Footnotes
Chapter I:
1. Panikkar, K.M. India and the Indian Ocean, p. 33.
2. The Fenny river was the boundary between the Burmese (Magh) kingdom of Arakan and the Mughal Empire, but during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan, the Magh pirates acquired complete domination over the rivers and creeks of East Bengal. Their naval power was strengthened by the settlement of Portuguese and half-caste (Feringi) adventurers in Chittagong, who acted as the agents of the local raja in these raids.
3. The conflict was threefold: between the English and the Portuguese, between the Portuguese and the Dutch, and between the Dutch and the English.
4. Joasmis were a powerful Arab tribe which held sway throughout the Persian Gulf with their headquarters at Ras-el-Khaima. They were originally merchants and pearl fishers but later took to piracy. In 1819, decisive action was taken against them and an expeditionary force was fitted out. As a result, they were utterly defeated and their stronghold of Ras-el-Khaima was reduced.
Chapter II:
1. Appendix I.
2. Appendix II.
3. For Base Facilities see Appendix III. Shore establishments of the Royal Indian Navy during the War are given in Appendix IV.
4. For ships of the Royal Indian Navy in 1944 see Appendix V.
5. For a list of Flag Officers Commanding Royal Indian Navy during the Second World War see Appendix VI.
Chapter III:
1. At Bombay these duties were carried out by the Captain Superintendent of the Dockyard in addition to his own.
2. There is some controversy about the loss of this ship. According to the official version, the ship was struck by enemy torpedo or mine. But some thought that it was due to the explosion of the ship's depth charges.
The casualties were two officers killed including the Commanding Officer Lt. Cdr. K. Durtson, R.i.N., one officer seriously injured, three ratings killed (one more rating died from injuries later) and sixteen ratings were injured.
Chapter IV:
1. East Indies War Diary T.S.D. 4536/40.
2. War At Sea 1939-1945 by Captain S. W. Roskill, D.S.C., R.N., Vol. I.
3. Dispatch by Commander-in-chief Middle East (M 02036G/40).
4. C-in-C East Indies Signal 0514/23.
5. Appendix VII gives the names of Ratnagiri's Officers.
6. Reports of H.M.I.S. Indus. File No. 601/12252/H.
For detailed Account of land operations see C.I.S.H.S. publication East African Campaign.
7. The scuttling of ships at Massawa was carried out according to a well thought-out plan. At first sight it appeared that the enemy had been successful in forbidding us the use of the inner harbour but fortunately this was not the case. A ship was sunk right across the entrance and ships were scuttled all along the deep water berths in the docks. In both cases the attempt just failed. It is possible for a medium size ship to pass the blockship in the entrance and there are two berths still. A ship of nearly 500 ft. length can be taken in one place and a smaller one in another. Twenty Italian and six German merchant ships have been deliberately sunk at Massawa in addition to two torpedo boats and some small naval craft. Most of these ships have gone down on an even keel and lie in some cases with their upper decks awash. It is a very sad sight to see these ships out of commission and it is hoped that some of them at least will one day be back to "their trade" (Report submitted by Lt. Cdr. Alexander Funk, Staff Officer Intelligence, Aden--File No. 601/12253/H.)
8. Report of Commander G.V.G. Beamish, Commanding Officer, H.M.I.S. Hindustan to Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Force, Aden, dated 10 April 1951.
9. Report on the sinking of H.M.I.S. Parvati File No. 601/10050/H.
10. Report of the Commanding Officer, H.M.I.S. Clive to the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Force, Aden, File No. 601/10050/H.
11. From the Report of Rear Admiral R.H.C.Hallifax, CB, Senior Officer Red Sea Force (letter No. 796 dated 19 Jnne 1941) to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station on Operation "CHRONOMETER", Capture of Assab, File No. 601/10051/H.
12. Report of the Commanding Officer H.M.I.S. Hiravati dated 19.11.1941. File No. QP. 3725 NHQ (I).
Chapter V:
1. See Official History of the Indian Armed Forces, Campaign in Weetern Asia, C.I.S. Historical Section, for details of the campaign.
2. File No. 601/12264/H: Assistance rendered to Iraq and France by H.M.I. Ships.
3. Playfair, History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. II.
4. Kanimbla, a 12,000 ton armed merchant cruiser, "a ship which at first sight appeared most unsuitable as a reinforcement for work in narrow waters, but which turned out to be probably the only ship in the navy which could have supplied what I required in the way of great number of hands, vast administrative endurance, and spacious accommodation"--Cosmo Graham "Report on Operation COUNTENANCE", 26 Sept. 1941.
5. Gill, G. H., Royal Australian Navy 1939-42.
6. See Appendix VIII for the approach tracks for ships which took part in this operation. For details of ships in Operation BISHOP see Appendix IX.
7. Report by Senior Officer Force "B" in H.M.S.Kanimbla dated 30th Sept. 1941--File 601/10886/H.
Chapter VI:
1. Journal of Midshipman K. L. Kulkarni, R.I.N.
2. See Appendix X for the Jumna's Officers. Engineer Lieutenant P.K. Mukerjee, R.I.N.R. was the Senior Engineer Officer of the ship. He is now Rear Admiral P.K.Mukerjee, I.N., Director General of the Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme, Bombay.
Chapter VII:
1. R.I.N. Memorandum--OSD/F6.
2. See Appendix XI.
Chapter VIII:
1. A detailed account of the pay and allowances in the R.i.N. is given in a later chapter.
2. For a full analysis of the intake see Appendix XII. Appendix XIII shows the manning progress of R.I.N. during World War II.
Chapter IX:
Chapter X:
1. For detailed account see chapter III, Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second. World War 1939-45, Medical Services, published by the Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan.
Chapter XI:
1. Beach Commandos
"A" & "B" were operational, "C" was Reserve and replacement. Each Commando consisted of 12 Officers, roughly 140 N.C.Os and other Ranks. Each Commando was divided into 3 sections of 3 Officers (One Beach Master and 2 Assistant Beach Masters) and 40 men each. The Commandos were entirely self-sufficient for equipment, transport and specialised craft like Rubber Dhingies, Kayaks etc. The transport included normal vehicles like 3 Tonners, 15 Cwts. Jeeps etc. and Dukws (amphibious vehicles which could go on land and water). Each Commando was attached to an Army Beach Group. A Beach Group served a Division.2. The War at Sea, Vol. II By Captain S. W. Roskill.
Chapter XII:
Chapter XIII:
1. See Appendix XIV. For names of officers borne in ships which took part in the Burma Operations see Appendix XV.
2. For names of officers borne in the Coastel Forces of the Burma Operations see Appendix XVI.
Chapter XIV:
Chapter XV:
1. For convenience of reference the various limits were defined as follows:--,
(a) The Upper Limit:--This comprised all Naval, Army and Air Forces required during occupational period, which was estimated to last from 18 to 24 months after V.J. Day. During the period known as the Demobilisation stage I, the Services reduced down to the "upper limit". The time allotted was from 1 November 1945 to 30 April 1946. The "upper limit", therefore came into force on I May 1946. It was not a fixed limit and periodical reductions were made as and when Forces became available for disposal.
(b) The Lower Limit:--This was an agreed numerical limit for demobilization purposes only, below which the Services were not reduced. It was I on the maintenance of forces, calculated by the Chief of Staff, as the minimum compatible with the safety of the country. It formed the basis which the structure of the final post-war forces was framed.
(c) The Lowest Limit:--This was a limit dictated purely by financial con-liderations and bore no relation to calculated requirements. It was an attempt to cut the defence coat according to the financial cloth. Should financial stringency be great this limit was to be substituted for the "lower limit".
Transcribed and formatted by Larry Jewell & Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation