DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL
HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060
Chapter IX
THE NEPTUNE ASSAULTS
PART 1
CONDITIONS FOR THE ASSAULT
A. Reasons for Success of NEPTUNE Operation
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The assaults were launched within the elaborate
framework of defense and support described in the two preceding
Chapters. But although these defenses materially
reduced the hazards of assault and eased the difficulties inherent
in establishing a bridgehead ashore, the attack was
bitterly contested and the success of the invasion was achieved
primarily by the determined gallantry of the assaulting
forces, particularly the soldiers. On the Naval side, the
assault movement and the landing went fundamentally according
to plan, "not necessarily because it was a good plan",
said Admiral Ramsay, "but because every single individual
taking part had confidence in it and was determined to achieve
his objective".1
Only a few matters of general interest,
apart from the particular adventures of the Task and Assault
Forces stood out: a - the weather, b - effect of surprise,
and c - the immunity of Allied shipping from attack.
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The weather was bad, both for the passage and for
the landings.2
Despite the bad weather, however, nearly all
vessels made the crossing in time. All the assaults hit the
beach within a few minutes of scheduled time. "In general
the weather had the following effect upon the assaults:
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Many of the troops suffered severely from sea-sickness.
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Some L.C.T.s, either through engine trouble
or overloading, were forced to drop astern
of their groups. In particular the L.C.T.
(Armoured) were badly affected, many of them
failing to carry out their role in the close fire
support plan.
--487--
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Difficulty was experienced in the lowering of L.C.A., and L.C.V.P.,
and some had a most unpleasant passage ashore, a few failing to arrive.
-
Considerable damage was inflicted on the smaller types of landing craft,
some of which "broached to" on beaching.
-
The operation of DD Tanks did not go according to plan.
-
Many of the small craft, such as the L.C.A. (H.R.) and Rhino tows, which were forced
to rely on towing, failed to arrive."1
B. The Effect of Surprise
-
Almost complete surprise was achieved. Admiral Ramsay has described
this unexpected success as follows:
"There was an air of unreality during the
passage of the assault forces across the
Channel curiously similar to that on D minus
1 in HUSKY as our forces approached Sicily.
The achievement of strategical surprise was
always hoped for in NEPTUNE but was by no
means certain, whereas that of tactical surprise
had always seemed extremely unlikely.
As our forces approached the French coast without
a murmur from the enemy or from their own
radio, the realization that once again almost
complete tactical surprise had been achieved
slowly dawned. This astonishing feat cannot
be explained by any single factor and must be
attributed in part to all of the following:
the cover and deception plan; the high degree of
air superiority attained by our Air Forces, which
drastically reduced the enemy's air reconnaissance;
the bad weather which caused the enemy to withdraw
his E-boat patrols to Cherbourg; and finally
the radio counter-measures employed by our forces,
--488--
which coupled with the diversions against
the Pas de Calais and Cap D'Antifer, left
the enemy in doubt as to the points at which
we would land even when he had become aware
that the invasion was in progress."1
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But whatever were the causes, the Germans were
certainly surprised. On the night of 5/6 June nothing
particularly disturbed the normal routine of the German
Naval Group Commander West, Admiral Krancke, until well
after midnight. At about 1 a.m. on the morning of the
6th, he was informed that the B.B.C. had broadcast an
announcement on the European Service that the invasion
would be launched very soon. Admiral Krancke assumed
that it was "hardly likely that the invasion would be
announced in advance over the radio", and made no further
special dispositions of his forces. At 0130 the paratroop
landings near the Orne were reported to him. This induced
him to put his MTB's and his Western Defense Forces on
notice, but still did not consider a large scale landing
probable. At 0209 large vessels were reported to seaward
of Port-en-Bassin.2
This, together with further reports
of airborne landings, at last persuaded Admiral Krancke
that a sizeable operation was in progress. But the resources
at his disposal to arrest the avalanche descending
upon him were pitifully small. He issued the following instructions:
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Vessels of West Defence Force to patrol coastal waters;
-
"Landwirt" Submarines3
to be in immediate readiness;
-
8th Destroyer Flotilla (Narviks) to move from Royan to Brest;
-
5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla from Le Havre, to reconnoitre in Port-en-Bassin to Grand Camp
Area; This was later changed to the Orne estuary;
--489--
-
5th and 9th Motor Torpedo Boat Flotillas from Cherbourg to patrol off Cap Barfleur
and west of Cap de la Hague respectively.1
-
The next day the German Naval Staff excused its
unreadiness for the landings by reporting: "By beginning
the invasion in such unsuitable weather, the enemy overthrew
all calculations."2
C. The Normandy Landings
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"Perhaps one of the most noticeable features of the
assault phase was", according to Admiral Ramsay,3
"the inability of the enemy to disturb the
tranquility of our shipping lying in the
anchorages either by coastal batteries or by air
bombardment. This was mainly due to the effectiveness
of our counter-battery fire and the pre-H hour
bombardment, and perhaps in part to the
poor quality of the troops, who manned the C.D.
batteries. On the other hand, there was no doubt
of the quality of the enemy field troops who stubbornly
manned various strongpoints and the mobile
field batteries which were sited to dominate the
beaches themselves. The siting of these positions so
as to be invisible from seaward, prevented them, however
from effectively attacking approaching shipping,
or being themselves satisfactorily engaged by direct
--490--
fire from seaward."1
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From the naval point of view, under water beach obstacles turned out to be "the greatest enemy in
the assault".2
The combination of bad weather, obstacles and teller mines attached to obstacles, accounted for
an estimated 50% of the casualties to landing vessels. This in turn
adversely effected LCT and LCI availability for the
build up.3
The leading elements of all forces touched down within
15 minutes of scheduled time. But "from H hour onward
the landing of the Assault and Reserve Brigades fell behind
schedule. This was due to our inability to gain exits.4
... There was some delay in getting the beach signs up on Force G
and Force S beaches (whilst the battle which raged on OMAHA
beach made any form of control almost impracticable), and
hence craft often had little idea where to beach. In general,
partly by recourse to drying out; LCT and LCI(L) of
the Assault Forces were cleared by 1500. The unloading of
LST, however, did not proceed so expeditiously. The loss
--491--
of Rhino tows on passage, and the difficulty of marrying
Rhino to LST in the bad weather, were mainly responsible;
but some casualties did also occur to the Rhinos on
the beaches."
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A birds eye review of the operation might perhaps
give the impression that the landings were easy and unopposed
assaults. But this impression would be far from true.
In point of fact, the crossings were difficult and dangerous.
The attacks themselves were met with determined
opposition, on every beach, except possibly at UTAH. A detailed
account of the assaults by the Western Task Force
follows in the next section, and a description of those by
the Eastern Task Force, as recounted by an Admiralty Historian,
is given in Section 4, chapter IX.
--492--
PART 2
WESTERN TASK FORCE: FORCE U
A. General Situation, Western Task Force
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The Western (US) Task Force had, on the whole, a
more difficult time in NEPTUNE than did the Eastern. Several
factors contributed to this:
-
The bad weather and the postponement severely
affected the W.T.F., especially Force U, both
because it had a longer journey to make, and
because many of its convoys were at sea when
the postponement order was given;
-
The transport areas of the W.T.F. were located
several miles further to seaward, than those of the E.T.F.;
-
Beach obstacles were particularly difficult at OMAHA Beach;
-
The terrain at OMAHA beach was more difficult than elsewhere;
-
The pre H-hour air bombardment scheduled for the OMAHA sector,
was not delivered.
-
By mischance, and unknown to allied intelligence,
a first class German Field Division
was conducting manoeuvres in the OMAHA area at
the time of the landings, and its pressure
greatly impeded the advance of the "O" landing force.
B. Assault Force U.: Organization and Assembly
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Force U's assault, which had been expected to be
the most bitterly contested landing of all,1
turned out to be the least opposed and most successful. Force U's part in
the invasion was characterized by:
-
an exceedingly difficult crossing;
-
the achievement of complete surprise;
-
a lightly opposed and highly successful landing; and
-
considerable trouble with minefields.
--493--
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The task of the Assault Force U was to land elements
of the VII Corps, U.S. Army, in the Madeline sector of the
coast of Normandy, to support the landing and subsequent
army operations. This was achieved by Naval gunfire, by
establishing and operating a Ferry Service to unload ships
and craft of follow up convoys and by coordinating the
siting and construction of a craft shelter off the beach.
To accomplish this task, Commander Assault Force U, Rear
Admiral D.F. Moon, U.S.N., had under his command approximately
865 ships and craft.1
--494--
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Assault Force U was organized in 16 Task Groups, as follows:
(a) Landing Force | 125.1 |
Major General Collins, U.S. Army VII Corps, Major General
Barton, U.S. Army 4th Infantry Division and attached units. |
(b) Shore Party |
125.2 |
1st Engineer Special Brigade - Brigadier General Wharton U.S. Army. |
(c) Force Flagship |
125.3 |
U.S.S. Bayfield, Capt. Lynden Spencer, USCG. |
(d) Green Assault Group |
125.4 |
Cmdr. A.L. Warburton, USN in LCH 530.
1 APA, 1 LSI(L), 15 LST, 23 LCI(L), 1 LCH, 69 LCT, 26 LCM,
3 RHF, 1 PC, 2 LCG. |
(e) Red Assault Group |
125.5 |
Comdr. E.W. Wilson, USNR, in LCH 10. 2 APA, 15 LST, 22 LCI(L),
1 LCH, 83 LCT, 25 LCM, 2 RHF, 1 PC, 2 LCG. |
(f) Escorts |
125.6 |
7 D.D. 3 A/S Trawlers, 2 Corvettes, 7 PC, 7 SC, 4 ML, 3 970 ML's. |
(g) Support Craft Group |
125.7 |
Lt. Comdr. L.E. Hart, USNR, in LCH 209, 4 LCG(L), 5 LCT(R),
12 LCS(S), 4 LCS, 8 LCT(A), 16 LCP(L). |
(h) Bombardment Group |
125.8 |
R.Adm. M.L. Deyo, USN, in USS Tuscaloosa, 2 CA, 1 OBB, 1 BM,
2 CL, 1 OCA, 1 PG, 8 DD. |
(i) Minesweeper Group |
125.9 |
Comdr. M.H. Brown, RN, (in HMS Shippigan), 16 MS, 11 AM, 18 YMS,
9 MHS, 8 ML, 8 Danlayers, 3 HDML Miscellaneous units as assigned. |
(j) Far Shore Service Group (NOIC-UTAH) |
125.10 |
Capt. J.R. Arnold USNR, 2 LHK, 14 Pontoon Causeways, 8 Blisters,
2 Warping Tugs, 1 Repair Barge, 1 LCH, 6 RHF, 22 LCM(3), 36 LBV
(2) 1 ARL, 8 LBE, 5 Fueling Trawlers, 20 LBO, 3 LBW. |
--495--
(k) Sea Rescue Group |
125.11 |
Comdr. Stewart, USCG, T5 10 Coast Guard Cutters. |
(l) Follow-up Convoy Group |
125.12 |
Comdr. W.S. Blair, USNR. 25 LST. |
(m) P.T. Boats |
125.13 |
R.R. Reed, USNR. 13 P.T. |
(n) Special Task Groups |
125.14 |
Lt.Comdr. H.M. Ness, RNVR. 7 HDML |
(o) Combat Salvage and Fire Fighting Unit "U" |
122.3.2 |
Lt.Comdr. M.L. McClung, USNR. 2 AT, 1 ATR. |
(p) Causeway Construction Unit |
125.15 |
Lt.Comdr. Bains, USNR |
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The Landing Force consisted of the reinforced 4th
Infantry Division (Major General R.O. Barton, U.S. Army,
Commanding) of the VII Corps U.S. Army (Major General J.
Lawton Collins, U.S. Army, Commanding). This Force was supported
by a Shore Party consisting of 1st Engineer Special Brigade
(Brigadier General Wharton, U.S. Army, Commanding), to which
the 2nd U.S. Naval Beach Battalion (Comdr. J.F. Curtin, USNR)
was attached. The assault plan provided for the 4th Division
to land, in column of regiments of a two battalion front; the
1st Battalion, of the 8th Infantry Regiment, landing on Tare
Green Beach; and the 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry, on Uncle Red
Beach. At the same time, Rangers were to storm the Isles
de St. Marcouf and to capture the heavy batteries which were
thought to be located there; which, by reason of their very
close proximity to the U approach channels, transport area,
boat lanes and anchorages, might have caused serious loss
to the force.
-
Force U was loaded and assembled at nine different
ports: Salcombe, Dartmouth, Brixham, Yarmouth, Portland-Weymouth,
Poole, Torbay-Torquay, and Belfast. Loading and
assembly was completed by the evening of 2 June. LST's,
LCIs and virtually all escort craft had to be employed continually
during the ten days prior to the sortie for towing
and escorting to assembly ports, a great number of barges and
other tows needed in the assault, and for escorting craft to
loading ports. Despite this additional burden and the late
arrival of craft, only two British LCT's of all the craft
assigned Force U were unable to load and sail.
--496--
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For the movement from the assembly point to the Assault
area, Force U was organized into twelve convoys. Most of
these were made up of three or four sections which sortied
from different ports and were required to make a precise
rendezvous at sea. Since the disposition of each ship in
every convoy was based on the beach it was to reach, and on
its position in the sequence of landing, convoys had to be
re-arranged at sea after making rendezvous.1
--497--
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Force U was required to steam much further from
sortie ports to the Assault Area than other Assault Forces.
--498--
This necessitated sailing slow convoys as early as H minus
34 hours. The three sections of U-2 accordingly put to
sea between 1500 and 2100 on June 3rd. It was not until
0415 on the 4th that the Supreme Commander decided that
the operation would be postponed, nor until 0515 that the
information was transmitted to forces at sea. All convoys,
except U-2A, received the postponement order and reversed
course in accordance with the postponement plan. U-2A,
however, continued vigorously in the direction of France.
By 0900 on the 4th it was about 25 miles south of St.
Catherines Point. Admiral Moon despatched U.S.S. Forrest,
a destroyer, and CinC Portsmouth a Walrus aeroplane to turn
U-2A back. Had this not been done, it was possible that
the Force would shortly have been detected by the enemy's
radar and this would most probably have increased his vigilance
for the next few days.
-
The postponement necessitated back tracking the
three U-2 convoys for 12 hours. About 250 LCT's, Gunfire
Support craft and other small vessels which would have become
dangerously short of fuel had they remained at sea for
another 24 hours, were diverted into Weymouth Bay. Throughout
4th June, great anxiety was felt as to whether Force U
could reform and be in a fit state to go forward with the
operation, should the decision be taken to assault on June 6.
Of the U.S. Naval Commanders, only Rear Admiral Hall was at
the scene of difficulty (Portland-Weymouth Bay) and his flagship,
U.S.S. Ancon, alone remained on the telephone. U.S.S.
Augusta, (flagship of Rear Admiral Kirk), U.S.S. Bayfield,
(flagship of force commander, Rear Admiral Moon) and U.S.S. Achernar
(H.Q. ship of General Bradley) were in Plymouth Sound
ready to sail. This made inter communication impossible. The
senior Army and Navy officers held meetings ashore in Plymouth
during the day. It was thought that Force U would have to
return to Devonshire to reform, but, "when it was pointed out
that this would almost certainly result in the postponement
of the Operation to the next moon period, Rear Admiral Kirk,
with characteristic verve announced his readiness to proceed".1
-
The decision to carry on with the operation was
telephoned through to Plymouth at 2130, June 4. "Admiral Kirk
--499--
and the Generals returned to their ships, but
Admiral Moon and his Chief of Staff were faced
with the frightening knowledge that about two
hundred and fifty gunfire support craft, LCT
and other smaller craft were still entering
Weymouth Bay after their abortive sortie from
ports in the Plymouth Command the day before,
that some had to be refuelled, that all had to
restart for the operation the same night, and that
these small craft would have to cross the track of
the convoys of Force 'O' leaving Portland at about
the same time. Fortunately Admiral Hall in the U.S.S.
Ancon was still on the telephone and he and the
staff of the Flag Officer-in-Charge, Portland somehow
achieved the impossible, with the result that
Force 'U' made their assault at the right time."1
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The little craft of convoy U-2 began their sortie
from Weymouth Bay at about 0100 on June the 5th, some 4 hours
after they had entered. Miraculously they had been refuelled
and reformed. Only 8 or 9 vessels failed to proceed in station
on the new schedule. By the time they reached Normandy they
had been at sea continuously for over 70 hours. At 0930, Rear
Admiral Moon in U.S.S. Bayfield and the Plymouth sections of
Convoy U-1A cleared Plymouth, with the U.S.S. Augusta and U.S.S.
Achenar in company. As they passed down the British coastal
channels, they were joined by the Belfast section (bombardment
group), and by the Dartmouth, Torbay, Weymouth and Poole sections.
The passage to the assault area was uneventful. Swept
Channel No. 1 which was found to be well marked, was entered
with little difficulty at 2245. At 0229 June 6th Bayfield
anchored with the rest of the convoy in the assault area,
22,500 yards off Utah Beach. By 0430 only one hour behind
schedule, all sections of Convoy U-2 had arrived and taken up
their assault stations.
D. The Assault on UTAH Beach
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The position of Force U on the westernmost of the
assault forces, had caused it prior to arrival in the assault
area to suffer most from the bad westerly weather; the same
fact (viz, being on the extreme west) had the result that,
during the assault, Force U suffered least from the heavy
weather, as it was then in the lee of the Cotentin Peninsula.
--500--
At the time of the deployment for assault, the wind was
at 18 knots from the west, with a moderate sea, good
visibility, a high cloud ceiling and the sky only slightly
overcast. For the development, assault LST's towing RHF's
were phased to arrive at the Transport Area simultaneously
with transports, but by different channels. The early
arrival of LST's was based upon two considerations:
-
Navy Demolition Units and their munitions,
which were to hit the beach in the earliest
waves, were brought over in LST's, to be
landed in LCVP's, from the LST's;
-
additional LCVP's, from LST's, were required
for lift of Assault elements from APA's.
Immediately astern of the LST's were
-
the LCT's carrying DD tanks,
-
the Fire Support Craft and
-
the LCM's, part under tow, the rest
under their own power.
The next unit to arrive was the convoy of LCT's organized in
tow sections, one for RED beach and the other for GREEN beach.
These anchored immediately to seaward of LST's, with units
assigned to early waves nearest LST's. The final Assault Units
to arrive were the LCI(L)'s which arrived at H-hour, those
for RED beach anchoring to S.E. of APA's, those for GREEN beach
to N.W. of APA's.
-
The ships in the transport area were completely free
of interference from enemy batteries. The LCVP's and LCA's,
of the first waves, were loaded from the transports and marshalled
without difficulty. All except DD tanks started on
their journey to the line of departure on time. The journey
toward the shore was almost completely free of enemy interference.
The assault landing craft were to have been guided
and shepherded to the line of departure by two control vessels
in each sector. Unfortunately, Red Secondary Control vessel
(LCC 80) was disabled by fouling her screw before the assault
waves left the transport area. Red Primary Control Vessel
(PC 1261) none the less took the assault waves in. But at
H minus 35 minutes, when still 7,000 or 8,000 yards from the
beach, she too became a casualty.1
This left the Red assault
formations without any control vessel at all. As they had no
--501--
reliable means of beach identification, the situation
might have become very serious. At this juncture Green
Primary Control (PC 1176) observing the situation in the
Red sector, detailed her own Secondary Control (LCC 60)
to shepherd the Red assault waves in.
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The pre-assault naval and air bombardment was delivered
according to plan. Naval gunfire was so successfully
placed on targets threatening the landing that only
a few craft were lost from hostile shelling.1
Active enemy batteries were destroyed or neutralized by effective naval
gunfire which was later controlled by observers who landed
with the early Assault Waves. The drenching fire of the
rockets of the LCT(R)'s and the fire of the LCO's and LCS effectively
played their part in the initial landings.
-
In conjunction with the pre-H-hour bombardment,
Rangers attached to Force U stormed the Isles de St. Marcouf,
which were thought to contain heavy batteries and which, due
to their position (about 3,000 yards on the flank of the
approach route and transport area), could have greatly handicapped
the landing had they been hotly defended. Fortunately,
the Rangers met no opposition and both islands were in their
hands by 0725 (H plus 55 minutes).
-
As originally planned, the order of landing of the
initial assault waves was to be as follows:
-
two waves of infantry in LCVP's.
-
Wave 1A of DD Tanks,
-
Wave 3 of LCT(A)'s, and
-
Demolition Units in LCVP's and LCM's
landing with Wave 4 at H plus 17.
Because of the urgency of the earliest possible attack upon the
substantial beach obstacles, a late decision was made to move
up 4 LCVP's with Navy Demolition Units, on each beach, from
Wave 4 to Wave 2, thereby starting demolition work 12 minutes
earlier . As a result Wave 2 on each beach totaled 15 LCVP's.
As this number of craft was believed to [be] more than could be
effectively controlled by a single Wave Commander, this wave
was organized as two boat divisions. Whether because of the
excessive numbers, or for other reasons, the actual number of
--502--
craft landing with Wave 2 on each beach was only 7 or 8.
Other units from Wave 2 landed with later Waves.
-
The early loss of the RED primary and secondary
control vessels combined with smoke and dust produced by
the pre-H-hour bombardment so obscured the shore line that
the landing was made about 1,000 yards to the south-east of
the scheduled landing place. This proved to be fortunate.
The obstacles found were less formidable than those farther
to the north. Nor were the hostile shore defenses as strong
as those opposite the intended landing beaches. The waves
had been trained to expect the possible loss of control vessels.
Consequently the landings on RED beach carried on even
though the control vessels were not functioning. The task
of the Army and Naval demolition parties was successfully
carried out. As the landing was made at a time when the tide
left all obstacles dry, they were cleared off before they
interfered with the landings.
-
The D.D. Tanks, which were scheduled to land at H-hour,
simultaneously with Wave 1 or as soon thereafter as
practicable, did not actually land until H-plus-20. This was
due to late arrival in the Transport Area, inability to make
up time because of slow speed, and the loss of one Primary
Control vessel, it had been recognized in advance that precise
timing of these units was uncertain and hence that no
reliance could be placed upon their ability to land at any
specified time. Their tardy arrival was therefore not seriously
felt. Though late, nearly all of the D.D. Tanks were
discharged and landed successfully. They supported the infantry
with marked success. The landings on both beaches
were orderly and according to schedule. The overwhelming
fire power on the beach, prior to landings, had been so effective
that losses of men and material on UTAH Beach were
small. After the initial landings, debarkation proceeded
rapidly and without serious incident. By 0730 (H-plus-60
minutes) the Isles St. Marcouf and St. Martin de Varreville
were captured and cleared. By 0945, 15 waves had landed and
the beaches had been cleared of obstacles. By 1030, the three
transports scheduled for immediate return to England were unloaded
and under way. By late afternoon, the 4th division
was completely ashore, and the Follow Up Forces were being
landed. By 6 o'clock in the evening, 21,328 men, 1,742 vehicles
and 1,695 tons of stores had been landed.
-
While the assault was less difficult than had been
anticipated, D-day for Force U was not altogether free of
trouble. Enemy batteries, on the flanks of the UTAH area,
which had remained very inactive during the landings, came to
--503--
life during the forenoon of D-day. From then until they were
overrun by the army, they intermittently subjected the beaches
and the Isles St. Marcouf to heavy shelling. This "frequent
shelling of the beachhead was effectively neutralized by assigning
each (bombardment) ship to probable targets and systematically
delivering fire on them. As it was impossible to
determine the location of the firing enemy batteries, this
proved the best means of halting enemy fire against our own
troops."1
Unloading was disturbed by enemy shellfire but not
substantially delayed. Only one ship was lost to enemy gunfire.2
-
Minefields were Force U's greatest enemy. As D-day
advanced, it became obvious that an unsuspected mine field
located in the Cardonet Shoals lay right across the boat lanes.
As has been seen, it claimed the PC 1261 in the early morning.
During the next few hours it sank LCT's 362, 592, and 777, and
LCF 31. U.S.S. Corry (DD) struck a mine in the field at 0710
and sank at 0735. Shortly afterward the same fate overtook
U.S.S. Tide (AM). On the 8th, U.S.S. Meredith and Glennon
(both DD's) were sunk by mines. U.S.S. Rich (DE), which was
despatched to the rescue of Glennon, struck two mines and sank
--504--
promptly.1
Throughout the remainder of the month, Force U
continued to lose ships and craft to mines, which thus
proved to be the most difficult of the enemy imposed obstacles
with which Force U had to contend.2
During the first
18 days, 144 ground mines and 77 moored mines were detonated
or cut in the U area.3
--505--
-
By midnight of D-day, the U landing force had made
contact with the first contingents of the 101st Airborne
division and was rapidly advancing toward St. Mere Eglise
to join the 82nd Airborne division. Force U's invasion,
which had started out in the wretched Channel weather as
the most difficult and hazardous of all, had turned out,
on the Madeleine beaches, to be the least opposed and most
successful of the 5 Amphibious landings.1
--506--
PART 3
WESTERN TASK FORCE ASSAULT FORCE O
A. Organization and Assembly
-
The experiences of Assault Force O were quite the
opposite from those of Force U. The cross channel passage
of Force U was seriously deranged by the weather and postponement;
Force O crossed the channel with little difficulty.
U's landings were protected from the weather, by the lee of
the Cotentin Peninsula; O's landings were seriously hampered
by the heavy seas. The enemy interposed little resistance
to U's landing but bitterly and efficiently contested O's.
U suffered heavily from enemy mines, but very little from
enemy shell fire; O was almost immune from mine damage, but
heavily engaged by gunfire on and near the beaches.
-
No better description of Force O's operations can
be given than that contained in the report of the Assault
Force Commander, Rear Admiral J.L. Hall, USN.1
"The task of Assault Force O was to land assigned elements of the V Corps
U.S. Army, in the Vierville-Colleville Sector of the coast
of Normandy, and to support the landing and subsequent Army
operations by Naval gunfire, by establishing and operating
a Ferry Service to unload ships and craft of follow-up convoys,
by coordinating the siting and construction of port
facilities off the beaches, and by exploiting the facilities
of small ports in the CARENTAN Estuary. To accomplish this
task the Command Assault Force O had under his command....
(approximately 1,500) ships and craft....2
--507--
(A continuation of the footnotes on page 507)
--508--
-
The ships and craft together with the Army
forces assigned to Assault Force O, were organized
into.....(thirteen) Task Groups.... as follows:
a. Landing Force | 124.1 |
Major General Huebner, USA
1st U.S. Inf. Div. (less
26th RCT., plus 115th &
116th RCTs of the 29th
Inf. Div., plus 2nd & 5th
Ranger Batts) Reinforced.
|
b. Shore Party | 124.2 |
Brigadier General Hoge, USA
2/3ds 5th Engr. Special
Brigade; 2/3ds 6th U.S.
Naval Beach Batt; 1/3ds
6th Engr. Special Brigade;
1/3d 7th U.S. Naval Beach
Batt.
|
c. Assault Group O-1 | 124.3 |
Capt. Fritzsche, USCG.
2 APAs; 1 LCH; 1 LSI(L);
6 LSTs; 5 LCI(L)s; 53 LCTs;
18 LCM(3)s; 2 PCs; 2 SCs;
2 MLs; 2 LCCs.
|
d. Assault Group O-2 | 124.4 |
Capt. Bailey, USN.
2 APAs; 1 LCH; 1 LSI(L);
6 LSTs; 17 LCI(L)s;
54 LCTs; 18 LCM(3)s;
4 PCs; 2 MLs; 4 SCs;
3 LCGs.
|
e. Assault Group O-3 | 124.5 |
Captain Schulten, USN.
3 XAPs; 1 LCH; 12 LSTs;
11 LCI(L)s; 39 LCTs;
1 LSD; 3 PCs; 2 MLs;
3 LSI(S)s; 3 LSI(H)s;
1 LCT(5); 2 MLs.
|
f. Escorts | 124.6 |
Captain Sanders, USN.
12 US DDs; 3 Hunt DDs;
3 US DE; 2 OODs; 6 SGBs;
2 Frigates; 3 A/S Trawlers;
9 PCs; 6 SCs; 5 MLs (970);
7 MLs; 2 HDMLs; 7 MTBs.
|
--509--
g. Gunfire Support Craft | 124.8 |
Captain Sabin, USN
1 LCH; 7LCFs; 5 LCG(L)s;
9 LCT(R)s; 28 LCP(L)s;
8 LCT(A)s; 10 LCT(HE)s.
|
h. Bombardment Group | 124.9 |
Rear-Admiral Bryant, USN
2 BBs; 3 CLs; 9 US DDs;
3 Hunt DDs
|
i. Sweeper Group | 124.10 |
Commander Cochrane, RN.,
9 MS; 3 Danlayers; 4 MLs;
8 BYMHs; 9 MMs.
|
j. Far Shore Service Group OMAHA | |
1 Accom. Ship; 1 ARL;
12 LCMs; 8 LCI(L)s;
4 LCH; 72 LCT(5) and (6)s;
20 RHFs; 139 LCM(3)s;
72 LBV(2)s; 172 LCVPs;
9 Fuel Trawlers;
16 LBEs; 26 LBCs; 5 LBWs;
2 LBKs; 1 Pont Drydock.
|
k. Dispatch Boats | 124.12 | 1 US PT; 9 Disp. Boats. |
l. Rescue Vessels | 124.13 | 15 USCG Cutters. |
-
"The Landing Force was composed of elements of
the V Corps, U.S. Army (Major General Gerrow, U.S. Army
commanding) and included the First U.S. Infantry Division,
Reinforced, less the 126th Regimental Combat Team, plus the
116th Regimental Combat Team, the 115th Regimental Combat
Team, and the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions. This Force was
supported by a Shore Party consisting of two thirds of the
5th Engineer Special Brigade, one third of the 6th Engineer
--510--
Special Brigade, and the Provisional Engineer Special
Brigade Group Commander and Staff. Also included in the
Shore Party were two-thirds of the 6th Naval Beach
Battalion and one-third of the 7th Naval Beach Battalion.
The remainder of the V Corps, and the remainder of the
Engineer Special Brigade Group, and of the 6th and 7th
Naval Beach Battalions comprised the Landing Force and
Shore Party of Force B, which landed on the same beach as
Force O. - - - - - - -"
B. OMAHA Beach: Plan for the Assault
-
The terrain1
in the area where Force O landed
was of great natural defensive strength, augmented by the
addition of many strongly protected and cleverly concealed
gun emplacements, machine gun nests, and pillboxes. Slit
trenches were dug for defending rifleman, and tank traps
and anti-tank ditches intervened between beaches and road
exits. In addition, there had been installed in the tidal
area, between high and low water, several rows of underwater
obstacles consisting of hedgehogs, tetrahedrons,
Element "C", and pole ramps all inter-connected by barbed
wire and thickly sown with mines. The obstacles actually
encountered were much more numerous than Intelligence
Reports had indicated. The artillery and machine guns were
--511--
generally sited for enfilading fire along the beaches. In
some cases they were completely concealed from a direct
view from seaward by concrete walls covered with earth which
extended well beyond the muzzle of the gun. This acted as
a blast screen and prevented them from being located by the
dust raised near their muzzles, so that when used with
flashless, smokeless, powder, and without tracer bullets, as
they were in defense of OMAHA Beaches, they were exceedingly
difficult to detect. These walls, of course, restricted the
arc of train of the pieces, but apparently the defenders had
accepted this in order to obtain concealment. As a result
of this arrangement of gun positions nearly all of the
defensive fire was delivered on the beaches themselves or
on craft within some two thousand yards of the beach.
Several officers noted the fact that craft inshore might
be under heavy fire, but those further out were comparatively
free from molestation and scarcely a shot fell more than
four thousand yards from the beach. The presence of
construction materials and more barbed wire indicated that
improvement in the defense was in progress. From prisoners
captured it appeared that there were four regiments either
actually manning these defenses or taking part in the
defense of the beach area. One of them was a coastal defense
regiment of the type rated only fair in combat efficiency.
The other three, however, belonged to the 362nd Field
Division of the German Army, and such troops are generally
rated among the best in the world.
-
To overcome these defenses.....the Landing Attack
Plan1
was as follows:
"The 16th RCT attacked on the left on beaches
FOX GREEN and EASY RED with two Battalions
in assault and one following. The 116th RCT
attacked on the right with two battalions in
assault and one following, on Beaches EASY
GREEN, DOG RED and DOG WHITE; the other landed
three companies in column on Beach DOG GREEN.
Nine of the twelve companies of the 2nd and 5th
Ranger Battalions landed on Beach DOG GREEN,
while the remaining three Ranger companies landed
on the POINTE DU HOE in Sector CHARLIE to capture
an enemy battery located there which threatened
the Transport Area. The 16th RCT landed immediately
--512--
after the 16th RCT on the same Beaches. The
Rifle Companies of the 115th embarked in LCI(L)s
were to land on call on the same beaches as the 116th
unless otherwise directed.
The landing was preceded by a 40-minute Naval bombardment at
previously designated targets.
1
A bombing attack was
scheduled for delivery between H-30 minutes and H-Hour. This,
however, failed to materialize. In addition to the bombardment
by naval gunfire from supporting ships and craft, tanks
embarked in LCT(A)s fired on targets of opportunity during
the last 3,000 yards of their approach to the beach, and 105
mm. SP artillery embarked in LCTs likewise fired during their
passage through the boat lanes. LCT(R)s and LCS(S)s were
scheduled to deliver a full discharge of rockets immediately
prior to the "touchdown" of the infantry. The fire of the
gunfire support craft, and of the destroyers close inshore
where they could observe the actual landings, was to continue
until such time as the advancing troops were actually
endangered by it, instead of being lifted at a pre-arranged
clock time. In general, no equipment or troops were
scheduled to land between the arrival of the demolition
parties at H plus 3 minutes and H plus 30 minutes. The
whole plan of assault, therefore, might be described as follows:
"to destroy enemy defenses and cover the shoreward
progress of the landing assault waves and air
bombardment; to land a wave of infantry preceded
and supported by tanks to storm the enemy beach
defenses, and cover the operations of the combat
demolition parties while the latter were engaged
in clearing lanes through the obstacles in the
tidal area; and as soon as the lanes were open,
to follow through with successive waves of infantry,
artillery, motorized equipment and stores, in order
to reduce the remaining enemy defenses and seize
the beachhead."
--513--
C. Assault Force O: Organization and Assembly
-
Force O was assembled at five ports: PORTLAND,
POOLE, EXMOUTH, FALMOUTH and BELFAST. With the exception
of the escort and control vessels and some of the minor
landing craft destined for POOLE, the assembly was completed
30 May 1944.1
--514--
All ships and craft were loaded at the assembly ports
indicated above, except 12 LCI(L)s carrying Rifle
Companies of the 115th Regimental Combat Team, which
were loaded in PLYMOUTH, but sailed from PORTLAND, and
16 LCTs carrying DD tanks, which were loaded at TORCROSS
in START BAY, but likewise sailed from PORTLAND. The
loading was smooth and uneventful except for the
necessity to make several substitutions involving a
shift of loads in LCTs. This was occasioned by casualties
to the craft, two of which were due to enemy action. They
were the result of damage from mines dropped in the harbor
during an air raid on the night of 27-28 May. All loading
was completed by the evening of 3 June.
-
For the movement from the assembly port to the
Assault Area, Force O was organized into five convoys,
designated Convoy Group O-1, O-2, O-3, O-4, and O-5,
respectively. Convoy Groups O-1 and O-2 were Assault
convoys, O-3, O-4 and O-5 follow-ups. 5th June was
originally designated as D-Day. On the night of 3-4 June,
the weather was clear, but with a rising wind. Convoy O-2
got away from the PORTLAND-WEYMOUTH area, and from POOLE
shortly after midnight as planned. After it had been
underway for several hours, orders were received postponing
D-Day 24 hours. Immediately the pre-arranged postponement
signal was sent to the Convoy Commander by radio, and in
addition, destroyers were dispatched to notify him in case
he failed to receive the message. Upon receipt of the
delaying order, Convoy O-2 reversed course and returned to
port. A large landing craft convoy of Force U, which had
likewise started for the Assault area, was unable to beat
its way back to westward against the wind, which had
reached near gale force, and was forced to take refuge in
PORTLAND HARBOR and WEYMOUTH ROAD. From the arrival of
these ships and craft of Force U until their departure the
following morning, the efforts of this Command were
chiefly absorbed in getting them re-organized and underway
on time. The only sheltered berths available were so
located as to require their crossing the track of Convoy
O-2, which had to sortie at about the same time. This
resulted in some interference with Convoy O-2 in the sortie
during darkness, but not enough to cause serious delay.
D. Assault Force O: The Channel Passage
-
Convoy Group O-1 cleared PORTLAND HARBOR on the
afternoon of 5 June. The Ancon, guide, passed through
the breakwater at 1400. Unfortunately, the transports
of the convoy were headed away from the harbor entrance
--515--
riding to the fresh westerly wind, and they had trouble
in turning inside the harbor and getting headed out.
This delayed their taking station in the convoy formation,
and it was not until 2000 that all of them were in position.
-
The movement of Convoy O-1 and O-2 to the Assault
area was comparatively uneventful. In Convoy O-2, several
of the LCP(L)s being towed had to be cast adrift and
abandoned, and two LCT(A)s foundered, but the crews were
removed in all cases. Convoy Group O-1 encountered one
floating mine during daylight, which was avoided by an
emergency turn signal. Four times between the entry into
the approach channel and the arrival at the Transport area
the guide had to reduce speed or stop entirely. Two of
these delays were occasioned by interference from landing
craft from Force U, which had been set to the eastward by
the strong tidal currents, and were crossing Channel 3
from east to west in an attempt to regain position in their
own approach channel. On both occasions the Ancon was
forced out of the swept channel in order to avoid running
through the craft convoys. The other two delays were
caused by stopping of the Bombardment Group, which was
immediately ahead of Convoy O-1. The second time this
occurred, no further delay could be accepted, and Convoy
Group O-1 passed the Bombardment Group and continued into
the Transport area, where the Ancon anchored in position,
49° 29' N., 00° 42' W., at 0251 D-day.1
The remaining ships
of Convoy Group O-1 and the landing craft of Convoy Group
O-2 followed rapidly into their proper positions.
--516--
[A continuation of the footnote on page 516]
--517--
-
The weather at this time was unfavourable, but
landing operations were possible. The sea was choppy with
wind Force 5 from the south-west. The sky was partially
overcast with visibility about 10 miles. Due to the wind
and sea, debarkation from transports into L.C.V.P.s was
difficult. Fortunately, plans had been made to rail-load
boats whenever possible, and those which could not be
rail-loaded were loaded despite the unfavourable conditions.
The trip of the L.C.V.P.s from the Transport Area 10 miles
off shore into the line of departure in the face of fresh
wind and choppy sea was neither easy nor pleasant.
Nevertheless, they arrived at the line of departure in
fairly good order. Due to the darkness and confusion in
the Transport Area, the L.C.T. with demolition parties
straggled considerably in their approach toward the line
of departure. Two L.C.T.(A)s foundered before reaching
the Transport Area. One L.C.T.(A) strayed to the Force
U area and did not return until several hours later. Two
more L.C.T.(A)s had gone so far to the eastward that they
could not get back in time for their part in the initial
assault wave. Thus, five of the 16 L.C.T.(A)s scheduled
for the first wave were missing.
E. The Assault on OMAHA Beach:
-
The pre-landing naval bombardment was carried
out in accordance with the plan, but the air bombardment
scheduled for delivery on OMAHA Beaches between H minus
30 minutes and H-hour did not materialize for reasons
unknown to the Force Commander. Its absence was felt
severely when the landing commenced. During the naval
bombardment the enemy made no reply of any kind. Several
competent observers have stated that during this entire
period only one shot was fired from enemy batteries
ashore and this missed.
-
The order of landing of the first four waves on
all beaches was: DD tanks between H minus 10 and H minus
5 minutes; L.C.T.(A)s carrying tanks and tank dozers
for obstacle clearance at H-hour; a wave of infantry
at H plus 1 minute; and demolition parties at H plus 3
minutes. DD tanks were to be launched from the L.C.T.s
in which they were embarked approximately 6,000 yards off
shore unless weather conditions prohibited, and were to
proceed in their assigned beaches from that point under
their own power. The decision whether to launch at 6,000 yards
or to close the beaches was left to the senior army tank
officer and senior naval officer in the L.C.T.s of the two
assault groups. Those on the left flank in Assault Group
O-1, preceding the 16th R.C.T., were launched as planned.
The sea conditions, however, were such that all but two or
three of them foundered before they reached the shore. The
--518--
responsible officers on the right gauged the sea conditions
more accurately and took their L.C.T.s in to a
point where the DD tanks grounded as soon as they were
launched. Therefore, all the DD tanks preceding the
assault troops of the 116th R.C.T. reached the shore.
-
Information is not available as to the exact
time of landing or the order of landing waves on all
of the beaches. The first landings on EASY RED and DOG
GREEN were made at 06351
and it is believed that the
leading waves landed on the other beaches at approximately
the same time. Due to the state of the sea, the loss of
the DD tanks, the absence of five L.C.T.(A)s and damage
to other by enemy gunfire, the order of landing was
somewhat mixed. Simultaneously with the landing and the
cessation of the naval gunfire bombardment, the enemy
commenced firing. This fire from artillery, mortars,
machine guns and small arms was heavy and accurate and
casualties were numerous. Many of the tanks which had
reached the shore line were knocked out and losses to the
infantry advancing shoreward through the obstacles, and
to the demolition parties trying to clear lanes through
them, were severe. A considerable portion of the
equipment of the demolition parties was lost in the
landing due to the surf. The limited time for working on
the obstacles before they were covered by the rapidly
rising tide and the devastating effect of the defensive
fire further reduced the effectiveness of the demolition
parties. Only five gaps were cleared all the way into the
beach and three part way in, instead of the 16 planned.
Most of these were inadequately marked. The result was
that during the high tide immediately following the assault
the only opening through the obstacles that was in use for
a considerable period was one lane on EASY RED beach.
2
--519--
[A continuation of the footnote on Page 519]
--520--
-
At the request of the Commanding General,
V-Corps, the Commander, Assault Group O-2, was directed
at the H-hour to land troops of the 115th R.C.T. at H-plus
4 hours. Thus all the landing force embarked in Force
O were committed from the beginning of the assault. After
the initial waves, landing continued throughout the forenoon
and afternoon of D-day. Due to the failure of the
demolition parties to clear and mark gaps through the
underwater obstacles, and to the heavy enemy fire, great
difficulty was experienced in getting anyone or anything
ashore. Some craft carrying infantry and elements of the
shore party managed to land their personnel, but the bulk
of the craft proceeding shoreward was stopped between the
seaward row obstacles and the line of departure. With the
strong tide, fresh wind and choppy sea this soon resulted
in a mass of craft in which all semblance of wave organization
was lost until the Deputy Assault Group Commanders
arrived on the scene, took charge of the situation, moved
the craft to seaward to give them more room, and reformed
the waves as best they could.
-
In the meanwhile, most of the tanks which had
reached the shore had been knocked out by enemy artillery
fire or by mines, or were caught in the obstacles and
flooded by the rising tide, and the personnel, both the
assault troops and the shore party, were pinned on the
beaches just above high water by enemy fire; few, if any,
troops actually crossed the beach during the early hours
of the forenoon. The supporting destroyers1
and gunfire
--521--
support craft stood in as close to the beach as the
depth of the water would allow and engaged all the
defensive installations which they could locate. Despite
this, however, little progress had been made prior to
1100 when there was still considerable machine gun fire,
sniping, artillery, and mortar fire, on the beaches
between the exits, the condition was critical. A number
of enemy string points in the beach were still holding
out and our troops were not able to move inland.2
--522--
-
The first encouraging news came at 1100 from
a message to Commander, Transport Division THREE,
intercepted by the Force Commander, to the effect that
German defenders were leaving their posts and
surrendering to U.S. troops. Shortly after that
another message from a member of the V-Corps staff
embarked in a DUKW near the shore line stated that the
troops were advancing up the western slope of the exit
from Sector EASY. By 1300 COLLEVILLE was taken, and by
1330 a general advance began up slopes of EASY RED and
FOX GREEN beaches. By 1340 the beaches of Sectors EASY
and DOG were clear of opposition except for artillery
and mortar fire. At 1400 the Commanding Officer of the
Engineer Special Brigade Group left the Ancon to set
up headquarters on the beach.
-
Early in the forenoon reports had been received
from the minesweepers stating that the sweep of the Transport
Area and the channels for the Bombardment Group from the
Transport Area to the 10-fathom curve had been completed with
negative results. Because of this the Force Commander felt
that the transports could close the beaches if necessary.
However, in view of their prospective early departure from
the Assault Area, it was decided that the delay caused by
the movement of the ships would result in a net loss rather
than a gain, and they were left in the Transport Area until
they completed unloading and departed.
-
Landing of personnel and vehicles from transports
and L.S.T.s continued throughout the afternoon of D-day.
During this time the beaches were subject to enemy artillery
and mortar fire which, while neither heavy nor sustained,
was deadly accurate. The fire was obviously observed
because enemy batteries would be silent until craft beached,
when there would be a few quick salvos, usually right on
the target. This artillery fire caused considerable loss
and was doubly disturbing because neither enemy observers
nor batteries could be located.1
In fact, repeated requests
--523--
for U.S. vessels to cease firing on the beaches were made
by personnel ashore and observers to seaward, who thought
that it was our own ships firing into our own troops.
Actually no U.S. ships were firing at the time the
requests were made, and when they did fire they were firing
at targets inland rather than on the beach. About 1430,
Commander, Force B, with Convoy B-2, consisting principally
of L.C.I.(L)s and H.M.S. Oceanway, stood into the Assault
Area. Anchorages close to the beaches were assigned to this
convoy and Commander, Force B, was directed to land the
troops embarked in accordance with plan, using L.C.V.(P)s as
necessary to unload L.C.I.(L)s. At the same time the
Deputy Commanders of Assault Groups O-1, O-2, and O-3, were
ordered to provide small landing craft to assist in landing
of Force B.
--524--
-
Meanwhile the L.S.I.(S)s and L.S.T.(H)s
which had carried the Ranger Battalions were sailed to the
ISLE OF WIGHT, and information was received that the
transports of Assault Groups O-1, O-2, and O-3, would
complete unloading and be ready to sail by 1700. They
sailed about 1800. By 1530, advance elements of the First
Division and Twenty-Ninth Division staffs were setting up
command posts ashore near the beach exits from Sectors
EASY and DOG respectively, and ST. LAURIENT was partially
occupied in addition to the capture of COLLEVILLE. At
1540 the Oceanway was directed to close FOX GREEN beach
and discharge her twenty (20) L.C.M.s carrying M.4 tanks,
these tanks to be attached to the 16th R.C.T. This was
completed by 1715. Convoy Groups O-3 and B-1 arrived
together about 1600. Although information as to the
actual loss of landing craft was meagre at this time indications
were that a considerable number was sunk or badly
damaged, and at 1700 the Force Commander requested the
Commander, Service Force, to sail ARL-4 to the OMAHA
Assault Area as soon as practicable. At 1715 the
Commanding General, First Division and his staff left the
Ancon to establish their headquarters on the beach. By
1730, except for sniping and the recurring artillery and
mortar fire, hostile action against the Beach Area had
ceased and the work of organizing the beaches for further
unloading was progressing in orderly fashion.
-
In accordance with the request of the Commanding
General, First Division, the 26th R.C.T. was landed in the
early evening. All rifle companies of the regiment were
ashore by 2100. Between 2320 and 2340 the air attack
which had been anticipated all day was finally delivered.
There were no radar warnings of the approach of the hostile
planes and the first information of the impending attack was
the sight and sound of an enemy plane which passed over the
Flagship at low altitude. Only a few more planes came over,
however, of which three were shot down. Several bombs were
dropped in the Transport Area but caused no damage. This
ended D-day....."1
--525--
F. The Battle on OMAHA Beach:
-
In conjunction with the main assaults on
OMAHA Beach, three companies of the 2nd Ranger Infantry
Battalion attacked a German battery position on Points du
Hoe in the Charlie Sector. This battery which was thought
to contain guns of the heaviest caliber (six 155 mm. guns)
was located on a high cliff dominating OMAHA Beach, the
boat lanes, anchorages and approach channels. The assault
was initiated by an especially heavy bombardment from the
battleship U.S.S. Texas, between H minus 45 minutes and H
minus 5 minutes. The Rangers were scheduled to land at
Force "O"'s H-hour, (0630). The control vessel for the
expedition, however, made an error in navigation, mistaking
the Raz de la Parce for Pointe du Hoc, with the result that
the Rangers were 35 minutes late in hitting their assigned
beach. By the time they had landed (0705) the numbing
effect of the bombardment had worn off and the enemy was
alert and in position.
1
Scaling the cliff proved to be a
very difficult enterprise. Scaling ropes had got wet and
many rockets failed to carry over the cliff. Many more
did not anchor. The men scaling the few ropes which did
hold were subject to incessant fire from enemy riflemen,
machine guns and hand grenades.
--526--
-
The attack was in this precarious position,
when U.S.S. Satterlee (DD) closed the Beach to 1500
yards and took the enemy under direct fire. With this
assistance the Rangers gained the summit at 0930. In
the course of the morning they fought their way through
to the Vierville - Grandcamp Road, where they established
a defense line. Here they remained until D plus 2, when
at "about 1100 the 5th Ranger Battalion, which had landed
on DOG GREEN Beach with the 116th Infantry and had been
fighting its way steadily westward along the shore line,
established contact with the survivors of the three Ranger
Companies which had landed on the POINTE DU HOE to knock out
the enemy batteries there. The latter had accomplished
their mission, but had been hemmed in within a small area
near the tip of the point where they had been under constant
enemy attack for more than 48 hours. Repeated requests had
been received from them for boats to evacuate wounded,
additional ammunition and reinforcements. These requests
had been passed to the Commanding General, V Corps, and
boats to carry the reinforcements were offered. Gunfire
support ships1
were doing their best to help by delivering
supporting fire as requested by the Liaison Officer with
the Rangers, but their situation was desperate. Finally,
on the afternoon of D plus 1, two boats from the Flagship
with 25 additional Rangers, plus small arms ammunition,
food, and medical supplies, landed on the POINTE DU HOE
and delivered them to the group besieged there. On their
way out, the boats evacuated the wounded."2
--527--
-
The enemy battery upon which all this heroism was
expended was found to be empty. Allied Air and Naval
Bombardment had destroyed one AA and three 155 mm. gun
emplacements. It later developed that four other guns
had been moved and emplaced in a lodge lane about a mile
further south. Texas, using air spot, knocked out the new
position during the morning of D-day.1
--528--
-
While D-day ended with the Rangers in a perilous
and besieged position, the situation on the principal
OMAHA Beach was very much better than could have been
predicted from the unpromising beginning in the morning.
By six o'clock in the evening, 18,772 men, and 1,033
vehicles had been landed. The army had gained the tops
of the cliffs and captured Colleville. Shortly after
midnight (0045 of D plus 1) "the Commanding General,
V Corps, informed the Force Commander that his line was
generally along the road from Vierville through St.
Laurient to about a mile south of Colleville, and that he
intended to attack with the beachhead line as his objective."
By noon on D plus 1, the Vth Corps had reached Bayeux-Carentan
Road, its D-day objective, and advanced beyond it.
The next day they advanced another three miles inland, and
by D plus 3 they had established contact with the British
50th Division of Force G. On D plus 4, they made contact
with the VII Corps from the U Sector.
-
Throughout the assault and build-up, Assault
Force O was singularly immune from losses to German minefields.
Though intelligence indicated that the approach
channels and the transport areas lay in the middle of a
mine field, and though both Force U to the west and Force
G to the east suffered heavily from mine damage, "up to
the time of the departure of the Force Commander....on
D plus 22, no mines had been swept in the OMAHA area, and
no ships had been mined there".1
Except along the beaches, and the waters close in shore, Force O was
equally immune from shell fire. By 1600 on D-day, losses to
--529--
ships and craft in Force O were:
-
sunk: LCT 294, and Despatch Boats 350;
-
damaged LST 375; LCI's 487, 553, 85;
LCT's 2043, 210, 25, 2041, 2037,
538,2307; Despatch Boats 320;
LCA's 25, 418;
and an unknown number of LCVP's.1
--530--
Naval personnel casualties, dead, wounded, and missing,
in Force O were 624.1
--531--
-
Although by the end of D-day the spearhead
at OMAHA Beach was well established, the battle fought
to accomplish that result was much the most difficult
of all the five assaults. The cumulative effect of
many adverse factors had conspired to defeat or nullify
the plans and preparations which had proved so successful
on the other beaches. "The air bombardment of the
beaches was not delivered, presumably because of the low
cloud ceiling over the beach area just before H-hour.
Sea conditions caused the loss of a considerable portion
of the tanks and many of those that did manage to reach
the beach were soon knocked out by enemy artillery and
mines. The obstacles were more numerous than had been
anticipated and casualties from enemy fire were heavy -
so that demolition parties, despite a gallant effort,
failed to breach the obstacles as planned. All of these
reduced the assault to the most elementary form of
amphibious attack; Infantry landing and attacking
supported by Naval gunfire. A Deputy Assault Group
Commander, in his report, attributed the success of the
landing to three factors; (1) the gallantry of the
crews of the landing craft who took the Army personnel
into the beach; (2) the stark courage of the soldiers
who worked their way shoreward through obstacles and
enemy fire from artillery, mortars, machine guns, and
rifles; and, (3) to the support provided by the Naval
gunfire. These are fundamental factors which will always
determine whether the assault succeeds or fails against
strong resistance. All the rest are "trimmings", schemes of
one sort or another to make it easier for the attacking
riflemen, but in the last analysis, it is he and the
floating batteries supporting him who win or lose the
battle."1
--532--
PART 4
EASTERN TASK FORCE
An accurate and comprehensive narrative
of the action of the Eastern Task Force
is being prepared at the Admiralty. The
following accounts of the adventures of
the Eastern Task Force are extracts from
a draft of this narrative.1
--533--
A. The Channel Passage:
-
For the passage each British Assault Force
was organized in 16 or 18 convoys or groups, the
composition and numbering of the groups being based on the
time of arrival at "the other side". A program was worked
out in great detail, times of sailings of the various
convoys being adjusted to the widely varying speeds and
seagoing capacities of the heterogeneous collection of
shipping of which the Assault Forces were composed. The
problem was not eased by the necessity for steaming dead
across the Channel stream running at times up to 2½ knots1
and, in the event, the heavy weather conditions added a
further complication.- - -
-
At 0900, 5th June, the first groups of Landing
Craft sailed from the Portsmouth area, and from then on
there was a constant stream of ships passing the Needles
and the Nab Tower. Force G proceeded through the Needles
Channel; Force J and those portions of Force S in this
area - Assault Groups S.1, and S.3. - used the Spithead
and Lumps Fort entrances. The sailing of the Assault
Forces from the crowded anchorages proceeded smoothly. As
the first convoy left Spithead the signal "Good Luck;
Drive On" was hoisted in the Largs, Rear-Admiral Talbot's
Headquarters Ship - which was anchored at the eastern end
of the Force S line of L.S.T., - and kept flying until
her own departure at 2145. The wind was west, Force 5,
slackening to Force 3 to 4, and veering to W.N.W. in the
evening; the sea was 4, swell 1. These conditions were
unexpectedly severe and imposed a high test on the landing
--534--
craft crews.1
Their spirit and seamanship alike rose
to meet the greatness of this hour, and they pressed
forward..... in high heart and resolution; there was no
faltering, and many of the smaller landing craft were
driven on till they foundered.2
-
The Reserve Group of Force S, - Assault Group
S.2, (S.O. Captain Gatto, R.N.) - which sailed from
Newhaven, had a steady beat of 33 miles into a head sea,
and was hard put to it to keep to its program. Similar
difficulties, enhanced by a strong flood stream, were
experienced by the landing craft of Force G in getting
clear of the Needles. At 1630, 5th June, H.M.S. Scylla,
wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian, sailed
and closed various groups of landing craft in the vicinity
of position E. Once the groups had turned to the
southward, it appeared that the major landing craft would
not have serious difficulty in keeping to their time
table, but conditions were much harder for the L.C.P.(L)
and L.C.A. (H.R.) which were in company or being towed.- - -
The leading groups of the Assault Forces arrived in Area Z
without incident during the afternoon and headed for the
entrances to the channels across the German mine barrier.- - -
--535--
-
The Assault Forces found little difficulty,
generally speaking, in locating the entrance of the
swept channels. A few mistakes naturally occurred, but
these were of no great moment. For example, four groups
of Force J and one of Force S proceeded down the wrong
channels, all to the westward of their correct ones,
without serious inconvenience to the proper users. These
errors were realized before reaching the end of the
channels, but the loss of time involved in making to the
eastward could not in the case of the L.C.T. (AVRE) of
Assault Group J.1 be made up. The leading group of
Assault Group G.1, which should have used Channel 5, was
jostled out of it and to the eastward by a group belonging
to Force O, whose tail had drifted down-wind tide. After
midnight the tide turned, the tail wagged the other way
and the leading group of G.1 was able to enter its correct
channel, only to be forced out of it again by overtaking
Infantry Landing ships and light cruisers; this group
only spent one hour in swept waters.
-
Divergences such as the foregoing were only to
be expected in view of the difficulty in the navigation
of slow moving craft in a cross stream, accentuated by
heavy weather. Casualties on passage were almost entirely
due to the weather, only two being caused by enemy action,
- H.M.S. Wrestler1
which was mined at 0545, 6th June,
in latitude 49° 36' N, while a cable to the eastward of
Channel No. 7 - and later on 1 L.S.T. of Follow-up Force
L. The total casualties on passage in the Eastern Task
Force are shown in the following Table:
--536--
Ship or Craft | Force S | Force J | Force G |
Force L | Remarks |
HMS Wrestler |
- | - | - | - | Mined |
L.S.T. |
- | - | - | - | Mined |
L.C.T. |
- | 1 | - | - | Sank in tow. |
| - | - | 2 | - | Missing |
| 1 | 1 | 3 | - | Broke down |
M.G.B. | - | 1 | - | - | Broke down |
Rhino Ferry | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | Sank on passage |
Rhino Tugs | 7 | 7 | 3 | - | Sank on passage |
L.C.P.(L) | 1 | - | 1 | - | Sank on passage |
L.C.A.(R.N.) | 8 | 8 | 7 | - | 12 sank in tow;
2 missing;
2 broke down and
towed to base |
-
In the Eastern Task Force Area, Forces G and J arrived
at the Lowering positions without the slightest molestation, the
Bulolo (Naval Commander, Force G) and leading L.C.I.s anchoring
at about 0535 and the Hilary (Naval Commander, Force J) at 0558.
The only opposition at this stage consisted of a torpedo
attack on Force S which developed from the eastern flank just
as the leading ships were arriving at the lowering position.
This attack, as well as the conditions obtaining at the time, is
best described in the words of Rear-Admiral Talbot's report. - - -
"As H.M.S. Largs, bringing up the rear of the L.S.I.
convoy, approached the coast of France, the sense that
we had achieved a large measure of tactical surprise
became apparent. No air attacks, no E-boat attacks,
no Radar or W/T jamming worth mentioning. The air
plot showed enemy aircraft on patrol away to the
eastward in the Pas de Calais area. A glance to starboard
showed the assault convoys on time as far as
could be judged. The operation was proceeding with
unreal precision...."
--537--
[No page 538--misnumbered in original.]
--538--
-
As we approached the lowering position,
HMS Warspite, HMS Ramillies, HMS Roberts and HMS Arethusa,
were already anchored in their bombarding positions to
port of us, down the extension of Channel 10 swept by the
40th M.S.F., H.M.S. Scylla, H.M.S. Mauritius, H.M.S. Danae,
O.P.P. Dragon, and H.M.S. Frobisher, disposed at anchor
along the swept "Loop" channel joining the lowering
position to the southern extremity of Channel 10 extension.
The bombarding squadron had opened fire, but were only
being engaged by the enemy in a desultory fashion, few shots
falling anywhere near them. The bombarding destroyers, under
the command of Captain (D) 23rd Flotilla (Captain P.G.L.
Cazelet, D.S.C., R.N.) in H.M.S. Saumarez were waiting, as
ordered, clear of the swept channels where they merged, to
be swept into their inshore positions by the 165th B.Y.M.S.
The "D.D." L.C.T. Convoy was just coming up to the lowering
position - on time, but the L.C.T.(A) convoy was obviously
late. Such was the picture at 0519 as we ran down from the
knuckle to join channel 9.
-
Then events started to move swiftly. In accordance
with plan, our own aircraft streaked low across the eastern
flank at about this time and laid a most effective smoke
screen to shield the Force from the heavy batteries at
Havre. Unfortunately, three German torpedo boats took
advantage of this to carry out a torpedo attack, and though
engaged by the bombarding squadron, were able to make good
their escape in the smoke.1
Two torpedoes passed between
H.M.S. Warspite and H.M.S. Ramillies, and at 0530 one hit
H.Nor.M.S. Svenner close on the port beam of H.M.S. Largs.
Another torpedo was seen approaching H.M.S. Largs; her
engines were put emergency full astern and the torpedo
passed a few feet ahead of her. It then came to rest and
sank just short of H.M.S. Virago. She had, however, seen
H.Nor M.S. Svenner's signal "TORPEDO PORT", and with the
remainder of the starboard division of bombarding destroyers
waiting stopped in a group, went emergency full ahead.2
--539--
The Svenner had apparently been hit immediately under
her boiler room. There was a burst of steam amidships
and her funnel fell aft as the whole ship lifted out of
the water. She broke her back and sank rapidly; the
greater part of her ship's company were picked up.
-
The Warspite followed the enemy in by Radar and
opened fire at 14,000 yards; she reported one torpedo
boat sunk. The Mauritius, Ramillies and Arethusa also
opened fire, the former claiming one trawler sunk and one
damaged.1
After this mauvaise quart d'heure things
quieted down; the L.S.I. of Force S anchored in the
lowering positions in accordance with plan, and the convoys
began to arrive.2
-
The fire from the enemy's coast batteries was
singularly ineffective. In "GOLD" area, Longues battery opened
fire on Bulolo at 0557; no hits were obtained, and the
battery was silenced by the Ajax by 0620.3
The two main
batteries opposing Force J were neutralized during the
assault and subsequently captured before they could interfere
with the shipping. In "SWORD" area the fire from the
--540--
batteries east of the Orne was directed mainly against
the bombarding ships; the Warspite shifted berth after
being straddled by shells from the Benerville battery,
but received no damage.1
By 0930 the main enemy batteries
had been silenced, though they required periodic attention
throughout the day; the Ramillies, for example, carried
out eleven shoots at Benerville with considerable observed
success. The cruisers of Force D fired on the batteries
assigned to them as occasion demanded. As the day wore on,
the beaches and anchorages were subjected to an increasing
fire from mobile guns in the woods south of Franceville
which proved most difficult to locate and engage -----.
-
Meanwhile, the Assaulting Flotillas had started
on their passage to the beaches. The weather at the
Lowering position - wind W.N.W., Force 4, with a short
steep sea - somewhat impeded the lowering and loading of
the landing craft, but despite this the "marriage" of the
minor craft from the L.S.T. with their various major craft
was completed successfully, and in general the flotillas
got away on time. The detailed organization of the Assault
Groups varied in the several Assault Forces, depending as
it did on the type of assault intended, the physical
characteristics of the beaches, the nature of the defenses,
and so forth.----- Destroyers proceeded in on the flanks
of the first wave of the assaults, giving direct close
support fire, while B.Y.M.S. swept the waters ahead of them.
The "Hunts" closed the beaches as near as possible, while
the "Fleets" anchored between three and four thousand yards
to seaward. Pre-arranged targets were engaged accurately
and effectively till the landing craft had touched down,
after which fire was shifted to strong points on the
flanks and inland as opportunity offered. In "SWORD" area,
Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian in the Scylla - after
engaging pre-arranged targets in Ouistreham till 0705 -
closed to within 5,500 yards of the beach and intensified
the fire on the beach defenses till a minute before the
touchdown.
--541--
-
The deployment and approach of the flotillas
was admittedly not conducted with the precision of the
later rehearsals. The weather allowed craft but little
margin of speed to adjust the errors of timing which had
inevitably crept in during the night cross-channel
passage; nevertheless, the landings all took place within
15 minutes of the scheduled times1
and except in "UTAH"
Area at the correct positions on the beaches, which in most
cases were identified without difficulty.2
In area "SWORD"
and "JUNO" the lights of submarines X.23 and X.20 - which
had up to that time spent 64 hours dived out of 76 hours at
sea - were readily picked up by the approaching flotillas
and provided a useful check on their position. The leading
groups approached the beaches unopposed until about 3,000
yards off shore. Even then fire was desultory and inaccurate,
except in "SWORD" area, where Landing Craft sustained damage
from mortar fire.- - - -
B. The Assaults - General Narrative
-
From the naval point of view the assault was
carried out in every main essential as planned. Contrary to
expectation, tactical surprise was achieved in every sector
save one, thereby greatly easing the problem of getting
ashore. This phase of the operation was further facilitated
by the strange immunity enjoyed by the Allied shipping lying
in the anchorages from interference either by coastal
batteries or air attack.3
--542--
-
To this extent the operation proved easier than
had been expected, but it would be a great mistake to
suppose on that account that the assaults were easy or
unopposed landings. The enemy troops manning the coast
defense batteries may have been of inferior quality, but
there was no doubt as to the quality of the field troops
manning the various strong points and the mobile field
batteries which dominated the beaches. These put up a
most stubborn resistance; their fire, in combination with
a heavy surf on the beaches and extensive obstacles called
for endurance and seamanship of the highest order in the
handling of the landing craft, and the exits from the
beaches were only secured by the assaulting troops after a
desperate struggle.1
-
The weather conditions were on the border line for
"swimming" DD - tanks;2
the decisions as to launching
them varied in different sectors, but in all cases they
arrived on shore late and after the first landing craft
--543--
had touched down.1
After beaching, they met with
varying success; for example, in the SWORD and UTAH
areas they were of great value; on OMAHA beaches they
were quickly knocked out.2
The initial landings were
made by the Americans in the Western area at about
0630, the British landings in the Eastern area following
about an hour to an hour and a half later. On most
beaches obstacle clearance presented greater difficulties
than had been anticipated. The weather preceding D-day
had tended to build up the tide, and the surf and the
large number of landing craft arriving on the beaches
prevented work in the water. Except in the UTAH beaches
but little clearance could be effected during the initial
assaults. Major craft smashed their way through the
obstacles at high speed, while the L.C.A. threaded their
way between them.3
-
By the end of the forenoon all the beaches in the
Eastern area had been secured with the exception of one in
GOLD area, and the landing of the Assault and Reserve
Brigades other than elements arriving in L.S.T. had been
completed by about 1500.4
The first of the return convoys
of empty landing craft were sailed from area "JUNO" at about
1300 and from then onwards there was a steady stream of
landing craft sailing from all areas.5
Some account of
how each assault force fared will be found in the ensuing
Sections.-----
--544--
[Footnotes continued from page 544.]
--545--
C. Force G.1 GOLD Area
-
GOLD Area - the western area of the British
assault area - extended from Port en Bessin to the mouth
of the River de Provence. It was divided into 4 sectors,
the two eastern most - JIG and KING - being chosen for the
initial assaults. Port en Bessin and the western sectors
were to be dealt with later.
-
H-hour for Force G was 0725 - 55 minutes after
the planned time of the American assault in OMAHA sector
to the westward and 10 minutes before that of Force J's
assault to the eastward. Assault Group G.1., commanded
by Captain Farquhar, R.N., in HMS Nith, landed the 231st
Infantry Brigade (Brig. Sir A. Stanier, Bt.) on JIG Green
beach, east of Asnelles, and Group G.2., commanded by
Captain Ballance, R.N., in HMS Kingsmill, the 69th Infantry
Brigade (Brig.Knox) on beaches KING,
RED and GREEN, opposite
Ver-sur-Mer. Following them, Group G.3, commanded by Act.
Captain G.V.M. Dolphin, R.N., in HMS Albrighton carried the
Reserve, consisting of the 56th Infantry Brigade (Brig.
Pepper) and the 151st Infantry Brigade (Brig. Senier). The
decision as to when and where the Reserve Brigades should
land was retained by the G.O.C., Northumbrian Division
embarked in HMS Bulolo.
--546--
-
The timing of the assaults in both sectors was
extremely accurate.1
Both Deputy S.O.A.C.s, in consultation
with the military officers embarked, decided that the
weather was too rough for the successful launching of their
DD tanks2
and their L.C.T. were beached just after the
L.C.T. (AVRE). The obstacle clearance units were thus the
first to set foot on shore, where they worked for a time
virtually unsupported. The obstacles were considerably
thicker and heavier than had been expected and the tide
was higher; in consequence, little clearance could be
effected at this time.
-
Considerable damage to landing craft was sustained
from mines fixed at the top and bottom of posts. In
addition, there was reluctance in the heat of the assault
to use Kedge anchors, and this in the surf, caused many
craft to broach, fill with water and so encumber the
beaches. Strong resistance was met with at Le Hamel and
La Riviere, both which had enfilading positions covering
the beaches. The former kept up its fire on JIG sector
till late afternoon and it was not until about 1600 after
a concentrated close range bombardment by L.C.G., L.C.F,
and destroyers, that the village was captured by the 1st
Hants., attacking from the west.3
--547--
-
No. 47 R.M. Commando landed on JIG Sector at
0930 and in doing so lost all but two of their L.C.A. and
much equipment including all their wireless sets. This
did not deter them from achieving their object - the capture
of Port en Bessin - but all contact was lost with them till
the afternoon of the following day. Shortly before the
landing of No. 47 Commando, the Scylla, wearing the flag
of the Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force, arrived in
"GOLD" area. After giving direct support to the assault
in "SWORD" area, Admiral Vian had proceeded along the
front keeping about two miles from the shore in order to
judge the progress of the landings. Finding fighting
on the "GOLD" beaches still going on, the Scylla fired
40 rounds at Arromanches at a range of about 8,000 yards
between 0924 and 0931, being herself intermittently - and
ineffectually - engaged by shore batteries; she then
returned to the eastward and anchored in the "SWORD" area. The
Reserve Brigades were sent in at 1050 and 1120, and the
G.O.C. of the Division landed at 1205. Later in the day
the G.O.C. 30th Corps arrived in the Beagle and boarded the
Bulolo about 1900. He went ashore later in an L.C.F. (P),
though there was a heavy sea then running in the anchorage.
D. Force J:1 JUNO Area
-
Force J, operating in JUNO area to the east of
Force G, attacked in sectors Mike and Nan in the neighborhood
of Courseulles, Group J.1. (Captain Pugsley, RN,
in H.M.S. Lawford) landing the 7th Canadian Infantry
Brigade in the three western beaches (Mike Green and Red,
and Nan Green) and Group J.2. (Captain Otway-Ruthven, RN,
in H.M.S. Waveney) the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade on
Nan White and Red beaches. Group J.3 (Captain Fanshawe,
RN, in H.M.S. Royal Ulsterman) followed with the Reserves
consisting of the 9th Canadian Brigade.
--548--
-
In order to ensure clearance over the outlying
rocks of Nan sector,1
H-hour for Group J.2 had been
fixed as 20 minutes later than for Assault Forces G and S;
for Group J.1 it was 10 minutes earlier than for Group J.2.
Owing to the heavy weather and to several groups using the
wrong channels...... the Assault Group commanders found it
necessary to retard these times by ten minutes, bringing
them to 0755 and 0745 respectively. As a result of these
progressive postponements the assault craft beached amongst
the obstacles instead of short of them. Despite strenuous
efforts by the obstacle clearance units, clearance of the
outer obstacles2
was not practicable until the tide had
fallen and considerable loss or damage was sustained from
them and from the Teller mines, etc., attached to them.
Nevertheless, the landing of the Assault Brigades was
achieved with relatively light casualties, "thanks to the
determination shown by the Commanding Officers and Coxwains
of craft, to the clockwork precision of the supporting fire
from H.M. ships, S.P. artillery, rocket craft, etc., and to
the unexpectedly feeble effort of the enemy coast and beach
defences.3
--549--
-
Submarine X.20 successfully marked the launching
position for the DD tanks and provided a useful check on
the positions of the leading flotillas.1
Actually, so far
as the DD tanks were concerned she was not needed as the
Deputy S.O.A.C.s of both groups decided not to attempt
to "swim" the DD tanks in the existing weather and to beach
them in their L.C.T.s with the AVRE groups. This was
adhered to by Group J.2, where the AVRE touched down at
0805, followed by the Infantry at 0811 and the DD tanks a
few minutes later, but in Group J.1, the Senior Officer
of the DD tank group revised the decision and when about
1000 yards from the beach decided to launch the DD tanks.
Some confusion ensued and they touched down between 0759
and 0810, and the AVRE - which had gone astray in the
night ...... arrived six minutes after the Infantry, 30
minutes late on their deferred time.2
-
Very little shooting apart from some inaccurate
mortar fire was directed on craft before the touch down.
On the left, on Group J.2's beaches, it was not until the
L.C.A. (H.R.) had fired their bombs that the defenses began
to shoot at the craft. The opposition encountered on the
beaches was moderate to heavy and included shell and mortar
fire, close range weapons and small arms fire. Generally
speaking opposition was heaviest in the center in Mike Red
and Nan Green beaches. Sniping from the dunes and from
buildings and churches close inshore continued throughout
D-day and the night of D-day plus 1. Great credit is
given by Commodore Oliver to the work of the bombarding
forces, which proceeded "in complete accordance with the
assault fire plan".3
--550--
-
The batteries at Beny-sur-Mere and behind Nan
White were engaged by the Diadem and Kempenfelt. On the
right the destroyers, Venus, Faulknor, Fury, Stevenstone
and La Combattante engaged beach sector targets on Mike
and Nan Green with direct fire at ranges down to 3000 yards;
on the left Nan White and Red beaches were similarly
dealt with by the Vigilant, Algonquin, Sioux, Bleasdale
and Glaisdale. Seven L.C.G. (mounting 14 - 4.7" guns
between them) and 8 L.C. Flak, gave close support with
direct fire on the beaches at ranges down to 1000 yards,
while four regiments of S.P. Artillery (who overcame the
difficult weather conditions and carried out their shoots
with remarkable accuracy) engaged pre-arranged strong
point targets from ranges between 9000 and 1000 yards
during the run in; these strong points were finally
engaged by 8 L.C.T. Rockets - 4 per brigade front - during
the touch down; the Rocket craft all covered their targets
well. Unfortunately, a passing Typhoon met a pattern in
mid-air and was destroyed.
-
Nine L.C.A. (H.R.) were assigned to each assault
group. Of those belonging to Group J.1., all except one
foundered or had to be cut adrift, apparently through being
towed at too great a speed in the prevailing weather. On
the left, all nine L.C.A. (H.R.) of Group J.2 reached their
firing positions on time, - a fine performance, to return
to the beaches. At about 0830, (H plus 45) No.48 R.M.
Commando had landed on Nan Red from L.C.I. (S), whose
wooden hulls suffered widespread damage from the beach
obstacles by this time mostly submerged. Heavy casualties
were suffered by the Commando from machine gun and mortar
fire, as the Assaulting Infantry had passed straight
through the beach without pausing to mop up, and some of
the defenses sited to give cross fire were then beginning
to come to life again.
-
Though the Infantry had got across the beaches
quickly, there was some delay before exits were established.
At 0941 Mike Red reported that the landing of the 7th
Brigades' vehicles was held up by lack of exits and flooding
inland; gradually one exit was got working satisfactorily
by 1112. The 8th Brigade had less difficulty; the seawall
was bridged on Nan White at 0650 and though congestion
occurred periodically, two exits were in use on Nan Red and
three on Nan White by 1040. An hour later (1140) the N.O.I.C.
JUNO (Captain Maud, RN) landed on Nan Green beach and set
--551--
up his advance Headquarters close east of Courseulles
at about 1330. Advanced beach signal stations had
been established promptly after the landings and were
functioning efficiently.1
-
By 1100, the leading army elements were
reported to be half way to the divisional intermediate
objectives; twenty minutes later the 8th Brigade reported
that Tailleville, Banville and St. Croix-sur-Mer had been
captured and that they were advancing. No. 48 R.M.
Commando had by this time taken the Langrune coastal strip.
The first craft of the Reserve Brigade group beached on Nan
White and Red at 1133 and by 1150 the 9th Canadian Infantry
Brigade was on shore. The G.O.C. Canadian Infantry Division
landed on Nan White beach at 1310, and by 1400 the landing
of second flight troops from the L.S.I. had been completed.
-
The first 12 L.S.T. had arrived at 1120 with the
good news that all Rhinos had survived the bad towing
conditions on passages,2
but no beaches were ready to
receive them till 1445. A limited number of L.C.T. started
discharging where gaps existed in the beach obstacles at
noon. Most of the beaches were heavily littered with
stranded landing craft, but a flow of discharge could be
maintained. At 1500 the D/S O.A.G., "Mike" Red, decided
to beach the maximum possible number of L.C.T. on the falling
tide and leave them to dry out; these had finished unloading
by 1615. At 1715 H.M.S. Hilary and other ships and craft
shifted inshore and took up berths in accordance with the
prearranged berthing plan. - - - -. At the same time, the
Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force - who had been touring
the beaches in a U.S. coast guard cutter during the afternoon
- arrived in the Scylla and anchored in "JUNO" area in
order to be centrally placed for a meeting of Flag Officers
and Commodores which took place at 1800.3
The Scylla
remained in "JUNO" area till 2200, when she returned to
"SWORD" area for the night.
--552--
-
Group L.1 of follow-up Force L, with a further
13 L.S.T.1
carrying the 51st Highland Division, and 21st
Army Group headquarters; H.M.S. Northway, loaded with
DUKWs; and 4 pre-loaded stores coasters had arrived as
planned during the afternoon, but in spite of the growing
accumulation of vessels, there was no sign of enemy air
activity - apart from a few Red warnings - and in fact
no air action took place over "JUNO" area till 0150 next
morning (7 June).
E. Force S2 - SWORD Area
-
SWORD Area - the easternmost in the British
Assault area - had been considered the most vulnerable to
enemy attack, both from the heavy batteries in the vicinity
of Havre and from light craft based on that port. For this
reason very powerful bombarding forces had been stationed
on its eastern flank. Actually, these forebodings proved
groundless in the early stages; beyond the loss of H.Nor,
M.S. Svenner and one L.C.I.(S), which was hit by shell fire
and blazing from stem to stern, the opening stages of the
assault were unbelievably unopposed. The air was full of
our bombers and fighters and the noise and smoke of our
bombardment. The enemy was obviously stunned by the sheer
weight of support we were meting out.3
--553--
-
The assault of Force S differed from the other
assaults in that the 3rd Division was landed on a one-brigade
front, whereas in the case of Force J and G each
division was landed on a two-brigade front. The points
chosen for the assault were in Queen Sector, northeast of
Colleville-sur-Orne. Assault Group S.3, under Captain
Bush, R.N., in H.M.S. Goatland was responsible for the
initial landing of the 8th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Cass)
on beaches Queen White and Red. Group S.2 (Captain Gotto,
R.N., in H.M.S. Dacres) - the intermediate group - with the
185th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Smith) closely followed
Group S.3, and Group S.1 (Captain Leggatt, R.N. in H.M.S.
Locust) with the 9th Brigade (Brigadier Cunningham) formed
the Reserve.
-
Weather conditions were recognized as being
unsuitable for swimming DD tanks, but it was decided to
launch them at 5000 yards.1
This decision was justified
by events; of the 40 tanks embarked, 34 were successfully
launched.2
Two sank immediately and one was rammed by an
overtaking L.C.T. (A.V.R.E.) the remaining 31 DDs touched
down at about 0730 and did valuable work. Many of these
had their engines swamped as their trim changed on beaching,
but they maintained their fire until the rising tide drowned
them, when the crews took to their dinghies and paddled
ashore. It is estimated that the DD tanks knocked out three
of four 75 mm. guns, four or five 50 mm and many 20 mm.
These guns were completely defiladed from the sea, and
destroyers were reporting them as neutralized or destroyed -
since no flashes were visible - while in fact they were very
much alive and only waiting for the first craft on which they
could bear..... Aimed fire from enemy guns actually on the
beaches, other than sniping from houses, is reputed to have
ceased by H plus 20 (0745). Brigadier Prior-Palmer,
commanding 27th Armoured Brigade, who was in the Headquarters
craft of the leaving group of Assault Group S.3. reported
that 23 of the DD tanks survived the beach battle.
--554--
-
The L.C.T. (AVRE) reduced speed to avoid overrunning
the DD tanks, but they were almost immediately
ordered by Captain Bush to proceed through them, and
reached the beach just after H-hour (0725); all the AVRE
tanks were landed by 0730, with the exception of those
in L.C.T. 947 in which one Flail was hit by a mortar shell
which detonated the bangalore torpedoes which it carried,
killing Lt. Col. A.D. Cooks, the Commander of the 5th
Assault Regiment, R.N., and putting two other tanks out of
action. The Infantry touched down within 5 minutes of the
AVRE. Opposition was slight and all troops were landed in
knee-deep water at the correct place and with few casualties.
-
The obstacles were much as had been expected, and
in general consisted of:
-
Two staggered rows of Hedgehogs, 150 yards
from the back of the beach.
-
Two irregular rows of stakes, 200 yards
from the back of the beach.
-
Clusters of ramps, 250 yards from the back
of the beach.
Teller mines or shells were attached to all of the above.
These devices were not as great an obstacle to the assault
as had been anticipated but "they most certainly would have
been if all craft had not been... instructed to drive their
craft in at full speed for the last mile of the approach."1
-
The L.C.T.(A) and L.C.T.(C.B.) had been late in
leaving the lowering position, but made up time on the run
in, and touched down on the flanks only five minutes after
H-hour. Their tanks were landed successfully and expeditiously
but two L.C.T.(A) on Red Beach were so severely hit that they
became total losses. All craft fired in support during the
final approaches; no opposition was met till about 3000 yards
from the beaches, when those on the eastern flank came under
fairly heavy mortar and machine gun fire. Only one L.C.T.
Hedgerow survived the passage; she hit the beach almost
immediately after firing her outfit, and her Commanding
Officer reported that her pattern extended right up the
beach, setting fire to one of the houses behind it.
--555--
-
On the beaches, considerable opposition was
encountered, particularly by the East Yorke on Red Beach.
At 0750 the Free French and A.O.4 Commandos touched down;
these suffered casualties from anti-tank guns and mortar
fire before they got ashore. By 0906 two exits had been
secured on White Beach , but there was considerable congestion
due to shelling, wrecked vehicles and soft sand. The
landing, however, was going well and the last groups of the
Assault Brigade touched down at 0943 - only 18 minutes late
on schedule. The Intermediate Brigade followed; but the
last groups of the Reserve Brigade had to be held up to
seaward for about 3 hours while the congestion on the
beaches was dealt with and did not get ashore till about
1600.
-
Meanwhile the landing craft had suffered considerably.
Although Captain Bush was able to report at 1153
"only 7 major craft destroyed so far" - a much greater number
was crippled and "only got off by dint of grim determination
and good seamanship. Indeed, the spirit in which these
crews endeavoured to save their damaged craft in great
difficulties of weather, obstacles, mines, mortar fire and
crowded foreshore makes good reading. Many were caught by
the tide and dried out but they continued firing their guns
at snipers in the houses and at enemy planes which were now
beginning to bomb and strafe the beaches in sneak raids
through the low clouds."1
These craft that succeeded in
unbeaching stood by those less fortunate and a large
number was hauled off, thanks to devotion to duty.
--556--
-
At 0930 H.M.S. Largs had shifted berth close
inshore and at 1535 Rear-Admiral Talbot landed to see
for himself how things were going. As he set foot on
shore, seven Ju.88's attacked the beaches; mortar fire
was continuous. More than 24 major landing craft were
stranded. There was still much congestion at the beach
exits - mainly caused by traffic blocks in the Ouistreham -
Lion-sur-Mer lateral road at the back of the beaches; the
resulting lack of transport had brought the unloading of
ammunition from four dried out stores L.C.T. to a standstill.
The Admiral remarked that "people were obviously
rather dazed and shaken. They were also very exhausted.
But the N.O.I.C. (Captain Legatt, R.N.) and the Commander,
101 Beach Sub-Area, (Colonel Montgomery) who had landed at
H plus 4 (1125) were competing bravely".1
-
On his return to the Largs, Rear-Admiral Talbot
arranged for Commander T.I.S. Bell, at that time Naval
Commander, Operations "Frog" and "Deer"2
to become Chief
Principal Beachmaster, and for Fleet working parties to be
sent ashore the following day to assist in clearing up the
beaches. Shortly before 2100, 6th June, the first 300
troop-carriers and towed gliders, lifting reinforcements to
the 6th Airborne Division started coming over Area "SWORD",
and landing on the right bank of the Orne some four miles
south of Ouistreham. A further contingent flew over some
20 minutes later - "a most impressive spectacle." At 2250
orders were given to smoke out the anchorage in anticipation
of a dusk air attack, which in fact developed half an hour
later. Most unfortunately this attack occurred immediately
prior to the arrival of the third and last wave of airborne troops.
--557--
-
Here was precisely the contingency foreseen by
Admiral Ramsay - - -. Light ack-ack ashore opened up
on some of the transport planes; certain merchant ships and
L.S.T. in the anchorage joined in and, despite repeated signals
to cease fire, at least two of the British aircraft
were shot down.
The Flagship of the Naval Commander,
Eastern Task Force, which was at anchor in "SWORD" area
at the time, was herself involved in this incident.
Admiral Vian records that at one moment a Ju.88 passed
down the side of the Scylla at masthead height; two
minutes later two Dakotas passed over at 1000 feet.
Visibility was good with a full moon and fortunately
they were recognized; but, on the request of the Naval
Commander, Eastern Task Force, 1
airborne operations of
this nature were in future confined to daylight hours.2
--558--
PART 5
THE ASSAULT ENDS: THE SITUATION AT H PLUS 24 HOURS
-
By the close of D-day the five Allied spearheads
were all successfully established on their respective
beach heads. In every area, reinforcements were
being landed apace. The forces ashore were being
braced against the expected enemy counter attack. The
Allied situation in Normandy at H plus 24 hours (0630
7th June) was as follows:
-
In the S Sector, the British 3rd Division
had been completely landed and had pushed
inland to a depth of 4 miles, capturing
Ouistreham and making contact with the
British 6th Airborne Division. The latter
had landed on the east banks of the river
Orne and secured intact the Benouville
bridges over the Orne River and Caen Canal.1
The British 3rd Division had also made
contact with the Canadian 3rd to the westward,
and held the line Perriers - Benouville.
--559--
-
The Canadian 3rd Division of Force J
had pushed up to 5 miles inland toward
Caen, established contact with the British
3rd on their left and the British 50th on
their right, and held a line running from Benny
to Cruelly.
-
In the G sector the British 50th Division
had advanced inland about 5 miles to a point
just east of Bayeux, and held a line from
there eastward to the J Sector where they were
in contact with the Canadians. It was not
until the 8th (D plus 2) that Bayeux was taken
nor until the 9th that contact was made with
the U.S. V-Corps from OMAHA Beach.
-
By nightfall on D-day, the V-Corps had
advanced scarcely a mile off the OMAHA Beach.
With the cliffs behind them they made
substantial progress during the night and by
mid-day on the 7th (D plus 1) they had
reached the Bayeux-Caranten road, some 4
miles inland. They made contact with the
British 50th Division to the eastward on the
9th and with the VII Corps to the westward
on the 10th (D plus 4) after a desperate
resistance by the Germans in the vicinity of
the Vire Estuary.
--560--
-
The VII Corps in the UTAH Sector had
rapidly consolidated a beach head 4000
yards long, driven inland some 5 miles
and joined the 101 airborne division by
nightfall of D-day. By H plus 24 hours,
they had also made contact with the 82nd
Airborne Division in the St. Mere Eglise
area. These two Airborne Divisions, which
had been landed over a period of 24 hours
beginning at about H minus 4 to 5 hours, had
successfully, though at considerable expense,
accomplished their mission. They had
captured the crossing of the Douvre River,
prevented the flooding of the Vire marshes
and had assisted the seabourne landing on
UTAH beach.1
--561--
-
In the air the enemy were equally unsuccessful
in disturbing the process of invasion. Between 3 o'clock
on D-day, when the first air attack against shipping was
made, until H plus 24 hours, only 85 aircraft, most of them
mine layers, were sent against the Allied forces in the
Bay of the Seine. Fifteen of these were destroyed.
-
Naval actions during the first 24 hours prospered
equally. By nightfall on D-day, the minesweepers had
completed the sweeping of the inner anchorages, shipping
was moved close inshore, and the area screen set. The
night passed quietly with only two small air raids and a half
hearted E/R boat attack on the eastern flank at 0336 o'clock.
This was beaten off with two German craft destroyed and no
injury to Allied vessels.1
The enemy also launched an E-boat
attack against the east wall of the Spour, but this too was
turned back, with the loss of two German craft and no loss
to the Allies.2
-
Summarizing the events of D-day, Admiral Ramsay
said: "The outstanding fact, from the Naval point of view,
was that, despite the unfavourable weather, in every main
essential the plan was carried out as written. Tactical
surprise, which had not been expected, was achieved and
greatly eased the problem of getting ashore in every sector
except at OMAHA. Losses of ships and landing craft of all
types were much lower than had been expected, but damage to
L.C.T. and smaller craft, aggravated by rough weather conditions
was higher than had been allowed for.- - - - - By the end of
D-day immediate anxiety was felt on only one count - whether
the weather would improve sufficiently quickly to enable the
build-up to start as planned."
--562--
Table of Contents
Previous Section **
Next Section
Footnotes:
p.487 #1
ANCXF Report, Vol. I, page 56, para. 1.
p.487 #2
(1) During the passage the weather in the channel was: wind
W.S.W. Force 5 veering W.N.W. decreasing in force at times
but with strong gusts; waves were 5 to 6 feet in mid channel.
(2) During the assaults the weather off the Normandy beaches
was: wind W.N.W. force 4; sea, moderate, waves 3 to 4 feet;
sky fair to cloudy with cloud increasing.
p.488 #1
ANCXF report Vol. 1. page 57 para. 11.
p.489 #1
Admiral Ramsay further said: "Although the unfavorable
weather caused difficulties and damage to craft off the
beaches later, the advantages gained by surprise were so
striking that your (SCAEF's) decision to go on despite the
weather was amply justified. A postponement of one more day,
e.g., till 7 June, would, in the event have proved disastrous
owing to the conditions of sea off the beaches. The problems
arising out of a postponement of 12 to 14 days to the next
suitable period are too appalling even to contemplate." See
ANCXF report Vol. 1 page 10 para. 33.
p.489 #2
Judging from the time, and number of vessels, the ten vessels
reported must have been minesweepers of Force G.
p.489 #3
A group of 36 submarines based on the West Coast of France,
earmarked for use against the Invasion.
p.490 #1
These Flotillas left Cherbourg at 0445, but bad weather
compelled them to return at first light.
p.490 #2
Admiralty NID 24/T 65/45 page 46. General Eisenhower's report
comments on these matters as follows: "The weather was
not the only circumstance surrounding the Allied landings
which was contrary to the enemy's expectations. Apparently
he had assumed that we should make our attempt only when there
was a new moon and on a high tide, and that in choosing the
place of main assault we should pick the immediate neighborhood
of a good harbor and avoid cliffs and shallows, dangerous
waters. In point of fact, we assaulted shortly after low
tide, when the moon was full; we landed away from large harbors
and at some points below sheer cliffs; and the waters
through which we approached the shore were so strewn with
reefs and subjected to strong currents that the German Naval
experts had earlier declared them to be impassable for landing
craft."
p.490 #3
ANCXF Report Vol. 1 page 56 para. 3.
p.491 #1
In his report, Rear Admiral Hall commented on this point as
follows: "From an examination of the beach defenses, and
from the action of the defenders, it appears that the German
defenses except obstructions were directed entirely against
troops on or near the beaches and not against shipping or
against boats until they were very close to the beaches. Casemated
guns, pillboxes and machine guns were almost all sited
to fire up and down the beach instead of out to sea. In many
cases they were constructed so that they were invisible from
seaward. All were difficult to detect. As a result, even
though photographic reconnaissance was very thorough and usually
correct, ships were unable to pick out all the positions
in the areas assigned them. Further, the time available for
pre-landing bombardment was not sufficient for the destruction
of beach targets. German technique permitted the attacking
units which got past the mines and underwater obstacles to get
on the beach and then endeavored to wipe them out by the fire
of automatic weapons and light artillery."
p.491 #2
ANCXF Report vol. 1 page 59, paragraph 21.
p.491 #3
Landing Craft losses during the assault were 131 LCT, 22 LCI(S),
21 LCI(L), 117 LCA.
p.491 #4
Admiral Ramsay went on to say, "the rate of landing will always
be governed by the availability of exits. During planning,
ANCXF's staff went to some pains to persuade Army opinion that
it was utterly wrong to gauge what could be put ashore in the
assaults by performance in unopposed exercises, in the hope
that the Army would agree to phasing back a proportion of the
L.S.T. to later convoys. If this advice had been accepted
fewer L.S.T. would have sailed with the Assault Forces, which
then would not have been encumbered with so many Rhino Ferries."
p.493 #1
See General Eisenhower's Report, p.30.
p.494 #1
The major units of this force were:
Battleships |
1 |
L.C.I. |
47 |
Monitors |
1 |
L.C.T. |
150 |
Cruisers |
5 |
L.C.M. and L.C.C. |
6 |
Gunboats |
1 |
Minor Landing Craft L.C.A. & L.C.V.P. L.C.A. (HR), L.C.S. (M),
L.C.S.(S) |
83 |
Fleet Destroyers |
16 |
Destroyer Escorts |
2 |
Frigates |
2 |
Corvettes |
2 |
Minor Support Craft |
12 |
Patrol Craft |
7 |
Landing Craft Flock |
4 |
Trawlers (A/S) |
3 |
Landing Craft Guns (L) |
4 |
Motor Torpedo Boats |
1 |
L.C.T. (A) |
8 |
P.T.'s. |
1 |
L.C.T. (R) |
5 |
S.C's. |
7 |
L.C.P. (L) Smoke |
18 |
Coast Guard Cutters |
15 |
L.C.M. |
67 |
Motor Launches |
7 |
L.C.M. (Salvage) |
6 |
H.D. Motor Launches |
3 |
L.C.V.P. |
88 |
Fleet M/S |
25 |
L.B.V. |
36 |
Y.M.S. (BYMS) |
16 |
L.B.O. |
10 |
Dan Layers |
8 |
L.B.E. |
3 |
Mine Sweeping M/L |
8 |
L.B.W. |
2 |
APA, LSI, Hq. Ships etc. |
5 |
L.B.K. |
2 |
L.S.T. |
30 |
Fueling Trawlers. |
4 |
p.497 #1
The assembly points, convoy formation and timing of Force U
is shown in the following table.
Convoy No. |
Composition |
Assembly Port |
Sortie |
Speed |
Arrd. off UTAH Beach |
U-1A |
1 BB, 3 CA, 2 CL, 4 DD. |
Belfast |
H-44 1030 3 June |
12 Kts. |
0229 5 June |
1 APA, 1 PT, 1 DD. |
Plymouth |
H-20 0930 5 June |
12 Kts. |
2 LCH, 2 PC. |
Dartmouth |
H-17 1230 5 June |
12 Kts. |
2 APA, 1 LSI, 2 DD. |
Tor Bay |
H-17 1230 5 June |
12 Kts. |
1 BM. |
Weymouth Bay |
H-13 1730 5 June |
12 Kts. |
2 USCGC. |
Poole |
H-13 1730 5 June |
12 Kts. |
U-1B |
14 LCI(L), 2 YMS, 1 DD. |
Plymouth |
1500 5 June |
11 Kts. |
0730 6 June |
17 LCI(L), 1 SC. |
Salcombe |
1635 5 June |
11 Kts. |
5 LCI(L). |
Torquay |
1815 5 June |
11 Kts. |
4 USCGC. |
Poole |
2055 5 June |
11 Kts. |
U-2A(1) |
1 LCI(L), 4 LCF, 4 LCT(R), 4 LCG, 8 LCT(A), 3 ML, 16 LCP(L). |
Salcombe |
1653 3 June |
5 Kts. |
0230 6 June |
16 LCT, 4 LCC, 50 LCM, 2 PC, 1 SC. |
Dartmouth |
1745 3 June |
5 Kts. |
3 LCM (Salvage) |
Portland |
0430 4 June |
5 Kts. |
1 DD. |
Plymouth |
1700 3 June |
5 Kts. |
U-2A(2) |
1 LCI(L), 1 PC, 85 LCT, 1 SC, 51 LCT, 2 PC |
Dartmouth |
2058 3 June |
5 Kts. |
0330 6 June |
1 SC. |
Brixham |
1833 3 June |
5 kts. |
1 PG, 2 DD, 5 YMS, 1 AT. |
Plymouth |
1515 3 June |
5 kts. |
U-2B |
2 DD, 1 AT, 1 ATR. |
Plymouth |
1430 3 June |
|
0200 6 June |
5 LST, 5 RHF |
Dartmouth |
1543 3 June |
5 kts. |
U-3 |
2 SC |
Salcombe |
0605 5 June |
5 kts. |
1430 6 June |
5 LST, 5 RHF |
Dartmouth |
0830 5 June |
5 kts. |
11 LST, 1 RHF,1 DD, 4 USCGC, 2 Corvettes, 2 A/S Trawlers |
Tor Bay |
At Pt.D 1004 5 June |
5 kts. |
4 USCGC |
Poole |
At Pt.F 5 June |
5 kts. |
U-4 |
9 LST. |
Salcombe |
1930 5 June |
5 kts. |
0900 7 June |
8 Pontoon Causeways |
Salcombe |
1930 5 June |
5 kts. |
8 Blisters |
Salcombe |
1930 5 June |
5 kts. |
1 Repair Barge |
Salcombe |
1930 5 June |
5 kts. |
3 A/S Trawlers |
Plymouth |
1630 5 June |
5 kts. |
U-5 |
18 LBV. |
Yarmouth |
1630 5 June |
4 kts. |
1630 6 June |
20 LBO, 4 LBE. |
Poole |
1630 5 June |
4 kts. |
3 LBW, 20 LCM |
Poole |
1630 5 June |
4 kts. |
5 Fuelling Trawlers |
Portland |
1600 5 June |
4 kts. |
2 ML. |
Poole |
1430 5 June |
4 kts. |
U-6 |
18 LBV, 190 ML. |
Yarmouth |
0530 5 June |
4 kts. |
1030 7 June |
4 LBE, 2 LBK, 2ML. |
Poole |
0500 5 June |
4 kts. |
UM-1 |
11 YMS, 8 MMS. |
Plymouth |
2400 4 June |
8 kts. |
0330 6 June |
11 AM. |
Tor Bay |
0632 5 June |
8 kts. |
0040 6 June |
6 PT. |
Portland |
1130 5 June |
8 kts. |
0330 6 June |
UM-2 |
4 ML, 8 FM. |
Plymouth |
1715 4 June |
8 kts. |
0015 6 June |
4 Dan Layers, 7 HDML. |
Plymouth |
1715 4 June |
8 kts. |
|
|
3 PT. |
Portland |
0400 5 June |
8 kts. |
|
|
UM-3 |
4 ML, 8 FM. |
Plymouth |
2300 4 June |
8 kts. |
2130 5 June |
3 PT. |
Portland |
1000 5 June |
8 kts. |
p.499 #1
ANCXF's report. Vol. 1 page 9 paragraph 30.
p.500 #1
Report of CinC Plymouth.
p.501 #1
At first it was thought that PC 1261 had been hit by enemy
batteries but as no shot was observed to fall in the area,
and it was later discovered that the Cardonet minefield
was located in that area it was concluded in the end that
she probably struck a mine.
p.502 #1
U's bombarding group was Bombardment Force A which consisted
of the following vessels:
Bombarding Force A. |
Destroyers. |
Support Craft |
Nevada, Quincy, Erebus, Prince, Enterprise, Soemba |
Fitch, Corry, Forrest, Hobson, Baldwin, Cherardi |
4 L.C.G.(L)
4 L.C.F.
5 L.C.T.(R)
8 L.C.T.(A) |
p.504 #1
Report of NC Force U, in ANCXF report vol. III page 31, para 3.
p.504 #2
In his report Rear Admiral Moon commented on enemy gunfire
as follows: "The losses on the initial assault on the
beach were small. This is attributed largely to emphasis
placed upon heavy gunfire support and the effective work
of the Bombardment Group in providing it. Intelligence indicated
extremely heavy enemy defenses against landings on
Utah Beach. The 28 batteries defending Utah Beach consisted
of 111 guns of medium to heavy calibre. Information obtained
from air reconnaissance indicated that at least 75 per
cent of these guns were effective at the time of the assault,
despite extensive pre-D-day bombing. Examination of captured
batteries indicates that approximately 50 percent of the guns
were still operational after capture. The neutralization of
these formidable batteries by the Bombardment Group was so
effective that these batteries offered little opposition to
either the assault or follow-up. As a result, all landings
of troops, equipment and supplies were accomplished with
minor losses. In addition the Bombardment Group effectively
supported ground forces on numerous fire call missions during
the entire period."
p.505 #1
Admiralty Report on the German War Effort (NID.24/T65/45)
contains, along with other materials, a translation of the
"Headline Diary" of meetings and reports of the German Naval
C's in C and with Hitler. Much talk of the new secret (pressure
acoustic and pressure magnetic mines) appears during
the months before invasion. It appears that the first use
of these mines was in the Cardonet Bank in June 1944. It will
be recalled that when first employed the allies had no means
of sweeping them. Rear Admiral Moon, in his usual thorough
manner, had assured the sweeping of those parts of the Cardonet
Bank to be used by his forces, before sending them in. The
rapid loss of these fine ships in swept waters distressed
Rear Admiral Moon considerably.
p.505 #2
This is in marked contrast to Force O which was almost completely
immune from mine losses.
p.505 #3
From the date of the second sortie until NC Force U withdrew
on D-plus-18, casualties to ships and craft of Force U were
as follows:
Corry (DD) |
6 June |
Sunk |
Enemy shellfire, or mined |
Glennon (DD) |
8 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
Meredith (DD) |
8 June |
Sunk |
Mined, or possible glider bomb |
Jeffers (DD) |
7 June |
Slight damage. |
Enemy shellfire |
Rich (DE) |
8 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
LCT 967 |
13 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
LCT 362 |
6 June |
Sunk |
Cause undetermined, probably mined |
LCT 597 |
6 June |
Sunk |
Cause undetermined, probably mined |
LCT 777 |
6 June |
Sunk |
Cause undetermined, probably mined |
LCT 486 |
7 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
LCT 458 |
7 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
LCT 447 |
15 June |
Damaged |
Near miss shellfire while beached |
LCT(A)2310 |
7 June |
Damaged |
Shellfire |
*AM 56 (Osprey) |
5 June |
Sunk |
Mined or torpedo enroute to UTAH area. |
AM 125 (Tide) |
7 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
PC 1261 |
6 June |
Sunk |
Enemy shellfire, or mined |
LST 496 |
11 June |
Sunk |
Probably mined |
LST 499 |
8 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
LST 381 |
14 June |
Damaged |
Ran aground, causeway |
MMS 297 |
17 June |
Damaged |
Acoustic mine |
LST 292 |
17 June |
Damaged |
Damaged hull while beaching |
MMS 229 |
13 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
YMS 377 |
17 June |
Damaged |
Near mine explosion |
SS Glenroy LSI(L) |
17 June |
Damaged |
Near mine explosion |
LCI 232 |
7 June |
Sunk |
|
*LCI(L) 219 |
11 June |
Sunk |
Bombed en route Utah area |
LCF 31 |
6 June |
Sunk |
Cause undetermined, probably mined |
HMS Minster |
8 June |
Sunk |
Mined |
*Susan B. Anthony |
7 June |
Sunk |
Mined en route to Utah area |
SS Charles Morgan |
10 June |
Sunk |
Bombed |
* Not in Assault Area.
p.506 #1
In his report, General Eisenhower has commented on Force U's
assault as follows: "The American 4th Division (VII Corps)
assault on the Utah beaches just west of the Vire Estuary,
met with the least opposition of any of our landings. Moreover,
an error in navigation turned out to be an asset, since
the obstacles were fewer where the troops actually went ashore
than on the sector where they had been intended to beach. The
enemy had apparently relied upon the flooding of the rear areas
here to check any force which might attempt a landing, and the
beaches themselves were only lightly held. Complete surprise
was achieved and a foothold was obtained with minimum casualties
although it was here that we had expected our greatest
losses. The airborne troops having seized the causeways through
the inundated hinterland and prevented the enemy from bringing
up reinforcements, the 4th Division struck northwest toward
Montebourg, on the road to Cherbourg.
p.507 #1
The following account is an extract from the Report of NC
Force O contained in ANCXF report vol. III page 3 to 8 para 3
to 17. A certain amount of material has been transferred
from text to footnote.
p.507 #2
Major units were:
Transports | Landing Craft | Bombardment Ships |
4 APA
3 XAP
2 LSI(L)
3 LSI(S)
3 LSI(H)
|
|
24 LST
91 LCT(6)
40 LCT(5)
2 LCT(4)
33 LCI(L)
4 LCH
5 LCC
|
|
2 BB 3 CL |
Gunfire Support Craft | Escort Craft | Minesweepers |
5 LCG(L)
7 LCF
9 LCT(R)
34 LCP(L)
8 LCT(A)
6 LCT(H.E.)
|
|
9 DD
3 Hunt DD
1 DE
2 ODD
2 Frigates
6 SGB
9 PC
5 970-ML
7 ML
2 HDML
6 SC
3 A/S Trawlers |
|
16 MS
4 ML
6 Danlayers
8 BYMS
8 MMS
|
|
Miscellaneous Ships and Craft |
1 ACC (Flagship)
1 DD (Relief Flagship)
1 LSD
15 USCG Rescue Craft
9 Dispatch Boats
1 PT (Dispatch Boat-Flag)
1 Accommodation Ship
1 ARL
12 LCM (CRU)
|
|
Ferry Craft: *86 LCT(5 and 6), 20 RHF, 119 LCM(3),
72 LBV(2). |
Service Craft:9 Fuelling Trawlers, 16 LBE,
20 LBO, 5 LSW, 2 LBK, 1 Pontoon Drydock |
* After the LCT(5 and 6)s completed their mission
they became part of the Far Shore Ferry Service in both
the U.S. and British Sectors. These LCT(5 and 6)s
were included in the Landing Craft listed above.
p.511 #1
This paragraph appears in Report of NC Force "O", Part V,
Para. 10, given in ANCXF Report Vol. III, Pages 53 and 54.
p.512 #1
Report of NC Force O, Part I, Para. 7.
p.513 #1
Force O's bombardment force (bombarding Force C) was
comprised of the following ships and craft:
Bombarding Force C | Destroyers | Support Craft |
Texas (Flag, R.A. C.F. Bryant)
Arkansas, Glasgow, Montcalm (Flag R.A. Jaujard)
Georges Leygues
|
Frankford, McCook,
Carmick, Doyle,
Endicott, Baldwin,
Harding, Satterlee,
Thomson, Tanaside,
Talybont, Melbreak
|
5 LCG(L)
7 LCF
9 LCT(R)
8 LCTA
8 LCT(HE)
|
p.514 #1
Prior to sortie, the disposition of the Force was as follows:
a. At PORTLAND-WEYMOUTH: |
4 APAs
3 XAPs
3 LSI(S)s
3 LSI(H)s
33 LCI(L)s
3 LCHs
24 LSTs
1 FDT
20 Rhino Ferries
147 LCTs
1 LSD
5 LCCs
15 USCG Cutters
3 DEs
1 PT
9 US DDs
3 Hunt DDs
7 MTB
|
6 LCM (CRU)s
19 LCM (NCDU)s
32 LCP(L)s
2 Br.ODDs
2 Fr.Frigates
7 PCs
4 SCs
3 ML - 970s
3 MLs
2 HDMLs
5 SGBs
18 MSs
6 Danlayers
8 MLs (Navigational Leaders for MSs)
8 BYMSs
9 MMSs
1 ARL
1 Accomodation Ship
|
b. At POOLE: |
1 LCH
5 LCG(L)s
9 LCT(R)s
7 LCFs
17 LCM (NCDU)s
83 LCMs
6 LCM (CRU)s
8 Seaplane Tenders
72 LBV (2)s
|
20 LBOs
5 LBWs
16 LBEs
2 LBKs
9 Fueling Trawlers
2 ML - 970s
4 MLs
2 PCs
2 SCs
|
c. At BELFAST: |
2 BBs
3 CLs
|
d. At EXMOUTH: |
3 A/S Trawlers
|
e. At FALMOUTH: |
1 Pontoon Drydock
|
p.516 #1
The position of the U transport area was 23,000 yards
from the beach, and that of O was 20,000 yards. (see
Report of NCWTF - contained in ANCXF Report Vol.III,
page 99.) In his report Admiral Ramsay said:
"It was always the intention to make the
'Lowering Positions' as near the beaches as
it was thought the enemy long range coastal
batteries would permit. In the Eastern Task
Force area they were therefore established
seven miles from the shore. The U.S. forces,
however, preferred to select positions 11
miles from the Coast. Actually it was found
that the LSI of the Eastern Task Force were not
menaced by enemy fire, and the reduction of the
length of the LCA trip to the beach must have
been most welcome to the British troops in the
unpleasant conditions that obtained.
"It is worthy of note that the A.P.A. of the
Western Task Force reached their lowering
positions at 4½ hours before H-hour. This was
at least 1½ hours earlier than the arrival
of the L.S.I. in the British area. This was
necessary:
-
because of the longer distance
from the lowering positions to the
beach, and,
-
because these ships have a larger
boat carrying capacity than the
average L.S.I. and more time is
therefore required for the "lowering"
and marshalling of the Assault craft.
Although one can fully sympathise with the
decisions of the U.S. Forces, in the light of
events it was unfortunate that the A.P.A. did
not anchor closer, and it is considered that
immunity from coastal batteries should not be
given undue weight in the selection of the
lowering positions, especially when adequate
naval counter battery fire is available."
Rear-Admiral Hall commented on the great distance from the
transport area to the beaches as follows:
"Information from Intelligence sources indicated
that there were extensive minefields outside of
and probably in the Bay of the Seine; in fact,
on the basis of the best information available,
it appeared that part of the channels leading
to Force O's Transport Area and the Transport
Area itself lay in a minefield. The location
of the Transport Area in such a spot rather than
further inshore in water which was thought to be
clear of mines was dictated by the desire of the
Force Commander to keep Transports of the Force
out of range of two enemy heavy batteries ashore.
As matters turned out, neither the mines nor the
batteries proved dangerous, and the Transport
Area could have been moved in to half its actual
distance from the shore with impunity. (See Report
NC Force O, Part V, Para. 17A, contained in ANCXF
Report, Vol.III, Page 65.)
p.519 #1
H-hour for Force O was 0630.
p.519 #2
In part V. of his Report NC Force "O" further described
the situation with respect to obstacles as follows:
"When it first became apparent that obstacles in
appreciable numbers were appearing on the OMAHA
Beaches, special plans for breaching them were
devised jointly by the V Corps and the Eleventh
Amphibious Force and submitted to C.T.F.122, and
the 1st U.S. Army, respectively. It was not until
the latter part of April, however, nearly a month
later, that approval of these plans was obtained, and
troops made available for the special training
necessary to their execution. Briefly, the plan
called for demolition teams consisting of both Army
and Naval personnel landing immediately after a wave
of tanks and a wave of infantry, and opening gaps
through the obstacles using demolition charges and
tank dozers. The time of landing was calculated
so that, theoretically, the demolition parties
would have a minimum of twenty minutes before the
rising tide reached the bases of the seaward band
of obstacles; all of which were believed to be
uncovered at low tide. This was decided because
it was believed to be impossible to remove
obstacles actually underwater in any quantity
within the probable time available in an assault;
this without even taking into consideration the
interference from enemy fire. The Force Commander
would have preferred to land at low tide or even
one hour before low tide in order to have allowed
the demolition parties more time to deal with the
obstacles and to afford some leeway in the event that
landing was delayed. Unfortunately, in this respect
the requirements on the OMAHA Beaches conflicted
with those on the British Force J Beach, where it
was believed necessary to have a minimum of nine
or ten feet above the low water mark in order to
permit the landing craft to pass over rocks offshore.
To allow each Force to have attacked at
its most favourable state of the tide would have
meant widely staggering the time of H-hour, and
might possibly have required major changes in
the plan because of the minesweeper problem and
the limited period of darkness at this time of the
year. Therefore, a limit was placed upon the
difference between the earliest and latest time
of landing of the several assault forces, and the
time chosen for Force O was the earliest permitted.
Whether or not the demolition parties could have
breached the obstacles as planned had the landing
been made at or before low water instead of on a
rising tide is problematical. As it was, the Navy
demolition parties suffered 41 per cent casualties,
and it is understood that the Army demolition
parties casualties were about the same. Had they
worked for a longer period exposed to enemy fire,
it is possible that they might have been virtually
annihilated, and still not have accomplished their
mission"
(See Report NC Force "O" as given ANCXF Report Vol.III,
Page 54, Par. 10A.)
p.521 #1
In Section V of his Report, NC Force "O" further
described the situation as follows:
"The assault sections of both the 116th and 16th
regiments were held up on the beaches by enemy mortar,
light artillery, automatic weapons, and small arms fire.
This fire was being delivered from strong points
located at the top of the cliffs and bluffs, overlooking
the beaches and from mortars a little further
inland. Although Shore Fire Control Parties were
landed at H plus 30 minutes, they were in many cases
unable to set up their equipment because of casualties
and enemy fire.
At this juncture the destroyers Carmick, Doyle,
McCook, Thompson, Frankford, Harding, Emmons, and
Baldwin, and the three British Hunts, Melbreak,
Talybont and Tanatside, closed the beach and took
under fire many of the enemy positions. Their fire
was directed in part from the ships and in part
from Shore Fire Control Parties which managed to set up
communications. Two much credit cannot be given the
destroyers which participated in this bombardment.
Lacking complete knowledge of their own troops' positions,
and hard pressed to pick out enemy positions, they closed in
some cases to within 800 yards of the beach. Position after
position was taken under direct fire. It is certain that
they destroyed many of the enemy positions, and it is
probable that without their assistance the casualties on the
beach would have been considerably higher. Heavier ships
joined in the fire but for the most part fired with
airspot at targets designated by the S.F.C.P.s or planes".
p.522 #2
At this juncture arrangements were considered to land
a part of Force "O" through Force G's beaches. But,
as will be seen, this proved unnecessary as the 1st
Division fought its way off the beach by early afternoon.
(See ANCXF report Vol.I, p.12, para.46.)
p.523 #1
"The Germans had an elaborate system of tunnels which it
was not practicable to clear out at this time even had its
full extent and nature been realized. Observers in these
tunnels were able to spot for field artillery in the rear
of the beaches with devastating accuracy. The Germans continued
to hold their fire until LCTs and LCI(L)s hit
the beach, and then opened up. Evidently their guns were
registered on the beaches; in any event their fire was very
successful. In addition to 88 mm. and 75 mm. fire the
Germans used 200 lb. oil filled incendiary rockets.
At least one LCT was hit by one of these rockets
just as unloading was commenced. The craft was
totally destroyed. This artillery and mortar fire was
very difficult to stop and continued with decreasing
intensity throughout the afternoon of D plus 1 day.
Fortunately in the later stages it was mostly directed
against the Gooseberries and against the beach area in
general rather than against specific LCTs and
vehicles on the beaches."
(See Report of NC Force O in Vol.III of ANCXF Report, P.58.)
p.525 #1
End of extract from Part I of Report of NC Force O.
p.526 #1
The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Texas, regretted that,
owing to a lack of visual communication with the Rangers,
he had not known of their plight at H-hour. Had he done so,
the enemy could have been kept down by gunfire until the
Rangers had scaled the cliff and over-run the area. The
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Satterlee, also remarked "We
should never have eased up enough to allow the enemy time
enough to get out of their hiding places. This mistake
can be attributed to two causes: lack of experience of the
Commanding Officer in actual shore bombardment and overconfidence
in the effectiveness of the air bombardment."
From this experience the provisional lesson was drawn that
"naval gunfire support should conform to the movement of
the landing boats rather than adhere to a pre-determined
schedule." (See Cominch P-006 June 1944.)
Rear Admiral Vian had made provision for this sort of
contingency. His orders directed that "fire is not to
be checked or shifted at the pre-arranged time of touchdown,
unless the craft have in fact arrived at the beach".
(See ONEAST 8, para 16.)
p.527 #1
Satterlee, Thompson, Harding and Boston (DD's).
p.527 #2
Report of NC Force "O", Part I, in Vol.III, ANCXF
Report, Page 8, Para.18.
p.528 #1
Commenting generally on the use of Rangers and Commandos,
Admiral Ramsay said "A daylight assault limited
considerably the use which could be made of Commandos
and Rangers, as the desire to achieve tactical surprise
as far as possible prevented night landings before H-hour.
On the British front Commandos were therefore
landed during the assault to cover the ground on the
flanks; in most cases they passed through the same
beaches as the Assault Troops. On the U.S. Front some
Rangers were landed on, and effected the early capture
of the Marcouf Islands, whilst the remainder attacked
the battery situated on Pointe du Hoc..... It was
certainly unfortunate that these highly trained troops
should have suffered heavy casualties getting ashore
(i.e. during a period over which they could have little
control). The difficulty in getting ashore bicycles,
handcarts and the like from L.C.I. has been stressed many
times before, but it is a hard lesson to learn"..... As
regards LCI(S) "a high percentage of these lightly built
craft were virtually thrown away and few in consequence
were used as planned in the "Build-up" as ferry craft
for personnel and as control craft. Similarly, in the
OMAHA Sector, landings were only effected with considerable
loss of craft and casualties to the Rangers. The battery
at the Pointe du Hoc upon which so much effort was
expended, was found to be unoccupied, the guns having been
moved to an alternative position to the rear, and the
Rangers, after a magnificent feat of cliff scaling,
became isolated, and could only be supported with the
greatest difficulty."
"From Naval Reports it is not possible to judge what
these landings achieved, but the crux of the matter was
that there were greater Ranger and Commando forces
available than were really suitable tasks for them".
(See ANCXF Report Vol.1, Page 60, para.26, 27 & 28.)
p.529 #1
Report of NC Force O in ANCXF Report, Vol.III, page 65.
p.530 #1
During the first 22 days, casualties to ships and
craft of Force "O" were:-
-
Ships: One lost; one damaged.
U.S.S. Susan B. Anthony (AP 72) mined and
sunk D plus 1 while en route from OMAHA
area to UTAH area.
U.S.S. Harding (DD 625) Propellers damaged
by under-water obstruction.
-
LST's: 4 lost, 3 damaged.
-
LCI(L)'s: 5 lost, 17 damaged.
-
LCT(5 and 6) 13 lost, 78 damaged.
-
Small Craft: 23 LCM's lost; 130 LCVP's lost.
-
Miscellaneous: 3 S.C.'s damaged; 2 USCG
Rescue Vessels damaged; 4 LCF's damaged.
The above figures include losses in the great storm
of 19 to 23 June (D plus 13 to D plus 17) which
proved almost as costly in ships and craft as the
initial invasion.
p.531 #1
This is the figure for the first 22 days. The breakdown
is as follows:
Total officers dead
Total enlisted men dead
Total officers wounded
Total enlisted men wounded
Total officers missing
Total enlisted men missing
Total dead, wounded & missing
|
12
95
41
272
16
188
-------
624
|
The above figure included naval shore parties. Special
mention should be made of the Naval Combat Demolition
Units which struggled so bravely with the beach obstacles.
NCDU losses were:
Dead:
Wounded:
Missing:
Total:
|
24
32
15
71
|
(4 officers and 20 men)
(3 officers and 29 men)
(0 officers and 15 men)
(7 officers and 64 men)
|
This was 41 per cent of their strength.
p.532 #1
Report of NC Force O, Part V, Para. 10. Contained in
ANCXF Report, Vol.III, Page 54.
p.533 #1
While this narrative is primarily concerned with
giving an account of the Royal Navy in Operation
NEPTUNE, it also gives full weight to the part
played by the United States Navy, and is indeed
more vivid and less lengthy than the one given
in the preceding section.
p.534 #1
On the night of 5th/6th June, under the combined effect
of wind and tidal streams some craft had to allow as
much as 40° to make good and track desired.
p.535 #1
Admiral Ramsay subsequently remarked, "...that the decision
of the Supreme Commander to launch the assaults under such
conditions was the correct one has never been questioned.
An unfortunate doctrine had, however, been given full
promulgation during planning, particularly in Army circles,
namely, that fine weather and a calm sea were essential
for the assault. In retrospect, with the experience of
operation "Husky" still fresh in our minds, and with the
knowledge of the fickleness of the weather in the Channel,
this should never have been allowed."- - - ANCXF Rept.Vol.1,
p.57.
p.535 #2
ANCXF Report, Vol.11, p.3, Report of NCETF. Rear Admiral
Vian added - "It may probably be that the weather conditions
had some part in what must ever be a matter for wonder that
the embarkation, sailing and passage of the Force by any
should have been carried through without so great a movement
being detected by a well-equipped, prepared and determined
enemy. That this should have been achieved is a lasting
tribute to the admirable work of the Allied Air Force and
the excellence of the cover plan." It is now known that
the German meteorological officers had in fact informed the
German Command that invasion would not be possible on the
5th or 6th [of] June on account of stormy weather which was
expected to last for several days.
p.536 #1
H.M.S. Wrestler had done useful service during the night
in rounding up stragglers and guiding stray groups into
the correct channels. The Commanding Officer had
appreciated that the importance of the punctual arrival
of these groups outweighed the risk to his ship by
operating in unswept waters." - - -
Commodore Oliver's report, p.4, ANCXF Report Vol.III.
p.539 #1
Rear-Admiral Vian subsequently remarked that the fact that
it was not possible to stop the aircraft from laying smoke
probably enabled the German torpedo boats, (who were
accompanied by Trawlers) to make their escape, and
recommended that in future direct communication between
smoke laying aircraft and the unit being screened should be
arranged.
p.539 #2
ANCXF Report, Vol.II, Report of NC Force S, pp.15,16.
p.540 #1
The attack was carried out by the 5th Torpedo Boat
Flotilla, 15 torpedoes in all being fired. According
to the Germans only minor damage was sustained by the
Torpedo boats; but the 15th Patrol Flotilla, stationed
off Havre, "ran into heavy enemy fire" under which one
vessel sank, after striking a mine.
p.540 #2
Rear-Admiral Talbot remarked that it was a pleasant
surprise that the congestion anticipated with such
large number of ships - mine-sweepers - destroyers - L.S.I.
anchored or waiting in the lowering position, and the
steady stream of Landing Craft steaming in two columns,
one either side of the L.S.I. - was no problem at all.
p.540 #3
This battery came to life again later and was engaged by
the Argonaut. It was subsequently found that 2 guns had
been put out of action by direct hits with 6" shell
through the embrasures. These hits must be attributed to
chance, since the density of craters around the guns was
not high. The remaining 2 guns were undamaged, though in
one case the casemate had been hit. In all, 150 round of
6" (Ajax) and 29 round of 5.25 (Argonaut) were fired at
Longues battery.
p.541 #1
Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian remarked - "The inability
of the enemy on the eastern flank to find or hold the
range may have been due to the Radar counter measure,
which included "window" and R.C.W. balloons... planted
in clumps to the north-eastward of the bombarding ships.
Some of these balloons were seen to be engaged by shore
batteries" - ANCXF Report Vol.II, Report by the Naval
Commander, Eastern Task Force p.7.
p.542 #1
An exception was the Ranger landing at Pointe du Hoc which
was 35 minutes late owing to an error of the control
vessel in mistaking Raz de la Perce for Pointe du Hoc.
p.542 #2
Specialists Hydrographic teams in L.C.P.(sy) and U.S. scout
teams in L.C.S. were provided to assist the Leading
Headquarters Landing Craft.
p.542 #3
This immunity was attributed to the numbing of the pre-H-hour
bombardment, Allied superiority in the air,
counter battery fire and perhaps in part to the poor
quality of the enemy troops manning the coast defenses.
p.543 #1
Admiral Ramsay subsequently remarked that there was nothing
but praise in the Reports of the Task and Assault Force
Commanders "for the courage and devotion to duty on the
part of the landing craft crews, just as the greatest
admiration has been expressed by both navies for the
magnificent bearing of the assaulting troops whom they put
ashore. In short, the assault proceeded according to plan
not necessarily because it was a good plan, but because
every single individual taking part had confidence in it and
was determined to achieve his objective." - ANCXF Report
Vol.I, p.56.
p.543 #2
Rear-Admiral Hall remarked that "the so-called 'Secret
Weapon' of the invasion forces, the DD tank was no secret
at all, except possibly to our own personnel. A captured
document by General Rommel.... warned the defenders that when
the invasion came the Allies would use all sorts of weapons,
including an amphibious tank that actually would float with
its body beneath the surface." ANCXF Report Vol.I, Report
by NC, Force D, p.73.
p.544 #1
Force U: |
Launched and landed successfully; reached
shore H plus 20 minutes. |
Force O: |
Left flank: launched 6000 yards off shore; all
but 2 or 3 foundered.
Right flank: landed on beach; quickly put out
of action by enemy fire. |
Force G: |
landed on beach just after L.C.T. (Avre)
|
Force J: |
Group J2: landed on beach with LCT (Avre)
Group J1: launched 1500 yards from shore;
reached shore 15 minutes late (6 minutes after infantry). |
Force S: |
Launched 5000 yards off shore; 31 out of 40
reached shore 12 minutes late, and did valuable
work. |
p.544 #2
It has to be admitted that conditions could not have been
less ideal for this novel weapon, but even so the consensus
of naval opinion is that ordinary water-proofed tanks,
landed on the beach in the normal manner, would have
served the purpose equally well. Had the assault been
conducted at dusk or in low visibility, on the other hand,
DD tanks might have achieved a valuable surprise". ANCXF
Report Vol.1, p.58.
p.544 #3
As soon as the tide started to fall, about 1330, and
uncover the obstacles, beach clearance proceeded
rapidly, and by midnight all sections of the beaches
in use had been cleared.
p.544 #4
To achieve this a number of L.C.T. had to be dried
as there was no room for their vehicles until the
tide started to fall.
p.544 #5
No L.S.T. were sailed till the following day (7 June).
p.546 #1
Force G:
Commodore Douglas-Pennant, Broad Pendant in H.Q. ship
H.M.S. Bulolo
Bombarding Force K: | Destroyers |
Support Craft |
Orion
Ajax
Argonaut
Emerald
Flores |
Grenville
Ulster
Urchin
Undine
Urania
Ursa
Ulysses |
Undaunted
Jervis
Cattistock
Pytchley
Cottesmore
Krakowiak |
3 L.C.G. (L)
8 L.C.T. (R)
4 L.C.S. (L)
7 L.C.F.
3 Regts. S.P. Artillery
16 L.C.T. (A) |
L.S. and L.C. with troops of 30th Corps; 50th British
Infantry Division Assaulting.
p.547 #1
Commodore Douglas-Pennant gives high credit for this
achievement after so difficult a passage to the Senior
Officers of the various groups.
p.547 #2
Commodore Douglas-Pennant fully concurred with this
decision.
p.547 #3
Four factors favoured the resistance of this powerful
position:
-
The 75 tons of bombs planned to be dropped on it
fell in fields 3000 yards south; very low cloud
caused this failure.
-
The 147th Field Regiment of S.P. Artillery were to
fire on this target, but both their navigational M.L.
and control L.C.T. fell astern due to the weather; their
fire was therefore concentrated with that of the
regiment on their left, one M.L. controlling both,
leaving Le Hamel unfired at.
-
Le Hamel was engaged by 3 destroyers, but the enemy
positions were protected against low trajectory fire
from seaward.
-
No calls for fire were received from the 1st.Bn.
Hampshire Regiment which was attacking the position,
owing to the first and second in command becoming
casualties soon after landing.
p.548 #1
Force J:
Bombarding Force E
Belfast (Flag R.A. Dalrymple-Hamilton)
Diadem |
Destroyers
Kempenfelt,
Faulknor, Venus,
Fury, Vigilant,
Bleasdale,
Algonquin, Glaisdale,
Sioux, Stevenstone,
La Combattante |
Supporting Craft
7 L.C.G. (L)
8 L.C.T. (R)
6 L.C.S. (L)
6 L.C.F.
4 Regts. S.P. Artillery
8 L.C.T. (A)
8 L.C.T. (H.E.) |
LS and LC with troops of 1st Corps; 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division and No. 48 R.M. Commando assaulting.
p.549 #1
At a fairly late stage in the planning these rocks were
reported to dry at 5 feet instead of 3 feet as previously
supposed. Actually the original estimate proved to be more
accurate.
p.549 #2
Fortunately the obstacles on these beaches were less
formidable and more widely spaced than had been expected,
and did not impede the beaching of landing craft to any
serious extent. Most of the losses occurred during retraction
after the initial landings.
p.549 #3
ANCXF Report II, Report by Naval Commander, Force J, p.6.
p.550 #1
X.20 later closed the Hilary by whom she was cheered at
0910, and was then towed back to Portsmouth by the
trawler Darthema as planned without incident.
p.550 #2
S.O.A.G. 1 was ordered by the Force Commander (after
consultation with the G.O.C.) not to wait for the AVRE.
p.550 #3
ANCXF Report Vol.II, Report by Naval Commander, Force J,
p.7.
p.552 #1
The times at which these stations were reported in action
were:
0823, Mike Green;
1004, Nan Red;
|
0831, Mike Red, Nan Green;
0850, Nan White;
|
p.552 #2
The next group of L.S.T. to arrive (Group 333 at 1615) were
not so fortunate, losing 7 tugs out of 11 and 1 Rhino out
of 3 on passage.
p.552 #3
A meeting of Flag Officers and Commodores was held daily
throughout the operation at 1800, unless otherwise ordered.
p.553 #1
U.S. L.S.T. 981 had been mined on passage some eight
hours previously, and left behind.
p.553 #2
FORCE S:
Bombarding Force D | Destroyers | Support Craft |
Mauritius (Flag R.A. Patterson)
Warspite,
Ramillies,
Roberts,
Arethusa,
Frobisher,
Dragon, Danae |
Saumarez, Kelvin,
Scourge, Virago,
Scorpion, Verulam,
Swift, Middleton,
Serapis, Eglinton,
Svenner, Slazak,
Stord. |
3 L.C.G. (L)
5 L.C.T. (R)
3 L.C.S. (L)
4 L.C.F.
3 Regts. S.P.
Artillery
8 L.C.T. (A) |
L.S. and L.C. with troops of 1st Corps; 3rd British
Infantry Division and Commandos Assaulting.
p.553 #3
ANCXF, Report Vol.III, Report by Naval Commander, Force S, P.16
p.554 #1
Rear-Admiral Talbot expressed the opinion that "the
courageous decision to launch these tanks and their gallant
swim will be found to have been a decisive factor in the
success of the assault." ANCXF Report Vol.II, Report of
NCFS, p.19.
p.554 #2
The leading tank in L.C.T. 467 slowed in its tracks and tore
the canvas surround. It was accordingly decided to beach the
L.C.T. Rear-Admiral Talbot regretted that the damaged tank
was not jettisoned and the remainder launched, since "the main
function of the DD tank is to provide close support fire at
H-hour and immediately after it." These DD tanks did not get
ashore till 0805, thereby depriving the Army of the fire of
4 guns at the most critical period of the assaults.
p.555 #1
ANCXF Report Vol.II, Report by N.C. Force S, p.21.
p.556 #1
Admiral Ramsay subsequently remarked - "All Naval
Commanders have remarked that some form of shallow
draught tug to clear damaged craft from the beaches
is a very urgent need...." ANCXF Report Vol.I, p.59.
ANCXF Report Vol.II Report by N.C. Force S, p.22.
p.557 #1
Assistant Beachmasters and their parties had landed with the
Assault Infantry at H-hour, and suffered proportionately
heavy casualties. The D.N.O.I.C. (Acting Commander Nicholl)
who landed shortly afterwards was also wounded.
p.557 #2
Operations "Frog" and "Deer" were Commando landings
designed to destroy the battery at Houlgate or Benerville
along the coast to the east of the Orne. Neither battery,
however, had given any sign of life since early morning,
and as the weather was unsuitable for reembarking the
Commandos on that part of the coast, both operations were
cancelled about 2030, 6th June.
p.558 #1
ANCXF Report, Vol.II, Report of N.C.E.T.F. pp.20 and 21.
p.558 #2
This is the end of the extracts taken from the Admiralty
narrative of the RN side of the NEPTUNE assaults.
p.559 #1
In his report General Eisenhower has described this operation
as follows:- "In the British sector, the very accurate work
of the Pathfinder force enabled the RAF groups to overcome
the difficulties arising from the use of different types of
aircraft, carrying various loads at various speeds, and the
6th Airborne Division troops were dropped precisely in the
appointed areas east of the Orne River. Thanks to this
good start, all the main military tasks were carried out,
and at a lower cost than would have been paid in using any
other arm of the service. The party charged with the
mission of securing the Benouville bridges over the Orne and
the Caen Canal was particularly successful. Landing exactly
as planned, in a compact area of just over one square
kilometer, the troops went into action immediately and
secured the bridges intact, as required, by 0850 hours. The
tactical surprise achieved, coupled with the confusion
created by the dropping of explosive dummy parachutists
elsewhere, caused the enemy to be slow to react, and it was
not until mid-day that elements of the 21st Panzer Division
counter-attacked. By that time our men had consolidated
their positions and the enemy's efforts to dislodge them
were in vain. During the day reinforcements were safely
landed by gliders, against which the German pole obstructions
proved ineffective; the operation went off like
an exercise, no opposition was encountered, and by
nightfall the division had been fully resupplied and was
in possession of all its heavy equipment. This formation
continued to hold the flank firmly until our lodgement
area had been consolidated and the breakout eastward across
France relieved it of its responsibility.
p.561 #1
General Eisenhower report described these operations as
follows:-
"On the western flank, at the base of the Cotentin
Peninsula, the American airborne forces of the 82nd and
101st Divisions were faced with greater initial
difficulties. Owing to the cloud and atmospheric
conditions, the Pathfinders failed to locate the exact
areas fixed for the parachute drops, and the inexperience
of some of the pilots led to wide dispersal of troops and
supplies. The 6,600 parachute elements of 101st Division
were scattered over an area 25 miles by 15 miles in extent,
and 60% of their equipment was lost in consequence.
Nevertheless, the operation represented an improvement
upon those undertaken in Sicily, and the great gallantry
with which the troops fought enabled them in general to
accomplish their mission successfully. Gliders flown in
during the day suffered considerable casualties, but
reinforcements were introduced during the night of 6/7
June. While 101st Division held the exits to Utah Beach
and struck southward toward Carentan, the 82nd Division,
despite heavy shelling in the Ste-Mere-Eglise area, also
established contact with the troops pushing inland from
Utah Beach early on 7 June. The element of surprise was
as effective in the western as in the eastern sector, and
the enemy himself bore witness to the confusion created
by the American troops in cutting communications and
disorganizing the German defense. The success of the Utah
assault could not have been achieved so conspicuously
without the work of the airborne forces."
p.562 #1
See Chapter VII, Section 5.
p.562 #2
See Chapter VII, Section 4.
6 July 2005