DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL
HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060
CHAPTER II
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR CROSS-CHANNEL
(OVERLORD) OPERATIONS
PART I
EARLY PLANS FOR CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS
A. Introduction: British Planning, 1940-1941
-
Introduction: British Planning 1940-1941. Detailed
planning for cross-channel operations of the combined
Anglo-American armies formally began early in 1943 in
accordance with decisions taken at the Casablanca Conference.
In the previous Chapter, reference has been made to the
strategical decisions taken at the first Anglo-American
War Conference (the Arcadia Conference), held in Washington,
22 December 1941-14 January 1942. Long before this date,
however, British Planning staffs had been at work preparing
preliminary studies of the operations that would be necessary
to land armies on the Continent to defeat the German forces.
In British strategy such an operation was envisaged in the
final stage of war operations in the European theater.
-
From the time the British expeditionary forces were
successfully evacuated from Dunkirk, at the end of May 1940,
the British staffs had had in mind the eventual return to
the Continent. Such an operation would involve larger scale
amphibious operations than had yet been undertaken. The
experience of the British in landings in Norway in April 1940,
had clearly indicated the major problems that would be confronted
in the planning and preparations of such amphibious
operations. Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister and Defense
Minister had set the British Joint Planning Staffs to work
in May 1940 to implement the strategic concepts of the British
War Cabinet. Even in that darkest moment of the war, this
planning envisaged ultimate victory. The immediate strategy
imposed, by the World situation at that time on the British
High Command, was inevitably the defensive. In statements
on long-range British intentions presented to the American
Staffs in the Summer of 1940, definite provisions had been
included for the ultimate return of British armies to the
Continent.
-
During the period 1940-1941 the organized War Cabinet,
with Mr. Churchill as Defense Minister, as well as Prime
Minister, reinforced the Chiefs of Staff Committee and undertook
to establish unity of command for future operations, and
as a first step in July 1940, the Prime Minister asked Admiral
of the Fleet, Lord Keyes, who had organized and conducted the
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brilliant operations at Zeebrugge in World War I, to serve
in the new post, then being created, of "Director of
Combined Operations".1
This new Combined Operations Organization
was charged not only with the organization and
training of "Commando" Striking Forces for raids on German-held
Europe, but also with the joint planning of amphibious
operations. Such operations necessarily involved the
employment, under unified command, of specially trained units
of sea, land, and air forces. Admiral of the Fleet, Lord
Keyes, has himself described the problems and difficulties
that were encountered in the planning and conduct of small-scale
Commando amphibious operations in 1940-1941. The
Combined Operations Staff, formed at this time, working with
the "Combined Commanders Committee" initiated the planning
and preparations for cross-channel operations which preceded the
development of the OVERLORD plan.
-
In the summer of 1941, when plans officers of the Staffs
of the U.S. Special Army and Navy Observers in London began
to work regularly with the British Joint Planing Staffs,
initial work was done on "ROUND-UP"
plans for landings on the
French channel coast. These plans, like the later OVERLORD
plan, are rightly associated with the name of Lieutenant-General
Frederick E. Morgan. After thirty years in the
British Army, Morgan had served as a Colonel commanding
troops, with the British Expeditionary Forces in France and
Belgium in 1939-1940. He was among those responsible for the
organization of the retreat from Dunkirk. In the spring of
1941, as a Major-General commanding the British Army Defense
Forces in the Devon Command, Morgan devoted his main attention
to preliminary planning for the return of British Armies to
France. Plans for a cross-channel operation soon came to be
called "the MORGAN Plan". Many senior officers of the
various British forces were consulted as these plans developed.
Among them were Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, RN., then
Vice-Admiral in Command of the Dover Station, and Captain
(later Vice-Admiral) Lord Louis Mountbatten, who succeeded
Admiral Keyes as Director of Combined Operations in October
1941. Admiral Ramsay had already begun in 1941 to study the
naval and amphibious aspects of such a cross-channel operation.
-
When Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff had
their first meeting with President Roosevelt and the American
Chiefs of Staff at the historic "Atlantic Charter" meeting in
Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, the "ROUND-UP"
Plan was already in existence. After 'Pearl Harbor' when Mr. Churchill, with
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the British Chiefs of Staff, went to Washington for the
first Anglo-American War Conference, a more detailed plan
for the operation "ROUND-UP" was presented. This plan
involved an operation from south-eastern England to the
French and Belgium Channel Coasts, the question of the
exact landing area being left for later decision.1
-
The discussions of this "ROUND-UP" plan in 1941-1942,
like the early discussions in 1943 of the later "OVERLORD"
plan, revealed a fundamental divergence between American
and British strategical concepts. It was obvious to the
Chiefs of staff, when they met in the Arcadia Conference,
that the Allies in 1942, would be on the defensive in all
theaters. The situation then confronting the combined Anglo-American
forces was ably described in Mr. Churchill's address
to the American Congress, and in his later address to the
Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. The program which Mr.
Churchill then presented had been discussed in detail by the
British Chiefs of Staff in Staff Conferences in December 1941.
-
The Prime Minister had himself prepared for the discussions
in Washington a note on "The Future Conduct of the War".
In presenting this to his military advisors he explained
that: "he thought it important to put before the peoples
of both the British Empire and the U.S. the mass invasion
of the continent of Europe as the goal for 1943. He thought,
in general, the three phases of the war could be described as:
-
Closing the Ring;
-
Liberating the Populations;
-
Final assault on the German citadel".2
--53--
-
In the discussions which followed, the Prime Minister
suggested the main points which he thought should be
emphasized in the forthcoming discussions with the
Americans. These points were:
-
A concerted U.S. - British effort to re-establish
"our Naval position in the Pacific as soon as
possible, and restore positions in the Far East
which may fall into enemy hands";
-
The despatch of U.S. forces to Northern Ireland
(3 Infantry Divisions and l Armored Division)
to release trained British troops in the United
Kingdom for overseas theaters;
-
The bombing of Germany by U.S. Air squadrons
(initially at least six squadrons) to be based
in the United Kingdom;
-
The United States to take the lead in occupying
North Africa (initially with a force of 25,000
men to be built up to a total of at least 150,000
in 1942);
-
The United States should leave the largest possible
number of destroyers in the Atlantic for
cooperation with the Royal Navy in convoy escort,
and anti-submarine duty;
-
The United States should help the Royal Navy by
providing auxiliary aircraft carriers, and by
assigning the highest priority for providing
the aircraft required for equipping Royal Naval
carriers.
1
-
The specific proposals thus presented by the British
delegation at the Washington Conference were based on
the strategic concepts developed by the British War Cabinets
and the British Chiefs of Staff from May 1940.
These had already been defined in the "General Strategy
Review" communicated to the President and to the U.S. Chiefs
of Staff at the Argentia Conference in August 1941. In
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this review it had been made clear that:
"So powerful is the German army that even if the
Russians are able to maintain an eastern front,
it would still be possible for them to face us in
the West with forces which in the present state of
German efficiency and morale we should be unable
to overthrow. We must first destroy the foundations
upon which the war machine rests - the economy
which feeds it, the morale which sustains it,
the supplies which nourish it and hopes of victory
which inspire it. Then only shall we be able to
return to the Continent and occupy and control portions
of his territory and impose our will upon
the enemy.
The methods we intend to employ are:
-
Blockade
-
Bombing
-
Subversive activities and propaganda.---
We believe that, if these methods are applied on
a vast scale, the whole structure upon which the
German forces are based, the economic system, the
machinery of production and distribution, the
morale of the nation, will be destroyed, and that,
whatever their present strength, the armed forces
of Germany would suffer such a radical decline in
fighting value and mobility that a direct attack would
once more become possible.
When that time will come no one can with accuracy
predict. It will depend largely on how well we
are able, with American assistance, to keep to our
programme of Air Force expansion and to obtain and
protect the necessary shipping.
It may be that the methods described above will by
themselves be enough to make Germany sue for peace
and that the role of a British Army on the Continent
will be limited to that of an Army of Occupation.
We must, however, be prepared to accelerate victory
by landing forces on the Continent to destroy
any elements of the German forces which still resist,
and strike into Germany itself.
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"We do not foresee vast armies of infantry, as in
1914-1918. The forces we employ will be armored
divisions with the most modern equipment. To
supplement their operations the local patriots
must be secretly armed and equipped so that at
the right moment they may rise in revolt ----
The intervention of the United States would have
a dramatic effect on the certainty with which we
could contemplate success and the date by which
we could expect it. Blockade would benefit by
the heightening of control at source, forces
might be available either to assist Weygand (i.e.,
in North Africa) or to act against Vichy, the
American bomber effort would increasingly swell
the air offensive against Germany, and in the final
phase, American armored forces would participate"---1
-
At the first meeting of the American and British Chiefs
of Staff in Washington on 24 December 1941, Field Marshal
Sir John Dill, in response to questions from Admiral Stark,
outlined British views concerning the size of the forces
which the United States would send to Europe. For example:
"from a preliminary study ........ of the landing of
armies on the Continent of Europe, it seemed that 15
to 17 Divisions, including armored Divisions, would be
the maximum forces which could be landed and maintained
if the operations were to take place toward the end of
1942 or early 1943. Later on it might be possible
to increase these forces up to forty (40) Divisions.....
The general idea was that it would not be possible to
undertake land operations on a large scale in Europe
until the Germans showed signs of cracking, and then
the governing factor in the size of the forces to be
maintained would be transportation and maintenance.".2
--56--
-
The consensus of opinion in the later Staff discussions
in Washington was expressed in a memorandum presented to the
President and to the Prime Minister on American-British
strategy. In this paper, under the heading "Development of
Land Offensives on the Continent", the following statement
was made:
"It does not seen likely that in 1942 any large scale
land offensive against Germany except on the Russian
Front, will be possible. We must, however, be ready
to take advantage of any opening that may result from
the wearing-down process .... to conduct limited
land offensives".
In 1943, the way may be clear for a return to the
Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into
the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such
operations will be the prelude to the final assault
on Germany itself and the scope of the victory program
should be such as to provide means by which they can
be carried out."1
--57--
B. Combined Planning, January-June 1942
-
The American staffs, in December 1941, were
influenced by traditional offensive doctrines,
implicating the strategic concepts expressed by them
at the ARCADIA Conference, and at subsequent meetings.
Moreover, the American war production program was
already well advanced. Hence the U.S. Staff representatives
knew the great striking force which American
man-power and industrial production would make available,
when American Armies could formed, trained
and equipped with the most effective offensive weapons.
The American military leaders were, therefore, committed
to an offensive strategy which would involve a maximum
concentration of armed forces, at the earliest possible
moment, in that area in which decisive military victory
could most quickly be achieved. This strategy
was up-held by the American Chiefs of Staff from the
time of their first meetings with their British colleagues,
in the informal staff conferences which began
in 1940, and which led to the ABC-1 Agreement of
27 March 1941. The same views were emphatically
expressed by General Marshall in the subsequent
American-British conferences, and at meetings of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.
-
General Marshall's views had already found
expression in the Joint Army-Navy Board "Comment on
'General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff'"
(30 September 1941). This "Comment" extended and developed
the definition of the "principal Offensive
Policies Against the Axis Powers", contained in the
ABC-1 Agreement (27 March 1941). It was pointed out
"that military operation, to be effective,
should be directed against specific and concrete
objectives and that care must be exercised to
avoid diffusion of effort ----"
-
In criticizing the British strategic concepts,
the Joint Board had referred especially to the -
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"offensive employment of land forces ---.
The 'Review' (of the British Chiefs of Staff)
does not envisage the offensive use of such
forces on a sufficient scale, either in operations
designed to break down the German
military power, or in the final operations
designed to accomplish the complete defeat
of Germany.
The Joint Board agrees that no clear decisions
are now (September 1941) possible as to major
land offensives against Germany. The Joint
Board holds the opinion that --- plans should
be made for equipping and training for offensive
use land task forces of the British Commonwealth
and possible allies, for eventual use wherever
land offensives may ultimately appear to be
profitable."1
-
In this same "Comment", the Joint Board had noted that
the British Chiefs of Staff had given only minor attention to
"possible operations by land forces. Except in
the case of Russian, the principal strength of
the possible enemies of Germany is in naval and
air categories. Naval and air power may prevent
wars from being lost, and by weakening enemy
strength may greatly contribute to victory. The
opinion is held that dependence cannot be placed
on winning important wars by naval and air forces
alone. It should be recognized as an almost
invariable rule that wars cannot be finally
won without the use of land armies."2
--59--
-
General Marshall was ably assisted at the Arcadia
Conference in his advocacy of immediate planning for the
strategic offensive by land forces, by the new appointed
Assistant Chief of the War Plans Division of the General
Staff, Brigadier-General (later General of the Army) D.D.
Eisenhower. At this Conference Eisenhower strongly emphasized
the necessity of the complete pooling of Anglo-American
resources in the war, and of the establishment of a
combined Command system to undertake, as soon as possible,
cross-Channel operations which would bring Anglo-American
forces in contact with the full power of the German armies.
-
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Organization, established
in January 1942, immediately organized a Combined Planning
Staff to review possible operations in 1942. General
Eisenhower, appointed in February 1942, Assistant Chief of
Staff in charge of the War Plans Division, participated in
these early planning activities. From the first he was
convinced that American forces should be sent as quickly as
possible to the British Isles, in preparation for the early
undertaking of cross-Channel operations. With control of
the seas assured, both Eisenhower and Marshall were convinced
that Anglo-American forces could cross the Channel
as soon as air supremacy could be obtained in the landing
area. Eisenhower therefore began the preparation of plans
for such an operation. A first draft was completed and
presented to General Marshall on 22 March, 1942. After
discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington,
General Marshall decided that the strategic concept of
this draft plan was sound, as a basis for further discussions
with the British staffs. It was then arranged
that General Marshall, accompanied by Mr Harry Hopkins as
personal representative of President Roosevelt, should proceed
immediately to England for conference with the British
Chiefs of Staff and with the Prime Minister.
-
At the meetings which followed in London, the combined
Chiefs of Staff reviewed the over-all war situation and
discussed the detailed strategic plans to be developed for
operations in 1942 and 1943. General Marshall strongly
urged that all available forces, British and American, be
concentrated in England to prepare for a full-scale cross-Channel
offensive in May 1943, or as soon thereafter as
possible. The British Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand,
maintained that it would be a mistake to hold British and
American forces unemployed in England for at least twelve
--60--
months as this would give Germany a free hand against
Russia. The British favored the immediate use of forces,
as they became available, for offensive operations in
order to divert German forces from the Eastern front.
The British believed this could be achieved by as rapid an
increase as possible of the air offensive against Germany
from bases in the British Isles, and by sea and land operations
in the Mediterranean. The British pointed out,
moreover, that if Russian resistance could continue with
offensive operations in 1943, and with simultaneous attack
by American and British forces from the Mediterranean and
from England, it might bring about a rapid defeat of
Germany.
-
No agreement was reached at these London discussions
in April 1942, on any definite plan for later cross-Channel
operations, but a plan was approved for the rapid build-up
of forces in the United Kingdom (the BOLERO Plan). The
British agreed that all possible British shipping should be
diverted to assist in the transport of American air and land
forces to the United Kingdom. It was also agreed that
American Plans officers should work with British Planning
Staffs in London to develop, as soon as possible, detailed
plans for operations on the Continent.
-
In May 1942 combined planning staffs therefore began
the work of drafting detailed plans for the various alternative
operations then under consideration. These were:
-
Operation IMPERATOR, a major raid scheduled
for the summer of 1942 with the object of
destroying aircraft and provoking an air battle.1
-
Operation JUBILEE, a major raid scheduled
for the summer of 1942 against Dieppe 2
(this was actually executed).
-
Operation WETBOB, a small scale assault to
capture and hold the Cherbourg Peninsula in
1942.
3
-
Operation SLEDGEHAMMER, a small scale
"sacrifice" assault on Le Havre in 1942.
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-
Operation ROUND-UP, a full scale invasion
of France in 1943.
-
Operation LETHAL, a small scale assault to
seize and hold the Brest Peninsula in 1943.1
-
Operation HADRIAN, a small-mode assault
to capture and hold the Cherbourg Peninsula
in 1943.2
-
Operation CRUICKSHANK, a small scale-assault
against the Low Countries in 1943.3
-
Operation TORCH, an opposed invasion of
Northwest Africa in November 1942.4
-
General Marshall has himself described the results of
his conferences in London in April 1942:
"A general agreement was reached that the final blow
must be delivered across the English Channel and
eastward through the plains of Western Europe. At
that time the Red Army was slowly falling back with
the full fury of the German assault, and it was
accepted at the London Conference that everything
practicable must be done to reduce the pressure on
the Soviet Union, lest she collapse and the door be
opened wide for a complete conquest of Europe, and
a probable juncture with the Japanese in the Indian
Ocean".5
--62--
-
During General Marshall's visit to London it had been
agreed that steps should be taken immediately to arrange
for two special planning committees, one in Washington and
one in London to prepare a maximum build-up of United
States forces and equipment in the United Kingdom. Such
forces would then be available for any operation that might
later be decided upon, whether in accordance with one of
the cross-Channel operations plans, or for operations in
North Africa and the Mediterranean. Those two committees,
called the "BOLERO Combined Committees", were charged with
covering:
-
Overall requirements of troops, equipment,
and facilities.
-
Allocation of forces and equipment.
-
The determination of requirements for
shipping, port facilities, concentration areas,
and communications systems.
-
The analysis of time schedules for troop and
cargo movements to the United Kingdom.1
-
It was specifically provided that this committee was
not to be responsible for planning any tactical operations.
The London Committee was established under the British Chiefs
of Staff, as a single combined planning agency, with representatives
of the U.S. and British Armies, Air Forces,
Navies, Shipping authorities, and other Government services
concerned. This committee was to work directly with the
Washington Committee. It was to be specially charged with
questions of port capacity and accommodations in the United
Kingdom, while the Washington Committee would be primarily
concerned with production questions.2
-
On General Marshall's return to Washington, the next
steps in planning cross-channel operations were further
discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff with the
President. It was decided that a group of staff officers
should proceed to London for further discussions with the
British services. General Eisenhower, General Mark Clark,
General H.H. Arnold (U.S. Army Air Forces) and Rear-Admiral
(later Admiral) J.H. Towers (U.S. Naval Aviation)
therefore arrived in London on 26 May, 1942. President
Roosevelt, in announcing this visit in a Press Conference,
--63--
emphasized the fact that the air offensive against
Germany was not the exclusive topic of conversation. General
Eisenhower and General Clark were chiefly concerned with
further discussions of the possibility of planning cross-Channel
operations for the beginning of 1943. This group
returned to Washington on 3 June 1942, to participate in
the Washington Conference attended by the Prime Minister
and the British Chiefs of Staff. Molotov, the Soviet
Foreign Commissar, visited London and Washington at the
time to complete negotiations for the British-Soviet Treaty
of Alliance, and for the U.S.-Soviet Lend-Lease Agreement,
Molotov also strongly urged, both in London and in Washington,
that the Western Allies should open a 'second front',
by cross-Channel operations at the earliest possible moment,
in order to divert German forces from the Eastern front.
-
General Marshall in commenting on the discussions at
this Washington meeting, of possible future operations, such
as "SLEDGEHAMMER", "ROUND-UP",
and "TORCH", pointed out that:
"During these discussions, the Allied situation
in North Africa took a more serious turn, culminating
in the loss of Tobruk. The discussions
thereafter were devoted almost exclusively to the
measures to be taken to meet the threat facing
Cairo, Rommel's forces having been checked with
difficulty on the El Alamein line. Further
advances by his Afrika Korps, with its Italian
reinforcements, and German successes along the
south-eastern portion of the Soviet front threatened
a complete collapse in the Middle East, the loss of
the Suez Canal and the total oil supply in the
vicinity of Abaden. It was a very black hour."1
--64--
C. Preliminary Cross-Channel Plan: ROUND-UP 1943
-
The plan for Operation ROUND-UP went through a
series of metamorphosis.1
The central concept provided
for an operation in two phases. The first
phase would be a Cross-Channel Assault by combined
British-U.S forces on the north coast of France,
with British forces striking the Pas de Calais sector,
and with U.S. forces assaulting selected beaches
between Fecamp and Caen. A simultaneous assault on
the Cherbourg Peninsula was also envisaged.
-
Development of subsequent phases of the operation
would depend on the seizure of sufficient aerodromes
and the acquisition of the major ports of Le
Havre, Rouen, and Cherbourg, which were to be made
operative at the earliest practicable date. Based
on successful completion of Phase I and assuming
that the full number of divisions would be available,
Phase 2 was to be carried out in two broad stages:
-
The capture of Paris and
-
The capture at Antwerp.
-
The plan provided for a widely dispersed attack,
on the suggested target date of 1 April 1943, by 36
reinforced divisions, (20 British and 16 U.S.) with
6 divisions in assault and 10 divisions in follow-up
or early build up. 2
The assault was to be supported
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[Page 66 is an extension of footnotes from Page 65]
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by:
-
6,652 Aircraft
-
No heavy bombarding ships
-
Six old cruisers, 1 gunboat, 25 destroyers and 48 fire-support craft.
1
Assault lift was to be provided by approximately 1,788 major
assault craft and ships.
2
-
The operation was to consist of four simultaneous assaults:
-
An attack by two British Infantry divisions
against two beaches in the vicinity of Boulogne;
to be followed up by 5 divisions, arriving over
a period of 18 days. The object was to secure
a beachhead, make a juncture with the U.S.
forces in the Seine area and thereafter to
advance on and capture Antwerp.
-
An attack by two U.S. reinforced infantry
divisions against two beaches between Le
Havre and Fecamp (north Seine sector) to be
followed up by one infantry, one armored division
and 1/3rd of a tank division. The object was
to capture Le Havre then to advance north and
eastward, making a juncture with British forces,
and thereafter, in conjunction with U.S. forces
further west to capture Rouen and later Paris.
-
One reinforced U.S. Infantry division (3 RCT),
followed up by one infantry and 2/3rds of a tank
division, were to attack the Normandy beaches
astride the Caen-Ouistraham Canal. The object
was to secure the Caen aerodromes, converge on
the Seine, joining the northern U.S. forces near
Rouen, and thereafter to envelope and capture Paris.
--67--
-
One and 1/3rd infantry and commando divisions
with a follow up of 2/3rds of an infantry
division were to attack the south-east beaches
of the Cherbourg Peninsula with the object of
seizing and holding the Port of Cherbourg and
the whole Peninsula. The remainder of the
36 divisions were to come in gradually and
thereafter 2 divisions a month were to arrive
direct from the U.S.
-
This was general outline plan of the operation (ROUND-UP
in 1943), which was discussed by the CCS in July 1942, as the
alternative to the North African invasion (TORCH in 1942).
When the decision was then made to abandon ROUND-UP in favor
of TORCH, the likelihood of success in ROUND-UP seemed dangerously
speculative. German forces were stretched but they had
not suffered serious defeat. They held an estimated 25 divisions
in France. 1
Italy was still in the War. The Italian
and French navies still demanded surveillance. As long as
use of the Mediterranean could be denied to the Allies,
Germany was not required to disperse forces in defensive
positions along the Mediterranean seaboard. Germany's submarine
campaign was then at its peak and the rate of allied shipping
losses still greatly exceeded the rate of new
construction. 2
The speed and reliability of the build up of allied reinforcements
from the U.S. was still dubious.
-
The German air force was heavily engaged in the east but
its striking power had not yet begun to decline. Allied air
forces employed for ROUND-UP would be operating at extreme
ranges over a widely dispersed front. The Allies, far from
having the overwhelming air superiority required for an amphibious
assault, would therefore probably have not even had parity
of air strength in the area of operations. From the assault
lift point of view, ROUND-UP
forces were scheduled to assault
with 6 divisions (one more than in OVERLORD) but with about
2/3rds the lift. Thus, the weight of assault, and the follow-up
which could be delivered, fell far short of the density and
speed achieved in OVERLORD. The planned cross-Channel build
up was far slower than that later employed for OVERLORD.
Hence, there was a much greater chance that the Germans could
concentrate their forces for decisive action before the Allied
spearhead was firmly established ashore. Moreover, as the
assault was to be dispersed over a wide area, the Germans
--68--
would have been able to concentrate their forces to defeat
the four small Allied spearheads in detail. Finally, the
weight of bombardment, which Air and Naval forces could
deliver against beach defenses, immediately before H-hour,
was minute in comparison to that actually employed in
OVERLORD.
--69--
D. Plan for a Sacrifice Operation: SLEDGEHAMMER 1942
-
Operation SLEDGEHAMMER was a plan for an attack to
be launched before September 15, 1942, against Le Havre.
The assault was to be made by one British division, one
British airborne brigade, and three American airborne
battalions. The assault was to be built up to a total
strength of 8-2/3 divisions (6-1/3 British and
2-1/3 U.S.)1
-
General Eisenhower has described the SLEDGEHAMMER
Plan as follows:
"The SLEDGEHAMMER conception was not initiated upon
a probability of a tactical success, but rather upon
the possibility that general emergency conditions
might arise requiring a 1942 attack against the
western coast of Europe with the purpose either of
taking advantage of an unusually favorable opportunity
or of supporting, indirectly, the Russian
front. Only the latter of these contingencies need
be considered. SLEDGEHAMMER springs from the
obvious fact that ROUND-UP will be a feasible operation,
only in the event that the Russian Army is
in the field next spring as an active fighting force.
----
It is difficult to give an estimate of probabilities
(of success). Lack of suitable landing craft limits
the initial landing to a total British-American force
of approximately one division. Aircraft operating
from England can support the operation only at
reduced efficiency. Difficulties in maintenance
are obvious. The danger of early defeat by enemy
forces in France, even assuming a successful landing
of the landing division, is always present. I
personally estimate that, favored by surprise, the
chances of a fairly successful landing by the landing
division are about 1 (chance) in 2, or finally
--70--
"establishing a force of 6 divisions in the area
with supporting air and other arms, about 1 (chance)
in 5. Later probabilities would depend largely on
intensity of German reaction, and our success in
developing and maintaining Le Havre as a workable
port.
But we do not forget the prize we seek is to keep
8,000,000 Russians in the war.
The decisions that must be made are:
-
Is the Russian situation sufficiently
desperate to justify an operation whose
minimum cost would be measured in a great
reduction in our readiness for 1943 ROUND-UP?
-
Would a reasonably or partially successful
SLEDGEHAMMER help the Russians effectively?
If both these questions are decided in the definite
affirmative, SLEDGEHAMMER is a practicable operation
and should be launched at the earliest possible date,
in spite of the relatively bleak outlook of eventual
success. If either question is answered in the
negative, we should not conduct SLEDGEHAMMER, but should:
-
redouble our efforts to build up ROUND-UP.
-
if the Russians are defeated this fall,
go immediately on the strategic defensive
in the Atlantic and begin to build up an
offensive against Japan."1
--71--
E. Build-up of U.S. Forces in the United Kingdom (Operation BOLERO)
-
A major step in preparation for a cross channel
invasion was the establishment of the program for
transporting U.S. troops and material to the United
Kingdom. The BOLERO build-up program was originally
approved in order to establish a sufficiently large
force in England to launch ROUND-UP in 1943. The
plan was so soundly conceived that it was capable of
supporting almost any offensive action in Europe which
the CCS might approve.1
American forces, equipment
and supplies, sufficient to launch ROUND-UP 1943, would
in fact have been available in time in the U.S., but
that they could not be moved to Europe unless the
British could provide 60% of the required shipping.2
--72--
-
A study was made early in 1942 of the availability
of British shipping for the BOLERO build-up. At the time
of General Marshall's visit to England, British shipping was
fully employed and its future employment was scheduled for
many months to come. The major uses of British shipping were:
-
Moving war material from the U.S. and the U.K. to Russia.
-
Moving war material from the U.S. to the U.K.
-
Moving food and other goods for the civil population from the U.S. to the U.K.
-
Moving U.S. troops and military cargo from the U.S. to the south-west Pacific.
-
Moving British reinforcements to the Middle East.
-
Moving British reinforcements to the Burma-India Theater.
--73--
-
The British could not take on the burden of moving
U.S. forces to England without curtailing some of the
above commitments. In their opinion, reduction of shipments
to Russia was totally unacceptable. Reduction in the scale
of movements of reinforcements to Burma and India was also
unacceptable, unless the United States could undertake the
task of defending the sea approaches against Japanese seaborne
attack. If this were done, they estimated that they
could arrange the movement of 50% of the U.S. requirements
in the 10 months between June 1942 and April 1, 1943 provided:
-
The U.S. Army would scale down its schedule
of vehicles, equipment and food to about
3/4th's of its standard.
-
The U.S. Army would accept a maximum of 2-months
reserve of food stocks and equipment in England.
-
The British Government would accept a reduction
of 1-3/4 million tons in the United Kingdom
import program for the 10 months involved.
-
No unforeseen scale of shipping losses occurred,
and no other major overseas movement were required,
either resulting from disaster elsewhere
or offensives in other theaters.1
-
Tentative agreements were accordingly reached on this
basis. The British agreed to carry 50% of the U.S. forces
and material included in General Marshall's estimate, and
United States shipping was to carry 40%.
2
The U.S. Army
was to accept the reduced scale of equipment, supplies and
reserves, while the British agreed to reduce to about one
half, their import program and also to reduce the scale of
their reinforcements to India. General Marshall agreed for
the U.S. Navy to undertake the protection of the Pacific
areas involved. The U.S. Army was to be responsible for
making forces available in America, while the British were
to be responsible for their reception in England.
-
Two special BOLERO planning committees were formed, one
in Washington and one in London. Each was composed of representatives
of both the British and the American Army, Navy,
Air Forces, shipping authorities, and other agencies. The
--74--
Washington BOLERO Committee, which was put under the Combined
Staff Planners (a committee of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff), was authorized to outline, coordinate and supervise
all plans relating to the movement, reception and maintenance
of American forces. Plans evolved by the Washington
BOLERO Combined committee were to cover:
-
Over-all requirements for an allocation of
troops, equipment, shipping, port facilities,
concentration areas, and communication systems.
-
Analysis of time schedules for troops and cargo
movements to the United Kingdom, and
-
The allocation of naval escorts.
This Committee was not responsible for the preparation of
operational plans.
-
The London BOLERO Committee, which was put directly under
the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, was established so as
to provide a single combined planning agency with which the
Committee in Washington could deal directly for planning and
information purposes.1
The London Committee dealt primarily
with questions of port capacity and accommodation, while the
Washington Committee was principally concerned with production
questions.2
-
Troop movements were begun under the BOLERO program in
July 1942. Though curtailed in order to meet the requirements
of TORCH and the Mediterranean theater, the BOLERO Plan and
Committees continued to function throughout the war. After
the decision to launch TORCH, the policy was adopted of limiting
BOLERO shipments primarily to the transport of air
forces and general cargo, so that when the time came to concentrate
U.S. troops in Britain, supplies would be abundantly available.
--75--
-
The BOLERO operation became the basis of a joint
Army-Navy shipping program, as a result of a joint logistic
plan which was adopted in March 1943.1
The object of the
plan was to insure coordinated logistical effort and procedure
in each area of unified command (of which the European
Theater was one),2
in order that the personnel, equipment,
supplies, facilities, shipping and other services of
the Army and Navy would be most effectively provided and utilized.
-
The Theater Commander (C.G. ETOUSA in the case of
the European Theater) was charged with control of, and responsibility
for all Army-Navy logistical services within the
area under his command. He established an Army-Navy theater
logistical organization which was required:
-
to keep the Commanding General, Services of
Supply, U.S. Army, and the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, U.S. Navy, informed of future
requirements;
-
to supply items or services common to both
the Army and Navy from a single agency;
-
to establish a schedule of priorities of
Army and Navy shipments arranged in a single
list;
-
to arrange on a joint basis storage and port
discharge facilities at shipping destinations;
-
to provide items from local sources if obtainable
in his theater and to screen them out of
requisitions submitted to supply agencies in
America.
-
Based upon information supplied by the Theater Commander,
Army and Navy seaboard agencies serving the Theater were
charged with the necessary coordination to meet fully the
combined requirements of both services with respect to:
-
Allocation of shipping
-
Loading of ships
-
Routing of ships.
--76--
The progress of BOLERO shipments to the U.K. is shown in
the following table:
1
|
|
U.S Army Cargo
Thousands of tons.
|
U.S. Navy Cargo Thousands of tons. |
Monthly Total. Thousands of tons. |
1942 |
monthly average. |
70.2 |
|
70.2 |
1943 |
monthly average. |
197.8 |
3.9 |
201.6 |
1944 |
monthly average. |
392.1 |
20.9 |
413.0 |
1943 |
January |
38.6 |
- |
38.6 |
|
February |
20.4 |
- |
20.4 |
|
March |
24.7 |
- |
24.7 |
|
|
April |
60.8 |
- |
60.8 |
|
May |
36.6 |
- |
36.6 |
|
June |
176.0 |
- |
176.0 |
|
July |
292.7 |
- |
292.7 |
|
August |
324.3 |
1.3 |
325.6 |
|
September |
302.9 |
1.6 |
304.5 |
|
October |
395.4 |
12.6 |
407.9 |
|
November |
322.8 |
13.3 |
336.1 |
|
December |
378.1 |
17.5 |
395.6 |
1944 |
January |
281.6 |
8.2 |
289.8 |
|
February |
233.7 |
22.9 |
256.6 |
|
March |
467.8 |
38.2 |
506.0 |
|
|
April |
496.4 |
60.1 |
556.5 |
|
May |
601.6 |
32.7 |
634.3 |
|
June |
635.9 |
23.0 |
658.9 |
|
July |
541.2 |
23.1 |
564.3 |
|
August |
353.8 |
25.4 |
379.2 |
|
September |
251.6 |
4.9 |
256.5 |
|
October |
331.3 |
4.7 |
336.0 |
|
November |
306.9 |
3.0 |
309.9 |
|
December |
203.9 |
4.3 |
208.2 |
1945 |
January |
141.9 |
0.9 |
142.8 |
|
February |
117.1 |
0.8 |
117.9 |
|
March |
115.3 |
0.9 |
116.2 |
--77--
[Part of preceding table originally appeared on this page]
--78--
PART II
THE OVERLORD PLAN: COSSAC APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE, 1943
A. Casablanca Conference Decisions: January 1943
-
After serious consideration, the CCS concluded in
July 1942 not to attempt the invasion of Northwest
Europe in 1942 with the inadequate resources then available
(see Chapter I).
The application of available resources
to the Mediterranean campaign for the TORCH operation
prohibited the accumulation of sufficient strength
in England for a full scale invasion in 1943. In the
1942 discussions, it had seemed possible that the forces
required for a small scale cross channel operation in
the late summer or early autumn of 1943, might still be
made available.
-
After the decision was reached to launch TORCH in
November 1942, outline planning for cross channel operations
was continued in London with the object of having
plans and long-term preparations in readiness should the
CCS find it possible or expedient to execute some sort of
an assault. Studies thus prepared were submitted at the
Casablanca Conference which met in January 1943. The
CCS then decided that, while the main American-British
effort for the first half of 1943 would be directed
toward exploiting the success of African operations,
planning and preparations for the future cross channel
assault should be continued. This would make it possible,
when forces did become available, for the operation to
be executed without delay.1
--79--
[Page 79 footnote continued.]
--80--
[Page 79 footnote continued.]
--81--
-
In order to put this further planning on a combined
basis, and to make sure that plans were realistically based
on the resources which the CCS would be able to allocate to
cross-channel operations, the CCS at the Casablanca Conference
in January 1943, directed the formation of a combined British-U.S.
authority with the title of COSSAC (Chief of Staff
Supreme Allied Command) to undertake detailed planning and
preparations for future cross-channel operations.1
It was also agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should designate
a senior British officer to act as COSSAC. General F.H.
Morgan was selected for this assignment in February 1943. He
set about immediately organizing a nucleus staff and took
over and continued the planning that had been begun in 1942
in relation to "ROUND-UP".
--82--
B. COSSAC: Functions and Organization
-
The CCS on 12 April 1943, after reviewing the initial
steps taken in England to organize planning for the
OVERLORD Operation, issued a directive to General Morgan,
as COSSAC, covering the following points:
-
The CCS have decided to undertake preparations
for operations against Europe;
-
The object is to defeat German fighting forces
in Northwest Europe;
-
The CCS have decided to appoint a Supreme Allied
Commander (SAC) in the future;
-
They have decided to appoint you Chief of Staff
to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) pending
SAC's appointment;
-
You will prepare plans in the following order of priority:
-
For a return to the Continent with such forces
as are available in the event of a German
collapse, weakening, or withdrawal. i.e.
Operation RANKIN.1
--83--
[Page 84 continued footnotes from page 83]
--84--
-
For a limited cross-channel assault with
a target date of 1 August 1943, to seize
and hold a bridgehead such as the Cotentin
Peninsula, in case the CCS decide at a
later date to execute such an operation.
-
For a full-scale invasion of northwest
Europe in the Spring of 1944.1
-
Small-scale amphibious operations (COMMANDO
raids) will be dealt with by the Chief of
Combined Operations consulting you;
-
You will be provided with monthly forecasts
of forces likely to be available for RANKIN
and other operations;
-
When you have completed your plans you will
report to the CCS.
-
You will be provided with a staff drawn from
the British and U.S. Navies, Armies, and Air
Forces.
-
Service Ministries and ETOUSA will assist on
administration and logistic aspects of your plans.
-
Controlling Security Officer will be consulted
for coordination of cover plans and deception.
2
--85--
-
This directive was modified as a result of the
Trident Conference,1
at which the CCS came to the conclusion
that the possibility of even a limited cross
channel invasion in 1943 before the weather closed in
(15 September) was extremely remote, and that a full scale
invasion was the most promising line of strategy for
1944. The new directive ordered COSSAC to submit by
1 August 1943 an outline plan for an assault, employing
specified forces for the target date of 1 May 1944, to
secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further
offensive operations could be developed.
2
-
To enable COSSAC to draw up his Appreciation and
Outline Plan, he was provided with a combined staff,
comprising Army, Navy and Air Officers of both British
and the U.S. services. In the beginning this staff
consisted of representatives of the various military
authorities directly or indirectly involved in this
preliminary planning. These representatives at first
acted more as liaison officers from their respective
chiefs than as officers of one staff. The authorities
represented were:
-
C-in-C, Portsmouth (an R.N. Home Command).
This was Admiral Little who was subsequently
designated ANCXF.
-
Commander of British Army forces in the U.K.
This was General Paget who was subsequently
designated CG 21 AG.
-
C-in-C Fighter Command (the R.A.F. Commander
of fighter air forces in Britain). This was
Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory who was subsequently
appointed C-in-C, AEAF.
-
Commanding General ETOUSA (European Theater of
Operations U.S. Army).
-
COSSAC and personal staff.
-
Admiralty.
-
The British War Office.
--86--
-
The British Air Ministry.
-
The Chief of Combined Operations, and
-
Other miscellaneous authorities.
The representatives of each of these authorities often
had army, air, and naval components so that the early
staff was a thoroughly heterogeneous collection.
-
The head of the U.S. section on COSSAC's staff was
Brigadier-General R.W. Barker, USA. The U.S. Army Air
Forces automatically came under his jurisdiction.
During the COSSAC period the U.S. Navy representatives
worked under the U.S. Army Command in the European
Theater.1
The U.S. Naval representation on COSSAC's
staff included officers designated by ComInCh and
ComNavEu who formed part of the ETOUSA section.2
Gradually, however, the various elements were sorted
out and the staff settled down in an organization
with two main sections, the British and the U.S., each
with an Army, Navy and Air sub-section. This process
was continued until ultimately the two naval sections
were working together; the two air sections were
doing their part together; and the innumerable sub-sections
of the two armies were paired off, each pair
doing its part as one team.
-
In view of the fact that the Royal Navy was scheduled
to provide the bulk of NEPTUNE sea-going forces,
the R.N. section of the COSSAC staff was from the first
--87--
regarded as the pre-eminent naval authority.1
--88--
C. COSSAC Appreciation and Outline Plan for OVERLORD, July 1943
-
COSSAC was not required to start his planning
from scratch. He had available very elaborate
and well grounded plans prepared in 1942 for projected
operations such as ROUND-UP,
SLEDGEHAMMER,
HADRIAN and others. In addition, his staff included
a large number of officers who had had experience
in drafting these plans and in devising the
various operations which had been executed in the
Mediterranean. The production of the COSSAC-OVERLORD
Appreciation and Outline Plan consisted for the most
part in a revision of the old ROUND-UP Plan, in the
light of Mediterranean experience and on the basis
of the forces tentatively allotted for a 1944 Cross-Channel
operation.
-
The early phases of COSSAC planning were reviewed
in two broad but rather heterogeneous conferences.
The first of these, held between 24 May
and 23 June, was organized by the CG ETOUSA at the
U.S. Assault Training Center, Woolacombe, England,
and was primarily a U.S. conference. The second,
called Operation RATTLE, was a conference held at
Largs, Scotland between 28 June and 1 July 1943.
All authorities and agencies of both America and
Britain, which would have any possible military
connection with OVERLORD, were represented at the
RATTLE conference. The agenda of both conferences
were given over to a general discussion of all
possible aspects of an amphibious operation against
the strongly defended shores of Northwest Europe.
-
After these two conferences, a complete but
very general summary of the preparations required
and of the operational methods appropriate for the
proposed operation, was drawn up. Each aspect of
the problem was made into a "project". A suitable
committee, drawn from all interested authorities,
--89--
was set up to deal with each project. In due course
each committee submitted its findings. These were
then developed by the COSSAC staff into the COSSAC
Appreciation and Outline Plan for Operation OVERLORD.
From time to time during the process of compiling
the COSSAC Plan, various drafts were circulated to all
interested parties, including the British and
American Chiefs of Staff and the CCS, so that all
could have a chance to add or subtract or revise the
plan before its final publication. The final COSSAC
Plan was published on 30 July 1943 under the label
COS (43) 416 (O) and CCS 304 of 10 August 1943.
-
The size and nature of the operation, as planned
by COSSAC, was limited by the forces which the CCS
undertook to make available:
-
The land forces allotted were a maximum of
30 and a minimum of 26 divisions of balanced
forces; plus 6½ U.S. divisions scheduled to
arrive in the United Kingdom, too late for
the assault but soon enough to be used in
the later phases of the build-up. In
addition, three to five divisions per month
were to arrive after the assault.1
-
The airborne forces allotted were 2 airborne
divisions, 5 paratroop regiments and 1 airborne
tank battalion. Air lift for only
2/3rds of one division was available.2
-
The forecast of available air forces provided
for an approximate total of 11,377 aircraft
of all types.3
-
The allotted assault lift was sufficient to
land three divisions in assault, two divisions
in follow up, and to sustain a build-up of
approximately one division a day.4
-
Naval strength sufficient to provide protection
against hostile naval forces was
available, but naval bombardment vessels were
meagre.5
--90--
[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]
--91--
[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]
--92--
[Footnotes for page 90 Cont'd.]
--93--
-
COSSAC's problem was to advise the CCS whether a force
so limited could successfully invade Europe by 1 May 1944, and
to draw up an outline plan for doing it. The COSSAC Plan
therefore included:
-
A review of the resources which the CCS had authorized
-
A survey of enemy capabilities, and
-
A plan by which, under certain conditions, a Cross
Channel amphibious operation could be launched from
England to secure a bridgehead on the Continent from
which further operations could be developed.
-
The COSSAC survey indicated that German dispositions for
the defense of the French coast were of three kinds:
-
Garrison troops installed in fixed defensive positions
were posted along the entire coast, in varying degrees
of strength, covering every stretch of beach which
nature had made suitable for landing.1
-
The Germans were well aware that an Allied assault
could not survive unless it could be sustained and
reinforced by a vast build-up. This would force the
Allies to concentrate on capturing a major port,
without which the build-up would be impossible. The
Germans, therefore, made it a second principle of
their defense to concentrate heavily on the defense
of major ports.
-
The third component of the German defense was a mobile
reserve which could be moved rapidly to any point
along the periphery, once the Allies had committed their forces.
--94--
The Germans considered that the Allies were most likely
to launch their invasion against the Pas de Calais. Hence
they had concentrated the bulk of coastal defenses, and the
major part of their army forces in that sector.1
-
The available allied ground and air forces would be
adequate to deal with German forces in France provided
they could once be firmly established ashore.2
The allotted
assault lift was sufficient to move a maximum of three
divisions in assault, with two more divisions as follow-up
forces. This figure set a limit on the weight of the assault
which the Allies could deliver. Available cross channel
shipping set a limit to the build-up rate of one division
per day. The COSSAC Plan conditioned by available solutions
of two main problems: first, that of getting assault forces,
limited by the available assault lift, onto the beach; and
second, that of holding off the German mobile reserve until
the allied preponderance of forces could be firmly established,
with the available build-up lift.
-
COSSAC planning began with a study of the sectors of
the French coast, which would be most suitable for the initial
landings. The coast line of Brittany and beyond was
dismissed at once, because it was out of range of U.K. based
fighter air cover and because the time required, for the
turn round of build-up shipping, would reduce the build-up
rate below an acceptable minimum. The remaining possible
areas were the Pas de Calais area, the area around the mouth
of the Seine, the Caen sector, and the Cotentin (Cherbourg)
Peninsula. Of these, geography seemed to make the Caen area
the least suitable. Its beaches were furthest from U.K.
fighter airplane bases; it was furthest from U.K. ports,
thus requiring the longest shipping turn round time and
therefore the slowest rate of build-up; it had the fewest
airfields, and it was not the best area for deploying armor.
But its major handicap was that it did not possess a port
of sufficient capacity to handle the build-up. The nearest port
to the eastward was Le Havre, which could not be reached
from the Caen sector, except by a long flank march over difficult
country with a very poor lateral road and rail network,
and after crossing the wide and well defended Seine river.
The nearest port to the westward was Cherbourg, which could
--95--
not be reached except after another hazardous flank march,
with wretched lateral communications through the Vire swamp
and up the rocky difficult Cotentin Peninsula.
-
The Germans had recognized that by nature the Caen
sector was the least suitable for landings, and they had
therefore left it the least defended. They had concentrated
their strongest defense on the Pas de Calais sector which
was closest to airfields, closest to U.K. ports, contained
the best terrain for manoeuvering, and led most directly into
Germany. They had concentrated strong garrison forces around
the Seine group of ports and around Cherbourg and the Brittany
ports. But they held the coastline from the Vire river to the
approaches to the Seine estuary with only one division, behind
defenses less concentrated and less developed then in any
Sector.1
-
From the Naval and Air point of view, the Caen sector
though less advantageous than the others, was acceptable.
From the Build-up point of view the Caen sector, being shy
of a major port, was utterly unacceptable, unless a method
of discharging the necessary tonnages over the beaches could
be devised. COSSAC evolved methods by which the beaches
could be sheltered, piers could be run out from the shore
and ships could be provided with anchorages. In effect his
plan was to build pre-fabricated ports in England and to
assemble them on the French shore concurrently with the
assault phase. COSSAC therefore, selected the Caen sector
for the assault area. It was the only sector in which the
German peripheral defenses were weak enough to give the
Allied spearhead, limited as it was by the shortage of assault
lift, a reasonable prospect of success. But COSSAC laid it
down, as a condition, that sheltered water and artificial
harbors must be provided.
-
Having contrived a method by which the Allied spearhead
could gain a foothold, COSSAC next considered the problem
of how the Allied army could establish itself in strength
before the German mobile reserves would have a chance to
crush it. This question resolved itself into the problem
of how to win the Build-up race. The Germans would be faced
with a Build-up problem too. Their mobile reserves would
have to be brought up progressively, one part at a time, just
--96--
as allied forces would have to be ferried across the channel
progressively. COSSAC believed that if the Allies could
stay ahead in the race, they would eventually win, because
their reservoir of troops was greater than the German reservoir.
The problem was how to win the race with the limited
build-up lift available.
-
One essential question faced was that of the early
construction and efficient operation of the artificial harbors.
A second essential problem was that of disorganizing
German lines of communication leading up to the assault area.
This would require both air action and sabotage by the French
resistance. Another method would be to tie down German armies
in the Pas de Calais, Scandinavia, and southern France by
maintaining a threat against those areas. Another method would
be to tie down German reserves in Italy, the Balkans, and in
the German homeland by operations or threatened operations in
Italy and the Mediterranean. All of these would contribute
to the allied chances of winning the battle of the build-up.
But COSSAC realized that, with the cross-channel shipping
available to the Allies, they could not win the build-up
race, nor maintain their foothold in Normandy, if the Germans
had unlimited reserves available. In fact, if German mobile
reserves in France exceeded some 12 full-strength first-line
divisions, they would in all probability be able to win the
build-up race and push the Allies back into the sea, before
the full weight of the army could be established in the
bridgehead area.
-
COSSAC made one further condition to his plan. The
Allies must have overwhelming air supremacy over the channel
and assault area. Failing this, the allied armada would be
disrupted at sea and the soldiers would never get to the
beach. Even if they did reach the beach, a comparatively small
scale of German air action over channel build-up lanes could
fatally delay the allied build-up, while the necessary disruption
of German lines of reinforcement would also be prejudiced.
-
COSSAC reported that OVERLORD in 1944 was possible with
the forces allotted, provided these three conditions were met, namely:
-
overwhelming air supremacy,
-
artificial harbors,
-
German mobile reserves not exceeding 12 divisions in
France or 15 available to be brought in from Russia
or the Mediterranean.
--97--
PART III
OVERLORD AND ANVIL: PLANNING THE 1944 GRAND ASSAULT
A. Quebec Conference Approval of OVERLORD, August 1943
-
The COSSAC for Operation OVERLORD was submitted for
the consideration of the President, the Prime minister
and the CCS at the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in August
1943. At that time the situation in Europe was good. The
Sicilian campaign was finished except for mopping up operations.
Mussolini had fallen from power. Italian peace
negotiations were in progress. Plans and preparations
were in hand for the occupation of Italy and for an
offensive against German armies in Italy. The position
in Russia was stable and in fact favorable for the Russians.
-
British views on the COSSAC plan were:
-
that COSSAC's three conditions were necessary
for the success of the operation;
-
that the Allied margin of superiority during
the critical first days was small; and,
-
that it was essential that the scale of German
reserves should be reduced below the maximum
twelve divisions specified by COSSAC or else
the operation might not succeed.1
-
United States views on the COSSAC plan were that it
was soundly conceived and within the means which would be
available on the target date. In regard to the apprehension
of the British Chiefs of Staff over the necessity of
meeting COSSAC's three conditions, the U.S. Chief of Staff
believed that, although OVERLORD would be more difficult
and hazardous than any other operation attempted up to
that time, the increasing pressure of the Russian armies,
the demoralizing effects of the bomber offensive, and the
steady air-ground pressure from the Mediterranean would
have the cumulative effect of reducing the scale of German
resistance to be offered in May 1944.2
The U.S. Chiefs of
--98--
Staff recommended that the plan be approved and that
COSSAC be directed to proceed with full preparations to
launch OVERLORD on a target date of
1 May 1944.1
-
The COSSAC OVERLORD plan was therefore approved, after
being reviewed by the President, the Prime Minister and
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff
urged that OVERLORD should be definitely scheduled for
May 1944. The Prime Minister stated that the British
would agree to execute OVERLORD but only subject to the
proviso that COSSAC's three conditions were met by the
target-date. If it developed that the strength of the
German ground or fighter air forces proved to be greater
than that upon which the success of the operations was
promised, the question of whether the operation should
be launched was to be subject to review by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. Subject to this proviso, Operation
OVERLORD for May 1944 was
approved.2
--99--
-
At the Quebec Conference COSSAC drew attention to
three measures which required immediate action if it were
to be possible to launch OVERLORD in May. These were:
-
The system of command to be employed should
be decided on and the principal commanders
and command organizations should be established
so that detailed plans and preparations
could be started immediately.
-
The air offensive, then in progress should
be re-oriented so as to bring about an over-all
reduction in German fighter air strength and so
as to disrupt German lines of transport into
the assault area.
-
A cover plan should be devised and the execution
of it should be undertaken, so that the reduction
and dispersion of German force in Western
Europe, necessary for the successful execution
of OVERLORD, might be effected.
-
The CCS in directing COSSAC to produce that OVERLORD
plan, had limited the "lift" available to that required
for three divisions in assault and two in follow-up.
COSSAC's plan was developed on the basis of this limitation.
He reported at the Quebec Conference that -
"It is possible to undertake the operation described,
on or about the target date named (1 May) with the
sea, land and air forces specified, given a certain
set of circumstances in existence at that time ----.
As regards the supply of shipping, naval landing
craft and transport air craft, increased resources
in these would permit of the elaboration of alternative
plans designed to meet more than one set of
extraneous conditions, whereas the state of provision
herein taken into account dictates the
adoption of one course only or none at all. In
proportion as additional shipping, landing craft
and transport aircraft can be made available, so
the chances of success in the operation will be
increased. It seems feasible to contemplate additions
as a result either of stepped-up production,
strategical re-allotment, or, in the last resort,
of postponement of the date of the assault."
--100--
-
At the Quebec Conference, General Morgan, and General
Barker, and indeed the whole COSSAC staff, repeatedly
urged the provision of more landing vessels. But the U.S.
Chiefs of Staff were busy with their plans for the Pacific
amphibious offensive and with persuading the British to
launch an amphibious offensive against Burma. The British
Chiefs of Staff in their turn were busy with projects for
launching various amphibious offensives in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Consequently little attention was given
to the fact that OVERLORD was being planned with a precariously
small spearhead.
-
One of the points of COSSAC's plan was that a diversionary
threat against the Mediterranean coast of France
should be mounted with a target date contemporaneous with
NEPTUNE D-Day. This threat should be followed by an
unopposed landing in southern France when the NEPTUNE
battle had finally compelled the Germans to move their
forces.1
--101--
B. Plans for Landings on the French Mediterranean Coast (ANVIL Operation)
-
The CCS approved at Quebec the COSSAC proposal
planning operations on the Mediterranean coast of France,
to coincide with OVERLORD. General Eisenhower, as
Supreme Allied Commander in the Western Mediterranean
was therefore directed to draw up an outline plan for a
diversionary assault (not merely a threat) against
southern France in assistance to
OVERLORD.1
General Eisenhower's report on this project made the following points:
-
Shortages in assault lift would limit any assault
against southern France to a scale not larger than
one division of two brigade groups, with a very
slow build-up.
-
An actual assault would probably have less effect
in pinning down the enemy than a threatened assault.
-
Availability of troops and assault shipping would
depend on the progress of the campaign in Italy:
until Rome was captured the assault lift available
in the Mediterranean would be required to support
Allied armies in Italy.
-
In case the Italian campaign had put the Allied
forces into the Po Valley by June 1944, the assault
into France could be launched from both land and
sea, with better prospects of success, both as an
operation and as a diversion.2
--102--
-
Concurrently, General Eisenhower submitted a plan
to use resources in the Mediterranean to mount a threat
against southern France.1
This plan involved:
-
A threat of an assault by one division with a
one division follow-up;
-
The assault would be made to appear to be timed
for OVERLORD D-Day or slightly afterward;
-
The threat would be made to appear as an invasion
by British or U.S. forces or both, with a heavy
build-up of French forces.
-
The threatened assault would be aimed at Toulon
as a first objective.
-
The plan also provided for an actual invasion
in case the Germans removed their mobile reserves
and air forces in sufficient quantity to make an
unopposed landing, or an assault a against slight
resistance possible.2
-
General Eisenhower's plan to employ ANVIL as a
diversion only, followed up if possible by an unopposed
landing, was approved by the CCS in November.3
At Teheran,
Marshall Stalin, having ascertained that there would be 8
or 9 comparatively idle allied divisions in the Mediterranean,
which could not be transferred to England in
available shipping, suggested that Britain and America
should attack in southern France rather than in Italy or
the Balkans.4
For reasons not indicated in the minutes of
--103--
CCS meetings, nor in the minutes of the Plenary Meetings
between the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal
Stalin, the British and American leaders agreed to this Proposal.
--104--
C. Strategy and Logistics of 1944 Amphibious Operations
-
At the Cairo meeting in November 1943 with Chiang Kai Shek,
the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff had envisaged
an amphibious operation in Burma. The U. S. Navy had plans
for a series of amphibious assaults in the Pacific. The
British were very desirous of launching a series of amphibious
landings in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Italian
campaign required supporting amphibious lift for one, and
preferably two divisions. The acceptance of Stalin's
suggestion for an assault against southern France in May
1944 would require amphibious lift for at least two
divisions in assault, and one follow-up. Finally, the CCS
had promised Stalin to launch the OVERLORD operation in
May, for which the allotted assault and follow-up lift
made the spearhead precariously weak. For this heavy program
of simultaneous amphibious operations in different war
theaters, Britain and America would not possess in the first
part of 1944 the required assault lift in amphibious and
landing craft.
-
The British reaction was prompt. They would have preferred
to have continued with their Mediterranean strategy,
to have applied available resources in the eastern
Mediterranean, and to have allotted OVERLORD only those
resources remaining after the requirements in the
Mediterranean had been met. They would accordingly have
preferred an elastic date for OVERLORD, dependent on the
time when OVERLORD could be conveniently built up to the
strength required by COSSAC conditions. But the Teheran
decisions having been taken, and the Allies having committed
themselves to landings in France, in operations OVERLORD and
ANVIL in May 1944, they believed that OVERLORD had become
paramount and everything else secondary. The British therefore
cancelled their eastern Mediterranean projects.1
The British also found it necessary to reduce their planned
--105--
operations (BUCCANEER) in the Indian Ocean to negligible
proportions.1
-
While landing craft in the Pacific were too far away
to be drawn on to strengthen OVERLORD, Admiral King
arranged to allot all new production, between November and
D-day, to OVERLORD and ANVIL, to accelerate production and
to transfer many of the larger amphibious ships from the
Pacific to the European Theater. By these expedients, and
by a project to use some OVERLORD follow-up landing craft
in the assault and some build-up shipping in the follow-up,
the CCS managed, before leaving Cairo, to strengthen the
OVERLORD assault by almost one division.2
-
The Italian campaign would require supporting assault
lift for two divisions until Rome was captured. ANVIL would
require lift for two divisions in assault and one to follow-up.
If this was to come from the Italian allocation the
vessels would have to be available sixty days in advance of
ANVIL D-day, in order to allow time for the necessary
amphibious training of the assault divisions and to permit
the vessels to be re-fitted, repaired and loaded. This
meant that, if Rome fell before 15th March assault, lift for
three divisions would be required in the Mediterranean but,
if it did not fall until after March 15, either ANVIL would
have to be postponed or assault lift for five divisions would
have to be provided.3
--106--
with OVERLORD scheduled, even on the three divisional basis,
Britain and America did not possess sufficient assault lift
to meet requirements for five divisions in the Mediterranean.
At the Cairo conference, therefore, the CCS left the question
on the following basis:
-
OVERLORD was to be augmented from a three division
assault to a four division (minus) basis;
-
The Italian campaign was to be accelerated so as
to capture Rome and release assault lift before
15 March;
-
ANVIL was to be scheduled roughly contemporaneously
with OVERLORD and was to employ lift released from
the Italian campaign;
-
The U.S. Navy was to provide the bulk of assault
lift and supporting naval forces for ANVIL, while
the Royal Navy would provide roughly three fourths
of the assault lift and the bulk of supporting
Naval forces for OVERLORD.1
-
In early December 1943, General Eisenhower was designated
Supreme Commander and General Montgomery CinC 21st Army Group.
General Eisenhower's cursory review of the COSSAC OVERLORD plan,
had led him to consider that the plan provided for the assault
being launched with insufficient initial strength. 2
General Montgomery similarly considered that the assaults had been
planned on too narrow a front, with insufficient forces. It
would therefore be necessary to extend the assault area both to
introduce a greater number of formations on D-day and also to
accelerate the capture of Cherbourg. 3
On reviewing the amount
of assault lift already allotted to OVERLORD it appeared that
the transfer to the Channel of half of that allotted to ANVIL
would permit OVERLORD to be launched on a five divisional
basis.4
--107--
-
When General Montgomery arrived in England in December
1943, he arranged for the revision of the OVERLORD Plan to
provide for an assault by five divisions with a two division
follow-up, rather than by three divisions. Without waiting
formal CCS approval, or allocation of the additional shipping
for the assault lift, the combined staffs in London undertook
this revision of the plan on the assumption that half of the
lift assigned to ANVIL would be made available for OVERLORD.
This revision provided that one of the two added divisions
would assault on the east flank with the object of seizing
Ouistreham and the Caen canal. The other would assault on
the west flank at the base of the Cherbourg Peninsula with
the object of accelerating the capture of Cherbourg. Even if
one half the ANVIL lift were available to OVERLORD, the five-divisional
lift could not be provided without reducing the
number of vehicles per division from the COSSAC figure of
3,200 to 2,500 and without reducing the number of landing
craft allotted for gun support.
-
From the U.S. Naval point of view the net effect of
General Montgomery's action was as follows:
-
By abandoning the Burma campaign and by transferring
amphibious responsibility for the Mediterranean to the
U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy had been able to scrape
together assault lift for almost one additional division;
-
As the Royal Navy did not have resources to fill out
the fourth assault force, or to provide the fifth one,
new naval assault forces would therefore have to be
provided by the United States Navy;
-
The United States Navy would be able to supply assault
lift for the additional assault force only if ANVIL
were cancelled; but the U.S. Navy was not prepared to
assign to OVERLORD those forces which were committed
to ANVIL unless and until ANVIL was officially cancelled
or postponed.
-
By drawing on fire support craft to provide lift, the
bombardment effort would be unacceptably weakened at
the same time that requirements were being increased
and hence the additional vessels (destroyers, cruisers,
battleships, etc.,) would be required which the Royal
Navy could not provide, and which the U.S. Navy would
have available only if ANVIL were cancelled.
--108--
-
Despite the fact that this revised planning, on a five
divisional basis, made it necessary to rely on resources
which were not then available, the three British Commanders
in Chief began planning on this basis on 14 January and the
initial Joint Plan was issued on 1 February.
--109--
D. 1944 Modifications of OVERLORD and ANVIL Plans:
December 1943--March 1944
-
The President and the Prime Minister, after the
SEXTANT and EUREKA Conference, (Cairo-Teheran, November -
December 1943), had approved the outline plan for both the
OVERLORD and ANVIL operations. The preliminary examination
which General Eisenhower had made of the COSSAC and OVERLORD
plans, with General Montgomery, had convinced both of them
that it would be necessary to increase the strength of the
initial assault on the Normandy beaches, even it this
involved the abandonment, or postponement, of the ANVIL operation.
-
When General Eisenhower reached London in January
1944, to assume the functions and responsibilities of the
Supreme Commander, he was immediately confronted with
difficult problems of both strategy and policy, involved
in the proposed modifications of the OVERLORD and ANVIL
plans. General Eisenhower had conferred with the American
Chiefs of Staff and the President in Washington in December,
and with the British Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister
in London in the middle of January. It had been agreed that the
formal OVERLORD directive would not be issued until he had had
the opportunity of reviewing the whole strategic situation, and
of submitting his own recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. In this review of the OVERLORD and ANVIL
projects he had to take into account the policy commitments which had been
made by the American and British authorities at the Cairo and
Teheran conferences. The President, the Prime Minister, and
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, had made commitments to Russia,
both for the beginning of the OVERLORD cross-channel
operations in May 1944, and for the simultaneous launching
of the landings on the French Mediterranean coast, as outlined
in the ANVIL plan. Both the President and the
American Chiefs of Staff desired that these commitments
should be fulfilled if possible.
--110--
General Marshall, moreover, attached particular
importance to ANVIL, in order to bring into action
in the Mediterranean U.S. and French troops who could
not be transported to England, and who would be relatively
inactive if ANVIL were abandoned or postponed.
-
Both the American and British leaders shared General
Eisenhower's conviction that the OVERLORD operation would
mark the crisis of the European War. It was the major
combined American-British operation which could not fail.
Everything must be done, at whatever risk in other theaters,
to make this attack the decisive assault on the European
fortress of the Axis. General Eisenhower felt, moreover,
that if the OVERLORD attack was made, with the limited
strength originally envisaged in the COSSAC plan, the
Allies would be working on a very narrow margin of strength.
It seemed essential to increase the prospects of success,
both by extending the area of assault, and by using an
initial force of five (5) rather than three (3) divisions,
in order to obtain quickly an adequate bridgehead which
would permit the allies to retain the initiative for subsequent
operations. The main factor in any such modification of
the original COSSAC plan was the availability of landing craft
for the assault lift. General Eisenhower agreed with the
COSSAC view that, if adequate shipping were not available, any
additional craft which might be obtained for OVERLORD, above
the requirements for the three divisional landing, should be
used as a floating reserve to strengthen the assault on the
three beaches.
-
The reallocation of available shipping and landing
craft in the European and Mediterranean theaters, therefore
involved the decisions as to the extent to which the assault
lift of ANVIL should be reduced to permit strengthening the
OVERLORD assault. General Eisenhower considered that the
southern France landings, simultaneously with the Normandy
attack, would be an important contribution to the success of
the OVERLORD assault. The mere threat of such landings in
the south would only contain briefly, if at all, enemy
forces in southern France, which might otherwise reinforce
the enemy strength in the North. Moreover, American forces
in the Mediterranean, and French armies stationed in North
Africa, or serving in Italy, were adequate for the ANVIL
operation. Such an operation would increase the cooperation
to be received from French resistance Groups in breaking up
enemy strength and the cohesion of enemy forces in France.
--111--
-
ANVIL and OVERLORD therefore had to be considered as
two parts of one coordinated operation designed to drive
the German armies back to the Rhine. The ideal would be
to have a simultaneous five-division OVERLORD, and a three-division
ANVIL attack. If, however, available ships and
landing craft were insufficient for both operations to be
conducted simultaneously, General Eisenhower felt that the
five-division OVERLORD assault should have first priority
in the allocation of the available lift, even though this
would have the result of reducing the Mediterranean resources
to a one-division assault basis. This would, in fact, make
ANVIL only a threat until its execution could be justified,
either by the allocation of increased shipping to the
Mediterranean, or by enemy weakness following the OVERLORD
attack.
-
Another possibility of increasing the initial
assault forces might be envisaged by the postponement
of the OVERLORD target date. While an attack on 1 May
would be preferable, as it would give a longer campaign
season, a months postponement was acceptable especially
as it would permit a longer time for preparation of air
operations and would make available an extra months production
of landing craft.1
Both the British and the
American Chiefs of Staff had indicated to General Eisenhower
their willingness to consider delaying the operation for a
month. They also agreed that the OVERLORD operation should
have over-riding priority in the allocation of assault
forces and assault lift. The British, however, felt that
although the ANVIL operation would be significant in contributing
to the success of OVERLORD, it would be unwise to
undertake it unless the assault could be made in sufficient
strength, which they defined as not less than two
divisions. Otherwise the British would prefer to maintain
the threat of amphibious operations in southern France,
while continuing offensive operations in Italy.2
--112--
The American Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand
preferred to concentrate whatever forces were available
in the Mediterranean for the ANVIL operation,
even though this might involve complete postponement
of any operation in the eastern Mediterranean and a
reduction of the strength available for the continuation
of operations in Italy.
-
General Marshall therefore recommended:
-
a target date for OVERLORD of not later than
31 May;
-
an ANVIL landing with a two-division assault;
-
the OVERLORD operation with the largest assault
possible with remaining resources;1
-
operations in support of Turkey should be
suspended, and the resources made available
for OVERLORD, ANVIL, or operations in Italy;
-
the employment of these resources should be
on the recommendation of SCAEF, who should
also be given the authority to make reallocations
of the resources of assault shipping
between OVERLORD and ANVIL, after conferring
with the Allied Commander-in-Chief in
the Mediterranean.2
-
The British Chiefs of Staff, after considering the
views of the American Chiefs of Staff and of General
Eisenhower, recommended that the forces assigned to
OVERLORD should be built up to the strength requested
by the Supreme Commander, and that any remaining forces
available should be left in the Mediterranean. As
these forces would be inadequate for the ANVIL operation,
the British felt the most profitable use which could be
--113--
made of the Mediterranean forces would be the
continuation of the Allied offensive in Italy. The
British pointed out that it had been believed at the
time of the Teheran Conference that the Germans would
withdraw to a line north of Rome but that later information
indicated that the Germans intended to resist
to the utmost the Allied advance in Italy. As a result
the Allies had no choice but to prosecute the Italian
campaign. It was greatly in their interest to do so,
since the main object of the Mediterranean strategy
was to prevent the Germans from sending reinforcements
to France, and, if possible, to make the Germans draw
forces from France before OVERLORD D-day. The distance
between the ANVIL and OVERLORD areas was so great . . .
nearly 500 miles . . . the country so rugged, and the
defensive power of modern weapons so great that the
"pincer" argument did not apply (that is, a "pincer"
operation with simultaneous landings in Northern and
Southern France.) As a result, ANVIL was not strategically
interwoven with OVERLORD, except for its
diversionary effect, which could be equally exerted
from Italy or other points. The disadvantages of not
putting French forces into Southern France were realized
but the British believed that the bulk of the U.S.,
U.K., and French forces would probably be needed for
the Italian campaign. The British believed that further
consideration should be given to proposals for increasing
French participation in Northern France.
-
In their proposals the British Chiefs of Staff
agreed to the suspension of operations in support of
Turkey, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to
get a maximum possibility of success from the offensives
in France and Italy, the British made the following
proposals:
-
The additional forces which were needed to build
up OVERLORD to the strength required by the
Supreme Commander, should be allotted immediately.
-
The Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, should be
told that he would have an assault lift of at
least one division and that ANVIL as presently
planned was cancelled.
-
Further, he should be asked how he proposed to
use his forces so as to contain the maximum
number of German forces in his theater.
--114--
-
A difference of view also arose between the U.S.
and British Chiefs of Staff as to the extent of authority
to be given to SCAEF to exercise over-all control
of allocations of resources in assault shipping between
OVERLORD and the Mediterranean. General Marshall still
felt that the Supreme Commander should exercise at
least a coordinating authority for operations to be
carried out in Northwest Europe, and in the Mediterranean.
The British, on the other hand, believed that this
authority should be retained by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff, who alone were in a position to review constantly
the situation in the various theaters of war, and to
determine priorities for allocation of available
resources to particular theaters.1
-
In the early part of February 1944, General Marshall
and General Eisenhower exchanged messages concerning
the OVERLORD and ANVIL operations. On 6 February 1944,
General Eisenhower asked for General Marshall's personal
views and repeated his own belief that an assault of
five divisions constituted the minimum which would provide
a really favorable chance of success. He hoped
that this could be accomplished by 31 May without the
sacrifice of a strong ANVIL. The experience in Italy
had confirmed the necessity of a landing force strong
enough to obtain a quick success, especially a quick
seizure of ports. A factor to be considered, General
Eisenhower thought, was that recent developments in
Italy, the failure to advance to and beyond Rome, had
created the possibility that forces from there could not
be disentangled in time for a strong ANVIL. The Germans
were fighting bitterly in Italy, and as long as that
continued it would partly compensate for the absence of
ANVIL.2
--115--
-
In his reply, General Marshall pointed out that the British
and American chiefs of Staff seemed to have reversed themselves
completely. The Americans were now "Mediterraneanites", while
the British were strongly pro-OVERLORD. In the American view
the OVERLORD operation was paramount, but General Eisenhower
himself was the best judge of the basis on which the attack
should be launched. General Eisenhower was, therefore, asked to
indicate the additional landing craft which should be assigned to
OVERLORD, taking into account the consequences for future operations
in the Mediterranean of any transfers of assault lift to
increase that available for OVERLORD.1
-
General Eisenhower then informed General Marshall that any
offensive in the Mediterranean in the Spring of 1944 must be with
all available forces. He felt, however, that a successful ANVIL
would provide greater opportunity for the engagement of all Allied
forces and would have an earlier effect upon the situation of the
enemy in France than an intensified Italian campaign. General
Eisenhower agreed that if the Allied aims in Italy could not be
achieved soon, it was probable that the Allies would be committed
to that battle with their whole Mediterranean forces. General
Eisenhower then reviewed his own analysis of the OVERLORD plans
and re-stated his own view, which was:
-
to postpone the OVERLORD date to 31 May, in order to
get an extra month's production of landing craft and
added time for air operations, and to retain the ANVIL
operation;
-
the assault wave of OVERLORD must have five divisions
heavily reinforced with armor;
-
there must be two months of heavy air preparations;
-
airborne troops must be used on D-day;
-
two reinforced divisions must be landed on the second
tide of D-day;
-
there must be the strongest possible help from the
Mediterranean;
-
during the first sixty days OVERLORD would take all of
the resources which the United Nations could muster;
-
following that, the operation would be one in which the
principal needs would be for land forces, cargo shipping
and tactical air strength.2
--116--
-
In view of the variety of complicated issues that had arisen
over the discussion of the OVERLORD - ANVIL
plans, the United
States Chiefs of Staff proposed that these questions should be
finally decided by General Eisenhower, as the representative of
the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, in conference with the British Chiefs
of Staff. The British agreed, on condition that any disagreement
be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 1
At this conference,
General Eisenhower indicated that it would be possible to launch
OVERLORD without the allocation of all of the ships and craft
previously requested. He felt that a maximum effort must be
made to mount ANVIL, because it would greatly aid the OVERLORD
operation by diverting German divisions from the build-up against
the OVERLORD lodgment, ANVIL would also open a way into France
for the French and American divisions in the Mediterranean, so
that they could aid in the decisive effort against Germany.
General Eisenhower also made detailed recommendations for allocations
between OVERLORD and ANVIL.2
-
In the discussion with General Eisenhower, the British
Chiefs of Staff repeated their opinion that both OVERLORD and
ANVIL forces, as envisaged in General Eisenhower's proposals,
were being under-estimated. Moreover, they felt that the slow
progress of the Italian campaign would make it necessary to
increase support for this offensive, even though this involved
the immediate cancellation of ANVIL.3
On the contrary, the
American Chiefs of Staff were still of the view that ANVIL should
be launched with a two-divisional lift by drawing upon all available
combat and shipping resources in the Mediterranean, even
though this involved cutting down reinforcements and assignment of
assault lift for Italian operations. General Eisenhower was,
therefore, requested to state these views to the British Chiefs of
Staff, with the recommendation that plans for OVERLORD and ANVIL
should be followed, at least until 1 April, then the situation
might, if necessary, be reviewed.4
--117--
-
The divergence of views which had developed in these
discussions was brought to the attention of the President by
the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the 21st February, 1944. General
Eisenhower was informed that this action was being taken and
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would support the Supreme
Commanders' recommendations.1
The President was influenced by
over-all policy considerations involved in view of the commitments
made to the Russians at the Teheran meeting. They had strongly
approved the ANVIL operation, and would naturally not understand
its abandonment. The President therefore directed that
Eisenhower be informed that ANVIL could not be abandoned without
referring the question to the Third Power. In view of the
existing military and political situation, the President felt
that it would be inadvisable to refer to this Third Power the
strategic divergences which had developed between U.S. and
British staffs.2
-
General Eisenhower therefore met with the British Chiefs of
Staff for a further conference on the 22 February 1944.3
It was agreed . . .
-
that the campaign in Italy should be given first priority
on the Mediterranean resources until further orders;
-
that alternative plans should be made by the Allied
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean for amphibious
operations which would aid the OVERLORD operation by
containing the maximum number of enemy forces;
-
the first of these alternatives should be ANVIL, on
about a two-divisional lift and ten-divisional scale, to
be launched shortly after the OVERLORD operation; the
maximum use of French troops should be given full consideration;
-
the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, should
base these plans on the present allocation of landing
craft with certain listed exceptions;
-
these arrangements should be reviewed on 24 March 1944
in the light of the then existing Italian situation;
--118--
-
if ANVIL should not prove to be practical at that
time on a two-divisional scale, landing craft above
a one-divisional lift, which could be used for
OVERLORD, should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean;
-
plans should then be revised on the basis of the lift
remaining in the Mediterranean;
-
if these conclusions were approved by the President and
the Prime Minister, they should be transmitted to
General Eisenhower and to General H.M. Wilson.1
-
Both the President and the Prime Minister agreed to the
conclusions reached at this conference between General Eisenhower
and the British Chiefs of Staff.2
-
The situation in the Mediterranean was further reviewed by
the Chiefs of Staff at the end of March. At that time the
Italian campaign was still bogged down in the Monte Cassino area,
the Anzio bridgehead was fighting an isolated battle, dependent
for its support and safety on the Mediterranean's limited supply
of amphibious lift. It was, therefore, obvious that, irrespective
of NEPTUNE requirements, ANVIL could not be launched concurrently
with OVERLORD. The CCS accordingly decided to postpone
ANVIL and to allot to OVERLORD the assault lift released.
-
Admiral King set the wheels in motion at once. On March 20,
he allotted the assault lift, and also the naval organization,
forces, commanders and staff required to make up the 5th Assault
Force. From 20 March to 31 May (the OVERLORD target D) was a
period of 70 days, a short time for the task of moving the vessels
to England, organizing them into an Assault Force, training the
Naval and Army forces, and putting the vessels in the required
state of readiness for D-day. Yet the job was done.3
With the
postponement of the ANVIL operation, the additional assault lift
required for the OVERLORD five-divisional assault became available.
It also became possible to provide the required Naval covering
and bombarding forces necessary to neutralize enemy coastal
defenses on the more extended 8-RCT front. The final preparations
for undertaking, the NEPTUNE assault phase of the OVERLORD
operation could now be taken.3
--119--
PART IV
AIR OPERATIONS IN RELATION TO OVERLORD
A. COSSAC Plan for Air Operations
-
In the COSSAC outline plan, it was proposed that, during
the preliminary stage of OVERLORD, which must start forthwith,
air action should be directed toward:
-
the reduction of German air forces on the Western
Front;
-
the progressive destruction of the German economic
system;
-
the undermining of German morale, and,
-
the disruption of German coastal defenses and lines
of communication in and leading to the assault area
so far as it would be possible to do so without
revealing the intended point of assault.
-
When the COSSAC plan was produced, the strategic air forces
had been engaged in a very similar program for some time. The
COSSAC plan therefore required only a slight modification in
overall objectives and in the priorities assigned to the list
of targets. The objects and scale of the bomber offensive had
passed through several stages of evolution, corresponding to
the development in the general war situation. In the early
days of 1941 and 1942, the primary object had been to compel
the Germans to divert air strength from Russia, by inflicting
heavy punishment on German war centers. The Germans would
thus be led to move air forces from Russia to ward off
Allied bombers in the period before January 1943.
-
The CCS, at the Casablanca Conference, reoriented the
priority of targets of the bomber offensive and defined the
primary objective as the progressive destruction and dislocation
of the German military, industrial, and economic system,
and the undermining of the morale of the German people to
such a point that their capacity for armed resistance would
be fatally weakened. The order of priority among primary
objectives was established as follows:
--120--
-
German submarine construction yards;
-
the German aircraft industry;
-
German transportation;
-
oil plants, and,
-
other targets in the enemy's war industry.1
-
Prior to 1943 the size of the American air force in the
United Kingdom was so limited by transatlantic shipping
shortages that it played a minor role in the bomber offensive.
But, by January 1943, substantial movements of U.S. air
forces into England had been assured. The CCS accordingly
decided to put the bomber offensive on a combined basis,
under the overall supervision of the British Chief of Air
Staff, who was to act in this matter as the agent of the CCS.
--121--
[Manuscript's page numbering skips 122.]
--122--
B. Plans for Combined SICKLE-POINTBLANK Air Operations
-
At the end of April, the Commanding General of the
8th U.S.A.A.F. presented a plan for the progressive expansion
in the employment of U.S. Air Forces, designed to
match the cumulating arrival of bombers, and to function
within the general framework of the agreed CCS plan for
the combined bomber offensive.
-
Six systems, comprising seventy-six (76) precision
targets, were selected as the objectives of the U.S. bomber
offensive. These systems were:
-
submarine construction yards and bases;
-
the German aircraft industry;
-
the ball-bearings industry;
-
the oil industry;
-
the synthetic rubber and tires industry; and,
-
the manufacture of military transport vehicles.
-
Of these targets the Germans were most sensitive to,
and had concentrated their principal defenses on:
-
aircraft factories;
-
submarine construction yards;
-
ball-bearings, and,
-
oil.
-
General Eaker's plan provided for the American and
British bomber effort to be conducted as separate, but
complementary, operations. The British bombers were very
much more numerous, were capable of carrying much heavier
bomb loads, and were fitted with special navigational devices
which permitted them to bomb at night with a fair degree of
accuracy. The U.S. bombers, which were equipped for pinpoint
bombing of visual targets, and were very heavily armed
for air combat, would follow up the British night effort with
daylight raids with the dual object of destroying small
targets and of engaging and destroying German fighter planes
in the air. The Germans had realized the vulnerability
--123--
of their vital industries and were rapidly increasing their
fighter plane strength. If this were not arrested quickly, it
might have become impossible to carry out the destruction planned,
or to create the conditions necessary for Cross-Channel operations.
Daylight raids by American bombers would provoke reaction
by the German day fighter air force. The formidable gun power
of American bombers in air combat would contribute heavily to
arresting this development by destroying first line German
fighter in the air. Bombing of aircraft factories, it was
hoped, would do the rest.
-
Considering the number of German fighter planes which could
be concentrated to meet the bombers on penetration and withdrawal,
it was believed that 300 heavy bombers constituted the minimum
operating force capable of making deep daylight penetrations.
In order to despatch 300 bombers on operations, it was necessary
to maintain 800 in the theater.1
-
This plan for air operations was approved by the C.C.S. at
the Trident conference in May 1943, at the time when tentative
approval was given for detailed planning of OVERLORD.2
The
Combined Bomber offensive, first known as operation SICKLE was
later known as operation POINTBLANK. This plan of operations
was divided into four phases, to correspond with the planned
increase of American planes in the Theater. The depth of
penetration, number of targets available, and the capacity of
the bombing force would increase successively with each phase.
--124--
-
In the first phase, lasting until July 1943, 300
daylight bombers per raid would attack German fighter
factories, repair depots, airdromes and submarine
installations.
-
During the second phase, July - October 1943, some
400 heavy bombers would attack German fighter plane
factories, making penetrations of 400 miles.
-
In the third phase, October 1943 - January 1944,
German fighter strength would be kept depleted by 655
heavy bombers.
-
The fourth phase, beginning early in 1944, would employ
a force of 2,702 heavy bombers. The entire force
would be used to sustain the effort already produced and
to pave the way for combined operations on the Continent
of Europe.1
--125--
C. Coordination of U.K. and Mediterranean Air Operations--1943
-
In October 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed
to proposals for the building of a United States strategic
bomber force in Italy. The advantages to be gained were
that shuttle bombing between Italian and British bases
could be started, German fighter plane strength would be
dispersed, other targets could be reached, and better
bombing weather could be expected in Southern Europe.1
(FAN 254, 22 October 1943.)
-
The first of a series of reports concerning the effects
of the bomber offensive on the German war effort was issued
in August 1943. It stated that all of the great industrial
centers in the Rhur and Rhineland areas were devastated.
This devastation led to a housing problem in the heavily
bombed areas, and the problem of housing refugees elsewhere
was very acute. The physical destruction of the productive
capacity in Germany was considerable but effected only a
small proportion of Germany's total industrial capacity.
Few individual industries had suffered the loss of a
critical number of factories. However, the reduction in
steel output was believed to be having an effect on armament
output. The greater part of the damage fell on industries
producing or processing for other industries. This meant
that there would be a time lag before the effect of the
bomber offensive would be fully felt. Nevertheless, there
would be an immediate effect on German plans because production
prospects were becoming both more adverse and
largely incalculable. The bombing offensive was also forcing
Germany to adopt a defensive air strategy. It also made very
heavy demands on German skilled manpower for radar and
fighter defenses.2
--126--
-
A second progress report on the combined bomber
offensive, covering the period 4 February to 31 October 1943,
indicated that conditions in Germany were resolving themselves
into an increasingly acute conflict of priorities
and a general deterioration in morale. It was difficult
to estimate the overall effect in quantitative terms, but
it was believed that a 10% reduction of the total German
war potential had been achieved. It was estimated that
nineteen of the towns of outstanding importance to the
enemy's war economy had been virtually destroyed, nineteen
more had been seriously damaged, and nine others had
been damaged. The maintenance of morale was thought to be
the greatest single problem facing German authorities.1
--127--
D. OVERLORD Plan For the Air Offensive in 1944
-
This was the position of the air offensive when COSSAC
presented his OVERLORD plan. Although the strength of the
German air forces, which would be available in 1944 on the
Western Front, could not be accurately forecast, it was
clear that the Allies would have a vast numerical superiority
in bomber forces. The comparable fighter situation, however,
was uncertain. A definite and steady increase in the first
line strength of the German fighter force was in progress.
Although this increase was not expected to result in a situation
in which the numbers of German fighters available would
be equal to those at the disposal of the Allies, it might
produce a local superiority in the area of operations. During
the assault against the Continent and during the follow-up
period, the Allied fighter forces would have a very large
number of commitments which would entail wide dispersal of
fighter forces and operations at maximum intensity. Allied
fighters would also be operating under serious tactical
disadvantages, particularly during the early stages, when
they would be required to operate at extreme ranges. As a
result, the Allied numerical superiority would be relatively
dissipated, and the German air forces relatively concentrated.
-
Before the assault could take place against the Continent,
therefore, it would be necessary to arrest the expansion and
to reduce the effectiveness of the German air force, particularly
that part of it which could be brought to bear against
the Caen area. It would then be relatively easy to provide
adequate air support for Allied land and sea forces. In view
of the operations scheduled for the latter half of 1943, both
in the Mediterranean, and by the Combined bomber offensive
against the German air forces, it was not possible for COSSAC
to estimate accurately, either the extent to which the
effectiveness of the German air forces could be reduced by
Allied air operations or the time required to complete such
operations. It was clear, however, that an amphibious assault
against the Caen area would require:
-
that the maximum number of enemy fighter forces
should be contained in the Low Countries and
Northwest Germany during the assault phase;
--128--
-
that the effectiveness of the German fighter defense
organization in the Caen area should be reduced;
-
that the arrival of early enemy reinforcements from
the Mediterranean and Russia should be prevented;
-
Above all, however, an over all reduction in the strength
of the German fighter forces before the time of the surface
assault was essential. The strategic bomber offensive then
in progress was expected to retard the expansion of the German
fighter force, and ultimately to reduce its strength, by
destruction of aircraft factories. The main deterrent to
the success of this long term policy was the existing first
line strength of the German day fighter defense. Inflicting
heavy casualties in a short space of time on German fighters
would weaken the greatest obstacle to the reduction of enemy
sources of production and the eventual depletion of the
German fighter force by the bomber offensive.
-
The achievement of the necessary air situation prior to
the assault stage of OVERLORD was therefore dependant on:
-
inflicting heavy casualties on the German fighter
force by air battles brought about at an early
date, in areas advantageous to the allies;
-
the long term bomber offensive against the sources
of supply and production of first line units of the
German Air Force;
-
the disorganization of the German Air Force and the
destruction of enemy air field installations within
fighter range of the Caen area; and
-
the disorganization of the main elements of the
German fighter command organization in the Caen
area.
-
CCS approval of the COSSAC plan included authorization
for COSSAC to take the necessary preliminary measures to
assure that the air offensive would be directed toward
accomplishing these results.1
The Combined Bomber offensive
was accordingly given an OVERLORD orientation and the program
for air action from the west was established as follows:
--129--
-
Long term bombing directed primarily at German
sources of supply and production of aircraft,
and particularly of fighter aircraft.
-
Employment of every available means to bring the
German fighter air force to battle in areas not
too disadvantageous to the allies.
-
Concurrently with, but without detriment to, the
main effort of reducing the German Air force on
the Western Front, the continuation of long term
bombing, directed toward progressive destruction
and dislocation of the German military, industrial
and economic system and the undermining of the
morale of the German people, to a point where their
capacity or armed resistance would be fatally
weakened.1
-
Although this new program did not progress as rapidly
as was hoped, it did succeed in arresting the expansion of
German fighter forces before the year was out.2
In December
1943, it was reported that as a result of successful attacks
upon seven factories, German single-engine fighter plane production
had been reduced by 40% below planned production.
Attacks on factories and industrial areas had seriously affected
German capacity for the manufacture of armaments,
chiefly ball bearings, rubber, electrical equipment, vehicles,
machine tools, steel, shipbuilding and heavy industry.3
-
In February it was decided to amend the directive for
the combined bomber offensive by assigning an appropriate
priority to Robot and Rocket Bomb (CROSSBOW) targets. In
the modified directive the overall bomber mission remained
the same. The primary objective was the German Air Force;
first priority being given equally to the bombardment of
the production centers of fighter airframes and of component
parts, as well as of ball bearings. Second priority was
given to installations which supported the German fighter
air force. Other objectives listed were Robot Bomb and
Rocket sites (CROSSBOW targets), Berlin and other industrial
areas, and targets in south eastern Europe.4
--130--
-
A report on the progress of the allied bomber offensive,
dated 18 May 1944, made just prior to the invasion of France,1
indicated that a change in broad German strategy was unlikely
before D-day. German production of aircraft had been further
reduced. The acute shortage of parts and accessories had been
further aggravated. More damage had been caused to factories
for land armaments. Military traffic in France was not being
appreciably hindered and the weight of dislocation, caused by
the bombing of transportation facilities, was falling primarily
on French civilian traffic. German civilian morale was low
and apathetic. There was a steady weakening in the will to
work, and signs of indiscipline and independence were appearing
among the workers. However, it was not believed that a collapse
of German resistance could be expected prior to the Allied invasion
of the Continent.2
--131--
-
When COSSAC had produced the outline plan for
OVERLORD in August 1943, the pre-eminent condition,
which above all others was essential to the success
of the assault, was that a major over all reduction
in the strength of the first line German fighter air
forces should be brought about before D-day. How
well the bomber offensive succeeded in accomplishing
this can be seen from the following figures:
-
First line fighter strength in Western
Europe in June 1943 was 1,400 planes.
-
Their strength on D-day as forecast in
January 1944 was 2,025 planes.
-
Strength on D-day as forecast in May 1944
was 825 planes.1
-
The successful development of the OVERLORD plan for
air operations was conclusively demonstrated in June 1944.
When the invasion came enemy air forces offered comparatively
light resistance to the allied armada.2
--132--
PART V
OVERLORD COVER AND DECEPTION OPERATIONS
The text of this part of Chapter Two has been
separately prepared and issued. For security reasons
the detailed planning and conduct of these cover and
deception operations remains highly classified.
From the time when plans for a cross-channel
operation were first considered, the vital importance
of concealing from the enemy any information as to the
time and place of the assault on the Fortress of Europe
had been recognized. It was also essential to the
success of the attempt to establish a bridgehead in France
that the enemy should be so deceived as to allied intentions
as to disperse his available forces by committing
them to defense of as many as possible of the European
coastal areas that might be the target of allied amphibious
operations.
Great success was in fact achieved by the allied High
Command, both in concealing their own strategical and
tactical plans and in misleading the enemy. The success
of the Normandy landings is at least in part due to the
OVERLORD program of Cover and Deception operations. The
British services had developed the program and organization
for such operations before the United States entered the
war. The allied Combined Command exploited to the full
from 1942 to 1945 the experience of this British organization.
In the months preceding D-Day the Germans were led to
expect allied landings from the Mediterranean and in
Scandinavia, as well as in the Channel. Even after the
Allied bridgehead was established in Normandy, the German
High Command failed to concentrate its reserves against
this allied landing, as the major assault was still expected
elsewhere. The story of these expert OVERLORD
operations has been presented in this separate study.
--133--
A. COSSAC Cover Plan
-
The COSSAC Outline Plan had calculated the maximum
enemy strength which the assault forces could normally
expect to meet successfully in the early phases of the
Normandy landings. If the OVERLORD operation was to have
a reasonable prospect of success, German forces should
not exceed:
-
on D-Day, not more than 3 German divisions
should arrive;
1
-
on D plus 2, not more than two more, (total
of five);
-
on D plus 8, not more than four more, (total
of nine).
-
By D plus 8, the Germans would have had time
to move all reserves stationed in France and
the Low Countries into the Normandy battle,
and they could be expected to do so unless
deterred by allied action.
-
The COSSAC plan proposed the following courses of
action to keep enemy forces in Normandy below these
maximums:
-
An air attack designed to disrupt transport
into the assault area,
2
-
Tactical diversions during and immediately
after the assault designed to cause the Germans
to postpone the despatch of nearby reinforcements
until after the first critical days,
3
and
-
a cover plan designed to cause the Germans to
delay the movement of a part of their strength
in France to meet the assault even after the
invasion had started.
--134--
-
COSSAC considered that two divisions could be tied down
in the South of France by a threat of an invasion from the
Mediterranean, and that one division could be detained in
the Pas de Calais by the threat of an assault there. But
he did not believe that OVERLORD could succeed if, on D-day
the mobile reserves of the German army in France were larger
than 12 full strength first line divisions, or if, before
D plus 60 they could reinforce their strength in France by
more than 15 additional divisions.
-
The cover plan (operation TORRENT) proposed by COSSAC
was therefore designed to accomplish two objects:
-
To cause the Germans, during the months preceding
the invasion, to make a faulty strategic disposition
of their forces in Western Europe, by which
their mobile reserves in France would be reduced
to a level of 12 divisions or less, and,
-
to cause the Germans to leave a part of their
strength in France immobile during the actual
battle.1
-
If these objects were to be achieved, execution of the
cover plan would have to be started before winter set in,
as the Germans would use the winter months to carry out
their major strategic disposition for the ensuing year. In
August 1943, therefore, COSSAC recommended that the OVERLORD
cover plan be set in motion without delay. But delay was
unavoidable. A cover plan depends for its success on causing
the enemy to believe a fictitious "story". During
--135--
the years before the Quebec conference the allies had
slowly brought the Germans to believe a "story" designed
to tie down German forces in areas harmless to the
Russian and Mediterranean fronts.1
One of the objectives
sought had always been to induce the enemy to station
strong forces in France. A considerable time was required
to effect the transition from the former objective
to the new one. As a sudden and radical change would
only serve to put the enemy on guard, a skilful reorientation
of the existing cover plan was required. The CCS
directed COSSAC, and later SHAEF, to employ existing
machinery and facilities, both for preparing and for
executing the OVERLORD program of deception.2
--136--
B. British and Combined Organization for Cover and Deception Operations
-
This machinery for cover and deception operations
dated back at least to the beginning of the European
war. In 1939, the British Chiefs of Staff had designated
a London Controlling Officer responsible for cover and
deception plans and operations of all British services and
governmental agencies. All proposed British cover plans
were submitted via this officer to the British Chiefs of
Staff and when plans were approved they were carried out
by him. All over the world and in every echelon of command,
the London Controlling Officer had established special
groups of cover and deception specialists. These groups
implemented the tasks which the London Controlling Officer
assigned them. They also worked up, and implemented,
special local cover plans. The London Controlling Officer,
when requested, helped plan and implement theater cover plans.
-
When the U.S. entered the war, the CCS directed the
London Controlling Officer to carry out the same tasks for
both the British and the Americans and to continue to act
under the direct supervision of the British Chiefs of staff.
In the European theater the London Controlling Officer dealt
generally with ETOUSA. No centralized U.S. authority was
established until 1 January 1944, when a Special Plans
Branch of the 1st U.S. Army Group was formed for coordination
of the U.S. effort. This authority gradually absorbed the
activities in this field of ETOUSA whose part gradually
dwindled away to nothing.
-
Overall command of the OVERLORD aspects of cover and
deception was exercised by SHAEF. For this purpose he
organized a special branch of his staff known as SHAEF
Ops "B" G-3. When the 1st U.S. Army Group became the
12th Army Group, A.E.F., the latter took over U.S. Army
participation in cover and deception operations. In the
British 21st Army Group, security, cover, and deception,
were handled by a separate staff known as G (R). Later,
in the 6th Army Group, security, cover, and deception, were
the responsibility of the Advanced Tactical Echelon, known
as "A Force". This was a purely American organization, a
part of the U.S. 7th Army.
--137--
-
On the Naval side, cover and deception was managed in
general by Admiralty (NID). For those aspects of the
plan which were strictly related to OVERLORD, Admiralty and
COMNAVEU supplied ANCXF with a special staff, which utilized
the resources and facilities of Admiralty (and to some extent
COMNAVEU) in developing and executing ANCXF's plans
and orders.
--138--
C. OVERLORD Cover Plans:
JAEL and BODYGUARD
-
OVERLORD cover plans passed through a large number of
changes, developments and modifications. COSSAC's original
proposals went little further than:
-
to mount a threat of a landing against the south
of France, with a fictitious D-day approximately
concurrent with OVERLORD D-day, and
-
to mount a threat against the Pas de Calais, with
the same "D-day".
-
After OVERLORD was conditionally approved the London
Controlling Section produced Plan JAEL
1
in August 1942. Plan
JAEL was intended to lead the Germans to make faulty strategic
dispositions with respect to all future operation of all the
United Nations. Allied strategy for 1944 had not yet been
agreed on, and it was not even unconditionally decided that
OVERLORD should be executed. Moreover, the nature of
future operations in the Mediterranean and in Russia were
not known. Plan JAEL therefore, could be no more than a
proposed outline plan.2
--139--
-
After the EUREKA decision to launch OVERLORD, ANVIL
and a Russian offensive in May of 1944, the London Controlling
Officer was able to draw up a definite and comprehensive
cover plan. This was called operation BODYGUARD.
The object of BODYGUARD was to cause the enemy
to make faulty strategic dispositions of his forces in
relation to all United Nations operations against Germany
as agreed at EUREKA, by leading him to so dispose his
forces that they would cause a minimum of interference
with operations OVERLORD, ANVIL and the Russian offensive.
The stories which the Germans were intended to believe
as a result of BODYGUARD operation, were comprehensive,
closely interrelated and cleverly interwoven with fact.
-
Story A. Britain and America were holding
forces in readiness to take advantage of
any German weakening or withdrawal in any
part of occupied Europe. If Germany
withdrew, or even reduced, her forces at
any point in Europe, the allies would immediately
land and seize the weakened spot.
This story had a basis of truth (Operation
RANKIN) and had been true for a long time.
But the allies did not have nearly so
strong a force for RANKIN as BODYGUARD
pretended. During the months just before
D-day, neither shipping nor forces were
available in the required quantity.
-
Story B. Britain and America were pinning
their hopes on POINT BLANK, the bomber offensive.
They were convinced that the
war could be won by bombing alone. In any
event, they believed that invasion of France
would be impossible until bombing had proceeded
much further than it had. Therefore,
they were allotting available shipping space
to the transport of air forces at the expense
of ground forces.
--140--
-
Story C. Britain and America did not intend,
and in fact were unable, to undertake cross-channel
landings in France before mid July
1944.2
The German Army in France was estimated
to be so strong, and the defenses so formidable,
that the allies would not try to invade
until they had assembled 50 divisions, nor
until they had acquired landing vessels for
the simultaneous lift of 12 divisions. The
shipping priority, allotted to the transport
of air forces, was moreover, delaying the
movement of the requisite ground forces which
could not arrive before mid-summer 1944, if
by then.
-
Story D. Britain, America and Russia were
preparing to attack northern Norway in May
of 1944, with the immediate object of freeing
the northern supply route. From the
Anglo-American point of view, this required
no radical change from the previous program
of deception as operation TINDEL had developed
and maintained the threat to Norway
long before. The Russians' scheme of deception
was even more realistic. They invaded
Norway.2
-
Story E. After they had occupied Norway,
Britain, America and Russia would enlist the
cooperation of Sweden, who would particularly
be requested to provide air bases in southern
Sweden to supplement the Bomber offensive and
to supply fields for air operations in support
of an intended invasion of Denmark.
-
Story F. After having acquired the necessary
air fields from Sweden, the allies would invade
Denmark in the late summer of 1944. Plans
and preparations were well in hand for this
major effort. This would be the prelude to
the main assault on Germany.
--141--
-
Story G. in the Mediterranean, Britain and
America intended to launch an amphibious
assault against Dalmatia; Britain intended
to launch another against Greece; and the
Russians would undertake a third assault
against the Bulgarian or Roumanian coast.
In connection with these Balkan adventures,
the allies would endeavour to entice Turkey
to enter the war on the allied side, in
order to gain airfields for air support of
scheduled operations and for the opening of
the Dardanelles. The allies would also
hold forces in readiness to give support to
any of Germany's satellite or occupied
nations which might be ready to abandon her.
In Italy, the allies were preparing to
launch amphibious attacks on the Northwest
and Northeast coasts of Italy in order to
turn the flank of the German armies in Italy.
These various Mediterranean operations would
together absorb all available Mediterranean
assault lift, leaving none available for an
attack on the south of France.
-
Story H. The Scandinavian and Balkan
offensives together, with the forces held
available for RANKIN, would absorb so large
a proportion of available Anglo-American
resources, that no major assault on France,
either from the west or from the south,
would be possible in the year 1944, and
certainly not before mid-July.
-
Story I. The Mediterranean "story" was
changed slightly, after the CCS decided
to postpone ANVIL. The new "story" asked
the Germans to believe that a strong amphibious
assault of French and American
forces was scheduled to land in southern
France in mid-June, (8 days after the real
OVERLORD D-day and 30 or more days before
the bogus OVERLORD D-day.)
--142--
-
Story J. The Russian offensive would be
continued through the winter and into the
spring, until the ground became too soggy
for operations. Thereafter they would
pause, consolidate and regroup. Because
of the weather which made the ground unsuitable
for major offensive operations
and because of the long time required to
deploy for a new offensive, the Russian
1944 offensive was not scheduled to begin
until the end of June.
-
It was intended to make this series of hypothetical
operations sufficiently realistic to cause the Germans
to disperse their forces in many different areas that
might be threatened, such as Norway, the Balkans, southern
France, and so on. The Germans might thus be led either
to expect attack at wrong times, or not to expect an
attack when one was imminent. The whole series of operation
projects was presented so plausibly that inconsistencies
which appeared from time to time were no more than
what might have been expected, as allied plans varied or
expanded. A whole series of reports, rumors and actual
or simulated movements of forces had to be created to
lead the Germans to believe these hypothetical versions
of allied intentions. The first step was to provide the
story tellers and to assign these their roles.
--143--
--144--
D. Outline of OVERLORD Deception Operations
-
The London Controlling Officer had previously
established echelons of command in every area of the
European and Mediterranean theaters, with special
groups specially prepared plausibly to spread these
versions of just such allied projects. When BODYGUARD
was approved, it became necessary to guide the staffs
of the theater commanders in producing the "story" they
were required to "put over". The attached sketch indicates
the allocations of responsibility for dissemination
of the numerous subordinate deceptive operations
and the development of each so as to serve a local
purpose while at the same time contributing to the coordinated
deception operation as a whole.
--145--
-
Many specific deception operations were envisaged to
implement and develop the basic plans for misleading the
Germans. Among these specific plans were a score which
are briefly described below:
-
BODYGUARD was the overall cover plan developed
in conjunction with OVERLORD and ANVIL and with
all other United Nations operations scheduled
for 1944 in Europe. It was designed to induce
the enemy to so dispose his forces as to serve
the strategic purposes of the allies, by dispersing
as many divisions as possible in Northern
Italy, in Southern Germany, in Southeast Europe
and in Scandinavia. After the decision was made
to postpone ANVIL, the plan was extended to include
threats against S.W. Europe, to divert
enemy divisions from the NEPTUNE area.
-
FORTITUDE was the broad plan of cover and
deception operations in the Northwestern
European area of Operations. Its objectives
were:
-
to induce faulty strategic dispositions
in N.W. Europe, before the NEPTUNE
operation took place, by threats against Norway;
-
to deceive the enemy as to the target
date and area of NEPTUNE;
-
to induce faulty tactical dispositions,
during and after NEPTUNE, by threats
against the Pas de Calais area.
-
ZEPPELIN was the broad plan of cover and
deception operations in the Mediterranean
Theater. SACMED was responsible for executing it.
-
ZEPPELIN STAGES 1, 2, 3, were threats against
the Balkans, Adriatic Islands, and Northern
Italy, in support of OVERLORD and ANVIL. They
were to become effective early in 1944. (SACMED)
--146--
-
ZEPPELIN STAGE 4 was a threat against S.W.
Europe generally, in addition to those
directed against the Adriatic Islands, to
become effective during NEPTUNE operations.
(SACMED).
-
VENDETTA was a threat against Southern France
from North Africa during NEPTUNE (SACMED).
-
IRONSIDE was the threat to the Bordeaux area
during NEPTUNE.
-
FORTITUDE NORTH was the threat against Norway.
It was designed to contain enemy forces in Scandinavia.
-
SKYE was a Military threat against the Narvik and
Stavanger areas, implemented by a Fourth
National Army training in Scotland.
-
GRAFFHAM was a diplomatic threat to reinforce
FORTITUDE NORTH, with negotiations for Swedish
airfields and transport facilities.
-
FORTITUDE SOUTH was the threat of a major invasion
of the Pas de Calais area. It was to
be effective during and after NEPTUNE in order
to contain German Forces north of the Seine,
during the critical first days of the landings
in Normandy.
-
QUICKSILVER provided for a series of deceptions
to be carried out, to implement FORTITUDE SOUTH.
-
BIGDRUM was a naval diversion in tactical support
of NEPTUNE by development of a feint near the
tip of the Cherbourg Peninsula, to screen NEPTUNE
movements from enemy Radar.
-
TAXABLE and GLIMMER were Naval diversions in
tactical support of Operation NEPTUNE, the
targets being Dieppe, Dunkirk and the Calais Area.
-
TITANIC I II III IV were airborne diversions in
tactical support of Operation NEPTUNE, with dummy parachutists,
supplemented by S.A.S. parties. Targets
were the Boudeville area, the Trouville area,
the Caen area and the Marigny area.
--147--
-
PARADISE was the dummy lighting of ports,
beaches, and bridging operations on the
English east coast in tactical support of
NEPTUNE.
-
TROUTFLY was a diversion in tactical support
of airborne elements in the Cotentin Peninsula.
-
COPPERHEAD was the pretended movement of
General Montgomery to Algiers for a conference,
executed Y minus 6,
-
ROYAL FLUSH was a Diplomatic plan, to provide
for taking advantage of expected changes in
Neutral attitudes after Operation NEPTUNE, by
pressure upon Sweden, Spain and possibly Turkey.
--148--
E. Operations VENDETTA (and ZEPPELIN)
in the Mediterranean (ANVIL)
-
Two sets of deceptive operations particularly
affected OVERLORD. These were operation FORTITUDE
and operation VENDETTA. When the CCS finally decided,
in March 1944, not to launch an invasion of southern
France (ANVIL) until NEPTUNE was firmly established,
they ordered the Supreme Commander Mediterranean
(SACMED) to mount a threat against Southern France.
Before that time his cover plans, collectively known
as ZEPPELIN, were designed to distract attention from
southern France, rather than to call attention to it.
SACMED ordered "A" force, the deception group attached
to the U.S. 7th Army to mount this threat through
operation VENDETTA, which coordinated with and formed
a part of the ZEPPELIN collective plan.
-
VENDETTA was designed to substantiate the following
story. The 6th Army Group, under the command of General
Patch composed of the 7th U.S. Army and the French
B Army, was preparing to assault the French Riviera in the
neighbourhood of Cette and Narbonne on a target date of
June 11 (NEPTUNE D plus 6).1
The deception was executed
as follows. General Patch moved from Salerno in Italy
to Mostagenem in Algeria. The 7th U.S. Army had no
forces in it except for a National Corps Headquarters,
shipped from the United States. The real U.S. 91st
Division and the real 65th Puerto Rican Infantry Regiment,
assigned to it, began amphibious training near Oran. The
French B Army, under command of General de Lattre de
Tassigny, was a real army composed of several real French
and French Colonial divisions. This army carried out a
considerable program of amphibious training under the impression
that they were preparing for an actual invasion.
--149--
-
The activities of this presumed army were
disseminated by the following means:
-
Bogus radio transmissions were organized
over wireless networks specially established
for the purpose and were combined
with misleading manipulation of transmissions
over real networks.
-
Various air fighter sweeps were made over
the bogus target area.
-
Air and other reconnaissance was made of
the bogus area.
-
Discreet display was made of training,
mounting and other amphibious activity in
the Oran area.1
-
Ships and landing vessels were specially
displayed to indicate availability of
assault shipping.
-
Special means (double agents).
-
As the bogus target date approached, all these
means were reoriented to indicate that, while the
operation was still scheduled, it had been postponed
for 8 days. This postponing process was repeated as
required. The results obtained through VENDETTA proved
satisfactory. In the months preceding NEPTUNE, the
Germans built up their strength in Southern France to
11 divisions, including 2 panzers. None were withdrawn
before June 30 (NEPTUNE D plus 24). On July 28, (NEPTUNE
D plus 52), all but two were still "tied down" in Southern
France. Those two had been replaced by two others from
Normandy, which were mauled but in fighting order. The
German Army High Command retained these dispositions
despite the fact that on June 16 the Chief of Foreign
Navies Section, German Naval Staff, expressed the opinion
that an enemy invasion of Southern France did not appear
likely at that time, since there were very few ships in
North African ports.2
--150--
F. Operation FORTITUDE (and TINDEL)
(in relation to OVERLORD) in North Europe
-
The OVERLORD part of plan BODYGUARD was known as
operation FORTITUDE.1
This was divided into two stages:
-
During stage A, in the period preceding the
time when it would no longer be possible to
conceal the allied intention of conducting
an assault from southern England, the London
Controlling Officer, acting through normal
channels and in coordination with SHAEF,
developed a threat against Scandinavia. This
was FORTITUDE NORTH.
-
During stage B, after the allied intention
to cross the channel from England had become
apparent, SHAEF, utilizing as required the
facilities of the London Controlling Officer,
developed a threat against the Pas de Calais
area, in order to conceal the target date,
the real target area, and the strength of
assaulting forces. This was FORTITUDE SOUTH.
-
In order to tie down German forces in Scandinavia,
FORTITUDE NORTH was designed to indicate that the allies
were preparing to assault Southern Norway, in the vicinity
of Stavanger, on a target date of May 1st. The assault
would be executed by one infantry division, supported by
paratroops and commandos, and by one follow up division.
This force, which would be built up, over a period of two
months, to a total strength of six divisions, one of them
mountain trained, would advance along the coast of Norway
supported by the Navy and by carrier-borne aircraft. An
additional Regimental Combat Team, with the associated
Naval assault force, would be held in readiness to support
the operation by flanking amphibious landings. Long range
--151--
fighter planes would be flown in as soon as airfields
were captured.
-
When the assault forces had been firmly established
in Southern Norway, the British and Americans would launch
another assault on Northern Norway, in conjunction with a
Russian advance from Finland. The initial objective of
the Russian-British-American armies in northern Norway
would be to open rail and road communication with Sweden.
Once this was done, and allied positions in the north and
south of Norway had been consolidated, an assault against
Denmark would be launched. The airfields required for
the attack on Denmark would be found in Sweden, who would
be asked, through diplomatic channels, to permit this.
(Operation GRAFFHAM).
-
After NEPTUNE was launched, FORTITUDE NORTH operations continued to
lead the Germans to believe the allies would conduct the
Norwegian offensive, as soon as assault lift was released
from NEPTUNE, in the late summer of 1944. The ensuing
assault on Denmark would be early in 1945. Even during
NEPTUNE operations, the allies were in fact holding ample
forces and lift to occupy Norway immediately if the Germans
weakened their hold on it.
-
FORTITUDE NORTH was executed as follows:- The
British General, Commanding in Chief Scottish Command, Sir
Andrew Thorne, was made Commanding General of the mythical
Fourth Army. The Fourth Army was to be composed of a
mythical 2nd British Corps, a mythical 7th British Corps,
and the real U.S. XV Corps, then stationed in Northern
Ireland. The real British 3rd Infantry Division and the
real Royal Navy Assault Force S, both of which were scheduled
for NEPTUNE, were assembled and trained in the Moray Firth
Area with headquarters at Inverness. The presence of this
amphibious force in Scotland, formed the basis for the building
up of the hypothesis that they were destined to assault
Norway.
-
When this force began its migration at the beginning
of April 1944 to its final assembly area in the vicinity
of Portsmouth, (Operation DOWNSTREAM) this move was concealed.
The mythical British 52nd Division was actually
brought into existence, and moved into the Clyde area on
10 April. There it engaged in 41 days of intensive
--152--
amphibious training with the mythical Naval Assault
Force - Force V. Force V, consisting of at least 38
non-existent Assault ships, was supposed to be training
for a long sea voyage to be followed by an assault
on a one-brigade front against a fjord type terrain,
At the same time, the mythical 58th Division was also
moved into the Clyde area and began training with the
mythical Naval Assault Force W, a force containing at
least 35 non-existent ships. This training was conducted
with a view to a northern sea passage and an
assault on a semi-RANKIN basis.
-
The means employed to disseminate reports of this
pretended series of operations were:
-
Creation of special wireless networks for
production of bogus "programs".
-
Manipulation of transmission and silences, on
"real" wireless circuits.
-
Special means (double agents) and German
"spies" sending back false stories.
-
Stimulated gossip in "informed circles" in
foreign capitals and elsewhere.
-
Discreet "display" of activities.
- Maneuvers of troops.
-
Construction of phony airfields, landing
vessels, hards, and so on.
-
Movement of merchant shipping, assault
vessels and combatant Naval ships in the
Clyde and Scapa Flow and elsewhere in
conformance with the story.
-
Careful control of security.
-
The results of FORTITUDE NORTH were good. On one
occasion, German aircraft attacked one of the mythical
headquarters in an air raid on Scotland. In April and
May 1944, the Germans sent reinforcements in Denmark,
although by October 1943, the Germans had already built
up their strength in Norway to 12 divisions. On NEPTUNE
D-day, there were still 12 divisions in Norway. By the
--153--
end of July 1944, three divisions were on their way
southward, but in August there were still 8 divisions
in Norway, a force which at certain stages of NEPTUNE
would have been decisive.
-
The results of FORTITUDE NORTH (and of TINDEL
previously) were also interesting from the Naval point
of view. The heavy German fleet lay almost immobile
in Norwegian waters (except for some ships, mostly
damaged, in the Baltic) from the and of 1941 onwards.
During this period, the allies transported their assault
forces to North Africa, supported and built up their
Mediterranean forces, brought many of them back to
England from the Mediterranean, and launched the cross-channel
operations. The German fleet during all this
period remained idle in Norway. While surveillance of
the heavy German surface vessels in this disposition
absorbed a considerable allied force and involved great
allied effort and loss in the Arctic convoy runs, the
Germans could hardly have based their high seas fleet in
an area more advantageous to the allies. By December
12th, 1941, Hitler had been persuaded that the menace of
large British landings in Norway was so great and so
imminent, that he ordered the concentration of all German
battleships, Panzershiffe and supporting forces in Northern
Waters.1
In November 1942, when allied forces were on the
high seas converging on Africa, Hitler was so worried about
the imminence of an invasion of Norway that he ordered a
strengthening of land and sea forces there.2
-
When the Allied Expeditionary Force landed in Normandy
in June 1944, the German heavy ships, with their supporting
destroyers, remained inactive in the north. Even on D-day,
Doenitz ordered the Northern and Baltic forces to be ready
for action to repel the further landings (on Norway and
Denmark) which he was convinced would be made.3
On the 10th
of June, Hitler would not consider the removal of even one
division from Norway, until the Navy had laid a barrage of
mines off the Danish coast.4
By 8 August, the German Naval
--154--
Staff no longer regarded major allied operations against
Norway as probable, but they still considered that Denmark
was threatened.1
On August 31st, the Naval War Staff again
ordered the strengthening of defenses of the east coast of
Jutland and on the Danish Islands as they considered invasion
imminent.2
On 25th September, Hitler ordered the
movement of troops to defend the Ems area against expected
attack. Doenitz thought a landing was more probable in
Jutland and ordered Naval vessels up to the Bight, Skaggerak
and Norway.3
--155--
G. Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH
(in Relation to NEPTUNE) Pas de Calais Threat
.
-
FORTITUDE SOUTH, as a threat of landings in the Pas
de Calais area, was executed by SHAEF, employing his three
service C's in C for the purpose,
1
but utilizing the available
facilities and assistance of the London Controlling
Officer. The objective of FORTITUDE SOUTH was to contain
the German 15th Army north of the Seine, before D-day and
for as long a period thereafter as possible.2
This threat
was so designed and implemented as to induce the Germans
to retain the 15th Army immobile on the coast of Flanders
during the first 15 to 20 critical days of the invasion.
-
FORTITUDE SOUTH was not set in motion until allied
concentrations in southern England had clearly indicated
the allied intention to launch a cross-channel invasion
in strength. It was so implemented as to provide evidence
that the allies were intending to launch the main cross-Channel
assault with an available force of 50 Divisions,
against the Pas de Calais in mid July. This attack was
supposed to be made with 6 Divisions in assault, four of
which would land in the Boulogne area just south of Cap
Gris Nez, while two would land North of Gris Nez in the
area between Calais and Ostende. The follow-up and immediate
build-up would consist of an additional 6 Divisions.
The allied objective, during the first phase of such an
operation, would be to establish and consolidate a bridgehead
in Flanders from which to capture both the major port
of Antwerp and the communication center of Brussels. They
would then be able to advance eastward on a wide front to
envelop and capture the Ruhr, as a step towards the final
objective of occupying Germany.
--156--
-
Following NEPTUNE D-day, FORTITUDE SOUTH story was
recast. The Normandy landings were presented as a diversion
in strength, to draw German forces away from the
Pas de Calais sector in order to weaken coastal defenses
in this sector in preparation for the main assault,
scheduled for mid-July, by which the allies would open
the way for their major thrust against Antwerp, the Ruhr
and Germany. The Germans were thus to be led to believe
that any transfer of forces from the Pas de Calais would be
a signal for an irresistible allied force to burst through
Belgium straight into Germany.
-
The detailed outline of this mythical assault, outlined
by FORTITUDE SOUTH, included the creation of a series of presumed
allied dispositions. General Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander,
was to have under his command two distinct army Groups:
-
The first U.S. Army Group (FUSAG), and
-
The British-Canadian 21st Army Group under
General Montgomery.
During the period of the Normandy assault, American Forces
were transferred to the 21st Army Group under Montgomery.
When the strength in France had been built up to almost two
army groups, General Bradley was to take over command of the
American Army Group, while Montgomery continued to command
the British-Canadian Army Group. The American Forces were
stationed in South West England, from Poole Westward. The
British end Canadian Forces were stationed in South East
England, from Poole Eastward. The entire assault was to
be launched against the Caen Beaches, Americans on the West,
British on the East.
-
FORTITUDE SOUTH presented an alternative hypothesis of
the allied Combined Order of Battle. SHAEF was made to
appear to command two Army Groups: 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG)
under command of General Patton, and the British 21st Army
Group under Montgomery. FUSAG was fictitiously located in
Eastern England, to be composed of the 3rd U.S. Army and the
1st Canadian Army.1
FUSAG was to be made to appear in training,
in conjunction with the fictitious Northern Naval Task force,
--157--
composed of three fictitious Naval Assault Forces, F,
M and N, based at Devon, Harwich and Yarmouth. These
Task Forces would be supported and defended by elements
of the British Home Fleet stationed in Scapa Flow.1
Further evidence would show that fictitious and real
air forces were also to be assigned on the projected
operation.2
-
FUSAG, the Naval Assault Forces and associated air
forces gave every appearance of being activated slowly.
While they appeared to be gradually assembling in Eastern
England, there were indications of other preparations,
such as the widening of roads, the building and reconditioning
of airfields, the organization of landing vessel
hards and berths, and the assembling of Naval Assault
Forces, was progressing steadily but slowly and on a large
scale. Amphibious training was proceeding, which, by the
end of May, had only reached an elementary stage. By
standards of ordinary allied procedure, this training had
reached a stage which would be normal in a period about
45 days before an assault. Beach reconnaissance was being
carried out by men in light boats off the Pas de Calais
area, from which one of the reconnaissance parties unfortunately
did not return. Preparations were also being
made to land and assemble FUSAG and the Naval Assault
forces in the Thames estuary and northward.
-
The other half of SHAEF's forces, for those FORTITUDE
hypothetical operations, was the British 21st Army Group
under General Montgomery, located in the Southampton,
Portsmouth, Isle of Wight area and eastward. This force
consisted of the real 21st Army Group, the real NEPTUNE
Eastern Naval Task force and the real British Air Forces.
These real forces, however, were to appear to be preparing
for an assault of great depth against two narrow beaches
(such as are to be found only near Boulogne). Other
evidence showed that these forces were preparing convoy
channels eastward and that they were to be joined by units
of the Home Fleet, come down from Scapa via the east coast
of England. By the end of May they also were presenting
evidence of being in a very elementary form of training,
such as would normally be expected some 45 days before an
assault.
--158--
-
It had been intended originally to maintain this
threat against Pas de Calais only until D plus 20.
The Germans continued however to believe that the threat
was real by leaving the 15th Army immobile. The FORTITUDE
SOUTH operation was therefore continued until July 25th,
when the breakthrough of the First American Army at St. Lo
forced the Germans to change their dispositions. When
General Bradley established his American Army Group in
Normandy, it had been given the new name of "12th Army Group."
The fictitious U.S. Army Group in Eastern England continued
to be designated as First U.S. Army Group. When General
Patton, with his third U.S. Army sprang from nowhere out of
the Cherbourg Peninsula, a new commander for the fictitious
FUSAG was required. General McNair performed this duty
until his death. General De Witt was then flown over from
the United States to take "command".
-
The following are some of the means employed to give
appearance of reality to this simulated threat in order to
lead the enemy to believe that such operations were imminent:
-
Battle headquarters were discreetly displayed as
being in course of construction at Dover, by
what appeared to be tunnelling, by the erecting
and testing of dummy wireless, stations, etc.,
(QUICKSILVER V);
-
FUSAG command organization and order of Battle
was established by constructing with theoretical
wireless nets, and headquarters closely approximating
what would be required for an Army Group
such as FUSAG (QUICKSILVER II);
-
Dummy air fields were built in South Eastern
England with dummy aircraft displayed in them,
while as large a proportion of real NEPTUNE
aircraft, as was permissible without prejudicing
the real operation, were based in south east
England, along with reserve aircraft, particularly
of the American type. Training in air
sea rescue and flying was done in the south
east. Air sweeps, air reconnaissance and bogus
air force radio emission also pointed the threat
to the Pas de Calais;
--159--
-
Dummy landing craft (Big Bobs) of various
types were displayed in the Thames, Harwich,
Nore and Dover areas, while dummy landing
craft berths and "hards" were being built
in the Thames estuary, dummy lighting was
being discreetly displayed. The adjacent
roads were being widened and marked with
special signs and markers;
-
Concurrently, the training activities of
the U.S. NEPTUNE forces in Western England
were being concealed by a rigorous combination
of security, camouflage and deception;
-
Double agents, gossip in informed circles,
and similar means were also used.
-
The objective and methods of this operation would
obviously have been betrayed, if the closest secrecy had
not been preserved. To accomplish this the following
measures were adopted:
-
On February 9th 1944, civil travel to Ireland
was prohibited, to prevent leakages through
that fertile German observation post;
-
On April 1st, the British Government placed a
ban on all civilian visits to and from a band
10 miles wide extending along the entire
British South and Southeast Coast from the
Wash to the Bristol Channel and from Arbroath
to Dunbar in Scotland;
-
On April 17, the British government banned the
movements of friendly diplomats to and from
England and deprived them of their diplomatic
immunity of sending and receiving sealed courier
pouches, a restriction which was continued after
D-day until June 19 in order to permit the prolongation
of FORTITUDE SOUTH, by convincing the
Germans that Normandy was not the only intended
assault area;
--160--
-
On May 25th SCAEF imposed an artificial delay
of 10 days in the transmission of all U.S.
personal mail so as to create the impression,
when troops sailed, that the back log of mail
then released came from troops standing by,
ready for the Pas de Calais assault;
-
SHAEF also suspended all personal trans-Atlantic
telephone, radio and telegraph traffic;
-
A careful censorship of all mail and other
correspondence - personal and otherwise - was maintained.
--161--
H. Organization of Radio Deception Operations
-
The Germans were known to be listening in on a great
many, if not all, allied radio transmissions in order to
obtain information which would permit them to infer the
real intentions of the allies. The fact that such radio
monitoring existed made possible indirect confirmation of
the diversion operations. If these allied radio transmissions
had not been carefully controlled the whole secret
of the simulated operations would have been disclosed.
Therefore elaborate measures of radio security were taken
to mislead the enemy monitoring services. Otherwise they
could have inferred from the volume and character of allied
radio traffic, the nature, composition, magnitude and state
of readiness of operations being prepared. The effort was
therefore made to withhold from him, so far as this was
possible, radio evidence which would reveal the approximate
invasion date and target area.
-
Standard precautions were therefore taken to preserve
security of radio communications. The security value of
codes and cyphers used prior to sailing, and of those
selected for use during the operation, were carefully
studied. Low grade and doubtful codes were limited to
unimportant traffic, and proper coding procedures were
enforced. The "BIGOT" Procedure of handling traffic, which
previous operations had proved to be a successful means of
limiting the number of persons handling highly secret traffic
to the essential minimum, was adopted and enforced. The
correct use of radio call signs and procedure was enforced.
All allied radio circuits were constantly monitored. Breaches
in procedure and security were noted end corrected, and, when
necessary, steps were taken to cover up breaks which had been
made. Other security measures were also adopted in order to
arrange such combinations of real and bogus traffic as would
prevent the enemy monitoring services from making accurate
inferences. All forces were required to adopt practically
identical wireless organizations, and to observe identical
procedure. During the training period standardized exercise
call sign books, with similar sets of call signs in every
force were put into effect. Ships and authorities, working
and guarding several circuits, used different call signs on
different frequencies, in order to make it impossible for
enemy Y, either to identify allied ships and forces, to
associate ships with commands, or to learn of later additions
of ships and forces.
--162--
-
It was anticipated:
-
that radio channels of long standing, such as
those between the U.K., and the U.S., those
between the U.K. and the Mediterranean, those
used by the Home Commands, and those used for
merchant shipping, would be called upon to
carry a substantially heavier load during the
period of preparation;
-
that the character of NEPTUNE traffic would be
markedly different from normal traffic as to
precedence, security, length, time of transmission,
date time groups, crypto channels, etc.;
-
that the character and source of this traffic
would alter during the different stages of preparations.
-
It was also necessary to open up certain new radio
channels, shortly prior to D-day, to transmit distinctive
types of traffic. To prevent the enemy from guessing
allied activities, from those new radio channels, transmissions
had to be begun long before they were actually
needed, and padded with dummy traffic well in advance.
All anticipated traffic peculiarities were inserted in
these dummy programmes, so that the enemy would not be
put on guard, by the sudden appearance of new channels,
or by the sudden introduction of unprecedented types
of traffic. Special attention was given to those "Fox"
broadcasts, designed solely for use during the operation,
which were opened up for the first time during the final
exercises. Since the enemy would certainly have associated
the intention of each broadcasts with the beginning
of the exercise, transmissions on them had to be
continuously maintained with dummy traffic, after the
final exercises to prevent accurate anticipation of the
actual beginning of the operation by observation that
these broadcasts were being resumed.
-
The numerous transmitters of the forces had to be
opened up for purposes of tuning and exercises on the
frequencies intended for operational use. If this had
been attempted on the eve of the operation it would have
been possible for the enemy to learn the allied frequency
plan and to prepare radio jamming of allied circuits.
--163--
To forestall this, every exercise and tuning test was
preceded and followed, at irregular intervals, by
exactly similar emissions originated in the same area
on different frequencies. The cover plan was intended
to mislead the enemy by transmitting bogus radio traffic
which would cause his Y (monitoring) services to surmise
that the intended target area was at a different location
from that actually planned, and would thus lead the
enemy to believe that the invasion date would not and
could not occur until 15 to 30 days after the planned
date. Special radio preparations were therefore required.
-
It was necessary, first of all, to determine what
sort of bogus radio traffic to transmit. This was done
by examining the radio logs and by monitoring the circuits
of the allied Armies, Navies and Air Forces while they
were in the process of preparing for large scale amphibious
operations, especially during exercise. In this way it
was possible to know just what enemy Y heard, when it
monitored the radio transmission of large amphibious forces
in the process of assembling, organizing, training, sailing
and assaulting. Several mobile radio teams were then
created, which, in conjunction with existing radio establishments
ashore and on ships not involved in the operation,
originated a "program" of controlled transmissions. Real
radio traffic was so manipulated, and bogus traffic was so
transmitted, that enemy Y services monitoring allied radio
transmissions, would draw false conclusions as to allied
activities.
-
Transmitters belonging to the Naval Commands at
Cleethorpes and Nore on the east coast of England, were
used on the special NEPTUNE broadcasts up until D-day.
Dummy traffic was transmitted by a merchant ships' shore
radio station, in Eastern England, paralleling transmissions
of the Niton Broadcast on the Isle of Wight,
which was the one actually used for merchant ships during
the operation. A completely dummy "FOX" broadcast was
begun from Eastern England for radio traffic parallel to
that sent on the real command broadcast. The radio side
of all exercises carried out by the actual assault forces
along the south coast of England were reproduced along
the east coast in order to lead the enemy Y to believe
that concentrations of forces along the south coast were
matched by similar groupings of forces along the east
coast, which might be intended to meet off the south east
corner of England for a concerted attack in the vicinity
of Ostend-Calais-Dieppe. Troops and ships were moved
about on the east coast to give visual corroboration for
observation by enemy air reconnaissance.
--164--
-
The radio traffic emitted during exercise FABIUS,
the culminating exercise prior to D-day, were so controlled
that the total radio effect sounded like a large number of
rather elementary uncoordinated exercises. After FABIUS
all forces were put on strict radio silence, while special
radio teams, adopting the call signs and frequencies of
the forces, put out radio programs in imitation of transmissions
being made by amphibious forces in a comparatively
elementary stage of development and training. Enemy Y,
which in the preceding two years had listened to the
organization and training of at least five amphibious
operations, were expected to infer that available forces
were in a comparatively early stage of preparation. This
artificial traffic was continued after the forces had sailed,
to give the impression to the enemy Y that the major portion
of allied forces were still in harbor on D-day.
--165--
I. Results of Cover and Deception Operations
-
The results of FORTITUDE SOUTH were gratifying.
When the Allied armada appeared off the Normandy coast, complete
tactical surprise was in fact achieved. The Germans seemed
completely unaware that the long-heralded invasion was actually
beginning. The German 15th Army, consisting of some 24
Divisions, including 3 Panzers, 2 Paratroop, and 5 or 6 mobile
reserves, remained immobile to meet what was apparently
expected to be the main Allied assault in the Pas de Calais,
north of the Seine, until 25 July (D plus 49), when the first
Division moved westward. The German C-in-C West still estimated
on 25 May, that the expected major Allied invasion was most
likely in the area between Dunkirk and Dieppe. He reported
that this invasion did not yet seem imminent.
-
The night before D-day, this German Commander revised
his view by stating that, in view of the heavy enemy air raids
on the French coast, the invasion might be imminent. The concentration
of bombing, on cutting off the Channel Front from
the Seine Front and from Normandy, might indicate that the
enemy intended to land in Normandy. The next day, D-day, the
German Naval staff commented that the Enemy had acted against
all traditions and calculation by beginning the invasion in
such unsuitable weather. Throughout the early invasion period,
the German High Command continued to expect another major
landing. On 12 June, Keitel and Jodl considered the situation
very serious, but believed that the best German chance of
victory would come from isolating the Normandy bridgehead, and
from defeating other future Allied attempts at landing.1
On 25 June, C-in-C West still considered it dangerous to weaken
the Pas de Calais garrison, as he believed the Anglo-American
Army Group in South East England was still uncommitted. In
fact, the Germans did not move a Division from the Pas de
Calais to the Normandy front until 25 July.
--166--
-
Another threat mounted by SCAEF but on a smaller
scale was operation IRONSIDES. This was a threat of
a landing in Britanny or in the Gironde by forces coming,
from the United States, Great Britain and the Mediterranean.
This threat, in conjunction with VENDETTA, may have been
partly responsible for the German decision to establish a
new army in southern France is 1943. Of the six divisions
in the German First Army in the Biscay coast, not more than
two moved up to Normandy to meet the assault.
-
The overall results of the OVERLORD cover and deception
operations (BODYGUARD) may be summarized in the following
table:
Number of German Divisions Deployed in Various Areas.
| 1943. 1 Oct. | 1944. 1 Jan. |
1 Feb. | 1 Mar. | 1 Apr. | 1 May. | 1 Jun. | 1 Jul. | 1 Aug. |
Eastern Front | 206 | 203 | 205 | 190 | 195 | 189 | 186 | 171 | 176 |
Poland | 10 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
Finland | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 9 |
Total | 223 | 216 | 218 | 203 | 204 | 198 | 195 | 183 | 186 |
|
Balkans | 19 | 22 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 23 |
Italy | 17 | 18 | 21 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 25 | 27 | 26 |
Norway | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 9 | 8 |
Denmark | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 |
|
Low Countries | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 6 |
|
France. |
North of Seine | 9 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 13 |
Center | 10 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 13 | 22 | 27 | 26 |
South | 15 | 10 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 15 | 13 | 12 |
--167--
List of References regarding Cover and Deception:
(1) Memo from JCS Joint Security Control to Director of
First Command Class, General Staff School. 2 January 1946.
(2) SHAEF/18209/Ops (B) of 3 June 1944.
(3) SHAEF (44) 21 of 26 February 1944.
(4) SHAEF (44) 13 of 23 February 1944.
(5) COSSAC (44) 4 of 7 January 1944.
(6) COSSAC/00/6/3/l/Ops of 22 September 1943.
(7) G.H.Q. H.F. 5/00/358/l/G (O) of 25 January 1944.
(8) SHAEF/18205/Ops of 7 February 1944.
(9) COSSAC/2355/Ops of 9 December 1943.
(10) COSSAC/3140/11/Sec. of 18 December 1943.
(11) COSSAC/18210/Ops. of 27 January 1944.
(12) SHAEF 18201/4/Ops. of 9 February 1944.
(13) SHAEF (44) 13 of 13 February 1944.
(14) SHAEF/18216/Ops. of 23 February 1944.
(15) SHAEF/18216/1/Ops. of 10 March 1944.
(16) NJC/00/261/33 and SHAEF/24132/4/SM of 6 May 1944.
(17) SHAEF/18236/3/Ops. (B) 9 July 1944.
(18) JAEL Cover Plan C.O.S. (43) 615 (O) C.O.S. (43) 65(final).
(19) Appx. Y to C.O.S. (43) 416 (O) of 20 November 1943.
(20) CCS 230023 Z January 1944.
(21) COSSAC 18216/Ops. of 11 January 1944.
(22) Serials 2, 3 and 14 to NJP of 1 February 1944.
(23) ANCXF (US) Report on Naval Communications.
--168--
[ Blank Page ]
--169--
Table of Contents
Previous Section **
Next Section
Footnotes
p.52 #1
"Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations", by Admiral
of the Fleet, Lord Keyes, page 81.
p.53 #1
ROUND-UP J.P. (41) 1028 of 24 December 194.
p.53 #2
From the Report of Staff Conversations 1100, 18
December 1941; British Document C.R.8.
p.54 #1
Report of Staff Conversation 1100 19 December 1941
British Arcadia Conference documents. (Ghormley papers).
p.56 #1
Joint Board Document No. 325 (Serial 729) of 30 September
1941 contains the "General Strategy Review" by the British
Chiefs of Staff, dated 31 July 1941.
p.56 #2
Report on the first meeting U.S. - British Chiefs of Staff,
British Document CR15 of 24 December 1941.
p.57 #1
Memo U.S. - British Chiefs of Staff, British Document
WW1, December 1941.
p.59 #1
Paragraphs 5-8 Joint Board No.325 (Serial 729) of
30 September 1941.
p.59 #2
Paragraph 9, Joint Board No.325 (Serial 729) Commenting
on paragraphs 19 and 20 of the "General Strategy Review
by the British Chiefs of Staff," dated 31 July 1941.
p.61 #1
See CC(42) 2; CC(42) 5; CC(42) 1st meeting; CC(42)
2nd meeting; CC(42) 3rd meeting.
p.61 #2
Ibid.
p.61 #3
CC(42)63; CC(42)10th meeting; CC(42) 11th meeting.
p.62 #1
CC(42)76; CC(42)103(final); CC(42)2(Final) LETHAL was
originally called ARABIAN.
p.62 #2
CC(42)84; CC(42)99(final); CC(42) 16th Meeting;CC(42)1st
draft 2/10/42.
p.62 #3
CC(42)86; CC(42)17th Meeting of 20 November 1942.
p.62 #4
See Chapter I, Section 3, for reference.
p.62 #5
In the Biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United
States Army to the Secretary of War, for the period 1 July
1943 to 30 June 1945. (published by the War Department,
September 1945).
p.63 #1
Document COS (42) 97 (O) of 13 April 1942.
p.63 #2
JPS 13th Meeting 24 April 1942; CCS 17th Meeting 28 April
1942 (Despatch 152217Z - 15 June 1943 JSM to Br.CoS).
p.64 #1
Biennial report of the Chief of Staff 1943-1945.
p.65 #1
ROUND-UP does not appear to have been reduced to one
definite co-ordinated operational plan before TORCH
was decided on. See ANCXF NEPTUNE Report -CB/004385A
or Admiralty M.07980/44 of October 1944, p.24. For
details of ROUND-UP plans see Operation ROUND-UP -
1943 - Provisional Assessment of Naval Implications
Admiralty M.051404 of 16 July 1942; CPS 26/1 of
3 April 42; CPS 26/2D of 28th April 1942; JP(41)1028
of 24 Dec.41; and the following papers of the Combined
Commanders CC(42)7; CC(42)11; CC (42) 88;
CC (42) 96; CC(42) 106; and CC (43) 3.
p.65 #2
Forces available were calculated as follows:
British Canadian Polish |
20 Divisions |
U.S.A. |
16 Divisions with 2 division build-up
per month from U.S. after April 1, 1943. |
ARMY |
United States: |
British: |
5 Armored Divisions
2 Motorized Divisions
7 Infantry Divisions
2 Airborne Divisions
in addition to:
18 Separate Tank Btns.
26 Tank Destroyer Btns. (HSP)
4 Corps Arty. Brig.
1 Army Arty. Brig.
2 Sep. 105 MM Hz Btns. (GHQ)
4 Brig. AA Corps, 26 AW Btn. Mob.
2 Brig. AA Army
14 Regts. AA (SM) GHQ
|
9 Armored Divisions
8 Infantry (New)
3 Infantry (Old)
1 Airborne Division
2 Paratroop Brigades
|
Air Corps Forces (U.S. and British) |
Short range fighters |
2,000 |
Long range fighters |
688 |
Heavy and medium bombers |
2,710 |
Light Bombers |
534 |
Bomber and Fighter Recon. |
240 |
Transport |
480 |
|
_________ |
|
6,652 |
|
p.67 #1
This compares with the 11,300 aircraft COSSAC expected to be
available for OVERLORD and with 7 battleships, 2 monitors, 23
cruisers, 2 gunboats, 74 bombarding destroyers and 242 gunfire
support craft which were employed in OVERLORD.
p.67 #2
This compares with 2,327 major assault craft and ships employed
in OVERLORD.
p.68 #1
By 1943 they had built this up to a strength of 41 divisions
in France and the Low Countries.
p.68 #2
For details see Chapter I, Sections 2 & 4.
p.70 #1
For details of the SLEDGEHAMMER Plan see CC(42) 1, CC
(42) 17, CC (42) 21, CC(42) 23, CC(42)30, CC42 (43)
CC(42)45.
p.71 #1
See Memorandum by General Eisenhower dated 17 July 1942,
"Conclusions as to practicability of SLEDGEHAMMER."
p.72 #1
For details of the BOLERO Plan and organization see
CCS 72 of 16 May 1942. It will be noted that the
code name BOLERO was originally linked with ROUND-UP,
the cross channel operation planned for 1943. When
TORCH was executed, the cross channel part of the plan
was abandoned but the shipping program was continued
under the name BOLERO.
p.72 #2
General Marshall asked the British to provide if they
could, the shipping required to transport the remaining
60% of the U.S. forces and supplies before April 1st.
If the British did not have sufficient shipping for this
purpose they should provide as much transportation as
might be available in order that the cross channel operation
could be launched some time during the summer of
1943. The British Chiefs of Staff were entirely in
agreement with the proposal that all possible shipping
ought to be concentrated on the task of building up
in England the greatest possible U.S. offensive force
in the shortest possible time. For the purpose of
planning and coordination they also agreed that the
build-up should be based on the assumption that an
invasion would be launched during April or May 1943.
The British reached this conclusion from entirely
different strategic consideration. In the British view
Anglo-American action in 1942 and the early months of 1943
would be governed by the situation in Russia. If Russia
were defeated, the Germans might attempt an invasion of
England. The BOLERO program would supply American forces
which would be invaluable to strengthen the defense of
England. If Russia were holding, an invasion in 1943
might be possible and might turn the scales and bring about
the most rapid defeat of Germany. If Russia were winning,
a major invasion in 1943 would probably hasten the defeat
of Germany. If Germany showed signs of collapse the Allies
should get all possible forces on the Continent to assure
her ruin before she had a chance to recuperate. A fourth
consideration was that a strong American build-up in England
coupled with an effective cover plan designed to cause the
Germans to believe either that the Allies definitely intended
to invade in 1942 or 1943, or that they were prepared to
take advantage of any German weakening in France, the Low
Countries, Norway or elsewhere by immediate occupation, would
contain strong German forces away from the Russian front. A
fifth consideration was that circumstances might arise in
which some other operation in aid of Russia ought to be
launched from Britain. In all five cases the build-up
of large American forces in England would be most desirable.
(CCS (42) 97 (O) of 13 April 42.)
p.74 #1
Annex to CCS (42) (O) of 13 April 1942.
p.74 #2
The remaining 10% of General Marshall's requirement could
not be met at all.
p.75 #1
(CPS 26/2/D, 28 April 1942)
p.75 #2
JPS 13th meeting of 24 April 1942) (CCS 17th meeting 28
April 1942) See Despatch dated 1522172 of 15 June 1943
from Joint Staff Mission to the Chiefs of Staff.
p.76 #1
CominCh serial 1428 of 8 March 1943. This is a joint
Agreement between Admiral King and General Marshall.
p.76 #2
See Chapter III for a discussion of Army and Navy Unity of
Command in the European Theater.
p.77 #1
Statistical Digest Series E. No.50 of June 1945 (issued
by Central Statistical Office, Office of the War Cabinet, London).
p.79 #1
Two British studies (CCS 167 of 22 Jan.43 and CCS 169 of
22 Jan.43) formed the basis for the CCS Casablanca policy on
cross channel preparations. These studies indicated that:
-
Unless German reserves and the beach defenses of
Northwestern Europe were substantially reduced, no
limited operation to seize and hold a beach-head in
France would be possible with the resources available
in 1943 as the Germans still had 41 divisions in France.
Even if adequate transport was employed on the BOLERO
build-up, the largest number of field divisions the
Allies could assemble in the U.K. before the weather
closed in would be 17 (12 British and 5 U.S.). Even if
all available assault shipping and craft were assembled,
assault lift for only two brigade groups (equals approximately
one division) would be available;
-
On the basis of available resources detailed plans
should be made for the seizure of the Cotentin Peninsula
of France;
-
An examination should be made to determine the level
to which German reserves in Northwest Europe must sink in
order to give a reasonable chance of success to the operations;
-
Preparations to launch the operation should be deferred
until the scale of the German reserves available on that
date could be reliably estimated;
-
Plans should be made to exploit a breakdown in German
morale and for a return to the Continent in the event of
German disintegration.
-
In 1944 the relative strength of German forces in France
as compared to the assaulting strength of the Allies in
the U.K. might be such that a cross channel invasion would
be feasible. The reasons for this opinion were:
-
the increase of Allied assault lift provided by
the production of an additional year and the reduction
of Mediterranean requirements would make
the assault stronger.
-
considerable increase in available ground forces
and supplies should be expected from another year
of BOLERO.
-
The air offensive would have reduced German strength
and especially their ability to rapidly reinforce
any Mediterranean fronts would create an overall
strain on their resources with a proportionate
weakening in France.
-
The continuing air battle would have further reduced
German air strength over the channel;
-
Plans and preparations should be made for a full scale
invasion in 1944 and an examination conducted to determine
the level to which German reserves must sink in order to
allow a reasonable prospect of success
to a 1944 invasion;
-
A combined command organization should be
established and a Supreme Commander or a
deputy to act on his behalf should be
appointed forthwith;
-
This Commander or Deputy Commander should be
charged with the task of conducting the surveys,
drawing the plans and initiating the preparations
referred to above. The U.S. Chiefs of
Staff agreed to these proposals subject to the
conditions;
-
that cross-channel preparations should
not be permitted to divert resources
from the Sicilian invasion, and
-
that no cross-channel plans should be
considered as commitments without
further consideration by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.
p.82 #1
In view of the fact that Operations in England were
considered to be in Britain's area of principle responsibility,
the CCS authorized the British COS to select
COSSAC. For details regarding the decision to form COSSAC
see CCS 67th Meeting of 22 Jan 1943; CCS 167 of 22 Jan
1943; CCS, 169 of 22 Jan 1943. For details of the selection
of General Morgan see CCS 169/4 of 8 April 1943; CCS 169/5
of 13 April 1943. It is interesting to note that at the
time of the Casablanca Conference that the CCS contemplated
having a British Supreme Commander for OVERLORD. See CCS
170/2 of 22 Jan 1942.
p.83 #1
RANKIN was to take place in the event of partial or
complete collapse of the German morale and military
defenses and was planned under certain assumed conditions,
or "cases". It was decided that a return to the
Continent under Operation RANKIN could take place under
the following alternatives:
RANKIN - CASE "A" was a plan developed to exploit a
substantial weakening in the strength and morale of
the German Armed Forces to an extent sufficient to
permit a successful assault with the Anglo-American
forces available prior to the target date of
OVERLORD. The course of action in the event of
substantial weakening of German moral in France
and the Low Countries envisaged operations in
January or February 1944 to put a modified OVERLORD
plan into effect, and provided for capture of the
port of Cherbourg within the first forty-eight hours.
In RANKIN "A" as in the case of OVERLORD, diversionary
operations in the Pas de Calais area and from the
Mediterranean were considered essential. No assault
against organized resistance was believed feasible,
unless measures were taken in time to make Naval
Assault forces available. As maintenance over
beaches and construction of artificial ports would
prove too hazardous in winter, it was essential to
capture the port of Cherbourg and as many minor
ports as possible within forty-eight hours. RANKIN,
"A", therefore, was OVERLORD, modified to meet
these special requirements.
RANKIN - CASE "B" was a plan to exploit a German withdrawal
from the occupied countries. In this event,
strategic planners recommended that Cherbourg would
be the first place of entry. As German withdrawal
proceeded the principal Allied forces would be based at
Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Rouen, supplemented as
necessary by smaller force for the rehabilitation of
Southwest France; the ports of Brest and Nantes
similarly would be occupied by small forces only,
partly to assist in French rehabilitation, but mainly
to prepare for a long-term policy for the entry and
maintenance of forces direct from America.
Forces would also be despatched northward from the
Mediterranean as required.
RANKIN - CASE "C" was a plan to exploit an unconditional
German surrender coupled with the cessation of organized
armed resistance in northwest Europe. Allied forces
from the United Kingdom were (1) to occupy and control
the Rhine Valley and the Ruhr. (2) to occupy and
control Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel Canal,
and the cities of Hamburg and Bremen. (3) to
operate selected ports on the west coast of France
and the Low Countries, and, (4) to undertake
rehabilitation measures in order to establish
control in Norway and rehabilitate the country.
The main object was to expedite disarmament of the
German forces. The bulk of Allied forces would have to be
carried by sea. In case of re-entry through Copenhagen,
Bremen, and Hamburg, minesweeping was expected to impose
short delays. Suitable ports for entry into the Rhine
Valley and the Ruhr would be Rotterdam and Antwerp respectively.
p.85 #1
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, particularly Admiral King,
made it clear that though they would have preferred to have
concentrated on the build-up for cross-channel operations,
it having been decided to continue the Mediterranean offensive
by assaulting Sicily (Operation HUSKY), resources would
not be diverted from HUSKY for use in a 1943 cross-channel
effort. See CCS 135 of 26 December 1942 and CCS 68th Meeting
of 23 Jan 1943.
p.85 #2
This directive is set out in CCS 169/3 of 5 March 1943. It
was approved CCS 74th Meeting of 5 March 1943.
p.86 #1
Held in Washington D.C. in May 1943.
p.86 #2
COS (43) 113th meeting (O) Item 4.
p.87 #1
In accordance with the principle of Unity of Operational
Command under an agreement between General
Marshall and Admiral King, (W.D. 1120 of 2 June 42;
ComInCh serial 00447 of 2 June 42; W.D. 1226 of 12
June 42; See Chapter III following, and under logistic
agreement between Admiral King and General
Marshall (See ComInCh serial 1428 of 8 March 1943
and Chapter II, Section 2).
p.87 #2
An exception to this were two U.S.N. officers
assigned by ComNavEu to the staff of the CCO, who
were re-assigned to COSSAC at an early date.
p.88 #1
On 5 May the Admiralty appointed Admiral Sir Charles
Little, who was CinC, Portsmouth, Naval CinC Expeditionary
Force (designate) and naval representative
on COSSAC's staff. (Admiralty letter M 053171/43 of
5 May 43.) Admiral King and the CCS generally concurred
in this selection on 20 August 1942. (See
CCS 113th meeting of 20 August 43.) To enable CinC
Portsmouth to carry out these duties, Admiralty
supplied him with a special staff - the X Staff,
under a special Chief of Staff (X). Admiral Sir
Philip Vian was originally appointed COS (X) (Admiral
Vian subsequently was appointed NCETF for the operation),
but being suddenly required for duty at sea he
was replaced by Commodore Hughes Hallet as COS (X)
and he remained as Chief of Staff to ANCXF until after
the assault. Admiral B.H. Ramsay replaced Admiral
Little as Senior Naval Member of COSSAC's staff and
as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary
Force (ANCXF) on 25 October 1943. (Admiralty letters
M 053171/43 of 12 October 43, and M 053171/43 of
4 Nov. 43.) The U.S. Naval section on COSSAC's staff was
very much smaller. In the earliest stages COMNAVEU
detailed Captain J.H. Wright, USN, to act for him on
the staff. Commander E.B. Strauss, USN, and Lieut.
E. Russell, USNR, who up until that time were USN
representatives on the staff of the British Chief of
Combined Operations (CCO) also joined COSSAC at the
same time. (Commander Strauss was at that time also
U.S. Naval Commander Amphibious Forces Europe.)
Pursuant to the Casablanca Agreement, CNO shortly
detailed Captain Gordon Hutchins, USN, as senior
U.S. Naval Officer with COSSAC, and Colonel R.O. Bare,
USMC, and Captain L.A. Thackery, USN, as staff
officers. In December Captain Thackery relieved
Captain Hutchins as senior representative and
Commander W.R. Carruthers, USN, joined the staff.
p.90 #1
Available land forces an estimated by CCS forecasts were:
|
United States |
British or Canadian |
French |
Polish |
Total Equivalent Divisions |
Assault forces - |
Assault divisions
Assault tank brigades
Royal Marine Division
Ranger battalions
Commandos
|
1 ... ... 2(d) ...
|
2 2 1(c) ... 12(d) |
... ... ... ... ...
|
... ... ... ... ...
|
3 1/3 1 ... ...
|
Follow-up Forces - |
Infantry divisions
|
1 |
1 |
... |
... |
2 |
Airborne forces - |
Airborne divisions
Parachute regiments
|
1 5(d) |
1 ... |
... ... |
... ... |
2 ... |
Build-up forces (a) - |
Armored Divisions
Mixed divisions
Infantry divisions
Divisions (b)
Army tank brigades
L. of C. Brigades
|
2 ... 7 ... ... ... |
4 3 3 3 2 3(c) |
... ... ... 1(c) ... ... |
1(c) ... ... ... ... ... |
7 3 10 4 2/3 1 |
Total Equivalent
divisions
|
12(e) |
20(f) |
1 |
1 |
34 |
NOTES.
-
British build-up may be reduced by a maximum of four equivalent
divisions by possible cannibalization.
-
Type not yet decided.
-
Availability doubtful.
-
Assumed available as a basis for outline planning.
-
Excluding ranger battalions and parachute regiments.
-
Excluding commandos and counting four tank brigades and three
L. of C. Brigades as two equivalent divisions.
SUMMARY.
Maximum possible number of equivalent divisions |
... |
34 |
Deduct equivalent divisions of doubtful availability |
... |
4 |
Maximum of equivalent divisions likely to be available |
... |
30 |
Deduct maximum of 4 by possible cannibalization |
... |
4 |
Minimum of equivalent divisions likely to be available |
... |
26 |
(See COSSAC Plan Appx. N)
p.90 #2
COSSAC Plan, pages 12 and 13, paragraphs 16, 17, 18.
p.90 #3
The following were the air forces allotted:-
|
U.S.A.A.F. |
R.A.F. |
|
Squadrons |
Aircraft (UE) |
Squadrons |
Aircraft (UE) |
Heavy Bombers |
204 |
2,448 |
80 |
1,600 |
Medium Bombers |
36 |
576 |
12 |
240 |
Light and Dive Bombers |
52 |
832 |
13 |
260 |
Bomber Recce |
... |
... |
1 |
14 |
Day Fighters |
100 |
2,500 |
44 |
792 |
Night Fighters |
... |
... |
6 |
150 |
Fighter Recce. |
... |
... |
15 |
231 |
Army Support (Fighters) |
... |
... |
8 |
112 |
Army Support (Bombers) |
... |
... |
4 |
56 |
Photo Recce. |
8 |
168 |
5 |
100 |
Observation |
16 |
336 |
10 |
160 |
Air/Sea Rescue |
... |
... |
8½ |
170 |
Troop Carrier |
34 |
442 |
7 |
190 |
|
Totals |
450 |
7,302 |
213½ |
4,075 |
|
GLIDERS. |
|
U.S. |
British |
C.G. - 4A |
... |
... |
1,141 |
- |
Horsas |
... |
... |
- |
1,465 |
Hamilcars |
... |
... |
- |
146 |
|
Total |
1,141 |
1,611 |
(See COSSAC Plan Appx. K Annexure 1.)
p.90 #4
The available assault lift was as follows:-
SHIPS. |
APA |
- |
7 |
AKA |
- |
6 |
LSI (L) |
- |
14 |
LSI (M) |
- |
3 |
LSI (S) |
- |
4 |
LSI (H) |
- |
17 |
LSH |
- |
4 |
LST (1) & (2) |
- |
159 |
LSG |
- |
1 |
|
MAJOR LANDING CRAFT. |
LSC |
- |
1 |
LCT (3) & (4) |
- |
381 |
LCT (5) & (6) |
- |
272 |
LCI |
- |
104 |
LCF (S) |
- |
38 |
LCF (L) |
- |
33 |
LCG (L) |
- |
5 |
LCG (M) |
- |
28 |
ICS (L) |
- |
15 |
|
MINOR LANDING CRAFT. |
LCS (N) |
- |
106 |
LCS (S) |
- |
8 |
LCM (1) |
- |
195 |
LCM (3) |
- |
424 |
LCA |
- |
495 |
LCV (P) |
- |
730 |
LCP (L) & (R) |
- |
289 |
|
MISCELLANEOUS. |
LBO |
- |
100 |
LBE |
- |
60 |
LBW |
- |
20 |
LFF |
- |
10 |
MOB |
- |
70 |
LBV (2) |
- |
240 |
Coasters |
- |
222 |
|
p.90 #5
(See COSSAC Plan Page 12, paragraph 8; page 19, paragraph 80,
Appx. H and Appx. M).
p.94 #1
Defenses consisted of a belt of shore minefields, under-water
beach obstacles, shoreward mine fields, traps of various sorts,
well dug in mutually supporting artillery positions with their
field of fire covering beaches and beach exits, and well organized
infantry entrenchments of both the permanent and the field
type. This peripheral defense was relatively lightly manned
but designed to accommodate reinforcements. The task of the coast
defense was to hold off landings by delaying action until mobile
reserves could be brought up.
p.95 #1
See Chapter IV, Section 1 for details of German defences.
The German 15th army guarded the Pas de Calais. The smaller
German 7th army guarded Normandy.
p.95 #2
And provided also that the German forces did not exceed a
certain strength. This limitation is described later.
p.96 #1
By D-day this had been increased to two divisions on the
Caen beaches, and there were one or two on the Cotentin
area. (See CTF 122 Intelligence Monograph.)
p.98 #1
CCS 304, Operation OVERLORD Outline Plan, 10 August 1943
p.98 #2
JPS 253 of 13 August 1943.
p.99 #1
See also CCS 286/4 of 27 September 1943; CCS 286/5 of
October 1943; CCS 124th meeting of 22 October 1944 for
U.S. views that OVERLORD should not take resources away
from other Theaters.
p.99 #2
The COSSAC Plan was reviewed and approved at QUADRANT,
at the Second Citadel Meeting of 23 August 1943. In
paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, of CCS 319/5 of 24 August 1943,
the final report of the CCS to the President and Prime
Minister are quoted:
- "Operation OVERLORD will be the primary U.S. -
British Ground and Air effort against the Axis in
Europe (Target date 1 May 1944) -- As between
OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean where
there is a shortage of resources, available resources
will be distributed and employed with the main
object of insuring the success of OVERLORD.
-
We have approved the Outline Plan of General
Morgan for operation OVERLORD, and have authorized
him to proceed with detailed planning and full
preparations.
-
In case circumstances render execution of OVERLORD
impossible it may be necessary to consider
JUPITER as an alternative. Plans for this operation
with particular reference to an entry into
Southern Norway should therefore be made and kept
to date."
p.101 #1
COSSAC Plan paragraphs 25, 26. Paragraph 7 (b) and
page 9 Paragraph 38.
p.102 #1
CCS 319/4 of 23 August 1943.
p.102 #2
Report by CinC Med. to CCS on Operation to assist
OVERLORD of 27 November 1943. See also NAF 492.
p.103 #1
This plan was worked out in conjunction with a mission from
COSSAC's staff which was called to the Mediterranean in order
to coordinate the planned diversionary threat with the OVERLORD
Plan.
p.103 #2
This plan is contained in NAF 492. See also (1) Report by
CinC Med. on Operation to assist OVERLORD dated 27 Nov.43.
(2) Agreement between COSSAC and CinC Med. dated 25 Nov.43 and
set out in COSSAC 17101/Ops. of 5 Jan.44; (3) COSSAC (44)5, of
6 Jan. 44.
p.103 #3
FAN 276 of November 1943.
p.103 #4
CCS 398 of 3 Dec.43 is a Memorandum by the U.S.Chiefs of
Staff entitled "Specific operations for the defeat of Germany
and her satellites". As none of the operations mentioned in
this paper are an assault on southern France, it appears certain
that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff at any rate did not plan
on ANVIL as an actual assault until persuaded by Marshal
Stalin.
p.105 #1
(See 3rd Plenary SEXTANT Meeting of 4 December 1943.) The
British, however, continued minor raids dressed up to look
like real major operations, or preparations for real major
operations as part of the deception plan to keep German
forces pinned down in the Balkans.
p.106 #1
(See 3rd SEXTANT Planning Meeting of 4 Dec. 1943.) This
raised strenuous objections on the part of the U.S. Chiefs
of Staff who believed that the cancellations of this
operation, promised to Chiang Kai Shek, would be still another
blow to the Chinese, which might have the effect of causing
China to drop out of the war. In their view prejudicing
OVERLORD by not allotting more landing craft was more
acceptable than the cancellation of BUCCANEER.
p.106 #2
When COSSAC and ANCXF made a study of these proposed allocations
they found that the additional allocations would not
be of an adequate type to launch a fourth division in assault
but that it could be best used as a floating reserve - such
that the attack would still be launched on a three-divisional
(5 RCT) front but with added strength afloat to follow in
over the beaches immediately behind the leading rudiments and
before the arrival of the follow-up divisions. (See ANCXF
Report Vol. l, Appx.l.)
p.106 #3
Rome did not fall in fact until the first week in June.
p.107 #1
CCS 428 Revised of 15 Dec.43. See also 3rd SEXTANT Plenary
meeting of 4 Dec.43.
p.107 #2
A copy of the COSSAC plan had been sent to General Eisenhower
in August and he had had a considerable opportunity to study
it.
p.107 #3
ANCXF report Vol.l, Appx.l.
p.107 #4
Ibid.
p.112 #1
CCS 465/1 of 24 January 1944.
p.112 #2
CCS 465/2 of 26 January 1944.
p.113 #1
It is a curious fact that when the agreed British-U.S.
strategy was to exert maximum offensive effort in the
Mediterranean, General Marshall invariably urged giving
a priority to movements in England and allowing the
Mediterranean only what remained of available resources.
During the landings at Salerno, he even had seven divisions
held in idleness in the Mediterranean for transfer
to England. (See Chapter II, Section II, for references).
But once the agreed British - U.S. strategy was OVERLORD,
he urged providing ANVIL requirements, allowing OVERLORD
only what was available from remaining resources.
p.113 #2
CCS 465/3 of 31 January 1944.
p.115 #1
CC 465/4, 4 February 1944.
p.115 #2
Eisenhower to Marshall, W10678, of 6 February 1944.
p.116 #1
Marshall to Eisenhower No. 78, 7 February 1944.
p.116 #2
Eisenhower to Marshall, W-10786, 8 February 1944.
p.117 #1
C.O.S. (W) 1139, 10 February 1944.
p.117 #2
C.O.S. (W) 1157, 19 February 1944.
p.117 #3
C.O.S. (W) 1156, 19 February 1944.
p.117 #4
CCS 465/10, 21 February 1944.
p.118 #1
JCS to SHAEF, 153, 21 February 1944. JCS to SHAEF, 151,
21 February 1944.
p.118 #2
Mts. of Mtgs. between the President and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 21 February 1944.
p.118 #3
ETOUSA to War, W-11674, 22 February 1944.
p.119 #1
C.O.S. (W) 1169, 23 February 1944.
p.119 #2
C.C.S., 147th Meeting, Supp. Minutes, 25 February 1944.
p.119 #3
ANCXF report, Vol. 1, Appendix 1.
p.121 #1
CCS 166/1/D of 21 January 1943. Other objectives of great
importance either from the political or the military point
of view, such as submarine bases on the Biscay coast or
Berlin, were to be attacked. In connection with amphibious
operations in the Mediterranean theater it might also be
necessary to attack objectives in Northern Italy. There
were other objectives of great, but fleeting importance,
such as the German fleet. When the Allied armies re-entered
the Continent, the allied Air Forces were to afford all
possible support. In attacking objectives in occupied
territories, the Allied Air forces were to conform to
such instructions as might be issued from time to time
for political reasons by the British Government through
the British Chiefs of Staff.
p.124 #1
The general tactical plan of operations with a minimum force
of bombers involved the following conception. First, a holding
attack would be made with 50 bombers plus fighter escort to
attract German fighter planes to certain areas and thus prevent
them from massing on the main force. Second, the main striking
force would consist of 200 bombers. Third, a covering force of
50 bombers with fighter escort would attack still another area
and attract German fighter planes in order to divert them from
the withdrawal of the main forces.
p.124 #2
JCS 341 of 29 May 1943, JCS special meeting of 29 April 1943.
p.125 #1
CCS 87th meeting of 18th May 43. The CCS also agreed that they
would require a periodic analysis and review of the progress of
the Bomber offensive (See CCS 211 of 11 May 43, and CCS 97th
meeting of 4th June 43). An interesting side light is the policy
adopted with regard to bombing of civilian populations in occupied
territory. The British War cabinet wishes to limit the bombing
of occupied countries to what could be accomplished without
excessive danger to the civilian population. Their proposal was
that by carefully selecting targets in occupied countries and by
publishing lists of possible targets in advance for the information
of civilians, the danger to allied peoples could be reduced
without prejudicing the bomber offensives. German defenses would
be kept spread out and effective bombing could not be diminished
(USFOR to WAR of 23 April 43). The American chiefs of staff,
however, believed that if this limitation were accepted it would
mean the end of bombing occupied countries since strays were
inevitable. In addition, if lists of possible targets were
published, the Germans might strengthen the defenses of these
targets, increase allied losses, and weaken allied effort. Hazards
to the civilian population must be accepted as a direct consequence
of their enslaved position. The complaints of these people were
of secondary importance to the destruction of German operated
factories. (JCS 34l, 29 May 1943). The CCS accordingly agreed
that it was inadvisable to publish a list of intended targets in
enemy occupied countries, and that the inherent military importance
of the target should be the criterion of its selection (CCS 97th
Mtg., 4 June 1943.).
p.126 #1
CCS 124th Meeting of 22 October 1943.
p.126 #2
JCS Memo for information No.113, 15 August 1943.
p.127 #1
CCS 403 of 21 November 1943, and CCS 300/3 of 13 November
1943. The damage to housing, combined with the evacuation
of certain areas, had resulted in what was believed to be
the final saturation of all suitable accommodation in
Germany.
p.129 #1
CCS 304 of 10 Aug.43 and Quadrant 2nd Citadel meeting of
23 Aug. 43. CCS 319/5 of 24 Aug. 43.
p.130 #1
CCS 309 of 15 Aug.1943. CCS 319/5 of 22 Aug.43 p.10.
p.130 #2
CCS 300/3 of 15 Nov.43 133rd meeting of 3 Dec.43.
p.130 #3
CCS 405/1 of 3 Dec.43.
p.130 #4
CCS 166/11, approved by CCS on 12 Feb.44; FACS 8, 12 Feb.44.
p.131 #1
The report made on 15 February 1944 concerning the results of
the combined bomber offensive was pessimistic (JIS 25/1,
"Results Achieved by the Combined Bomber Offensive").
However, in March 1944 Maj.General B.M. Giles stated that
the recent success in attacking primary objectives had so
reduced the number of remaining approved targets that the
operations of the strategic air forces in Europe were
being seriously hampered (Maj.Gen. B.M. Giles, Memo for
Secretariat, CCS, "Modification of the Revised Directive
for the Combined Bomber Offensive," 10 March 1944.)
In May 1943 General Spaatz reported to General Arnold that
the operations of the Eighth Air Force during the preceding
four months had definitely resulted in a marked depletion
of German air power. He reported that at a conference held
on 6 May 1943 target priorities for the Eighth Air Force
were fixed: (1) support of the battle in Italy; (2) targets
of the combined bomber offensive; (3) railroad centers in
Southern France; (4) targets in the Balkans (U 61850, 8 May
1944.)
p.131 #2
JIC Memorandum for Information No.73 of 18 May.44.
p.132 #1
These figures were taken from, (1) COSSAC plan Appx. K
Annex 2. (2) Initial Joint Plan. Paragraphs 13, 14,
15 and 16 (3) ON 11 Appx.4.
p.132 #2
See Chapter VII Section 9.
p.134 #1
One to stand guard at the base of the Cherbourg
Peninsula and two to counter attack.
p.134 #2
See Chapter 2 Section 6.
p.134 #3
Naval diversions are discussed in Chap. VIII, Sect.9.
p.135 #1
The first draft of plan (TORRENT) as drawn up by COSSAC
was simply intended to cause the enemy to believe that the
Allied target area was Pas de Calais and the target date
mid-July. As originally conceived TORRENT was not to
attempt to carry the deception past D-day. But ETOUSA
believed that the threat to the Pas de Calais could be
maintained after D-day, and that even after the Allies had
launched, a part at least of German forces north of the
Seine could be deterred from moving into Normandy. Plan
TORRENT was accordingly expanded to accomplish this result.
The name was also changed to FORTITUDE SOUTH. FORTITUDE is
discussed in more detail later in this Section, (See
COSSAC (43) 28, of 20 Nov 43 entitled Appx. Y to OVERLORD
Appreciation and Outline Plan.)
p.136 #1
Prior to the 1st September 1943 British and U.S.
Cover Plans in the European Theater, known collectively
as operation COCKADE, were designed with the object of
containing the maximum enemy forces in Western Europe
so as to ease the pressure on Russia. COCKADE had
three parts:- (1) A threat to Norway (Operation TINDEL),
(2) A threat to the Pas de Calais (Operation STARKIE),
(3) A threat to Brest, the Brittany Peninsula and the
Bay of Biscay (Operation WADHAM). It was clear,
however, that if OVERLORD was to be executed, a drastically
new cover plan was required which would cause
the Germans to depart from the OVERLORD area rather
than concentrate in France. It was also clear that
if the cover plan were to succeed in deceiving the
Germans the transition from the one "story" to the
other should not be too abrupt. (See SHAEF/18209/Ops(B)
of 3 June 44.)
p.136 #2
CCS 169/3 of 5 March 1943.
p.139 #1
COS (43) 615 (O)
p.139 #2
With respect to the cross channel and Southern France
invasions plan JAEL proposed two stages of deception.
(1) During Stage A, that period continuing to the moment
when it would no longer be possible to conceal the allied
invasion intentions, the London Controlling Officer,
acting through normal channels, would develop threats
against Scandinavia and Southern France, with the object
of causing the Germans to retain and reinforce their
forces there. (2) During Stage B, from the end of Stage A
onward, cover and deception would be controlled by the
Supreme Commander, utilizing as required the facilities of
the London Controlling Officer. In this stage the object
would be to conceal the strength, timing and assault area
of intended operations.
p.141 #1
This story pretended at first that they did not
intend to invade France at all, but as unmistakable
signs of the approaching OVERLORD became more and
more obvious it was only the date and target area
which was concealed.
p.141 #2
The British-U.S. part of the Norway threat was
called FORTITUDE NORTH.
p.149 #1
This date was selected so as to contain forces during
the NEPTUNE critical period and also because the wind
and moon were favorable on that date for a real invasion.
p.150 #1
Parts of the invading forces for Sicily and Italy were
trained and mounted in and around Oran.
p.150 #2
Report on German Naval War Effort Admiralty NID 24/T
65/45 p. 48.
p.151 #1
FORTITUDE was originally known as MESSPOT.
p.154 #1
Report on the German Naval War Effort NID 24/T 65/45 P.20.
p.154 #2
Ibid., P.26. See also P.28, Hitler worried about Norwegian
invasion in January 1943.
p.154 #3
Ibid., P.46.
p.154 #4
Ibid., P.47 Hitler still wanted mines off Denmark, West France,
Pas de Calais, and Holland (Normandy left out of the list) on
June 11th.
p.155 #1
Ibid., P.50.
p.155 #2
Ibid., P.52.
p.155 #3
Ibid., P.54.
p.156 #1
SHAEF/18216/Ops. of 14 Feb.44.
p.156 #2
It will be seen in Chapter IV, Section 1, that the
German land forces in France and the low countries were
divided into four armies; the 15th holding the coast
from the area of the Seine northward, the 7th holding
the Normandy and Brittany area from the Seine to the Loire,
the first army held the Biscay coast from the Loire to the
Spanish frontier, and the 19th army held the Mediterranean
coast of France.
p.157 #1
Both real entities but stationed elsewhere.
p.158 #1
These in fact were scheduled to stand guard in Scapa
against movement by the German High Seas Fleet.
p.158 #2
The real ones executed a massive diversionary attack on
the evening of NEPTUNE D-day to deter movement of German
fighter aircraft from the Pas de Calais.
p.166 #1
See report on the German Naval War Effort Admiralty NID
24/T 65/45, P.44,46,47,48 and ff.) See also Appx. 1 to
Informal Report of Special Plans Branch G3, 12 A.G. (Army document).
6 July 2005