DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL
HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060
CHAPTER X
THE BUILD-UP FOR THE BATTLE OF FRANCE
PART 1
THE POST-NEPTUNE NAVAL TASK
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The first naval task of the Allied Expeditionary
Force was accomplished when the Allied armies had been
landed on the Normandy Beaches. The Primary naval task
then became the Build-up for the later offensive thrusts,
designed to defeat the German Forces in France. By D + 6,
the American, British, and Canadian armies, of the
General Montgomery's 21st Army Group, had consolidated
their positions on the beaches and were preparing attacks,
both in the Caen Sector to effect a break-through in the
lower Seine area, and in the St. Lo Sector to open the way
to Brittany, and into the Loire-Seine region.
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The army still had a desperate battle before them
before they would consolidate possession of their bridgehead
in the lodgement area. In fighting this battle,
naval bombardment would lend valuable aid. The issue of
the battle ashore would, moreover, in large measure, be
determined by the degree of success of the Build-up. If
the allied forces could be reinforced in Normandy more
rapidly than the German army, the allied armies would be
able to organize their hold on the lodgement area, as the
base for further operations. Otherwise they might be
driven back into the sea by the German counter-attacks.
Allied measures to delay the reinforcement of the German
army by air bombardment, and by cover and deception have
been described in Chapter II. Allied methods for preventing
the Germans from delaying the allied Build-up, by protecting
NEPTUNE from German counter action, have been described in
Chapters VII and VIII. The methods employed to effect the
transport of allied men, machinery, and stores in the Build-up
race are described below.
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The problem of the Build-up can be sub-divided into
three principle tasks:
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the establishment of an organization on the Far Shore
capable of receiving, protecting, discharging, and
returning Build-up shipping;
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the installation of artificial ports and breakwaters
on the Far Shore;
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the development in the Near Shore of a Build-up
service capable of providing and operating
the channel shipping program.
In accomplishing all three of these tasks, the army and
navy, and also the airforce, acted jointly.
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PART 2
FAR SHORE ORGANIZATION
A. Plans and Preparations for Naval Far Shore Service
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Preparations had been begun at an early date for
establishing the organization necessary for handling
the Far Shore end of the NEPTUNE Build-up program. For
two years prior to D-day, many agencies in Britain,
under the leadership of Combined Operations Headquarters,
had studied the problem and had conducted dozens of
exercises and experiments. The largest of these maintained
a division on an open beach of similar characteristics to
the Normandy beaches for six weeks. On the U.S. side,
similar, though less prolonged, experimentation was carried
out from July 1943 onward at Appledore and Woolacombe.
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The British War Office had convened an inter-service
committee in late summer 1943 to study the NEPTUNE Far
Shore problem. Though invited, responsible U.S. authorities
were not substantially represented on this committee.
In conformity with the general plans evolved by the inter-service
committee, ANCXF formed a special branch of his
staff to deal with the Naval Far Shore Organization. This
was set up under the title, Chief Naval Administrative
Officer, by Rear-Admiral Rivett-Carnac, R.N. Again, for
lack of adequate U.S. representation, this branch became
primarily a British organization.
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The problem faced by the planners had been that of
providing support for a five-divisional assault and for
a Build-up of approximately one and one-third divisions
per day, over open beaches, for ninety days or longer.
Several factors, which had not been encountered in previous
amphibious operations in the European war, had to be faced:
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the landing was to be made in a heavily fortified
area, where the enemy's potential rate of reinforcement
was greater than the Allied;
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the flanks would be exposed to fire from the
enemy heavy coastal batteries to attacks over
a long period from nearby, well-established,
E-boat and U-boat bases, and to air raids from
strong forces based near the assault area;
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a tidal rise and fall of 25 feet, and a strong
off-shore current had to be reckoned with;
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the beaches were very flat, drying to as much
as 2,000 feet from [the] high water mark, runnels
paralleled the beach, and at points the tide
receded horizontally at an average rate of four
and one-half feet per minute;
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good weather could not be relied on for more than
four days at a time;
-
each major beach had to provide necessary
facilities for up to 700 landing craft and other
vessels based on the far shore.
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In view of these conditions, NEPTUNE, unlike previous
amphibious assaults, would require a vast build-up over
the assault beaches for a prolonged period. It therefore
was decided to operate the beaches, as if they were ports,
during the beach build-up. This required a Far Shore
establishment to be organized in three phases:
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the assault phase;
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the beach Build-up phase, and
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the post-NEPTUNE phase.
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During the assault phase the beaches would be a battle
ground. The Far Shore therefore had to be controlled by
the assault force commanders, employing their combatant
organization. As soon as the beaches and anchorages were
freed of enemy shelling, and were no longer in danger from
local counter attack, the control of the beach in the
British area would be assumed by a NOIC (Naval Officer in
Charge). He would be supplied with an organization
paralleling that employed in the Mediterranean for Naval
Commanders of captured ports. Control of the entire U.S.
area during this period was to be assumed by the Flag
Officer West (FOWEST), while control of the British area
would be taken over by Flag Officer, British Assault Area
(FOBAA). As soon as adequate ports were captured, the
beach Build-up organization would be transformed in each
area into the standard British and U.S. organizations for
the administration and operation of a captured area.
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During all three phases, the basic tasks to be
performed on the Far Shore, would be the same, although
the relative importance of each would change. These
tasks were:
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control of shipping movements to and from the
Far Shore;
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protection of shipping in the area;
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discharge of shipping on the Far Shore;
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provision for logistic supply and administration
of Naval vessels, personnel, and
equipment at the Far Shore;
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salvage and maintenance;
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the evacuation of casualties.
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ANCXF had originally intended to develop British and
American Naval Far Shore organizations in parallel,
through the CNAO branch of his staff. A variety of
circumstances contributed however to defeat this plan.
In particular, NCWTF did not wish to develop the American
organization along lines which he considered conformed to
British, rather than to U.S. habits and procedures. As a
result ANCXF, in January 1944, assigned responsibility
for the provision of the Far Shore organization to the
respective Task Force Commanders. Each was authorized to
put into effect a system in conformity with the practice
of their own navys.
B. British Area Far Shore Naval Organization
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Pursuant to this arrangement, Rear Admiral Rivett-Carnac
was relieved of duty as Chief Naval Administrative
Officer on the staff of ANCXF and took up a similar
appointment, but for British Forces only, on the staff of
NCETF, with the title Rear-Admiral (Administration) and
Flag Officer British Assault Area (designate). In this
capacity he developed the following organization for the
R.N. Far Shore establishment:
-
when the area of the British assault was first
seized it would come under the naval command
of NCETF. NCETF would act through the Assault
Force Commanders as necessary.
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when a headquarters and the necessary
communications had been set up ashore, and
when the situation warrants the withdrawal
of NCETF, the Flag Officer, British Assault
Area (FOBAA), Rear-Admiral J.W. Rivett-Carnac,
RN. would assume command.
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In order to relieve NCETF of administrative
matters, the Flag Officer, British Assault
Area (designate) was to act as Rear-Admiral
(Administration) to NCETF, and would be
responsible to him for co-ordination and
action in regard to the following matters:
-
Ferry Service.
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Repair, salvage, and fuelling.
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Inter-service matters relating to shore
defense.
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The set-up of Far Shore communication
and equipment.
-
Administration of naval units attached
to MULBERRIES, GOOSEBERRIES, and ashore.
-
FOBAA (designate), during this period would
issue orders and instructions as NCETF (Administration)
on behalf of NCETF.
1
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NCETF (Administration) in the initial stage, would
accompany NCETF in his Flagship, transferring to a
headquarter ship in GOOSEBERRY 4 on about D + 2.
When NCETF (Administration) was thus established
in a separate headquarters, signals on administrative
matters were to be addressed to NCETF (A) and
repeated to NCETF.
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Each Assault Force was to be self-contained. It
would include organizations under the operational and
administrative control of the Assault Force Commanders,
subject only to the Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force:
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Beach organization, including ferry craft unit
commanded by the Beach Naval Officer-in-Charge;
-
repair organization;
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a salvage and fire-fighting organization.
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Notwithstanding the above, NCETF (A), acting for
Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force, would make any
necessary adjustments in the strength of these organizations
as between assault force fronts, to meet
contingencies, and would issue the necessary orders to
effect such adjustments through the Assault Force
Commanders.
-
A depot Ship Organization was to be set up in each
MULBERRY and GOOSEBERRY to provide accommodation ships
for ferry craft crews. The whole depot ship organization
was to be under the command of Commodore H.T.
England. Commodore, Depot Ships (short title - Com.D.S.)
was to be responsible to NCETF for keeping this organization
up to date with the operational requirements.
1
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As soon as possible after the assault, officers
nominated by the Assault Force Commanders would land in
areas GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD, and would be responsible
to their respective Assault Force Commanders for all Naval
matters ashore in their areas. They would be known as:
NOIC., SWORD
NOIC., JUNO
NOIC., GOLD
2
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NOIC MULBERRY B and NOIC PORT-EN-BESSIN assumed
command when ordered by NCETF. They were directly
responsible to NCETF (NCETF (A) for administrative matters).
The Resident Naval Officers at COURSEULLES and OUISTREHAM
were responsible to the NOIC of the Beach area, in which
their port was situated.
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NCETF (A) in his capacity as FOBAA (designate),
acted directly through Naval Officers-in-Charge
concerned on all matters related to the set-up of all
far shore communications, to special equipment and to
all inter-service matters affecting only the shore
organization.
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As a result of this organization, the Eastern Task
force achieved a continuity of organization and control.
The Far Shore parties began their duties in the combatant
phase under command of the assault force commanders. They
were progressively enlarged and developed, and in due
course became the NOIC organization, still charged with
the same jobs. Later this organization grew until it
became the over-all Far Shore organization operating
captured ports in the British area.
C. U.S. Area: American Far Shore Naval Organization
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The U.S. Far Shore organization developed along
different lines. NCWTF never centered responsibility
for Far Shore matters in any one authority or staff section.
It was not until the 4th of April, that NCWTF made any
provision for a Far Shore organization. At this late date
there was not time to develop an "American" system.
Accordingly, NCWTF directed the formation of a Far Shore
organization, patterned on the British model, with the
major difference that control and coordination of the
whole was not centered in any one authority. The
organization provided was as follows:
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During the initial phase, U.S. Naval Forces
were to operate under the over-all command of
NCWTF. Commander Force O, and Commander
Force U, were to be responsible for all operations
in their respective areas. At some unspecified
time, control of shipping movements was to be
turned over to an authority to be styled shuttle
control, operating under the direct command of
NCWTF. Early in this phase officers of Captains
rank, with the titles of NOIC OMAHA and NOIC UTAH,
were to assume control, under the Assault Force
Commanders, of the beaches, minor ports, ferry
control, maintenance, recovery, repair, etc..
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In phase two, which would begin when the
army was firmly established ashore, one or
the other of the Assault Force Commanders would
be designated to relieve the other and to assume
command of both areas, under the title of FOWEST.
FOWEST was expected to take over the control on D + 1
or D + 2. He would therefore be given sweeping
duties to perform. As no definite person was
designated in advance to become FOWEST, and as
each Assault Force Commander had his time and
resources completely occupied in preparing for
the assault, no particular advance preparations
were made for the organization of Far Shore
Naval activities during this phase of the operation.
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In phase three, which would begin only when the
situation was sufficiently stabilized, Commander
Landing Craft and Bases, who had been redesignated
for the operation as Commander Service Force 122
(CTF 127), would assume control on the Far Shore
as Flag Officer France (FO FRANCE). The name was
subsequently changed to Commander United States
Naval Ports and Bases France (short title
ComUSBasFrance).
D. Shore Parties: U.S. Area
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The primary responsibility for operating the beaches,
and for unloading vessels on the beaches in the U.S. area,
rested with the army. In each assault force, the army
organization responsible for beach operation (styled
Shore Party) was an engineer special brigade. One such
brigades was provided for each divisional front. This
resulted in the assignment of two ESB at OMAHA beach, and
of one at UTAH beach. Over-all command of the three ESB,
was vested in a "Provisional Engineer Special Brigade
Group." One Naval Beach Battalion was attached to each
Engineer Special Brigade. Allocation of ESB and Beach
Battalions was as follows:
a. | At UTAH Beach | 1st Engineer Special Brigade |
| | 2nd Beach Battalion |
b. | At OMAHA Beach | 5th Engineer Special Brigade |
| 1st Division Sector | 6th Beach Battalion |
c. | At OMAHA Beach | 6th Engineer Special Brigade |
| 29th Division Sector | 7th Beach Battalion |
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Each ESB [Engineer Special Brigade] was organized around a Battalion of combat
engineers as a nucleus. In addition to combat engineers
it contained:
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port battalions for unloading;
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DUWK companies;
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truck companies;
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AA units;
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communications units;
-
medical units;
-
service units.
-
Each Naval Beach Battalion contained:
-
beach masters and party, to control beaching of craft;
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a hydrographic section, to determine suitable points of landing;
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a communication section for ship shore communication;
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a medical section to handle evacuation of casualties;
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a salvage and repair section.
-
Like an engineer special brigade, a beach battalion
normally operates on a two, or even three, regimental front.
In NEPTUNE, however, each beach battalion was responsible for
only a one regimental front (over which the entire division
was to be landed). Unlike other operations in the European
area, the beach battalions were early associated with and
operated under their respective ESB's. They remained with
them for a considerable period after D-day. They were thus
definitely attached to the army shore party and had no
direct link with the other Naval Units. The Beach Battalions
began landing in the earliest assault waves. They had an
administrative task to perform under combatant conditions.
Despite the hazards and difficulties they performed their
functions in a truly remarkable, but unspectacular manner.
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PART 3
NAVAL FAR SHORE ACTIVITIES AFTER D-DAY
(Extracts from ANCXF NEPTUNE Report)
III. Performance.
-
In spite of a combination of foul weather and
some unexpectedly stiff opposition in the landings, the
temporary disablement of 70% of ferry craft by a near-disastrous
3-day storm about D plus 15 and the closing
of one beach by enemy shelling, the "NEPTUNE" beaches
in the 30 days landed:
730,000 | long tons of stores exclusive of vehicular loads; |
200,000 | vehicles; |
1,018,000 | men, and, |
reached a peak for one day of 40,000 tons.
IV. Early Difficulties.
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Difficulties with weather and the enemy upset
the D and D plus 1 day landing schedules, and created a
big back log. The Assault Force Commanders were then
reluctant to turn over to the Build-up organization, in
which they apparently had little confidence. Instead of
withdrawing D-day or D plus 1, as had been planned, the
Force Commanders remained off the beaches until about
D plus 25. A most unsatisfactory state of dual control
resulted, and it was some time before the planned set-up was
allowed to function freely. However, once given the
opportunity the plans proved themselves and eventually the
NOIC organizations operated almost as planned.
V. The Plan
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The two U.S. assault beaches were approximately
fifteen miles apart, but so situated in the Bay of the
Seine, that common approach channels could be used. On
the westernmost beach a regular one-divisional front was
established. On the other, however, two divisions landed,
each in a column of regiments on a 7,500 yard beach
naturally defended by cliffs.
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One reinforced Engineer Special Brigade
supported each division, and one Naval Beach Battalion
was attached to each Brigade.
-
To achieve the required control and coordination,
and to enable a smooth operation for at least ninety days,
an additional overall command was established on each beach.
The Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, under
command of a Brigadier General, was formed. (A complete
troop list of this group for the larger beach is attached.
ANNEX A.) Paralleling this military command a Naval Officer
in charge (NOIC) was set up with a similar function.
-
Every effort was made to maintain constant Army,
and Navy contact and cooperation at all levels throughout
these two organizations.
VI. Beach Battalions.
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The Naval Beach Battalions were not greatly
changed for this operation. In the assault they fulfilled
all their normal functions, but gradually as the Build-up
increased, and the specialized elements of the shore
parties landed, they were relieved of a major part of
communication and repair and salvage.
-
As the NOICs organization became established, the
operations began more and more to resemble that of a port,
and by about D plus 21 the Beach Battalions had been almost
entirely relieved.
-
The most noteworthy deviations from the normal
procedure followed by these units were:
-
each battalion was responsible for only
a regimental front.
-
had to function for a long period and
were truly attached directly to the E.S.B.
-
had no direct link with other Naval units.
VII. NOIC.
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The NOIC's staff included most personnel
required in a port operation combined with many specialists
to enable discharging over flat beaches.
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The NOIC himself was a Captain and made his
headquarters immediately adjacent to that of the
Commanding General, P.E.S.B.G., where the operations room
was run jointly by Army and Navy.
-
The functions of his organization was to
establish and maintain the Army ashore. Hence, its two
most important departments were Operations (Port Direction)
and Ferry Control.
-
His staff included among others; Deputy NOIC -
analogous to Chief Staff Officer; Assistant to NOIC - in
charge of personnel, Senior Watch Officer; Operation
Officer - all port direction duties; Ferry Control Officer -
control of all ferry craft; Salvage and Repair - coordinate
repair, maintenance, etc. with operational requirements;
P.O.L. Officer - provide all necessary fuel, water, lubricants,
etc.; Medical Officer - evacuation of wounded,
health and welfare; Communications - radio, landlines,
radar.
VIII. Joint Conferences.
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Daily conferences to fix priorities for following
days unloading and to discuss operational matters were
attended by representatives of NOIC Operations, Ferry
Control, Engineer Special Brigade, and Army.
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The E.S.B. representatives indicated the section
of beach over which it preferred to handle the cargo of
each ship expected, and the type of ferry craft considered
most suitable to handle it.
-
Ferry Control informed the meeting of landing
craft availability, state of repair, and arranged with the
Military for necessary "lay offs" to enable major repairs.
-
General discussions of previous days operations
took place, suggestions for improvement were made, and
controversies settled. Complaints of non-appearance of
ferry craft, hatch crews, etc. were investigated.
-
Except for emergencies, ALL military demands
upon naval shore facilities were coordinated at this
meeting and much conflict avoided. Requests for emergency
alterations of plan were made ONLY through C.O. Provisional
Brigade Group, and NOIC, or their Operations Officers.
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IX. Operations
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Operations Officers on NOIC Staff were set
up ashore with their military opposites. (Later, to
improve working and living conditions, both moved afloat
without loss of efficiency.) They jointly maintained
plots of shipping in the area, expected arrivals,
priorities , ferry craft operating, state of unloading,
etc..
-
Demands made at daily conferences were handled
by the Joint Operations and necessary compromises worked
out.
-
Sailing lists and manifests were despatched to
this office from the Near Shore by air or fast boat.
Berths were assigned, hatch crews and ferry craft allocated
in advance, in order that unloading might begin immediately
convoys arrived.
-
The purely naval functions of NOIC Operations
included all Port Director duties. Boarding officers were
put aboard all merchant ships arriving to guide them to
assigned berths or beaches, and to acquaint masters with
harbor regulations, condition of channels, etc.. When
manifests had not arrived in advance, these were despatched
to Operations by the boarding officers who used their
discretion in berthing ships.
X. Ferry Control.
-
The Ferry Service, as distinguished from the
Shuttle Service, included all craft based on the Far Shore,
and used as lighterage. The Shuttle Service included all
craft plying between the Near Shore and the Far Shore.
-
The object of the Ferry Service was to effect a
rapid and continuous discharge of shipping over the beaches.
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Because communications, no matter how good,
always present the most difficult problem of ferry craft
control, every effort was made to decentralize command and
responsibility in this service once requirements are fixed.
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Ferry Control Officers (FCO) were assigned to each
regimental front and worked closely with the Beachmasters
of their area. The latter controlled time and place of
beaching through FCO, whose HQ ship (LCI) was always within
easy visual signal distance. These officers conferred at
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least once a day, and when possible before each tide,
on beach conditions, weather, etc.
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A Principal Ferry Control Officer, at NOIC's
headquarters, coordinated and supervised the service on the
divisional front. He attended daily joint conferences,
divided assignments for the following day among area FCO,
and made necessary adjustments of ferry craft between areas.
Engineer Officers attached to NOIC's staff supervised
maintenance and repairs, and kept the Principal Ferry
Control Officer informed of the present and forecast
availability.
-
Ferry craft of all types were assigned to each
FCO, whose HQ craft was made as conspicuous as possible,
and was always anchored in its assigned position. If the
FCO desired to move about his area, he did so in a tender
and left a deputy aboard. (In the press of the early days
of the landings the Assault Survey Commanders, acting as
Ferry Control Officers, did not follow this phase of the
plan, and it was often impossible for shore authorities to
communicate with them for hours at a time because of interference
with radio, and unoccupied ferry craft could find
no one to whom to report.) After daily requirements were
communicated to him, he made his assignments through
Flotilla Officers, who in turn, assigned individual craft
and were responsible for orders being executed expeditiously.
The Flotilla Officers continued in their primary administrative
role, and kept the FCO informed of all matters concerning
their flotilla.
-
Plots and charts of all craft in the area, state
of repair, assignments, position and state of all ships
unloading, etc., were maintained by FCO. He had Army
liaison officers attached who aided in keeping plots.
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LCVP group officers with their boats were
assigned to FCO as messengers, and to aid him and his
flotilla officer in keeping track of craft.
-
FCO were responsible for the welfare, relief,
fueling, etc., of all craft in their area.
XI. Salvage Repair and Maintenance.
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A Senior Officer attached to the staff of the
NOIC was charged with the responsibility for repair and
maintenance of minor landing craft, and keeping them
beached clear of wrecks.
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All craft disabled on the beach were removed
to maintenance areas out of the way of traffic, or, in
the case of major landing craft, patched up and towed
to repair vessels lying off shore.
-
Maintenance and repair were provided by reinforced
E.9 units ashore and ARL afloat. British LBE
(barges equipped with lathes, welding apparatus, cranes,
etc.) were brought alongside disabled craft afloat and
dried out alongside those on the beach when necessary.
-
Routine maintenance was carried out as convenient,
and the Maintenance Officer arranged with Operations for
"lay offs" during slack unloading periods.
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Much specialized equipment such as Le Tournesus,
bulldozers, etc., with attached "A" frames and a great deal
of ingenuity was necessary to refloat craft "heaped" on the
flat beaches.
-
General policy dictated that:
-
Craft sunk in deep water was not an
immediate commitment;
-
Craft working from the Near Shore received
only first aid repairs to enable their
return;
-
All units tackled any class of work on all
types of craft to the limit of their own
capacity;
-
Craft damaged beyond the capacity of Far
Shore repair facilities were returned to
UK in LSD;
-
Beaches were kept clear even at the cost
of demolition and sinking of partially
destroyed craft.
XII. Commander Service Forces.
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In OVERLORD, because of the continued operations of
beaches, the Mulberry and minor ports required coordinating,
it was necessary to establish an over-all command.
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In the initial stages, Naval Commander
Western Task Force commanded the area through the
Force Commanders, but it was planned that these should all
leave shortly after the assault.
-
Another command, Commander Service Forces, was
formed to take over when headquarters and communications
had been established ashore and when the situation
warranted the withdrawal of NCWTF. COMSENFOR commanded
the area through the NOIC, who relieved the Force
Commanders, and those officers who assumed command of the
ports.
-
In order that a minimum of confusion should
result from the turn-over of command, the Commander of
the Near Shore bases from which the assault and Build-up
were mounted became COMSENFOR. He did not leave the Near
Shore until about D plus 20, when Near Shore operations
had become routine. However, his deputy arrived on the
Far Shore on D plus 1, and gradually took over the
coordination of the activities eventually to come under
his command.
XIII. Accommodation.
-
Transports and major landing craft left the
assault area immediately they had discharged their assault
loads. The crews of hundreds of minor landing craft and
thousands of naval personnel ashore were required to be
accommodated and messed permanently on the Far Shore.
-
Old transports and "Liberty" ships equipped with
extra galleys and enlarged mess decks provided accommodations
afloat. The hot bunk system was used when necessary.
Minor landing craft were assigned to these "Depot" ships
by flotillas and were moored nearby when off duty.
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Ferry Control Officers were responsible for the
administration of personnel. Regulating officers in the
ships were responsible for discipline and control and
relief of watches of the Ferry Service.
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Beach Camps were provided to take the place of
depot ships sunk or damaged, to relieve congestion afloat
and to accommodate "Seabees" and other shore based personnel.
-
Bathing and recreational facilities were provided
by depot ships, for the crews of larger ferry craft.
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XIV. Messing.
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The depot ships maintained twenty-four hour
galleys for personnel assigned to them. Crews of craft
on the beach were messed by the Army or in the shore camps.
Those on duty were fed by the ships unloading and by LBK.
(LBK: a self-propelled barge fitted as a kitchen capable
of serving 800 hot meals a day. Thermos containers to hold
food and beverages for the entire crew of an LCVP or LCM,
were provided to enable working boats to pick up hot meals
"on the run.")
-
Shore parties were initially messed by the army
and when camps were established, drew rations from the army.
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LBK, LCT, LBV, and other craft fitted with galleys
drew stores, bread, and meat, from depot ships.
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Water barges (LBW) provided potable water in bulk, and
water in jerry cans was shipped from the Near Shore.
XV. Turn Round.
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Because of the proximity of beaches, restrictions
of swept channels, congestion at embarkation ports, etc., an
elaborate organization was required to speed turn-round of
shipping. It included three main, inter-dependent agencies.
-
BUCO - Build-up Control, controlled merchant
shipping as well as landing ships and craft and military
units.
On the Naval side it issued instructions for
movement of all shipping and craft, order all changes in
planned loadings, and sailings.
On the Military side similar instructions were
issued for the movement of units from concentration areas.
BUCO was composed of representatives of MOWT, WSA,
War Office, various Armies and Army Groups, Navy and Air
Force.
-
TURCO - Turn-Round Control, primarily a Naval
control to speed up turn-round of ships and craft on the
Near Shore, included representatives of Force Commander,
Near Shore Repair Organizations, Movement Control, M of WT,
and WSA.
--580--
Individual TURCOs were set up in each loading
port on the Near Shore. They controlled inward passage
of shipping, allocated berths and loading priorities,
arranged for repairs, fuel, water, ammo, and replacements
for casualties and issued sailing orders.
-
SHUTTLE CONTROL - In the initial stages Force
Commanders were responsible for return sailings from the
assault coast. Later a central control was established
for the entire U.S. area, known as Shuttle Control.
It was divided into two parts, one to deal with
inbound, the other outbound traffic. Both sections were
embarked in HQ ships several miles off shore. Inbound
control met arriving convoys, signalled their arrival to
beach operations, made necessary diversions from one area
to another, and directed convoys to assigned beach areas.
When transport areas were too congested to receive the
ships, convoys were ordered to swept and patrolled positions
and despatched inshore as the situation permitted.
Outbound control maintained a similar assembly
area to which ships moved immediately they were unloaded,
thus relieving transport area congestion. Here they were
formed into convoys for the various Near Shore ports,
escorts assigned and their sailing signalled to TURCO and BUCO.
-
These three shipping controls made every effort
to keep each other informed of all movements and proposed
movements in order to minimize waste time on both shores.
XVI. Recovery and Repair.
-
Recovery, maintenance and repair in the assault
area were under the general control of senior engineer
officers on FOBAA Staff. These included base engineer,
electrical and construction officers, principal salvage
officer, and fuelling officer.
-
Off shore repairs were handled by large repair
parties in LSE, Depot Ships and floating docks.
-
In shore repair and recovery was organized on
a divisional front basis under the NOIC. His staff
included Reserve Assault Group Squadron Engineer Officers
and Engineer Officers of the MLRU.
--581--
-
Ferry craft Squadron Engineer Officers were
attached to PBM to coordinate repairs in each regimental
front.
-
Craft Recovery Units (para 9) were attached to
Beach Masters and Mobile Land Repair Units (para. 10) to
NOIC. The function of the former is to assist stranded
craft to unbeach and effect such emergency repairs as may
be necessary to this end, or the latter, to assist in
beach recovery and repair, maintenance of naval vehicles,
provide spares, and to provide emergency repair facilities
in a captured port before the arrival of the port parties.
-
Three LBE worked with each CRU, one beached,
with its repair truck or crane landed, to serve as repair
HQ, and two anchored off shore. The function of the
former was mainly to aid the CRU while the latter furnished
routine maintenance and made engine repairs. A landing
Craft Repairs Officer was in charge of each unit of three
craft. The CRU Officer commanded all engineer units to
release the Beach Master for other duties.
-
Maintenance and repair problems were simplified
by the RN Squadron and Flotilla organizations which provide
maintenance as well as administrative personnel. These
staffs (para. 11 and 12) are permanently attached to
flotillas and in OVERLORD, manned the LBE and some repair
facilities in the depot ships.
-
General policy dictated that:
-
salvage of vessels sunk in deep water was
not an immediate commitment.
* * * * * * * * *
--582--
Table of Contents
Previous Section
Footnotes:
p.568 #1
See also ONAD 2, Article 2000.
p.569 #1
See also ONAD 2, Article 2011.
p.569 #2
See O.N. 19, Section B and ONAD 2, Article 2044.
6 July 2005