THE ISOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE JAPANESE LANDINGS
For those on the west side of the international date line, the "date which will live in infamy" came on 8 December 1941. Few responsible military or naval men had believed that the Japanese would be able to strike in more than one place. The number and diversity of their attacks took the Allies completely by surprise. During the early morning hours of the 8th, Japanese naval and air forces struck almost simultaneously at Kota Bharu in British Malaya (0140), Singora, just across the border in Thailand (0305), Singapore (0610), Guam (0805), Hong Kong (0900), Wake, and the Philippines.
Chapter V: The First Days of War
Landing operation began almost immediately. By dawn, Japanese forces were in possession of Shanghai. Even as the first bombs were dropping on Hong Kong, Japanese troops were on their way into the leased territory. By the end of that day they were only a few miles from Kowloon which they took on the 13th. Hong Kong fell on Christmas Day.
Within an hour after the first bombardment of Kota Bharu, Japanese troops from Indochina began to land on the beaches against bitter opposition. The same day, when the main force of the 25th Army arrived, the beachhead was secured. The landings at Singora were unopposed. There, the troops marched down the east coast of the Kra Isthmus, while one division crossed the Thailand-British Malay border and moved down the west coast. Thus began a two-month campaign which ended with the fall of Singapore on 15 February.
On Guam the air attacks continued for two days. Finally, at dawn on the 10th, the South Seas Detachment and supporting naval units landed on the island. A few hours later, the garrison there surrendered. This was the first American possession to fall into Japanese hands. At Wake Island, the Marine detachment under Maj. James P.S. Devereux was better prepared for the enemy and offered heroic resistance. The first attempt to land was beaten off and the Japanese returned to Kwajalein to lick their wounds and collect more troops for the next attempt. They were back at Wake on the 22d and the next morning landed in force. That same day the garrison surrendered.
The fall of Wake and Guam cut the line of communications between Hawaii and the Philippines and left the United States with no Central Pacific base west of Midway,
4,500 miles from Manila. But even before this, on the first day of war, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had destroyed the Battle Force of the Pacific Fleet and nullified all plans to come to the aid of the Philippines.
East of the date line, Vice Adm. C. Nagumo's Pearl Harbor Striking Force of six carriers reached its launching position 200 miles north of Oahu exactly on schedule, at 0600 on the morning of 7 December (0100 on the 8th, Tokyo time). Two Jakes (Zero-type reconnaissance planes), which had taken off at 0530 to reconnoiter, returned with the report that, except for the richest prize, the three carriers, the entire Pacific Fleet was in port. Pilots of the First Air Fleet, amidst shouts of "banzai" from their comrades, took off from the flight decks and climbed above the overcast into a magnificent sunrise. At 0750, while "Pearl Harbor was still asleep in the morning mist," the Japanese planes came in over the island. Five minutes later, just an hour before Nomura presented his government's reply to Mr. Hull, they dropped their first bombs.
The next two hours of that Sabbath morning in Hawaii were a nightmare. Bombs and torpedoes dropped everywhere, on the ships in the harbor, on Army installations, on depots, and other targets. Dive bombers machine-gunned planes on the ground and men on the ships. Within a half hour every battleship at Pearl Harbor had been badly damaged.
Hickam and Wheeler Fields were struck in the first attacks. The Army planes, parked in close order, wing tip to wing tip, made perfect targets. By ten o'clock the raid was over and the last Japanese planes had returned to their carriers, leaving behind them death and destruction. Tactical surprise had been as complete as strategical surprise.
The Japanese pilots knew exactly what to go after. Though there were ninety-four naval vessels in the harbor they concentrated on the Battle Force, sinking 3 battleships, capsizing 1, and damaging 4 more. In addition to the battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and miscellaneous vessels were badly damaged. Ninety-two naval planes were lost and 31 damaged. The Army lost a total of 96 planes, including those destroyed in depots and those later stripped for parts. Army and Navy installations were badly hit. Fortunately, the Japanese failed to destroy the repair shops at Pearl Harbor or the oil tanks, filled to capacity. The carriers, then at sea, escaped the attack altogether. American casualties for the day were 2,280 men killed and 1,109 wounded. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft and 5 midget submarines. "The astoundingly disproportionate extent of losses," concluded the Joint Committee which investigated the attack, "marks the
greatest military and naval disaster in our Nation's history."
With this smashing blow, the Japanese made obsolete the carefully prepared plans of defense in the event of war in the Pacific. The RAINBOW plan called for the progressive movement of the Pacific Fleet across the Central Pacific by the capture of the Caroline and Marshall Islands and the establishment of an advanced base at Truk. The fleet would thus open the line of communications, establish superiority in the western Pacific, and come to the relief of the Philippine Islands. Along this protected line of communications would flow the supplies and men that would enable the Philippine garrison to beat back any Japanese effort to seize the Islands. By 1000 on the morning of 7 December, the force required to put RAINBOW into effect, the Battle Force of the Pacific Fleet, lay in ruins in Pearl Harbor. The Philippines were isolated, cut off from the nearest base 5,000 miles away, even before they had felt the first blow of the war. Their only hope now lay with the Far East Air Force and the Asiatic Fleet.
They duty officer at Asiatic Fleet headquarters in the Marsman Building in Manila on the night of 7-8 December (Philippine time) was Lt. Col. William T. Clement, USMC. At 0230 of the 8th (0800, 7 December, Pearl Harbor time), the operator at the Navy station intercepted the startling message, "Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." Recognizing the technique of the sender, an old friend stationed at Pearl Harbor, the operator brought the message to Colonel Clement. Within a half hour, it was in Admiral Hart's hands. He broadcast the news to the fleet immediately, and then, with his chief of staff, hurried to his office.
The Attack on Clark Field
Shortly after 0330 General Sutherland received the news of the Pearl Harbor attack, not from the Navy but from commercial broadcasts. He passed the news on to MacArthur over the private wire to the general's penthouse apartment in the Manila Hotel, then notified all commanders that a state of war existed with Japan. Troops were ordered to battle position immediately.
At Clark Field the news flash about Pearl Harbor was also picked up from commercial broadcasts. The operator immediately notified headquarters at the field and all units were alerted. "I knew," Brereton later wrote, "we could expect an attack from the Japs any time after daylight." Before leaving for MacArthur's headquarters he ordered Colonel Eubank, the
bomber commander at Clark Field, to come down to Manila at once. At about 0500 in the morning Brereton was waiting outside MacArthur's office for orders.
By breakfast, the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor had reached all ranks. The men had for so long accepted the fact that war with Japan might come that the event itself was an anticlimax. There was no cheering and no demonstration, but "a grim, thoughtful silence." War with Japan was not, for the American and Philippine troops, a remote war across a wide ocean. It was close and immediate.
On Formosa airfields, 500 mils away, Japanese Army and Navy pilots were standing by, their planes gassed and ready to take off for Luzon, when the first news of Pearl Harbor reached Manila. Around midnight of the 7th dense clouds of heavy fog had closed in on the island, blanketing airfields and preventing the scheduled take-offs at dawn.
Prologue to Attack
This unforeseen development filled the Japanese commanders with nervous apprehension. The timetable for the attack was extremely close and left little leeway. As the early morning hours rolled by, anxiety increased. By this time, the Japanese believed, the American high command in the Philippines would have received news of Pearl Harbor and either sent the Far East Air Force southward or set up an effective defense against the impending raid. All hope of surprise would be lost.
Even more frightening was the possibility that this delay would enable to heavy bombers of the Far East Air Force to attack the planes lined up on Formosa fields. Indeed, at 0800, the Japanese intercepted an American radio message which they interpreted as meaning that such an attack would come off in two hours. At 1010 a Japanese plane mistakenly reports B-17s approaching Formosa and the frightened Japanese began passing out gas masks.
Japanese fears of American attack against Formosa were not without foundation. Such plans had already been made and target data had been prepared. The objective folders were far from complete, however, and lacked calibrated bomb-target maps and bomb release lines for given speeds and altitudes. "But we had something complete enough," thought Capt. Allison Ind, a Far East Air Force intelligence officer, "to make this bombing mission a very far cry from the blind stab it would have had to be otherwise."
On his first visit to USAFFE headquarters about 0500, General Brereton had been unable to see MacArthur and had talked with Sutherland. At that time he had requested permission to carry out a daylight attack against Formosa. MacArthur's chief of staff had told him to go ahead with the necessary preparations, but to wait for MacArthur's authorization before starting the attack. Brereton returned to his headquarters at Nielson Field, where he talked with Colonel Eubank, who had just flown down from Clark Field. Orders were issued to get the B-17s ready. At about 0715 Brereton apparently went to MacArthur's headquarters again to request permission to attack Formosa. Again he was told by Sutherland to stand by for orders.
About this time the Far East Air Force commander received a transoceanic telephone call from his air force chief, General Arnold. Brereton explained what he was trying to do, and Arnold told him what had happened at Pearl Harbor, so that, as he later explained, Brereton would not be caught in the same way and have his "entire air force destroyed."
By this time, reports of enemy flights were being received at air force headquarters and planes of the Interceptor Command were sent up. Around 0800 the heavy bombers at Clark Field, were ordered aloft on patrol, without bombs, to avoid being caught on the ground.
At 1000 Brereton renewed his request to take offensive action. "I personally called General Sutherland," he say, "and informed him ... that if Clark Field was attacked successfully we would be unable to operate offensively with the bombers." Again the request was denied. Ten minutes later, Colonel Eubank started back to Clark Field with instructions to dispatch a photographic reconnaissance mission immediately to southern Formosa.
No sooner had those orders been issued than Brereton received a telephone call from General MacArthur. He told MacArthur that since Clark Field had not yet been attacked, he would hold the bombers in readiness until he received reports from the reconnaissance mission already authorized. They agreed that if no reports were received, the bombers would attack Formosa late that afternoon. MacArthur left to Brereton "the decision for offensive action."
Brereton called in his staff and told them of his conversation with MacArthur. Orders were then dispatched to Clark Field to call in the heavy bombers. Three were to be readied for the photo reconnaissance mission; the others were to be briefed for offensive missions. At 1120 Field Order No. 1 of the Far East Air Force was sent by teletype to Clark Field. It confirmed Brereton's instructions to Eubank, given at 1045, to attack southern Formosa with two heavy bombardment squadrons "at the latest daylight hour today that visibility will permit." By 1130 the bombers were back on the field, being loaded with 100- and 300-pound bombs; the fighters had also returned to base for refueling. At 1156 Brereton gave Sutherland a full report of the situation over the telephone, and informed him that he planned to attack Formosa fields late that afternoon.
General Sutherland's account of the proposed raid on Formosa differs from the air force story. On one occasion, Sutherland recollected that there had been some plan to bomb Formosa on 8 December but that "Brereton said he had to have the photos first." On another occasion Sutherland took the opposite and more consistent position that when Brereton asked for permission to attack Formosa, he, Sutherland, had ordered a reconnaissance first.
General MacArthur's statements do not throw any light on this question. He had received word from Washington early that morning (at 0530) that hostilities with Japan had begun, and that he was to carry out the tasks assigned in RAINBOW. Brereton's surmise, therefore, that he was not permitted at first to attack Formosa because MacArthur was under orders not to attack unless attacked first and that the Pearl Harbor attack "might not have been construed as an overt act against the Philippines" must be dismissed. MacArthur had authority to act, and RAINBOW specifically assigned as one of his missions "air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases."
General Brereton's surmise, however, was not entirely without foundation. It was evidently based on the 27 November warning from the War Department. That warning had stated that "if hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." The War Department had been careful, however, not to restrict MacArthur's freedom of action, and had authorized him in the same message to "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary" prior to hostile Japanese action. In the event of war he was to execute the tasks assigned in RAINBOW.
In the period between the receipt of this message and the outbreak of hostilities, the B-17s had flown reconnaissance missions north of Luzon in the direction of Formosa. Their search sectors, according to General Sutherland, reached to "the southern edge of Formosa with one segment of the pie running up the east coast of the island a little way." But General Brereton declares that he was instructed by MacArthur to limit reconnaissance to "two-thirds of the distance between North Luzon and Southern Formosa." Later, he says, he secured permission to extend the northern limit of the search sector to the international treaty boundary between the Philippines and Formosa. On the basis of Sutherland's statement, then, it was possible to conduct a partial reconnaissance of Formosa before the war; according to Brereton there was no prewar reconnaissance on MacArthur's orders.
On Brereton's proposal to bomb Formosa, General MacArthur expressed himself most clearly. When Brereton's diaries were published in 1946, MacArthur released a statement to the press recounting in full his recollection of the events of 8 December 1941. The press release, issued on 27 September 1946, read:General Brereton never recommended an attack on Formosa to me and I know nothing of such a recommendation having been made... That it must have been of a most nebulous and superficial character, as no official record exists of it at headquarters. That such a proposal, if intended seriously, should have been made to me in person by him; that he never has spoken of the matter to me either before or after the Clark Field attack. That an attack on Formosa with its heavy concentrations by his small bomber force without fighter support, which because of the great distance involved, was impossible, would have had no chance of success.
On 8 December, in summarizing the results of the Japanese attack, MacArthur had told the War Department: "I am launching a heavy bombardment counterattack tomorrow morning on enemy airdromes in southern Formosa." It is evident, then, that MacArthur himself planned, by the afternoon or evening of the 8th, to execute an attack against Formosa with the remaining B-17s.
Faced with these conflicting accounts, the historian can be sure only of five facts: (1) That an attack against Formosa was proposed; (2) that such an attack was deferred in favor of a photo reconnaissance mission requested either by Brereton or Sutherland; (3) that about 1100 on 8 December a strike
against Formosa, to take place that day, was finally authorized; (4) that the heavy bombers were back on Clark Field after 1130 on the morning of 8 December; and (5) that MacArthur planned an attack against Formosa for the morning of 9 December.
The Japanese, fearing an air attack against Formosa, had meanwhile made haste to get their planes off the ground. The fog, which had grounded the 11th Air Fleet, had lifted to the east at dawn, permitting twenty-five twin-engine Army bombers to take off for Luzon.
Shortly before 0900 the Japanese Army bombers were reported by the aircraft warning service on Luzon to be heading south over Lingayen Gulf in the direction of Manila. It was probably this report that sent the B-17s at Clark Field aloft without bombs. The 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark took off to intercept the strike and the 17th Pursuit Squadron rose from Nichols Field to cover Clark. But the Japanese Army planes, limited to targets north of the 16th latitude, turned east as they approached Lingayen Gulf. One group struck Tuguegarao at about 0930 while another concentrated on barracks and other installations at Baguio, the summer capital of the Commonwealth, where Quezon was staying at this time. The Japanese bombers returned to base without having sighted any American aircraft. Far East Air Force reports between 1000 and 1030 of a flight of enemy bombers, first in the Cagayan valley, and then "turned around and proceeding north," apparently referred to these Japanese Army planes.
By the time the false report of approaching B-17s had been received on Formosa, the fog had lifted sufficiently to permit the naval planes of the 11th Air Fleet to take off. At 1015, a force of 108 twin-engine bombers escorted by eighty-four Zeros set out for Clark and Iba. Only the very best and most experienced pilots had been assigned to this important mission.
As the Japanese planes approached northern Luzon, the airborne American aircraft received the all-clear signal and were instructed to land. By 1130 nearly all the planes were back at their bases. The two squadrons of B-17s were on Clark Field, loading with gas and bombs for the raid against Formosa. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was also at Clark after its vain attempt to intercept the last Japanese flight. At Nichols, the 17th Pursuit Squadron, which had been covering Clark, was landing to refuel. The 3d and 34th pursuit Squadrons were standing by at Iba and Del Carmen.
Shortly before 1130, reports of an approaching enemy formation began coming in to the plotting board at Nielson.
In addition to radar reports, almost every postmaster along the northwest coast of Luzon reported the high-flying enemy bombers to the air warning center by telephone or telegraph. Colonel George, chief of staff of the Interceptor Command, was in the plotting room when the reports were coming in, and predicted "that the objective of this formidable formation was Clark Field."
At about 1145, according to Col. Alexander H. Campbell, the aircraft warning officer, a warning message went out to Clark Field by teletype. If the message did not get through, as is frequently asserted, this fact was not know to the officers in the plotting room at Nielson. It is asserted also that an attempt to warn the field by radio over the Far East Air Force net was made, but with no success. The reason for this failure can only be guessed. Col. James V. Colier, a G-3 officer in USAFFE headquarters, later stated, "The radio operator had left his station to go to lunch," and another source states, "Radio reception was drowned by static which the Japanese probably caused by systematic jamming of the frequencies." Apparently other available means of communication, such as the long distance telephone lines, telegraph, and the command radio net to Fort Stotsenburg, were not used or thought of. Colonel Campbell did get a telephone message through to Clark Field and talked with an unknown junior officer there. This officer intended, said Campbell, to give the base commander or the operations officer the message at the earliest opportunity.
Meanwhile, Colonel George at Nielson had dispersed his fighters to meet the attack. The 34th Squadron was ordered to cover Clark Field; the 17th, the Bataan peninsula; and the 21st, the Manila area. The 3d Squadron at Iba was dispatched to intercept a reported enemy formation over the South China Sea. At Clark Field, two squadrons of B-17s and the 20th Pursuit Squadron were still on the ground. Sometime shortly before 1145 the fighters were ordered aloft as soon as refueling was completed to cover their own base.
The 3d Pursuit Squadron took off from Iba to intercept the enemy flight over the South China Sea. A thick haze of dust prevented the 34th at Del Carmen from taking off, and at 1215 the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark, whose planes had just completed refueling, made ready to take off.
At that moment the first formation of Japanese bombers appeared over Clark
Field. All but one of the B-17s was lined up on the field and the fighters were just getting ready to take off. After the warning of the Pearl Harbor attack, and after the loss of several valuable hours because of bad weather, the Japanese pilots did not expect to find so rich a harvest waiting for them. But they did not question their good fortune. The first flight of Japanese planes consisted of twenty-seven twin-engine bombers. They came over the unprotected field in a V-formation at a height estimated at 22,000 to 25,000 feet, dropping their bombs on the aircraft and buildings below, just as the air raid warning sounded. As at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese archived complete tactical surprise.
The first flight was followed immediately by a similar formation which remained over the field for fifteen minutes. The planes in this formation, as in the first, accomplished their mission almost entirely without molestation. American antiaircraft shells exploded from 2,000 to 4,000 feet short of the targets. After the second formation of bombers, came thirty-four Zeros--which the Americans believed were carrier based--to deliver the final blow with their low-level strafing attacks on the grounded B-17s, and on the P-40s with their full gasoline tanks. This attack lasted for more than an hour.
With the first high wail of the siren, the men on the field below streamed from the mess halls. As the bombers passed over, the Americans could see the falling bombs glistening in the sunlight. Then came the explosions, hundreds of them, so violent that they seemed to pierce the eardrums and shake the ground. Throwing aside momentary disbelief and stupefaction, the men rushed to their battle stations. The scene was one of destruction and horror, unbelievable to the men who only a few minutes before had been eating lunch or servicing the planes. Flash fires sprang up and spread rapidly to the trees and long cogon grass around the field "roaring and crackling like an evil beast." Dense smoke and a heavy cloud of dust rose over the field.
Against such odds, the Americans could offer little opposition. The 200th Coast Artillery (AA) experienced considerable difficulty with its 3-inch gun ammunition, the most recent of which was manufactured in 1932. The percentage of duds was abnormally high and "most of the fuses were badly corroded." Only one of every six shells fired, says one observer, actually exploded. Acts of personal heroism were commonplace. Ground and combat crews manned the guns of the grounded planes, and men dashed into flaming buildings to rescue their comrades as well as supplies and equipment. Others braved the strafing gunfire to aid the wounded. One private appropriated an abandoned truck and made seven trips with wounded men to the station hospital.
During the attack, 3 P-40s of the 20th Pursuit Squadron managed to get into the air, but 5 more were blasted by bombs as
they taxied for the take-off. A similar number was caught in the strafing attack. The 3 airborne fighters shot down 3 or 4 Japanese fighters.
The 34th Pursuit Squadron, still at Del Carmen, could see the great clouds of smoke rising from Clark. The old P-35s of the squadron finally managed to take off and were soon in action against the superior Zeros over Clark. Though outclassed and outnumbered, the squadron knocked down three enemy fighters without loss to itself. But few of its planes were without serious damage. The 17th and 21st Pursuit Squadrons, on patrol over Bataan and Manila, made no effort to attack the Japanese aircraft, presumably because the communications center at Clark had been bombed out and news of the raid did not reach the Interceptor Command in time to dispatch aid.
The 11th Air Fleet's attack against Clark was even more successful than the worried Japanese had expected. The operation had been well planned and executed. The first flights of bombers had concentrated on the hangars, barracks, and warehouses, and left them a burning ruin. Some of the grounded planes had been damaged in these bombings but the greatest casualties were inflicted by the low-level attacks of the Zeros which followed. Casualties in men were fifty-five killed and more than one hundred wounded.
Simultaneously with the raid against Clark, other 11th Air Fleet planes were attacking the fighter base at Iba. The 12 planes of the 3d Pursuit Squadron, which had been patrolling over the China Sea, low on gas, returned to base. As they were circling to land, Iba was struck by 54 Japanese twin-motored naval bombers escorted by 50 Zeros. Effective action by the P-40s resulted in the loss of 2 Japanese fighters (probables) and kept the Zeros from carrying out the low-level attacks which were so successful at Clark. But the losses at Iba were almost as great as at Clark. Barracks, warehouses, equipment, and the radar station were destroyed. Ground crews suffered heavy casualties and all but 2 of the 3d Squadron's P-40s were lost.
The reaction from Washington headquarters of the Air Forces was delayed but explosive, despite a radio from MacArthur stating that the losses had been "due to overwhelming superiority of enemy forces." General Arnold, when he received the news of the losses in the Philippines, "could not help thinking that there must have been some mistake made somewhere in my Air Force command," and he decided "to tell Brereton so." Brereton had just returned from an inspection of Clark Field when he received a transoceanic telephone call from an irate General Arnold asking "how in the hell" an experienced airman like himself could have been caught with his planes down. Apparently he felt his explanation had not satisfied General Arnold, for he immediately reported the conversation to MacArthur and asked his help in presenting the situation to the Army Air Forces chief. According to Brereton, MacArthur was furious. "He told me to go back and fight the war and not to worry,"
Brereton recorded in his diary. "As I walked out of his office he asked Sutherland to get General Marshall on the phone." Unfortunately, there is no record of the telephone conversation that followed.
Thus, after one day of war, with its strength cut in half, the Far East Air Force had been eliminated as an effective fighting force. Of the modern combat aircraft, only 17 of the original 35 B-17s remained. Fifty-three P-40s and 3 P-35s had been destroyed, and an additional 25 or 30 miscellaneous aircraft (B-10s, B-18s, and observation planes) were gone. In addition, many of the planes listed as operational were heavily damaged. Installations at Clark and Iba were either burned out or badly hit. Total casualties for the day were 80 killed and 150 wounded. The total cost to the Japanese was 7 fighters. The conclusion of the Joint Congressional Committee which investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, that it was the greatest military disaster in American history, is equally applicable to the Philippines.
The catastrophe of Pearl Harbor overshadowed at the time and still obscures the extent of the ignominious defeat inflicted on American air forces in the Philippines on the same day. The Far East Air Force had been designed as a striking force to hit the enemy before he could reach Philippine shores. The heavy bombers were an offensive weapon, thought capable of striking the enemy's bases and cutting his lines of communication. Hopes for the active defense of the Islands rested on these aircraft. At the end of the first day of war, such hopes were dead.
The tragedy of Clark Field, where the heavy bombers were caught like so many sitting ducks, becomes even more tragic when one considers the strange sequence of events that preceded it. Even before the war, the danger of basing the B-17s on Clark Field had been recognized. General MacArthur had written to General Marshall on 29 November, "The location of potential enemy fields and types of aircraft indicate that heavy bombers should be located south of Luzon where they would be reasonably safe from attack." He intended at the time to base the bombers in the Visayas. Time did not permit the construction of fields there, but before the outbreak of hostilities he did order General Brereton to move the heavy bombers from Clark Field to Mindanao.
During the first week in December, Brereton had sent two squadrons of B-17s to the recently constructed field at Del Monte in Mindanao. The decision to move only two squadrons, Brereton states, was based on the expected arrival from the United States of the 7th Bombardment Group which was to be stationed at Del Monte. Had all the heavy bombers on Clark been transferred to Mindanao, there would have been no room for the 7th when it arrived.
General Sutherland's version of the same incident differs considerably from that of the air force commander. It was at his insistence, he recollected, that even the two squadrons were sent south. "General Brereton," he says, "did not want them to go." Sutherland says he had ordered all the B-17s moved to Del Monte. On checking, he had found that only half of the planes had been sent and that General MacArthur's orders had not been obeyed.
Wherever the responsibility lies for failing to move all the B-17s south, there still remains the question of why the remaining bombers were caught on the ground. Brereton argues that had he been permitted to attack Formosa when he wished, the planes would not have been on the field. Implicit is the assumption that if the raid had been successful, the Japanese could not have made their own attack. MacArthur denied knowledge of such a proposal in 1946, but in a radio sent on 8 December 1941 he stated that he intended to attack Formosa the next morning. General Sutherland, in one interview, claimed that Brereton was responsible for deferring the attack, and in another interview, that he himself deferred the attack because the Far East Air Force did not have sufficient target data for such an attack. It is clear that this project was discussed by Brereton and Sutherland, that MacArthur mentioned it in a radio that day, and that authorization to execute the attack was delayed until 1100 that morning.
Whether such an attack would have had a serious chance of success is not argued by either Sutherland or Brereton. Knowing now what the Japanese had at Formosa, the possibility of a successful raid by the B-17s seems extremely remote. The Far East Air Force admittedly had sketchy information on the strength and disposition of the Japanese forces on Formosa. Had it been known that there were over five hundred Japanese planes waiting on Formosa, ready to take off, it is doubtful that anyone would have considered the project seriously. Moreover, the B-17s would have had to fly to Formosa, out of fighter range, unescorted. Once there, they would have been greeted by swarms of Zeros. "An attack on Formosa, with its heavy air concentrations," MacArthur later wrote, "... was impossible, would have had no chance of success." Sutherland's request for a photo reconnaissance mission prior to an attack would appear, therefore, to have been entirely justified. The heavy bombers were indeed far too valuable to risk in so hazardous a mission.
Another unresolved question is why the warning of approaching Japanese aircraft did not reach the bomber commander at Clark Field in time to meet the attack. All forces in the Philippines had knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor hours before the first Japanese bombers appeared over Luzon. A dawn raid at Davao had given notice that the Japanese had no intention of bypassing the archipelago. The early morning bombings on Luzon gave even more pointed warning that an attack against the major airbase in the Islands could be expected. Colonel Campbell testifies that Clark Field had received word of the approaching Japanese aircraft before the attack. Colonel Eubank states that no such warning was ever received. Other officers speak of the breakdown of communications
at this critical juncture. There is no way of resolving this conflicting testimony.
Assuming that Colonel Eubank did not receive the warning from Nielson Field, there still remains one final question. Were the aircraft on the field adequately dispersed for wartime conditions? It is not possible to state definitely how the aircraft were dispersed when they came in at 1130. There surely must have been some recognition of the danger of an enemy air attack at any moment. The Japanese state that they were "surprised to find the American aircraft line up on the field." And at least one flight of four B-17s was lined neatly on the field when the Japanese came over. Captain Ind tells of finding photographs, one of which was taken by an American pilot flying over the field, showing the planes inadequately dispersed for any but high-level bombing attacks. "This entire set of photographs," he says, "was removed from my desk a few nights later. no one seemed to know what had happened to them." This question, like the others, remains unanswered.
The full story of the events which preceded the Japanese air attacks against the Far East Air Force on the first day of the war will probably never be known. There was no time for reports, and if any records ever existed they have since been lost. The historian must rely on the memories of participants whose stories conflict at numerous points. General Arnold, eight years after the event, wrote that he was never able "to get the real story of what happened in the Philippines." Brereton's diary, in his opinion, did not provide, "a complete and accurate account," and General Sutherland's story "does not completely clear it up, by any means."
Whatever the answers to the questions one may ask about the events of 8-9 December 1941 on Luzon, the significance of these events is clear. As at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had removed in one stroke the greatest single obstacle to their advance southward. The Philippine garrison could expect little help in the near future. It was now almost entirely surrounded. The only path open lay to the south, and that, too, soon would be closed.
The mission of the Asiatic Fleet in the event of war was to support he defense of the Philippines, "as long as that defense continues." The actual employment of local naval defense forces was entrusted to the commander of the 16th Naval District, who was responsible for the Joint tactical and strategical employment of his forces in co-operation with the Army. The commander of the Asiatic Fleet, at his discretion and when the situation demanded, was authorized to "shift base to British and Dutch ports."
The Fleet Moves South
The force assigned for this task was pitifully small and deployed over a distance of more than 1,500 miles, from northern Luzon to Borneo. In the Manila Bay area were 5 destroyers, 2 of which were under repair and 3 on patrol; 27 submarines with their 3 tenders--3 of the underwater craft
were being overhauled; 28 Catalinas (twin-engine patrol bombers or PBYs); 4 utility planes; and 1 observation plane. The planes were organized into Patrol Wing 10 under Capt. F.D. Wagner, with one full squadron operating from Sangley Point, Cavite, and the remainder from Olongapo. In addition, there were 5 gunboats, a similar number of motor torpedo boats, 5 minesweepers, and other auxiliary craft in the area. At Mariveles was the floating dry dock Dewey. The installations of the 16th Naval district, commanded by Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell, were centered in Manila and Subic Bays--at Cavite, Corregidor, and Olongapo--with approximately 2,000 officers and men assigned. The reorganized and strengthened 4th Marines, with a strength of 1,600 and commanded by Col. Samuel L. Howard, was at Olongapo.
The bulk of the surface strength of the Asiatic Fleet, organized in Task Force 5, was based south of Manila Bay. The flagship of the task force, the heavy cruiser Houston, was at Iloilo, in Panay. The light cruiser Boise, which belonged to the Pacific Fleet, was also in the Visayas, off Cebu, where she had gone after her arrival in Manila on 4 December with an Army convoy. At the Dutch Borneo port of Tarakan was the light cruiser Marblehead accompanied by 5 destroyers, and at Balikpapan were 4 more destroyers and a tender. The remaining 2 submarines of the Asiatic Fleet were on patrol off the Luzon coast, 1 in Lingayen Gulf and another in Sorsogon Bay. Patrolling to the south and linking up with the Dutch patrols from Borneo were 2 small aircraft detachments, 1 at Davao and another on a small island south of Palawan.
On the morning of 8 December, the only portion of the Asiatic Fleet to come under fire was the small aircraft detachment at Davao with the tender Preston. After the attack from the Ryujo-based dive bombers and fighters, Preston let pass four Japanese destroyers, and then slipped out of Davao Gulf to escape southward.
Before noon of the 8th, Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, commander of Task Force 5 and recently arrived from China, left by plane for Iloilo to hoist his flag aboard the Houston. He was joined there by the Boise from Cebu. That evening the aircraft tender Langley, protected by two destroyers, slipped out of Manila Bay under cover of darkness to join the cruisers at Panay. From there Glassford, on orders from Admiral Hart, led his small fleet south to Dutch Borneo to pick up oil and to assemble the rest of his force. He met no enemy ships on the way, only a long line of merchant vessels making good their escape. Thus, by the end of the first day of war, the striking force of the Asiatic
Fleet, Task Force 5, was steaming south, and on 10 December had left Philippine waters.
The Japanese followed up their successes of the first day of war with a series of air attacks aimed at destroying or driving American air and naval power from the Philippines. Before dawn of the 9th 7 Japanese naval bombers struck Nichols Field near Manila. The Japanese had planned a larger attack but the fog had again rolled in over Formosa during the early morning hours. The 7 bombers were enough to do the job. The loss of 2 or 3 P-40s, as well as other planes, and the destruction of ground installations completed the havoc begun at noon the previous day.
The Japanese Gain Air and Naval Supremacy
On the 9th ground crews worked desperately to patch up the damaged planes, and units were reorganized. Antiaircraft defenses, especially in the Manila area, were strengthened, and one battery of the 60th Coast Artillery (AA) which had left Corregidor after dark on the 8th was in position on the morning of the 9th to furnish local protection for the port area, Nichols Field, and the oil storage and railroad yards. About five hundred men of the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) from Clark Field were dispatched to Manila during the day, supplied with equipment from the Philippine Ordnance Depot, and organized into a provisional antiaircraft regiment, later designated the 515th.
The air attack against Formosa which General MacArthur had promised for the 9th never materialized. At 0800 one B-17 took off from Clark Field for a photo reconnaissance mission over Formosa but was forced back because of mechanical difficulty. Army fighters flew reconnaissance missions over northern Luzon and the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 continued their patrols to the west and northwest. Numerous reports of enemy sightings were received but on investigation proved to be unfounded. Such reports, Hart noted, placed all Japanese vessels in one of two categories, "either a Transport or a Battleship!" The Japanese also searched north Luzon during the day for evidence of American air activities.
On the 9th, the thirteen heavy bombers on Mindanao moved forward to Luzon. Six of the Flying Fortresses landed at ill-fated Clark Field at 1430; the rest reached San Marcelino, an emergency field along the west coast of Luzon, later in the afternoon. The B-17s at Clark refueled and took off immediately after their arrival, remaining in the air until dark to avoid being caught on the ground as had the others the day before.
JAPANESE AIR ATTACK ON 10 DECEMBER 1941 left warehouses on fire at Nichols Field, above; below, at Cavite Navy Yard, small-arms shells explode (left) as the torpedo-loaded barge (center) burns.
The weather over Formosa on the morning of 10 December was threatening, but the Japanese, anticipating a change for the better, decided to press their advantage. Naval planes took off about 1000 to strike Luzon again. This time the target was the Manila Bay area. First warning of the approach of Japanese planes reached the Interceptor Command at Nielson Field at 1115, and fighters were immediately dispatched to cover Manila Bay, the port area, and Bataan. A half hour later, the enemy aircraft hit the Del Carmen Field near Clark, and the Nichols and Nielson Fields, near Manila. So severe was the attack against Nichols and so great the number of bombs dropped that the men at Nielson, nearly two miles away, thought the bombs were falling on their own field. The pattern set at Clark Field two days earlier was repeated. High-level bombers came in first and hit the barracks, offices, and warehouses. The fighters then came in at low level to strafe the grounded planes and installations. American planes returning to refuel were attacked by Zeros and destroyed. There was no antiaircraft fire and no fighter protection over the field; all the pursuits were engaged over Manila Bay.
The naval base at Cavite received no less attention than Nichols Field. The Japanese force had divided north of Manila, and part had turned east toward the army installations. The rest, 54 bombers attacked ships and small craft in the bay and the remainder went on toward the naval base. With maddening deliberation, the bombers flew over Cavite, dropping their bombs from a height of 20,000 feet, above the range of the 9 3-inch antiaircraft guns protecting the base. Almost every bomb fell within the navy yard. After the first run, the first flight withdrew and the other 27 bombers, having completed their attack against ships in the bay, flew in to strike the targets.
The attack lasted for two hours. As at Clark and Nichols, the opposition was feeble and the damage extensive. The entire yard was set ablaze; the power plant, dispensary, repair ships, warehouses, barracks, and radio station received direct hits. Greatest damage was done by the fire which spread rapidly and was soon out of control. Admiral Rockwell estimated that five hundred men were killed or seriously wounded that day. The large submarine Sealion received a direct hit, but Seadragon was pulled away in time by its tender. The most serious loss to the submarine force, however, was the destruction of well over two hundred torpedoes.
Throughout the attack, Admiral Hart had watched the destruction of Cavite from atop the Marsman Building. That night, after receiving an account of the damage done, he reported to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington that he regarded Manila untenable as a naval base since the
enemy had control of the air, but promised to "continue submarine and air operations as long as possible." He then sent 2 destroyers, 3 gunboats, 3 submarine tenders, and 2 minesweepers south to join Task Force 5. "It is unfortunate," he noted in his report, "that two or three additional small ships were not sent south at this time."
The naval vessels were not the only ships to move south. At the start of the war there had been about forty large merchant ships, many with valuable cargoes, in Manila Bay. The Navy had promptly closed the bay to all outbound traffic, and had extinguished the lighthouses on Corregidor and two other outlying islands. Fortunately the merchant vessels had escaped attack during the first day of operations.
In the next two days, many commercial vessels sought protection in Manila Bay and were guided through the mine fields by the inshore patrol. During the attack of the 10th, the Japanese had dropped a few bombs among these ships, scoring one hit. Admiral Hart had told the shipmasters on the 11th that their vessels would be safer in Visayan ports, and that evening the commercial vessels began to steam out of Manila Bay. All but one finally escaped. The Japanese had missed a golden opportunity to cripple Allied shipping.
On the morning of the 11th the fires at Cavite were burning more fiercely than ever. Evidently there was no chance of saving the yard. When Rockwell reported to Hart in manila that day the two men agreed to salvage as much as possible from the ruins. Remaining supplies were to be distributed among the installations at Manila, Corregidor, and Mariveles. The base at Sangley Point was to be maintained as long as possible, and when no longer tenable the radio station and fuel supply were to be moved to Corregidor.
Meanwhile, the Japanese air force continued the systematic destruction of the air and naval forces remaining in the Philippines. There had been no raids on the 11th, largely because the weather over Formosa had been bad. The planes returning from the raid on the 10th had been forced to set down wherever they could, thus scattering units among the many Formosan fields. The next day was spent in reassembling the units. On the 12th and 13th the Japanese again attacked in force. On these two days hundreds of Japanese Army and Navy planes struck targets on Luzon at will in a final effort to destroy the remnants of the Far East Air Force and the Asiatic Fleet.
By this time American air power was at a low ebb. There were only 22 P-40s in commission, with 6 more promised if they could be repaired in time. In addition, between 5 and 8 P-35s and a handful of the obsolete P-26s were operational. Sixteen heavy bombers were still in commission but 5 of these were suitable only for low-altitude flights and another 4 were not fit for tactical missions. With the Far East Air Force thus reduced in strength it
wad decided to use the remaining planes for reconnaissance in order to conserve them as long as possible. The pursuit planes were based at Clark and Nichols, and the heavy bombers were withdrawn to Del Monte. On the morning of the 12th few American planes remained to hinder the Japanese.
The enemy attack on the 12th came at noon, the hour when Clark and Cavite had been hit. Sixty-three naval bombers from Takao in Formosa arrived over Central Luzon between 1130 and 1200 and struck Iba and Clark Fields. Only a small number of planes flew over Clark; the remainder delivered the main attack against Iba, reporting the destruction of ten planes on the ground.
That morning, the PBYs at Olongapo had been dispatched on a fruitless search for a nonexistent Japanese carrier reported off the Luzon coast. They were followed in by a Japanese force of Zeros which had been escorting a large number of bombers in a scheduled strike against one of the Manila fields. When the mission was canceled on account of poor weather over the target, the Zeros sought targets elsewhere. The returning PBYs offered an opportunity too good to be missed. Unseen by the Americans, the Japanese planes waited for the seven Navy patrol bombers to land, and then destroyed them at leisure. These same planes then went on to attack Batangas before returning to Formosa. MacArthur reported at the end of the day that "the crescendo of enemy air offensive was rapidly rising," with attacks by at least 113 planes. "Pilots have been ordered to avoid direct combat," he explained, in order to make a "show of strength and to have air reconnaissance."
The next day almost 200 Japanese planes were over Luzon. The first attack came at dawn against Del Carmen. At 1030 and at 1100 Clark Field was attacked. About the same time Baguio and Tarlac were hit. These early strikes were made by Army planes. At 1230 the naval bombers put in an appearance. During the afternoon, Del Carmen, Clark, Nichols, Cabanatuan, and Batangas were hit at least once. The fields, already strewn with wrecked planes, received further damage. Over Subic Bay additional PBYs were destroyed, leaving less than a full squadron in Patrol Wing 10. By the end of the day, American Army and Navy air power in the Philippines had been virtually destroyed.
One thing was clear to Admiral Hart by this time: the United States forces in the Philippines were on their own. With the loss of air power the possibility of effective naval support was extremely limited and the sea lanes along which reinforcements could be expected to travel were closed. he felt, therefore, that he must salvage what he could of the Asiatic Fleet for later operations in the defense of the Malay Barrier. On 14 December he sent out the remaining bombers of Patrol Wing 10, together with three tenders and such extra personnel
and spare parts as could be carried southward. Staff officers, including the chief of staff of the Asiatic Fleet, followed by plane and by boat. All that remained of the Asiatic Fleet in Philippine waters were 2 destroyers (1 under repair), 6 motor torpedo boats, 2 tenders, 3 gunboats, and various small craft, in addition to the 27 submarines. Admiral Hart himself decided to remain in Manila as long as the underwater craft could be operated and serviced from there.
The position of the heavy bombers in Mindanao had by now become precarious. The Japanese were flying extensive reconnaissance missions in an effort to discover the remaining American aircraft. Thus far they had been unable to find the Del Monte field, but it was only a question of time before this last haven would be discovered and destroyed. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly difficult to service the B-17s with the inadequate facilities at Del Monte. There were no spare parts, engines, or propellers for the B-17s in the Philippines; B-18s and damaged B-17s had to be cannibalized to keep the bombers flying. The only tools were those in the possession of the crews. The men who worked on the planes all night often got no rest the next day because of air alerts. On some days the heavy bombers had to remain aloft during the daylight hours to avoid destruction on the ground. They dodged back and forth between Mindanao and Luzon, playing "a game of hide-and-seek that wore out men as well as planes."
Under these conditions, it was evident that the remaining heavy bombers could not operate efficiently in the Philippines. General Brereton therefore requested authority on 15 December to move the B-17s to Darwin in northwest Australia, 1,500 miles away, where they could be based safely and serviced properly. His intention was to operate from fields near Darwin, using Clark and Del Monte as advance bases from which to strike enemy targets in the Philippines. Sutherland approved the plan the same day and secured General MacArthur's concurrence. The planes were immediately prepared for the long flight southward, and two days later the first group of B-17s left Del Monte airfield. By the following evening ten of the bombers had reached Batchelor Field outside Darwin. They had left Mindanao none too soon, for on the 19th the field at Del Monte received its first major air attack from Japanese planes based on the carrier Ryujo.
By 15 December the air strength of the Philippines had been reduced to a handful of fighters All hopes for preventing the main Japanese landings soon to come and for keeping the supply routes open rested now on these few planes and on the submarines of the Asiatic Fleet.
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (4) * Next Chapter (6)
 All times are Tokyo time.
 Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., The Defense of Wake (USMC Hist Sec, 1947); Opns of South Seas Detachment, 1941-42, Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 36, p. 3. For operations at Hong Kong and in Malaya, see Japanese Landing Operations, December 8, 1941-June 8, 1942, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Campaign Study 3.
 The quotation is from an account by a Japanese naval officer and is quoted in Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 94.
 At 0800, Admiral Kimmel broadcast the nessage: "Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." Secretary Knox, when he read the message in Washington, exclaimed, "My God! This can't be true, this must mean the Philippines." Pearl Harbor Attack Report, p. 439.
 The best account of the attack on Pearl Harbor has been written by Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, Ch. V. For the Air Forces story, see Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 194-201. Much personal testimony and first-hand accounts of the attack can be found scattered through the Congressional hearings on the Pearl Harbor attack. A summary of the action can be found in Pearl Harbor Attack report, pp. 53-72.
 Pearl Harbor Attack Report, p. 65. The breakdown of casualties is as follows:
Killed Wounded Navy and Marines 2,086 749 Army 194 360 ------ ------ 2,280 1,109
In an earlier volume of the series, Watson, Chief of Staff, page 517, the number of dead is placed at 2,403, including civilians. Mr. Watson's figures are from Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, page 126, and are based on 1947 estimates.
 Min, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41, OPD Reg Doc.
 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 36-37; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 168-69. Captain Morison secured additional information from Admiral Hart by interview after the war.
 Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against Japan, p. 27; Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 18; intervs, author with Col Diller, 24 Aug 49, Gens Sutherland and Marshall, 12 Nov 46 and 7 Apr 48, OCMH. Admiral Hart states that Colonel Clement, unable to "get response from USAFFE Headquarters," passed the news "to one of the staff duty officers at his home." Ltr, Hart to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 19 Dec 51, OCMH.
 Brereton, Diaries, pp. 38-39. It is evident from internal evidence that the diary for this period was put in its present form at a later date and cannot therefore be considered always a contemporaneous record.
 Mallonée, Bataan Diary, I, 34.
 Interrog of Capt Takahashi Chihaya, Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), 20 Oct 45, and of Comdr Ryosuke Nomura, Opns Officer, 23d Air Flotilla, 11th Air Fleet, 28 Nov 45, in USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols. (Washington 1946) I, 74-76; II, 531; 14th Army Opns, I, 41.
It is difficult to understand the origin of the 0800 message. While there was discussion of such a raid at USAFFE, there was no need to send radios on the subject. It is possible that orders sending B-17s at Clark aloft to avoid being caught on the ground were in some way intercepted and misunderstood by the apprehensive Japanese. 14th Army Opns, I, 41, refers to the report as "intelligence reports," but does not indicate its origin any further. 5th Air Grp, Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 3, p. 6.
 Lt. Col. Allison Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat (New York, 1944), p. 92. Material used with the permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.
The official air force account of the attack on Clark Field is contained in Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 201-14. General Brereton has a full account in his Diaries, pages 38-44, which must be considered as the evidence of an interested party in the dispute which later arose over responsibility for the disaster. Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, Chapter III, covers the Clark Field attack and is substantially the same as that given in the air force history.
Official records of the events surrounding the attack are practically nonexistent. An effort had been made by the authors to supplement the existing accounts with interviews with those participants not interviewed by the air force historians. persons interviewed were General Sutherland and R.J. Marshall, Colonels Diller, Collier, and Campbell, the last of whom was aircraft warning officer of USAFFE.
Mr. Walter D. Edmonds, who was commissioned by the air force to write the account of air operations in the Philippines, interviewed General Sutherland in Manila in June 1945, as well as a large number of air force officers. A copy of his notes taken on the Sutherland interview is included in Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, Appendix 9, and a portion is printed in Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces and World War II, I, 205. The information Edmonds secured is directly at variance with information the present author secured in two interviews with General Sutherland. Edmond's findings are embodied in an article entitled "What Happened at Clark Field," The Atlantic (July 1951), pp. 20-33.
The editor cannot resist intruding: Brereton's diaries are explicitly discounted as "the evidence of an interested party", but Sutherland's statements are left without qualification? Most interesting is the absence of any evidence from MacArthur himself...
 Summary of Activities, Far East Air Force, entry of 8 Dec 41, in Air University Hist Off. This document is evidently a transcription from notes hastily made during December 1941. Errors in dating the year of entry are explained as the result of "harried field conditions." Despite the imperfections of this document it remains one of the few written contemporary sources for the events of 8 December 1941. Ltr, Col Wilfred J. Paul, Air University Hist Off, to Gen Ward, 7 Dec 51, OCMH. The official air force account in Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 206 note, takes cognizance of the mistakes in dating in this document. Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," pages 24-26, contains an excellent account of the discussion at air force headquarters that morning.
 Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 272.
 Brereton, Diaries, p. 40. The author has also used a letter written by Brereton to the AAF Hist Off expanding the diary entries. 1st Ind, Brereton to Paul, 30 Jan 43, Air University Hist Off. See also Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," p. 25.
 Summary of Activities, Far East Air Force, entry of 8 Dec 41. General Brereton omits entirely any mention of his conversation with General MacArthur, and states that he received the authorization to attack Formosa at 1100 from General Sutherland. In an interview with the present author in June 1951, Sutherland decalred that he does not recall that Brereton spoke with MacArthur that morning. Brereton, Diaries, p. 41.
 Summary of Activities, Far East Air Force, entry of 8 Dec 41.
 The first version was given in his interview with Walter D. Edmonds in Manila in June, 1945. The second version was given in an interview with the present author in November 1946. This author interviewed Sutherland a second time in June 1951 and on being presented with both versions, Sutherland was most emphatic in asserting that it was he who had ordered the reconnaissance because Brereton did not have sufficient information to warrant an attack against Formosa. USAFFE and air force records do not contain any material relating to this incident.
 Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, Nol. 736, 7 Dec 41, WPD 4544-20.
 Brereton, Diaries, p. 39n; ltr, Brereton to Paul, Air University Hist Off.
 Ltr, CofS to CG USAFFE, 21 Nov 41, sub: U.S.-British Co-operation, incl, War Plan RAINBOW 5, WPD 4402-112.
Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 27 Nov 41, No. 624, WPD 4544-13; see above, Ch. IV, p. 71.
 Interv, Edmonds with Sutherland, Jun 45, and confimed in interv, Morton with Sutherland, 12 Nov 46.
 Brereton, Diaries, pp. 34-35.
 New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6.
Editor again: Not a contradiction: Sutherland stood between MacArthur and Brereton. As noted above, official records are notably lacking due to the Japanese victory. In spite of MacArthur's deprecation of the proposed raid, he then goes on to order an attack the next morning with a remnant of the bombers!
 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1133, 8 Dec 41. The raid was canceled the next day. Rad, MacArthur to AFWAR, No. 1135, 9 Dec 41. Both in AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East.
 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 16.
 Summary of Activities, Far East Air Force, 8 Dec 41; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 207-08; Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," p. 24; 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 16; USSBS, Japanese Air Power (Washgton, 1946), p. 7.
 Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 6-7; interrog of Capt Takahashi and Comdr Nomura, USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, I, 75; II, 531.
 The account of the attack is based, except where otherwise noted, on Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II,, I, 207-13; Brereton, Diaries,. pp. 38-44; History of the Fifth Air Force (and its Predecessors); Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," pp. 28-31; Japanese Naval Opns in the Phil Invasion, p. 6; 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 12.
 Collier, Notebooks, I, 49.
 Ibid., 50; Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 55.
 Interv, author with Col Campbell, Sep 46; Collier, Notebooks, I, 50. Colonel Campbell's notebook contains the following entry: Sgt. Alfred H. Eckles, Hopkinsville, Ky., was on duty with Maj. Sam Lamb's communications detail Hqrs. F.E.A.F. Dec. 8th and carried message to Teletype operator re flight of planes heading toward Clark Field, saw it sent and acknowledged as received by them. This at about 11:45 (?) A.M., about 30-45 min. before arrival of bombers and bombing of Clark Field. I, togbether with Coyle, George and Sprague watched this particular flight for considerable length of time. I kept urging them to do something about it, but they insisted on waiting until they reached a certain distance from field. Sprague typed wrote out message showed it to George and myself. I asked what "Kickapoo" meant in message. Was told it meant, "Go get 'em." Sprague then took message into Teletype Room for transmission, about 15 minutes before bombing.
 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 209.
 Hist of Fifth Air Force, p. 16. This statement would imply that Colonel George was in communication with the pursuit squadron at Clark Field after 1145, although the Bomber Command could not be reached at this time.
 Hist of Fifth Air Force, p. 16.
 It is not possible to state the exact time of this attack. Like so many other matters, this question, too, is controversial. The author has selected this time, about 1220, since it is supported by the weight of evidence. Walter D. Edmonds gives the time as 1240 in his account of the attack. They Fought With What They Had, pp. 100, 102n.
 Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 67.
 Ibid.; Prov CA Brig (AA) Rpt of Opns, p. 3, Annex IX, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns; interv, author with Gen Sage, 28 Feb 51.
 This account of the operations of the 20th Pursuit Squadron is based on an interview with the squadron commander, Col. Joseph H. Moore, 12 August 1949. It varies slightly from the official ari force account which places four planes in the air before the attack.
 It is strange that the pilots over Bataan and Manila did not see the heavy columns of smoke and dust rising from Clark, only fifty miles away.
 Rad, MacArthur to Arnold, 10 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East.
 Arnold, Global Mission, p. 272.
Ibid.; Brereton, Diaries, p. 50. General Sutherland has no recollection of such a telephone call. Interv, author with Sutherland, 12 Jun 51.
 Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 7. An additional fighter of the 4th Carrier Squadron was lost at Davao. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 213. There is some disagreement on the number of P-40s lost, some sources placing the figure as low as 42. USSBS, Japanese Air Power, p. 7.
 Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 20 Nov 41, WPD 3489-21.
 New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6; interv, author with Sutherland, 12 Nov 46.
 Brereton, Diaries, pp. 35-36.
 Intervs, author and Edmonds with Sutherland. General Kenney was also told this story by Sutherland. General Kenney Reports, p. 27.
 New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6.
 Interrog of Comdr Nomura, 28 Nov 45, USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 531; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 6.
 Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat, p. 101.
 Arnold, Global Mission, p. 272.
 Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW 5 (Short Title: WPL-46), 26 May 41, Ch. III, reproduced in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Exhibit 129, Part 18, p. 2875.
 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 30ff; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 158-60. Strength of the 16th Naval District and 4th Marines was obtained from papers lent to the author by Admiral Rockwell, and from rad, COM 16 to OPNAV, 31 Dec 41, Off of Naval Rcds.
 The deployment of the fleet southward had been made as a result of the war warning of 27 November which ordered a "defensive deployment." Ltr, Hart to Ward, 19 Dec 51, OCMH. The destroyers at Balikpapan were ordered to Batavia on 6 December, and en route were redirected to Singapore. They were later recalled to Borneo to join the rest of Task Force 5. Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 36, 41.
 The dispostion of the fleet is also covered in The Java Sea Campaign, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Combat Narratives, pp. 1-6.
 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 36; The Java Sea Campaign, ONI Combat Narrative, pp. 4-6.
 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 213; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 6-7.
 Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 18.
 Prov CA Brig Rpt of Opns, p. 1.
 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1133, 8 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East.
 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 38; Brereton, Diaries, p. 45; interv, Edmonds with Sutherland, Jun 45.
 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 16.
 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 214. There seems to be some confusion as to the number of B-17s at Del Monte. The History of the Fifth Air Force states that only 12 heavy bombers were based there. Brereton states that 16 B-17s had gone to Mindanao on the 5th, and Craven and Cate, as well as Brereton, state that 13 flew up from Mindanao to Clark Field on the 9th. Brereton, Diaries, pp. 36, 44-45; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 214. The author has accepted these last figures.
 Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 7-8.
 Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat, pp. 119-20; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 218; Diary of Cpl L. Arthutick, 17th Pursuit Sq, OCMH; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 7.
 Admiral Rockwell, Narrative of Naval Activites in Luzon Area, 1 Dec 41--19 Mar 42, p. 4, Off of Naval Rcds; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 7; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 171.
 Rockwell, Naval Activities in Luzon Area, p. 4.
 Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 172; The Java Sea Campaign, ONI Combat Narrative, p. 6. Admiral Hart states that the submarine torpedoes had been moved to Corregidor and that the torpedoes lost were destroyer torpedoes. Ltr, Hart to Ward, 19 Dec 51, OCMH.
 Rad, CINCAF to OPNAV, 10 Dec 41, 101330, War Diary of 16th Naval Dist, Off of Naval Rcds. The Navy Department approved Hart's action and at a meeting of the Joint Board on 10 December informed the Army of Hart's decision. Min, JB Mtg, 10 Dec 41, OPD Reg Doc.
 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 39.
 Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 17. Later, on 16 December, limited use of the lighthouse on Corregidor was allowed.
 Ibid.; Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 39-40.
 Rockwell, Naval Activities in Luzon Area, pp. 5-6.
 Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 7-8.
 Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 218-19; Brereton, Diaries, p. 51; Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat, p. 124; Hist of FIfth Air Force, p. 22.
 Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 8. American sources do not mention an attack at Iba.
 Ibis.; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 173.
 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, 12 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East.
 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 22; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 8; The Java Sea Campaign, ONI Narrative, p. 7.
 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 41.
 Ibid.; rad, CINCAG to Naval Observer, Singapore, 16 Dec 41, 160755, War Diary of 16th Naval Dist, Off of Naval Rcds.
 Brereton, Diaries, p. 55.
 Hist of Fifth Air Force, p. 21; Brereton, Diaries, pp. 55, 57, 59; Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 221-22. The Darwin-based B-17s flew missions against the Japanese in Mindanao on 22 and 24 December.