US Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts
(1974-2005)

Why written?

What impact & why?

Author: Peter M. Swartz
Graphics: Karin B. Duggan

Outline

 Introduction & overview

 The documents

 Conclusions

--2--4/i>


Tasking: "3/1 Strategy Workshop" Lockheed-Martin 14 April 2005

 To inform development of draft USN "3/1 Strategy" construct

 Look at:

 "The Maritime Strategy" (1982-9)

 ". . . From the Sea" (1992)

 "Forward . . . From the Sea" (1994)

 What were they?

 What prompted these initiatives?

 What was the Effect?

 Keys to Success?

 But . . . there were more

--3--


US Navy Strategy & Capstone Documents

 At least 16 "capstone" documents since 1972

 Some explicitly said they described USN "strategy"

 E.g.: "The Maritime Strategy," "3/1 Strategy" construct

 Others said they were something else, but contained important elements of strategy

 E.g.: "Navy Policy Book," "Fleet Response Plan"

 Most—even those labeled "strategy"—have occasioned debates as to whether or not they really were "strategies"

--4--


Our Approach

 Does not address these debates on nature of strategy

 Casts a wide net. Looks at concepts

 Strategy = using Means in Ways to achieve Ends

 But lines between policy & strategy, and between strategy & operations, can be fuzzy

 This presentation eschews definitional rigor in order to more clearly show context and sweep

--5--


16 Capstone Documents: 1974-2005

 "Missions of the Navy"                                                                                            1974

 "NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy"                                                     1976

 "THE MARITIME STRATEGY" '82 (S) '84 (S), '85 (S), '86 (U), '89 (S)

 "The Way Ahead"                                                                                                    1991

 "The Navy Policy Book"                                                                                          1992

 ". . . FROM THE SEA"                                                                                           1992

 "Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare"                                                                  1994

 "FORWARD . . . FROM THE SEA "                                                                     1994

 "F . . . FTS: The Navy Operational Concept (NOC)"                                              1997

 "Anytime, Anywhere"                                                                                             1997

 "Navy Strategic Planning Guidance II: The Maritime Concept"                 2000

 "Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision"                                                                    2002

 "Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations"                                        2002

 "Sea Power 21"                                                                                                        2002

 "Fleet Response Plan"                                                                                              2003

 "3/1 STRATEGY" construct draft                                                                2005

--6--


Doesn't counts

 Unsigned efforts

 "NDP 3: Naval Operations"

 "Naval Operational Concept"

 ". . . Beyond the Sea"

 "Power and Influence . . . From the Sea"

 "2020 Vision"

 "Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century"

 "21st Century Navy"

 Annual Navy "Posture Statements"

 Annual "Vision/Presence/Power"

 Unofficial efforts

--7--


Disclaimers

 Several people contributed

 Judgments are my own

Not CNA's, not the Navy's, not contributors

 Some judgments are tentative

 Feel free to question & debate

--8--


Full Disclosure

 An author and spokesman for The Maritime Strategy

 Very minor contributor to Naval Warfare (NDP 1)

 Very minor contributor to Forward... From the Sea

 Help set climate for Fleet Response Plan

 Very minor contributor to The 3/1 Strategy construct draft

CNA "Scientific Analyst" to N5SP (RDML-SEL Martoglio) & staff

--9--


Approach

 Empower an educated, experienced analyst

 Literature search

 Draft initial strawman brief

 Circulate draft within a wide but, trusted network

 Improve data and analysis

 Co-opt potential rivals, collaborators, predecessors, dissenters

 Hound recalcitrants

 Impose simple, effective organization scheme and revisions

 Incessant murder boards and revisions

 Improve date and analysis

 Socialize approach, findings, conclusions

 Not unlike development of "The Maritime Strategy"

--10--


Contributors to this effort

 CAPT Roger Barnett USN (Ret)

 CAPT Joe Bouchard USN (Ret)

 CAPT Linton Brooks USN (Ret)

 Dr. Greg Cox (CNA)

 CAPT Mike Dunaway USN (Ret)

 Dr. Hank Gaffney (CNA)

 LCDR Neil Golightly USN (Ret)

 CAPT Robby Harris USN (Ret)

 CAPT Bradd Hayes USN (Ret)

 CDR Paul Nagy USN

 RADM Mike McDevitt USN (Ret) (CNA)

 CAPT Judy (Holden) Myers USN (Ret)

 Hon. Robin Pirie

 Dr. Bruce Powers

 Mr. Fred Rainbow

 LCDR Steve Recca USN (Ret)

 CAPT Pat Roth USN (Ret)

 CAPT Brian Scott USN

 CAPT Larry Seaquist USN (Ret)

 RADM Joe Strasser USN (Ret)

 CAPT George Thibault USN (Ret)

 CDR Jim Tritten USN (Ret)

--11--


Why analyze these documents?

To provide context & perspective

 To help better understand why the USN is what it is today

 To help foster thinking about the USN of the future

 To help inform USN decisions on the formulation and promulgation of the draft 3/1 Strategy construct

--12--


Why CNA?

 Recent historical analyses:

 Evolution of USN policies:

 Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

 The Unified Command Plan (UCP) & USN componency

Especially NAVSOUTH

 Deployment strategies since 1775

 Homeland defense

 Riverine operations

 Pre-World War II transformations & experimentation

 USMC

 Roots of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)

 Cold War & post-Cold War amphibious lift requirements

 Examples available (PASEP)

--13--


Situational Awareness on CNA

 CNA Corporation (CNAC)

 President: Hon. Bob Murray

 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)

 The DON'S FFRDC

 President: Christine Fox

 Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)

 Director: RADM Mike McDevitt (Ret)

 International Affairs Group (IAG)

 Director: Dr. Eric Thompson

--14--


Can/should the USN have a strategy?

 Yes. It's the service's responsibility to:

 Describe & amplify on maritime aspects of national military strategy

 Recommend changes and professional judgments

 Others often don't agree

 Joint Staff, COCOMs, COCOM staffs

 Civilian & military defense specialists

 Believe services can have "visions," "policies," "doctrines," etc., but not strategies

 "Strategy" = domain of joint staffs

--15--


Kinds of Strategies

 Declaratory strategy

 Deployment strategy

 Planned employment strategy

 Actual employment strategy

 Force architecture strategy

 Personnel and training strategy

Issues:

 Which, if any, leads others?

 Alignment

--16--


Outline

 Introduction & overview

 The documents

 Too many to cover in detail

 Will show them all, but only discuss a few highlights

 Conclusions

--17--


USN Capstone Document Timeline

--18--


The 1970s

1974 "Missions of the Navy"

1976 "NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the US Navy"

--19--


Missions of the Navy (1974)

--20--


Missions of the Navy (1974)

 Pres NWC VADM Turner signed

 Drafted by VADM Turner & CAPT George Thibault

 UNCLAS Naval War College Review article

 Milieu:

 Post-Vietnam; Outgoing CNO Zumwalt; Soviet naval buildup; downsizing; DON TOA now >Da or DAF

 Why written?

 To transform Navy internal thinking about what it does

 To tout cross-cutting outputs (missions), vice parochial inputs (platforms, unions)

 To inform force structure decisions

 Institutionalize Zumwalt-era thinking

--21--


 Key ideas:

 4 Missions: Strategic deterrence; projection of power; sea control; naval presence

 USN officers should think deeply about their service

 Influence:

 Very wide. Cited throughout defense literature

 Why?

 Filled a conceptual void & need

 Widely adopted by Navy leadership

 Personality: Author widely regarded as USN's intellectual leader

 Adopted by academia (civilian & military)

--22--


NWP-1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1976)

--23--


NWP-1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1976)

 CNO (Holloway) signed

 Drafted in OP-60N (LCDR Joe Strasser)

 Published as standard Naval Warfare Publication

 Milieu:

 Post-Nixon, post-Zumwalt, down-sizing, carrier debates

 Creation of CVNs & CVBGs

 Why written?

 "Consolidation" of internal USN thinking, esp. Turner "missions"

 To emphasize warfare areas over platforms

 To try to inform force structure decisions

 Personality: CNO ADM Holloway

--24--


 Key ideas:

 Warfare areas across platforms; carrier power & versatility; strategic concepts drive force requirements

 Refined Turner vocabulary (4 "functions" vice "missions")

 USMC 1/2 of 1 of 8 warfare areas

 Influence:

 Modest. Wide distribution within USN as NWP

 Why?

 USN "wary of doctrine." But war colleges used

--25--


The 1980s

 1982 "The Maritime Strategy" (SECRET Brief)

 1984 "The Maritime strategy" (SECRET Pub)

 1985 "The Maritime Strategy" (SECRET Pub rev)

 1985 "The Maritime Strategy" (UNCLAS brief)

 1986 "The Maritime Strategy" (UNCLAS insert)

 1989 "The Maritime Strategy" (SECRET Pub rev)

--26--


The Maritime Strategy (1982-9)

--27--


The Maritime Strategy (1982-9)

 CNOs (Watkins, Trost) signed

 SN Lehman, CMC Kelley buy-in. USN lead. USMC support.

 Many influences. Drafted in OP-603. Widely vetted. UNCLAS version OP-00K (CAPT Brooks, CDR Harris)

Key roles for Intell community, SSG, NWC Global War Games

 Published: Multi-media:

 SECRET, UNCLAS briefs, Pubs, Proceedings, journal article

 Constant revisions

--28--


 Milieu:

 Post-Carter Administration

 New Reagan Administration

 SECNAV Lehman

 increased USN budget

--29--


Why written?

 Late-Carter USN perceived need to "get our act together"

 VCNO tasker: To try to inform force structure decisions

 Part of a larger USN "perception management" approach

 Personalities: Many: Lehman, Hayward, Watkins, Small, Moreau, etc.

 USN lead. USMC contributions

Supporting Amphibious Strategy

--30--


 

Key ideas:

 Consolidation & organization of existing USN views

 Peace, crises, war, war termination. Uncertainties

 Global, forward offensive ops vs SU (not just vs SN. 3 phases. Horizontal escalation

 New agreed intell on SU

 Used NWP-1 warfare functions vocab: AAW, ASW, etc.

 USN officers should think deeply about their service

 Very joint (coordinated, not integrated); very allied

 Included "below-the-line" forces until last iteration

 Included uncertainties

--31--


The Maritime Strategy (1982-9)

Was not:

 USN go-it-alone

 Blue-water, open ocean, sea control focused

--32--


 Influence: Significant

 Within the Navy; outside the Navy; overseas (allies & Soviets); academia; fleet exercises; Global War Games

 Why?

 Filled a need for clarity and consolidation of thinking

 Major push by SECNAV, Navy Flags, SSG

--33--


The 1990s

 1991             “The Way Ahead

 1992             "The Navy Policy Book"

 1992             ". . . From the Sea"

♦ 1994             "Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare"

♦ 1994             "Forward . . . From the Sea"

 1997             "F . . . FTS: The Navy Operational Concept (NOC)"

 1997             "Anytime, Anywhere"

 2000             "Navy Strategic Planning Guidance II: The Maritime Concept"

--34--


The Way Ahead (1991)

--35--


The Way Ahead (1991)

 SN (Garrett), CNO (Kelso), CMC (Gray) signed

 Drafted in OP-G03 & HQMC PP + O

 UNCLAS. Published in NIP & as stand-alone

 Milieu:

 Fundamental change in world power relationships

 Cold War end. "Peace dividend"; Desert Storm in progress. Goldwater-Nichols law. Bush Aspen speech.

 CJCS Powell Base Force looming (450 ships)

--36--


Why written?

 "Need a new strategy" to explain USN force levels

 Example of The Maritime Strategy: need to supplant

 Personalities: GEN Gray had already turned from the Maritime Strategy years before

 USN-USMC equality in drafting

--37--


Key ideas:

 Maritime Strategy "on the shelf"

 "Meeting our presence requirements with fewer assets calls for . . . new patterns in length and location of deployments, as well as in the composition of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups"

 "The changes occurring in our security environment will require us to break out of these hubs."

 "The need for focused forward presence & credible surge capability—more than historical deployment patterns—will dictate peacetime employment of naval forces"

--38--


 Influence:

 Little. But "The Way Ahead" was "way ahead" of its time

 Why?

 Overtaken by NCA, CINC, BUR, GNFPP 3-hub forward presence demands

--39--


The Navy Policy Book (1992)

--40--


The Navy Policy Book (1992)

 SN (Garrett), CNO (Kelso) signed

 Drafted in NOOK

 UNCLAS. Published as a stand-alone document

 Milieu:

 Cold War, Desert Storm over. CJCS Powell & Base Force; "Tailhook" scandal roiling Navy & outside views of Navy

 Why written?

 CNO view: Post-Cold War world needs a Navy Policy, vice a naval strategy.

 Maritime strategy to remain "on the shelf", used if needed

 Provide common USN understanding of USN principles

 Ref A for Total Quality leadership (TQL) effort

 Personality: ADM Kelso dedicated to TQL

--41--


Key ideas:

 Nature of the Navy as an organization

 Included Strategic Principles , e.g.: deterrence, forward presence, force projection

 Professional Reading List, including books on strategy

Influence: Little

Why?

 SECNAV gone within months;

 TQL never took

--42--


. . . From The Sea (1992)

--43--


. . . From the Sea (1992)

 SN (O'Keefe), CNO (Kelso), CMC (Mundy) signed

 Committee (NFCPE) drafted, then VADM L. Smith (OP-06)

 UNCLAS. Published in NIP & as stand-alone

 Milieu:

 Post-Cold War, Desert-Storm, Goldwater-Nichols; VADM Owens: OPNAV reorg & new USN program vocabulary; "1/3-1/3-1/3" service budget share stability era begins

 Why Written?

 To demonstrate USN knows it has to change

 To align USN with CJCS Powell "Base Force"

 To try to inform Navy force structure

 Personalities: Several, VADM Smith, VADM Owens

 USMC very much a player (BGen Wilkerson)

--44--


Key ideas:

 Joint, littoral, enabling

 Expeditionary

 Times have changed; so has the Navy

 Focus on strike and power projection operations

 Downgrading of ASW and other sea control operations

 Mandated actions: NAVDOCCOM, COMUSNAVCENT, etc.

--45--


 Influence:

 Wide. Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony

 Some civilian defense expert commentary

 Why?

 Ideas were right for the times

 Hangover from The Maritime Strategy

--46--


NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

--47--


NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

 CNO (Kelso), CMC (Mundy) signed

 Drafted by Naval Doctrine Command (established 1993)

 UNCLAS. Glossy Naval Doctrine Publication

 Milieu:

 Jointness & doctrinal frenzy, CJCS Powell, new Joint Pub 1

 Why Written?

 Fill externally- and internally-felt need for Naval Doctrine

 Joint, Army influences

 To try to inform all other Naval & Navy doctrine

 Try to tie USN & USMC closer together

 USMC saw opportunity to sign USN up to USMC concepts

--48--


 

 Key ideas:

 Doctrine matters to the USN

 Principles of War

 Maneuver warfare (USMC thrust)

 War, deterrence, presence, operations other than war

 Influence:

 Modest. Used in war colleges, other schools, modeling & simulation community

 No follow-on NDP 3 (Naval Operations)

 Why?

 Saliency of doctrine in USN waxed briefly, then waned

 USN remained wary of doctrine

 USN-USMC differences remained

--49--


Forward . . . From The Sea (1994)

--50--


Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

 SN (Dalton), CNO (Boorda), CMC (Mundy) signed

 Written in N51, with OLA impetus

 UNCLAS. Published in NIP & as stand-alone

 Milieu:

 Clinton Administration (Democrats) replaced Bush Administration (Republicans). Bottom-Up Review (BUR).

 Why written?

 To try to inform USN Force structure decisions

 Personalities: SECNAV Dalton, RADM Phil Dur (N51); CDR Joe Sestak (N513)

--51--


 Key ideas:

 Maintain continuity with . . . From the Sea

 Even more emphasis on Combat-credible-forward-presence in 3 hubs = the centerpiece of USN operations

 More attention to sea control operations

 Influence:

 Widely cited; solidified Forward Presence as central USN tenet; Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony

--52--


Forward . . . From The Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Forward . . . from the Sea The Navy Operational Concept                http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/tiavpalib/policy/fromsca/frManoc.html

The United States Navy

Forward . . . From the Sea

The Navy Operalional Concept

March 1997

Foreword by
Admiral Jay L. Johnson,
U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps published . . . From the Sea in 1992 as our combined vision for the 21st century. Since then, we have been constantly checking our bearings to ensure we stay on course. We refined our direction in 1994 with Forward . . . From the Sea. These two documents continue to drive the on-going process of innovation that is rapidly transforming the Navy into a 21st century force.

I have expressed my vision for the Navy in four guiding stars: operational primacy, leadership, teamwork, and pride. This paper promulgates guidance on operational primacy - the ability to carry out swiftly and effectively any naval, joint or coalition mission and to prevail decisively over any foe that may oppose us. It directs how we operate Forward . . . From the Sea across the three components of the National Military Strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win

This paper sets our direction for operational primacy in the next century. Emerging technology and innovative operational concepts are creating new opportunities for employing naval forces in support of national strategy. We will have an integral role in future joint operations, including those described in Joint Vision 2010. In the 21st century as today, the most important contributions we make to national security will exploit fully the advantages we gain from operating on, under, above and from the sea.

Introduction

The Navy's unique contributions to national security stem from the advantages of operating on, under, above and from the sea. This is the message of Forward . . . From the Sea. The primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project American power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across the operational spectrum of peace, crisis and war. That is what we do. This paper describes how we do it today, and how we will do it in the future.

The roles of America's armed forces are defined by the three components of the National Military Strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win. Although national policy changes as the strategic landscape evolves, there will be continued emphasis on using the armed forces across this spectrum. Operations in peacetime and crisis to maintain regional economic and political stability are traditional roles of the Navy-Marine Corps team. These roles are rooted in our fundamental ability to maneuver independently of political constraints and fight and win. A key operational advantage of forward-deployed naval forces is that we provide on-scene capabilities for executing simultaneously all three components of the National Military Strategy, and do so without infringing on any nation's sovereignty. This advantage exists because we operate in international waters. Our hallmark is forward-deployed forces with the highest possible readiness and capability to transition instantly from

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5/17/2002 4:33 PM

--53--


Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (1997)

 CNO (Johnson) signed

 Drafted by N513 (CAPT Bouchard), but widely vetted

 UNCLAS. Published on the web

 Milieu:

1997 QDR, increasing jointness, USN-USMC friction, increasing influence of network-minded flags (Tuttle, Clemins, Cebrowski), F/A-18E/F acquisition

--54--


Why written?

 To stimulate internal USN & USMC conceptual innovation

 USN wariness of NAVDOCCOM & NDP 1; lack of an NDP 3

 Personalities: CAPT Bouchard (N513); VADM Cebrowski (N6); CMC Gen Krulak; CNO Johnson

 Concern that USN Forward Presence focus was stale & increasingly counterproductive in joint, OSD arenas

--55--


 Key ideas:

 Focused more on concepts than on strategy

 Peace-Crisis-War continuum

 _FTS continues as USN capstone document

 Maneuver warfare

 Net Centric Warfare

 Influence:

 Little, but a launch platform for Net Centric Warfare.

 Why?

 Little internal Navy leadership support

--56--


Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

"Reprinted from Proceedings with permission; Copyright © Nov. 1997 U.S. Naval Institute/ www.navalinstitute.org"

--57--


Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

 CNO (Johnson) signed

 A "vision"

 Drafted in NOOK

 UNCLAS

 Milieu:

 Why written?

--58--


Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

 Key ideas:

 Continuity: " . . . From the Sea," "Forward . . . From the Sea" and "Navy Operational Concept"

 USN to influence events ashore

 VADM Turner's "4 Missions"

 "Win any conflict, anytime, anywhere"

 Shock and awe: Distributed precision strike

 Influence

 Picked-up in subsequent posture statements

 Cited by following CNO ADM Clark in Change of Command speech

 Not much else

--59--


Navy Strategic Planning Guidance II (2000)

--60--


Navy Strategic Planning Guidance II: The Maritime Concept (2000)

 CNO (Johnson) and N3/N5 (Natter) signed

 UNCLAS. Drafted by N51

 Milieu:

 8 years of Clinton Administration "engagement-enlargement;" Combat-credible-forward presence-in-3-hubs = accepted USN dogma; Kosovo air-only campaign; QDR 2001 looming

 Why written?

 Idea of concept-driven programs made sense

 Personalities: CAPTS Bouchard & Tangredi (earlier N513s); RDML Sestak (N51)

--61--


 Published as a stand-alone document

 Key ideas:

 Forward presence; Knowledge superiority; Inform force structure decisions

 Influence: Brief

 Why?

 CNO, N3/N5, N51 detached later that year

--62--


The 21st Century

 2002                         "Naval Power 21^A Naval Vision"

 2002                         "Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations"

 2002                         "Sea Power 21"

 2003                         "Fleet Response Plan"

 2005                         "3/1 Strategy" draft construct

--63--


Naval Power 21_A Naval Vision (2002)

--64--


Naval Power 21 . . . A Naval Vision (2002)

 SN (England), CNO (Clark), CMC (Jones) signed

 Drafted in N3/N5 Deep Blue

 UNCLAS. Published on the web

 Milieu:

 New Bush administration; 9-11; transformation; QDR '01

 Why written?

 Bring USN & USMC visions together in one overarching document

 Personalities: SECNAV England, RDML Stavridis

--65--


 Key ideas

 Navy-Marine Team

 Influence: Little?

 Why?

 Overwhelmed by Sea Power 21 & MC 21

 No strong SECNAV public push

--66--


Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2002)

--67--


Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (2002)

 CNO (Clark), CMC (Hagee) signed

 Drafted by N513 & MCCDC

 UNCLAS. Published on web

 Milieu:

New Bush administration; 9-11; transformation; QDR 2001

 Why written? To achieve USN-USMC consensus on Sea Basing & other concepts

--68--


 Key ideas:

 USMC narrower Sea Basing concept; USN broader view; jointness (USN-driven)

 Calls for new NDP 1, Naval Warfare

 Influence: Little

 Why?

 No USN fanfare. USMC cited sometimes

--69--


Sea Power 21 (2002)

--70--


Sea Power 21 (2002)

 CNO (Clark) signed

 Drafted by N-00Z

 UNCLAS. Published in NIP & as stand-alone

 Milieu:

 New Bush administration; Post 9-11; transformation; QDR 2001

 Why written?

 CNO (belatedly) saw a need, beyond his "Goals"

 Response to SECDEF push for Transformation

 Personality: CNO ADM Clark

--71--


Key ideas:

 "A vision, not a strategy"

 Explicitly descends from "The Maritime Strategy"," . . . FTS" & "F . . . FTS"

 Transformation; new cross-cutting categories to transcend platform communities & demonstrate change

 Global CONOPS: Downgrade hubs; increase global presence; dispersed combat striking power; simultaneous response to crises around the world; new force packages; 375 ships

Repackages the framework for Navy force structure decisions; New vocabulary

--72--


 Influence:

 Wide within OPNAV & other USN headquarters

 Resource for flag speeches, testimony

 Some criticisms

 Why?

 Relentless repetition

 Power & influence of CNO

--73--


Fleet Response Plan (2003)

 CNO (ADM Clark) and CFFC promulgated

 Drafted in N3/N5 Deep Blue

 Published in internal USN directives & external flag officer interviews, speeches & articles

 Milieu:

 New Bush administration; Post 9-11; OEF & OIF ongoing; transformation; Sea Power 21 (& Global CONOPS)

 Why written?

 SECDEF demand for greater surge capability from all DOD components

 Personality: CNO ADM Clark

--74--


 Key ideas:

 Increase USN capability to surge CSGs, ESGs, and other fleet elements

 Capitalize on improved fleet readiness

 Influence:

 Great within USN on the waterfront & at sea. Summer Pulse 04. SECDEF public approval.

 Flexible Deployment Concept yet to be endorsed, implemented as national policy

--75--


The draft "3/1 Strategy" construct (2005)

--76--


The draft "3/1 Strategy" construct (2005)

 Not yet published. Widely briefed.

 Drafted in N5SP

 Milieu:

 Bush Administration, post-9/11, OIF, CNO Clark term end, QDR 05, GWOT, China concerns

 Why Written?

 USN perceives lack of strategy, despite welter of capstone documents

 Personalities:

VADM Morgan (N3/N5), RDML-SEL Martoglio (N5SP), incoming CNO ADM Mullen

--77--


Key ideas:

 USN does more than MCOs; "A Strategy to inform investments to achieve Sea Power 21 vision"

 New salience of Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) & "below-the-line" forces

 Coalition partner navies prominent

--78--


Influence:

TBD. Will it influence . . .

 Internal USN conceptual & strategic thinking?

 USN operations & training?

 USN force structure & investment decisions?

 Joint, OSD & coalition strategies, plans & policies?

--79--


Outline

 Introduction & overview

 The documents

 Conclusions

--80--


Conclusions

 USN has not lacked for capstone documents

At least . . . over the full careers of current USN leadership

 Often they matter

--81--


Why do they get written?

 To address changing world, country, USN

 To implement specific ideas of USN leaders (& drafters)

 Codification of current thinking

 Advocacy of new directions

 Response to higher authority

 To strengthen Budget arguments

--82--


Why do they get written?

 To unify Navy elements in a common conceptual framework

 To break down community & platform parochialism

 To try to influence internal Navy force structure decision

 To try to influence external policy debates & academia (sometimes)

 To demonstrate USN intellectual capability and/or positive responses to change

--83--


Some constant (or almost constant) themes

 USN operates (& should operate) globally, forward, offensively

 Encompasses both presence & surge

 Enabling force

 Sea control as enabler for power projection

 USN vital for peacetime, crisis response, war

 USN must have balanced fleet, for a variety of missions

 USN operates as part of joint (& coalition) military efforts

--84--


Constant (or almost constant) themes

 USN operations must transcend individual warfare specialties & platform communities

 USN has overarching concepts that drive it; not just sum of community desires for budget share & new equipment

 USN wants to be - & can be - entrusted with defining what it does & with managing its own destiny

 USN concepts & strategy drive (and should drive) USN program decisions

--85--


What constituted "success?"

 Influence over USN programmatic decisions

 Usually stated as a goal; rarely achieved

 Legacy programs & OSD Guidance are primary program drivers

 Hard for Navy strategy/concepts/policy/doctrine to compete as influence

 Stimulate internal USN conceptual & strategic thinking

 Become lingua franca of USN policy- and decision-makers

 Resource for flag officer speeches & testimony

--86--


What constituted "success?"

 USN gained reputation for intellectual thinking,

Within DOD & externally

 USN retained/gained freedom to shape its own destiny

 Influence joint, DOD, national security, & allied policy & strategy

--87--


What were some ingredients for success?

 Became everyone's central Navy message

 Satisfied a real need by OPNAV

 Real buy-in by USN leadership

 Repetition & hard work

 CNO +/or SECNAV signature, + USMC buy-in

Normally necessary, but not sufficient

 Choose specialists as drafters

 Tough internal criticism

--88--


What were some ingredients for success?

 Simplicity & power of core elements

 Aligned with what fleet was doing

 Continuity across CNO terms

 Planned or incessant ad hoc dissemination

 Wide multi-media distribution

 Built on what came before OR led/reflected changes

--89--


Secondary Consequences

 Strong influence on allied & coalition naval thinking

 Affects their support for USN

 Influence on civilian national security specialists & academia

 Reflected in education of next generation of policy works

 Influence on adversaries?

--90--


USN Officers as USN Strategists

 USN Strategic planning subspecialty is famously broken

 Yet . . . the system works

Q: Who developed the concepts and drafted the strategies?

A: Some examples (just the PhDs):

 CAPT Roger Barnett, PhD

 CAPT Joe Bouchard, PhD

 RADM Phil Dur, PhD

 CAPT Frank Pandolfe, PhD

 CAPT Joe Sestak, PhD

 CAPT Ed Smith, PhD

 CAPT Jim Stavridis, PhD

 LCDR Joe Strasser, PhD

 CAPT Sam Tangredi, PhD

 CDR Jim Tritten, PhD

 LCDR Stan Weeks, PhD

--91--


Service Budget Shares (1972-2006)

"Reprinted (with modifications) from Air Force Magazine: Journal of the Air Force Association with permission; Copyright © May 2005. p65.

--92--


Further reading on "making USN Strategy"

 "The Maritime Strategy"

 Byron, Swartz, "Make the Word Become the Vision" (Proceedings Nov 92)

 Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy (2004)

" . . . From the Sea"

 Hayes, "Keeping the Naval Service Relevant," Proceedings 1993)

 Owens, High Seas (1995)

 Smith, "What '. . . From the Sea' Didn't Say" (NWCR 1995)

 Meconis, "Main Aspects of the 'New U.S. Naval Strategy'" (1996)

 Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map (2004)

 "Forward . . . From the Sea"; "NOC"

 Rhodes, "'. . . From the Sea' and Back Again," (NWCR 1999)

 Tangredi, "Who's Afraid of the NETF?, (Proceedings 1999)

--93--


Better analysis needed

 This was a brief initial assessment

 More rigorous analyses could prove helpful, e.g.:

 Assessing influence & impact of each on

 USN operations, plans & training recommendations & decisions

 By the President, SECDEF, CJCS, COCOMs

 By USN commanders

 USN force structure recommendations & decisions

 By the Congress, President, SECDEF, OSD

 By OPNAV

 One updated document (e.g.: '80s) vs several ('90s)

--94--


Why analyze these documents?

To provide context & perspective

 To help better understand why the USN is what it is today

 To help foster thinking about the USN of the future

 To help inform USN decisions on the formulation and promulgation of the draft 3/1 Strategy construct

--95--


The End

Questions?

--96--