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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
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Fuehrer Directives and Other top-level directives of the German Armed Forces
1939-1941

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces
Fuehrer Headquarters
22 Sep. 1941
Nr. 441578/41 g.K.Chefs. WPSt/L
(I-Op)
No. 4 of twelve copies

Top secret

Directive No. 36

I. Due to unusual terrain difficulties and poor lines of communication on the one hand, and to the continually renewed reinforcement of the Soviet Russian forces in Karelia and Lapland on the other, the weak forces of the Army High Command, Norway and the 5th Air Force have not yet succeeded in reaching the Murman railroad, in spite of tremendous achievements and extremely brave efforts. Enemy interference with out shipping lanes along the coast of the Arctic Ocean has decreased even more the prospect that the Mountain Corps might reach Murmansk this year.

However, we did succeed in tying down large enemy forces and in drawing them away from the main Russian front. We likewise managed to push the enemy across the former Finnish border along its whole length, thus eliminating all threats to northern Finland, particularly to her nickel mines.

II. We must adhere to the final goal of operations in northern and central Finland, which consists of destroying the enemy forces in the vicinity of Murmansk along the Murman railroad.

The importance of this area lies in teh nickel mines, which are vital to the German war effort. The enemy realizes this importance. It is to be expected that the British will deploy strong air forces around Murmansk and Kandalaksha (possibly even committing Canadian or Norwegian troops) and that they will send as much war materiel as possible to Murmansk. Even during winter, air raids on the nickel mines and the homes of the miners must be anticipated. Our efforts must be proportionate to the seriousness of this threat.

III. I therefore order as follows:

  1. Army High Command, Norway:

    1. The attacks in the sector of the III (Finnish) Army Corps are to be halted, and forces which are dispensable are to be transferred to the XXXVI Army Corps.

    2. All preparations are to be made by the XXXVI Army Corps for resuming the advance in the direction of Kandalakaha during the first half of October, with the minimum mission of at least cutting off Murmansk from its railroad connection before the beginning of winter. Moreover, the question of whether a continuation of this attack will have a better prospect of succeeding during the winter than during the fall should be considered.

      The Finnish High Command will be asked to transfer the 163rd Division by railroad via Rovaniemi to the Army High Command, Norway at the proper time.

    3. The advance of the Mountain Corps in the direction of Murmansk is to be halted for the time being. Only the northern wing is to continue the thrust, insofar as it is necessary for improving positions with regard to furthering the task of the Navy, to capture at least the western part of the Rybachi Peninsula before the beginning of the winter. This would serve to eliminate enemy interference by means of artillery and PT boats at the harbor entrance of Liinahamari.

      The investigations and preparations prerequisite for such an attack are to be initiated immediately; their results are to be reported as soon as possible. Suitable special weapons for use against ground and naval targets which are still lacking will be supplied.

      A decision, however, as to whether the plan of the Army High Command Norway for the winter can be realized must be left to the future. This plan consists of leaving two reinforced mountain divisions in the area around Petsamo and permitting the 2nd Mountain Division to rest in and around Rovaniemi.

      If possible this should be done. The relief of the 3r4d Mountain Division by the 5th Mountain Division or a newly organized mountain division is planned ofr later.

    4. Large numbers of motor vehicles will be bought and rented in Sweden in order to shift supply transports of the mountain corps to the Oulu-Petsamo highway. Ic these vehicles should not suffice, as additional supply from Germany will be ordered.

    2. [sic: IMHO, this should be paragraph e. --HyperWar] I have ordered Reichsminister Dr. Todt to use Russian prisoners of war ruthlessly to construct a narrow-gauge field railway from Rovaniemi along the road to Petsamo as quickly as possible.

    1. A supply of all modern means of attack which can be brought into the tundra for the puirpose will be provided for the resumption of the attack on Murmansk.

  2. Navy:

    It will be the mission of the Navy to attack enemy supply ships on the way to Murmansk, even during the winter, and especially during the period when the Air Force is more or less paralyzed.

    For that purpose, in case we should succeed in capturing the western part of the Ryubachi Peninsula, a suitable auxiliary base for light naval forces is to be established if possible, in the Bay of Petsamo. The shippoing of supplies by sea to Kirkenes and Petsamo, even in temporarily interrupted, must be attempted again and again.

    The coastal defense in the bays of Petsamo and Ki8rkenes will have to be reinforced to such an etent that it will be equal to meeting attacks even by heavy naval forces.

  3. Air Force:

    It is of peramount importance that the 5th Air Force remain in the northern Norwegian area with strong forces suited for winter tasks.

    These forces are to be large enought to be able to support the operation against Kandalaksha (which is to continue) and the capture of the Rybachi Peninsula, with good effect, right up to the beginning of the bad weather period. Meanwhile it will be necessary to attack continually the enemy's shipping and his lines of communication as well as his supply and storage depots.

    This fight is to be continued during the bad weather season whenever opportunity offers and should be extended most of all to attacking the enemy's shipping and to interfering with his construction of improvement of strong points.

    For this purpose our air force ground organization must be left to as large an extent as possible in its northern Norwegian and Finnish bases, and must be made ready to withstand the winter with every means available.

    Protection against enemy air attacks of our troops quarters, of supply lines, and most of all of the n9ickel mines and the naval base which is to be established is to be assured.

    The air force ground organization will have to be reinforced and the storage depots replenished to such an etent that it will be possible, at the proper time, to support the attack on Murmansk with substantially reinforced air fores.

signed: Adolf Hitler


The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command Berlin, 25 Sep. 1941
Nr. 002171/41 g.K. No. 2 of two copies

Secret

To: 1. Commander in Chief, Army
2. Commander in Chief, Navy

With regard to the necessity of protecting our extended coasts and the European countries dependent on us from attacks by the Anglo-Americans, the Fuehrer is of the following opinion:

It is of decisive importance for warding off enemy operations against the coasts to have:

  1. Far-reachjing, effective flat-trajectory guns.

  2. Long-distance torpedoes to be used by torpedo batteries from land.

  3. Local anti-aircraft guns for the coastal defenses.

Rel a:
It is necessary to increase further the number of medium and heavy mobile flat-trajectory batteries of the Army, especially the 17 cm. cannons in howitzer mounts, the 21 em. Skoda canons (360° traverse guns), as well as the 24 cm. guns. In addition, heavy naval batteries are to be provided.

Re b:
The Navy is requested to order use and development of torpedoes for these tasks.

Re c:
As a matter of principle, heavy coastal batteries must be protected against enemy air raids.

signed: Keitel


Naval Staff Berlin
Skl Ia 1601/41l g.Kdos. Chefs. 29 Sep. 1941

Top secret

Re: The future of Leningrad

I. In order to obtain a clear view of the measures tc be adopted by the Navy in ease Leningrad should be occupied or handed over, the ques­tion of further military operations against this city was made clear by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff to the Armed Forces High Command.The result is reported as follows:

II. The Fuehrer has decided to have Leningrad wiped from the face of the earth, the further esHtenee of this large town is of no interest once Soviet Russia is overthrown. Finland has also similarly declared no interest in the continued existence of the city directly on her new frontier.

III. The original demands of the Navy that the shipyard, harbor, and other installations vital to the Navy be preserved are known to the Armed Forces High Command, but in view of the basic principles under­lying the operation against Leningrad it is not possible to comply with them.

IV. The intention is to close in on the city and blast it to the ground by bombardments of artillery of all calibres and by continuous air at­tacks .Requests that the city may be handed over, arising from the situation within, will he turned down, for the problem of the survival of the pop­ulation and of supplying it with food is one which cannot and should not be solved by us. In tHis war for existence, we have no Interest in keeping even part of this great city's population. If necessary, a forceful evacuation towards the eastern territories of Russia should take place.

V. The consequences arising from the extinction of Leningrad and re­lating to the measures for organization and personnel, already carried out or held in readiness, will be worked out at the Armed Forces High Command and the corresponding guiding principles will then be made known. If there are any suggestions on this subject at Group Command, it is requested that they be forwarded at the earliest possible moment to the Naval Staff.

Naval Staff


The Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters
WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu)
Nr. 002255/4I g.Kdos.
5 Oct. 1941
No. 7 of thirty copies

Special orders in connection with Directive 36

(The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Nr. 441578/41 g.Kdos. Chefs. WFSt/Abt.L(I-Op) of 22 Sep. 1941)

The situation in the areas of Finland and northern Norway requires special measures to take care of supplies.

According to Directive 36, supplies for troops in Finland and northern Norway are to be prepared in such a way that the necessary supplies will be on hand at the proper time for the planned operations.

The Navy will make available the shipping"space needed to transport the supplies, if necessary in.agreement with the Transportation Ministry, and will furnish the necessary escort forces. Ships reinforced against ice and icebreakers should be provided for the purpose.

In shipping supplies by sea, care should be taken not to expose valuable goods to enemy attack.

The following measures should be taken:

I. Administratlon:

  1. Food supplies; The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas is to arrange with the Army Administration Office for food supplies according to the needs of the Army High Command, Norway, both as regards reserve supplies and.current needs. The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas will see to it that the supplies are shipped promptly, so that in case of difficulties due to ice and the resulting disruption of supply shipments the current needs can be filled froa supply dumps to be established by the Army High Command in Finland and Sv-sden. Furthermore the Army High Command, Norway should keep sufficient supplies in dumps in northern'Norway, so that even if there should be difficulties in shipping supplies by sea, as little use as possible will have to be made of the Oulu-Petsamo highway, in view of the fuel shortage.

  2. Living quarters:

    1. Barracks:

      The barracks obtained by the Army High Command, Norway in Sweden and Finland should be snipped to northern Finland by sea, in order to avoid transport via the Oulu-Petsamo highway. If it is at all possible to transport these barracks through Sweden to Narvik, and from there by sea, this should be done. The Navy is requested, in agreement with the Transportation Ministry, to make sure that all shipping space becoming available should be used for iron and nickel ore transports from Lulea, Narvik, or Petsamo.

    2. Fuel:

      If fuel requirements cannot be covered within the country (wood and peat), the Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas should arrange*with the responsible agencies (Reich Coal Com­missioner) for the necessary amount of coal, and ship it in agreement with the Transportation Ministry.

    3. Equipment for quartering troops

      Necessary equipment that cannot be purchased in Sweden and Finland is to be made available by the Army Administration Office. The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas will arrange for shipment.

    4. Clothing:

      Winter clothing and equipment shipped so far is not suf­ficient to cover operational requirements during the winter. The Army High Command (Army Clothing Section) should give priority to the re­quests of the Army High Command, Norway which are still unfilled.

II. Truck space:

  1. The following are made available for necessary traffic on the Oulu-Petsamo highway:

    1. 200 to 250 trucks without tires, purchased in Sweden.

    2. One column of the Speer Construction Staff, consisting of 5 companies, or 225 trucks.

    3. 6 large fuel columns and 3 motor vehicle repair trains, furnished by the Army High Command, Motor Vehicle Section.

  2. The Army High Command, Norway will arrange for the transfer of the trucks purchased directly with the responsible German offices. The Armed Forces High Command, War Economy and Armaments Division will ar­range through the Army High Command, Motor Vehicle Section for the tires needed for these trucks. The General Army Office, at the request of the Army High Command, Norway, will facilitate formation of the columns by allocating personnel, weapons, and equipment. If the Swedish government should approve the purchase and export of ad­ditional trucks, the needs of the air forces in northern Norway and Finland should b© covered first.

  3. The Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas will transport the trucks and motor vehicle repair trains mentioned under lb and 1c at the earliest possible date to Finnish harbors for the Army High Command, Norway, in agreement with the General Army Office.

III. Oil:

The oil so far allocated to the Army High Command, Norway (headquarters Finland) is not sufficient for the tasks to be carried out.

Therefore the War Economy and Armaments Division of the Armed Forces High Command should make available the necessary oil, including that needed for transports via the Oulu-Petsamo highway, in addition to the 5,000 cu.m. allocated for September, the 5,000 cu.m. for October, and the 10,000 cu.m. allocated as winter supply, delivery of which the Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas has promised by 31 Oct. Before the Finnish harbors freeze over, as much oil should be brought in as possible with the tankers leased for German purposes in Finland.

IV. The Todt Organization has been asked to begin construction of the Rovanieml-Vuotsa field railroad at once. The Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas will arrange with the Todt Organization for transportation of the necessary labor and building material. Only the simplest kind of quarters should be constructed for the Russian prisoners of war used in building the railroad.

  The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel



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