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HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Grand Strategy
Volume V
August 1943-September 1944By John Ehrman
Sometime Fellow of Trinity College, CambridgeLONDON 1956
HMSO
Contents
Page Editor's Preface xi Introduction xiii Chapter I. Strategy and Supply in the Autumn of 1943 i. Outline of Strategy 1 ii. Outline of Command 15 iii. Supply 25 iv. Data for an Offensive Strategy 49 II. OVERLORD and the Mediterranean, August-November 1943 i. The Conditions for OVERLORD 53 ii. The Rôle of the Italian Campaign 58 iii. The Consequences in the Eastern Mediterranean 75 iv. The British and American Strategies 105 III. British Strategy in the Far East, and the Formation of the South-East Asia Command, August-November 1943 i. The Strategic Conditions 123 ii. The Formation of the South-East Asia Command 135 iii. A Strategy for Burma 148 IV. The Decisions for 1944: I, Cairo and Teheran, November-December 1943 i. Cairo: The Problems Considered 155 ii. Teheran: The Decisions Taken 173 iii. Cairo: The Details Reconsidered 183 V. The Decisions for 1944: II, Epilogue to Cairo, December 1943-January 1944 i. The Settlement of the European Commands 203 ii. Unsettlement in the Mediterranean and South-East Asia 207 VI. OVERLORD and the Mediterranean, January-March 1944 i. The Attacks on Anzio and Cassino 225 ii. New Demands from OVERLORD and from Italy 231 iii. The Postponement of ANVIL 243 VII. OVERLORD and the Mediterranean, April-June 1944 i. The Debate on ANVIL Continued 249 ii. The Capture of Rome and its Implications 259 iii. Developments in Yugoslavia 270 VIII. Preparation for OVERLORD, January-June 1944 i. The Revised Plan 279 ii. The Rôle of the Air: POINTBLANK and the Transportation Plan 286 iii. The Rôle of the Air: CROSSBOW 305 iv. Deception, Security and the French 315 v. The Last Weeks 332 IX. Advance on Three Fronts, June-September 1944 i. The Two Great Offensives 337 ii. The Consequences for the Mediterranean 345 iii. Relations with the Russians 367 iv. Victory in Europe in 1944? 377 X. The Campaign in Burma, January-June 1944 i. Arakan and the Central Front 405 ii. The Northern Front 415 XI. The Strategy for the Pacific & South-East Asia, January-April 1944 i. Growth of a British Strategy for the Pacific 421 ii. The Americans' Positions 450 iii. The Pursuit of Facts 456 XII. The Strategy for the Pacific & South-East Asia, April-August 1944 i. The Middle Strategy and Its Implications 459 ii. The Middle Strategy Discussed 478 iii. Developments in South-East Asia 486 iv. The Final British Proposals 493 XIII. The Second Quebec Conference and the Aftermath, September 1944 i. The Conference 505 ii. Arnhem, the Gothic Line and the Consequences 524 Index 621
Appendices
Maps
I. The Far East, Position and Possibilities, Winter 1943 facing page 11 II. The Mediterranean, Possible Strategies, Autumn 1943 57 III. Burma and Malaya 129 IV. The Mediterranean, Possible Strategies, April-August 1944 263 V. Central Italy 270 VI. North-West Europe 279 VII. The Three European Fronts, 1st July-6th September 1944 343 VIII. Northern Italy 384 IX. The Far East, Possible Strategies, May-June 1944 459 End Papers Front: 'Festung Europa' and the Japanese Position, August 1943 Rear: Combined Chiefs of Staff's Theatres, October 1943
The Frontispiece is reproduced by courtesy of the Keystone Press Agency, Plat VI by courtesy of the Sport and General Press Agency, and Plat VII by courtesy of Life Magazine. The other Plates are Crown Copyright, and have been selected with the help of the staff of the Imperial War Museum, where they are housed. Illustrations
Frontispiece. The First Quebec Conference, August 1943 Plate I. Mediterranean Commanders facing page 64 II. The Cairo Conference, November 1943 160 III. The Teheran Conference, December 1943 176 IV. General Wilson
General Alexander228 V. OVERLORD Commanders 284 VI. Air Commanders 292 VII. Admiral Mountbatten
General Stilwell408 VIII. British Military Advisers at the Second Quebec Conference, September 1944 510