the next important category involved cargo ships (AK) and attack cargo ships (AKA), which, together, accounted for over 20% of the total tonnage. In third place were found oilers (AO), amounting about 10% of the aggregate.

Conversion of auxiliary vessels to naval use started with the Emergency Defense Program in 1939 and was

--72--

accelerated in 1941. The peak was not reached, however, until 1944-1945, 1,794,000 tons being converted in 1944 and 754,000 tons converted in the first six months of 1945.

As early as 1923 the Navy started to prepare plans for conversions which were anticipated in the event of war. In that year a War Plans Division established in the Bureau of Construction and Repair was charged with the responsibility of preparing for the conversion of merchant type vessels to Navy use. Vessels were selected by the Chief of Naval Operations to be used for specific purposes after consultation with naval architects in the War Plans and Design Divisions of the Bureau of Construction and Repair. Further preparations were made possible by the provision in the Act establishing the Maritime Commission in 1936, which required plans for new commercial vessels built under the Act to be submitted to the Navy so that characteristics needed in time of war could be incorporated therein. Two advantages were derived from this provision of the Act: (1) the improvement of such features as speed, stability and structural strength, vital in time of war;

(2) it kept the Navy fully abreast of the latest developments and potentialities in the commercial shipbuilding field. An example of the gains derived from Navy participation in the Maritime construction program was the building of fast (16 1/2 knot) tankers in 1937. The commercial

--73--

company desiring these vessels would have found it most economical to build a 12 1/2 knot ship, but by the granting of a subsidy representing the difference between the cost of the two types, the company was delighted to have the faster vessels, which proved to be of great value after the start of the war.

From the time the Navy started to purchase commercial vessels in 1939 to the end of the war, it was found that few of the detailed plans prepared for the conversion of specific vessels could be used, as the need for different types did not conform to peacetime planning.

This work, however, was not wasted, as the men in the bureau who had worked out the detailed conversion plans were thoroughly familiar with the vessels in question and were in a position to create new plans or to make recommendations as to alternative use of the vessels in question much more rapidly than would have otherwise been the case.

From 1939 to the outbreak of the war, vessels were acquired by purchase or bare boat charter after direct negotiation with the owner. In the great majority of cases this procedure was entirely satisfactory and the Navy was able to obtain the vessels it desired. For example, in response to a public announcement of the Navy's need for yachts and other small craft, a great many private owners turned their vessels over to the Government for the nominal

--74--

fee of one dollar. After 7 December 1941 the power to requisition vessels was made effective under the terms of the Maritime Commission Act of 1936. Thereafter all vessels were purchased for the Navy by the Maritime Commission.

In the entire conversion program emphasis had to be placed on a reasonable compromise between the ideal and the minimum necessary to do the job. In the first phases of the emergency, particularly in 1942, minimum requirements were all that could be met. For example, when the decision was made to invade North Africa in 1942, the Bureau acquired and directed the conversion of approximately 15 transports (AP) within a period of ten to fifteen days. In this case about all that could be done was to provide berthing and messing facilities, and a very few guns. Detailed plans could not be prepared and apart from conferences between representatives of the Bureau, Commandant and representatives of private shipyards, responsibility for execution of the conversion was left with the Commandant of the Yard in which the work was being done, and with the District Material Officer, the predecessor of the Industrial Manager and Assistant Industrial Manager.

Throughout the program difficulties were experienced in obtaining components such as fans, generators, pumps, distilling equipment, and so forth, necessary to equip the

--75--

vessels so that they could berth the greatly increased complements of wartime and to provide for the complex equipment of war, including radio and electronics gear, fire control apparatus, et cetera. As a result, much of the equipment installed during conversion was purchased according to commercial specifications rather than Navy.

As the war progressed, experience gained in all theaters of operation required the constant modification of conversion plans and the addition of a great amount of new equipment. The result was the aggravation of the shortage noted above. The extreme case is found in the radio equipment carried by an amphibious force flagship (AGC), which by the end of the war had 124 radio receiving sets and 63 transmitters. Such developments required, of course, not only the procurement of the equipment in question, but changes in arrangements and much additional wiring and generator capacity.

In the early stages of the war all conversion work was carried on by the Navy after the acquisition of a completed ship. As the war developed and the Maritime Commission building program expanded, it became necessary to take over partially completed vessels from the Maritime Commission and to finish them in naval facilities. Finally, as the needs became more clearly defined and working relationships between the Maritime Commission and the

--76--

Navy improved, conversions of Maritime designs were worked out jointly prior to the beginning of the construction period and the vessels built from the keel up as transports, cargo vessels or whatever else was desired. The largest single program of this sort involved the completion of 130 attack transports (APA) during the years 1944 and 1945. In this program, which received the highest precedence from the Navy, Maritime Commission and War Production Board, the Maritime Commission bore responsibility for supervising the construction but Used the Bureau of Ships and the Inspectors of Naval Material to expedite materials and to break bottlenecks. It was a truly cooperative undertaking and utilized to the full the strong-points of both organizations.

The size of the auxiliary conversion program which was carried on simultaneously with the expansion of the combatant fleet reemphasizes the fact that the United States Navy had been permitted to decline to a dangerously low point in the years between the wars. Although the need for many auxiliary vessels developed out of the demands of amphibious warfare which had not been anticipated prior to the war, the need for new fleet auxiliary vessels had been recognized in the Navy for many years. The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the fiscal year 1935 contained the following passage:

--77--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-10-t.jpg

MAINTENANCE ON A FLAT-TOP

--78--

[block] "A further great need, not yet provided for, is a force of fleet auxiliary vessels of improved characteristics and in sufficient numbers for adequate operating maintenance of the combatant forces. The present fleet auxiliaries are generally old vessels and all have insufficient speed. New auxiliaries should be provided by a progressive program such as is nov under way for combatant ships." [/block]

Without the revival of commercial shipbuilding under the Maritime Commission, it is doubtful if the record outlined above could have been achieved. This experience should reemphasize the importance of a strong merchant marine as a supplement to a regular auxiliary vessel building program.

2. Other Conversions:

In addition to the large auxiliary conversion program, extensive conversions of combatant vessels, minecraft, patrol craft, and district craft were undertaken during the emergency period. Table 54 below summarizes this record:

--79--

TABLE 54

Number of Vessels and Tonnage Converted 1939 - 1945

Vessels

Tonnage

COMBATANT

81

832,680

MINE

CRAFT

102

36,726

PATROL CRAFT

189

160,108

DISTRICT CRAFT-SELF PROPELLED

500

65,306

DISTRICT CRAFT-NON SELF PROPELLED

103

144,816

In addition to conversions as defined by the bureau and tabulated in bureau records, extensive repair and alteration work of similar magnitude was involved in the refitting and equipping of existing Naval vessels to meet new demands. The most extensive work of this type involved destroyers and destroyer escorts. Ninety-four destroyer escorts were made into high-speed troop transports; approximately one half of these alterations were accomplished after the vessels were completed as DEs and involved an expenditure of about one million dollars apiece and required nine to ten weeks.

--80--

Twenty-five 1200-ton destroyers were reclassified as highspeed troop transports. The alterations of these vessels required an average of thirty to forty-five days.

Twenty-four 1630-ton destroyers were reclassified as highspeed minesweepers. These alterations required about forty-five days each.

Less extensive work was involved in the redesigning of vessels originally Ordered as destroyers or destroyer escorts; in other words, the alterations were incorporated before completion. Half of the ninety-four destroyer escorts re-designated as high-speed troop transports as mentioned above fell into this category. Similarly twelve 2,200 ton destroyers were re-designated as high-speed minelayers.

In addition to the above periodic major rearrangements of destroyer and destroyer escorts as well as the converted types it was necessary to augment new armament and to add or replace electrical equipment and new fire control equipment. Nineteen destroyer escorts were regunned from 3-inch to 5-inch gun ships. Twenty-four 2,000 ton destroyers and seven destroyer escorts were rearranged to act as radar picket ships. Less extensive alterations were required for practically all vessels of this category.

--81--

D. SPARE PARTS

1. BACKGROUND

The biggest and most difficult problem in field maintenance during the war proved to be the procurement and distribution of spare parts necessary to keep Naval vessels in fighting trim. To a large extent the difficulties of the spare parts program resulted from the decision made shortly before the outbreak of war to push the construction of new vessels at the cost of maintenance spares. As a consequence, this spare parts program soon found itself so far in arrears of requirements that the struggle throughout the war proved to be an uphill battle.

The decision to sacrifice maintenance spares for new construction was made because of the acute shortage of manufacturing capacity for major components of Naval vessels. When new construction schedules required deliveries beyond the capacity of existing facilities it became quite natural to divert components from maintenance to new vessels. This policy was set forth in detail in a Chief of the Bureau of Ships memorandum of 17 November 1941 which is quoted herewith in full.

--82--

PS/L8-3(733)
EN28/A2-11

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.
November 17, 1941

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.
To: All Supervisors of Shipbuilding, USN.

The Commandant, Navy Yard:

New York, N. Y.
Boston, Mass.
Norfolk, Va.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Charleston, S.C.
Puget Sound, Wash.
Portsmouth, N. H.
Mare Island, Calif.

SUBJECT: Shore Spares - Suspension of Manufacture of.

1. It has been an established practice in contracting for vessels to require that certain shore based spares be delivered with their respective vessels. That procedure especially in connection with turbines and reduction gears, is operating to delay seriously the delivery of this type of equipment badly needed to complete vessels according to schedule. In other words, the fabrication of shore based spares concurrently with their parent equipment ties up facilities and requires material that can well be utilized to set forward the manufacture of gears and turbines for subsequent vessels.

2. It is the Bureau's desire that material for the completion of turbines and gears be given priority over material for their respective shore based spares and that no facilities capable of utilization on gears and turbines be devoted to the fabrication of shore based spares without the approval of the Bureau. In other words, it is the Bureau's purpose to devote all energies and applicable facilities to speed up deliveries of turbines and gears to meet a current emergency by setting back the manufacture of related shore based spares. It may be practicable for a certain manufacturer to meet satisfactorily the delivery of turbines and gears and at the same time to deliver shore based spares with their parent equipment. However, at the present time all manufacturers are not able to meet required delivery dates of turbines and gears even without their shore based spares. It is the Bureau's purpose to use the facilities of the former more fortunate manufacturer devoted to shore based spares to assist the latter manufacturers to improve their dates of delivery of operating equipment necessary to complete vessels.

--83--

5. Delaying shore based spares affects generally contractual obligations of private shipbuilders and machinery manufacturers in the case of Government furnished material. Where an adjustment of a contract is necessary in order to comply with the above stated purposes the Bureau requests to be advised promptly so that the necessary amendments of contract can be made to permit immediate compliance.

4. While the foregoing paragraphs refer specifically to the main propelling turbines and gears, the Bureau desires a similar but less general application of procedure in regard to all shore based spares for auxiliary machinery, shafting, etc., where the supplying of such shore based spares delays seriously subsequent parent equipment.

5. The foregoing applies only to spares for vessels under construction. For vessels in operation, spares will be produced in accordance with the assigned priority except in cases where the need for spares is indefinite and thus where the facilities can be diverted to the manufacture of materials urgently needed for new construction, resulting

in an over-all benefit to the defense effort. Where such a situation presents itself, it is requested that full information be immediately reported to the Bureau for decision as to the advisability of deferring the manufacture of the spares involved.

S. M. ROBINSON
Chief of Bureau.

Copy to: BUSANDA.

--84--

It should be noted that for vessels in operation spares could be produced in accordance with assigned priority as applied. This reservation actually meant that battle damage spares could be diverted from new construction, but production could not be diverted to the building of inventories necessary to meet anticipated repair loads. Another exception made early in the war was the development of a comprehensive program for the manufacture and distribution of spare parts to keep submarines in operation.

--85--

During the darker days there did exist a need for a central planning organization within the Bureau to determine the allocation of that part of the nations productive capacity which was available to the Bureau of Ships between the shipbuilding and maintenance. In the latter part of the war, however, the Bureau did take a strong stand to improve the position of production for maintenance purposes, although it was not prepared to determine to what extent CNO directives for new construction would adversely affect fleet maintenance. For example, the Bureau should have been in a position to point out that building 100 LSTs in six months would make no spare parts available for their maintenance, and therefore fewer LSTs would be available for operations a year thereafter than if, for example, 90 new LSTs with 10 ships' worth of spare parts had been produced.

The step which might have reduced some of the competition between new construction and maintenance, and also permitted better exchange of technical information so that problems arising in new construction could be passed on to those responsible for maintenance of vessels and vice versa, was the consolidation of the type desks in the Shipbuilding and Maintenance Division. Effected in 1945, this would have proved most useful had the war continued for any considerable length of time but during the course of the war it served no material benefit.

--86--

Although manufacture of spare parte could be subordinated in the early phases of the war, by early 1944 the policy of the Navy and the Bureau of Ships had to change to meet the rapid growth in demand. Several changes were made, therefore, in the Bureau and Navy organization to meet the growing problem. The most important internal change was the creation of the Materials Branch on 9 August 1944. This organization permitted centralization of control over spare parts and the placing of responsibility upon a single organization for creation of new methods to meet the problem. Earlier in the year attention had been directed to the problem by the placing of all work incidental to repairs and alterations to United Nations vessels, including the manufacture of maintenance parts, at the top of the Master Precedence List on 27 April 1944. Apparently, however, previous policy with regard to spares resulted in arbitrary and conflicting interpretations by both the Bureau and the field, and continued efforts had to be directed to establish the fact that fleet maintenance spares should be given precedence at the expense of new construction components if necessary. Additional pressure developed in the latter part of the year as a result of actions in the Philippines. This situation is well summarized in the following memorandum from the Chief of the Bureau of Ships to the Chief of Naval Operations of 14 November 1944.

--87--

ADDRESS NAVY DEPARTMENT.
BUREAU OF SHIPS
Section 702-802-501

REFER TO FILE NO
C-P14-2(702-802-501)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
14 November 1944

To: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: Maintenance of the Fleet - Production Urgency and Manpower Priority.
Ref: (a) BuShips Conf. ltr. C-S31-1 to CNO dtd 25 February 1944.
(b) OP&M End-1, on BuShips Conf. ltr. C-S31-1 to CNO dtd 23 February 1944.
(c) OP&M ltr. PM225/JDS:hw to WPB dtd 23 February 1944.
(d) VCNO 1st Conf. Memo Ser. 0119923-05 on BuShips Conf. ltr. C-S31-1 to CNO dtd 23 February 1944.
(e) COMINCH and CNO Conf. ltr. Ser. 0120023-05 to JCS dated 29 February 1944.
(f) Chief of Staff Commander in Chief Army and Navy Conf. ltr. Ser. 0414032 to WPB dtd 27 March 1944.
(g) WPB Conf. ltr. to Chief of Staff Commander in Chief Army and Navy dtd 3 April 1944.
(h) WPB "National Production Urgency List" dtd 16 October 1944 (Revised).

1. The recent action in the Philippines brings out forcefully the need for immediate action on the manpower and priority status for maintenance and repair of the Fleet. The Chief of the Bureau of Ships has repeatedly emphasized this matter and has done everything within his power to anticipate and assure that the requirements will be met. It is the purpose of this letter to invite the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations to the urgent need for a top preference in both priority and manpower referral in order that unpredictable battle damage repairs and the increasing maintenance load, including the production of maintenance parts, may proceed without delay.

2. In reference (a), there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations the need for a decision as to the position of the Maintenance Program of the Bureau of Ships with respect to all other programs for the war effort.

--88--

The Chief of the Office of Procurement and Material by references (b) and (c) concurred with the recommendations of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships in this matter. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, in reference (d), concurred with the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, and stated that a greater percentage of the Navy's production effort must be placed on the maintenance of operating vessels.

3. In reference (a), the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations indicated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the War Production Boards should be advised that "such priority as necessary to meet required delivery dates should be awarded to spare parts for Naval vessels even at the expense of conflicting programs, including Naval new construction." In reference (f), the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy advised the War Production Board of the necessity for particular attention being paid to expediting maintenance material, including spare parts, and the need for prompt and effective assistance from the War Production Board. In reply to this communication, the Acting Chairman of the War Production Board advised by reference (g) that established procedures provided for rescheduling of spare parts production to meet the Navy's needs wherever possible without interference with equal or higher rated programs and also provided for the precedence of maintenance parts over parts for Naval new construction.

4. As directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Bureau of Ships on 27 April 1944 placed all work incidental to repairs and alterations to United Nations vessels, including the manufacture of maintenance parts, at the top of the Master Precedence List for Naval shipbuilding and repair. This precedence rating has been maintained since its inception with the exception of the overriding precedence given to certain APAs, AKAs, and AGCs since 4 September 1944.

5. Engaged in the manufacture of Internal Combustion Engine parts alone are approximately fifty prime contractors with thousands of subcontractors. Engaged in the production and the delivery of maintenance materials, including spare parts other than Internal Combustion Engine parts, are thousands of prime contractors and subcontractors scattered throughout the country. There are approximately 25,000 purchase orders and contracts now in existence for hull and

--89--

machinery spare parts alone. In order that contracts for maintenance materials might be identified in the offices of the Material Inspection Service and in the plants of the contractors and subcontractors, the Bureau of Ships has directed all procuring agencies to stamp all such contracts and purchase orders with the phrase "Purpose - For the Maintenance, Repair, and Operation of Existing Vessels". Such ready identification of contracts for maintenance materials and spare parts permits the lowest echelon of the Inspection Service, and also all contractors and subcontractors, to recognize such material and to give it preferred treatment where necessary to meet the delivery dates required. This method can be effectuated only within the Navy's program. The Bureau is now in consultation with the Office of Procurement and Material, the Army and the War Production Board in an attempt to institute an adequate scheduling procedure for spare parts. It should be realized, however, that such a procedure will require many months to become effective, and even after it is effective, the manpower needs of the manufacturers must be met or production will be inadequate to meet the scheduled requirements. The problem with respect to manpower is one of tying together the precedence of Navy ship maintenance with the referral of manpower in the amount and type needed by the many prime and subcontractors in a manner which will assure an orderly flow of materials to the shipyards and Fleet together with an adequate supply of labor in the shipyards to meet the fluctuation in repair loads. The manpower needs of the many thousands of contractors engaged in the manufacture of Navy ship maintenance material vary greatly from time to time, depending upon the demands established by fleet operations, shipping, and distribution difficulties. It Is imperative that needed production of ship maintenance materials, including spare parts, be met in a timely and expeditious manner. Such will require frequently the highest manpower priority for critical trades in various plants throughout the country if requirements for ship maintenance materials are to be met.

6. In order that the Chief of Naval Operations may have specific indications of the need for expediting production of ship maintenance materials, the following examples are quoted:

--90--

(a) Even though thousands of tons of ship maintenance materials have been delivered to the active theaters of war, deficiencies exist, as is proved by the fact that in the 1 October 1944 reports from Area Commanders on Landing Craft there were 3,414 landing craft units repairable but unserviceable. These units alone represent a considerable striking force which will be immobilized unless a great quantity and variety of maintenance materials are on hand for immediate repairs. The Navy has been operating on a slim margin of critical ship maintenance material based on the rising curve of maintenance requirements which are known to exist or can be anticipated. Any failure to meet these predictable requirements will result from the inability of contractors to meet scheduled production. In addition to this, however, there are the tremendous fluctuating requirements for battle damage and operational casualties for which the production and deliveries must be expedited at top preference at the moment the specific demands are known. The rising maintenance load and unpredictable needs for battle damage make it inevitable that major operational delays will result unless the flow of ship maintenance materials is rapidly increased. It is impossible at this time to evaluate the requirements which are resulting from the continuing battle of the Philippines, but the Philippine campaign plus the general acceleration of operations in the Pacific will place an unprecedented and unpredictable load on the maintenance program for which immediate preparation must be made.

(b) Analysis with respect to the situation in internal combustion engine spare parts shows that monthly deliveries in 1944 are only $11,500,000 against requirements of $13,500,000, a current deficit of $2,000,000 per month. The estimated ship maintenance requirements for engine spare parts in 1945 is approximately $23,000,000 per month, or a 100 percent increase over present deliveries. It Is clear that these parts manufacturers will be unable to attain the required increase unless manpower and priority are immediately available when and where needed.

(c) In the manufacture of hull and machinery spare parts, which parts involve all materials other than internal combustion engine spare parts, 25 percent of all orders are behind the necessary delivery schedule. As has been stated, these orders are scattered in plants of contractors and subcontractors all over the country.

--91--

7. The Bureau of Ships and the Navy Material Inspection Service are fully cognizant of the stated relative urgency of the fleet maintenance to other Navy production. However, the field service of the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission, having control of urgency ratings and manpower priorities for contractors, are not authoritatively informed in this matter. The recent revision of the National Production Urgency List of the Production Executive Committee of the War Production Board is the only current authoritative directive governing program end plant urgency in the referral of manpower. This list, reference (h), covers ship repair and maintenance by the inclusion of only the four West Coast Navy Yards and Drydocks. These four industrial establishments are responsible at the present time for only about 60 percent of the shipyard repairs to Naval vessels on the West Coast. There is no mention made in this National Production Urgency List of either private repair yards or the production of maintenance materials and spare parts for existing vessels. The Bureau of Ships has repeatedly recommended the inclusion of the entire Navy ship maintenance program in the National Production Urgency List in order that such list may be consistent with the precedence assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations, and, further, in order that the various contractors in the ship maintenance program may obtain expeditious handling of their manpower needs in sufficient time to prevent delays before the delays occur.

8. The present situation is such that Navy preference rating instructions and Navy precedence lists are not consistent with instructions issued by the War Production Board for manpower action. It seems apparent to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships that such consistency must be had if thousands of contractors and subcontractors throughout the country, working with the Material Inspection Service, may obtain without delay manpower referrals to permit the production of materials to be needed in the repair of Naval vessels. Specifically, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships recommends:

(a) That the National Production Urgency List of the War Production Board be revised to reflect the priority of Naval programs for manpower needs as designated in

--92--

Precedence Lists by the Chief of Naval Operations. This revision should provide for the inclusion of all plants and shipyards engaged in manufacturing ship maintenance material and in affecting repairs to existing Naval vessels.

(b) When (a) has been accomplished, such instructions issued by the Navy Department as may be inconsistent with the War Production Board, be cancelled.

(c) When (a) has been accomplished, the efforts of the Office of Procurement and Material be directed to implementing the cooperation between the War Production Board, War Manpower Commission and the Material Inspection Service, to permit such manpower as is needed to be obtained.

(d) Any publicity by the Navy, the War Production Board, the Office of War Information, or any other Government activity, with respect to manpower needs, be consistent with the proposed revision of the National Production Urgency List.

(e) The Production Urgency List of the War Production Board be definite to the point that labor referrals be made by the War Manpower Commission to those plants engaged in the manufacture of maintenance materials and spare parts when any contract in those plants is stamped "Purpose - For the Maintenance, Repair, and Operation of Existing Vessels" and when the manufacture in that plant is not up to schedule requirements.

9. The Chief of the Bureau of Ships considers this a matter of utmost importance and requests that every effort be made to resolve the inconsistencies now existing, in order that the effort now being made in the Bureau and by its representatives in the field, may not be hampered by such inconsistencies.

 

S/ E. L. COCHRANE
CHIEF OF BUREAU

CC: OP&M
BUSHIPS, Code 100
101
300
501
546
800
801
802

 

--93--

 

B. SYSTEMS AND CATEGORIES

One of the first requisites to an understanding of the spare parts problem is the classification of material used by the Bureau of Ships into distinct categories: first, there is material generally classified as "Standard Stock", which consists of common items in general use by various types of ships or shore stations. These items may have a number of different uses and include practically all portable or semi-portable shipboard equipment, consumable supplies and tools. The material is procurable under standard or commercial specifications approved by the Navy, and is listed in the General Stores Section of the Catalog of Navy Material (formerly known as the Navy Supplement of the Federal Standard Stock Catalog). Second is material under direct control of the Bureau of Ships intended only for shipboard use and normally a permanent shipboard installation. Material in this classification consists mostly of complete hull and machinery components and major shore-based ships spares such as propellers, main engine shafts, generator armatures, etc. These are listed in the Index of Special Ship Material. Third are special materials controlled by activities designated by the Bureau of Ships, covering repair parts and installed hull machinery and internal combustion engine components. Such parte are peculiar to a particular piece of machinery or equipment and are normally furnished for replacing a part worn in service.

--94--

Usually spares are supplied only by the manufacturer of the parent machinery or equipment.

An idea of the scope of the problems involved in the control of this material may be obtained when it is realized that estimates indicate there are more than 3,500,000 different kinds of parts and equipment of Bureau of Ships Controlled Components, Equipment, Parts and Materials in service and there are about 450,000 different parts and equipment in store or on order. Most of this material is of a highly technical nature requiring skilled and in many cases specially trained personnel to Identify, store and issue it.

In addition to the problems of procurement and identification, distribution systems had to be established for distributing this material on a world-wide basis so that it would be available when and where it was needed. In planning for distribution of material in this system, consideration had to be given to the tremendous physical distances over which material must be shipped, and the time required to procure, manufacture and ship material to stocking activities. In general, about nine to twelve months were required for procuring and shipping repair parts to stocking activities, while even longer was required for many pieces of complete equipment.

One of the principal difficulties encountered in establishing adequate control over Bureau of Ships Special

--95--

Material was that of identifying material in store. Until late in the war no organized system existed for determining or maintaining identification during movements of material. Technical sections were responsible for procuring the material and were primarily concerned with the distribution of material from contracts. Because of inadequate records of the material in store it became necessary to examine all available information both from stocking activities and within the Bureau to identify like units and to obtain the total on hand and on order figures to be compared with requirements.

Identification so that interchangeability could be determined presented some of the most complex problems in this area and often required careful engineering analysis of not only the equipment itself but of the circumstances surrounding the installation. For example, two vertical rotary pumps of the same general design and capacity may not fit on the same foundation or fit into the same space.

Additional problems were faced by the Bureau in connection with the financial control and justification of budget requests so that commitments would not be made over and above available appropriations and to determine the rate of expenditure in order to decide if supplementary appropriations would be required or excess funds left over

at the end of the fiscal year. Still other problems arose after the passage of the Surplus War Property Act of October 1944, in connection with the redistribution and disposal of excess material. In this area the Bureau had to conform with directives, written by the Materials Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary, to maintain adequate records.

Another key problem in this same area was the integration of the Bureau of Ships Allowance Lists into the inventory control program of the Bureau. Allowance Lists have been used thru the years to delineate the kind and amount of material required for the proper operation of a vessel. They included machinery components with accessories and spare parts, equipments and consumable supplies. Replenishment of all items on an Allowance List can be ordered or requisitioned without authority from any higher Command than the ship itself. Inasmuch as Allowance Lists are used for stock control purposes by the ships themselves, it is necessary to the success of a general material control plan to see that they conform to general Bureau catalogs, classification systems and inventory controls at all levels. During the early days of the War Allowance Lists for new construction were by necessity hurriedly prepared, and covered large groups of vessels. In most cases it is impossible to incorporate such important data as serial numbers of components, plan numbers and part numbers. Allowance

--97--

Lists covering identical vessels frequently differed widely due to the fact that lists were prepared in different activities. Experience proved the importance of considering, with each alteration to individual ships or classes or types of ships, the accuracy of the Allowance Lists affected. Changes in individual ships which were identical spring fitting out have made it practically impossible to keep Allowance Lists up to date due to replacement of components and material during alteration, repair and overhaul availabilities.

By far the greatest problem, however, was that of distribution and control. A detailed description of the evolution of these systems cannot be attempted in this study, but a history of the Automatic Flow Plan for the Global Distribution of Internal Combustion Spare Parts has been prepared and is presented to cover the most important of these activities and to illustrate the fundamental problems involved. Because of the inadequacies of this system, it was decided at the cessation of hostilities to plan for the replacement of the Automatic Flow Program with a plan which would place more responsibility for the determination of requirements on individual spare parts distribution centers and bases in the field, rather than at the Ships Parts Control Center at Mechanicsburg. Procedures were being finally worked out at the time this was written. The history of the Automatic Flow Plan

--98--

which follows was prepared by the Mechanicsburg center.

C. THE AUTOMATIC FLOW PLAN FOR GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE PARTS

Preface:

To fully understand Automatic Flow and its principal objectives a general knowledge is important of Navy spare parts distribution from the time Internal Combustion engines, particularly Diesels, were first used in the service till the introduction of the plan in 1943.

This brief history attempts to put down in non-technical language events and conditions leading up to the Automatic Flow Plan, a general summary of its functions, and a brief discussion of the major complications that developed during its operation.

Navy Internal Combustion engine parts distribution went through three specific phases of development and this document has, therefore, been subdivided accordingly.

--99--

SPARE PARTS DISTRIBUTION FIRST PHASE

The first Diesel engines were introduced into Naval Service sometime prior to the First World War. From then until the declaration by the President in 1941 of the National Emergency, most of the Navy Diesel engines were installed in submarines. Such engines were generally custom-built to Navy specification and procured in small quantities complete with on-board, tender and overhaul spares. The overhaul parts were marked for each ship and stored in lockers at their home bases.

Vessels were scheduled for definite periodic overhauls at specific yards and the replacement parts requirements could be anticipated well in advance. When such needs developed parts were requisitioned through Naval Procurement Offices or purchased directly from manufacturers by Supply Officers of the ships or overhaul yards concerned.

Spare Parts were identified by plan and piece number on the contract under which the engines were originally procured. Identification was limited to specific engines and did not apply to engines purchased under other contracts. Most of these manufacturers had not developed part numbering system even so far as to cover identical parts on different engine models.

--100--

Inasmuch as raw materials were plentiful and the Diesel Industry was Just coming into its own and as yet was not overburdened with large construction programs, small maintenance parts orders placed by the Navy could be quickly produced.

Engineering Officers and men were well trained in the proper operation and maintenance of Diesel engines and peacetime maneuvers normally did not subject the engines to long hours of operation under heavy loads at high speeds.

It can be readily seen that under such circumstances no great difficulty was experienced in supplying Internal Combustion maintenance parts nor was controlled global distribution essential.

SECOND PHASE

Immediately after the outbreak of War, the Diesel Industry was called upon to produce complete engines on a schedule that taxed manufacturers' production facilities to the maximum.

Many new engines were introduced into service in order to meet the demands of the accelerated shipbuilding program for propulsion units in new type surface craft. A similar situation existed with manufacturers of marine gasoline engines. So urgent was the need for complete units that the production of new engines was scheduled to the full capacity of the Industry's output without regard

--101--

to on-board or maintenance parts requirements.

Only because new vessels could not be commissioned without complete allowances of spares, were engine production schedules finally relaxed enough, in the early part of 1943, to allow manufacturers to produce just enough spare parts for on-board allowances. Only in the cases of extreme emergency breakdowns that had to be fully substantiated, were maintenance parts given over-riding priority. Even with Internal Combustion engine manufacturers' plants completely turned to the output of new units the immediate demand for vessels to combat the submarine threat in the early days of the War could not be entirely met. To supplement the construction program the Navy took over and converted numerous pleasure and commercial craft for patrol or convoy service. Thus, the Navy inherited a collection of miscellaneous engines of various makes and models.

Many of them had long since been out of production and needed parts to put them In such condition that they could withstand the rigorous assignments demanded of ships In Wartime Naval Service. More often than not neither bills of material or drawings were available with which to identify or determine replacement parts requirements. Some sources of supply had completely dropped out of the picture and could be only re-established after long weeks of engineering research.

Along with the inflated requirements for new vessels came the equally important need for personnel to man them.

--102--

The necessarily limited training given new crews and their unfamiliarity with proper engine maintenance had a telling effect on replacement parts demand.

Financial limitations for ships maintenance, previously controlled by quarterly allotment, was withdrawn and there immediately followed a period of uncontrolled and indiscriminate spare parts purchases. Manufacturers were swamped with small orders from ships and repair bases, some requesting exorbitant quantities in an attempt to hoard items that were known to be critical and frequently requiring replacement. A large percentage of these orders could not be interpreted due to insufficient information and unintelligent requisitioning practices. Such was the spare parts picture in March of 1942.

It became apparent that this method of spare parts procurement and distribution was entirely inadequate to meet the needs of a vastly inflated fleet so widely dispersed. Controls and the establishment of an orderly program were needed at once, unless ships maintenance was to bog down completely. It was essentially for these reasons that the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts by joint letter on 13 March 1942 established the U.S. Navy Diesel Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, as a clearing house for all engine parts requests. On 25 July 1942 the name was changed to Diesel Department, Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, and the

--103--

responsibility expanded to take in the handling of requisitions for gasoline as well as Diesel parts.

Although no stock was on hand, by 3 September of that year Mechanicsburg, at least as far as paper routine, was in position to start operations under the new plan. All manufacturers of Internal Combustion engine parts were immediately instructed no longer to accept direct orders or negotiations for spare parts. Fewer orders for larger quantities, that had been interpreted as well as possible with the technical information available, could now be placed with manufacturers in place of thousands of small miscellaneous requests. Although, this was a tremendous step forward, the real Job had Just begun and many complex problems had to be overcome before any semblance of order could come from the confused situation.

While Mechanicsburg had been set up to receive and screen all orders for engine parts, consideration had to be given to anticipating future maintenance requirements so that adequate stock piles would be on hand as needs developed. Up until this time no complete record of the various types of Internal Combustion engines in service was available on which to base financial estimates and stock contract quantities. In order to compile this information, questionnaires were sent out to all ships of the Fleet as well as Supervisors of Shipbuilding. Reports were tabulated and catalogued by engine application and

--104--

estimated, annual hours of operation. These tabulations were then used as the first guide in placing overall stock contracts. Sums of money based upon estimated horsepower of engines known to be in service were set aside for the procurement of spare parts for each manufacturers model. Having no operating or usage experience to fall back on in the computation of future requirements, manufacturers were asked to submit recommendations of items and quantities to be procured up to the dollar value allocated for their engines. Emphasis was stressed on those parts known by manufacturers to require frequent replacement under similar operating conditions. Quantities ordered under these contracts were intended to serve only until a more reliable procurement policy could be developed. Negotiations were completed in the first months of 1943.

By this time engine construction was in high gear and still had preference over the production of spare parts. The scheduled lead time for many badly needed parts ordered under the new contracts was as high as six and eight months. It became evident that only comparatively small quantities would be available for distribution in the immediate future.

At the same time requisitions for engine parts were being received by Mechanicsburg in increasingly greater volume. New ships were coming into service daily and old ones needed attention to keep them operating. In addition, as operations expanded and the War took on a more global

--105--

aspect, the need for shortening supply lines to meet emergency conditions and maintain full striking power of the fleet at all times was vital. To meet these various necessities the Automatic Flow Plan for global distribution was designed.

THIRD PHASE

THE AUTOMATIC FLOW PLAN

PART I - PURPOSE

To correct the unsatisfactory conditions that developed during the second phase of spare parts distribution, preliminary planning on the Automatic Flow Plan was undertaken with the following primary objectives:

(1) To establish a sound procurement policy based initially on approved procurement factors and later by consideration of actual global usage experience as the information became available.

(2) To shorten global supply lines by the establishment of strategically located bases where small piles of spare parts could be maintained, thereby reducing long shipping time on emergency demands for advanced areas.

(3) To assemble, catalogue, and distribute parts books, parts lists, drawings, and such other

--106--

technical data as might be necessary for the proper interpreting and ordering of engine parts by ships or field activities.

(4) Ration the flow of available material on certain high production engines by the distribution of monthly spare parts allotments to Spare Parts Distribution Centers, based on the number and types of vessels operating within that area. These allotments to be anticipated in sufficient quantity to meet day to day requests and allow for gradually building up small stock piles of parts most frequently requisitioned.

PART II - PREPARATION

General Research and Planning

The first step In determining the most intelligent approach to the problem was a complete analysis of the tabulated lists prepared from questionnaires sent to all vessels of the fleet. As a result of this study these findings and decisions were made:

(1) 556 different models of engines were at that time either in service or scheduled to go into service.

(2) Nearly one-and-a-half million different identifying markings of plan and piece number,

--107--

manufacturers part, or production number and accessory manufacturers number were found to be in use.

(3) 128 of the 556 different engine models represented 93% of the total horsepower,

(4) A breakdown of the parts in the 128 models into "FAST Moving”, or frequently replaceable parts, and "SLOW Moving", or parts not often replaced, indicated that 15% of the items of the Fast Moving Group would account for about 80% of the total urgent maintenance requirements,

(5) Having thus determined that by concentrating on some 15,000 items the bulk of the job could be accomplished, these were the parts selected for Automatic distribution and the ones on which close scheduling and reporting procedures would be set up. Because of the high usage and large quantities required, they generally speaking were the most critical items.  

Parts lists were put into the hands of the manufacturers of the 128 engine models, who were asked to recommend a procurement factor for each item on each model engine.

This factor was to represent his best estimate of the number of pieces required to keep one engine operating for one year. No reliable information was available as to the number of anticipated hours of operations or the conditions

--108--

to which engines would be subjected. Only by carefully studying performance data for each part under what was thought might be similar operation conditions could anywhere nearly accurate figures be arrived at.

In addition to procurement factors the manufacturers were to work up numerical interchangeability lists to show the different models that each part would be used on, and the quantity installed in each type engine.

After completion the interchangeability lists with the procurement factors were sent to the Bureau of Ships, where they were checked by Navy technicians and approved.

The Master Control Center which had been set up at Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, prepared decks of tabulating cards for each engine model that indicated the following information as furnished by the Bureau of Ships:

(1) Part Number
(2) Nomenclature
(3) Manufacturer
(4) Model Application
(5) Number used per engine
(6) Procurement factor
(7) Fast or Slow Moving Part

Procurement

By taking projected figures of engines expected to be in service by the end of the year 1943 and multiplying them by the procurement factors in engine model cards, a

--109--

one year’s requirement for each part was arrived at.

It was then necessary to compare these quantities with those already under contract so that deficiency contracts for the items that were under-bought could be immediately negotiated. No action was taken at this time to adjust quantities that had been over-bought since procurement factors were untried and the cancellation of material already scheduled for production was considered to be exceedingly dangerous.

So that the Master Control Center could act as a central administrative agency for all engine parts contracts, unshipped balances on Bureau orders previously placed for base spares, Lend Lease material, and repair base stock requirements were placed at the disposal of Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg. Shipping instructions were modified to bring this material into Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, or such other destination as Mechanicsburg might designate. By this action both procurement and distribution problems were considerably complicated, in that Mechanicsburg was not properly notified of undelivered balances in many instances prior to the receipt of material.

Distribution and Shipment Controls

It was agreed that eight strategically located major supply points or Spare Parts Distribution Centers would be set up to receive, store, distribute and account for engine

--110--

spare parts in their areas. The distribution to SPDCs of fast moving parts was to be made by monthly allotments based on the number of engines of each type operating within a given area, procurement or usage factor and a 1.75 factor to compensate for shipping losses and the building of small stock piles.

Formula:

Number of Engines x 1.75 = Number of sets to 12 (Reduced to monthly requirements) be distributed

Number of Sets to be distributed x procurement factor = shipping quantity

Two copies of a report of material to be allocated for the month were to be air mailed to each SPDC. One copy to be for information and the other returned to the Master Control Center showing the stock position and the last thirty days issues for each item. By recording and accumulating this data, procurement factors could be periodically refined so as to more closely coincide with actual usage experience. Rather than consider material shipped overseas for stock as expended, as was the case with many other types of material, on hand quantities at SPDCs could be recognized in the procurement of global requirements. Also, inasmuch as the initial quantities provided in out-fitting tenders and repair ships would be based entirely on procurement factor it would be necessary that these factors be adjusted to reflect the most recent usage conditions.

--111--

Slow Moving parts for models under the Automatic Flow Plan were to be distributed initially by the Master Control Center in quantities equal to pre-determined SPDC stocking levels. These parts were not to be automatically supplied nor was usage data to be reported. Replenishment would be made by requisition to the Master Control Center as stock became low.

Trans-shipment Control Centers were activated at major shipping points to expedite the loading of spare parts for overseas transport and to advise SPDCs and Navy Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, on pertinent information relative to shipment, including dates shipped, general nature of material, inland and ocean bill of lading numbers and vessel’s name.

Preservation and Packaging

Information received from overseas activities indicated that a large percentage of parts being received were not in useable condition due to improper preservation and lack of adequate identification. In making shipment to Spare Parts Distribution Centers in advance areas consideration had to be given to box sizes and weights.

Box specifications would have to be such as to make them serviceable as temporary bins in many locations. Further, box weights should not exceed a maximum of two hundred pounds as many of them would have to be moved from beaches to storage points by hand. The standardization of

--112--

box markings was most important in order to expedite the locating and movement of material through trans-shipment points.

The Bureau of Ships, in cooperation with the packing and shipping section at Mechanicsburg, set up standards for preservation, packaging, boxing and marking of material under Navy spare parts contracts. All manufacturers participating in the Automatic Plow Program were personally contacted to assist them in setting up to meet the new standards.

Personnel and Equipment

One of the most important programs undertaken in connection with Automatic Flow, was the training of SPDC personnel. Before SPDCs could start functioning, complements of officers, trained parts men, and technicians, had to be indoctrinated into operations such as stock control, storage, proper requisitioning practices and the use of engine parts books, as well as other interpreting media.

It was to be the responsibility of the Master Control Center at Mechanicsburg to conduct comprehensive courses in these subjects for all SPDC personnel before shipping out. The Overseas School at Mechanicsburg was instituted to handle this specific job.

Estimated space, equipment and personnel requirements for the new Master Control Center were presented to the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts

--113--

in July, 1943. Additional tabulating equipment and specialist to operate the machines were most critically needed to start the plan in operation. Vigorous expediting action was taken immediately and needs were met with reasonable promptness.

PART III - OPERATION

Institution

The Bureau of Ships and Bureau of Supplies and Accounts in a Joint letter dated 13 July 1943 announced the functions and responsibilities a Master Control Center at Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, and the establishment of eight Spare Parts Distribution Centers in the various geographical areas.

SPDC CODE

LOCATION

Left

Brisbane, Australia

Epic

Noumea, New Caledonia

Fray

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

Glen

Oran, Algeria

Pith

Trinidad, British West Indies

Fear

Recife, Brazil

Join

Dutch Harbor, Alaska

Jowl

Exeter, Devonshire, England

In addition, Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg was designated to exercise the functions of a SPDC for continental bases including Panama, but excluding Hawaii and Alaska.

A Spare Parts Distribution manual, distributed on 6 August 1943 by the Bureau of Ships, described in detail the SPDCs responsibilities and operating practices. This was supplemented in February

--114--

of 1944 by a Bulletin outlining the organization for a typical Spare Parte Distribution Center.

The British, having acquired numerous Diesel propelled craft through Lend Lease appropriations, had to be considered in the distribution of maintenance parts. Blanket requisitions were initiated by the British Admiralty Delegation to cover emergency requests from British vessels as well as automatic monthly shipments of parts under the global distribution plan. Rather than attempt bo compute quantities and deliver material direct to the various bases under Automatic Flow in England, total British requirements were shipped to one central distributing point from which the material was fanned out. Inasmuch as the British had no warehouses in this country available for storing engine parts, all shipment were consigned directly to vessels for overseas transport. Two other Central distributing points were established in 1944 at Malta and Bombay, India. Automatic Flow distribution was later extended to take in the Lend Lease governments of Canada, Russia and Brazil. Smaller requirements for numerous other Lend Lease vessels were supplied through the various SPDC’s. Engine population figures provided each month by the Bureau of Ships indicated the number of foreign government units in operation in each SPDC area. Monthly allotments were increased to allow for maintenance of these engine models.

--115--

By letter of 25 September 1943 Naval Supply Depot, Clearfield, was set up as an adjunct to Mechanicsburg in order to provide parts storage space for increasing Pacific requirements. Complete control of material flow in or out of Clearfield as well as a master set of stock records was maintained at Mechanicsburg. By building up adequate stocks at this activity, in-transit time on West Coast and Pacific shipments could be materially reduced.

Although all of the planning had not been completed, the first distribution of engine parts under the Automatic Flow Plan was made in June, 1943 on the following General Motors, Cleveland Diesel Engine Division models:

(1) 3-268A
(2) 8-268A
(3) 8-268  

Other models were introduced into the program in subsequent months, with the plan scheduled to be in full operation by the end of 1943.

Under this system of world-wide distribution involving large quantities of parts for so many different engine models, the burden of making monthly overseas shipments would necessarily have to fall on the manufacturers. Mechanicsburg packing and shipping facilities were known to be entirely inadequate for a program of this magnitude and the flow of material might be dangerously bottle-necked if it were attempted. Every month, therefore, the Master

Control Center computed specific shipping quantities for

--116--

each SPDC and submitted them in tabulated form to various manufacturers for direct shipment of the material from the factory. Due to the lead time and the negotiation complications involved in placing new orders, a system of diversions from large stock contracts placed in anticipation of future requirements was worked out in the handling of monthly allotments. A letter accompanying the shipping instructions served as an authority to divert for direct overseas or continental shipment quantities as indicated from any open stock contract. Copies of the tabulation were posted to the stock record cards at Mechanicsburg, reducing contract balances accordingly.

The first stock status and usage reports were received from SPDCs in January, 1944. As soon as a base had reported on an engine model for three successive months, computation of monthly allotments was made by application of a formula based on information contained in the report rather than procurement factor. Recognizing that unusual conditions could considerably inflate or deflate issue figures for any thirty day period, three months data was considered to be in the minimum required to determine a definite trend:

[picture here]

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-11-t.jpg

--117--

As a precaution against the building up of excess stocks at any one point, definite stocking levels based on geographical locations were established for each SPDC by the Bureau of Ships in April, 1944. Once a base had attained this level on any given part, automatic shipments were temporarily discontinued regardless of issues until the balance had dropped below the allowable stocking limit.

To compensate for inaccuracies, quantities distributed on a procurement factor basis due to unpredictable operations and other unusual circumstances, SPDCs were permitted to request on the monthly report to Master Control Centers quantities required in excess of Automatic Flow allotments, providing the specific need was substantiated. After being screened by Mechanicsburg, these quantities were added to the next month's shipping quantity for that base.

Modified Automatic Flow

As usage data was received from the field it became more and more apparent that no distribution formula could be worked out to accurately anticipate requirements where only a small number of engines were in service. Fast Moving parts for a number of models were, therefore, removed from automatic monthly distribution and handled by quarterly allocations based on usage and balances on hand. Every three months Mechanicsburg distributed a printed form, "The Automatic Flow Order Form" to all SPDCs on

-118--

which usage data and quantities required were reported. Generally speaking, Modified Automatic Flow models were selected on the basis of twenty-five engines or less in total service.

Complications and Transition to Bi-Monthly Requisition System

One of the most troublesome problems in the distribution of engine parts was the continual superseding of part numbers by manufacturers, due to design and substitution of material. One Diesel contractor alone issued part number changes at the rate of 200 per week for over a two year period. Some changes in design made as a result of excessive operation failures were necessary and entirely justified. Many others, however, were made indiscriminately, without prior approval of the Navy, on parts that performed satisfactorily. Unestimatable thousands of man hours were expended in attempting to keep SPDCs informed on part number supercessions, thereby assisting them in requisitioning and stock problems of identification. Although considerable pressure was brought to bear on the contractors by Navy Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, and the Bureau of Ships to remedy the condition, no appreciable change was experienced during the War period.

Ever changing conditions, unanticipated operation of the fleet and production schedules set up under the Controlled Materials Plan precluded any possibility of Mechanicsburg

--119--

having contract material available in the exact quantities required each month for global distribution. Some items that did not contain critical material were readily available in large quantities and had to be accepted by the Navy as produced, so as not to overload manufacturers warehouses. Frequently small items could not be economically fabricated in quantities representing less than a year's requirements. To relieve the factories of these surpluses, manufacturers were requested to advise Mechanicsburg promptly of items and quantities available in excess of those called for on Automatic Flow shipping instructions. The Master Control Center, upon obtaining this information, reviewed stock positions at the various SPDCs and issued special shipping instructions distributing these parts in quantities up to maximum stocking levels. Any balances were directed into Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, or Naval Supply Depot, Clearfield. Having made such a distribution, these parts were immediately stricken from the "Fast Moving" list, thus suspending Automatic shipments.

On the other hand, many items could not be scheduled in nearly sufficient quantities to meet monthly shipping requirements. Generally speaking these parts were also badly needed for new engine construction, which in 1944 still had priority over the production of maintenance spares.

--120--

As a result, monthly shipments were going forth to SPDCs minus such critically needed material as shell bearings, ball bearings and piston rings. The Bureau of Ships in July 1944 directed manufacturers to give current months allotments preference over previous months shortages. Inasmuch as some parts were never produced or made available to the Wavy in quantities great enough to more than meet current months demands, many shortages created early in the program were never satisfied. Not until a War Production Board Directive, issued in November 1944 and giving replacement parts priority over new engine production, were critical materials made available in sufficient quantity to meet Automatic Flow monthly allotments.

As the War progressed in the Pacific, fleet operations were greatly accelerated and expanded. Some of the Spare Parts Distribution Centers originally set up in 1943 in strategic areas were in the space of a few short months several thousand miles away from advance units. This meant that new bases had to be established on short notice. Such parts as were available at old locations had to be moved up to the new bases. This material, of course, was frozen during the transfer period, which in some cases was a matter of six to eight weeks. Mechanicsburg, upon notification by the Bureau of Ships that a new SPDC was to be activated, computed stocking level quantities for all parts required to serve Internal Combustion engines assigned in the area. Items available

--121--

at Mechanicsburg and Clearfield were shipped from stock to a predesignated assembly point. Special shipping instructions for direct shipment to the assembly point were issued to manufacturers concerned for the balance.

Studies made of distribution time factors indicated that the elapsed time, from the date an SFDC prepared and forwarded usage data to Mechanicsburg until shipments computed from these figures arrived at their designation, was between seven and eight months, depending upon the location of the base. It could not be expected, under the circumstances, that by the time monthly allotments were received they would correspond in quantity to prevailing usage requirements. Further, it had been firmly proven that SFDCs, by virtue of their proximity to fleet operations, were in a better position to anticipate their own future requirements than the Master Control Center at Mechanicsburg. In consideration of these facts, monthly Automatic Flow distribution by formula was discontinued in August 1945 in favor of a bi-monthly requisition plan, whereby SPDCs could estimate their own future requirements for a two months period.

Many individuals disagreed with the Automatic Flow Plan both in principle and in operating detail. Even proponents of the system freely admitted that it had certain inherent weaknesses. Whether any other method of distribution could have been designed to do a better Job under the

--122--

circumstances prevailing at the time is debatable and largely a matter of conjecture.

--123--

CHAPTER XVI

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

--124--

CHAPTER XVI

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Most of the industrial relations curative measures were taken, and most serious shortages of manpower existed, during the offensive period of the war. Thus, in order to discuss the measures taken in their proper relationship with contemporary problems, the over-all topic of industrial relations is discussed at this time. It must constantly he kept in mind, however, that the basic causes of these conditions stemmed from the emergency periods prior to and soon after our entry into the war. Attention being fixed upon production during the expansion stages, little planning centered on the inevitable resultant manpower problems and labor relation difficulties.

--125--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-12-t.jpg

MANPOWER

--126--

A. BUREAU ORGANIZATION FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Not until July 1941, after 8 months of war, did the Bureau of Ships find it necessary to become involved in the field of shipbuilding labor relations. This situation arose from the reimbursement problems which followed upon the institution of the Zone Standarde in April of that year, as discussed in Section C-1 of this chapter, and resulted in an officer of the Legal Branch of the Shipbuilding Division being assigned to this work in addition to his regular legal duties. By February 1942, the labor relations work bad reached such proportions that it became necessary to employ one lawyer full time on the problem of reimbursement of labor costs. This lawyer, a civilian contract employee, under the cognizance of the Legal Branch until March 1943 and then transferred ae a special assistant to the Head of the Contract Branch, continued as a sole liaison to the Office of the Assistant Secretary on labor relatione and reimbursement problems.

Until June 1942, the Bureau of Ships had established no office to handle industrial manpower problems which were arising in connection with the expansion and location of shipbuilding facilities, the placement of production contracts, and the coordination of action by other Governmental agencies on recruitment, training, housing, transportation, labor turnover including Selective Service and pirating and utilization of personnel of Bureau of Ships' contractors. At that time the Facilities Branch of the Shipbuilding Division assigned one officer to handle this work and serve as liaison with the Manpower Offices of the Assistant

--127--

and Under Secretaries of the Navy. It is interesting to note that at this time employment in shipyards on the Navy Program amounted to over 600,000 workers, employment in component plants was probably twice what it was in the shipyards, and the Bureau of Ships was expending approximately $350,000,000 per month.

The principal activities of the Bureau of Ships Manpower Office between June and October 1942 centered around the developing of a working relationship with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, whereby shipyard employment data would be collected and tabulated from private contractors by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; establishing methods for Joint Bureau of Ships-Bureau of Labor Statistics estimation of future labor requirements of contractors on the basis of known or anticipated workload assignments; obtaining the War Production Board and the Under Secretary of Navy Directives on contract placement in areas and plants with available labor and assisting the Bureau of Ships’ contracting officers in complying with those directives by furnishing information on employment and working conditions and coordinating the clearance of proposed contracts; and trying to stimulate recruitment and training for contractors by analyzing their requirements and calling the attention of the War Manpower Commission, National Housing Agency, Office of Defense Transportation and other agencies to their problems.

Selective Service, The Fair Employment Practices Committee and Restrictive Recruitment Control by the War Manpower Commission had had little effect on private contractors or Navy Yards at this stage of the Program.

--128--

On 22 September 1942 the Secretary of the Navy established a Manpower Section, headed by a Captain, USN, in the Shore Establishments Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to establish policies and procedures for handling manpower problems and charged it with the responsibility of liaison with the Naval Districts and other Governmental agencies in connection with such problems. The Office of Procurement and Material on 26 September 1942 directed that all liaison with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy on problems affecting Navy contractors would be through OP&M. The Bureau of Ships then implemented this directive and clarified its organizational responsibilities for handling manpower and labor matters in a Bureau of Ships memorandum showing the relationship between the Manpower Office and the Labor Relations Office heretofore mentioned, which relationship remained in effect until June 1943 when the two offices were consolidated in the Contract Branch of the Shipbuilding Division.

From June 1943 until March 1944, two officers, (1) a Lieutenant (jg) and (2) an Ensign, were the only ones in the Bureau concerned with labor problems of any nature. On 9 March 1944, certain additional functions in the field of labor relations were assigned to the Bureau of Ships and an Industrial Relations Section, in the Contract Branch, Shipbuilding Division, was formally established with a Lieutenant Commander as Head with two officers engaged on Manpower and Selective Service work, two on Shipbuilding Labor Relations work, and one statistician. In June, 1944,

--129--

the Section was removed from the Shipbuilding Division and reported directly to the Chief of the Bureau until April, 1945. With the creation of the Shore Division at that time, Industrial Relations transferred to that Division with the status of a Branch. Although the complement remained the same, the Branch now divided into two sections, i.e., Manpower, and Labor Relations.

Despite the organizational changes outlined above, the basic problems in the field of Manpower and Labor Relations, which remained substantially the same throughout this whole period, are described in the following sections:

B. MANPOWER

1. Contract Placement: At the beginning of the war the War Production Board, as a matter of policy, required that, whenever possible, production facilities or production contracts be placed in areas of plants possessing a labor surplus. It became the responsibility of the contracting officers, in their best judgment, to implement this policy and the Manpower Section obtained and furnished contracting officers the labor data required in making a decision. Toward the end of 1943 and early in 1944, when the labor shortage had become critical in certain areas the War Production Board and War Manpower Commission in some instances questioned the decision of the Procurement Agency and held up clearance of contract awards. The Manpower Section in such instances prepared briefs supporting the position of the Bureau. In no cases was the Bureau overruled, although this pressure resulted in establishing within the Bureau

--130--

a procedure for clearance of proposed contract awards as developed by the type desks and technical sections before they were acted on by the contracting officers. This method served to screen the labor considerations in advance of requesting clearance of OP&M and WPB.

In the fall of 1944 the discretionary authority of the contracting officers was further limited by a requirement that all proposed contracts in excess of $100,000 be cleared by Area Production Urgency Committees composed of field representatives of the WPB, War Manpower Commission and Procurement Agencies, and that such committees be informed of proposed contract awards in lesser amount not requiring clearance.

The Manpower Section, in conjunction with the negotiating and contracting officers, worked out a simplified procedure for obtaining the required employment data from the prospective contractors, and the Manpower Section handled the clearances with the area committees concerned. This procedure was unique to the Bureau of Ships and operated quite successfully to the end of the war, relieving the contracting officers from details, specialized paper work and negotiations with representatives of outside agencies.

2. Recruitment - Manpower Priority - Production UrgencyWhen the War Manpower Commission was created early in 1942, it took over the direction of the U. S. Employment Service for the purpose of referring unemployed workers to war contractors. During 1942 and the first half of 1945 the referral of workers depended in large measure on the amount of labor released by the curtailment of materials for civilian production and by the representatives of war

--131--

contractors concerning their manpower needs. The Manpower Section of the Bureau of Ships was responsible for evaluating the manpower needs of its most essential contractors and supporting their requests to the War Manpower Commission and USES. The established procedure called for the referral of these problems to the Assistant Secretary of Navy, but it proved more effective in many instances to write a letter to the contractors confirming the essentiality in production and need for labor.

The contractor used this letter as evidence in direct negotiation with the War Manpower Commission officials in his area. By summer and early fall of 1943 the labor shortage had become so acute in most industrial areas that the War Production Board and War Manpower Commission established Area Production Urgency and Manpower Priority Committees, headed by the area officials of those agencies and including representatives of the procurement agencies, to consider the relative urgency and manpower needs of war contractors in an area and assign manpower priorities based on these considerations. These committees continued to operate for the duration of the war, but the validity of their decisions and the effectiveness of manpower referrals under their Jurisdiction were defective for three principal reasons: First, the active representatives of the Navy were personnel specialists who, with few exceptions, had little or no experience in industrial production and little knowledge of the urgency of programs which were initiated and controlled from Washington; Secondly, the confusion generated in the field by these committees indicated the need for direction from Washington, but such direction took the form of

--132--

inflexible production urgency lists which were limited in scope, which were inconsistent with the priorities accorded materials and which were usually several months behind true military requirements, except for a few vital programs which were seriously behind schedule; and, Lastly, the coordination at the Washington level was such that production urgencies assigned by the War Production Board were not consistently followed by manpower priorities controlled by the War Manpower Commission, nor were the War Production Board urgencies consistent with those of the procurement agencies. The Bureau of Ships Manpower Section tried unsuccessfully for two years to reconcile inconsistencies in the manpower priority system which adversely affected its production, but the only relief to be had resulted from action taken on the several thousand individual cases as they arose. It should be noted that OP&M created a Navy Production Urgency and Manpower Priorities Committee to develop a consistent Navy policy and program, but this Committee met only once in late 1944 and the results were negligible.

It is the belief of interested parties that the only solution to the allocation of manpower in periods of national emergency is by the delegation of its administration to area mobilization directors who can be kept fully informed of basic production requirements and by manpower legislation which would both safeguard fundamental rights of workers and require their taking essential employment as directed. At no time during World War II, all regulations and directives notwithstanding, did the manpower priority referrals operate at more than 50 per cent effectiveness.

--133--

3. Selective Service Selective Service withdrawals from Navy Yards and the plants of Bureau of Ships contractors did not become serious until the end of 1942 and early in 1943. At about that time a replacement schedule system was developed by means of which contractors listed all vulnerable workers in their employ and the order of the workers' essentiality, based on the qualifications of each employee and the estimated length of time required to recruit and train a replacement. The Manpower Section took steps through the Assistant Secretary of Navy and National Selective Service Headquarters to assist contractors in negotiating such replacement schedules with the directors of Selective Service in the various states. In general, the military withdrawals imposed a heavy recruiting and training load on contractors but did not become crippling until the summer of 1944, when Selective Service proceeded to draft tool and die makers, engineers and other irreplaceable key personnel, mainly on the basis of age and dependency. During the last year of the war the Navy Department and other procurement agencies were placed in the position of having to certify not only the essentiality and urgency of its contractors' work but also, in considerable detail, the qualifications and irreplaceability of the contractors' individual employees subject to induction. The function of certifying individuals for deferment was delegated to the Navy Inspectors in the plants and shipyards, with a review and approval by the District Civilian Personnel Directors and final appeal to the cognizant bureau and Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel Selective Service Section. The departure from the policy that the procurement agencies would certify only the nature and

--134--

urgency of the contractors' work resulted in a tremendous load on the Manpower Section of the Bureau of Ships. Cases were handled covering more than four thousand contractors and sub-suppliers of this Bureau. The amount of paper work became so heavy both here and in SECP, Selective Service Section, that the Bureau frequently had to prepare correspondence for signature in SECP in order to accomplish the necessary results.

In general, it has been the consensus that the Navy Department in Washington may have occasioned more effectiveness by the limitation of its administrative action on Selective Service matters to the character and urgency of the work, and by the subordination of the administration of Selective Service to the National and Area Directors of Industrial Mobilization as discussed above. Of extreme importance to any possible future planning concerning manpower allocation is the fact that until late in 1944 the Navy liaison officers to both National and Selective Service Headquarters were representatives of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, whose predominant interest centered on the meeting of Navy induction quotas rather than the retention of essential personnel in essential production and research. It should be further noted that, as a corollary of Selective Service, the manpower section in the Bureau of Ships took the necessary action to obtain the release of key men in the Army for their return to essential employment in their contractors' plants but found themselves unsuccessful in effecting similar action with respect to the release of Navy inductees.

4. Utilization of Labor. Responsibility for action on all cases of alleged under-utilization of labor by Bureau of Ships contractors and the Navy Yards rested with the Manpower Section. Early in 1944 the War

--135--

Manpower Commission developed, a division of manpower utilization analysts, both in Washington and in the field, whose function it was to survey industrial establishments and make recommendations to Management for improvement. Also, the far sighted Chief of the Bureau of Ships made it a responsibility of the Supervisors of Shipbuilding and Inspectors of Naval Machinery and other branches of the Inspection Service handling Bureau of Ships work to exercise vigilance over the use of manpower which might result in failure to meet production schedules or in excessive cost to the Government. A failure on the part of contractors or Navy Yards to affect desired improvements resulted usually in the referral of the problem to the Bureau of Ships for action under its contract. In such situations the Manpower Office, in conjunction with the Technical Section and contracting officers, analyzed the problem and took corrective action including, in many instances, the preparation of the facte of the case and the action taken thereon for the information of Congress or other Governmental agencies.

The Manpower Section of the Bureau of Ships participated directly or indirectly in all investigations of manpower utilization in Navy Yards or plants of its contractors.

5. Cut-Backs and Run-Outs Until the fall of 1944 the cancellation of Bureau of Ships contracts had been quantitatively negligible, with little or no effect upon employment in private plants. The more serious problem, however, bad become the run-out of certain production programs such as the landing craft program. The Manpower Section was responsible for clearing all proposed procurements and cut-backs and, as such cut-backs

--136--

or run-outs in programs occurred, it advised the Assistant Secretary of the Navy's Manpower Section and requested the cognizant field inspectors to inform the District Civilian Personnel Directors and the local War Manpower Commission officers in order to assure that any released manpower could be recruited for other urgent work in the area. In October 1944, however, the War Production Board established a very involved procedure for the clearance of all proposed cut-backs, including the transmission of information on employment in the plant and the impact the proposed cut-back would have on such employment. Following such clearance it was required, at the discretion of the Area War Production Board Chairman, to hold a meeting with Management, Labor and Governmental agencies to prepare Labor and the public for the impending cut-back. The Manpower Section of the Bureau of Ships, together with the Labor Relatione Section, handled all the manpower and labor problems incidental to such cut-backs. However, there occurred few instances in which a serious labor impact resulted from a Bureau of Ships contract termination. The decline in the new construction program from the spring of 1944 through to VJ-Day produced a much greater downward adjustment in shipyard employment, but it was sufficiently gradual that no serious hardships developed for either Management or Labor. Furthermore, the increase in repair employment absorbed a reasonable amount of the taper-off in new construction. The Contract Termination policy of the War Production Board, designed to meet the serious curtailment in military programs and drop in employment at the end of the war, was eliminated in its entirety Just prior to VJ-Day.

--137--

6. Other Activities Responsibility for obtaining and acting as custodian for all information pertaining to the employment or prospective employment at the Navy Yards or private contractors' plants, in connection with the action of other Naval activities or outside agencies on housing, transportation, training, feeding, etc., also fell upon the Manpower Section of the Bureau of Ships. Problems of this type came to the Bureau of Ships usually as appeals from the contractors to expedite action on their requests for such facilities. The Manpower Section assembled the data and prepared the action on such matters through the cognizant production division.

C. LABOR RELATIONS

1. The Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee - In the early part of 1941 there had been set up in the shipbuilding industry the Zone Standards Agreements. These Agreements covered the basic wages and working conditions in the four Shipbuilding Zones, i.e., the Atlantic Coast, Gulf Coast, Pacific Coast, and Great Lakes. The Government, as well as Labor and Management, served as a party to these labor agreements. This unusual situation arose from the fact that the Government was extremely interested in stabilizing the shipbuilding industry to the end that substantial uniformity in each zone would prohibit the unrestricted piracy of labor which had occurred in the early part of the last war. In 1942 there was established a National Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee comprised of Management, Labor and Government, the functions of which were to administer and to interpret the various Zone Standards, which in turn had been amended on a national basis by the Chicago Amendments of that year.

--138--

The representation of the Navy Department on both the Stabilization Committee and in the various Zone Conferences was delegated to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, but as time elapsed, and particularly after a formation of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee, it became increasingly necessary that the Bureau of Ships be represented at these various meetings and Zone Conferences, at least in the capacity of an observer. This necessity arose from the fact that the Bureau, as the contracting agency, was bound to follow all rulings and actions of this nature for reimbursement purposes and, in order to do this, the Bureau had to be thoroughly familiar with the background and proper interpretation of such rulings and actions.

In the beginning of 1944 it became apparent that, as a practical matter, the Bureau representatives should attend these meetings not only as observers but as actual participants and, accordingly, on 9 March a directive assigned to the Bureau one full and one alternate membership on the Stabilization Committee and transferred all the administrative responsibility under the Shipbuilding Stabilization Program to the Bureau of Ships. The amount of work involved in this activity can not be underestimated. The mere attendance at meetings and Zone Conferences required innumerable conferences between the procurement agencies beforehand in order that a unified Government position at such meetings might be established. Furthermore, the Stabilization Committee promulgated more than fifty Interpretative Rulings, which made it incumbent upon Bureau representatives to be thoroughly familiar with each of these in order that they might properly and effectively represent the Navy's interests.

--139--

Upon the termination of the war, a National Shipbuilding Conference was held at which the Government representatives proposed a termination of the Zone Standards as of 31 May 1946, which tied in this proposal with the prospective general wage increase in the industry.

The Bureau's representatives at this conference had to act with the utmost caution inasmuch as this was the only industry in which the Government acted as a party to labor agreements governing wages and working conditions in that industry and, consequently, any action by the Government in this conference would have been interpreted as establishing national policy. It is for this reason, plus the fact that the procurement agencies were no longer the sole customer in the Shipbuilding industry, that the proposition had been made to relieve the Government of the responsibility of further participation in what constituted a collective bargaining agreement.

2. The Shipbuilding Commission - On 13 January 1943, a Shipbuilding Commission had been created by the National War Labor Board to handle all Board cases in the field of shipbuilding. The procurement agencies participated as voting members in this original commission Just as they did in the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee. After about six months of operations however, this setup appeared impracticable insofar as the Shipbuilding Commission was concerned, which led to the creation of a new body on which sat no Government agencies who were represented on the Zone Standards. However, the Directive Order setting up the Commission provided that:

--140--

["Representatives of the Secretary of Navy, the Secretary of War, the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, and the Chairman of the War Production Board may consult with the Commission for the purpose of presenting to it any information necessary to facilitate the conduct of the business of the Commission."

On 24 August 1943, an invitation was extended by the newly appointed Chairman of the Shipbuilding Commission to in the Directive Order. The Chairman of the Shipbuilding Commission stated:

A liaison representative of the three agencies, to be designated by the procurement agencies, is invited to attend all meetings of the Commission. The Commission understands that as a normal procedure only one Joint representative will attend, but if additional representatives of the agencies wish to attend, they are cordially invited.

The representative or representatives of the procurement agencies do not have the privilege to vote or make motions, but it is the desire of the Commission that any and all information available to the agencies which may be helpful toward the disposition of the business at hand shall be freely stated with or without specific invitation from the Chair.

Minutes of Commission meetings, digests of pending cases, directive orders, orders of approval or modified approval, and other releases distributed to the members of the Commission shall be made available to the agencies through the liaison representative at the same time this material is distributed to Commission members.

The Commission desires the cooperation of the procurement agencies in furnishing to it and to the representatives of the Bureau of Labor Statistics who are working on shipbuilding wage data for the Commission, any available wage data which may be helpful in the determination of specific cases before the Commission or in the establishment of wage rate brackets. In return, the Commission will furnish to the agencies any like material available to it."  

--141--

As a result of such invitation, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy on 1 September 1943 endorsed the principles of the Chairman's letter and indicated that an officer on the labor relations staff in the Office of the Assistant Secretary would be appointed and designated as liaison representative. The Shipbuilding Commission as created on 9 August 1943 continued to function until the National War Labor Board was terminated on 31 December 1945.

On 9 March 1944, in accordance with the Directive which transferred the functions with reference to the Shipbuilding Stabilization Program to the Bureau of Ships, an officer from the Bureau of Ships was designated as the liaison officer for the Navy Department to the Shipbuilding Commission, and for the first time bureau representation existed before that agency. During the existence of this second Commission, the Bureau of Ships' position on several of the cases which came before the Shipbuilding Commission was presented to that agency in terms of the reimbursement policy of the procurement agencies and operational requirements which necessitated prompt disposition of labor matters.

During the course of the Commission's existence from 9 August 1943 some 3400 cases came before it as dispute or voluntary submission. During 1943 and 1944, frequent representations were made by the Bureau of Ships' liaison officer on key cases pending before the Commission apprising that body of the Department's view concerning proper reimbursable labor costs. Furthermore, advice was given to the Commission in many particular cases in reference to the need for expedition of the

--142--

determinations and decisions of the Commission so as to assure maximum production in the yards concerned.

The guiding principles which determined the acceptability of the Shipbuilding Commission's directive orders and rulings were set forth in a joint procurement agency reimbursement policy letter dated 9 July 1943. In accordance with that policy, the Bureau accepted directive orders of the Commission for the purpose of allowance of costs but gave consideration to allowing payments under a permissive ruling. While there were frequent disagreements in principle, because of the different interests involved, between the procurement agencies and the Shipbuilding Commission, for the most part those differences were resolved prior to the issuance of a formal order or ruling. The procurement agencies and particularly the Bureau of Ships made known to the Shipbuilding Commission, in such cases where it was deemed necessary, their views on issues which involved reimbursement and production. Outright conflicts were therefore minimized, and in few cases did the procurement agencies fail to approve of allowances of costs.

The desirability of establishing a firm liaison relationship with the Commission is demonstrated by the almost uniform acceptance for reimbursement purposes of the orders and rulings of that agency. Had the procurement agencies and the Bureau refrained from forwarding information to the Shipbuilding Commission and had they failed to present their views, within their respective interests, there would have arisen numerous occasions on which conflict would have arisen and been reflected in a loss of production. In 1945 the Commission became more and more aware

--143--

of procurement agencies' policies on the recurrent issues which were presented to the Commission, and it therefore became apparent that a continual and daily representation at the Commission by Bureau of Ships personnel was no longer necessary. The liaison relationship was maintained with less frequent appearances before the Commission except when the Commission requested the views of the Bureau or when the Bureau felt that certain major cases required the submission of advice and information to the Commission.

In the course of maintaining this liaison with the Commission, the Bureau of Ships' representative presented factual data to the Commission at its formal and informal sessions. The Bureau representative was afforded all the privileges of a Commission member except the right to vote, for the Commission welcomed the presence of procurement agencies' representatives.

The Bureau's representatives furnished much factual data" to the Commission, particularly with reference to payroll information and data on terms of employment in private shipyards. In turn, the liaison representatives to the Commission maintained files which included the agenda, minutes, and copies of orders and rulings of the Shipbuilding Commission.

It should be added that on important issues concerning which the Bureau's representatives spoke before the Commission, it became the customary practice to obtain, prior to such presentation, the Joint views of all the procurement agencies involved in informal "joint agency"

--144--

meetings. However, in retrospect, it appears that those agency meetings became less frequent after August 1943, so that there were cases when it devolved upon the judgment of the procurement agency representatives at the Commission sessions to express opinions of the procurement agencies' views without prior clearance from all the agencies. It would have been more advisable to have had regular meetings of such joint agencies, so that the representatives appearing before the Commission might be assured of the combined views of the several agencies. Differences between the procurement agencies, however, were kept at a minimum by "on the spot" consultation among the representatives to the Commission.

The experiences of maintaining the liaison relationship with the Commission demonstrated that differences in viewpoint may be kept at a minimum by such technique, and that it was desirable and necessary that such procedures be adopted. It also follows from these experiences that once the need for maximum production became lees real, the necessity for such relationship in like manner diminished. Certainly, in peacetime, there exists no Bureau of Ship's need for a full and formal relationship with stabilization agencies of the National War Labor Board. Elimination of formal liaison relationship is regarded as wise and necessary to preserve the independent function of the agencies concerned, particularly in view of the fact that other civilian agencies are rightfully charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of peaceful and sound labor relations.

--145--

3. Reimbursement - As indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, the Bureau was required by the 9 March Directive to pass on all questions of reimbursement under rulings of the Stabilization Committee and decisions of the Shipbuilding Commission. In order to accomplish this in the most effective manner, two general procedures were followed.

In the first place, the Bureau inherited a technique which had been used by the Office of the Assistant Secretary since the inception of the Zone Standards; namely, that of issuing Administrative Instructions. These instructions, in a general way, indicated what would be acceptable for purposes of allowance of cost and authorized the field representatives to grant approvals in accordance with them. Certain instructions, however, were primarily procedural in nature and required the submission to Washington for approval of any changes in wages and working conditions in any individual shipyards, except in those instances where the change resulted from the Interpretative Rulings of the Stabilization Committee where the ruling itself constituted authority for reimbursement purposes.

In order to effectuate the foregoing, the following procedure was adopted. The contractor forwarded via the Supervisor of Shipbuilding to the Bureau of Ships the proposed change together with a copy of the decision of the Shipbuilding Commission, approving the change under the National Wage policy. The Bureau then considered the propriety of accepting the proposed change in the light of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Program as a whole and determined whether or not it should be accepted for purposes of allowance of cost. The decision of the Shipbuilding Commission, of course, was prima facie evidence that the proposed change

--146--

would not have an unstabilizing effect, and in all cases of mandatory orders by the Commission the Bureau accepted the decision without question. As a matter of actual history, it was found necessary to refuse reimbursement only in extremely rare cases, and the chief merits of this plan lay in the fact that, first, it tended to make contractors more careful in seeing to it that their wage structure did not get out of line and, secondly, it provided the Bureau with complete wage data for all shipyards, thus furnishing it with the necessary information to participate effectively before the Shipbuilding Commission when the necessity arose.

4. Labor Disturbances - The Labor Relations Section had to cooperate closely with the Office of the Assistant Secretary on the question of labor disturbances. It will be remembered that a Labor Relations Officer, reporting to the Assistant Secretary, was assigned to each district to handle labor disturbances coming under the cognizance of that district.

It became essential that this officer be kept informed as to the urgency of the work involved where a stoppage occurred. This information, of course, could only be secured from the cognizant bureau, which, because of its size and diversified interests, proved to be the Bureau of Ships in the majority of cases. It was also, of course, necessary that the Bureau be kept informed of the progress and probable duration of stoppages in order that it might take the necessary steps in the rescheduling or reassignment of work on components as has been indicated above. The Labor Relations Section acted as liaison between the Labor Relations Officers in the field and the type desk in the Bureau on all these cases.

--147--

5. Miscellaneous - The Industrial Relations Branch of the Bureau was assigned numerous other miscellaneous duties; for example, it assisted the Legal Division on all problems which involved questions of labor law or labor relations. It also assumed responsibility for the Bureau's interests in the very delicate question of the utilization of prisoners of war for productive purposes. It also handled the Bureau's interests where problems of a labor relations nature arose under the Fair Employment Practices Committee or National Labor Relations Board. It assisted in drafting the contractual provisions required by statute on the subject of the Walsh-Healey Act, Davis-Bacon Act, the Copeland Act, Eight-hour Law and Antidiscriminations Provisions,

D. CONCLUSION

From the above discussion, some degree of the magnitude and importance of the armed services industrial relations program may be appreciated. In view of the relative immobility of labor in contrast to the other factors of production, and the variable human elements involved in personnel matters, industrial relations in wartime as in peace is a matter of paramount importance and comprehensiveness. The control over facilities expansion in connection with labor markets, discussed in Chapter H, is of major concern with regard to labor relations, since an injudicious allocation of production facilities occasions difficulties in all spheres of industrial relations. For this reason, prevention of situations rather than curative measures afterwards proves to be the solution in a considerable portion of labor matters. The responsibility, therefore, rests upon a sound planning group in anticipation of difficulties. For the solution of problems which may arise in any future emergency, however, the basic causes and possible solutions discussed in this chapter may serve as a valuable guide.

--148--

CHAPTER XVII

SHIPBUILDING AND HISTORY OF THE WAR

--149--

CHAPTER XVII

SHIPBUILDING AND HISTORY OF THE WAR

I. STRATEGY:

As has already been proposed, in any discussion regarding production a most vital concept to be considered is that of the use to which these vessels will be put. In brief, production constitutes one of the most important factors upon which an over-all strategy must be based. Therefore, before discussing the total war shipbuilding program, with particular emphasis upon the offensive era of the war, it behooves us to look briefly at the comprehensive strategy exercised during the war and its expression as found in a short chronology of the war's last two years.

For this purpose, no document more admirably summarizes the situation than a report from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy and, through that office, to the people of the United States. With this as background, the reader may better comprehend the role of the Bureau of Ships in World War II.

"The major strategic decision of the war provided first for the defeat of Germany and then for the defeat of Japan. Both of these tasks have now been accomplished and we can view in clearer perspective the two major campaigns which led to victory. The contrast between them is at once apparent. The war in Europe was primarily a ground and air war with naval support, while the war in the Pacific was primarily a naval war with ground and air support.

In the European war, sea power was an essential factor because of the necessity of transmitting our entire military effort across the Atlantic and supporting it there. Without command of the sea, this could not have been done. Nevertheless, the surrender of the land, sea and air forces of the German Reich on 8 May 1945 was the direct result of the application of air power over land and the power of the Allied ground forces.

In the Pacific war, the power of our ground and strategic air forces, like sea power in the Atlantic, was an essential factor. By contrast with

--149--

Germany, however, Japan's armies were intact and undefeated and her air forces only weakened when she surrendered, but her navy had been destroyed and her merchant fleet had been fatally crippled. Dependent upon imported food and raw materials and relying upon sea transport to supply her armies at home and overseas, Japan lost the war because she lost command of the sea,

and in doing so lost ---- to us ---- the island bases from which her factories and cities could be destroyed by air.

From the earliest days of the war our submarines, operating offensively in the farthest reaches of the Pacific, exacted a heavy toll of Japanese shipping. At a conservative estimate, they sank, in addition to many combatant ships, nearly two thirds of the merchant shipping which Japan lost during the war.

Our surface forces ---- fast task forces composed of aircraft carriers, fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers ---- carried the war to the enemy homeland and destroyed impressive numbers of naval vessels and merchant ships. Our amphibious forces, operating initially behind air offensives and under air cover launched from carriers, seized the island bases which made possible the achievements of land-based aircraft in cutting enemy lines of communications and in carrying devastation to the Japanese home islands.

Thus our sea power separated the enemy from vital resources on the Asiatic mainland and in the islands which he had seized early in the war, and furnished us the bases essential to the operations of shore-based aircraft from which the atomic bombs finally were despatched, and on which troops and supplies were being massed for the invasion of Kyushu and of Honshu. The defeat of Japan was directly due to our overwhelming power at sea.

The destruction of the Japanese Navy followed the Nelsonian doctrine that naval victory should be followed up until the enemy fleet is annihilated. Of 12 battleships, 11 were sunk; of 26 carriers, 20 were sunk; of cruisers, 38 were destroyed; and so on throughout the various types of ships, which collectively constituted a fleet considerably larger than ours was before the war began. The few ships that remained afloat were for the most part so heavily damaged as to be of no military value.

In striking contrast is the record of our ships. Although 2 old battleships were lost at Pearl Harbor, 8 new battleships have since Joined the fleet. Against 5 aircraft carriers and 6 escort carriers lost, we completed 27 carriers and 110 escort carriers. While we lost 10 cruisers, 48 new cruisers have been commissioned. We lost 52 submarines and built 203.

The capacity of the United States to build warships, auxiliary ships and merchant ships, while supporting our forces and our allies all over the world, exceeded all former records and surpassed our most sanguine hopes. It proved to be a vital component of that sea power which Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz has well defined in the following words:

--150--

"Sea power is not a limited term. It includes many weapons and many techniques. Sea power means more than the combatant ships and aircraft, the amphibious forces and the merchant marine. It includes also the port facilities of New York and California; the bases in Guam and in Kansas; the factories which are the capital plant of war; and the farms which are the producers of supplies. All these are elements of sea power. Furthermore, sea power is not limited to materials and equipment. It includes the functioning organization which has directed its use in the war. In the Pacific we have been able to use our naval power effectively because we have been organized along sound lines. The present organization of our Navy Department has permitted decisions to be made effectively. It has allowed great flexibility. In each operation we were able to apply our force at the time and place where it would be most damaging to the enemy."

In the successful application of our sea power, a prime factor has been the flexibility and balanced character of our naval forces. In the Atlantic the German Navy was virtually limited to the use of submarines, without surface and naval air support. In the Pacific, Japanese sea power was hampered by army control, and Japanese naval officers lacked the freedom of initiative so necessary to gain and exercise command of the seas. On the other hand, while ours was a vast fleet, it was also a highly flexible and well balanced fleet, in which ships, planes, amphibious forces and service forces in due proportion were available for unified action whenever and wherever called upon.

It is of interest to note, in connection with formulation of plans for the future strength of our Navy, that our fleet in World War II was not solely engaged in fitting enemy fleets. On numerous occasions a large part of the fleet effort was devoted to operations against land objectives. A striking example is the capture of Okinawa. During the three months that this operation was in progress our Pacific Fleet -- the greatest naval force ever assembled in the history of the world -- was engaged in a continuous battle which for sustained intensity has never been equaled in naval history; yet at this time the Japanese Navy had virtually ceased to exist-- we were fighting an island, not an enemy fleet.

With the possible exception of amphibious warfare, which covers a field of considerably broader scope, the outstanding development of the war in the field of naval strategy and tactics has been the convincing proof and general acceptance of the fact that, in accord with the basic concept of the United States Navy, a concept established some 25 years ago, naval aviation is and must always be an integral and primary component of the fleet. Naval aviation has proved its worth not only in its basic purpose of destroying hostile air and naval forces, but also in amphibious warfare involving attacks in support of landing operations, in reconnaissance over the sea and in challenging and defeating hostile land-based planes over positions held in force by the enemy. In these fields our naval aviation has von both success and distinction. Because of its mobility and the striking power and long range of its weapons,

--151--

the aircraft carrier has proved itself a major and vital element of naval strength, whose only weakness -- its vulnerability -- demands the support of all other types, and thereby places an additional premium on the flexibility and balance of our fleet. The balanced fleet is the effective fleet.

The strength of the Navy lies in the complete integration of its submarine, surface and air elements.

The epic advance of our united forces across the vast Pacific, westward from Hawaii and northward from New Guinea, to the Philippines and to the shores of Japan, was spearheaded by naval aviation and closely supported by the power of our fleets. In these advances, some of the steps exceeded 2000 miles and the assaulting troops often had to be transported for much greater distances. The Navy moved them over water, landed them and supported them in great force at the beaches, kept them supplied and, particularly at Okinawa, furnished air cover during weeks of the critical fighting ashore.

The outstanding development of this war, in the field of joint undertakings, was the perfection of amphibious operations, the most difficult of all operations in modern warfare. Our success in all such operations, from Normandy to Okinawa, involved huge quantities of specialized equipment, exhaustive study and planning, and thorough training, as well as complete integration of all forces, under unified command.

Integration and unification characterized every amphibious operation of the war and all were successful. Command was determined chiefly by application of the principle of paramount capability. A naval officer was in over-all command of an amphibious operation while troops were embarked and until they had been landed and were firmly established in their first main objectives ashore. Beyond that point, an officer of the ground forces was in command and directed whatever naval support was considered necessary.

Unity of command at the highest military level, in Washington (as an extension of the principle of unity of command), was never attempted nor, in fact, seriously considered. It is a matter of record that the strategic direction of the war, as conducted collectively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fully as successful as were the operations which they directed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff system proved its worth.

In connection with the matter of command in the field, there is perhaps a popular misconception that the Army and the Navy were intermingled in a standard form of Joint operational organization in every theater throughout the world. Actually, the situation was never the same in any two areas. For example, after General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower had completed his landing in Normandy, his operation became purely a land campaign. The Navy was responsible for maintaining the line of communications across the ocean and for certain supply operations in the ports of Europe, and small naval groups became part of the land army for certain special purposes, such as the boat groups which helped in the crossing of the Rhine. But the strategy and

--152--

 tactics of the great "battles leading up to the surrender of Germany were primarily army affairs and no naval officer had anything directly to do with the command of this land campaign.

A different situation existed in the Pacific, where, in the process of capturing small atolls, the fighting was almost entirely within range of naval gunfire; that is to say, the whole operation of capturing an atoll was amphibious in nature, with artillery and air support primarily naval. This situation called for a mixed Army-Navy organization which was entrusted to the command of Fleet Admiral Nimitz. A still different situation existed in the early days of the war during the Solomon Islands campaign where Army and Navy became, of necessity, so thoroughly intermingled that they were, to all practical purposes, a single service directed by Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. Under General of the Amy Douglas MacArthur, Army, Army Aviation, and the naval components of his command were separate entities tied together only at the top in the person of General MacArthur himself. In the Mediterranean the scheme of command differed somewhat from all the others.

All these systems of command were successful largely because each was placed in effect to meet a specific condition imposed by the characteristics of the current situation in the theater of operations. I emphasize this fact because it is important to realize that there can be no hard and fast rule for setting up commands in the field. Neither is it possible to anticipate with accuracy the nature of coming wars. Methods adopted in one may require radical alteration for the next, as was true of World Wars I and II. It was fortunate that the War Department and the Navy Department, working together

for many years -- definitely since World War I -- before the war began, had correctly diagnosed what was likely to occur and had instituted, not rigid rules, but a set of principles for joint action in the field which proved sufficiently flexible to meet the varying conditions that were encountered during the war.

--153--

II. CHRONOLOGY:

A. PACIFIC THEATER:

The conquest of the southern and central Solomon Islands may be considered to have definitely turned the tide in the Allies favor and placed the Japanese on the defensive. We pressed our advantage, occupying Treasury and Choiseul Islands in late October 1943, then invading Bougainville on 1 November. By the end of 1943 Bougainville was ours.

At the same time Rabaul came under concentrated attack by our planes and surface forces. This Japanese-held port was in a key position to control the general area to the south and constituted the base for men-of-war resisting our offensive in the northern Solomons, New Guinea, and the Gilbert Islands. Kavieng, another stronghold, on New Ireland, also came under attacks which resulted in the destruction of two Japanese cruisers and four destroyers.

In the meantime, "leap frogging" up the coast of New Guinea continued to prove successful and by 13 February 1944 the meeting of the Australians and Americans in a pincer movement completed the occupation of the Huon Peninsula.

In December, also, forces under General MacArthur landed on the western tip of New Britain and in February 1944 on the Admiralty Islands in a brilliant amphibious maneuver. Emirau Island, north of New Britain, fell into Admiral Halsey's hands on 20 March.

--154--

The command decided to by-pass the heavy troop concentrations of Wewak, several hundred miles west of Huon Peninsula, to capture Hollandia, which was two hundred miles further west and the site of an excellent harbor and three good airstrips. To prevent enemy interference from nearby bases of operations, carrier task forces under Admiral Spruance attacked the Western Carolines, where they sank 3 destroyers, 17 freighters, 5 oilers, and damaged 17 additional ships. Although severe air opposition was encountered, our forces successfully nullified any possible enemy strength which could have been used against the New Guinea move. The assault on Hollandia late in April was almost unopposed. Hollandia proved a most valuable acquisition. Its capture was quickly succeeded by similar "hops" up the coast, each cutting off concentrations of enemy troops, until the Cape Sansapor operation in August brought our forces to the western extremity of New Guinea.

In the meantime, operations in the Central Pacific proceeded with equal success. The Gilberts were important because they formed the center of a circle of activity: to the east lay Hawaii, to the north the Aleutians, to the west important Japanese bases in the Marshalls and Carolines, to the south the Solomons. Before any serious thrust could be made against the Japanese Empire, therefore, the Gilberts had to be taken. Widespread air attacks throughout August, September and October, were intensified in early November and were followed on 20 November by landings on Makin and Tarawa islands. Subduing Makin required but three days of moderate fighting. Tarawa's four day

--155--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-13-t.jpg

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE - CV6 Starboard View

ONE "DEATH FOR GLORY" NIP BIRDMAN MISSES TO THE STARBOARD SIDE OF THE "BIG E"

--156--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-14-t.jpg

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE - CV6 Starboard View

BUT THE SECOND SUICIDE DIVE SCORES A HIT ON THE FLAT TOP--FAVORITE TARGETS OF THE KAMIKAZE FLIERS

--157--

 

contest proved one of the most bitter of the war. The aerial and naval bombardment destroyed everything above ground and killed half of the island's 3500 defenders, but tenacious defense of the one invasion beach and pillbox and cave warfare exacted over 3,000 American lives.

The rest of the year was taken up with attacks against vessels, aircraft, and shore installations. At the beginning of 1944 the largest scale offensive operations were begun against the Marshall Islands; it was made possible to a marked degree by the flow of new ships joining the fleet and by minimum losses sustained by our forces. Combined forces blasted enemy strongholds from sea and air and on 31 January the first island, Majuro, was occupied. Roi, Namur and Kwajalein fell in rapid succession, with meager casualties in our ranks. Heavy attacks on islands to the west continued, with particular success against the Jap-held island on Truk and the many ships harbored in that atoll.

The capture of Eniwetok Island on 20 February 1944 placed the Marshall Islands in our hands, permitting occupation and neutralization of the Marianas to the west during the following summer. Tokyo was now within range of our land-based aircraft.

Saipan was the key to the Japanese defenses. Following extreme bombardment from surface and air, our forces landed 15 June 1944. On the first day, while our ground forces were experiencing heavy resistance, Admiral Spruance received news of a Japanese fleet movement towards the Marianas. In the ensuing battle 402 enemy planes were destroyed out of 545 reported seen, as against 17 American planes lost and minor damage

--158--

to four ships; on the second day our carrier aircraft sank two carriers, two destroyers, and one tanker, while severely damaging three carriers, 1 battleship, three cruisers, one destroyer and three tankers. The enemy naval forces once more suffered a severe blow and the balance of power swung overwhelmingly in the Allied favor. Following the bloody battle of Saipan, which fell on 9 July, Guam was taken after a twenty-day campaign. Tinian fell quickly, securing the Marianas. Meanwhile a fast carrier task force virtually wiped out one Japanese convoy of 19 ships.

The operations necessary to capture these three islands and neutralize the other Mariana Islands required more than 600 vessels, ranging from battleships and aircraft carriers to cruisers, high-speed transports and tankers, more than 2,000 aircraft, and some 300,000 Navy, Marine and Army personnel. Now, a year after the offensive phase of the war commenced, the Navy possessed overwhelming and unprecedented strength, for not only had the Allied advance been effected with unbelievably small naval losses but also the stream of ships Just off the ways had become a river of vessels of all classifications. It was now possible to strike within the inner defenses of the Japanese Empire.

During the first half of September strikes began in the western Carolines, with over 800 vessels participating. A sweep of our planes and ships destroyed innumerable enemy aircraft, shore installations, and many ships, including a convoy of 32 freighters in the southern Philippine Seas. With particular attention now centering on the Philippines, the

--159--

invasion and capture of Palau Islands, commencing 15 September, concluded by mid-October while Morotai, to the south of the Philippines, was taken with ease. To illustrate our command of naval operations, our forces in the Southwest Pacific suffered their first naval loss in a year: a destroyer escort at Morotai.

With the invasion of Palau, our constant airstrikes against the Philippines increased to such sizeable proportions that landings on Leyte, 20 October 1944, were accomplished with light naval losses: three minor craft and one destroyer sunk, and one cruiser seriously damaged. Between 23 and 26 October, however, one of the great battles of naval history occurred, as the Japanese made a determined, almost suicidal, attempt to drive us from the area. The three engagements, which have been designated the Battle for Leyte Gulf, are well known in operational history and are too significant in scope and interest to be included herewith in summary form. Suffice it to observe that this constituted virtually the last breath of Japanese naval power in World War II. Their initial forces were comprised of 1 large carrier, 3 light carriers, 9 battleships, 14 cruisers, and 23 destroyers, plus submarines. All enemy surface craft were either damaged or sunk, while our losses consisted of two destroyers, one destroyer escort, two escort carriers and one light carrier sunk, with one destroyer and four escort carriers damaged.

In the succeeding month’s operations, until 25 November, our air forces continued to strike the shattered Japanese fleet with the following results: 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 destroyer escorts, 1 sub chaser,

--160--

1 mine layer, and 22 large auxiliaries sunk, with approximately 129 other vessels damaged. Our losses were only in aircraft and these were relatively light.

By March 1945 the Philippines were in our hands, although the cost in major fleet units during the campaign rapidly mounted under repeated, savage, suicidal Kamikaze attacks. The extent of damage inflicted by these "Death for Glory" pilots was considerable. Although relatively few of our ships were sunk, the loss of life and the number of ships requiring repair proved serious.

In February 1945 the memorable assault upon Iwo Jima in the Volcano Island group occurred, which took the fight within the inner defenses of the Japanese Empire. Seven months of bombardment against the small (five miles by two miles), heavily fortified island preceded the invasion. Landing forces of 60,000 Marines, put ashore by a naval force of more than 800 ships, manned by approximately 220,000 naval personnel, evidence the scale of attack and the determination of opposition expected. The valiant battle for Iwo Jima is now legend.

At this same time, the long awaited strike against the Japanese homeland itself became reality, on 16 and 17 February, when our carrier task force brought to the Japanese people an unpleasant awareness of the war’s progress.

In April 1945 we attacked Okinawa, only 350 miles from industrial Kyushu. The Allied forces (now augmented by the arrival of a strong British task force) consisted of 548,000 men and 318 combatant vessels and 1139 auxiliary vessels, exclusive of personnel landing craft of all

--161--

types. The Japanese put up suicidal defense. The heroic efforts of all allied forces, tut the Marines and the destroyer picket line in particular, resulted in Okinawa's fall on 21 June 1945, after 82 days of unprecedentedly savage fighting. From 24 March until 21 June the suicidal Kamikaze planes had accounted for damage to over 250 vessels of all classes, including the sinking of 34 destroyers or smaller craft in the picket line... "suicide row".

Borneo fell in the meantime and, in the closing days of the war --- after Germany's surrender in May -- the pre-invasion air operations against the Japanese home lands intensified to an overwhelming degree. Supplementing the B-29 raids by the Army Air Forces, our carrier forces under Admiral Halsey, from 10 July until the "cease fire" order of 15 August, damaged or destroyed 2,804 enemy planes, sank or damaged 148 Japanese combat ships and 1,598 merchant ships, destroyed 195 locomotives and damaged 109 more.

The importance of the submarine in the Pacific cannot be overestimated. They sank a total of 276 combatant vessels: one battleship, four carriers, four escort carriers, twelve cruisers, 43 destroyers, 23 submarines, 189 minor combatant vessels and naval auxiliaries. However, their greatest contribution was the sinking of over two-thirds of the Japanese merchant shipping. This box-score, however, indicates but a portion of their role in the war, for the other missions of reconnaissance, rescue, supply, etc. made them a versatile craft second to none.

--162--

B. MEDITERRANEAN THEATER:

With the invasion of Italy in early September 1943, following bombardment and attack by our naval and air forces, the first landing on the continent had been effected. Already Germany, Italy and their satellite nations were beginning to experience desperation. The encirclement of the Reich was close at hand.

The large fleet of combatant and supporting vessels which participated in the earlier Mediterranean campaigns in North Africa and Sicily were now utilized in bridging the sea. The naval forces underwent severe air attacks during the first few days, but withstood them and continued to pour supplies to our ground forces. In addition, the heavy guns of our vessels proved of utmost importance in lending support to the Army against heavily fortified positions. In several cases fire of naval vessels saved the Army from the possibility of being driven into the sea.

After the battle for Salerno, Naples came under our naval guns as well as other strong points. Then our forces landed at Anzio. Amphibious warfare similar to that in the Pacific continued to serve the Allies well, but the battle for this beachhead persisted for an unusually long period, with the naval guns constantly furnishing support by bombarding of enemy targets on shore. Screening and patrol vessels guarded the anchorage from air-surface attack and amphibious craft transported supplies and fresh troops from the Naples area to Anzio. In this battle motor torpedo boats once more proved their worth, intercepting enemy shipping endeavoring coastwise support of

--163--

its armies. Once more adequate ship production on the home front made possible an operational victory.

Elba was captured and Normandy invaded; Allied strategy now dictated landings in southern France. By this time, new construction had supplemented our fleet strength, the submarine menace had been brought under control and enemy surface strength was not a serious threat. On August 15 the convoy of 880 ships and craft and 1,370 shipborne landing craft arrived off the southern coast of France.

This allied naval force included 515 United States, 283 British, 12 French, and 7 Greek ships and craft and 63 merchant ships of various nationalities. By the time this amphibious campaign was considered ended, naval vessels had carried out 850 separate shore bombardment missions, with more than 54,000 rounds fired, and mine sweeping forces had swept 550 mines.

As no further large scale amphibious operation appeared in prospect in the Mediterranean, forces were returned as rapidly as practicable to the United States for use in other war areas.

--164--

C. ATLANTIC AND NORMANDY CAMPAIGNS:

By the turning of the tide in mid-1943, the German U-boat no longer presented a menace against either our coastal or open eea shipping. To a considerable degree, this resulted from the high priority given escort craft during the early days of the var and from combined air-sea operations. An important duty of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet was the maintenance of what might be called a general reserve of battleships, cruisers and other ships needed to make up a balanced task force to combat any possible breakout of German naval forces and to supply support where needed. In addition, this fleet served to train the large number of ships and landing craft built on the Atlantic coast.

The success of our amphibious operations in North Africa, Sicily and Italy had demonstrated that, given air and eea superiority, there would be small doubt of our initial success against even so strongly fortified a coast as northern France. The primary strategy of an invasion across the channel involved the assembly of forces in England. The critical factor was whether, having seized a beachhead, we would be able to supply and to reinforce it sufficiently fast to build an army larger than that which the enemy was certain to concentrate against ours. The operation thus had two phases of almost equal importance -- the assault and the build-up. In both, the Navy would play a key part.

The Normandy beaches selected were within easy range of fighter plane bases in England. They possessed no suitable harbor for a quick

--165--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-15-t.jpg

"MULBERRY" -- THE SECRET FLOATING HARBORS -- NORMANDY BEACHHEAD

--166--

build-up following the assault, but there were compensating factors: their defenses were undeveloped and the enemy would not expect the invasion to take place there.

After training and full dress rehearsals, the task forces were divided in two: the Western to he composed of United States forces, the Eastern of British and Canadian. The U.S. division was subdivided into two assault forces, "O" and "U", and the follow-up force. Each assault group, in turn, contained the transports, bombardment ships, landing craft, escort craft, gunfire support craft, mine sweepers and control craft required to transport and to land Army forces. Preliminary bombing began on D-minus-90 and lasted until D-Day. Naval gunfire support was an important element in this softening process. D-Day was 6 June 1944 -- a date long to be remembered in history. About 124,000 United States naval officers and men participated directly or indirectly in the invasion. Of these, 87,000 were aboard landing craft and small escort vessels, 15,000 aboard combatant ships, and 22,000 attached to the amphibious bases in England. On 1 June, when the loading of troops began, 2,493 United States Navy ships and craft had been assembled, and of these only 14 were unable to take part because of material difficulties. The assault plans for overcoming the defenses at the beachheads included the use of naval and air bombardment to destroy or neutralize as many of the enemy installations as possible, breaching the underwater obstacles under cover of an assault by infantry and tanks, and storming the remaining defenses with succeeding waves of infantry supported by naval gunfire.

--167--

The first waves of troops, pinned to the "Omaha" beach after sustaining heavy losses, were saved when destroyers and other gunfire support craft moved in to shallowest water possible and blasted the enemy's artillery. By late afternoon hostile action against the beach area had ceased to threaten disaster and Allied forces were established in northern France. For the first four days, naval gunfire support continued to give such aid to the ground forces that the German high command commented: "These floating batteries enabled the invaders to achieve overpowering artillery concentrations at any point along the coast". The only ship lost, a transport, struck a mine, but all hands were saved.

The "Utah" beachhead was established with less disruption of the plans. The landing was opposed lightly during the early hours and came under more accurate artillery fire by mid-day, but early in the afternoon all but three enemy batteries had been silenced by naval gunfire.

In the first twelve hours we landed 21,328 troops, 1742 vehicles, and 1695 tone of supplies. In the course of the "Utah" landings, two destroyers, one destroyer escort, one mine sweeper, and several landing craft were lost.

Supplying the invading forces now became the Navy's major task, but, to accomplish it, docking and unloading facilities were needed.

The assault of established harbors would have cost dearly; the use of unprotected coastline subjected our forces to the vagaries of the weather. The decision to use the latter necessitated the improvisation of artificial harbors and small boat shelters. The small boat shelters ---

--168--

termed "gooseberries" -- were formed by sinking a number of old warships and merchant ships in a line in 2.5 fathoms of water Just off the beaches; blockships then proceeded to the beaches under their own power and were sunk quickly by internally placed explosives.

The artificial harbors -- termed "Mulberries" -- were more difficult to construct and absolute secrecy had to be maintained during their manufacture, since any indication of their nature would have "telegraphed" our plan to attack a harborless part of the French coast. A large pool of British and American tugs, the latter having crossed the ocean under their own power, had the important task of towing "Mulberry" unite, as well as other essential parts of the invasion armada, across the channel. The pontoon "harbors" in the American zone were destroyed by a severe storm a week after they became operative, but fortunately the British "mulberries" held.

After the initial landings, a major port was essential to the maintenance of unloading schedules through the fall and winter. Cherbourg was to be the first port to fall to our troops. The coastal defenses in this area consisted of 20 casemated batteries, three of which had 280 MM guns with an estimated range of 20 miles. The heavy exchange of fire between these steel and concrete emplacements and our ships lasted 2-1/2 hours. The ships' fire, however, from four to eight miles off shore, proved the more accurate, for of 21 firings requested by the Army 19 were successful. Two days later the Army took over Cherbourg.

--169--

The bombardment of Cherbourg was the last major combat activity of the Navy in the European theatre; the job of maintaining the expanding flow of supplies had yet to be accomplished. Needless to say, both combat and supply enterprises could not have been successfully completed without the ships furnished through the Bureau of Ships' building program.

--170--

III. REFLECTING STRATEGY

The war's strategy is reflected in the shipbuilding program, (as we have already seen in Chapter XIII) by lists of precedence of naval vessels and by construction directives from the high command. However great the number of modifications to the established program during the war's first two years, the latter half of the war proved even more dynamic.

A. PRECEDENCE LISTS:

From 17 December 1941 to 5 October 1943 there occurred nine major changes in precedence of naval vessels, an average of one every 2.4 months. From 26 February 1944 to 27 July 1945 there were twelve changes, averaging one every 1.4 months. Referring to the chronology already presented, perhaps we may discover some explanation for the frequency of modification.

The last precedence discussed -- the ninth -- occurred on 5 October 1943 and emphasized landing craft and repairs, alterations and spare parts. Almost five months passed before the next modification came to pass on 26 February 1944. Our chronology shows that the Marshall Islands had been taken by this time, Italy had been invaded some six months before, but coast hopping continued and the series of conferences at Quebec, Cairo and Teheran between the leaders of Allied nations terminated in December 1943, with plans being laid for future strategy. General "Ike" Eisenhower's appointment immediately thereafter as head of the European invasion forces indicated that the long awaited western

--171--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-16-t.jpgpix 16

THE NAZI U-BOAT PENS AND DOCKS AT BREMEN AND BREMERHAVEN.
WHATEVER HAPPENED HERE CONDITIONED THE PRECEDENCE LISTS AND CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIVES OF THE U. S. NAVY.

--172--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-17-t.jpg

KURE HARBOR - JAPAN'S "BONEYARD BAY" - NURSING THE SHATTERED REMNANTS OF SUBS AND DESTROYERS NEVER TO SEE ACTION AGAIN.

--173--

attack was imminent. Under these world conditions, landing craft for the crossing of the channel, the invasion of southern France, and the continued leap frogging across the Pacific remained of top priority. The major change in the previous list occurred in the number 2 and 3 precedence groups. Two icebreakers were awarded "2" precedence to replace the two given the Russians under Lend-Lease to clear their northern supply lines. Tugs and barges to be used in the Normandy invasion, principally for the hauling of the "mulberry" and "gooseberry" artificial harbors and small boat shelters, were granted "3" precedence. Repairs, alterations and spare parts retained "B" precedence while - as already mentioned - all landing craft types, auxiliaries for troop transport and supply retained the "A" precedence group. The remaining auxiliaries followed the icebreakers and tugs and barges. Destroyers, however, had dropped from "2" precedence to "5" at this date, for the enemy submarines had now come under control. Following this group came submarines, carriers, destroyer escorts, escort carriers, cruisers and battleships, minesweepers, and all other craft, since these types were to play little or no part in the major European offensive of would not be completed in time to participate. The next big major change, dated 23 June 1944 --- three weeks after the Normandy invasion, which by now had become a strong foothold, removed landing craft from top precedence for the first time in almost two years. Repairs, alterations and spare parts, long second on the list, now assumed the highest precedence, since return of damaged vessels to

--174--

the fleet was faster than construction of new ships, since alterations conforming to scientific advancements and to combat experience increased ships effectiveness, and since superhuman efforts devoted to production of spare parts extended the operational life of ships in combat areas.

All landing craft types, however, had merely dropped one precedence group, for the Allies still seemed to be faced with a long campaign in the Pacific. For this campaign the next highest precedence also fell to cargo attack ships, attack transports, amphibious force flagships, and repair ships (landing craft).

The precedences of the rest of the ships, icebreakers, tugs and barges, auxiliaries, were unchanged. Cruisers, carriers and escort carriers, however, now jumped to higher priorities as emphasis shifted almost completely to the Pacific and island hopping, with its attendant need for far flung air attacks, air support, and anti-aircraft defense. Destroyers dropped to "8" group, superseding submarines, battleships, mine sweepers, and the other classes of vessels.

The August 1944 changes of precedence list reflected the conclusions reached by President Roosevelt, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in a three-day strategy conference on the Philippine invasion. 163 selected attack transports, attack cargo ships, and amphibious force flagships assumed overriding preference. No other major alterations were necessary.

--175--

Following the invasion of the Philippines in October 1944, however, another change was dictated, this time by the increasing number of Japanese suicide attacks upon our ships. Although relatively few of our ships were lost due to Kamikaze dives, many vessels were damaged to such an extent that they required retirement from action and extensive repairs. Therefore, repairs, along with continuing alterations and spare parts priorities, retained highest precedence as of 19 December 1944.

As a result of the suicidal defense by the Japanese when we entered the inner islands of the Empire and as the fury of the Nazi's last gasp mounted, special purpose ships came under second precedence: rocket ships for laying down patterns of devastating rockets on the inner islands and on the mainland itself; hospital ships as the casualties mounted; attack cargo and transports for the further invasion of the Japanese inner defenses; and, ammunition ships for the transportation of incredible numbers of bombs and shells. To handle the almost incalculable number of landing craft to be involved in any attack against the heart of the Empire, amphibious force flagships and landing craft repair ships continued to have next priority, together with other repair ships and destroyer tenders. The ice-breakers came next, succeeded by aircraft carriers for the invasion's naval air support, then by tugs and barges for logistic elements of oil, gas, etc. once the landing has been effected, then by ell landing craft. All these classes preceded the cruisers, remaining auxiliaries, destroyers, minesweepers, submarines, battleships, patrol craft, and all others.

--176--

A directive on March 16, 1945 merely increased the emphasis upon high speed transports and repair ships as the Kamikaze efforts increased following the invasion of Iwo Jima.

Then, on 1 April 1945, the Allied forces invaded Okinawa, which became one of the bloodiest battles of World War II and led to a sustained campaign of suicide planes against our naval forces, principally the destroyers in the outer picket lines. On 23 April therefore, destroyers rose to third precedence while the new large aircraft carriers scored to second, not only that they might be off the ways for the invasion but because carriers too had become a favorite target of the Kamikaze corps. All other types of vessels retained their previous status, which remained essentially the same until the war's end.

Table 55 lists the major precedence changes for the entire war, in order to present a continuous and comprehensive picture of the overall strategy as reflected by these major precedence modifications.

--177--

MAJOR CHANGES IN PRECEDENCE OF NAVAL VESSELS TABLE 55

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-18-t.jpg

*A - "Overriding Precedence" (WPB Directive Assistance)
B - "First Precedence" (Repairs and Alterations)
C - "Second Precedence" (Special Cases) 1-14 As Established in MPL

--179--

Table 55 (Cont'd)

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-19-t.jpg

*A - "Overriding Precedence" (WPB Directive Assistance)
B - "First Precedence" (Repairs and Alterations)
C - "Second Precedence" (Special Cases) 1-14 As Established in MPL

 

--180--

Table 55 (Cont'd.)

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-20-t.jpg

 

 

*A - "Overriding Precedence" (WPB Directive Assistance)
B - "First Precedence" (Repairs and Alterations)
C - "Second Precedence" (Special Cases) 1-14 As Established in MPL

--181--

B. CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIVES:

As discussed in Chapter XIII, another reflection of strategy in terms of shipbuilding may be found in the directives from the Secretary of Navy and from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Bureau of Ships with regards to new construction and conversions. As naval operations in the European and Atlantic theaters became principally ones of supply and transportation and of anti-submarine warfare, the frequency of alterations to number of ships diminished noticeably.

Table 56 lists these production directives for the entire war as well as for the emergency period starting in 1939 in order to present an over-all picture of the changing tides of construction and conversions.

--183--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-21-t.jpg

ONE DESTROYER LIVES THRU SEVEN SUICIDE ATTACKS!!
THE USS NEWCOMB, HIT BY FOUR KAMIKAZE PLANES AND DEAD IN THE WATER, REFUSED TO SINK.
SHE RETURNED TO FIGHT

--184--

TABLE 56

NEW CONSTRUCTION AND CONVERSIONS DIRECTED

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-22-t.jpg

 

Months and Figures underlined represent decreases.

--185--

[blank]

--186--

IV. SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTION OF WORLD WAR II:

In view of the facts expressed, in the previous sections of this chapter, it may readily be concluded that the accomplishments of the Bureau of Ships in World War II can scarcely be measured solely in terms of dollars, number of ships, or tonnage of vessels completed. The precedence lists illustrated one of the Bureau's greatest achievements: the ability to meet changing demands for different types of vessels. The directives from the Secretary of Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations further demonstrated the capacity for modification of building programs with regard to volume as well as to type of ship.

These facts having been established, it is now possible to study the actual production figures under the Bureau of Ships' jurisdiction --- a shipbuilding program unequalled in the annals of history and a production schedule which staggered the imagination of the most creative industrialists. Since a complete discussion of this production is almost impossible within the limited scope of this work, comprehensive breakdowns of the most vital data applicable to the Bureau's shipbuilding program are presented in a series of tables and charts which follow. From these an incalculable number of inter-relationships and of deductions may be drawn. To summarize the over-all program, however:

In monetary terms, the Bureau of Ships expended during the war for new construction alone the staggering sum of over $17,000,000,000! In terms of tonnage, this amounted to well over 11,000,000 tons of new construction'. And, in terms of number of vessels, this totalled over 100,000 individual craft!

--187--

In order to present as complete a breakdown as possible of these summarized statements, the following tables and charts in their order of presentation are:

CONSTRUCTION

Chart XV

U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Program:
Breakdown graphically of on hand, building and converting, as well as completions and acquisitions during World War II.

Table 57

Major combatant vessels of U.S., Great Britain and Japan on hand 7 Dec. 1941 and subsequent wartime construction.

Chart XVI, Table 58

Graph and Tabulation of New Construction by tonnage and number of vessels of all types;

Table 58a

New Construction of Combatant Vessels by number of vessels and tonnage.

Table 59

New Construction of Mine Craft by number of vessels and tonnage.

Table 60

New Construction of Patrol Craft by number of vessels and tonnage.

Table 61

New Construction of Auxiliaries by number of vessels and tonnage.

Table 62

New Construction of District Craft (self-propelled) by number of vessels and tonnage.

Table 63

New Construction of District Craft (non-self propelled) by number of vessels and tonnage.

Table 64

New Construction of Large Landing Craft by number of vessels and tonnage.

Table 65

New Construction of Small Landing Craft by number of vessels and tonnage.

--188--

CONSTRUCTION

Table 66

New Construction of Small Boats by number of vessels and tonnage.

CONVERSIONS AND ACQUISITIONS

Table 67

Conversions of Combatant, Mine Craft, and Patrol Craft.

Table 68

Conversions and Acquisitions of Auxiliaries.

Table 69

Conversions and Acquisitions of District Craft (self propelled).

Table 70

Conversions and Acquisitions of District Craft (non-self propelled).

Table 71

Acquisitions: Small landing Craft and Small Boats.

FINANCIAL

Chart XVII

Expenditure by Types of Ships in World War II.

Table 72

Semi-Annual Value of Ship Completions by Type of Ships.

Table 73

Appropriations for Construction, Acquisition, and Conversion of Ships.

--189--

[blank]

--190--

Chart XV

U. S. NAVAL SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-23-t.jpg

--191--

[blank]

--192--

TABLE 57

Major Combatant Vessels of
United States, British Empire and Japan,
On Hand, 7 December 1941,
And Subsequent Construction Through 14 August 1946*

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-24-t.jpg

--193--

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-25-t.jpg

--194--

NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 58

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE
COMPLETED SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE
 AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
COMBATANT
S

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-26-t.jpg

--195--

TABLE 59

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE AND
PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
MINE CRAFT

NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-27-t.jpg

--196--

TABLE 60

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 1 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE
AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1943 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
PATROL CRAFT

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-28-t.jpg

 

--197--

NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 61

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945
INCLUSIVE AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
AUXILIARY

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-29-t.jpg

--198--

NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 62

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE
AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
DISTRICT CRAFT - SELF PROPELLED

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-30-t.jpg

--199--

NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 63

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE
AND PREDICTIONS 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
DISTRICT CRAFT - NON-SELF PROPELLED

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-31-t.jpg

--200--

NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 64

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE
AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
LANDING CRAFT (LARGE)

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-32-t.jpg

--201--

 

 NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 65

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE
AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
LANDING CRAFT (SMALL)

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-33-t.jpg

---202--

 NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 66

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945
INCLUSIVE AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(NEW CONSTRUCTION)
SMALL BOATS

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-34-t.jpg

--203--

TABLE 66 (Cont'd)
SMALL BOATS (Cont'd)

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-35-t.jpg

 

 

--204--

NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 67

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945
INCLUSIVE AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945
TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(CONVERSIONS)
COMBATANT

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-36-t.jpg

--205--

NAVSHIPS (1851)
30 November 1945

TABLE 68

NUMBER OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE
AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

(CONVERSIONS)
AUXILIARY

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-37-t.jpg

--206--

 

NAVSHIPS (1851)
2 November 1945

TABLE 69

NO. OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE
AND PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

DISTRICT CRAFT-SELF-PROPELLED
(CONVERSIONS)

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-38-t.jpg

--207--

 

NAVSHIPS (1851)
2 November 1945

TABLE 70

NO. OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE AND

PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

DISTRICT CRAFT- NON SELF PROPELLED
(CONVERSIONS)

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-39-t.jpg

--208--

NAVSHIPS (1851)
2 November 1945

TABLE 71

NO. OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE COMPLETED
SINCE 4 MARCH 1933 TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1945 INCLUSIVE AND

PREDICTIONS FROM 1 OCTOBER 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1947 INCLUSIVE

NO CONVERSION REQUIRED
SMALL LANDING CRAFT

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-40-t.jpg

--209--

[blank]

--210--

EXPENDITURE BY TYPES OF SHIPS

WORLD WAR II

[move picture here]

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-41-t.jpg

--211--

 

SEMI-ANNUAL VALUE OF SHIP COMPLETION (Estimated Dollar Value) (C&M only)
1 JULY 1940 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1947 (Predicted figures from 1 January 1946)

NEW CONSTRUCTION

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-42-t.jpg

--213--

TABLE 73 Appropriations for Construction, Acquisition and Conversion of Ships, Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Facilities and Defense Installations on Merchant Vessels, - Fiscal years 1933 to 1946 incl.

BuShipsAdminHistWWII-v.3-43-t.jpg

--214--

V. FACILITIES:

The general aspects and importance of adequate expansion of facilities to the shipbuilding program have already been discussed in Chapter IX. In connection with any comprehensive study of ships production, however, it may be well to include a re-emphasis upon facilities and their expansion during the offensive phase of the war.

Shipbuilding is possible only if adequate facilities -- both shipyards and manufacturers of material and of components --- are available. Adequate availability of facilities, in turn, are based upon the general strength of American industry. Not only must this strength, therefore, be divided between war and consumer goods, but the facilities allocated to the production of war goods must be further sub-divided among the various branches of the military services. Hence, the Navy constantly competes not only with other agencies of the government but also within its own organization for materials and finished products.

The Navy assisted the financing of the expansion of private industry in the abnormal initial period both directly and indirectly. In the direct investment of funds, the Bureau of Ships spent or committed itself to spend nearly two billion dollars during the period June 1940 to November 1945. Of this total, nearly one and one-half billions represented investment in private ship yards and ship yards or other facilities at naval establishments. This sum, in turn, was divided fairly equally between Navy Yards and other naval establishments on the one hand, and private shipbuilders on the other. The total investment in general industry, such as motor manufacturers, turbine and gear manufacturers, etc., amounted to slightly over $400 millions.

--215--

The other methods of Bureau financing ---- primarily Certificates of Necessity for five-year tax amortization, and Defense Plant Corporation and other government finance agency sponsorship ---- proved most valuable in the expansion of facilities which made the shipbuilding program possible.

Before the turning of the war's operational tide, most yards were concerned principally with new construction: in December 1942, for example, 322 new construction yards were active while 143 yards were engaged in conversion and repair work. As we have seen, however, alteration, repair and spare parts assumed the high "B" precedence commencing October 1943 and did not lose that standing thereafter. This is reflected in the statistics of September 1944, when 248 shipyards engaged in conversion and repair, while only 225 shipyards were working on new construction; at the war's end the figures were 227 and 102 respectively. The geographical distribution of these shipyards throughout 26 states is depicted by Chart XVIII. (This may be contrasted with the distribution at its highest point, September 1943, as illustrated by Chart X, Chapter IX.)

--216--

VI. FIELD ACTIVITIES OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS:

In addition to the Washington offices, the Bureau of Ships administered numerous field activities. The extent of these activities may be illustrated by the fact that by the war's end the military personnel under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships assigned to them included 9,721 officers and 19,397 enlisted men. In general the activities consisted of shipyards, repair bases, industrial managers, assistant industrial managers, inspectors of machinery, research activities, technical activities, naval landing force equipment depots, supervisors of shipbuilding, and several activities outside the continental limits.

Table 74 gives, if not an accurate picture, at least a general conception of the extensive scope of business in which the Bureau was necessarily engaged. The major activities listed are considered separately elsewhere in this history while some are not even included in Table 74 for reasons of security.

--217--

TABLE 74

FIELD ACTIVITIES ADMINISTERED BY BUSHIPS

CIVILIAN

MILITARY

MILITARY

Pre-War July 1, 1938

Peak Employment

High Point For Over-All Program 6-1-45

On Board Jan. 1, 1940

OFFICERS

ENLISTED

OFFICER

ENLISTED

CONTINENTAL ACTIVITIES

SHIPYARDS -

Portsmouth, N. H.

3,273

20,461

154

149

60

37

Boston, Mass.

2,860

50,128

552

486

91

70

New York, N. Y.

6,876

69,128

976

971

128

65

Philadelphia, Penna.

5,636

46,454

560

274

104

80

Norfolk, Va.

5,179

42,372

482

906

114

225

Charleston, S. C.

1,632

26,014

390

392

83

70

Terminal Island, Calif.

-

15,971

432

102

-

-

San Francisco, Calif.

-

17,174

276

653

-

-

Mare Island, Calif.

4,756

39,736

666

1,292

104

206

Puget Sound, Wash.

3469

32,643

518

514

106

81

TOTAL

5,006

5,739

TOTAL - Pearl Harbor Excluded

33,681

360,081

REPAIR BASES -

New Orleans, La.

2,029

84

1,012

San Diego, Calif.

387

3,593

TOTAL

471

4,605

INDUSTRIAL MANAGERS -

Chicago, Ill.

-

102

35

26

Jacksonville, Fla.

-

115

80

85

New Orleans, La.

-

701

230

304

TOTAL

335

415

ASSISTANT INDUSTRIAL MANAGERS -

Galveston, Texas

-

-

18

0

Mobile, Ala.

-

484

45

0

Orange, Texas

-

-

49

65

TOTAL

112

65

INSPECTORS OF MACHINERY -

Beloit, Wisc.

-

67

10

1

Cleveland, Ohio

5

51

9

4

Essington, Penna.

-

50

6

1

Schenectady, N. Y.

-

80

13

9

TOTAL

38

15


- = not known or not in existence at time.

--218--

TABLE 74, Cont'd.

CIVILIAN

MILITARY

MILITARY

Pre-War July 1, 1938

Peak
Employment

High Point For Over-All
Program 6-1-45

On Board Jan. 1,. 1940

OFFICERS

ENLISTED

OFFICER

ENLISTED

CONTINENTAL ACTIVITIES

RESEARCH ACTIVITIES -

Naval Code & Signal laboratory, Washington, D. C.

-

-

20

328

Navy Electronics Laboratory, Pt. Loma, Calif.

19

-

40

80

David Taylor Model Basin, Washington, D. C.

213

-

95

180

Experimental Station, Annapolis, Md.

-

-

103

92

Underwater Sound Laboratory, New London, Conn.

-

-

18

61

Mine Countermeasures Station, Panama City, Fla.

-

-

30

150

Air Navigation Electronics Project, Charleston, R. I.

-

-

13

17

Test Station, Ft. Miles, Lowes, Del.

-

-

9

25

Liaison Office, Ft. Monmouth

-

-

12

3

Computing Mach. Lab.

-

-

13

4

TOTAL

353

873

TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES -

Electronics Field Service (Group, Anacostia, D. C.

-

247

61

Sup. of Salvage

-

-

4

27

Exper. Diving Unit

-

-

5

21

TOTAL

256

115

NAVAL LANDING FORCE EQUIPMENT DEPOTS

-

Albany, Calif.

-

-

75

1,612

Little Creek, Va.

-

-

55

2,209

TOTAL

130

3,851

SUPERVISORS OF SHIPBUILDING -

Annapolis, Md.

26

-

8

0

Bath, Maine

48

-

15

2

Camden, N. J.

-

-

33

5

Evansville, Ind.

16

-

11

0

Groton, Conn.

-

-

21

5

Houston, Texas

54

-

34

0

Newport News, Va.

67

-

35

3


- = not known or not in existence at time.

--219--

 

TABLE 74, cont'd.

CIVILIAN

MILITARY

MILITARY

 

Pre-War
July 1 1938

Peak
Employment

High Point For Over-All
Program 6-1-45

On Board Jan. 1, 1940

OFFICERS

ENLISTED

OFFICER

ENLISTED

 

CONTINENTAL ACTIVITIES

 

SUPERVISORS OF SHIPBUILDING Cont'd)

 

New York, N. Y.

-

-

84

3

 

Orange, Texas

-

-

41

0

 

Philadelphia, Penna.

-

-

-

-

 

Portland, Ore.

57

-

57

12

 

Quincy, Mass.

7

-

80

3

 

San Francisco, Calif.

-

-

45

7

 

San Pedro, Calif.

-

-

80

9

 

Savannah, Ga.

-

-

40

0

 

Seattle, Wash.

-

-

58

23

 

Tacoma, Wash.

-

-

37

9

 

Tampa, Fla.

-

-

38

0

 

TOTAL

720

81

 

OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S. ACTIVITIES

 

Drydock & Repair Facility, San Juan, P.R.

-

27

87

 

Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, T. H.

1974

24,910

774

2,538

113

226

 

Cavite (Phil. Is.)

-

-

-

-

48

87

 

TOTAL

801

2,625

 

TOTAL CONTINENTAL ACTIVITIES

8,920

16,772

 

TOTAL OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL ACTIVITIES

801

2,625

 

GRAND TOTAL

9,721

19,397

 

- = not known or not in existence at time.

--220--