U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980):
Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents
Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan
MISC D0026414.A1/Final December 2011
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Contents
♦ CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (1970-1974) |
1 |
|
4 |
|
17 |
♦ CNO Admiral James Holloway (1974-1978) |
32 |
|
34 |
|
|
|
|
♦ Sea Plan 2000 |
54 |
♦ CNO Admiral Thomas Hayward (1978-1982) |
72 |
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74 |
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♦ Companion reference on USN 1970s documents |
90 |
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (1970-1974)
♦ Sep 1970 Project SIXTY
♦ An assessment; direction to move
♦ Mar-Apr 1974 "Missions of the Navy"
♦ Missions
--1--
♦ Surface warfare officer
♦ Followed 3 naval aviator CNOs
♦ Served under President Nixon; SECDEFs Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger; SECNAVs Chaffee, Warner, Middendorf
♦ Drew on previous education & experience
♦ Naval War College & National War College graduate
♦ OSD/ISA (Arms Control), SECNAV EA, 1st OP-96 (Director, Systems Analysis)
♦ Protege of Paul Nitze (NSC-68 Cold War strategy author)
♦ Drew on ideas of subordinates (esp. RADM -later ADM -- Stansfield Turner) & civilians (created CNO Executive Panel)
--2--
♦ Came into office from Commander, US Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV.
♦ Imaginative COIN thinker & operator in-country
♦ But saw Vietnam War as ill-advised drain on needed USN anti-Soviet resources, esp. for sea control
♦ Had a clear agenda when he came into office and immediately created a capstone document as blueprint
♦ Sought to implement it throughout his term
♦ Had NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner promulgate its overarching themes at end of his term
♦ Centralized Navy POM & budget decision-making
♦ Publicly fearful of Soviet Navy
♦ Sought to avoid USN anti-Soviet SSBN prosecution; focus on SLOC sea control
♦ Opposed to Nixon-Kissinger arms control efforts (SALT I)
♦ Conflicts with ADM Rickover
♦ Signature programs: FFGs, PHMs, sea control ships, equal opportunity, personnel reforms
♦ Later, continued to write on US naval policy and strategy
--3--
♦ Memoirs:
♦ On Watch (1976)
♦ My Father, My Son (1986)
Project SIXTY (Sep 1970)
--4--
♦ Overview
♦ Signed by CNO ADM Zumwalt (Sept 1970)
♦ "Assessment" & "Direction to Move"
♦ Medium-length (30 pp) SECRET brief & memo
♦ CNO flag officer special assistants drafted
♦ Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV Comprehensive plan, program guidance for Zumwalt term
♦ Precedent for subsequent annual CNO program guidance
♦ To re-optimize USN to counter Soviet threat
♦ 4 USN capability categories; hi-low mix
♦ Sea control priority over power projection programs
♦ Listed 22 specific actions taken or proposed
♦ Presented 3 force structure alternatives
♦ Concepts proved more influential than programs
♦ Signed by:
♦ CNO ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
♦ 2 months after taking office
--5--
♦ What it was
♦ Billed as "an assessment", "direction to move," "concepts"
♦ Secret briefing for SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF (Sep 1970)
♦ Secret memorandum to all Flag Officers (and Marine general officers)
♦ Medium-length (30 pages plus slides)
♦ Kickoff for development of POM-73 & precedent for subsequent CNO ADM Zumwalt annual Navy program guidance
♦ Why it was written (I)
♦ Show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through SLOC defense
♦ Re-optimize USN vs. growing Soviet at-sea combat & SLOC-cutting capabilities in a NATO-Pact war
♦ Take advantage of SECDEF Laird de-centralization of DOD POM & budget processes to services
♦ Establish CNO guidance as authoritative interpretation of SECDEF guidance
♦ Centralize under the CNO what had been a decentralized internal Navy program planning process, to implement his policies
♦ To guide USN, USMC flag/general officer actions, especially in developing POM-73 and subsequent CNO ADM Zumwalt POMs
♦ Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV
--6--
♦ Why it was written (II)
♦ Gain OSD & OPNAV support for CNO ADM Zumwalt vision to reconfigure fleet capabilities
♦ Focus more on sea control, less on power projection
♦ Add "low-mix" ships to established "high-mix" programs
♦ Focus on "capability categories", to reduce "union" parochialism
♦ Show that the Navy was conforming to:
♦ New national "Nixon Doctrine" policy of reliance on allies, focus on USSR
♦ Sharply reduced budget allocations
♦ Leave the 1960s and the Vietnam War behind
♦ Despite current ongoing major Navy Vietnam War combat operations
♦ Context (I)
♦ 2nd year of Nixon administration (1969-74)
♦ SECDEF Laird (1969-73)
♦ Decentralization of DOD PPBS to services
♦ US-Soviet strategic nuclear weapons parity
♦ Detente, deterrence & disarmament policies vis-a-vis Soviets
♦ Nixon Doctrine: Allies do more
♦ "1 1.2 War" national defense planning construct (reduced from "2 1/2 wars")
♦ Vietnam War still raging, but US withdrawing troops
♦ Improving US relations with China
♦ US economy in recession
♦ GDP growth slowing; inflation rate rising
♦ Modest U.S. government deficit spending
♦ Price of oil low and steady
--7--
♦ Context (II)
♦ AVF impending
♦ USN downsizing; declining budgets
♦ But, DoN TOA now >DoA or DoAF
♦ SECNAV Chaffee (1969-72) (Made VADM Zumwalt CNO)
♦ New CNO ADM Zumwalt (1970-74)
♦ Soviet naval buildup
♦ 1st Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 70
♦ Imminent deployment of Delta SSBNs w/ long range SLBMs, & Backfire-C bombers
♦ Six-Day War Egypt Styx anti-ship missile use shock (1967)
♦ N. Korean USN EC-121 SOJ shoot-down (Apr 1969)
♦ Violent Sino-Soviet border clashes & nuclear threats (1969)
♦ US withdrew from Libya Wheelus AFB (1970)
♦ Context (III)
♦ USN in 1970: 769 battle force ships & declining sharply; 10 new ships authorized
♦ DON budgets declining CEP, OPNAV OP-00K, NADEC created (1970)
♦ Demise of OPNAV Long Range Planning Group (1970)
♦ Carriers changing to CV/CVN concept
♦ From CVAs & CVSs
--8--
♦ Cited references
♦ Nixon Doctrine (1969)
♦ JCS Plans
♦ DoD FY 72 Fiscal Guidance
♦ FY 72 POM Annex Navy budget
♦ Context: Other important publications
♦ CAPT E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., "A Course for Destroyers," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov 1962)
♦ NATO MC 14/3 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1968)
♦ Flexible response
♦ NATO MC 48/3 Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1969)
♦ SACLANT, Relative Maritime Strategies and Capabilities of NATO and the Soviet Bloc ("Brosio Study") (Mar 1969)
♦ DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958)
♦ Herman Kahn works
♦ Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (1968) (resisted)
♦ Paul Nitze thinking
♦ Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970)
--9--
♦ How it was written
♦ Drafted by RADM-SEL Stansfield Turner
♦ New OPNAV special office (Op-OOH)
♦ Drew officers from OP-60, OP-93, OP-96, Secretariat
♦ Finished by RADM Worth Bagley
♦ "60-day effort"
♦ CNO & SECNAV Chaffee briefed SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF Packard, to influence POM 73 (Sep 1970)
♦ Then distributed to USN, USMC flag & general officers
♦ Tracking goal accomplishment (measuring effectiveness) by new Coordinator of Decisions (OP-09C) (RADM Emmett Tidd)
♦ Outline
♦ CNO's Project SIXTY presentation to SECDEF
♦ Assured second strike potential
♦ Sea control and projection
♦ Overseas presence
♦ Alternative combinations of sea control and projection forces
♦ Other types of change
♦ Summary
--10--
Key Ideas (I):
♦ Soviets & their navy are the priority threat
♦ Taken very seriously
♦ "CHICOM" threat mentioned in passing
♦ Soviet threat is global
♦ Alarming view of USN capabilities to defeat Soviets at sea
♦ 55% w/ present forces
♦ 30% w/ POM 72 forces
♦ Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific
♦ Joint & allied coordination & cooperation
♦ Need allied navies to contribute more to sea control
♦ Reprioritized naval missions
Key ideas (II):
♦ 22 specific actions taken or proposed
♦ Included topics for further study & analysis
♦ 3 force structure alternatives
♦ Theater tradeoffs necessary. Gave details.
♦ Retire obsolescing forces early (for $)
♦ Modernize ("hi-low mix")
♦ New R&D initiatives
♦ Reduce support costs
♦ Pursue people programs
♦ Reduce forward deployments to ensure optimum rotation policies for personnel retention & motivation
♦ Testing new force packages: Add SSNs to surface task forces
--11--
What was new?
♦ Comprehensive USN statement of strategy & policy
♦ Annual CNO program guidance
♦ 4 prioritized disaggregated capabilities
♦ Assured second strike
♦ Control of sea lines and areas
♦ Projection of power ashore
♦ Overseas presence in peacetime
♦ "Strategic deterrence must come first"
♦ Focus on sea control vs. Soviet threat
♦ Shift $ from VN-era USN power projection CV strike to defensive sea control
♦ Many new programs
♦ Sea control ships to replace CVSs (aborted)
♦ Perry-class FFGs
♦ Tracking goal accomplishment; measuring effectiveness
♦ Not addressed
♦ Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970)
♦ Non-Soviet threats
♦ World trade issues
♦ On-going war in Vietnam
♦ USN submarine ISR operations
♦ Counterinsurgency; terrorist threats
♦ Coastal & riverine operations & programs
♦ Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
♦ Maritime Security Operations
♦ US Coast Guard
♦ US government inter-agency partners
♦ US industrial base & shipbuilding
♦ Little on USMC
♦ Just distribution list & USMC CV TACAIR bid
--12--
♦ Subsequent analyses & critiques
♦ Herschel Kanter & Thomas Anger, Navy Responses to Changes in the Defense Resource Planning Process (CNA 1973)
♦ ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (1976)
♦ David A. Rosenberg, "Project 60: Twelve Years Later" (1982)
♦ Jeffrey Sands, On His Watch (CNA 1993)
♦ Included measuring effectiveness
♦ Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space (Ch X) (2000)
♦ CAPT Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies (2004)
♦ Edgar Puryear, American Admiralship (Ch IX) (2005)
♦ Harlan Ullman, "A New Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Mar 2007)
♦ Criticisms (I)
♦ "A non-Mahanian aberration" (Norman Friedman)
♦ Too defensive and fearful
♦ Too much focus on sea control vs. Soviets
♦ Too little focus on power projection vs. Soviets
♦ Sea control & power projection were actually intertwined, not bifurcated
♦ Wrongly assumed Soviet priority to cut SLOCs
♦ To abandon naval offensive would lose the fleet & the war
--13--
♦ Criticisms (II):
♦ A step backwards from focus on forward USN influence on events ashore
♦ Wrong solutions to problems
♦ Unaffordable
♦ Led to tactical caution
♦ Not well connected to national policy of detente
♦ Not joint or allied enough
♦ Too parochial (surface-warfare advocacy)
♦ Too heavy on programmatics and too light on strategy
♦ Not a consensual document. One man's vision
♦ Influence (I):
♦ Wide within Navy & DOD at the time
♦ Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on sea control
♦ Concepts more influential than specific programs
♦ Many programs repudiated by successors
♦ Subsequent Navy program planning used Project 60 "missions of the Navy" construct: Strategic deterrence, projection of power, control of sea lines
♦ Especially OP-96-led CNO Program Analysis Memoranda (CPAMs)
♦ OP-96 reorganized internally along "mission area" & support area" lines
♦ Overseas presence could not be used to justify forces, IAWDOD guidance
--14--
♦ Influence (II):
♦ Institutionalized as annual CNO Policy and Planning Guidance (CPPG) (from 1971 on)
♦ Drafted in OP-96 (Systems Analysis) (RADM Turner (1971-2) et al.)
♦ As a Navy "program planning" document, OP-00H-drafted Project SIXTY & successor OP-96-drafted CPPGs eclipsed influence of OP-06/OP-60-drafted planning & strategy documents as conceptual basis for internal OPNAV & USN thinking during 1970s
♦ Led to USN emphasis on "second P" of PPBS, vice "First P"
♦ Why did it have this influence (I)
♦ Personalities:
♦ Strong backing by forceful & thoughtful, but unorthodox & controversial, CNO ADM Zumwalt
♦ Continued advocacy by Stansfield Turner
♦ As RADM & OP-96 (1971-2); and later VADM & President, Naval War College (1972-4)
♦ Effective CNO management techniques (special assistants, NADEC, Z-Grams, successor CPPGs)
♦ Deliberate fostering of OP-96-led OPNAV "program planning" as intellectual center of OPNAV staff, vice OP-06-led "planning"
--15--
♦ Why did it have this influence (II)
♦ SECDEF Laird left Navy alone to implement its own plan
♦ Declining US defense budgets & post-Vietnam operational lull in 1970s led to USN focus on getting the budget right
♦ Limited internal Navy buy-in on many specifics
♦ Crystallized poles in USN thinking; sparked debates
♦ 1982 ENS Rosenberg OP-965 retrospective study showed utility of comprehensive USN policy statement
♦ Successive descendent CPPGs had become more programmatic & less conceptual & strategic overtime
♦ Influence on subsequent capstone documents
♦ Set the example for all
♦ Conceptual roots of Missions of the U.S. Navy
♦ Triggered contrary views in Strategic Concepts of the US Navy
♦ Studied for lessons leading to The Maritime Strategy
♦ But spawned succession of CPPGs that refocused many in Navy away from strategy
--16--
Mission of the U.S. Navy (1974)
♦ Overview
♦ Drafted & signed by NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner (Mar-Apr 1974)
♦ Drafting assistance by NAVWARCOL faculty
♦ Short (16 pp max) UNCLAS articles
♦ Described 4 Navy missions (from Project SIXTY)
♦ Showed relationship of missions to tactics
♦ Deliberate creation of a new vocabulary
♦ Principal target: US Navy officer corps
♦ USN officers should think deeply about their service
♦ Missions construct lends itself to analyzing naval issues
♦ Soviet Union the chief threat for USN to counter
♦ Lasting influence
--17--
♦ Signed by VADM Stansfield Turner
♦ President, Naval War College (1972-4)
♦ Surface warfare officer
♦ Later, NATO CINCSOUTH, Carter Administration CIA Director (1977-81)
♦ Continued to write extensively on naval policy & strategy
♦ What it was
♦ Billed as "Missions"
♦ UNCLAS Naval War College Review article (Mar-Apr 1974)
♦ Short (16 pages)
♦ Reprinted in Naval War College Review (Winter 1998)
♦ UNCLAS US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Dec 1974)
♦ Derived from Project SIXTY
--18--
♦ Why it was written
♦ To get USN officers to think deeply about their service
♦ To transform Navy internal thinking about what it does
♦ To help naval officers understand what is best for the whole organization, not just their own platforms or programs
♦ To focus the Navy on cross-cutting outputs (missions), vice parochial inputs (platforms, unions)
♦ To inform future naval force structure decisions
♦ To form a basis to establishing priorities for allocating resources
♦ To assist in selecting the best among competing systems
♦ Institutionalize Project SIXTY framework
♦ Principal target: US Navy officer corps
♦ Context (I)
♦ Last year of Nixon administration (1969-74)
♦ Watergate scandal 1972-4
♦ All US forces withdrawn from South Vietnam (1973)
♦ Northern combat actions against South Vietnam continued
♦ SECDEF Schlesinger (1973-75)
♦ All-Volunteer Force (from 1973)
♦ US economy in recession again; inflation rate rising
♦ Arab oil embargo; Price of oil soaring
--19--
♦ Context (II)
♦ SECDEF nuclear strategy changes (1974)
♦ Palestinian attack at Munich airport (1970). Beginning of major terrorist campaign
♦ Munich Olympics (1972); Rome airport (1973)
♦ World food crisis (1972-74)
♦ Shortages, price hikes led to famines, unrest
♦ Yom Kippur War (1973)
♦ Battle of Latakia
♦ 1st naval battle in history between surface-to-surface missile-equipped boats, & using electronic deception
♦ Context (III)
♦ Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit meeting (May 1972)
♦ High point of detente
♦ INCSEA agreement with Soviets (1972)
♦ ABM & SALT Treaties (1972)
♦ Soviet naval buildup
♦ Delta-class SSBNs w/long-range SLBMs (from 1972)
♦ USN-Soviet Navy Mediterranean confrontations (1970 & 1973)
♦ USN post-Vietnam War ops
♦ Indo-Pakistani War & Enterprise cruise (1971-2)
♦ Close Soviet-Indian military ties
♦ Improving US relations with PRC
--20--
♦ Context (IV)
♦ Outgoing CNO Zumwalt (1970-74)
♦ OPNAV reorganization: Creation of "3 platform barons" as Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) (1971)
♦ OP-02 (Submarines); OP-03 (Surface); OP-05 (Air)
♦ Formalized increased post-World War II officer specialization
♦ OPNAV OP-090 Net Assessment Office created
♦ OP-96-led "program planning" the dominant intellectual activity in OPNAV, vice OP-06-led "planning"
♦ Declining DON budgets
♦ USN in 1974: 512 battle force ships and declining sharply; 14 new ships authorized
♦ But, DON TOA now >DA or DAF
♦ Context (V)
♦ Sea Control Ship experiment on USS Guam with AV-8s & SH-3s (1972)
♦ Racial incidents on USN ships (1972)
♦ "Turner Revolution" at Naval War College (1972-4)
♦ Curriculum transformation, esp. Strategy & Policy Course (1972)
♦ New top-notch faculty, esp. Strategy Department
♦ Current Strategy Forum instituted (1973)
♦ Increasing USAF minelaying & surveillance support at sea
♦ Army at TRADOC developing defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe
--21--
♦ Context: Cited references
♦ Mahan
♦ Context: Other important publications
♦ Project SIXTY (1970)
♦ Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (1968) (resisted)
♦ Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy (1970)
♦ USN-USAF MOAs on B-52 minelaying at sea (1971, 1974)
♦ Future Maritime Strategy Study (FUMAR) (1973)
♦ "U.S. Strategy for the Pacific/Indian Ocean Area in the 1970s"
♦ "Project 2000" long-range planning Study (1974)
♦ ADM Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace" articles in US Naval Institute Proceedings (with commentaries) (Jan-Nov 1974)
--22--
♦ How it was written
♦ Drafted at newly-transformed Naval War College
♦ Drafter: NAVWARCOL President, VADM Stansfield Turner (Jun 1972-Aug 1974)
♦ Had conceived and drafted CNO ADM Zumwalt's Project SIXTY
♦ Director of OPNAV analysis office (OP-96) before going to NWC
♦ Leaving Naval War College for command of US Second Fleet
♦ Editor & sounding board: CDR George Thibault (NAVWARCOL faculty)
♦ Outline (Naval War College Review article)
♦ Usefulness of categorizing Navy missions
♦ Evolution of Naval capabilities and missions
♦ Definition of naval missions and discussion of their forces and tactics
♦ Strategic deterrencemission
♦ Sea control mission
♦ Projection of power ashore missions
♦ Naval presence mission
♦ Current and future issues involving naval missions areas
--23--
Key ideas (I):
♦ 4 "Missions"
Naval War College Review order
♦ Strategic deterrence
♦ Projection of power ♦ Sea control ♦ Naval presence US Naval Institute Proceedings
order ♦ "Warfighting
missions" ♦ Sea control ♦ Projection of power ♦ "Deterrent
missions" ♦ Naval presence ♦ Strategic deterrence ♦ Key ideas (II): ♦ Each of 4 missions
subdivided into "tactics" ♦ Detailed & nuanced
definitions & discussions of each --24-- ♦ Key ideas
(III): ♦ "To force the Navy
to think in terms of output rather than input" ♦ (Key goal of
McNamara-instituted PPBS since 1961-2) ♦ Missions as
"outputs". ♦ Tied to national
objectives ♦ Interdependent ♦ NOT prioritized ♦ Tradeoffs within/among
missions ♦ USMC implements a few of
the tactics ♦ Key ideas (IV): ♦ USN officers should
think deeply about their service ♦ USN sea control focus
may yield to naval presence focus (US Naval Institute Proceedings article) ♦ Discussed historical
development of Navy concepts ♦ Placed 4 Missions in
historical context ♦ Soviets the chief threat ♦ Communist Chinese
threat mentioned in passing ♦ Discussion of
"blockade" as a discreet naval operation --25-- Interdependent Naval Missions Reproduced with permission from: Naval War College
Review. Mar-Apr 1974 Vol XXVI, #5. "Missions of
the U.S. Navy, "by Vice Admiral Stansfield
Turner, U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College. ♦ What was new ♦ Going public with Project
SIXTY 4-capability construct ♦ Explicit discussion of
"sea control" as superseding "control of the sea"
terminology ♦ Rejection of
"command of the seas" and "sea power" terminology ♦ Explication of
"Presence" mission Tying mission areas to tactics ♦ Wide subsequent
influence and citation --26-- ♦ Not addressed
(I) ♦ Explicit
priorities among missions ♦ Non-Soviet threats ♦ World trade issues ♦ Submarine ISR operations ♦ Counterinsurgency & irregular
warfare ♦ Convoy operations
Coastal & riverine operations & programs ♦ Maritime Security
Operations ♦ Terrorist threats ♦ Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Response ♦
"Fleet-in-being" or "force-in-being" Not addressed (II) ♦ Sealift ♦ US Coast Guard; U.S.
Army ♦ U.S. Merchant marine ♦ US industrial
base & shipbuilding ♦ U.S. government
interagency partners ♦ Little joint or
allied mention --27-- ♦ Subsequent
analyses & critiques ♦ ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (1976) ♦ John Allen Williams,
"Strategies and Forces of the U.S. Navy: A Critical Reappraisal," Armed
Forces & Society (Summer 1981) ♦ Were they
"missions?" ♦ What is a
"mission" (officially)? 1. The task, together with the
purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason
therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units,
a duty assigned to an individual or unit. 3. The dispatching of one or more
aircraft to accomplish one particular task Joint Pub 1-02 DOD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Oct 2008) --28-- ♦ Were they
"missions? ♦ What is a
"mission" (officially)? "The terms 'roles,
missions, and functions' often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions
between them are important. 'Roles' are the broad and enduring purposes for
which the Services . . . were established in law. "Missions" are the
tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders.
'Functions' are specific responsibilities assigned by the NCA to enable the
services to fulfill their legally established roles." Joint Pub 02 Unified Action
Armed Forces (UNAAF) (July 2001) ♦ Criticisms ♦ These weren't really
"missions"? ♦ These weren't really the
right missions. ♦ "Sea control"
really 2 missions: "Offensive" & "Defensive" (CDR/Dr
John Allen Williams USNR) Sea control & power
projection intertwined, not bifurcated ♦ Presence not really a
"mission" ♦ All 4 missions not
co-equal ♦ Implicit primacy of
"sea control" right/wrong ♦ New vocabulary shouldn't
supersede older terms --29-- ♦ Subsequent
evolution of ADM Turner's thought ♦
4 roles/missions of the Navy ♦ Sea control ♦ Projection of power by amphibious assault ♦ Projection of power ashore by bombardment ♦ Strategic nuclear retaliation Today a new mission may be emerging Defending the homeland or
other land areas against attack by missiles through space Setting aside homeland defense
. . . The other four missions are today of lessening importance to our
country's security ADM Stansfield
Turner USN (Ret) ♦ Influence: ♦ Very wide and very
long-lasting ♦ In particular, led to
increased DOTMLPF focus on naval forward presence ♦ Cited throughout world
defense literature ♦ E.g.: Japanese admiral
quoted in 2007 conference paper ♦ Forged a long-lasting
consensus on the missions of the US Navy ♦ Spilled over into CNO
ADM Holloway 1st (Mar 75) Posture Statement & US Naval Institute
Proceedings article (Jun 1975) --30-- ♦ Why did it have
this influence? ♦ Groundwork already laid
by Project SIXTY, subsequent CPPGs, and OP-96-led OPNAV program planning ♦ Simple, elegant
construct; Filled a conceptual void & need ♦ Widely adopted by Navy
leadership ♦ Personality: VADM Turner
reputation as USN's intellectual leader, inside & outside USN ♦ Adopted by
academia (civilian & military) ♦ Links to ADM Zumwalt-specific policies muted ♦ Influence on subsequent capstone documents ♦ New vocabulary used in almost all ♦ But "control of the
seas" & "sea power" terms persisted too ♦ 4-mission framework triggered
contrary views in Strategic Concepts of the US Navy & The Future
of U.S. Sea Power ♦ Missions restated,
re-ordered and/or modified somewhat in Forward . . . From the Sea, Anytime,
Anywhere, Naval Power 21, Sea Power 21, & added to in NOC (2006) ♦ Missions repeated in
2007 Program Guide to the U.S. Navy ("crisis response" added) ♦ Missions formed 4 of 6
"core capabilities" of Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower (2007) --31-- ♦ Dec 1975 Strategic
Concept for the U. S. Navy (S) ♦ 1976-78
CNO Reports (Posture Statements) ♦ Jul 1976
"U.S. Navy: A Bicentennial
Appraisal" ♦ Jan 1977 Strategic
Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1) ♦ May 1978 Strategic
Concepts of the U.S. Navy NWP 1 (Rev. A) ♦ (Mar 1978) (Sea Plan 2000) (S) ♦ A force planning study ♦ Naval aviator (nuclear
power trained & experienced) ♦ Served under Presidents
Ford & Carter; SECDEFs Schlesinger, Rumsfeld & Brown; SECNAVs Middendorf & Claytor ♦ Experienced in
initiating concepts & processes ♦ E.g.: NATOPS; USN
program planning; CV concept (1968); Nuclear Powered Carrier Program; changed
USN frigate nomenclature; CVBGs (1977); flexible, reconfigurable air wing;
fostered CWC concept ♦ Combat veteran of three
wars & numerous crises --32-- ♦ Initially let previous concepts stand (he had
been VCNO under ADM Zumwalt) ♦ Progressively developed & promulgated a new
coherent set of concepts to replace them ♦ At end of his term, promulgated a final
comprehensive statement ♦ His DCNO for Plans Policy & Operations, VADM
William Crowe, created a new Strategy & Concepts Branch (OP-603), staffed
by hand-picked strategists (1978) ♦ Fought successfully to prevent cruise missiles from
being banned by US-USSR SALT II agreement ♦ Signature program: CVN, CVBG ♦ Later, continued to write on naval strategy &
policy, & serve on high-level national & DOD commissions & study
groups ♦ President, Council of
American-Flag Ship Operators (1978-88) ♦ Chairman, Special
Operations Review Group (investigating 1980 Desert One Iran Hostages Rescue
debacle) ♦ Executive Director,
President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism (1985) ♦ President, then Chairman
of Naval Historical Foundation (1980-2008) ♦ Memoir: Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal
Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam and the Soviet Confrontation (2007) --33-- Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8) ♦ Overview ♦ Drafted and signed by
CNO ADM Holloway ♦ "Strategic
Concepts" ♦ Principal targets: USN
officer corps & Capitol Hill ♦ CLAS memo, then UNCLAS
article, NWP, posture statement brochures, revised medium-length (37 pp) NWP ♦ Concepts evolved through
various editions ♦ Comprehensive analysis
of naval requirement development ♦ Rigorous flow from
national policy to systems ♦ Focus on naval warfare
tasks, across platforms ♦ Highlighted range of aircraft
carrier capabilities ♦ No specific USN
adversaries mentioned by name ♦ Still modestly
influential --34-- ♦ Signed by: ♦ CNO ADM James L.
Holloway, III ♦ Successive drafts after
1 1/2 years in office ♦ What it was ♦ Billed as
"Strategic concept(s)" ♦ Secret signed document
circulated to Fleet ♦ Commanders for comment
(Dec 1975) ♦ CNO Reports (Posture
Statements) (Jul 76, Apr 77, Mar 78) ♦ Pocket-sized for
portability ♦ US Naval Institute Proceedings
article (Jul 1976) ♦ UNCLAS Naval Warfare
Publications (NWP) ♦ NWP 1 (Jan 1977) ♦ NWP 1(A) (May 1978): 37
pages ♦ Not formally cancelled
until 1993 ♦ Later boiled down in
Holloway 1985 Oceanus article --35-- ♦ Why it was
written (I) ♦ So USN officers would
understand basic USN concepts, doctrine & processes, in order to be able to
contribute effectively to internal Navy decisions, make effective external
cases for the Navy, and understand the implications of making changes ♦ To lay out the
capabilities of the US Navy in support of the nation, including aircraft
carriers ♦ Reaction to Project
SIXTY & Turner "Missions" "Consolidation" of
internal USN thinking, esp. "missions" ♦ To emphasize warfare
tasks over platforms ♦ And in so doing
highlight the versatility of the aircraft carrier ♦ Why it was
written (II) ♦ To reflect evolution of
CNO ADM Holloway's thinking ♦ To influence
Administration policies: ♦ To create a coherent
Navy policy statement in anticipation of a possible Jan 1977 change in
administrations (1975-6) ♦ To try to influence new
administration policies (1977) ♦ To try to change
administration policies (1978) ♦ To enlist Congressional
support in influencing/changing Administration policies (1977-8) ♦ To achieve consensus on
US Navy roles, missions, tasks, functions (and, ultimately, force levels &
mix) ♦ Principal targets: USN
officer corps, Capitol Hill, DOD --36-- ♦ Context (I) ♦ CNO ADM Holloway
(1974-78) ♦ 2nd year of
Ford (R) administration (1974-77) thru 2nd year of Carter (D)
administration ♦ US voters repudiated
Ford administration (Nov 1976) ♦ SECDEFs Laird, Rumsfeld
(1975-77); SECNAV Middendorf ♦ SECDEF Brown (1977-81);
SECNAV Claytor ♦ US economy pulling out
of recession (from Mar 1975) ♦ But inflation rate
rising & unemployment rate high ♦ Increasing U.S.
government deficit spending ♦ Price of oil high but
declining somewhat ♦ PRC occupied Paracel Islands; PLAN defeated VNN in South China Sea naval
battle (1974) ♦ N. Vietnam victory,
occupation of S. Vietnam (1975) ♦ Communist regimes in
Laos, Cambodia (1975) ♦ Context (II) ♦ National policy shift
from Pacific military commitments ♦ Outgoing Ford
Administration policies comfortable for Navy, if underfunded ♦ Soviets deployed SS-20
nuclear missiles Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Central Europe
(1975) ♦ US countered with
Pershing II & GLCM INF deployment plans ♦ New Carter
administration defense focus on NATO central region & USN Atlantic SLOC
protection ♦ Robert Komer as DOD Special Assistant for NATO --37-- ♦ Context (III) ♦ Arms Control Agreements
& talks ♦ Seabed, INCSEA, SALT I,
ABM ♦ US-Soviet talks to
demilitarize Indian Ocean (1977-8 ) ♦ Soviet fleet build-up ♦ New Delta-class SSBNs
w/ long-range SLBMs (1972) ♦ Soviet SSBNs no longer
needed to deploy far forward & transit GIUK & other barriers to reach
CONUS targets ♦ Backfire-B bomber with
ASMs (1972) ♦ To keep US carrier
aviation beyond striking range of Soviet targets ♦ 2nd Soviet
global naval exercise: Okean 75 ♦ 1st USN,
Soviet Navy reciprocal port visits (1975) ♦ Context (IV) ♦ Increased Soviet
interventions in 3rd world ♦ Close Soviet-Indian
military ties ♦ 1st nuclear
weapon test by Soviet-friendly India (1974) ♦ Improving US relations
with PRC ♦ Yom Kippur War (1973) ♦ Battle of Latakia ♦ 1st naval
battle in history between surface-to-surface missile-equipped boats, &
using electronic deception --38-- ♦ Context (V) ♦ Portuguese empire freed
(1974-5) ♦ Periodic Korean crises ♦ Tree-cutting incident
& Operation Paul Bunyan (1976) ♦ Panama Canal transfer
treaty signed (1977) ♦ Executive branch,
Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3rd world ("Vietnam
syndrome") ♦ Congress blocked US aid
to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6) ♦ Context (VI) ♦ Declining USN force
levels; fluctuating DON budgets ♦ USN in 1978: 468 battle
force ships & starting to increase somewhat; 18 new ships authorized ♦ Emerging USN force level
goal: 600 ships ♦ New systems entering
fleet ♦ CWC concept entering
fleet ♦ Internal USN
"Repeal Zumwalt" debates ♦ Bitter internal US
government aircraft carrier, VSTOL budget debates ♦ Culmination: Congress
debated adding CVN 71 to carrier-less FY 79 defense budget (Feb-Aug 1978) --39-- ♦ Context (VII) ♦ Specialized USN ASW
carriers disappeared ♦ CVA/CVAN/CVS ♦ CV/CVN ♦ CVWs transformed
from 2 specialized air wing types to one general multi-mission model ♦ New fleet battle
organization (1977) ♦ CVTF/CVTG ♦ CVBF/CVBG ♦ Continued primacy of
OP-96-led program planning as intellectual basis for OPNAV activity, vice
OP-06-led planning ♦ OPNAV Op-96-OP-60
rivalry ♦ Context (VIII) ♦ USN surface ship
reclassifications (1975) ♦ CNO ADM Holloway
initiatives ♦ Brought USN
"frigate" nomenclature in line with international practice ♦ Eliminated perceived
USN-Soviet Navy "cruiser gap" ♦ Eliminated USN surface
combatant "escort" terminology ♦ CG/CLG
♦ ♦ DL/DLG
♦ ♦ DD/DDG
♦ DD/DDG ♦ DE/DEG
♦ FF/FFG ♦ PF
♦ FFG ♦ CNO ADM Holloway
decision to halt CGN procurement --40-- ♦ Context (IX) ♦ New
SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south,
to free up escort forces for northern forward ops ♦ New
CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific ♦ CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans
to stand & fight in central, eastern Med ♦ But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM
Turner plans to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis ♦ Context (X) ♦ USN Advanced Technology
Panel (ATP) created (1975) ♦ NAVWARCOL Center for
Advanced Research created (1975) ♦ John F. Lehman as CNO
consultant (from 1977) ♦ Army at TRADOC developed
defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe (1976) ♦ Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea ♦ Military Reform Movement
(from 1976) ♦ SEN Taft, then SEN
Hart. Bill Lind ♦ Adopted & advocated
"lo" end of Zumwalt "hi-lo mix" ♦ Committee on the Present
Danger (from 1976) ♦ Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc. --41-- ♦ Cited
references ♦ Title 10 of U.S. Code ♦ DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions
of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958) ♦ DOD Total Force Policy ♦ Unified Command Plan ♦ JCS & USN Readiness
Reporting Systems ♦ Discussed historical development of USN strategy
& law of the sea ♦ Context: Other
contemporary publications (I) ♦ Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6) ♦ Esp. Alliance Defense
in the Eighties (AD-80) (Nov 1976) ♦ Collaborator: CAPT
Ernie Schwab USN (Ret) ♦ NSDM 242 Policy for
Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear
options) ♦ NIE 11-15-74 Soviet
Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974) ♦ ADM Gorshkov,
"Navies in War and Peace" US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (w/
USN flag officer commentaries) (1974) ♦ Bound &
published as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974) ♦ NSDM 242 Policy for
Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear
options) ♦ OPNAV OP-96, Project
2000 (1974-1977) ♦ USN-USAF MOA on
cooperation at sea (1975) --42-- ♦ Context: Other
contemporary publications (II)
"Is the U.S. Navy Being Marginalized?"
Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)
♦ CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)
♦ David Rosenberg & Floyd Kennedy, History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972. Supporting Study: U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Strategic Role, Part I - Naval Strategy in a Period of Change: Interservice Rivalry, Strategic Interaction, and the Development of Nuclear Attack Capability, 1945-1951 (Lulejian) (1975)
♦ Record & Binkin (Brookings), Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here? (1976)
♦ SEN Taft "White Paper on Defense" (1976)
♦ US Army FM 100-5 Operations ("active defense") (1976)
♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (III)
♦ CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward "Sea Strike" briefings (1977-9)
♦ NSDM 344 Navy Shipbuilding Program (Jan 1977)
♦ Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers
♦ Based on NSC study on "U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements" (Sep 1976)
♦ John Lehman helped draft
♦ NSC PRM 10 Military Strategy & Force Posture Review (1977) & PD 18 US National Strategy (Aug 1977)
♦ USN Sea Based Air Platform Study (Feb 1978)
♦ Sea Plan 2000 naval force planning study (1978)
--43--
♦ How it was written (I)
♦ Personality: CNO ADM Holloway the driver
♦ Saw importance of "writing it all down", himself
♦ Advocate of direct senior involvement; not "completed staff work"
♦ Advocate of standardized processes throughout his career
♦ Denigrated fancy pictures and art work
♦ Assisted by
♦ Executive Assistant CAPT John Poindexter as sounding board
♦ CNO Fellow
♦ OP-60N (LCDR Joseph Strasser, Fletcher Ph.D.); 1-on-1 meetings
♦ CAPT Dirk Pringle (OP-64) for "readiness" section
♦ How it was written (II)
♦ Unhappy with "4 Missions of the Navy," (which had informed his 1st Posture Statement & 1st US Naval Institute Proceedings article)
♦ Continuously reworked his ideas, in various media
♦ Added "readiness" section IRT perceived SECDEF Brown confusion on readiness terminology at Armed Forces Policy Council meeting
♦ Published in final form as NWP 1 (Rev A) in May 1978
♦ Saw it as a baseline. Ok to deviate from as required
♦ "If you're going to break the rules, you've got to have rules to break"
--44--
♦ Outline (NWP 1 (Rev A)
♦ Part I: Generation of naval force requirements
1. Introduction
2. National strategy
3. U.S. Navy support of the national military strategy
4. Required capabilities and characteristics of naval forces
5. Navy program development
♦ Part II: Planning, employment and readiness doctrine for naval operating forces
♦ Key ideas (I)
♦ Strategic concepts drive force requirements
♦ Formal orderly top-down general processes
♦ Used accepted DOD definitions of terms
♦ "Mission," "roles," "functions," etc.
♦ Importance to US of open & free seaborne trade
♦ Importance of factors unique to shipbuilding
--45--
♦ Key ideas (II)
♦ Utility & importance of net assessment & analysis
♦ Importance of ship & a/c readiness & employment cycles
♦ Forward deployment & surge posture balance
♦ Coordinated joint & allied ops
♦ USN sea control a prerequisite for sustained Army, Air Force overseas campaigns (enabling)
♦ Capabilities-based. Discussed only generic threats
♦ Soviets not mentioned
♦ Key ideas (III)
♦ Revised (& complexified) Turner concepts, vocabulary
♦ 2 basic USN functions
♦ Sea control (prerequisite)
♦ Power projection
♦ 3 USN roles
♦ Strategic nuclear deterrence
♦ SLOC security
♦ Overseas deployed forces
♦ Presence = a "clear side benefit" of forward deployment
♦ Must reflect "combat capability"
♦ Presence nota mission; buys "reduced response time"
--46--
♦ Key Ideas (IV)
♦ Fundamental warfare tasks
♦ AAW
♦ Strike
♦ ASW
♦ Amphibious
♦ ASUW
♦ Mine ♦ Supporting warfare tasks ♦ Special warfare ♦ C3 ♦ Ocean surveillance ♦ EW ♦ Intelligence ♦ Logistics ♦ NWP 10(B) (1970) "Types of naval
operations" ♦ Strike force operations ♦ Amphibious operations ♦ Anti-air warfare ♦ Anti-submarine warfare ♦ Mining & mine
countermeasures ♦ Riverine
operations ♦ Support operations ♦ Surveillance &
blockading ♦ Search and rescue ♦ Domestic emergency
operations ♦ NWP 1 (Rev A) (1978) ♦"Warfare tasks"
♦ Anti-submarine warfare ♦ Anti-surface warfare ♦ Strike warfare ♦ Amphibious warfare ♦ Mine warfare ♦ Special warfare ♦ Ocean surveillance ♦ Intelligence ♦ C3 ♦ Electronic warfare ♦ Logistics --47-- ♦ Key ideas (V) ♦ Warfare
tasks across platforms ♦ Update of earlier NWP
10 listings ♦ Implicit primacy of
strike warfare & carrier platform ♦ New CVBG force packages
to incorporate CVS missions ♦ USMC
= 1/2 of 1 of 6 "fundamental" warfare tasks ♦ Key ideas (VI):
Evolution of CNO ADM Holloway thinking ♦ 1975 Posture Statement
& NIP article ♦
Followed Zumwalt-Turner "4 Missions"
construct ♦ Dec 1975 SECRET Strategic
Concept for the U.S. Navy ♦
"Sea Control is the fundamental U.S. Navy function" ♦
Naval presence a "unique capability" ♦ 1976 Posture Statement
& July 1976 US Naval Institute Proceedings article ♦
Two principal functions: Sea Control & Power Projection ♦ 1977 & 1978 Posture
Statements ♦ May 1978 NWP 1 (Rev A) ♦ Naval presence a "clear side benefit" --48-- Generation of Naval
Force Requirements ♦ What was new♦
(I) ♦ Heavy CNO involvement in
initial drafting ♦ CNO signature ♦ Contrast with Naval
Warfare (NWP 10) of 1950s & 60s ♦ Comprehensive taxonomies
& processes ♦ Even submarine
reconnaissance role embedded in chart --49-- ♦ What was new? (II) ♦ Capabilities-based
threats ♦ No mention of Soviets ♦ Contrast with ADMs Zumwalt & Turner's approach ♦ Mention of benefits to
US of "a system of free & open trade" ♦ Reference to a
"system" will not reappear for 20+ years ♦ NWP-Posture Statement
similarity ♦ Not addressed ♦ Soviets (or any other
adversary) by name ♦ Terrorist threats ♦ Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Response ♦ Maritime Security
Operations ♦ US Coast Guard ♦ Arms control ♦ U.S. government
interagency partners ♦ Blockade --50-- ♦ Barely
addressed ♦ "Sealift"
mentioned as part of "logistics" task ♦ Unconventional warfare,
coastal & riverine interdiction subsumed under
Naval Special Warfare ♦ Were they "strategic concepts?" ♦ What is a "strategic concept"
(officially)? The course of action accepted as
the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of
what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in
framing the military, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures
which stem from it Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms (Oct 2008) --51-- ♦ Subsequent
analyses & critiques ♦ ADM James L. Holloway
III, Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam,
and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007) ♦ Criticisms ♦ Too long & complex ♦ Too dry & lifeless ♦ Too generic, general
& abstract ♦ Too hard to update &
keep current ♦ Too
"doctrinal" ♦ All form & no
substance ♦ Did not convey a
"story" or "narrative" ♦ Not aligned with
contemporary national defense policies Not the right vehicle to achieve
internal USN consensus --52-- ♦ Influence: ♦ In NWP format, modest
within USN ♦ Used in war colleges ♦ Still cited in 2005 ♦ P.H. Liotta & Richmond M. Lloyd Naval War College Review article
on strategy & force planning ♦ In Posture Statement
format, influential on Capitol Hill during budget battles ♦ Especially
spring-summer 1978 re: FY 79 budget & CVN-71. ♦ ADM Holloway influence
on John Lehman ♦ Why did it have
the influence it did? ♦ Deep, personal
involvement by CNO ADM Holloway ♦ But ADM Holloway little
known to defense academics Comprehensive ♦ Wide distribution as
internal USN NWP & external Posture Statements ♦ But USN "wary of
doctrine;" limited buy-in by officers ♦ Posture Statement format
had short shelf life ♦ Overshadowed by in Washington by Sea Plan 2000 debate ♦ Superseded by The Maritime Strategy ♦ Never updated --53-- ♦ Influence on
subsequent capstone documents ♦ Warfare tasks adopted in
The Maritime Strategy Sea Plan 2000 (1978) --54-- ♦ Overview ♦ Signed by SECNAV Claytor (Mar 1978) ♦ Article signed by Under
SECNAV Woolsey ♦ Principal target:
SECDEF, OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV ♦ SECRET 2-volume force
planning study ♦ Separate UNCLAS
medium-length (23 pp) abridgement of study executive summary ♦ USN Woolsey International
Security article ♦ Drafted by a working
group; NAVWARCOL professor lead ♦ Maintain stability -
Contain crises - Deter war spectrum ♦ Focus on countering
Soviet threat ♦ Naval forces can be decisive in crises & in war with Soviets ♦ 7 USN missions ♦ New technology as USN
enabler ♦ 3 USN force level
options ♦ Great short-term
influence. Overshadowed later by Hayward views & The Maritime Strategy ♦ Document signed
by: ♦ SECNAV W. Graham Claytor (1977-9) ♦ 2nd year in
office ♦ Went on to become
Carter Administration Deputy Secretary of Defense, Acting Secretary of
Transportation (1979-81) ♦ Article signed by: ♦ Under SECNAV R. James
Woolsey (1977-9) ♦ 2nd year in
office ♦ Went on to become Bush
Administration CFE Ambassador (1989-91); Clinton Administration CIA Director
(1993-5) --55-- ♦ What it was ♦ Billed as a "force
planning study" ♦ "Major source
document of DoN planning and policy" ♦ Massive SECRET study ♦ Book length (889 pages
in two volumes) ♦ UNCLAS abridgement of
Executive Summary ♦ Medium length (23
pages) ♦ SECDEF Brown tasked SECNAV
Claytor (Aug 1977) ♦ SECNAV Claytor signed (Mar 1978) ♦ Under SECNAV Woolsey
summarized in International Security (Summer 1978) ♦ "Planning a Navy:
The Risks of Conventional Wisdom" ♦ Why it was
written ♦ To show USN relevance to
conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval
operations ♦ To try to reverse
policies & concepts underlying PRM 10, PD 18, general Carter
Administration/SECDEF Brown defense policy & strategy, & US Army/USEUCOM
recommendations on US defense policy & strategy, especially focus on
central Europe & ground combat ♦ To bolster Congressional
Navy supporters in ongoing bitter inter-branch government debates on funding
more carriers, esp. CVN-71 ♦ To act as an advocacy
vehicle for SECNAV Claytor & USN Woolsey ♦ Principal target: NSC
staff, SECDEF & OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV, Capitol Hill --56-- ♦ Context: (I) ♦ Early in 2nd
year of Carter administration ♦ SECDEF Brown (1977-81) ♦ Robert Komer as Special Assistant for NATO Affairs ♦ SECNAV Claytor; USN Woolsey ♦ Outgoing CNO ADM
Holloway ♦ Low US economic growth;
high unemployment and very high inflation ♦ U.S. government deficit
spending plateauing ♦ Price of oil high but
declining somewhat ♦ Executive branch,
Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3rd world ("Vietnam
syndrome") ♦ Congress blocked US aid
to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6) ♦ Context: (II) ♦ Administration defense
focus on NATO central region & USN SLOC protection ♦ Focus on ASW, ASUW,
AAW, readiness, not strike, amphibious ops ♦ NSC PRM 10 & PD 18
policies slighted Navy roles ♦ OMB Randy Jayne indicted
Navy for incoherence ♦ Bitter internal US
government CVN, VSTOL budget debates, culminating in carrier-less FY 79 DOD
& presidential budget proposal (Feb 1978) ♦ Congressional dissatisfaction
with Carter Administration naval policies, especially omission of new CVN in FY
79 defense budget proposal --57-- ♦ Context: (III) ♦ USN in 1978: 468 battle
force ships, & starting to increase somewhat; 18 new ships authorized ♦ DON budgets fluctuating
modestly ♦ Evolving 600-ship Navy
force goal ♦ 1974: Zumwalt HASC recommendation: 600 ships ♦ 1974: Holloway HASC
recommendation: 600 ships ♦ 1974: DEPSECDEF HASC
statement: 575-600 ships ♦ 1977: NSDM 344: About
600 ships in mid-1990s ♦ 1977: Outgoing SECDEF
Rumsfeld: "closer to 600 than to the present 485 ships" by mid-1990s ♦ New systems entering USN
fleet ♦ CWC becoming
institutionalized in fleet ♦ Context: (IV) ♦ Soviet fleet buildup ♦ Especially submarines
& Backfire-B bombers w/ ASMs ♦ Increasing Soviet
"out-of-area" deployments ♦ OPNAV morale rattled ♦ Resurgence of OP-06
influence within OPNAV; increasing dissatisfaction with OP-96-led analytical
program planning as intellectual center of naval thought ♦ Unofficial
"Commanders Cabal" DC-area officer discussion group (late 1970s) ♦ Convener: CDR Norm
Mosher ♦ Members included Sea
Plan 2000 contributors, OP-06 and 0P-96 staff officers --58-- ♦ Context: (V) ♦ Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea ♦ US Army implementing
defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe ♦ Internal Army
resistance to defensive concepts building, esp. at TRADOC ♦ Soviets deploying SS-20
missiles in Europe (1977) ♦ US rapprochement with
PRC ♦ Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai dead (1976) ♦ Deng Xiaoping takes
power (1978) ♦ Periodic Korean crises ♦ Tree-cutting incident
& Operation Paul Bunyan (1976) ♦ Communist regime in
Vietnam aligned with USSR ♦ Panama Canal transfer
treaty signed (1977) ♦ Context: (VI) ♦ Increased Soviet
interventions in 3rd world ♦ Operations & plans ♦ Jordanian crisis (1970) ♦ Cienfuegos crisis
(1970) ♦ Indo-Pakistan War
(1971) ♦ Mideast War/ resupply
of Israel (1973) ♦ Mayaguez incident &
amphibious raid (1975) ♦ Increased war gaming activity
at NAVWARCOL ♦ Center for Advanced
Research created (1975) ♦ ONI "Newport
Detachment" created (1977) --59-- ♦ Context: (VII) ♦ Non-DOD policy experts ♦ Military Reform
Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind) ♦ Adopted & advocated
"lo" end of Zumwalt "hi-lo mix"
RADM (Ret) Gene Laroque & Center for Defense
Information (CDI) (1972) ♦ "Team B"
assessment of Soviet threat (1976) ♦ Committee on the
Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (1976) ♦ John Lehman as
independent US Navy CNO consultant ♦ Context (VIII) ♦ New
SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south,
to free up escort forces for northern forward ops ♦ New
CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific ♦ CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans
to stand & fight in central, eastern Med ♦ But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM
Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis
(1975-7) --60-- ♦ Cited
references ♦ NSSM 3 (1970) ♦ NSC PRM 10 Military
Strategy & Force Posture Review (1977) ♦ SEN Taft "White
Paper on Defense" (1976) ♦ Other (DOD papers,
congressional reports, studies & theses) ♦ Context: Other
contemporary publications (I) ♦ NATO MC 14/3 Overall
Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1968) ♦ NATO MC 48/3 Measures
to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1969) ♦ Flexible response ♦ Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6) ♦ Esp. Alliance
Defense in the Eighties (AD-80) (Nov 1976) ♦ Collaborator: CAPT
Ernie Schwab USN (Ret) ♦ NATO Long-Term
Defense Program (LTDP) (1977-78) ♦ DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions
of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958) ♦ Consolidated Guidance ♦ JSCP & OPLANS --61-- ♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (II) ♦ NSDM 344 Navy
Shipbuilding Program (Jan 1977) ♦ Lame duck Ford Admin
call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers ♦ Based on NSC study on
"U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements" (Sep 1976) ♦ John Lehman helped
draft ♦ GAO UNCLAS report on
NSC study (Mar 1978) ♦ PD 27 Procedures for
Dealing with Non-Military Incidents (1978) ♦ USN-USAF MOA on
cooperation at sea (1975) ♦ US Army FM 100-5 Operations
("active defense") (1976) ♦ Context: Other
contemporary publications (III) ♦ ADM Gorshkov,
"Navies in War and Peace" US Naval Institute Proceedings articles
(w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974) ♦ Bound & published
as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974) ♦ CBO (Dov
Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80) ♦ Record & Binkin (Brookings), Where Does the Marine Corps Go from
Here? (1976) ♦ Richard Pipes, "Why
the Soviet Union Thinks it could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," (Commentary
Jul 1977) --62-- ♦ Context: Other contemporary publications (IV) ♦ NIE 11-15-74 Soviet
Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974) ♦ USN SEAMIX I study
(1973) ♦ USN SEAMIX II study
(1975) ♦ CNA Sea War 85 study
(1975-8) ♦ Atlantic campaign in a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war ♦ (Scenario for Tom
Clancy (LT Larry Bond) Red Storm Rising) ♦ CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward
"Sea Strike" briefings ongoing (1977-9) ♦ CNO ADM Holloway NWP 1
"Strategic Concepts" drafting efforts ongoing ♦ USN Sea Based Air
Platform Study (Feb 1978) ♦ Ongoing simultaneously ♦ Re: CVNs, CVVs, VSSs,
etc. ♦ How it was
written (I) ♦ SECNAV Claytor, USN Woolsey requested SECDEF authorize DON study
of range of USN roles (Jul 1977) ♦ SECDEF so tasked SECNAV
(Aug 1977) ♦ To examine probable
range of naval tasks ♦ A series of policy and
feasibility analyses ♦ USN-USMC study group
drafted ♦ Director: F.J. (Bing)
West, Jr. (NWC civilian professor; former USMC) ♦ 12 military team
members (10 USN; 2 USMC) ♦ Staff incl/ LCDR Ken McGruther (NWC)
& LCDR Jim Stark (OPNAV OP-965), OP-06 representatives, others --63-- ♦ How it was
written (II) ♦ SECNAV
Graham Claytor, USN James Woolsey, VCNO ADM Robert
Long active oversight ♦ No significant
CNO (ADM Holloway) role ♦ Liaison with ADM
Hayward & staff (CINCPACFLT) ♦ Influence of
consultant Hon. John Lehman ♦ Analytic support: Presearch, Inc. ♦ Len Gollubin,
President ♦ Tensions between "policy
analysts" & "quantitative analysts" ♦ SECNAV delivered study
to SECDEF (Mar 1978) ♦ USN Woolsey
summarized in International Security (Summer 1978) ♦ Outline (UNCLAS
Executive Summary) ♦ Introduction ♦ The international
environment ♦ Basic study findings and
trends U.S. security objectives: General ♦ Security objective:
Maintenance of stability ♦ Security objective:
Containment of crises ♦ Security objective:
Deterrence of global war ♦ Security objectives and
naval missions: A summary ♦ Force/funding options ♦ Assessment of Sea
Plan 2000 force alternatives ♦ Fiscal assumptions --64-- ♦ Key ideas (I): ♦ 3 national security
objectives & 7 USN Missions I. Maintain stability 1. Forward deployments II. Contain crises 2. Calibrated use of force
against the shore 3. Superiority at sea in a
crisis setting III. Deter global war 4. SLOC defense 5. Reinforcement of allies 6. Pressure upon the Soviets 7. Hedge against uncertainties
of the distant future ♦ No priorities given ♦ Disregarded Zumwalt/Turner & Holloway typologies ♦ Key ideas (II): ♦ Soviet Union the
dominant threat, across the spectrum ♦ One single dominant
force sizing criterion is wrong focus for naval forces ♦ Carriers necessary,
important, not highly vulnerable ♦ New technology enabled
strike fleets to win ♦ Especially Aegis, EW ♦ Entire Volume II
addressed technology assumptions ♦ Navy-Marine Corps team ♦ Sufficient numbers of
ships are important ♦ Especially carrier
numbers ♦ Vital role of USN forces
in supporting, influencing allies ♦ But far less on
contributions of allied naval forces ♦ "Forward naval
operations can have a decisive effect on the outcome of a land war in
Europe" ♦ NATO Europe center &
flanks interdependent --65-- ♦ Key ideas (III) ♦ Deter major war: USN
contributions ♦ War with Soviets will
be global ♦ USN forces should take
the offensive worldwide Operate forward & increase risks to Soviets ♦ Survivable USN SSBN
force USN SLOC protection ♦ Support allies ♦ Capability to open
second front, especially in Pacific ♦ Hedge against
uncertainty of where & how war would start ♦ A primary use of naval
forces: ♦ Contain conflicts &
so prevent outbreak of major conflict ♦ Key ideas (IV): ♦ Passing mention of
"blockade" as a naval activity ♦ 3 USN force level
alternatives ♦ Option 1 ♦ 439 ships (1% budget
growth) ♦ Option 2 ♦ 535 ships (3% budget
growth) ♦ Option 3 ♦ 585 ships (4% budget
growth) --66-- COMPARISON OF SEA PLAN 2000 FORCE OPTIONS Measure Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Maintain Stability • Relax current forward deployment • Maintain current deployment • Current deployment at objective rotation Contain Crises • Crisis/deployment tradeoff • Sustain forward deployments during a crisis • Sustain forward deployments during crisis Deter Global War • Some SLOCs • Proceed SLOCs • All-around superiority Risk Assessment High risk; minimal capability; not flexible Minimum acceptable risk; maintains selective
superiority vs. Soviets. Lover risk; provides hedge and options Illustrative Alternative Force Levels Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Total active ships 439 535 585 Attack submarines 80 94 98 Aircraft carriers 10 12 14 Surface combatants 220 276 300 Amphibious ships 52 66 78 --67-- ♦ What was new?
(I) ♦ Major Navy future force
level needs study (since at least 1945) ♦ Strong SECNAV, Under
SECNAV, VCNO involvement ♦ Drafting by committee ♦ Peace-crisis-war spectrum used as framework ♦ 7-mission construct ♦ USN lead in anti-air warfare touted ♦ Aegis system introduction ♦ What was new? (II) ♦ Naval forces can be decisive in crises & in war with Soviets ♦ Horizontal escalation ♦ Strong USMC amphibious assault role ♦ Call for perception
management ♦ Naval forces can prevent major global war through containing lesser
conflicts ♦ Identification of four
"uncertainties" to hedge against --68-- ♦ Not addressed
(in UNCLAS "Executive Summary") ♦ Priorities among
missions ♦ World trade issues ♦ Jointness
U.S. Army ♦ Submarine ISR operations ♦ Mine warfare ♦ Humanitarian Assistance
& Disaster Response Maritime Security Operations ♦ US Coast Guard ♦ US Merchant Marine ♦ US inter-agency partners ♦ Subsequent
analyses & critiques ♦ James Hessman, "Sea Plan 2000," Sea Power (May
1978) ♦ "Notebook," US
Naval Institute Proceedings (Jun 1978) ♦ GAO, How Good Are
Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces? (Feb 1980) ♦ John Allen Williams,
"Strategies and Forces of the U.S. Navy: A Critical Reappraisal," Armed
Forces & Society (Summer 1981) ♦ Francis J. West et al., Review
of USN Long-Range Planning (CNA, 1985) ♦ ADM (Ret) Stansfield Turner "The Future of the U.S. Navy in the
Mediterranean," Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1992) ♦ John Hattendorf,
Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986 (Naval War
College Press, 2004) --69-- ♦ Criticisms: ♦ Unrealizable ♦ Unrealistic funding
assumptions ♦ Overly optimistic re:
Soviet threats ♦ Questionable assumptions ♦ Too carrier-centric ♦ Overly focused on
conventional anti-Soviet warfighting & offensive
sea control; not enough on defensive sea control or 3rd world
contingencies (CAPT John Allen Williams USNR) (1981) ♦ Not aligned with
contemporary national defense policies ♦ GAO critique "How
Good are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces" ♦ "Executive
Summary" not always congruent with analysis ♦ Influence: ♦ Highly controversial for
a few years ♦ Center of intense open
& classified discussions on USN roles & forces ♦ Used to support
arguments inside & outside Congress for increased Navy funding, especially
for CVN 71 ♦ Led to increased DOTMLPF
focus on power projection ♦ Experience helped
develop new cadre of USN strategists (e.g.: LCDR Stark, LCDR McGruther) ♦ Influenced 1980s efforts
by OP-603 & SSGs ♦ Launched Global War
Games to test hypotheses --70-- ♦ Why did it have
the influence it did? ♦ Strong SECNAV, Under
SECNAV, VCNO, other USN leadership involvement & ownership ♦ Most coherent &
detailed compilation to date of Navy strategy views in current world & US
policy context ♦ Study format & study
team composition limited buy-in by the fleet ♦ Soon superseded by CNO
ADM Hayward views & The Maritime Strategy (which incorporated many
elements) ♦ Influence on
subsequent capstone documents ♦ Strong & direct
conceptual influence on "The Future of U.S. Sea Power" and The
Maritime Strategy ♦ Horizontal escalation ♦ Centrality of naval
strike & amphibious assault ♦ Vital importance of
NATO flanks & NE Pacific ♦ Enumeration &
analysis of uncertainties ♦
"Peace-crisis-war" framework used in The Maritime Strategy,
Forward . . . From the Sea, Navy Operating Concept, & Sea Power 21 ♦ Also, Sea Plan 2000 influenced
USCINCPAC ADM Long Pacific Campaign Plan, which formed core construct
for 2nd version of The Maritime Strategy (1984) ♦ ADM Long had been VCNO
overseeing Sea Plan 2000 --71-- ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982) ♦ Jan 1979 CNO Strategic
Concepts (Top Secret) ♦ Jan 1979 CNO Posture
Statement (UNCLAS) ♦ May 1979 The Future of
U.S. Sea Power (UNCLAS) ♦ Fundamental principles ♦ Naval aviator ♦ Naval War College &
National War College graduate; George Washington University International
Affairs master's degree ♦ Extensive previous
experience in Navy program planning --72-- ♦ Began term as CNO having
developed new theater strategies for the Pacific & influenced Sea Plan 2000 ♦ Previous tours as
post-Vietnam Commander, Seventh fleet, then Commander, Pacific Fleet ♦ Within 6 months as CNO
had expanded on his Pacific theater thinking to embrace the globe ♦ Maintained same course
for duration of his term ♦ Created flag officer
dialogue during 1st year in office ♦ Encouraged NAVWARCOL
Global War Game ♦ Created CNO's Strategic
Studies Group (SSG) ♦ Expanded mandate of
OP-095 directorate to encompass all naval warfare; moved responsibility for
warfare area program planning from OP-96 to OP-095 (1980) ♦ Created OPNAV Long-Range
Study Group (OP-00X) (1980-82) --73-- CNO Strategic Concepts (1979) The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979) --74-- ♦ Overview ♦ Signed by CNO ADM
Hayward (May 1979) ♦ Primary targets: OSD,
Congress, USN officer corps ♦ CLAS briefings &
letter; then UNCLAS Posture Statement & very short (6 pp) article ♦ Principal drafter: CNO
Executive Assistant ♦ "Fundamental
principles of naval strategy" ♦ Call for USN maritime
superiority, indeed, supremacy ♦ Global forward,
offensive USN ops vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact ♦ More allied naval
contributions encouraged ♦ 12 CVBGs the centerpiece ♦ Need to keep USN
technological edge ♦ Heavy influence on The
Maritime Strategy ♦ Signed by: ♦ CNO ADM Thomas B.
Hayward ♦ Successive versions
within 1st year in office --75-- ♦ What it was ♦ Billed as
"Fundamental principles of naval strategy" ♦ Classified versions ♦ TS "CNO Strategic
Concepts" (Jan 1979) ♦ Vetted at Flag Officer
conferences ♦ Briefings ♦ Then much shorter UNCLAS
versions ♦ FY 1980 CNO Report
("Posture Statement" (Feb 1979) ♦ Testimony before House Seapower Subcommittee (Feb 1979) ♦ Very short (7 pages) ♦ US Naval Institute Proceedings
"Naval Review" issue article "The Future of Sea Power"
(May 1979) culled from testimony ♦ Very short (6 pages) ♦ Briefings Why it was written (I) ♦ To show USN relevance to
conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval
operations ♦ Dampen Zumwalt/Turner/Carter emphasis on SLOC protection ♦ Influence & change
perceptions about utility of USN ♦
By U.S. political leadership ♦
By Soviets ♦ Explain why US needed
"maritime superiority" - even "supremacy" - especially in
war with the Soviets ♦ Elevate debates on USN
budget to strategic level, especially to provide rationale for high-quality
platforms & systems over less capable ones, and to deploy 12 carrier battle
groups --76-- Why it was written (II) ♦ To catalyze US Navy
strategic thinking: ♦ To influence and/or
resist Carter Administration policies (1978-80) ♦ To influence
Congressional policies toward the Navy (1978-80) ♦ To prepare for possible
Administration change (1980) ♦ Expand CNO ADM Hayward's
earlier C7F & CPF fleet operational concepts to global policy &
strategic level ♦ Primary targets: OSD,
Capitol Hill, USN officer corps ♦ To achieve internal USN
consensus, based on evolution of ADM Hayward's thinking ♦ Context (I) ♦ 3rd year of
Carter administration (1977-81) ♦ SECDEF Brown (1977-81) ♦ Robert Komer now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ♦ Continued Carter
administration focus on NATO central region & USN SLOC protection ♦ New CNO ADM Hayward
(1978-82) ♦ Low US economic growth;
high unemployment and very high inflation ♦ Price of oil high but
declining somewhat --77-- ♦ Context (II) ♦ Continuing Soviet
interventions in 3rd world ♦ Esp. Afghanistan
Communist coup (1978) ♦ Continuing US
rapprochement with PRC ♦ Deng Xiaoping takes
power in PRC (1978) ♦ Soviet-aligned
Communist regime in Vietnam invaded, occupied PRC-aligned communist Cambodia
(1978) ♦ Emerging concerns over
oil security & Gulf region ♦ Israeli-Egyptian Camp
David Accords (Sep 1978) ♦ Panama Canal transfer
treaty signed (1977) ♦ SALT II Agreement
limitations (1979) Context (III) ♦ Continuing Soviet Navy
build-up ♦ Especially submarines,
Backfire-B bombers with ASMs ♦ Continued increase in
Soviet "out of area" deployments ♦ USN force levels rising
modestly; DON budgets flat ♦ USN in 1979: 471 ships;
16 new ships authorized ♦ New systems deploying in
USN Fleet ♦ CWC concept becoming
institutionalized in fleet ♦ CMC full member of JCS
(1978) ♦ Increasing USAF minelaying, ISR support at sea ♦ US Army developing new,
more offensive operational doctrine --78-- Context (IV) ♦ Intensified bitter
internal US government debates on carrier funding (1978-79) ♦ Congress added
unrequested CVN 71 to FY 79 defense budget (Aug 1978) ♦ President Carter vetoed
entire budget bill due to CVN funding ♦ Congress could not
override CVN veto (Oct 1978) ♦ CVN $ to other USN,
Army, Air Force programs ♦ CAPT John McCain head
of OLA (1977-1981) ♦ Feb 1979 DOD budget
request for FY 80 included CVV ♦ US economic slowdown
(1979) Context (V) ♦ NIFTY NUGGET worldwide
DOD mobilization & deployment command post exercise (1978) ♦ Exposed weaknesses in
joint inter-modal integration, including sealift ♦ Led to Joint Deployment
Agency (JDA) establishment (1979) ♦ Major public debates on
US defense policy & strategy ♦ Military Reform
Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind) ♦ Retired RADM Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972) ♦ Committee on the
Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (from 1976) (Paul Nitze,
John Lehman, etc.) --79-- Context (VI) ♦ Evolving 600-ship Navy
force goal ♦ OPNAV morale wavering ♦ VADM Bill Crowe (OP-06)
& RADM Bob Hilton (OP-60) created new OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch
(OP-603) (1978) ♦ CDR Hank Mauz, CDR John Bitoff, CDR Bill
West, LCDR Phil Dur, LCDR Joe Strasser,
LCDR Peter Swartz, etc. ♦ Global War Games began
at Newport (1979) ♦ Examined US-USSR war
issues TACTRAGRUs created ♦ Unofficial
"Commanders Cabal" DC-area officer discussion group continued ♦ (late 1970s) ♦ Convener: CDR Norm
Mosher (OP-965) ♦ Context (VII) ♦ New
SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south,
to free up escort forces for northern forward ops ♦ New
CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific ♦ CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans
to stand & fight in central, eastern Med ♦ But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM
Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis
(1975-7) --80-- ♦ Context:
Important contemporary publications (I) (none cited in document) ♦ NATO MC 14/3 Overall
Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1968) ♦ NATO MC 48/3 Measures
to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1969) ♦ Flexible response ♦ NATO Long Term
Defense Plan (LTDP) (1978) ♦ DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions
of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958) ♦ CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward
"Sea Strike" briefings (1977-9) ♦ CAPT William Cockell & CAPT James Patton ♦ NSDM 344 "Navy
Shipbuilding Program" (Jan 1977) ♦ Lame duck Ford Admin
call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers ♦ Context:
Important contemporary publications (II) (none cited in document) ♦ Consolidated Guidance ♦ NSC PRM 10 Military
Strategy & Force Posture Review (1977) & PD 18 US National
Strategy (Aug 1977) ♦ USN-USAF MOAs on
cooperation at sea (1975, 1979) ♦ Sea Plan 2000 naval
force planning study (1978) ♦ USN Sea Based Air
Platform Study (Feb 1978) ♦ CNA outer air battle
studies ♦ John F. Lehman, Jr., Aircraft
Carriers: The Real Choices (1978) --81-- ♦ Context:
Important contemporary publications (III) (none cited in document) ♦ NIE 11-15-74 Soviet
Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974) ♦ Jamie McConnell et al.
(CNA), "Strategy & Missions of the Soviet Navy" (1978), etc. ♦ ADM Gorshkov,
"Navies in War and Peace" US Naval Institute Proceedings articles
in (w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974) ♦ Bound as Red Star
Rising at Sea (1974) ♦ CBO (Dov
Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80) ♦ Taft-Hart-Lind White
Paper on Defense (1978 ed.) ♦ Gen Sir John Hackett, The
Third World War, August 1985 (1978) ♦ Col John Boyd USAF
briefings on defense reform, maneuver warfare, OODA Loop (1970s) ♦ How it was
written (I) ♦ Drafted by CNO EA (CAPT Cockell) ♦ Sovietologist
w/ law degree ♦ Prior tour as ADM Zumwalt's CEP Director (OP-00K) ♦ Influenced by Hayward
CEP Director CAPT Jim Patton (OP-OOK) ♦ Fletcher School Ph.D. ♦ Prior tour on SECSTATE
Kissinger Policy Planning Staff ♦ Heavy personal CNO ADM
Hayward involvement ♦ Influenced by recent
fleet experience as C7F, CINCPACFLT ♦ Influenced by previous
OPNAV experience as Director, Navy Program Planning (OP-090) --82-- ♦ How it was
written (II) ♦ Roots: Hayward thinking in fleet as C7F, CPF (1976-9); previous experience
as USN program planner (OP-090) ♦ "Sea Strike:"
Hayward-Cockell-Patton-Dr. Al Brandenstein
PACFLT "prompt offensive action" concept vs. Soviet Far East ♦ To pin Soviet forces in
place in global war (& avoid PACFLT "swing" to LANT/EUR),
influence PR /Japan decisions (1977-79) ♦ Leveraged existing
& new USN technologies. Included USMC ♦ Listed
"incompatibilities" that impeded implementation ♦ "Sea Strike"
existed only in briefing format. An alternative concept. Did not reflect actual
war plans of the period ♦ Tested in at sea
exercises & war games ♦ "Influenced Sea
Plan 2000; CINCPAC (former VCNO) ADM Long PACOM campaign plan; subsequent
PACOM, PACFLT war plans ♦ How it was
written (III) ♦ Circulation to flag
officers by TS memo as "CNO Strategic Concepts" (TS) (Spring 1979) ♦ Numerous flag officer conferences
(1979) ♦ Opinions & insights
debated ♦ Annapolis, Norfolk,
Pearl Harbor, San Diego ♦ Publicized externally
through briefings, Congressional testimony, US Naval Institute Proceedings
article --83-- CNO Strategic Concepts (TS) (1979) ♦ Key ideas (I): ♦ Focus on global
conventional war with Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact ♦ NATO had global
concerns ♦ War in Europe the least
likely scenario ♦ USN NORLANT convoy
escort only one of many important USN roles ♦ Why & how a war
starts will influence USN response capabilities ♦ Uncertainties re:
Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea ♦ Strategic nuclear
forces & other contingencies not considered ♦ Key ideas (II): ♦ Global Conventional War
vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact (continued) ♦ NATO-Pact War will be
global ♦ USN must be offensively
capable to destroy Soviet forces US is and will be outnumbered ♦ USN margin of
superiority = carriers & at-sea sustainability ♦ USN must not mirror-image
Soviets ♦ USN must retain
technological superiority ♦ USN must draw on sister
services & allies --84-- ♦ Key ideas
(III): ♦ Global Conventional War
vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact (continued) ♦ US must capitalize on
Soviet geographical disadvantages & defensive mentality ♦ USN must fight with
what it has on hand ♦ USN must use tactics
that ensure favorable attrition ratios NATO northern flank has direct impact on
NATO center ♦ The "Swing
Strategy" is an anachronism ♦ US must prioritize key
areas & choose order for sequential control, given limited USN force levels ♦ Key ideas (IV): ♦ Call for USN
"maritime superiority" (even "supremacy") ♦ "Sea Control"
& "Power Projection" seen as "confusing" concepts ♦ Soviet Union the
priority threat ♦ War with Soviets will be
global ♦ Not confined to Central
Europe ♦ Swing strategy an
anachronism ♦ US & Allied naval
forces will do more in global war with Soviets than protect sea-lanes ♦ Offensive strike
operations ♦ Exploit Soviet
disadvantages --85-- ♦ Key ideas (V): ♦ 12 CVBG minimum: The
centerpiece & priority ♦ Need to distribute USN
offensive capability among greater number of platforms ♦ But quality of
platforms has priority over quantity Need for highly capable USN
platforms ♦ Vs. Low-end USN ships ♦ Offensive USN
ops/ systems have priority over defensive Need to keep USN technological
edge ♦ Sequential operations
necessary, given USN force levels ♦ Need for perception
management ♦ Key ideas (VI): ♦ Discussion of: ♦ 8 principles ♦ 5 conclusions ♦ Regions of the world ♦ No priorities provided --86-- What was new? ♦ Fleet origins ♦ Call for allied &
sister service support to achieve maritime superiority ♦ Emphasis on the Persian
Gulf & access to oil ♦ Call for favorable
attrition ratios ♦ Role of naval forces
post-conflict ♦ Not addressed ♦ Priorities among regions ♦ Non-Soviet threats ♦ US Marine Corps ♦ Amphibious assault ♦ Submarine ISR operations ♦ Sealift ♦ U.S. Coast Guard ♦ U.S. Merchant Marine ♦ U.S. industrial base
& shipbuilding industry ♦ US inter-agency partners ♦ US Air Force & US
Army --87-- ♦ Subsequent
analyses & critiques ♦ ADM (Ret) Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "Total Force," US Naval Institute Proceedings
(May 1979) ♦ In same issue as ADM
Hayward article ♦ Focus on SLOC
protection as well as NATO flanks ♦ Pessimistic on Soviets,
USN CVN vulnerability ♦ Advocated "hi-lo
mix" of USN platforms ♦ "Comment &
Discussion," US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jul-Dec 1979; Jan
1980) ♦ John Hattendorf,
Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986 (2004) ♦ Gregory Vistica, Fall from Glory (1995) ♦ CAPT James Patton (Ret),
"Dawn of the Maritime Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings (May
2009) ♦ Criticisms ♦ Too ambitious. Unexecutable ♦ Not aligned with contemporary
Carter Administration national defense policies ♦ Over-emphasis on power
projection & carrier strike warfare; neglect of SLOC security ♦ Only European theater
should matter, not Pacific --88--- ♦ Influence:
Significant, and grew overtime ♦ Began to forge a
consensus within the Navy on USN rationale ♦ Engaged Navy Flag
Officers & OPNAV staff ♦ Set stage for Strategic
Studies Group (SSG) & influenced Global War Games ♦ Influenced Capitol Hill
debates ♦ Congress replaced
DOD-requested CW with unrequested CVN 71 in FY 80 defense budget (Oct 1979) ♦ Weakened President
Carter did not veto; signed into law (Dec 1979) ♦ Later christened USS
Theodore Roosevelt (1984) ♦ Why this
influence? ♦ Powerful, clear, simple
messages ♦ Direct CNO involvement
& ownership ♦ Repetition ♦ Reinforced by fleet
exercises & Global War Games ♦ Not aligned well with
Carter administration defense policy when written ♦ But aligned with rising
popular, Congressional defense views ♦ Increasingly aligned
with new Carter Administration focus on power projection & Third World ops
in wake of fall of Shah of Iran & Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (late
1979) --89-- The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979) ♦ Influence on
subsequent capstone documents ♦ Strong & direct
conceptual influence on The Maritime Strategy ♦ Especially calls for: ♦ Global offensive forward
ops vs. Soviets, ♦ Sister service & allied naval support to USN ♦ Perception management 1970s: Text & content of each document ♦ Can be found in John B. Hattendorf,
ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents (2007) --90-- CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context ♦ Swartz, Peter M., U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy,
Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to consider before you write one, (CQR
D0020071.A1/Final, March 2009). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy
Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): A Brief Summary, (MISC
D0026437.A1/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy
Capstone Strategies and Concepts. Introduction, Background and Analyses, (MISC
D0026421.A1/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy
in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and
Concepts: Volume I, (MISC D0026417.A1/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy
in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and
Concepts: Volume II, (MISC D0026417.A2/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy
Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980): Strategy, Policy, Concept,
and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026414.A1/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy
in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and
Concepts, (MISC D0026418.A1/ Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy
Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1981-1990): Strategy, Policy, Concept,
and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026415.A1, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy
in the World (1981-1990): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and
Concepts, (MISC D0026419.A1/Final (December 2011). • Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy
Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1991-2000): Strategy, Policy, Concept,
and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026416.A2/Final, March 2012). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy
in the World (1991-2000): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and
Concepts, (MISC D0026420.A2/Final, March 2012). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy
Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010): Strategy, Policy, Concept,
and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026241.A2/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy
in the World (2001-2010): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and
Concepts, (MISC D0026242.A2/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., and Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone
Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes:
Volume I, (MISC D0026422.A1/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy
Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes:
Volume II, (MISC D0026423.A1/Final, December 2011). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz, Organizing
OPNAV (1970-2009), (CAB D0020997.A5/2Rev, January 2010). ♦ Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy -
U.S. Air Force Relationships 1970-2010, (MISC D0024022.A4/1Rev, June 2011). These documents supersede Peter M. Swartz with Karin
Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970-2009), (MISC
D0019819.A1/Final, February 2009.) MISC D0026414.A1/Final CNA 4825 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22311-1850
703-824-2000 www.cna.org
• Reduced U.S. visibility
• Resolve versus Soviet growth
• Enhanced perception
• High D-day shootout loss
• Create SAGs
• Significant residuals
• No forward ops
• At base, defensive
• Enables 2-4 forward ops
• Second front option