Marshall Islands--ENIWETOK

PLANS FOR ENIWETOK ADVANCED

The success of the operations against Kwajalein and the expeditious manner in which they were realized made it possible to advance the date for the attack on Eniwetok Atoll by nearly 3 months, With D-day for this operation originally set for 10 May, it was now advanced to 17 February, 1944. The ships were ready and the troops of the Reserve Group which had not been used at Kwajalein were available. Basic plans for the attack had already been made and it remained only necessary to complete the details. Strong supporting operations were scheduled to take place simultaneously with the amphibious assault on Eniwetok by both carrier and land based aircraft and the first of these was made on Truk by a powerful Carrier-Battleship Task Force on the 16th and 17th of February. On 22 February part of the same force struck at enemy bases in the Mariannas, and land based air forces continued strikes against Ponape, Kusaie and Wake. These operations deterred the enemy from making a single counter attack against our forces in the assault on Eniwetok.

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COAST GUARD-MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)

COAST GUARD-MANNED COMBAT TRANSPORT LEONARD WOOD (APA-12)

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THREE PRINCIPAL ISLANDS

Eniwetok Atoll lies 330 miles NW of Kwajalein and is the westernmost atoll of the Marshall Group: It is roughly circular in shape, 21 miles long, in the NW-SE direction and 17 miles across on the NE-SW direction. There are 30 small islands on the coral rim none of which attain a height of more than 21 feet. Nevertheless they are the highest in the Marshall Group, permitting a defense system of comparatively deep trenches and foxholes. The 3 principal islands used by the Japanese were Engebi in the north and Eniwetok and Parry in the southern part of the atoll. The Japanese air strip was on Engebi, shaped like an equilateral triangle with each side a mile long, Eniwetok is about 3 miles long ranging in width from 500 to 2,000 feet, covered with Cocoanut trees and with a sandy beach encircling the island. Parry Island is two miles long with the northern part 2,000 feet wide tapering gradually to the southern tip. There are 3 passages into Eniwetok Lagoon, two of which were the ones used by our forces, It is estimated that there were 1,200 Japanese troops on Engebi, 900 on Eniwetok and 1,300 on Parry Island, most of them having arrived less than 6 weeks before the attack. Engebi was the most heavily defended with earthworks and coastal defense guns. The defenses on Eniwetok consisted of deep foxholes and trench systems and those on Parry were similar. Smoke generating equipment was found on Engebi and land mines were encountered on Eniwetok and Parry.

ORGANIZATION OF EXPEDITION

The Task Group assembled for the amphibious Assault consisted of 89 vessels including the flagship APA Cambria, Coast Guard manned, ten transports including the Coast Guard manned APA's Leonard Wood, Centaurus, and Arthur Middleton, 9 LST's and 6 LCI's, a fire support group of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, an escort carrier group of three carrier escorts and 3 destroyers, a carrier task group consisting of a carrier, two small carriers, 3 cruisers and 7 destroyers, a minesweeping group, a service group and a tug group. Altogether the force carried 7,997 assault troops mainly of the 22nd Marines and 106th Infantry. These forces were finally assembled in Kwajalein Atoll on 15 February. The Northern Group, consisting of transports and most of the combatant vessels, proceeded by a northern route and the Southern Group of LST's, LCI's, service and other small vessels, with a screen of destroyers, proceeded by a southern route.

THE ATTACK

The same pattern of attack was made on all 3 islands, the islands being assaulted one at a time. First each island was subjected to a continuous bombardment from the time of the arrival of the Task Group until the troops were landed. Landings were made on the lagoon beaches, most of the troops being transported in the large transports and prior to each landing, troops designated to embark in LVT's were transported to LST's in which the LVT's were loaded. D-day, 17 February, was primarily one of preparation for the assault on Engebi Island. Action began at 0700 with counter-battery fire on the main islands flanking the lagoon entrances. No return fire was encountered. Minesweeping vessels preceded all other vessels into the lagoon. Vessels of the Southern Group (LST's, LCI's, etc.) then entered via Wide

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AN AMERICAN MARINE, IN FOREGROUND, STILL CLUTCHES THE KNIFE WITH WHICH HE KILLED THE JAP, IN BACKGROUND, IN A DUEL ON ENGEBI ISLAND, ENITWEOK ATOLL. A MOMENT AFTER FINISHING OFF HIS ADVERSARY. A SNIPER'S BULLET KILLED THE MARINE

AN AMERICAN MARINE, IN FOREGROUND, STILL CLUTCHES THE KNIFE WITH WHICH HE KILLED THE JAP, IN BACKGROUND

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Passage and those of the Northern Group (battleships, transports and destroyers) entered via Deep Entrance. It was later learned that Japanese on both Parry and Eniwetok Islands had orders hot to fire on ships entering the lagoon so that their presence on these islands would not be disclosed.

CAPTURE OF ENGEBI

Bombardment of Engebi, the first island selected for capture, commenced early on the morning of 17 February and continued without interruption until our troops landed the following day. Landings were made on two small islands along the reef about 4 miles eastward of Engebi at about 1318 without opposition. Landings via the reef were then made without opposition on several more of the next adjacent islands. On these islands howitzers were landed and began harassing fire against Engebi at 1950. The main event of D plus. 1 day, 18 February, was the seizure of Engebi Island. The first wave of assault troops landed at 0843 and enemy resistance was quickly overcome, the island being reported secure at 1600, except for isolated positions. While this attack was in progress other forces were methodically occupying and securing the smaller islands along the reefs. The initial assault on Engebi consisted,of 5 waves, followed shortly afterwards by 3 more waves in LCVP's loaded directly from the APA's Heywood and Arthur Middleton. Shortly after 1100 the transports moved closer to the beach in order to facilitate unloading and delivery of the desired types of ammunition and water to the troops ashore. Approximately 1400 long tons of shells and bombs were expended on the island during the 17th and 18th of February and the effect was one of devastation. Practically all structures above ground were demolished and about half the defenders were killed or wounded prior to the landing. Only light scattered fire was received by our troops on landing. Our losses on Engebi were 78 killed, 166 wounded and 7 missing. 934 Japanese dead were buried.

CAPTURE OF ENIWETOK

During the afternoon of 18 February, as the operations on Engebi were proceeding satisfactorily, advance preparations were made for the landing on Eniwetok Island the following day. All ships involved, except Leonard Wood and Ashland who shifted anchorage the following morning, moved from the Engebi area to the Eniwetok area. On the morning of 19 February, Eniwetok Island was subjected to the usual heavy and destructive gunfire just prior to the landing of the assault troops. Yoke Hour, previously set for 0900 was delayed until 0922. The landings were made with formations similar to those used in the assault on Engebi. Waves were supported by 6 flanking LCI(L)'s 3 on each flank and LVT(A)'s. The first 5 waves consisted of LVT's averaging 18 to 20 to the wave. The 6th and 7th waves consisted of LCM's with tanks, the 8th and 9th waves were LCVP's. Some sniper and mortar fire was directed at the boat waves. This increased after the first wave landed and appeared to reach its maximum at the time the 9th wave landed at 1030. Only light losses were sustained by the troops as they landed on the beaches and very little resistance was offered for the first several hundred yards; thereafter the enemy conducted a stubborn defense, with rifle and mortar fire. Within an hour our troops had cut a path across the island and divided the enemy

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LANDED BY COAST GUARDSMEN AMERICAN MARINES MOVE IN FROM THE BEACH TO MAKE QUICK WORK OF THE CONQUEST OF PARRY ISLAND, ENIWETOK ATOLL

LANDED BY COAST GUARDSMEN AMERICAN MARINES MOVE IN FROM THE BEACH

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into two areas of resistance. At 1800 about half the island was in our hands. It was not entirely secured, however, until 1740 on the 31st. About 204 tons of shells were fired by naval gunfire prior to. the landing and 52 tons of air bombs. Our losses on Eniwetok were 34 killed, 94 wounded and 3 missing, a total of 131. Japanese dead numbered 704.

CAPTURE OF PARRY ISLAND

Due to the slow progress on Eniwetok and the nature of the deep trench system found on that island, as well as information that Parry Island was even more strongly held, it was decided to postpone the assault on that island until D plus 5 day, 22 February. Accordingly, Parry Island was held under continuous harassing bombardment from the late afternoon of D-day until the morning of the 22nd. Four ships were constantly firing at Parry Island during this period from close range to obtain the necessary plunging fire to destroy the deep trench systems. On the 21st the Pack Howitzer Battalion landed on Japtan Island just north of Parry and set up its battery and this battery along with that set up on Eniwetok Island pounded Parry Island throughout the night of 21 and 22 February. At 0710 on the morning of the 22nd the intense pre-landing phase of the bombardment commenced. Aerial bombing commenced when the boats left the Line of Departure. The first wave landed as scheduled at 0900 and consisted of 20 LVT's and flanking LVT(A)'s. 2 more waves followed with 24 and 30 LVT's respectively. The 4th wave contained 10 LCM's with medium tanks and the 5th wave 24 LVT's. Succeeding waves were of LCVP's. The first wave met some opposition at the beach from rifle and mortar fire but casualties were small. After an advance of about 100 yards the progress was slower but by 1315 the north end of the islands was in our hands. At 1924 the island was declared secure but mopping up operations continued until about 1000 on the 23rd. Naval gunfire delivered 944 long tons of shells prior to the landing, artillery 244 tons and bombing 98 tons. Our losses on Parry Island were 57 killed, 261 wounded and 16 missing and 1,027 dead Japanese were buried.

COAST GUARD AT PARRY ISLAND

Landing boat Coast Guard coxswains, toughened by months of battling heavy seas, tricky beaches and murderous Jap fire, again demonstrated at Parry Island the prowess which had given them almost legendary reputation. Here they were put to the toughest test of all. Leaving their attack transport motherships in the pre-dawn gloom, they found their way thru rough seas and smoke filled air to one particular bit of beachhead. They braved Jap fire, standing up to steer their tiny ramp-boats into the rugged coral beaches, unload their cargoes of men, ammunition, food, water or TNT and then back off the beach, splash their way thru more heavy gunfire and get out of the area and back to their ships for another load. One of these Coast Guard coxswains was Clyde Brien of Alameda, California. He was first to spot the shellfire that was creeping closer to them as they sped toward the beach. "I first noticed black puffs of smoke, followed by a sharp crack when we passed an LCI which was being used as a gun support vessel on Parry

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THE MARINES LANDED BY COAST GUARD ON ENIWETOK ATOLL PEPPERING THE JAPS SMOKING NO-MAN'S LAND

THE MARINES LANDED BY COAST GUARD ON ENIWETOK ATOLL PEPPERING THE JAPS SMOKING NO-MAN'S LAND

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Island," he said. "Then as we passed close by the LCI another sharp crack made us all hit the deck. When we looked up again smoke was pouring from the LCI's stern." As they tied up alongside the LCI, flames were shooting from the stern and they noticed bodies, badly burned and grotesquely sprawled on the blackened fantail of the ship. "We clambered aboard and saw a horrible sight," Brien continued. "One man had been decapitated by the explosion which had apparently hit their powder magazines. The flames we saw were coming from the magazine itself, where hundreds of rounds of 40 mm ammunition were stored." They worked desperately to get a firehose into the flaming stern while tossing red hot shells and rockets into the water. "Luckily the magazine fire was put out finally," Brien continued, "and we went on our way, dropping the wounded men at the hospital ship."

OBSERVER'S COMMENT

The following is quoted from the report of an observer who accompanied the expedition to the Marshalls. In regard to the transports and their landing craft crews he says: "Their boat crews take a terrific beating. There is no lying at the boom for them or resting on board between scheduled trips, even after the troops have been landed. They get put into the water before daylight, are under way until dark, and are lucky if they get hoisted in then, instead of beaching for the nights to get such sleep as the mosquitoes and the Japanese will let them. They have to be highly skilled at (a) hoisting out, lowering, hoisting in, often at night and in a seaway, (b) handling boats alongside, under any and all conditions, while embarking troops and cargo, and (c) carrying out the highly specialized technique of forming assault waves, beaching, debarking troops, retracting (perhaps under fire) etc."

MOBILE FORCES VERSUS BASES

"Our successful seizure of Majuro, Kwajalein and Eniwetok Atolls and our resulting domination not only of the Marshalls Group but of considerable areas beyond them, is an excellent illustration of strength in mobile forces winning over strength in bases and fixed positions. xxxxxx The weakness of this reliance on bases, as representing strength in themselves, rather than being merely contributory factors, lay in the fact that any base can be neutralized or captured if sufficient force is brought against it, and if it is cut off from supply, support, and reinforcement. In land warfare this has been proven time and again, but in overseas warfare it was more uncertain. It had not yet been demonstrated that with strong enough air forces, based on carriers, plus a superiority in battleships, cruisers and destroyers, aided by one or two hastily advanced landing fields, it would be possible to isolate and dominate a wide area where the enemy's strength lay in the number of his bases rather than in the size and effectiveness of his mobile forces. It still remained for us to show that troops, trained for amphibious warfare and made mobile by air and surface support and transportation, could then assault and occupy key points within this area, from which the remainder could then be throttled into impotence or more readily captured."

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ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC FLEET, WELCOMED ABOARD THE COAST GUARD-MANNED TRANSPORT USS Leonard Wood BY ITS COMMANDING OFFICER, CAPTAIN (NOW ADMIRAL) MERLIN O'NEILL

ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ

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THE UNPREDICTABILITY OF THE JAPANESE MIND

Admiral Merlin O'Neill, now Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard, who was then serving as commanding officer (with rank of Captain) of the Coast Guard manned transport USS Leonard Wood in the Pacific tells of one interesting incident in regard to the occupation of three islands at the Eniwetok Atoll. A Task Force under the command of Admiral Harry F. Hill, USN, entered the lagoon at Eniwetok on February 17, 1944, through the eastern passage known as "Deep Entrance." The Task Force was preceded by minesweepers, destroyers, and battleships, followed by transports. As the Task Force entered the passage, a white flag apparently hoisted by natives was observed flying from Japtan Island at the north side of the entrance. This entrance is comparatively narrow, a circumstance which caused the ships to pass within easy range of the island at the southern entrance known as Parry Island. Information available at the time was insufficient to prove that Parry Island was occupied in any force by Japanese. It was strongly suspected that there were Japanese on that island and all Allied ships had orders to be at general quarters to return any fire. The entire Task Force passed close by the island and entered the lagoon without sighting any Japanese or being fired on. The island of Engebi at the north of the Atoll was captured that day. Certain units of the Task Force proceeded to the southern island of Eniwetok which was captured the following day. After preliminary bombing, shelling by surface ships, and straffing by American planes, there was an assault on Parry Island on February 22nd. A surprising amount of enemy resistance was encountered on this island and at that time it was estimated that approximately 800 Japanese occupied the island. Enemy resistance was broken the afternoon of the 22nd and the island was formally occupied by Americans the evening of that day. It appeared strange and somewhat puzzling as to why the Japanese did not fire on the transports as they passed within easy range (the entrance passage was about a mile wide) of rifles and mortars on their entrance into the lagoon on February 17th. This incident and the attendant circumstances constitute a remarkable example of the unpredictability of the Japanese mind. The fact that they did not fire on such an inviting enemy target which passed within ideal range for effective fire is also an interesting commentary on the order and discipline of these 800 Japanese troops.

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MARSHALL & GILBERT ISLANDS

MARSHALL & GILBERT ISLANDS

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OCCUPATION OF THE LESSER MARSHALLS

Shortly after the occupation of the Marshall Islands in February, 1944, there were at the beginning of March some 28 islands and atolls in the Marshalls Group which had not been reconnoitered or occupied by our forces. Starting with the expedition to WOTHO, UJAE and LAE on 7 March, there began a systematic and methodical occupation of the Lesser Marshalls, This campaign continued through 23 April, 1944, until only four atolls, WOTJE, MALOELAP, MILLS and JALUIT remained in the enemy's possession. The position of the enemy on these islands, however, had been rendered quite hopeless by repeated bombings and bombardments, plus sea and air blockade, which were gradually destroying the defenders and their facilities and installations. The force which operated against the remaining Lesser Marshall Atolls were elements of the 22nd Marines (until relieved by the Army in April), a Civil Affairs Unit, and an Epidemiology Unit. They were transported in landing craft (LCT, LCI(L), or LST) and screened by AM's and DD's. Native scouts were also present. Upon approach to the objective, the scouts would be dispatched to the shore to contact the local natives, explain the purpose of the operation, and ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, if any. After cessation of enemy hostilities (frequently through suicide) the civil affairs units would read and post the prescribed proclamation and raise the U.S. Flag. These atolls were then revisited twice monthly for periodic inspection, administration and medical survey, usually by one platoon of infantry, a civil affairs party, and a medical party in an LCI(L), The first such inspection commenced in mid-April, 1944. In a period of about 12 weeks the U.S. captured some 90% of the enemy possessions in the Marshalls and completely dominated the 330,000 square miles of sea and air in their environs. The islands and atolls occupied in these operations included LIB Island, AILINGLAPALAP, NAMU, EBON, and NAMORIK Atolls and KILI Island, BIKINI, RONGELAP, AILlNGINAE and RONGERIK Atolls (the latter two uninhabited); AILUK and MEJIT Atolls and JEMO Island (uninhabited); LIKIEP and UTIRIK Atolls; BIKA and TAKA Atolls (uninhabited); also ERIKUB and AUR Atolls and UJELANG Atoll (uninhabited). Total American casualties in all these operations were 17 and Japanese 118, while 16 enemy prisoners of war were taken. There is no record of downed American fliers found in these islands.

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