COS 5/71
Restricted Distribution
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEESALE OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA -
EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Note by the Secretary
1. The Chiefs of Staff have approved (1) the report (2) at Annex A.
2. In approving the report the Chiefs of Staff agreed:
13 January 1971
SALE OF ARMS TO SOUTH
AFRICA -
EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLANNING
INTRODUCTION
1. In 2 previous Notes (1) (2), related to the issue of arms sales to South Africa, the Director of Defence Operational Plans summarised the threat, the existing contingency plans, and the forces that could be made available after 18 January 1971 to take any required action. following the DOPC meeting (3) of 4 January, a Committee of Officials, on which the MOD is represented, as been set up to coordinate the further work necessary to meet contingencies concerned with possible threats to UK citizens in Africa, and to report to a Ministerial Committee. To provide the MOD contribution to the official's committee, we have examined the implications of the Services-assisted evacuation from the affected countries in Africa, together with any measure that might be necessary to increase the effectiveness of plans and improve preparedness.
SERVICE ASSISTANCE
2. As has been previously noted (1) there are no evacuation plans in existence for the 2 countries in which UK citizens are likely to be at most risk, Zambia and Uganda; nor for Tanzania which is assessed at somewhat lower risk. There are, however, protection plans for these 3 countries and for Kenya. The question of any protection/intervention operations has been considered separately (4). There is now a need to consider the possibilities of evacuation from all the affected countries using Service assistance.
3. All Service plans will be essentially an augmentation of the corresponding civil plans. We are advised that, in the event of any evacuation becoming necessary, the relevant civil plans would be implemented in the first instance with the maximum use of charter aircraft and ships, although no action would be taken prior to signs of trouble because of the probably adverse effect in Africa. It is likely therefore that the numbers to be evacuated by the Services would be considerably less than the estimated total. However, as no estimate of the scope of the civil plans is possible, we have assumed for the purposes of this paper,
Notes:
and as an indication of capability, that the total commitment would fall on the Services. A list of countries in order of priority for evacuation, with the total numbers that might have to be evacuated is at Appendix 1.
ASSUMPTIONS
4. We have made the following assumptions:
FORCES AVAILABLE AND NOTICE
5. Details of forces available for a Services-assisted evacuation and their notice are listed at Appendix 2.
OUTLINE OF EVACUATION OPERATIONS
Situation
6. There is a variety of circumstances that could give rise to the need for evacuation. In the worst case there could be a requirement to evacuate from all countries, rapidly and concurrently. Furthermore the expulsion of "non-belonger" UK citizens would greatly increase the burden of evacuation. On the other hand we might have to evacuate from only one country in slow time.
Capability
7. We examine now our capability to evacuate from the 2 most likely trouble spots, Zambia and Uganda and from Tanzania using airlift as the primary means, augmented by HM Ships. In the case of a rapid evacuation it is possible that reasonably friendly Black African countries such as Malawi and Kenya could provide safe havens. Some UK "belongers" might well move of their own accord to safety in Rhodesia and South Africa. This would reduce the evacuation problems but the extent of the reduction cannot be forecast. We have considered below the case in which Portuguese and South African bases only would be available for mounting and for the reception of evacuees; however, it should be remembered that if these bases are used other African countries may be alienated to the extent that they withdraw cooperation in any evacuation from their countries. Onward movement from these points would be by ST and charter aircraft and/or ships' further study is needed into the availability of routes and airfields.
8. On the assumption that 5 reception points/bases are used and that the reception problems do not slow up the flow of aircraft, the concurrent evacuation "belongers" from Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania could theoretically be completed, using the 1st line availability of ASC in 9 days.
9. There would be great difficulties in carrying out such operations, particularly if the numbers involved approached the estimated total. Some of the more important of these are:
Implications
10. The main implications of mounting operations on the scale that might be required are:
MEASURES TO INCREASE PREPAREDNESS
11. There are a number of military measures that could be taken to increase preparedness, but many of these would be difficult to conceal and might therefore be regarded by Black Africa as being provocative. Some would also incur severe penalties and seriously affect other commitments. We discuss below only the more realistic measures that could be considered.
HM Ships
12. HM Ships positioned off Lagos/Dar Es Salaam could provide some evacuation capability. Those with embarked helicopters could be particularly valuable. The only major ships which could be sailed with relatively little likelihood of their change of programme becoming known are:
13. HMS TRIUMPH is not programmed for sea until 8 Feb 71. HMS ALBION is due to sail on 28 January on completing a dockyard maintenance period. The advancement of these dates would create speculation which might lead to unwelcome publicity.
14. In the case of the INTREPID and the TRIUMPH a cover plan for extra helicopters being embarked would have to be devised. The ships of the Beira Patrol and RFAs at sea could be used to support the INTREPID with little or no warning and are within about 2 days steaming of Dar Es Salaam. To provide Wessex 5 and their stores for EAGLE in addition to her Sea Kings would entail use of aircraft ex-BULWARK now at RNAS Culdrose with a consequent high risk of speculation. The Fleet Commanders and selected staff officers would have to be informed by 12 January 1971 at the latest to meet a sailing date of 19th. If ALBION is required to be off Lagos by 31 January immediate measures will have to be taken for the earlier completion of her current dockyard maintenance period and preparation for sea including informing the Dockyard Departments.
15. If there is a relaxation in the strict need-to-know restrictions by say:
the major RN units could be off Lagos/Dar Es Salaam as shown:
Warned 12 Jan |
Warned 18 Jan |
|
---|---|---|
EAGLE (Lagos) |
27 Jan |
27 Jan |
ALBION (Lagos) |
31 Jan |
5 Feb |
INTREPID (Dar Es Salaam) |
24 Jan |
27 Jan |
TRIUMPH (Dar Es Salaam) |
24 Jan |
29 Jan |
16. EAGLE and INTREPID would be the most suitable ships to select. However for both ships to be in position with a reasonable chance that this would be achieved without speculation the Prime Minister's announcement in Parliament would have to be delayed 3 days. With the same postponement of announcement, and if the risk of some speculation was also accepted, it would be possible to have EAGLE, TRIUMPH and INTREPID in position. If a postponement of the announcement by 7 days was accepted, ALBION could also be positioned, but with higher risk of speculation resulting from the action required for earlier completion of her dockyard maintenance period.
Standby Army Units
17. Although in the context of this paper no requirement for protection forces is envisaged, a number of Army units may be required to assist with the evacuation. The following units could be required for the duties shown, and should be included in any plans:
18. Warning orders to Army units must be issued at least 7 days before G Day.
Air Support Command
19. Measures to increase the overall readiness of the ASC transport fleet could include:
20. However, we believe that many of these measures could not be concealed and would cause unwelcome publicity. Moreover we consider that the present states of readiness are adequate.
Earliest Alert Measures
21. Discussions initiated by the Prime Minister in Singapore on or about 18 January might cause repercussions in Africa at any time after this date. Some preparations for an evacuation against this eventuality ought to be initiated now, but if they were the likely result would be a loss of security with the likely resultant repercussions in Africa. However there will always be some reserve capability available at short notice, even without prior preparations.
Arrangements with Other Government Departments
22. The setting up of the FCO Emergency Unit, when this can safely be done will greatly facilitate liaison and planning between the FCO and MOD staff, particularly outside normal working hours. A similar arrangement with the Home Office would also be required.
Further Planning
23. CICC(West) and CINCFE have been instructed (5) to carry out the necessary detailed planning on a need-to-know basis as a
Note:
matter of urgency for the possible evacuation of UK Nationals from Commonwealth African countries, using this paper as a guide.
CRITICAL DATES
24. The earliest possible date the Prime Minister can announce his decision in the House of Commons after his return from Singapore is 25 Jan 71 and on this basis we identify the following dates as being critical:
12 Jan |
Fleet Commanders to be informed
of firm requirements for ships to be off the African Coast by 24th and
27th. If ALBION is required by 31st Dockyard Departments will have to
be informed. |
13 Jan |
The latest date on which HMS
INTREPID must be warned to enable her to sail to be off Dar Es Salaam
by 24 January. This would entail transferring the Prime Minister's
dinner party to another venue. |
15 Jan pm |
The Prime Minister's dinner part
for other Commonwealth Prime Ministers aboard HMS INTREPID. |
17 Jan |
Reducing the note of the
proposed Army evacuation force for a possible move on the 25th. |
18 Jan |
The Prime Minister is expected
to mention the subject of arms to South Africa in his speech in the
Commonwealth Conference |
CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX A TO
COS 5/71
BLACK AFRICAN COUNTRIES - NUMBERS POSSIBLY REQUIRING EVACUATION
1. Although no general breakdown of law and order is expected, mass demonstrations against diplomatic mission and British expatriate communities could get out of hand. Zambia and Uganda represent the greatest danger. Relevant details of the 7 countries most likely to be affected are:
Note: "UK belongers" are UK citizens. "Non-belongers" are UK citizens of Asian origin.
APPENDIX
2 TO
ANNEX A TO
COS 5/71
FORCES AVAILABLE AND NOTICE
Ship |
Availability to Deploy |
Penalty |
Comment |
Latest Deployment Date to be off
Lagos on 24 Jan |
Austere Emergency Lift Capability
Assuming more than 24 hour passage |
(a) EAGLE (Devonport) | 19/20 Jan | 3rd Work up |
|
At 20 Kts 16 Jan At 24 Kts 17 Jan Earliest arrival 27 Jan |
1750 |
(b) ALBION (Portsmouth) | 29 Jan |
|
|
At 29 Kts 16 Jan At 24 Kts 17 Jan Earliest arrival 5 Feb |
Operational with Commando
embarked possibly 250 Non operational up to 1000 |
(c) FEARLESS (Devonport) | Approx 30 Jan |
|
Refit CD 22.1.71 |
Earliest arrival 6 Feb |
Without troops embarked 500 |
Ship |
Availability to Deploy |
Penalty |
Comment |
Latest Deployment Date to be off
Lagos on 24 Jan |
Austere Emergency Lift Capability
Assuming more than 24 hour passage |
(a) GLAMORGAN (Devonport) (Portland area) |
|
|
14 Jan |
375 |
|
(b) LONDON (Portsmouth) |
|
AMP CD 19 Jan |
14 Jan |
375 |
|
(c) FIFE (Malta) | 8 hours |
UK date for repair 30 Jan |
16 Jan |
375 |
Ship |
Availability to Deploy |
Penalty |
Comment |
Latest Deployment Date to be off
Lagos on 24 Jan |
Austere Emergency Lift Capability
Assuming more than 24 hour passage |
(a) WHITBY (Gibraltar) |
8 hours |
Gib Guardship commitment |
18 Jan |
100 |
|
(b) CAVALIER (Med force level) |
8 hours | Cagliari visit 12-16 Jan |
Approx 17 Jan |
120 |
|
(c) JUNG (Portsmouth area) ZULU (deploying to Far East) (19 Jan) |
8 hours 8 hours |
|
There is slack in the programme
to Far East by cancelling visits |
16 Jan |
100 |
(d) SIRIUS LONDONDERRY |
8 hours | Bahamas patrol |
Approx 15 Jan |
100 100 |
Ship |
Availability |
Penalty |
Comment |
Latest Deployment Date to be off
Dar Es Salaam on 24 Jan |
Austere Emergency Lift Capability
Assuming more than 24 hour passage |
(a)INTREPID (Singapore) |
47 hours notice |
|
|
13 Jan |
Without troops embarked 500 With troops embarked possibly 100 |
(b) TRIUMPH (Singapore) |
47 hours notice |
Far East Fleet maintenance
(LLANDAFF, NAIAD, CHARYBDIS, LYNX, DIDO) |
Notice dependent on FF/DD
maintenance state |
Approx 12 Jan |
With full complement 500. With
reduced complement up to 1000 |
(c) FORTH (Singapore) |
Approx 47 hours notice |
|
|
||
(d) LSL SIR TRISTRAM (Singapore
ETD 6 Jan) |
On passage Mauritius Simonstown
15 Jan-21 Jan |
UK date |
Approx 19 Jan |
Up to 400 dependent on current
loading |
|
(e) LSL SIR GALAHAD (Singapore) |
Extended notice |
DED |
DED 2 Jan-3 Feb |
Approx 8 Jan |
|
(f) LSL SIR BEDIVERE (Gulf area) |
13 Jan |
Gulf Support |
Repairs CD 13 Jan |
Approx 17 Jan |
Up to 400 dependent on current
loading |
Ship |
Availability |
Penalty |
Comment |
Latest Deployment Date to be off
Dar Es Salaam on 24 Jan |
Austere Emergency Lift Capability
Assuming more than 24 hour passage |
(a) PUMA (Beira Patr) SALISBURY (Beira Patrol) |
Immediate | Beira commitment | 21 Jan | 100 |
|
(b) TARTAR | Mozambique Channel area | Beira 22 Jan | Non operational at Gan until approx 13 Jan | 21 Jan | 100 |
(c) ASHANTI | Immediate on passage Singapore Gulf 8-20 Jan |
|
Approx 18 Jan | 100 |
|
(d) ESKIMO | Immediate Gulf Area |
|
Approx 19 Jan | 100 |
|
(e) MINERVA |
Immediate Passage
Madras-Simonstown 6-19 Jan |
UK date for DED |
Approx 18 Jan |
100 |
|
(f) CHARYBDIS (Singapore) |
47 hours |
|
13 Jan |
100 |
|
(g) LLANDAFF (Singapore) |
47 hours |
|
13 Jan |
100 |
|
(h) LYNX (Singapore) |
|
|
13 Jan Approx 19 Jan |
100 |
|
(i) NAIAD (Singapore) |
47 hours |
|
13 Jan |
100 |
|
(j) DIDO (Singapore) |
47 hours |
|
Approx 10 Jan |
100 |
|
(k) AURORA (Hong Kong) |
8 hours |
|
Not considered available for task |
Ship |
Availability |
Penalty |
Comment |
Latest Deployment Date to be off
Dar Es Salaam on 24 Jan |
Austere Emergency Lift Capability
Assuming more than 24 hour passage |
(a) DERWENTDALE |
Immediate |
|
21 Jan |
||
(b) DENDALE (Gulf-Indian Ocean) |
Immediate |
|
Approx 16 Jan |
Approx 100 |
|
(c) Up to three more RFA |
Singapore/Indian Ocean areas |
|
Unit |
Notice |
|
a. |
SPEARHEAD Bn Gp leading elements
(Tac HQ and one coy) |
24 hours to emplane |
b. |
Remainder of SPEARHEAD Bn Gp |
72 hours to emplane |
c. |
An Airportable Bde Gp |
7 days to emplane |
d. |
Signals, Medical and other
logistic units |
7 days |
The National Archives of the UK: Public Record Office DEFE 5/188/5
© Crown
Copyright
1971.
Reproduced under the terms of the Crown Copyright waiver on
unpublished public records.