Naval Historical Center Department of the Navy

 

Operational Experience of Fast Battleships; World War II, Korea, Vietnam

 

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF FAST BATTLESHIPS; WORLD WAR II, KOREA, VIETNAM

Compiled and edited, with introduction and notes, by John C. Reilly, Jr.

Second Edition

NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
Department of the Navy
WASHINGTON: 1989

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402

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Keep them at sea, and they can't help becoming seamen; but attention is needed to make them learn their business with the guns.
-- Admiral Sir John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent (1734-1823)

Hits per gun per minute/weapons on target per unit of time is the bottom line in our profession.
-- Vice Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.

The best protection against the enemy's fire is a well directed fire from our own guns.
-- Rear Admiral David G. Farragut, 1863.

If you want to win your battles take and work your bloomin' guns',
-- Rudyard Kipling, Snarleyow

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FOREWORD

The fast battleship has returned to the fleet, not as a tribute to nostalgia, but as a powerful and versatile component of our modern surface Navy. The four ships of the IOWA class, now back on active service, bring with them a rich legacy of experience and accomplishment spanning three wars. This heritage is not only a justifiable source of pride and tradition, but also a valuable repository of practical ideas and lessons for today's battleship Navy.

The idea for this publication originated with my brief visit to IOWA in late 1986. At that time, many members of the ship's company expressed curiosity and interest about the role of the fast battleship in earlier years, and a keen desire to have access to concrete, detailed information about their operational experience in Vietnam, Korea, and World War II. The result was the first edition of this compilation, issued in 1987. It was well received, and produced valuable suggestions for improvement. This second edition includes a considerable amount of new material requested by readers. Although modest in scope, it nevertheless represents the Naval Historical Center's continuing commitment to support the operating forces of the Navy, as well as our larger commitment to increase public and professional awareness of the value of naval history.

The documents offered here are, in many cases, firsthand accounts by participants in the actions they describe. Recorded soon after the event, they should not be regarded as infallibly accurate and definitive, but rather as guides to the experiences, impressions, and lessons learned of earlier generations of battleship officers and seamen.

It gives me particular pleasure to offer this historical record to a new generation of battleship sailors. May it help them to acquire and enhance that sense of their heritage that is essential to future progress.

Any work of this kind is the product of many heads and hands. The principal editor and author, Mr. John C. Reilly Jr., Head, Ships' History Branch, is a noted authority on ship types. Without the generous assistance of Mr. Richard M. Walker; Mrs. Kathleen Lloyd; YN1 Julie Howells; YN3 Tom West; Mrs. Margaret Wadsworth; Mrs. Theresa M. Schuster; Mr. Raymond A. Mann; and Mrs. Shelley Wallace, it could not have been completed. FCCM(SW) Stephen Skelley, USS IOWA, provided valuable insight. Special appreciation is due to Mr. Claude A. Browne, Jr., of the Navy Publications and Printing Service, for his skillful efforts on our behalf.

RONALD H. SPECTOR
Director of Naval History

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CONTENTS

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INTRODUCTION

The ships discussed in these pages form the three classes of fast battleships completed for the United States Navy between 1941 and 1944. The IOWA class has rejoined the active fleet as modern surface warships. NORTH CAROLINA, MASSACHUSETTS, and ALABAMA, survivors of the two earlier classes, now serve as memorials to those who built, sailed, and fought them in World War II.

NORTH CAROLINA (BB-55), WASHINGTON (BB-56)

728 feet 9 inches; 46,770 tons at full load; 121,000 SHP; 27.6 knots. Nine 16"/45; 20 5"/38 (10 twin mounts); 1.1" and .50-cal. AA (replaced by 40mm, 20mm AA). Fire control: Main Battery Directors Mk 38 w/Radar Mk 3, later Mk 8, later Mk 13. Secondary Battery Directors Mk 37 w/Radar Mk 4, later Mks 12/22 in combination.

SOUTH DAKOTA (BB-57), INDIANA (BB-58), MASSACHUSETTS (BB-59), ALABAMA (BB-60)

680 feet; 46,200 tons; 130,000 SHP; 27.8 knots. Nine 16"/45; 20 5"/38 (16 in SOUTH DAKOTA, built as Fleet Flagship); 1.1" and .50 AA, later 40mm, 20mm AA. Fire control as in NORTH CAROLINA.

IOWA (BB-61), NEW JERSEY (BB-62), MISSOURI (BB-63), WISCONSIN (BB-64) 887 feet 3 inches; 57,540 tons; 212,000 SHP; 32.5 knots. Nine 16"/50; 20 5"/38; 40mm, 20mm AA. 20mm removed, Korea; 40mm removed from NEW JERSEY, Vietnam. Fire control as in NORTH CAROLINA; Radar Mk 25 on Directors Mk 37 after WW II. ILLINOIS (BB-65), KENTUCKY (BB-66) begun, but never completed.

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Five ships of the MONTANA (BB-67) class (925 feet; 70,500 tons; 172,000 SHP; 28 knots. Twelve 16"/50; 20 5"/54; 40mm, 20mm AA) were authorized in 1940, but canceled in 1943. These would have been enlarged IOWAs, sacrificing some speed for firepower and protection.

A Note on Sources

The documents, and extracts from documents, which make up the body of this work were selected from the holdings of the Ships' History Branch and Operational Archives Branch of the Naval Historical Center. Since the Office of Library and Naval War Records was originally established in 1884, the Navy has sought to collect and preserve the historical record of its operating forces and to make it usable to new generations. We hope that this publication will contribute to that end.

Notes, comments, and interpolations appear in boldface.

Acknowledgements

Without the strong help of the individuals mentioned by Dr. Spec-tor in his foreword, this work could hardly have been begun, let alone finished. My special thanks go to my wife, Anna, who put up with the whole process from beginning to end.

Errors, whether of commission, omission, or interpretation, are solely mine.

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I. WORLD WAR II

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE

Although shore bombardment became a principal task of older battleships in World War II, fast battleships were also called on to take their share of this mission. The new MASSACHUSETTS supported landings in North Africa in 1942 and, through the end of the war in the Pacific, fast battleships conducted gun strikes and furnished fire support for amphibious landings.

Landing at Casablanca

November 1942

On 8 November 1942 the new and the o1d -- MASSACHUSETTS and TEXAS (BB 35) -- supported American landings in North Africa. MASSACHUSETTS, off Casablanca, dropped 5 hits on the unfinished French battleship JEAN BART and put her one operational 15-inch turret out of action. She later engaged French destroyers, dodged torpedoes and sank two of the attackers. MASSACHUSETTS scored hits on a powerful battery at E1 Hank, but she lacked HC bombardment ammunition and her AP shells did little damage.

MASSACHUSETTS ACTION REPORT:

It is the consensus of opinion on this ship that JEAN BART only fired five or six salvos during the engagement. ... We know she was hit at least once as the aviator observed it. Before we commenced firing on her she put up a smoke screen ... and kept it over her throughout the day, so that all fire was indirect, and spotting from aircraft was difficult.

Toward the end of the first run I was informed that El Hank had not replied for ... four or five minutes, and the consensus appeared to be that El Hank was out of commission. This ... proved totally in error. El Hank was also covered by a large dust cloud or used a smoke screen. We believe that shells from this force probably temporarily disabled El Hank, causing the crew ... to seek shelter. After we had ceased firing, they repaired whatever damage took place and, through the remainder of the day, continued to fire spasmodically whenever we were in range.

This vessel ceased firing with 16" shells at JEAN BART and El Hank when the ... number remaining was approximately 40%. Later we engaged enemy cruisers and destroyers and used up another 8%.

The final 7 rounds fired at El Hank from ... about 33,000 yards were fired ... to unload the guns through the muzzle. This salvo apparently caused a large explosion and it is possible that it destroyed one of the ammunition dumps.

In the future, if it is intended for men of war to bombard land fortifications, the ships ... must be equipped with bombardment ammunition as armor piercing shells apparently do not accomplish extensive damage unless they make a direct hit.

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DAMAGE INFLICTED BY ENEMY GUNFIRE

1000: Hit at frame 48, port, by an estimated 240mm shell. Angle of penetration about 70°. Shell pierced wooden deck and 60# STS deck and detonated after gouging a hole about one inch deep in the protective (second) deck. "Sail"* coil of Degaussing System ruptured, causing small electric fire which was readily extinguished with CO2. Also, wooden deck at hole started to blaze up, but was brought under control by fog from below and a stream from above. No personnel casualties ..., and only a small amount of structural damage. ...

1057: Hit at frame 107, starboard, by what appeared to be a 240mm shell, striking at an angle of about 40° with the horizontal. The ... shell ... came from the starboard quarter, ...hit the deck, bounced up at an angle of about 40°, ... and detonated about 10 feet beyond. The shell did not penetrate the 60# STS deck ..., but knocked out several rivets and made a dent about two inches deep. ... The shell detonated about six feet above the deck and about eight feet from the bulkhead. Fragments pierced stanchions, 20mm ready service boxes, 25# STS bulkheads ... Smoke from the detonation was sucked down in the engine room but was quickly dissipated ...

(1) JEAN BART - A six-gun salvo landed on the stern of this ship but had no visible effect on her main battery. Numerous near misses were observed, and her main battery was silenced after it had fired four to six salvos.

(4) EL HANK - An ammunition dump ... about 1000 yards southeast of E1 Hank lighthouse appeared to blow up as a result of a direct hit.

MASSACHUSETTS also claimed hits on the Mole de Commerce, alongside which JEAN BART was moored; on ammunition dumps and moored submarines; on a cargo ship in Casablanca harbor; and on CL PRIMAUGUET and four destroyers. Action reports are contradictory; S. E. Morison credits MASSACHUSETTS and CA TUSCALOOSA with sharing the sinking of DD FOUGEUX, and MASSACHUSETTS with later sinking DD BOULONNAIS. MASSACHUSETTS landed five hits on JEAN BART. Two exploded belowdecks; two others penetrated unprotected portions of the hull, but did not meet enough resistance to trigger their fuzes. The fifth round, a dud, hit JEAN BART’s turret and glanced against its barbette, jamming the turret in train and, for practical purposes, putting it out of action.

MAIN BATTERY FIRE CONTROL

*Phonetic alphabet.

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BOMBARDMENT OF CASABLANCA DEFENSES BY COVERING GROUP

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ces numerous salvos were reported as straddling the target. In deflection the salvo would cover one-third of the ship and extend not over one hundred yards on either side. ... only one salvo ... had an abnormal spread in deflection. This ... was due to one turret not being matched in train. Several salvos ... reported as having excessive range patterns were also traced to mismatching by the gun layers. Nearly all of these salvos came near the end of the engagement and the crew was becoming fatigued. In these instances we had two guns match low. Firing was checked for several minutes, as all targets had been lost in the smoke. ... gun layers were again cautioned about matching pointers. When ... fire was resumed ... salvos then returned to ... normal pattern size.

From this ... we have learned that, during prolonged engagements, the operating crews become fatigued and are, more than ever, subject to... errors and ... casualties. The turret train layers are not under as great a physical strain as the gun layers,* as they steadily follow the pointer. The errors in matching pointers by the train layers can be expected to be normally very small. On occasions where the turrets were not matched at the instant of firing, they were offset by the same amount, which indicated the lag in personal reaction to a rapidly-moving problem. The gun layers have a more difficult problem, in that they are continually bringing their gun to the firing position and, then, back to the loading position. As they tire during the day their reactions become slower and it required a greater time for them to match their pointers. Also, in some instances, their matching was not too accurate. As these salvos are very powerful when they hit, this engagement clearly demonstrates the desirability ... of ... installation of full automatic features in train and elevation in all turrets.

Experiments ... at the Naval Gun Factory in automatic operation versus personal operation clearly demonstrate the fact that men, watching the movements of a dial, fatigue rapidly. It was definitely proven that a man cannot match a moving pointer, within the limits of error required for automatic gun control equipment, for ... much in excess of ten minutes. He will follow accurately for a few minutes, make a break, and then match up again and follow for a short period of time. ...

During the firing we had some difficulty with ... weave in deflection. The cause of this ... has not ... yet been determined. When firing on ... JEAN BART at times, by indirect fire, it was sufficient to move the salvos from just one side of the target to the other. We are hoping that the trouble is entirely within the Stable Vertical and can be corrected in the near future. The only pieces of Main Battery fire control equipment that have given us any trouble at all are the stable verticals. ... .

Automatic Control in Elevation and Train for Main Battery Turrets

*MASSACHUSETTS' turrets had not yet been fitted for automatic control.

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der to hit, the turrets had to be very closely matched in train. With the existing conditions of yaw, crosslevel, and ... necessary changes in course to maintain the desired firing ranges, we had a most difficult set of circumstances for hand-matching in train. An error in matching of 5 minutes* would probably mean a complete miss in deflection for an entire salvo. This happened several times. The need for train receiver regulators** is acute, and they should be installed in the turrets at once.

To reduce salvo intervals, continuous level and crosslevel fire is used by this ship. The range pattern, in most cases, is small, and errors of 5 to 10 minutes in matching in elevation have caused salvos not to straddle. Elevation receiver regulators are, thus, a crying need for the 16"/45 ... turrets , as hand matching in continuous level is not adequate.

Setting of Erosion during Battle

The battle was fought in three main phases. During each phase, all guns did not fire on every salvo. In the lulls between phases, it was thus necessary to correct initial velocity for the fastest gun*** and to correct the individual guns to the fastest gun by means of the initial velocity loss correctors in the gun elevation indicators. The turret officers kept track of the shots fired by each gun so that this procedure was possible. The ... shots fired per gun varied from 66 to 115 for the engagement. Pattern size in range was, thus, kept normal even though erosion varied from gun to gun. This procedure is novel, and is mentioned only as a matter to be kept in mind by plotting room officers so that it will not be forgotten in the heat of battle. All guns should be star-gauged at first opportunity if a considerable number of rounds have been fired.

Indirect Fire

The entire first phase of the engagement was indirect fire on ... -JEAN BART. ... BART was seen indistinctly for only a few seconds some time before tracking was begun. The haze and smoke in the harbor made it necessary to open fire with a range and bearing taken from the plotting table in Main Battery Plot. The only means of correcting the setup in an hour and a half of rangekeeping and shooting was by means of Air Spot. During this time the ship maneuvered radically at speeds above 20 knots, closing and opening the range from 23,200 to 32,400 and reversing course. The rangekeepers were subjected to a test in indirect firing as, probably, never before.

*Minutes of angle, 60 to a degree.

**Device which controls hydraulic train or elevation gear in response to electrical orders from the fire-control system.

***Gun with the highest initial velocity.

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tion. The range spots were good but, during the early salvos, the air spotter had trouble with deflection spots. These deflection spots were all too meager. The usual difficulty of establishing the line of fire was a problem, but the selection of a position from which to make his spots was a far greater one for the air spotter. He was constantly beset by difficulties, inc1uding ... hostile aircraft, antiaircraft fire, smoke, and sun glare. The position finally selected did not afford a good opportunity for estimating deflection during the early salvos.

The range problem during the first phase was not troublesome but the deflection problem was critical.

RADAR

One of the great advancements in the last few years in Naval gunnery has been Radar. By constant practice, we have reached such a degree of perfection with the use of our radars that we depend greatly upon them for ranges during an approach in any kind of weather. If it is hazy, or the weather conditions are such that the target cannot be distinctly seen by the director trainers, we are able to stay on the target with ... high ... accuracy by following the Radar in train. Our radars have held up beautifully ..., even during target practices with reduced velocity charges. But, when we commenced to shoot service velocity charges, ... the radars failed. FC Radar #1, used by Spot One, failed early in the day and was not back in operation until ... practically all of the firing had been completed. FC Radar #2, used by Spot Two, was in and out all day and, at times when both optical and Radar ranges could be obtained, they varied so greatly that the spotter feared the Radar was not reliable for use. During the part of the battle in which we were engaging enemy light forces, neither Main Battery Radar was performing properly. We were set back ... in that we had to operate entirely optically and could only bring a target under fire when it became visible through the smoke. This loss was felt very keenly and was costly in that many more salvos were required ... than would have been necessary if we could have ranged, trained, and spotted by Radar through the smoke. It is urgently recommended that an immediate study be commenced of the effect of shock on all our Radars and equipment.

RANGEFINDERS

All rangefinders ... functioned satisfactorily when it was possible for them to see a target through the haze and smoke, which was seldom. Considerable difficulty was experienced by the rangefinder levellers in keeping their rangefinders level or on the target with the present levelling equipment. The levelling drive installation should be redesigned to remove the excessive lost motion now present. The installation of ... rangefinder stabilizers will greatly improve ranging. It is recommended that these stabilizers be gotten into the ship at the earliest practicable date.

MAIN BATTERY

Armor-piercing projectiles are not suitable ammunition for shore bombardment. When firing at ... shore batteries, time and again we silenced the battery, apparently by driving the crews to cover. If we

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would cease firing or shift to another target for ... 10 to 15 minutes, the battery would again come to life. To do a satisfactory job on a shore installation, high-capacity shells with instantaneously-acting fuzes are required. With such ammunition, these ships can be used effectively for bombarding shore installations in that their range, speed, and maneuverability are such that they can avoid enemy fire while, at the same time, delivering a high rate of fire on the enemy's fortifications. Unless it is possible to close the range sufficiently to insure direct hitting of a shore fortification, the objective should be to neutralize the battery instead of to destroy it as the necessary rates of fire for neutralization are very much less ...

CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM EXPERIENCE OF AIR SPOT ....

The two most difficult things about spotting a shore bombardment are (1) seeing the fall of shot, and (2) keeping in mind the line of fire between ship and target, especially when one or the other is out of vision.

Use of Bombardment Ammunition - It was virtually impossible to observe the impacts of AP projectiles which landed on the beach, the docks, or in the city. Water splashes were easy to see, but when the fall of shot was any other place it usually went unseen. I estimate that the action against ... El Hank would have been about fifty percent more efficient, as far as expenditure of ammunition is concerned, had bombardment shells been used.

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET, COMMENTS:

Material Performance. The TORCH operation served as a severe material test for the heavy armaments of the capital ships engaged. Turret crews were called upon to serve their guns for long periods of actual firing time. The performance of turrets of battleships and heavy cruisers was excellent. The few casualties that occurred were ... soon restored. Powder and shell supply was fast, and loading crews performed without casualty. It may be said, in general, that naval gunfire ... gave substantial assistance to the landing forces and aided materially in overcoming enemy opposition.

Fire Control Information. Shore fire control parties and spotting planes should amplify their requests for fire support by including such information as location of own front line, type of target, type of fire required, proposed movements of own troops, and any other pertinent data that will be of service to the ship furnishing fire support. All shore fire control parties should keep the Attack Force Commander informed of targets under fire.

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Bombardment of Nauru Island

December 1943

To prevent Nauru from being used as a base for attacks on our forces, a task group including two carriers and the battleships WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, MASSACHUSETTS, INDIANA, SOUTH DAKOTA, and ALABAMA bombarded the island. Since this was the first Pacific gunfire strike carried out by the fast battleships, the firing ships reported their methods and results in detail.

WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT:

The ship was informed of the probability of the bombardment of Nauru about ten days ahead of the actual bombardment. Preliminary studies of the problem were made during this period. The film on Nauru and the model of Nauru furnished by JICPOA were studied, as were the intelligence folders and current intelligence on the Island. When the Task Force Commander's bombardment plan was received, the Gunnery Department studied the target assignment and prepared a bombardment and salvo plan to cover the assigned areas. The Navigation Department prepared track charts of the proposed targets. By conference between the Navigation Department and the Gunnery Department, the best possible visual and radar targets for navigation were selected and given letter designations in the middle of the alphabet which facilitated identification. The X3JW* and the 3JW* circuits were crossed, with the intention that visual bearings would be available to the Navigator, Flag Plot, Combat, and Main and Secondary Plot. However, due to unforeseen personnel difficulties, none of these visual bearings were put on this circuit. The various plots were kept independently, the Navigator's plot by visual bearings, the Gunnery plots by combination of optical bearings and radar ranges, and Combat plot by radar ranges and bearings. Under the visibility conditions which obtained, it is believed that better plots would have resulted in some stations if visual bearings had been disseminated as planned.

A conference was held during the afternoon of D-2 day, ...attended by the Captain, all Heads of Departments, all senior officers down to the fourth lieutenant in seniority, plus key officers in each department. At this conference, the Navigator presented and discussed the Navigation Plan. The Gunnery Officer presented and discussed the Fire Plan to be used by both batteries, referring frequently to the track chart of the Navigation Plan to point out the expected position of the ship during various phases of the Fire Plan. Each officer present ... was given an opportunity to stress important matters under his cognizance and their relationships to fire control, ship control, and damage control. Care was taken that these discussions brought out clearly the following points:

*Ship's internal fire-control telephone circuits.

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Where our own forces might be seen at various times during the bombardment. What our own forces were supposed to be doing at various times.

Time, with relation to H-hour, that such observations might be expected in the various sectors.

As the separation of the forces developed, the carrier force (Task Group 50.8.5) (which, the conference was informed, would probably be within visual and radar range, and on the disengaged side of the bombardment formation to the west and northwest) was widely separated from the bombardment formation (Task Group 50.8.1), and was not encountered, visually or by radar, during the bombardment.

The officers present were informed as to probable enemy forces to be expected: surface, none; and air, moderate, if any enemy planes at all would be airborne. Information was disseminated as to the air plan of our own forces and the probable location of our own aircraft.

The conference was then thrown open to discussion as to various contingencies which might arise, with the warning that comments must be specific and well-prepared, and that a general conversation was not desired.

This conference occupied 51 minutes. After this conference, an instruction period was scheduled for all divisions on D-1 day, at which time officers present at the conference disseminated information to the lower echelons concerned, particularly to junior officers and key enlisted personnel. Special attention was devoted to assuring that all look-lookouts, particularly sky lookouts in Condition ONE, were thoroughly instructed. As a result of this conference, and the subsequent instruction period, all fire control, ship control, and damage control personnel had a clear and complete picture of the prospective operations.

Comment should be made on the great value of the model of Nauru Island furnished by JICPOA. This was used for familiarization of all key officers and enlisted personnel. Lookouts were given an opportunity to examine it through reversed binoculars from the directions from which it might be sighted and approached, and from the relative height of eye which they would be using. This model was also used for familiarization of aircraft spotters with the target areas and the targets assigned to the ship. Air spotting drills were effectively conducted, using this model and white cotton splashes in conjunction with bombardment rehearsal of the main battery.

ALABAMA ACTION REPORT:

First contact was made on the Island by the various radar equipments as follows:

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Comment by Radar Officer on Performance of Mark 8:

At 47,000 yards the outline of the cliffs of the Northern end of the Island was quite distinct on high speed scan, and as had been previously planned, was used as reference point for finding on the screen the signal corresponding to Point Able. The following procedure was used in identifying Point Able on radar screen:

(a) Predicted pictures of the Mk. 8 screen had been drawn previously for points along the predicted approach course and firing course. From a study of the Relief Model it has been predicted that the Cantilever* would be picked up bearing 195° T., distance 43,000 yards, so a radar view of the Island to exact scale was prepared of this point for use with high speed precision sweep. It had also been predicted that on this bearing Point Able would be 4,700 yards farther in range than the nearest land and would be on the right tangent to the Island.

(b) With the aid of this information the tracking point was identified earlier than it would otherwise have been. When the Island bore 195° T. a range was taken to the nearest point of land. 4,700 yards was immediately added to this reading, and the range step was then cranked to the resulting range. The Cantilever was tentatively identified at once on the screen by its relatively strong signal, and by its location with respect to other predicted signals.

Tracking was commenced at 43,000 yards, as had been planned, using optical bearings and radar ranges. It is believed, however, that full radar control would have been feasible throughout most of the bombardment. As it was, radar bearing was used intermittently during periods of poor visibility resulting from smoke.

Comment by Spot One:

After initial contact and establishment of bluffs at the NW end of the Island, no tracking points were immediately observed so director was kept trained on right tangent. What was believed to be the Cantilever was picked up by rangefinder at about 44,000 yards. Shortly thereafter, from a comparison of the Mk 8 screen with scaled pictures which had been prepared the tracking point was tentatively identified on the screen and tracking was commenced. At 40,000 yards radar the rangefinder range was 39,900, and the two instruments agreed exactly on the angle of train. This and immediately succeeding comparisons made possible the early and certain identification of the tracking point. Still early in the approach period three pips coming onto the screen were identified as the phosphate plants.

*A prominent pier, used as a radar reference point.

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Main Battery

Firing was done in accordance with the fire schedule. Cantilever pier was tracked using forward FH radar and optical bearings and positions plotted each minute on a chart 1,000 yards to the inch. These positions were used to determine ranges and bearings to tracking points in the respective areas. Tracking errors were negligible.

Control spots for coverage were computed using an overlay grid oriented to the line of fire on a large scale chart. These often varied appreciably from tentative control spots listed on the fire schedule. Control spots were chosen to give coverage of assigned targets in accordance with information from plane and top spotters.

Salvo one was fired on "commence firing" from the OTC, and thereafter salvos were fired on time as indicated on the fire schedule. On salvos 2 and 3, turret 3 could not bear, but caught up by firing 3 guns on salvo 4. On salvo 30, turret 2 and 3 each failed to fire one gun necessitating the firing of salvo 32.

Salvo 1 was fired with a total deflection pattern of 400 yards by use of horizontal parallax correctors. The MPI of this salvo was in the center of the assigned area and coverage was almost complete. Subsequent salvos were fired with a 100-yard deflection pattern.

ACTH in range was used as determined for AP projectiles, and was very close to correct. A left ACTH of about 4 mils was used on the basis of reports from other ships, and an additional left ACTH of 5 mils was required throughout.

High order detonation was obtained on all impacts observed.

Secondary Battery

Bombardment was conducted in accordance with prepared procedure and fire schedule, with the following exceptions:

(1) Fire was opened at +20 minutes of Main Battery commence-fire instead of at +17. This ... was necessitated by the fact that the target area was beyond maximum range at +17 minutes.

(2) Computer was shifted to LOCAL, indirect control, twice during firing when Point Able (Cantilever Pier), the tracking point, became obscured to Sky 2* by smoke. In each instance of returning to SEMI-AUTO, no change in bearing solution was evident.

(3) Commencing after 23rd salvo, salvo interval was decreased to 10 seconds. This was done to bring completion of firing to within time allowed.

*Sky 4: After secondary-battery director. Main 2: after main-battery director. Sky 2: port secondary-battery director.

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ALABAMA secondary battery bombardment doctrine and procedure provides for direct type, indirect type, and offset type control. The doctrine and procedure for offset-type control were selected in advance for the Nauru bombardment after consideration of the factors involved, and were not departed from.

Tracking errors are considered negligible. Mark 8 radar ranges with secondary battery optical bearings were used. Secondary battery optical ranges were transmitted in standby, and were accurate and consistent enough to have been used successfully for the periods in which the tracking point was visible to rangefinder operators. Mark 4 radar operators had been prepared in advance to cope with the problem of ranging on the Cantilever, and were able to provide continuous, though slightly inconsistent ranges throughout. It is believed they obtained the maximum possible performance of the Mark 4 in a problem of this nature.

Control spots were determined from a grid overlay used in conjunction with a large scale plot of the tracking point and target area. Grid was oriented to true bearing of line of sight to Point Able by setting to the bearing obtained from advancing ship's position one minute along the track. Since course was steady throughout firing this was very accurate. No difficulty was encountered in the employment of this method and accuracy obtained is believed to have been satisfactorily high. Postfiring check of ranges, bearings, computation errors and errors of application indicates that the seven subdivisions of the target area were properly covered. This, of course, is not conclusive proof of success, since, under the circumstance of almost no fall-of-shot observations, the accuracy of the gun ballistic and arbitrary ballistic remain unverified. However, in connection with these latter ballistics, past performance leaves no reason to believe the gun ballistic was not accurate, since it was obtained as heretofore. An extremely successful calibration practice, conducted just before the operation with this eventuality in mind, was fired at precisely the range at which bombardment fire was opened. The ACTH then determined was IN 278 yards. IN 250 yards was used on bombardment.

NORTH CAROLINA ACTION REPORT:

Control

Main Battery

The control procedure followed the standard bombardment procedure used by this ship. The position of the ship relative to the target area was continuously and accurately plotted in CIC by means of information obtained from radar and optical ranges and bearings to prominent landmarks. The rangekeeper continuously tracked the seaward end of the cantilever pier. Spots were applied to the rangekeeper ... to hit the assigned targets. Immediately after firing a salvo, the control spot plus ... arbitrary corrections to hit determined from previous salvos was applied for the next salvo. As aircraft spots were received, they were applied in addition to the a already-calculated offset. This system was simple and effective. Invariably, salvos had to be held for the time

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schedule rather than for "Plot Ready". A salvo interval of 20 seconds greater than the time of flight would have been possible had it been desirable.

Secondary Battery

The secondary battery control procedure followed in general that outlined above for the main battery. While firing in the first target area directors and computers tracked the seaward end of the cantilever pier, offsetting gun train order and gun elevation order by means of control spots in order to hit the desired targets. When fire was shifted to grid areas G1 and G2, it was necessary to shift the point being tracked to a point closer to the target area. A radio tower on top of the hill was selected. At this time heavy smoke obscured the entire target area so that no points were visible, nor were any satisfactory radar targets observed. Combat Information Center furnished the controlling computer with continuous ranges and bearings to the radio tower and firing at the second target area was accomplished in complete indirect fire.

Post firing analysis does not explain the large ACTH in the deflection in main battery firing. The average ACTH in deflection was left 30 mils and in range was Zero. The only possible explanation is that the position of the target area relative to the seaward end of the cantilever pier may have been in error on the charts. A discrepancy of about 400 yards in the chart would have caused this error in deflection. Fortunately, the deflection error was observed, both by the air spotter and by Spot One,* on early partial salvos, fired specifically as spotting salvos, so that few projectiles were wasted.

The aviator reported that secondary battery salvos landed within the main battery area during the early phase. He was unable to accurately determine the positions of fall of shot of the secondary battery projectiles after shift in targets because of the confusion existing in determining own salvos. Other battleships and several destroyers were firing at the landing strip immediately adjacent to our assigned area.

Battery performance was excellent. The main battery fired salvos as planned without variation. Loading times were shorter than those obtain-obtained in drill. Secondary battery salvo intervals were originally 15 salvos were fired. Due to misfires, partial salvos were fired upon the completion of the 40 planned salvos to complete ammunition expenditure.

WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT:

Fire Control for Bombardment

*Gunfire spotting station in forward main-battery director.

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its own. It is felt that better results would be obtained if a few standard items, such as drafting machine scales, were furnished by the Bureau of Ordnance for the control of bombardment. Many action reports on shore bombardments have emphasized the need for charts of uniform scale to be issued in advance of a scheduled bombardment. In view of the many amphibious operations which will be required in this war, it is believed that each battleship and cruiser should be furnished, immediately, a set of charts to this standard scale of all probable early objectives, followed, as soon as possible, by a set of charts for all probable future objectives. Similar charts should be available in the advanced areas for issue to destroyers as required. This ship recommends contour charts of 1,000 yards to the inch and detailed target intelligence charts of 500 yards to the inch.

In connection with the equipment problem, the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard built bombardment tables for both main and secondary battery plot in accordance with designs of this ship. The table in Main Battery Plot, which also serves as a navigational plotting table for Auxiliary C.I.C., has a space allotted for a dead reckoning tracer. With the addition of such a dead reckoning tracer, preferably of the destroyer type, the problem of firing a shore bombardment while the ship is maneuvering would be greatly simplified. The systems used by the Main and Secondary Batteries in this bombardment are described below:

Main Battery

All Main Battery salvos were by indirect fire. A description of the methods used follows: Ship's track was plotted on the bombardment table in Auxiliary CIC (Main Battery Plot) using a scale of one inch to one thousand yards. An exact scale photograph of an Army terrain map of the island, showing previously selected radar and optical points of aim, was used in conjunction with this track. A large drafting machine scale, manufactured by ship's force, enabled the plotter to extend his track to a range of 36,000 yards. Initially the track was plotted using optical bearings of tangents and both optical and radar observations of peaks of the island. When the Cantilever Pier was definitely identified optically and on the Mark 8 Radar scope, Director Two* was placed on the pier and all further tracking was done using optical bearings and radar ranges measured to the pier. The controlling rangekeeper was set up to generate a solution on a reference point near the center of the target area assigned this ship. Prior to the time of opening fire, several setups on this point were given to the controlling rangekeeper, the later ones serving as a check on the accuracy of the earlier information. From the time of commence firing, the controlling rangekeeper was allowed to generate without correction, it being felt that any error which might develop would be rectified by spots.

*After main-battery director.

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the controlling rangefinder before each salvo using the predicted bearing of the reference point for the time of the salvo. Spots received were plotted on the chart in such a way that the measured offsets for later salvos included corrections for error of previous fall of shot. Responsibility for properly covering the targets rested with the Spot Coordinator, who had full authority to depart from the schedule.

Spots from ... aircraft ... and spots necessitated by the shifting of targets were handled by the Spot Coordinator, using a plexiglass grid. The horizontal scale along the central line, which is the 20,000 yard line of the scale (other range lines run from the origin at various angles to this one) is graduated in 100 yard increments; the scale along the bottom is divided into mils. Deflection spots in yards may be converted to mils by running parallel to the diagonal lines under the range line corresponding to present range is reached and then travelling along a vertical line to the mil scale. The grid is aligned in bearing by a drafting machine. A range scale on the drafting machine arm permits the grid to be positioned in range.

An illustration represents the following situation: The rangekeeper is tracking in generated a reference point "R". Two salvos have been fired in a target "T₁". The first fall of shot resulted in a spot of approximately Up 120 yards, left 50 yards and a point "A" was plotted in this position relative to "T₁". The second salvo was fired at Point A and resulted in a spot which when plotted from A located Point B. The mid-point between points A and B give the location of a fictitious target. The distance from T₁ to this mid-point is the spot to be applied as the result of the two salvos. In shifting to a second target T₂, a fictitious target C is plotted in relation to T₂, separated by the previously determined spot. The necessary correction from the reference point (R) to point (C) is obtained by placing the zero point of the range scale at the reference point. The grid is then positioned with the central scale line over C. Then the range spot is picked off of the range scale at the central line (in this case Up 1100). By following the proper lines, the deflection spot is seen to be 5 mils right (at a range of 22,000 yards).

Ballistic corrections for height of target and for difference between high-capacity range table values and the values generated by the computer were applied to the spot knobs in such a way that the difference between the total spot counter and the partial spot counter represented the ballistic spot. In this way, a new ballistic could be entered at any time by merely setting it on the dial and pushing the knob in, thereby returning the partial spot dial to zero. The spot for offsetting a target point from the reference point was then set on the partial spot dial without pushing in the knob.

As previously mentioned, Director Two remained on the Cantilever Pier throughout the firing. Director One received designation from the controlling rangekeeper and, hence, was trained on the target area. The field of view from both directors was sufficiently large to enable personnel to see the entire target area as well as the Cantilever, but the blanket of smoke prevented either director from furnishing any usable information regarding the fall of shot. As expected from the experience

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gained in drills, the Mark 8 radar in the plotting room proved itself invaluable for bombardment. When the Mark 8 went out of commission, tracking continued with optical ranges.

The use of a universal drafting machine with a scale sufficiently long to allow plotting at the maximum ranges of the main battery has many disadvantages. The machine is clumsy to handle and lost motion inherent in the instrument becomes magnified when the longer arm is used. Unless some better means is found, it is believed that the method used by the secondary battery to determine offsets, i.e. moving the target area and leaving the ship at the center of a large compass rose, will be adopted.

Secondary Battery

Except for the extra salvos fired at the barracks area, the Secondary Battery used indirect fire from the plotting room (stable element key). Verbal orders to the mounts originated at the controlling director, which was trained on the specific targets during firing. Another director stood by to fire on targets of opportunity. The latter director fired the extra salvos by direct fire on the barracks area upon completion of the scheduled bombardment.

The grid used in Secondary Battery Plot proved effective in simplifying the bombardment problem. This grid, constructed of a sheet of heavy cellulose acetate, is ruled off in accurate one-inch squares and has a wedge for attaching it to a standard drafting machine. The chart of the bombardment target was drawn in ink on the under side of the grid with target locations, possible tracking points, and tangents indicated for ready reference and use. In the center of the grid, a set of circles indicate by their radii the distance the ship travels at speeds of 10, 15, 20 and 25 knots. A small hole is placed at the center of the circles to enable the making of a pencil mark on the paper beneath. The grid is used in conjunction with a large-scale mooring board which has divisions of one degree and 200 yards (to a scale of one thousand yards per inch).

Employment of the grid is as follows: Using the best available source of range and bearing, the grid point is placed over the mooring board in the proper location. These values of range and bearing are obtained by phone from the Main Battery Plot following a "Mark". At the "Mark", a stop watch is started, the point on the chart placed over the range and bearing on the mooring board, and a pencil mark made below the hole in the center of the speed circles. The cellulose sheet is then moved in the direction of the ship's movement until the pencil mark is seen to lie on the circle of the ship's speed. The range and bearing of the target is then read under the target's position on the cellulose sheet and set on the controlling computer. When the stop watch indicates 45 seconds the computer time motor is started, thus commencing generation of range and bearing of the target. Repetitions of this procedure are used for checking. In these checks, at the end of the 45 second period the value sent to the computer should appear under pointers of the range and bearing dials. If ... not ..., a small adjustment is made.

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After opening fire, the cellulose sheet is moved along over the mooring board as ranges and bearings are received from the Ship's Position Talker. When spots are received, they are marked in ink on the surface of the grid to indicate the location of the fall of shot and provide a reference for the application of spots. Using this method, it is easiest to set spots by the present-range and generated-bearing knobs.

The east end of the runway was used as a reference point for air spots, since this was the only clear reference in the assigned target area. As the location of the fall of shot was marked on the surface of the cellulose sheet, the spots required at the computer to move the fall of shot to the next target was immediately apparent.

NORTH CAROLINA ACTION REPORT:

Detailed information on the target area made possible careful planning and successful execution of this bombardment.

The ability to fire complete indirect fire with no visible point of aim made possible the firing of the secondary battery at the assigned targets in grid Areas G1 and G2.

The performance of material and personnel was up to the standards set in previous actions by this ship and was all that could be expected.

All 5" projectiles were loaded in the upper hoists with their bases down, thereby preventing setting time fuzes off "Safe". There were no prematures from this ship. This procedure is considered sound and is recommended for all future bombardments.

There were no material casualties affecting gunfire. The concussion due to main battery gunfire caused minor damage to certain hull fittings and equipment around the turrets.

WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT:

Although plane spot was maintained, the heavy clouds of dust and smoke covering the target area, and the interference caused by many ships firing at near or adjacent targets, precluded efficient spotting. In spite of this, however, a careful examination of many excellent photographs taken by the planes of the USS BUNKER HILL, during and after the bombardment firing, show that the targets assigned to this vessel were very effectively covered. I attribute full credit for this to the excellent preparation of the Gunnery Department.

MASSACHUSETTS ACTION REPORT:

Although the use of these heavy ships for such a mission might be questioned, it is desired to point out that the action herein reported did more to raise the spirits of the crew of this ship than all the efforts put forth in other ways. It is perhaps true that more rounds were fired than were necessary to accomplish the obtainable physical results at the target, but the fact that firing was done at a Jap was enough to renew the men's feeling that they were actually in the war. Perhaps fewer rounds and slower firing would have accomplished as much. It is

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recommended that, in any future campaigns in which it is evident that surface engagement with our like [gunnery action with enemy capital ships] are not probable, that effort be made to carry our at least a token bombardment of some enemy outpost. The use of reduced charges for this purpose is recommended when conditions warrant.

USS SOUTH DAKOTA
AURU BOMBARDMENT
8 DEC. 1943 (+12 ZD)

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SOUTH DAKOTA ACTION REPORT:

The following specific tasks were assigned to SOUTH DAKOTA...

(a) Fire one 9-gun 16-inch salvo into a designated area.
(b) Cover two 500-yard squares with 63 16-inch HC projectiles over a 15-minute period.
(c) At the end of the first 15-minute period, ...take an additional area, 500 yards square, under fire. ... 63 projectiles and ... 15 minutes were provided....
(d) Cover one 500-yard square with 400 5-inch projectiles.
(e) Destroy all targets of opportunity.

The nine-gun 16-inch salvo was fired with a deflection spread of 300 yards between turrets and a range spread of 600 yards between the high and low guns of each turret. The basis for the size of the spread was the information contained in BuOrd conf. circular letter A47-43.* An examination of the assigned area indicated that sufficient saturation and the effect desired would be obtained by the use of this spread.

The few air spots received indicate that the areas assigned were properly covered. When the main battery was shifted to the second target area in which a structure identified as a radio installation was seen, the air spotter reported that the second salvo in this area demolished

everything at that point. ... No targets of opportunity were fired upon. If the information from the aircraft spotter concerning buildings on the shore remaining intact had been received, the 5-inch battery could have been used to better advantage on these targets.

The following conclusions are drawn from the results of this action:

(a) Lacking an enemy surface target, this bombardment is believed to have been an extremely valuable influence in drawing the units of the fast battleship type of combatant vessel together as a mutual supporting and effective fighting group. The intangible effect on the temperament and morale of personnel is equally important. It is expected it will manifest itself in a greatly increased interest in the individual's job, an increased desire to do damage to the enemy and increased fighting efficiency.

(b) In future bombardments, where the opposition is light, the fire plan should be much more deliberate. Fire should be checked to allow the smoke and dust to clear away if found necessary. With good spotting from the air spotter it should be possible to demolish any target. It is believed that three-gun salvos are sufficient for any type of target to be encountered.

NARRATIVES

MAIN PLOT:

At 0645 the turrets were trained out to a general relative bearing line and told to get up High Capacity ammunition. At 0648 Main Battery

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Director One identified the cantilever by radar, and both rangekeepers commenced tracking this target. ... At 0650 watches were synchronized with Combat, and the ship's track was started on our plotting table, using ranges and bearings off rangekeeper #2, which was still tracking the cantilever. At 0653 Director One identified their target, optically, as being the cantilever. ...we were ready for spotting. At 0655 order was given to turrets to load and lay. Range was about 30,000 yards at this time. At 0658 rangekeeper #1 was shifted to regenerative setup, and corrections applied to correct solution to point of aim of first salvo. At 0659 turrets ... matched pointers in hand, as previously instructed for the opening salvo. At 0702 ... the first salvo was fired. As soon as possible, salvo #2 was fired, aiming at a point in the water 400 yards short of the target area. Our planes reported salvos ... 1anding on the beach, and the third salvo went out aimed at the gun emplacement on top of cliff in our area.

About this time, the ship came left and turret #3 was forced into the stops. Turrets #1 and #2 continued firing, using 2-gun salvos, and Conn was asked to come right, if possible, to bring turret #3 to bear. Turret #3 was told to stand by to fire two guns per salvo, as soon as she could bear, ...to catch up with the fire schedule. No good spots were received, and we had to assume we were somewhere in the area during the next four salvos. After four salvos, the ship came right and turret #3 was able to reopen fire. The following four salvos were 4-gun salvos, with turret #3 firing two guns per salvo. The 6th salvo was spotted as falling in the water, short of the target area, and an up spot was introduced to cover the building and town area. Fire was laddered across this area without subsequent spots until the supply dump was reached, where about three more salvos were fired. The 19th salvo was shifted, still without any further spots, to the buildings on ... top of the bluff, which were in our area.

After the 22nd salvo, fire was checked while the turrets reset their IV loss, and the rangekeeper was shifted to set up for the Radio Station.... Fire was resumed in about 40 seconds, and a spot of R030 was received on the 24th salvo. Corrections were applied and, after the 26th salvo, our planes reported the target covered with smoke and dust. The gunnery officer ... believed the target destroyed. Three more salvos were fired at this target, after which fire was shifted to ... possible fuel dump, ... which seemed worth taking under fire. Fire was laddered, after about 3 salvos, into this target .... ....The firing was completed at 0733 ....

Throughout the bombardment the spots received were very few and far between, and it was necessary to assume where our fall of shot occurred ...to carry out our time schedule. As best we could, we took all targets under fire, and our shifts were corroborated by some spots and not with others. It seems to me that the poor position of our spotting planes, and ...poor communications with ... overlapping frequencies were largely the cause of so much blind firing.

MAIN BATTERY PERFORMANCE

In general battery performance was excellent. A salvo interval of 46.2 seconds was maintained through the first twenty-two salvos and for the last twenty-three; an interval of thirty-seven seconds was maintain-

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ed. On the whole, gun crews and turret officers had no difficulty in maintaining this interval. From salvo twenty-five through salvo thirty-seven, the salvo interval averaged 29.5 seconds, and in some cases was as low as 15 seconds. Despite the reduction of time between salvos, gun crews had ample time to make good smooth loads, and there were no gun room or loading casualties which caused a gun to miss a salvo.

SECONDARY BATTERY PERFORMANCE

The 5" battery was scheduled to open fire at H+1 time, with point "Able"* at 17,000 yards. Actually, the battery commenced firing at H+20, with point "Able" at 16,000 yards. Eight-gun salvos at 15 second intervals were used.

The first salvo was offset to hit in the water in grid square Option* One, and the splash was sighted in this square. Thenceforth the MPI was shifted continuously to cover the assigned area. Spotting plane observations confirm the fact that the area was covered, with no stray salvos except near the end of the bombardment when several bursts were seen on the bluff in areas Prep* and Queen* Five.

Observation from Air Defense and Directors was limited by smoke and dust over the target. However, the cantilever pier and the cleared area along the northwest landing ship were usually visible and were used to judge the location of the bombardment area. Tracers could be followed until lost in the smoke of the target, and they seemed to be headed the right direction.

After approximately 30 salvos, the interval was reduced to 12 seconds and after salvo #36 rapid continuous fire was used to complete the bombardment on schedule. Because of the difficulties of keeping a check of rounds fired during rapid fire, the ammunition allowance was exceeded by 82 rounds before "cease firing" was given.

At the beginning of the rapid firing phase, several splashes were sighted in the area Jig* One, northwest of the cantilever, 1,000 yards short of the 5" area. At this period the only 5" firing was from this ship and the three destroyers astern. The splashes were probably ranging salvos from one of the destroyers, but were erroneously spotted as an error in this ship's 5" fire. The resulting up-spot was late in being applied and probably accounts for the bursts sighted on the bluff beyond the 5" area as reported by plane spotters near the end of the 5" bombardment.

SPOT I

*Phonetic alphabet.

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shifted to it. Almost immediately thereafter the cantilever was identified on the radar screen, and tracking proceeded using optical bearings and radar ranges. At about 40,000 yards the cantilever was giving a stronger pip than is normally given by a battleship at the same range.

Director One was the controlling director until just before fire was opened, at which time Director Two took control and Director One followed designation from Plot ... to observe the fall of shot. Shortly after opening fire, Director Two reported ... they had lost the target. Director One trained on the cantilever, and took control for about two salvos until Director Two reported being on the target. Director One then again followed designation from Plot. About the middle of the firing period Director Two reported ... a fuse ... blown in the radar, and Director One again trained on the cantilever but, at about the same time, Director Two reported ... they were again in commission, and Director One trained back and matched designation from Plot for the rest of the firing.

Accurate spotting from Director One would have been impossible, but ... by ... a few salvos, placed in the water at intervals during the firing, it would have been possible to cover the area fairly well if no plane spots had been available.

SPOT II

In future bombardments, where the opposition is as scarce as it was here at Nauru, the fire plan could be slowed up letting the smoke clear ang enabling spotting from directors. With excellent points of aim, such as we had here ..., many more buildings could have been destroyed had we used director fire from Director I.

MAIN BATTERY PROCEDURE

Prior to D-Day, all director and spotting personnel were thoroughly indoctrinated with general information on the target area .... The areas to be fired upon, and all possible radar targets, were marked on... large terrain maps ..., and each director and ... control station was furnished with one copy. Large-scale copies of an aerial photograph ... were made up with a superimposed grid for ... aircraft spotters and spot conversion in Plot. All ... reference points were numbered, and all targets lettered, for ease in designation. A family of curves was drawn up for use in determining IV corrections for various target heights at various ranges. A ... grid, used for conversion of grid spots to range and deflection spots, ... was available for use. The tentative ship's track ... was laid down on the plotting table in Plot and on the DRT in Combat for a check on ship's position. A ... target outline, with all possible tracking points marked, was also drawn in on these plots, so ... position relative to any reference point or target might be taken off these plots. Drills were held, and the entire bombardment rehearsed, several times prior to actual firing.

Main Battery Directors One and Two pick up reference points ... and transmit range and bearing ... to Plot and Combat, where they are used to plot ... ship's position and determine ship's track. As soon as a good reference point is picked up ... and positively identified, both rangekeepers begin tracking it ... to determine any ... current and ... provide a basis for a firing setup on the controlling rangekeeper. If a good reference

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point is not available, the setup for the controlling rangekeeper is taken off the plot of ship's track in Plot. In such a case, data for this track is received from Combat, using information available. If a good reference point for tracking is available, the rangekeeper is controlled by the director until just prior to opening fire, when it is shifted ... to become regenerative, leaving the same problem running. A range and bearing correction is then introduced to shift the theoretical tracking point from the reference point to the point of aim for the first salvo. If no such reference point ... is available, the control rangekeeper is set up using range and true bearing to the target ... taken from the plotting board.

Range and deflection spots are applied to correct for range-table differences between HC and Service [AP] ammunition, and an IV correction is applied to correct for target height. Level and crosslevel are continuously received from the Mark 43 Stable Vertical, and all firing is done using the indirect method .... Throughout the firing, Director Two remains on the reference point, which is continuously tracked by the standby rangekeeper. This solution is used to furnish range and bearing to secondary battery plot ..., and also to check the setup on the controlling rangekeeper. The plot of the ship's position is continued throughout, using information [from the] standby rangekeeper. Director One is controlled, in train, in "Automatic" by the controlling rangekeeper ... to be able to augment air spots by optical spots.

Master Chief Fire Controlman (SW) Stephen Skelly (Fire Control Gunner, USS IOWA) comments on SOUTH DAKOTA action report:

-- Fire plan should be much more deliberate.

-- Fire should be checked when target is obscured.

-- With good air spot, it should be possible to demolish any target.

-- 3-gun salvos are sufficient for any target.

-- SOUTH DAKOTA was on the right track long before Saipan [see p. 43]!

Cross-section of a 16"/50 gun. A series of concentric outer cylinders, called hoops, are heated and shrunk around an inner cylinder, the A tube. As the hoops shrink, they tightly grip the cylinders within them. Locking rings hold the hoops in place. The entire gun is then heated and shrunk onto a rifled liner. The assembled gun forms a reinforced cylinder capable of withstanding the enormous pressures of firing.

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Bombardment of Kwajalein, Marshall Islands
January 1944

Battleships conduct a pre-invasion strike at Kwajalein Atoll. WASHINGTON'S report refers to individual islands by code names; Porcelain, for instance, is Kwajalein Island, the principal island of the atoll; Ebeye Island is Burton. MASSACHUSETTS, on the other hand, uses actual geographic names, and mentions her use of previous combat experience.

WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT:

Porcelain was picked up first by Director One's Mark 3 Radar at 0907 at a range of 42,500 yards, but a suitable visual point of aim could not be picked up until 0944. Visibility up to this time had been very poor due to heavy squalls. At 0950 WASHINGTON reported having a

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KWAJALEIN ATOLL
MARSHALL ISLANDS

KWAJALEIN ATOLL
Contemporary chart showing the code names used to identify Kwajalein’s many islands.

satisfactory solution. On orders from the Commander Task Unit, one 6-gun and one 3-gun salvo were fired at areas 101, 102, 103, and 104 between 0956 and 1007 by WASHINGTON. Neither of these salvos was effective.

Before the completion of the approach firing several patrol craft were sighted off the north tip of Porcelain. Between 1008 and 1015 the Secondary Battery fired on three of these, sinking one and obtaining hits in two others. On arrival at Point Baker at 1016, the Secondary Battery ceased fire on the patrol craft and commenced bombardment of Burton.

Phase I

Secondary Battery fire against Burton was conducted according to plan. Only a poor coverage of the target resulted due to normal shift of the MPI and lost motion in the elevation system, as the stable element was used as the source of level in this and the following firing. However, several of the beach defenses were straddled, and a small fire was started in the hangar area.

The Main Battery opened fire on Berlin at 1038 with an excellent setup on the small tower in area 307. Despite this, the run on Berlin Island was not satisfactory. The narrow target area combined with shifts of the MPI and the often-stressed doctrine of boldness in spot application caused many salvos to land partially or fully in the water. Hits on the island caused the directors to lose their point of aim from time to time, including the entire period of a 150° turn to the southward leg. Shortly after this turn, one 16-inch salvo was fired at a 4,000-ton tanker behind the northern tip of Berlin but missed. Fire was resumed on Berlin after this salvo and the remainder of the allowed ammunition was effectively expended.

The starboard 5-inch battery had opened fire on the tanker as soon as the turn was completed, obtaining a straddle on the third salvo. Fire was continued at the tanker while the set-up for bombardment of Bennett Island was made. At 1052 the starboard battery was divided to allow fire on Bennett Island. At 1052 the starboard battery was divided to allow fire on Bennett Island. The tanker was seen to be hit and smoking when it was lost to sight about 1056 and all starboard mounts resumed fire on Bennett Island, firing a total of eight salvos.

During the latter part of the firing on Berlin, the off Main Battery Director picked up a large concentration of buildings on Beverly Island. Fire was opened on this island immediately after ceasing on Berlin, as the ship was rapidly moving southward out of the firing area affording best enfilade. The other director and rangekeeper were put on Burton. Some delay occurred while Director One searched for a point of aim on Burton, and effective fire was continued on Beverly even after getting set up on Burton, as considerable damage was being done. A total of 36 rounds were fired on Beverly in rapid fire.

At 1100 the 5-inch battery commenced firing on Berlin without air spot, but with considerably better opportunity for enfilading fire. The target was obscured by smoke from fires started by the Main Battery, however, and the true effectiveness could not be observed.

At 1109, the Main Battery fire was shifted to Burton Island, concentrating on the area surrounding the seaplane service apron. The firing on Beverly had consumed both ammunition and time originally allotted to Burton, and only 24 of the allowed 54 rounds were fired. A

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large fire was started in what is believed to have been a fuel storehouse south of the hangar, which continued to burn throughout the day. Direct hits were observed on buildings surrounding the seaplane apron and on what appeared to be gun emplacements near the ramps. A few overs landed among a group of small vessels anchored near the pier.

By 1110 the 5-inch battery had completed firing on Berlin Island, and another director, which had been tracking its point of aim on Burton Island was given control of the starboard mounts and commenced firing a minute later. The first salvos fell in the assigned area along the northern beach of the island. Fire was then shifted to the hangar area, where fires were started. This firing was considered effective.

Phase II

Because of delays occurring prior to the scheduled bombardment and during the period between phases, the runs to the south of Porcelain were made at a speed of 20 knots instead of 12 knots as planned, and the salvo interval was decreased to one minute. The Main Battery opened fire at 1226 on the target areas on the western end of Porcelain. Salvos were fired in accordance with the fire plan and are believed to have been highly effective. All shoreline target areas from 196 around to 152 were covered. In the attempt to put the MPI of the salvos in the installations near the water's edge many shots fell in the water, but most salvos were at least partially effective, and many were completely so. All strong points as indicated on the intelligence charts are believed to have been hit. Fire was ceased at 1250, having fired 66 rounds. Fires were started in areas 175 and 196 which continued to burn throughout the bombardment.

From 1240 to 1250 the port 5-inch battery fired on beach defenses on the southwestern beach of Porcelain Island, and inland ... where batteries were believed to be located. A large fire was started in the latter area, and beach defenses were well covered. At 1251 course was changed to 240° T. and the starboard 5-inch mounts opened fire on beach defenses on the western end of Porcelain Island. Again the effectiveness was good; fires and explosions were seen in this vicinity by both ship and plane observers. This fire was maintained until 1317.

Burton Island was picked up by the Main Battery Directors immediately after ceasing fire on Porcelain. Fire was opened at 1256, and a quick run was made with almost perfect conditions of enfilade. The fire schedule was carried out, and two additional three-gun salvos were fired to partially make up for the small number of rounds fired on the island in the first phase. After initially concentrating on the seaplane apron and adjacent areas, salvos were landed on the southern portion of the island which had not been previously covered. A total of 36 rounds was fired in this phase, 32 of which hit assigned areas. Hangars and shops were set afire, and an antiaircraft battery on the north end of the island was silenced.

A report, now believed to have been erroneous, had been received of a heavy gun emplacement on the southeastern tip of Carlson Island, and Main Battery fire was commenced on this point at 1320. Much difficulty was experienced during this firing due to lack of a definite point of aim in train and range and the narrow width of the target area.

At 1327 the Secondary Battery opened fire for four minutes on an LST type vessel anchored north of the western tip of Porcelain. A hit

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was obtained on the second salvo, starting a small fire and buckling the craft amidships.

Main Battery fire was shifted from the southern tip to the central part of Carlson Island at 1330. Again difficulties were experienced against the narrow island,* but great damage was indicted on the radio station and adjacent buildings. One large radio tower was knocked down, and buildings were left in flames.

Fire was interrupted on Carlson at 1351 to take under fire active batteries on Porcelain. The batteries were quickly silenced by 5-inch and 16-inch fire. Fire was then divided, the forward turrets resuming bombardment of Carlson while Turret 3 and the 5-inch battery continued shooting in the west beach areas on Porcelain until 1407. After the ship completed its run to the northwest and started south again, the Secondary Battery took the northern half of Carlson under fire. After six 5-gun salvos had been fired, the air spotter reported no further suitable targets in this area and, at 1426, the port mounts opened fire on targets in the center of the island, starting several fires and explosions. The fire was continued for three minutes. At 1426, 16-inch fire on Carlson was ceased and the Main Battery was again trained on the west end of Porcelain. The remaining 14 rounds were expended against the shore installations with very gratifying effect.

After completion of 5-inch firing on Carlson, fire was shifted to the west end of Porcelain. After minutes of firing, the after two ports mounts shifted fire to undamaged buildings ... on the lagoon side of Porcelain. This fire was very effective and explosions and fires were seen. Fire was ceased when the target became obscured. Two 5-inch remnant salvos were then fired at the center of Carlson, both of which hit among buildings in the target area.

Because of the many target areas required to be covered by both batteries, fire could not be diverted to ships for any length of time. During the action, the following targets were taken under fire: six islands (bombardment and counterbattery), three patrol craft, two tankers, and one barge. Counterbattery fire was ordered on three occasions and the enemy batteries were promptly silenced. Divided fire in both batteries was employed several times, in order to provide counterbattery fire or to take targets of opportunity under fire, while still continuing the scheduled bombardment. The rapid shift of targets, points of aim, and change of type of fire were ably handled by the plotting room and director personnel because of the careful preparation and realistic drill of the Gunnery Department in the bombardment problem.

This problem not only tested the Gunnery, Fire Control, Radar and CIC equipment to their fullest capacity but also tested the skill and efficiency of the operating personnel of the above equipment. The difficulties at first encountered were readily overcome. The entire performance was most satisfactory.

*Pattern sizes of salvoes are small in deflection, about 10 times longer in range.

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MASSACHUSETTS ACTION REPORT:

Gunnery Officer's Comments

Training for the bombardment had initial impetus from previous battle experience at Casablanca and Nauru. Every effort was made to utilize the experience of other ships in similar problems. The actual training began when the ship's force constructed relief maps of ROI, NAMUR, KWAJALEIN, and EBEYE Islands enroute from Efate to Funafuti. The details of the bombardment and the target areas were learned during the sojourn at Funafuti. Enroute to the Marshalls ammunition was allotted to the various targets and salvo plans were evolved. The salvo plan for each battery and each phase was then tested at General Quarters, with Plot running a solution based on the track charts provided by Commander Battleships, Pacific. After such testing the firing schedules were incorporated in the Bombardment Plan. Considerable time was spent in studying relief maps, photographs, and charts to identify target areas and points of aim for both batteries. All pilots, lookouts, spotters, and director personnel were included in this familiarizing program. In spite of this training, trouble was experienced in identifying the proper point of aim twice during the bombardment. It should be noted that, although this ship was assigned the task of destroying emplacements, pillboxes, and machine guns on EBEYE Island, no chart was ever received showing these specific targets. The targets fired upon were selected from photographs and air target charts.

The Secondary Battery was adequate to the task and provided all the counterbattery fire required. In the bombardment, itself, some of the Main Battery salvos had range patterns of 600 yards. This may have been caused by different initial velocities of the various indices of reduced powder charges. The battery was carefully boresighted and director-checked just prior to the bombardment. All turrets were fired in full automatic train and elevation. Matching errors of any magnitude are therefore unlikely. The most spectacular salvo was the one which caused the explosion of an ammunition dump.

As a recommendation for future bombardments it is suggested that more time be allowed. In the case of EBEYE ISLAND, the firing period was only 30 minutes. In this phase 63 main battery rounds had to be fired at targets B1 to B57 and the seaplane base. In most instances, therefore, only sufficient time was available to fire one three-gun salvo at any particular target or area. The target assignments were such that 63 deliberate single-gun salvos would have been more effective.

EFFECTIVENESS OF GUNNERY - SURFACE

From the standpoint of bombardment, the results of this vessel's main battery fire are considered satisfactory, Phase 2 on Kwajalein Island being considered particularly effective. The north ends of Kwajalein and Ebeye Islands ... were especially well covered. To a lesser degree, [other] areas were well covered [or] partially covered. At least four large fires were started and the ammunition dump was destroyed in this general area. The ammunition storage ... must have been a large one. One of the computers, when the associated director line of sight was elevated to the peak of the explosion and a range taken on the same point, registered an altitude of 3100 feet. Another lesser explosion was also reported resulting from this fire. Concentrated fire at specific defense installations ... on Kwajalein and ... on Ebeye, was reported to have attained hits on guns and pillboxes. In other strong points assigned as targets for this battery direct hits were likewise reported.

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Smoke from earlier firing obscured much of the fall of shot of the secondary battery precluding a specific appraisal of the results of the fire delivered by that battery. It is established, however, that a concentration of 5" projectiles were landed in [seven] areas. ...

The port 5" battery succeeded, by counter battery fire, in silencing a shore defense battery. ... This battery fired at this ship during Phase 1 and was silenced after four salvos from this vessel and no further interference from these beach installations was observed. Other specific targets ... were hit. The secondary battery also fired at small boats at anchor or on a reef.

In many instances, especially during the bombardment of Ebeye Island, main battery fire would have proved considerably more effective had the range pattern been smaller than it was. The reason for this large pattern probably lies in the fact that different indices of reduced charges were used in this bombardment. The three powder indices used were made up of 8", 14", and 16" grains. It was suspected that these indices would produce variations in initial velocities could be expected: 1710 f.s., 1745 f.s., and 1770 f.s. There is no available I.V. data on firing these indices with 1900 lb. projectiles, but there are undoubtedly variations in initial velocity of magnitude comparable to those quoted in this despatch. A 60 f.s. variation in I.V. would produce a 600-yard variation in the fall of shot of H.C. projectiles fired with reduced charge at 14,000 yards. These data are submitted to account for the large range patterns reported from time to time. Since most of the salvos on Ebeye Island were across the width of the island, and since the average width of this island is 300 yards, it must be expected that salvos with accurately placed M.P.I.s would at times result in overs and shorts which would not hit the island. These shots are referred to as "wild" shots since they missed the target area.

MAIN BATTERY

Capture of Kwajalein Atoll

February 1944

The invasion of the Marshall islands was supported and protected by the Fast Carrier Force, its task groups including eight fast battleships.

The newest of these were the recently-added IOWA and NEW JERSEY. The naval bombardment which immediately preceded the landing on Kwajalein featured the 16-inch and 5-inch batteries of six of Task Force 58's new battleships.

INDIANA ACTION REPORT:

All gunnery machinery was shut down when the other battery (main or secondary) was firing, in order to avoid overheating of motors. This paid dividends as no trouble was experienced with any machinery other than the minor casualties.

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SOUTH DAKOTA ACTION REPORT:

The first approach of the fast battleships followed three aircraft bombings of the previous day. At this stage low speed cannot be used generally due to the probable counter battery fire and submarine threat. In the later runs, the low speeds recommended should be used. Low speed with a proper anti-submarine screen, identification of the individual blockhouses, gun installations, pillboxes, control posts, etc., and subsequent destruction is ensured provided adequate and timely photographs are furnished the bombarding ships.

ALABAMA ACTION REPORT:

The aids to preparation and conduct of the bombardment were extensive, and it is strongly recommended that this service be continued, since the success of the enterprise will be directly proportional to the amount of preparation and training preceding it, which in turn depends on this pre-bombardment intelligence. Photographs taken 29 January from altitudes as low as 500 feet by ESSEX planes were delivered to ALABAMA that afternoon by message drop and were most helpful. Continuance of this procedure whenever practicable is recommended.

NORTH CAROLINA ACTION REPORT:

Preparations Preliminary to Bombardment.

This ship took advantage of regular entry and departure from various ports to conduct simulated bombardment. These drills involved Ship Control and Combat Information Center in addition to the Main and Secondary Battery fire control organizations. Procedures, methods of control, types of fire, and battery and ammunition setups had been organized and tested during drills, during firing of bombardment practices, and in the battleship bombardment of Nauru on December 8, 1943. No major departure from these procedures was found necessary to carry our either the scheduled bombardment of Roi and Namur or the special bombardment of ROI. As soon as security measures permitted their release, orders and intelligence data pertaining to the scheduled ROI-NAMUR bombardment were carefully studied by all officers and men whose duties required knowledge of these. Classes were held for rangefinder, director and all control station crews on the general plan of attack, objectives, intended salvo plan, characteristics of ROI and NAMUR and adjacent islands, location and appearance of all known landmarks, targets and target areas, methods of fire planned to be used, bearings on which to obtain best enfilade effect on target areas, and possible enemy countermeasures. Radar personnel were particularly instructed as to probable good lands for tracking.

*Gunfirespotters stationed in the elevated main-battery directors.

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Flintlock Bombardment
Main Battery
USS Washington
January 30, 1944

Operation FLINTLOCK, the seizure of the Marshall Islands, began with the occupation of Majuro. On 30 January 1944 the fast battleships returned to Kwajalein; WASHINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS, and INDIANA opened the assault, later followed by older battleships. This track chart, from WASHINGTON'S action report, traces her movements off southern Kwajalein. Individual islands were identified by code names:

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Methods of Gunnery Control.

The gunnery control procedure followed the standard bombardment procedures used by this ship for the Main and Secondary Batteries. Except when in direct fire, the rangekeeper tracked prominent landmarks upon which a director could obtain ranges and bearings, either by optics or by radar. Spots were applied in range and deflection ... to hit assigned target areas. Points on which the directors trained were shifted, keeping the director point of aim as close as possible to the target area being fired on. Spotting during the daylight phase of the special bombardment was by top spotters, assisted by Mark 8 radar spots when splashes of shells hitting the water were seen in the scope. Deflection spots were generally accurate. Good range spots were obtained optically on salvos intended for beach areas and areas close to the beach. Little trouble was caused by smoke and dust from explosions on the island. At times targets were obscured momentarily, but except where large continuous fires were burning, the visibility rapidly cleared. During Phase 2 on January 30, direct fire was employed on targets such as blockhouses, runways, pillboxes, beach defenses, etc., with excellent results.

Firing by radar control during the night was not difficult because of the excellent performance of the Mark 8 radars in picking up landmarks. Flashes of bursts from the projectiles could easily be seen and made optical spotting possible. The spotter could determine the position of the bursts relative to persistent fires on the island. The Mark 8 radars observed the bursting on land of projectiles from one salvo only and gave a "no change" spot on that salvo. Optical spotting in deflection at night is considered to have been accurate. The top spotter made range spots which were probably fairly reliable. Many explosions on the island were seen during the night bombardment.

SITUATION MAP KWAJALEIN ISLAND
1-4 February 1944

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SUMMARY OF ROUNDS FIRED BY VESSELS AGAINST KWAJALEIN ATOLL OBJECTIVES

Bombardment of Mili (Mille) Atoll March 1944

On 18 March 1944, IOWA, NEW JERSEY, and two destroyers attacked bypassed Mili Atoll. Two hits from Mili's coast defense guns caused IOWA minor damage; the scar from one hit can still be seen on the side plate of Turret II.

IOWA ACTION REPORT:

It was planned that the bombardment group conduct a slow and methodical bombardment of Mille in coordination with ... air strikes by LEXINGTON groups in order to afford training to BatDiv 7, to destroy and damage enemy coastal installations, antiaircraft guns and coastal stations, ammunition, stores, fuel and personnel; and to cooperate in training LEXINGTON air group in gunnery observation and spotting procedure.

Upon arrival off Mille on morning of 18 March, bombardment commenced according to plan. Effective counterfire from shore batteries was experienced after closing to the 15,000 yard track line. As a result, the original bombardment plan, which contemplated final phase on the 10,000 yard track line, was abandoned. The final phase was fired outside 20,000 yards. Task group returned to base on 19 March 1944.

(a) Fast battleships of TF 58
(b) Older battleships, operating with the amphibious forces.

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MILLI ISLAND – APPROACH
MAY 20, 1943

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MILLI I. -
MARSHALL IS.

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Commander Task Unit 50.10.1 gave verbal orders to fire the main battery only at the times prescribed by the Bombardment Plan, but to continue using the 5" battery for counter battery fire. At about 0956, IOWA took another medium caliber hit in the hull, port side, frame 134, about four feet below the main deck. No fires resulted from either hit. Moderate damage was sustained. At 1000 cease firing with all batteries was executed according to plan, and air groups commenced first strike. During the period 0929 to 1007, approximately 20 shells were reported to have hit the water within a radius of 300 yards from IOWA, both shorts and overs. The last two of these shells landed close aboard to starboard when IOWA was retiring, distant some 20,000 yards from the nearest land.

IOWA still had her planned allowance of main battery bombardment ammunition remaining for use during the second firing period. NEW JERSEY was directed to leave formation and operate independently while IOWA resumed bombardment. At 1315, opened fire with main battery on enemy shore installations, range 20,000 yards. During this last phase of the bombardment no activity by shore batteries was observed. At 1359, ceased firing and hauled off to the west, NEW JERSEY rejoining formation at this time. At 1400 LEXINGTON air group commenced its second strike according to schedule. During this strike, two particularly violent explosions were observed on Mille Island.

Performance of Own Ordnance Material and Equipment.

Tracking. Reference points in the target area were tracked by the rangekeeper in plot aft* and Director 2. Current was determined by solving for target course and speed, these values being set on the firing rangekeeper in plot forward. A navigational plot was maintained in plot forward using ranges and bearings of the tracking point as supplied by the after rangekeeper. Since the island had been under almost daily air bombardment for a period of several weeks, it was anticipated that difficulty would be experienced in identifying tracking points. This proved to be the case. Throughout the whole operation only two tracking points could be even partially identified. One was a major tower apparently located bout 500 yards east of the intersection of runways A and C. This tower was used as a point of aim several times during the bombardment, but could not be located by the air spotters even though one carrier spotter made several low passes over the area in an effort to identify the tower. The other point was an aircraft revetment at the western intersection of runways A and C. This was visible from the ship for only a short time when the ship was to the southwest of the island.

*IOWA-class battleships have two main-battery plotting rooms.

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The situation was cleared up by directing the plane to spot North or South and East or West. Communications with spotting planes were excellent. Air spots were received in the plotting room over a loudspeaker so that all concerned could clearly hear the spotter. The plotting room officer used the radio transmitter at intervals to talk directly to the air spotter. At other times the plotting room radioman controlled the spotting circuit as directed by the plotting room officer.

Rangefinder. Mark 8 radar ranges to nearest land were compared with optical ranges to assist radar operators in determining the range to reference point. Casualties to the Mark 8 radar due to shock of gunfire made it necessary to rely entirely on optical ranges during the latter part of the 15,000 yard run.

Performance of enemy ordnance.

Enemy gunfire was well controlled and accurate. When the battleships turned away to haul off for the first air strike, the enemy guns quickly went to rapid fire and continued in rapid fire until the ships were out of range, this ship was straddled at least 10 times at a range of about 13,000 yards, and many shells landed from 200 yards over to 1,000 yards short. The foremost tower structure was apparently used as a point of aim since most of the near misses were from 10 to 50 yards on either side of the tower in deflection. Two hits were received. ... The hit on the left side plate of Turret 2 did not affect operation of the turret which continued to fire until the phase was completed. There were 10 shots that landed less than 50 yards from the ship's side.

Own battle damage.

Gunnery. The projectiles which struck the left side plate of Turret 2 about 18" above the barbette, detonated on impact. Fragments entered the left pointer's night port, demolishing the pointer's telescope, Mark 66. Another fragment entered the left rangefinder port, breaking the glass in the left end window of the Mark 52 rangefinder.* About 20 feet of the watershed and gas seal on the left side of the turret was torn off. The STS splinter shield around 40 MM Mount #1 on the starboard side of the first superstructure deck was heavily sprayed by fragments, but the shield was not pierced and none of the crew was injured.

*Long-base turret rangefinder.

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permitted passage of a fragment that was driven through the upper half of writing desk in stateroom 103. Other fragments hit against the conning tower foundation at frame 84 (25 lb. STS) but only scarred the surface. A fragment also deflected top of davit stop. Damage to turret did not interfere with operation, but exposed roller path to effects of weather. Pointer’s telescope in the turret was ruined.

A shell having base plug measuring 4.5" struck and penetrated through "P" strake (25 lb. STS) at frame 134 on port side. Exploding on impact, or soon thereafter, this shell tore a jagged hole inward, roughly 30" by 50" in size. Many fragments, including base plate, were found in the space inboard of the shell in the second deck void B-228V, which runs from frame 127 to 135. The void is 5' wide at the second deck level. The top of this hole was about 1’ below the main deck level, and the bottom limits cleared the waterline by some 13 feet. Several fragments struck and marked the next bulkhead inboard, torpedo defense bulkhead, #3 (4C lb. STS), but did not penetrate. At one point a small bulge in this bulkhead is noticeable from the inboard side in the Engineering Log Room. Fragments tore away a 3’ section of air escape line from fuel oil overflow line, but did not damage the latter line appreciably. Several holes were made in a small drain line going through the void. The "M" and "Q" degaussing coils running through the void were cut, 12 strands being severed. No damage was done to 20 lb. STS deck, or to other limits of the space.

Battleship Bombardment of Ponape, Caroline Islands

May 1944

Part of the preliminaries to the invasion of the Marianas consisted of an attack on the large island of Ponape, site of a Japanese airfield and seaplane base. While a carrier task group provided air cover IOWA, NEW JERSEY, MASSACHUSETTS, NORTH CAROLINA, ALABAMA, and SOUTH DAKOTA shelled the island for 70 minutes.

ALABAMA ACTION REPORT:

The bombardment was conducted in a leisurely manner and was scheduled so that there was no confusion between the fire of different ships. The approach and firing navigation tracks were highly satisfactory and operated to simplify what could easily have been a very difficult gunnery problem. It is recommended that surface ship bombardment be conducted in similar fashion whenever practicable.

Control was relatively easy and merits little comment. The main battery used indirect fire throughout; the secondary battery used offset control. The secondary battery also was set up for indirect fire and maintained a track during the bombardment. Main battery control against Langar and Japutik Islands, in particular, was extremely accurate.

Exact knowledge of results obtained would benefit gunnery personnel greatly in the determination of accuracy of fire and improvement of future performance. It is recommended that post bombardment pictures be distributed whenever possible.

--40--

MASSACHUSETTS ACTION REPORT:

Include low altitude pictures of area to be bombarded taken from altitude of approximately 100'-150’ at ranges of 25,000, 20,000 and

15,000 yards along the prospective lines of fire. These would be of inestimable aid to top spotters in picking out points of aim and targets.

NEW JERSEY ACTION REPORT:

Air spots were provided by ship's planes. Voice radio communication between ship and plane was excellent. The radio receiver in the controlling spotter's plane was apparently jarred off frequency by the force of catapulting, but this trouble was remedied by returning prior to commence fire.

The C.I.C, maintained a navigational track of the ship throughout the action. The position of the ship was determined by Director 2 Radar bearings and ranges on Mant Island of Pakin Atoll. The use of high peaks on PONAPE, as radar navigational targets, was not attempted as it would have involved the identification of one of several high peaks and could easily have resulted in confusion.

The navigational track obtained was plotted on a chart containing an expanded section of the island with grid areas designated, and was used to furnish bearings and ranges on any desired point to the Main and Secondary Battery Plotting Rooms.

IOWA ACTION REPORT:

Prior to the bombardment, a relief map of the target area was constructed which was of great value in preparing aloft personnel for the actual appearance of the island from the firing area. However, photographs taken from low altitudes from seaward would have been of much more benefit, and it is recommended that future photo reconnaissance of target areas which may be bombarded include such photographs. An object which, in a vertical photograph appears to offer a good point of aim, usually turns out to be invisible or unrecognizable from the foretop of a ship 20,000 yards away.

Control Procedure and Spotting -- When firing direct, Director One was in control of train, level, and firing circuits. Top spots were used in deflection and air spot in range. When firing indirect fire, Director One controlled train to the reference point, and director 4 (stable vertical) controlled level and firing circuits. Necessary range and deflection spots to correct for the difference between the reference point and the target area were computed in the plotting room. Air spots in range and deflection were used.

Tracking - Numerous well defined reference points were available on Ponape Island and no difficulty was experienced in maintaining an accurate navigational track in plot forward. Except for the two salvos fired at Tolen Palikir and the three at Jokaj Ridge, all fire was indirect, using some visible object near the target area as a reference point for director train and rangefinder ranges. Except for the five salvos mentioned above, the target areas were not visible from the ship. During

--41--

the second phase the top of a hangar near number one airfield was used as a reference point. This hangar became hidden behind a ridge at 1548 and the range keeper was allowed to generate range and bearing on this reference point while the ship made a 180-degree course change and closed the range 1,700 yards. At 1557, with the reference point still hidden, fire was reopened on generated range and bearing and four salvos were fired obtaining hits in the barracks area and starting fires. At 1603 the reference point came into view from behind the ridge, and the trainer's crosswire of director one, which had remained matched in automatic in train, was found to be one mil to the right. The rangefinder range was 100 yards low on generated present range. The accuracy of own ship's course and speed inputs and of the range and bearing integrators in the Mark 8 range-keeper, as evidenced by this small cumulative error over a fifteen minute period, was most gratifying, and speaks well for the high quality of IOWA's fire control equipment.

Air spotter reported that IOWA salvos started fires in Ponape Town and in the stores and barracks areas southeast of airfield number one. Salvos fired at airfield number two did no apparent damage aside from digging up the runways and adjacent areas.

NORTH CAROLINA ACTION REPORT:

In view of the great amount of detailed planning and instruction necessary in preparing for bombardment, intelligence data should be provided as far in advance as possible. Late photographs showing remaining targets and target areas after air bombing, as were furnished by CTF 57 for the bombardment of Ponape, are most valuable.

The gunnery control procedure followed the standard bombardment procedures previously used by this ship for main and secondary batteries. Except when direct fire was employed, the rangekeeper tracked prominent landmarks upon which optical bearings, and radar and optical ranges were obtained. Level was controlled in phase 1 by Spot 1, with the top of the hill as point of aim. In phases 2 and 4 level was controlled by the stable vertical. Spots were applied in range and deflection to hit specific targets or areas. During phase 1 the controlling secondary battery computer received train and radar range from the controlling main battery director for firing on Japutik Island. (This was the initial use made of a recent alteration to the switchboard wiring making provision for the control of the secondary battery from a main battery director.)

Shift of the main battery MPI to hit specific targets in the town of Ponape, during phase 2, was done by application of spots from the spotting aviator with excellent results. Provisions were made to shift to indirect-fire method of bombardment in the event that tracking points close to the target area became obscured.

Coordination and flow of information between CIC, flag plot, gunnery department, ship control and communications were smoothly and efficiently handled. Control of fighter aircraft in the Combat Air Patrol, assigned this ship during the bombardment, functioned in excellent fashion.

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Marianas Operation; Fast Battleship Bombardment of Saipan and Tinian

June 1944

Two days before D-Day the fast battleships of Task Force 58--IOWA, NEW JERSEY, WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, INDIANA, and ALABAMA -- began the pre-landing bombardment of Saipan and Tinian. Though this attack appeared successful to shipboard observers at the time, it proved a failure due to a lack of the specialized training and experience required for successful shore bombardment.

COMMANDER, TG 51, ACTION REPORT:

The following essential features were incorporated in basic plans:

(a) Major air strikes by aircraft of fast Carrier Task Forces (TF 58) commencing on D-3. (Actually the first strike, a fighter sweep, was made on D-4). These strikes were to gain complete control of the air and to soften the islands for the landings.

(b) An extensive bombardment on Dog minus TWO by Battleships of Task Force 58. This bombardment was designed to knock out major enemy defenses and to support initial minesweeping activities in accordance with requirements specified by CTF 52.

IOWA ACTION REPORT:

1. Performance of ... ordnance material was satisfactory in all respects. Tracking presented no difficulties and plane and top spots were coordinated in the plotting room. Numerous fires were started among buildings adjacent to the Ushi Point airfields by both 16" and 5" fire. One 16" salvo blew up an ammunition dump in a most spectacular fashion and provided an excellent fireworks display for several minutes afterwards.

The procedure used in previous bombardments of Milli and Ponape was found to be satisfactory.

Samuel Eliot Morison,
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II,
Volume VIII:

On the morning of 13 June (D minus 2 day) the seven new battleships under Admiral Lee's command, together with a number of destroyers, were detached from the fast carrier groups to deliver the first scheduled bombardment of Saipan and Tinian, reports of land-based reconnaissance planes on 29 May had shown intense activity in the strengthening of the Saipan defenses. The fringe of the island was well provided with coast defense and antiaircraft guns, but very few blockhouses. Miles of new trenches had been dug. Admiral Turner's fire support groups were not due to arrive until the 14th, hence the big ships of the carrier groups were given the assignment to start bombardment a day earlier.

Sad to relate, the bombardment of 13 June was a failure. These fast battleships simply did not know the technique. They had been too busy steaming around with carriers to practice bombardment, a type of firing that requires slow and patient adjustment on specific targets, differing widely from main battery fire in a naval engagement. Pilots of the battleships' spotter planes had not learned to distinguish targets. And the battlewagons were required to shoot from ranges between 10,000 and

--43--

16,000 yards because they were considered too valuable to risk in the unswept shoal area which extends about six miles to leeward of Saipan. The result was that most of the 16-inch and 5-inch shells went completely wild, and the only targets destroyed were large, conspicuous, and of no military value, such as farmhouses and the Charan Kanoa sugar mill. Actually 2432 high-capacity 16-inch and 12,544 five-inch shells were expended in all this sound and fury. There was much truth in a humorous bluejacket's description of this bombardment as "a Navy-sponsored farm project that simultaneously plows the fields, prunes the trees, harvests the crops, and adds iron to the soil."

SAIPAN
Landings and progress
15-21 June 1944

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Capture of Iwo Jima

February 1945

Preinvasion bombardment of Iwo Jima was carried out, for three days, by fire support ships of the amphibious force. These warships were joined, on the morning of D-Day, by the fast battleships WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA for what Samuel Eliot Morison called "the heaviest pre-H-Hour bombardment of World War II."

COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS GROUP 1, ACTION REPORT:

This operation clearly demonstrated that previous high altitude bombings and long range bombardment of Iwo Jima directed only into "target areas" achieved negligible damage to the very numerous defenses of the island, which were stout, comparatively small, and well dispersed. Photographic interpretation shows, on the contrary, that the defenses were substantially increased in number during December, January, and early February. The bombardment by this force on 16 and 17 February also had less than the desired effect, due to interference by weather, to the need for giving way to minesweeping and UDT operations, and by lack of thorough familiarity with the actual important targets, as distinguished from a mark on a map, or a photograph. It was not until after fire support ships, their spotting planes, and support aircraft had worked at the objective for 2 days, had become familiar with the location and appearance of the defenses, and had accurately attacked them with close-range gunfire and low altitude air strikes, that substantial results were achieved. This experience emphasizes once again the need for ample time as well as ample ships, aircraft, and ammunition, for preliminary reduction of defenses of a strongly defended position. At the same time it is realized that certain defenses will never be destroyed or even discovered until after the troops land.

NORTH CAROLINA ACTION REPORT:

19 February (D-Day)

0530, special task group consisting of NORTH CAROLINA (BB55), WASHINGTON (BB56), [3 cruisers and screening destroyers] arrived vicinity Iwo Jima. ... 0545 , sounded general quarters for scheduled bombardment of Iwo Jima.

Took station ..., later maneuvering to maintain line of fire north of 270° True after H-Hour. 0640, launched two spotting planes. 0701, commenced firing main battery. 0705, sunrise. First targets were coast defense guns ..., ... antiaircraft guns and dual-purpose battery. ... 0744, main battery commenced firing area coverage fire over assigned areas. 0827, secondary battery commenced firing. ... 1243, main battery shifted to direct fire on pillboxes and caves containing antiaircraft guns. ... 1258, main battery shifted to 155mm gun or mortar installation. ... 1343, main battery shifted fire to ... engage gun installations reported by WASHINGTON'S spotting planes. 1435, took antiaircraft guns ...under fire of main battery. 1542, main battery fire was shifted to gun installations. ... From 1605 to 1712 secondary battery fire was concentrated ... to destroy small caliber guns which were firing at this ship. 1649, gun installations ... again taken under fire by the main battery. 1712, secondary battery ceased firing. 1738, main battery ceas-

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ed firing. 1842, recovered one aircraft, other being recovered by WASHINGTON. Proceeded to join TG 54.9 (Covering Force Night Deployment Group). ...

20 February

0615, arrived off Iwo Jima. ... 0717, launched one spotting plane, other of this ship's planes being launched by WASHINGTON..... 0759, commenced firing with main battery on coast defense guns ... and with secondary battery. ... Secondary battery continued firing ... until 0948. 0931, main battery ceased firing. 1100, recovered two aircraft. ...

21 February

1140, commenced firing secondary battery. ... 1650, secondary battery ceased fire. ...

22 February

1407, commenced firing secondary battery. ... Entire firing was close support fire for our troops, as directed by shore fire control party. 1641, secondary battery ceased fire. ... 1 840, joined TG 58.12 ... and departed Iwo Jima area.

Personnel Performance and Casualties

.... Personnel maintained a high degree of efficiency throughout four days of bombardment and one night AA action, this period having been preceded, and being followed, by the ship's operations with Task Force 58 in connection with the Tokyo air strikes.

Lessons Learned...

Additional oblique photographs should be provided which indicate the appearance of the target from a height of approximately 100 feet at ranges of 6,000 - 10,000 yards.

Bombardment tracking drill, as a matter of routine in entering port, is recommended for the development of a well-trained team for bombardment actions.

Great care must be used in ramming 16" reduced charges, particularly at low gun elevations, to preclude the possibility of primers' flames failing to ignite these short bags at an excessive distance from the primer vent.

Auxiliary CIC, capable of tracking the ship's position in the main plotting room, is an effective aid to fire control in bombardment actions.

The accuracy demonstrated by the 5" battery in blind, close-support fire on D-plus-3 indicates that, with present equipment and methods of indirect fire, the 16" battery also warrants consideration for such a role if deemed necessary.

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NAVAL GUNFIRE OFFICER REPORT TO COMMANDING GENERAL, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS:

TRAINING: CONCLUSIONS. That the successful coordination of Naval Gunfire, Air and Artillery was largely due to the indoctrination of all command levels of the Corps, as a result of extensive command post exercises.

DOG DAY BOMBARDMENT. A squadron of specially trained air spotters made its first appearance controlling fires in the PACIFIC in this operation. The squadron was a veteran of EUROPEAN operations. Thirty-two pilots, equipped with 24 FM-2 fighter ... aircraft and 6 TBFs, were available. The FM-2s were equipped with a two-channel MF* radio and a ten-channel VHF* set. The unit trained with ships and SFCPs in the HAWAIIAN area. Their workmanlike performance during this training period indicated that the squadron would be a valuable asset during an operation. The squadron was capable of maintaining 8 VOF on station throughout Dog-Day and Dog-plus-1. Thereafter, 6 planes would be kept in the air for spotting missions.

BRIEFING. The plan, as finally drawn, was the product of virtually all echelons of command. The gunnery officers ... worked in close coordination. Questions were fully discussed and completely considered before they were incorporated into the plan. The plan itself was closely studied by all echelons and, in its final form, represented the efforts of all organizations, and three months of work. It was realized that all hands had to know the plan completely. The assault troops who were to follow the barrage, and the firing ships which had to maintain a complicated schedule of fire while keeping station in the midst of [landing] boats, had to be thoroughly familiar with all phases.

CONCLUSIONS. That the Dog-Day bombardment, in conjunction with the destruction accomplished in the preliminary firing, enabled a successful landing to be made against one of the enemy’s most heavily and skillfully defended possessions, with acceptable casualties.

*MF: medium frequency. VHF: very high frequency.

--47—

IWO JIMA
19 FEBRUARY 1943

TRACK CHART
TASK FORCE 39
I July - 15 August 1945

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Third Fleet Operations off Japan, July-August 1945:

Fast Battleship Bombardments of Honshu, Hokkaido

14 July: SOUTH DAKOTA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS bombard Kamaishi, Honshu.

15 July: IOWA, MISSOURI, WISCONSIN bombard Muroran, Hokkaido.

18 July: NORTH CAROLINA, ALABAMA, IOWA, MISSOURI, WISCONSIN bombard Hitachi, Honshu. British fast BB KING GEORGE V attacks nearby target. 29-30 July: SOUTH DAKOTA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS night bombardment of

Hamamatsu, Honshu.

9 August: SOUTH DAKOTA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS bombard Kamaishi.

SOUTH DAKOTA ACTION REPORT (Kamaishi, 14 July):

Fire discipline was excellent throughout. The methods used by CIC and Main Plot, employing both fire control and search radars for determining the ship's position, proved extremely satisfactory; little difficulty had been expected in view of the rugged and distinctive nature of the terrain. Gunnery communications, with the exception of the radio communications with the air spotters, were excellent.

Kamaishi proved to be an excellent bombardment target from the standpoint of radar tracking. Tracking points which appeared to be good targets were predesignated, similar to the procedure employed in SOUTH DAKOTA'S previous bombardments; the ship's position was accurately fixed at all times. At close ranges the ship's track in CIC was maintained with the VF PPI almost entirely. For the early stages of the approach a plexiglass overlay with 10° bearing lines and concentric range circles was used with some success. Once the range had closed to 25 miles it was of little use, and normal tracking proved to be speedier and much more accurate. It is believed the overlay would work well at short ranges where radar is confronted with a low unbroken coast line and where sharp, distinct echoes cannot be found.

Land was first picked up on the SK at 0214 ... and identified as Rakko Take (4,800 feet) bearing 343°, 77 miles; no difficulty was experienced thereafter, and land contacts were made at expected ranges and times.

Director control officers and radar operators should make a complete analysis of radar tracking points from all available photos and charts and should sketch appearance of these points as they will appear on fire control radar scopes from several different bearings and ranges. It would be of material value if the OTC were to lay down the bombardment approach track in the operation order and endeavor to follow that track as closely as possible. This would facilitate the analysis and identification of tracking points by radar.

CTU 34.8.2 (COMBATDIV 7) ACTION REPORT (Muroran, 15 July):

On 15 July 1945 Commander Battleship Division 7 conducted the day bombardment of industrial targets in Muroran, Hokkaido. The timing of this bombardment was an important factor because as the bombardment progressed weather and visibility closed in and upon completion the ceiling was 1,000 feet. Spotters were hampered throughout by the reduced visibility, the low ceiling, and flames and smoke in the target area. Under these circumstances the successful control of fire was enhanced by the expeditious completion of the bombardment.

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Reports of spotters immediately upon completion of the bombardment disclosed the following: In the Nihon Plant a terrific explosion, followed by fires to 300 feet in large shops, was observed in addition to considerable damage along the waterfront. In the Wanishi Iron Works, of 8 buildings with stacks observed from ships on arrival, 4 were seen to be demolished. The entire area was covered by fires, with damage to 4 blast furnaces, a storehouse, and many other buildings. Heavy smoke was also observed from what appeared to be a chemical plant. The coal liquefaction plant was heavily hit and gas tanks and all coke furnaces but one were damaged.

CTU 34.1.2 6 COMBATDIV 6) ACTION REPORT (Hitachi, 18 July):

This (bombardment of HITACHI-MITO Area, HONSHU, 17-18 July) is the first experience on a large scale, so far as is known, with night bombardment of enemy industrial targets. Conditions for accurate gunnery were about as difficult as might ever be expected. There was not complete control of the air, it was raining, and visibility was about 2 miles. It was impossible to spot, so the bombardment was completely blind and any hits obtained were entirely dependent upon an accurate fixing of the ship's position. The range was extreme, so that even had the fix been perfect the errors of ordnance and gunnery which make spot

ting necessary might well have caused all projectiles to miss. The speed had to be high and the duration of the bombardment short with consequent high rate of fire. None of the elements of successful destructive bombardment was present--s1ow speed, close range, deliberate fire, accurate fixing of the ship's position, and the spotting of each salvo. From the standpoint of maintaining pressure on the enemy it was a success. In terms of gun wear and hits per round fired it was expensive. Material damage to the enemy, as judged from the photo interpretation report and as expected, was small. In fact the damage was considerably greater than might be expected under the conditions.

Five rounds per gun--5 salvos--were fired at each of 4 targets. None of these targets was hit. Although, in this case, it was necessary to take these targets under fire, it appears that where it is not necessary, such a small number of salvos is unproductive of material damage in a night bombardment and these rounds would be more effective if added to other targets.

It is felt that the results of this bombardment were encouraging in forecasting substantial success for a night bombardment where spotting is possible. The destruction should be directly proportional to the accuracy of the spotting.

MASSACHUSETTS ACTION REPORT:

When salvos are being directed in a large area blanketed by smoke, with observations impossible, it is believed that better control of the salvos in hitting define targets can be gained by shifting the point of aim for one or two salvos to a target that is visible to the spotter and, having checked the hitting range, returning to the blanketed area.

MISSOURI ACTION REPORT:

The bombardment of HITACHI, HONSHU, 17/18 July apparently was another

--50--

very successful bombardment. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise. The bombardment problem was a most difficult one. The coast was relatively unknown and the charts varied in presentation of the navigational points and soundings. The coast was also quite smooth, and there were practically no distinctive tracking points throughout the approach and bombardment run.

Main reliance for obtaining a fix was placed on DRT position and soundings, plus occasional radar cuts on peaks or small points along the coastline. The position was checked between ships using the interplotting-room frequency.* This was the first time this frequency was used and it proved to be of great assistance to this ship. The coordination between the navigator, Combat and Plot was satisfactory and at all times Plot had the latest and best navigational position form whence to shoot. To make the problem more difficult, the visibility was very limited and a steady drizzle of rain was present during the approach and firing. At no time was the fall of shot or land visible to the ship.

In order to check the firing data the following procedure was used: The center of the target on the second phase was about 1,000 yards from the water's edge. The forward Mark 8 radar (Spot I) was placed in automatic to track the target following the rangekeeper setup** just before opening fire on this target. The range line indicated a fall of shot 1,000 yards in from the beach on the first salvo. A down spot of 500 yards was placed on the second salvo and the range line indicated a fall of shot 500 yards from the beach. Another down 500 was placed on the third salvo and three splashes were observed on the Mark 8 scope at all stations indicating the accuracy of the original range to the target. This procedure was carried out again on the eighth and ninth salvos with the same results. It is believed that this is a good procedure to follow under similar bombardment circumstances on targets near the beach.

MASSACHUSETTS ACTION REPORT:

The success or failure of a bombardment depends entirely on the air spotter's observations. Therefore, every consideration should be given to the factors which affect the ability of the spotter to make accurate observations. First, he must be thoroughly familiar with the area, which can be brought about only through the study of low oblique and colored photographs in addition to high verticals. Second, he must be assigned a type plane or position in a plane which permits observations with ease. The rear seat of the Helldiver and Avenger is not suitable for this assignment. Third, due consideration must be given to the adverse effect of smoke in obscuring an area.

*Voice radio net connecting ships' plotting rooms.

**According to the solution generated by the rangekeeper.

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THE TIDES OF WAR IN THE PACIFIC

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Photographs of the coast line taken from seaward, at masthead height on the probable approach bearings, distributed for study, would greatly assist the problem of identifying landmarks for fixing the ship's position.

Every effort should be made to obtain low altitude photographs of a target area after the bombardment, with copies forwarded to the firing ships for study.

The use of smoke for deception and concealment by the Japanese is a definite possibility, and may be encountered in future bombardments. Spotters must be on the alert to detect this and must avoid making false reports on the extent of damage based on the quantity of smoke or fires observed.

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U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT SURVEY: SHIPS' BOMBARDMENT OF JAPAN, 1945. REPORT OF SHIPS' BOMBARDMENT SURVEY PARTY:

Surface bombardments of Japan proper took place shortly before the Japanese surrender. It is not probable that the economic consequences ... were felt on the fighting fronts before the war ended, but there is evidence...that the attacks, in combination with other pressures ..., had considerable influence in lowering the will to continue the war of the local populations which were subjected to gunfire from heavy ships.

Had the war continued, it is estimated that about 22 per cent of total Japanese pig iron production ... would have been lost because of the effects of three attacks against plants of the iron and steel industry .... Other surface bombardments appear to have had little effect on the Japanese economic structure ... except to the extent that they contributed to increased ... absenteeism and reduced ... productivity. ...

This report demonstrates the vital role which intelligence information plays in shore bombardment, and the necessity for ... an organization which, among other functions, is capable of identifying key industries in the enemy's ... economy, designating the most vulnerable points of attack, providing detailed information on targets selected for assault, and assessing results.

The Kamaishi Works of Japan Iron Company, ... as a result of two bombardments, incurred very considerable physical damage, and a loss of production equivalent to from eight to twelve months output. Yet no major building ... was destroyed because the greatest concentration of hits did not exceed 37 per 200 yard square. In the bombardments generally the density of hits was much lower, possibly because of the technique of aiming at different buildings scattered throughout a target area, or intentionally spreading the fall of shot to cover an entire target, under the assumption that both accuracy of firing and effectiveness of ammunition would be greater than they actually proved to be.

Data on the effectiveness of projectiles ... indicate that about 42 direct hits by 16-inch high-capacity projectiles would be required to cause 50 per cent structural damage to a heavy steel-framed building approximately 600 feet long and 150 feet wide. ...doctrine and techniques for attacking industrial targets with ships can be considerably improved by further study based on reappraisals of weapon effectiveness and accuracy of firing under varying conditions. It also appears that, although long and medium range attacks by both day and night can inflict considerable damage, destruction of ... heavy industry by such attacks is not to be expected unless either a very large amount of ammunition is allotted to the task or much greater accuracy is obtained. Experience has shown that it is possible to raise the level of accuracy at the expense of increasing the hazard to ... ships by using shorter ranges and prolonging firing periods. The extent to which these measures can be adopted will therefore usually be governed by the broad strategic aspects of the war as well as the immediate tactical situation.

The Hamamatsu and Hitachi areas were subjected to high explosive and incendiary bombing as well as ... surface bombardment, and study... thus permitted a certain ... comparison of the relative effectiveness of these forms of attack. Because of the highly combustible nature of the majority of ... targets, fires initiated by incendiary bombing clearly

--54--

caused the greatest ... damage. Although a considerable number of fires were associated with high explosive bombing and gunfire, there were many instances in which detonation ... definitely did not initiate fires directly, even when occurring in structures of light wood and paper construction. It therefore seems probable that, in general, fires initiated by ... explosives were caused by overturning of cooking fires, striking of volatile and inflammable liquids or gases, short circuits, etc.

It appears that development of major caliber incendiary ammunition is warranted, and is a necessity if ships are to be used in the future for large- scale bombardment of industrial plants or urban areas.

It is concluded that ... explosive projectiles or bombs are most efficiently used when directed against targets which are highly resistant to burning. Against heavy steel-framed buildings, individual 2,000-pound bombs seem to be approximately eight times as effective as 16-inch high capacity projectiles in producing damage when mean areas of effectiveness are compared. Serious fragment damage from bombs seems to be confined largely to the immediate vicinity of each hit, while the heavy fragments from projectiles proved capable of damaging machines at considerable distances. Both missiles showed themselves ... capable of damaging the heaviest ... industrial structures. Choice of weapon against such targets would seem to be governed largely by deciding whether, in specific circumstances, sufficient hits can most easily be delivered by ships or planes, and weighing the relative risk involved. Since reports of gunnery exercises indicate that at least 90 per cent of hits on individual large buildings is to be expected at short ranges, as compared to an average of something less than one per cent in these bombardments, it is apparent that this type of attack can be devastating with great economy of ammunition and effort when circumstances permit its use. It is ... evident that, considering the enemy economy as a whole, only a small percentage of important targets will usually be within reach of attack by ships.

The damaging effect of individual eight-inch and smaller projectiles appears ... too small to make their use profitable against ... heavy industry unless a very great number of hits ... can be obtained, or unless harassment and not destruction is the result desired. Incendiary ammunition in the smaller calibers, however, should produce results comparable to those obtained by incendiary bombing, if used against ... inflammable targets.

GENERAL SUMMARY

Units of the Third Fleet attacked selected targets with gunfire in the areas of Kamaishi, Hamamatsu, Hitachi, Muroran, Shimizu, Shionomisaki and Nojima Saki. The primary task of the first four ... attacks was bombardment, and the principal components of task units which executed them were, in general, fast battleships and heavy cruisers. Attacks on [the latter three] were secondary tasks carried out during antishipping sweeps ... by light cruisers and destroyers. ...

The two bombardments of Kamaishi caused damage which, according to Japanese officials, would have required repairs costing about 65 per cent of the total value of physical assets to restore the plant. ... the equivalent of from eight to 12 months’ production ... would have been lost, because of the combined effects of gunfire and the critical

--55--

condition of the Japanese economy. Fires initiated by gunfire extensively damaged the town of Kamaishi. Refrigeration plants and other facilities of the considerable fishing industry ... were destroyed. ...

Widespread damage had been inflicted on the Hamamatsu area by air attacks prior to the ... bombardment. Gunfire damaged surviving buildings and equipment of the ... Hamamatsu Locomotive Works and incapacitated [it] for about three months. Projectiles falling in the railway yards caused interruption of through traffic on the Tokaido main line for about three days. Slight damage was also inflicted on [other] plants ... and on a naval barracks. Damage to dwellings, gas, electrical attacks, was considerably augmented by gunfire.

In Hitachi ... ships' gunfire moderately damaged the Taga Works and Mito Works of Hitachi Manufacturing Company and slightly damaged Yamate Plant ... and the copper refining section of Hitachi Mine. In addition, projectiles falling in the urban area caused considerable damage to housing and to telephone, power, water and gas facilities. .... Some Japanese officials considered that the effectiveness of the incendiary attack was increased by the surface bombardment, because many persons who had fled from the city were not available to fight fires. These officials were impressed by this apparent coordination between our surface and air forces.

Targets for surface bombardment in the Muroran area were the Wanishi Iron Works ... and the Muroran Works of Japan Steel Company. ... It is estimated that ... damage inflicted on the former ... would have resulted in loss of ... about two and one half months' output of coke, and a slightly smaller loss of pig iron. Loss in production at the latter ... can be roundly stated as about 40 per cent of one month's output. In the city, ... gunfire interrupted railway service for three days, and double track service was not restored for five days. The ... water supply was disrupted for about one week, electric power supply for about two days, and damage to the telephone system required about two months for repair.

Effectiveness of ammunition ... indicates that the average amount of structural damage caused by a 16-inch high capacity ... hit is about 1,400 square feet in heavy steel framed buildings, and about 3,200 square feet in wooden structures. Corresponding figures for eight-inch projectiles are about zero square feet and 400 square feet. The equivalent figure for heavy steel frame buildings calculated in the same manner for the average 2,000 pound GP bomb hit is 8,800 square feet. The mean area of effectiveness of a 16-inch high capacity projectile for serious damage (destroyed plus heavy damage) against machine tools is 4,900 square feet as contrasted to 8,500 square feet for a 1,000 pound bomb.

27 ... industrial plants or housing areas were fired on by heavy ships. Of these 22 were hit. In daylight firings by battleships the ... average target was about 1.5 million square yards, or 39.6 of the 200-yard squares used on bombardment charts. The average percentage of shots ... which fell within target boundaries was 24.9, at an average range of 23,300 yards. The approximate average error of the mean point of impact of shots directed at all targets during daylight was 249 yards in range and 209 yards in deflection. During night firings by battleships, at an average range of 24,740 yards and against targets averaging half a million square yards, or 14.8 200-yard square, in size, the aver-

--56--

age percentage of hits ... was 21.6 and the average error of mean point of impact was 280 yards in range and 468 yards in deflection. The average accuracy of heavy cruiser firings was slightly less than the average ... obtained by battleships.

Interrogations seemed to indicate that even ... officials knew little of what was transpiring away from their own localities. For this reason surface bombardments caused people to wonder what had happened to their own ships and planes, and with the realization that our ships could approach the shores of Japan with impunity they knew ... that the progress of the war was even more unfavorable than they had suspected. People ... invariably stated ... that gunfire was more terrifying than either HE or incendiary bombing. When asked why ... the most common answer was that there was normally ample warning before major air attacks, and the duration of the danger could be judged by the arrival and departure of the planes. Surface bombardments, however, usually came without warning, the fall of projectiles was more prolonged, and people were perplexed and confused by the uncertainty of where the attack was coming from and how long they would be forced to endure it.

Commander Edward J. Mathews, USNR (Ret.), "Bombarding Japan."
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. CV (February 1979), 75:

We liked Kamaishi because the main target, a big steel mill, was well removed up a deep bay from the little town. That meant that we could shoot up the mill without killing townspeople and destroying buildings. We were confident (wrongly) that any merchant vessels had by now taken refuge in the Inland Sea or on the west coast. When, in the operation order, we restricted the cruisers and destroyers of the screen to "targets of opportunity," I felt sure, on the basis of aerial reconnaissance, that no such targets would appear.

We picked up the coast of Honshu in the gray dawn of 14 July and bore down at high speed on the unsuspecting little city. Our force constituted a formidable phalanx of gray ships, with spray creaming over our bows and signal flags snapping at the halyards. As we rounded onto the bombardment track, I was surprised to see a large merchant ship ... emerge from the ... inner bay. She was followed by two others, then by a minuscule gunboat which had the impertinence to poop tiny shells at us that fell half way. They had sneaked in since the last photo reconnaissance.

The screen was screaming for permission to release batteries. None of them had ever encountered so juicy a target. Just then we opened fire on the mill with the 16-inch guns, and either someone cut the screen loose or they just couldn't stand it any longer. At any rate, the air became solid with flying metal. ... The merchantmen and their escort disappeared behind curtains of spray from concentrated salvos. They were directly in line with the town, and soon red gouts of flame showed where the "overs" had ignited the little frame houses. Smoke from the burning town began to obscure the mill, but the merchantmen continued on their way and finally disappeared behind a headland, seemingly unscathed.

--57--

In the meanwhile, the battleships were throwing everything they had in the direction of the mill. Several tiny islands stood across the mouth of the big bay below the mill. ...

As we bellowed back and forth on our bombardment track, one small island in particular drew our attention. It was close aboard, a particularly charming one, with the conventional white paper house in which dwelt a little white-kimonoed man with a tiny white dog. ...the little dog, ... frightened by the noise, was careering around the island with the man in hot pursuit. Around ... they went, and each time we repassed the island we shouted encouragement. Finally ... the man caught the dog, gave him a whack, dashed into the paper house and banged the paper door behind him, obviously convinced that therein lay security. A triumphant cheer rose from our formation as we turned away.

Bombardments

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B. SURFACE ACTION

World War II was the first truly three-dimensional conflict. Air power, both land- and carrier-based, took a full share of the work in coordination with ground, surface, and undersea forces. In this war the fast battleship's fleet air defense capability became, arguably, its most important characteristic. The fast battleship, though, was still very much a battleship, designed to fight surface actions and to absorb damage while delivering heavy armor-piercing projectiles at ranges up to twenty miles or more. Opportunities for surface combat were relatively scarce but, as long as an enemy surface strike capability existed, had to be anticipated. Through the end of the war in the Pacific operating plans included a contingency plan, to be put into effect if heavy Japanese surface forces should threaten American amphibious units or carriers. When ordered, the fast battleships were to detach themselves from the carrier task groups and form a surface task group with supporting cruisers and destroyers. Backed up by carrier planes, they would then engage the attackers in day or night battle in general accordance with the tactical doctrine which had been developed in years of fleet exercises since World War I. Such a general battleship force surface action never materialized--though it seemed tantalizingly close at Leyte Gulf, when fast battleships steamed north after what proved to be a Japanese decoy force--and the battleship task group was, otherwise, formed only for air defense or shore bombardment.

Engagement with French Surface Force, Casablanca November 1942

Off Casablanca on 8 November 1942, MASSACHUSETTS fought a brief gunnery action with defending French destroyers, sinking one and sharing a second with cruiser TUSCALOOSA.

MASSACHUSETTS ACTION REPORT:

Evasive Tactics by the Enemy and Effect on Rangekeeping

During the second phase of the battle, enemy light forces were engaged. The radars were inoperative and the rangefinders were ineffective due to own ship changing course and because of enemy smoke screens. Enemy ships maneuvered in circles, ellipses, figure eights in and out of the smoke screen. Accurate ranges were not possible and range lines on the graphic plotter,* with deduction of range rates, were out of the question. Target angle changed so rapidly that the spotter had trouble keeping up with it. The best range obtainable was set on rangekeeper along with target angle and estimated target speed. Shooting was "from the hip," with application of spots in range and deflection when salvo landed.

*A graphic plotter, attached to the Mark 8 rangekeeper, automatically registers a graphic time record of advance range, generated present range, and sight deflection. Generated range rate can be checked with an integral protractor.

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BATTLE OF CASABLANCA
MORNING FLEET ENGAGEMENT
PHASE I

BATTLE OF CASABLANCA
MORNING FLEET ENGAGEMENT
PHASE II

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fail on shock of gunfire. Range lines and rates are unobtainable, and present-range pencil [on plotter] must be matched with best range obtained or, if range cannot be measured, the "shoot and spot" method must be used.

A suggestion for shooting at light forces using evasive tactics is to shoot one turret with existing angle set, shoot a second turret with target angle 45 degrees to the right of present target angle, and a third turret with target angle 45 degrees to the left of present target angle. This procedure will have a good chance to catch the enemy no matter which way he turns.

GENERAL REMARKS

War Watch Officer. The ...War Watch Officer is to act for the Captain in case of emergency. For this reason, it is impossible to lay down detailed instructions as to his course of action. He should be guided by the following general principles.

U.S.S. MASSACHUSETTS is a large and valuable unit of the fleet. She was never designed as an offensive unit to be used against submarines and destroyers, nor as a salvage vessel or commerce raider, and should not be used as such. As a general principle MASSACHUSETTS should close anything her size or larger, and keep out of torpedo range of vessels which are, or may be, so armed.

Battleship Night Action, Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

November 1942

In this decisive action WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA engaged a Japanese force formed around the battleship KIRISHIMA. SOUTH DAKOTA suffered extensive topside damage, but WASHINGTON'S accurate fire mortally injured KIRISHIMA. Set aflame and racked by explosions, KIRISHIMA was scuttled by her crew. The last major Japanese naval thrust at Guadalcanal had been turned back, and WASHINGTON had done what she had been designed to do--sink one of her own kind in a gunnery action. WASHINGTON was the only American fast battleship to defeat another capital ship.

WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT:

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING EVENTS AND GENERAL COMMENT.

On the night of November 14-15 WASHINGTON was flagship of Commander Task Force 64 (ComBatDiv 6.) In column, with four destroyers ahead and SOUTH DAKOTA astern, she stood north between Russell and Guadalcanal, then east and southeast, passing north of Savo. Standing west from this point, first radar contact was made a 0001 with enemy ships east of Savo. From 0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16", opening at 18,500 yards, at large cruiser or battleship which it is believed was sunk. From 0016 to 0017 fired 100 rounds 5" at ranges 12 to 13,000 yards at enemy cruiser or large destroyer which was also engaged by SOUTH DAKOTA and was left burning. Standing on north-westerly courses fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,00 yards at light craft close to southeast shore of Savo which were engaging our destroyers; all were silenced

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and one was left burning. From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16" and 107 rounds 5" at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, at battleship northwest of Savo which was firing at SOUTH DAKOTA. This battleship was silenced and was subsequently tracked by radar through a 500-degree turn. From 0100 to 0107, fired 120 rounds 5", at ranges from 7,400 to 9,500 yards, in succession at three enemy cruisers illuminating and engaging SOUTH DAKOTA and also under fire by her; they were silenced.

By the time our 5" fire on light craft close to southeast shore of Savo had ceased one of our destroyers was sunk, one was hopelessly afire (she exploded and sank a few minutes later) and the other two were put out of action (they retired to southward). Subsequently, and before we opened fire on ships northwest of Savo, the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen to the eastward between this ship and Savo on a course to northward of WASHINGTON course. What appeared to be the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen at about 0121 at a considerable distance to the southeastward between this ship and Guadalcanal on a southerly course.

From radar tracking and visual observation of enemy ships, there were:

(1) Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk:

1 large cruiser or BB (WASHINGTON only.)

2 large cruisers (SOUTH DAKOTA plus WASH 5".)

1 destroyer (our DD's plus WASH 5".)[

(2) Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged:

1 - 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH, only.)

1 DD burning (WASH. 5".)

5-9 light craft silenced (our DD's plus WASH. 5" plus S.D.)

There was no melee. This ship was undamaged.

COMMENT.

The following comments are submitted:

(1) Our radar is effective for accurate gunfire at long ranges at night. Japanese radar aboard ships present, if any, is not effective for surface targets.

(2) Japanese are sufficiently familiar with radar and aware of our use of it to make full use of land cover both between them and ourselves and closely backing them up.

(3) Our optical vision is superior to Japanese.

(4) Our fire control and the effectiveness of our projectiles meet or exceed our expectations.

Accordingly,

(5) We should seek rather than avoid night action, opening at ranges as great as satisfactory solutions can be obtained.

EFFECTIVENESS OF GUNNERY.

This ship was fired on only sporadically. She was not illuminated. No hits were sustained and the nearest miss noted was the splash, apparent-

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BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL
BATTLESHIP NIGHT ACTION
14-15 NOV. 1942.

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ly of a major-ca1ibre shell about 200 yards on the port quarter. Observers who witnessed other ships of our force under concentrated fire reported the Japanese gunnery to be accurate. Enemy ships close to Savo fired automatic weapons accurately at our destroyers. The Japanese ships were, apparently, not equipped with radar. Their searchlights provided excellent illumination of SOUTH DAKOTA, but attracted our fire and provided a point of aim.

MAIN BATTERY.

This ship's gunnery appeared highly effective. Fire was opened with a gun range of 18,500 yards initially by this vessel using radar ranges and optical train and hits were definitely obtained by the third salvo. It is believed target was stopped and sinking after third salvo. 42 rounds were fired.

In the second phase target had been tracked by radar ranges and bearing and later by optical train. Fire was opened at 8,400 yards and a hit was probably obtained on first salvo and certainly on the second. Fire was rapid, on one turret ready light, for about 2 minutes 39 seconds, firing about 39 rounds. It was interrupted for 1 1/2 minutes due to an erroneous report that target was sunk, and resumed for 2 minutes and 45 seconds, during which time 36 rounds were fired. A total of 75 rounds was fired on this target which was believed to be an old type battleship.* Starshell illumination was used on this phase after about the second salvo, 62 rounds being fired.

According to the best data available, overall SPGPM was 1.30 and 5 guns had 1.8 average. Fire discipline was excellent.

The normal fire control set-up of this vessel was used throughout, namely:

Collective fire, Director I** controlling in train.
Group I controlling in Plot.
Director IV (Stable Vertical I)*** controlling in continuous
level and crosslevel.
Director IV controlling firing circuit (Plot.)
Radar ranges by indicating and voice.

Turret pointers were matched during phases in which the director was being trained on the visual target. During the time when the visual target was obscured, whether training by radar or generated,**** a turret spread in deflection was fired.

*KIRISHIMA

**Forward main-battery director.

***Stable-vertical director located in plotting room (plot).

****Using rate of train derived from previously-observed relative motion of firing ship and target.

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train is on target. It has been standard practice for this vessel to use that key at night when visual or radar train indications are accurate, shifting to generated bearing only in case of poor train indication or obscured target.

Against the first main battery target, 18,500 yards, radar range was used in conjunction with visual train. The target became obscured after the second salvo. The target was lost by all radars after this salvo.

As a result the last salvos went out in what amounted to generated. That is, the present range was let ride and the director being in automatic remained on the generated train. On the second main battery target the tracking was done entirely by radar for at least five minutes. When the target finally came into view optically, checks given by the pointer indicated that the radar was exactly on. In this connection it is noted that a considerable period of time is taken to adapt the trainer's eyes to the telescope at either night or day after looking at the radar scope (train indicator.) The reverse is also true. As a result of this difficulty, main battery Director II found it desirable to let the trainer keep track by radar and the pointer observe by telescope. Such a system is made possible by the fact that the director is trained automatically by generated bearing. Therefore small corrections only are necessary and such corrections can be made by coaching from a pointer's station.

Radar spots were used against the first target while the target echo was present. It is of interest to note that against the second target (BB) "overs" as well as "shorts" could be seen optically. Salvos were walked back and forth across the target.

The fire control switchboards on this ship provide for a secondary battery director to furnish target bearing to a main battery rangekeeper. Thus it can also be used to designate to a main battery director. At the time of first contact both main battery directors lost the target and the shift was made for designation, but the secondary battery director had not yet settled down and its designation was not used. In the meantime main-battery Director I had again picked up the target and target bearing was shifted back to it.

SECONDARY BATTERY.

Secondary battery fire control used radar ranges throughout. During Phase 1 radar train was used. In Phases 1A and 2 optical train was used. Level for the basis of gun elevation order was obtained from the Stable Element with dip-range being set on the synchronized elevation knob in accordance with advance range. Firing circuits were controlled by director pointers. Group I used rapid continuous fire. On the other hand, Group III soon shifted to salvo fire, 4 second interval, to facilitate spotting.

In the first phase effectiveness of the Secondary Battery was undetermined. Group I and Group III each controlled two mounts in firing at surface targets at ranges between 13,000 and 15,000 yards. The control of the groups was by radar, range and training. Group III used 400-yard rocking ladder in 200-yard steps. No radar spots were obtained and there was no observation of the fall of shot.

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Phase 1A consisted of shooting at what at first appeared to be shore batteries on Savo Island but later identified as surface craft. Initially both groups opened fire on these targets. In view of the fact that Group I appeared to be shooting "over," Mounts 1 and 3 were switched over to Director III which continued the fire. Group III opened fire initially at the target near the right tangent of the island, aiming at the gun flashes, using a 200-yard rocking ladder based on the closest radar range with target speed set on zero. The first target was set on fire, many observers reporting that a stream of 5" tracers poured into the target which immediately burst into flames. A range of 10,200 yards on the burning ship from the main battery coincidence rangefinder was within 100 yards of the range set on the computer. Fire was shifted successively to the left using gunfire flashes as points of aim, and was continued against gunfire flashes until each gun ceased firing. Apparently another target on bearing near the center of Savo Island was set on fire. These targets may have been destroyers or large MTBs.

In Phase 2 (the third secondary battery phase) the secondary battery again opened with divided fire. Group I fired on main battery target and Group III on target whose searchlights were illuminating SOUTH DAKOTA. Twice during the firing Group I was hitting, apparently starting fires in the upper works. When searchlights on another ship were seen to be turned on, secondary battery Director III used them as a point of aim.

On this target, which was apparently a heavy cruiser, also engaged by the SOUTH DAKOTA'S 5", Group III fired with a 200-yard rocking ladder. The first salvo landed short and was spotted "up 400." Fires were started. At about the 4th salvo the searchlights went out. Director III continued with about eight or ten more salvos, at which time another group of searchlights was seen to come on. The point of aim was shifted to these searchlights and fire continued until they went out. Another set of searchlights came on and fire was again shifted to them. The last searchlights were turned off about the time of cease firing. No hits were definitely observed on the last two targets.

The tactical situation was greatly affected by the presence of islands and the necessity of fighting in comparatively restricted waters. As noted previously the radar screens had many land echoes. For a surface engagement under reduced visibility, and especially in restricted waters, a navigational plot should be maintained in radar plot for fully effective use of the radar. If this vessel were to keep such a plot more space would be required. An expansion of radar plot appears justified.

The picture presented by the SG radar is not a true plan view. Radar operators must be given concentrated training in areas surrounded by land in distinguishing between land and ships. During a previous sweep by this vessel around Russell Island at night, numerous false reports of surface targets were received from the fire control radars that turned out to be land more than 100,000 yards away. During the night of the engagement only one such report was received.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Radar has forced the Captain or OTC to base a greater part of his actions in a night engagement on what he is told, rather than what he can

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see. This ship was not hit but examination of SOUTH DAKOTA revealed completeness with which bridge structure may be riddled by shells and splinters which penetrate 1" STS bulkheads. The enemy may be counted upon to hit foremast superstructure.

The captain and navigator should be in Conn. An experienced officer, other than the navigator, should be OOD and should filter for the Captain the tremendously numerous reports received at the conning station over the various telephone circuits.

COMBATDIV 6 ACTION REPORT:

This action demonstrated the tremendous value of radar in a night action. Battleships obtained excellent fire control results using radar range and radar spots, combined with optical instruments.

Strong signals from enemy ships permitted quick and accurate solution and spots.

First phase opening ranges 16,000 - 18,000 yards, illumination by setting moon. Hit with second salvo. Second phase opening range 6,000 -9,000 yards; illumination by starshells ... did not add to accuracy of fire.

No indication that enemy used radar. Enemy apparently ranged on gun flashes, but inaccurately. SOUTH DAKOTA hit after enemy searchlight illuminated her.

Own gunfire superior to Japs, particularly as range increased.

SG radar invaluable in locating surface targets and coaching fire control radars on.

Samuel Eliot Morison, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Volume V:

The battleship action of November 14-15 was vastly better fought by the United States Navy than the unorganized brawl of two nights earlier. Admiral Lee had a positive doctrine that he maintained, despite the absence of his entire destroyer screen. An able and original scientist as well as a flag officer, he appreciated the value of radar, used it to keep himself informed of enemy movements and tactics, and made quick, accurate analyses from the information on the screens.

Yet some mistakes of earlier night battles were repeated. Lee's task force was a scratch team, destroyer and battleships captains alike being unfamiliar with each other and with their commander. Apparently the recurring urgencies in the South Pacific imposed a haphazard composition for every task force thrown together to meet the enemy. Again, and not for the last time, the Japanese taught the American a lesson in the use of torpedoes. SOUTH DAKOTA was lucky to escape alive. WASHINGTON, conned by Captain Glenn Davis and directed by Admiral Lee with a skill and imperturbability worthy of her eponym, saved the day for the United States.

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Surface Sweep Around Truk

February 1944

While the Fast Carrier Force carried out air strikes at Japanese installations and shipping, IOWA and NEW JERSEY conducted an anti-ship sweep around the atoll.

CINCPACFLT ACTION REPORT:

At 1118, 16 February, Commander Task Force 50 (Vice Admiral R. A. Spruance) ordered that Task Group 50.9, composed of NEW JERSEY, IOWA, MINNEAPOLIS,* NEW ORLEANS,* BURNS,** BRADFORD,** IZARD** and CHARRETTE** be formed for the purpose of making a sweep around TRUK, counterclockwise, to destroy any enemy ships encountered. Commander Task Force 58 was directed to provide air cover and to provide the O.T.C. with information of the location of targets.

When approximately 13 miles north of NORTH PASS, TRUK Atoll, lookouts on several of our ships observed smoke dead ahead on the horizon, and radars commenced to pick up surface targets ahead of the formation, bearing from 250° to 270° True. Reports from the air observer, other planes, lookouts, and radar were inconsistent; however, it is believed that enemy ships present at the time were:

(1) 1 KATORI Class light cruiser.
(2) 1 ASASHIO Class destroyer.
(3) 1 Trawler or mine vessel carrying a considerable quantity of explosives. This ship was approaching TRUK from the north, apparently unaware of the presence of our ships.
(4) 1 Large fast destroyer.

By 1509, range to the trawler had been reduced to 15,000 yards and our destroyers opened fire. The trawler maneuvered and returned ineffective fire with its anti-aircraft battery. By 1520, the trawler was drifting toward the head of the column, and burning. Shortly thereafter NEW JERSEY opened fire with its port 5-inch battery at 800 yards. The trawler blew up, with a violent explosion, and disappeared.

The next ship engaged was the light cruiser of the KATORI Class which at 1515 was distant at 17,400 yards. Hit by both the cruisers and IOWA, the enemy CL took a heavy list to port, capsized, and about a minute later sank by the stern.

*Heavy cruisers.

**Destroyers.

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During the foregoing, the fourth enemy ship, an undamaged destroyer, had been standing away to the westward at high speed. By 1546, the range of this vessel from IOWA had opened to 34,000 yards despite the fact that Task Group 50.9 was steaming at 30 knots. At 1547, both IOWA and NEW JERSEY opened fire and continued to fire until 1558. IOWA fired 40 projectiles and NEW JERSEY fired 18 at ranges from 32,000-39,000 yards. The Air Observer reported straddles, but it is believed that no hits were made. An increase of speed to 31 knots at 1601 failed to close the range. The enemy continuing to draw away and finally escaped.

From 1300 to 1500 Task Group 50.9 was subjected to 3 air attacks.

The first attack made by one fighter bomber came as a surprise. The plane dropped one bomb which exploded harmlessly off the starboard bow of IOWA. A second attack by a dive-bomber was driven off by antiaircraft fire, and a third plane was shot down by the Combat Air Patrol.

SWEEP AROUND TRUK
By TG 50.9

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IOWA ACTION REPORT:

By 1500 three targets were visible to IOWA: a cruiser* bearing 245, range 33,000 yards; a cruiser (or destroyer) bearing 260; and a small ship bearing 270, range 22,000. Our planes were bombing the two largest ships and splashes were observed near them. These two enemy ships were firing at our planes. When the cruiser bore 243, range 30,000 yards, Spot One reported he considered it to be an AOBA class cruiser, dead in the water, with her after stack blown off.

At 1512 began to build up speed to 30 knots in obedience to signal. At 1516 the light cruiser (destroyer) ahead, now bearing 267 true at ... 28,800 yards, was observed to stand away to the westward at high speed. The main battery was trained on her and ready to open fire. She was tracked as making 24 knots on course 318 true. NEW JERSEY was nearly in the line of fire and, further, no orders had been received regarding target designation or opening fire. A fourth target ... was later identified as a FUBUKI class destroyer, dead in the water and smoking.

Some concern was felt in this ship due to the fact that it appeared that the course of 270 would cause the ship to pass within torpedo range of the cruiser and very close aboard the small vessel under fire by NEW JERSEY and our destroyers. It was feared that this small vessel might be carrying mines.

The ship which was retiring to the westward was still well within range of the main battery but had increased speed to 32 knots and by 1525 the range had opened to 31,500. Her course was then 267. IOWA was on course 270, speed 30.

At 1527 NEW JERSEY was seen to open fire with her port 5" battery on the minelayer. The minelayer blew up and disintegrated. ...

Following ... this ... NEW JERSEY shifted her secondary battery fire to the FUBUKI class destroyer lying dead in the water and now bearing 270 true. At 1526 the enemy cruiser on the port bow appeared to be firing.

No fire signals had been received, but Commander Battleship Division 7 gave oral permission to IOWA to open fire on the enemy ships. At 1530 IOWA opened fire with both the main and 5" batteries on the AOBA class cruiser. ... The main battery fired ... eight salvos, 46 16" high

capacity shells, and the 5-inch battery a total of 124 projectiles. At the time the IOWA batteries opened on the ... cruiser, she had been under fire for some time by our 8" cruisers. All eight of IOWA's salvos were spotted as being straddles. Just after IOWA's fourth salvo fell, the cruiser took a sudden and heavy list to port. At about 1541 her bow rose about 30 feet out of the water and she sank stern first.

*Recognition of ships and planes has always been a problem. The "cruiser" cited here was the training cruiser KATORI. The "cruiser (or destroyer)" was the KAGERO-class DD NOWAK I; the "small ship" was the converted trawler SHONAN MARU. The "FUBUKI class destroyer" was the KAGERO-class MAIKAZE.

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down the port side side from ahead. A second ... passed close under the stern. The third ... passed about 100-200 yards ahead. ... The starboard 5", 40mm and 20mm batteries, which had been trained to open fire, without orders, on any torpedo wake sighted, opened fire on the torpedo.

At 1539 the FUBUKI class destroyer, still under fire by NEW JERSEY'S 5" port battery, was on port beam of IOWA, range 7,000 yards, and smoking so heavily that she could not be seen clearly. Permission had just been given for IOWA’s 5" battery to open fire ..., when she rolled toward IOWA and sank rapidly. ... Her after gun had been firing all the time and continued to do so until there was an explosion near the stern of the vessel just before she sank. The destroyer running to the westward continued to draw away, despite the fact that own speed was not 30 knots, and by 1542 her range was 34,000 yards.

At 1546 NEW JERSEY, without signal, changed course to the right and IOWA followed, in column, steadying on course 310 true. When on the new course NEW JERSEY opened fire with her main battery at the retiring destroyer. No signals had been made so IOWA followed the motions of the OTC and also opened fire ... at 1547 . Five main battery salvos were fired. The initial range was 35,700 yards, and the final range 39,000 yards.

The first salvo was spotted as "No Change" and fire and smoke were observed to appear on the target.* She changed course away, to 222 true, and appeared to slow to about 28 knots. By the time the third salvo fell, 1554:30, the target began to disappear in the sun-glare, haze and distance. Two more salvos were fired in full radar control before the OTC signalled Cease Firing at 1558.

PERFORMANCE OF OWN ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

From 1531 to 1536, the main battery fired 8 salvos (46 rounds; mean gun range of 14,250 yards) at an AOBA class cruiser. ... Mark 8 radar ranges and spots were used. No air spots were received. The maximum spot was on the first salvo, the spot being "Straddle, Down 2."   ... . HC projectiles, half of them ... with superquick nose fuzes and the other half with steel nose plugs,** and service charges were used. Splashes were extremely large and easily seen ... optically and by Mark 8 radar.

At 1532 the port 5" battery opened on this same ... cruiser and fired ... 124 rounds. Full radar control was used, as the 5" control personnel could not see the target because of own main battery smoke. Because of this smoke, and the splashes from own 16" and cruisers' 8" shells, the MPI of ... 5" projectiles could not be determined accurately, but was considered ... well positioned.

*Wishful thinking; NOWAKI was not hit.

**And base fuzes.

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radar even at the maximum range of 39,000 yards. The spot on the first salvo was "No Change" and flame and smoke ... were observed. ... Spot for second salvo was "Up 2, Left 3" and for third salvo, "Up 1, Left 2" (the target was changing course to the left at this time). Spots on the fourth and fifth salvos were "No Observation" due to ... glare, haze and difficulty in seeing the small target at the long range.

For firing high-capacity projectiles with service charges, this ship uses an unnumbered range table titled "Range Table for 16"/50 Caliber Gun, 2690 f.s. Initial Velocity, 1900 lb. HC Projectile." A table of arbitrary spots has been prepared to compensate for the differences in sight angle, drift, and wind effect between this range table and OP 770, the table used when firing 2700-lb. AP projectiles. Arbitrary spots in range and deflection, and a multiplier for the ballistic wind, are tabulated for various ranges between 10,000 and 40,000 yards.

For the first phase of the engagement, fired at 14,500 yards, the arbitrary spot taken from the table was "Down 1200, left 2" with a ballistic-wind multiple of 1.3. All salvos straddled, and the ACTH determined from the results of 7 hot-gun salvos fired at the target was "Down 1300, left 2." The cold-gun correction, for first salvo only, was "Up 100."

For the second phase, win which the opening range was 36,000 yards, the tabulated ACTH was "Down 200, left 12" with a wind multiplier of 1.4. The first salvo was spotted "No change," and included at least one hit on the target. Since the guns were hot at the commencement of this phase, the "Up" corrections for cold guns could not be determined.

Lessons Learned

The need for a doctrine covering assumption of spotting assistance to surface vessels by any observing planes is believed to have been demonstrated.

COMMANDER, BATTLESHIP DIVISION SEVEN, ENDORSEMENT:

High visibility and the sequence of events have permitted details to be observed and recorded with reasonable precision and clarity. The account of IOWA is considered excellent and complete, except that identification of the target ships destroyed appears open to doubt.

NEW JERSEY ACTION REPORT:

16"/5 0 Battery: Detailed Information on Gunnery

*The ASASHIO and KAGERO classes were similar in appearance.

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ordered at ... 32,200 yards. At 1555, because the target was fast disappearing, both optically and by radar, it was decided to cease firing when the loaded guns had been fired and attempt to close the range. At 1556 the last salvo was fired and "Cease Firing" ordered. Range at this time was 35,000 yards. When the splashes from this salvo had subsided, spot one was unable to see any portion of the target and the target disappeared from the radar screen. The target was not again picked up by this vessel, although the Combat Air Patrol reported the target standing away at 25 knots.

Fire Control setup was director fire collective with Director One controlling train, Director Four controlling elevation and firing circuits, continuous aim. Gunnery communication and fire discipline were excellent.

Air spot was provided by the Combat Air Patrol during a portion of the firing. There were no spots on the later salvos, presumably as a result of lack of identification of splashes as IOWA was, at this time, firing on the same target.

The Mark 8 Radar, operated in low speed precision sweep in Director One, gave excellent results. The target disappeared at a range of 35,500 yards, when optical train was lost ... the target being obscured by smoke and haze. The radar ranging is considered remarkable in ... that the target had only stick masts, with no radars or other structures in the tops to act as reflecting surfaces. There was no difficulty discerning splashes for radar spotting.

Ammunition Expended.

Eighteen rounds of sixteen inch high-capacity projectiles and service powder were expended.

Effectiveness of Gunnery.

Heavy smoke was seen to rise from the target following the fourth salvo. This may have been the result of fragments from a short burst as, following the action, the Air Observer reported several straddles but no hits.

5"/38 Battery

Equipment functioned very well. There were no casualties and no serious difficulties with the ordnance equipment itself.

The major problem encountered was in regard to shifting from one type of ammunition to another. The battery had two air targets followed by two surface targets. The first air target was first seen diving out of low cloud without radar or other warning. As the cloud cover persisted throughout the day, there was considerable anxiety regarding renewal of the attack during the time that the surface targets were being engaged and, as a consequence, the type of ammunition sent up to the guns was shifted five times during the afternoon.

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Observation of Gunfire by Carrier Aircraft

On the afternoon of 16 February 1944, while this ship was ... searching for enemy vessels near Truk, the Commanding Officer of the BUNKER HILL Air Group* kept this ship informed of the locations of targets. ... One enemy destroyer, which was apparently undamaged, began retirement to the westward at high speed, and it became apparent that the main battery should be used ... . The position of this ship and the tactical situation were such that it was not practicable to launch our own observation aircraft. Without further request, the Commanding Officer of the BUNKER HILL Air Group spotted ... gunfire, which ... was of great help. ...

It is the opinion of this ship that situations under which battleships' ... aircraft cannot be used due to location of ship, weather, unexpected engagement, slow speed of observation aircraft,** and difficulty of recovery in heavy weather will be the rule rather than the exception, particularly in the Pacific. It is, therefore, recommended that it be made doctrine for carrier aircraft to be assigned to battleship spotting, that frequencies and procedures be established, and that ships be prepared promptly and fully to utilize such air spot information, It is possible that, had such a doctrine been in effect, the destroyer which eventually escaped IOWA and NEW JERSEY might have been destroyed.

COMMANDER, BATTLESHIP DIVISION SEVEN, ENDORSEMENT:

*Commander of the air units assigned to the carrier BUNKER HILL.

**Performance of American catapult floatplanes was, generally, inferior to that of their German and Japanese contemporaries.

***VOF (observation/fighting) units spotted gunfire at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Floatplane pilots spotted gunfire from borrowed Spitfire VBs at Normandy, where Luftwaffe opposition was anticipated.

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Battle of Leyte Gulf

October 1944

During one phase of this complex action, the last great sea battle of World War II, the Fast Carrier Force engaged Japanese carriers and surface ships north of Luzon. The Seventh Fleet, operating off Leyte, was attacked by other Japanese surface forces. Fast battleships and supporting forces were detached and ordered south to assist.

Samuel Eliot Morison, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Volume XII:

While Strike No. 2 was coming in at 0822, Admiral Halsey received Admiral Kinkaid's pain-language message about the surprise off Samar. A succession of urgent pleas for any kind of assistance, air or surface, that Halsey could spare, began to flow in on his flag plot in NEW JERSEY. As early as 0848 Halsey instructed McCain "to proceed at best possible speed" to block Kurita's Center Force, but he did not detach TF 34, Lee's Battle Line, to block Kurita's escape, until it was too late.

At 1000 Halsey received Nimitz's query as to the whereabouts of TF 34. Halsey wished to keep these heavy gunfire ships with TF 38 to sink Ozawa's cripples and catch up with ISE and HYUGA. But the pressure on him to help Seventh Fleet became so great that after another hour's cogitation he yielded. At 1055 he ordered Bogan's TG 38.2, together with the major part of Lee's Battle Line, to reverse course and steam south to help Kinkaid. When his order was executed at 1115, the battleships had reached lat. 18° N, long. 126° E. Even by making best speed they could not expect to reach San Bernardino Strait before 0100 next day.

It almost broke Halsey's heart to pull out Task Force 34 just as the battleships were on the point of reaching good gunfire targets. He afterwards told the writer that it was the only move in the Battle for Leyte Gulf that he regretted; that the query from Nimitz, which he knew meant that Cincpac was alarmed for the safety of the Seventh Fleet, was the final factor that influenced his decision.

Admiral Lee with the six battleships steamed south at only 20 knots, slowing down to about 12 at 1345 in order to fuel destroyers that particularly needed it. At 1622, when fueling was completed, TG 34.5 was formed, under Rear Admiral Badger's command, and at 1701 Halsey ordered it to push on to San Bernardino Strait. This he did at 28 knots. TG 34.5 included Badger's flagship IOWA, Halsey's flagship NEW JERSEY, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. Admiral Bogan's carriers operated to the eastward of them in order to render air support if required.

Badger's orders were to arrive off the Strait by 0100 October 26, sweep the approaches, and continue along the coast of Samar to Leyte Gulf, destroying all enemy ships encountered. This was over three hours too late to catch Kurita before he reentered San Bernardino Strait. The only ship of Kurita's force that he encountered was destroyer NOWAKI, which had been unable to catch up. She was sunk by gunfire at 0100 October 26. Badger's group then made a southerly sweep, but picked up

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nothing except six survivors from heavy cruiser SUZUYA. Unfortunately it missed the floating survivors from Clifton Sprague's escort carrier unit.

If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernardino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Center Force. We may well speculate what might then have happened. Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to believe that Lee would have crossed Kurita's T and completed the destruction of Center Force. As it was, Badger's TG 34.5, consisting of only two battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers, was both too late and too weak for the work in hand. Supported by Bogan's carrier group it would doubtless have put up a good fight, but it would have been seriously outgunned by Kurita's four battleships. Halsey should have sent all TF 34 or nothing, and done it earlier. It is clear that his heart was with the carriers up north, although he himself gallantly sought action down south in NEW JERSEY.

IOWA ACTION REPORT:

At 0258, 25 October, Task Force 34 was formed, and IOWA proceeded north with this force in anticipation of early contact with enemy surface units. Air strikes launched at 0600 contacted the enemy to the north, retiring at 20 knots, and repeated strikes were made during the forenoon. At 1114, course was changed to 180°, Task Group 38.2 was reformed, and destroyers were fueled during the afternoon. About 1130 an enemy snooper was seen low on the western horizon, and during the next half hour frequent radar and visual contacts were made. ... It was not intercepted, nor did it come close enough for any ship to fire at it.

At 1626, 25 October, Task Group 34.5 was formed, and proceeded at 28 knots ... towards San Bernardino Strait. At 2315, radar contact was made on Cantanduanes Island bearing 275°, distant 45 miles, and at 2324 cruising disposition 3-R was formed. At 2340 IOWA went to general quarters, and the sweep of the entrance to San Bernardino Strait was started on course 207° at 28 knots. The search having thus far proved negative, formation course and axis were changed at 0025 to 135° by column movement from the van. At 0029, 26 October, STEPHEN POTTER,* acting as picket in the van, reported a single surface target bearing 150° T, distant 50,000 yards from this ship on course 275° at 20 knots. At 0044 this target was picked up by the Mark 8 radar in the forward main battery director bearing 156° T, distant 32,000 yards. At 0032 ComCruDiv 14 was told by the Task Group Commander to take positive action and at 0045 IOWA and NEW JERSEY, with screening destroyers, changed course to the left to 090° T in order to remain clear of the cruisers. During this period the target was tracked on course 273° T at 21 knots. At 0051 the target was abeam to starboard at a range of 28,000 yards and, at 0055, a light cruiser (later determined to be VINCENNES) opened fire on the target with 12-gun salvos from her main battery, followed by fire from her

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5-inch battery. At 0057 the target had turned away to a course of 215° T, and appeared to have slowed to about 15 knots. Spot One reported that the target appeared to be returning the cruiser's fire sporadically. At 0100 the target was lost from Director One's radar at a range of

32,000 yards and at 0105 it disappeared from the SG radar screen bearing 204° T, distant 35,500 yards. At 0102 IOWA and NEW JERSEY reversed course to 270° T at 20 knots and, at 0106, Spot One reported that the cruiser's salvos appeared to have hit the target for the first time. At 0107 a large explosion was seen and, at 0111, track on the target was reestablished, giving a target speed of zero and a range of 33,400 yards. At 0116 Spot One reported that the whole after part of the target appeared to be in flames, silhouetting the superstructure, which appeared to be that of a TERUTSUKI Class DD or possibly a YUBARI Class CL. At 0119 course was changed to 090.

In the meantime, OWEN* and MILLER* had been ordered to close and destroy the target and, from 0117 to 0133, they fired 5-inch ... at close range. During this period the target continued to burn with intermittent explosions and at 0136 there was a tremendous explosion which threw burning debris high in the air. At 0134 Spot One reported that the show appeared to be over as all fires in the target area had disappeared, the last range being 35,000 yards (rangefinder) bearing 205° T. At 0142 personnel below decks in this ship heard and felt heavy underwater explosions and, shortly thereafter, MILLER reported a heavy explosion in the area where the target had disappeared.** The cruisers had rejoined the formation at 0115 and, at 0130, the task group proceeded on course 135° at 15 knots with OWEN and MILLER rejoining on the starboard quarter.

At 0307 NEW JERSEY reported a possible surface target bearing 200°, distant 32,000 yards. At this time the coast of Samar, on that bearing was 34,000 yards away, with a rain cloud about 5,000 yards off the coast. A hazy pip was visible on the PPI between the rain cloud and the coast, and was picked up by both the Mark 8 radars, and tracked at zero speed. At 0313 NEW JERSEY reported the target's course to be 255° at 18 knots, and at 0314 reported the course as 010° and the speed 20. Inspection of the chart showed a small bay on the coast of Samar at the position indicated, and a point of land which was believed to be NEW JERSEY'S contact. At 0325 NEW JERSEY reported the target bearing 256° at 30,000 yards on course 295° at 20 knots, and at 0334 she reported it to be on course 300° at 16 knots. At this time formation course was changed to 315° and at 0340, NEW JERSEY having reported that she had lost the target, the formation course was changed back to 135°.

*Destroyer.

**This was NOWAKI, which had eluded IOWA and NEW JERSEY off Truk.

--77--

 

TYPICAL BATTLE DISPOSITION

The classic disposition prescribed for surface battle in the manuals of tactical doctrine at the time of World War II. The battle line is formed in column, with cruisers and destroyers echeloned to the flanks. If the fast battleships had been granted the opportunity for a full-fledged surface action, they might well have engaged along the lines of this theoretical concept.

--78--

Battle of Surigao Strait; Battleship Gunnery Action

25 October 1944

This night action was fought between the Japanese battleship YAMASHIRO and destroyer SHIGURE, on the one hand, and the Seventh Fleet's Bombardment and Fire Support Group. The armament of three of the six old battleships which took part in the final gunfire phase of this action had been updated to the approximate standard of the new ships, with modernized fire-control suits and automatic turret control in train and elevation. Considering the general similarity of their main-battery installations, their experience is relevant to that of their descendants.

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE: THE BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF; STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL ANALYSIS, VOL. V:

Commander, Battle Line* ... now observed that the enemy range was closing rapidly. He therefore ... directed the battle line to open fire when the range had closed to 26,000 yards. Since:

(A) This range was contrary to CTG 77.2’s** battle plan, which specified opening-fire ranges for the battle line at 17,000 to 20,000 yards;

(B) These ... ranges had been chosen because CTG 77.2 felt that, due to the shortage of ammunition of all types, but especially to the shortage of armor-piercing projectiles, it was essential that the battle line get a high percentage of armor piercing hits at ranges where their effect would be high; and

(C) ComBatLine should have been fully cognizant of this fact ...,

It seems pertinent to discuss the reasons which prompted him to make this sudden change in firing plan.

ComBatLine stated later that his reasons were:

(A) He felt that, if he waited until the range had decreased to 20,000 yards, he would lose some of the range advantage he possessed in firing at a longer range, using armor-piercing projecti1es--his first five salvos were to employ these ... --and deliberate fire; and

(B) That CTG 77.2 had chosen the range band (17,000-20,000 yards) because of the predominant bombardment loading of the battle line which limited its effective fire to that range in a prolonged engagement.

*Rear Admiral George L. Weyler.

**Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, CTG 77.2.

--79--

BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT
MAJOR GUNFIRE PHASE, 0351-0409
FIRE DISTRIBUTION OF OPENING SALVOS

--80--

Third Fleet was expected to intercept any threatening enemy surface force, and all preparatory fire had to be provided by TG 77.2 and TG 77.3,* the ammunition allowance of armor-piercing projectiles had been set at but 20 percent of the possible loading. High-capacity projectiles for bombardment comprised the remainder.

Based on the above considerations, it seems clear that ComBatLine's decision to open fire at 26,000 yards, rather than at 20,000 or less, was unsound.

At 0338 ComBatLine noted that the range to the enemy was closing steadily. Since he planned to open fire in a few minutes he decided that, in order to avoid ... possible interference ... it would be wise to station his van and rear destroyer screens (DESDIV XRAY) in a column ahead and astern of the battleships. He ... immediately ordered COMDESDIV XRAY ... to concentrate his screens, van and rear, 4,000 yards from the nearest battleship.

The time drew near when ComBatLine would reach his designated open-fire range of 26,000 yards, and he was making preparations to do so. His target at this time, although he did not know it, was YAMASHIRO. [For various reasons, the battleships which were tracking YAMASHIRO and the other Japanese ships present in Surigao Strait passed the 26,000-yard line without opening fire.] Whatever ... the actual reasons for the failure of the battle line to open fire, it was to the advantage of the Allied command that it did not do so for, as has been pointed out ..., the correct firing range was in the range band 20,000-17,000 yards.

CTG 77.2 (OTC) carefully watched the approach of the enemy. ... ... at 0351, when the range was 16,500 yards, ... he ordered all cruisers of TG 77.2 to "open fire." .... At 0353, as the left flank cruisers continued firing ... he heard the Commanding Officer, WEST VIRGINIA, inform Commander Battle Line that WEST VIRGINIA was about to open fire, and shortly afterward he observed her open fire. ... He now observed that more battleships ... had opened fire, for CALIFORNIA and TENNESSEE commenced firing at 0355 .

[At 0406 ComBatLine radioed that CALIFORNIA had missed a signal to turn, and that other ships should look out for her.] This message was of considerable concern ... but was not entirely unexpected for ... battleships had had little opportunity to practice station keeping in column or in line of bearing. [CTG 77.2] could only hope that this error ... was not so serious as to endanger the operations of the battle line, but this hope did not long survive, for he now noted that the fire of the battle line had ceased. WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, CALIFORNIA and TENNESSEE had checked fire, and PENNSYLVANIA and MISSISSIPPI had not ... yet opened fire.

*The two designated task groups of battleships assigned to gunfire support.

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bution was normally ordered by the task group commander, Oldendorf was thoroughly familiar with the principles of concentration of fire. Under the particular circumstances of Surigao Strait, he chose to leave this to unit commanders and individual ships in accordance with the principle that, in the absence of specific orders from the OTC, subordinate commanders should use their initiative in selecting targets "when, due to low visibility, confusion of battle or other conditions, the control of fire distribution by the senior is impracticable."]

... WEST VIRGINIA ... commenced firing with an opening range of 22,800 yards, using salvo fire, at the leading enemy large ship. [ComBatLine was still operating at 15 knots, instead of five knots as ordered, to give his ships sufficient steerageway to avoid torpedoes. His guns would, soon, no longer bear. At 0354 he ordered simultaneous ship turns 30 degrees to starboard to course 120 degrees. At 0355 CALIFORNIA opened fire on YAMASHIRO at 20,400 yards; a minute later TENNESSEE also fired on YAMASHIRO at 20,500 yards. MARYLAND joined in at 0359, opening at 19,800 yards. At 0401 Oldendorf suggested that the battle line change course to 270 degrees, and ComBatLine ordered a simultaneous turn of 150 degrees to starboard. At about this time CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA, to conserve their AP shells, checked fire.]

[ComBatLine's course change had been passed by voice radio. As she turned, TENNESSEE noticed that CALIFORNIA, next ahead, was not turning. CALIFORNIA had understood the voice signal as a 15-degree, rather than a 150-degree, course change and had come right to 135 degrees and resumed firing. TENNESSEE'S range was fouled by CALIFORNIA, and TENNESSEE had to back her engines and maneuver to avoid a collision. CALIFORNIA checked fire again at 0405.]

[ComBatLine broadcast a voice warning to avoid CALIFORNIA; this signal awoke the ship to her mistake, and she now turned right to 270 degrees. Her delayed turn put her south of the battle line, and in the line of fire. No battleships were firing at this time, since MARYLAND had also checked fire during her turn. Just before 0408 TENNESSEE, seeing that her line of sight was now clear, fired her last salvo. CALIFORNIA fired one more salvo, and was ordered to fall in astern of TENNESSEE. At 0409 CTG directed all ships to cease firing. WEST VIRGINIA fired two more guns before ceasing. CALIFORNIA and MARYLAND reported having loaded hot guns, and asked permission to unload them in the direction of the enemy. CALIFORNIA then fired one round, while MARYLAND got off eight. At 0412 ComBatLine's flagship, MISSISSIPPI, "which at long last had finally obtained a solution to the fire control problem," fired one full 12-gun salvo at YAMASHIRO at 19,790 yards.]

The opening-fire ranges and bearings of WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, AND CALIFORNIA ... with their Mark VIII fire-control radars were approximately correct; those of MARYLAND were incorrect, possibly due to the fact that she may have opened fire on a phantom and she was having difficulty with her Mark III fire-control radar and, since she finally picked up her target from WEST VIRGINIA'S fall of shot, she may have ranged on a WEST VIRGINIA splash. The bearing of MISSISSIPPI'S target was correct, but her time of opening fire was long delayed because she had difficulty in identifying her target and obtaining an acceptable

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solution. Finally, PENNSYLVANIA'S failure to open fire at all was, likewise, due to her failure to identify her target or to obtain an acceptable solution. The MISSISSIPPI and PENNSYLVANIA difficulties were attributed, by Commander Battle Line, to material (Mark III fire-control radar) and to personnel.

[Through the rest of the night the battle line steamed east and west along a line north of Surigao Strait.]

WEST VIRGINIA ACTION REPORT:

Extensive refitting and modernization of this vessel's ordnance, fire control, and radar equipment was completed on 15 July 1944. The genera] efficiency of the equipment and the state of training of the personnel were amply demonstrated by the fact that the first salvo was a straddle with numerous hits, on which a "No Change" spot was ... applied. Of the thirteen full salvos fired, all were straddles. The general excellent performance of the material was marred by the temporary failure of the forward Mk 8 Mod 2 radar,* and shell hoist casualties in turrets 1 and 3. The right gun of turret 1 missed 3 salvos, while the right gun of turret 3 missed 7 salvos. ...

Fire was opened with full radar control, with after radar, director 2, rangekeeper 2, and Stable Vertical 2 controlling. All spotting was by radar. Turrets were in full automatic.** Rapid salvo fire was used after the second salvo. Computed ballistic plus arbitrary of UP 100 and UP 100 cold-gun correction was used. After the 1st salvo the cold-gun correction was removed. Opening gun range was 22,400 yards. Average gun range was 20,880 yards.

There were no errors in deflection observed on the MK 8 screen. Because of the known possible error in bearing of the MK 8 Mod 2 radar the 7th, 9th, 11th, and 13th salvos were "rocked" in deflection. Range patterns were noted to average about 300 yards. Average salvo interval for the first 13 salvos was 41 seconds.

Previous instructions from Commander Battle Line were that HC projectiles were to be used against cruisers, carriers, or any unarmored vessel; AP projectiles against battleships and armored vessels.

*Mounted on the forward Mark 34 main-battery gun director.

**Automatically controlled by the fire-control system, as in the fast battleships.

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The gunfire from this vessel was very effective. There were possible and probable hits in all salvos. Three pronounced flareups were observed on the target* at the splash time of our 1st, 2nd, and 6th salvos. The 4th salvo seemed to be particularly concentrated on the target. The MK 8 radar operators had no difficulty in identifying or spotting our salvos. Splashes from other ships were observed, but did not interfere except on the 5th salvo. It was possible to distinguish between our own and other ships' salvos by the size of the individual splashes.

TENNESSEE ACTION REPORT:

The Mk. 8 radar picked up the designated target from CIC at an initial range of 39,000 yards. A good solution for opening fire** was obtained at a range of 37,500 yards. There were two large and three small targets visible on the ... radar screen at the time. TENNESSEE opened fire on the closest heavy ship at ... 20,500 yards. The performance of both the Mk. 8 radar and the ... operator were superlative and cannot be praised too highly. Range spots were based primarily on radar. Deflection spots were made by the top spotter from both visual observation and from the radar screen. Direct spots to the target were used. The range pattern was about 400 yards. The target was either hit directly, or straddled, by 12 salvos. The target was tracked continuously after "cease firing" and was observed to grow smaller on the screen and to finally disappear at about 18,000 yards.***

Damage from the shock of main battery firing ... was slight, consisting of a few broken brackets on ventilation and other piping.

COMMENTS BY THE GUNNERY OFFICER

The first salvo hit the target. Thereafter the MPI of each salvo was corrected to center the pattern on the target, which could be seen continuously on the radar screen and, at times, visually. Pattern size was estimated to be 400 yards. The largest spot applied was 300 yards.

Of the 13 salvos fired, it is estimated that 12 salvos were straddles. The majority of the salvos were six-gun salvos fired from the forward turrets. The line of fire was always forward of the beam. Fire distribution afforded no real problem because of the nearly head-on approach of the enemy.

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

*YAMASHIRO

**Main battery plot had acquired and assimilated all the necessary information and was ready to provide gun train and elevation orders.

***YAMASHIRO rolled over and sank at 0419.

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COMMANDER, BATTLESHIP DIVISION TWO, ENDORSEMENT:

The performance of Mark 8 radar speaks for itself. TENNESSEE, by means of it, had a firing solution in Main Battery Plot and was ready to fire long before enemy formation came within gun range. For night engagements, it is truly a "seeing eye."

CALIFORNIA ACTION REPORT:

GUNNERY OFFICER'S REPORT

Firing was conducted in full radar control with Number I MK. 8 Radar, the Forward Main Battery Director, and Number I Rangekeeper controlling the battery. Both MK. 8 radars were coached on the target by CIC, and a constant comparison of target course and speed was maintained between the rangekeepers and CIC. Radar spot was used, and applied directly. No difficulty was experienced in keeping the director on target, except when the enemy countermarched.

Six-gun salvos were fired as spotting salvos until a straddle was obtained, and then nine-gun salvos were used. Fire was deliberate and, in each case, the salvo was held until the spot had been applied and the rangekeeper solution appeared to be good.

Spotting was done entirely by MK. 8 radar, as neither target nor splashes were visible.

Although the target could not be seen, except indistinctly by Spot I, still we were able to observe what we identified as three CALIFORNIA hits. These were determined by observing a flash at the target which was distinct from enemy gunfire, and which occurred at the time of our salvo's landing. The latter time could be very accurately gauged, as it was simple to follow our tracers all the way.

Pattern size appeared to be no more than three or four hundred yards. Consistent straddles were obtained, and probable hits as indicated. ... It appears that fire was effective, and that CALIFORNIA'S fire was definitely contributory to the destruction of one enemy battleship.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER'S REPORT

Gunnery.

The performance of the main battery was uniformly excellent. All except the first two salvos were straddles, and undoubtedly numerous hits were registered. With the exception of a torn powder bag in Turret I, and misfires in Turrets II and IV, there were no casualties in nine salvos of 63 rounds. Several instances of 1oose1y-1aced and torn powder bags have recently come to light. ...

It is interesting to note that the firing of full service charges in nine-gun salvos caused considerably less structural damage to the ship than did ... smaller salvos, using reduced charges, during shore

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bombardment. Such damage as occurred was extremely minor, while that caused by bombardment was quite extensive and resulted in broken pipe lines, vent ducts, stanchions, boats, and light metal doors throughout the ship.

COMMANDER, BATTLESHIP DIVISION TWO, ENDORSEMENT:

The formation, course, and speed of the enemy force, the fact that enemy force was confined in the comparatively narrow waters of SURIGAO STRAIT, and the position of our own battle line capping the enemy's "T" made the conventional methods of fire distribution inapplicable. While some sort of ... fire distribution plan might have been improvised, the proof that this was not necessary is afforded by the final box score.

Failure of CALIFORNIA to turn 150 degrees at 0401 could have had very disastrous results. Fortune was on our side that night as TENNESSEE just passed under CALIFORNIA'S stern. In executing the proper turn after passing TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA may have blanked the fire of MISSISSIPPI to some extent.

Track chart from TENNESSEE's Action Report

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C. FLEET AIR DEFENSE

Defense of task forces against air attack is no longer one of the modem battleship's missions. In World War II, however, it was a major task.

During the war in the Pacific, the fast carrier force became the Pacific Fleet's striking arm. Working in cooperation with the amphibious landing forces, the carrier force spearheaded the island hopping offensive from Guadalcanal to Okinawa and the final attacks on the Japanese home islands. In the Pacific the Japanese airplane was the principal threat. As the new generation of fast battleships "worked out the kinks" and entered fleet service, they were assigned to carrier task groups. Their heavy batteries of 5-inch and lighter antiaircraft guns made them valuable assets. From the early air-sea actions off Guadalcanal through the kamikaze attacks of 1945, the big ships had a large part in providing the umbrella of gunfire that made it possible for the fast carriers to move, at will, through enemy waters.

The attackers were subsonic propeller planes; dive, torpedo, or horizontal bombers. Toward the end of 1944 the deliberate suicide plane, the kamikaze, began to appear; during 1945 it became the fleet's principal concern. Air defense was organized around long-range air-search radars, which had begun to enter service shortly before Pearl Harbor; surface search radar could also detect low-flying torpedo planes. Information was plotted by hand, and communicated by Voice radio and sound-powered phones. Five-inch guns, firing mechanical time-fuzed ammunition, were controlled by the Mk 37 directors still used in the IOWA class. Early range-finding radars were installed during 1942, and the first proximity fuzes were introduced. Five-inch fire was supplemented by large numbers of automatic guns using impact-fuzed explosive ammunition.

The extracts from action reports and contemporary narratives which follow illustrate the use of the fast battleship as a vital element of fleet air defense.

Battle of the Eastern Solomons

August 1942

NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55) was the first fast battleship to see air-defense service in the Pacific, as a unit of Task Force (TF) 61, organized around carriers SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE. During the battle for Guadalcanal a Japanese carrier force headed south from Truk, and TF 61 moved to engage it. The Japanese carriers launched a strike, which was picked up on radar at 88 miles. All available fighters were put into the air. TF 61 went to battle speed, and began to spot incoming attackers.

COMINCH (Commander in Chief, United States Fleet) NARRATIVE:

Task Force 61 was now up to 27 knots, maneuvering radically with maximum rudder. The screen came in to close support distance, 2,000 yards for cruisers, destroyers inside 1,800 yards. North Carolina was on station 2500 yards, bearing 180°. Although 27 knots was full power for her, she maintained station readily at this speed.

--87--

ENTERPRISE GROUP
ANTI-AIRCRAFT FORMATION
24 AUGUST 1942

The search radar lost the planes as they came inside its minimum range. Although information in all ships mounting search radar appears to have been freely passed to gunnery radar sets, because of multiplicity of own and enemy planes, it was impossible to take over targets and track them in. Hence the first appreciation that the enemy attack had commenced was when planes were sighted in their dives.

On the NORTH CAROLINA this was when they were at about 15,000 feet, beginning to dive on the ENTERPRISE. On the ELLET it was when "sudden flashes of reflected light on a maneuvering plane at high altitude ... attracted the attention of the control officer. Binoculars revealed a line of attacking planes being attacked by own VF. Shortly ... a plane showed intermittent streaks of smoke then went into a spin." On the carrier itself it was when a 20mm. battery officer sighted them coming down at about 12,000 feet and very properly opened fire without delay, thus giving immediate warning and point of aim to the other batteries. At about the same time the NORTH CAROLINA and other screening ships open fire with 5" guns on the same group of planes.

This first dive ended in a near miss at about 1641. Thereafter for approximately 4 minutes, except for two short breathing spaces of 20-30 seconds each, there was a continuous roar of planes diving at the carrier.

The 5" fire of the ENTERPRISE and accompanying screen, including six of NORTH CAROLINA'S 5" guns, forced some of the planes to pull out of their dives at 4,000 to 6,000 feet. Others swerved to avoid the bursts or were so jolted by them that they were thrown off their point of aim. A few jettisoned bombs. Three planes coming through he 5" fire disintegrated as if from direct hits and others came through burning. Of the 25-30 planes that approached to dive on the ENTERPRISE, 15 came down in determined dives approximately 70°, which were pushed home in many instances to 1500 feet or lower before release. Dives were in sections of as many as five planes with very short intervals between planes, many below 7 seconds. Thus AA gunners had the minimum opportunity to clear jams, replenish ammunition, and recover from the shock of hits or misses close aboard.

Meanwhile the NORTH CAROLINA was having a battle of her own. When the attack commenced the ENTERPRISE increased speed to 30 knots. The NORTH CAROLINA gradually fell behind so that at the end of the engagement she was

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about 4000 yards from the ENTERPRISE, 1500 yards behind her assigned station. There, separated from the remainder of the Force, the NORTH CAROLINA fought off alone 16 dive bombing and several glide or torpedo plane attacks, and was apparently target for a high altitude attack.

At 1506 the NORTH CAROLINA had picked up many unidentified planes at 141,000 yards; at 1601 three large groups of planes showed on her radar screen distant about 64,000 yards. These apparently maneuvered to avoid fighters, remaining at this approximate range until about 1620 when they began to close rapidly. By 1636 they were within 30,000 yards. Thereafter there were so many contacts on widely varying bearings of own as well as enemy planes, that her radar screen was covered with echoes. It was generally impossible to distinguish friend from foe and therefore impossible to get the gunnery radar sets on for a fire control setup.

At 1641 NORTH CAROLINA picked up about 15 dive bombers over the ENTERPRISE, range 8,000 yards, height 15,000 feet, and within a minute opened up with one group of three mounts. Two minutes later the NORTH CAROLINA herself was attacked by about 10 dive bombers from the starboard bow. These she took under fire, with three other 5" mounts director controlled, still maintaining fire with one group on the dive bombers attacking the ENTERPRISE. Most attacks were from about 20° to the right of the sun, the planes coming down to about 3,000 feet and then into a 70° dive, releasing very low. So heavy was the 5" fire that some of the planes turned away. Several persisted in the attack but only three were able to come through the heavy 5" and automatic weapon fire with sufficient accuracy to place their bombs close the NORTH CAROLINA. Two landed within 15-20 yards. One was about 75 yards away.

During this attack, and well coordinated with the dive bombers, low flying planes appeared on the port quarter and in a few seconds others from numerous directions at altitudes of 50 to 5,000 feet. Some of these low flying planes maneuvered in and out at 6000 to 10,000 yards. Some approached more directly as for torpedo attack "and were shot down." Others came in a glide from about 6,000 feet levelling off at 50-200 feet, 2,000 to 4,000 yards away, which is another method of attack used by Japanese torpedo planes. There were approximately eight of these planes whose movements were coordinated with the dive bombers either making actual attacks or simulated ones to draw the NORTH CAROLINA'S fire from the dive bombers. At this time practically all of her battery was firing; viz., twenty 5"/38, four 1.1 [inch] mounts (16 barrels),* forty 20mm. and twenty-six 50 calibers.

* 1.1-inch quad-mount automatic AA gun, developed before WW II. It proved unsatisfactory and was gradually replaced by the 40mm gun.

--89--

Coordinated with the dive bombing attack 8 to 12 heavy bombers made a horizontal dive run over the NORTH CAROLINA at 15,000 feet and dropped a pattern of heavy bombs between her and the ENTERPRISE. This attack was unobserved partly because the high level bombers were able to use cloud cover, partly because the NORTH CAROLINA was busy with low altitude and dive bombing planes, two of which flew very low down the length of the ship just above the main deck distracting attention and fire from other planes.

This coordinated high altitude and dive bombing attack on the NORTH CAROLINA ended the runs on the Task Force, though for another 5-7 minutes enemy aircraft at low position angles were flying about and were fired on. One or more of these may have been our own, since one of our planes reports being hit by the NORTH CAROLINA'S fire. Most were either dive bombers or possibly torpedo planes escaping. The NORTH CAROLINA'S 5" fire appears to have been so heavy and accurate that few planes encountering it were willing to press home an attack through it. The NORTH CAROLINA considers that only three dive bombers attacking her escaped, some of those completing dives being shot down later. It is possible these three were destroyed by fighters.

The anti-aircraft fire of the Task Force was excellent. The ENTERPRISE reports that her own gunfire, particularly from 20 mm. and 1.1's was most gratifying. "Target after target was taken under tremendous fire concentration. This, together with the excellent AA assistance from other ships in the Task Force and our radical turns at high speed, was responsible for the small percent of bomb hits." The NORTH CAROLINA'S fire was so heavy that observers in other ships reported that she looked to be ablaze throughout.

Gilbert Islands Operation November 1943

Fast battleships defend TG 50.2 against night attack by Japanese torpedo planes.

NORTH CAROLINA ACTION REPORT:

1. Task Group 50.2, on the night of 25 November 1943, successfully repelled an air attack between 1854 to 1950 Zone plus 12 time, in a location 45 miles bearing 320 True from Makin Island. From 10 to 12 Japanese attack planes and 1 or more reconnaissance planes engaged this Task Group just after darkness. This ship sustained no damage and shot down 1 enemy plane and probably destroyed 1 additional plane. All enemy planes were either shot down or turned away by antiaircraft fire.

2. This Task Group had operated all day in an area about 40 miles square, 50 miles northwest of Makin Island while covering the landing operations at Makin. It consisted of the ENTERPRISE, MONTEREY, BELLEAU WOOD, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS, NORTH CAROLINA and 6 destroyers. During the day the Task Group was in cruising disposition 5-ROGER, as prescribed in PacFlt ltr. 36CL-42, on various courses and speeds while launching and recovering aircraft. Just prior to sunset, cruising disposition 5-VICTOR was taken with ships disposed as follows: ENTERPRISE guide at 1 000, INDIANA 2.5 060, MASSACHUSETTS 2.5 180, NORTH CAROLINA 2.5 300, MONTEREY 1 240, BELLEAU WOOD 1 120, destroyers on 2.5 circle between battleships, axis 310° True, circle spacing 1000 yards.

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3. Enemy planes were known to be operating from bases in the Marshall Islands and indications were that Task Group 50.2 probably had been sighted and tracked during the day. At 17000 a single bogie was contacted by radar. This snooper closed the formation to 17 miles. Fighters from the carriers were vectored out by the fighter director but were not successful in making an interception.

4. The night was clear but dark; sunset at 1817. There was no moon. Surface visibility after darkness was 4,000 yards. The sky was about 0.3 covered with cumulus clouds. The sea was calm, the wind was about 14 knots from 100 True.

5. At sunset all planes had landed on the carriers of this Task Group and the radar screen was clear. At 1840 this ship made visual contact and reported to the OTC one Japanese plane, identified as an "Emily",* bearing 025 True, distance 34.000 yards. This plane was tracked by radar for the next hour. It shadowed the formation at ranges between 30,000 and 40,000 yards until after the attack group arrived on station. At 1904 radar contact was made on a group of 10 or 12 bogies bearing 050 True at 48,000 yards. These planes were designated in this ship as "Raid Baker". All planes maneuvered about the formation and were tracked by search and fire control radars until they withdrew at about 1950. The OTC maneuvered this Task Group by turn signals transmitted by TBS in order to keep Raid Baker astern.

6. At 1911 Raid Baker split into 3 sections; 2 of these sections rejoined at 1920 and never did press home their attacks. At about 1916 two float lights were dropped, bearing 050 True, distance 20,000 yards, parallel to the course of the formation. These float lights burned brightly for at least half an hour. At 1932 five flares were dropped across the head of the formation, bearing 130 True, range 34.000  yards. These flares gave excellent performance and silhouetted the force from a sector astern. They were too far away and covered only a small arc. At 1936 both Raid Able and section 3 of Raid Baker closed rapidly to make their attacks, Raid Able approaching from 210 True and Raid Baker approaching from 020 True. At 1940 orders were given to the port 5" battery to open fire on planes of Raid Able, which were then dead ahead at 4,000 yards. Before a shot could be fired the target passed to starboard. The destroyer RADFORD, in position ahead, opened fire on this group with automatic weapons. Immediately thereafter a plane was sighted visually close aboard on the starboard bow of this ship. A splash was seen under the plane but no wake or explosion was observed. The plane passed down the starboard side at a range of less than 200 yards and at about masthead height. It was taken under fire by 1 40mm gun and 2 20mm guns located on the starboard bow. After passing astern, the plane was seen to break into flames and crash into the water.

* Emily: Code name for Japanese reconnaissance flying boat.

** Proximity fuze.

--91--

8. Another plane of section 3 or Raid Baker, after circling, started its approach bearing 295 True, range 21,000 yards and pressed home an attack. At 1948-1/2 the entire starboard 5" battery opened fire on this plane at a range of 6,000 yards, bearing 260 True. The destroyer BROWN, to starboard, opened fire shortly thereafter. At 1950 the radar signal of this plane was lost from all tracking radars simultaneously. A large ball of smoke and a splash in the water was observed. It is believed probable that this plane was shot down. After this, no other enemy planes approached the formation.

12. Comments on Own Disposition, Maneuvers and Ship Control.

(a) The modified disposition 5-V is considered to be an excellent formation for repelling air attack either night or day, and proved very effective during this attack. The formation is sufficiently tight to allow two battleships and at least two destroyers to fire at any low flying attacking plane without firing over another ship. For a dive attack on any carrier, two battleships and at least four destroyers may fire automatic weapons well within their range. Each battleship is within 2200 yards of two carriers. The formation is sufficiently loose to permit maneuverability, minimum distance between all ships being 1750 yards. Maneuvering was done by TBS* turn signals.

(b) The conn was kept on the bridge. For night air attack this ship has the signal officer stationed in the chart house with duplicate TBS transmitters and receivers. A TBS speaker is also in the pilot house. The signal officer is in direct communication with the Commanding Officer by teletalk. With the excessive noise encountered during an air attack the bridge speaker is unreliable and the teletalk at full volume has proved invaluable. The signal officer uses a headset with helmet, and transits all maneuvering signals over the teletalk. All glass ports were left down on the bridge, and half the battle ports were left closed, which excluded some of the glare from firing but allowed good vision from ahead to each quarter. This vision and the RPPI** in the pilot house, on the SG*** position, gave the Captain a complete and clear picture of the formation at all times. A running plot of attacking planes was also kept in the pilot house by an officer in direct communication with Combat Information Center.

(c) The maneuvering of the formation was excellent. In general, the attacking planes were kept astern or on the quarter, the formation being maneuvered, using TBS, so radically and quickly that it was difficult for the attacking planes to make an attack, and also kept them under fire a maximum length of time. This ship had no difficulty in keeping station.

FLAG OFFICER COMMENTS:

*TBS: High-frequency voice radio.

**RPPI: Remote Plan Position Indicator.

***SG: High-frequency surface search radar.

--92--

(b) Prior to and during both attacks Rear Admiral RADFORD handled his Task Group in such masterly manner that the enemy attacks were broken up with considerable damage to attacking enemy aircraft and with no damage to Task Group 50.2. During each attack Task Group 50.2 consisted of:

One CV and two CVL - ENTERPRISE, BELLEAU WOOD, and MONTEREY
Three BB - INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS and NORTH CAROLINA
Six DD

4. Own Anti-Aircraft Defense.

(a) BBs and DDs were directed to open fire when enemy aircraft were known to be approaching our disposition for attack.

(b) CVs were directed to hold fire until directed to open fire until directed to open fire until actually under attack by approaching enemy aircraft.

(c) On both nights BBs and DDs opened fire in volume and with effectiveness when the enemy aircraft dared to approach or drive home an attack. Truly that 5-V disposition formed a ring of steel around the Carriers and gave the torpedo planes a wholesome respect for our withering gunfire.

(d) On neither night did the Carriers open fire with their AA batteries. As a result the carriers were never illuminated by their own gunfire. The gunfire of the screening vessels did not illuminate the Carriers.

NORTH CAROLINA ACTION REPORT:

Search Radar Performance

1. Radar contact was not established on bogey planes until the range was approximately 17 miles. This has been a normal occurrence and is explained by the low altitude (50 to 800 feet) of the enemy planes. The procedure for the SK* radar has been to search 360 degrees, stopping only long enough on each contact to determine if friendly or bogey. Once a raid has broken through to attack, the SK operators continue reporting bogies until such time as a minimum range is reached. Inside of 6,000 yards the air search radar loses its effectiveness.

2. The search radars were employed as follows during the action:

*SK: Long-range air search radar.

--93—

Cruising Disposition 5-V ("Five-Victor")

--94--

(b) SG No. 1 (on foremast), on 15,000 yard scale, used for station keeping and to give a continuous picture of RPPI units for keeping locations of ships of own formation.

(c) The radar signal in the C and I* unit is clearest and strongest and the notch disappears when exactly on in both elevation and train. When off target in either bearing or elevation, the notch remains in place and the target signal is fuzzy.

(d) From the type attack expected, an estimate can be made as to target altitude.

(e) Occasionally a target is momentarily sighted optically, being silhouetted against flares or tracer streams from other ships. One position angle and range is sufficient to determine the altitude.

The computer operator then coaches the director pointer to the proper value of sight elevation to give this altitude. This procedure has the advantages that the director optics are always directed at the target and if the target is sighted optically, no shift in control is required to use optical elevation control. It is slightly more complicated than controlling elevation by level from the stable element, as recommended at destroyer gunnery schools.

4. When low flying planes are in the vicinity of a surface ship, the radar signal on the planes tend to merge with the radar signal of the surface ship. Under these conditions, if the pointer and trainer attempt to keep on target by radar, the director invariably leaves the air target and begins tracking the surface target. The radar range operator must warn the pointer and trainer when another signal approaches his slot on the C and I scope, so that they might let the generated solution carry the director through the interfering signal.

C.I.C.** Performance

1. As noted in the remarks for the search radar, Combat Information Center maintained both an air and a surface plot. Continuous information was furnished the Captain by the Evaluator over the JA circuit. In addition, an auxiliary plot, using a mooring board and pins with colored heads, was maintained on the bridge. By looking at this board, the Captain could better coordinate and understand the information being furnished him and could form a clear conception of enemy movements. This system worked exceedingly well. There was no confusion and information was immediately available as to the location and maneuvers of the various groups of planes.

*C and I; Combat Information Center, first developed during the early months of World War II.

** C.I.C.: Combat Information Center, first developed during the early months of World War II.

--95--

The SG radars were on the same sound powered telephone circuit and gave information directly to the surface plotter. The arrangement above proved highly satisfactory and fulfilled all necessary demands. The results of search radar were highly satisfactory. The SG radars have picked up low flying aircraft when not showing on the SK screen,

FD* Radar Performance

1. Three of the four FD radars gave excellent results, tracking designated targets without difficulty at ranges exceeding 35,000 yards. One target was tracked by fire control radars to 80,000 yards. The radar antenna in Sky 4 was not properly aligned in elevation so did not give satisfactory performance. When aligned after navy yard overhaul the radar antenna was set in elevation on a lobe of the target and was therefore 13 degrees out. This occurred also in other directors, but the errors were discovered and corrected. Sky 4 radar antenna was aligned after the action and gave excellent performance.

2. Range, trainers' and pointers' pips were obtained on all designated targets. It was known that the pointers' pips were not reliable at position angles lower than ten degrees. From experiments conducted during daylight it had been found that the error in elevation on low flying aircraft was often greater than the position angle.** The procedure, as developed for control of elevation and actually used during this and subsequent actions, is based on making an estimate of the target's altitude and walking the projectiles back and forth in elevation across this altitude. The control of sight elevation remains in the director synchronized elevation knob in the computer in its "IN" position (normal setting). The computer operator manually turns the dive rate knob back and forth across zero to give an artificial shift in elevation.

3. The best estimate of target altitude is based on several factors:

(a) It has been observed that when the radar is exactly on the target in elevation, even though the pointer's pips are not matched, the trainer's pips are strongest and clearest. By careful teamwork the trainer can give a good estimate of position angle by this means. (Under present circumstances, the director crews get good and learn these things for themselves.)

2. C.I.C, also furnished target designations to the Sky directors, and evaluated all information for Sky Control and Control. This information was transmitted by an officer in C.I.C, over the 5JP circuit.

*FD: 5-inch fire control radar, later redesignated Mark 4.

**Wartime 5-inch fire control radars, Mks 4 and 12, lost accuracy at low angles. The Mk 22 was developed as a supplementary radar to remedy this deficiency. All three radars were later replaced by the Mk 25.

--96--

Surface Task Group Sweep Around Truk

February 1944

IOWA and NEW JERSEY repel single-plane air attack; NEW JERSEY serves as fighter-direction ship.

IOWA ACTION REPORT:

At 1318 Iowa was under a heavy black cloud with a ceiling of about 2,000 feet. An intense sun glare shone through a small in this cloud at bearing 240 (relative), elevation about 70°. Suddenly a plane (Zeke or Hap)* dove through this hole and dropped a light bomb when even with the bottom of the cloud. The bomb hit the water about 100 to 200 feet from the starboard side of the ship, abreast Turret 1. Spray was thrown up over Turrets 1 and 2 and the 20mm guns on the main deck at the starboard side of Turret 2. No casualties or damage resulted.

After dropping the bomb, the plane banked sharply up and to the left, making a complete and tight circle just above the ship's port beam at a position angle of about 70°. It was close to the cloud and disappeared intermittently in it.

The plane then started another steep dive on the ship. One observer reported that is was strafing and that its bullets were hitting the water on the starboard side of the ship. Heavy Number 4 fired two rounds and 20mm guns fired 74 rounds at the plane during this dive. The plane pulled out of the dive at about 1,000 feet altitude, crossed the ship, banked left, and stood away on the starboard bow.

NEW JERSEY opened fire but the plane continued ahead to the vicinity of the screen where it turned left and stood off in a southerly direction. Two of the screening destroyers were observed to fire 5" guns at it. Later information indicated that this plane was downed by CAP shortly thereafter.

NEW JERSEY ACTION REPORT:

*Zeke, Hap: Allied identification code names for versions of the Japanese Zero single-engine fighter.

**Voice-radio phrase meaning "enemy aircraft sighted in clouds."

--97--

Antiaircraft Action During Carrier Strike Against Palau

March 1944

AA gunfire defends carrier task group against two evening attacks by Japanese land-based torpedo bombers.

ALABAMA ACTION REPORT:

1. NARRATIVE.

(a) While acting as a unit of Task Group 58.3 (Rear Admiral S.P. Ginder, U.S.N., Commander Carrier Division ELEVEN), and Task Force 58 (Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher, U.S.N.), during the recently completed attack on Palau, this vessel took part in engagements with low-flying Japanese planes which attacked or harassed the Task Group on the nights of 29 and 30 March, 1944.

(b) The first engagement occurred during evening twilight of 29 March, 1944. About six enemy planes approached Task Group 58.3 and of these, four attempted to attack in the vicinity of ALABAMA. One of these was shot down by ALABAMA A.A. and one, which crashed just astern of LANGLEY, by other ships of the Group. Both burst into flames. The other two planes escaped. The enemy was not observed to have dropped bombs or torpedoes.

(c) The second night, March 30, at 2045, an estimated group of six enemy planes, and again at 2146 a single plane, approached Task Group 58.3, and upon being taken under fire by this and other ships, retired without pressing home an attack. No apparent damage was suffered by the enemy or by the ships of this Task Group.

1. PERFORMANCE OF OWN ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT.

(a) No new material deficiencies were encountered and no evidence was given of training deficiencies. Personnel performance was effective throughout. However, the many changes continuing to occur in officer and enlisted personnel emphasizes the desirability of having more opportunities and services provided to conduct training fire. The material deficiencies most in evidence during these A.A. actions were; as usual:

(1) The radar sight elevation difficulties experienced with the MK. 4 radar.

(2) The lack of satisfactory control equipment for use with the 40mm during darkness.

In the matter of passing targets from search radar for putting MK. 4 radars on a target initially, ALABAMA has used search radar range and bearing designations by 5JP battle telephone as the means of so doing, over since commissioning. This practice is thoroughly routine and is both easy and reliable. Upon installation of SK radar, it was found that any early difficulties in this connection experienced with SC radar were no longer encountered. One potentially dangerous weakness of the SK in use for designation lies in its inability to hold targets at close range. If close and dangerous targets were multiple this deficiency would assume serious proportions.

--98--

SOUTH DAKOTA ACTION REPORT:

"Radar casualties were more serious during this operation than on any previous one. Two antiaircraft director Mark 4 equipments were out of commission during periods when they were most urgently needed. As it happened, no direct attack was made on the formation after the failure of these equipments. All casualties occurring were distinctly material failures due to factors such as the breakdown of circuit components caused by age or shock of gunfire.

"The enemy resorted to radar jamming for the first time in this ship's experience during this operation. A small amount of the "window"* type was used in the vicinity of Task Group 58.3 and caused no confusion although one antiaircraft director shifted from the plane to the "window," having concluded that the raid was splitting and that the other director on that side would continue to track the other plane. Considerably more of this type of radar jamming material is believed to have been dropped in the vicinity of Task Group 58.2. The comments of the SK and FD radar operators who experienced the jamming follow.

"Comments by SK radar operator on 'window' dropped during night air action 30 March 1944:

"'The first appearance of the enemy having dropped "windows" was observed early during the night attack. One plane tracked in from the south was lost in the water-return for several minutes; it reappeared at six miles on a north-easterly course. The target stood out clearly on the PPI scope as there was about two miles distance between it and the edge of the water-return. Suddenly what looked like a rain squall showed up right behind the plane. On the 'A' scope** it appeared as several sharp, fluctuating, pips while the PPI scope showed an erratic, hazy arc. As this was the only raid in the screen at the time, the operator was able to study it carefully and quickly came to the conclusion that "windows" were dropped. They were evidently dropped at a low altitude as they remained on the screen for a short while and had only an E2 pip strength. (Having observed "windows" during a recent exercise it was concluded that "windows" dropped from any great height at such close range should have saturated pips.)

*Window: Wartime code name for chaff.

**"A" scope: Oscilloscope presentation giving target range only.

--99--

thought that they might be side lobes but this was quickly disproved by decreasing the receiver gain control. Those "windows" were evidently dropped from a higher altitude as they gave a strong echo on the 'A' scope and remained on the scope for quite some time.

"Comment by FD radar operator on 'windows’ dropped during night air action 30 March 1944.

"On the basis of one exhibition of the 'window' type radar jamming and one positive contact with it during action with the enemy, the following points appear to be worthy of mention:

"Properly used this type of jamming could seriously impair the efficiency of the FD type radar equipment. Operators appear to have little difficulty staying on an incoming target that drops the 'window' material but will shift to it when dropped by a target opening range. 'Windows' dropped beyond ten miles should present no great difficulty other than keeping track of a large number of contacts in CIC.

"However, if the enemy coordinated his attack to the extent that one plane was used to drop the 'window' material in the large quantities at ranges of 10,000 yards and less, closely followed by other planes making the attack, it is believed that the FD radar operators would have a great deal of difficulty in staying on the true targets as they came through the 'window' material. The enemy has not yet fully exploited the possibilities of this radar-jamming device.

Marianas Operation; Battle of the Philippine Sea

June 1944

TASK FORCE 58 ACTION REPORT (Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher):

"On the evening of 15 June at about the time the carriers were recovering their planes and while heading on a southeasterly course several bogeys appeared from the westward. This developed into an aggressive torpedo attack by about a dozen planes thought to be Milky Ways or Frans.* Although their attack was pressed home and there were many close misses, no ship was torpedoed, and at least seven of the attackers were shot down. By this time the landing operation by our huge amphibious forces was under way and the Japanese could no longer be in doubt that we were endeavoring to capture SAIPAN. Their torpedo attack, by planes probably brought into the area, indicated that they were beginning to assemble all the power they could to repel the attack, and start their attrition tactics on our fleet.

*Frans: The Nakajima P1Y1 Ginga (Milky Way) twin-engined landbased bomber, code-named Frances.

--100--

"At about 1000 many planes were picked up on the radar to the west, distance approximately 130 miles, and additional fighters were launched. Our fighters were vectored out and intercepted many enemy carrier fighters, dive bombers and torpedo planes about 35 or 40 miles west of Task Group 58.7, which was nearer to the enemy than any of the four Carrier Task Groups. The fighters shot down most of the enemy planes, but a few got through to attack the battleship group which was subjected to intermittent attacks by groups of three or four to a dozen planes until about 1500. During these attacks nine planes identified as Judys, Jills and Kates* were shot down by ships' gunfire.

 

*Judy, Jill, Kate: Allied code names for types of single-engined Japanese attack planes.

--101--

CRUISING DISPOSITION 7-V
Air defense formation of TG 58.7 (Battle Line), Philippine Sea

"The enemy attack was made in four main raids, all of which were intercepted and broken up by our fighters with only a few planes getting through to attack the force. Two of these raids had Mark III IFF indications. Task Group 58.2 was subjected to two attacks, the first by four JUDYS of which three were shot down by gunfire, and the second by about 10 planes of which three were shot down by fighters very close to the disposition and two more which were shot down by ships' gunfire. Task Group 58.3 suffered one attack by five or six planes which came in singly. Two JUDYS and two JILLS were shot down by gunfire.

"During the attacks on Task Group 58.7 SOUTH DAKOTA and MINNEAPOLIS sustained a direct hit and a near miss respectively and a plane crashed into the side of INDIANA. The battle efficiency of these ships was, however, not impaired. In Task Group 58.2 WASP and BUNKER HILL suffered near misses during both of the attacks on that task group. In BUNKER HILL, one officer and one enlisted man were killed and three officers and 70 enlisted men injured. The hangar deck

--102--

gassing system was put out of commission for several days, an F6F was blown off the flight deck, and other damage not affecting her battle efficiency was suffered. WASP had one enlisted man killed and one officer and 11 men injured. Damage to the ship was very slight.

"During the day, fighters were repeatedly sent to Guam and strikes were made by fighters, dive bombers and torpedo planes on both Guam and Rota to deny the enemy the use of these bases for launching shore based attacks or for refueling and rearming planes flown in from carriers far at sea to the west. The Orote and Agana airfields at Guam were well cratered and hits were made on the Rota strip."

BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA, IV
"THE GREAT MARIANAS TURKEY SHOOT"
0300-1500 June 19, 1944

RECAPITULATION

27 Total airborne enemy aircraft destroyed by ships’ gunfire.

848 Total airborne enemy aircraft destroyed by our aircraft.

875 Total airborne enemy aircraft destroyed by our aircraft and ships' gunfire.<