Chapter

		Paragraphs
Section I.	General	1-8
II.	Advance forces	9-12
III.	Main and secondary landings	13-16
IV.	Selection of landing areas	17-26
V.	Time of landing	27-33

Section I
General

1. Joint Oversea Expedition.--

   1. Definition and purpose.--A joint oversea expedition is a combined Army and Navy force dispatched to a theater of operations by sea for the purpose of undertaking military operations ashore which may involve all or any of the following:

      1. The securing of a beachhead from which to project major land operations.

      2. The seizure and securing of an area for use in connection with other military operations; or for use as a naval or air base from which to carry out further operations.

      3. The seizure and securing of an area in order to deny its use to the enemy.

      4. The destruction of enemy installations and facilities.

   2. Phases.--The execution of a joint oversea expedition divides itself into the following phases for which appropriate plans should be prepared:

      1. Concentration and specialized training at or near suitable areas where the water conditions and beach terrain are similar to those of the proposed landing area. This phase should include the operations of joint staff and the use of appropriate Navy equipment and personnel.

      2. The embarkation phase consists of all additional preparatory measures required to assemble the troops and their

equipment, the supplies and the transportation at or near the port of embarkation, and the actual loading of the troops and supplies on the transports.
3. The movement overseas from the time the expedition departs from the port of embarkation until the joint attack forces rendezvous within their landing areas.

4. The landing phase which beings with the movement of the expedition from the rendezvous within the landing area, and continues until the landing forces are securely established on shore.
3. Responsibility.--The respective responsibilities of the Army commander and the Navy commander in the embarkation, movement overseas, and landing phases are set forth in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.

4. Joint basic decisions and directives.--See Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.

5. Command and coordination.--See Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.
2. Considerations Affecting Landing Operations.--

   1. Nature of operations.--

      1. A joint overseas expedition may involve many of the features inherent in offensive warfare. It will ordinarily have the initiative which will permit, within limits prescribed by higher authority, the choice of objectives and the lines of approach towards them. Its mobility combined with the use of feints frequently will conceal the objective selected until the coast is approached. Through the use of the mobility of reserves retained afloat, it has excellent opportunity to exploit successes ashore.

      2. On the other hand, certain disadvantages of landing operations should be appreciated. It requires a longer time to launch an attack by troops from transports than from a position already established ashore. Troops being brought ashore are unable to take any effective part in the combat, but are especially vulnerable to all enemy weapons. Troops usually will land on and fight over comparatively unfamiliar terrain where information of hostile dispositions will be difficult to obtain. Difficulties of supply and communication are greatly increased. Success will depend to a great degree upon proper coordination and cooperation of two distinct services. The fire support in the initial stages of the attack must be furnished by naval guns and aviation. For details of naval

gunfire and aviation support of landing operations see chapters 6 and 7.
2. Special organization.--Special organization of Army units is required to facilitate debarkation of appropriate intact combat units, to reduce ship cargo requirements, to provide increased small-arms, machine-gun, and other weapon fire in lieu of normal artillery support, and to insure mobility of the first units ashore. Similarly, special naval organization is required to embark, escort, debark, and land the Army forces, including provision for effective artillery, communications, and air support until the Army can establish its own artillery and air units ashore.

3. Special equipment.--Depending upon the nature and extent of the projected operations and the conditions existing in the contemplated area of landing operations, special equipment will be required by participating Army and Navy elements. For this reason, necessary steps must be taken to determine and procure the required special equipment tin sufficient time to permit some training in its use before embarkation.
3. Joint Planning and Training.--For the scope and nature of joint plans and training, see Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. and chapter 11.

4. Relationship of Embarkation to Debarkation Plans.--Embarkation of forces to participate in a landing operation is so intimately related to and dependent upon the projected landing operations, that is, the debarkation, that the details of embarkation plans cannot be completed until decision has been reached as to the projected method of debarkation. This is necessarily dependent upon the tactical plan of employment of the landing forces.

5. Scope of This Manual.--This manual covers the landing phase of joint oversea operations primarily from the Army viewpoint. Embarkation is considered in its relationship to debarkation. Naval plans and operation are discussed only to the extent necessary for an understanding of the related plans and operation of Army forces.

6. Plans for Landing Force.--

   1. After the development of the basic plan for the operation, including any required

special equipment or weapons, plans usually required for each echelon of the landing force are--

1. Plan of special training.

2. Plan of movement of troops from concentration centers to ports of embarkation.

3. Plan of embarkation and loading of transports.

4. Plan of debarkation and ship-to-shore movement, including any troops transported by air. Plan of operations ashore.
2. A preferred plan and separate alternative plans are prepared for a(5) and (5) above. They are subject to modifications necessary because of weather conditions and changes in the situation that may occur between departure and arrival at destination.
7. Centralization in Planning.--Centralization of planning is customary. The necessity for centralization arises from the following considerations that are peculiar to oversea expeditions:

   1. The plans of all echelons are based on the tactical plan of the combat teams. Hence before any plan of higher echelons can be finally determined upon, the plans of the combat teams for seizing the beachhead line must be developed.

   2. The nonavailability of commanders and staffs of lower echelons or lack of time may limit the extent to which the usual procedure in planning may be carried down through the chain of command.

   3. Need for secrecy may make it desirable to withhold plans from the lower echelons as long as practicable. However, the more realism that can be imparted ot training and rehearsals, the more effective will be the execution of actual operations.

8. Glossary.--

   1. Boat nomenclature.--See appendix I.

   2. Types of Navy ships.--See appendix II.

   3. Types of small boats.--See appendix III.

   4. Sea terms.--See appendix IV.

   5. Other definitions.--It is essential that there be a common understanding of terms generally used in joint oversea expeditions. The following terms are used in this manual in the sense indicated:

      1. Naval attack force is the naval unit in landing operations,

consisting of transports, cargo ships, and supporting naval vessels, operating against a continuous shore line, usually designated by the geographical name of the locality, or by the terms "right," "left," "center," etc.
2. Landing force consists of the Army organizations which are to carry out landing operations from the transports of a naval attack force. Some elements of this force may be transported by air.

3. Joint attack force includes a naval attack force and the landing force associated therewith.

4. Landing area is the area within which are included the operations of a joint attack force and comprises the shore and sea area involved in the landing operation. A large joint oversea expedition may require the use of more than one landing area.

5. Transport area is the water area assigned for debarking troops from the transports.

6. Naval support area is the sea area assigned to naval vessels detailed to support a landing.

7. Beach is that portion of the shore line of a landing area normally required for the landing of a force approximating a combat team. A combat team is defined in (11) below.

8. Beachhead is a position organized in depth, with a view to offensive of defensive operations, which protects the beach initially from enemy light artillery fire (range about 10,000 yards) and eventually from medium artillery (range about 15,000 yards). For detailed discussion, see section III, chapter 5.

9. Beachmaster is a naval officer detailed to control the beach from the high water mark seaward. For composition and functions of beach party, see section II, chapter 2, and section II, chapter 8.

10. Shore party commander is an Army officer detailed to control Army administrative activities at the beach. For composition and function of shore party, see section II, chapter 2, and section II, chapter 8.

11. Combat team is the basic Army unit in landing operations, consisting normally of an infantry battalion and supporting troops, including any or all of the following, depending upon the requirements of the situation and the availability of transportation: a platoon of antitank guns;

battalion medical detachment; a battery of field artillery; a company of engineers; a detachment of antiaircraft automatic weapons; necessary liaison and communication agencies.
12. Artillery concentration is artillery fire placed on an area.

13. Counterbattery is fire delivered by naval vessels of the Army artillery on enemy artillery for the purpose of neutralizing or destroying it.

14. Boat group is a group of boats organized for transporting a combat team or some other similar tactical unit. See also section II, chapter 4.

15. Boat division is a subordinate task organization of a boat group organized for transporting a subordinate unit of a combat team of other similar tactical unit. See also section II, chapter 4.

16. Wave consists of the boats within a boat group which carry the troops that are to land approximately simultaneously. It may consist of a single boat division or two or more boat divisions. See also section II, chapter 4.

17. Commercial loading utilizes to the maximum the ship space and does not contemplate tactical employment of the troops on landing until their equipment other than personal equipment has been issued to them. This method of loading is applicable to movements from an established port to an established and well-secured port. Troops moved by this method are not available for tactical employment in landing operations against hostile forces.

18. Unit loading give primary consideration to the availability of the troops for combat purposes on landing rather than utilization of ship space. The degree of readiness for employment depends upon the degree to which organizations are unit-loaded as follows:

    1. Combat unit loading, in which certain units selected because of their probable destination and employment in landing on hostile shores are completely loaded on one ship with at least their essential combat equipment and supplies immediately available for debarkation with the troops, together with the animals for the organization, when this is practicable. This method of unit loading is particularly applicable to units which probably will be required for an assault

on hostile shores by a landing from small boats. Such an operation against any one beach will require an Army combat team. This of source is subject to modification to meet special requirements. Combat teams will be loaded in such manner as to permit simultaneous debarkation. [NOTE: combat unit loading also implies that the matériel be loaded in such a manner that the supplies most urgently needed in the assault are located nearest the hatches, with less urgent supplies loaded deeper in the holds. --HyperWar]
2. Organizational unit loading, in which organizations with their equipment and supplies are loaded on the same transport, but not so loaded as to allow debarkation of troops and their equipment simultaneously. This is somewhat more economical in ship capacity than is combat unit loading. It permits debarkation of complete units available for employment as soon as the troops and their equipment have been assembled on land. Like combat unit loading, this method permits diversion en route by complete ship loads from the destination originally intended.

3. Convoy unit loading, in which the troops with their equipment and supplies are loaded on transports of the same convoy, but not necessarily on the same transport. This allows a considerable utilization of ship space, particularly by using this method of loading to fill in space on transports carrying combat unit loaded organizations. Troops which are convoy unit loaded are available for tactical employment only when landed at established beachheads, and after the lapse of time necessary to assemble them on land with their equipment and supplies.

Section II
Advance Forces

9. Purpose.--Landing operations may be preceded by advance forces for the purpose of reconnaissance, creating diversions by means of feints and demonstrations, seizure of a supporting base, and operations against defending aircraft and naval defense forces.

10. Reconnaissance.--

    1. A successful landing requires careful, comprehensive reconnaissance and utilization of all intelligence means. This involves the procurement or preparation photogrammetrically of complete detailed maps of the landing areas.

    2. The naval information desired includes--

1. Locating enemy naval forces.

2. Verifying and supplementing existing hydrographic and meteorologic data.

3. Selecting from a navigational standpoint the beaches and sea areas for landing operations.

4. Preparing sailing directions.

5. Establishing aids to navigation.
3. The military information desired includes--

   1. Nature of the terrain, including beaches.

   2. Enemy dispositions.

   3. Installations ashore such as defensive works, artillery positions, location of reserves, landing fields, gassed areas, and supply facilities.

4. The stronger the defensive dispositions, the more thorough the reconnaissance must be except when surprise or time considerations are paramount. The means employed include--

   1. Surface craft.

   2. Submarines.

   3. Aerial observation and photography.

   4. Landing parties transported ashore either by boat or by air.

5. Based on a study of existing data, an intelligence plan is prepared which lists the additional naval and military information required. This plan is considered when the size, composition, and tasks of the reconnaissance force are determined.

6. The furtherance of surprise requires that reconnaissance measures apt to become known to the enemy cover all practicable landing areas and beaches whether or not they are to be used.

7. Specially trained Army personnel and suitable boats accompany advance forces for shore reconnaissance.

8. The desirability of detailed reconnaissance must not be allowed to obscure the fact that in many cases there will be greater chance for success if the landing is initiated within the shortest possible time after the presence of a fleet with transports becomes known to the enemy. Therefore, the period of reconnaissance must be held to a minimum.
11. Supporting Bases.--

    1. Supporting bases facilitate supply, permit employment of seaplanes and land-based aviation,

afford shelter for vessels, serve as a rendezvous for subsequent landings, and may deny landing fields and other facilities to the enemy.
2. Generally the defender fortifies certain areas; others are lightly held or unoccupied. it is usually necessary to operate step by step, seizing first the weakly defended areas for use as supporting bases in the subsequent landings against the fortified positions. The initial operation may take the form of a landing in force, or a foothold may be secured by advance forces.

3. The enemy may be expected to bring the full strength of his aviation against the establishment of a supporting base.
12. Operations Against Aircraft and Naval Defense Forces.--

    1. Operations against defending aircraft are considered in chapter 7.

    2. Opposing naval forces are cleared from the sea areas required for conducting operations or neutralized during the course of the landing.

Section III
Main and Secondary Landings

13. General.--

    1. Landing operations generally involve the main landing, one or more secondary landings, and one or more demonstrations or feints.

    2. Landings usually include three phases:

       1. First.--The first phase includes the seizure of the terrain immediately in the rear of the beach, followed, when sufficient strength has been landed, by an advance to a position--about 10,000 yards inland--which secures the beach from enemy light artillery fire.

       2. Second.--The second phase consists of an advance to a position--at least 15,000 yards inland--which denies enemy medium artillery fire on the beach.

       3. Third.--The third phase includes further land and air operations made for securing the objectives for which the landing was undertaken.

14. Main Landing.--The main landing is the one upon which the ultimate success of the tactical plan depends. In the assignment of troops, ships, and aircraft, it has first

consideration, and is provided with the forces necessary for success. The detachment of any forces from the main landing for the conduct of a subsidiary operation is justified only when the results reasonably to be expected are greater than if these forces were used in the main landing.
15. Secondary Landings.--

    1. Secondary landings are made outside the immediate area of the main landing and directly or indirectly support the main landing. They may be made prior to, simultaneously with, or subsequent to the main landing.

    2. 1. Secondary landings are made to seize an area in order to deny it to the enemy; to delay or divert enemy reserves, artillery fire, and aircraft from action against the main landing; or to seize an area which permits an easy entry into action of field artillery and land-based aircraft.

       2. If the purpose is to divert enemy reserves or forces from other sectors, the strength of the secondary landing force must be sufficient to seize or threaten an area important to the defender.

    3. The term "secondary landing" is not used in orders. Secondary landings are conducted with the same determination as the main landing.

    4. A secondary landing may be ultimately exploited rather than the main landing. Plans must therefore be flexible so that unexpected success may be exploited rapidly either by employment of local or floating reserves.

16. Demonstrations.--

    1. Demonstrations, or feints, are exhibitions of force, or movement, indicating an attack. They may divert or retard movement of enemy reserves against main and secondary landings, or deceive the enemy as to the direction of attack. Usually they are more effective than a weak landing.

    2. The mobility of ships should be utilized to threaten important enemy objectives over a large area.

    3. Demonstrations or feints are coordinated with landing operations as to time and distance in order to divert enemy mechanized and motorized formations, aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines from the main landing.

    4. Demonstration conducted in conjunction with and in the vicinity of an actual landing are effective in causing a dispersion of enemy artillery fire. Shore batteries usually

have a normal zone covering one or more beaches and a contingent zone covering other beaches or areas. The defensive artillery plan generally provides for a concentration of the fire of all batteries within range of a designated area. A few boats approaching a beach, particularly when they are accompanied by smoke and some gunfire, may make all enemy batteries, within the normal zone of which the beach lies, open fire on that particular beach or boats rather than join in generally concentration on the actual landing. This is particularly desirable when the main landing is conducted on a comparatively narrow front.
5. The plans for the demonstration should be sufficiently flexible and the composition of the force suitable to permit the exploitation of any un usual success by the demonstration force.

6. Demonstrations may be conducted in connection with reconnaissance prior to landing.

Selection of Landing Areas

17. Governing Considerations.--The landing area comprises the sea and land areas required for establishing a beachhead of sufficient depth to protect the beach from medium artillery. Its selection is governed by the mission, strength of enemy's position, available landing facilities such as piers and wharves, number and types of beaches and approaches thereto, suitability of terrain for shore operations, station and maneuver areas for naval vessels, configuration of the coast line, time element, and weather conditions.

18. Mission.--The area selected should permit the landing of sufficient troops at a place from which they can reach their objective and accomplish the mission for which the landing is undertaken.

19. Enemy Positions.--

    1. Fortified areas are avoided if the mission can be accomplished from other beaches. They are attacked only when sufficient ships, aircraft, and ammunition are available to neutralize enemy weapons, or when seizure by parachute troops can be supported properly and successfully.

2. The probable location of enemy reserves and the facility and speed with which they can be employed are given consideration.

Beaches.--

1. A beach should be large enough for the lan ding of a force of at least an infantry battalion with supporting troops.

2. Favorable beaches, from a physical standpoint, are those which permit the beaching of small boats close to the shore line and the rapid disembarking and movement inland of troops and equipment without undue interference from weather conditions or navigational difficulties.

3. Open beaches on the windward side where surf is likely to break during the several days of landing operations are especially unfavorable, particularly where there are rocks or coral. They also increase the difficulty of supply.

4. Gently shelving beaches, or those having offshore reefs, cause small boats to ground at a considerable distance from the shore line and lengthen the time of disembarking, with consequent increase in the effect of hostile fire.

5. Approaches to the beach should be free from natural or artificial obstructions to navigation under all conditions of tide. There should be sufficient room to seaward for boats to deploy into attack formations before coming under effective artillery or small-arms fire. Narrow entrances between islands and channels in reefs prevent early deployment.

6. Some of the beaches must provide suitable landing conditions and routes inland for armored and wheeled vehicles and tractors. these beaches may be captured initially or in subsequent operations. Other beaches may be suitable only for landing infantry and pack artillery. Precipitous slopes can be negotiated by determined foot troops and often offer dead spaces from enemy fires. Landing conditions at the foot of rocky cliffs, however, are hazardous and generally are possible only in calm seas. li> the area around a beach in which the defender can place weapons for direct fire on the beach is limited by the configuration of the ground. When the beach area permits the defender clear fields of fire and observation over a depth of several hundred yards, the immediate landing is difficult because of the large zone which must be neutralized. Shallow areas are advantageous in that they reduce the size of this

zone and permit the attacker to deprive the defender of observation on the beach after a relatively short advance. The presence of woods or a bluff close to the beach is advantageous to the attacker, provided the advance of necessary combat equipment is not seriously impeded. They may render difficult the support by naval gunfire of the subsequent advance inland.
8. The number of beaches required for an operation depends upon the size of the attacking force, the scheme of maneuver, and the amount of resistance expected. A landing area with a large number of beaches is desirable even for a comparatively small force, for it causes a dispersion of the defender's efforts and permits the attacker to land on as broad a front as is commensurate with his strength. such an area favors tactical surprise in that it offers the attacker a choice in the selection of beaches and denies the defender knowledge of the exact point of landing until the boats have approached close to the shore.

9. The shore line need not be suitable for landing throughout its entirety, but the various beaches should permit mutual support by the landing units.
21. Suitability of Terrain for Shore Operations.--

    1. The influence of the terrain on the shore operations is identical with that in ordinary land warfare. Examination of the proposed zone of advance includes road and rail net, covered routes of advance, natural obstacles or defiles which have to be forced, observation points, maneuver room for the force engaged, landing fields which permit the early entry into action of the attacker's land-based aircraft, and areas suitable for the landing and operation of parachute units. for factors to be considered in terrain estimate, see FM 101-5.

    2. A movement along the coast line affords protection to at least one flank and facilitates supply because the shore base may be shifted as the action progresses, resulting in shorter and more easily protected lines of communication. The attacker can reinforce field artillery fire by ships' guns firing under the most advantageous conditions.

22. Area for Naval Forces.--

    1. The naval forces require station and maneuver areas free from mines and obstructions and with suitable approaches. The area must be conveniently

located with respect to the available beaches. (See sec. III, ch. 2.)
2. Water deep enough for maneuvering vessels close inshore enables ships supporting the landing boats to deliver fire at short range.

3. A sheltered transport area materially decreases the time required for unloading troops and equipment and lessens the danger of interruption of the operation by unfavorable weather.

4. Water with a depth suitable for anchoring marking ships or buoys is desirable. In some cases anchoring transports or even firing ships may be advantageous. Water of less than 10 fathoms furnishes considerable protection against large submarines if the shallow depth extends far enough to keep enemy submarines outside of maximum torpedo range.

5. If a convenient supporting base is not available for anchorage and protection of the naval forces during the period elapsing between the initial landing and the securing of a suitable new base, the landing and operations ashore should be planned with a view to securing a sheltered anchorage as quickly as possible.
23. Configuration of Coast Line.--

    1. Favorable landing conditions usually are found in harbors, bays, and indentations in the coast line. Such indentations favor the concentration of enemy artillery fire on the entrances and permit the defender to bring flanking fire upon the boats from automatic and other weapons. These weapons are neutralized either by air craft, naval gunfire, or the leading elements of the landing force before the boats carrying the main force come within effective range of the flanking fire.

    2. Land projections facilitate flanking fire by ships' guns and permit attacking units to protect both flanks by resting them on the water's edge. The base of a peninsula may afford the enemy a strong defensive position which will block progress inland. The seizure of such projections as a supporting measure for other operations may be advisable.

    3. A chain of small islands offers certain advantages as a landing area, and it may be advisable or necessary to seize one or more prior to the main landing. Ordinarily this operations will not be as difficult as other types of landing.

Naval gunfire, particularly counterbattery, is relatively effective for island targets. Even though the islands may be capable of mutual support by fire, the effective use of general reserves by the defender will usually be impossible. An island once seized may be used as a base for further operations. On the other hand, landings on a chain of small islands may present certain disadvantages, especially where the defenders on each must be overcome successively.
24. Time Element.--Certainty of getting ashore is of primary importance, but a successful landing os of no value if the landing force, by reason of the distance or the difficulties of the terrain, is unable to reach its objective in time to carry out its mission. If time is limited, it may be necessary for the attacker to land relatively near the objective regardless of enemy dispositions. If more time is available, the landing may be made in an area in which the beaches are less heavily defended, even though more extensive shore operations are required for the carrying out of the mission.

25. Meteorological Conditions.--Meteorological conditions influencing the selection of landing areas include humidity, temperatures, snows, prevailing winds, storms, direction of the sun, phase of the moon, and tide.

26. Conclusion.--

    1. Landing areas possessing the best beaches and the most favorable approaches inland are usually those most heavily defended by the enemy. Conversely, landing areas with unfavorable beaches and easily defended avenues of approach inland are less heavily defended.

    2. The final selection of the landing area is usually a question of deciding between these conflicting conditions. A correct decision demands a careful estimate of the situation, including a study of the physical features of the beaches, a thorough knowledge of the methods, capabilities, and limitations of the opposing forces, and computation of the time and space factors.

Time of Landing

27. General.--In selecting the time of landing, consideration is given the influence of daylight and darkness, particularly

as they affect surprise, air operations, enemy's sea, land, and aviation forces, navigation, and shore operations.
28. Surprise.--

    1. Darkness increases the chance of securing some measure of tactical surprise. It deprives the defender to a material degree of the information necessary for the prompt maneuver of his forces to meet the attack. Illumination of water areas is difficult but may be partially accomplished by searchlights and flares. Information at night is obtained largely by airplanes or patrol vessels and is subject to delay error, or loss in transmission. Landing operations at night are difficult and liable to be attended by greater confusion than during daylight.

    2. during daylight hours the defender, with his extended system of observation and his permanent means of signal communication, can more rapidly secure complete and accurate information than at night. Such information permits him to act with greater promptness and certitude in the movement of defense forces and means.

29. Air Operations.--Bombing under cover of darkness, though less accurate than in the daytime, can hardly be prevented regardless of the numerical superiority in the air. A night operation involving the anchoring or laying to of transports for several hours in the face of an active enemy air force is therefore hazardous. This hazard may be reduced, however, when destroyers or small craft not so vulnerable to air attack are used for transporting troops for the initial assault echelons.

30. Enemy Sea and Land Forces.--

    1. The attacker's control of the sea in the area of operations does not preclude the defender launching night attacks with destroyers and other small surface craft, day and night submarine attacks, and mining operations. Countermeasures against these threats are more effective during daylight than in darkness.

    2. The fire of all weapons is less effective at night. During the day the effectiveness of the defender's small-arms fire may be reduced by smoke and other chemicals.

31. Navigational Considerations.--The navigation of ships and the handling of small boats are facilitated by daylight operations. On an unfamiliar coast without thorough reconnaissance

and the establishment of navigational aids, there is no assurance that a landing can be made at night on the designated beaches. The establishment of navigational aids tends to deprive the attacker of the surprise sought in a night operation, but they should not be dispensed with where it is important to land at specific points. Navigational hazards may dictate a day landing.
32. Operations on Shore.--

    1. Night attacks are difficult to execute and are rarely attempted in land warfare except under special conditions. Even if a night landing of the initial assault elements is contemplated, the bulk of the force should be landed shortly before or at daybreak so that the troops will have the benefit of daylight in conducting the operations on shore.

    2. A day landing should allow sufficient daylight for the operations contemplated for the first day.

33. Summary.--

    1. The principal advantages of a night landing are that it tends to secure tactical surprise and reduces the effectiveness of the defender's fire. the principal advantages of a day landing are that air and naval superiority are best obtained, the navigation of ships and boats is facilitated, and shore operations are easier to execute.

    2. The initial assault elements of the landing force will normally be brought in under cover of darkness, debarking and movement to shore being made preferably before dawn or shortly thereafter, and shore operations will be conducted principally during daylight. Transports carrying the main forces may best come in after daybreak under the protection of the attacker's air force.

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